diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 38621-h.zip | bin | 0 -> 107467 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 38621-h/38621-h.htm | 6948 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 38621.txt | 5602 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 38621.zip | bin | 0 -> 103777 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 |
7 files changed, 12566 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/38621-h.zip b/38621-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..acf7933 --- /dev/null +++ b/38621-h.zip diff --git a/38621-h/38621-h.htm b/38621-h/38621-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..27513ba --- /dev/null +++ b/38621-h/38621-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,6948 @@ +<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/strict.dtd"> +<html> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"> +<title>Doctrine of the Will</title> + +<style type="text/css"> + + body { + font-family:'Bookman Old Style', 'Book Antiqua', 'Garamond'; + text-align:justify; + margin-left:2em; + margin-right:2em + } + + p { + text-indent:1.5em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0 + } + + p.pnn { + text-indent:0; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0 + } + + p.pns { + text-indent:1.5em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em + } + + p.ps { + text-indent:0; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em + } + + p.p0s { + margin-left:1em; + text-indent:-1em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em; + font-size:83% + } + + p.p1 { + margin-left:4em; + text-indent:-1em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0; + font-size:92% + } + + p.p1s { + margin-left:4em; + text-indent:-1em; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em; + font-size:92% + } + + p.p2 { + margin-left:8em; + text-indent:-1em; + font-size:83%; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:0; + font-size:92% + } + + p.p2s { + margin-left:8em; + text-indent:-1em; + font-size:83%; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em; + font-size:92% + } + + p.pr { + margin-left:25em; + text-align:left; + font-size:83%; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:3em + } + + p.pt1 { + text-align:center; + margin-top:0; + margin-bottom:1em; + font-size:92%; + font-weight:normal + } + + sup { + color:blue; + font-size:80%; + font-weight:bold + } + + .sc { + font-variant:small-caps + } + + h1 { + text-align:center; + margin-top:1.5em; + margin-bottom:1em; + font-size:108%; + font-weight:normal; + letter-spacing:0.2em + } + + h2 { + text-align:center; + margin-top:1em; + margin-bottom:1em; + font-size:83%; + font-weight:normal + } + + + blockquote.vs pre { + display: table; + font-family: inherit; + margin: 0 auto; + } + + + </style> +</head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Doctrine of the Will, by Asa Mahan + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Doctrine of the Will + +Author: Asa Mahan + +Release Date: January 20, 2012 [EBook #38621] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DOCTRINE OF THE WILL *** + + + + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p class="pnn"> +<a href="#Contents">Contents</a> +</p> +<p class="pnn"> +<a href="#Preface">Dedicatory Preface</a> +</p> +<p class="pnn"> +<a href="#Footnotes">Footnotes</a> +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:158%; letter-spacing:0.2em; margin-top:3em; margin-bottom:1.3em"> +DOCTRINE +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:92%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:2.2em"> +OF +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:233%; letter-spacing:0.4em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:1.2em"> +THE WILL. +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.2em"> +BY REV. A. MAHAN, +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:75%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:2.5em"> +PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE. +</p> + +<div style="font-size:88%"> +<blockquote class="vs"> + <pre> +“Not man alone, all rationals Heaven arms +With an illustrious, but tremendous power, +To counteract its own most gracious ends; +And this, of strict necessity, not choice; +That power denied, men, angels, were no more +But passive engines void of praise or blame. +A nature rational implies the power + +Of being blest, or wretched, as we please. +Man falls by man, if finally he falls; +And fall he must, who learns from death alone, +The dreadful secret—That he lives for ever.” + <span class="sc">Young</span>. + </pre> +</blockquote></div> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.1em"> +NEW YORK: +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.1em"> +MARK H. NEWMAN, 199 BROADWAY. +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.3em"> +OBERLIN; OHIO: R. E. GILLET. +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:10em"> +1845. +</p> + + + + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.2em"> +Entered according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1844, by +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:100%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.2em"> +ASA MAHAN, +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:13em"> +In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York. +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.2em"> +S. W. BENEDICT & CO., STER. & PRINT., +</p> + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:83%; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:16em"> +16 Spruce street. +</p> + + + + +<p style="text-align:center; font-size:117%; letter-spacing:0.2em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:0.3em"> +<a name="Contents" id="Contents">CONTENTS.</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#I">CHAPTER I</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#I"><span class="sc">Introductory Observations</span></a>.—<a href="#I">Importance of the Subject</a>—<a href="#Ia">True and +false Methods of Inquiry +</a>—<a href="#Ib">Common Fault</a>—<a href="#Ic">Proper Method of Reasoning +from Revelation to the System of Mental Philosophy therein +pre-supposed +</a>—<a href="#Id">Errors of Method</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#II">CHAPTER II</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#II"><span class="sc">Classification of the Mental Faculties</span></a>.—<a href="#IIa">Classification verified</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#III">CHAPTER III</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#III"><span class="sc">Liberty and Necessity</span></a>.—<a href="#IIIa">Terms defined</a>—<a href="#IIIb">Characteristics of the +above Definitions</a>—<a href="#IIIc">Motive defined</a>—<a href="#IIId">Liberty as opposed to Necessity, +the Characteristic of the Will</a>—<a href="#IIIe">Objections to Doctrine of +Necessity</a>—<a href="#IIIf">Doctrine of Liberty, direct Argument</a>—<a href="#IIIg">Objection to an Appeal +to Consciousness</a>—<a href="#IIIh">Doctrine of Liberty argued from the existence of the +idea of Liberty in all Minds</a>—<a href="#IIIi">The Doctrine of Liberty, the Doctrine of +the Bible</a>—<a href="#IIIj">Necessity as held by Necessitarians</a>—<a href="#IIIk">The term Certainty, as +used by them</a>—<a href="#IIIl">Doctrine of Ability, according to the Necessitarian +Scheme</a>—<a href="#IIIm">Sinful inclinations</a>—<a href="#IIIn">Necessitarian Doctrine of Liberty</a>—<a href="#IIIo">Ground +which Necessitarians are bound to take in respect to the Doctrine of +Ability</a>—<a href="#IIIp">Doctrine of Necessity, as regarded by Necessitarians of +different Schools</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#IV">CHAPTER IV</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#IV"><span class="sc">Extent and Limits of the Liberty of the Will</span></a>.—<a href="#IVa">Strongest +Motive—Reasoning in a Circle</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#V">CHAPTER V</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#V"><span class="sc">Greatest apparent Good</span></a>.—<a href="#Va">Phrase defined</a>—<a href="#Vb">Its meaning according to +Edwards</a>—<a href="#Vc">The Will not always as the Dictates of the Intelligence</a>—<a href="#Vd">Not +always as the strongest desire</a>—<a href="#Ve">Nor as the Intelligence and Sensibility +combined</a>—<a href="#Vf">Necessitarian Argument</a>—<a href="#Vg">Motives cause acts of the Will, in +what sense</a>—<a href="#Vh">Particular Volitions, how accounted for</a>—<a href="#V9">Facts wrongly +accounted for</a>—<a href="#Vj">Choosing between Objects known to be equal, how treated +by Necessitarians</a>—<a href="#Vk">Palpable Mistake</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#VI">CHAPTER VI</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#VI"><span class="sc">Doctrine of Liberty and the Divine Prescience</span></a>.—<a href="#VIa">Dangers to be +avoided</a>—<a href="#VIb">Mistake respecting Divine Prescience</a>—<a href="#VIc">Inconsistency of +Necessitarians</a>—<a href="#VId">Necessitarian Objection</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#VII">CHAPTER VII</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#VII"><span class="sc">Doctrine of Liberty and the Divine Purposes and Agency</span></a>.—<a href="#VIIa">God’s Purposes +consistent with the Liberty of Creatures</a>—<a href="#VIIb">Senses in which God purposed +moral Good and Evil</a>—<a href="#VIIc">Death of the Incorrigible preordained, but not +willed</a>—<a href="#VIId">God not responsible for their Death</a>—<a href="#VIIe">Sin a Mystery</a>—<a href="#VIIf">Conclusion +from the above</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#VIII">CHAPTER VIII</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#VIII"><span class="sc">Obligation predicable only of the Will</span></a>.—<a href="#VIIIa">Men not responsible for the Sin +of their progenitors</a>—<a href="#VIIIb">Constitutional Ill-desert</a>—<a href="#VIIIc">Present Impossibilities +not required</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#IX">CHAPTER IX</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#IX"><span class="sc">Standard of Moral Character</span></a>.—<a href="#IXa">Sincerity, and not Intensity, the true +Standard</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#X">CHAPTER X</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#X"><span class="sc">Moral acts never of a mixed Character</span></a>.—<a href="#Xa">Acts of Will resulting from a +variety of Motives</a>—<a href="#Xb">Loving with a greater Intensity at one time than +another</a>—<a href="#Xc">Momentary Revolutions of Character</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#XI">CHAPTER XI</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#XI"><span class="sc">Relations of the Will to the Intelligence and Sensibility, in states +morally right, or wrong</span></a>.—<a href="#XIa">Those who are and are not virtuous, how +distinguished</a>—<a href="#XIb">Selfishness and Benevolence</a>—<a href="#XIc">Common Mistake</a>—<a href="#XId">Defective +forms of Virtue</a>—<a href="#XIe">Test of Conformity to Moral Principle</a>—<a href="#XIf">Common +Mistake</a>—<a href="#XIg">Love as required by the Moral Law</a>—<a href="#XIh">Identity of Character among +all Beings morally Virtuous</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#XII">CHAPTER XII</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#XII"><span class="sc">Element of the Will in complex Phenomena</span></a>.—<a href="#XIIa">Natural +Propensities—Sensation, Emotion, Desire, and Wish defined</a>—<a href="#XIIb">Anger, +Pride, Ambition, &c</a>.—<a href="#XIIc">Religious Affections</a>—<a href="#XIId">Repentance</a>—<a href="#XIIe">Love</a>—<a href="#XIIf">Faith</a>— +<a href="#XIIg">Convictions, Feelings and external Actions, why required or prohibited</a>— +<a href="#XIIh">Our Responsibility in respect to such Phenomena</a>—<a href="#XII9">Feelings how controlled +by the Will</a>—<a href="#XIIj">Relation of Faith to other Exercises morally right</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#XIII">CHAPTER XIII</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#XIII"><span class="sc">Influence of the Will in Intellectual Judgments</span></a>.—<a href="#XIIIa">Men often voluntary in +their Opinions</a>—<a href="#XIIIb">Error not from the Intelligence, but Will</a>—<a href="#XIIIc">Primary +Faculties cannot err</a>—<a href="#XIIId">So of the secondary Faculties</a>—<a href="#XIIIe">Assumptions</a>— +<a href="#XIIIf">Pre-judgments</a>—<a href="#XIIIg">Intellect not deceived in Pre-judgments</a>—<a href="#XIIIh">Mind, how +influenced by them</a>—<a href="#XIIIi">Influences which induce false Assumptions</a>—<a href="#XIIIj">Cases +in which we are apparently, though not really, misled by the Intelligence</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#XIV">CHAPTER XIV</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#XIV"><span class="sc">Liberty and Servitude</span></a>.—<a href="#XIVa">Liberty as opposed to moral Servitude</a>—<a href="#XIVb">Mistake +of German Metaphysicians</a>—<a href="#XIVc">Moral Servitude of the race</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#XV">CHAPTER XV</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#XV"><span class="sc">Liberty and Dependence</span></a>.—<a href="#XVa">Common Impression</a>—<a href="#XVb">Spirit of +Dependence</a>—<a href="#XVc">Doctrine of Necessity tends not to induce this +Spirit</a>—<a href="#XVd">Doctrine of Liberty does</a>—<a href="#XVe">God controls all Influences under +which Creatures act</a>—<a href="#XVf">Dependence on account of moral Servitude</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#XVI">CHAPTER XVI</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#XVI"><span class="sc">Formation of Character</span></a>.—<a href="#XVI">Commonly how accounted for</a>—<a href="#XVIa">The voluntary +element to be taken into the account</a>—<a href="#XVIb">Example in Illustration</a>— +<a href="#XVIc">Diversities of Character</a> +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +<a href="#XVII">CHAPTER XVII</a>. +</p> + +<p class="p0s"> +<a href="#XVII"><span class="sc">Concluding Reflections</span></a>.—<a href="#XVII">Objection, The Will has its Laws</a>—<a href="#XVIIa">Objection, +God dethroned from his Supremacy if the Doctrine of Liberty is +true</a>—<a href="#XVIIb">Great and good Men have held the doctrine of Necessity</a>—<a href="#XVIIc">Last +Resort</a>—<a href="#XVIId">Willing and aiming to perform impossibilities</a>—<a href="#XVIIe">Thought at +Parting</a> +</p> + + + + +<h1 style="margin-top:5em"> +<a name="Preface" id="Preface">DEDICATORY PREFACE.</a> +</h1> + +<div style="font-size:92%"> +<p class="ps"> +To one whose aim is, to “serve his generation according to the Will of +God,” but two reasons would seem to justify an individual in claiming +the attention of the public in the capacity of an author—the existence +in the public mind of a want which needs to be met, and the full belief, +that the Work which he has produced is adapted to meet that want. Under +the influence of these two considerations, the following Treatise is +presented to the public. Whether the author has judged rightly or not, +it is not for him to decide. The decision of that question is left with +the public, to whom the Work is now presented. It is doubtful, whether +any work, prepared with much thought and pains-taking, was ever +published with the conviction, on the part of the author, that it was +unworthy of public regard. The community, however, may differ from him +entirely on the subject; and, as a consequence, a work which he regards +as so imperiously demanded by the public interest, falls dead from the +press. Many an author, thus disappointed, has had occasion to be +reminded of the admonition, “Ye have need of patience.” Whether the +following Treatise shall succeed in gaining the public ear, or not, one +consolation will remain with the writer, the publication of the work has +satisfied his sense of duty. To his respected Associates in the +Institution over which he presides, Associates with whose approbation +and counsel the work was prepared, the Author would take this occasion +publicly to express his grateful acknowledgments for the many important +suggestions which he received from them, during the progress of its +preparation. +</p> + +<p> +Having said thus much, he would simply add, that, <span class="sc">To the Lovers of +Truth, the Work is now respectfully dedicated, with the kind regards of</span> +</p> +</div> + <p style="text-align:left; font-size:100%; margin-left:20em; margin-top:0; margin-bottom:10em"> +THE AUTHOR. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="I" id="I">CHAPTER I.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. +</p> + +<h2> +IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT. +</h2> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">The</span> doctrine of the Will is a cardinal doctrine of theology, as well as +of mental philosophy. This doctrine, to say the least, is one of the +great central points, from which the various different and conflicting +systems of theological, mental, and moral science, take their departure. +To determine a man’s sentiments in respect to the Will, is to determine +his position, in most important respects, as a theologian, and mental +and moral philosopher. If we turn our thoughts inward, for the purpose +of knowing what we are, what we ought to do, and to be, and what we +shall become, as the result of being and doing what we ought or ought +not, this doctrine presents itself at once, as one of the great pivots +on which the resolution of all these questions turns. +</p> + +<p> +If, on the other hand, we turn our thoughts from ourselves, to a study +of the character of God, and of the nature and character of the +government which He exercises over rational beings, all our +apprehensions here, all our notions in respect to the nature and desert +of sin and holiness, will, in many fundamental particulars, be +determined by our notions in respect to the Will. In other words, our +apprehensions of the nature and character of the Divine government, must +be determined, in most important respects, by our conceptions of the +nature and powers of the subjects of that government. I have no wish to +conceal from the reader the true bearing of our present inquiries. I +wish him distinctly to understand, that in fixing his notions in respect +to the doctrine of the Will, he is determining a point of observation +from which, and a medium through which, he shall contemplate his own +character and deserts as a moral agent, and the nature and character of +that Divine government, under which he must ever “live, and move, and +have his being.” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Ia" id="Ia">TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF INQUIRY.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Such being the bearing of our present inquiries, an important question +arises, to wit: What should be the influence of such considerations upon +our investigations in this department of mental science It should not +surely induce us, as appears to be true in the case of many divines and +philosophers even, first to form our system of theology, and then, in +the light of that, to determine our theory of the Will. The true science +of the Will, as well as that of all ether departments of mental +philosophy, “does not come by observation,” but by internal reflection. +Because our doctrine of the Will, whether true or false, will have a +controlling influence in determining the character of our theology, and +the meaning which we shall attach to large portions of the Bible, that +doctrine does not, for that reason, lose its exclusively psychological +character. Every legitimate question pertaining to it, still remains +purely and exclusively a psychological question. The mind has but one +eye by which it can see itself, and that is the eye of consciousness. +This, then, is the organ of vision to be exclusively employed in all our +inquiries in every department of mental science, and in none more +exclusively than in that of the Will. We know very well, for example, +that the science of optics has a fundamental bearing upon that of +Astronomy. What if a philosopher, for that reason, should form his +theory of optics by looking at the stars? This would be perfectly +analogous to the conduct of a divine or philosopher who should determine +his theory of the Will, not by psychological reflection, but by a system +of theology formed without such reflection. Suppose again, that the +science of Geometry had the same influence in theology, that that of the +Will now has. This fact would not change at all the nature of that +science, nor the mode proper in conducting our investigations in respect +to it. It would still remain a science of demonstration, with all its +principles and rules of investigation unchanged. So with the doctrine of +the Will. Whatever its bearings upon other sciences may be, it still +remains no less exclusively a psychological science. It has its own +principles and laws of investigation, principles and laws as independent +of systems of theology, as the principles and laws of the science of +optics are of those of Astronomy. In pursuing our investigations in all +other departments of mental science, we, for the time being, cease to be +theologians. We become mental philosophers. Why should the study of the +Will be an exception? +</p> + +<p> +The question now returns—what should be the bearing of the fact, that +our theory of the Will, whether right or wrong, will have an important +influence in determining our system of theology? This surely should be +its influence. It should induce in us great care and caution in our +investigations in this department of mental science. We are laying the +foundation of the most important edifice of which it ever entered into +the heart of man to conceive—an edifice, all the parts, dimensions, and +proportions of which, we are required most sedulously to conform to the +“pattern shown us in the mount.” Under such circumstances, who should +not be admonished, that he should “dig deep, and lay his foundation upon +a rock?” I will therefore, in view of what has been said above, +earnestly bespeak four things of the reader of the following treatise. +</p> + +<p> +1. That he read it as an honest, earnest inquirer after truth. +</p> + +<p> +2. That he give that degree of attention to the work, that is requisite +to an <i>understanding</i> of it. +</p> + +<p> +3. That when he dissents from any of its fundamental principles, he will +distinctly state to his own mind the reason and ground of that dissent, +and carefully investigate its validity. If these principles are wrong, +such an investigation will render the truth more conspicuous to the +mind, confirm the mind in the truth, and furnish it with means to +overturn the opposite error. +</p> + +<p> +4. That he pursue his investigations with <i>implicit confidence in the +distinct affirmations of his own consciousness in respect to this +subject</i>. Such a suggestion would appear truly singular, if made in +respect to any other department of mental science but that of the Will. +Here it is imperiously called for so long have philosophers and divines +been accustomed to look without, to determine the characteristics of +phenomena which appear exclusively within, and which are revealed to the +eye of consciousness only. Having been so long under the influence of +this pernicious habit, it will require somewhat of an effort for the +mind to turn its organ of self-vision in upon itself, for the purpose of +correctly reporting to itself, what is really passing in that inner +sanctuary. Especially will it require an effort to do this, with a fixed +determination to abandon all theories formed from external observation, +and to follow implicitly the results of observations made internally. +This method we must adopt, however, or there is at once an end of all +real science, not only in respect to the Will, but to all other +departments of the mind. Suppose an individual to commence a treatise on +<i>colors</i>, for example, with a denial of the validity of all affirmations +of the Intelligence through the eye, in respect to the phenomena about +which he is to treat. What would be thought of such a treatise? The +moment we deny the validity of the affirmations of any of our faculties, +in respect to the appropriate objects of those faculties, all reasoning +about those objects becomes the height of absurdity. So in respect to +the mind. If we doubt or deny the validity of the affirmations of +consciousness in respect to the nature and characteristics of all mental +operations, mental philosophy becomes impossible, and all reasoning in +respect to the mind perfectly absurd. Implicit confidence in the +distinct affirmations of consciousness, is a fundamental law of all +correct philosophizing in every department of mental science. Permit me +most earnestly to bespeak this confidence, as we pursue our +investigations in respect to the Will. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Ib" id="Ib">COMMON FAULT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +It may be important here to notice a common fault in the method +frequently adopted by philosophers in their investigations in this +department of mental science. In the most celebrated treatise that has +ever appeared upon this subject, the writer does not recollect to have +met with a single appeal to <i>consciousness</i>, the only adequate witness +in the case. The whole treatise, almost, consists of a series of +syllogisms, linked together with apparent perfectness, syllogisms +pertaining to an abstract something called Will. Throughout the whole, +the facts of consciousness are never appealed to. In fact, in instances +not a few, among writers of the same school, the right to make such an +appeal, on the ground of the total inadequacy of consciousness to give +testimony in the case, has been formally denied. Would it be at all +strange, if it should turn out that all the fundamental results of +investigations conducted after such a method, should be wholly +inapplicable to <i>the</i> Will, the phenomena of which lie under the eye of +consciousness, or to stand in plain contradiction to the phenomena thus +affirmed? What, from the method adopted, we see is very likely to take +place, we find, from experience, to be actually true of the treatise +above referred to. This is noticed by the distinguished author of The +Natural History of Enthusiasm, in an Essay introductory to Edwards on +the Will. “Even the reader,” he says, “who is scarcely at all familiar +with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be +perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, +that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although +the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in +strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the +form of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their +apparently necessary connection with the premises.” What should we +expect from a treatise on mental science, from which the affirmations of +consciousness should be formally excluded, as grounds of any important +conclusions? Just what we find to be true, in fact, of the above named +treatise on the Will; to wit: all its fundamental conclusions positively +contradicted by such affirmations. What if the decisions of our courts +of justice were based upon data from which the testimony of all material +witnesses has been formally excluded? Who would look to such decisions +as the exponents of truth and justice? Yet all the elements in those +decisions may be the necessary logical consequents of the data actually +assumed. Such decisions may be all wrong, however, from the fact that +the data which ought to be assumed in the case, were excluded. The same +will, almost of necessity, be true of all treatises, in every department +of mental science, which are not based upon the facts of consciousness. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Ic" id="Ic">PROPER METHOD OF REASONING FROM REVELATION TO THE SYSTEM OF MENTAL +PHILOSOPHY THEREIN PRE-SUPPOSED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +By what has been said, the reader will not understand me as denying the +propriety of comparing our conclusions in mental science with the Bible. +Though no system of mental philosophy is directly revealed in the Bible, +some one system is therein pre-supposed, and assuming, as we do, that +the Scriptures are a revelation from God, we must suppose that the +system of mental science assumed in the sacred writings, is the true +system. If we could find the system pre-supposed in the Bible, we should +have an infallible standard by which to test the validity of any +conclusions to which we have arrived, as the results of psychological +investigation. It is therefore a very legitimate, interesting, and +profitable inquiry—what is the system of mental science assumed as true +in the Bible? We may very properly turn our attention to the solution of +such a question. In doing this, however, two things should be kept +distinctly in mind. +</p> + +<p> +1. In such inquiries, we leave the domain of mental philosophy entirely, +and enter that of theology. In the latter we are to be guided by +principles entirely distinct from those demanded in the former. +</p> + +<p> +2. In reasoning from the Bible to the system of mental philosophy +pre-supposed in the Scriptures, we are in danger of assuming wrong data +as the basis of our conclusions that is, we are in danger of drawing our +inferences from those truths of Scripture which have no legitimate +bearing upon the subject, and of overlooking those which do have such a +bearing. While there are truths of inspiration from which we may +properly reason to the theory of the Will, pre-supposed in the Bible, +there are other truths from which we cannot legitimately thus reason. +Now suppose that we have drawn our conclusions from truths of +inspiration which have no legitimate bearing upon the subject, truths +which, if we do reason from them in the case, will lead us to wrong +conclusions; suppose that in the light of such conclusions we have +explained the facts of consciousness, assuming that such must be their +true character, else we deny the Bible. Shall we not then have almost +inextricably lost ourselves in the labyrinth of error? +</p> + +<p> +The following principles may be laid down as universally binding, if we +would reason correctly, as philosophers and theologians, on the subject +under consideration. +</p> + +<p> +1. In the domain of philosophy, we must confine ourselves strictly and +exclusively to the laws of psychological investigation, without +reference to any system of theology. +</p> + +<p> +2. In the domain of theology, when we would reason from the truths of +inspiration to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible, we +should be exceedingly careful to reason from those truths only which +have a direct and decisive bearing upon the subject, and not from those +which have no such bearing. +</p> + +<p> +3. We should carefully compare the conclusions to which we have arrived +in each of these domains, assuming that if they do not harmonize, we +have erred either as philosophers or theologians. +</p> + +<p> +4. In case of disagreement, we should renew our independent +investigations in each domain, for the purpose of detecting the error +into which we have fallen. +</p> + +<p> +In conducting an investigation upon such principles, we shall, with +almost absolute certainty, find ourselves in each domain, following rays +of light, which will converge together in the true theory of the Will. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Id" id="Id">ERRORS OF METHOD.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Two errors into which philosophers and divines of a certain class have +fallen in their method of treating the department of our subject now +under consideration, here demand a passing notice. +</p> + +<p> +1. The two methods above referred to, the psychological and theological, +which should at all times be kept entirely distinct and separate, have +unhappily been mingled together. Thus the subject has failed to receive +a proper investigation in the domain, either of theology or of +philosophy. +</p> + +<p> +2. In reasoning from the Scriptures to the theory of the Will +pre-supposed in the same, <i>the wrong truth</i> has been adduced as the +basis of such reasoning, to wit: <i>the fact of the Divine foreknowledge</i>. +As all events yet future are foreknown to God, they are in themselves, +it is said, alike certain. This certainty necessitates the adoption of a +particular theory of the Will. Now before we can draw any such +conclusion from the truth before us, the following things pertaining to +it we need to know with absolute certainty, things which God has not +revealed, and which we never can know, until He has revealed them, to +wit: the <i>mode</i>, the <i>nature</i>, and the <i>degree</i> of the Divine +foreknowledge. Suppose that God should impart to us apprehensions +perfectly full and distinct, of the mode, nature and degree of His +foreknowledge of human conduct. How do we know but that we should then +see with the most perfect clearness, that this foreknowledge is just as +consistent with the theory of the Will, denied by the philosophers and +divines under consideration, as with that which they suppose necessarily +to result from the Divine foreknowledge? This, then, is not the truth +from which we should reason to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in +the Bible. +</p> + +<p> +There are truths of inspiration, however, which appear to me to have a +direct and decisive bearing upon this subject, and upon which we may +therefore safely base our conclusions. In the Scriptures, man is +addressed as a moral agent, the subject of commands and prohibitions, of +obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and +punishment. Now when we have determined the powers which an agent must +possess, to render him a proper subject of command and prohibition, of +obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and +punishment, we have determined the philosophy of the Will, really +pre-supposed in the Scriptures. Beneath these truths, therefore, and not +beneath that of the divine foreknowledge, that philosophy is to be +sought for. This I argue— +</p> + +<p> +1. Because the former has a <i>direct</i>, while the latter has only an +<i>indirect</i> bearing upon the subject. +</p> + +<p> +2. Of the former our ideas are perfectly clear and distinct, while of +the mode, the degree, and the nature of the Divine foreknowledge we are +profoundly ignorant. To all eternity, our ideas of the nature of +commands and prohibitions, of obligations, of merit and demerit, and of +reward and punishment grounded on moral desert, can never be more clear +and distinct than they now are. From such truths, then, and not from +those that we do not understand, and which at the utmost have only an +indirect bearing upon the subject, we ought to reason, if we reason at +all, to the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Scriptures. The +reader is now put in possession of the <i>method</i> that will be pursued in +the following treatise, and is consequently prepared to enter upon the +investigation of the subject before us. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="II" id="II">CHAPTER II.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">Every</span> individual who has reflected with any degree of interest upon the +operations of his own mind, cannot have failed to notice three classes +of mental phenomena, each of which is entirely distinct from either of +the others. These phenomena, which comprehend the entire operations of +the mind, and which may be expressed by the terms <i>thinking</i>, <i>feeling</i>, +and <i>willing</i>, clearly indicate in the mind three faculties equally +distinct from one another. These faculties are denominated the +Intellect, the Sensibility or Sensitivity, and the Will. To the first, +all intellectual operations, such as perceiving, thinking, judging, +knowing, &c., are referred. To the second, we refer all sensitive +states, all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, &c. To the +Will, or the active voluntary faculty, are referred all mental +determinations, such as purposes, intentions, resolutions, choices and +volitions. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIa" id="IIa">CLASSIFICATION VERIFIED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. The classes of phenomena, by which this tri-unity of the mental +powers is indicated, differ from one another, not in <i>degree</i>, but in +<i>kind</i>. Thought, whether clear or obscure, in all degrees, remains +equally distinct, in its nature, from feelings and determinations of +every class. So of feelings. Sensations, emotions, desires, all the +phenomena of the Sensibility, in all degrees and modifications, remain, +in their nature and essential characteristics, equally distinct from +thought on the one hand, and the action of the Will on the other. The +same holds true of the phenomena of the Will. A resolution, for example, +in one degree, is not a thought in another, a sensation, emotion, or +desire and in another a choice, purpose, intention, or volition. In all +degrees and modifications, the phenomena of the Will, in their nature +and essential characteristics, remain equally distinct from the +operations of the Intelligence on the one hand, and of the Sensibility +on the other. +</p> + +<p> +2. This distinction is recognized by universal consciousness. When, for +example, one speaks of <i>thinking</i> of any particular object, then of +<i>desiring</i> it, and subsequently of <i>determining</i> to obtain the object, +for the purpose of gratifying that desire, all mankind most clearly +recognize his meaning in each of the above-named affirmations, and +understand him as speaking of three entirely distinct classes of mental +operations. No person, under such circumstances, ever confounds one of +these states with either of the others. So clearly marked and +distinguished is the three-fold classification of mental phenomena under +consideration, in the spontaneous affirmations of universal +consciousness. +</p> + +<p> +3. In all languages, also, there are distinct <i>terms</i> appropriated to +the expression of these three classes of phenomena, and of the mental +power indicated by the same. In the English language, for example, we +have the terms <i>thinking</i>, <i>feeling</i>, and <i>willing</i>, each of which is +applied to one particular class of these mental phenomena, and never to +either of the others. We have also the terms Intellect, Sensibility, and +Will, appropriated, in a similar manner, to designate the mental powers +indicated by these phenomena. In all other languages, especially among +nations of any considerable advancement in mental culture, we find terms +of precisely similar designation. What do such facts indicate? They +clearly show, that in the development of the universal Intelligence, the +different classes of phenomena under consideration have been distinctly +marked, and distinguished from one another, together with the three-fold +division of the mental powers indicated by the same phenomena. +</p> + +<p> +4. The clearness and particularity with which the universal intelligence +has marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated +by the fact, that there are <i>qualifying terms</i> in common use which are +applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of +the others. It is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously +applied to all classes of mental phenomena. There are terms, however, +which are never applied to but one class. Thus we speak of <i>clear +thoughts</i>, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of +<i>irrepressible feelings and desires</i>, but never of irrepressible +thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of <i>inflexible determinations</i>, +but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect +distinctness, then, must universal consciousness have marked thoughts, +feelings, and determinations of the Will, as phenomena entirely distinct +from one another—phenomena differing not in <i>degree</i>, but in <i>kind</i>, +and as most clearly indicating the three-fold division of the mental +powers under consideration. +</p> + +<p class="pns"> +5. So familiar are mankind with this distinction, so distinctly marked +is it in their minds, that in familiar intercourse, when no particular +theory of the mental powers is in contemplation, they are accustomed to +speak of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, and of their respective +phenomena, as entirely distinct from one another. Take a single example +from Scripture. “What I shall <i>choose</i>, I wot not—having a <i>desire</i> to +depart.” Here the Apostle evidently speaks of <i>desire</i> and <i>choice</i> as +phenomena differing in kind, and not in degree. “If you engage his +heart” [his feelings], says Lord Chesterfield, speaking of a foreign +minister, “you have a fair chance of imposing upon his <i>understanding</i>, +and determining his Will.” “<i>His Will</i>,” says another writer, speaking +of the insane, “is no longer restrained by his <i>Judgment</i>, but driven +madly on by his passions.” +</p> + + <p class="p1"> +“When wit is overruled by <i>Will</i>, +</p> + <p class="p1"> +And Will is led by fond <i>Desire</i>, +</p> + <p class="p1"> +Then <i>Reason</i> may as well be still, +</p> + <p class="p1s"> +As speaking, kindle greater fire.”<sup><a href="#n1" id="f1" title="see footnote" name="f1">[1]</a></sup> +</p> + +<p> +In all the above extracts the tri-unity of the mental powers, as +consisting of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, is distinctly +recognized. Yet the writers had, at the time, no particular theory of +mental philosophy in contemplation. They speak of a distinction of the +mental faculties which all understand and recognize as real, as soon as +suggested to their minds. +</p> + +<p> +The above considerations are abundantly sufficient to verify the +three-fold distinction above made, of mental phenomena and powers. Two +suggestions arise here which demand special attention. +</p> + +<p> +1. To confound either of these distinct powers of the mind with either +of the others, as has been done by several philosophers of eminence, in +respect to the Will and Sensibility, is a capital error in mental +science. If one faculty is confounded with another, the fundamental +characteristics of the former will of course be confounded with the same +characteristics of the latter. Thus the worst forms of error will be +introduced not only into philosophy, but theology, too, as far as the +latter science is influenced by the former. What would be thought of a +treatise on mental science, in which the Will should be confounded with +the Intelligence, and in which <i>thinking</i> and <i>willing</i> would be +consequently represented as phenomena identical in kind? This would be +an error no more capital, no more glaring, no more distinctly +contradicted by fundamental phenomena, than the confounding of the Will +with the Sensibility. +</p> + +<p> +2. We are now prepared to contemplate one of the great errors of Edwards +in his immortal work on the Will—an error which we meet with in the +commencement of that work, and which lays a broad foundation for the +false conclusions subsequently found in it. He has confounded the Will +with the Sensibility. Of course, we should expect to find that he has +subsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena +of the former faculty, with the same characteristics of the latter. +</p> + +<p> +“God has endowed the soul,” he says, “with two faculties: One is that by +which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it +discerns, and views, and judges of things; which is called the +<i>understanding</i>. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not +merely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined <i>to</i> them, or +is disinclined and averse <i>from</i> them; or is the faculty by which the +soul does not behold things as an indifferent, unaffected spectator; but +either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or +rejecting. This faculty, as it has respect to the actions that are +determined by it, is called the Will.” +</p> + +<p> +From his work on the Affections, I cite the following to the same +import: +</p> + +<p> +“The Affections of the soul,” he observes, “are not properly +distinguished from the Will, as though they were two faculties of the +soul. All acts of the Affections of the soul are, in some sense, acts of +the Will, and all acts of the Will are acts of the affections. All +exercises of the Will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the +soul’s appetition or aversion; or which is the same thing, of its love +or hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one +thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more +than another.” “The Affections are only certain modes of the exercise of +the Will.” “The Affections are no other than the more vigorous and +sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul.” +</p> + +<p> +Whether he has or has not subsequently confounded the fundamental +characteristics of the phenomena of the Will with those of the phenomena +of the Sensibility will be seen in the progress of the present treatise. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="III" id="III">CHAPTER III.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">We</span> come now to consider the great and fundamental characteristic of the +Will, that by which it is, in a special sense, distinguished from each +of the other mental faculties, to wit: that of Liberty. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIa" id="IIIa">SEC. I. TERMS DEFINED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Our first inquiry respects the meaning of the term Liberty as +distinguished from that of Necessity. These terms do not differ, as +expressing genus and species; that is, Liberty does not designate a +species of which Necessity expresses the genus. On the other hand, they +differ by way of <i>opposition</i>. All correct definitions of terms thus +related, will possess these two characteristics. 1. They will mutually +exclude each other that is, what is affirmed of one, will, in reality, +be denied of the other. 2. They will be so defined as to be universal in +their application. The terms <i>right</i> and <i>wrong</i>, for example, thus +differ from each other. In the light of all correct definitions of these +terms, it will be seen with perfect distinctness, 1st, that to affirm of +an action that it is right, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is +not wrong; and to affirm that it is wrong, is to affirm that it is not +right; 2d, that all moral actions, actual and conceivable, must be +either right or wrong. So of all other terms thus related. +</p> + +<p> +The meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as distinguished the one +from the other, may be designated by a reference to two relations +perfectly distinct and opposite, which may be supposed to exist between +an <i>antecedent</i> and its <i>consequent</i>. +</p> + +<p> +1. The antecedent being given, one, and only one, consequent can +possibly arise, and that consequent <i>must</i> arise. This relation we +designate by the term Necessity. I place my finger, for example, +constituted as my physical system now is, in the flame of a burning +candle, and hold it there for a given time. The two substances in +contact is the antecedent. The feeling of intense pain which succeeds is +the consequent. Now such is universally believed to be the correlation +between the nature of these substances, that under the circumstances +supposed, but one consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent +must arise; to wit—the feeling of pain referred to. The relation +between such an antecedent and its consequent, therefore, we, in all +instances, designate by the term Necessity. When the relation of +Necessity is pre-supposed, in the presence of a new consequent, we affirm +absolutely that of a new antecedent. +</p> + +<p> +2. The second relation is this. The antecedent being given, either of +two or more consequents is equally possible, and therefore, when one +consequent does arise, we affirm that either of the others might have +arisen in its stead. When this relation is pre-supposed, from the +appearance of a new consequent, we do not necessarily affirm the +presence of a new antecedent. This relation we designate by the term +Liberty. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIb" id="IIIb">CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +On the above definitions I remark: +</p> + +<p> +1. That they mutually exclude each other. To predicate Liberty of any +phenomenon is to affirm that it is not necessary. To predicate Necessity +of it, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not free. +</p> + +<p> +2. They are strictly and absolutely universal in their application. All +antecedents and consequents, whatever the nature of the subjects thus +connected may be, must fall under one or the other of these relations. +As the terms right and wrong, when correctly defined, will express the +nature of all moral actions, actual and conceivable, so the terms +Liberty and Necessity, as above defined, clearly indicate the nature of +the relation between all antecedents and consequents, real and +supposable. Take any antecedent and consequent we please, real or +conceivable, and we know absolutely, that they must sustain to each +other one or the other of these relations. Either in connection with +this antecedent, but this one consequent is possible, and this must +arise, or in connection with the same antecedent, either this, or one or +more different consequents are possible, and consequently equally so: +for possibility has, in reality, no degrees. +</p> + +<p> +3. All the phenomena of the Will, sustaining, as they do, the relation +of <i>consequents</i> to motives considered as antecedents, must fall under +one or the other of these relations. If we say, that the relation +between motives and acts of Will is that of <i>certainty</i>, still this +certainty must arise from a necessary relation between the antecedent +and its consequent, or it must be of such a nature as consists with the +relation of Liberty, in the sense of the term Liberty as above defined. +</p> + +<p> +4. The above definitions have this great advantage in our present +investigations. They at once free the subject from the obscurity and +perplexity in which it is often involved by the definitions of +philosophers. They are accustomed, in many instances, to speak of moral +necessity and physical necessity, as if these are in reality different +kinds of necessity: whereas the terms moral and physical, in such +connections, express the nature of the <i>subjects</i> sustaining to each +other the relations of antecedents and consequents, and not at all that +of the <i>relation</i> existing between them. This is exclusively expressed +by the term Necessity—a term which designates a relation which is +always one and the same, whatever the nature of the subjects thus +related may be. An individual in a treatise on natural science, might, +if he should choose, in speaking of the relations of antecedents and +consequents among solid, fluid, and aeriform substances, use the words, +solid necessity, fluid necessity, and aeriform necessity. He might use +as many qualifying terms as there are different subjects sustaining to +each other the relation under consideration. In all such instances no +error will arise, if these qualifying terms are distinctly understood to +designate, not the nature of the <i>relation</i> of antecedent and consequent +in any given case (as if there were as many different kinds of necessity +as there are qualifying terms used), but to designate the nature of the +<i>subjects</i> sustaining this relation. If, on the other hand, the +impression should be made, that each of these qualifying terms +designates a necessity of a peculiar kind, and if, as a consequence, the +belief should be induced, that there are in reality so many different +kinds of necessity, errors of the gravest character would arise—errors +no more important, however, than actually do arise from the impression +often induced, that moral necessity differs in kind from physical +necessity. +</p> + +<p> +5. I mention another very decisive advantage which the above definitions +have in our present investigations. In the light of the terms Liberty +and Necessity, as above defined, the two great schools in philosophy and +theology are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in +difference between them, without the possibility on the part of either, +of escaping under a fog of definitions about moral necessity, physical +necessity, moral certainty, &c., and then claiming a victory over their +opponents. These terms, as above defined, stand out with perfect +clearness and distinctness to all reflecting minds. Every one must see, +that the phenomena of the Will cannot but fall under the one or the +other of the relations designated by these terms inasmuch as no third +relation differing in <i>kind</i> from both of these, is conceivable. The +question therefore may be fairly put to every individual, without the +possibility of misapprehension or evasion—Do you believe, whenever a +man puts forth an act of Will, that in those circumstances, this one act +only is possible, and that this act cannot but arise? In all prohibited +acts, for example, do you believe that an individual, by the resistless +providence of God, is placed in circumstances in which this one act only +is possible, and this cannot but result, that in these identical +circumstances, another and a different act is required of him, and that +for not putting forth this last act, he is justly held as infinitely +guilty in the sight of God, and of the moral universe? To these +questions every one must give an affirmative or negative answer. If he +gives the former, he holds the doctrine of Necessity, and must take that +doctrine with all its consequences. If he gives the latter, he holds the +doctrine of Liberty in the sense of the term as above defined. He must +hold, that in the identical circumstances in which a given act of Will +is put forth, another and different act might have been put forth; and +that for this reason, in all prohibited acts, a moral agent is held +justly responsible for different and opposite acts. Much is gained to +the cause of truth, when, as in the present instance, the different +schools are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in +difference between them, and that without the possibility of +misapprehension or evasion in respect to the nature of that question. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIc" id="IIIc">MOTIVE DEFINED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Having settled the meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as +designating two distinct and opposite relations, the only relations +conceivable between an antecedent and its consequent, one other term +which may not unfrequently be used in the following treatise, remains to +be defined; to wit—<i>motive</i>—a term which designates that which +sustains to the phenomena of the Will, the relation of antecedent. +Volition, choice, preference, intention, all the phenomena of the Will, +are considered as the consequent. Whatever within the mind itself may be +supposed to influence its determinations, whether called +susceptibilities, biases, or anything else; and all influences acting +upon it as incentives from without, are regarded as the antecedent. I +use the term motive as synonymous with antecedent as above defined. It +designates <i>all the circumstances and influences</i> from within or without +the mind, which operate upon it to produce any given act of Will. +</p> + +<p> +The term antecedent in the case before us, in strictness of speech, has +this difference of meaning from that of motive as above defined: The +former includes all that is designated by the latter, together with the +<i>Will</i> itself. No difficulty or obscurity, however, will result from the +use of these terms as synonymous, in the sense explained. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIId" id="IIId">SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE +WILL.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +We are now prepared to meet the question, To which of the relations +above defined shall we refer the phenomena of the Will? If these +phenomena are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever a +particular antecedent (motive) is given, but one consequent (act of +Will) is possible, and that consequent must arise. It cannot possibly +but take place. If, on the other hand, these phenomena fall under the +relation of Liberty, whenever any particular motive is present, either +of two or more acts of Will is equally possible; and when any particular +consequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other consequents +might have arisen in its stead. +</p> + +<p> +Before proceeding directly to argue the question before us, one +consideration of a general nature demands a passing notice. It is this. +The simple statement of the question, in the light of the above +relations, settles it, and must settle it, in the judgment of all +candid, uncommitted inquirers after the truth. Let any individual +contemplate the action of his voluntary powers in the light of the +relations of Liberty and Necessity as above defined, and he will +spontaneously affirm the fact, that he is a free and not a necessary +agent, and affirm it as absolutely as he affirms his own existence. +Wherever he is, while he retains the consciousness of rational being, +this conviction will and must be to him an omnipresent reality. To +escape it, he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIe" id="IIIe">OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Such is the importance of the subject, however, that a more extended and +particular consideration of it is demanded. In the further prosecution +of the argument upon the subject, we will— +</p> + +<p> +I. In the first place, contemplate the position, that the phenomena of +the Will are subject to the laws of Necessity. In taking this position +we are at once met with the following palpable and insuperable +difficulties. +</p> + +<p> +1. The conviction above referred to—a conviction which remains proof +against all apparent demonstrations to the contrary. We may pile +demonstration upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of Necessity, +still, as the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations of its +own Intelligence, it finds, in the depths of its inner being, a higher +demonstration of the fact, that that doctrine is and must be false—that +man is not the agent which that doctrine affirms him to be. In the +passage already cited, and which I will take occasion here to repeat, +the writer has, with singular correctness, mapped out the unvarying +experience of the readers of Edwards on the Will. “Even the reader,” he +says, “who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if +he follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague +dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into +the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems +perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and +will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against +certain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary +connection with the premises.” What higher evidence can we have that +that treatise gives a false interpretation of the facts of universal +consciousness pertaining to the Will, than is here presented? Any theory +which gives a distinct and true explanation of the facts of +consciousness, will be met by the Intelligence with the response, +“That’s true; I have found it.” Any theory apparently supported by +adequate evidence, but which still gives a false interpretation of such +facts, will induce the internal conflict above described—a conflict +which, as the force of apparent demonstration increases, will, in the +very centre of the Intelligence, “condense itself into the form of a +protest against the conclusions presented, notwithstanding their +apparently necessary connection with the premises.” The falsity of the +doctrine of Necessity is a first truth of the universal Intelligence. +</p> + +<p> +2. If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evident, that in no +instance, real or supposable, have men any power whatever to will or to +act differently from what they do. The connection between the +determinations of the Will, and their consequents, external and +internal, is absolutely necessary. Constituted as I now am, if I will, +for example, a particular motion of my hand or arm, no other movement, +in these circumstances, was possible, and this movement could not but +take place. The same holds true of all consequents, external and +internal, of all acts of Will. Let us now suppose that these acts +themselves are the necessary consequents of the circumstances in which +they originate. In what conceivable sense have men, in the circumstances +in which Providence places them, power either to will or to act +differently from what they do? The doctrine of ability to will or to do +differently from what we do is, in every sense, false, if the doctrine +of Necessity is true. Men, when they transgress the moral law, always +sin, without the possibility of doing right. From this position the +Necessitarian cannot escape. +</p> + +<p> +3. On this theory, God only is responsible for all human volitions +together with their effects. The relation between all antecedents and +their consequents was established by him. If that relation be in all +instances a necessary one, his Will surely is the sole responsible +antecedent of all consequents. +</p> + +<p> +4. The idea of obligation, of merit and demerit, and of the consequent +propriety of reward and punishment, are chimeras. To conceive of a being +deserving praise or blame, for volitions or actions which occurred under +circumstances in which none others were possible, and in which these +could not possibly but happen, is an absolute impossibility. To conceive +him under obligation to have given existence, under such circumstances, +to different consequents, is equally impossible. It is to suppose an +agent under obligation to perform that to which Omnipotence is +inadequate. For Omnipotence cannot perform impossibilities. It cannot +reverse the law of Necessity. Let any individual conceive of creatures +placed by Divine Providence in circumstances in which but one act, or +series of acts of Will, can arise, and these cannot but arise—let him, +then, attempt to conceive of these creatures as under obligation, in +these same circumstances, to give existence to different and opposite +acts, and as deserving of punishment for not doing so. He will find it +as impossible to pass such a judgment as to conceive of the annihilation +of space, or of an event without a cause. To conceive of necessity and +obligation as fundamental elements of the same act, is an absolute +impossibility. The human Intelligence is incapable of affirming such +contradictions. +</p> + +<p> +5. As an additional consideration, to show the absolute incompatibility +of the idea of moral obligation with the doctrine of Necessity, permit +me to direct the attention of the reader to this striking fact. While no +man, holding the doctrine of Liberty as above defined, was ever known to +deny moral obligation, such denial has, without exception, in every age +and nation, been avowedly based upon the assumption of the truth of the +doctrine of Necessity. In every age and nation, in every solitary mind +in which the idea of obligation has been denied, this doctrine has been +the great maelstrom in which this idea has been swallowed up and lost. +How can the Necessitarian account for such facts in consistency with his +theory? +</p> + +<p> +6. The commands of God addressed to men as sinners and requiring them in +all cases of transgression of the moral law, to choose and to act +differently from what they do, are, if this doctrine is true, the +perfection of tyranny. In all such cases men are required— +</p> + +<p> +(1.) To perform absolute impossibilities; to reverse the law of +necessity. +</p> + +<p> +(2.) To do that to which Omnipotence is inadequate. For Omnipotence, as +we have seen, cannot reverse the law of necessity. Not only so, but— +</p> + +<p> +(3.) Men in all such instances are required, as a matter of fact, to +resist and overcome Omnipotence. To require us to reverse the relation +established by Omnipotence, between antecedents and consequents, is +certainly to require us to resist and overcome Omnipotence, and that in +the absence of all power, even to attempt the accomplishment of that +which we are required to accomplish. +</p> + +<p> +7. If this doctrine is true, at the final Judgment the conscience and +intelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the +condemned. Suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed +at that Day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, to +wit, that God himself had placed these beings where but one course of +conduct was possible to them, and that course they could not but pursue, +to wit, the course which they did pursue, and that for having pursued +this course, the only one possible, they are now to be “punished with +everlasting destruction from the presence of God and the glory of his +power,” must not the intelligence of the universe pronounce such a +sentence unjust? All this must be true, or the doctrine of Necessity is +false. Who can believe, that the pillars of God’s eternal government +rest upon such a doctrine? +</p> + +<p> +8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might +with the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the +chemist, as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary +result of the circumstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What +must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal +retribution, probation based on such a principle? +</p> + +<p> +9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential particulars, identical +with <i>Fatalism</i> in its worst form. All that Fatalism ever has +maintained, or now maintains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot +control nor resist, are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but +pursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This +doctrine has never affirmed, that, in the Necessitarian sense, men +cannot “do as they please.” All that it maintains is, that they cannot +but please to do as they do. Thus this doctrine differs not one “jot or +tittle,” from Necessity. No man can show the want of perfect identity +between them. Fatalists and Necessitarians may differ in regard to the +origin of this Necessity. In regard to its nature, the only thing +material, as far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not differ +at all. +</p> + +<p> +10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the Will of <i>man</i>, we +must maintain, that the Will of <i>God</i> is subject to the same law. This +is universally admitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in maintaining +the necessity of all acts of the Divine Will, the following conclusions +force themselves upon us: +</p> + +<p> +(1.) <span class="sc">Motives</span> which necessitate the determinations of the Divine Will, +are the sole originating and efficient causes in existence. God is not +the first cause of anything. +</p> + +<p> +(2.) To motives, which of course exist independently of the Divine Will, +we must ascribe the origin of all created existences. The glory of +originating “all things visible and invisible,” belongs not to Him, but +to motives. +</p> + +<p> +(3.) In all cases in which creatures are required to act differently +from what they do, as in all acts of sin, they are in reality required +not only to resist and overcome the omnipotent determinations of the +Divine Will, but also the <i>motives</i> by which the action of God’s Will is +necessitated. We ask Necessitarians to look these consequences in the +face, and then say, whether they are prepared to deny, or to meet them. +</p> + +<p> +11. Finally, if the doctrine under consideration is true, in all +instances of the transgression of the moral law, men are, in reality, +required to produce an event which, when it does exist, shall exist +without a cause. In circumstances where but one event is possible, and +that cannot but arise, if a different event should arise, it would +undeniably be an event without a cause. To require such an event under +such circumstances, is to require an event without a cause, the most +palpable contradiction conceivable. Now just such a requirement as this +is laid upon men, in all cases of disobedience of the moral law, if the +doctrine of Necessity is true. In all such cases, according to this +doctrine men are placed in circumstances in which but one act is +possible, and that must arise, to wit: the act of disobedience which is +put forth. If, in these circumstances, an act of obedience should be put +forth, it would be an event without a cause, and in opposition also to +the action of a necessary cause. In these identical circumstances, the +act of obedience is required, that is, an act is required of creatures, +which, if it should be put forth, would be an event without a cause. Has +a God of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as +that? How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such +a difficulty? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIf" id="IIIf">DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY—DIRECT ARGUMENT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +II. We will now, as a second general argument, consider the position, +that the Will is subject in its determinations to the relation of +Liberty, in opposition to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, that +as the phenomena of the Will must fall under one or the other of these +relations, and as it has been shown, that they cannot fall under that of +Necessity, but one supposition remains. They must fall under that of +Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. The intrinsic absurdity of supposing +that a being, all of whose actions are necessary, is still accountable +for such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity +for ever. A few additional considerations are deemed requisite, in order +to present the evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will. +</p> + +<p> +1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the doctrine of Liberty, +as above defined, is distinctly apprehended, it is spontaneously +recognized by every mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the +facts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the Will. +This doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations +of the universal Intelligence. This is the highest possible evidence of +the truth of the doctrine. +</p> + +<p> +2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of +conduct might have been different from what it was. I will venture to +affirm, that there is not a person on earth, who has not this conviction +resting upon his mind in respect to his own past life. It is important +to analyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon +our present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that if our +circumstances had been different, we might have acted differently from +what we did. A man, for example, says to himself—“At such a time, and +in such circumstances, I determined upon a particular course of conduct. +I might have determined upon a different and opposite course. Why did I +not?” These affirmations are not based upon the conviction, that, in +different circumstances, we might have done differently. In all such +affirmations we take into account nothing but the particular +circumstances in which our determinations were formed. It is in view of +these circumstances exclusively, that we affirm that our determinations +might have been different from what they were. Let the appeal be made to +any individual whatever, whose mind is not at the time under the +influence of any particular theory of the Will. You say, that at such a +time, and under such circumstances, you determined upon a particular +course, that you might then have resolved upon a different and opposite +course, and that you blame yourself for not having done so. Is not this +your real meaning? “If my circumstances had been different, I might have +resolved upon a different course.” No, he would reply. That is not my +meaning. I was not thinking at all of a change of circumstances, when I +made this affirmation. What I mean is, that in the circumstances in +which I was, I might have done differently from what I did. This is the +reason why I blame myself for not having done so. The same conviction, +to wit: that without any change of circumstances our past course of life +might have been different from what it was, rests upon every mind on +earth in which the remembrance of the past dwells. Now this universal +conviction is totally false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The +doctrine of the Liberty of the Will must be true, or the universal +Intelligence is a perpetual falsehood. +</p> + +<p> +3. In favor of the doctrine of Liberty, I next appeal to the direct, +deliberate, and universal testimony of consciousness. This testimony is +given in three ways. +</p> + +<p> +(1.) In the general conviction above referred to, that without any +change of circumstances, our course of conduct might have been the +opposite of what it was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the +Liberty of the Will, can account for this conviction. +</p> + +<p> +(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind, +consciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these +identical circumstances, either of two or more acts of Will is equally +possible. Every man in such circumstances is as conscious of such power +as he is of his own existence. In confirmation of these affirmations, +let any one make the appeal to his own consciousness, when about to put +forth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious that either of two +or more different determinations is, in the same circumstances, equally +possible, as he is of any mental state whatever. +</p> + +<p> +(3.) In reference to all deliberate determinations of Will in time past, +the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most +positive, that, in the same identical circumstances, determinations +precisely opposite might have been originated. Let any one recall any +such determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined +differently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He +cannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he will be, that he might +have acted [determined] differently. All these affirmations of +consciousness are false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true. +</p> + +<p> +4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the +phenomena of the Will, and those of the other faculties, the Sensibility +for example, is a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a +truth of universal consciousness. A man is taken out of a burning +furnace, with his physical system greatly injured by the fire. As a +consequence, he subsequently experiences much suffering and +inconvenience. For the injury done him by the fire, and for the pain +subsequently experienced, he never blames or reproaches himself. With +self-reproach he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, did I +not come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of +Nebuchadnezzar? Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as +a consequence of that injury? Suppose, now, that his fall into the +furnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of +self-murder. For that determination, and for not having, in the same +circumstances, determined differently, he will ever after reproach +himself, as most guilty in the sight of God and man. How shall we +account for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance, and for +its presence in the latter? If the appeal should be made to the subject, +his answer would be ready. In respect to the injury and pain, in the +circumstances supposed, they could not but be experienced. Such +phenomena, therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. In the +condition in which the determination referred to was formed, a different +and opposite resolution might have been originated. That particular +determination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. How shall we +account for this distinction, which all mankind agree in making, between +the phenomena of the Sensibility on the one hand, and of the Will on the +other? But one supposition accounts for this fact, the universal +consciousness, that the former are necessary, and the latter free that +in the circumstances of their occurrence the former may not, and the +latter may, be different from what they are. +</p> + +<p> +5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the words, obligation, +merit and demerit, &c., are words without meaning. A man is, we will +suppose, by Divine Providence, placed in circumstances in which he +cannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, which is the same +thing, put forth given determinations. When it is said that, in these +identical circumstances, he ought to pursue a different and opposite +course, or to put forth different and opposite determinations, what +conceivable meaning can we attach to the word <i>ought</i>, here? There is +nothing, in the circumstances supposed, which the word, <i>ought</i>, or +obligation, can represent. If we predicate merit or demerit of an +individual thus circumstanced, we use words equally without meaning. +Obligation and moral desert, in such a case, rest upon “airy nothing,” +without a “local habitation or a name.” +</p> + +<p> +On the other hand, if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all +times equally possible to an individual; that when he chooses the one, +he might, in the same identical circumstances, choose the other; +infinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obligation, merit and +demerit, when it is said that an individual thus circumstanced ought to +do the right and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or +punishment, when he does the one, or does not do the other. The ideas of +obligation, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, and probation with +reference to a state of moral retribution, are all chimeras, on any +other supposition than that of the Liberty of the Will. With this +doctrine, they all perfectly harmonize. +</p> + +<p> +6. All moral government, all laws, human and Divine, have their basis in +the doctrine of Liberty; and are the perfection of tyranny, on any other +supposition. To place creatures in circumstances which necessitate a +given course of conduct, and render every other course impossible, and +then to require of them, under the heaviest sanctions, a different and +opposite course—what can be tyranny if this is not? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIg" id="IIIg">OBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +An objection which is brought by Necessitarians, in perpetual bar of an +appeal to consciousness, to determine the fact whether the phenomena of +the Will fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here demands +special attention. Consciousness, it is said, simply affirms, that, in +given circumstances, we do, in fact, put forth certain acts of Will. But +whether we can or cannot, in these circumstances, put forth other and +opposite determinations, it does not and cannot make any affirmation at +all. It does not, therefore, fall within the province of Consciousness +to determine whether the phenomena of the Will are subject to the +relation of Liberty or Necessity; and it is unphilosophical to appeal to +that faculty to decide such a question. This objection, if valid, +renders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject; and +as it constitutes a stronghold of the Necessitarian, it becomes us to +examine it with great care. In reply, I remark, +</p> + +<p> +1. That if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the Will, +it must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties the +Intelligence, for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection to a +test, by applying it to certain intellectual phenomena. We will take, as +an example, the universal and necessary affirmation, that “it is +impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be.” +Every one is conscious, in certain circumstances, of making this and +other kindred affirmations. Now, if the objection under consideration is +valid, all that we should be conscious of is the fact, that, under the +circumstances supposed, we do, in reality, make particular affirmations; +while, in reference to the question, whether, in the same circumstances, +we can or cannot make different and opposite affirmations, we should +have no consciousness at all. Now, I appeal to every man, whether, when +he is conscious of making the affirmation, that it is impossible for the +same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be, he is not equally +conscious of the fact, that it is impossible for him to make the +opposite affirmation whether, when he affirms that three and two make +five, he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that +three and two are six? In other words, when we are conscious of making +certain intellectual affirmations, are we not equally conscious of an +impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations? Every man +is just as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his Intelligence +fall under the relation of Necessity, as he is of making any +affirmations at all. If this is not so, we cannot know but that it is +possible for us to affirm and believe perceived contradictions. All that +we could say is, that, as a matter of fact, we do not do it. But whether +we can or cannot do it, we can never know. Do we not know, however, as +absolutely as we know anything, that we <i>cannot</i> affirm perceived +contradictions? In other words, we do and can know absolutely, that our +Intelligence is subject to the law of Necessity. We do know by +consciousness, with absolute certainty, that the phenomena of the +Intelligence, and I may add, of the Sensibility too, do fall under the +relation of Necessity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty, +whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation +of Liberty? What then becomes of the objection under consideration? +</p> + +<p> +2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the Intellect is under +the law of Necessity, we are equally conscious that Will is under that +of Liberty. We make intellectual affirmations; such, for example, as the +propositions, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another, +There can be no event without a cause, &c., with a consciousness of an +utter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations. We +put forth acts of Will with a consciousness equally distinct and +absolute, of a possibility, in the same circumstances, of putting forth +different and opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit and +affirm the validity of the testimony of consciousness in the former +instance. Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter? +</p> + +<p> +3. The question, whether Consciousness can or cannot give us not only +mental phenomena, but also the fundamental characteristics of such +phenomena, cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory, in respect to +what Consciousness can or cannot affirm. If we wish to know to what a +witness is able to testify, we must not first determine what he can or +cannot say, and then refuse to hear anything from him, except in +conformity to such decisions. We must first give him a full and +attentive hearing, and then judge of his capabilities. So in respect to +Consciousness. If we wish to know what it does or does not, what it can +or cannot affirm, we must let it give its full testimony, untrammelled +by any pre-formed theories. Now, when the appeal is thus made, we find, +that, in the circumstances in which we do originate given +determinations, it affirms distinctly and absolutely, that, in the same +identical circumstances, we might originate different and opposite +determinations. From what Consciousness does affirm, we ought surely to +determine the sphere of its legitimate affirmations. +</p> + +<p> +4. The universal solicitude of Necessitarians to take the question under +consideration from the bar of Consciousness is, in fact, a most decisive +acknowledgment, on their part, that at that tribunal the cause will go +against them. Let us suppose that all men were as conscious that their +Will is subject to the law of Necessity, as they are that their +Intelligence is. Can we conceive that Necessitarians would not be as +solicitous to carry the question directly to the tribunal of +Consciousness, as they now are to take it from that tribunal? When all +men are as conscious that their Will is under the law of Liberty, as +they are that their other faculties are under the relation of Necessity, +no wonder that Necessitarians anticipate the ruin of their cause, when +the question is to be submitted to the bar of Consciousness. No wonder +that they so solemnly protest against an appeal to that tribunal. Let +the reader remember, however, that the moment the validity of the +affirmations of Consciousness is denied, in respect to any question in +mental science, it becomes infinite folly in us to reason at all on the +subject; a folly just as great as it would be for a natural philosopher +to reason about colors, after denying the validity of all affirmations +of the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to reason. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIh" id="IIIh">DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN +ALL MINDS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +III. I will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of +Liberty; an argument, which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but +which differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above +presented. I argue the Liberty of the Will <i>from the existence of the +idea of Liberty in the human mind, in the form in which it is there +found</i>. +</p> + +<p> +If the Will is not free, the idea of Liberty is wholly inapplicable to +any phenomenon in existence whatever. Yet this idea is in the mind. The +action of the Will in conformity to it is just as conceivable as its +action in conformity to the idea of Necessity. It remains with the +Necessitarian to account for the existence of this idea in the human +mind, in consistency with his own theory. Here the following +considerations present themselves demanding special attention. +</p> + +<p> +1. The idea of Liberty, like that of Necessity, is a <i>simple</i>, and not a +<i>complex</i> idea. This all will admit. +</p> + +<p> +2. It could not have come into the mind from observation or reflection +because all phenomena, external and internal, all the objects of +observation and reflection, are, according to the doctrine of Necessity, +not free, but necessary. +</p> + +<p> +3. It could not have originated, as <i>necessary</i> ideas do, as the logical +antecedents of the truths given by observation and reflection. For +example, the idea of space, time, substance, and cause, are given in the +Intelligence, as the logical antecedents of the ideas of body, +succession, phenomena, and events, all of which are truths derived from +observation or reflection. Now the idea of Liberty, if the doctrine of +Necessity is true, cannot have arisen in this way because all the +objects of observation and reflection are, according to this doctrine, +necessary, and therefore their logical antecedents must be. How shall we +account, in consistency with this theory, for the existence of this idea +in the mind? It came not from perception external, nor internal, nor as +the logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus perceived. Now if +we admit the doctrine of Liberty as a truth of universal consciousness, +we can give a philosophical account of the existence of the idea of +Liberty in all minds. If we deny this doctrine, and consequently affirm +that of Necessity, we may safely challenge any theologian or philosopher +to give such an account of the existence of that idea in the mind. For +all ideas, in the mind, do and must come from observation or reflection, +or as the logical antecedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained. We +have here an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Necessity is +true. +</p> + +<p> +4. All <i>simple</i> ideas, with the exception of that of Liberty, have +realities within or around us, corresponding to them. If the doctrine of +Necessity is true, we have one solitary idea of this character, that of +Liberty, to which no reality corresponds. Whence this solitary intruder +in the human mind? +</p> + +<p> +The existence of this idea in the mind is proof demonstrative, that a +reality corresponding to it does and must exist, and as this reality is +found nowhere but in the Will, there it must be found. Almost all +Necessitarians are, in philosophy, the disciples of Locke. With him, +they maintain, that all ideas in the mind come from observation and +reflection. Yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea, that +of Liberty, which never could thus have originated; because, according +to their theory, no objects corresponding do or can exist, either as +realities, or as the objects of observation or reflection. We have again +an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true. +</p> + +<p> +5. The relation of the ideas of Liberty and Necessity to those of +obligation, merit and demerit, &c., next demand our attention. If the +doctrine of Necessity is true, the idea of Liberty is, as we have seen, +a chimera. With it the idea of obligation can have no connection or +alliance; but must rest exclusively upon that of Necessity. Now, how +happens it, that no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever known +to deny that of obligation, or of merit and demerit? How happens it, +that the validity of neither of these ideas has ever, in any age or +nation, been denied, except on the avowed authority of the doctrine of +Necessity? Sceptics of the class who deny moral obligation, are +universally avowed Necessitarians. We may safely challenge the world to +produce a single exception to this statement. We may challenge the world +to produce an individual in ancient or modern times who holds the +doctrine of Liberty, and denies moral obligation, or an individual who +denies moral obligation on any other ground than that of Necessity. Now, +how can this fact be accounted for, that the ideas of obligation, merit +and demerit, &c., universally attach themselves to a chimera, the idea +of Liberty, and stand in such irreconcilable hostility to the only idea +by which, as Necessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed? +</p> + +<p> +6. Finally, If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the phenomena of the +Intelligence, Sensibility, and the Will, are given in Consciousness as +alike necessary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in the +mind, would not be likely to attach itself to either of these classes of +phenomena; and if to either, it would be just as likely to attach itself +to one class as to another. Now, how shall we account for the fact, that +this idea always attaches itself to one of these classes of phenomena, +those of the Will, and never to either of the others? How is it that all +men agree in holding, that, in the circumstances of their occurrence, +the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility cannot but be what +they are, while those of the Will may be otherwise than they are? Why, +if this chimera, the idea of Liberty, attaches itself to either of these +classes, does it not sometimes attach itself to the phenomena of the +Intelligence or Sensibility, as well as to those of the Will? Here, once +again, we have an event without a cause, a distinction without a +difference, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The facts before us +can be accounted for only on the supposition, that the phenomena of the +Intelligence and Sensibility are given in Consciousness as necessary, +while those of the Will are given as free. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIi" id="IIIi">THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE BIBLE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +IV. We will now, in the fourth place, raise the inquiry, an inquiry very +appropriate in its place, and having an important bearing upon our +present investigations, whether the doctrine of the Will, above +established, is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible? The following +considerations will enable us to give a decisive answer to this inquiry. +</p> + +<p> +1. If the doctrine of the Will here maintained is not, and consequently +that of Necessity is, the doctrine pre-supposed in the Scriptures, then +we have two revelations from God, the external and internal, in palpable +contradiction to each other. As the <i>works</i> of God (see Rom. 1: 19, 20) +are as real a revelation from him as the Bible, so are the necessary +affirmations of our Intelligence. Now, in our inner being, in the depths +of our Intelligence, the fact is perpetually revealed and affirmed—a +fact which we cannot disbelieve, if we would—that we are not +<i>necessary</i> but <i>free</i> agents. Suppose that, in the external revelation, +the Scriptures, the fact is revealed and affirmed that we are <i>not free</i> +but <i>necessary</i> agents. Has not God himself affirmed in one revelation +what he has denied in another? Of what use can the internal revelation +be, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the external? +Has the Most High given two such revelations as this? +</p> + +<p> +2. In the Scriptures, man is presented as the subject, and, of course, +as possessing those powers which render him the proper subject of +command and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and +consequently of reward and punishment. Let us suppose that God has +imparted to a being a certain constitution, and then placed him in a +condition in which, in consequence of the necessary correlation between +his constitution and circumstances, but one series of determinations are +possible to him, and that series cannot but result. Can we conceive it +proper in the Most High to prohibit that creature from pursuing the +course which God himself has rendered it impossible for him not to +pursue, and require him, under the heaviest sanctions, to pursue, under +these identical circumstances, a different and opposite course—a course +which the Creator has rendered it impossible for him to pursue? Is this +the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible? Does the Bible imply a system +of mental philosophy which renders the terms, obligation, merit and +demerit, void of all conceivable meaning, and which lays no other +foundation for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny? +</p> + +<p> +3. Let us now contemplate the doings of the Great Day revealed in the +Scriptures, in the light of these two opposite theories. Let us suppose +that, as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and separate +masses before the Eternal One, the Most High says to the one class, +“You, I myself placed in circumstances in which nothing but obedience +was possible, and that you could not but render; and you, I placed in a +condition in which nothing but disobedience was possible to you, and +that you could not but perpetrate. In consequence of these distinct and +opposite courses, each of which I myself rendered unavoidable, <i>you</i> +deserve and shall receive my eternal smiles; and <i>you</i> as richly deserve +and shall therefore endure my eternal frowns.” What would be the +response of an assembled universe to a division based upon such a +principle? Is this the principle on which the decisions of that Day are +based? It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and that of +Necessity is, the doctrine of the Bible? +</p> + +<p> +4. We will now contemplate another class of passages which have a +bearing equally decisive upon our present inquiries. I refer to that +class in which God expresses the deepest regret at the course which +transgressors have pursued, and are still pursuing, and the most +decisive unwillingness that they should pursue that course and perish. +He takes a solemn oath, that he is not willing that they should take the +course of disobedience and death, but that they should pursue a +different and opposite course. God expresses no regret that they are in +the <i>circumstances</i> in which they are, but that in those circumstances +they should take the path of disobedience, and not that of obedience. +Now, can we suppose, what must be true, if the doctrine of Necessity is +the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible, that God places his creatures in +circumstances in which obedience is to them an impossibility, and in +which they cannot but disobey, and then takes a solemn oath that he is +not willing that they should disobey and perish, “but that they should +turn from their evil way and live?” What is the meaning of the +exclamation, “O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandment,” if God +himself had so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an +impossibility to him? Is this the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in +the Bible? On the other hand, how perfectly in place are all the +passages under consideration, on the supposition that the doctrine of +Liberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed, and that consequently the +obedience which God affirms Himself desirous that sinners should render, +and his regret that they do not render, is always possible to them! One +of the seven pillars of the Gospel is this very doctrine. Take it from +the Bible, and we have “another Gospel.” +</p> + +<p> +5. One other class of passages claims special attention here. In the +Scriptures, the Most High expresses the greatest <i>astonishment</i> that men +should sin under the influences to which he has subjected them. He calls +upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the conduct +of men under those influences. “Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth,” +he exclaims, “for the Lord hath spoken; I have nourished and brought up +children, and they have rebelled against me.” Now, let us suppose, as +the doctrine of Necessity affirms, that God has placed sinners under +influences under which they cannot but sin. What must we think of his +conduct in calling upon the universe to unite with him in astonishment, +that under these influences they should sin—that is, take the only +course possible to them, the course which they cannot but take? With the +same propriety, he might place a mass of water on an inclined plane, and +then call upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the +downward flow of the fluid. Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the +Bible? +</p> + +<h2> +SEC. 3. VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS. +</h2> + +<p> +We are now prepared for a consideration of certain miscellaneous +questions which have an important bearing upon our present inquiries. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIj" id="IIIj">NECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +I. The first inquiry that presents itself is this: Do Necessitarians +hold the doctrine of Necessity as defined in this chapter? Do they +really hold, in respect to every act of will, that, in the circumstances +of its occurrence, that one act only is possible, and that cannot but +arise? Is this, for example, the doctrine of Edwards? Is it the doctrine +really held by those who professedly agree with him? I argue that it is: +</p> + +<p> +1. Because they unanimously repudiate the doctrine of Liberty as here +defined. They must, therefore, hold that of Necessity; inasmuch as no +third relation is even conceivable or possible. If they deny that the +phenomena of the Will fall under either of these relations, and still +call themselves Necessitarians, they most hold to an inconceivable +something, which themselves even do not understand and cannot define, +and which has and can have no real existence. +</p> + +<p> +2. Edwards has confounded the phenomena of the Will with those of the +Sensibility which are necessary in the sense here defined. He must, +therefore, hold that the characteristics of the latter class belong to +those of the former. +</p> + +<p> +3. Edwards represents the relation between motives and acts of Will, as +being the same in <i>kind</i> as that which exists between <i>causes</i> and +<i>effects</i> among external material substances. The former relation he +designates by the words <i>moral necessity</i>; the latter, by that of +natural, or <i>philosophical</i>, or <i>physical necessity</i>. Yet he says +himself, that the difference expressed by these words “does not lie so +much in the nature of the <i>connection</i> as in the two terms <i>connected</i>.” +The qualifying terms used, then, designate merely the nature of the +antecedents and consequents, while the nature of the connection between +them is, in all instances, the same, that of naked necessity. +</p> + +<p> +4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as +physical, or natural necessity. “Moral necessity may be,” he says, “as +absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly +connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its +natural cause.” +</p> + +<p> +5. Necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of +Will as that of <i>cause</i> and <i>effect</i>; and for this reason necessary. +“If,” says Edwards, “every act of Will is excited by some motive, then +that motive is the <i>cause</i> of that act of Will.” “And if volitions are +properly the effects of their motives, then they are <i>necessarily</i> +connected with their motives.” Now as the relation of cause and effect +is necessary, in the sense of the term Necessity as above defined, +Edwards must hold, and design to teach, that all acts of Will are +necessary in this sense. +</p> + +<p> +6. Necessitarians represent the connection between motives and acts of +Will as being, in all instances, the same in kind as that which exists +between volitions and external actions. “As external actions,” says +President Day, “are directed by the Will, so the Will itself is directed +by influence.” Now all admit, that the connection between volitions and +external actions is necessary in this sense, that when we will such +action it cannot but take place. No other act is, in the circumstances, +possible. In the same sense, according to Necessitarians, is every act +of Will necessarily connected with influence, or motives. We do +Necessitarians no wrong, therefore, when we impute to them the doctrine +of Necessity as here defined. In all cases of sin, they hold, that an +individual is in circumstances in which none but sinful acts of Will are +possible, and these he cannot but put forth; and that in these identical +circumstances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put forth +different and opposite acts. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIk" id="IIIk">THE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +II. We are prepared for another important inquiry, to wit: whether the +words, <i>certainty</i>, <i>moral certainty</i>, &c., as used by Necessitarians, +are identical in their meaning with that of Necessity as above defined? +The doctrine of Necessity would never be received by the public at all, +but for the language in which it is clothed, language which prevents the +public seeing it as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in +distinction from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to be nothing +but Certainty, or moral Certainty, &c. Now the question arises, what is +this Certainty? Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else? +That it is, I argue, +</p> + +<p> +1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can possibly be no +Certainty, which does not fall either under the relation of Liberty or +Necessity as above defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not, +according to their own showing, fall under the former relation: it must, +therefore, fall under the latter. It must be naked Necessity, and +nothing else. +</p> + +<p> +2. While they have defined the term Necessity, and have not that of +Certainty, they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the +former. The latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, and not +the former by the latter. +</p> + +<p> +3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes +the possibility of different and opposite acts of Will under the +influences, or motives, under which particular acts are put forth. The +Certainty under consideration, therefore, is not necessity of a +particular kind, a necessity consistent with liberty and moral +obligation. It is the Necessity above defined, in all its naked +deformity. +</p> + +<p> +<a name="IIIl" id="IIIl">III.</a> We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the doctrine of +Ability, according to the Necessitarian scheme. Even the Necessitarians, +with very few exceptions, admit, that in the absence of all power to do +right or wrong, we can be under no obligation to do the one or avoid the +other. “A man,” says Pres. Day, “is not responsible for remaining in his +place if he has no power to move. He is not culpable for omitting to +walk, if he has no strength to walk. He is not under obligation to do +anything for which he has not what Edwards calls <i>natural</i> power.” It is +very important for us to understand the <i>nature</i> of this ability, which +lies at the foundation of moral obligation; to understand, I repeat, +what this Ability is, according to the theory under consideration. This +Ability, according to the doctrine of Liberty, has been well stated by +Cousin, to wit: “The moment we take the resolution to do an action, we +take it with a consciousness of being able to take a contrary +resolution;” and by Dr. Dwight, who says of a man’s sin, that it is +“chosen by him unnecessarily, <i>while possessed of a power to choose +otherwise</i>.” The nature of this Ability, according to the Necessitarian +scheme, has been stated with equal distinctness in the Christian +Spectator. “If we take this term [Ability or Power] in the absolute +sense, as including <i>all</i> the antecedents to a given volition, there is +plainly no such thing as power to the contrary; for in this sense of the +term,” as President Day states, “a man never has power to do anything but +what he actually performs.” “In this comprehensive, though rather +unusual sense of the word,” says President Day, “a man has not power to +do anything which he does not do.” The meaning of the above extracts +cannot be mistaken. Nor can any one deny that they contain a true +exposition of the doctrine of Necessity, to wit: that under the +influences under which men do will, and consequently act, it is +absolutely impossible for them to will and act differently from what +they do. In what sense, then, have they power to will and act +differently according to this doctrine? To this question President Day +has given a correct and definite answer. “The man who wills in a +particular way, under the influence of particular feelings, might will +differently under a different influence.” +</p> + +<p> +Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? A man, +for example, commits an act of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act, +to have put forth an act of obedience. Without the power to render this +obedience, as President Day admits, there can be no obligation to do it. +When the Necessitarian says, that the creature, when he sins, has power +to obey, he means, not that under the influence under which the act of +sin is committed, the creature has power to obey; but that <i>under a +different influence he might obey</i>. But mark, it is under the identical +influence under which a man does sin, and under which, according to the +doctrine of Necessity, he cannot but sin, that he is required not to +sin. Now how can a man’s ability, and obligation not to sin under a +given influence, grow out of the fact, that, under a different +influence, an influence under which he cannot but do right, he might not +sin? This is all the ability and ground of obligation as far as Ability, +Natural Ability as it is called, is concerned, which the doctrine of +Necessity admits. A man is, by a power absolutely irresistible, placed +in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but sin. In these +circumstances, it is said, that he has <i>natural ability</i> not to sin, and +consequently ought not to do it. Why? Because, to his acting +differently, no change in his nature or powers is required. These are +“perfect and entire, wanting nothing.” All that is required is, that his +<i>circumstances</i> be changed, and then he might not sin. “In what sense,” +asks President Day, “is it true, that a man has power to will the +contrary of what he actually wills? He has such power that, with a +<i>sufficient inducement</i>, he will make an opposite choice.” Is not this +the strangest idea of Natural Ability as constituting the foundation of +obligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? In +illustration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the city of New York, +cannot but sin; placed in that of Boston, he cannot but be holy, and +that the fact whether he is in the one or the other city depends upon +the irresistible providence of God. He is placed in New York where he +cannot but sin. He is told that he ought not to do it, and that he is +highly guilty for not being perfectly holy. It is also asserted that he +has all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to lay the +foundation for the highest conceivable obligation to be holy. What is +the evidence? he asks. Is it possible for me, in my present +circumstances, to avoid sin? and in my present circumstances, you know, +I cannot but be. I acknowledge, the Necessitarian says, that under +present influences, you cannot but sin, and that you cannot but be +subject to these influences. Still, I affirm, that you have all the +powers of moral agency, all the natural ability requisite to obedience, +and to the highest conceivable obligation to obedience. Because, in the +first place, even in New York, you could obey if you chose. You have, +therefore, <i>natural</i>, though not <i>moral</i>, power to obey. But stop, +friend, right here. When you say that I might obey, if I chose, I would +ask, if choosing, as in the command, “choose life,” is not the very +thing required of me? When, therefore, you affirm that I might obey, if +I chose, does it not mean, in reality, that I might choose, if I should +choose? Is not your Natural Ability this, that I might obey if I did +obey?<sup><a href="#n2" id="f2" title="see footnote" name="f2">[2]</a></sup> I cannot deny, the Necessitarian replies, that you have +correctly stated this doctrine. Permit me to proceed in argument, +however. In the next place, all that you need in order to be holy as +required, is a change, not of your <i>powers</i>, but of the <i>influences</i> +which control the <i>action</i> of those powers. With no change in your +constitution or powers, you need only to be placed in Boston instead of +New York, and there you cannot but be holy. Is it not as clear as light, +therefore, that you have now all the powers of moral agency, all the +ability requisite to the highest conceivable obligation to be holy +instead of sinful? +</p> + +<p> +I fully understand you, the sinner replies. But remember, that it is not +in Boston, where, as you acknowledge, I cannot be, that I am required +not to sin; but here, in New York, where I cannot but be, and cannot +possibly but sin. It is here, and not somewhere else, that I am required +not to sin. How can the fact, that if I were in Boston, where I could +not but be holy, I might not sin, prove, that here, in New York, I have +any ability, either natural or moral—am under any obligation +whatever—not to sin? These are the difficulties which press upon me. +How do you remove them according to your theory? +</p> + +<p> +I can give no other answer, the Necessitarian replies, than that already +given. If that does not silence for ever every excuse for sin in your +mind, it is wholly owing to the perverseness of your heart, to its +bitter hostility to the truth. I may safely appeal to the Necessitarian +himself, whether I have not here given an uncaricatured expose of his +theory. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIm" id="IIIm">SINFUL INCLINATIONS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +IV. When pressed with such appalling difficulties as these, the +Necessitarian falls back, in self-justification, upon the <i>reason why</i> +the sinner cannot be holy. The only reason, it is said, why the sinner +does not do as he ought is, not the want of power, but the strength of +his sinful inclinations. Shall he plead these in excuse for sin? By no +means. They constitute the very essence of the sinner’s guilt. Let it be +borne in mind, that, according to the doctrine of Necessity, such is the +connection between the nature, or constitution of the sinner’s mind—a +nature which God has given him, and the influences under which he is +placed by Divine Providence—that none but these very inclinations are +possible to him, and these cannot but exist. From these inclinations, +sinful acts of Will cannot but arise. How is the matter helped, as far +as ability and obligation, on the part of the sinner, are concerned, by +throwing the guilt back from acts of Will upon inclinations equally +necessary? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIn" id="IIIn">NECESSARIAN DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +The real liberty of the Will, according to the Necessitarian scheme, +next demands our attention. All admit that Liberty is an essential +condition of moral obligation. In what sense, then, is or is not, man +free, according to the doctrine of Necessity? +</p> + +<p> +“The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty,” says +President Edwards, “is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one +has to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from +hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any +respect as he wills. And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we +please to call that by, is a person’s being hindered, or unable to +conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise.” “The only +idea, indeed, that we can form of free-agency, or of freedom of Will,” +says Abercrombie, “is, that it consists in a man’s being able to do what +he wills, or to abstain from doing what he will not. Necessary agency, +on the other hand, would consist in a man’s being compelled, by a force +from without, to do what he will not, or prevented from doing what he +wills.” +</p> + +<p> +With these definitions all Necessitarians agree. This is all the Liberty +known, or conceivable, according to their theory. Liberty does not +consist in the power to choose in one or the other of two or more +different and opposite directions, under the same influence. It is found +wholly and exclusively in the connection between the act of Will, +considered as the antecedent, and the effort, external or internal, +considered as the consequent. On this definition I remark, +</p> + +<p> +1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from +<i>Servitude</i>, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man +is free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints +hinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing +to do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity. +</p> + +<p> +2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the +language of a very distinguished philosopher, “if you cut off a man’s +little finger, you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency;” +because, in that case, you abridge so much his power to do as he +chooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may +be destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? Is this Liberty as +distinguished from Necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of +moral obligation? +</p> + +<p> +3. If this is the only sense in which man is free, then dire Necessity +reigns throughout the entire domain of human agency. If all acts of Will +are the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at +the time subjected, much more must a like necessity exist between all +acts of Will and their consequents, external and internal. This has been +already shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and states, exists in a +chain of antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, linked +together in every part and department by a dire necessity. This is all +the Liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us; a Liberty to choose +as influences necessitate us to choose, and to have such acts of Will +followed by certain necessary consequents, external and internal. In +this scheme, the idea of Liberty, which all admit must have a location +somewhere, or obligation, is a chimera; this idea, I say, after +“wandering through dry places, seeking rest and finding none,” at length +is driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not a living +habitation. +</p> + +<p> +4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, as the foundation of +moral obligation, should be located here. Because that acts of Will are +followed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and +internal, therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of Will, +whatever the influences acting upon us may be, and however impossible it +may be to put forth those acts under those influences! Did ever a +greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian? +</p> + +<p> +5. The public are entirely deceived by this definition, and because they +are deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true? +Suppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means, +when he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this +express your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for +example, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must +put forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot +but walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No, +he would say. That is not my idea at all. If that is true, man is not a +free agent at all. What men in general really mean when they say, they +can do as they please, and are therefore free, is, that when they put +forth a given act of Will, and for this reason conduct in a given +manner, they may in the same circumstances put forth different and +opposite determinations, and consequently act in a different and +opposite manner from what they do. +</p> + +<p> +VI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to the <i>practical +tendencies</i> of their doctrine demands a passing notice. All acts of the +Will, they say, are indeed necessary under the circumstances in which +they occur; but then we should learn the practical lesson not to place +ourselves in the circumstances where we shall be liable to act wrong. To +this I reply: +</p> + +<p> +1. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in the circumstances +which originate a given choice, is as necessary as the choice itself. +For I am in those circumstances either by an overruling Providence over +which I have no control, or by previous acts of the Will rendered +necessary by such Providence. Hence the difficulty remains in all its +force. +</p> + +<p> +2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, that is, that our +being in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not +necessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such +circumstances, and not to place himself there again? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIo" id="IIIo">GROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE +OF ABILITY.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +VII. We are now fully prepared to state the ground which Necessitarians +of every school are bound to take in respect to the doctrine of Ability. +It is to deny that doctrine wholly, to take the open and broad ground, +that, according to any appropriate signification of the words, it is +absolutely impossible for men to will, and consequently to act, +differently from what they do; that when they do wrong, they always do +it, with the absolute impossibility of doing right; and that when they +do right, there is always an equal impossibility of their doing wrong. +If men have not power to <i>will</i> differently from what they do, it is +undeniably evident that they have no power whatever to act differently: +because there is an absolutely necessary connection between volitions +and their consequents, external actions. The doctrine of Necessity takes +away wholly all ability from the creature to will differently from what +he does. It therefore totally annihilates his ability to <i>act</i> +differently. What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, becomes +of the doctrine of Ability? It is annihilated. It is impossible for us +to find for it a “local habitation or a name.” As honest men, +Necessitarians are bound to proclaim the fact. They are bound to +proclaim the doctrine, that, in requiring men to be holy, under +influences under which they do sin, and cannot but sin (as it is true of +all sinful acts according to their theory), God requires of them +absolute impossibilities, and then dooms them to perdition for not +performing such impossibilities. +</p> + +<p> +The subterfuge to which Necessitarians resort here, will not avail them +at all, to wit: that men are to blame for not doing right, because, they +might do it if they chose. To will right is the thing, and the only +thing really required of them. The above maxim therefore amounts, as we +have already seen, to this: Men are bound to do, that is, to will, what +is right, because if they should will what is right, they would will +what is right. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IIIp" id="IIIp">DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS REGARDED BY NECESSITARIANS OF DIFFERENT +SCHOOLS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +VIII. Two schools divide the advocates of Necessity. According to one +class, God produces in men all their volitions and acts, both sinful and +holy, by the direct exertion of his own omnipotence. Without the Divine +agency, men, they hold, are wholly incapable of all volitions and +actions of every kind. With it, none but those which God produces can +arise, and these cannot but arise. This is the scheme of Divine +efficiency, as advocated by Dr. Emmons and others. +</p> + +<p> +According to the other school, God does not, in all instances, produce +volitions and actions by his own direct agency, but by creating in +creatures a certain nature or constitution, and then subjecting them to +influences from which none but particular volitions and acts which they +do put forth can result, and these must result. According to a large +portion of this school, God, either by his own direct agency, or by +sustaining their laws of natural generation, produces in men the +peculiar nature which they do possess, and then imputes to them infinite +guilt, not only for this nature, but for its necessary results, sinful +feelings, volitions, and actions. +</p> + +<p> +Such are these two schemes. In the two following particulars, they +perfectly harmonize. 1. All acts of Will, together with their effects, +external and internal, in the circumstances of their occurrence, cannot +but be what they are. 2. The ground of this necessity is the agency of +God, in the one instance producing these effects directly and +immediately, and in the other producing the same results, mediately, by +giving existence to a constitution and influences from which such +results cannot but arise. They differ only in respect to the <i>immediate</i> +ground of this necessity, the power of God, according to the former, +producing the effects directly, and according to the latter, indirectly. +According to both, all our actions sustain the same essential relation +to the Divine Will, that of Necessity. +</p> + +<p> +Now while these two theories so perfectly harmonize, in all essential +particulars, strange to tell, the advocates of one regard the other as +involving the most monstrous absurdities conceivable. For God to +produce, through the energies of his own omnipotence, human volitions, +and then to impute infinite guilt to men for what he himself has +produced in them, what a horrid sentiment that is, exclaims the advocate +of constitutional depravity. For God to create in men a sinful nature, +and then impute to them infinite guilt for what he has himself created, +together with its unavoidable results, what horrid tyranny such a +sentiment imputes to the Most High, exclaims the advocate of Divine +efficiency, in his turn. +</p> + +<p class="pns"> +The impartial, uncommitted spectator, on the other hand, perceives most +distinctly the same identical absurdities in both these theories. He +knows perfectly, that it can make no essential difference, whether God +produces a result directly, or by giving existence to a constitution and +influences from which it cannot but arise. If one theory involves +injustice and tyranny, the other must involve the same. Let me here add, +that the reprobation with which each of the classes above named regards +the sentiments of the other, is a sentence of reprobation passed +(unconsciously to be sure) upon the doctrine of Necessity itself which +is common to both. For if this one element is taken out of either +theory, there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is +thus that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, pass sentence of +condemnation upon their own theory, by condemning it, in every system in +which they meet with it except their own. There is not a man on earth, +that has not in some form or other passed sentence of reprobation upon +this system. Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but the one +he has himself adopted, any theory that involves this element, and he +will instantly fasten upon this one feature as the characteristic which +vitiates the whole theory, and renders it deserving of universal +reprobation. It is thus that unsophisticated Nature expresses her +universal horror at a system which +</p> + + <p class="p1"> +“Binding nature fast in fate, + <p class="p1s"> +Enslaves the human Will.” +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +Unsophisticated Nature abhors this doctrine infinitely more than she was +ever conceived to abhor a vacuum. Can a theory which the universal +Intelligence thus agrees in reprobating, as involving the most horrid +absurdity and tyranny conceivable, be the only true one? +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="IV" id="IV">CHAPTER IV.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">While</span> it is maintained, that, in the sense defined in the preceding +chapter, the Will is free, it is also affirmed that, in other respects, +it is not free at all. It should be borne distinctly in mind, that, in +the respects in which the Will is subject to the law of Liberty, its +liberty is absolute. It is in no sense subject to the law of Necessity. +So far, also, as it is subject to the law of Necessity, it is in no +sense free. What then are the extent and limits of the Liberty of the +Will? +</p> + +<p> +1. In the absence of Motives, the Will cannot act at all. To suppose the +opposite would involve a contradiction. It would suppose the action of +the Will in the direction of some object, in the absence of all objects +towards which such action can be directed. +</p> + +<p> +2. The Will is not free in regard to what the Motives presented shall +be, in view of which its determinations shall be formed. Motives exist +wholly independent of the Will. Nor does it depend at all upon the Will, +what Motives shall be presented for its election. It is free only in +respect to the particular determinations it shall put forth, in +reference to the Motives actually presented. +</p> + +<p> +3. Whenever a Motive, or object of choice, is presented to the mind, the +Will is necessitated, by the presentation of the object, to act in some +direction. It must yield or refuse to yield to the Motive. But such +refusal is itself a positive act. So far, therefore, the Will is wholly +subject to the law of Necessity. It is free, not in respect to whether +it shall, or shall not, choose at all when a Motive is presented; but in +respect to <i>what</i> it shall choose. I, for example, offer a merchant a +certain sum, for a piece of goods. Now while it is equally possible for +him to receive or reject the offer, one or the other determination he +<i>must</i> form. In the first respect, he is wholly free. In the latter, he +is not free in any sense whatever. The same holds true in respect to all +objects of choice presented to the mind. Motive necessitates the Will to +act in some direction; while, in all deliberate Moral Acts at least, it +leaves either of two or more different and opposite determinations +equally possible to the mind. +</p> + +<p> +4. Certain particular volitions may be rendered necessary by other, and +what may be termed <i>general</i>, determinations. For example, a +determination to pursue a particular course of conduct, may render +necessary all particular volitions requisite to carry this general +purpose into accomplishment. It renders them necessary in this sense, +that if the former does exist, the latter must exist. A man, for +example, determines to pass from Boston to New York with all possible +expedition. This determination remaining unchanged, all the particular +volitions requisite to its accomplishment cannot but exist. The general +and controlling determination, however, may, at any moment, be +suspended. To perpetuate or suspend it, is always in the power of the +Will. +</p> + +<p> +5. I will here state a conjecture, viz.: that there are in the primitive +developments of mind, as well as in all primary acts of attention, +certain necessary spontaneities of the Will, as well as of other powers +of the mind. Is it not in consequence of such actions, that the mind +becomes first conscious of the power of volition, and is it not now +necessary for us under certain circumstances to give a certain degree of +attention to phenomena which appear within and around us? My own +convictions are, that such circumstances often do occur. Nor is such a +supposition inconsistent with the great principle maintained in this +Treatise. This principle is, that Liberty and Accountability, in other +words, Free, and Moral Agency, are co-extensive. +</p> + +<p> +6. Nor does Liberty, as here defined, imply, that the mind, antecedently +to all acts of Will, shall be in a state of <i>indifference</i>, unimpelled +by feeling, or the affirmations of the Intelligence, more strongly in +one direction than another. The Will exists in a tri-unity with the +Intelligence and Sensibility. Its determinations may be in harmony with +the Sensibility, in opposition to Intelligence, or with the Intelligence +in opposition to the Sensibility. But while it follows either in +distinction from the other, under the same identical influences, +different and opposite determinations are equally possible. However the +Will may be influenced, whether its determinations are in the direction +of the strongest impulse, or opposed to it, it never, in deliberate +moral determination, puts forth particular acts, because, that in these +circumstances, no others are possible. In instances comparatively few, +can we suppose that the mind, antecedently to acts of Will, is in a +state of indifference, unimpelled in one direction in distinction from +others, or equally impelled in the direction of different and opposite +determinations. Indifference is in no such sense an essential or +material condition of Liberty. How ever strongly the Will may be +impelled in the direction of particular determinations, it is still in +the possession of the highest conceivable freedom, if it is not thereby +<i>necessitated</i> to act in one direction in distinction from all others. +</p> + +<p> +7. I now refer to one other fixed law under the influence of which the +Will is always necessitated to act. It is the law of <i>habit</i>. Action in +any one direction always generates a tendency to subsequent action in +the same direction under similar influences. This tendency may be +increased, till it becomes so strong as to render action in the same +direction in all future time really, although contingently, certain. The +certainty thus granted will always be of such a nature as consists fully +with the relation of Liberty. It can never, while moral agency +continues, come under the relation of Necessity. Still the certainty is +real. Thus the mind, by a continued course of well or ill doing, may +generate such fixed habits, as to render subsequent action in the same +direction perfectly certain, during the entire progress of its future +being. Every man, while conscious of freedom, should be fully aware of +the existence of this law, and it should surely lead him to walk +thoughtfully along the borders of “the undiscovered country,” his +location in which he is determining by the habits of thought, feeling, +and action, he is now generating. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IVa" id="IVa">STRONGEST MOTIVE—REASONING IN A CIRCLE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +A singular instance of reasoning in a circle on the part of +Necessitarians, in respect to what they call the <i>strongest Motive</i>, +demands a passing notice here. One of their main arguments in support of +their doctrine is based upon the assumption, that the action of the Will +is always in the direction of the strongest Motive. When, however, we +ask them, which is the strongest Motive, their reply in reality is, that +it is the Motive in the direction of which the Will does act. “The +strength of a <i>Motive</i>,” says President Day, “is not its prevailing, but +the power by which it prevails. Yet we may very properly <i>measure</i> this +power by the actual result.” Again, “We may measure the comparative +strength of Motives of different kinds, from the results to which they +lead; just as we learn the power of different causes, from the effects +which they produce:” that is, we are not to determine, <i>a priori</i>, nor +by an appeal to consciousness, which of two or more Motives presented is +the strongest. We are to wait till the Will does act, and then assume +that the Motive, in the direction of which it acts, is the strongest. +From the action of the Will in the direction of that particular Motive, +we are finally to infer the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. The +strongest Motive, according to the above definition, is the motive to +which the Will does yield. The argument based upon the truism, that the +Will always acts in the direction of this Motive, that is, the Motive +towards which it does act, the argument, I say, put into a logical form, +would stand thus. If the action of the Will is always in the direction +of the strongest Motive, that is, if it always follows the Motive it +does follow, it is governed by the law of Necessity. Its action is +always in the direction of this Motive, that is, it always follows the +Motive it does follow. The Will is therefore governed by the law of +Necessity. How many philosophers and theologians have become “rooted and +grounded” in the belief of this doctrine, under the influence of this +sophism, a sophism which, in the first instance, assumes the doctrine as +true, and then moves round in a vicious circle to demonstrate its truth. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="V" id="V">CHAPTER V.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +THE GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. +</p> + +<h2> +SECTION I. +</h2> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">We</span> now come to a consideration of one of the great questions bearing +upon our personal investigations—the proposition maintained by +Necessitarians, as a chief pillar of their theory, that “<i>the Will +always is as the greatest apparent good</i>.” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Va" id="Va">PHRASE DEFINED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +The first inquiry which naturally arises here is What is the proper +meaning of this proposition? +</p> + +<p> +In reply, I answer, that it must mean one of these three things. +</p> + +<p> +1. That the Will is always, in all its determinations, conformed to the +dictates of the Intelligence, choosing those things only which the +Intelligence affirms to be best. Or, +</p> + +<p> +2. That the determinations of the Will are always in conformity to the +impulse of the Sensibility, that is, that its action is always in the +direction of the strongest feeling. Or, +</p> + +<p> +3. In conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence, and the impulse of +the Sensibility combined, that is that the Will never acts at all, +except when impelled by the Intelligence and Sensibility both in the +same direction. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Vb" id="Vb">MEANING OF THIS PHRASE ACCORDING TO EDWARDS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +The following passage leaves no room for doubt in respect to the meaning +which Edwards attaches to the phrase, “the greatest apparent good.” “I +have chosen,” he says, “rather to express myself thus, that the Will +always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most +agreeable, than to say, that the Will is <i>determined</i> by the greatest +apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing +most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind’s preferring and +choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct.” Here +undeniably, the words, choosing, preferring, “appearing most agreeable +or pleasing,” and “the greatest apparent good,” are defined as identical +in their meaning. Hence in another place, he adds, “If strict propriety +of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the +<i>voluntary action</i> which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the +mind’s volition and choice, is determined by that which appears most +agreeable, than by the preference or choice itself.” The reason is +obvious. Appearing most agreeable or pleasing, and preference or choice, +had been defined as synonymous in their meaning. To say, therefore, that +preference or choice is determined by “what appears most agreeable or +pleasing,” would be equivalent to the affirmation, that choice +determines choice. “The act of volition itself,” he adds, “is always +determined by that in or about the mind’s view of an object, which +causes it to appear most agreeable,” or what is by definition the same +thing, causes it to be chosen. The phrases, “the greatest apparent +good,” and “appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind,” and the +words, choosing, preferring, &c., are therefore, according to Edwards, +identical in their meaning. The proposition, “the Will is always as the +greatest apparent good,” really means nothing more nor less than this, +that Will always chooses as it chooses. The famous argument based upon +this proposition in favor of the doctrine of Necessity may be thus +expressed. If the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, that is, +if the Will always chooses as it chooses, it is governed by the law of +Necessity. The Will is as the greatest apparent good, that is, it always +chooses as it chooses. Therefore it is governed by this law. By this +very syllogism, multitudes have supposed that the doctrine of Necessity +has been established with all the distinctness and force of +demonstration. +</p> + +<p> +The question now returns, Is “the Will always as the greatest apparent +good,” in either of the senses of the phrase as above defined? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Vc" id="Vc">THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE DICTATES OF THE INTELLIGENCE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +I. Is the Will then as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that +all its determinations are in conformity to the dictates of the +Intelligence. Does the Will never harmonize with the Sensibility in +opposition to the Intelligence? Has no intelligent being, whether sinful +or holy, ever done that which his Intellect affirmed at the time, that +he ought not to do, and that it was best for him not to do? I answer, +</p> + +<p> +1. Every man who has ever violated moral obligation knows, that he has +followed the impulse of desire, in opposition to the dictates of his +Intelligence. What individual that has ever perpetrated such deeds has +not said, and cannot say with truth, “I know the good, and approve it; +yet follow the bad?” Take a matter of fact. A Spanish nobleman during +the early progress of the Reformation, became fully convinced, that the +faith of the Reformers was true, and his own false, and that his +salvation depended upon his embracing the one and rejecting the other. +Yet martyrdom would be the result of such a change. While balancing this +question, in the depths of his own mind, he trembled with the greatest +agitation. His sovereign who was present, asked the cause. The reply +was, “the martyr’s crown is before me, and I have not Christian +fortitude enough to take it.” He died a few weeks subsequent, without +confessing the truth. Did he obey his Intelligence, or Sensibility +there? Was not the conflict between the two, and did not the latter +prevail? In John 12: 42, 43, we have a fact revealed, in which men were +convinced of the truth, and yet, because “they loved the praise of men +more than the praise of God,” they did not confess, but denied the +truth, a case therefore in which they followed the impulse of desire, in +opposition to the dictates of the Intelligence. The Will then is not +“always as the greatest apparent good,” in this sense, that its action +is always in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence. +</p> + +<p> +2. If this is so, sin, in all instances, is a mere blunder, a necessary +result of a necessary misjudgment of the Intelligence? Is it so? Can the +Intelligence affirm that a state of moral impurity is better than a +state of moral rectitude? How easy it would be, in every instance, to +“convert a sinner from the error of his way,” if all that is requisite +is to carry his Intellect in favor of truth and righteousness? Who does +not know, that the great difficulty lies in the enslavement of the Will +to a depraved Sensibility? +</p> + +<p> +3. If the Will of all Intelligents is always in harmony with the +Intellect, then I affirm that there is not, and never has been, any such +thing as sin, or ill desert, in the universe. What more can be said of +God, or of any being ever so pure, than that he has always done what his +Intellect affirmed to be best? What if the devil, and all creatures +called sinners, had always done the same thing? Where is the conceivable +ground for the imputation of moral guilt to them? +</p> + +<p> +4. If all acts of Will are always in perfect harmony with the +Intelligence, and in this sense, “as the greatest apparent good,” then, +when the Intellect affirms absolutely that there can be no ground of +preference between two objects, there can be no choice between them. But +we are, in fact, putting forth every day just such acts of Will, +selecting one object in distinction from another, when the Intellect +affirms their perfect equality, or affirms absolutely, that there is and +can be no perceived ground of preference between them. I receive a +letter, I will suppose, from a friend, informing me that he has just +taken from a bank two notes, perfectly new and of the same value, that +one now lies in the east and the other in the west corner of his drawer, +that I may have one and only one of them, the one that I shall name by +return of mail, and that I must designate one or the other, or have +neither. Here are present to my Intelligence two objects absolutely +equal. Their location is a matter of indifference, equally absolute. Now +if as the proposition “the Will is <i>always</i> as the greatest apparent +good,” affirms, I cannot select one object in distinction from another, +without a perceived ground for such selection, I could not possibly, in +the case supposed, say which bill I would have. Yet I make the selection +without the least conceivable embarrassment. I might mention numberless +cases, of daily occurrence, of a nature precisely similar. Every child +that ever played at “odd or even,” knows perfectly the possibility of +selecting between objects which are, to the Intelligence, absolutely +equal. +</p> + +<p> +I will now select a case about which there can possibly be no mistake. +Space we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite. Space in itself is in +all parts alike. So must it appear to the mind of God. Now when God +determined to create the universe, he must have resolved to locate its +centre in some one point of space in distinction from all others. At +that moment, there was present to the Divine Intelligence an infinite +number of points, all and each absolutely equally eligible. Neither +point could have been selected, because it was better than any other: +for all were equal. So they must have appeared to God. Now if the “Will +is always as the greatest apparent good,” in the sense under +consideration, God could not in this case make the selection, and +consequently could not create the universe. He did make the selection, +and did create. The Will, therefore, is not, in this sense, “always as +the greatest apparent good.” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Vd" id="Vd">THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE STRONGEST DESIRE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +II. Is the “Will always as the greatest apparent good” in this sense, +that it is always as the strongest desire, or as the strongest impulse +of the Sensibility? Does the Will never harmonize with the Intelligence, +in opposition to the Sensibility, as well as with the Sensibility in +opposition to the Intelligence? If this is not so, then— +</p> + +<p> +1. It would be difficult to define self-denial according to the ordinary +acceptation of the term. What is self-denial but placing the Will with +the Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility? How often in moral +reformations do we find almost nothing else but this, an inflexible +purpose placed directly before an almost crushing and overwhelming tide +of feeling and desire? +</p> + +<p> +2. When the Will is impelled in different directions, by conflicting +feelings, it could not for a moment be in a state of indecision, unless +we suppose these conflicting feelings to be absolutely equal in strength +up to the moment of decision. Who believes that? Who believes that his +feelings are in all instances in a state of perfect equilibrium up to +the moment of fixed determination between two distinct and opposite +courses? This <i>must</i> be the case, if the action of the Will is always as +the strongest feeling, and in this sense as the “greatest apparent +good.” How can Necessitarians meet this argument? Will they pretend +that, in all instances, up to the moment of decisive action, the +feelings impelling the Will in different directions are always +absolutely equal in strength? This must be, if the Will is always as the +strongest feeling. +</p> + +<p> +3. When the feelings are in a state of perfect equilibrium, there can +possibly, on this supposition, be no choice at all. The feelings often +are, and must be, in this state, even when we are necessitated to act in +some direction. The case of the bank notes above referred to, presents +an example of this kind. As the objects are in the mind’s eye absolutely +equal, to suppose that the feelings should, in such a case, impel the +Will more strongly in the direction of the one than the other, is to +suppose an event without a cause, inasmuch as the Sensibility is +governed by the law of Necessity. If A and B are to the Intelligence, in +all respects, absolutely equal, how can the Sensibility impel the Will +towards A instead of B? What is an event without a cause, if this is +not? Contemplate the case in respect to the location of the universe +above supposed. Each point of space was equally present to God, and was +in itself, and was perceived and affirmed to be, equally eligible with +all the others. How could a stronger feeling arise in the direction of +one point in distinction from others, unless we suppose that God’s +Sensibility is not subject to the law of Necessity, a position which +none will assume, or that here was an event without a cause? When, +therefore, God did select this one point in distinction from all the +others, that determination could not have been either in the direction +of what the Intelligence affirmed to be best, nor of the strongest +feeling. The proposition, therefore, that “the Will <i>always</i> is as the +greatest apparent good,” is in both the senses above defined +demonstrably false. +</p> + +<p> +4. Of the truth of this every one is aware when he appeals to his own +Consciousness. In the amputation of a limb, for example, who does not +know that if an individual, at the moment when the operation commences, +should yield to the strongest feeling, he would refuse to endure it? He +can pass through the scene, only by placing an inflexible purpose +directly across the current of feeling. How often do we hear individuals +affirm, “If I should follow my <i>feelings</i>, I should do this; if I should +follow my <i>judgment</i>, I should do that.” In all such instances, we have +the direct testimony of consciousness, that the action of the Will is +not always in the direction of the strongest feeling: because its action +is sometimes consciously in the direction of the Intelligence, in +opposition to such feelings; and at others, in the conscious presence of +such feelings, the Will remains, for periods longer or shorter, +undecided in respect to the particular course which shall be pursued. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Ve" id="Ve">THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY COMBINED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +III. Is not the Will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense, +that its determinations are always as the affirmations of the +Intelligence and the impulse of the Sensibility combined? That it is +not, I argue for two reasons. +</p> + +<p> +1. If this was the case, when the Intelligence and Sensibility are +opposed to each other—a fact of very frequent occurrence,—there could +be no acts of Will in either direction. The Will must remain in a state +of absolute inaction, till these belligerent powers settle their +differences, and unite in impelling the Will in some particular +direction. But we know that the Will can, and often does, act in the +direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, when the affirmations of +one and the impulses of the other are in direct opposition to each +other. +</p> + +<p> +2. When both the Intellect and Sensibility, as in the cases above cited, +are alike indifferent, there can be, on the present hypothesis, no acts +of Will whatever. Under these identical circumstances, however, the Will +does act. The hypothesis, therefore, falls to the ground. +</p> + +<p> +I conclude, then, that the proposition, “the Will is always as the +greatest apparent good,” is either a mere truism, having no bearing at +all upon our present inquiries, or that it is false. +</p> + +<p> +In the discussion of the above propositions, the doctrine of Liberty has +received a full and distinct illustration. The action of the Will is +sometimes in the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to the +Sensibility, and sometimes in the direction of the Sensibility, in +opposition to the Intelligence, and never in the direction of either, +because it must be. Sometimes it acts where the Sensibility and +Intelligence both harmonize, or are alike indifferent. When also the +Will acts in the direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, it is not +necessitated to follow, in all instances, the highest affirmation, nor +the strongest desire. +</p> + +<h2> +SEC. II—MISCLLANEOUS TOPICS. +</h2> + +<h2> +<a name="Vf" id="Vf">NECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +I. We are now prepared to appreciate the Necessitarian argument, based +upon the assumption, that “the Will always is as the greatest apparent +good.” This assumption is the great pillar on which that doctrine rests. +Yet the whole argument based upon it is a perpetual reasoning in a +circle. Ask the Necessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his +doctrine. His answer is, because “the Will <i>always</i> is as the greatest +apparent good.” Cite now such facts as those stated above in +contradiction of his assumption, and his answer is ready. There must be, +in all such cases, some perceived or felt ground of preference, or there +could be no act of Will in the case. There must have been, for example, +some point in space more eligible than any other for the location of the +universe, and this must have been the reason why God selected the one he +did. Ask him why he makes this declaration? His reply is, because “the +Will is always as the greatest apparent good.” Thus this assumption +becomes premise or conclusion, just as the exigence of the theory based +upon it demands. Nothing is so convenient and serviceable as such an +assumption, when one has a very difficult and false position to sustain. +But who does not see, that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle? +To assume the proposition, “the Will always is as the greatest apparent +good,” in the first instance, as the basis of a universal theory, and +then to assume the truth of that proposition as the basis of the +explanation of particular facts, which contradict that theory, what is +reasoning in a circle if this is not? No one has a right to assume this +proposition as true at all, until he has first shown that it is affirmed +by all the phenomena of the Will. On its authority he has no right to +explain a solitary phenomenon. To do it is not only to reason in a +circle, but to beg the question at issue. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Vg" id="Vg">MOTIVES CAUSE ACTS OF WILL, IN WHAT SENSE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +II. We are also prepared to notice another assumption of President +Edwards, which, if admitted in the sense in which he assumes it as true, +necessitates the admission of the Necessitarian scheme, to wit: that the +determination of the Will is always <i>caused</i> by the Motive present to +the mind for putting forth that determination. “It is that motive,” he +says, “which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest +which determines the Will.” Again, “that every act of the Will has some +cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a +necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity +of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of +Will, whatsoever, is excited by some motive.” “But if every act of the +Will is excited by some motive, then that motive is the cause of that +act of the Will.” “And if volitions are properly the effects of their +motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives.” +</p> + +<p> +If we grant the principle here assumed, the conclusion follows of +necessity. But let us inquire in what sense motive and volition sustain +to each other the relation of cause and effect. <i>The presence and action +of one power causes the action of another, so far, and so far only, as +it necessitates such action; and causes its action in a particular +direction, so far only as it necessitates its action in that direction, +in opposition to every other</i>. Now the action of one power may cause the +action of another, in one or both these ways. +</p> + +<p> +1. It may necessitate its action, and necessitate it in one direction in +opposition to any and every other. In this sense, fire causes the +sensation of pain. It necessitates the action of the Sensibility, and in +that one direction. Or, +</p> + +<p> +2. One power may necessitate the <i>action</i> of another power, but not +necessitate its action in one direction in opposition to any or all +others. We have seen, in a former chapter, that the Motive causes the +action of the Will in this sense only, that it necessitates the Will to +act in some direction, but not in one direction in distinction from +another. Now the error of President Edwards lies in confounding these +two senses of the word <i>cause</i>. He assumes that when one power causes +the action of another in any sense, it must in every sense. It is +readily admitted, that in one sense the Motive causes the action of the +Will. But when we ask for the reason or cause of any one particular +choice in distinction from another, we find it, not in the motive, but +in the power of willing itself. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Vh" id="Vh">OBJECTION—PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +III. We are also prepared to notice the great objection of +Necessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here maintained. How, it is +asked, shall we account, on this theory, for <i>particular</i> volitions? The +power to will only accounts for acts of Will in <i>some</i> direction, but +not for one act in distinction from another. This distinction must be +accounted for, or we have an event without a cause. To this argument I +reply, +</p> + +<p> +1. It assumes the position in debate, to wit: that there cannot be +consequents which are not necessarily connected with particular +antecedents, which antecedents necessitate these particular consequents +in distinction from all others. +</p> + +<p> +2. To account for any effect, all that can properly be required is, to +assign the existence and operation of a cause adequate to the production +of such effects. Free-agency itself is such a cause in the case now +under consideration. We have here given the existence and operation of a +cause which must produce one of two effects, and is equally capable, +under the circumstances, of producing either. Such a cause accounts for +the existence of such an effect, just as much as the assignment of an +antecedent necessarily producing certain consequents, accounts for those +consequents. +</p> + +<p> +3. If, as this objection affirms, an act of Will, when there is no +perceived or felt reason for that act in distinction from every other, +is equivalent to an event without a cause; then it would be as +impossible for us to <i>conceive</i> of the former as of the latter. We +cannot even conceive of an event without a cause. But we can conceive of +an act of Will when no reason, but the power of willing, exists for that +particular act in distinction from others. We cannot conceive of an +event without a cause. But we <i>can</i> conceive of the mind’s selecting +odd, for example, instead of even, without the Intellect or Sensibility +impelling the Will to that act in distinction from others. Such act, +therefore, is not equivalent to an event without a cause. The objection +under consideration is consequently wholly baseless. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="V9" id="V9">FACTS LIKE THE ABOVE WRONGLY ACCOUNTED FOR.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +IV. The manner in which Necessitarians sometimes endeavor to account for +acts of Will in which a selection is made between objects perceived and +felt to be perfectly equal, requires attention. Suppose that A and B are +before the mind. One or the other is to be selected, or no selection at +all is to be made. These objects are present to the mind as perfectly +equal. The Intelligence and Sensibility are in a state of entire +equilibrium between them. Now when one of these objects is selected in +distinction from the other, this act of Will is to be accounted for, it +is said, by referring back to the determination to make the selection +instead of not making it. The Will does not choose between A and B, at +all. The choice is between choosing and not choosing. But mark: To +determine to select A or B is one thing. To select one in distinction +from the other, is quite another. The former act does not determine the +Will towards either in distinction from the other. This last act remains +to be accounted for. When we attempt to account for it, we cannot do it, +by referring to the Intelligence or Sensibility for these are in a state +of perfect equilibrium between the objects. We can account for it only +by falling back upon the power of willing itself, and admitting that the +Will is free, and not subject to the law of Necessity. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Vj" id="Vj">CHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL—HOW TREATED BY +NECESSITARIANS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +V. The manner in which Necessitarians treat facts of this kind, to wit, +choosing between things perceived and felt to be equal, also demands a +passing notice. Such facts are of very little importance, one way or the +other, they say, in mental science. It is the height of folly to appeal +to them to determine questions of such moment as the doctrine of Liberty +and Necessity. I answer: Such facts are just as important in mental +science, as the fall of a piece of gold and a feather, in an exhausted +receiver, is in Natural Philosophy. The latter reveals with perfect +clearness the great law of attraction in the material universe. The +former reveals with equal conspicuousness the great law of Liberty in +the realm of mind. The Necessitarian affirms, that no act of Will is +possible, only in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence, or +of the strongest impulse of the Sensibility. Facts are adduced in which, +from the necessity of the case, both Faculties must be in a state of +perfect equilibrium. Neither can impel the Will in one direction, in +distinction from the other. In such circumstances, if the doctrine of +Necessity is true, no acts of Will are possible. In precisely these +circumstances acts of Will do arise. The doctrine of Necessity therefore +is overthrown, and the truth of that Liberty is demonstrated. So +important are those facts which Necessitarians affect to despise. True +philosophy, it should be remembered, never looks contemptuously upon +facts of any kind. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Vk" id="Vk">PALPABLE MISTAKE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +VI. We are prepared to notice a palpable mistake into which +Necessitarians have fallen in respect to the use which the advocates of +the doctrine of Liberty design to make of the fact, that the Will can +and does select between objects perceived and felt to be equal. +</p> + +<p> +“The reason why some metaphysical writers,” says President Day, “have +laid so much stress upon this apparently insignificant point, is +probably the <i>inference</i> which they propose to draw from the position +which they assume. If it be conceded that the mind decides one way or +the other indifferently, when the motives on each side are perfectly +equal, they infer that this may be the fact, in all <i>other</i> cases, even +though the motives to opposite choices may be ever so unequal. But on +what ground is this conclusion warranted? If a man is entirely +indifferent which of two barley-corns to take, does it follow that he +will be indifferent whether to accept of a guinea or a farthing; whether +to possess an estate or a trinket?” The advocates of the doctrine of +Liberty design to make, and do make, no such use of the facts under +consideration, as is here attributed to them. They never argue that, +because the Will can select between A and B, when they are perceived and +felt to be equal, therefore, when the Will acts in one direction, in +distinction from another, it is always, up to the moment of such action, +impelled in different directions by feelings and judgments equally +strong. What they do argue from such facts is, that the Will is subject +to the law of Liberty and not to that of Necessity. If the Will is +subject to the latter, then, when impelled in different directions by +Motives equally strong (as in the cases above cited), it could no more +act in the direction of one in distinction from the other, than a heavy +body can move east instead of west, when drawn in each direction by +forces perfectly equal. If the Will is subject to the law of Necessity, +then, in all instances of selection between objects known and felt to be +equal, we have an event without a cause. Even the Necessitarians, many +of them at least, dare not deny that, under these very circumstances, +selection does take place. They must, therefore, abandon their theory, +or admit the dogma, of events without causes. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="VI" id="VI">CHAPTER VI.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +CONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY WITH THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">The</span> argument on which Necessitarians chiefly rely, against the doctrine +of Liberty, and in support of that of Necessity, is based upon the +Divine prescience of human conduct. The argument runs thus: all acts of +the Will, however remote in the distant future, are foreknown to God. +This fact necessitates the conclusion, that such acts are in themselves +certain, and, consequently, not free, but necessary. Either God cannot +foreknow acts of Will, or they are necessary. The reply to this argument +has already been anticipated in the Introduction. The Divine prescience +is not the truth to which the appeal should be made, to determine the +philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible. This I argue, for the +obvious reason, that of the <i>mode</i>, <i>nature</i>, and <i>degree</i>, of the +Divine prescience of human conduct we are profoundly ignorant. These we +must know with perfect clearness, before we can affirm, with any +certainty, whether this prescience is or is not consistent with the +doctrine of Liberty. The Divine prescience is a truth of inspiration, +and therefore a fact. The doctrine of Liberty is, as we have seen, a +truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. It is also a fact, as +affirmed by the universal consciousness of man. How do we know that +these two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other? How do we +know but that, if we understood the <i>mode</i>, to say nothing of the nature +and degree of the Divine prescience, we should not perceive with the +utmost clearness, that this truth consists as perfectly with the +doctrine of Liberty, as with that of Necessity. +</p> + +<p> +If God foresees events, he foreknows them as they are, and not as they +are not. If they are free and not necessary, as free and not necessary +he foresees them. Having ascertained by consciousness that the acts of +the Will are free, and having, from reason and revelation, determined, +that God foreknows such acts, the great truth stands revealed to our +mind, that God does and can foreknow human conduct, and yet man in such +conduct be free; and that the mode, nature, and degree, of the former +are such as most perfectly to consist with the latter. +</p> + +<p> +I know with perfect distinctness, that I am now putting forth certain +acts of Will. With equal distinctness I know, that such acts are not +necessary, but free. My present knowledge is perfectly consistent with +present freedom. How do I know but that God’s foreknowledge of future +acts is equally consistent with the most perfect freedom of such acts. +</p> + +<p> +Perhaps a better presentation of this whole subject cannot be found than +in the following extract from Jouffroy’s “Introduction to Ethics.” The +extract, though somewhat lengthy, will well repay a most attentive +perusal. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIa" id="VIa">DANGER IN REASONING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH WE FOREKNOW EVENTS TO THAT +OF DIVINE PRESCIENCE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +“To begin, then, with a very simple remark: if we conceive that +foreknowledge in the Divine Being acts as it does in us, we run the risk +of forming a most incorrect notion of it, and consequently, of seeing a +contradiction between it and liberty, that would disappear altogether +had we a truer notion. Let us consider that we have not the same faculty +for foreseeing the future as we have of reviewing the past; and even in +cases where we do anticipate it, it is by an induction from the past. +This induction may amount either to certainty, or merely to probability. +It will amount to certainty when we are perfectly acquainted with +necessary causes, and their law of operation. The effects of such causes +in given circumstances having been determined by experience, we can +predict the return of similar effects under similar circumstances with +entire certainty, so long at least as the present laws of nature remain +in force. It is in this way that we foresee, in most cases, the physical +occurrences, whose law of operation is known to us; and such foresight +would extend much further, were it not for unexpected circumstances +which come in to modify the result. This induction can never go beyond +probability, however, when we consider the acts of free causes; and for +the very reason that they are free, and that the effects which arise +from such causes are not of necessary occurrence, and do not invariably +follow the same antecedent circumstances. Where the question is, then, +as to the acts of any free cause, we are never able to foresee it with +certainty, and induction is limited to conjectures of probability. +</p> + +<p> +Such is the operation, and such are the limits of human foresight. Our +minds foresee the future by induction from the past; this foresight can +never attain certainty except in the case of causes and effects +connected by necessary dependence; when the effects of free causes are +to be anticipated, as all such effects are contingent, our foresight +must be merely conjecture.” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIb" id="VIb">MISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +“If, now, we attempt to attribute to the Deity the same mode of +foresight of which human beings are capable, it will follow, as a strict +consequence, that, as God must know exactly and completely the laws to +which all the necessary causes in nature are subject—laws which change +only according to his will,—he can foresee with absolute certainty all +events which will take place in future. The certain foresight of +effects, therefore, which is to us possible only in particular cases, +and which, even then, is always liable to the limitation that the actual +laws of nature are not modified,—this foresight, which, even when most +sure, is limited and contingent, must be complete and absolute certainty +in God, supposing his foreknowledge to be of like kind with ours. +</p> + +<p> +But it is evident that, according to this hypothesis, the Deity cannot +foresee with certainty the volitions of free causes any more than we +can; for, as his foresight is founded, as ours is, upon the knowledge of +the laws which govern causes, and as the law of free causes is precisely +this, that their volitions are not necessary, God cannot calculate, any +more than a human being can, the influence of motives, which, in any +given case, may act upon such causes. Even his intelligence can lead no +further than to conjectures, more probable, indeed, than ours, but never +amounting to certainty. According to this hypothesis, we must, +therefore, say either that God can foresee, certainly, the future +volitions of men, and that man, therefore, is not a free being, or that +man is free, and that God, therefore, cannot, any more than we can, +foresee his volitions with certainty; and thus Divine prescience and +human free-will are brought into direct contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +But, gentlemen, why must there be this contradiction? Merely because we +suppose that God foresees the future in the same way in which we foresee +it; that his foreknowledge operates like our own. Now, is this, I ask, +such an idea as we ought to form of Divine prescience, or such an idea +as even the partisans of this system, which I am opposing, form? Have we +any reason for thus imposing upon the Deity the limitation of our own +feebleness? I think not. +</p> + +<p> +Unendowed as we are, with any faculty of foreseeing the future, it may +be difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in God. But yet can we +not from analogy form such an idea? We have now two faculties of +perception—of the past by memory, of the present by observation; can we +not imagine a third to exist in God—the faculty of perceiving the +future, as we perceive the past? What would be the consequence? This: +that God, instead of conjecturing, by induction, the acts of human +beings from the laws of the causes operating upon them, would see them +simply as the results of the free determinations of the will. Such +perception of future acts no more implies the necessity of those +actions, than the perception of similar acts in the past. To see that +effects arise from certain causes is not to force causes to produce +them; neither is it to compel these effects to follow. It matters not +whether such a perception refers to the past, present, or future; it is +merely a perception; and, therefore, far from producing the effect +perceived, it even presupposes this effect already produced. +</p> + +<p> +I do not pretend that this vision of what is to be is an operation of +which our minds easily conceive. It is difficult to form an image of +what we have never experienced; but I do assert, that the power of +seeing what no longer exists is full as remarkable as that of seeing +what has as yet no being, and that the reason of our readily conceiving +of the former is only the fact that we are endowed with such a power: to +my reason, the mystery is the same. +</p> + +<p> +But whatever may or may not be in reality the mode of Divine +foreknowledge, or however exact may be the image which we attempt to +form of it, it always, I say,—and this is the only point I am desirous +of proving,—it always remains a matter of uncertainty, which cannot be +removed, whether the Divine foreknowledge is of a kind like our own, or +not; and as, in the one case, there would not be the same contradiction +that there is in the other, between our belief in Divine foreknowledge +and human freedom, it is proved true, I think, that no one has a right +to assert the existence of such a contradiction, and the necessity that +human reason should choose between them.” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIc" id="VIc">SINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +There is no class of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent +reverence, upon the truth, that “secret things belong to God,” and those +and those only, “that are revealed to us;” that “none by searching can +find out God;” that “as the heavens are high above the earth, so are His +ways above our ways, and His thoughts above our thoughts;” and that it +is the height of presumption in us, to pretend to understand God’s mode +of knowing and acting. None are more ready to talk of mysteries in +religion than they. Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless +true, that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine foreknowledge, +against the doctrine of Liberty, and in favor of that of Necessity, is +based entirely upon the assumption that they have found out and fully +understand the <i>mode</i> of the Divine prescience of human conduct; that +they have so measured and determined the “ways and thoughts” of God, +that they <i>know</i> that he cannot foresee any but <i>necessary</i> events; that +among many events, all in themselves equally possible, and none of them +necessary in distinction from others, he cannot foreknow which, in fact, +will arise. We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he obtained +this knowledge, so vast and deep; whence he has thus “found out the +Almighty to perfection?” To me, the pretension to such knowledge appears +more like presumption than that deep self-distrust and humiliation which +becomes the Finite in the presence of the Infinite. This knowledge has +not been obtained from revelation. God has never told us that He can +foresee none but necessary events. Whether He can or cannot foresee +events free as well as necessary, is certainly one of the “secret +things” which God has not revealed. If we admit ourselves ignorant of +the <i>mode</i> of God’s fore-knowledge of future events (and who will dare +deny the existence of such ignorance in his own case?), the entire +argument of the Necessitarian, based upon that fore-knowledge, in favor +of his doctrine, falls to the ground at once. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VId" id="VId">NECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +To all that has been said above, the Necessitarian brings an objection +which he deems perfectly unanswerable. It is this: If actions are free +in the sense maintained in this treatise, then in themselves they are +uncertain. If they are still certainly known to God, they are both +certain and uncertain, at the same time. True, I answer, but not in the +same sense. As far as the <i>powers</i> of the agent are concerned, the +action may be uncertain, while God at the same time may know certainly +how he will exert his powers. In reference merely to the <i>powers</i> of the +agent, the event is uncertain. In reference to the mind of God, who +knows instinctively how he will exert these powers, the event is +certain. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="VII" id="VII">CHAPTER VII.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY UPON THE PURPOSES AND AGENCY OF GOD, +IN RESPECT TO HUMAN CONDUCT. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">All</span> truth is in harmony with itself. Every particular truth is, and must +be, in harmony with every other truth. If the doctrine of Necessity be +assumed as true, we must take one view of the relation of God’s purposes +and agency in respect to the conduct of moral agents. If, on the other +hand, we assume as true the doctrine of Liberty, quite another and a +different view, in respect to this whole subject, must be taken. In the +remarks which I have to make upon this subject, I shall assume the truth +of the doctrine of Liberty, together with those of the perfect Divine +Omniscience, Wisdom, and Benevolence. The question now arises, in the +light of all these great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes +and agency sustain to human action? In what sense does God purpose, +preordain, and bring to pass, the voluntary conduct of moral agents? To +this question but one answer can be given, in the light of the truths +before us. God purposes human action in this sense only: He determines +himself to act in a given manner, because it is wisest and best for him +to act in that manner, and in that manner only. He determines this, +knowing how intelligent beings will act under the influence brought to +bear upon them by the Divine conduct. He purposes and brings about, or +causes human action in this sense only, that in the counsels of +eternity, He, in the exercise of infinite wisdom and goodness, +preordains, and at the time appointed, gives existence to the <i>motives</i> +and <i>influences</i> under which moral agents do act, and in the light of +which they voluntarily determine their own character and conduct. +</p> + +<h2> +CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE. +</h2> + +<h2> +<a name="VIIa" id="VIIa">GODS PURPOSES CONSISTENT WITH THE LIBERTY OF CREATURES.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. We perceive the perfect consistency of God’s purposes and agency with +human liberty. If the motives and influences in view of which men do +act, do not destroy their free agency,—a fact which must be true from +the nature of the Will,—then God’s purposes to give existence, and his +agency in giving existence, to these motives and influences, cannot in +any sense destroy, or interfere with such agency. This is a self-evident +truth. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIIb" id="VIIb">SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND EVIL.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +2. We also perceive the senses in which God purposed the existence of +moral good and evil, in the universe. He purposed the existence of the +motives, in view of which He knew that a part of His subjects would +render themselves holy, and a part would render themselves sinful. But +when we contemplate all the holiness and consequent happiness which do +exist, we then perceive the reason why God gave existence to these +motives. The sin consequent, in the sense above explained, constitutes +no part of the reason for their existence, but was always, in the Divine +Mind, a reason against their existence; which reason, however, was +overpowered by infinitely more important reasons on the other side. The +good which results from creation and providence is the great and +exclusive object of creation and providence. The evil, God always +regretted, and would have prevented, if possible, i. e. if compatible +with the existence of the best possible system. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIIc" id="VIIc">DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT WILLED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +3. We also perceive the perfect consistency of those Scriptures which +represent God as, on the whole, <i>purposing</i> the death of incorrigible +transgressors, and yet as not <i>willing</i> it, but as willing the opposite. +The purpose to destroy is based upon the foreseen incorrigibleness of +the transgressor,—a purpose demanded by perfect wisdom and benevolence, +in view of that foreseen incorrigibleness. The incorrigibleness itself, +however, and the perdition consequent, are evils, the existence of which +God never willed; but are the opposite of what he willed, are evils +which a being of perfect wisdom and goodness never could, and never can +will. It is with perfect consistency, therefore, that the Scriptures +represent God, in view of incorrigibleness foreseen, as purposing the +death of the transgressor, and at the same time, in view of the fact +that such incorrigibleness is the opposite of what He wills the creature +to do, as affirming, that He is not “willing that any should perish, but +that all should come to a knowledge of the truth.” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIId" id="VIId">GOD NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +4. We see, also, how it is, that, while God does that, and eternally +purposed to do that, in view of which he eternally knew that certain of +his creatures would for ever destroy themselves, none but themselves are +in fault for such destruction. The reasons are these: +</p> + +<p> +(1.) God never did anything in view of which men ought to act thus, nor +which did not lay them under obligations infinite, to act differently, +and which was not best adapted to secure that end. +</p> + +<p> +(2.) Their destruction constituted no part of the <i>object</i> of God in +creation and providence, the opposite of this being true. +</p> + +<p> +(3.) The great object of God in creation and providence was and is, to +produce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent +happiness, and to prevent, in every possible way consistent with this +end, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery.—Now if creatures +perish under such an influence, they perish by their own fault. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIIe" id="VIIe">SIN A MYSTERY.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +5. I have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the Will, in +which evil is chosen instead of good, or sin instead of holiness. That +all intelligent beings possess the power to make such a choice, is a +fact affirmed by universal consciousness. But that any being, under any +circumstances, should make such a choice, and that he should for ever +refuse to return to the paths of virtue, notwithstanding his experience +of the consequences of sin, is an abuse of human liberty, which must for +ever remain an inexplicable mystery. When a being assigns the real +reason in view of which right is chosen, we are always satisfied with +such reason. But we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite +course. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIIf" id="VIIf">CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE.</a> +</h2> + +<p class="pns"> +One conclusion forces itself upon us, from that view of the Divine +government which consists with the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of +that government which results from this view of the subject commends +itself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe. +<i>Mysteries</i> we do and must find in it; but <i>absurdities</i> and +<i>contradictions</i>, never. Under such a Government, no being is condemned +for what he cannot avoid, nor rewarded for what he could but do. While +</p> + + <p class="p1"> +“God sits on no precarious throne, + <p class="p1s"> +Nor borrows leave to be,” +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +the destiny of the creature turns upon his own deserts, his own choice +of good or evil. The elucidation of the principles of such a government +“commends itself to every man’s conscience in the sight of God.” +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="VIII" id="VIII">CHAPTER VIII.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL. +</p> + +<h2> +SECTION I. +</h2> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">The</span> Will, as I have already said, exists in a trinity with the +Intelligence and Sensibility. In respect to the operations of the +different departments of our mental being, I lay down the two following +propositions: +</p> + +<p> +1. Obligation, moral desert, &c., are directly predicable only of the +action of the Will. +</p> + +<p> +2. For the operations of the other faculties we are accountable so far +forth only as the existence and character of such operations depend upon +the Will. In other words, it is for voluntary acts and states only that +we are accountable. This I argue because, +</p> + +<p> +1. Obligation, as we have seen, consists only with Liberty. All the +phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility, in the circumstances of +their occurrence, are not free, but necessary. Accountability, +therefore, cannot be predicated of such phenomena. We may be, and are, +accountable for such phenomena, so far forth as their existence and +character depend upon the Will: in other words, so far forth as they are +voluntary, and not involuntary, states of mind. +</p> + +<p> +2. The truth of the above proposition, and of that only, really +corresponds with the universal conviction of the race. This conviction +is expressed in two ways. +</p> + +<p> +(1.) When blame is affirmed of the operations of the Intelligence or +Sensibility, it is invariably thus affirmed: “You have no right to +<i>entertain</i> such thoughts or sentiments. You have no right <i>indulge</i> +such feeling’s.” In other words, praise or blame is never directly +predicated of these operations themselves, but of the action of the Will +relatively to them. +</p> + +<p> +(2.) All men agree, that the moral character of all actions, of all +states of mind whatever; depends upon <i>intention</i>. In no point is there +a more universal harmony among moral philosophers than in respect to +this. But intention is undeniably a phenomenon of the Will, and of that +exclusively. We must therefore admit, that moral obligation is +predicable of the Will only, or deny the fundamental convictions of the +race. +</p> + +<p> +3. The truth of the above propositions is intuitively evident, the +moment the mind apprehends their real import. A man, as he steps out of +a warm room, amid the external frosts of winter, feels an involuntary +chill over his whole system. We might with the same propriety attribute +blame to him for such feelings, as for any other feelings, thoughts, or +perceptions which exist alike independent of his Will, and especially in +opposition to its determinations. +</p> + +<p> +4. If we suppose all the voluntary acts and states of a moral agent to +be, and always to have been, in perfect conformity to moral rectitude, +it is impossible for us to impute moral guilt to him for any feelings or +thoughts which may have risen in his mind independently of his Will. We +can no more conceive him to have incurred ill desert, than we can +conceive of the annihilation of space. We may safely put it to the +consciousness of every man whether this is not the case. This renders +demonstrably evident the truth, that moral obligation is predicable only +of the Will. +</p> + +<p> +5. With the above perfectly harmonize the positive teachings of +Inspiration. For example. “Lust, when it is <i>conceived</i>, bringeth forth +sin.” The involuntary feeling does not constitute the sin, but the +action of the Will in harmony with that feeling. +</p> + +<p> +6. A single supposition will place this whole subject in a light +perfectly conspicuous before the mind. We can readily conceive that the +Will, or voluntary states of the mind, are in perfect harmony with the +moral law, while the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are opposed to +it. We can also with equal readiness make the opposite supposition, to +wit, that the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are in harmony with +the law, while the determinations of the Will are all opposed to it. +What shall we think of these two states? Let us suppose a case of no +unfrequent occurrence, that the feelings, or involuntary state of the +mind, are in perfect harmony with the law, while the action of this +Will, or the voluntary states, are in determined opposition to the law, +the individual being inflexibly determined to quench such feelings, and +act in opposition to them. Is there any virtue at all in such a state of +mind? Who would dare to say that there is? Is not the guilt of the +individual aggravated in proportion to the depth and intensity of the +feeling which he is endeavoring to suppress? Now if, as all will admit, +there is no virtue at all, when the states of the Sensibility are in +harmony with the law, and the determinations of the Will, or voluntary +states of the mind, are opposed to it, how can there be guilt when the +Will, or voluntary states, are in perfect harmony with the law, and the +Sensibility or involuntary states, opposed to it? This renders it +demonstrably evident that obligation and moral desert of praise or blame +are predicable only of the Will, or voluntary states of mind. +</p> + +<p> +7. We will make another supposition; one, if possible, still more to the +point. The tiger, we well know, has received from his Maker, either +directly or through the laws of natural generation sustained by the Most +High, a ferocious nature. Why do we not blame the animal for this +nature? The answer, perhaps, would be, that he is not a rational being, +and is therefore not responsible for anything. +</p> + +<p> +Let us suppose, then, that with this nature, God had associated +Intelligence and Free-Will, such as man possesses. Why should the animal +now be held responsible for the bare existence of this nature, any more +than in the first instance, when the effect, in both instances, exists, +alike independent of his knowledge, choice, and agency? A greater +absurdity than this never lay upon the brain of a Theologian, that the +mere existence of rationality renders the subject properly responsible +for what God himself produces in connection with that rationality, and +produces wholly independent of the knowledge, choice, and agency of that +subject. +</p> + +<p> +Let us suppose, further, that the animal under consideration, as soon as +he becomes aware of the existence and tendencies of this nature, holds +all its impulses in perfect subjection to the law of love, and never +suffers them, in a single instance, to induce a voluntary act contrary +to that law. Is it in the power of the Intelligence to affirm guilt of +that creature? Do we not necessarily affirm his virtue to be great in +proportion to the strength of the propensity thus perfectly subjected to +the Moral law? The above illustration renders two conclusions +demonstrably evident: +</p> + +<p> +1. For the mere <i>existence</i> of any constitutional propensity whatever, +the creature is not and cannot be responsible. +</p> + +<p> +2. When all the actions of the Will, or voluntary power, are in perfect +harmony with the moral law, and all the propensities are held in full +subjection to that law, the creature stands perfect and complete in the +discharge of his duty to God and Man. For the involuntary and necessary +actings of those propensities, he cannot be responsible. +</p> + +<p> +It is no part of my object to prove that men have not derived from their +progenitors, propensities which impel and induce them to sin; but that, +for the mere <i>existence</i> of these propensities, together with their +necessary involuntary action, they are not guilty. +</p> + +<h2> +SEC. II. DOGMAS IN THEOLOGY. +</h2> + +<p> +Certain dogmas in Theology connected with the subject above illustrated +here claim our attention. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIIIa" id="VIIIa">MEN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SIN OF THEIR PROGENITORS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +I. The first that I notice is the position, that creatures are now held +responsible, even as “deserving God’s wrath and curse, not only in this +life, but in that which is to come,” not merely for their own voluntary +acts of disobedience, nor for their involuntary exercises, but for the +act of a progenitor, performed when they had no existence. If God holds +creatures responsible for such an act, we may safely affirm that it is +absolutely impossible for them to conceive of the justice of such a +principle; and that God has so constituted them, as to render it +impossible for them to form such a conception. Can a being who is not a +<i>moral</i> agent sin? Is not <i>existence</i> necessary to moral agency? How +then can creatures “sin <i>in</i> and <i>through</i> another” six thousand years +before their own existence commenced? We cannot conceive of creatures as +guilty for the involuntary and necessary exercises of their own minds. +How can we conceive of them as guilty for the act of another being,—an +act of which they had, and could have, no knowledge, choice, or agency +whatever? How can intelligent beings hold such a dogma, and hold it as a +revelation from Him who has declared with an oath, that the “son shall +not bear the iniquity of the father,” but that “every man shall die for +his own sins?” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIIIb" id="VIIIb">CONSTITUTIONAL ILL-DESERT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +II. The next dogma deserving attention is the position, that mankind +derive from our first progenitor a corrupt nature, which renders +obedience to the commands of God impossible, and disobedience necessary, +and that for the mere <i>existence</i> of this nature, men “deserve God’s +wrath and curse, not only in this world, but in that which is to come.” +</p> + +<p> +If the above dogma is true, it is demonstrably evident, that this +corrupt nature comes into existence without the knowledge, choice, or +agency of the creature, who, for its existence, is pronounced deserving +of, and “bound over to the wrath of God.” Equally evident is it, that +this corrupt nature exists as the result of the direct agency of God. He +proclaims himself the Maker of “every soul of man.” As its Maker, He +must have imparted to that soul the constitution or nature which it +actually possesses. It does not help the matter at all, to say, that +this nature is derived from our progenitor: for the laws of generation, +by which this corrupt nature is derived from that progenitor, are +sustained and continued by God himself. It is a truth of reason as well +as of revelation, that, even in respect to plants, derived “by ordinary +generation” from the seed of those previously existing, it is <span class="sc">God</span> who +“giveth them a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed its own +body.” If this is true of plants, much more must it be so of the soul of +man. +</p> + +<p> +If, then, the above dogma is true, man, in the first place, is held as +deserving of eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent +of his knowledge, choice, or agency, in any sense, direct or indirect. +He is also held responsible for the result, not of his own agency, but +for that which results from the agency of God. On this dogma, I remark, +</p> + +<p> +1. It is impossible for the Intelligence to affirm, or even to conceive +it to be true, that a creature deserves eternal punishment for that +which exists wholly independent of his knowledge, choice, or agency; for +that which results, not from his own agency, but from that of another. +The Intelligence can no more affirm the truth of such propositions, than +it can conceive of an event without a cause. +</p> + +<p> +2. This dogma is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race. +Present the proposition to any mind, that, under the Divine government, +the creature is held responsible for his own voluntary acts and states +of minds only, and such a principle “commends itself to every man’s +conscience in the sight of God.” Present the dogma, on the other hand, +that for a nature which renders actual obedience impossible, a nature +which exists as the exclusive result of the agency of God himself, +independently of the knowledge, choice, or agency of the creature, such +creature is justly “bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the +law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, +temporal, and eternal,” and there is not a conscience in the universe +which will not reprobate with perfect horror such a principle. The +intuitive convictions of the race are irreconcilably opposed to it. +</p> + +<p> +3. If mankind, as this dogma affirms, have a nature from which voluntary +acts of a given character necessarily result, to talk of real <i>growth</i> +or <i>confirmation</i> in holiness or sin, is to use words without meaning. +All that influence, or voluntary acts, can do in such a case, is to +develope the nature already in existence. They can do nothing to confirm +the soul in its tendencies, one way or the other. What should we think +of the proposition, that a certain tree had formed and confirmed the +habit of bearing particular kinds of fruits, when it commenced bearing, +with the necessity of bearing this kind only, and with the absolute +impossibility of bearing any other? So the soul, according to this +dogma, commences action with the absolute impossibility of any but +sinful acts, and with the equal necessity of putting forth sinful ones. +Now, Necessity and Impossibility know and can know no degrees. How then +can a mind, thus constituted, generate and confirm the habit of sinning? +What, on this supposition, is the meaning of the declaration, “How can +ye, who are <i>accustomed</i> to do evil, learn to do well?” All such +declarations are without meaning, if this dogma is true. +</p> + +<p> +4. If God imputes guilt to the creature, for the existence of the nature +under consideration, he must have required the creature to prevent its +existence. For it is a positive truth of reason and inspiration both, +that as “sin is a transgression of the law;” that “where there is no law, +there is no transgression;” and that “sin is not imputed where there is +no law,” that is, where nothing is required, no obligation does or can +exist, and consequently no guilt is imputed. The existence of the nature +under consideration, then, is not and cannot be sin to the creature, +unless it is a transgression of the law; and it cannot be a +transgression of the law, unless the law required the creature to +prevent its existence, and prevent it when that existence was the +exclusive result of God’s agency, and when the creature could have no +knowledge, choice, or agency, in respect to what God was to produce. Can +we conceive of a greater absurdity than that? God is about to produce a +certain nature by his own creative act, or by sustaining the laws of +natural generation. He imputes infinite guilt to the creature for not +preventing the result of that act, and inducing a result precisely +opposite, and that in the absence of all knowledge of what was required +of him, and of the possibility of any agency in respect to it. Is this a +true exposition of the Government of God? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="VIIIc" id="VIIIc">PRESENT IMPOSSIBILITIES REQUIRED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +III. The last dogma that I notice is the position, that the Moral law +demands of us, as sinners, not what is now possible to us on the ground +of natural powers and proffered grace, but what would be possible, had +we never sinned. It is admitted by all, that we have not now a capacity +for that degree of virtue which would be possible to us, had we always +developed our moral powers in harmony with the Divine law. Still it is +maintained, that this degree of virtue, notwithstanding our present +total incapacity to exercise it, is demanded of us. For not rendering +it, we are justly bound over to the wrath and curse of God. In reply, I +remark: +</p> + +<p> +1. That this dogma, which is professedly founded on the express +teachings of Inspiration, has not even the shadow of a foundation in any +direct or implied affirmation of the Bible. I may safely challenge the +world to adduce a single passage of Holy Writ, that either directly or +indirectly asserts any such thing. +</p> + +<p> +2. This dogma is opposed not only to the <i>spirit</i>, but to the <i>letter</i> +of the <i>law</i>. The law, addressing men, enfeebled as their powers now +are, in consequence of sin previously committed, requires them to love +God with all their “mind and strength,” that is, not with the power they +would have possessed, had they never sinned, but with the power they now +actually possess. On what authority does any Theologian affirm, when the +law expressly makes one demand upon men, that it, in reality, makes +another, and different demand? In such an assertion, is he not wise, not +only <i>above</i>, but <i>against</i> what is written? +</p> + +<p> +3. This dogma is opposed to the express and positive teachings of +Inspiration. The Scriptures expressly affirm, Rom. xiii. 8, that every +one that exercises love, “hath fulfilled the law,” hath done all that +the law requires of him. This would not be true, did the law require a +degree of love not now practicable to the creature. Again, in Deut. x. +12, it is positively affirmed, that God requires nothing of his +creatures but to “love him with all the heart and with all the soul,” +that is, with all the powers they actually possess. This could not be +true, if the dogma under consideration is true. +</p> + +<p> +4. If we conceive an individual to yield a voluntary conformity to moral +obligations of every kind, to the full extent of his present capacities, +it is impossible for us to conceive that he is not now doing all that he +really ought to do. No person would ever think of exhorting him to do +more, nor of charging him with guilt for not doing it. We may properly +blame him for the past, but as far as the present is concerned, he +stands guiltless in the eye of reason and revelation both. +</p> + +<p> +5. Let us suppose that an individual continues for fifty years in sin. +He is then truly converted, and immediately after dies. All admit that +he enters heaven in a state of perfect holiness. Yet no one supposes +that he now exercises, or has the capacity to exercise, as high a degree +of holiness, as he would, had he spent those fifty years in obedience, +instead of disobedience to God. This shows that even those who +theoretically hold the dogma under consideration do not practically +believe it themselves. +</p> + +<p> +The conclusion to which our inquiries lead us is this: Holiness is a +voluntary conformity to all perceivable obligation. Sin is a similar +violation of such obligation. Nothing else is or can be holiness. +Nothing else is or can be sin. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="IX" id="IX">CHAPTER IX.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +THE STANDARD BY WHICH THE MORAL CHARACTER OF VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND, +OR ACTS OF WILL, SHOULD BE DETERMINED. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">In</span> the remarks which I have to make in elucidation of this subject, I +shall, on the authority of evidence already presented, take two +positions for granted: +</p> + +<p> +1. Moral obligation and moral desert are predicable only of acts of +Will. +</p> + +<p> +2. It is only of those acts of Will denominated <i>Intentions</i>, and of +course ultimate intentions, that obligation, merit and demerit, are +predicable. +</p> + +<p> +In this last position, as I have already said, there is a universal +agreement among moral philosophers. We may also safely assume the same +as a first truth of the universal Intelligence. The child, the +philosopher, the peasant, men of all classes, ages, and conditions, +agree in predicating obligation and moral desert of intention, and of +ultimate intention only. By ultimate intention, I, of course, refer to +those acts, choices, or determinations of the Will, to which all other +mental determinations are subordinate, and by which they are controlled. +Thus, when an individual chooses, on the one hand, the Divine glory, and +the highest good of universal being, as the end of his existence; or, on +the other, his own personal gratification; and subordinates to one or +the other of these acts of choice all the law of his being, here we find +his ultimate intention. In this exclusively all mankind agree in finding +the moral character of all mental acts and states. +</p> + +<p> +Now an important question arises, By what <i>standard</i> shall we judge of +the moral character of intentions? Of course, they are to be placed in +the light of the two great precepts of the Moral law by which we are +required to love God with all our powers, and our neighbor as ourselves. +But two distinct and opposite explanations have been given of the above +precepts, presenting entirely different standards of moral judgment. +According to one, the precept requiring us to love God with <i>all our +heart and strength</i>, requires a certain degree of <i>intensity</i> of +intention and feeling. On no other condition, it is said, do we love God +with <i>all</i> the heart. +</p> + +<p> +According to the other explanation, the precept requiring us to love God +with <i>all</i> the heart, &c., means, that we devote our entire powers and +interests to the glory of God and the good of his creatures, with the +sincere intention to employ these powers and interests for the +accomplishment of these objects in the <i>best possible manner</i>. When all +our powers are under the exclusive control of such an intention as this, +we then, it is affirmed, love God according to the letter and spirit of +the above precept, “with all our heart, and with all our strength.” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="IXa" id="IXa">SINCERITY, AND NOT INTENSITY, THE TRUE STANDARD.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +My object now is to show, that this last is the right exposition, and +presents the only true standard by which to judge of all moral acts and +states of mind. This I argue from the following considerations. +</p> + +<p> +1. If <i>intensity</i> be fixed upon as the standard, no one can define it, +so as to tell us what he means. The command requiring us to love with +<i>all</i> the heart, if understood as requiring a certain degree of +intensity of intention, may mean the highest degree of tension of which +our nature is susceptible. Or it may mean the highest possible degree, +consistent with our existence in this body; or the highest degree +consistent with the most perfect health; or some inconceivable +indefinable degree, nobody knows what. It cannot include all, and may +and must mean some one of the above-named dogmas. Yet no one would dare +to tell us which. Has God given, or does our own reason give us, a +standard of moral judgment of which no one can form a conception, or +give us a definition? +</p> + +<p> +2. No one could practically apply this standard, if he could define it, +as a test of moral action. The reason is obvious. No one, but +Omniscience, can possibly know what degree of tensity our nature is +capable of; nor precisely what degree is compatible with life, or with +the most perfect health. If intensity, then, is the standard by which we +are required to determine definitely the character of moral actions, we +are in reality required to fix definitely the value of an unknown +quantity, to wit: moral action, by a standard of which we are, and of +necessity must be, most profoundly ignorant. We are required to find the +definite by means of the indefinite; the plain by means of the “palpable +obscure.” Has God, or our own reason, placed us in such a predicament as +this, in respect to the most momentous of all questions, the +determination of our true moral character and deserts? +</p> + +<p> +3. While the standard under consideration is, and must be, unknown to +us, it is perpetually varying, and never fixed. The degree of intensity +of mental effort of which we are capable at one moment, differs from +that which is possible to us at another. The same holds equally of that +which is compatible with life and health. Can we believe that “the judge +of all the earth” requires us to conform, and holds us responsible for +not conforming to a standard located we cannot possibly know where, and +which is always movable, and never for a moment remaining fixed? +</p> + +<p> +4. The absurdity of attempting to act in conformity to this principle, +in reference to particular duties, will show clearly that it cannot be +the standard of moral obligations in any instance. Suppose an individual +becomes convinced that it is his duty, that is, that God requires him to +walk or travel a given distance, or for a time to compose himself for +the purpose of sleeping. Now he must will with all his heart to perform +the duty before him. What if he should judge himself bound to will to +sleep, for example, and to will it with all possible intensity, or with +as great an intensity as consists with his health? How long would it +take him to compose himself to sleep in this manner? What if he should +with all possible intensity will to walk? What if, when with all +sincerity, he had intended to perform, in the best manner, the duty +devolved upon him, he should inquire whether the intention possessed the +requisite intensity? It would be just as rational to apply this standard +in the instances under consideration, as in any other. +</p> + +<p> +5. That <i>Sincerity</i>, and not intensity of intention, presents the true +standard of moral judgment, is evident from the fact, that the former +commends itself to every man’s conscience as perfectly intelligible, of +ready definition in itself, and of consequently ready application, in +determining the character and moral desert of all moral actions. We can +readily conceive what it is to yield all our powers and interests to the +Will of God, and to do it with the sincere intention of employing them +in the wisest and best manner for the accomplishment of the highest +good. We can conceive, too, what it is to employ our powers and +interests under the control of such an intention. We can also perceive +with perfect distinctness our obligation to live and act under the +supreme control of such an intention. If we are bound to yield to God at +all, we are bound to yield our entire being to his supreme control. If +we are bound to will and employ our powers and resources to produce any +good at all, we are bound to will and aim to produce the highest good. +</p> + +<p> +This principle also is equally applicable in, determining the character +and deserts of all moral actions. Every honest mind can readily +determine the fact, whether it is or is not acting under the supreme +control of the intention under consideration. If we adopt this +principle, as expressing the meaning of the command requiring us to love +with <i>all</i> the heart, perfect sunlight rests upon the Divine law. If we +adopt any other standard, perfect midnight hangs over that law. +</p> + +<p> +6. If we conceive a moral agent really to live and act in full harmony +with the intention under consideration, it is impossible for us to +conceive, or affirm, that he has not done his entire duty. What more +ought a moral agent to intend than the highest good he can accomplish? +Should it be said, that he ought to intend this with a certain degree of +intensity, the reply is, that Sincerity implies an intention to will and +act, at all times, with that degree of intensity best adapted to the end +to be accomplished. What more can properly or wisely be demanded? Is not +this loving with all the heart? +</p> + +<p> +7. On this principle, a much greater degree of intensity, and consequent +energy of action, will be secured, than on the other principle. Nothing +tends more effectually to palsy the energies of the mind, than the +attempt always to act with the greatest intensity. It is precisely like +the attempt of some orators, to speak, on all subjects alike, with the +greatest possible pathos and sublimity. On the other hand, let an +individual throw his whole being under the control of the grand +principle of doing all the good he can, and his powers will energize +with the greatest freedom, intensity, and effect. If, therefore, the +standard of moral obligation and moral desert has been wisely fixed, +Sincerity, and nothing else, is that standard. +</p> + +<p> +8. I remark, once more, that Sincerity is the standard fixed in the +Scriptures of truth. In Jer. iii. 16, the Jews are accused of not +“turning to the Lord with <i>the whole heart</i>, but feignedly,” that is, +with insincerity. If they had turned sincerely, they would, according to +this passage, have done it with the <i>whole heart</i>. The whole heart, +then, according to the express teachings of the Bible, is synonymous +with Sincerity and Sincerity according to the above definition of the +term. This is the true standard, according to revelation as well as +reason. I have other arguments, equally conclusive as the above, to +present, but these are sufficient. The importance of the subject, +together with its decisive bearing upon the momentous question to be +discussed in the next Chapter, is my apology for dwelling thus long upon +it. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="X" id="X">CHAPTER X.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +INTUITIONS, OR MORAL ACTS, NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER; THAT IS, PARTLY +RIGHT AND PARTLY WRONG. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">We</span> are now prepared to consider the question, whether each moral act, or +exercise, is not always of a character purely unmixed? In other words, +whether every such act, or intention, is not always perfectly right or +perfectly wrong I would here be understood to speak of single acts, or +intuitions, in distinction from a series, which continues through some +definite period, as an hour or a day. Such series of acts may, of +course, be of a mixed character; that is, it may be made up of +individual acts, some of which are right and some wrong. But the +question is, can distinct, opposite, and contradictory elements, such as +sin and holiness, right and wrong, selfishness and benevolence, enter +into one and the same act No one will pretend that an individual is +virtuous at all, unless he <i>intends</i> obedience to the moral law. The +question is, can an individual intend to obey and to disobey the law, in +one and the same act? On this question I remark, +</p> + +<p> +1. That the principle established in the last Chapter really settles the +question. No one, to my knowledge, pretends, that, as far as sincerity +is concerned, the same moral act can be of a mixed character. Very few, +if any, will be guilty of the folly of maintaining, that an individual +can sincerely intend to obey and to disobey the law at one and the same +time. When such act is contemplated in this point of light, it is almost +universally admitted that it cannot be of a mixed character. But then +another test is applied—that of intensity. It is conceivable, at least, +it is said, that the intention might possess a higher degree of +intensity than it does possess. It is, therefore, pronounced defective. +On the same supposition, every moral act in existence might be +pronounced defective. For we can, at least, conceive, that it might +possess a higher degree of intensity. It has been abundantly established +in the last Chapter, however, that there is no such test of moral +actions as this, a test authorized either by reason or revelation. +Sincerity is the only standard by which to determine the character and +deserts of all moral acts and states. In the light of this standard, it +is intuitively evident, that no one act can combine such contradictory +and opposite elements as sin and holiness, right and wrong, an intention +to obey and to disobey the moral law. +</p> + +<p> +2. The opinions and reasonings of distinguished philosophers and +theologians on the subject may be adduced in confirmation of the +doctrine under consideration. Let it be borne in mind, that if the same +act embraces such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and +holiness, it must be, in reality, opposed to itself, one element +constituting the act, being in harmony with the law, and in opposition +to the other element which is opposed to the law. +</p> + +<p> +Now the remark of Edwards upon this subject demands our special +attention. “It is absurd,” he says, “to suppose the same individual Will +to oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be +opposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of +two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time.” Does not +the common sense of the race affirm the truth of this statement Sin and +holiness cannot enter into the same act, unless it embraces a serious +intention to obey and not to obey the moral law at the same time. Is not +this, in the language of Edwards, as “absurd as it is to talk of two +contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time.” +</p> + +<p> +Equally conclusive is the argument of Kant upon the same subject. Having +shown that mankind are divided into two classes, the morally good and +the morally evil; that the distinguishing characteristic of the former +is, that they have adopted the Moral law as their maxim, that is, that +it is their serious intention to comply with all the claims of the law; +and of the latter, that they have not adopted the law as their maxim; he +adds, “The sentiment of mankind is, therefore, never indifferent +relatively to the law, and he never can be neither good nor evil.” Then +follows the paragraph to which special attention is invited. “In like +manner, mankind cannot be, in some points of character, morally good, +while he is, at the same time, in others evil; for, is he in any point +good, then the moral law is his maxim (that is, it is his serious +intention to obey the law in the length and breadth of its claims); but +is he likewise, at the same time, in some points bad, then quoad [as to] +these, the Moral law is not his maxim, (that is, in these particulars, +it is his intention not to obey the law). But since the law is one and +universal, and as it commands in one act of life, so in all, then the +maxim referring to it would be, at the same time universal and +particular, which is a contradiction;” (that is, it would be his +intention to obey the law universally, and at the same time, not to obey +it in certain particulars, one of the most palpable contradictions +conceivable.) To my mind the above argument has all the force of +demonstration. Let it be borne in mind, that no man is morally good at +all, unless it is his intention to obey the Moral law universally. This +being his intention, the law has no higher claims upon him. Its full +demands are, and must be, met in that intention. For what can the law +require more, than that the voluntary powers shall be in full harmony +with its demands, which is always true, when there is a sincere +intention to obey the law universally. Now, with this intention, there +can be nothing in the individual morally evil; unless there is, at the +same time, an intention not to obey the law in certain particulars; that +is, not to obey it universally. A mixed moral act, or intention, +therefore, is possible, only on this condition, that it shall embrace +these two contradictory elements—a serious determination to obey the +law universally, and a determination equally decisive, at the same time, +to disobey it in certain particulars; that is, not to obey it +universally. I leave it with the advocates of the doctrine of Mixed +Moral Action to dispose of this difficulty as they can. +</p> + +<p> +3. If we could conceive of a moral act of a mixed character, the Moral +law could not recognize it as holy at all. It presents but one scale by +which to determine the character of moral acts, the command requiring us +to love with all the heart. It knows such acts only as conformed, or not +conformed, to this command. The mixed action, if it could exist, would, +in the light of the Moral law, be placed among the not-conformed, just +as much as those which are exclusively sinful. The Moral law does not +present two scales, according to one of which actions are classed as +conformed or not-conformed, and according to the other, as partly +conformed and partly not-conformed. Such a scale as this last is unknown +in the circle of revealed truth. The Moral law presents us but one +scale. Those acts which are in full conformity to its demands, it puts +down as holy. Those not thus conformed, it puts down as sinful; as holy +or sinful is the only light in which actions stand according to the law. +</p> + +<p> +4. Mixed actions, if they could exist, are as positively prohibited by +the law, and must therefore be placed under the category of total +disobedience, just as much as those which are in themselves entirely +sinful. While the law requires us to love with <i>all</i> the heart, it +positively prohibits everything short of this. The individual, +therefore, who puts forth an act of a mixed character, puts forth an act +as totally and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth a totally +sinful one. Both alike must be placed under the category of total +disobedience. A father requires his two sons to go to the distance of +ten rods, and positively prohibits their stopping short of the distance +required. One determines to go nine rods, and there to stop. The other +determines not to move at all. One has put forth an act of total +disobedience just as much as the other. So of all moral acts which stop +short of loving with all the heart. +</p> + +<p> +5. A moral act of a mixed character cannot possibly proceed from that +regard to moral obligation which is an essential condition of the +existence of any degree of virtue at all. Virtue, in no degree, can +exist, except from a sacred regard to moral obligation. The individual +who thus regards moral obligation in one degree, will regard it equally +in all degrees. The individual, therefore, who, from such regard, yields +to the claims of the law at all, will and must conform to the full +measure of its demands. He cannot be in voluntary opposition to any one +demand of that law. A mixed moral act, then, cannot possibly proceed +from that regard to moral obligation which is the essential condition of +holiness in any degree. This leads me to remark, +</p> + +<p> +6. That a moral act of a mixed character, if it could exist, could arise +from none other than the most purely selfish and wicked intention +conceivable. Three positions, we will suppose, are before the mind—a +state of perfect conformity to the law, a state of total disobedience, +and a third state combining the elements of obedience and disobedience. +By a voluntary act of moral election, an individual places himself in +the last state, in distinction from each of the others. What must have +been his intention in so doing? He cannot have acted from a regard to +moral rectitude. In that case, he would have elected the state of total +obedience. His intention must have been to secure, at the same time, the +reward of holiness and the “pleasures of sin”—a most selfish and wicked +state surely. The supposition of a moral act, that is, intention +combining the elements of holiness and sin—is as great an absurdity as +the supposition, that a circle has become a square, without losing any +of its properties as a circle. +</p> + +<p> +7. I remark again that the doctrine of mixed moral action is +contradicted by the express teachings of inspiration. “Whosoever cometh +after me,” says Christ, “and forsaketh not <i>all</i> that he hath, he cannot +be my disciple.” The Bible knows men only as the disciples, or not +disciples, of Christ. All who really comply with the condition above +named are His disciples. All others, however near their compliance, are +not His disciples, any more than those who have not conformed in any +degree. If an individual has really conformed to this condition, he has +surely done his entire duty. He has loved with all his heart. What other +meaning can we attach to the phrase, “forsaketh all that he hath?” All +persons who have not complied with this principle are declared to be +wholly without the circle of discipleship. What is this, but a positive +assertion, that a moral action of a mixed character is an impossibility? +</p> + +<p> +Again. “No man can serve two masters.” “Ye cannot serve God and mammon.” +Let us suppose that we can put forth intentions of a mixed +character—intentions partly sinful and partly holy. So far as they are +in harmony with the law, we serve God. So far as they are not in harmony +with the law, we serve Mammon. Now, if all our moral exercises can be of +a mixed character, then it is true that, at every period of our lives, +we can serve God and Mammon. The service which we can render also to +each, may be in every conceivable degree. We may render, for example, +ninety-nine degrees of service to God and one to Mammon, or ninety-nine +to Mammon and one to God. Or our service may be equally divided between +the two. Can we conceive of a greater absurdity than this? +</p> + +<p> +What also is the meaning of such declarations as this, “no fountain can +send forth both sweet water and bitter,” if the heart of man may +exercise intentions combining such elements as sin and holiness? +Declarations of a similar kind abound in the Bible. They are surely +without meaning, if the doctrine of Mixed Moral Actions is true. +</p> + +<p> +8. Finally. It may be questioned whether the whole range of error +presents a dogma of more pernicious tendency than the doctrine of Mixed +Moral Actions. It teaches moral agents that they may be selfish in all +their moral exercises, and yet have enough of moral purity mingled with +them to secure acceptance with the “Judge of all the earth.” A man who +has adopted such a principle will almost never, whatever his course of +life may be, seem to himself to be destitute of real virtue. He will +always seem to himself to possess enough of it, to render his acceptance +with God certain. The kind of virtue which can mingle itself with +selfishness and sin in individual intentions or moral acts, may be +possessed, in different degrees, by the worst men on earth. If this be +assumed as real holiness—that holiness which will stand the ordeal of +eternity, who will, who should conceive himself destitute of a title to +heaven? Here is the fatal rock on which myriads of minds are wrecked for +ever. Let it ever be borne in mind, that the same fountain cannot, at +the same time and place, “send forth both sweet water and bitter.” “Ye +cannot serve God and Mammon.” +</p> + +<h2> +OBJECTIONS. +</h2> + +<p> +Two or three objections to the doctrine above established demand a +passing notice here. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Xa" id="Xa">AN ACT OF WILL MAY RESULT FROM A VARIETY OF MOTIVES.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. It is said that the mind may act under the influence of a great +variety of motives at one and the same time. The same intention, +therefore, may be the result of different and opposite motives, and as a +consequence, combine the elements of good and evil. In reply, I remark, +that when the Will is in harmony with the Moral law, it respects the +good and rejects the bad, alike in <i>all</i> the motives presented. The +opposite is true when it is not in harmony with the law. The same regard +or disregard for moral obligation which will induce an individual to +reject the evil and choose the good, or to make an opposite choice, in +respect to one motive, will induce the same in respect to all other +motives present at the same time. A mixed moral act can no more result +from a combination of motives, than different and opposite motions can +result in the same body at the same time, from forces acting upon it +from different directions. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Xb" id="Xb">LOVING WITH GREATER INTENSITY AT ONE TIME THAN ANOTHER.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +2. It is said that we are conscious of loving our friends, and serving +God, with greater strength and intensity at one time than at another. +Yet our love, in all such instances, is real. Love, therefore, may be +real, and yet be greatly defective—that is, it may be real, and embrace +elements morally wrong. It is true, that love may exist in different +degrees, as far as the action of the Sensibility is concerned. It is not +so, however, with love in the form of intention—intention in harmony +with moral obligation, the only form of love demanded by the moral law. +Such intention, in view of the same degrees of light, and under the same +identical influences, cannot possess different degrees of intensity. The +Will always yields, when it really does yield at all to moral +obligation, with all the intensity it is, for the time being, capable +of, or the nature of the case demands. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="Xc" id="Xc">MOMENTARY REVOLUTIONS OF CHARACTER.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +3. On this theory, it is said, an individual may become perfectly good +and perfectly bad, for any indefinite number of instances, in any +definite period of time. This consequence, to say nothing of what is +likely to take place in fact, does, as far as possibility is concerned, +follow from this theory. But let us contemplate it, for a moment, in the +light of an example or two. An individual, from regard to moral +obligation, maintains perfect integrity of character, up to a given +period of time. Then, under the influence of temptation, he tells a +deliberate falsehood. Did his previous integrity so fuse itself into +that lie, as to make it partly good and partly bad?—as to make it +anything else than a <i>total</i> falsehood? Did the prior goodness of David +make his acts of adultery and murder partly good and partly bad? Let the +advocate of mixed moral action extract the elements of moral goodness +from these acts if he can. He can just as well find these elements here, +as in any other acts of disobedience to the Moral law. “The +righteousness of the righteous cannot save him” from total sinfulness, +any more than from condemnation “in the day of his transgression.” +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="XI" id="XI">CHAPTER XI.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY, IN ALL ACTS OR +STATES, MORALLY RIGHT OR WRONG. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">The</span> Will, sustaining the relation it does to the Intelligence and +Sensibility, must yield itself to the control of one or the other of +these departments of our nature. In all acts and states morally right, +the Will is in harmony with the Intelligence, from respect to moral +obligation or duty; and all the desires and propensities, all the +impulses of the Sensibility, are held in strict subordination. In all +acts morally wrong, the Will is controlled by the Sensibility, +irrespective of the dictates of the Intelligence. Impulse, and not a +regard to the just, the right, the true and the good, is the law of its +action. In all such cases, as the impulses which control the Will are +various, the external forms through which the internal acts, or +intentions, will manifest themselves, will be equally diversified. Yet +the <i>spring</i> of action is in all instances one and the same, impulse +instead of a regard to duty. Virtue does not consist in being controlled +by <i>amiable</i>, instead of <i>dissocial</i> and <i>malign</i> impulses, and in a +consequent exterior of a corresponding beauty and loveliness. It +consists in a voluntary harmony of intention with the just, the right, +the true and the good from a sacred respect to moral obligation, instead +of being controlled by mere impulse of any kind whatever. On the +principle above illustrated, I remark: +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIa" id="XIa">THOSE WHO ARE OR ARE NOT TRULY VIRTUOUS, HOW DISTINGUISHED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. That the real distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and +those who are not, now becomes apparent. It does not consist, in all +instances, in the mere exterior <i>form</i> of action, but in the <i>spring</i> or +<i>intention</i> from which all such action proceeds. In most persons, and in +all, at different periods, the amiable and social propensities +predominate over the dissocial and malign. Hence much of the exterior +will be characterized by much that is truly beautiful and lovely. In +many, also, the impulsive power of conscience—that department of the +Sensibility which is correlated to the idea of right and wrong, and +impels to obedience to the Moral law—is strongly developed, and may +consequently take its turn in controlling the Will. In all such +instances, there will be the external forms of real virtue. It is one +thing, however, to put on the exterior of virtue from mere impulse, and +quite another, to do the same thing from an internal respect and sacred +regard for duty. +</p> + +<p> +How many individuals, who may be now wearing the fairest forms of +virtue, will find within them, as soon as present impulses are +supplanted by the strong action of others, in opposition to rectitude, +no maxims of Will, in harmony with the law of goodness, to resist and +subject such impulses. Their conduct is in conformity to the +requirements of virtue, not from any internal intention to be in +universal harmony with moral obligation, but simply because, for the +time being, the strongest impulse happens to be in that direction. No +individual, it should ever be kept in mind, makes any approach to real +virtue, whatever impulses he may be controlled by, till, by a sealing +act of moral election, the Will is placed in harmony with the universal +law of duty, and all external action of a moral character proceeds from +this internal, all-controlling intention. Here we find the broad and +fundamental distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and those +who are not. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIb" id="XIb">SELFISHNESS AND BENEVOLENCE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +2. We are also prepared to explain the real difference between +<i>Selfishness</i> and <i>Benevolence</i>. The latter expresses and comprehends +all the forms of real virtue of every kind and degree. The former +comprehends and expresses the forms of vice or sin. Benevolence consists +in the full harmony of the Will or intention with the just, the right, +the true, and the good, from a regard to moral obligation. Selfishness +consists in voluntary subjection to <i>impulse</i>, irrespective of such +obligation. Whenever self-gratification is the law of action, there is +pure selfishness, whatever the character or direction of the impulse may +be. Selfishness has sometimes been very incorrectly defined, as a +supreme regard to our own interest or happiness. If this is a correct +definition, the drunkard is not selfish at all; for he sacrifices his +present and future happiness, to gratify a beastly appetite, and +destroys present peace in the act of self-gratification. If selfishness, +however, consists in mere subjection to impulse, how supreme his +selfishness at once appears! A mother who does not act from moral +obligation, when under the strong influence of maternal affection, +appears most distinguished in her assiduous care of her offspring. Now +let this affection be crossed by some plain question of duty, so that +she must violate the latter, or subject the former, and how soon will +selfishness manifest itself, in the triumph of impulse over duty! A gift +is not more effectual in blinding the eyes, than natural affection +uncontrolled by a regard to moral obligation. Men are just as selfish, +that is, as perfectly subject to the law of self-gratification, when +under the influence of the social and amiable propensities, as when +under that of the dissocial and malign, when, in both instances alike, +impulse is the law of action. Moral agents were made, and are required +to be, social and amiable, from higher principles than mere impulse. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIc" id="XIc">COMMON MISTAKE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +3. I notice a mistake of fundamental importance into which many appear +to have fallen, in judging of the moral character of individuals. As we +have seen, when the Will is wholly controlled by the Sensibility +irrespective of moral obligation, the impulsive department of conscience +takes its turn, among the other propensities, in controlling the action +of the voluntary power. Now because, in all such instances, there are +the exterior forms of virtue, together with an apparently sincere +internal regard for the same, the presence of real virtue is +consequently inferred. Now before such a conclusion can be authorized, +one question needs to be determined, the <i>spring</i> from which such +apparent virtues originate. They may arise from that regard to moral +obligation which constitutes real virtue. Or they may be the result +purely of excited Sensibility, which, in such instances happens to be in +the direction of the forms of virtue. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XId" id="XId">DEFECTIVE FORMS OF VIRTUE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +4. Another very frequent mistake bearing upon moral character deserves a +passing notice here. Men sometimes manifest, and doubtless with a +consciousness of inward sincerity, a very high regard for some one or +more particular principles of virtue, while they manifest an equal +disregard of all other principles. Every real reform, for example, has +its basis in some great principle of morality. Men often advocate, with +great zeal, such reforms, together with the principle on which they +rest. They talk of virtue, when called to defend that principle, of a +regard to moral obligation, together with the necessity of +self-sacrifice at the shrine of duty, as if respect for universal +rectitude commanded the entire powers of their being. Yet but a slight +observation will most clearly evince, that their regard for the right, +the true, and the good, is wholly circumscribed by this one principle. +Still, such persons are very likely to regard themselves as virtuous in +a very high degree. In reality, however, they have not made the first +approach to real virtue. Their respect for this one principle, together +with its specific applications, has its spring in some other department +of their nature, than a regard for what is right in itself. Otherwise +their respect for what is right, would be co-extensive with the entire +range of moral obligation. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIe" id="XIe">SEC. II. TEST OF CONFORMITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +In preceding chapters, the great truth has been fully established, that +the Moral law addresses its commands and prohibitions to the Will only, +and that moral obligation is predicable only of the action of the +voluntary power, other states being required, only as their existence +and character are conditioned on the right exercise of that power. From +this, it undeniably follows, that the Moral law, in all the length and +breadth of its requirements, finds its entire fulfilment within the +sphere of the Will. A question of great importance here presents itself: +By what test shall we determine whether the Will is, or is not, in full +harmony with the law? In the investigation of this question, we may +perhaps be thought to be intruding somewhat into the domain of Moral +Philosophy. Reasons of great importance, in the judgment of the writer, +however, demand its introduction here. +</p> + +<p> +The Moral law is presented to us through two comprehensive precepts. +Yet, a moment’s reflection will convince us that both these precepts +have their basis in one common principle, and are, in reality, the +enunciation of that one principle. The identical reason why we are bound +to love God with all the heart, requires us to love our neighbors as +ourselves. So the subject is presented by our Saviour himself. After +speaking of the first and great commandment, He adds, “the second is +like unto it,” that is, it rests upon the same principle as the first. +</p> + +<p> +Now the question is, What is this great principle, obedience to which +implies a full discharge of all obligation, actual and conceivable; the +principle which comprehends all other principles of the Moral law, and +of which each particular precept is only the enunciation of this one +common principle in its endlessly diversified applications? This +principle has been announced in forms somewhat different, by different +philosophers. I will present two or three of these forms. The first that +I notice is this. +</p> + +<p> +<i>It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to esteem and +treat all persons, interests, and objects according to their perceived +intrinsic and relative importance, and out of respect for their +intrinsic worth, or in obedience to the idea of duty, or moral +obligation.</i> +</p> + +<p> +Every one will readily apprehend, that the above is a correct +enunciation of the principle under consideration. It expresses the +fundamental reason why obedience to each and every moral principle is +binding upon us. The reason and only reason why we are bound to love God +with <i>all the heart</i>, is the intrinsic and relative importance of the +object presented to the mind in the contemplation of the Infinite and +Perfect. The reason why we are bound to love our neighbor as ourselves, +is the fact, that his rights and interests are apprehended, as of the +same value and sacredness as our own. In the intention under +consideration, all obligation, actual and conceivable, is really met. +God will occupy his appropriate place in the heart, and the creature +his. No real right or interest will be dis-esteemed, and each will +intentionally command that attention and regard which its intrinsic and +relative importance demands. Every moral agent is under obligation +infinite ever to be under the supreme control of such an intention, and +no such agent can be under obligation to be or to do anything more than +this. +</p> + +<p> +The same principle has been announced in a form somewhat different by +Kant, to wit: “So act that thy maxim of Will (intention) might become +law in a system of universal moral obligation”—that is, let your +controlling intention be always such, that all Intelligents may properly +be required ever to be under the supreme control of the same intention. +</p> + +<p> +By Cousin, the same principle is thus announced: “The moral principle +being universal, the sign, the external type by which a resolution may +be recognized as conformed to this principle, is the impossibility of +not erecting the immediate motive (intention) of the particular act or +resolution, into a maxim of universal legislation”—that is, we cannot +but affirm that every moral agent in existence is bound to act from the +same motive or intention. +</p> + +<p> +It will readily be perceived, that each of these forms is really +identical with that above announced and illustrated. It is only when we +are conscious of the supreme control of the intention, to esteem and +treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and +relative importance, from respect to the idea of duty, that, in +conformity with the principle as announced by Kant, our maxim of Will +might become law in a system of universal legislation. When we are +conscious of the control of such an intention, it is impossible for us +not to affirm, according to the principle, as announced by Cousin, that +all Intelligents are bound always to be under the control of the same +intention. Two or three suggestions will close what I have to say on +this point. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIf" id="XIf">COMMON MISTAKE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. We notice the fundamental mistake of many philosophers and divines in +treating of moral exercises, or states of mind. Such exercises are very +commonly represented as consisting wholly in excited states of the +Sensibility. Thus Dr. Brown represents all moral exercises and states as +consisting in emotions of a given character. One of the most +distinguished Professors of Theology in this country laid down this +proposition, as the basis of a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy, +that “everything right or wrong in a moral agent, consists exclusively +of right or wrong <i>feelings</i>”—feelings as distinguished from volitions +as phenomena of Will. Now precisely the reverse of the above proposition +is true, to wit: that <i>nothing</i> right or wrong, in a moral agent, +consists in any states of the Sensibility irrespective of the action of +the Will. Who would dare to say, when he has particular emotions, +desires, or involuntary feelings, that the Moral law has no further +claim upon him, that all its demands are fully met in those feelings? +Who would dare to affirm, when he has any particular emotions, that all +moral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings? If +the demands of the Moral law are fully met in any states of the +Sensibility—which would be true, if everything right or wrong, in moral +agents, consists of right or wrong feelings—then all moral agents, at +all times, and under all circumstances, are bound to have these same +feelings. For what the law demands, at one time, it demands at all +times. All the foundations of moral obligation are swept away by the +theory under consideration. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIg" id="XIg">LOVE AS REQUIRED BY THE MORAL LAW.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +2. We are now prepared to state distinctly the <i>nature</i> of that <i>love</i> +which is the “fulfilling of the law.” It does not, as all admit, consist +in the mere external act. Nor does it consist, for reasons equally +obvious and universally admitted, in any mere <i>convictions</i> of the +Intelligence. For reasons above assigned, it does not consist in any +states of the Sensibility. No man, when he is conscious of such +feelings, can affirm that all Intelligents are bound, under all +circumstances, to have the same feelings that he now has. This would be +true, if the love under consideration consists of such feelings. But +when, from, a regard to the idea of duty, the whole being is voluntarily +consecrated to the promotion, in the highest degree, of universal good +and when, in the pursuit of this end, there is a serious intention to +esteem and treat all beings and interests according to their intrinsic +and relative importance; <i>here</i> is the love which is the fulfilling of +the law. Here is the intention by which all intelligents, in reference +to all interests and objects, are, at all times, bound to be controlled, +and which must be imposed, as universal law, upon such Intelligents in +every system of righteous moral legislation. Here is the intention, in +the exercise of which all obligation is fully met. Here, consequently, +is that love which is the fulfilling of the law. In a subsequent +Chapter, my design is to show that this is the view of the subject +presented in the Scriptures of truth. I now present it merely as a +necessary truth of the universal Intelligence. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIh" id="XIh">IDENTITY OF CHARACTER AMONG ALL BEINGS MORALLY VIRTUOUS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +3. We now perceive clearly in what consists the real identity of moral +character, in all Intelligents of true moral rectitude. Their +occupations, forms of external deportment, and their internal +convictions and feelings, may be endlessly diversified. Yet one +omnipresent, all-controlling intention, an intention which is ever one +and identical, directs all their moral movements. It is the intention, +in the promotion of the highest good of universal being, to esteem and +treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and +relative importance, from regard to moral obligation. Thus moral virtue, +in all Intelligents possessed of it, is perfectly one and identical. In +this sense only are all moral agents capable of perfect identity of +character. They cannot all have, at all times, or perhaps at any time, +precisely the same thoughts and feelings. But they can all have, at all +times, one and the same intention. The omnipresent influence and control +of the intention above illustrated, constitutes a perfect identity of +character in God and all beings morally pure in existence. For this +reason, the supreme control of this intention implies, in all moral +agents alike, a perfect fulfilment of the law, a full discharge of all +obligation of every kind. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="XII" id="XII">CHAPTER XII.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +THE ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA. +</p> + +<h2> +SECTION I. +</h2> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">Every</span> perception, every judgment, every thought, which appears within +the entire sphere of the Intelligence; every sensation, every emotion, +every desire, all the states of the Sensibility, present objects for the +action of the Will in one direction or another. The sphere of the Will’s +activity, therefore, is as extensive as the vast and almost boundless +range of the Intelligence and Sensibility both. Now while all the +phenomena of these two last named faculties are, in themselves, wholly +destitute of moral character, the action of the Will, in the direction +of such phenomena, constitutes <i>complex</i> states of mind, which have a +positive moral character. In all instances, the <i>moral</i> and <i>voluntary</i> +elements are one and identical. As the distinction under consideration +has been overlooked by the great mass of philosophers and theologians, +and as very great errors have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy, +but in theology and morals both, I will dwell at more length upon the +subject than I otherwise should have done. My remarks will be confined +to the action of the Will in the direction of the <i>natural propensities</i> +and <i>religious affections</i>. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIa" id="XIIa">ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL +PROPENSITIES.—EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural +propensities, such as the appetites, the love of esteem, of power, &c., +I would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly +explained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting +this subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed +necessary. When any physical power operates upon any of the organs of +sense, or when any thought is present in the Intelligence, the state of +the Sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called a +<i>sensation</i> or <i>emotion</i>. When any feeling arises impelling the Will to +seek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion, this impulsive +state of the Sensibility is called a <i>desire</i>. When the Will concurs +with the desire, a complex state of mind results, called a <i>wish</i>. Wish +is distinguished from Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is +cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the +desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the +action of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, constitutes a wish +morally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction, +and the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the +desire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds +true in regard to the action of all the propensities. The excitement of +the propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, constitutes desire—a +feeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities. The action of the +Will in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, constitutes a +complex state of mind morally right or wrong. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIb" id="XIIb">ANGER, PRIDE, AMBITION, &c.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Anger, for example, as prohibited by the moral law, is not a mere +<i>feeling</i> of displeasure awakened by some injury, real or supposed, +perpetrated by another. This state, on the other hand, consists in the +surrendering of the Will to the control of that feeling, and thus acting +from malign impulse. Pride also is not the mere <i>desire</i> of esteem. It +consists in voluntary subjection to that propensity, seeking esteem and +admiration as the great end of existence. Ambition, too, is not mere +desire of power, but the voluntary surrendering of our being to the +control of that propensity. The same, I repeat, holds true in respect to +all the propensities. No mere excitement of the Sensibility, +irrespective of the action of the Will, has any moral character. In the +action of the Will in respect to such states—action which must arise in +some direction under such circumstances—moral guilt, or +praiseworthiness, arises. +</p> + +<p> +I might here adduce other cases in illustration of the same principle; +as, for example, the fact that intemperance in food and drink does not +consist, as a moral act or state, in the mere strength of the +appetite—that is, in the degree in which it is excited in the presence +of its appropriate objects. Nor does it consist in mere excess in the +quantity partaken of—excess considered as an external act. It consists, +on the other hand, in the surrendering of the voluntary power to the +control of the appetite. The excess referred to is the <i>consequent</i> and +<i>index</i> of such voluntary subjection. The above examples, however, are +abundantly sufficient to illustrate the principle. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIc" id="XIIc">RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +2. We will now contemplate the element of the Will in those complex +phenomena denominated <i>religious affections</i>. The position which I here +assume is this, that whatever in such affections is morally right and +praiseworthy, that which is directly referred to, where such affections +are required of us, is the voluntary element to be found in them. The +voluntary element is directly required. Other elements are required only +on the ground that their existence is conditioned upon, and necessarily +results from, that of the voluntary element. This must be admitted, or +we must deny the position established in the last Chapter, to wit: that +all the requirements of the Moral law are fully met in the right action +of the Will. +</p> + +<h2> +SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY. +</h2> + +<p> +My object now is to show, that this is the light in which the subject is +really presented in the Scriptures. I will cite, as examples, the three +cardinal virtues of Christianity, Repentance, Love, and Faith. The +question is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as +mere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? Are +they not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or +as acts of Will? Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such +acts? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIId" id="XIId">REPENTANCE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +In regard to Repentance, I would remark, that the term is scarcely used +at all in the Old Testament. Other terms and phrases are there employed +to express the same thing; as for example, “Turn ye;” “Let the wicked +forsake his way;” “Let him turn unto the Lord;” “He that confesseth and +forsaketh his sins shall find mercy,” &c. In all such passages +repentance is most clearly presented as consisting exclusively of +voluntary acts or intentions. The commands requiring it are, therefore, +fully met in such acts. In the New Testament this virtue is +distinguished from Godly Sorrow, the state of the Sensibility which +accompanies its exercise. As distinguished from the action of the +Sensibility, what can it be, but a voluntary state, as presented in the +Old Testament? When the mind places itself in voluntary harmony with +those convictions and feelings which attend a consciousness of sin as +committed against God and man, this is the repentance recognized and +required as such in the Bible. It does not consist in the mere +<i>conviction</i> of sin; for then the worst of men, and even devils, would +be truly repentant. Nor does it consist in the states of the Sensibility +which attend such convictions; else Repentance would be Godly Sorrow, +from which the Bible, as stated above, definitely distinguishes it. It +must consist in a voluntary act, in which, in accordance with those +convictions and feelings, the mind turns from sin to holiness, from +selfishness to benevolence, from the paths of disobedience to the +service of God. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIe" id="XIIe">LOVE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +A single passage will distinctly set before us the nature of <i>Love</i> as +required in the Bible—that love which comprehends all other virtues, +and the exercise of which is the “fulfilling of the law.” “Hereby,” says +the sacred writer, “we perceive the love of God.” The phrase “<i>of God</i>” +is not found in the original. The passage, as it there stands, reads +thus: “By this we know <i>love;</i>” that is, we know the nature of the love +which the Scriptures require, when they affirm, that “love is the +fulfilling of the law.” What is that in which, according to the express +teaching of inspiration, we learn the nature of this love? “Because he +laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the +brethren.” In the act of “laying down his life for us,” we are here +told, that the love required of us is embodied and revealed. What is the +nature of this love? I answer, +</p> + +<p> +1. It is not a conviction of the Intelligence, nor any excited state of +the Sensibility. No such thing is here referred to. +</p> + +<p> +2. It does and must consist exclusively in a voluntary act, or +intention. “He laid down his life for us.” What is this but a voluntary +act? Yet this is love, the “love which is the fulfilling of the law.” +</p> + +<p> +3. As an act of Will, love must consist exclusively in a voluntary +devotion of our entire powers to one end, the highest good of universal +being, from a regard to the idea of duty. “He laid down his life for +us.” “We <i>ought</i> to lay down our lives for the brethren.” In each +particular here presented, a universal principle is expressed and +revealed. Christ “laid down his life for us,” because he was in a state +of voluntary consecration to the good of universal being. The particular +act was put forth, as a means to this end. In a voluntary consecration +to the same end, and as a means to this end, it is declared, that “we +ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” When, therefore, the +Scriptures require love of us, they do not demand the existence of +particular convictions of the Intelligence, nor certain states of the +Sensibility. They require the voluntary consecration of our entire being +and interests to the great end of universal good. In this act of +consecration, and in the employment of all our powers and interests, +under the control of this one intention, we fulfil the Law. We fully +discharge all obligations, actual and conceivable, that are devolved +upon us. The exercise of love, like that of repentance, is attended with +particular convictions and feelings. These feelings are indirectly +required in the precepts demanding love, and required, because when the +latter does exist, the former will of course exist. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIf" id="XIIf">OF FAITH.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +But little need be said in explanation of the nature of Faith. It is +everywhere presented in the Bible, as synonymous with <i>trust</i>, reposing +confidence, committing our interests to God as to a “faithful Creator.” +Now Trust is undeniably a voluntary state of mind. “I know,” says Paul, +“in whom I have believed,” that is, exercised faith, “that he is able to +keep that which I have <i>committed</i> to him against that day.” Here the +act of committing to the care of another, which can be nothing else than +an act of Will, is presented as synonymous with Faith. Faith, then, does +not consist in conviction, nor in any excited feelings. It is a +voluntary act, <i>entrusting</i> our interests to God as to a faithful +Creator. The principle above established must apply to all religious +affections of every kind. +</p> + +<h2> +SEC. II. GENERAL TOPICS SUGGESTED BY THE TRUTH ILLUSTRATED IN THE +PRECEDING SECTION. +</h2> + +<p> +Few truths are of greater practical moment than that illustrated in the +preceding section. My object, now, is to apply it to the elucidation of +certain important questions which require elucidation. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIg" id="XIIg">CONVICTIONS, FEELINGS AND EXTERNAL ACTIONS—WHY REQUIRED, OR PROHIBITED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. We see why it is, that, while no mere external action, no state of +the Intelligence or Sensibility, has any moral character in itself, +irrespective of the action of the Will, still such acts and states are +specifically and formally required or prohibited in the Bible. In such +precepts the <i>effect</i> is put for the <i>cause</i>. These acts and states are +required, or prohibited, as the natural and necessary results of right +or wrong intentions. The thing really referred to, in such commands and +prohibitions, is not the acts or states specified, but the <i>cause</i> of +such acts and states, to wit: the right or wrong action of the Will. +Suppose, that a certain loathsome disease of the body would necessarily +result from certain intentions, or acts of Will. Now God might prohibit +the intention which causes that disease, in either of two ways. He might +specify the intention and directly prohibit that; or he might prohibit +the same thing, in such a form as this: Thou shalt not have this +disease. Every one will perceive that, in both prohibitions, the same +thing, precisely, would be referred to and intended, to wit: the +intention which sustains to the evil designed to be prevented, the +relation of a cause. The same principle, precisely, holds true in +respect to all external actions and states of the Intelligence and +Sensibility, which are specifically required or prohibited. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIh" id="XIIh">OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPECT TO SUCH PHENOMENA.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +2. We also distinctly perceive the ground of our responsibility for the +existence of external actions, and internal convictions and feelings. +Whatever effects, external or internal, necessarily result, and are or +may be known to result, from the right or wrong action of the Will, we +may properly be held responsible for. Now, all external actions and +internal convictions and feelings which are required of or prohibited to +us, sustain precisely this relation to the right or wrong action of the +Will. The intention being given, the effect follows as a consequence. +For this reason we are held responsible for the effect. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XII9" id="XII9">FEELINGS HOW CONTROLLED BY THE WILL.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +3. We now notice the <i>power of control</i> which the Will has over the +feelings. +</p> + +<p> +(1.) In one respect its control is unlimited. It may yield itself to the +control of the feelings, or wholly withhold its concurrence. +</p> + +<p> +(2.) In respect to all feelings, especially those which impel to violent +or unlawful action, the Will may exert a direct influence which will +either greatly modify, or totally suppress the feeling. For example, +when there is an inflexible purpose of Will not to yield to angry +feelings, if they should arise, and to suppress them, as soon as they +appear, feelings of a violent character will not result to any great +extent, whatever provocations the mind may be subject to. The same holds +true of almost all feelings of every kind. Whenever they appear, if they +are directly and strongly willed down, they will either be greatly +modified, or totally disappear. +</p> + +<p> +(3.) Over the action and states of the Sensibility the Will may exert an +indirect influence which is all-powerful. If, for example, the Will is +in full harmony with the infinite, the eternal, the just, the right, the +true and the good, the Intelligence will, of course, be occupied with +“whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely and of good +report,” and the Sensibility, continually acted upon by such objects, +will mirror forth, in pure emotions and desires, the pure thoughts of +the Intelligence, and the hallowed purposes of the Will. The Sensibility +will be wholly isolated from all feelings gross and sensual. On the +other hand, let the Will be yielded to the control of impure and sensual +impulse, and how gross and impure the thoughts and feelings will become. +In yielding, or refusing to yield, to the supreme control of the law of +Goodness, the Will really, though indirectly, determines the action of +the Intelligence and Sensibility both. +</p> + +<p> +(4.) To present the whole subject in a proper light, a fixed law of the +<i>affections</i> demands special attention. A husband, for example, has +pledged to his wife, not only kind intentions, but the exclusive control +of those peculiar affections which constitute the basis of the marriage +union. Let him cherish a proper regard for the sacredness of that +pledge, and the wife will so completely and exclusively fill and command +her appropriate sphere in the affections, that, under no circumstances +whatever, will there be a tendency towards any other individual. The +same holds true of every department of the affections, not only in +respect to those which connect us with the creature, but also with the +Creator. The affections the Will may control by a fixed and changeless +law. +</p> + +<p> +Such being the relation of the Will to the Sensibility, while it is true +that there is nothing right or wrong in any feelings, irrespective of +the action of the Will, still the presence of feelings impure and +sensual, may be a certain indication of the wrong action of the +voluntary power. In such a light their presence should always be +regarded. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIj" id="XIIj">RELATION OF FAITH TO OTHER EXERCISES MORALLY RIGHT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +4. In the preceding Section it has been fully shown, that love, +repentance, faith, and all other religious exercises, are, in their +fundamental and characteristic elements, phenomena of the Will. We will +now, for a few moments, contemplate the relations of these different +exercises to one another, especially the relation of <i>Faith</i> to other +exercises of a kindred character. While it is true, as has been +demonstrated in a preceding Chapter, that the Will cannot at the same +time put forth intentions of a contradictory character, such as sin and +holiness, it is equally true, that it may simultaneously put forth acts +of a homogeneous character. In view of our obligations to yield implicit +obedience to God, we may purpose such obedience. In view of the fact, +that, in the Gospel, grace is proffered to perfect us in our obedience, +at the same time that we purpose obedience with all the heart, we may +exercise implicit trust, or faith for “grace whereby we may serve God +acceptably with reverence and godly fear.” Now, such is our condition as +sinners, that without a revelation of this grace, we should never +purpose obedience in the first instance. Without the continued influence +of that grace, this purpose would not subsequently be perfected and +perpetuated. The purpose is first formed in reliance upon Divine grace; +and but for this grace and consequent reliance, would never have been +formed. In consequence of the influence of this grace relied upon, and +received by faith, this same purpose is afterwards perfected and +perpetuated. Thus, we see, that the purpose of obedience is really +conditioned for its existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance +upon Divine grace. The same holds true of the relation of Faith to all +acts or intentions morally right or holy. One act of Will, in itself +perfectly pure, is really conditioned upon another in itself equally +pure. This is the doctrine of Moral Purification, or Sanctification by +faith, a doctrine which is no less true, as a fact in philosophy, than +as a revealed truth of inspiration. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="XIII" id="XIII">CHAPTER XIII.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +INFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL JUDGMENTS. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIa" id="XIIIa">MEN OFTEN VOLUNTARY IN THEIR OPINIONS.</a> +</h2> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">It</span> is an old maxim, that the Will governs the understanding. It becomes +a very important inquiry with us, To what extent, and in what sense, is +this maxim true? It is undeniable, that, in many important respects, +mankind are voluntary in their opinions and judgments, and therefore, +responsible for them. We often hear the declaration, “You ought, or +ought not, to entertain such and such opinions, to form such and such +judgments.” “You are bound to admit, or have no right to admit, such and +such things as true.” Men often speak, also, of <i>pre-judging</i> particular +cases, and thus incurring guilt. A question may very properly be asked +here, what are these opinions, judgments, admissions, pre-judgments, +&c.? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence, or are they +exclusively phenomena of the Will? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIb" id="XIIIb">ERROR NOT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE, BUT THE WILL.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +The proposition which I lay down is this, <i>that the Intelligence, in its +appropriate exercise, can seldom if ever, make wrong affirmations; that +wrong opinions, admissions, pre-judgments, &c., are in most, if not all +instances, nothing else than phenomena, or assumptions of Will</i>. If the +Intelligence can make wrong affirmations, it is important to determine +in what department of its action such affirmations may be found. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIc" id="XIIIc">PRIMARY FACULTIES CANNOT ERR.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Let us first contemplate the action of the <i>primary</i> intellectual +faculties—Sense, or the faculty of <i>external</i> perception; +Consciousness, the faculty of <i>internal</i> observation; and Reason, the +faculty which gives us <i>necessary</i> and <i>universal truths</i>. The two +former faculties give us phenomena external and internal. The latter +gives us the logical antecedents of phenomena, thus perceived and +affirmed, to wit: the ideas of substance, cause, space, time, &c. In the +action of these faculties, surely, real error is impossible. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIId" id="XIIId">SO OF THE SECONDARY FACULTIES.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Let us now contemplate the action of the secondary faculties, the +Understanding and Judgment. The former unites the elements given by the +three primary faculties into <i>notions</i> of particular objects. The latter +classifies these notions according to qualities perceived. Here, also, +we find no place for wrong affirmations. The understanding can only +combine the elements actually given by the primary faculties. The +Judgment can classify only according to qualities actually perceived. +Thus I might go over the entire range of the Intelligence, and show, +that seldom, if ever, in its appropriate action, it can make wrong +affirmations. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIe" id="XIIIe">ERROR, WHERE FOUND.—ASSUMPTION.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Where then is the place for error, for wrong opinions, and +pre-judgments? Let us suppose, that a number of individuals are +observing some object at a distance from them. No qualities are given +but those common to a variety of objects, such as a man, horse, ox, &c. +The perceptive faculty has deceived no one in this case. It has given +nothing but real qualities. The Understanding can only form a notion of +it, as an object possessing these particular qualities. The Judgment can +only affirm, that the qualities perceived are common to different +classes of objects, and consequently, that no affirmations can be made +as to what class the object perceived does belong. The Intelligence, +therefore, makes no false affirmations. Still the inquiry goes round. +“What is it?” One answers, “It is a man.” That is my opinion. Another: +“It is a horse.” That is my judgment. Another still says, “I differ from +you all. It is an ox.” That is my notion. Now, what are these opinions, +judgments, and notions? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence? +By no means. The Intelligence cannot affirm at all, under such +circumstances. They are nothing in reality, but mere <i>assumptions</i> of +the Will. A vast majority of the so called opinions, beliefs, judgments, +and notions among men, and all where <i>error</i> is found, are nothing but +assumptions of the Will. +</p> + +<p> +Assumptions are sometimes based upon real affirmations of the +Intelligence, and sometimes not. Suppose the individuals above referred +to approach the object, till qualities are given which are peculiar to +the horse. The Judgment at once classifies the object accordingly. As +soon as this takes place, they all exclaim, “well, it is a horse.” Here +are assumptions again, but assumptions based upon real affirmations of +the Intelligence. In the former instance we had assumptions based upon +no such affirmations. +</p> + +<p> +False assumptions do not always imply moral guilt. Much of the necessary +business of life has no other basis than prudent or imprudent +<i>guessing</i>. When the farmer, for example, casts any particular seed into +the ground, it is only by balance of probabilities that he often +determines, as far as he does or can determine, what is best; and not +unfrequently is he necessitated to assume and act, when all +probabilities are so perfectly balanced, that he can find no reasons at +all for taking one course in distinction from another. Yet no moral +guilt is incurred when one is necessitated to act in some direction, and +when all available light has been sought and employed to determine the +direction which is best. +</p> + +<p> +As false assumptions, however, often involve very great moral guilt, it +may be important to develope some of the distinguishing characteristics +of assumptions of this class. +</p> + +<p> +1. All assumptions involve moral guilt, which are in opposition to the +real and positive affirmations of the Intelligence. As the Will may +assume in the absence of such affirmations, and in the direction of +them, so it may in opposition to them. When you have carried a man’s +Intellect in favor of a given proposition, it is by no means certain +that you have gained his assent to its truth. He may still assume, that +all the evidence presented is inadequate, and consequently refuse to +admit its truth. When the Will thus divorces itself from the +Intelligence, guilt of no ordinary character is incurred. Men often +express their convictions of the guilt thus incurred, by saying to +individuals, “You are bound to admit that fact or proposition as true. +You are already convinced. What excuse have you for not yielding to that +conviction?” Yet individuals will often do fatal violence to their +intellectual and moral nature, by holding on to assumptions, in reality +known to be false. +</p> + +<p> +2. Assumptions involve moral guilt which are formed without availing +ourselves of all the light within our reach as the basis of our +assumptions. For us to assume any proposition, or statement, to be true +or false, in the absence of affirmations of the Intelligence, as the +basis of such assumptions, when adequate light is available, involves +the same criminality, as assumptions in opposition to the Intelligence. +Hence we often have the expression in common life, “You had no right to +form a judgment under such circumstances. You were bound, before doing +it, to avail yourself of all the light within your reach.” +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Positive</i> assumptions, without intellectual affirmations as their +basis, equally positive, involve moral guilt of no ordinary character. +As remarked above, we are often placed in circumstances in which we are +necessitated to act in some direction, and to select some particular +course without any perceived reasons in favor of that one course in +distinction from another. Now while <i>action</i> is proper in such a +condition, it is not proper to make a positive assumption that the +course selected is the best. Suppose, that all the facts before my mind +bearing upon the character of a neighbor, are equally consistent with +the possession, on his part, of a character either good or bad. I do +violence to my intellectual and moral nature, if, under such +circumstances, I make the assumption that his character is either the +one or the other, and especially, that it is the latter instead of the +former. How often do flagrant transgressions of moral rectitude occur in +such instances! +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIf" id="XIIIf">PRE-JUDGMENTS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +A few remarks are deemed requisite on this topic. A pre-judgment is an +assumption, that a proposition or statement is true or false, before the +facts, bearing upon the case, have been heard. Such assumptions are +generally classed under the term prejudice. Thus it is said of +individuals, that they are prejudiced in favor or against certain +persons, sentiments, or causes. The real meaning of such statements is, +that individuals have made assumptions in one direction or another, +prior to a hearing of the facts of the case, and irrespective of such +facts. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIg" id="XIIIg">INTELLECT NOT DECEIVED IN PRE-JUDGMENTS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +It is commonly said, that such prejudices, or pre-judgments, blind the +mind to facts of one class, and render it quick to discern those of the +other, and thus lead to a real mis-direction of the Intelligence. This I +think is not a correct statement of the case. Pre-judgments may, and +often do, prevent all proper investigation of a subject. In this case, +the Intelligence is not deceived at all. In the absence of real data, it +can make no positive affirmations whatever. +</p> + +<p> +So far also as pre-judgments direct attention from facts bearing upon +one side of a question, and to those bearing upon the other, the +Intelligence is not thereby deceived. All that it can affirm is the true +bearing of the facts actually presented. In respect to those not +presented, and consequently in respect to the real merits of the whole +case, it makes no affirmations. If an individual forms an opinion from a +partial hearing, that opinion is a mere assumption of Will, and nothing +else. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIh" id="XIIIh">THE MIND HOW INFLUENCED BY PRE-JUDGMENTS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +But the manner in which pre-judgments chiefly affect the mind in the +hearing of a cause, still remains to be stated. In such pre-judgments, +or assumptions, an assumption of this kind is almost invariably +included, to wit: that all facts of whatever character bearing upon one +side of the question, are wholly indecisive, while all others bearing +upon the other side are equally decisive. In pre-judging, individuals do +not merely pre-judge the real merits of the case, but the character of +all the facts bearing upon it. They enter upon the investigation of a +given subject, with an inflexible determination to treat all the facts +and arguments they shall meet with, according to previous assumptions. +Let the clearest light poured upon one side of the question, and the +reply is, “After all, I am not convinced,” while the most trivial +circumstances conceivable bearing upon the other side, will be seized +upon as perfectly decisive. In all this, we do not meet with the +operations of a deceived Intelligence, but of a “deceived heart,” that +is, of a depraved Will, stubbornly bent upon verifying its own +unauthorized, pre-formed assumptions. Such assumptions can withstand any +degree of evidence whatever. The Intelligence did not give them +existence, and it cannot annihilate them. They are exclusively creatures +of Will, and by an act of Will, they must be dissolved, or they will +remain proof against all the evidence which the tide of time can roll +against them. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIi" id="XIIIi">INFLUENCES WHICH INDUCE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +The influences which induce false and unauthorized assumptions, are +found in the strong action of the Sensibility, in the direction of the +appetites, natural affections, and the different propensities, as the +love of gain, ambition, party spirit, pride of character, of opinion, +&c. When the Will has long been habituated to act in the direction of a +particular propensity, how difficult it is to induce the admission, or +assumption, that action in that direction is wrong! The difficulty, in +such cases, does not, in most instances, lie in convincing the +Intelligence, but in inducing the Will to admit as true what the +Intelligence really affirms. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIIIj" id="XIIIj">CASES IN WHICH WE ARE APPARENTLY, THOUGH NOT REALLY, MISLED BY THE +INTELLIGENCE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +As there are cases of this kind, it is important to mark some of their +characteristics. Among these I cite the following: +</p> + +<p> +1. The qualities of a particular object, actually perceived, as in the +case above cited, may be common to a variety of classes which we know, +and also to others which we do not know. On the perception of such +qualities, the Intelligence will suggest those classes only which we +know, while the particular object perceived may belong to a class +unknown. If, in such circumstances, a positive assumption, as to what +class it does belong, is made, a wrong assumption must of necessity be +made. The <i>Intelligence</i> in this case is not deceived. It places the +Will, however, in such a relation to the object, that if a positive +assumption is made, it must necessarily be a wrong one. In this manner, +multitudes of wrong assumptions arise. +</p> + +<p> +2. When facts are before the mind, an <i>explanation</i> of them is often +desired. In such circumstances, the Intelligence may suggest, in +explanation, a number of hypotheses, which hypotheses may be all alike +false. If a positive assumption is made in such a case, it must of +necessity be a false one; because it must be in the direction of some +one hypothesis before the mind at the time. Here, also, the Intelligence +necessitates a wrong assumption, if any is made. Yet it is not itself +deceived; because it gives no positive affirmations as the basis of +positive assumptions. In such circumstances, error very frequently +arises. +</p> + +<p> +3. <i>Experience</i> often occasions wrong assumptions, which are attributed +incorrectly to real affirmations of the Intelligence. A friend, for +example, saw an object which presented the external appearance of the +apple. He had never before seen those qualities, except in connection +with that class of objects. He assumed, at once, that it was a real +apple; but subsequently found that it was an artificial, and not a real +one. Was the Intelligence deceived in this instance? By no means. That +faculty had never affirmed, that those qualities which the apple +presents to the eye, never exist in connection with any other object, +and consequently, that the apple must have been present in the instance +given. <i>Experience</i>, and not a positive affirmation of the Intelligence, +led to the wrong assumption in this instance. The same principle holds +true, in respect to a vast number of instances that might be named. +</p> + +<p> +4. Finally, the Intelligence may not only make positive affirmations in +the presence of qualities perceived, but it may affirm <i>hypothetically</i>, +that is, when a given proposition is <i>assumed</i> as true, the Intelligence +may and will present the logical <i>antecedents</i> and <i>consequents</i> of that +assumption. If the assumption is false, such will be the character of +the antecedents and consequents following from it. An individual, in +tracing out these antecedents and consequents, however, may mistake the +hypothetical, for the real, affirmations of the Intelligence. One wrong +assumption in theology or philosophy, for example, may give an entire +system, all of the leading principles of which are likewise false. In +tracing out, and perfecting that system, how natural the assumption, +that one is following the <i>real</i>, and not the <i>hypothetical</i>, +affirmations of the Intelligence! From this one source an infinity of +error exists among men. +</p> + +<p> +In an enlarged Treatise on mental science, the subject of the present +chapter should receive a much more extensive elucidation than could be +given to it in this connection. Few subjects would throw more clear +light over the domains of truth and error than this, if fully and +distinctly elucidated. +</p> + +<p> +In conclusion, I would simply remark, that one of the highest +attainments in virtue which we can conceive an intelligent being to +make, consists in a continued and vigorous employment of the +Intelligence in search of the right, the just, the true, and the good, +in all departments of human investigation; and in a rigid discipline of +the Will, to receive and treat, as true and sacred, whatever the +Intelligence may present, as possessed of such characteristics, to the +full subjection of all impulses in the direction of unauthorized +assumptions. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="XIV" id="XIV">CHAPTER XIV.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIVa" id="XIVa">LIBERTY OF WILL AS OPPOSED TO MORAL SERVITUDE.</a> +</h2> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">There</span> are, among others, two senses of the term Liberty, which ought to +be carefully distinguished from each other. In the first sense, it +stands opposed to Necessity; in the second, to what is called Moral +Servitude. It is in the last sense that I propose to consider the +subject in the present Chapter. What, then, is Liberty as opposed to +Moral Servitude? <i>It is that state in which the action of Will is in +harmony with the Moral Law, with the idea of the right, the just, the +true, and the good, while all the propensities are held in perfect +subordination—a state in which the mind may purpose obedience to the +law of right with the rational hope of carrying that determination into +accomplishment</i>. This state all mankind agree in calling a state of +moral freedom. The individual who has attained to it, is not in +servitude to any propensity whatever. He “rules his own spirit.” He is +the master of himself. He purposes the good, and performs it. He +resolves against the evil, and avoids it. “Greater,” says the maxim of +ancient wisdom, “is such a man than he that taketh a city.” +</p> + +<p> +Moral Servitude, on the other hand, is <i>a state in which the Will is so +ensnared by the Sensibility, so habituated to subjection to the +propensities, that it has so lost the prerogative of self-control, that +it cannot resolve upon action in the direction of the law of right, with +any rational expectation of keeping that resolution</i>. The individual in +this condition “knows the good, and approves of it, yet follows the +bad.” “The good that he would (purposes to do), he does not, but the +evil that he would not (purposes not to do), that he does.” All men +agree in denominating this a state of Moral Servitude. Whenever an +individual is manifestly governed by appetite, or any other propensity, +by common consent, he is said to be a slave in respect to his +propensities. +</p> + +<p> +The reason why the former state is denominated Liberty, and the latter +Servitude, is obvious. Liberty, as opposed to Servitude, is universally +regarded as a good in itself. As such, it is desired and chosen. +Servitude, on the other hand, may be submitted to, as the least of two +evils. Yet it can never be desired and chosen, as a good in itself. +Every man who is in a state of servitude, is there, in an important +sense, against his Will. The <i>state</i> in which he is, is regarded as in +itself the greatest of evils, excepting those which would arise from a +vain attempt at a vindication of personal freedom. +</p> + +<p> +The same principle holds true in respect to Moral Liberty and Servitude. +When any individual contemplates the idea of the voluntary power rising +to full dominion over impulse of every kind, and acting in sublime +harmony with the pure and perfect law of rectitude, as revealed in the +Intelligence, every one regards this as a state, of all others, the most +to be desired and chosen as a good in itself. To enter upon this state, +and to continue in it, is therefore regarded as a realization of the +idea of Liberty in the highest and best sense of the term. Subjection to +impulse, in opposition to the pure dictates of the Intelligence, to the +loss of the high prerogative of “ruling our own spirits,” on the other +hand, is regarded by all men as in itself a state the most abject, and +least to be desired conceivable. The individual that is there, cannot +but despise his own image. He, of necessity, loathes and abhors himself. +Yet he submits to self-degradation rather than endure the pain and +effort of self-emancipation. No term but Servitude, together with others +of a kindred import, expresses the true conception of this state. No man +is in a state of Moral Servitude from choice—that is, from choice of +the state as a good in itself. The <i>state</i> he regards as an evil in +itself. Yet, in the exercise of free choice, he is there, because he +submits to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to freedom. +</p> + +<p class="pt1"> +REMARKS. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIVb" id="XIVb">MISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. We notice a prominent and important mistake common to metaphysicians, +especially of the German school, in their Treatises on the Will. Liberty +of Will with them is Liberty as distinguished from Moral Servitude, and +not as distinguished from Necessity. Hence, in all their works, very +little light is thrown upon the great idea of Liberty, which lies at the +foundation of moral obligation, to wit: Liberty as distinguished from +Necessity. “A free Will,” says Kant, “and a Will subjected to the Moral +Law, are one and identical.” A more capital error in philosophy is not +often met with than this. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XIVc" id="XIVc">MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +2. In the state of Moral Servitude above described, the Bible affirms +all men to be, until they are emancipated by the influence of the +Remedial System therein revealed—a truth affirmed by what every man +experiences in himself, and by the entire mass of facts which the +history of the race presents. Where is the individual that, unaided by +an influence out of himself, has ever attained to a dominion over his +own spirit? Where is the individual that, without such an influence, can +resolve upon acting in harmony with the law of pure benevolence, with +any rational hope of success? To meet this great want of human nature; +to provide an influence adequate to its redemption, from what the +Scriptures, with great propriety, call the “bondage of corruption,” is a +fundamental design of the Remedial System. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="XV" id="XV">CHAPTER XV.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVa" id="XVa">COMMON IMPRESSION.</a> +</h2> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">A very</span> common impression exists,—an impression universal among those +who hold the doctrine of Necessity,—that the doctrine of Liberty, as +maintained in this Treatise, renders man, really, in most important +respects, independent of his Creator, and therefore, tends to induce in +the mind, that spirit of haughty independence which is totally opposite +and antagonistic to that spirit of humility and dependence which lies at +the basis of all true piety and virtue. If this is the real tendency of +this doctrine, it certainly constitutes an important objection against +it. If, on the other hand, we find in the nature of this doctrine, +essential elements totally destructive of the spirit of pride and +self-confidence, and tending most strongly to induce the opposite +spirit,—a spirit of humility and dependence upon the grace proffered in +the Remedial System; if we find, also, that the doctrine of Necessity, +in many fundamental particulars, lacks these benign tendencies, we have, +in such a case, the strongest evidence in favor of the former doctrine, +and against the latter. The object of the present Chapter, therefore, is +to <i>elucidate the tendency of the doctrine of Liberty to destroy the +spirit of pride, haughtiness, and self-dependence, and to induce the +spirit of humility and dependence upon Divine Grace</i>. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVb" id="XVb">SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE DEFINED.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +Before proceeding directly to argue this question, we need to settle +definitely the meaning of the phrase <i>spirit of dependence</i>. The +<i>conviction</i> of our dependence is one thing. The <i>spirit</i> of dependence +is quite another. What is this spirit? In its exercise, the mind <i>rests +in voluntary dependence upon the grace of God</i>. The heart is fully set +upon doing the right, and avoiding the wrong, while the mind is in the +voluntary exercise of <i>trust</i> in God for “grace whereby we may serve Him +acceptably.” The <i>spirit</i> of dependence, then, implies obedience +actually commenced. The question is, does the belief of the doctrine of +Liberty tend intrinsically to induce the exercise of this spirit? In +this respect, has it altogether a superiority over the doctrine of +Necessity? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVc" id="XVc">DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY TENDS NOT TO INDUCE THE SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +1. In accomplishing my object, I will first consider the tendency, in +this one respect, of the doctrine of Necessity. An individual, we will +suppose, finds himself under influences which induce him to sin, and +which consequently, if this doctrine is true, render it impossible for +him, without the interposition of Divine power, not to sin. A +consideration of his condition tends to <i>convince</i> him, that is, to +induce the intellectual conviction, of his entire dependence upon Divine +grace. But the intellectual <i>conviction</i> of our dependence, as above +shown, is one thing. The <i>spirit</i> of dependence, which, as there stated, +consists in actually trusting the Most High for grace to do what he +requires, and implies actual obedience already commenced, is quite +another thing. Now the doctrine of Necessity has a tendency to produce +this <i>conviction</i>, but none to induce the <i>spirit</i> of dependence: +inasmuch as with this conviction, it produces another equally strong, to +wit: that the creature, without a Divine interposition, will not, and +cannot, exercise the <i>spirit</i> of dependence. In thus producing the +conviction, that, under present influences, the subject does not, and +cannot exercise that spirit, this doctrine tends exclusively to the +annihilation of that Spirit. +</p> + +<p> +When an individual is in a state of actual obedience, the tendency of +this doctrine upon him is no better; since it produces the conviction, +that while a Divine influence, independently of ourselves, produces in +us a spirit of dependence, we shall and must exercise it; and that while +it does not produce that spirit, we do not and cannot exercise it. Where +is the tendency to induce a spirit of dependence, in such a conviction? +According to the doctrine of Necessity, nothing but the actual +interposition of Divine grace has any tendency to induce a spirit of +dependence. The <i>belief</i> of this doctrine has no such tendency whatever. +The grand mistake of the Necessitarian here, consists in the assumption, +that, because his <i>doctrine has a manifest tendency to produce the</i> +<span class="sc">conviction</span> <i>of dependence, it has a tendency equally manifest to induce +the</i> <span class="sc">spirit</span> <i>of dependence;</i> when, in fact, it has no such tendency +whatever. +</p> + +<p> +<a name="XVd" id="XVd">2.</a> We will now contemplate the intrinsic tendencies of the doctrine of +Liberty to induce the spirit of humility and dependence. Every one will +see, at once, that the consciousness of Liberty cannot itself be a +ground of dependence, in respect to action, in favor of the right and in +opposition to the wrong: for the possession of such Liberty, as far as +the power itself is concerned, leaves us, at all times, equally liable +to do the one as the other. How can an equal liability to two distinct +and opposite courses, be a ground of assurance, that we shall choose the +one, and avoid the other? Thus the consciousness of Liberty tends +directly and intrinsically to a total annihilation of the spirit of +self-dependence. +</p> + +<p> +Let us now contemplate our relation to the Most High. He knows perfectly +in what direction we shall, in our self-determination, exert our powers +under any influence and system of influences brought to bear upon us. It +is also in His power to subject us to any system of influences he +pleases. He has revealed to us the great truth, that if, in the exercise +of the spirit of dependence, we will trust Him for grace to do the good +and avoid the evil which He requires us to do and avoid, He will subject +us to a Divine influence, which shall for ever secure us in the one, and +against the other. The conviction, therefore, rises with full and +perfect distinctness in the mind, that, in the exercise of the spirit of +dependence, action in all future time, in the direction of purity and +bliss, is secure; and that, in the absence of this spirit, action, in +the opposite direction, is equally certain. In the belief of the +doctrine of Liberty, another truth becomes an omnipresent reality to our +minds, that the <i>exercise</i> of this spirit, thus rendering our “calling +and election sure,” is, at all times, practicable to us. What then is +the exclusive tendency of this doctrine? To destroy the spirit of +self-dependence, on the one hand, and to induce the exercise of the +opposite spirit, on the other. The doctrine of Necessity reveals the +<i>fact</i> of dependence, but destroys the <i>spirit</i>, by the production of +the annihilating conviction, that we neither shall nor can exercise that +spirit, till God, in his sovereign dispensations, shall subject us to an +influence which renders it impossible for us not to exercise it. The +doctrine of Liberty reveals, with equal distinctness, the <i>fact</i> of +dependence; and then, while it produces the hallowed conviction of the +perfect practicability of the exercise of the <i>spirit</i> of dependence, +presents motives infinitely strong, not only to induce its exercise, but +to empty the mind wholly of everything opposed to it. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVe" id="XVe">GOD CONTROLS ALL INFLUENCES UNDER WHICH CREATURES DO ACT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +3. While the existence and continuance of our powers of moral agency +depend wholly upon the Divine Will, and while the Most High knows, with +entire certainty, in what direction we shall exert our powers, under all +influences, and systems of influences, brought to bear upon us, all +these influences are entirely at his disposal. What tendency have such +convictions, together with the consciousness of Liberty, and ability to +exercise, or not to exercise, the spirit of dependence, but to induce +us, in the exercise of that spirit, to throw our whole being into the +petition, “Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil?” If +God knows perfectly under what influences action in us shall be in the +direction of the right, or the wrong, and holds all such influences at +his own control, what attitude becomes us in the presence of the “High +and lofty One,” but dependence and prayer? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVf" id="XVf">DEPENDENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE WILL.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +4. Finally, a consciousness of a state of Moral Servitude, together with +the conviction, that in the exercise of the spirit of dependence, we can +rise to the “Glorious Liberty of the Sons of God;” that in the absence +of this spirit, our Moral Servitude is perfectly certain; all these, +together with the conviction which the belief of the doctrine of Liberty +induces (to wit: that the exercise of the spirit of dependence is always +practicable to us), tends only to one result, to induce the exercise of +that spirit, and to the total annihilation of the opposite spirit. +</p> + +<p> +While, therefore, the doctrine of Liberty sanctifies, in the mind, the +feeling of obligation to do the right and avoid the wrong, a feeling +which the doctrine of Necessity tends to annihilate, the former (an +effect which the latter cannot produce) tends only to the annihilation +of the spirit of pride and self-confidence, and to induce that spirit of +filial dependence which cries “Abba, Father!” +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="XVI" id="XVI">CHAPTER XVI.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +FORMATION OF CHARACTER. +</p> + +<h2> +ELEMENT OF WILL IN FORMATION OF CHARACTER. +</h2> + +<h2> +CHARACTER COMMONLY HOW ACCOUNTED FOR. +</h2> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">In</span> accounting for the existence and formation of peculiarities of +character, individual, social, and national, two elements only are +commonly taken into consideration, the <i>natural propensities</i>, and the +<i>circumstances and influences</i> under which those propensities are +developed and controlled. The doctrine of Necessity permits us to take +nothing else into the account. Undoubtedly, these elements have very +great efficacy in determining character. In many instances, little else +need to be taken into consideration, in accounting for peculiarities of +character, as they exist around us, in individuals, communities, and +nations. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVIa" id="XVIa">THE VOLUNTARY ELEMENT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE ACCOUNT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +In a vast majority of cases, however, another, and altogether a +different element, that of the Will, or voluntary element, must be taken +into the reckoning, or we shall find ourselves wholly unable to account +for peculiarities of mental and moral development, everywhere visible +around us. It is an old maxim, that “every man is the arbiter of his own +destiny.” As character determines destiny, so the Will determines +character; and man is the arbiter of his own destiny, only as he is the +arbiter of his own character. The element of Free Will, therefore, must +be taken into the reckoning, if we would adequately account for the +peculiarities of character which the individual, social, and national +history of the race presents. Even where mental and moral developments +are as the propensities and external influences, still the voluntary +element must be reckoned in, if we would account for facts as they +exist. In a majority of instances, however, if the two elements under +consideration, and these only, are taken into the account, we shall find +our conclusions very wide from the truth. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVIb" id="XVIb">AN EXAMPLE IN ILLUSTRATION.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +I will take, in illustration of the above remarks, a single example—a +case with which I became so familiarly acquainted, that I feel perfectly +safe in vouching for the truth of the statements which I am about to +make. I knew a boy who, up to the age of ten or twelve years, was under +the influence of a most ungovernable temper—a temper easily and quickly +excited, and which, when excited, rendered him perfectly desperate. +Seldom, if ever, was he known to yield in a conflict, however superior +in strength his antagonist might be. Death was always deliberately +preferred to submission. During this period, he often reflected upon his +condition, and frequently wished that it was otherwise. Still, with +melancholy deliberation, he as often said to himself, I never can and +never shall subdue this temper. At the close of this period, as he was +reflecting upon the subject again, he made up his mind, with perfect +fixedness of purpose, that, to the control of that temper, he would +never more yield. The Will rose up in the majesty of its power, and +assumed the reins of self-government, in the respect under +consideration. From that moment, that temper almost never, even under +the highest provocations, obtained the control of the child. A total +revolution of mental developments resulted. He afterwards became as +distinguished for natural amiability and self-control, in respect to his +temper, as before he had been for the opposite spirit. This total +revolution took place from mere prudential considerations, without any +respect whatever to moral obligation. +</p> + +<p> +Now suppose we attempt to account for these distinct and opposite +developments of character—developments exhibited by the same +individual, in these two periods—by an exclusive reference to natural +propensities and external influences. What a totally inadequate and +false account should we give of the facts presented! That individual is +just as conscious, that it was the element of Free Will that produced +this revolution, and that when he formed the determination which +resulted in that revolution, he might have determined differently, as he +is, or ever has been, of any mental states whatever. All the facts, +also, as they lie out before us, clearly indicate, that if we leave out +of the account the voluntary element, those facts must remain wholly +unexplained, or a totally wrong explanation of them must be given. +</p> + +<p> +The same principle holds true in all other instances. Though natural +propensities and external influences greatly <i>modify</i> mental +developments, still, the <i>distinguishing</i> peculiarities of character, in +all instances, receive their form and coloring from the action of the +voluntary power. This is true, of the peculiarities of character +exhibited, not only by individuals, but communities and nations. We can +never account for facts as they are, until we contemplate man, not only +as possessed of Intelligence and Sensibility, but also of Free Will. All +the powers and susceptibilities must be taken into the account, if men +would know man as he is. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVIc" id="XVIc">DIVERSITIES OF CHARACTER.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +A few important definitions will close this Chapter. +</p> + +<p> +A <i>decisive</i> character exists, where the Will acts in harmony with +propensities strongly developed. When a number of propensities of this +kind exist, action, and consequently character, may be changeable, and +yet decisive. +</p> + +<p> +<i>Unity</i> and <i>decision</i> of character result, when the Will steadily acts +in harmony with some one over-shadowing propensity. +</p> + +<p> +Character is <i>fluctuating</i> and <i>changeable</i>, when the Will surrenders +itself to the control of different propensities, each easily and highly +excited in the presence of its appropriate objects, and yet the +excitement but temporary. Thus, different propensities, in rapid +succession, take their turn in controlling the Will. +</p> + +<p> +<i>Indecision</i> and <i>feebleness</i> of character result, when the Will +uniformly acts under the influence of the principle of <i>fear</i> and +<i>caution</i>. To such a mind, in all important enterprises especially, +there is always “a lion in the way.” Such a mind, therefore, is +continually in a state of distressing indecision when energetic action +is necessary to success. +</p> + + + + +<h1> +<a name="XVII" id="XVII">CHAPTER XVII.</a> +</h1> + +<p class="pt1"> +CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. +</p> + +<p class="pnn"> +<span class="sc">A few</span> reflections of a general nature will conclude this Treatise. +</p> + +<h2> +OBJECTION. THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS. +</h2> + +<p> +1. An objection, often adduced, to the entire view of the subject +presented in this Treatise, demands a passing notice here. All things in +existence, it is said, and the Will among the rest, are governed by +<i>Laws</i>. It is readily admitted, that all things have their laws, and +that the Will is not without law. It is jumping a very long distance to +a conclusion, however, to infer from such a fact, that Necessity is the +only law throughout the entire domain of existence, physical and mental. +What if, from the fact, that the Will has its law, it should be assumed +that Liberty is that law? This assumption would be just as legitimate as +the one under consideration. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVIIa" id="XVIIa">OBJECTION. GOD DETHRONED FROM HIS SUPREMACY, IF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY +IS TRUE.