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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/38587-8.txt b/38587-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac2ebb6 --- /dev/null +++ b/38587-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,14354 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Victory At Sea, by +William Sowden Sims and Burton J. Hendrick + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Victory At Sea + +Author: William Sowden Sims + Burton J. Hendrick + +Release Date: January 15, 2012 [EBook #38587] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VICTORY AT SEA *** + + + + +Produced by David Edwards, Barbara Kosker and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + + +THE VICTORY AT SEA + +REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. SIMS +U.S. NAVY + + + + +THE VICTORY AT SEA + +[Illustration: _Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims U.S. Navy_ +_G. Vandyk Ltd. photographers_] + + + + +THE +VICTORY AT SEA + + + + +BY REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS +U.S. NAVY + +COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES OPERATING +IN EUROPEAN WATERS DURING THE GREAT WAR + + + + +IN COLLABORATION WITH +BURTON J. HENDRICK + +WITH PORTRAIT AND PLANS + + + + +LONDON +JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. +1920 + + + + +FIRST EDITION _November 1920_ +_Reprinted_ _December 1920_ + +ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + +_Printed by Hasell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury, England._ + + + + +TO + +THE GALLANT OFFICERS AND MEN + +WHOM I HAD THE HONOUR TO COMMAND + +DURING THE GREAT WAR + +IN + +GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF + +A LOYAL DEVOTION TO THE CAUSE + +THAT GREATLY LIGHTENED THE + +RESPONSIBILITY + +BORNE BY + +"THE OLD MAN" + + + + +PREFACE + + +This is not in any sense a history of the operations of our naval forces +in Europe during the Great War, much less a history of the naval +operations as a whole. That would require not only many volumes, but +prolonged and careful research by competent historians. When such a work +is completed, our people will realize for the first time the admirable +initiative with which the gallant personnel of our navy responded to the +requirements of an unprecedented naval situation. + +But in the meantime this story has been written in response to a demand +for some account of the very generally misunderstood submarine campaign +and, particularly, of the means by which it was defeated. The interest +of the public in such a story is due to the fact that during the war the +sea forces were compelled to take all possible precautions to keep the +enemy from learning anything about the various devices and means used to +oppose or destroy the under-water craft. This necessity for the utmost +secrecy was owing to the peculiar nature of the sea warfare. When the +armies first made use of airplane bombs, or poison gas, or tanks, or +mobile railroad batteries, the existence of these weapons and the manner +of their use were necessarily at once revealed to the enemy, and the +press was permitted to publish full accounts of them and, to a certain +extent, of their effect and the means used to oppose them. Moreover, all +general movements of the contending armies that resulted in engagements +were known with fair accuracy on both sides within a short time after +they occurred and were promptly reported to an anxious public. + +But this situation bore almost no resemblance to the struggle between +the U-boats and the anti-submarine forces of the Allies. Barring a few +naval actions between surface vessels, such as the battles of Jutland +and of the Falkland Islands, the naval war was, for the most part, a +succession of contests between single vessels or small groups of +vessels. The enemy submarines sought to win the war by sinking the +merchant shipping upon which depended the essential supplies of the +allied populations and armies; and it was the effort of the Allies to +prevent this, and to destroy submarines when possible, that constituted +the vitally important naval activities of the war. By means of +strategical and tactical dispositions, and various weapons and devices, +now no longer secret, such as the depth charge, the mystery ship, +hydrophones, mine-fields, explosive mine nets, special hunting +submarines, and so forth, it was frequently possible either to destroy +submarines with their entire crews, or to capture the few men who +escaped when their boats were sunk, and thus keep from the German +Admiralty all knowledge of the means by which their U-boats had met +their fate. Thus the mystery ships, or decoy ships, as the Germans +called them, destroyed a number of submarines before the enemy knew that +such dangerous vessels existed. And even after they had acquired this +knowledge, the mystery ships used various devices that enabled them to +continue their successes until some unsuccessfully attacked submarine +carried word of the new danger back to her home port. + +Under such unprecedented conditions of warfare, it is apparent that the +Allied navies could not safely tell the public just what they were doing +or how they were doing it. All articles written for the press had to be +carefully censored, and all of these interesting matters ruthlessly +suppressed; but now that the ban has been removed, it is desirable to +give the relatives and friends of the fine chaps who did the good work +sufficient information to enable them to understand the difficulty of +the problem that was presented to the anti-submarine forces of the +Allies, the manner in which it was solved, and the various means +invented and employed. + +The subject is of course largely technical, but an effort has been made +to present the story in such form that the layman can readily understand +it. As it is difficult, if not quite impossible, for a naval officer to +determine just which of the details that are a part of his daily life, +and what incidents of sea experience would interest his civilian +friends, the story has been written in collaboration with Mr. Burton J. +Hendrick, to whom I am greatly indebted for invaluable assistance; and +who, being an experienced hand at this writing business, deserves all +the credit the reader may be disposed to accord him for both the form +and such graces of descriptive style as he may be able to detect. + +While opinions may differ to a certain extent as to the influence +exerted upon the campaign by the various forms of tactics, the means and +weapons employed, and the general strategy adopted, I have given what I +believe to be a consensus of the best informed opinion upon these +matters; and I have taken advantage of all of the information now +available to insure accuracy in the account of the conditions that +confronted the European naval forces, and in the description of the +various operations that have been selected as typical examples of this +very extraordinary warfare. + +It is probably unnecessary to add that this book is published with the +full approval of the Navy Department. My correspondence on this subject +with the Secretary will be found in the Appendix. + +W. S. S. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER PAGE + + I. WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR 1 + + II. THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER" 40 + + III. THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY 78 + + IV. AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION 99 + + V. DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION 141 + + VI. AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS 168 + + VII. THE LONDON FLAGSHIP 204 + +VIII. SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE 224 + + IX. THE AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN THE NORTH SEA 244 + + X. GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT THE AMERICAN COAST 266 + + XI. FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR 275 + + XII. THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND 289 + +XIII. TRANSPORTING TWO MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO FRANCE 294 + + APPENDIX 316 + + INDEX 347 + + + + +THE VICTORY AT SEA + + + + +CHAPTER I + +WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR + + +I + +In the latter part of March, 1917, a message from the Navy Department +came to me at Newport, where I was stationed as president of the Naval +War College, summoning me immediately to Washington. The international +atmosphere at that time was extremely tense, and the form in which these +instructions were cast showed that something extraordinary was +impending. The orders directed me to make my visit as unostentatious as +possible; to keep all my movements secret, and, on my arrival in +Washington, not to appear at the Navy Department, but to telephone +headquarters. I promptly complied with these orders; and, after I got in +touch with the navy chiefs, it took but a few moments to explain the +situation. It seemed inevitable, I was informed, that the United States +would soon be at war with Germany. Ambassador Page had cabled that it +would be desirable, under the existing circumstances, that the American +navy be represented by an officer of higher rank than any of those who +were stationed in London at that time. The Department therefore wished +me to leave immediately for England, to get in touch with the British +Admiralty, to study the naval situation and learn how we could best and +most quickly co-operate in the naval war. At this moment we were still +technically at peace with Germany. Mr. Daniels, the Secretary of the +Navy, therefore thought it wise that there should be no publicity about +my movements. I was to remain ostensibly as head of the War College, +and, in order that no suspicions should be aroused, my wife and family +were still to occupy the official residence of its president. I was +directed to sail on a merchant vessel, to travel under an assumed name, +to wear civilian clothes and to take no uniform. On reaching the other +side I was to get immediately in communication with the British +Admiralty, and send to Washington detailed reports on prevailing +conditions. + +A few days after this interview in Washington two commonplace-looking +gentlemen, dressed in civilian clothes, secretly boarded the American +steamship _New York_. They were entered upon the passenger list as V. J. +Richardson and S. W. Davidson. A day or two out an enterprising steward +noticed that the initials on the pyjamas of one of these passengers +differed from those of the name under which he was sailing and reported +him to the captain as a suspicious character. The captain had a quiet +laugh over this discovery, for he knew that Mr. Davidson was +Rear-Admiral Sims, of the United States Navy, and that his companion who +possessed the two sets of conflicting initials was Commander J. V. +Babcock, the Admiral's _aide_. The voyage itself was an uneventful one, +but a good deal of history was made in those few days that we spent upon +the sea. Our ship reached England on April 9th; one week previously +President Wilson had gone before Congress and asked for the declaration +of a state of war with Germany. We had a slight reminder that a war was +under way as we neared Liverpool, for a mine struck our vessel as we +approached the outer harbour. The damage was not irreparable; the +passengers were transferred to another steamer and we safely reached +port, where I found a representative of the British Admiralty, +Rear-Admiral Hope, waiting to receive me. The Admiralty had also +provided a special train, in which we left immediately for London. + +Whenever I think of the naval situation as it existed in April, 1917, I +always have before my mind two contrasting pictures--one that of the +British public, as represented in their press and in their social +gatherings in London, and the other that of British officialdom, as +represented in my confidential meetings with British statesmen and +British naval officers. For the larger part the English newspapers were +publishing optimistic statements about the German submarine campaign. +In these they generally scouted the idea that this new form of piracy +really threatened in any way the safety of the British Empire. They +accompanied these rather cheerful outgivings by weekly statistics of +submarine sinkings; figures which, while not particularly reassuring, +hardly indicated that any serious inroads had yet been made on the +British mercantile marine. The Admiralty was publishing tables showing +that four or five thousand ships were arriving at British ports and +leaving them every week, while other tables disclosed the number of +British ships of less than sixteen hundred tons and more than sixteen +hundred tons that were going down every seven days. Thus the week of my +arrival I learned from these figures that Great Britain had lost +seventeen ships above that size, and two ships below; that 2,406 vessels +had arrived at British ports, that 2,367 had left, and that, in +addition, seven fishing vessels had fallen victims to the German +submarines. Such figures were worthless, for they did not include +neutral ships and did not give the amount of tonnage sunk, details, of +course, which it was necessary to keep from the enemy. The facts which +the Government thus permitted to come to public knowledge did not +indicate that the situation was particularly alarming. Indeed the +newspapers all over the British Isles showed no signs of perturbation; +on the contrary, they were drawing favourable conclusions from these +statistics. Here and there one of them may have sounded a more +apprehensive note; yet the generally prevailing feeling both in the +press and in general discussions of the war seemed to be that the +submarine campaign had already failed, that Germany's last desperate +attempt to win the war had already broken down, and that peace would +probably not be long delayed. The newspapers found considerable +satisfaction in the fact that the "volume of British shipping was being +maintained"; they displayed such headlines as "improvement continues"; +they printed prominently the encouraging speeches of certain British +statesmen, and in this way were apparently quieting popular apprehension +concerning the outcome. This same atmosphere of cheerful ignorance I +found everywhere in London society. The fear of German submarines was +not disturbing the London season, which had now reached its height; the +theatres were packed every night; everywhere, indeed, the men and women +of the upper classes were apparently giving little thought to any danger +that might be hanging over their country. Before arriving in England I +myself had not known the gravity of the situation. I had followed the +war from the beginning with the greatest interest; I had read +practically everything printed about it in the American and foreign +press, and I had had access to such official information as was +available on our side of the Atlantic. The result was that, when I +sailed for England in March, I felt little fear about the outcome. All +the fundamental facts in the case made it appear impossible that the +Germans could win the war. Sea power apparently rested practically +unchallenged in the hands of the Allies; and that in itself, according +to the unvarying lessons of history, was an absolute assurance of +ultimate victory. The statistics of shipping losses had been regularly +printed in the American press, and, while such wanton destruction of +life and property seemed appalling, there was apparently nothing in +these figures that was likely to make any material change in the result. +Indeed it appeared to be altogether probable that the war would end +before the United States could exert any material influence upon the +outcome. My conclusions were shared by most American naval officers whom +I knew, students of warfare, who, like myself, had the utmost respect +for the British fleet and believed that it had the naval situation well +in hand. + +Yet a few days spent in London clearly showed that all this confidence +in the defeat of the Germans rested upon a misapprehension. The Germans, +it now appeared, were not losing the war--they were winning it. The +British Admiralty now placed before the American representative facts +and figures which it had not given to the British press. These documents +disclosed the astounding fact that, unless the appalling destruction of +merchant tonnage which was then taking