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +2. Another objection of a general nature, is the assumption, that the +doctrine of Liberty destroys the Divine supremacy in the realm of mind. +“If man,” says Dr. Chalmers, “is not a necessary agent, God is a +degraded sovereign.” A sentiment more dishonorable to God, more fraught +with fatal error, more revolting to a virtuous mind, when unperverted by +a false theory, could scarcely be uttered. Let us, for a moment, +contemplate the question, whether the doctrine of Liberty admits a +Divine government in the realm of mind. The existence and perpetuity, as +stated in a former Chapter, of free and moral agency in creatures, +depend wholly upon the Divine Will. With a perfect knowledge of the +direction in which they will exert their powers, under every kind and +degree of influence to which they may be subjected, He holds all these +influences at his sovereign disposal. With such knowledge and resources, +can God exercise no government, but that of a degraded sovereignty in +the realm of mind? Can He not exercise the very sovereignty which +infinite wisdom and love desire? Who would dare affirm the contrary? If +the doctrine of Liberty is true, God certainly does not sit upon the +throne of iron destiny, swaying the sceptre of stern fate over myriads +of subjects, miscalled moral agents; subjects, all of whom are +commanded, under infinite sanctions, to do the right and avoid the +wrong, while subjected to influences by the Most High himself, which +render obedience in some, and disobedience in others, absolute +impossibilities. Still, in the light of this doctrine, God has a +government in the domain of mind, a government wisely adapted to the +nature of moral agents—agents capable of incurring the desert of praise +or blame; a government which all approve, and under the benign influence +of which, all who have not forfeited its protection by crime, may find +“quietness and assurance for ever.” +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVIIb" id="XVIIb">OBJECTION. GREAT AND GOOD MEN HAVE HELD THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +3. In reply to what has been said in respect to the <i>tendencies</i> of the +doctrine of Necessity, the fact will doubtless be adduced, that the +greatest and best of men have held this doctrine, without a development +of these tendencies in their experience. My answer is, that the goodness +of such men, their sense of moral obligation, &c., did not result from +their theory, but existed in spite of its intrinsic tendencies. They +held this doctrine in theory, and yet, from a <i>consciousness</i> of +Liberty, they practically adopted the opposite doctrine. Here, we have +the source of the deep feeling of obligation in their minds, while the +intrinsic and exclusive tendency of their <i>Theory</i>, even in them, was to +weaken and annihilate this hallowed feeling. The difference between such +men and sceptics is this: The piety of the former prevents their +carrying out their theory to its legitimate results; while the impiety +of the latter leads them to march boldly up to those results—a fearless +denial of moral obligation in every form. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVIIc" id="XVIIc">LAST RESORT.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +4. The final resort of certain Necessitarians, who may feel themselves +wholly unable to meet the arguments adduced against their own and in +favor of the opposite theory, and are determined to remain fixed in +their opinions, may be readily anticipated. It is an assumption which +may be expressed in language somewhat like the following: “After all, +the immortal work of Edwards still lives, and will live, when those of +his opponents will be lost in oblivion. That work still remains +unanswered.” A sweeping assumption is a very easy and summary way of +disposing of a difficulty, which we might not otherwise know what to do +with. Let us for a moment contemplate some of the facts which have been +undeniably established in reference to this immortal work. +</p> + +<p> +(1.) At the outset, Edwards stands convicted of a fundamental error in +philosophy, an error which gives form and character to his whole +work—the confounding of the Will with the Sensibility, and thus +confounding the characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty +with those of the phenomena of the latter. +</p> + +<p> +(2.) His whole work is constructed without an appeal to Consciousness, +the only proper and authoritative tribunal of appeal in the case. Thus +his reasonings have only an accidental bearing upon his subject. +</p> + +<p> +(3.) All his fundamental conclusions have been shown to stand in direct +contradiction to the plainest and most positive testimony of universal +Consciousness. +</p> + +<p> +(4.) His main arguments have been shown to be nothing else but reasoning +in a circle. He defines, for example, the phrase “Greatest apparent +good,” as synonymous with <i>choosing</i>, and then argues, from the fact +that the “Will always is as the greatest apparent good,” that is, that +it always chooses as it chooses, that it is subject to the law of +Necessity. +</p> + +<p> +So in respect to the argument from the Strongest Motive, which, by +definition, is fixed upon as the Motive in the direction of which the +Will, in each particular instance, acts. From the fact that the action +of the Will is always in the direction of this Motive, that is, in the +direction of the Motive towards which it does act, the conclusion is +gravely drawn, that the Will is and must be subject, in all its +determinations, to the law of Necessity. I find my mind acted upon by +two opposite Motives. I cannot tell which is the strongest, from a +contemplation of what is intrinsic in the Motives themselves, nor from +their effects upon my Intelligence or Sensibility. I must wait till my +Will has acted. From the fact of its action in the direction of one +Motive, in distinction from the other, I must then draw two important +conclusions. 1. The Motive, in the direction of which my Will did act, +is the strongest. The evidence is, the <i>fact</i> of its action in that +direction. 2. The Will must be subject to the law of Necessity. The +proof is, the action of the Will in the direction of the Strongest +Motive, that is, the Motive in the direction of which it did act. Sage +argument to be regarded by Philosophers and Theologians of the 19th +century, as possessing the elements of immortality! +</p> + +<p> +(5.) His argument from the Divine fore-knowledge has been shown to be +wholly based upon an <i>assumption</i> unauthorized by reason, or revelation +either, to wit: that he understands the <i>mode</i> of that Fore-knowledge,— +an assumption which cannot be made except through ignorance, as was true +in his case, without the greatest impiety and presumption. +</p> + +<p> +(6.) The theory which Edwards opposes has been shown to render sacred, +in all minds that hold it, the great idea of <i>duty</i>, of moral +obligation; while the validity of that idea has never, in any age or +nation, been denied, excepting on the avowed authority of his Theory. +</p> + +<p> +(7.) All the arguments in proof of the doctrine of Necessity, with the +single exception of that from the Divine Fore-knowledge—an argument +resting, as we have seen, upon an assumption equally baseless,—involve +a begging of the question at issue. Take any argument we please, with +this one exception, and it will be seen at once that it has no force at +all, unless the truth of the doctrine designed to be established by it, +be assumed as the basis of that argument. Shall we pretend that a +Theory, that has been fully demonstrated to involve, fundamentally, the +errors, absurdities, and contradictions above named, has not been +answered? +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVIId" id="XVIId">WILLING, AND AIMING TO PERFORM IMPOSSIBILITIES.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +5. We are now prepared to answer a question about which philosophers +have been somewhat divided in opinion—the question, whether the Will +can act in the direction of perceived and affirmed impossibilities? The +true answer to this question, doubtless is, that the Mind may <i>will</i> the +occurrence of a known impossibility, but it can never <i>aim</i> to produce +such an occurrence. +</p> + +<p> +The Mind, for example, while it regards the non-existence of God as that +which cannot possibly occur, may come into such a relation to the Most +High, that the <i>desire</i> shall arise that God were not. With this desire, +the Will may concur, in the <i>wish</i>, that there were no God. Here the +Mind wills a known impossibility. In a similar manner, the Mind may will +its own non-existence, while it regards its occurrence, on account of +its relation to the Divine Will, as impossible. +</p> + +<p> +But while the Mind may thus <i>will</i> the occurrence of an impossibility, +it never can, nor will aim, that is, intend, to produce what it regards +as an impossibility. A creature may will the non-existence of God; but +even a fallen Spirit, regarding the occurrence as an absolute +impossibility, never did, nor will aim to annihilate the Most High. To +suppose the Will to set itself to produce an occurrence regarded as +impossible, involves a contradiction. +</p> + +<p> +For the same reason, the Will will never set itself upon the +accomplishment of that which it is perfectly assured it never shall +accomplish, however sincere its efforts towards the result may be. All +such results are, to the Mind, <i>practical</i> impossibilities. Extinguish +totally in the Mind the <i>hope</i> of obtaining the Divine favor, and the +Divine favor will never be sought. Produce in the Mind the conviction, +that should it aim at the attainment of a certain end, there is an +infallible certainty that it will not attain it, and the subject of that +conviction will no more aim to attain that end, than he will aim to +cause the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be. +</p> + +<p> +In reply, it is sometimes said, that men often aim at what they regard +even as an impossible attainment. The painter, for example, aims to +produce a <i>perfect</i> picture, while he knows well that he cannot produce +one. I answer, the painter is really aiming at no such thing. He is not +aiming to produce a perfect picture, which he knows he cannot, and will +not produce, but to produce one as <i>nearly</i> perfect as he can. This is +what he is really aiming at. Question the individual critically, and he +will confirm what is here affirmed. Remind him of the fact, that he +cannot produce a perfect picture. I know that, he replies. I am +determined, however, to produce one as <i>nearly</i> perfect as possible. +Here his real aim stands revealed. The same principle holds true in all +other instances. +</p> + +<h2> +<a name="XVIIe" id="XVIIe">THOUGHT AT PARTING.</a> +</h2> + +<p> +6. In taking leave of the reader, I would simply say, that if he has +distinctly apprehended the great doctrine designed to be established in +this Work, and has happily come to an agreement with the author in +respect to it, the following hallowed impression has been left very +distinctly upon his mind. While he finds himself in a state of profound +and most pleasing dependence upon the Author of his being, in the Holy +of Holies of the inner sanctuary of his mind, one idea, the great +over-shadowing idea of the human Intelligence, has been fully +sanctified—the idea of <i>duty</i>, of <i>moral obligation</i>. With the +consciousness of Liberty, that idea must be to the mind an omnipresent +reality. From it we can never escape and in all states, and in all +worlds, it must and will be to us, as a guardian angel, or an avenging +fiend. But one thing remains, and that is, through the grace proffered +in the Remedial System, to “live and move, and have our being,” in +harmony with that idea, thus securing everlasting “quietness and +assurance” in the sanctuary of our minds, and ever enduring peace and +protection under, the over-shadowing perfections of the Author of our +existence, and amid all the arrangements and movements of his eternal +government. +</p> + + + +<h1> +<a name="Footnotes" id="Footnotes">FOOTNOTES</a> +</h1> + +<p> +<sup><a href="#f1" id="n1" name="n1">[1]</a></sup> See Upham on the Will, pp. 32-35. +</p> + +<p> +<sup><a href="#f2" id="n2" name="n2">[2]</a></sup> The above is a perfectly correct statement of the famous distinction +between natural and moral ability made by Necessitarians. The sinner is +under obligation to do right, they say, because he might do what is +required of him, if he chose to do it. He has, therefore, <i>natural</i> but +not <i>moral</i> power to obedience. But the choice which the sinner wants, +the absence of which constitutes his moral inability, is the very thing +required of him. When, therefore, the Necessitarian says, that the +sinner is under obligation to obey, because he might obey if he chose to +do it, the real meaning is, that the sinner is under obligation to +obedience, because if he should choose to obey he would choose to obey. +In other words he is under obligation to obedience, because, if he did +obey, he would obey. +</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Doctrine of the Will, by Asa Mahan + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DOCTRINE OF THE WILL *** + +***** This file should be named 38621-h.htm or 38621-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/6/2/38621/ + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + +</pre> + +</body> +</html> + diff --git a/38621.txt b/38621.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2aabbb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/38621.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5602 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Doctrine of the Will, by Asa Mahan + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Doctrine of the Will + +Author: Asa Mahan + +Release Date: January 20, 2012 [EBook #38621] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DOCTRINE OF THE WILL *** + + + + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + + + + +Contents +Dedicatory Preface +Footnotes + +DOCTRINE + +OF + +THE WILL. + +BY REV. A. MAHAN, + +PRESIDENT OF THE OBERLIN COLLEGIATE INSTITUTE. + + "Not man alone, all rationals Heaven arms + With an illustrious, but tremendous power, + To counteract its own most gracious ends; + And this, of strict necessity, not choice; + That power denied, men, angels, were no more + But passive engines void of praise or blame. + A nature rational implies the power + Of being blest, or wretched, as we please. + + Man falls by man, if finally he falls; + And fall he must, who learns from death alone, + The dreadful secret--That he lives for ever." + YOUNG. + +NEW YORK: + +MARK H. NEWMAN, 199 BROADWAY. + +OBERLIN; OHIO: R. E. GILLET. + +1845. + + + + +Entered according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1844, by + +ASA MAHAN, + +In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for +the Southern District of New York. + +S. W. BENEDICT & CO., STER. & PRINT., + +16 Spruce street. + + + + +CONTENTS. + +CHAPTER I. + +INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS.--Importance of the Subject--True and +false Methods of Inquiry--Common Fault--Proper Method of Reasoning +from Revelation to the System of Mental Philosophy therein +pre-supposed--Errors of Method + +CHAPTER II. + +CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES.--Classification verified + +CHAPTER III. + +LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.--Terms defined--Characteristics of the +above Definitions--Motive defined--Liberty as opposed to Necessity, +the Characteristic of the Will--Objections to Doctrine of +Necessity--Doctrine of Liberty, direct Argument--Objection to an Appeal +to Consciousness--Doctrine of Liberty argued from the existence of the +idea of Liberty in all Minds--The Doctrine of Liberty, the Doctrine of +the Bible--Necessity as held by Necessitarians--The term Certainty, as +used by them--Doctrine of Ability, according to the Necessitarian +Scheme--Sinful inclinations--Necessitarian Doctrine of Liberty--Ground +which Necessitarians are bound to take in respect to the Doctrine of +Ability--Doctrine of Necessity, as regarded by Necessitarians of +different Schools + +CHAPTER IV. + +EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL.--Strongest +Motive--Reasoning in a Circle + +CHAPTER V. + +GREATEST APPARENT GOOD.--Phrase defined--Its meaning according to +Edwards--The Will not always as the Dictates of the Intelligence--Not +always as the strongest desire--Nor as the Intelligence and Sensibility +combined--Necessitarian Argument--Motives cause acts of the Will, in +what sense--Particular Volitions, how accounted for--Facts wrongly +accounted for--Choosing between Objects known to be equal, how treated +by Necessitarians--Palpable Mistake + +CHAPTER VI. + +DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY AND THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE.--Dangers to be +avoided--Mistake respecting Divine Prescience--Inconsistency of +Necessitarians--Necessitarian Objection + +CHAPTER VII. + +DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY AND THE DIVINE PURPOSES AND AGENCY.--God's Purposes +consistent with the Liberty of Creatures--Senses in which God purposed +moral Good and Evil--Death of the Incorrigible preordained, but not +willed--God not responsible for their Death--Sin a Mystery--Conclusion +from the above + +CHAPTER VIII. + +OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL.--Men not responsible for the Sin +of their progenitors--Constitutional Ill-desert--Present Impossibilities +not required + +CHAPTER IX. + +STANDARD OF MORAL CHARACTER.--Sincerity, and not Intensity, the true +Standard + +CHAPTER X. + +MORAL ACTS NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER.--Acts of Will resulting from a +variety of Motives--Loving with a greater Intensity at one time than +another--Momentary Revolutions of Character + +CHAPTER XI. + +RELATIONS OF THE WILL TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY, IN STATES +MORALLY RIGHT, OR WRONG.--Those who are and are not virtuous, how +distinguished--Selfishness and Benevolence--Common Mistake--Defective +forms of Virtue--Test of Conformity to Moral Principle--Common +Mistake--Love as required by the Moral Law--Identity of Character among +all Beings morally Virtuous + +CHAPTER XII. + +ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA.--Natural +Propensities--Sensation, Emotion, Desire, and Wish defined--Anger, +Pride, Ambition, &c.--Religious Affections--Repentance--Love--Faith-- +Convictions, Feelings and external Actions, why required or prohibited-- +Our Responsibility in respect to such Phenomena--Feelings how controlled +by the Will--Relation of Faith to other Exercises morally right + +CHAPTER XIII. + +INFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL JUDGMENTS.--Men often voluntary in +their Opinions--Error not from the Intelligence, but Will--Primary +Faculties cannot err--So of the secondary Faculties--Assumptions-- +Pre-judgments--Intellect not deceived in Pre-judgments--Mind, how +influenced by them--Influences which induce false Assumptions--Cases +in which we are apparently, though not really, misled by the Intelligence + +CHAPTER XIV. + +LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE.--Liberty as opposed to moral Servitude--Mistake +of German Metaphysicians--Moral Servitude of the race + +CHAPTER XV. + +LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE.--Common Impression--Spirit of +Dependence--Doctrine of Necessity tends not to induce this +Spirit--Doctrine of Liberty does--God controls all Influences under +which Creatures act--Dependence on account of moral Servitude + +CHAPTER XVI. + +FORMATION OF CHARACTER.--Commonly how accounted for--The voluntary +element to be taken into the account--Example in Illustration-- +Diversities of Character + +CHAPTER XVII. + +CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS.--Objection, The Will has its Laws--Objection, +God dethroned from his Supremacy if the Doctrine of Liberty is +true--Great and good Men have held the doctrine of Necessity--Last +Resort--Willing and aiming to perform impossibilities--Thought at +Parting + + + + +DEDICATORY PREFACE. + +To one whose aim is, to "serve his generation according to the Will of +God," but two reasons would seem to justify an individual in claiming +the attention of the public in the capacity of an author--the existence +in the public mind of a want which needs to be met, and the full belief, +that the Work which he has produced is adapted to meet that want. Under +the influence of these two considerations, the following Treatise is +presented to the public. Whether the author has judged rightly or not, +it is not for him to decide. The decision of that question is left with +the public, to whom the Work is now presented. It is doubtful, whether +any work, prepared with much thought and pains-taking, was ever +published with the conviction, on the part of the author, that it was +unworthy of public regard. The community, however, may differ from him +entirely on the subject; and, as a consequence, a work which he regards +as so imperiously demanded by the public interest, falls dead from the +press. Many an author, thus disappointed, has had occasion to be +reminded of the admonition, "Ye have need of patience." Whether the +following Treatise shall succeed in gaining the public ear, or not, one +consolation will remain with the writer, the publication of the work has +satisfied his sense of duty. To his respected Associates in the +Institution over which he presides, Associates with whose approbation +and counsel the work was prepared, the Author would take this occasion +publicly to express his grateful acknowledgments for the many important +suggestions which he received from them, during the progress of its +preparation. + +Having said thus much, he would simply add, that, TO THE LOVERS OF +TRUTH, THE WORK IS NOW RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, WITH THE KIND REGARDS OF + + THE AUTHOR. + + + + +CHAPTER I. + +INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS. + +IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT. + +THE doctrine of the Will is a cardinal doctrine of theology, as well as +of mental philosophy. This doctrine, to say the least, is one of the +great central points, from which the various different and conflicting +systems of theological, mental, and moral science, take their departure. +To determine a man's sentiments in respect to the Will, is to determine +his position, in most important respects, as a theologian, and mental +and moral philosopher. If we turn our thoughts inward, for the purpose +of knowing what we are, what we ought to do, and to be, and what we +shall become, as the result of being and doing what we ought or ought +not, this doctrine presents itself at once, as one of the great pivots +on which the resolution of all these questions turns. + +If, on the other hand, we turn our thoughts from ourselves, to a study +of the character of God, and of the nature and character of the +government which He exercises over rational beings, all our +apprehensions here, all our notions in respect to the nature and desert +of sin and holiness, will, in many fundamental particulars, be +determined by our notions in respect to the Will. In other words, our +apprehensions of the nature and character of the Divine government, must +be determined, in most important respects, by our conceptions of the +nature and powers of the subjects of that government. I have no wish to +conceal from the reader the true bearing of our present inquiries. I +wish him distinctly to understand, that in fixing his notions in respect +to the doctrine of the Will, he is determining a point of observation +from which, and a medium through which, he shall contemplate his own +character and deserts as a moral agent, and the nature and character of +that Divine government, under which he must ever "live, and move, and +have his being." + +TRUE AND FALSE METHODS OF INQUIRY. + +Such being the bearing of our present inquiries, an important question +arises, to wit: What should be the influence of such considerations upon +our investigations in this department of mental science It should not +surely induce us, as appears to be true in the case of many divines and +philosophers even, first to form our system of theology, and then, in +the light of that, to determine our theory of the Will. The true science +of the Will, as well as that of all ether departments of mental +philosophy, "does not come by observation," but by internal reflection. +Because our doctrine of the Will, whether true or false, will have a +controlling influence in determining the character of our theology, and +the meaning which we shall attach to large portions of the Bible, that +doctrine does not, for that reason, lose its exclusively psychological +character. Every legitimate question pertaining to it, still remains +purely and exclusively a psychological question. The mind has but one +eye by which it can see itself, and that is the eye of consciousness. +This, then, is the organ of vision to be exclusively employed in all our +inquiries in every department of mental science, and in none more +exclusively than in that of the Will. We know very well, for example, +that the science of optics has a fundamental bearing upon that of +Astronomy. What if a philosopher, for that reason, should form his +theory of optics by looking at the stars? This would be perfectly +analogous to the conduct of a divine or philosopher who should determine +his theory of the Will, not by psychological reflection, but by a system +of theology formed without such reflection. Suppose again, that the +science of Geometry had the same influence in theology, that that of the +Will now has. This fact would not change at all the nature of that +science, nor the mode proper in conducting our investigations in respect +to it. It would still remain a science of demonstration, with all its +principles and rules of investigation unchanged. So with the doctrine of +the Will. Whatever its bearings upon other sciences may be, it still +remains no less exclusively a psychological science. It has its own +principles and laws of investigation, principles and laws as independent +of systems of theology, as the principles and laws of the science of +optics are of those of Astronomy. In pursuing our investigations in all +other departments of mental science, we, for the time being, cease to be +theologians. We become mental philosophers. Why should the study of the +Will be an exception? + +The question now returns--what should be the bearing of the fact, that +our theory of the Will, whether right or wrong, will have an important +influence in determining our system of theology? This surely should be +its influence. It should induce in us great care and caution in our +investigations in this department of mental science. We are laying the +foundation of the most important edifice of which it ever entered into +the heart of man to conceive--an edifice, all the parts, dimensions, and +proportions of which, we are required most sedulously to conform to the +"pattern shown us in the mount." Under such circumstances, who should +not be admonished, that he should "dig deep, and lay his foundation upon +a rock?" I will therefore, in view of what has been said above, +earnestly bespeak four things of the reader of the following treatise. + +1. That he read it as an honest, earnest inquirer after truth. + +2. That he give that degree of attention to the work, that is requisite +to an _understanding_ of it. + +3. That when he dissents from any of its fundamental principles, he will +distinctly state to his own mind the reason and ground of that dissent, +and carefully investigate its validity. If these principles are wrong, +such an investigation will render the truth more conspicuous to the +mind, confirm the mind in the truth, and furnish it with means to +overturn the opposite error. + +4. That he pursue his investigations with _implicit confidence in the +distinct affirmations of his own consciousness in respect to this +subject_. Such a suggestion would appear truly singular, if made in +respect to any other department of mental science but that of the Will. +Here it is imperiously called for so long have philosophers and divines +been accustomed to look without, to determine the characteristics of +phenomena which appear exclusively within, and which are revealed to the +eye of consciousness only. Having been so long under the influence of +this pernicious habit, it will require somewhat of an effort for the +mind to turn its organ of self-vision in upon itself, for the purpose of +correctly reporting to itself, what is really passing in that inner +sanctuary. Especially will it require an effort to do this, with a fixed +determination to abandon all theories formed from external observation, +and to follow implicitly the results of observations made internally. +This method we must adopt, however, or there is at once an end of all +real science, not only in respect to the Will, but to all other +departments of the mind. Suppose an individual to commence a treatise on +_colors_, for example, with a denial of the validity of all affirmations +of the Intelligence through the eye, in respect to the phenomena about +which he is to treat. What would be thought of such a treatise? The +moment we deny the validity of the affirmations of any of our faculties, +in respect to the appropriate objects of those faculties, all reasoning +about those objects becomes the height of absurdity. So in respect to +the mind. If we doubt or deny the validity of the affirmations of +consciousness in respect to the nature and characteristics of all mental +operations, mental philosophy becomes impossible, and all reasoning in +respect to the mind perfectly absurd. Implicit confidence in the +distinct affirmations of consciousness, is a fundamental law of all +correct philosophizing in every department of mental science. Permit me +most earnestly to bespeak this confidence, as we pursue our +investigations in respect to the Will. + +COMMON FAULT. + +It may be important here to notice a common fault in the method +frequently adopted by philosophers in their investigations in this +department of mental science. In the most celebrated treatise that has +ever appeared upon this subject, the writer does not recollect to have +met with a single appeal to _consciousness_, the only adequate witness +in the case. The whole treatise, almost, consists of a series of +syllogisms, linked together with apparent perfectness, syllogisms +pertaining to an abstract something called Will. Throughout the whole, +the facts of consciousness are never appealed to. In fact, in instances +not a few, among writers of the same school, the right to make such an +appeal, on the ground of the total inadequacy of consciousness to give +testimony in the case, has been formally denied. Would it be at all +strange, if it should turn out that all the fundamental results of +investigations conducted after such a method, should be wholly +inapplicable to _the_ Will, the phenomena of which lie under the eye of +consciousness, or to stand in plain contradiction to the phenomena thus +affirmed? What, from the method adopted, we see is very likely to take +place, we find, from experience, to be actually true of the treatise +above referred to. This is noticed by the distinguished author of The +Natural History of Enthusiasm, in an Essay introductory to Edwards on +the Will. "Even the reader," he says, "who is scarcely at all familiar +with abstruse science, will, if he follow our author attentively, be +perpetually conscious of a vague dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, +that some fallacy has passed into the train of propositions, although +the linking of syllogisms seems perfect. This suspicion will increase in +strength as he proceeds, and will at length condense itself into the +form of a protest against certain conclusions, notwithstanding their +apparently necessary connection with the premises." What should we +expect from a treatise on mental science, from which the affirmations of +consciousness should be formally excluded, as grounds of any important +conclusions? Just what we find to be true, in fact, of the above named +treatise on the Will; to wit: all its fundamental conclusions positively +contradicted by such affirmations. What if the decisions of our courts +of justice were based upon data from which the testimony of all material +witnesses has been formally excluded? Who would look to such decisions +as the exponents of truth and justice? Yet all the elements in those +decisions may be the necessary logical consequents of the data actually +assumed. Such decisions may be all wrong, however, from the fact that +the data which ought to be assumed in the case, were excluded. The same +will, almost of necessity, be true of all treatises, in every department +of mental science, which are not based upon the facts of consciousness. + +PROPER METHOD OF REASONING FROM REVELATION TO THE SYSTEM OF MENTAL +PHILOSOPHY THEREIN PRE-SUPPOSED. + +By what has been said, the reader will not understand me as denying the +propriety of comparing our conclusions in mental science with the Bible. +Though no system of mental philosophy is directly revealed in the Bible, +some one system is therein pre-supposed, and assuming, as we do, that +the Scriptures are a revelation from God, we must suppose that the +system of mental science assumed in the sacred writings, is the true +system. If we could find the system pre-supposed in the Bible, we should +have an infallible standard by which to test the validity of any +conclusions to which we have arrived, as the results of psychological +investigation. It is therefore a very legitimate, interesting, and +profitable inquiry--what is the system of mental science assumed as true +in the Bible? We may very properly turn our attention to the solution of +such a question. In doing this, however, two things should be kept +distinctly in mind. + +1. In such inquiries, we leave the domain of mental philosophy entirely, +and enter that of theology. In the latter we are to be guided by +principles entirely distinct from those demanded in the former. + +2. In reasoning from the Bible to the system of mental philosophy +pre-supposed in the Scriptures, we are in danger of assuming wrong data +as the basis of our conclusions that is, we are in danger of drawing our +inferences from those truths of Scripture which have no legitimate +bearing upon the subject, and of overlooking those which do have such a +bearing. While there are truths of inspiration from which we may +properly reason to the theory of the Will, pre-supposed in the Bible, +there are other truths from which we cannot legitimately thus reason. +Now suppose that we have drawn our conclusions from truths of +inspiration which have no legitimate bearing upon the subject, truths +which, if we do reason from them in the case, will lead us to wrong +conclusions; suppose that in the light of such conclusions we have +explained the facts of consciousness, assuming that such must be their +true character, else we deny the Bible. Shall we not then have almost +inextricably lost ourselves in the labyrinth of error? + +The following principles may be laid down as universally binding, if we +would reason correctly, as philosophers and theologians, on the subject +under consideration. + +1. In the domain of philosophy, we must confine ourselves strictly and +exclusively to the laws of psychological investigation, without +reference to any system of theology. + +2. In the domain of theology, when we would reason from the truths of +inspiration to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible, we +should be exceedingly careful to reason from those truths only which +have a direct and decisive bearing upon the subject, and not from those +which have no such bearing. + +3. We should carefully compare the conclusions to which we have arrived +in each of these domains, assuming that if they do not harmonize, we +have erred either as philosophers or theologians. + +4. In case of disagreement, we should renew our independent +investigations in each domain, for the purpose of detecting the error +into which we have fallen. + +In conducting an investigation upon such principles, we shall, with +almost absolute certainty, find ourselves in each domain, following rays +of light, which will converge together in the true theory of the Will. + +ERRORS OF METHOD. + +Two errors into which philosophers and divines of a certain class have +fallen in their method of treating the department of our subject now +under consideration, here demand a passing notice. + +1. The two methods above referred to, the psychological and theological, +which should at all times be kept entirely distinct and separate, have +unhappily been mingled together. Thus the subject has failed to receive +a proper investigation in the domain, either of theology or of +philosophy. + +2. In reasoning from the Scriptures to the theory of the Will +pre-supposed in the same, _the wrong truth_ has been adduced as the +basis of such reasoning, to wit: _the fact of the Divine foreknowledge_. +As all events yet future are foreknown to God, they are in themselves, +it is said, alike certain. This certainty necessitates the adoption of a +particular theory of the Will. Now before we can draw any such +conclusion from the truth before us, the following things pertaining to +it we need to know with absolute certainty, things which God has not +revealed, and which we never can know, until He has revealed them, to +wit: the _mode_, the _nature_, and the _degree_ of the Divine +foreknowledge. Suppose that God should impart to us apprehensions +perfectly full and distinct, of the mode, nature and degree of His +foreknowledge of human conduct. How do we know but that we should then +see with the most perfect clearness, that this foreknowledge is just as +consistent with the theory of the Will, denied by the philosophers and +divines under consideration, as with that which they suppose necessarily +to result from the Divine foreknowledge? This, then, is not the truth +from which we should reason to the theory of the Will pre-supposed in +the Bible. + +There are truths of inspiration, however, which appear to me to have a +direct and decisive bearing upon this subject, and upon which we may +therefore safely base our conclusions. In the Scriptures, man is +addressed as a moral agent, the subject of commands and prohibitions, of +obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and +punishment. Now when we have determined the powers which an agent must +possess, to render him a proper subject of command and prohibition, of +obligation, of merit and demerit, and consequently of reward and +punishment, we have determined the philosophy of the Will, really +pre-supposed in the Scriptures. Beneath these truths, therefore, and not +beneath that of the divine foreknowledge, that philosophy is to be +sought for. This I argue-- + +1. Because the former has a _direct_, while the latter has only an +_indirect_ bearing upon the subject. + +2. Of the former our ideas are perfectly clear and distinct, while of +the mode, the degree, and the nature of the Divine foreknowledge we are +profoundly ignorant. To all eternity, our ideas of the nature of +commands and prohibitions, of obligations, of merit and demerit, and of +reward and punishment grounded on moral desert, can never be more clear +and distinct than they now are. From such truths, then, and not from +those that we do not understand, and which at the utmost have only an +indirect bearing upon the subject, we ought to reason, if we reason at +all, to the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Scriptures. The +reader is now put in possession of the _method_ that will be pursued in +the following treatise, and is consequently prepared to enter upon the +investigation of the subject before us. + + + + +CHAPTER II. + +CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTAL FACULTIES. + +EVERY individual who has reflected with any degree of interest upon the +operations of his own mind, cannot have failed to notice three classes +of mental phenomena, each of which is entirely distinct from either of +the others. These phenomena, which comprehend the entire operations of +the mind, and which may be expressed by the terms _thinking_, _feeling_, +and _willing_, clearly indicate in the mind three faculties equally +distinct from one another. These faculties are denominated the +Intellect, the Sensibility or Sensitivity, and the Will. To the first, +all intellectual operations, such as perceiving, thinking, judging, +knowing, &c., are referred. To the second, we refer all sensitive +states, all feelings, such as sensations, emotions, desires, &c. To the +Will, or the active voluntary faculty, are referred all mental +determinations, such as purposes, intentions, resolutions, choices and +volitions. + +CLASSIFICATION VERIFIED. + +1. The classes of phenomena, by which this tri-unity of the mental +powers is indicated, differ from one another, not in _degree_, but in +_kind_. Thought, whether clear or obscure, in all degrees, remains +equally distinct, in its nature, from feelings and determinations of +every class. So of feelings. Sensations, emotions, desires, all the +phenomena of the Sensibility, in all degrees and modifications, remain, +in their nature and essential characteristics, equally distinct from +thought on the one hand, and the action of the Will on the other. The +same holds true of the phenomena of the Will. A resolution, for example, +in one degree, is not a thought in another, a sensation, emotion, or +desire and in another a choice, purpose, intention, or volition. In all +degrees and modifications, the phenomena of the Will, in their nature +and essential characteristics, remain equally distinct from the +operations of the Intelligence on the one hand, and of the Sensibility +on the other. + +2. This distinction is recognized by universal consciousness. When, for +example, one speaks of _thinking_ of any particular object, then of +_desiring_ it, and subsequently of _determining_ to obtain the object, +for the purpose of gratifying that desire, all mankind most clearly +recognize his meaning in each of the above-named affirmations, and +understand him as speaking of three entirely distinct classes of mental +operations. No person, under such circumstances, ever confounds one of +these states with either of the others. So clearly marked and +distinguished is the three-fold classification of mental phenomena under +consideration, in the spontaneous affirmations of universal +consciousness. + +3. In all languages, also, there are distinct _terms_ appropriated to +the expression of these three classes of phenomena, and of the mental +power indicated by the same. In the English language, for example, we +have the terms _thinking_, _feeling_, and _willing_, each of which is +applied to one particular class of these mental phenomena, and never to +either of the others. We have also the terms Intellect, Sensibility, and +Will, appropriated, in a similar manner, to designate the mental powers +indicated by these phenomena. In all other languages, especially among +nations of any considerable advancement in mental culture, we find terms +of precisely similar designation. What do such facts indicate? They +clearly show, that in the development of the universal Intelligence, the +different classes of phenomena under consideration have been distinctly +marked, and distinguished from one another, together with the three-fold +division of the mental powers indicated by the same phenomena. + +4. The clearness and particularity with which the universal intelligence +has marked the distinction under consideration, is strikingly indicated +by the fact, that there are _qualifying terms_ in common use which are +applied to each of these classes of phenomena, and never to either of +the others. It is true that there are such terms which are promiscuously +applied to all classes of mental phenomena. There are terms, however, +which are never applied to but one class. Thus we speak of _clear +thoughts_, but never of clear feelings or determinations. We speak of +_irrepressible feelings and desires_, but never of irrepressible +thoughts or resolutions. We also speak of _inflexible determinations_, +but never of inflexible feelings or conceptions. With what perfect +distinctness, then, must universal consciousness have marked thoughts, +feelings, and determinations of the Will, as phenomena entirely distinct +from one another--phenomena differing not in _degree_, but in _kind_, +and as most clearly indicating the three-fold division of the mental +powers under consideration. + +5. So familiar are mankind with this distinction, so distinctly marked +is it in their minds, that in familiar intercourse, when no particular +theory of the mental powers is in contemplation, they are accustomed to +speak of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, and of their respective +phenomena, as entirely distinct from one another. Take a single example +from Scripture. "What I shall _choose_, I wot not--having a _desire_ to +depart." Here the Apostle evidently speaks of _desire_ and _choice_ as +phenomena differing in kind, and not in degree. "If you engage his +heart" [his feelings], says Lord Chesterfield, speaking of a foreign +minister, "you have a fair chance of imposing upon his _understanding_, +and determining his Will." "_His Will_," says another writer, speaking +of the insane, "is no longer restrained by his _Judgment_, but driven +madly on by his passions." + + "When wit is overruled by _Will_, + And Will is led by fond _Desire_, + Then _Reason_ may as well be still, + As speaking, kindle greater fire."[1] + +In all the above extracts the tri-unity of the mental powers, as +consisting of the Intellect, Sensibility, and Will, is distinctly +recognized. Yet the writers had, at the time, no particular theory of +mental philosophy in contemplation. They speak of a distinction of the +mental faculties which all understand and recognize as real, as soon as +suggested to their minds. + +The above considerations are abundantly sufficient to verify the +three-fold distinction above made, of mental phenomena and powers. Two +suggestions arise here which demand special attention. + +1. To confound either of these distinct powers of the mind with either +of the others, as has been done by several philosophers of eminence, in +respect to the Will and Sensibility, is a capital error in mental +science. If one faculty is confounded with another, the fundamental +characteristics of the former will of course be confounded with the same +characteristics of the latter. Thus the worst forms of error will be +introduced not only into philosophy, but theology, too, as far as the +latter science is influenced by the former. What would be thought of a +treatise on mental science, in which the Will should be confounded with +the Intelligence, and in which _thinking_ and _willing_ would be +consequently represented as phenomena identical in kind? This would be +an error no more capital, no more glaring, no more distinctly +contradicted by fundamental phenomena, than the confounding of the Will +with the Sensibility. + +2. We are now prepared to contemplate one of the great errors of Edwards +in his immortal work on the Will--an error which we meet with in the +commencement of that work, and which lays a broad foundation for the +false conclusions subsequently found in it. He has confounded the Will +with the Sensibility. Of course, we should expect to find that he has +subsequently confounded the fundamental characteristics of the phenomena +of the former faculty, with the same characteristics of the latter. + +"God has endowed the soul," he says, "with two faculties: One is that by +which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it +discerns, and views, and judges of things; which is called the +_understanding_. The other faculty is that by which the soul does not +merely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined _to_ them, or +is disinclined and averse _from_ them; or is the faculty by which the +soul does not behold things as an indifferent, unaffected spectator; but +either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or +rejecting. This faculty, as it has respect to the actions that are +determined by it, is called the Will." + +From his work on the Affections, I cite the following to the same +import: + +"The Affections of the soul," he observes, "are not properly +distinguished from the Will, as though they were two faculties of the +soul. All acts of the Affections of the soul are, in some sense, acts of +the Will, and all acts of the Will are acts of the affections. All +exercises of the Will are, in some degree or other, exercises of the +soul's appetition or aversion; or which is the same thing, of its love +or hatred. The soul wills one thing rather than another, or chooses one +thing rather than another, no otherwise than as it loves one thing more +than another." "The Affections are only certain modes of the exercise of +the Will." "The Affections are no other than the more vigorous and +sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul." + +Whether he has or has not subsequently confounded the fundamental +characteristics of the phenomena of the Will with those of the phenomena +of the Sensibility will be seen in the progress of the present treatise. + + + + +CHAPTER III. + +LIBERTY AND NECESSITY. + +WE come now to consider the great and fundamental characteristic of the +Will, that by which it is, in a special sense, distinguished from each +of the other mental faculties, to wit: that of Liberty. + +SEC. I. TERMS DEFINED. + +Our first inquiry respects the meaning of the term Liberty as +distinguished from that of Necessity. These terms do not differ, as +expressing genus and species; that is, Liberty does not designate a +species of which Necessity expresses the genus. On the other hand, they +differ by way of _opposition_. All correct definitions of terms thus +related, will possess these two characteristics. 1. They will mutually +exclude each other that is, what is affirmed of one, will, in reality, +be denied of the other. 2. They will be so defined as to be universal in +their application. The terms _right_ and _wrong_, for example, thus +differ from each other. In the light of all correct definitions of these +terms, it will be seen with perfect distinctness, 1st, that to affirm of +an action that it is right, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is +not wrong; and to affirm that it is wrong, is to affirm that it is not +right; 2d, that all moral actions, actual and conceivable, must be +either right or wrong. So of all other terms thus related. + +The meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as distinguished the one +from the other, may be designated by a reference to two relations +perfectly distinct and opposite, which may be supposed to exist between +an _antecedent_ and its _consequent_. + +1. The antecedent being given, one, and only one, consequent can +possibly arise, and that consequent _must_ arise. This relation we +designate by the term Necessity. I place my finger, for example, +constituted as my physical system now is, in the flame of a burning +candle, and hold it there for a given time. The two substances in +contact is the antecedent. The feeling of intense pain which succeeds is +the consequent. Now such is universally believed to be the correlation +between the nature of these substances, that under the circumstances +supposed, but one consequent can possibly arise, and that consequent +must arise; to wit--the feeling of pain referred to. The relation +between such an antecedent and its consequent, therefore, we, in all +instances, designate by the term Necessity. When the relation of +Necessity is pre-supposed, in the presence of a new consequent, we affirm +absolutely that of a new antecedent. + +2. The second relation is this. The antecedent being given, either of +two or more consequents is equally possible, and therefore, when one +consequent does arise, we affirm that either of the others might have +arisen in its stead. When this relation is pre-supposed, from the +appearance of a new consequent, we do not necessarily affirm the +presence of a new antecedent. This relation we designate by the term +Liberty. + +CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ABOVE DEFINITIONS. + +On the above definitions I remark: + +1. That they mutually exclude each other. To predicate Liberty of any +phenomenon is to affirm that it is not necessary. To predicate Necessity +of it, is equivalent to an affirmation that it is not free. + +2. They are strictly and absolutely universal in their application. All +antecedents and consequents, whatever the nature of the subjects thus +connected may be, must fall under one or the other of these relations. +As the terms right and wrong, when correctly defined, will express the +nature of all moral actions, actual and conceivable, so the terms +Liberty and Necessity, as above defined, clearly indicate the nature of +the relation between all antecedents and consequents, real and +supposable. Take any antecedent and consequent we please, real or +conceivable, and we know absolutely, that they must sustain to each +other one or the other of these relations. Either in connection with +this antecedent, but this one consequent is possible, and this must +arise, or in connection with the same antecedent, either this, or one or +more different consequents are possible, and consequently equally so: +for possibility has, in reality, no degrees. + +3. All the phenomena of the Will, sustaining, as they do, the relation +of _consequents_ to motives considered as antecedents, must fall under +one or the other of these relations. If we say, that the relation +between motives and acts of Will is that of _certainty_, still this +certainty must arise from a necessary relation between the antecedent +and its consequent, or it must be of such a nature as consists with the +relation of Liberty, in the sense of the term Liberty as above defined. + +4. The above definitions have this great advantage in our present +investigations. They at once free the subject from the obscurity and +perplexity in which it is often involved by the definitions of +philosophers. They are accustomed, in many instances, to speak of moral +necessity and physical necessity, as if these are in reality different +kinds of necessity: whereas the terms moral and physical, in such +connections, express the nature of the _subjects_ sustaining to each +other the relations of antecedents and consequents, and not at all that +of the _relation_ existing between them. This is exclusively expressed +by the term Necessity--a term which designates a relation which is +always one and the same, whatever the nature of the subjects thus +related may be. An individual in a treatise on natural science, might, +if he should choose, in speaking of the relations of antecedents and +consequents among solid, fluid, and aeriform substances, use the words, +solid necessity, fluid necessity, and aeriform necessity. He might use +as many qualifying terms as there are different subjects sustaining to +each other the relation under consideration. In all such instances no +error will arise, if these qualifying terms are distinctly understood to +designate, not the nature of the _relation_ of antecedent and consequent +in any given case (as if there were as many different kinds of necessity +as there are qualifying terms used), but to designate the nature of the +_subjects_ sustaining this relation. If, on the other hand, the +impression should be made, that each of these qualifying terms +designates a necessity of a peculiar kind, and if, as a consequence, the +belief should be induced, that there are in reality so many different +kinds of necessity, errors of the gravest character would arise--errors +no more important, however, than actually do arise from the impression +often induced, that moral necessity differs in kind from physical +necessity. + +5. I mention another very decisive advantage which the above definitions +have in our present investigations. In the light of the terms Liberty +and Necessity, as above defined, the two great schools in philosophy and +theology are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in +difference between them, without the possibility on the part of either, +of escaping under a fog of definitions about moral necessity, physical +necessity, moral certainty, &c., and then claiming a victory over their +opponents. These terms, as above defined, stand out with perfect +clearness and distinctness to all reflecting minds. Every one must see, +that the phenomena of the Will cannot but fall under the one or the +other of the relations designated by these terms inasmuch as no third +relation differing in _kind_ from both of these, is conceivable. The +question therefore may be fairly put to every individual, without the +possibility of misapprehension or evasion--Do you believe, whenever a +man puts forth an act of Will, that in those circumstances, this one act +only is possible, and that this act cannot but arise? In all prohibited +acts, for example, do you believe that an individual, by the resistless +providence of God, is placed in circumstances in which this one act only +is possible, and this cannot but result, that in these identical +circumstances, another and a different act is required of him, and that +for not putting forth this last act, he is justly held as infinitely +guilty in the sight of God, and of the moral universe? To these +questions every one must give an affirmative or negative answer. If he +gives the former, he holds the doctrine of Necessity, and must take that +doctrine with all its consequences. If he gives the latter, he holds the +doctrine of Liberty in the sense of the term as above defined. He must +hold, that in the identical circumstances in which a given act of Will +is put forth, another and different act might have been put forth; and +that for this reason, in all prohibited acts, a moral agent is held +justly responsible for different and opposite acts. Much is gained to +the cause of truth, when, as in the present instance, the different +schools are obliged to join issue directly upon the real question in +difference between them, and that without the possibility of +misapprehension or evasion in respect to the nature of that question. + +MOTIVE DEFINED. + +Having settled the meaning of the terms Liberty and Necessity, as +designating two distinct and opposite relations, the only relations +conceivable between an antecedent and its consequent, one other term +which may not unfrequently be used in the following treatise, remains to +be defined; to wit--_motive_--a term which designates that which +sustains to the phenomena of the Will, the relation of antecedent. +Volition, choice, preference, intention, all the phenomena of the Will, +are considered as the consequent. Whatever within the mind itself may be +supposed to influence its determinations, whether called +susceptibilities, biases, or anything else; and all influences acting +upon it as incentives from without, are regarded as the antecedent. I +use the term motive as synonymous with antecedent as above defined. It +designates _all the circumstances and influences_ from within or without +the mind, which operate upon it to produce any given act of Will. + +The term antecedent in the case before us, in strictness of speech, has +this difference of meaning from that of motive as above defined: The +former includes all that is designated by the latter, together with the +_Will_ itself. No difficulty or obscurity, however, will result from the +use of these terms as synonymous, in the sense explained. + +SEC. II. LIBERTY, AS OPPOSED TO NECESSITY, THE CHARACTERISTIC OF THE +WILL. + +We are now prepared to meet the question, To which of the relations +above defined shall we refer the phenomena of the Will? If these +phenomena are subject to the law of necessity, then, whenever a +particular antecedent (motive) is given, but one consequent (act of +Will) is possible, and that consequent must arise. It cannot possibly +but take place. If, on the other hand, these phenomena fall under the +relation of Liberty, whenever any particular motive is present, either +of two or more acts of Will is equally possible; and when any particular +consequent (act of Will) does arise, either of the other consequents +might have arisen in its stead. + +Before proceeding directly to argue the question before us, one +consideration of a general nature demands a passing notice. It is this. +The simple statement of the question, in the light of the above +relations, settles it, and must settle it, in the judgment of all +candid, uncommitted inquirers after the truth. Let any individual +contemplate the action of his voluntary powers in the light of the +relations of Liberty and Necessity as above defined, and he will +spontaneously affirm the fact, that he is a free and not a necessary +agent, and affirm it as absolutely as he affirms his own existence. +Wherever he is, while he retains the consciousness of rational being, +this conviction will and must be to him an omnipresent reality. To +escape it, he must transcend the bounds of conscious existence. + +OBJECTIONS TO THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. + +Such is the importance of the subject, however, that a more extended and +particular consideration of it is demanded. In the further prosecution +of the argument upon the subject, we will-- + +I. In the first place, contemplate the position, that the phenomena of +the Will are subject to the laws of Necessity. In taking this position +we are at once met with the following palpable and insuperable +difficulties. + +1. The conviction above referred to--a conviction which remains proof +against all apparent demonstrations to the contrary. We may pile +demonstration upon demonstration in favor of the doctrine of Necessity, +still, as the mind falls back upon the spontaneous affirmations of its +own Intelligence, it finds, in the depths of its inner being, a higher +demonstration of the fact, that that doctrine is and must be false--that +man is not the agent which that doctrine affirms him to be. In the +passage already cited, and which I will take occasion here to repeat, +the writer has, with singular correctness, mapped out the unvarying +experience of the readers of Edwards on the Will. "Even the reader," he +says, "who is scarcely at all familiar with abstruse science, will, if +he follow our author attentively, be perpetually conscious of a vague +dissatisfaction, or latent suspicion, that some fallacy has passed into +the train of propositions, although the linking of syllogisms seems +perfect. This suspicion will increase in strength as he proceeds, and +will at length condense itself into the form of a protest against +certain conclusions, notwithstanding their apparently necessary +connection with the premises." What higher evidence can we have that +that treatise gives a false interpretation of the facts of universal +consciousness pertaining to the Will, than is here presented? Any theory +which gives a distinct and true explanation of the facts of +consciousness, will be met by the Intelligence with the response, +"That's true; I have found it." Any theory apparently supported by +adequate evidence, but which still gives a false interpretation of such +facts, will induce the internal conflict above described--a conflict +which, as the force of apparent demonstration increases, will, in the +very centre of the Intelligence, "condense itself into the form of a +protest against the conclusions presented, notwithstanding their +apparently necessary connection with the premises." The falsity of the +doctrine of Necessity is a first truth of the universal Intelligence. + +2. If this doctrine is true, it is demonstrably evident, that in no +instance, real or supposable, have men any power whatever to will or to +act differently from what they do. The connection between the +determinations of the Will, and their consequents, external and +internal, is absolutely necessary. Constituted as I now am, if I will, +for example, a particular motion of my hand or arm, no other movement, +in these circumstances, was possible, and this movement could not but +take place. The same holds true of all consequents, external and +internal, of all acts of Will. Let us now suppose that these acts +themselves are the necessary consequents of the circumstances in which +they originate. In what conceivable sense have men, in the circumstances +in which Providence places them, power either to will or to act +differently from what they do? The doctrine of ability to will or to do +differently from what we do is, in every sense, false, if the doctrine +of Necessity is true. Men, when they transgress the moral law, always +sin, without the possibility of doing right. From this position the +Necessitarian cannot escape. + +3. On this theory, God only is responsible for all human volitions +together with their effects. The relation between all antecedents and +their consequents was established by him. If that relation be in all +instances a necessary one, his Will surely is the sole responsible +antecedent of all consequents. + +4. The idea of obligation, of merit and demerit, and of the consequent +propriety of reward and punishment, are chimeras. To conceive of a being +deserving praise or blame, for volitions or actions which occurred under +circumstances in which none others were possible, and in which these +could not possibly but happen, is an absolute impossibility. To conceive +him under obligation to have given existence, under such circumstances, +to different consequents, is equally impossible. It is to suppose an +agent under obligation to perform that to which Omnipotence is +inadequate. For Omnipotence cannot perform impossibilities. It cannot +reverse the law of Necessity. Let any individual conceive of creatures +placed by Divine Providence in circumstances in which but one act, or +series of acts of Will, can arise, and these cannot but arise--let him, +then, attempt to conceive of these creatures as under obligation, in +these same circumstances, to give existence to different and opposite +acts, and as deserving of punishment for not doing so. He will find it +as impossible to pass such a judgment as to conceive of the annihilation +of space, or of an event without a cause. To conceive of necessity and +obligation as fundamental elements of the same act, is an absolute +impossibility. The human Intelligence is incapable of affirming such +contradictions. + +5. As an additional consideration, to show the absolute incompatibility +of the idea of moral obligation with the doctrine of Necessity, permit +me to direct the attention of the reader to this striking fact. While no +man, holding the doctrine of Liberty as above defined, was ever known to +deny moral obligation, such denial has, without exception, in every age +and nation, been avowedly based upon the assumption of the truth of the +doctrine of Necessity. In every age and nation, in every solitary mind +in which the idea of obligation has been denied, this doctrine has been +the great maelstrom in which this idea has been swallowed up and lost. +How can the Necessitarian account for such facts in consistency with his +theory? + +6. The commands of God addressed to men as sinners and requiring them in +all cases of transgression of the moral law, to choose and to act +differently from what they do, are, if this doctrine is true, the +perfection of tyranny. In all such cases men are required-- + +(1.) To perform absolute impossibilities; to reverse the law of +necessity. + +(2.) To do that to which Omnipotence is inadequate. For Omnipotence, as +we have seen, cannot reverse the law of necessity. Not only so, but-- + +(3.) Men in all such instances are required, as a matter of fact, to +resist and overcome Omnipotence. To require us to reverse the relation +established by Omnipotence, between antecedents and consequents, is +certainly to require us to resist and overcome Omnipotence, and that in +the absence of all power, even to attempt the accomplishment of that +which we are required to accomplish. + +7. If this doctrine is true, at the final Judgment the conscience and +intelligence of the universe will and must be on the side of the +condemned. Suppose that when the conduct of the wicked shall be revealed +at that Day, another fact shall stand out with equal conspicuousness, to +wit, that God himself had placed these beings where but one course of +conduct was possible to them, and that course they could not but pursue, +to wit, the course which they did pursue, and that for having pursued +this course, the only one possible, they are now to be "punished with +everlasting destruction from the presence of God and the glory of his +power," must not the intelligence of the universe pronounce such a +sentence unjust? All this must be true, or the doctrine of Necessity is +false. Who can believe, that the pillars of God's eternal government +rest upon such a doctrine? + +8. On this supposition, probation is an infinite absurdity. We might +with the same propriety represent the specimens in the laboratory of the +chemist, as on probation, as men, if their actions are the necessary +result of the circumstances in which Omnipotence has placed them. What +must intelligent beings think of probation for a state of eternal +retribution, probation based on such a principle? + +9. The doctrine of Necessity is, in all essential particulars, identical +with _Fatalism_ in its worst form. All that Fatalism ever has +maintained, or now maintains, is, that men, by a power which they cannot +control nor resist, are placed in circumstances in which they cannot but +pursue the course of conduct which they actually are pursuing. This +doctrine has never affirmed, that, in the Necessitarian sense, men +cannot "do as they please." All that it maintains is, that they cannot +but please to do as they do. Thus this doctrine differs not one "jot or +tittle," from Necessity. No man can show the want of perfect identity +between them. Fatalists and Necessitarians may differ in regard to the +origin of this Necessity. In regard to its nature, the only thing +material, as far as present inquiries are concerned, they do not differ +at all. + +10. In maintaining the Necessity of all acts of the Will of _man_, we +must maintain, that the Will of _God_ is subject to the same law. This +is universally admitted by Necessitarians themselves. Now in maintaining +the necessity of all acts of the Divine Will, the following conclusions +force themselves upon us: + +(1.) MOTIVES which necessitate the determinations of the Divine Will, +are the sole originating and efficient causes in existence. God is not +the first cause of anything. + +(2.) To motives, which of course exist independently of the Divine Will, +we must ascribe the origin of all created existences. The glory of +originating "all things visible and invisible," belongs not to Him, but +to motives. + +(3.) In all cases in which creatures are required to act differently +from what they do, as in all acts of sin, they are in reality required +not only to resist and overcome the omnipotent determinations of the +Divine Will, but also the _motives_ by which the action of God's Will is +necessitated. We ask Necessitarians to look these consequences in the +face, and then say, whether they are prepared to deny, or to meet them. + +11. Finally, if the doctrine under consideration is true, in all +instances of the transgression of the moral law, men are, in reality, +required to produce an event which, when it does exist, shall exist +without a cause. In circumstances where but one event is possible, and +that cannot but arise, if a different event should arise, it would +undeniably be an event without a cause. To require such an event under +such circumstances, is to require an event without a cause, the most +palpable contradiction conceivable. Now just such a requirement as this +is laid upon men, in all cases of disobedience of the moral law, if the +doctrine of Necessity is true. In all such cases, according to this +doctrine men are placed in circumstances in which but one act is +possible, and that must arise, to wit: the act of disobedience which is +put forth. If, in these circumstances, an act of obedience should be put +forth, it would be an event without a cause, and in opposition also to +the action of a necessary cause. In these identical circumstances, the +act of obedience is required, that is, an act is required of creatures, +which, if it should be put forth, would be an event without a cause. Has +a God of truth and justice ever laid upon men such a requisition as +that? How, I ask, can the doctrine of Necessity be extricated from such +a difficulty? + +DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY--DIRECT ARGUMENT. + +II. We will now, as a second general argument, consider the position, +that the Will is subject in its determinations to the relation of +Liberty, in opposition to that of Necessity. Here I would remark, that +as the phenomena of the Will must fall under one or the other of these +relations, and as it has been shown, that they cannot fall under that of +Necessity, but one supposition remains. They must fall under that of +Liberty, as opposed to Necessity. The intrinsic absurdity of supposing +that a being, all of whose actions are necessary, is still accountable +for such actions, is sufficient to overthrow the doctrine of Necessity +for ever. A few additional considerations are deemed requisite, in order +to present the evidence in favor of the Liberty of the Will. + +1. The first that I present is this. As soon as the doctrine of Liberty, +as above defined, is distinctly apprehended, it is spontaneously +recognized by every mind, as the true, and only true exposition of the +facts of its own consciousness pertaining to the phenomena of the Will. +This doctrine is simply an announcement of the spontaneous affirmations +of the universal Intelligence. This is the highest possible evidence of +the truth of the doctrine. + +2. The universal conviction of mankind, that their former course of +conduct might have been different from what it was. I will venture to +affirm, that there is not a person on earth, who has not this conviction +resting upon his mind in respect to his own past life. It is important +to analyze this conviction, in order to mark distinctly its bearing upon +our present inquiries. This conviction is not the belief, that if our +circumstances had been different, we might have acted differently from +what we did. A man, for example, says to himself--"At such a time, and +in such circumstances, I determined upon a particular course of conduct. +I might have determined upon a different and opposite course. Why did I +not?" These affirmations are not based upon the conviction, that, in +different circumstances, we might have done differently. In all such +affirmations we take into account nothing but the particular +circumstances in which our determinations were formed. It is in view of +these circumstances exclusively, that we affirm that our determinations +might have been different from what they were. Let the appeal be made to +any individual whatever, whose mind is not at the time under the +influence of any particular theory of the Will. You say, that at such a +time, and under such circumstances, you determined upon a particular +course, that you might then have resolved upon a different and opposite +course, and that you blame yourself for not having done so. Is not this +your real meaning? "If my circumstances had been different, I might have +resolved upon a different course." No, he would reply. That is not my +meaning. I was not thinking at all of a change of circumstances, when I +made this affirmation. What I mean is, that in the circumstances in +which I was, I might have done differently from what I did. This is the +reason why I blame myself for not having done so. The same conviction, +to wit: that without any change of circumstances our past course of life +might have been different from what it was, rests upon every mind on +earth in which the remembrance of the past dwells. Now this universal +conviction is totally false, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The +doctrine of the Liberty of the Will must be true, or the universal +Intelligence is a perpetual falsehood. + +3. In favor of the doctrine of Liberty, I next appeal to the direct, +deliberate, and universal testimony of consciousness. This testimony is +given in three ways. + +(1.) In the general conviction above referred to, that without any +change of circumstances, our course of conduct might have been the +opposite of what it was. Nothing but a universal consciousness of the +Liberty of the Will, can account for this conviction. + +(2.) Whenever any object of choice is submitted to the mind, +consciousness affirms, directly and positively, that, under these +identical circumstances, either of two or more acts of Will is equally +possible. Every man in such circumstances is as conscious of such power +as he is of his own existence. In confirmation of these affirmations, +let any one make the appeal to his own consciousness, when about to put +forth any act of Will. He will be just as conscious that either of two +or more different determinations is, in the same circumstances, equally +possible, as he is of any mental state whatever. + +(3.) In reference to all deliberate determinations of Will in time past, +the remembrance of them is attended with a consciousness the most +positive, that, in the same identical circumstances, determinations +precisely opposite might have been originated. Let any one recall any +such determination, and the consciousness of a power to have determined +differently will be just as distinctly recalled as the act itself. He +cannot be more sure that he acted at all, than he will be, that he might +have acted [determined] differently. All these affirmations of +consciousness are false, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true. + +4. A fundamental distinction which all mankind make between the +phenomena of the Will, and those of the other faculties, the Sensibility +for example, is a full confirmation of the doctrine of Liberty, as a +truth of universal consciousness. A man is taken out of a burning +furnace, with his physical system greatly injured by the fire. As a +consequence, he subsequently experiences much suffering and +inconvenience. For the injury done him by the fire, and for the pain +subsequently experienced, he never blames or reproaches himself. With +self-reproach he never says, Why, instead of being thus injured, did I +not come out of the furnace as the three worthies did from that of +Nebuchadnezzar? Why do I not now experience pleasure instead of pain, as +a consequence of that injury? Suppose, now, that his fall into the +furnace was the result of a determination formed for the purpose of +self-murder. For that determination, and for not having, in the same +circumstances, determined differently, he will ever after reproach +himself, as most guilty in the sight of God and man. How shall we +account for the absence of self-reproach in the former instance, and for +its presence in the latter? If the appeal should be made to the subject, +his answer would be ready. In respect to the injury and pain, in the +circumstances supposed, they could not but be experienced. Such +phenomena, therefore, can never be the occasion of self-reproach. In the +condition in which the determination referred to was formed, a different +and opposite resolution might have been originated. That particular +determination, therefore, is the occasion of self-reproach. How shall we +account for this distinction, which all mankind agree in making, between +the phenomena of the Sensibility on the one hand, and of the Will on the +other? But one supposition accounts for this fact, the universal +consciousness, that the former are necessary, and the latter free that +in the circumstances of their occurrence the former may not, and the +latter may, be different from what they are. + +5. On any other theory than that of Liberty, the words, obligation, +merit and demerit, &c., are words without meaning. A man is, we will +suppose, by Divine Providence, placed in circumstances in which he +cannot possibly but pursue one given course, or, which is the same +thing, put forth given determinations. When it is said that, in these +identical circumstances, he ought to pursue a different and opposite +course, or to put forth different and opposite determinations, what +conceivable meaning can we attach to the word _ought_, here? There is +nothing, in the circumstances supposed, which the word, _ought_, or +obligation, can represent. If we predicate merit or demerit of an +individual thus circumstanced, we use words equally without meaning. +Obligation and moral desert, in such a case, rest upon "airy nothing," +without a "local habitation or a name." + +On the other hand, if we suppose that the right and the wrong are at all +times equally possible to an individual; that when he chooses the one, +he might, in the same identical circumstances, choose the other; +infinite meaning attaches to the words, ought, obligation, merit and +demerit, when it is said that an individual thus circumstanced ought to +do the right and avoid the wrong, and that he merits reward or +punishment, when he does the one, or does not do the other. The ideas of +obligation, merit and demerit, reward and punishment, and probation with +reference to a state of moral retribution, are all chimeras, on any +other supposition than that of the Liberty of the Will. With this +doctrine, they all perfectly harmonize. + +6. All moral government, all laws, human and Divine, have their basis in +the doctrine of Liberty; and are the perfection of tyranny, on any other +supposition. To place creatures in circumstances which necessitate a +given course of conduct, and render every other course impossible, and +then to require of them, under the heaviest sanctions, a different and +opposite course--what can be tyranny if this is not? + +OBJECTION IN BAR OF AN APPEAL TO CONSCIOUSNESS. + +An objection which is brought by Necessitarians, in perpetual bar of an +appeal to consciousness, to determine the fact whether the phenomena of +the Will fall under the relation of Liberty or Necessity, here demands +special attention. Consciousness, it is said, simply affirms, that, in +given circumstances, we do, in fact, put forth certain acts of Will. But +whether we can or cannot, in these circumstances, put forth other and +opposite determinations, it does not and cannot make any affirmation at +all. It does not, therefore, fall within the province of Consciousness +to determine whether the phenomena of the Will are subject to the +relation of Liberty or Necessity; and it is unphilosophical to appeal to +that faculty to decide such a question. This objection, if valid, +renders null and void much of what has been said upon this subject; and +as it constitutes a stronghold of the Necessitarian, it becomes us to +examine it with great care. In reply, I remark, + +1. That if this objection holds in respect to the phenomena of the Will, +it must hold equally in respect of those of the other faculties the +Intelligence, for example. We will, therefore, bring the objection to a +test, by applying it to certain intellectual phenomena. We will take, as +an example, the universal and necessary affirmation, that "it is +impossible for the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be." +Every one is conscious, in certain circumstances, of making this and +other kindred affirmations. Now, if the objection under consideration is +valid, all that we should be conscious of is the fact, that, under the +circumstances supposed, we do, in reality, make particular affirmations; +while, in reference to the question, whether, in the same circumstances, +we can or cannot make different and opposite affirmations, we should +have no consciousness at all. Now, I appeal to every man, whether, when +he is conscious of making the affirmation, that it is impossible for the +same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be, he is not equally +conscious of the fact, that it is impossible for him to make the +opposite affirmation whether, when he affirms that three and two make +five, he is not conscious that it is impossible for him to affirm that +three and two are six? In other words, when we are conscious of making +certain intellectual affirmations, are we not equally conscious of an +impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations? Every man +is just as conscious of the fact, that the phenomena of his Intelligence +fall under the relation of Necessity, as he is of making any +affirmations at all. If this is not so, we cannot know but that it is +possible for us to affirm and believe perceived contradictions. All that +we could say is, that, as a matter of fact, we do not do it. But whether +we can or cannot do it, we can never know. Do we not know, however, as +absolutely as we know anything, that we _cannot_ affirm perceived +contradictions? In other words, we do and can know absolutely, that our +Intelligence is subject to the law of Necessity. We do know by +consciousness, with absolute certainty, that the phenomena of the +Intelligence, and I may add, of the Sensibility too, do fall under the +relation of Necessity. Why may we not know, with equal certainty, +whether the phenomena of the Will do or do not fall under the relation +of Liberty? What then becomes of the objection under consideration? + +2. But while we are conscious of the fact, that the Intellect is under +the law of Necessity, we are equally conscious that Will is under that +of Liberty. We make intellectual affirmations; such, for example, as the +propositions, Things equal to the same things are equal to one another, +There can be no event without a cause, &c., with a consciousness of an +utter impossibility of making different and opposite affirmations. We +put forth acts of Will with a consciousness equally distinct and +absolute, of a possibility, in the same circumstances, of putting forth +different and opposite determinations. Even Necessitarians admit and +affirm the validity of the testimony of consciousness in the former +instance. Why should we doubt or deny it in the latter? + +3. The question, whether Consciousness can or cannot give us not only +mental phenomena, but also the fundamental characteristics of such +phenomena, cannot be determined by any pre-formed theory, in respect to +what Consciousness can or cannot affirm. If we wish to know to what a +witness is able to testify, we must not first determine what he can or +cannot say, and then refuse to hear anything from him, except in +conformity to such decisions. We must first give him a full and +attentive hearing, and then judge of his capabilities. So in respect to +Consciousness. If we wish to know what it does or does not, what it can +or cannot affirm, we must let it give its full testimony, untrammelled +by any pre-formed theories. Now, when the appeal is thus made, we find, +that, in the circumstances in which we do originate given +determinations, it affirms distinctly and absolutely, that, in the same +identical circumstances, we might originate different and opposite +determinations. From what Consciousness does affirm, we ought surely to +determine the sphere of its legitimate affirmations. + +4. The universal solicitude of Necessitarians to take the question under +consideration from the bar of Consciousness is, in fact, a most decisive +acknowledgment, on their part, that at that tribunal the cause will go +against them. Let us suppose that all men were as conscious that their +Will is subject to the law of Necessity, as they are that their +Intelligence is. Can we conceive that Necessitarians would not be as +solicitous to carry the question directly to the tribunal of +Consciousness, as they now are to take it from that tribunal? When all +men are as conscious that their Will is under the law of Liberty, as +they are that their other faculties are under the relation of Necessity, +no wonder that Necessitarians anticipate the ruin of their cause, when +the question is to be submitted to the bar of Consciousness. No wonder +that they so solemnly protest against an appeal to that tribunal. Let +the reader remember, however, that the moment the validity of the +affirmations of Consciousness is denied, in respect to any question in +mental science, it becomes infinite folly in us to reason at all on the +subject; a folly just as great as it would be for a natural philosopher +to reason about colors, after denying the validity of all affirmations +of the eye, in respect to the phenomena about which he is to reason. + +DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY ARGUED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF LIBERTY IN +ALL MINDS. + +III. I will present a third general argument in favor of the doctrine of +Liberty; an argument, which, to my mind, is perfectly conclusive, but +which differs somewhat from either of the forms of argumentation above +presented. I argue the Liberty of the Will _from the existence of the +idea of Liberty in the human mind, in the form in which it is there +found_. + +If the Will is not free, the idea of Liberty is wholly inapplicable to +any phenomenon in existence whatever. Yet this idea is in the mind. The +action of the Will in conformity to it is just as conceivable as its +action in conformity to the idea of Necessity. It remains with the +Necessitarian to account for the existence of this idea in the human +mind, in consistency with his own theory. Here the following +considerations present themselves demanding special attention. + +1. The idea of Liberty, like that of Necessity, is a _simple_, and not a +_complex_ idea. This all will admit. + +2. It could not have come into the mind from observation or reflection +because all phenomena, external and internal, all the objects of +observation and reflection, are, according to the doctrine of Necessity, +not free, but necessary. + +3. It could not have originated, as _necessary_ ideas do, as the logical +antecedents of the truths given by observation and reflection. For +example, the idea of space, time, substance, and cause, are given in the +Intelligence, as the logical antecedents of the ideas of body, +succession, phenomena, and events, all of which are truths derived from +observation or reflection. Now the idea of Liberty, if the doctrine of +Necessity is true, cannot have arisen in this way because all the +objects of observation and reflection are, according to this doctrine, +necessary, and therefore their logical antecedents must be. How shall we +account, in consistency with this theory, for the existence of this idea +in the mind? It came not from perception external, nor internal, nor as +the logical antecedent or consequent of any truth thus perceived. Now if +we admit the doctrine of Liberty as a truth of universal consciousness, +we can give a philosophical account of the existence of the idea of +Liberty in all minds. If we deny this doctrine, and consequently affirm +that of Necessity, we may safely challenge any theologian or philosopher +to give such an account of the existence of that idea in the mind. For +all ideas, in the mind, do and must come from observation or reflection, +or as the logical antecedents or consequents of ideas thus obtained. We +have here an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Necessity is +true. + +4. All _simple_ ideas, with the exception of that of Liberty, have +realities within or around us, corresponding to them. If the doctrine of +Necessity is true, we have one solitary idea of this character, that of +Liberty, to which no reality corresponds. Whence this solitary intruder +in the human mind? + +The existence of this idea in the mind is proof demonstrative, that a +reality corresponding to it does and must exist, and as this reality is +found nowhere but in the Will, there it must be found. Almost all +Necessitarians are, in philosophy, the disciples of Locke. With him, +they maintain, that all ideas in the mind come from observation and +reflection. Yet they maintain that there is in the mind one idea, that +of Liberty, which never could thus have originated; because, according +to their theory, no objects corresponding do or can exist, either as +realities, or as the objects of observation or reflection. We have again +an event without a cause, if the doctrine of Liberty is not true. + +5. The relation of the ideas of Liberty and Necessity to those of +obligation, merit and demerit, &c., next demand our attention. If the +doctrine of Necessity is true, the idea of Liberty is, as we have seen, +a chimera. With it the idea of obligation can have no connection or +alliance; but must rest exclusively upon that of Necessity. Now, how +happens it, that no man holding the doctrine of Liberty was ever known +to deny that of obligation, or of merit and demerit? How happens it, +that the validity of neither of these ideas has ever, in any age or +nation, been denied, except on the avowed authority of the doctrine of +Necessity? Sceptics of the class who deny moral obligation, are +universally avowed Necessitarians. We may safely challenge the world to +produce a single exception to this statement. We may challenge the world +to produce an individual in ancient or modern times who holds the +doctrine of Liberty, and denies moral obligation, or an individual who +denies moral obligation on any other ground than that of Necessity. Now, +how can this fact be accounted for, that the ideas of obligation, merit +and demerit, &c., universally attach themselves to a chimera, the idea +of Liberty, and stand in such irreconcilable hostility to the only idea +by which, as Necessitarians will have it, their validity is affirmed? + +6. Finally, If the doctrine of Necessity is true, the phenomena of the +Intelligence, Sensibility, and the Will, are given in Consciousness as +alike necessary. The idea of Liberty, then, if it does exist in the +mind, would not be likely to attach itself to either of these classes of +phenomena; and if to either, it would be just as likely to attach itself +to one class as to another. Now, how shall we account for the fact, that +this idea always attaches itself to one of these classes of phenomena, +those of the Will, and never to either of the others? How is it that all +men agree in holding, that, in the circumstances of their occurrence, +the phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility cannot but be what +they are, while those of the Will may be otherwise than they are? Why, +if this chimera, the idea of Liberty, attaches itself to either of these +classes, does it not sometimes attach itself to the phenomena of the +Intelligence or Sensibility, as well as to those of the Will? Here, once +again, we have an event without a cause, a distinction without a +difference, if the doctrine of Necessity is true. The facts before us +can be accounted for only on the supposition, that the phenomena of the +Intelligence and Sensibility are given in Consciousness as necessary, +while those of the Will are given as free. + +THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY, THE DOCTRINE OF THE BIBLE. + +IV. We will now, in the fourth place, raise the inquiry, an inquiry very +appropriate in its place, and having an important bearing upon our +present investigations, whether the doctrine of the Will, above +established, is the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible? The following +considerations will enable us to give a decisive answer to this inquiry. + +1. If the doctrine of the Will here maintained is not, and consequently +that of Necessity is, the doctrine pre-supposed in the Scriptures, then +we have two revelations from God, the external and internal, in palpable +contradiction to each other. As the _works_ of God (see Rom. 1: 19, 20) +are as real a revelation from him as the Bible, so are the necessary +affirmations of our Intelligence. Now, in our inner being, in the depths +of our Intelligence, the fact is perpetually revealed and affirmed--a +fact which we cannot disbelieve, if we would--that we are not +_necessary_ but _free_ agents. Suppose that, in the external revelation, +the Scriptures, the fact is revealed and affirmed that we are _not free_ +but _necessary_ agents. Has not God himself affirmed in one revelation +what he has denied in another? Of what use can the internal revelation +be, but to render us necessarily sceptical in respect to the external? +Has the Most High given two such revelations as this? + +2. In the Scriptures, man is presented as the subject, and, of course, +as possessing those powers which render him the proper subject of +command and prohibition, of obligation, of merit and demerit, and +consequently of reward and punishment. Let us suppose that God has +imparted to a being a certain constitution, and then placed him in a +condition in which, in consequence of the necessary correlation between +his constitution and circumstances, but one series of determinations are +possible to him, and that series cannot but result. Can we conceive it +proper in the Most High to prohibit that creature from pursuing the +course which God himself has rendered it impossible for him not to +pursue, and require him, under the heaviest sanctions, to pursue, under +these identical circumstances, a different and opposite course--a course +which the Creator has rendered it impossible for him to pursue? Is this +the philosophy pre-supposed in the Bible? Does the Bible imply a system +of mental philosophy which renders the terms, obligation, merit and +demerit, void of all conceivable meaning, and which lays no other +foundation for moral retributions but injustice and tyranny? + +3. Let us now contemplate the doings of the Great Day revealed in the +Scriptures, in the light of these two opposite theories. Let us suppose +that, as the righteous and the wicked stand in distinct and separate +masses before the Eternal One, the Most High says to the one class, +"You, I myself placed in circumstances in which nothing but obedience +was possible, and that you could not but render; and you, I placed in a +condition in which nothing but disobedience was possible to you, and +that you could not but perpetrate. In consequence of these distinct and +opposite courses, each of which I myself rendered unavoidable, _you_ +deserve and shall receive my eternal smiles; and _you_ as richly deserve +and shall therefore endure my eternal frowns." What would be the +response of an assembled universe to a division based upon such a +principle? Is this the principle on which the decisions of that Day are +based? It must be so, if the doctrine of Liberty is not, and that of +Necessity is, the doctrine of the Bible? + +4. We will now contemplate another class of passages which have a +bearing equally decisive upon our present inquiries. I refer to that +class in which God expresses the deepest regret at the course which +transgressors have pursued, and are still pursuing, and the most +decisive unwillingness that they should pursue that course and perish. +He takes a solemn oath, that he is not willing that they should take the +course of disobedience and death, but that they should pursue a +different and opposite course. God expresses no regret that they are in +the _circumstances_ in which they are, but that in those circumstances +they should take the path of disobedience, and not that of obedience. +Now, can we suppose, what must be true, if the doctrine of Necessity is +the doctrine pre-supposed in the Bible, that God places his creatures in +circumstances in which obedience is to them an impossibility, and in +which they cannot but disobey, and then takes a solemn oath that he is +not willing that they should disobey and perish, "but that they should +turn from their evil way and live?" What is the meaning of the +exclamation, "O that thou hadst hearkened to my commandment," if God +himself had so conditioned the sinner as to render obedience an +impossibility to him? Is this the philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in +the Bible? On the other hand, how perfectly in place are all the +passages under consideration, on the supposition that the doctrine of +Liberty is the doctrine therein pre-supposed, and that consequently the +obedience which God affirms Himself desirous that sinners should render, +and his regret that they do not render, is always possible to them! One +of the seven pillars of the Gospel is this very doctrine. Take it from +the Bible, and we have "another Gospel." + +5. One other class of passages claims special attention here. In the +Scriptures, the Most High expresses the greatest _astonishment_ that men +should sin under the influences to which he has subjected them. He calls +upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the conduct +of men under those influences. "Hear, O heavens, and give ear, O earth," +he exclaims, "for the Lord hath spoken; I have nourished and brought up +children, and they have rebelled against me." Now, let us suppose, as +the doctrine of Necessity affirms, that God has placed sinners under +influences under which they cannot but sin. What must we think of his +conduct in calling upon the universe to unite with him in astonishment, +that under these influences they should sin--that is, take the only +course possible to them, the course which they cannot but take? With the +same propriety, he might place a mass of water on an inclined plane, and +then call upon heaven and earth to unite with him in astonishment at the +downward flow of the fluid. Is this the philosophy pre-supposed in the +Bible? + +SEC. 3. VIEWS OF NECESSITARIANS. + +We are now prepared for a consideration of certain miscellaneous +questions which have an important bearing upon our present inquiries. + +NECESSITY AS HELD BY NECESSITARIANS. + +I. The first inquiry that presents itself is this: Do Necessitarians +hold the doctrine of Necessity as defined in this chapter? Do they +really hold, in respect to every act of will, that, in the circumstances +of its occurrence, that one act only is possible, and that cannot but +arise? Is this, for example, the doctrine of Edwards? Is it the doctrine +really held by those who professedly agree with him? I argue that it is: + +1. Because they unanimously repudiate the doctrine of Liberty as here +defined. They must, therefore, hold that of Necessity; inasmuch as no +third relation is even conceivable or possible. If they deny that the +phenomena of the Will fall under either of these relations, and still +call themselves Necessitarians, they most hold to an inconceivable +something, which themselves even do not understand and cannot define, +and which has and can have no real existence. + +2. Edwards has confounded the phenomena of the Will with those of the +Sensibility which are necessary in the sense here defined. He must, +therefore, hold that the characteristics of the latter class belong to +those of the former. + +3. Edwards represents the relation between motives and acts of Will, as +being the same in _kind_ as that which exists between _causes_ and +_effects_ among external material substances. The former relation he +designates by the words _moral necessity_; the latter, by that of +natural, or _philosophical_, or _physical necessity_. Yet he says +himself, that the difference expressed by these words "does not lie so +much in the nature of the _connection_ as in the two terms _connected_." +The qualifying terms used, then, designate merely the nature of the +antecedents and consequents, while the nature of the connection between +them is, in all instances, the same, that of naked necessity. + +4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as +physical, or natural necessity. "Moral necessity may be," he says, "as +absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly +connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its +natural cause." + +5. Necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of +Will as that of _cause_ and _effect_; and for this reason necessary. +"If," says Edwards, "every act of Will is excited by some motive, then +that motive is the _cause_ of that act of Will." "And if volitions are +properly the effects of their motives, then they are _necessarily_ +connected with their motives." Now as the relation of cause and effect +is necessary, in the sense of the term Necessity as above defined, +Edwards must hold, and design to teach, that all acts of Will are +necessary in this sense. + +6. Necessitarians represent the connection between motives and acts of +Will as being, in all instances, the same in kind as that which exists +between volitions and external actions. "As external actions," says +President Day, "are directed by the Will, so the Will itself is directed +by influence." Now all admit, that the connection between volitions and +external actions is necessary in this sense, that when we will such +action it cannot but take place. No other act is, in the circumstances, +possible. In the same sense, according to Necessitarians, is every act +of Will necessarily connected with influence, or motives. We do +Necessitarians no wrong, therefore, when we impute to them the doctrine +of Necessity as here defined. In all cases of sin, they hold, that an +individual is in circumstances in which none but sinful acts of Will are +possible, and these he cannot but put forth; and that in these identical +circumstances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put forth +different and opposite acts. + +THE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS. + +II. We are prepared for another important inquiry, to wit: whether the +words, _certainty_, _moral certainty_, &c., as used by Necessitarians, +are identical in their meaning with that of Necessity as above defined? +The doctrine of Necessity would never be received by the public at all, +but for the language in which it is clothed, language which prevents the +public seeing it as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in +distinction from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to be nothing +but Certainty, or moral Certainty, &c. Now the question arises, what is +this Certainty? Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else? +That it is, I argue, + +1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can possibly be no +Certainty, which does not fall either under the relation of Liberty or +Necessity as above defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not, +according to their own showing, fall under the former relation: it must, +therefore, fall under the latter. It must be naked Necessity, and +nothing else. + +2. While they have defined the term Necessity, and have not that of +Certainty, they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the +former. The latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, and not +the former by the latter. + +3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes +the possibility of different and opposite acts of Will under the +influences, or motives, under which particular acts are put forth. The +Certainty under consideration, therefore, is not necessity of a +particular kind, a necessity consistent with liberty and moral +obligation. It is the Necessity above defined, in all its naked +deformity. + +III. We are now prepared for a distinct statement of the doctrine of +Ability, according to the Necessitarian scheme. Even the Necessitarians, +with very few exceptions, admit, that in the absence of all power to do +right or wrong, we can be under no obligation to do the one or avoid the +other. "A man," says Pres. Day, "is not responsible for remaining in his +place if he has no power to move. He is not culpable for omitting to +walk, if he has no strength to walk. He is not under obligation to do +anything for which he has not what Edwards calls _natural_ power." It is +very important for us to understand the _nature_ of this ability, which +lies at the foundation of moral obligation; to understand, I repeat, +what this Ability is, according to the theory under consideration. This +Ability, according to the doctrine of Liberty, has been well stated by +Cousin, to wit: "The moment we take the resolution to do an action, we +take it with a consciousness of being able to take a contrary +resolution;" and by Dr. Dwight, who says of a man's sin, that it is +"chosen by him unnecessarily, _while possessed of a power to choose +otherwise_." The nature of this Ability, according to the Necessitarian +scheme, has been stated with equal distinctness in the Christian +Spectator. "If we take this term [Ability or Power] in the absolute +sense, as including _all_ the antecedents to a given volition, there is +plainly no such thing as power to the contrary; for in this sense of the +term," as President Day states, "a man never has power to do anything but +what he actually performs." "In this comprehensive, though rather +unusual sense of the word," says President Day, "a man has not power to +do anything which he does not do." The meaning of the above extracts +cannot be mistaken. Nor can any one deny that they contain a true +exposition of the doctrine of Necessity, to wit: that under the +influences under which men do will, and consequently act, it is +absolutely impossible for them to will and act differently from what +they do. In what sense, then, have they power to will and act +differently according to this doctrine? To this question President Day +has given a correct and definite answer. "The man who wills in a +particular way, under the influence of particular feelings, might will +differently under a different influence." + +Now, what is the doctrine of Ability, according to this scheme? A man, +for example, commits an act of sin. He ought, in the stead of that act, +to have put forth an act of obedience. Without the power to render this +obedience, as President Day admits, there can be no obligation to do it. +When the Necessitarian says, that the creature, when he sins, has power +to obey, he means, not that under the influence under which the act of +sin is committed, the creature has power to obey; but that _under a +different influence he might obey_. But mark, it is under the identical +influence under which a man does sin, and under which, according to the +doctrine of Necessity, he cannot but sin, that he is required not to +sin. Now how can a man's ability, and obligation not to sin under a +given influence, grow out of the fact, that, under a different +influence, an influence under which he cannot but do right, he might not +sin? This is all the ability and ground of obligation as far as Ability, +Natural Ability as it is called, is concerned, which the doctrine of +Necessity admits. A man is, by a power absolutely irresistible, placed +in circumstances in which he cannot possibly but sin. In these +circumstances, it is said, that he has _natural ability_ not to sin, and +consequently ought not to do it. Why? Because, to his acting +differently, no change in his nature or powers is required. These are +"perfect and entire, wanting nothing." All that is required is, that his +_circumstances_ be changed, and then he might not sin. "In what sense," +asks President Day, "is it true, that a man has power to will the +contrary of what he actually wills? He has such power that, with a +_sufficient inducement_, he will make an opposite choice." Is not this +the strangest idea of Natural Ability as constituting the foundation of +obligation, of which the human mind ever tried to conceive? In +illustration, let us suppose that a man, placed in the city of New York, +cannot but sin; placed in that of Boston, he cannot but be holy, and +that the fact whether he is in the one or the other city depends upon +the irresistible providence of God. He is placed in New York where he +cannot but sin. He is told that he ought not to do it, and that he is +highly guilty for not being perfectly holy. It is also asserted that he +has all the powers of moral agency, all the ability requisite to lay the +foundation for the highest conceivable obligation to be holy. What is +the evidence? he asks. Is it possible for me, in my present +circumstances, to avoid sin? and in my present circumstances, you know, +I cannot but be. I acknowledge, the Necessitarian says, that under +present influences, you cannot but sin, and that you cannot but be +subject to these influences. Still, I affirm, that you have all the +powers of moral agency, all the natural ability requisite to obedience, +and to the highest conceivable obligation to obedience. Because, in the +first place, even in New York, you could obey if you chose. You have, +therefore, _natural_, though not _moral_, power to obey. But stop, +friend, right here. When you say that I might obey, if I chose, I would +ask, if choosing, as in the command, "choose life," is not the very +thing required of me? When, therefore, you affirm that I might obey, if +I chose, does it not mean, in reality, that I might choose, if I should +choose? Is not your Natural Ability this, that I might obey if I did +obey?[2] I cannot deny, the Necessitarian replies, that you have +correctly stated this doctrine. Permit me to proceed in argument, +however. In the next place, all that you need in order to be holy as +required, is a change, not of your _powers_, but of the _influences_ +which control the _action_ of those powers. With no change in your +constitution or powers, you need only to be placed in Boston instead of +New York, and there you cannot but be holy. Is it not as clear as light, +therefore, that you have now all the powers of moral agency, all the +ability requisite to the highest conceivable obligation to be holy +instead of sinful? + +I fully understand you, the sinner replies. But remember, that it is not +in Boston, where, as you acknowledge, I cannot be, that I am required +not to sin; but here, in New York, where I cannot but be, and cannot +possibly but sin. It is here, and not somewhere else, that I am required +not to sin. How can the fact, that if I were in Boston, where I could +not but be holy, I might not sin, prove, that here, in New York, I have +any ability, either natural or moral--am under any obligation +whatever--not to sin? These are the difficulties which press upon me. +How do you remove them according to your theory? + +I can give no other answer, the Necessitarian replies, than that already +given. If that does not silence for ever every excuse for sin in your +mind, it is wholly owing to the perverseness of your heart, to its +bitter hostility to the truth. I may safely appeal to the Necessitarian +himself, whether I have not here given an uncaricatured expose of his +theory. + +SINFUL INCLINATIONS. + +IV. When pressed with such appalling difficulties as these, the +Necessitarian falls back, in self-justification, upon the _reason why_ +the sinner cannot be holy. The only reason, it is said, why the sinner +does not do as he ought is, not the want of power, but the strength of +his sinful inclinations. Shall he plead these in excuse for sin? By no +means. They constitute the very essence of the sinner's guilt. Let it be +borne in mind, that, according to the doctrine of Necessity, such is the +connection between the nature, or constitution of the sinner's mind--a +nature which God has given him, and the influences under which he is +placed by Divine Providence--that none but these very inclinations are +possible to him, and these cannot but exist. From these inclinations, +sinful acts of Will cannot but arise. How is the matter helped, as far +as ability and obligation, on the part of the sinner, are concerned, by +throwing the guilt back from acts of Will upon inclinations equally +necessary? + +NECESSARIAN DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY. + +The real liberty of the Will, according to the Necessitarian scheme, +next demands our attention. All admit that Liberty is an essential +condition of moral obligation. In what sense, then, is or is not, man +free, according to the doctrine of Necessity? + +"The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty," says +President Edwards, "is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one +has to do as he pleases. Or, in other words, his being free from +hinderance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any +respect as he wills. And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we +please to call that by, is a person's being hindered, or unable to +conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise." "The only +idea, indeed, that we can form of free-agency, or of freedom of Will," +says Abercrombie, "is, that it consists in a man's being able to do what +he wills, or to abstain from doing what he will not. Necessary agency, +on the other hand, would consist in a man's being compelled, by a force +from without, to do what he will not, or prevented from doing what he +wills." + +With these definitions all Necessitarians agree. This is all the Liberty +known, or conceivable, according to their theory. Liberty does not +consist in the power to choose in one or the other of two or more +different and opposite directions, under the same influence. It is found +wholly and exclusively in the connection between the act of Will, +considered as the antecedent, and the effort, external or internal, +considered as the consequent. On this definition I remark, + +1. That it presents the idea of Liberty as distinguished from +_Servitude_, rather than Liberty as distinguished from Necessity. A man +is free, in the first sense of the term, when no external restraints +hinder the carrying out of the choice within. This, however, has nothing +to do with Liberty, as distinguished from Necessity. + +2. If this is the only sense in which a man is free, then, in the +language of a very distinguished philosopher, "if you cut off a man's +little finger, you thereby annihilate so much of his free agency;" +because, in that case, you abridge so much his power to do as he +chooses. Is this Liberty, the only liberty of man, a liberty which may +be destroyed by chains, bolts, and bars? Is this Liberty as +distinguished from Necessity the liberty which lays the foundation of +moral obligation? + +3. If this is the only sense in which man is free, then dire Necessity +reigns throughout the entire domain of human agency. If all acts of Will +are the necessary consequents of the influences to which the mind is at +the time subjected, much more must a like necessity exist between all +acts of Will and their consequents, external and internal. This has been +already shown. The mind, then, with all its acts and states, exists in a +chain of antecedents and consequents, causes and effects, linked +together in every part and department by a dire necessity. This is all +the Liberty that this doctrine knows or allows us; a Liberty to choose +as influences necessitate us to choose, and to have such acts of Will +followed by certain necessary consequents, external and internal. In +this scheme, the idea of Liberty, which all admit must have a location +somewhere, or obligation, is a chimera; this idea, I say, after +"wandering through dry places, seeking rest and finding none," at length +is driven to a location where it finds its grave, and not a living +habitation. + +4. It is to me a very strange thing, that Liberty, as the foundation of +moral obligation, should be located here. Because that acts of Will are +followed by certain corresponding necessary consequents external and +internal, therefore we are bound to put forth given acts of Will, +whatever the influences acting upon us may be, and however impossible it +may be to put forth those acts under those influences! Did ever a +greater absurdity dance in the brain of a philosopher or theologian? + +5. The public are entirely deceived by this definition, and because they +are deceived as to the theory intended by it, do they admit it as true? +Suppose any man in the common walks of life were asked what he means, +when he says, he can do as he pleases, act as he chooses, &c. Does this +express your meaning? When you will to walk, rather than sit, for +example, no other volition is at the time possible, and this you must +put forth, and that when you have put forth this volition, you cannot +but walk. Is this your idea, when you say, you can do as you please? No, +he would say. That is not my idea at all. If that is true, man is not a +free agent at all. What men in general really mean when they say, they +can do as they please, and are therefore free, is, that when they put +forth a given act of Will, and for this reason conduct in a given +manner, they may in the same circumstances put forth different and +opposite determinations, and consequently act in a different and +opposite manner from what they do. + +VI. The argument of Necessitarians in respect to the _practical +tendencies_ of their doctrine demands a passing notice. All acts of the +Will, they say, are indeed necessary under the circumstances in which +they occur; but then we should learn the practical lesson not to place +ourselves in the circumstances where we shall be liable to act wrong. To +this I reply: + +1. That on the hypothesis before us, our being in the circumstances +which originate a given choice, is as necessary as the choice itself. +For I am in those circumstances either by an overruling Providence over +which I have no control, or by previous acts of the Will rendered +necessary by such Providence. Hence the difficulty remains in all its +force. + +2. The solution assumes the very principle denied, that is, that our +being in circumstances which originate particular acts of choice is not +necessary. Else why tell an individual he is to blame for being in such +circumstances, and not to place himself there again? + +GROUND WHICH NECESSITARIANS ARE BOUND TO TAKE IN RESPECT TO THE DOCTRINE +OF ABILITY. + +VII. We are now fully prepared to state the ground which Necessitarians +of every school are bound to take in respect to the doctrine of Ability. +It is to deny that doctrine wholly, to take the open and broad ground, +that, according to any appropriate signification of the words, it is +absolutely impossible for men to will, and consequently to act, +differently from what they do; that when they do wrong, they always do +it, with the absolute impossibility of doing right; and that when they +do right, there is always an equal impossibility of their doing wrong. +If men have not power to _will_ differently from what they do, it is +undeniably evident that they have no power whatever to act differently: +because there is an absolutely necessary connection between volitions +and their consequents, external actions. The doctrine of Necessity takes +away wholly all ability from the creature to will differently from what +he does. It therefore totally annihilates his ability to _act_ +differently. What, then, according to the theory of Necessity, becomes +of the doctrine of Ability? It is annihilated. It is impossible for us +to find for it a "local habitation or a name." As honest men, +Necessitarians are bound to proclaim the fact. They are bound to +proclaim the doctrine, that, in requiring men to be holy, under +influences under which they do sin, and cannot but sin (as it is true of +all sinful acts according to their theory), God requires of them +absolute impossibilities, and then dooms them to perdition for not +performing such impossibilities. + +The subterfuge to which Necessitarians resort here, will not avail them +at all, to wit: that men are to blame for not doing right, because, they +might do it if they chose. To will right is the thing, and the only +thing really required of them. The above maxim therefore amounts, as we +have already seen, to this: Men are bound to do, that is, to will, what +is right, because if they should will what is right, they would will +what is right. + +DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY, AS REGARDED BY NECESSITARIANS OF DIFFERENT +SCHOOLS. + +VIII. Two schools divide the advocates of Necessity. According to one +class, God produces in men all their volitions and acts, both sinful and +holy, by the direct exertion of his own omnipotence. Without the Divine +agency, men, they hold, are wholly incapable of all volitions and +actions of every kind. With it, none but those which God produces can +arise, and these cannot but arise. This is the scheme of Divine +efficiency, as advocated by Dr. Emmons and others. + +According to the other school, God does not, in all instances, produce +volitions and actions by his own direct agency, but by creating in +creatures a certain nature or constitution, and then subjecting them to +influences from which none but particular volitions and acts which they +do put forth can result, and these must result. According to a large +portion of this school, God, either by his own direct agency, or by +sustaining their laws of natural generation, produces in men the +peculiar nature which they do possess, and then imputes to them infinite +guilt, not only for this nature, but for its necessary results, sinful +feelings, volitions, and actions. + +Such are these two schemes. In the two following particulars, they +perfectly harmonize. 1. All acts of Will, together with their effects, +external and internal, in the circumstances of their occurrence, cannot +but be what they are. 2. The ground of this necessity is the agency of +God, in the one instance producing these effects directly and +immediately, and in the other producing the same results, mediately, by +giving existence to a constitution and influences from which such +results cannot but arise. They differ only in respect to the _immediate_ +ground of this necessity, the power of God, according to the former, +producing the effects directly, and according to the latter, indirectly. +According to both, all our actions sustain the same essential relation +to the Divine Will, that of Necessity. + +Now while these two theories so perfectly harmonize, in all essential +particulars, strange to tell, the advocates of one regard the other as +involving the most monstrous absurdities conceivable. For God to +produce, through the energies of his own omnipotence, human volitions, +and then to impute infinite guilt to men for what he himself has +produced in them, what a horrid sentiment that is, exclaims the advocate +of constitutional depravity. For God to create in men a sinful nature, +and then impute to them infinite guilt for what he has himself created, +together with its unavoidable results, what horrid tyranny such a +sentiment imputes to the Most High, exclaims the advocate of Divine +efficiency, in his turn. + +The impartial, uncommitted spectator, on the other hand, perceives most +distinctly the same identical absurdities in both these theories. He +knows perfectly, that it can make no essential difference, whether God +produces a result directly, or by giving existence to a constitution and +influences from which it cannot but arise. If one theory involves +injustice and tyranny, the other must involve the same. Let me here add, +that the reprobation with which each of the classes above named regards +the sentiments of the other, is a sentence of reprobation passed +(unconsciously to be sure) upon the doctrine of Necessity itself which +is common to both. For if this one element is taken out of either +theory, there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is +thus that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, pass sentence of +condemnation upon their own theory, by condemning it, in every system in +which they meet with it except their own. There is not a man on earth, +that has not in some form or other passed sentence of reprobation upon +this system. Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but the one +he has himself adopted, any theory that involves this element, and he +will instantly fasten upon this one feature as the characteristic which +vitiates the whole theory, and renders it deserving of universal +reprobation. It is thus that unsophisticated Nature expresses her +universal horror at a system which + + "Binding nature fast in fate, + Enslaves the human Will." + +Unsophisticated Nature abhors this doctrine infinitely more than she was +ever conceived to abhor a vacuum. Can a theory which the universal +Intelligence thus agrees in reprobating, as involving the most horrid +absurdity and tyranny conceivable, be the only true one? + + + + +CHAPTER IV. + +EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL. + +WHILE it is maintained, that, in the sense defined in the preceding +chapter, the Will is free, it is also affirmed that, in other respects, +it is not free at all. It should be borne distinctly in mind, that, in +the respects in which the Will is subject to the law of Liberty, its +liberty is absolute. It is in no sense subject to the law of Necessity. +So far, also, as it is subject to the law of Necessity, it is in no +sense free. What then are the extent and limits of the Liberty of the +Will? + +1. In the absence of Motives, the Will cannot act at all. To suppose the +opposite would involve a contradiction. It would suppose the action of +the Will in the direction of some object, in the absence of all objects +towards which such action can be directed. + +2. The Will is not free in regard to what the Motives presented shall +be, in view of which its determinations shall be formed. Motives exist +wholly independent of the Will. Nor does it depend at all upon the Will, +what Motives shall be presented for its election. It is free only in +respect to the particular determinations it shall put forth, in +reference to the Motives actually presented. + +3. Whenever a Motive, or object of choice, is presented to the mind, the +Will is necessitated, by the presentation of the object, to act in some +direction. It must yield or refuse to yield to the Motive. But such +refusal is itself a positive act. So far, therefore, the Will is wholly +subject to the law of Necessity. It is free, not in respect to whether +it shall, or shall not, choose at all when a Motive is presented; but in +respect to _what_ it shall choose. I, for example, offer a merchant a +certain sum, for a piece of goods. Now while it is equally possible for +him to receive or reject the offer, one or the other determination he +_must_ form. In the first respect, he is wholly free. In the latter, he +is not free in any sense whatever. The same holds true in respect to all +objects of choice presented to the mind. Motive necessitates the Will to +act in some direction; while, in all deliberate Moral Acts at least, it +leaves either of two or more different and opposite determinations +equally possible to the mind. + +4. Certain particular volitions may be rendered necessary by other, and +what may be termed _general_, determinations. For example, a +determination to pursue a particular course of conduct, may render +necessary all particular volitions requisite to carry this general +purpose into accomplishment. It renders them necessary in this sense, +that if the former does exist, the latter must exist. A man, for +example, determines to pass from Boston to New York with all possible +expedition. This determination remaining unchanged, all the particular +volitions requisite to its accomplishment cannot but exist. The general +and controlling determination, however, may, at any moment, be +suspended. To perpetuate or suspend it, is always in the power of the +Will. + +5. I will here state a conjecture, viz.: that there are in the primitive +developments of mind, as well as in all primary acts of attention, +certain necessary spontaneities of the Will, as well as of other powers +of the mind. Is it not in consequence of such actions, that the mind +becomes first conscious of the power of volition, and is it not now +necessary for us under certain circumstances to give a certain degree of +attention to phenomena which appear within and around us? My own +convictions are, that such circumstances often do occur. Nor is such a +supposition inconsistent with the great principle maintained in this +Treatise. This principle is, that Liberty and Accountability, in other +words, Free, and Moral Agency, are co-extensive. + +6. Nor does Liberty, as here defined, imply, that the mind, antecedently +to all acts of Will, shall be in a state of _indifference_, unimpelled +by feeling, or the affirmations of the Intelligence, more strongly in +one direction than another. The Will exists in a tri-unity with the +Intelligence and Sensibility. Its determinations may be in harmony with +the Sensibility, in opposition to Intelligence, or with the Intelligence +in opposition to the Sensibility. But while it follows either in +distinction from the other, under the same identical influences, +different and opposite determinations are equally possible. However the +Will may be influenced, whether its determinations are in the direction +of the strongest impulse, or opposed to it, it never, in deliberate +moral determination, puts forth particular acts, because, that in these +circumstances, no others are possible. In instances comparatively few, +can we suppose that the mind, antecedently to acts of Will, is in a +state of indifference, unimpelled in one direction in distinction from +others, or equally impelled in the direction of different and opposite +determinations. Indifference is in no such sense an essential or +material condition of Liberty. How ever strongly the Will may be +impelled in the direction of particular determinations, it is still in +the possession of the highest conceivable freedom, if it is not thereby +_necessitated_ to act in one direction in distinction from all others. + +7. I now refer to one other fixed law under the influence of which the +Will is always necessitated to act. It is the law of _habit_. Action in +any one direction always generates a tendency to subsequent action in +the same direction under similar influences. This tendency may be +increased, till it becomes so strong as to render action in the same +direction in all future time really, although contingently, certain. The +certainty thus granted will always be of such a nature as consists fully +with the relation of Liberty. It can never, while moral agency +continues, come under the relation of Necessity. Still the certainty is +real. Thus the mind, by a continued course of well or ill doing, may +generate such fixed habits, as to render subsequent action in the same +direction perfectly certain, during the entire progress of its future +being. Every man, while conscious of freedom, should be fully aware of +the existence of this law, and it should surely lead him to walk +thoughtfully along the borders of "the undiscovered country," his +location in which he is determining by the habits of thought, feeling, +and action, he is now generating. + +STRONGEST MOTIVE--REASONING IN A CIRCLE. + +A singular instance of reasoning in a circle on the part of +Necessitarians, in respect to what they call the _strongest Motive_, +demands a passing notice here. One of their main arguments in support of +their doctrine is based upon the assumption, that the action of the Will +is always in the direction of the strongest Motive. When, however, we +ask them, which is the strongest Motive, their reply in reality is, that +it is the Motive in the direction of which the Will does act. "The +strength of a _Motive_," says President Day, "is not its prevailing, but +the power by which it prevails. Yet we may very properly _measure_ this +power by the actual result." Again, "We may measure the comparative +strength of Motives of different kinds, from the results to which they +lead; just as we learn the power of different causes, from the effects +which they produce:" that is, we are not to determine, _a priori_, nor +by an appeal to consciousness, which of two or more Motives presented is +the strongest. We are to wait till the Will does act, and then assume +that the Motive, in the direction of which it acts, is the strongest. +From the action of the Will in the direction of that particular Motive, +we are finally to infer the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. The +strongest Motive, according to the above definition, is the motive to +which the Will does yield. The argument based upon the truism, that the +Will always acts in the direction of this Motive, that is, the Motive +towards which it does act, the argument, I say, put into a logical form, +would stand thus. If the action of the Will is always in the direction +of the strongest Motive, that is, if it always follows the Motive it +does follow, it is governed by the law of Necessity. Its action is +always in the direction of this Motive, that is, it always follows the +Motive it does follow. The Will is therefore governed by the law of +Necessity. How many philosophers and theologians have become "rooted and +grounded" in the belief of this doctrine, under the influence of this +sophism, a sophism which, in the first instance, assumes the doctrine as +true, and then moves round in a vicious circle to demonstrate its truth. + + + + +CHAPTER V. + +THE GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. + +SECTION I. + +WE now come to a consideration of one of the great questions bearing +upon our personal investigations--the proposition maintained by +Necessitarians, as a chief pillar of their theory, that "_the Will +always is as the greatest apparent good_." + +PHRASE DEFINED. + +The first inquiry which naturally arises here is What is the proper +meaning of this proposition? + +In reply, I answer, that it must mean one of these three things. + +1. That the Will is always, in all its determinations, conformed to the +dictates of the Intelligence, choosing those things only which the +Intelligence affirms to be best. Or, + +2. That the determinations of the Will are always in conformity to the +impulse of the Sensibility, that is, that its action is always in the +direction of the strongest feeling. Or, + +3. In conformity to the dictates of the Intelligence, and the impulse of +the Sensibility combined, that is that the Will never acts at all, +except when impelled by the Intelligence and Sensibility both in the +same direction. + +MEANING OF THIS PHRASE ACCORDING TO EDWARDS. + +The following passage leaves no room for doubt in respect to the meaning +which Edwards attaches to the phrase, "the greatest apparent good." "I +have chosen," he says, "rather to express myself thus, that the Will +always is as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most +agreeable, than to say, that the Will is _determined_ by the greatest +apparent good, or by what seems most agreeable; because an appearing +most agreeable or pleasing to the mind, and the mind's preferring and +choosing, seem hardly to be properly and perfectly distinct." Here +undeniably, the words, choosing, preferring, "appearing most agreeable +or pleasing," and "the greatest apparent good," are defined as identical +in their meaning. Hence in another place, he adds, "If strict propriety +of speech be insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the +_voluntary action_ which is the immediate consequence and fruit of the +mind's volition and choice, is determined by that which appears most +agreeable, than by the preference or choice itself." The reason is +obvious. Appearing most agreeable or pleasing, and preference or choice, +had been defined as synonymous in their meaning. To say, therefore, that +preference or choice is determined by "what appears most agreeable or +pleasing," would be equivalent to the affirmation, that choice +determines choice. "The act of volition itself," he adds, "is always +determined by that in or about the mind's view of an object, which +causes it to appear most agreeable," or what is by definition the same +thing, causes it to be chosen. The phrases, "the greatest apparent +good," and "appearing most agreeable or pleasing to the mind," and the +words, choosing, preferring, &c., are therefore, according to Edwards, +identical in their meaning. The proposition, "the Will is always as the +greatest apparent good," really means nothing more nor less than this, +that Will always chooses as it chooses. The famous argument based upon +this proposition in favor of the doctrine of Necessity may be thus +expressed. If the Will always is as the greatest apparent good, that is, +if the Will always chooses as it chooses, it is governed by the law of +Necessity. The Will is as the greatest apparent good, that is, it always +chooses as it chooses. Therefore it is governed by this law. By this +very syllogism, multitudes have supposed that the doctrine of Necessity +has been established with all the distinctness and force of +demonstration. + +The question now returns, Is "the Will always as the greatest apparent +good," in either of the senses of the phrase as above defined? + +THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE DICTATES OF THE INTELLIGENCE. + +I. Is the Will then as the greatest apparent good in this sense, that +all its determinations are in conformity to the dictates of the +Intelligence. Does the Will never harmonize with the Sensibility in +opposition to the Intelligence? Has no intelligent being, whether sinful +or holy, ever done that which his Intellect affirmed at the time, that +he ought not to do, and that it was best for him not to do? I answer, + +1. Every man who has ever violated moral obligation knows, that he has +followed the impulse of desire, in opposition to the dictates of his +Intelligence. What individual that has ever perpetrated such deeds has +not said, and cannot say with truth, "I know the good, and approve it; +yet follow the bad?" Take a matter of fact. A Spanish nobleman during +the early progress of the Reformation, became fully convinced, that the +faith of the Reformers was true, and his own false, and that his +salvation depended upon his embracing the one and rejecting the other. +Yet martyrdom would be the result of such a change. While balancing this +question, in the depths of his own mind, he trembled with the greatest +agitation. His sovereign who was present, asked the cause. The reply +was, "the martyr's crown is before me, and I have not Christian +fortitude enough to take it." He died a few weeks subsequent, without +confessing the truth. Did he obey his Intelligence, or Sensibility +there? Was not the conflict between the two, and did not the latter +prevail? In John 12: 42, 43, we have a fact revealed, in which men were +convinced of the truth, and yet, because "they loved the praise of men +more than the praise of God," they did not confess, but denied the +truth, a case therefore in which they followed the impulse of desire, in +opposition to the dictates of the Intelligence. The Will then is not +"always as the greatest apparent good," in this sense, that its action +is always in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence. + +2. If this is so, sin, in all instances, is a mere blunder, a necessary +result of a necessary misjudgment of the Intelligence? Is it so? Can the +Intelligence affirm that a state of moral impurity is better than a +state of moral rectitude? How easy it would be, in every instance, to +"convert a sinner from the error of his way," if all that is requisite +is to carry his Intellect in favor of truth and righteousness? Who does +not know, that the great difficulty lies in the enslavement of the Will +to a depraved Sensibility? + +3. If the Will of all Intelligents is always in harmony with the +Intellect, then I affirm that there is not, and never has been, any such +thing as sin, or ill desert, in the universe. What more can be said of +God, or of any being ever so pure, than that he has always done what his +Intellect affirmed to be best? What if the devil, and all creatures +called sinners, had always done the same thing? Where is the conceivable +ground for the imputation of moral guilt to them? + +4. If all acts of Will are always in perfect harmony with the +Intelligence, and in this sense, "as the greatest apparent good," then, +when the Intellect affirms absolutely that there can be no ground of +preference between two objects, there can be no choice between them. But +we are, in fact, putting forth every day just such acts of Will, +selecting one object in distinction from another, when the Intellect +affirms their perfect equality, or affirms absolutely, that there is and +can be no perceived ground of preference between them. I receive a +letter, I will suppose, from a friend, informing me that he has just +taken from a bank two notes, perfectly new and of the same value, that +one now lies in the east and the other in the west corner of his drawer, +that I may have one and only one of them, the one that I shall name by +return of mail, and that I must designate one or the other, or have +neither. Here are present to my Intelligence two objects absolutely +equal. Their location is a matter of indifference, equally absolute. Now +if as the proposition "the Will is _always_ as the greatest apparent +good," affirms, I cannot select one object in distinction from another, +without a perceived ground for such selection, I could not possibly, in +the case supposed, say which bill I would have. Yet I make the selection +without the least conceivable embarrassment. I might mention numberless +cases, of daily occurrence, of a nature precisely similar. Every child +that ever played at "odd or even," knows perfectly the possibility of +selecting between objects which are, to the Intelligence, absolutely +equal. + +I will now select a case about which there can possibly be no mistake. +Space we know perfectly to be absolutely infinite. Space in itself is in +all parts alike. So must it appear to the mind of God. Now when God +determined to create the universe, he must have resolved to locate its +centre in some one point of space in distinction from all others. At +that moment, there was present to the Divine Intelligence an infinite +number of points, all and each absolutely equally eligible. Neither +point could have been selected, because it was better than any other: +for all were equal. So they must have appeared to God. Now if the "Will +is always as the greatest apparent good," in the sense under +consideration, God could not in this case make the selection, and +consequently could not create the universe. He did make the selection, +and did create. The Will, therefore, is not, in this sense, "always as +the greatest apparent good." + +THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE STRONGEST DESIRE. + +II. Is the "Will always as the greatest apparent good" in this sense, +that it is always as the strongest desire, or as the strongest impulse +of the Sensibility? Does the Will never harmonize with the Intelligence, +in opposition to the Sensibility, as well as with the Sensibility in +opposition to the Intelligence? If this is not so, then-- + +1. It would be difficult to define self-denial according to the ordinary +acceptation of the term. What is self-denial but placing the Will with +the Intelligence, in opposition to the Sensibility? How often in moral +reformations do we find almost nothing else but this, an inflexible +purpose placed directly before an almost crushing and overwhelming tide +of feeling and desire? + +2. When the Will is impelled in different directions, by conflicting +feelings, it could not for a moment be in a state of indecision, unless +we suppose these conflicting feelings to be absolutely equal in strength +up to the moment of decision. Who believes that? Who believes that his +feelings are in all instances in a state of perfect equilibrium up to +the moment of fixed determination between two distinct and opposite +courses? This _must_ be the case, if the action of the Will is always as +the strongest feeling, and in this sense as the "greatest apparent +good." How can Necessitarians meet this argument? Will they pretend +that, in all instances, up to the moment of decisive action, the +feelings impelling the Will in different directions are always +absolutely equal in strength? This must be, if the Will is always as the +strongest feeling. + +3. When the feelings are in a state of perfect equilibrium, there can +possibly, on this supposition, be no choice at all. The feelings often +are, and must be, in this state, even when we are necessitated to act in +some direction. The case of the bank notes above referred to, presents +an example of this kind. As the objects are in the mind's eye absolutely +equal, to suppose that the feelings should, in such a case, impel the +Will more strongly in the direction of the one than the other, is to +suppose an event without a cause, inasmuch as the Sensibility is +governed by the law of Necessity. If A and B are to the Intelligence, in +all respects, absolutely equal, how can the Sensibility impel the Will +towards A instead of B? What is an event without a cause, if this is +not? Contemplate the case in respect to the location of the universe +above supposed. Each point of space was equally present to God, and was +in itself, and was perceived and affirmed to be, equally eligible with +all the others. How could a stronger feeling arise in the direction of +one point in distinction from others, unless we suppose that God's +Sensibility is not subject to the law of Necessity, a position which +none will assume, or that here was an event without a cause? When, +therefore, God did select this one point in distinction from all the +others, that determination could not have been either in the direction +of what the Intelligence affirmed to be best, nor of the strongest +feeling. The proposition, therefore, that "the Will _always_ is as the +greatest apparent good," is in both the senses above defined +demonstrably false. + +4. Of the truth of this every one is aware when he appeals to his own +Consciousness. In the amputation of a limb, for example, who does not +know that if an individual, at the moment when the operation commences, +should yield to the strongest feeling, he would refuse to endure it? He +can pass through the scene, only by placing an inflexible purpose +directly across the current of feeling. How often do we hear individuals +affirm, "If I should follow my _feelings_, I should do this; if I should +follow my _judgment_, I should do that." In all such instances, we have +the direct testimony of consciousness, that the action of the Will is +not always in the direction of the strongest feeling: because its action +is sometimes consciously in the direction of the Intelligence, in +opposition to such feelings; and at others, in the conscious presence of +such feelings, the Will remains, for periods longer or shorter, +undecided in respect to the particular course which shall be pursued. + +THE WILL NOT ALWAYS AS THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY COMBINED. + +III. Is not the Will always as the greatest apparent good in this sense, +that its determinations are always as the affirmations of the +Intelligence and the impulse of the Sensibility combined? That it is +not, I argue for two reasons. + +1. If this was the case, when the Intelligence and Sensibility are +opposed to each other--a fact of very frequent occurrence,--there could +be no acts of Will in either direction. The Will must remain in a state +of absolute inaction, till these belligerent powers settle their +differences, and unite in impelling the Will in some particular +direction. But we know that the Will can, and often does, act in the +direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, when the affirmations of +one and the impulses of the other are in direct opposition to each +other. + +2. When both the Intellect and Sensibility, as in the cases above cited, +are alike indifferent, there can be, on the present hypothesis, no acts +of Will whatever. Under these identical circumstances, however, the Will +does act. The hypothesis, therefore, falls to the ground. + +I conclude, then, that the proposition, "the Will is always as the +greatest apparent good," is either a mere truism, having no bearing at +all upon our present inquiries, or that it is false. + +In the discussion of the above propositions, the doctrine of Liberty has +received a full and distinct illustration. The action of the Will is +sometimes in the direction of the Intelligence, in opposition to the +Sensibility, and sometimes in the direction of the Sensibility, in +opposition to the Intelligence, and never in the direction of either, +because it must be. Sometimes it acts where the Sensibility and +Intelligence both harmonize, or are alike indifferent. When also the +Will acts in the direction of the Intelligence or Sensibility, it is not +necessitated to follow, in all instances, the highest affirmation, nor +the strongest desire. + +SEC. II--MISCLLANEOUS TOPICS. + +NECESSITARIAN ARGUMENT. + +I. We are now prepared to appreciate the Necessitarian argument, based +upon the assumption, that "the Will always is as the greatest apparent +good." This assumption is the great pillar on which that doctrine rests. +Yet the whole argument based upon it is a perpetual reasoning in a +circle. Ask the Necessitarian to give the grand argument in favor of his +doctrine. His answer is, because "the Will _always_ is as the greatest +apparent good." Cite now such facts as those stated above in +contradiction of his assumption, and his answer is ready. There must be, +in all such cases, some perceived or felt ground of preference, or there +could be no act of Will in the case. There must have been, for example, +some point in space more eligible than any other for the location of the +universe, and this must have been the reason why God selected the one he +did. Ask him why he makes this declaration? His reply is, because "the +Will is always as the greatest apparent good." Thus this assumption +becomes premise or conclusion, just as the exigence of the theory based +upon it demands. Nothing is so convenient and serviceable as such an +assumption, when one has a very difficult and false position to sustain. +But who does not see, that it is a most vicious reasoning in a circle? +To assume the proposition, "the Will always is as the greatest apparent +good," in the first instance, as the basis of a universal theory, and +then to assume the truth of that proposition as the basis of the +explanation of particular facts, which contradict that theory, what is +reasoning in a circle if this is not? No one has a right to assume this +proposition as true at all, until he has first shown that it is affirmed +by all the phenomena of the Will. On its authority he has no right to +explain a solitary phenomenon. To do it is not only to reason in a +circle, but to beg the question at issue. + +MOTIVES CAUSE ACTS OF WILL, IN WHAT SENSE. + +II. We are also prepared to notice another assumption of President +Edwards, which, if admitted in the sense in which he assumes it as true, +necessitates the admission of the Necessitarian scheme, to wit: that the +determination of the Will is always _caused_ by the Motive present to +the mind for putting forth that determination. "It is that motive," he +says, "which, as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest +which determines the Will." Again, "that every act of the Will has some +cause, and consequently (by what has been already proved) has a +necessary connection with its cause, and so is necessary by a necessity +of connection and consequence, is evident by this, that every act of +Will, whatsoever, is excited by some motive." "But if every act of the +Will is excited by some motive, then that motive is the cause of that +act of the Will." "And if volitions are properly the effects of their +motives, then they are necessarily connected with their motives." + +If we grant the principle here assumed, the conclusion follows of +necessity. But let us inquire in what sense motive and volition sustain +to each other the relation of cause and effect. _The presence and action +of one power causes the action of another, so far, and so far only, as +it necessitates such action; and causes its action in a particular +direction, so far only as it necessitates its action in that direction, +in opposition to every other_. Now the action of one power may cause the +action of another, in one or both these ways. + +1. It may necessitate its action, and necessitate it in one direction in +opposition to any and every other. In this sense, fire causes the +sensation of pain. It necessitates the action of the Sensibility, and in +that one direction. Or, + +2. One power may necessitate the _action_ of another power, but not +necessitate its action in one direction in opposition to any or all +others. We have seen, in a former chapter, that the Motive causes the +action of the Will in this sense only, that it necessitates the Will to +act in some direction, but not in one direction in distinction from +another. Now the error of President Edwards lies in confounding these +two senses of the word _cause_. He assumes that when one power causes +the action of another in any sense, it must in every sense. It is +readily admitted, that in one sense the Motive causes the action of the +Will. But when we ask for the reason or cause of any one particular +choice in distinction from another, we find it, not in the motive, but +in the power of willing itself. + +OBJECTION--PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR. + +III. We are also prepared to notice the great objection of +Necessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here maintained. How, it is +asked, shall we account, on this theory, for _particular_ volitions? The +power to will only accounts for acts of Will in _some_ direction, but +not for one act in distinction from another. This distinction must be +accounted for, or we have an event without a cause. To this argument I +reply, + +1. It assumes the position in debate, to wit: that there cannot be +consequents which are not necessarily connected with particular +antecedents, which antecedents necessitate these particular consequents +in distinction from all others. + +2. To