place could be materially +checked, the unconditional surrender of the British Empire would +inevitably take place within a few months. + +On the day of my arrival in London I had my first interview with Admiral +Jellicoe, who was at that time the First Sea Lord. Admiral Jellicoe and +I needed no introduction. I had known him for many years and for a +considerable period we had been more or less regular correspondents. I +had first made his acquaintance in China in 1901; at that time Jellicoe +was a captain and was already recognized as one of the coming men of the +British navy. He was an expert in ordnance and gunnery, a subject in +which I was greatly interested; and this fact had brought us together +and made us friends. The admiration which I had then conceived for the +Admiral's character and intelligence I have never lost. He was then, as +he has been ever since, an indefatigable worker, and more than a worker, +for he was a profound student of everything which pertained to ships and +gunnery, and a man who joined to a splendid intellect the real ability +of command. I had known him in his own home with his wife and babies, as +well as on shipboard among his men, and had observed at close hand the +gracious personality which had the power to draw everyone to him and +make him the idol both of his own children and the officers and jackies +of the British fleet. Simplicity and directness were his two most +outstanding points; though few men had risen so rapidly in the Royal +Navy, success had made him only more quiet, soft spoken, and +unostentatiously dignified; there was nothing of the blustering seadog +about the Admiral, but he was all courtesy, all brain, and, of all the +men I have ever met, there have been none more approachable, more frank, +and more open-minded. + +Physically Admiral Jellicoe is a small man, but as powerful in frame as +he is in mind, and there are few men in the navy who can match him in +tennis. His smooth-shaven face, when I met him that morning in April, +1917, was, as usual, calm, smiling, and imperturbable. One could never +divine his thoughts by any outward display of emotion. Neither did he +give any signs that he was bearing a great burden, though it is not too +much to say that at this moment the safety of the British Empire rested +chiefly upon Admiral Jellicoe's shoulders. I find the absurd notion +prevalent in this country that his change from Commander of the Grand +Fleet to First Sea Lord was something in the nature of a demotion; but +nothing could be farther from the truth. As First Sea Lord, Jellicoe +controlled the operations, not only of the Grand Fleet, but also of the +entire British navy; he had no superior officer, for the First Lord of +the Admiralty, the position in England that corresponds to our Secretary +of the Navy, has no power to give any order whatever to the fleet--a +power which our Secretary possesses. Thus the defeat of the German +submarines was a direct responsibility which Admiral Jellicoe could +divide with no other official. Great as this duty was, and appalling as +was the submarine situation at the time of this interview, there was +nothing about the Admiral's bearing which betrayed any depression of +spirits. He manifested great seriousness indeed, possibly some +apprehension, but British stoicism and the usual British refusal to +succumb to discouragement were qualities that were keeping him +tenaciously at his job. + +After the usual greetings, Admiral Jellicoe took a paper out of his +drawer and handed it to me. It was a record of tonnage losses for the +last few months. This showed that the total sinkings, British and +neutral, had reached 536,000 tons in February and 603,000 in March; it +further disclosed that sinkings were taking place in April which +indicated the destruction of nearly 900,000 tons. These figures +indicated that the losses were three and four times as large as those +which were then being published in the press.[1] + +It is expressing it mildly to say that I was surprised by this +disclosure. I was fairly astounded; for I had never imagined anything so +terrible. I expressed my consternation to Admiral Jellicoe. + +"Yes," he said, as quietly as though he were discussing the weather and +not the future of the British Empire. "It is impossible for us to go on +with the war if losses like this continue." + +"What are you doing about it?" I asked. + +"Everything that we can. We are increasing our anti-submarine forces in +every possible way. We are using every possible craft we can find with +which to fight submarines. We are building destroyers, trawlers, and +other like craft as fast as we can. But the situation is very serious +and we shall need all the assistance we can get." + +"It looks as though the Germans were winning the war," I remarked. + +"They will win, unless we can stop these losses--and stop them soon," +the Admiral replied. + +"Is there no solution for the problem?" I asked. + +"Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe announced. He described +the work of destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, but he showed no +confidence that they would be able to control the depredations of the +U-boats. + +The newspapers for several months had been publishing stories that +submarines in large numbers were being sunk; and these stories I now +found to be untrue. The Admiralty records showed that only fifty-four +German submarines were positively known to have been sunk since the +beginning of the war; the German shipyards, I was now informed, were +turning out new submarines at the rate of three a week. The newspapers +had also published accounts of the voluntary surrender of German +U-boats; but not one such surrender, Admiral Jellicoe said, had ever +taken place; the stories had been circulated merely for the purpose of +depreciating enemy _moral_. I even found that members of the Government, +all of whom should have been better informed, and also British naval +officers, believed that many captured German submarines had been +carefully stowed away at the Portsmouth and Plymouth navy yards. Yet the +disconcerting facts which faced the Allies were that the supplies and +communications of the forces on all fronts were threatened; that German +submarines were constantly extending their operations farther and +farther out into the Atlantic; that German raiders were escaping into +the open sea; that three years' constant operations had seriously +threatened the strength of the British navy, and that Great Britain's +control of the sea was actually at stake. Nor did Admiral Jellicoe +indulge in any false expectations concerning the future. Bad as the +situation then was, he had every expectation that it would grow worse. +The season which was now approaching would make easier the German +operations, for the submarines would soon have the long daylight of the +British summer and the more favourable weather. The next few months, +indeed, both in the estimation of the Germans and the British, would +witness the great crisis of the war; the basis of the ruthless campaign +upon which the submarines had entered was that they could reach the +decision before winter closed in. So far as I could learn there was a +general belief in British naval circles that this plan would succeed. +The losses were now approaching a million tons a month; it was thus a +matter of very simple arithmetic to determine the length of time the +Allies could stand such a strain. According to the authorities the limit +of endurance would be reached about November 1, 1917; in other words, +unless some method of successfully fighting submarines could be +discovered almost immediately, Great Britain would have to lay down her +arms before a victorious Germany. + +"What we are facing is the defeat of Great Britain," said Ambassador +Walter H. Page, after the situation had been explained to him. + +In the next few weeks I had many interviews with Admiral Jellicoe and +other members of the Admiralty. Sitting in conference with them every +morning, I became, for all practical purposes, a member of their +organization. There were no secrets of the British navy which were not +disclosed to their new American ally. This policy was in accordance with +the broad-minded attitude of the British Government; there was a general +desire that the United States should understand the situation +completely, and from the beginning matters were discussed with the +utmost frankness. Everywhere was manifested a willingness to receive +suggestions and to try any expedient that promised to be even remotely +successful; yet the feeling prevailed that there was no quick and easy +way to defeat the submarine, that anything even faintly resembling the +much-sought "answer" had not yet appeared on the horizon. The prevailing +impression that any new invention could control the submarine in time to +be effective was deprecated. The American press was at that time +constantly calling upon Edison and other great American inventors to +solve this problem, and, in fact, inventors in every part of two +hemispheres were turning out devices by the thousands. A regular +department of the Admiralty which was headed by Admiral Fisher had +charge of investigating their proposals; in a few months it had received +and examined not far from 40,000 inventions, none of which answered the +purpose, though many of them were exceedingly ingenious. British naval +officers were not hostile to such projects; they declared, however, that +it would be absurd to depend upon new devices for defeating the German +campaign. The overshadowing fact--a fact which I find that many naval +men have not yet sufficiently grasped--is that time was the +all-important element. It was necessary not only that a way be found of +curbing the submarine, but of accomplishing this result at once. The +salvation of the great cause in which we had engaged was a matter of +only a few months. A mechanical device, or a new type of ship which +might destroy this menace six months hence, would not have helped us, +for by that time Germany would have won the war. + +I discussed the situation also with members of the Cabinet, such as Mr. +Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, and Sir Edward Carson. Their attitude to me +was very different from the attitude which they were taking publicly; +these men naturally would say nothing in the newspapers that would +improve the enemy _moral_; but in explaining the situation to me they +repeated practically everything that Jellicoe had said. It was the +seriousness of this situation that soon afterward sent Mr. Balfour and +the British Commission to the United States. The world does not yet +understand what a dark moment that was in the history of the Allied +cause. Not only were the German submarines sweeping British commerce +from the seas, but the German armies were also defeating the British and +French on the battlefields in France. It is only when we recall that the +Germans were attaining the high peak of success with the U-boats at the +very moment that General Nivelle's offensive had failed on the Western +Front that we can get some idea of the real tragedy of the Allied +situation in the spring of 1917. + +"Things were dark when I took that trip to America," Mr. Balfour said to +me afterward. "The submarines were constantly on my mind. I could think +of nothing but the number of ships which they were sinking. At that time +it certainly looked as though we were going to lose the war." + +One of the men who most keenly realized the state of affairs was the +King. I met His Majesty first in the vestibule of St. Paul's, on that +memorable occasion in April, 1917, when the English people held a +thanksgiving service to commemorate America's entrance into the war. +Then, as at several subsequent meetings, the King impressed me as a +simple, courteous, unaffected English gentleman. He was dressed in +khaki, like any other English officer, and his manner was warm-hearted, +sincere, and even democratic. + +"It gives me great pleasure to meet you on an occasion like this," said +His Majesty, referring to the great Anglo-American memorial service. "I +am also glad to greet an American admiral on such a mission as yours. +And I wish you all success." + +On that occasion we naturally had little time to discuss the submarines, +but a few days afterward I was invited to spend the night at Windsor +Castle. The King in his own home proved to be even more cordial, if that +were possible, than at our first meeting. After dinner we adjourned to a +small room and there, over our cigars, we discussed the situation at +considerable length. The King is a rapid and animated talker; he was +kept constantly informed on the submarine situation, and discussed it +that night in all its details. I was at first surprised by his +familiarity with all naval questions and the intimate touch which he was +evidently maintaining with the British fleet. Yet this was not really +surprising, for His Majesty himself is a sailor; in his early youth he +joined the navy, in which he worked up like any other British boy. He +seemed almost as well informed about the American navy as about the +British; he displayed the utmost interest in our preparations on land +and sea, and he was particularly solicitous that I, as the American +representative, should have complete access to the Admiralty Office. +About the submarine campaign, the King was just as outspoken as Jellicoe +and the other members of the Admiralty. The thing must be stopped, or +the Allies could never win the war. + +Of all the influential men in British public life there was only one who +at that time took an optimistic attitude. This was Mr. Lloyd George. I +met the Prime Minister frequently at dinners, at his own country place +and elsewhere, and the most lasting impression which I retain of this +wonderful man was his irrepressible gaiety of spirits. I think of the +Prime Minister of Great Britain as a great, big, exuberant boy, always +laughing and joking, constantly indulging in repartee and by-play, and +even in this crisis, perhaps the darkest one of British history, showing +no signs of depression. His face, which was clear in its complexion as a +girl's, never betrayed the slightest anxiety, and his eyes, which were +always sparkling, never disclosed the faintest shadow. It was a picture +which I shall never forget--that of this man, upon whose shoulders the +destiny of the Empire chiefly rested, apparently refusing to admit, even +to himself, the dangers that were seemingly overwhelming it, heroically +devoting all his energies to uplifting the spirits of his countrymen, +and, in his private intercourse with his associates, even in the most +fateful moments, finding time to tell funny stories, to recall +entertaining anecdotes of his own political career, to poke fun at the +mistakes of his opponents, and to turn the general conversation a +thousand miles away from the Western Front and the German submarines. It +was the most inspiring instance of self-control that I have ever known; +indeed only one other case in history can be compared with it; Lloyd +George's attitude at this period constantly reminded me of Lincoln in +the darkest hours of the Civil War, when, after receiving news of such +calamities as Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville, he would entertain his +cabinet by reading selections from Artemus Ward, interlarded with +humorous sayings and anecdotes of his own. Perhaps Lloyd George's +cheerfulness is explained by another trait which he likewise possessed +in common with Lincoln; there is a Welsh mysticism in his nature which, +I am told, sometimes takes the form of religious exaltation. Lloyd +George's faith in God and in a divine ordering of history was evidently +so profound that the idea of German victory probably never seized his +mind as a reality; we all know that Lincoln's absolute confidence in the +triumph of the North rested upon a similar basis. Certainly only some +such deep-set conviction as this could explain Lloyd George's serenity +and optimism in the face of the most frightful calamities. I attended a +small dinner at which the Premier was present four days after the +Germans had made their terrible attack in March, 1918. Even on this +occasion he showed no evidences of strain; as usual his animated spirits +held the upper hand; he was talking incessantly, but he never even +mentioned the subject that was absorbing the thoughts of the rest of +the world at that moment; instead he rattled along, touching upon the +Irish question, discussing the impression which Irish conscription would +make in America, and, now and then, pausing to pass some bantering +remark to Mr. Balfour. This was the way that I always saw the head of +the British Government; never did I meet him when he was fagged or +discouraged, or when he saw any end to the war but a favourable one. + +On several occasions I attempted to impress Mr. Lloyd George with the +gravity of the situation; he always refused to acknowledge that it was +grave. + +"Oh, yes, things are bad," he would say with a smile and a sweep of his +hand. "But we shall get the best of the submarines--never fear!" + +The cheerfulness of the Prime Minister, however, was exceptional; all +his associates hardly concealed their apprehension. On the other hand, a +wave of enthusiasm was at that time sweeping over Germany. Americans +still have an idea that the German Government adopted the submarine +campaign as the last despairing gambler's chance, and that they only +half believed in its success themselves. There is an impression here +that the Germans never would have staked their Empire on this desperate +final throw had they foreseen that the United States would have +mobilized against them all its men and resources. This conviction is +entirely wrong. The Germans did not think that they were taking any +chances when they announced their unrestricted campaign; the ultimate +result seemed to them to be a certainty. They calculated the available +shipping which the Allies and the neutral nations had afloat; they knew +just how many ships their submarines could sink every month, and from +these statistics they mathematically deduced, with real German +precision, the moment when the war would end. They did not like the idea +of adding the United States to their enemies, but this was because they +were thinking of conditions after the war; for they would have preferred +to have had American friendship in the period of readjustment. But they +did not fear that we could do them much injury in the course of the war +itself. This again was not because they really despised our fighting +power; they knew that we would prove a formidable enemy on the +battlefield; but the obvious fact, to their eyes, was that our armies +could never get to the front in time. The submarine campaign, they said, +would finish the thing in three or four months; and certainly in that +period the unprepared United States could never summon any military +power that could affect the result. Thus from a purely military +standpoint the entrance of 100,000,000 Americans affected them about as +much as would a declaration of war from the planet Mars. + +We confirmed this point of view from the commanders of the occasionally +captured submarines. These men would be brought to London and +questioned; they showed the utmost confidence in the result. + +"Yes, you've got _us_," they would say, "but what difference does that +make? There are plenty more submarines coming out. You will get a few, +but we can build a dozen for every one that you can capture or sink. +Anyway, the war will all be over in two or three months and we shall be +sent back home." + +All these captives laughed at the merest suggestion of German defeat; +their attitude was not that of prisoners, but of conquerors. They also +regarded themselves as heroes, and they gloried in the achievements of +their submarine service. For the most part they exaggerated the sinkings +and estimated that the war would end about the first of July or August. +Similarly the Berlin Government exaggerated the extent of their success. +This was not surprising, for one peculiarity of the submarine is that +only the commander, stationed at the periscope, knows what is going on. +He can report sinking a 5,000 ton ship and no one can contradict his +statement, for the crew and the other officers do not see the surface of +the water. Not unnaturally the commander does not depreciate his own +achievements, and thus the amount of sunken tonnage reported in Berlin +considerably exceeded the actual losses. + +The speeches of German dignitaries resounded with the same confidence. + +"In the impending decisive battle," said the Kaiser, "the task falls +upon my navy of turning the English war method of starvation, with which +our most hated and most obstinate enemy intends to overthrow the German +people, against him and his allies by combating their sea traffic with +all the means in our power. In this work the submarine will stand in the +first rank. I expect that this weapon, technically developed with wise +forethought at our admirable yards, in co-operation with all our other +naval fighting weapons and supported by the spirit which, during the +whole course of the war, has enabled us to perform brilliant deeds, will +break our enemy's war will." + +"In this life and death struggle by hunger," said Dr. Karl Helfferich, +Imperial Secretary of the Interior, "England believed herself to be far +beyond the reach of any anxiety about food. A year ago it was supposed +that England would be able to use the acres of the whole world, bidding +with them against the German acres. To-day England sees herself in a +situation unparalleled in her history. Her acres across sea disappear as +a result of the blockade which our submarines are daily making more +effective around England. We have considered, we have dared. Certain of +the result, we shall not allow it to be taken from us by anybody or +anything." + +These statements now read almost like ancient history, yet they were +made in February, 1917. At that time, Americans and Englishmen read them +with a smile; they seemed to be the kind of German rodomontade with +which the war had made us so familiar; they seemed to be empty mouthings +put out to bolster up the drooping German spirit. That the Kaiser and +his advisers could really believe such rubbish was generally regarded as +absurd. Yet not only did they believe what they were saying but, as +already explained, they also had every reason for believing it. The +Kaiser and his associates had figured that the war would end about July +1st or August 1st; and English officials with whom I came in contact +placed the date at November 1st--always provided, of course, that no +method were found for checking the submarine.[2] + + +II + +How, then, could we defeat the submarine? Before approaching this +subject, it is well to understand precisely what was taking place in the +spring and summer of 1917 in those waters surrounding the British +Isles. What was this strange new type of warfare that was bringing the +Allied cause to its knees? Nothing like it had ever been known in +recorded time; nothing like it had been foreseen when, on August 4, +1914, the British Government threw all its resources and all its people +against the great enemy of mankind. + +Leaving entirely out of consideration international law and humanity, it +must be admitted that strategically the German submarine campaign was +well conceived. Its purpose was to marshal on the German side that force +which has always proved to be the determining one in great international +conflicts--sea power. The advantages which the control of the sea gives +the nation which possesses it are apparent. In the first place, it makes +secure such a nation's communications with the outside world and its own +allies, and, at the same time, it cuts the communications of its enemy. +It enables the nation dominant at sea to levy upon the resources of the +entire world; to obtain food for its civilian population, raw materials +for its manufactures, munitions for its armies; and, at the same time, +to maintain that commerce upon which its very economic life may depend. +It enables such a power also to transport troops into any field of +action where they may be required. At the very time that sea power is +heaping all these blessings upon the dominant nation, it enables such a +nation to deny these same advantages to its enemy. For the second great +resource of sea power is the blockade. If the enemy is agriculturally +and industrially dependent upon the outside world, sea power can +transform it into a beleaguered fortress and sooner or later compel its +unconditional surrender. Its operations are not spectacular, but they +work with