account for any effect, all that can properly be required is, to +assign the existence and operation of a cause adequate to the production +of such effects. Free-agency itself is such a cause in the case now +under consideration. We have here given the existence and operation of a +cause which must produce one of two effects, and is equally capable, +under the circumstances, of producing either. Such a cause accounts for +the existence of such an effect, just as much as the assignment of an +antecedent necessarily producing certain consequents, accounts for those +consequents. + +3. If, as this objection affirms, an act of Will, when there is no +perceived or felt reason for that act in distinction from every other, +is equivalent to an event without a cause; then it would be as +impossible for us to _conceive_ of the former as of the latter. We +cannot even conceive of an event without a cause. But we can conceive of +an act of Will when no reason, but the power of willing, exists for that +particular act in distinction from others. We cannot conceive of an +event without a cause. But we _can_ conceive of the mind's selecting +odd, for example, instead of even, without the Intellect or Sensibility +impelling the Will to that act in distinction from others. Such act, +therefore, is not equivalent to an event without a cause. The objection +under consideration is consequently wholly baseless. + +FACTS LIKE THE ABOVE WRONGLY ACCOUNTED FOR. + +IV. The manner in which Necessitarians sometimes endeavor to account for +acts of Will in which a selection is made between objects perceived and +felt to be perfectly equal, requires attention. Suppose that A and B are +before the mind. One or the other is to be selected, or no selection at +all is to be made. These objects are present to the mind as perfectly +equal. The Intelligence and Sensibility are in a state of entire +equilibrium between them. Now when one of these objects is selected in +distinction from the other, this act of Will is to be accounted for, it +is said, by referring back to the determination to make the selection +instead of not making it. The Will does not choose between A and B, at +all. The choice is between choosing and not choosing. But mark: To +determine to select A or B is one thing. To select one in distinction +from the other, is quite another. The former act does not determine the +Will towards either in distinction from the other. This last act remains +to be accounted for. When we attempt to account for it, we cannot do it, +by referring to the Intelligence or Sensibility for these are in a state +of perfect equilibrium between the objects. We can account for it only +by falling back upon the power of willing itself, and admitting that the +Will is free, and not subject to the law of Necessity. + +CHOOSING BETWEEN OBJECTS KNOWN TO BE EQUAL--HOW TREATED BY +NECESSITARIANS. + +V. The manner in which Necessitarians treat facts of this kind, to wit, +choosing between things perceived and felt to be equal, also demands a +passing notice. Such facts are of very little importance, one way or the +other, they say, in mental science. It is the height of folly to appeal +to them to determine questions of such moment as the doctrine of Liberty +and Necessity. I answer: Such facts are just as important in mental +science, as the fall of a piece of gold and a feather, in an exhausted +receiver, is in Natural Philosophy. The latter reveals with perfect +clearness the great law of attraction in the material universe. The +former reveals with equal conspicuousness the great law of Liberty in +the realm of mind. The Necessitarian affirms, that no act of Will is +possible, only in the direction of the dictates of the Intelligence, or +of the strongest impulse of the Sensibility. Facts are adduced in which, +from the necessity of the case, both Faculties must be in a state of +perfect equilibrium. Neither can impel the Will in one direction, in +distinction from the other. In such circumstances, if the doctrine of +Necessity is true, no acts of Will are possible. In precisely these +circumstances acts of Will do arise. The doctrine of Necessity therefore +is overthrown, and the truth of that Liberty is demonstrated. So +important are those facts which Necessitarians affect to despise. True +philosophy, it should be remembered, never looks contemptuously upon +facts of any kind. + +PALPABLE MISTAKE. + +VI. We are prepared to notice a palpable mistake into which +Necessitarians have fallen in respect to the use which the advocates of +the doctrine of Liberty design to make of the fact, that the Will can +and does select between objects perceived and felt to be equal. + +"The reason why some metaphysical writers," says President Day, "have +laid so much stress upon this apparently insignificant point, is +probably the _inference_ which they propose to draw from the position +which they assume. If it be conceded that the mind decides one way or +the other indifferently, when the motives on each side are perfectly +equal, they infer that this may be the fact, in all _other_ cases, even +though the motives to opposite choices may be ever so unequal. But on +what ground is this conclusion warranted? If a man is entirely +indifferent which of two barley-corns to take, does it follow that he +will be indifferent whether to accept of a guinea or a farthing; whether +to possess an estate or a trinket?" The advocates of the doctrine of +Liberty design to make, and do make, no such use of the facts under +consideration, as is here attributed to them. They never argue that, +because the Will can select between A and B, when they are perceived and +felt to be equal, therefore, when the Will acts in one direction, in +distinction from another, it is always, up to the moment of such action, +impelled in different directions by feelings and judgments equally +strong. What they do argue from such facts is, that the Will is subject +to the law of Liberty and not to that of Necessity. If the Will is +subject to the latter, then, when impelled in different directions by +Motives equally strong (as in the cases above cited), it could no more +act in the direction of one in distinction from the other, than a heavy +body can move east instead of west, when drawn in each direction by +forces perfectly equal. If the Will is subject to the law of Necessity, +then, in all instances of selection between objects known and felt to be +equal, we have an event without a cause. Even the Necessitarians, many +of them at least, dare not deny that, under these very circumstances, +selection does take place. They must, therefore, abandon their theory, +or admit the dogma, of events without causes. + + + + +CHAPTER VI. + +CONNECTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY WITH THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE. + +THE argument on which Necessitarians chiefly rely, against the doctrine +of Liberty, and in support of that of Necessity, is based upon the +Divine prescience of human conduct. The argument runs thus: all acts of +the Will, however remote in the distant future, are foreknown to God. +This fact necessitates the conclusion, that such acts are in themselves +certain, and, consequently, not free, but necessary. Either God cannot +foreknow acts of Will, or they are necessary. The reply to this argument +has already been anticipated in the Introduction. The Divine prescience +is not the truth to which the appeal should be made, to determine the +philosophy of the Will pre-supposed in the Bible. This I argue, for the +obvious reason, that of the _mode_, _nature_, and _degree_, of the +Divine prescience of human conduct we are profoundly ignorant. These we +must know with perfect clearness, before we can affirm, with any +certainty, whether this prescience is or is not consistent with the +doctrine of Liberty. The Divine prescience is a truth of inspiration, +and therefore a fact. The doctrine of Liberty is, as we have seen, a +truth of inspiration, and therefore a fact. It is also a fact, as +affirmed by the universal consciousness of man. How do we know that +these two facts are not perfectly consistent with each other? How do we +know but that, if we understood the _mode_, to say nothing of the nature +and degree of the Divine prescience, we should not perceive with the +utmost clearness, that this truth consists as perfectly with the +doctrine of Liberty, as with that of Necessity. + +If God foresees events, he foreknows them as they are, and not as they +are not. If they are free and not necessary, as free and not necessary +he foresees them. Having ascertained by consciousness that the acts of +the Will are free, and having, from reason and revelation, determined, +that God foreknows such acts, the great truth stands revealed to our +mind, that God does and can foreknow human conduct, and yet man in such +conduct be free; and that the mode, nature, and degree, of the former +are such as most perfectly to consist with the latter. + +I know with perfect distinctness, that I am now putting forth certain +acts of Will. With equal distinctness I know, that such acts are not +necessary, but free. My present knowledge is perfectly consistent with +present freedom. How do I know but that God's foreknowledge of future +acts is equally consistent with the most perfect freedom of such acts. + +Perhaps a better presentation of this whole subject cannot be found than +in the following extract from Jouffroy's "Introduction to Ethics." The +extract, though somewhat lengthy, will well repay a most attentive +perusal. + +DANGER IN REASONING FROM THE MANNER IN WHICH WE FOREKNOW EVENTS TO THAT +OF DIVINE PRESCIENCE. + +"To begin, then, with a very simple remark: if we conceive that +foreknowledge in the Divine Being acts as it does in us, we run the risk +of forming a most incorrect notion of it, and consequently, of seeing a +contradiction between it and liberty, that would disappear altogether +had we a truer notion. Let us consider that we have not the same faculty +for foreseeing the future as we have of reviewing the past; and even in +cases where we do anticipate it, it is by an induction from the past. +This induction may amount either to certainty, or merely to probability. +It will amount to certainty when we are perfectly acquainted with +necessary causes, and their law of operation. The effects of such causes +in given circumstances having been determined by experience, we can +predict the return of similar effects under similar circumstances with +entire certainty, so long at least as the present laws of nature remain +in force. It is in this way that we foresee, in most cases, the physical +occurrences, whose law of operation is known to us; and such foresight +would extend much further, were it not for unexpected circumstances +which come in to modify the result. This induction can never go beyond +probability, however, when we consider the acts of free causes; and for +the very reason that they are free, and that the effects which arise +from such causes are not of necessary occurrence, and do not invariably +follow the same antecedent circumstances. Where the question is, then, +as to the acts of any free cause, we are never able to foresee it with +certainty, and induction is limited to conjectures of probability. + +Such is the operation, and such are the limits of human foresight. Our +minds foresee the future by induction from the past; this foresight can +never attain certainty except in the case of causes and effects +connected by necessary dependence; when the effects of free causes are +to be anticipated, as all such effects are contingent, our foresight +must be merely conjecture." + +MISTAKE RESPECTING THE DIVINE PRESCIENCE. + +"If, now, we attempt to attribute to the Deity the same mode of +foresight of which human beings are capable, it will follow, as a strict +consequence, that, as God must know exactly and completely the laws to +which all the necessary causes in nature are subject--laws which change +only according to his will,--he can foresee with absolute certainty all +events which will take place in future. The certain foresight of +effects, therefore, which is to us possible only in particular cases, +and which, even then, is always liable to the limitation that the actual +laws of nature are not modified,--this foresight, which, even when most +sure, is limited and contingent, must be complete and absolute certainty +in God, supposing his foreknowledge to be of like kind with ours. + +But it is evident that, according to this hypothesis, the Deity cannot +foresee with certainty the volitions of free causes any more than we +can; for, as his foresight is founded, as ours is, upon the knowledge of +the laws which govern causes, and as the law of free causes is precisely +this, that their volitions are not necessary, God cannot calculate, any +more than a human being can, the influence of motives, which, in any +given case, may act upon such causes. Even his intelligence can lead no +further than to conjectures, more probable, indeed, than ours, but never +amounting to certainty. According to this hypothesis, we must, +therefore, say either that God can foresee, certainly, the future +volitions of men, and that man, therefore, is not a free being, or that +man is free, and that God, therefore, cannot, any more than we can, +foresee his volitions with certainty; and thus Divine prescience and +human free-will are brought into direct contradiction. + +But, gentlemen, why must there be this contradiction? Merely because we +suppose that God foresees the future in the same way in which we foresee +it; that his foreknowledge operates like our own. Now, is this, I ask, +such an idea as we ought to form of Divine prescience, or such an idea +as even the partisans of this system, which I am opposing, form? Have we +any reason for thus imposing upon the Deity the limitation of our own +feebleness? I think not. + +Unendowed as we are, with any faculty of foreseeing the future, it may +be difficult for us to conceive of such a faculty in God. But yet can we +not from analogy form such an idea? We have now two faculties of +perception--of the past by memory, of the present by observation; can we +not imagine a third to exist in God--the faculty of perceiving the +future, as we perceive the past? What would be the consequence? This: +that God, instead of conjecturing, by induction, the acts of human +beings from the laws of the causes operating upon them, would see them +simply as the results of the free determinations of the will. Such +perception of future acts no more implies the necessity of those +actions, than the perception of similar acts in the past. To see that +effects arise from certain causes is not to force causes to produce +them; neither is it to compel these effects to follow. It matters not +whether such a perception refers to the past, present, or future; it is +merely a perception; and, therefore, far from producing the effect +perceived, it even presupposes this effect already produced. + +I do not pretend that this vision of what is to be is an operation of +which our minds easily conceive. It is difficult to form an image of +what we have never experienced; but I do assert, that the power of +seeing what no longer exists is full as remarkable as that of seeing +what has as yet no being, and that the reason of our readily conceiving +of the former is only the fact that we are endowed with such a power: to +my reason, the mystery is the same. + +But whatever may or may not be in reality the mode of Divine +foreknowledge, or however exact may be the image which we attempt to +form of it, it always, I say,--and this is the only point I am desirous +of proving,--it always remains a matter of uncertainty, which cannot be +removed, whether the Divine foreknowledge is of a kind like our own, or +not; and as, in the one case, there would not be the same contradiction +that there is in the other, between our belief in Divine foreknowledge +and human freedom, it is proved true, I think, that no one has a right +to assert the existence of such a contradiction, and the necessity that +human reason should choose between them." + +SINGULAR INCONSISTENCY OF NECESSITARIANS. + +There is no class of men who dwell with more frequency and apparent +reverence, upon the truth, that "secret things belong to God," and those +and those only, "that are revealed to us;" that "none by searching can +find out God;" that "as the heavens are high above the earth, so are His +ways above our ways, and His thoughts above our thoughts;" and that it +is the height of presumption in us, to pretend to understand God's mode +of knowing and acting. None are more ready to talk of mysteries in +religion than they. Yet, strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless +true, that their whole argument, drawn from the Divine foreknowledge, +against the doctrine of Liberty, and in favor of that of Necessity, is +based entirely upon the assumption that they have found out and fully +understand the _mode_ of the Divine prescience of human conduct; that +they have so measured and determined the "ways and thoughts" of God, +that they _know_ that he cannot foresee any but _necessary_ events; that +among many events, all in themselves equally possible, and none of them +necessary in distinction from others, he cannot foreknow which, in fact, +will arise. We may properly ask the Necessitarian whence he obtained +this knowledge, so vast and deep; whence he has thus "found out the +Almighty to perfection?" To me, the pretension to such knowledge appears +more like presumption than that deep self-distrust and humiliation which +becomes the Finite in the presence of the Infinite. This knowledge has +not been obtained from revelation. God has never told us that He can +foresee none but necessary events. Whether He can or cannot foresee +events free as well as necessary, is certainly one of the "secret +things" which God has not revealed. If we admit ourselves ignorant of +the _mode_ of God's fore-knowledge of future events (and who will dare +deny the existence of such ignorance in his own case?), the entire +argument of the Necessitarian, based upon that fore-knowledge, in favor +of his doctrine, falls to the ground at once. + +NECESSITARIAN OBJECTION TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENT. + +To all that has been said above, the Necessitarian brings an objection +which he deems perfectly unanswerable. It is this: If actions are free +in the sense maintained in this treatise, then in themselves they are +uncertain. If they are still certainly known to God, they are both +certain and uncertain, at the same time. True, I answer, but not in the +same sense. As far as the _powers_ of the agent are concerned, the +action may be uncertain, while God at the same time may know certainly +how he will exert his powers. In reference merely to the _powers_ of the +agent, the event is uncertain. In reference to the mind of God, who +knows instinctively how he will exert these powers, the event is +certain. + + + + +CHAPTER VII. + +BEARING OF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY UPON THE PURPOSES AND AGENCY OF GOD, +IN RESPECT TO HUMAN CONDUCT. + +ALL truth is in harmony with itself. Every particular truth is, and must +be, in harmony with every other truth. If the doctrine of Necessity be +assumed as true, we must take one view of the relation of God's purposes +and agency in respect to the conduct of moral agents. If, on the other +hand, we assume as true the doctrine of Liberty, quite another and a +different view, in respect to this whole subject, must be taken. In the +remarks which I have to make upon this subject, I shall assume the truth +of the doctrine of Liberty, together with those of the perfect Divine +Omniscience, Wisdom, and Benevolence. The question now arises, in the +light of all these great truths, What relation do the Divine purposes +and agency sustain to human action? In what sense does God purpose, +preordain, and bring to pass, the voluntary conduct of moral agents? To +this question but one answer can be given, in the light of the truths +before us. God purposes human action in this sense only: He determines +himself to act in a given manner, because it is wisest and best for him +to act in that manner, and in that manner only. He determines this, +knowing how intelligent beings will act under the influence brought to +bear upon them by the Divine conduct. He purposes and brings about, or +causes human action in this sense only, that in the counsels of +eternity, He, in the exercise of infinite wisdom and goodness, +preordains, and at the time appointed, gives existence to the _motives_ +and _influences_ under which moral agents do act, and in the light of +which they voluntarily determine their own character and conduct. + +CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE. + +GODS PURPOSES CONSISTENT WITH THE LIBERTY OF CREATURES. + +1. We perceive the perfect consistency of God's purposes and agency with +human liberty. If the motives and influences in view of which men do +act, do not destroy their free agency,--a fact which must be true from +the nature of the Will,--then God's purposes to give existence, and his +agency in giving existence, to these motives and influences, cannot in +any sense destroy, or interfere with such agency. This is a self-evident +truth. + +SENSES IN WHICH GOD PURPOSED MORAL GOOD AND EVIL. + +2. We also perceive the senses in which God purposed the existence of +moral good and evil, in the universe. He purposed the existence of the +motives, in view of which He knew that a part of His subjects would +render themselves holy, and a part would render themselves sinful. But +when we contemplate all the holiness and consequent happiness which do +exist, we then perceive the reason why God gave existence to these +motives. The sin consequent, in the sense above explained, constitutes +no part of the reason for their existence, but was always, in the Divine +Mind, a reason against their existence; which reason, however, was +overpowered by infinitely more important reasons on the other side. The +good which results from creation and providence is the great and +exclusive object of creation and providence. The evil, God always +regretted, and would have prevented, if possible, i. e. if compatible +with the existence of the best possible system. + +DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE PREORDAINED BUT NOT WILLED. + +3. We also perceive the perfect consistency of those Scriptures which +represent God as, on the whole, _purposing_ the death of incorrigible +transgressors, and yet as not _willing_ it, but as willing the opposite. +The purpose to destroy is based upon the foreseen incorrigibleness of +the transgressor,--a purpose demanded by perfect wisdom and benevolence, +in view of that foreseen incorrigibleness. The incorrigibleness itself, +however, and the perdition consequent, are evils, the existence of which +God never willed; but are the opposite of what he willed, are evils +which a being of perfect wisdom and goodness never could, and never can +will. It is with perfect consistency, therefore, that the Scriptures +represent God, in view of incorrigibleness foreseen, as purposing the +death of the transgressor, and at the same time, in view of the fact +that such incorrigibleness is the opposite of what He wills the creature +to do, as affirming, that He is not "willing that any should perish, but +that all should come to a knowledge of the truth." + +GOD NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF THE INCORRIGIBLE. + +4. We see, also, how it is, that, while God does that, and eternally +purposed to do that, in view of which he eternally knew that certain of +his creatures would for ever destroy themselves, none but themselves are +in fault for such destruction. The reasons are these: + +(1.) God never did anything in view of which men ought to act thus, nor +which did not lay them under obligations infinite, to act differently, +and which was not best adapted to secure that end. + +(2.) Their destruction constituted no part of the _object_ of God in +creation and providence, the opposite of this being true. + +(3.) The great object of God in creation and providence was and is, to +produce the greatest possible amount of holiness and consequent +happiness, and to prevent, in every possible way consistent with this +end, the existence of sin, and consequently of misery.--Now if creatures +perish under such an influence, they perish by their own fault. + +SIN A MYSTERY. + +5. I have a single remark to make upon those phenomena of the Will, in +which evil is chosen instead of good, or sin instead of holiness. That +all intelligent beings possess the power to make such a choice, is a +fact affirmed by universal consciousness. But that any being, under any +circumstances, should make such a choice, and that he should for ever +refuse to return to the paths of virtue, notwithstanding his experience +of the consequences of sin, is an abuse of human liberty, which must for +ever remain an inexplicable mystery. When a being assigns the real +reason in view of which right is chosen, we are always satisfied with +such reason. But we are never satisfied with the reason for the opposite +course. + +CONCLUSION FROM THE ABOVE. + +One conclusion forces itself upon us, from that view of the Divine +government which consists with the doctrine of Liberty. The aspect of +that government which results from this view of the subject commends +itself to the reason and conscience of the intelligent universe. +_Mysteries_ we do and must find in it; but _absurdities_ and +_contradictions_, never. Under such a Government, no being is condemned +for what he cannot avoid, nor rewarded for what he could but do. While + + "God sits on no precarious throne, + Nor borrows leave to be," + +the destiny of the creature turns upon his own deserts, his own choice +of good or evil. The elucidation of the principles of such a government +"commends itself to every man's conscience in the sight of God." + + + + +CHAPTER VIII. + +OBLIGATION PREDICABLE ONLY OF THE WILL. + +SECTION I. + +THE Will, as I have already said, exists in a trinity with the +Intelligence and Sensibility. In respect to the operations of the +different departments of our mental being, I lay down the two following +propositions: + +1. Obligation, moral desert, &c., are directly predicable only of the +action of the Will. + +2. For the operations of the other faculties we are accountable so far +forth only as the existence and character of such operations depend upon +the Will. In other words, it is for voluntary acts and states only that +we are accountable. This I argue because, + +1. Obligation, as we have seen, consists only with Liberty. All the +phenomena of the Intelligence and Sensibility, in the circumstances of +their occurrence, are not free, but necessary. Accountability, +therefore, cannot be predicated of such phenomena. We may be, and are, +accountable for such phenomena, so far forth as their existence and +character depend upon the Will: in other words, so far forth as they are +voluntary, and not involuntary, states of mind. + +2. The truth of the above proposition, and of that only, really +corresponds with the universal conviction of the race. This conviction +is expressed in two ways. + +(1.) When blame is affirmed of the operations of the Intelligence or +Sensibility, it is invariably thus affirmed: "You have no right to +_entertain_ such thoughts or sentiments. You have no right _indulge_ +such feeling's." In other words, praise or blame is never directly +predicated of these operations themselves, but of the action of the Will +relatively to them. + +(2.) All men agree, that the moral character of all actions, of all +states of mind whatever; depends upon _intention_. In no point is there +a more universal harmony among moral philosophers than in respect to +this. But intention is undeniably a phenomenon of the Will, and of that +exclusively. We must therefore admit, that moral obligation is +predicable of the Will only, or deny the fundamental convictions of the +race. + +3. The truth of the above propositions is intuitively evident, the +moment the mind apprehends their real import. A man, as he steps out of +a warm room, amid the external frosts of winter, feels an involuntary +chill over his whole system. We might with the same propriety attribute +blame to him for such feelings, as for any other feelings, thoughts, or +perceptions which exist alike independent of his Will, and especially in +opposition to its determinations. + +4. If we suppose all the voluntary acts and states of a moral agent to +be, and always to have been, in perfect conformity to moral rectitude, +it is impossible for us to impute moral guilt to him for any feelings or +thoughts which may have risen in his mind independently of his Will. We +can no more conceive him to have incurred ill desert, than we can +conceive of the annihilation of space. We may safely put it to the +consciousness of every man whether this is not the case. This renders +demonstrably evident the truth, that moral obligation is predicable only +of the Will. + +5. With the above perfectly harmonize the positive teachings of +Inspiration. For example. "Lust, when it is _conceived_, bringeth forth +sin." The involuntary feeling does not constitute the sin, but the +action of the Will in harmony with that feeling. + +6. A single supposition will place this whole subject in a light +perfectly conspicuous before the mind. We can readily conceive that the +Will, or voluntary states of the mind, are in perfect harmony with the +moral law, while the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are opposed to +it. We can also with equal readiness make the opposite supposition, to +wit, that the Sensibility, or involuntary states, are in harmony with +the law, while the determinations of the Will are all opposed to it. +What shall we think of these two states? Let us suppose a case of no +unfrequent occurrence, that the feelings, or involuntary state of the +mind, are in perfect harmony with the law, while the action of this +Will, or the voluntary states, are in determined opposition to the law, +the individual being inflexibly determined to quench such feelings, and +act in opposition to them. Is there any virtue at all in such a state of +mind? Who would dare to say that there is? Is not the guilt of the +individual aggravated in proportion to the depth and intensity of the +feeling which he is endeavoring to suppress? Now if, as all will admit, +there is no virtue at all, when the states of the Sensibility are in +harmony with the law, and the determinations of the Will, or voluntary +states of the mind, are opposed to it, how can there be guilt when the +Will, or voluntary states, are in perfect harmony with the law, and the +Sensibility or involuntary states, opposed to it? This renders it +demonstrably evident that obligation and moral desert of praise or blame +are predicable only of the Will, or voluntary states of mind. + +7. We will make another supposition; one, if possible, still more to the +point. The tiger, we well know, has received from his Maker, either +directly or through the laws of natural generation sustained by the Most +High, a ferocious nature. Why do we not blame the animal for this +nature? The answer, perhaps, would be, that he is not a rational being, +and is therefore not responsible for anything. + +Let us suppose, then, that with this nature, God had associated +Intelligence and Free-Will, such as man possesses. Why should the animal +now be held responsible for the bare existence of this nature, any more +than in the first instance, when the effect, in both instances, exists, +alike independent of his knowledge, choice, and agency? A greater +absurdity than this never lay upon the brain of a Theologian, that the +mere existence of rationality renders the subject properly responsible +for what God himself produces in connection with that rationality, and +produces wholly independent of the knowledge, choice, and agency of that +subject. + +Let us suppose, further, that the animal under consideration, as soon as +he becomes aware of the existence and tendencies of this nature, holds +all its impulses in perfect subjection to the law of love, and never +suffers them, in a single instance, to induce a voluntary act contrary +to that law. Is it in the power of the Intelligence to affirm guilt of +that creature? Do we not necessarily affirm his virtue to be great in +proportion to the strength of the propensity thus perfectly subjected to +the Moral law? The above illustration renders two conclusions +demonstrably evident: + +1. For the mere _existence_ of any constitutional propensity whatever, +the creature is not and cannot be responsible. + +2. When all the actions of the Will, or voluntary power, are in perfect +harmony with the moral law, and all the propensities are held in full +subjection to that law, the creature stands perfect and complete in the +discharge of his duty to God and Man. For the involuntary and necessary +actings of those propensities, he cannot be responsible. + +It is no part of my object to prove that men have not derived from their +progenitors, propensities which impel and induce them to sin; but that, +for the mere _existence_ of these propensities, together with their +necessary involuntary action, they are not guilty. + +SEC. II. DOGMAS IN THEOLOGY. + +Certain dogmas in Theology connected with the subject above illustrated +here claim our attention. + +MEN NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SIN OF THEIR PROGENITORS. + +I. The first that I notice is the position, that creatures are now held +responsible, even as "deserving God's wrath and curse, not only in this +life, but in that which is to come," not merely for their own voluntary +acts of disobedience, nor for their involuntary exercises, but for the +act of a progenitor, performed when they had no existence. If God holds +creatures responsible for such an act, we may safely affirm that it is +absolutely impossible for them to conceive of the justice of such a +principle; and that God has so constituted them, as to render it +impossible for them to form such a conception. Can a being who is not a +_moral_ agent sin? Is not _existence_ necessary to moral agency? How +then can creatures "sin _in_ and _through_ another" six thousand years +before their own existence commenced? We cannot conceive of creatures as +guilty for the involuntary and necessary exercises of their own minds. +How can we conceive of them as guilty for the act of another being,--an +act of which they had, and could have, no knowledge, choice, or agency +whatever? How can intelligent beings hold such a dogma, and hold it as a +revelation from Him who has declared with an oath, that the "son shall +not bear the iniquity of the father," but that "every man shall die for +his own sins?" + +CONSTITUTIONAL ILL-DESERT. + +II. The next dogma deserving attention is the position, that mankind +derive from our first progenitor a corrupt nature, which renders +obedience to the commands of God impossible, and disobedience necessary, +and that for the mere _existence_ of this nature, men "deserve God's +wrath and curse, not only in this world, but in that which is to come." + +If the above dogma is true, it is demonstrably evident, that this +corrupt nature comes into existence without the knowledge, choice, or +agency of the creature, who, for its existence, is pronounced deserving +of, and "bound over to the wrath of God." Equally evident is it, that +this corrupt nature exists as the result of the direct agency of God. He +proclaims himself the Maker of "every soul of man." As its Maker, He +must have imparted to that soul the constitution or nature which it +actually possesses. It does not help the matter at all, to say, that +this nature is derived from our progenitor: for the laws of generation, +by which this corrupt nature is derived from that progenitor, are +sustained and continued by God himself. It is a truth of reason as well +as of revelation, that, even in respect to plants, derived "by ordinary +generation" from the seed of those previously existing, it is GOD who +"giveth them a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed its own +body." If this is true of plants, much more must it be so of the soul of +man. + +If, then, the above dogma is true, man, in the first place, is held as +deserving of eternal punishment for that which exists wholly independent +of his knowledge, choice, or agency, in any sense, direct or indirect. +He is also held responsible for the result, not of his own agency, but +for that which results from the agency of God. On this dogma, I remark, + +1. It is impossible for the Intelligence to affirm, or even to conceive +it to be true, that a creature deserves eternal punishment for that +which exists wholly independent of his knowledge, choice, or agency; for +that which results, not from his own agency, but from that of another. +The Intelligence can no more affirm the truth of such propositions, than +it can conceive of an event without a cause. + +2. This dogma is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the race. +Present the proposition to any mind, that, under the Divine government, +the creature is held responsible for his own voluntary acts and states +of minds only, and such a principle "commends itself to every man's +conscience in the sight of God." Present the dogma, on the other hand, +that for a nature which renders actual obedience impossible, a nature +which exists as the exclusive result of the agency of God himself, +independently of the knowledge, choice, or agency of the creature, such +creature is justly "bound over to the wrath of God, and curse of the +law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries, spiritual, +temporal, and eternal," and there is not a conscience in the universe +which will not reprobate with perfect horror such a principle. The +intuitive convictions of the race are irreconcilably opposed to it. + +3. If mankind, as this dogma affirms, have a nature from which voluntary +acts of a given character necessarily result, to talk of real _growth_ +or _confirmation_ in holiness or sin, is to use words without meaning. +All that influence, or voluntary acts, can do in such a case, is to +develope the nature already in existence. They can do nothing to confirm +the soul in its tendencies, one way or the other. What should we think +of the proposition, that a certain tree had formed and confirmed the +habit of bearing particular kinds of fruits, when it commenced bearing, +with the necessity of bearing this kind only, and with the absolute +impossibility of bearing any other? So the soul, according to this +dogma, commences action with the absolute impossibility of any but +sinful acts, and with the equal necessity of putting forth sinful ones. +Now, Necessity and Impossibility know and can know no degrees. How then +can a mind, thus constituted, generate and confirm the habit of sinning? +What, on this supposition, is the meaning of the declaration, "How can +ye, who are _accustomed_ to do evil, learn to do well?" All such +declarations are without meaning, if this dogma is true. + +4. If God imputes guilt to the creature, for the existence of the nature +under consideration, he must have required the creature to prevent its +existence. For it is a positive truth of reason and inspiration both, +that as "sin is a transgression of the law;" that "where there is no law, +there is no transgression;" and that "sin is not imputed where there is +no law," that is, where nothing is required, no obligation does or can +exist, and consequently no guilt is imputed. The existence of the nature +under consideration, then, is not and cannot be sin to the creature, +unless it is a transgression of the law; and it cannot be a +transgression of the law, unless the law required the creature to +prevent its existence, and prevent it when that existence was the +exclusive result of God's agency, and when the creature could have no +knowledge, choice, or agency, in respect to what God was to produce. Can +we conceive of a greater absurdity than that? God is about to produce a +certain nature by his own creative act, or by sustaining the laws of +natural generation. He imputes infinite guilt to the creature for not +preventing the result of that act, and inducing a result precisely +opposite, and that in the absence of all knowledge of what was required +of him, and of the possibility of any agency in respect to it. Is this a +true exposition of the Government of God? + +PRESENT IMPOSSIBILITIES REQUIRED. + +III. The last dogma that I notice is the position, that the Moral law +demands of us, as sinners, not what is now possible to us on the ground +of natural powers and proffered grace, but what would be possible, had +we never sinned. It is admitted by all, that we have not now a capacity +for that degree of virtue which would be possible to us, had we always +developed our moral powers in harmony with the Divine law. Still it is +maintained, that this degree of virtue, notwithstanding our present +total incapacity to exercise it, is demanded of us. For not rendering +it, we are justly bound over to the wrath and curse of God. In reply, I +remark: + +1. That this dogma, which is professedly founded on the express +teachings of Inspiration, has not even the shadow of a foundation in any +direct or implied affirmation of the Bible. I may safely challenge the +world to adduce a single passage of Holy Writ, that either directly or +indirectly asserts any such thing. + +2. This dogma is opposed not only to the _spirit_, but to the _letter_ +of the _law_. The law, addressing men, enfeebled as their powers now +are, in consequence of sin previously committed, requires them to love +God with all their "mind and strength," that is, not with the power they +would have possessed, had they never sinned, but with the power they now +actually possess. On what authority does any Theologian affirm, when the +law expressly makes one demand upon men, that it, in reality, makes +another, and different demand? In such an assertion, is he not wise, not +only _above_, but _against_ what is written? + +3. This dogma is opposed to the express and positive teachings of +Inspiration. The Scriptures expressly affirm, Rom. xiii. 8, that every +one that exercises love, "hath fulfilled the law," hath done all that +the law requires of him. This would not be true, did the law require a +degree of love not now practicable to the creature. Again, in Deut. x. +12, it is positively affirmed, that God requires nothing of his +creatures but to "love him with all the heart and with all the soul," +that is, with all the powers they actually possess. This could not be +true, if the dogma under consideration is true. + +4. If we conceive an individual to yield a voluntary conformity to moral +obligations of every kind, to the full extent of his present capacities, +it is impossible for us to conceive that he is not now doing all that he +really ought to do. No person would ever think of exhorting him to do +more, nor of charging him with guilt for not doing it. We may properly +blame him for the past, but as far as the present is concerned, he +stands guiltless in the eye of reason and revelation both. + +5. Let us suppose that an individual continues for fifty years in sin. +He is then truly converted, and immediately after dies. All admit that +he enters heaven in a state of perfect holiness. Yet no one supposes +that he now exercises, or has the capacity to exercise, as high a degree +of holiness, as he would, had he spent those fifty years in obedience, +instead of disobedience to God. This shows that even those who +theoretically hold the dogma under consideration do not practically +believe it themselves. + +The conclusion to which our inquiries lead us is this: Holiness is a +voluntary conformity to all perceivable obligation. Sin is a similar +violation of such obligation. Nothing else is or can be holiness. +Nothing else is or can be sin. + + + + +CHAPTER IX. + +THE STANDARD BY WHICH THE MORAL CHARACTER OF VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND, +OR ACTS OF WILL, SHOULD BE DETERMINED. + +IN the remarks which I have to make in elucidation of this subject, I +shall, on the authority of evidence already presented, take two +positions for granted: + +1. Moral obligation and moral desert are predicable only of acts of +Will. + +2. It is only of those acts of Will denominated _Intentions_, and of +course ultimate intentions, that obligation, merit and demerit, are +predicable. + +In this last position, as I have already said, there is a universal +agreement among moral philosophers. We may also safely assume the same +as a first truth of the universal Intelligence. The child, the +philosopher, the peasant, men of all classes, ages, and conditions, +agree in predicating obligation and moral desert of intention, and of +ultimate intention only. By ultimate intention, I, of course, refer to +those acts, choices, or determinations of the Will, to which all other +mental determinations are subordinate, and by which they are controlled. +Thus, when an individual chooses, on the one hand, the Divine glory, and +the highest good of universal being, as the end of his existence; or, on +the other, his own personal gratification; and subordinates to one or +the other of these acts of choice all the law of his being, here we find +his ultimate intention. In this exclusively all mankind agree in finding +the moral character of all mental acts and states. + +Now an important question arises, By what _standard_ shall we judge of +the moral character of intentions? Of course, they are to be placed in +the light of the two great precepts of the Moral law by which we are +required to love God with all our powers, and our neighbor as ourselves. +But two distinct and opposite explanations have been given of the above +precepts, presenting entirely different standards of moral judgment. +According to one, the precept requiring us to love God with _all our +heart and strength_, requires a certain degree of _intensity_ of +intention and feeling. On no other condition, it is said, do we love God +with _all_ the heart. + +According to the other explanation, the precept requiring us to love God +with _all_ the heart, &c., means, that we devote our entire powers and +interests to the glory of God and the good of his creatures, with the +sincere intention to employ these powers and interests for the +accomplishment of these objects in the _best possible manner_. When all +our powers are under the exclusive control of such an intention as this, +we then, it is affirmed, love God according to the letter and spirit of +the above precept, "with all our heart, and with all our strength." + +SINCERITY, AND NOT INTENSITY, THE TRUE STANDARD. + +My object now is to show, that this last is the right exposition, and +presents the only true standard by which to judge of all moral acts and +states of mind. This I argue from the following considerations. + +1. If _intensity_ be fixed upon as the standard, no one can define it, +so as to tell us what he means. The command requiring us to love with +_all_ the heart, if understood as requiring a certain degree of +intensity of intention, may mean the highest degree of tension of which +our nature is susceptible. Or it may mean the highest possible degree, +consistent with our existence in this body; or the highest degree +consistent with the most perfect health; or some inconceivable +indefinable degree, nobody knows what. It cannot include all, and may +and must mean some one of the above-named dogmas. Yet no one would dare +to tell us which. Has God given, or does our own reason give us, a +standard of moral judgment of which no one can form a conception, or +give us a definition? + +2. No one could practically apply this standard, if he could define it, +as a test of moral action. The reason is obvious. No one, but +Omniscience, can possibly know what degree of tensity our nature is +capable of; nor precisely what degree is compatible with life, or with +the most perfect health. If intensity, then, is the standard by which we +are required to determine definitely the character of moral actions, we +are in reality required to fix definitely the value of an unknown +quantity, to wit: moral action, by a standard of which we are, and of +necessity must be, most profoundly ignorant. We are required to find the +definite by means of the indefinite; the plain by means of the "palpable +obscure." Has God, or our own reason, placed us in such a predicament as +this, in respect to the most momentous of all questions, the +determination of our true moral character and deserts? + +3. While the standard under consideration is, and must be, unknown to +us, it is perpetually varying, and never fixed. The degree of intensity +of mental effort of which we are capable at one moment, differs from +that which is possible to us at another. The same holds equally of that +which is compatible with life and health. Can we believe that "the judge +of all the earth" requires us to conform, and holds us responsible for +not conforming to a standard located we cannot possibly know where, and +which is always movable, and never for a moment remaining fixed? + +4. The absurdity of attempting to act in conformity to this principle, +in reference to particular duties, will show clearly that it cannot be +the standard of moral obligations in any instance. Suppose an individual +becomes convinced that it is his duty, that is, that God requires him to +walk or travel a given distance, or for a time to compose himself for +the purpose of sleeping. Now he must will with all his heart to perform +the duty before him. What if he should judge himself bound to will to +sleep, for example, and to will it with all possible intensity, or with +as great an intensity as consists with his health? How long would it +take him to compose himself to sleep in this manner? What if he should +with all possible intensity will to walk? What if, when with all +sincerity, he had intended to perform, in the best manner, the duty +devolved upon him, he should inquire whether the intention possessed the +requisite intensity? It would be just as rational to apply this standard +in the instances under consideration, as in any other. + +5. That _Sincerity_, and not intensity of intention, presents the true +standard of moral judgment, is evident from the fact, that the former +commends itself to every man's conscience as perfectly intelligible, of +ready definition in itself, and of consequently ready application, in +determining the character and moral desert of all moral actions. We can +readily conceive what it is to yield all our powers and interests to the +Will of God, and to do it with the sincere intention of employing them +in the wisest and best manner for the accomplishment of the highest +good. We can conceive, too, what it is to employ our powers and +interests under the control of such an intention. We can also perceive +with perfect distinctness our obligation to live and act under the +supreme control of such an intention. If we are bound to yield to God at +all, we are bound to yield our entire being to his supreme control. If +we are bound to will and employ our powers and resources to produce any +good at all, we are bound to will and aim to produce the highest good. + +This principle also is equally applicable in, determining the character +and deserts of all moral actions. Every honest mind can readily +determine the fact, whether it is or is not acting under the supreme +control of the intention under consideration. If we adopt this +principle, as expressing the meaning of the command requiring us to love +with _all_ the heart, perfect sunlight rests upon the Divine law. If we +adopt any other standard, perfect midnight hangs over that law. + +6. If we conceive a moral agent really to live and act in full harmony +with the intention under consideration, it is impossible for us to +conceive, or affirm, that he has not done his entire duty. What more +ought a moral agent to intend than the highest good he can accomplish? +Should it be said, that he ought to intend this with a certain degree of +intensity, the reply is, that Sincerity implies an intention to will and +act, at all times, with that degree of intensity best adapted to the end +to be accomplished. What more can properly or wisely be demanded? Is not +this loving with all the heart? + +7. On this principle, a much greater degree of intensity, and consequent +energy of action, will be secured, than on the other principle. Nothing +tends more effectually to palsy the energies of the mind, than the +attempt always to act with the greatest intensity. It is precisely like +the attempt of some orators, to speak, on all subjects alike, with the +greatest possible pathos and sublimity. On the other hand, let an +individual throw his whole being under the control of the grand +principle of doing all the good he can, and his powers will energize +with the greatest freedom, intensity, and effect. If, therefore, the +standard of moral obligation and moral desert has been wisely fixed, +Sincerity, and nothing else, is that standard. + +8. I remark, once more, that Sincerity is the standard fixed in the +Scriptures of truth. In Jer. iii. 16, the Jews are accused of not +"turning to the Lord with _the whole heart_, but feignedly," that is, +with insincerity. If they had turned sincerely, they would, according to +this passage, have done it with the _whole heart_. The whole heart, +then, according to the express teachings of the Bible, is synonymous +with Sincerity and Sincerity according to the above definition of the +term. This is the true standard, according to revelation as well as +reason. I have other arguments, equally conclusive as the above, to +present, but these are sufficient. The importance of the subject, +together with its decisive bearing upon the momentous question to be +discussed in the next Chapter, is my apology for dwelling thus long upon +it. + + + + +CHAPTER X. + +INTUITIONS, OR MORAL ACTS, NEVER OF A MIXED CHARACTER; THAT IS, PARTLY +RIGHT AND PARTLY WRONG. + +WE are now prepared to consider the question, whether each moral act, or +exercise, is not always of a character purely unmixed? In other words, +whether every such act, or intention, is not always perfectly right or +perfectly wrong I would here be understood to speak of single acts, or +intuitions, in distinction from a series, which continues through some +definite period, as an hour or a day. Such series of acts may, of +course, be of a mixed character; that is, it may be made up of +individual acts, some of which are right and some wrong. But the +question is, can distinct, opposite, and contradictory elements, such as +sin and holiness, right and wrong, selfishness and benevolence, enter +into one and the same act No one will pretend that an individual is +virtuous at all, unless he _intends_ obedience to the moral law. The +question is, can an individual intend to obey and to disobey the law, in +one and the same act? On this question I remark, + +1. That the principle established in the last Chapter really settles the +question. No one, to my knowledge, pretends, that, as far as sincerity +is concerned, the same moral act can be of a mixed character. Very few, +if any, will be guilty of the folly of maintaining, that an individual +can sincerely intend to obey and to disobey the law at one and the same +time. When such act is contemplated in this point of light, it is almost +universally admitted that it cannot be of a mixed character. But then +another test is applied--that of intensity. It is conceivable, at least, +it is said, that the intention might possess a higher degree of +intensity than it does possess. It is, therefore, pronounced defective. +On the same supposition, every moral act in existence might be +pronounced defective. For we can, at least, conceive, that it might +possess a higher degree of intensity. It has been abundantly established +in the last Chapter, however, that there is no such test of moral +actions as this, a test authorized either by reason or revelation. +Sincerity is the only standard by which to determine the character and +deserts of all moral acts and states. In the light of this standard, it +is intuitively evident, that no one act can combine such contradictory +and opposite elements as sin and holiness, right and wrong, an intention +to obey and to disobey the moral law. + +2. The opinions and reasonings of distinguished philosophers and +theologians on the subject may be adduced in confirmation of the +doctrine under consideration. Let it be borne in mind, that if the same +act embraces such contradictory and opposite elements as sin and +holiness, it must be, in reality, opposed to itself, one element +constituting the act, being in harmony with the law, and in opposition +to the other element which is opposed to the law. + +Now the remark of Edwards upon this subject demands our special +attention. "It is absurd," he says, "to suppose the same individual Will +to oppose itself in its present act; or the present choice to be +opposite to and resisting present choice; as absurd as it is to talk of +two contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time." Does not +the common sense of the race affirm the truth of this statement Sin and +holiness cannot enter into the same act, unless it embraces a serious +intention to obey and not to obey the moral law at the same time. Is not +this, in the language of Edwards, as "absurd as it is to talk of two +contrary motions in the same moving body at the same time." + +Equally conclusive is the argument of Kant upon the same subject. Having +shown that mankind are divided into two classes, the morally good and +the morally evil; that the distinguishing characteristic of the former +is, that they have adopted the Moral law as their maxim, that is, that +it is their serious intention to comply with all the claims of the law; +and of the latter, that they have not adopted the law as their maxim; he +adds, "The sentiment of mankind is, therefore, never indifferent +relatively to the law, and he never can be neither good nor evil." Then +follows the paragraph to which special attention is invited. "In like +manner, mankind cannot be, in some points of character, morally good, +while he is, at the same time, in others evil; for, is he in any point +good, then the moral law is his maxim (that is, it is his serious +intention to obey the law in the length and breadth of its claims); but +is he likewise, at the same time, in some points bad, then quoad [as to] +these, the Moral law is not his maxim, (that is, in these particulars, +it is his intention not to obey the law). But since the law is one and +universal, and as it commands in one act of life, so in all, then the +maxim referring to it would be, at the same time universal and +particular, which is a contradiction;" (that is, it would be his +intention to obey the law universally, and at the same time, not to obey +it in certain particulars, one of the most palpable contradictions +conceivable.) To my mind the above argument has all the force of +demonstration. Let it be borne in mind, that no man is morally good at +all, unless it is his intention to obey the Moral law universally. This +being his intention, the law has no higher claims upon him. Its full +demands are, and must be, met in that intention. For what can the law +require more, than that the voluntary powers shall be in full harmony +with its demands, which is always true, when there is a sincere +intention to obey the law universally. Now, with this intention, there +can be nothing in the individual morally evil; unless there is, at the +same time, an intention not to obey the law in certain particulars; that +is, not to obey it universally. A mixed moral act, or intention, +therefore, is possible, only on this condition, that it shall embrace +these two contradictory elements--a serious determination to obey the +law universally, and a determination equally decisive, at the same time, +to disobey it in certain particulars; that is, not to obey it +universally. I leave it with the advocates of the doctrine of Mixed +Moral Action to dispose of this difficulty as they can. + +3. If we could conceive of a moral act of a mixed character, the Moral +law could not recognize it as holy at all. It presents but one scale by +which to determine the character of moral acts, the command requiring us +to love with all the heart. It knows such acts only as conformed, or not +conformed, to this command. The mixed action, if it could exist, would, +in the light of the Moral law, be placed among the not-conformed, just +as much as those which are exclusively sinful. The Moral law does not +present two scales, according to one of which actions are classed as +conformed or not-conformed, and according to the other, as partly +conformed and partly not-conformed. Such a scale as this last is unknown +in the circle of revealed truth. The Moral law presents us but one +scale. Those acts which are in full conformity to its demands, it puts +down as holy. Those not thus conformed, it puts down as sinful; as holy +or sinful is the only light in which actions stand according to the law. + +4. Mixed actions, if they could exist, are as positively prohibited by +the law, and must therefore be placed under the category of total +disobedience, just as much as those which are in themselves entirely +sinful. While the law requires us to love with _all_ the heart, it +positively prohibits everything short of this. The individual, +therefore, who puts forth an act of a mixed character, puts forth an act +as totally and positively prohibited as the man who puts forth a totally +sinful one. Both alike must be placed under the category of total +disobedience. A father requires his two sons to go to the distance of +ten rods, and positively prohibits their stopping short of the distance +required. One determines to go nine rods, and there to stop. The other +determines not to move at all. One has put forth an act of total +disobedience just as much as the other. So of all moral acts which stop +short of loving with all the heart. + +5. A moral act of a mixed character cannot possibly proceed from that +regard to moral obligation which is an essential condition of the +existence of any degree of virtue at all. Virtue, in no degree, can +exist, except from a sacred regard to moral obligation. The individual +who thus regards moral obligation in one degree, will regard it equally +in all degrees. The individual, therefore, who, from such regard, yields +to the claims of the law at all, will and must conform to the full +measure of its demands. He cannot be in voluntary opposition to any one +demand of that law. A mixed moral act, then, cannot possibly proceed +from that regard to moral obligation which is the essential condition of +holiness in any degree. This leads me to remark, + +6. That a moral act of a mixed character, if it could exist, could arise +from none other than the most purely selfish and wicked intention +conceivable. Three positions, we will suppose, are before the mind--a +state of perfect conformity to the law, a state of total disobedience, +and a third state combining the elements of obedience and disobedience. +By a voluntary act of moral election, an individual places himself in +the last state, in distinction from each of the others. What must have +been his intention in so doing? He cannot have acted from a regard to +moral rectitude. In that case, he would have elected the state of total +obedience. His intention must have been to secure, at the same time, the +reward of holiness and the "pleasures of sin"--a most selfish and wicked +state surely. The supposition of a moral act, that is, intention +combining the elements of holiness and sin--is as great an absurdity as +the supposition, that a circle has become a square, without losing any +of its properties as a circle. + +7. I remark again that the doctrine of mixed moral action is +contradicted by the express teachings of inspiration. "Whosoever cometh +after me," says Christ, "and forsaketh not _all_ that he hath, he cannot +be my disciple." The Bible knows men only as the disciples, or not +disciples, of Christ. All who really comply with the condition above +named are His disciples. All others, however near their compliance, are +not His disciples, any more than those who have not conformed in any +degree. If an individual has really conformed to this condition, he has +surely done his entire duty. He has loved with all his heart. What other +meaning can we attach to the phrase, "forsaketh all that he hath?" All +persons who have not complied with this principle are declared to be +wholly without the circle of discipleship. What is this, but a positive +assertion, that a moral action of a mixed character is an impossibility? + +Again. "No man can serve two masters." "Ye cannot serve God and mammon." +Let us suppose that we can put forth intentions of a mixed +character--intentions partly sinful and partly holy. So far as they are +in harmony with the law, we serve God. So far as they are not in harmony +with the law, we serve Mammon. Now, if all our moral exercises can be of +a mixed character, then it is true that, at every period of our lives, +we can serve God and Mammon. The service which we can render also to +each, may be in every conceivable degree. We may render, for example, +ninety-nine degrees of service to God and one to Mammon, or ninety-nine +to Mammon and one to God. Or our service may be equally divided between +the two. Can we conceive of a greater absurdity than this? + +What also is the meaning of such declarations as this, "no fountain can +send forth both sweet water and bitter," if the heart of man may +exercise intentions combining such elements as sin and holiness? +Declarations of a similar kind abound in the Bible. They are surely +without meaning, if the doctrine of Mixed Moral Actions is true. + +8. Finally. It may be questioned whether the whole range of error +presents a dogma of more pernicious tendency than the doctrine of Mixed +Moral Actions. It teaches moral agents that they may be selfish in all +their moral exercises, and yet have enough of moral purity mingled with +them to secure acceptance with the "Judge of all the earth." A man who +has adopted such a principle will almost never, whatever his course of +life may be, seem to himself to be destitute of real virtue. He will +always seem to himself to possess enough of it, to render his acceptance +with God certain. The kind of virtue which can mingle itself with +selfishness and sin in individual intentions or moral acts, may be +possessed, in different degrees, by the worst men on earth. If this be +assumed as real holiness--that holiness which will stand the ordeal of +eternity, who will, who should conceive himself destitute of a title to +heaven? Here is the fatal rock on which myriads of minds are wrecked for +ever. Let it ever be borne in mind, that the same fountain cannot, at +the same time and place, "send forth both sweet water and bitter." "Ye +cannot serve God and Mammon." + +OBJECTIONS. + +Two or three objections to the doctrine above established demand a +passing notice here. + +AN ACT OF WILL MAY RESULT FROM A VARIETY OF MOTIVES. + +1. It is said that the mind may act under the influence of a great +variety of motives at one and the same time. The same intention, +therefore, may be the result of different and opposite motives, and as a +consequence, combine the elements of good and evil. In reply, I remark, +that when the Will is in harmony with the Moral law, it respects the +good and rejects the bad, alike in _all_ the motives presented. The +opposite is true when it is not in harmony with the law. The same regard +or disregard for moral obligation which will induce an individual to +reject the evil and choose the good, or to make an opposite choice, in +respect to one motive, will induce the same in respect to all other +motives present at the same time. A mixed moral act can no more result +from a combination of motives, than different and opposite motions can +result in the same body at the same time, from forces acting upon it +from different directions. + +LOVING WITH GREATER INTENSITY AT ONE TIME THAN ANOTHER. + +2. It is said that we are conscious of loving our friends, and serving +God, with greater strength and intensity at one time than at another. +Yet our love, in all such instances, is real. Love, therefore, may be +real, and yet be greatly defective--that is, it may be real, and embrace +elements morally wrong. It is true, that love may exist in different +degrees, as far as the action of the Sensibility is concerned. It is not +so, however, with love in the form of intention--intention in harmony +with moral obligation, the only form of love demanded by the moral law. +Such intention, in view of the same degrees of light, and under the same +identical influences, cannot possess different degrees of intensity. The +Will always yields, when it really does yield at all to moral +obligation, with all the intensity it is, for the time being, capable +of, or the nature of the case demands. + +MOMENTARY REVOLUTIONS OF CHARACTER. + +3. On this theory, it is said, an individual may become perfectly good +and perfectly bad, for any indefinite number of instances, in any +definite period of time. This consequence, to say nothing of what is +likely to take place in fact, does, as far as possibility is concerned, +follow from this theory. But let us contemplate it, for a moment, in the +light of an example or two. An individual, from regard to moral +obligation, maintains perfect integrity of character, up to a given +period of time. Then, under the influence of temptation, he tells a +deliberate falsehood. Did his previous integrity so fuse itself into +that lie, as to make it partly good and partly bad?