the inevitable remorselessness of death itself. + +This fact is so familiar that I insist upon it here only for the purpose +of inviting attention to another fact which is not so apparent. Perhaps +the greatest commonplace of the war, from the newspaper standpoint, was +that the British fleet controlled the seas. This mere circumstance, as I +have already said, was the reason why all students of history were firm +in their belief that Britain could never be defeated. It was not until +the spring of 1917 that we really awoke to the actual situation; it was +not until I had spent several days in England that I made the +all-important discovery, which was this--that Britain did _not_ control +the seas. She still controlled the seas in the old Nelsonian sense; that +is, her Grand Fleet successfully "contained" the German battle squadrons +and kept them, for the greater part of the war, penned up in their +German harbours. In the old days such a display of sea power would have +easily won the war for the Allies. But that is not control of the seas +in the modern sense; it is merely control of the _surface_ of the seas. +Under modern methods of naval warfare sea control means far more than +controlling the top of the water. For there is another type of ship, +which sails stealthily under the waves, revealing its presence only at +certain intervals, and capable of shooting a terrible weapon which can +sink the proudest surface ship in a few minutes. The existence of this +new type of warship makes control of the seas to-day a very different +thing from what it was in Nelson's time. As long as such a warship can +operate under the water almost at will--and this was the case in a +considerable area of the ocean in the early part of 1917--it is +ridiculous to say that any navy controls the seas. For this subsurface +vessel, when used as successfully as it was used by the Germans in 1917, +deprives the surface navy of that advantage which has proved most +decisive in other wars. That is, the surface navy can no longer +completely protect communications as it could protect them in Nelson's +and Farragut's times. It no longer guarantees a belligerent its food, +its munitions, its raw materials of manufacture and commerce, or the +free movement of its troops. It is obviously absurd to say that a +belligerent which was losing 800,000 or 900,000 tons of shipping a +month, as was the case with the Allies in the spring of 1917, was the +undisputed mistress of the seas. Had the German submarine campaign +continued to succeed at this rate, the United States could not have +transported its army to France, and the food and materials which we were +sending to Europe, and which were essential to winning the war, could +never have crossed the ocean. + +That is to say, complete control of the subsurface by Germany would have +turned against England the blockade, the very power with which she had +planned to reduce the German Empire. Instead of isolating Germany from +the rest of the world, she would herself be isolated. + +In due course I shall attempt to show the immediate connexion that +exists between control of the surface and control of the subsurface; +this narrative will disclose, indeed, that the nation which possesses +the first also potentially possesses the second. In the early spring of +1917, however, this principle was not effective, so far as merchant +shipping was concerned. + +Germany's purpose in adopting the ruthless submarine warfare was, of +course, the one which I have indicated: to deprive the Allied armies in +the field, and their civilian populations, of these supplies from +overseas which were essential to victory. Nature had been kind to this +German programme when she created the British Isles. Indeed this tight +little kingdom and the waters which surround it provided an ideal field +for operations of this character. For purposes of contrast, let us +consider our own geographical situation. A glance at the map discloses +that it would be almost impossible to blockade the United States with +submarines. In the first place, the operation of submarines more than +three thousand miles from their bases would present almost insuperable +difficulties. That Germany could send an occasional submarine to our +coasts she demonstrated in the war, but it would be hardly possible to +maintain anything like a regular and persistent campaign. Even if she +could have kept a force constantly engaged in our waters, other natural +difficulties would have defeated their most determined efforts. The +trade routes approach our Atlantic sea-coast in the shape of a fan, of +which different sticks point to such ports as Boston, New York, +Philadelphia, Norfolk, and the ports of the Gulf of Mexico. To destroy +shipping to American ports it would be necessary for the enemy to cover +all these routes with submarines, a project which is so vast that it is +hardly worth the trial. In addition we have numerous Pacific ports to +which we could divert shipping in case our enemy should attempt to +blockade us on the Atlantic coast; our splendid system of +transcontinental railroads would make internal distribution not a +particularly difficult matter. Above all such considerations, of course, +is the fact that the United States is an industrial and agricultural +entity, self-supporting and self-feeding, and, therefore, it could not +be starved into surrender even though the enemy should surmount these +practically insuperable obstacles to a submarine blockade. But the +situation of the British Isles is entirely different. They obtain from +overseas the larger part of their food and a considerable part of their +raw materials, and in April of 1917, according to reliable statements +made at that time, England had enough food on hand for only six weeks or +two months. The trade routes over which these supplies came made the +submarine blockade a comparatively simple matter. Instead of the sticks +of a fan, the comparison which I have suggested with our own coast, we +now have to deal with the neck of a bottle. The trade routes to our +Atlantic coast spread out, as they approach our ports; on the other +hand, the trade routes to Great Britain converge almost to a point. The +far-flung steamship lanes which bring Britain her food and raw materials +from half a dozen continents focus in the Irish Sea and the English +Channel. To cut the communications of Great Britain, therefore, the +submarines do not have to patrol two or three thousand miles of +sea-coast, as would be necessary in the case of the United States; they +merely need to hover around the extremely restricted waters west and +south of Ireland. + +This was precisely the area which the Germans had selected for their +main field of activity. It was here that their so-called U-boats were +operating with the most deadly effect; these waters constituted their +happy hunting grounds, for here came the great cargo ships, with food +and supplies from America, which were bound for Liverpool and the great +Channel ports. The submarines that did destruction in this region were +the type that have gained universal fame as the U-boats. There were +other types, which I shall describe, but the U-boats were the main +reliance of the German navy; they were fairly large vessels, of about +800 tons, and carried from eight to twelve torpedoes and enough fuel and +supplies to keep the sea for three or four weeks. And here let me +correct one universal misapprehension. These U-boats did not have bases +off the Irish and Spanish coasts, as most people still believe. Such +bases would have been of no particular use to them. The cruising period +of a submarine did not depend, as is the prevailing impression, upon its +supply of fuel oil and food, for almost any under-water boat was able to +carry enough of these essential materials for a practically indefinite +period; the average U-boat, moreover, could easily make the voyage +across the Atlantic and back. The cruising period depended upon its +supply of torpedoes. A submarine returned to its base only after it had +exhausted its supply of these destructive missiles; if it should shoot +them all in twenty-four hours, then a single day would end that +particular cruise; if the torpedoes lasted a month, then the submarine +stayed out for that length of time. For these reasons bases on the Irish +coast would have been useful only in case they could replenish the +torpedoes, and this was obviously an impossibility. No, there was not +the slightest mystery concerning the bases of the U-boats. When the +Germans captured the city of Bruges in Belgium they transformed it into +a headquarters for submarines; here many of the U-boats were assembled, +and here facilities were provided for docking, repairing, and supplying +them. Bruges was thus one of the main headquarters for the destructive +campaign which was waged against British commerce. Bruges itself is an +inland town, but from it two canals extend, one to Ostend and the other +to Zeebrugge, and in this way the interior submarine base formed the +apex of a triangle. It was by way of these canals that the U-boats +reached the open sea. + +Once in the English Channel, the submarines had their choice of two +routes to the hunting grounds off the west and south of Ireland. A large +number made the apparently unnecessarily long detour across the North +Sea and around Scotland, going through the Fair Island Passage, between +the Orkney and the Shetland islands, along the Hebrides, where they +sometimes made a landfall, and so around the west coast of Ireland. This +looks like a long and difficult trip, yet the time was not entirely +wasted, for the U-boats, as the map of sinkings shows, usually destroyed +several vessels on the way to their favourite hunting grounds. But there +was another and shorter route to this area available to the U-boats. And +here I must correct another widely prevailing misapprehension. While the +war was going on many accounts were published in the newspapers +describing the barrage across the English Channel, from Dover to Calais, +and the belief was general that this barrier kept the U-boats from +passing through. Unfortunately this was not the case. The surface boats +did succeed in transporting almost at will troops and supplies across +this narrow passage-way; but the mines, nets, and other obstructions +that were intended to prevent the passage of submarines were not +particularly effective. The British navy knew little about mines in +1914; British naval men had always rather despised them as the "weapons +of the weaker power," and it is therefore not surprising that the +so-called mine barrage at the Channel crossing was not successful. A +large part of it was carried away by the strong tide and storms, and the +mines were so defective that oysters and other sea growths, which +attached themselves to their prongs, made many of them harmless. In +1918, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes reconstructed this barrage with a new type +of mine and transformed it into a really effective barrier; but in the +spring of 1917, the German U-boats had little difficulty in slipping +through, particularly in the night time. And from this point the +distance to the trade routes south and west of Ireland was relatively a +short one. + +Yet, terribly destructive as these U-boats were, the number which were +operating simultaneously in this and in other fields was never very +large. The extent to which the waters were infested with German +submarines was another particularly ludicrous and particularly prevalent +misapprehension. Merchant vessels constantly reported that they had been +assailed by "submarines in shoals," and most civilians still believe +that they sailed together in flotillas, like schools of fish. There is +hardly an American doughboy who did not see at least a dozen submarines +on his way across the Atlantic; every streak of suds which was caused by +a "tide rip," and every swimming porpoise, was immediately mistaken for +the wake of a torpedo; and every bit of driftwood, in the fervid +imagination of trans-Atlantic voyagers, immediately assumed the shape of +a periscope. Yet it is a fact that we knew almost every time a German +submarine slunk from its base into the ocean. The Allied secret service +was immeasurably superior to that of the Germans, and in saying this I +pay particular tribute to the British Naval Intelligence Department. We +always knew how many submarines the Germans had and we could usually +tell pretty definitely their locations at a particular time; we also had +accurate information about building operations in Germany; thus we could +estimate how many they were building and where they were building them, +and we could also describe their essential characteristics, and the +stage of progress they which had reached at almost any day. + +It was not the simplest thing to pilot a submarine out of its base. The +Allies were constantly laying mines at these outlets; and before the +U-boat could safely make its exit elaborate sweeping operations were +necessary. It often took a squadron of nine or ten surface ships, +working for several hours, to manoeuvre a submarine out of its base +and to start it on its journey. For these reasons we could keep a +careful watch upon its movements; we always knew when one of our enemies +came out; we knew which one it was, and not infrequently we had learned +the name of the commander and other valuable details. Moreover, we knew +where it went, and we kept charts on which we plotted from day to day +the voyage of each particular submarine. + +"Why didn't you sink it then?" is the question usually asked when I make +this statement--a question which, as I shall show, merely reflects the +ignorance which prevails everywhere on the underlying facts of submarine +warfare. + +Now in this densely packed shipping area, which extended from the north +of Ireland to Brest, there were seldom more than eight or ten submarines +engaged in their peculiar form of warfare at one time. The largest +number which I had any record of was fifteen; and this was an +exceptional force; the usual number was four, six, eight, or perhaps +ten. Yet the men upon our merchant convoys and troopships saw submarines +scattered all over the sea. We estimated that the convoys and troopships +reported that they had sighted about 300 submarines for every submarine +which was actually in the field. Yet we knew that for every hundred +submarines which the Germans possessed they could keep only ten or a +dozen at work in the open sea. The rest were on their way to the hunting +grounds, or returning, or they were in port being refitted and taking on +supplies. Could Germany have kept fifty submarines constantly at work on +the great shipping routes in the winter and spring of 1917--before we +had learned how to handle the situation--nothing could have prevented +her from winning the war. Instead of sinking 850,000 tons in a single +month, she would have sunk 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 tons. The fact is that +Germany, with all her microscopic preparations for war, neglected to +provide herself with the one instrumentality with which she might have +won it. + +This circumstance, that so few submarines could accomplish such +destructive results, shows how formidable was the problem which +confronted us. Germany could do this, of course, because the restricted +field in which she was able to operate was so constantly and so densely +infested with valuable shipping. + +In the above I have been describing the operations of the U-boats in the +great area to the west and south of Ireland. But there were other +hunting fields, particularly that which lay on the east coast of +England, in the area extending from Harwich to Newcastle. This part of +the North Sea was constantly filled with ships passing between the North +Sea ports of England and Norway and Sweden, carrying essential products +like lumber and many manufactured articles. Every four days a convoy of +from forty to sixty ships left some port in this region for Scandinavia; +I use the word "convoy," but the operation was a convoy only in the +sense that the ships sailed in groups, for the navy was not able to +provide them with an adequate escort--seldom furnishing them more than +one or two destroyers, or a few yachts or trawlers. Smaller types of +submarines which were known as UB's and UC's and which issued from +Wilhelmshaven and the Skager Rack constantly preyed upon this coastal +shipping. These submarines differed from the