--as to make it +anything else than a _total_ falsehood? Did the prior goodness of David +make his acts of adultery and murder partly good and partly bad? Let the +advocate of mixed moral action extract the elements of moral goodness +from these acts if he can. He can just as well find these elements here, +as in any other acts of disobedience to the Moral law. "The +righteousness of the righteous cannot save him" from total sinfulness, +any more than from condemnation "in the day of his transgression." + + + + +CHAPTER XI. + +RELATION OF THE WILL TO THE INTELLIGENCE AND SENSIBILITY, IN ALL ACTS OR +STATES, MORALLY RIGHT OR WRONG. + +THE Will, sustaining the relation it does to the Intelligence and +Sensibility, must yield itself to the control of one or the other of +these departments of our nature. In all acts and states morally right, +the Will is in harmony with the Intelligence, from respect to moral +obligation or duty; and all the desires and propensities, all the +impulses of the Sensibility, are held in strict subordination. In all +acts morally wrong, the Will is controlled by the Sensibility, +irrespective of the dictates of the Intelligence. Impulse, and not a +regard to the just, the right, the true and the good, is the law of its +action. In all such cases, as the impulses which control the Will are +various, the external forms through which the internal acts, or +intentions, will manifest themselves, will be equally diversified. Yet +the _spring_ of action is in all instances one and the same, impulse +instead of a regard to duty. Virtue does not consist in being controlled +by _amiable_, instead of _dissocial_ and _malign_ impulses, and in a +consequent exterior of a corresponding beauty and loveliness. It +consists in a voluntary harmony of intention with the just, the right, +the true and the good from a sacred respect to moral obligation, instead +of being controlled by mere impulse of any kind whatever. On the +principle above illustrated, I remark: + +THOSE WHO ARE OR ARE NOT TRULY VIRTUOUS, HOW DISTINGUISHED. + +1. That the real distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and +those who are not, now becomes apparent. It does not consist, in all +instances, in the mere exterior _form_ of action, but in the _spring_ or +_intention_ from which all such action proceeds. In most persons, and in +all, at different periods, the amiable and social propensities +predominate over the dissocial and malign. Hence much of the exterior +will be characterized by much that is truly beautiful and lovely. In +many, also, the impulsive power of conscience--that department of the +Sensibility which is correlated to the idea of right and wrong, and +impels to obedience to the Moral law--is strongly developed, and may +consequently take its turn in controlling the Will. In all such +instances, there will be the external forms of real virtue. It is one +thing, however, to put on the exterior of virtue from mere impulse, and +quite another, to do the same thing from an internal respect and sacred +regard for duty. + +How many individuals, who may be now wearing the fairest forms of +virtue, will find within them, as soon as present impulses are +supplanted by the strong action of others, in opposition to rectitude, +no maxims of Will, in harmony with the law of goodness, to resist and +subject such impulses. Their conduct is in conformity to the +requirements of virtue, not from any internal intention to be in +universal harmony with moral obligation, but simply because, for the +time being, the strongest impulse happens to be in that direction. No +individual, it should ever be kept in mind, makes any approach to real +virtue, whatever impulses he may be controlled by, till, by a sealing +act of moral election, the Will is placed in harmony with the universal +law of duty, and all external action of a moral character proceeds from +this internal, all-controlling intention. Here we find the broad and +fundamental distinction between those who are truly virtuous, and those +who are not. + +SELFISHNESS AND BENEVOLENCE. + +2. We are also prepared to explain the real difference between +_Selfishness_ and _Benevolence_. The latter expresses and comprehends +all the forms of real virtue of every kind and degree. The former +comprehends and expresses the forms of vice or sin. Benevolence consists +in the full harmony of the Will or intention with the just, the right, +the true, and the good, from a regard to moral obligation. Selfishness +consists in voluntary subjection to _impulse_, irrespective of such +obligation. Whenever self-gratification is the law of action, there is +pure selfishness, whatever the character or direction of the impulse may +be. Selfishness has sometimes been very incorrectly defined, as a +supreme regard to our own interest or happiness. If this is a correct +definition, the drunkard is not selfish at all; for he sacrifices his +present and future happiness, to gratify a beastly appetite, and +destroys present peace in the act of self-gratification. If selfishness, +however, consists in mere subjection to impulse, how supreme his +selfishness at once appears! A mother who does not act from moral +obligation, when under the strong influence of maternal affection, +appears most distinguished in her assiduous care of her offspring. Now +let this affection be crossed by some plain question of duty, so that +she must violate the latter, or subject the former, and how soon will +selfishness manifest itself, in the triumph of impulse over duty! A gift +is not more effectual in blinding the eyes, than natural affection +uncontrolled by a regard to moral obligation. Men are just as selfish, +that is, as perfectly subject to the law of self-gratification, when +under the influence of the social and amiable propensities, as when +under that of the dissocial and malign, when, in both instances alike, +impulse is the law of action. Moral agents were made, and are required +to be, social and amiable, from higher principles than mere impulse. + +COMMON MISTAKE. + +3. I notice a mistake of fundamental importance into which many appear +to have fallen, in judging of the moral character of individuals. As we +have seen, when the Will is wholly controlled by the Sensibility +irrespective of moral obligation, the impulsive department of conscience +takes its turn, among the other propensities, in controlling the action +of the voluntary power. Now because, in all such instances, there are +the exterior forms of virtue, together with an apparently sincere +internal regard for the same, the presence of real virtue is +consequently inferred. Now before such a conclusion can be authorized, +one question needs to be determined, the _spring_ from which such +apparent virtues originate. They may arise from that regard to moral +obligation which constitutes real virtue. Or they may be the result +purely of excited Sensibility, which, in such instances happens to be in +the direction of the forms of virtue. + +DEFECTIVE FORMS OF VIRTUE. + +4. Another very frequent mistake bearing upon moral character deserves a +passing notice here. Men sometimes manifest, and doubtless with a +consciousness of inward sincerity, a very high regard for some one or +more particular principles of virtue, while they manifest an equal +disregard of all other principles. Every real reform, for example, has +its basis in some great principle of morality. Men often advocate, with +great zeal, such reforms, together with the principle on which they +rest. They talk of virtue, when called to defend that principle, of a +regard to moral obligation, together with the necessity of +self-sacrifice at the shrine of duty, as if respect for universal +rectitude commanded the entire powers of their being. Yet but a slight +observation will most clearly evince, that their regard for the right, +the true, and the good, is wholly circumscribed by this one principle. +Still, such persons are very likely to regard themselves as virtuous in +a very high degree. In reality, however, they have not made the first +approach to real virtue. Their respect for this one principle, together +with its specific applications, has its spring in some other department +of their nature, than a regard for what is right in itself. Otherwise +their respect for what is right, would be co-extensive with the entire +range of moral obligation. + +SEC. II. TEST OF CONFORMITY TO MORAL PRINCIPLE. + +In preceding chapters, the great truth has been fully established, that +the Moral law addresses its commands and prohibitions to the Will only, +and that moral obligation is predicable only of the action of the +voluntary power, other states being required, only as their existence +and character are conditioned on the right exercise of that power. From +this, it undeniably follows, that the Moral law, in all the length and +breadth of its requirements, finds its entire fulfilment within the +sphere of the Will. A question of great importance here presents itself: +By what test shall we determine whether the Will is, or is not, in full +harmony with the law? In the investigation of this question, we may +perhaps be thought to be intruding somewhat into the domain of Moral +Philosophy. Reasons of great importance, in the judgment of the writer, +however, demand its introduction here. + +The Moral law is presented to us through two comprehensive precepts. +Yet, a moment's reflection will convince us that both these precepts +have their basis in one common principle, and are, in reality, the +enunciation of that one principle. The identical reason why we are bound +to love God with all the heart, requires us to love our neighbors as +ourselves. So the subject is presented by our Saviour himself. After +speaking of the first and great commandment, He adds, "the second is +like unto it," that is, it rests upon the same principle as the first. + +Now the question is, What is this great principle, obedience to which +implies a full discharge of all obligation, actual and conceivable; the +principle which comprehends all other principles of the Moral law, and +of which each particular precept is only the enunciation of this one +common principle in its endlessly diversified applications? This +principle has been announced in forms somewhat different, by different +philosophers. I will present two or three of these forms. The first that +I notice is this. + +_It shall be the serious intention of all moral agents to esteem and +treat all persons, interests, and objects according to their perceived +intrinsic and relative importance, and out of respect for their +intrinsic worth, or in obedience to the idea of duty, or moral +obligation._ + +Every one will readily apprehend, that the above is a correct +enunciation of the principle under consideration. It expresses the +fundamental reason why obedience to each and every moral principle is +binding upon us. The reason and only reason why we are bound to love God +with _all the heart_, is the intrinsic and relative importance of the +object presented to the mind in the contemplation of the Infinite and +Perfect. The reason why we are bound to love our neighbor as ourselves, +is the fact, that his rights and interests are apprehended, as of the +same value and sacredness as our own. In the intention under +consideration, all obligation, actual and conceivable, is really met. +God will occupy his appropriate place in the heart, and the creature +his. No real right or interest will be dis-esteemed, and each will +intentionally command that attention and regard which its intrinsic and +relative importance demands. Every moral agent is under obligation +infinite ever to be under the supreme control of such an intention, and +no such agent can be under obligation to be or to do anything more than +this. + +The same principle has been announced in a form somewhat different by +Kant, to wit: "So act that thy maxim of Will (intention) might become +law in a system of universal moral obligation"--that is, let your +controlling intention be always such, that all Intelligents may properly +be required ever to be under the supreme control of the same intention. + +By Cousin, the same principle is thus announced: "The moral principle +being universal, the sign, the external type by which a resolution may +be recognized as conformed to this principle, is the impossibility of +not erecting the immediate motive (intention) of the particular act or +resolution, into a maxim of universal legislation"--that is, we cannot +but affirm that every moral agent in existence is bound to act from the +same motive or intention. + +It will readily be perceived, that each of these forms is really +identical with that above announced and illustrated. It is only when we +are conscious of the supreme control of the intention, to esteem and +treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and +relative importance, from respect to the idea of duty, that, in +conformity with the principle as announced by Kant, our maxim of Will +might become law in a system of universal legislation. When we are +conscious of the control of such an intention, it is impossible for us +not to affirm, according to the principle, as announced by Cousin, that +all Intelligents are bound always to be under the control of the same +intention. Two or three suggestions will close what I have to say on +this point. + +COMMON MISTAKE. + +1. We notice the fundamental mistake of many philosophers and divines in +treating of moral exercises, or states of mind. Such exercises are very +commonly represented as consisting wholly in excited states of the +Sensibility. Thus Dr. Brown represents all moral exercises and states as +consisting in emotions of a given character. One of the most +distinguished Professors of Theology in this country laid down this +proposition, as the basis of a course of lectures on Moral Philosophy, +that "everything right or wrong in a moral agent, consists exclusively +of right or wrong _feelings_"--feelings as distinguished from volitions +as phenomena of Will. Now precisely the reverse of the above proposition +is true, to wit: that _nothing_ right or wrong, in a moral agent, +consists in any states of the Sensibility irrespective of the action of +the Will. Who would dare to say, when he has particular emotions, +desires, or involuntary feelings, that the Moral law has no further +claim upon him, that all its demands are fully met in those feelings? +Who would dare to affirm, when he has any particular emotions, that all +moral agents in existence are bound to have those identical feelings? If +the demands of the Moral law are fully met in any states of the +Sensibility--which would be true, if everything right or wrong, in moral +agents, consists of right or wrong feelings--then all moral agents, at +all times, and under all circumstances, are bound to have these same +feelings. For what the law demands, at one time, it demands at all +times. All the foundations of moral obligation are swept away by the +theory under consideration. + +LOVE AS REQUIRED BY THE MORAL LAW. + +2. We are now prepared to state distinctly the _nature_ of that _love_ +which is the "fulfilling of the law." It does not, as all admit, consist +in the mere external act. Nor does it consist, for reasons equally +obvious and universally admitted, in any mere _convictions_ of the +Intelligence. For reasons above assigned, it does not consist in any +states of the Sensibility. No man, when he is conscious of such +feelings, can affirm that all Intelligents are bound, under all +circumstances, to have the same feelings that he now has. This would be +true, if the love under consideration consists of such feelings. But +when, from, a regard to the idea of duty, the whole being is voluntarily +consecrated to the promotion, in the highest degree, of universal good +and when, in the pursuit of this end, there is a serious intention to +esteem and treat all beings and interests according to their intrinsic +and relative importance; _here_ is the love which is the fulfilling of +the law. Here is the intention by which all intelligents, in reference +to all interests and objects, are, at all times, bound to be controlled, +and which must be imposed, as universal law, upon such Intelligents in +every system of righteous moral legislation. Here is the intention, in +the exercise of which all obligation is fully met. Here, consequently, +is that love which is the fulfilling of the law. In a subsequent +Chapter, my design is to show that this is the view of the subject +presented in the Scriptures of truth. I now present it merely as a +necessary truth of the universal Intelligence. + +IDENTITY OF CHARACTER AMONG ALL BEINGS MORALLY VIRTUOUS. + +3. We now perceive clearly in what consists the real identity of moral +character, in all Intelligents of true moral rectitude. Their +occupations, forms of external deportment, and their internal +convictions and feelings, may be endlessly diversified. Yet one +omnipresent, all-controlling intention, an intention which is ever one +and identical, directs all their moral movements. It is the intention, +in the promotion of the highest good of universal being, to esteem and +treat all persons and interests according to their intrinsic and +relative importance, from regard to moral obligation. Thus moral virtue, +in all Intelligents possessed of it, is perfectly one and identical. In +this sense only are all moral agents capable of perfect identity of +character. They cannot all have, at all times, or perhaps at any time, +precisely the same thoughts and feelings. But they can all have, at all +times, one and the same intention. The omnipresent influence and control +of the intention above illustrated, constitutes a perfect identity of +character in God and all beings morally pure in existence. For this +reason, the supreme control of this intention implies, in all moral +agents alike, a perfect fulfilment of the law, a full discharge of all +obligation of every kind. + + + + +CHAPTER XII. + +THE ELEMENT OF THE WILL IN COMPLEX PHENOMENA. + +SECTION I. + +EVERY perception, every judgment, every thought, which appears within +the entire sphere of the Intelligence; every sensation, every emotion, +every desire, all the states of the Sensibility, present objects for the +action of the Will in one direction or another. The sphere of the Will's +activity, therefore, is as extensive as the vast and almost boundless +range of the Intelligence and Sensibility both. Now while all the +phenomena of these two last named faculties are, in themselves, wholly +destitute of moral character, the action of the Will, in the direction +of such phenomena, constitutes _complex_ states of mind, which have a +positive moral character. In all instances, the _moral_ and _voluntary_ +elements are one and identical. As the distinction under consideration +has been overlooked by the great mass of philosophers and theologians, +and as very great errors have thereby arisen, not only in philosophy, +but in theology and morals both, I will dwell at more length upon the +subject than I otherwise should have done. My remarks will be confined +to the action of the Will in the direction of the _natural propensities_ +and _religious affections_. + +ACTION OF THE WILL IN THE DIRECTION OF THE NATURAL +PROPENSITIES.--EMOTION, DESIRE, AND WISH DEFINED. + +1. In respect to the action of the Will in the direction of the natural +propensities, such as the appetites, the love of esteem, of power, &c., +I would remark, that the complex states thence resulting, are commonly +explained as simple feelings or states of the Sensibility. In presenting +this subject in a proper light, the following explanations are deemed +necessary. When any physical power operates upon any of the organs of +sense, or when any thought is present in the Intelligence, the state of +the Sensibility immediately and necessarily resulting is called a +_sensation_ or _emotion_. When any feeling arises impelling the Will to +seek or avoid the object of that sensation or emotion, this impulsive +state of the Sensibility is called a _desire_. When the Will concurs +with the desire, a complex state of mind results, called a _wish_. Wish +is distinguished from Desire in this, that in the former, the desire is +cherished and perpetuated by the concurrence of the Will with the +desire. When the Desire impels the Will towards a prohibited object, the +action of the Will, in concurrence with the desire, constitutes a wish +morally wrong. When the Desire impels the Will in a required direction, +and the Will, from a respect to the idea of duty, concurs with the +desire, a wish arises which is morally virtuous. This principle holds +true in regard to the action of all the propensities. The excitement of +the propensity, as a state of the Sensibility, constitutes desire--a +feeling in itself destitute of all moral qualities. The action of the +Will in concurrence with, or opposition to, this feeling, constitutes a +complex state of mind morally right or wrong. + +ANGER, PRIDE, AMBITION, &c. + +Anger, for example, as prohibited by the moral law, is not a mere +_feeling_ of displeasure awakened by some injury, real or supposed, +perpetrated by another. This state, on the other hand, consists in the +surrendering of the Will to the control of that feeling, and thus acting +from malign impulse. Pride also is not the mere _desire_ of esteem. It +consists in voluntary subjection to that propensity, seeking esteem and +admiration as the great end of existence. Ambition, too, is not mere +desire of power, but the voluntary surrendering of our being to the +control of that propensity. The same, I repeat, holds true in respect to +all the propensities. No mere excitement of the Sensibility, +irrespective of the action of the Will, has any moral character. In the +action of the Will in respect to such states--action which must arise in +some direction under such circumstances--moral guilt, or +praiseworthiness, arises. + +I might here adduce other cases in illustration of the same principle; +as, for example, the fact that intemperance in food and drink does not +consist, as a moral act or state, in the mere strength of the +appetite--that is, in the degree in which it is excited in the presence +of its appropriate objects. Nor does it consist in mere excess in the +quantity partaken of--excess considered as an external act. It consists, +on the other hand, in the surrendering of the voluntary power to the +control of the appetite. The excess referred to is the _consequent_ and +_index_ of such voluntary subjection. The above examples, however, are +abundantly sufficient to illustrate the principle. + +RELIGIOUS AFFECTIONS. + +2. We will now contemplate the element of the Will in those complex +phenomena denominated _religious affections_. The position which I here +assume is this, that whatever in such affections is morally right and +praiseworthy, that which is directly referred to, where such affections +are required of us, is the voluntary element to be found in them. The +voluntary element is directly required. Other elements are required only +on the ground that their existence is conditioned upon, and necessarily +results from, that of the voluntary element. This must be admitted, or +we must deny the position established in the last Chapter, to wit: that +all the requirements of the Moral law are fully met in the right action +of the Will. + +SCRIPTURE TESTIMONY. + +My object now is to show, that this is the light in which the subject is +really presented in the Scriptures. I will cite, as examples, the three +cardinal virtues of Christianity, Repentance, Love, and Faith. The +question is, Are these virtues or affections, presented in the Bible as +mere convictions of the Intelligence, or states of the Sensibility? Are +they not, on the other hand, presented as voluntary states of mind, or +as acts of Will? Are not the commands requiring them fully met in such +acts? + +REPENTANCE. + +In regard to Repentance, I would remark, that the term is scarcely used +at all in the Old Testament. Other terms and phrases are there employed +to express the same thing; as for example, "Turn ye;" "Let the wicked +forsake his way;" "Let him turn unto the Lord;" "He that confesseth and +forsaketh his sins shall find mercy," &c. In all such passages +repentance is most clearly presented as consisting exclusively of +voluntary acts or intentions. The commands requiring it are, therefore, +fully met in such acts. In the New Testament this virtue is +distinguished from Godly Sorrow, the state of the Sensibility which +accompanies its exercise. As distinguished from the action of the +Sensibility, what can it be, but a voluntary state, as presented in the +Old Testament? When the mind places itself in voluntary harmony with +those convictions and feelings which attend a consciousness of sin as +committed against God and man, this is the repentance recognized and +required as such in the Bible. It does not consist in the mere +_conviction_ of sin; for then the worst of men, and even devils, would +be truly repentant. Nor does it consist in the states of the Sensibility +which attend such convictions; else Repentance would be Godly Sorrow, +from which the Bible, as stated above, definitely distinguishes it. It +must consist in a voluntary act, in which, in accordance with those +convictions and feelings, the mind turns from sin to holiness, from +selfishness to benevolence, from the paths of disobedience to the +service of God. + +LOVE. + +A single passage will distinctly set before us the nature of _Love_ as +required in the Bible--that love which comprehends all other virtues, +and the exercise of which is the "fulfilling of the law." "Hereby," says +the sacred writer, "we perceive the love of God." The phrase "_of God_" +is not found in the original. The passage, as it there stands, reads +thus: "By this we know _love;_" that is, we know the nature of the love +which the Scriptures require, when they affirm, that "love is the +fulfilling of the law." What is that in which, according to the express +teaching of inspiration, we learn the nature of this love? "Because he +laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the +brethren." In the act of "laying down his life for us," we are here +told, that the love required of us is embodied and revealed. What is the +nature of this love? I answer, + +1. It is not a conviction of the Intelligence, nor any excited state of +the Sensibility. No such thing is here referred to. + +2. It does and must consist exclusively in a voluntary act, or +intention. "He laid down his life for us." What is this but a voluntary +act? Yet this is love, the "love which is the fulfilling of the law." + +3. As an act of Will, love must consist exclusively in a voluntary +devotion of our entire powers to one end, the highest good of universal +being, from a regard to the idea of duty. "He laid down his life for +us." "We _ought_ to lay down our lives for the brethren." In each +particular here presented, a universal principle is expressed and +revealed. Christ "laid down his life for us," because he was in a state +of voluntary consecration to the good of universal being. The particular +act was put forth, as a means to this end. In a voluntary consecration +to the same end, and as a means to this end, it is declared, that "we +ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." When, therefore, the +Scriptures require love of us, they do not demand the existence of +particular convictions of the Intelligence, nor certain states of the +Sensibility. They require the voluntary consecration of our entire being +and interests to the great end of universal good. In this act of +consecration, and in the employment of all our powers and interests, +under the control of this one intention, we fulfil the Law. We fully +discharge all obligations, actual and conceivable, that are devolved +upon us. The exercise of love, like that of repentance, is attended with +particular convictions and feelings. These feelings are indirectly +required in the precepts demanding love, and required, because when the +latter does exist, the former will of course exist. + +OF FAITH. + +But little need be said in explanation of the nature of Faith. It is +everywhere presented in the Bible, as synonymous with _trust_, reposing +confidence, committing our interests to God as to a "faithful Creator." +Now Trust is undeniably a voluntary state of mind. "I know," says Paul, +"in whom I have believed," that is, exercised faith, "that he is able to +keep that which I have _committed_ to him against that day." Here the +act of committing to the care of another, which can be nothing else than +an act of Will, is presented as synonymous with Faith. Faith, then, does +not consist in conviction, nor in any excited feelings. It is a +voluntary act, _entrusting_ our interests to God as to a faithful +Creator. The principle above established must apply to all religious +affections of every kind. + +SEC. II. GENERAL TOPICS SUGGESTED BY THE TRUTH ILLUSTRATED IN THE +PRECEDING SECTION. + +Few truths are of greater practical moment than that illustrated in the +preceding section. My object, now, is to apply it to the elucidation of +certain important questions which require elucidation. + +CONVICTIONS, FEELINGS AND EXTERNAL ACTIONS--WHY REQUIRED, OR PROHIBITED. + +1. We see why it is, that, while no mere external action, no state of +the Intelligence or Sensibility, has any moral character in itself, +irrespective of the action of the Will, still such acts and states are +specifically and formally required or prohibited in the Bible. In such +precepts the _effect_ is put for the _cause_. These acts and states are +required, or prohibited, as the natural and necessary results of right +or wrong intentions. The thing really referred to, in such commands and +prohibitions, is not the acts or states specified, but the _cause_ of +such acts and states, to wit: the right or wrong action of the Will. +Suppose, that a certain loathsome disease of the body would necessarily +result from certain intentions, or acts of Will. Now God might prohibit +the intention which causes that disease, in either of two ways. He might +specify the intention and directly prohibit that; or he might prohibit +the same thing, in such a form as this: Thou shalt not have this +disease. Every one will perceive that, in both prohibitions, the same +thing, precisely, would be referred to and intended, to wit: the +intention which sustains to the evil designed to be prevented, the +relation of a cause. The same principle, precisely, holds true in +respect to all external actions and states of the Intelligence and +Sensibility, which are specifically required or prohibited. + +OUR RESPONSIBILITY IN RESPECT TO SUCH PHENOMENA. + +2. We also distinctly perceive the ground of our responsibility for the +existence of external actions, and internal convictions and feelings. +Whatever effects, external or internal, necessarily result, and are or +may be known to result, from the right or wrong action of the Will, we +may properly be held responsible for. Now, all external actions and +internal convictions and feelings which are required of or prohibited to +us, sustain precisely this relation to the right or wrong action of the +Will. The intention being given, the effect follows as a consequence. +For this reason we are held responsible for the effect. + +FEELINGS HOW CONTROLLED BY THE WILL. + +3. We now notice the _power of control_ which the Will has over the +feelings. + +(1.) In one respect its control is unlimited. It may yield itself to the +control of the feelings, or wholly withhold its concurrence. + +(2.) In respect to all feelings, especially those which impel to violent +or unlawful action, the Will may exert a direct influence which will +either greatly modify, or totally suppress the feeling. For example, +when there is an inflexible purpose of Will not to yield to angry +feelings, if they should arise, and to suppress them, as soon as they +appear, feelings of a violent character will not result to any great +extent, whatever provocations the mind may be subject to. The same holds +true of almost all feelings of every kind. Whenever they appear, if they +are directly and strongly willed down, they will either be greatly +modified, or totally disappear. + +(3.) Over the action and states of the Sensibility the Will may exert an +indirect influence which is all-powerful. If, for example, the Will is +in full harmony with the infinite, the eternal, the just, the right, the +true and the good, the Intelligence will, of course, be occupied with +"whatsoever things are true, honest, just, pure, lovely and of good +report," and the Sensibility, continually acted upon by such objects, +will mirror forth, in pure emotions and desires, the pure thoughts of +the Intelligence, and the hallowed purposes of the Will. The Sensibility +will be wholly isolated from all feelings gross and sensual. On the +other hand, let the Will be yielded to the control of impure and sensual +impulse, and how gross and impure the thoughts and feelings will become. +In yielding, or refusing to yield, to the supreme control of the law of +Goodness, the Will really, though indirectly, determines the action of +the Intelligence and Sensibility both. + +(4.) To present the whole subject in a proper light, a fixed law of the +_affections_ demands special attention. A husband, for example, has +pledged to his wife, not only kind intentions, but the exclusive control +of those peculiar affections which constitute the basis of the marriage +union. Let him cherish a proper regard for the sacredness of that +pledge, and the wife will so completely and exclusively fill and command +her appropriate sphere in the affections, that, under no circumstances +whatever, will there be a tendency towards any other individual. The +same holds true of every department of the affections, not only in +respect to those which connect us with the creature, but also with the +Creator. The affections the Will may control by a fixed and changeless +law. + +Such being the relation of the Will to the Sensibility, while it is true +that there is nothing right or wrong in any feelings, irrespective of +the action of the Will, still the presence of feelings impure and +sensual, may be a certain indication of the wrong action of the +voluntary power. In such a light their presence should always be +regarded. + +RELATION OF FAITH TO OTHER EXERCISES MORALLY RIGHT. + +4. In the preceding Section it has been fully shown, that love, +repentance, faith, and all other religious exercises, are, in their +fundamental and characteristic elements, phenomena of the Will. We will +now, for a few moments, contemplate the relations of these different +exercises to one another, especially the relation of _Faith_ to other +exercises of a kindred character. While it is true, as has been +demonstrated in a preceding Chapter, that the Will cannot at the same +time put forth intentions of a contradictory character, such as sin and +holiness, it is equally true, that it may simultaneously put forth acts +of a homogeneous character. In view of our obligations to yield implicit +obedience to God, we may purpose such obedience. In view of the fact, +that, in the Gospel, grace is proffered to perfect us in our obedience, +at the same time that we purpose obedience with all the heart, we may +exercise implicit trust, or faith for "grace whereby we may serve God +acceptably with reverence and godly fear." Now, such is our condition as +sinners, that without a revelation of this grace, we should never +purpose obedience in the first instance. Without the continued influence +of that grace, this purpose would not subsequently be perfected and +perpetuated. The purpose is first formed in reliance upon Divine grace; +and but for this grace and consequent reliance, would never have been +formed. In consequence of the influence of this grace relied upon, and +received by faith, this same purpose is afterwards perfected and +perpetuated. Thus, we see, that the purpose of obedience is really +conditioned for its existence and perpetuity upon the act of reliance +upon Divine grace. The same holds true of the relation of Faith to all +acts or intentions morally right or holy. One act of Will, in itself +perfectly pure, is really conditioned upon another in itself equally +pure. This is the doctrine of Moral Purification, or Sanctification by +faith, a doctrine which is no less true, as a fact in philosophy, than +as a revealed truth of inspiration. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII. + +INFLUENCE OF THE WILL IN INTELLECTUAL JUDGMENTS. + +MEN OFTEN VOLUNTARY IN THEIR OPINIONS. + +IT is an old maxim, that the Will governs the understanding. It becomes +a very important inquiry with us, To what extent, and in what sense, is +this maxim true? It is undeniable, that, in many important respects, +mankind are voluntary in their opinions and judgments, and therefore, +responsible for them. We often hear the declaration, "You ought, or +ought not, to entertain such and such opinions, to form such and such +judgments." "You are bound to admit, or have no right to admit, such and +such things as true." Men often speak, also, of _pre-judging_ particular +cases, and thus incurring guilt. A question may very properly be asked +here, what are these opinions, judgments, admissions, pre-judgments, +&c.? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence, or are they +exclusively phenomena of the Will? + +ERROR NOT FROM THE INTELLIGENCE, BUT THE WILL. + +The proposition which I lay down is this, _that the Intelligence, in its +appropriate exercise, can seldom if ever, make wrong affirmations; that +wrong opinions, admissions, pre-judgments, &c., are in most, if not all +instances, nothing else than phenomena, or assumptions of Will_. If the +Intelligence can make wrong affirmations, it is important to determine +in what department of its action such affirmations may be found. + +PRIMARY FACULTIES CANNOT ERR. + +Let us first contemplate the action of the _primary_ intellectual +faculties--Sense, or the faculty of _external_ perception; +Consciousness, the faculty of _internal_ observation; and Reason, the +faculty which gives us _necessary_ and _universal truths_. The two +former faculties give us phenomena external and internal. The latter +gives us the logical antecedents of phenomena, thus perceived and +affirmed, to wit: the ideas of substance, cause, space, time, &c. In the +action of these faculties, surely, real error is impossible. + +SO OF THE SECONDARY FACULTIES. + +Let us now contemplate the action of the secondary faculties, the +Understanding and Judgment. The former unites the elements given by the +three primary faculties into _notions_ of particular objects. The latter +classifies these notions according to qualities perceived. Here, also, +we find no place for wrong affirmations. The understanding can only +combine the elements actually given by the primary faculties. The +Judgment can classify only according to qualities actually perceived. +Thus I might go over the entire range of the Intelligence, and show, +that seldom, if ever, in its appropriate action, it can make wrong +affirmations. + +ERROR, WHERE FOUND.--ASSUMPTION. + +Where then is the place for error, for wrong opinions, and +pre-judgments? Let us suppose, that a number of individuals are +observing some object at a distance from them. No qualities are given +but those common to a variety of objects, such as a man, horse, ox, &c. +The perceptive faculty has deceived no one in this case. It has given +nothing but real qualities. The Understanding can only form a notion of +it, as an object possessing these particular qualities. The Judgment can +only affirm, that the qualities perceived are common to different +classes of objects, and consequently, that no affirmations can be made +as to what class the object perceived does belong. The Intelligence, +therefore, makes no false affirmations. Still the inquiry goes round. +"What is it?" One answers, "It is a man." That is my opinion. Another: +"It is a horse." That is my judgment. Another still says, "I differ from +you all. It is an ox." That is my notion. Now, what are these opinions, +judgments, and notions? Are they real affirmations of the Intelligence? +By no means. The Intelligence cannot affirm at all, under such +circumstances. They are nothing in reality, but mere _assumptions_ of +the Will. A vast majority of the so called opinions, beliefs, judgments, +and notions among men, and all where _error_ is found, are nothing but +assumptions of the Will. + +Assumptions are sometimes based upon real affirmations of the +Intelligence, and sometimes not. Suppose the individuals above referred +to approach the object, till qualities are given which are peculiar to +the horse. The Judgment at once classifies the object accordingly. As +soon as this takes place, they all exclaim, "well, it is a horse." Here +are assumptions again, but assumptions based upon real affirmations of +the Intelligence. In the former instance we had assumptions based upon +no such affirmations. + +False assumptions do not always imply moral guilt. Much of the necessary +business of life has no other basis than prudent or imprudent +_guessing_. When the farmer, for example, casts any particular seed into +the ground, it is only by balance of probabilities that he often +determines, as far as he does or can determine, what is best; and not +unfrequently is he necessitated to assume and act, when all +probabilities are so perfectly balanced, that he can find no reasons at +all for taking one course in distinction from another. Yet no moral +guilt is incurred when one is necessitated to act in some direction, and +when all available light has been sought and employed to determine the +direction which is best. + +As false assumptions, however, often involve very great moral guilt, it +may be important to develope some of the distinguishing characteristics +of assumptions of this class. + +1. All assumptions involve moral guilt, which are in opposition to the +real and positive affirmations of the Intelligence. As the Will may +assume in the absence of such affirmations, and in the direction of +them, so it may in opposition to them. When you have carried a man's +Intellect in favor of a given proposition, it is by no means certain +that you have gained his assent to its truth. He may still assume, that +all the evidence presented is inadequate, and consequently refuse to +admit its truth. When the Will thus divorces itself from the +Intelligence, guilt of no ordinary character is incurred. Men often +express their convictions of the guilt thus incurred, by saying to +individuals, "You are bound to admit that fact or proposition as true. +You are already convinced. What excuse have you for not yielding to that +conviction?" Yet individuals will often do fatal violence to their +intellectual and moral nature, by holding on to assumptions, in reality +known to be false. + +2. Assumptions involve moral guilt which are formed without availing +ourselves of all the light within our reach as the basis of our +assumptions. For us to assume any proposition, or statement, to be true +or false, in the absence of affirmations of the Intelligence, as the +basis of such assumptions, when adequate light is available, involves +the same criminality, as assumptions in opposition to the Intelligence. +Hence we often have the expression in common life, "You had no right to +form a judgment under such circumstances. You were bound, before doing +it, to avail yourself of all the light within your reach." + +3. _Positive_ assumptions, without intellectual affirmations as their +basis, equally positive, involve moral guilt of no ordinary character. +As remarked above, we are often placed in circumstances in which we are +necessitated to act in some direction, and to select some particular +course without any perceived reasons in favor of that one course in +distinction from another. Now while _action_ is proper in such a +condition, it is not proper to make a positive assumption that the +course selected is the best. Suppose, that all the facts before my mind +bearing upon the character of a neighbor, are equally consistent with +the possession, on his part, of a character either good or bad. I do +violence to my intellectual and moral nature, if, under such +circumstances, I make the assumption that his character is either the +one or the other, and especially, that it is the latter instead of the +former. How often do flagrant transgressions of moral rectitude occur in +such instances! + +PRE-JUDGMENTS. + +A few remarks are deemed requisite on this topic. A pre-judgment is an +assumption, that a proposition or statement is true or false, before the +facts, bearing upon the case, have been heard. Such assumptions are +generally classed under the term prejudice. Thus it is said of +individuals, that they are prejudiced in favor or against certain +persons, sentiments, or causes. The real meaning of such statements is, +that individuals have made assumptions in one direction or another, +prior to a hearing of the facts of the case, and irrespective of such +facts. + +INTELLECT NOT DECEIVED IN PRE-JUDGMENTS. + +It is commonly said, that such prejudices, or pre-judgments, blind the +mind to facts of one class, and render it quick to discern those of the +other, and thus lead to a real mis-direction of the Intelligence. This I +think is not a correct statement of the case. Pre-judgments may, and +often do, prevent all proper investigation of a subject. In this case, +the Intelligence is not deceived at all. In the absence of real data, it +can make no positive affirmations whatever. + +So far also as pre-judgments direct attention from facts bearing upon +one side of a question, and to those bearing upon the other, the +Intelligence is not thereby deceived. All that it can affirm is the true +bearing of the facts actually presented. In respect to those not +presented, and consequently in respect to the real merits of the whole +case, it makes no affirmations. If an individual forms an opinion from a +partial hearing, that opinion is a mere assumption of Will, and nothing +else. + +THE MIND HOW INFLUENCED BY PRE-JUDGMENTS. + +But the manner in which pre-judgments chiefly affect the mind in the +hearing of a cause, still remains to be stated. In such pre-judgments, +or assumptions, an assumption of this kind is almost invariably +included, to wit: that all facts of whatever character bearing upon one +side of the question, are wholly indecisive, while all others bearing +upon the other side are equally decisive. In pre-judging, individuals do +not merely pre-judge the real merits of the case, but the character of +all the facts bearing upon it. They enter upon the investigation of a +given subject, with an inflexible determination to treat all the facts +and arguments they shall meet with, according to previous assumptions. +Let the clearest light poured upon one side of the question, and the +reply is, "After all, I am not convinced," while the most trivial +circumstances conceivable bearing upon the other side, will be seized +upon as perfectly decisive. In all this, we do not meet with the +operations of a deceived Intelligence, but of a "deceived heart," that +is, of a depraved Will, stubbornly bent upon verifying its own +unauthorized, pre-formed assumptions. Such assumptions can withstand any +degree of evidence whatever. The Intelligence did not give them +existence, and it cannot annihilate them. They are exclusively creatures +of Will, and by an act of Will, they must be dissolved, or they will +remain proof against all the evidence which the tide of time can roll +against them. + +INFLUENCES WHICH INDUCE FALSE ASSUMPTIONS. + +The influences which induce false and unauthorized assumptions, are +found in the strong action of the Sensibility, in the direction of the +appetites, natural affections, and the different propensities, as the +love of gain, ambition, party spirit, pride of character, of opinion, +&c. When the Will has long been habituated to act in the direction of a +particular propensity, how difficult it is to induce the admission, or +assumption, that action in that direction is wrong! The difficulty, in +such cases, does not, in most instances, lie in convincing the +Intelligence, but in inducing the Will to admit as true what the +Intelligence really affirms. + +CASES IN WHICH WE ARE APPARENTLY, THOUGH NOT REALLY, MISLED BY THE +INTELLIGENCE. + +As there are cases of this kind, it is important to mark some of their +characteristics. Among these I cite the following: + +1. The qualities of a particular object, actually perceived, as in the +case above cited, may be common to a variety of classes which we know, +and also to others which we do not know. On the perception of such +qualities, the Intelligence will suggest those classes only which we +know, while the particular object perceived may belong to a class +unknown. If, in such circumstances, a positive assumption, as to what +class it does belong, is made, a wrong assumption must of necessity be +made. The _Intelligence_ in this case is not deceived. It places the +Will, however, in such a relation to the object, that if a positive +assumption is made, it must necessarily be a wrong one. In this manner, +multitudes of wrong assumptions arise. + +2. When facts are before the mind, an _explanation_ of them is often +desired. In such circumstances, the Intelligence may suggest, in +explanation, a number of hypotheses, which hypotheses may be all alike +false. If a positive assumption is made in such a case, it must of +necessity be a false one; because it must be in the direction of some +one hypothesis before the mind at the time. Here, also, the Intelligence +necessitates a wrong assumption, if any is made. Yet it is not itself +deceived; because it gives no positive affirmations as the basis of +positive assumptions. In such circumstances, error very frequently +arises. + +3. _Experience_ often occasions wrong assumptions, which are attributed +incorrectly to real affirmations of the Intelligence. A friend, for +example, saw an object which presented the external appearance of the +apple. He had never before seen those qualities, except in connection +with that class of objects. He assumed, at once, that it was a real +apple; but subsequently found that it was an artificial, and not a real +one. Was the Intelligence deceived in this instance? By no means. That +faculty had never affirmed, that those qualities which the apple +presents to the eye, never exist in connection with any other object, +and consequently, that the apple must have been present in the instance +given. _Experience_, and not a positive affirmation of the Intelligence, +led to the wrong assumption in this instance. The same principle holds +true, in respect to a vast number of instances that might be named. + +4. Finally, the Intelligence may not only make positive affirmations in +the presence of qualities perceived, but it may affirm _hypothetically_, +that is, when a given proposition is _assumed_ as true, the Intelligence +may and will present the logical _antecedents_ and _consequents_ of that +assumption. If the assumption is false, such will be the character of +the antecedents and consequents following from it. An individual, in +tracing out these antecedents and consequents, however, may mistake the +hypothetical, for the real, affirmations of the Intelligence. One wrong +assumption in theology or philosophy, for example, may give an entire +system, all of the leading principles of which are likewise false. In +tracing out, and perfecting that system, how natural the assumption, +that one is following the _real_, and not the _hypothetical_, +affirmations of the Intelligence! From this one source an infinity of +error exists among men. + +In an enlarged Treatise on mental science, the subject of the present +chapter should receive a much more extensive elucidation than could be +given to it in this connection. Few subjects would throw more clear +light over the domains of truth and error than this, if fully and +distinctly elucidated. + +In conclusion, I would simply remark, that one of the highest +attainments in virtue which we can conceive an intelligent being to +make, consists in a continued and vigorous employment of the +Intelligence in search of the right, the just, the true, and the good, +in all departments of human investigation; and in a rigid discipline of +the Will, to receive and treat, as true and sacred, whatever the +Intelligence may present, as possessed of such characteristics, to the +full subjection of all impulses in the direction of unauthorized +assumptions. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV. + +LIBERTY AND SERVITUDE. + +LIBERTY OF WILL AS OPPOSED TO MORAL SERVITUDE. + +THERE are, among others, two senses of the term Liberty, which ought to +be carefully distinguished from each other. In the first sense, it +stands opposed to Necessity; in the second, to what is called Moral +Servitude. It is in the last sense that I propose to consider the +subject in the present Chapter. What, then, is Liberty as opposed to +Moral Servitude? _It is that state in which the action of Will is in +harmony with the Moral Law, with the idea of the right, the just, the +true, and the good, while all the propensities are held in perfect +subordination--a state in which the mind may purpose obedience to the +law of right with the rational hope of carrying that determination into +accomplishment_. This state all mankind agree in calling a state of +moral freedom. The individual who has attained to it, is not in +servitude to any propensity whatever. He "rules his own spirit." He is +the master of himself. He purposes the good, and performs it. He +resolves against the evil, and avoids it. "Greater," says the maxim of +ancient wisdom, "is such a man than he that taketh a city." + +Moral Servitude, on the other hand, is _a state in which the Will is so +ensnared by the Sensibility, so habituated to subjection to the +propensities, that it has so lost the prerogative of self-control, that +it cannot resolve upon action in the direction of the law of right, with +any rational expectation of keeping that resolution_. The individual in +this condition "knows the good, and approves of it, yet follows the +bad." "The good that he would (purposes to do), he does not, but the +evil that he would not (purposes not to do), that he does." All men +agree in denominating this a state of Moral Servitude. Whenever an +individual is manifestly governed by appetite, or any other propensity, +by common consent, he is said to be a slave in respect to his +propensities. + +The reason why the former state is denominated Liberty, and the latter +Servitude, is obvious. Liberty, as opposed to Servitude, is universally +regarded as a good in itself. As such, it is desired and chosen. +Servitude, on the other hand, may be submitted to, as the least of two +evils. Yet it can never be desired and chosen, as a good in itself. +Every man who is in a state of servitude, is there, in an important +sense, against his Will. The _state_ in which he is, is regarded as in +itself the greatest of evils, excepting those which would arise from a +vain attempt at a vindication of personal freedom. + +The same principle holds true in respect to Moral Liberty and Servitude. +When any individual contemplates the idea of the voluntary power rising +to full dominion over impulse of every kind, and acting in sublime +harmony with the pure and perfect law of rectitude, as revealed in the +Intelligence, every one regards this as a state, of all others, the most +to be desired and chosen as a good in itself. To enter upon this state, +and to continue in it, is therefore regarded as a realization of the +idea of Liberty in the highest and best sense of the term. Subjection to +impulse, in opposition to the pure dictates of the Intelligence, to the +loss of the high prerogative of "ruling our own spirits," on the other +hand, is regarded by all men as in itself a state the most abject, and +least to be desired conceivable. The individual that is there, cannot +but despise his own image. He, of necessity, loathes and abhors himself. +Yet he submits to self-degradation rather than endure the pain and +effort of self-emancipation. No term but Servitude, together with others +of a kindred import, expresses the true conception of this state. No man +is in a state of Moral Servitude from choice--that is, from choice of +the state as a good in itself. The _state_ he regards as an evil in +itself. Yet, in the exercise of free choice, he is there, because he +submits to self-degradation rather than vindicate his right to freedom. + +REMARKS. + +MISTAKE OF GERMAN METAPHYSICIANS. + +1. We notice a prominent and important mistake common to metaphysicians, +especially of the German school, in their Treatises on the Will. Liberty +of Will with them is Liberty as distinguished from Moral Servitude, and +not as distinguished from Necessity. Hence, in all their works, very +little light is thrown upon the great idea of Liberty, which lies at the +foundation of moral obligation, to wit: Liberty as distinguished from +Necessity. "A free Will," says Kant, "and a Will subjected to the Moral +Law, are one and identical." A more capital error in philosophy is not +often met with than this. + +MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE RACE. + +2. In the state of Moral Servitude above described, the Bible affirms +all men to be, until they are emancipated by the influence of the +Remedial System therein revealed--a truth affirmed by what every man +experiences in himself, and by the entire mass of facts which the +history of the race presents. Where is the individual that, unaided by +an influence out of himself, has ever attained to a dominion over his +own spirit? Where is the individual that, without such an influence, can +resolve upon acting in harmony with the law of pure benevolence, with +any rational hope of success? To meet this great want of human nature; +to provide an influence adequate to its redemption, from what the +Scriptures, with great propriety, call the "bondage of corruption," is a +fundamental design of the Remedial System. + + + + +CHAPTER XV. + +LIBERTY AND DEPENDENCE. + +COMMON IMPRESSION. + +A VERY common impression exists,--an impression universal among those +who hold the doctrine of Necessity,--that the doctrine of Liberty, as +maintained in this Treatise, renders man, really, in most important +respects, independent of his Creator, and therefore, tends to induce in +the mind, that spirit of haughty independence which is totally opposite +and antagonistic to that spirit of humility and dependence which lies at +the basis of all true piety and virtue. If this is the real tendency of +this doctrine, it certainly constitutes an important objection against +it. If, on the other hand, we find in the nature of this doctrine, +essential elements totally destructive of the spirit of pride and +self-confidence, and tending most strongly to induce the opposite +spirit,--a spirit of humility and dependence upon the grace proffered in +the Remedial System; if we find, also, that the doctrine of Necessity, +in many fundamental particulars, lacks these benign tendencies, we have, +in such a case, the strongest evidence in favor of the former doctrine, +and against the latter. The object of the present Chapter, therefore, is +to _elucidate the tendency of the doctrine of Liberty to destroy the +spirit of pride, haughtiness, and self-dependence, and to induce the +spirit of humility and dependence upon Divine Grace_. + +SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE DEFINED. + +Before proceeding directly to argue this question, we need to settle +definitely the meaning of the phrase _spirit of dependence_. The +_conviction_ of our dependence is one thing. The _spirit_ of dependence +is quite another. What is this spirit? In its exercise, the mind _rests +in voluntary dependence upon the grace of God_. The heart is fully set +upon doing the right, and avoiding the wrong, while the mind is in the +voluntary exercise of _trust_ in God for "grace whereby we may serve Him +acceptably." The _spirit_ of dependence, then, implies obedience +actually commenced. The question is, does the belief of the doctrine of +Liberty tend intrinsically to induce the exercise of this spirit? In +this respect, has it altogether a superiority over the doctrine of +Necessity? + +DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY TENDS NOT TO INDUCE THE SPIRIT OF DEPENDENCE. + +1. In accomplishing my object, I will first consider the tendency, in +this one respect, of the doctrine of Necessity. An individual, we will +suppose, finds himself under influences which induce him to sin, and +which consequently, if this doctrine is true, render it impossible for +him, without the interposition of Divine power, not to sin. A +consideration of his condition tends to _convince_ him, that is, to +induce the intellectual conviction, of his entire dependence upon Divine +grace. But the intellectual _conviction_ of our dependence, as above +shown, is one thing. The _spirit_ of dependence, which, as there stated, +consists in actually trusting the Most High for grace to do what he +requires, and implies actual obedience already commenced, is quite +another thing. Now the doctrine of Necessity has a tendency to produce +this _conviction_, but none to induce the _spirit_ of dependence: +inasmuch as with this conviction, it produces another equally strong, to +wit: that the creature, without a Divine interposition, will not, and +cannot, exercise the _spirit_ of dependence. In thus producing the +conviction, that, under present influences, the subject does not, and +cannot exercise that spirit, this doctrine tends exclusively to the +annihilation of that Spirit. + +When an individual is in a state of actual obedience, the tendency of +this doctrine upon him is no better; since it produces the conviction, +that while a Divine influence, independently of ourselves, produces in +us a spirit of dependence, we shall and must exercise it; and that while +it does not produce that spirit, we do not and cannot exercise it. Where +is the tendency to induce a spirit of dependence, in such a conviction? +According to the doctrine of Necessity, nothing but the actual +interposition of Divine grace has any tendency to induce a spirit of +dependence. The _belief_ of this doctrine has no such tendency whatever. +The grand mistake of the Necessitarian here, consists in the assumption, +that, because his _doctrine has a manifest tendency to produce the_ +CONVICTION _of dependence, it has a tendency equally manifest to induce +the_ SPIRIT _of dependence;_ when, in fact, it has no such tendency +whatever. + +2. We will now contemplate the intrinsic tendencies of the doctrine of +Liberty to induce the spirit of humility and dependence. Every one will +see, at once, that the consciousness of Liberty cannot itself be a +ground of dependence, in respect to action, in favor of the right and in +opposition to the wrong: for the possession of such Liberty, as far as +the power itself is concerned, leaves us, at all times, equally liable +to do the one as the other. How can an equal liability to two distinct +and opposite courses, be a ground of assurance, that we shall choose the +one, and avoid the other? Thus the consciousness of Liberty tends +directly and intrinsically to a total annihilation of the spirit of +self-dependence. + +Let us now contemplate our relation to the Most High. He knows perfectly +in what direction we shall, in our self-determination, exert our powers +under any influence and system of influences brought to bear upon us. It +is also in His power to subject us to any system of influences he +pleases. He has revealed to us the great truth, that if, in the exercise +of the spirit of dependence, we will trust Him for grace to do the good +and avoid the evil which He requires us to do and avoid, He will subject +us to a Divine influence, which shall for ever secure us in the one, and +against the other. The conviction, therefore, rises with full and +perfect distinctness in the mind, that, in the exercise of the spirit of +dependence, action in all future time, in the direction of purity and +bliss, is secure; and that, in the absence of this spirit, action, in +the opposite direction, is equally certain. In the belief of the +doctrine of Liberty, another truth becomes an omnipresent reality to our +minds, that the _exercise_ of this spirit, thus rendering our "calling +and election sure," is, at all times, practicable to us. What then is +the exclusive tendency of this doctrine? To destroy the spirit of +self-dependence, on the one hand, and to induce the exercise of the +opposite spirit, on the other. The doctrine of Necessity reveals the +_fact_ of dependence, but destroys the _spirit_, by the production of +the annihilating conviction, that we neither shall nor can exercise that +spirit, till God, in his sovereign dispensations, shall subject us to an +influence which renders it impossible for us not to exercise it. The +doctrine of Liberty reveals, with equal distinctness, the _fact_ of +dependence; and then, while it produces the hallowed conviction of the +perfect practicability of the exercise of the _spirit_ of dependence, +presents motives infinitely strong, not only to induce its exercise, but +to empty the mind wholly of everything opposed to it. + +GOD CONTROLS ALL INFLUENCES UNDER WHICH CREATURES DO ACT. + +3. While the existence and continuance of our powers of moral agency +depend wholly upon the Divine Will, and while the Most High knows, with +entire certainty, in what direction we shall exert our powers, under all +influences, and systems of influences, brought to bear upon us, all +these influences are entirely at his disposal. What tendency have such +convictions, together with the consciousness of Liberty, and ability to +exercise, or not to exercise, the spirit of dependence, but to induce +us, in the exercise of that spirit, to throw our whole being into the +petition, "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil?" If +God knows perfectly under what influences action in us shall be in the +direction of the right, or the wrong, and holds all such influences at +his own control, what attitude becomes us in the presence of the "High +and lofty One," but dependence and prayer? + +DEPENDENCE ON ACCOUNT OF THE MORAL SERVITUDE OF THE WILL. + +4. Finally, a consciousness of a state of Moral Servitude, together with +the conviction, that in the exercise of the spirit of dependence, we can +rise to the "Glorious Liberty of the Sons of God;" that in the absence +of this spirit, our Moral Servitude is perfectly certain; all these, +together with the conviction which the belief of the doctrine of Liberty +induces (to wit: that the exercise of the spirit of dependence is always +practicable to us), tends only to one result, to induce the exercise of +that spirit, and to the total annihilation of the opposite spirit. + +While, therefore, the doctrine of Liberty sanctifies, in the mind, the +feeling of obligation to do the right and avoid the wrong, a feeling +which the doctrine of Necessity tends to annihilate, the former (an +effect which the latter cannot produce) tends only to the annihilation +of the spirit of pride and self-confidence, and to induce that spirit of +filial dependence which cries "Abba, Father!" + + + + +CHAPTER XVI. + +FORMATION OF CHARACTER. + +ELEMENT OF WILL IN FORMATION OF CHARACTER. + +CHARACTER COMMONLY HOW ACCOUNTED FOR. + +IN accounting for the existence and formation of peculiarities of +character, individual, social, and national, two elements only are +commonly taken into consideration, the _natural propensities_, and the +_circumstances and influences_ under which those propensities are +developed and controlled. The doctrine of Necessity permits us to take +nothing else into the account. Undoubtedly, these elements have very +great efficacy in determining character. In many instances, little else +need to be taken into consideration, in accounting for peculiarities of +character, as they exist around us, in individuals, communities, and +nations. + +THE VOLUNTARY ELEMENT TO BE TAKEN INTO THE ACCOUNT. + +In a vast majority of cases, however, another, and altogether a +different element, that of the Will, or voluntary element, must be taken +into the reckoning, or we shall find ourselves wholly unable to account +for peculiarities of mental and moral development, everywhere visible +around us. It is an old maxim, that "every man is the arbiter of his own +destiny." As character determines destiny, so the Will determines +character; and man is the arbiter of his own destiny, only as he is the +arbiter of his own character. The element of Free Will, therefore, must +be taken into the reckoning, if we would adequately account for the +peculiarities of character which the individual, social, and national +history of the race presents. Even where mental and moral developments +are as the propensities and external influences, still the voluntary +element must be reckoned in, if we would account for facts as they +exist. In a majority of instances, however, if the two elements under +consideration, and these only, are taken into the account, we shall find +our conclusions very wide from the truth. + +AN EXAMPLE IN ILLUSTRATION. + +I will take, in illustration of the above remarks, a single example--a +case with which I became so familiarly acquainted, that I feel perfectly +safe in vouching for the truth of the statements which I am about to +make. I knew a boy who, up to the age of ten or twelve years, was under +the influence of a most ungovernable temper--a temper easily and quickly +excited, and which, when excited, rendered him perfectly desperate. +Seldom, if ever, was he known to yield in a conflict, however superior +in strength his antagonist might be. Death was always deliberately +preferred to submission. During this period, he often reflected upon his +condition, and frequently wished that it was otherwise. Still, with +melancholy deliberation, he as often said to himself, I never can and +never shall subdue this temper. At the close of this period, as he was +reflecting upon the subject again, he made up his mind, with perfect +fixedness of purpose, that, to the control of that temper, he would +never more yield. The Will rose up in the majesty of its power, and +assumed the reins of self-government, in the respect under +consideration. From that moment, that temper almost never, even under +the highest provocations, obtained the control of the child. A total +revolution of mental developments resulted. He afterwards became as +distinguished for natural amiability and self-control, in respect to his +temper, as before he had been for the opposite spirit. This total +revolution took place from mere prudential considerations, without any +respect whatever to moral obligation. + +Now suppose we attempt to account for these distinct and opposite +developments of character--developments exhibited by the same +individual, in these two periods--by an exclusive reference to natural +propensities and external influences. What a totally inadequate and +false account should we give of the facts presented! That individual is +just as conscious, that it was the element of Free Will that produced +this revolution, and that when he formed the determination which +resulted in that revolution, he might have determined differently, as he +is, or ever has been, of any mental states whatever. All the facts, +also, as they lie out before us, clearly indicate, that if we leave out +of the account the voluntary element, those facts must remain wholly +unexplained, or a totally wrong explanation of them must be given. + +The same principle holds true in all other instances. Though natural +propensities and external influences greatly _modify_ mental +developments, still, the _distinguishing_ peculiarities of character, in +all instances, receive their form and coloring from the action of the +voluntary power. This is true, of the peculiarities of character +exhibited, not only by individuals, but communities and nations. We can +never account for facts as they are, until we contemplate man, not only +as possessed of Intelligence and Sensibility, but also of Free Will. All +the powers and susceptibilities must be taken into the account, if men +would know man as he is. + +DIVERSITIES OF CHARACTER. + +A few important definitions will close this Chapter. + +A _decisive_ character exists, where the Will acts in harmony with +propensities strongly developed. When a number of propensities of this +kind exist, action, and consequently character, may be changeable, and +yet decisive. + +_Unity_ and _decision_ of character result, when the Will steadily acts +in harmony with some one over-shadowing propensity. + +Character is _fluctuating_ and _changeable_, when the Will surrenders +itself to the control of different propensities, each easily and highly +excited in the presence of its appropriate objects, and yet the +excitement but temporary. Thus, different propensities, in rapid +succession, take their turn in controlling the Will. + +_Indecision_ and _feebleness_ of character result, when the Will +uniformly acts under the influence of the principle of _fear_ and +_caution_. To such a mind, in all important enterprises especially, +there is always "a lion in the way." Such a mind, therefore, is +continually in a state of distressing indecision when energetic action +is necessary to success. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII. + +CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. + +A FEW reflections of a general nature will conclude this Treatise. + +OBJECTION. THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS. + +1. An objection, often adduced, to the entire view of the subject +presented in this Treatise, demands a passing notice here. All things in +existence, it is said, and the Will among the rest, are governed by +_Laws_. It is readily admitted, that all things have their laws, and +that the Will is not without law. It is jumping a very long distance to +a conclusion, however, to infer from such a fact, that Necessity is the +only law throughout the entire domain of existence, physical and mental. +What if, from the fact, that the Will has its law, it should be assumed +that Liberty is that law? This assumption would be just as legitimate as +the one under consideration. + +OBJECTION. GOD DETHRONED FROM HIS SUPREMACY, IF THE DOCTRINE OF LIBERTY +IS TRUE. + +2. Another objection of a general nature, is the assumption, that the +doctrine of Liberty destroys the Divine supremacy in the realm of mind. +"If man," says Dr. Chalmers, "is not a necessary agent, God is a +degraded sovereign." A sentiment more dishonorable to God, more fraught +with fatal error, more revolting to a virtuous mind, when unperverted by +a false theory, could scarcely be uttered. Let us, for a moment, +contemplate the question, whether the doctrine of Liberty admits a +Divine government in the realm of mind. The existence and perpetuity, as +stated in a former Chapter, of free and moral agency in creatures, +depend wholly upon the Divine Will. With a perfect knowledge of the +direction in which they will exert their powers, under every kind and +degree of influence to which they may be subjected, He holds all these +influences at his sovereign disposal. With such knowledge and resources, +can God exercise no government, but that of a degraded sovereignty in +the realm of mind? Can He not exercise the very sovereignty which +infinite wisdom and love desire? Who would dare affirm the contrary? If +the doctrine of Liberty is true, God certainly does not sit upon the +throne of iron destiny, swaying the sceptre of stern fate over myriads +of subjects, miscalled moral agents; subjects, all of whom are +commanded, under infinite sanctions, to do the right and avoid the +wrong, while subjected to influences by the Most High himself, which +render obedience in some, and disobedience in others, absolute +impossibilities. Still, in the light of this doctrine, God has a +government in the domain of mind, a government wisely adapted to the +nature of moral agents--agents capable of incurring the desert of praise +or blame; a government which all approve, and under the benign influence +of which, all who have not forfeited its protection by crime, may find +"quietness and assurance for ever." + +OBJECTION. GREAT AND GOOD MEN HAVE HELD THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. + +3. In reply to what has been said in respect to the _tendencies_ of the +doctrine of Necessity, the fact will doubtless be adduced, that the +greatest and best of men have held this doctrine, without a development +of these tendencies in their experience. My answer is, that the goodness +of such men, their sense of moral obligation, &c., did not result from +their theory, but existed in spite of its intrinsic tendencies. They +held this doctrine in theory, and yet, from a _consciousness_ of +Liberty, they practically adopted the opposite doctrine. Here, we have +the source of the deep feeling of obligation in their minds, while the +intrinsic and exclusive tendency of their _Theory_, even in them, was to +weaken and annihilate this hallowed feeling. The difference between such +men and sceptics is this: The piety of the former prevents their +carrying out their theory to its legitimate results; while the impiety +of the latter leads them to march boldly up to those results--a fearless +denial of moral obligation in every form. + +LAST RESORT. + +4. The final resort of certain Necessitarians, who may feel themselves +wholly unable to meet the arguments adduced against their own and in +favor of the opposite theory, and are determined to remain fixed in +their opinions, may be readily anticipated. It is an assumption which +may be expressed in language somewhat like the following: "After all, +the immortal work of Edwards still lives, and will live, when those of +his opponents will be lost in oblivion. That work still remains +unanswered." A sweeping assumption is a very easy and summary way of +disposing of a difficulty, which we might not otherwise know what to do +with. Let us for a moment contemplate some of the facts which have been +undeniably established in reference to this immortal work. + +(1.) At the outset, Edwards stands convicted of a fundamental error in +philosophy, an error which gives form and character to his whole +work--the confounding of the Will with the Sensibility, and thus +confounding the characteristics of the phenomena of the former faculty +with those of the phenomena of the latter. + +(2.) His whole work is constructed without an appeal to Consciousness, +the only proper and authoritative tribunal of appeal in the case. Thus +his reasonings have only an accidental bearing upon his subject. + +(3.) All his fundamental conclusions have been shown to stand in direct +contradiction to the plainest and most positive testimony of universal +Consciousness. + +(4.) His main arguments have been shown to be nothing else but reasoning +in a circle. He defines, for example, the phrase "Greatest apparent +good," as synonymous with _choosing_, and then argues, from the fact +that the "Will always is as the greatest apparent good," that is, that +it always chooses as it chooses, that it is subject to the law of +Necessity. + +So in respect to the argument from the Strongest Motive, which, by +definition, is fixed upon as the Motive in the direction of which the +Will, in each particular instance, acts. From the fact that the action +of the Will is always in the direction of this Motive, that is, in the +direction of the Motive towards which it does act, the conclusion is +gravely drawn, that the Will is and must be subject, in all its +determinations, to the law of Necessity. I find my mind acted upon by +two opposite Motives. I cannot tell which is the strongest, from a +contemplation of what is intrinsic in the Motives themselves, nor from +their effects upon my Intelligence or Sensibility. I must wait till my +Will has acted. From the fact of its action in the direction of one +Motive, in distinction from the other, I must then draw two important +conclusions. 1. The Motive, in the direction of which my Will did act, +is the strongest. The evidence is, the _fact_ of its action in that +direction. 2. The Will must be subject to the law of Necessity. The +proof is, the action of the Will in the direction of the Strongest +Motive, that is, the Motive in the direction of which it did act. Sage +argument to be regarded by Philosophers and Theologians of the 19th +century, as possessing the elements of immortality! + +(5.) His argument from the Divine fore-knowledge has been shown to be +wholly based upon an _assumption_ unauthorized by reason, or revelation +either, to wit: that he understands the _mode_ of that Fore-knowledge,-- +an assumption which cannot be made except through ignorance, as was true +in his case, without the greatest impiety and presumption. + +(6.) The theory which Edwards opposes has been shown to render sacred, +in all minds that hold it, the great idea of _duty_, of moral +obligation; while the validity of that idea has never, in any age or +nation, been denied, excepting on the avowed authority of his Theory. + +(7.) All the arguments in proof of the doctrine of Necessity, with the +single exception of that from the Divine Fore-knowledge--an argument +resting, as we have seen, upon an assumption equally baseless,--involve +a begging of the question at issue. Take any argument we please, with +this one exception, and it will be seen at once that it has no force at +all, unless the truth of the doctrine designed to be established by it, +be assumed as the basis of that argument. Shall we pretend that a +Theory, that has been fully demonstrated to involve, fundamentally, the +errors, absurdities, and contradictions above named, has not been +answered? + +WILLING, AND AIMING TO PERFORM IMPOSSIBILITIES. + +5. We are now prepared to answer a question about which philosophers +have been somewhat divided in opinion--the question, whether the Will +can act in the direction of perceived and affirmed impossibilities? The +true answer to this question, doubtless is, that the Mind may _will_ the +occurrence of a known impossibility, but it can never _aim_ to produce +such an occurrence. + +The Mind, for example, while it regards the non-existence of God as that +which cannot possibly occur, may come into such a relation to the Most +High, that the _desire_ shall arise that God were not. With this desire, +the Will may concur, in the _wish_, that there were no God. Here the +Mind wills a known impossibility. In a similar manner, the Mind may will +its own non-existence, while it regards its occurrence, on account of +its relation to the Divine Will, as impossible. + +But while the Mind may thus _will_ the occurrence of an impossibility, +it never can, nor will aim, that is, intend, to produce what it regards +as an impossibility. A creature may will the non-existence of God; but +even a fallen Spirit, regarding the occurrence as an absolute +impossibility, never did, nor will aim to annihilate the Most High. To +suppose the Will to set itself to produce an occurrence regarded as +impossible, involves a contradiction. + +For the same reason, the Will will never set itself upon the +accomplishment of that which it is perfectly assured it never shall +accomplish, however sincere its efforts towards the result may be. All +such results are, to the Mind, _practical_ impossibilities. Extinguish +totally in the Mind the _hope_ of obtaining the Divine favor, and the +Divine favor will never be sought. Produce in the Mind the conviction, +that should it aim at the attainment of a certain end, there is an +infallible certainty that it will not attain it, and the subject of that +conviction will no more aim to attain that end, than he will aim to +cause the same thing, at the same time, to be and not to be. + +In reply, it is sometimes said, that men often aim at what they regard +even as an impossible attainment. The painter, for example, aims to +produce a _perfect_ picture, while he knows well that he cannot produce +one. I answer, the painter is really aiming at no such thing. He is not +aiming to produce a perfect picture, which he knows he cannot, and will +not produce, but to produce one as _nearly_ perfect as he can. This is +what he is really aiming at. Question the individual critically, and he +will confirm what is here affirmed. Remind him of the fact, that he +cannot produce a perfect picture. I know that, he replies. I am +determined, however, to produce one as _nearly_ perfect as possible. +Here his real aim stands revealed. The same principle holds true in all +other instances. + +THOUGHT AT PARTING. + +6. In taking leave of the reader, I would simply say, that if he has +distinctly apprehended the great doctrine designed to be established in +this Work, and has happily come to an agreement with the author in +respect to it, the following hallowed impression has been left very +distinctly upon his mind. While he finds himself in a state of profound +and most pleasing dependence upon the Author of his being, in the Holy +of Holies of the inner sanctuary of his mind, one idea, the great +over-shadowing idea of the human Intelligence, has been fully +sanctified--the idea of _duty_, of _moral obligation_. With the +consciousness of Liberty, that idea must be to the mind an omnipresent +reality. From it we can never escape and in all states, and in all +worlds, it must and will be to us, as a guardian angel, or an avenging +fiend. But one thing remains, and that is, through the grace proffered +in the Remedial System, to "live and move, and have our being," in +harmony with that idea, thus securing everlasting "quietness and +assurance" in the sanctuary of our minds, and ever enduring peace and +protection under, the over-shadowing perfections of the Author of our +existence, and amid all the arrangements and movements of his eternal +government. + + + +FOOTNOTES + +[1] See Upham on the Will, pp. 32-35. + +[2] The above is a perfectly correct statement of the famous distinction +between natural and moral ability made by Necessitarians. The sinner is +under obligation to do right, they say, because he might do what is +required of him, if he chose to do it. He has, therefore, _natural_ but +not _moral_ power to obedience. But the choice which the sinner wants, +the absence of which constitutes his moral inability, is the very thing +required of him. When, therefore, the Necessitarian says, that the +sinner is under obligation to obey, because he might obey if he chose to +do it, the real meaning is, that the sinner is under obligation to +obedience, because if he should choose to obey he would choose to obey. +In other words he is under obligation to obedience, because, if he did +obey, he would obey. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Doctrine of the Will, by Asa Mahan + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK DOCTRINE OF THE WILL *** + +***** This file should be named 38621.txt or 38621.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/8/6/2/38621/ + +Produced by Keith G Richardson + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/38621.zip b/38621.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..69d59dc --- /dev/null +++ b/38621.zip diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e24a6de --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #38621 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/38621) |