U-boats in that they were +smaller, displacing about 350 and 400 tons, and in that they also +carried mines, which they were constantly laying. They were much handier +than the larger types; they could rush out much more quickly from their +bases and get back, and they did an immense amount of damage to this +coastal trade. The value of the shipping sunk in these waters was +unimportant when compared with the losses which Great Britain was +suffering on the great trans-Atlantic routes, but the problem was still +a serious one, because the supplies which these ships brought from the +Scandinavian countries were essential to the military operations in +France. + +Besides these two types, the U-boats and the UB's and UC's, the Germans +had another type of submarine, the great ocean cruisers. These ships +were as long as a small surface cruiser and were half again as long as a +destroyer, and their displacement sometimes reached 3,000 tons. They +carried crews of seventy men, could cross the Atlantic three or four +times without putting into port, and some actually remained away from +their bases for three or four months. But they were vessels very +difficult to manage; it took them a relatively long time to submerge, +and, for this reason, they could not operate around the Channel and +other places where the anti-submarine craft were most numerous. In fact, +these vessels, of which the Germans had in commission perhaps half a +dozen when the armistice was signed, accomplished little in the war. The +purpose for which they were built was chiefly a strategic one. One or +two were usually stationed off the Azores, not in any expectation that +they would destroy much shipping--the fact is that they sank very few +merchantmen--but in the hope that they might divert anti-submarine craft +from the main theatre of operations. In this purpose, however, they were +not successful; in fact, I cannot see that these great cruisers +accomplished anything that justified the expense and the trouble which +were involved in building them. + + +III + +This, then, was the type of warfare which the German submarines were +waging upon the shipping of the Allied nations. What were the Allied +navies doing to check them in this terrible month of April, 1917? What +anti-submarine methods had been developed up to that time? + +The most popular game on both sides of the Atlantic was devising means +of checking the under-water ship. Every newspaper, every magazine, every +public man, and every gentleman at his club had a favourite scheme for +defeating the U-boat campaign. All that any one needed for this engaging +pastime was a map of the North Sea, and the solution appeared to be as +clear as daylight. As Sir Eric Geddes once remarked to me, nothing is +quite so deceptive as geography. All of us are too likely to base our +conception of naval problems on the maps which we studied at school. On +these maps the North Sea is such a little place! A young lady once +declared in my hearing that she didn't see how the submarines could +operate in the English Channel, it was so narrow! She didn't see how +there was room enough to turn around! The fact that it is twenty miles +wide at the shortest crossing and not far from two hundred at the widest +is something which it is apparently difficult to grasp. + +The plan which was most popular in those days was to pen the submarines +in their bases and so prevent their egress into the North Sea. +Obviously the best way to handle the situation was to sink the whole +German submarine fleet; that was apparently impossible, and the next +best thing was to keep them in their home ports and prevent them from +sailing the high seas. It was not only the man in the street who was +advocating this programme. I had a long talk with several prominent +Government officials, in which they asked me why this could not be done. + +"I can give you fourteen reasons why it is impossible," I answered. "We +shall first have to capture the bases, and it would be simply suicidal +to attempt it, and it would be playing directly into Germany's hands. +Those bases are protected by powerful 15-, 11-, and 8-inch guns. These +are secreted behind hills or located in pits on the seashore, where no +approaching vessel can see them. Moreover, those guns have a range of +40,000 yards, but the guns on no ships have a range of more than 30,000 +yards; they are stationary, whereas ours would be moving. For our ships +to go up against such emplacements would be like putting a blind +prize-fighter up against an antagonist who can see and who has arms +twice as long as his enemy's. We can send as many ships as we wish on +such an expedition, and they will all be destroyed. The German guns +would probably get them on the first salvo, certainly on the second. +There is nothing the Germans would so much like to have us try." + +Another idea suggested by a glance at the map was the construction of a +barrage across the North Sea from the Orkneys to the coast of Norway. +The distance did not seem so very great--on the map; in reality, it was +two hundred and thirty miles and the water is from 360 to 960 feet in +depth. If we cannot pen the rats up in their holes, said the newspaper +strategist, certainly we can do the next best thing: we can pen them up +in the North Sea. Then we can route all our shipping to points on the +west coast of England, and the problem is solved. + +I discussed this proposition with British navy men and their answer was +quite to the point. + +"If we haven't mines enough to build a successful barrage across the +Straits of Dover, which is only twenty miles wide, how can we construct +a barrage across the North Sea, which is 230?" + +A year afterward, as will be shown later, this plan came up in more +practical form, but in 1917 the idea was not among the +possibilities--there were not mines enough in the world to build such a +barrage, nor had a mine then been invented that was suitable for the +purpose. + +The belief prevailed in the United States, and, to a certain extent, in +England itself, that the most effective means of meeting the submarine +was to place guns and gun crews on all the mercantile vessels. Even some +of the old British merchant salts maintained this view. "Give us a gun, +and we'll take care of the submarines all right," they kept saying to +the Admiralty. But the idea was fundamentally fallacious. In the +American Congress, just prior to the declaration of war, the arming of +merchant ships became a great political issue; scores of pages in the +_Congressional Record_ are filled with debates on this subject, yet, so +far as affording any protection to shipping was concerned, all this was +wasted oratory. Those who advocated arming the merchant ships as an +effective method of counteracting submarine campaigns had simply failed +to grasp the fundamental elements of submarine warfare. They apparently +did not understand the all-important fact that the quality which makes +the submarine so difficult to deal with is its invisibility. The great +political issue which was involved in the submarine controversy, and the +issue which brought the United States into the war, was that the Germans +were sinking merchant ships without warning. And it was because of this +very fact--this sinking without warning--that a dozen guns on a merchant +ship afforded practically no protection. The lookout on a merchantman +could not see the submarine, for the all-sufficient reason that the +submarine was concealed beneath the water; it was only by a happy chance +that the most penetrating eye could detect the periscope, provided that +one were exposed. The first intimation which was given the merchantman +that a U-boat was in his neighbourhood was the explosion of the torpedo +in his hull. In six weeks, in the spring and early summer of 1917, +thirty armed merchantmen were torpedoed and sunk off Queenstown, and in +no case was a periscope or a conning-tower seen. The English never +trusted their battleships at sea without destroyer escort, and certainly +if a battleship with its powerful armament could not protect itself from +submarines, it was too much to expect that an ordinary armed +merchantman would be able to do so. I think the fact that few American +armed ships were attacked and sunk in 1917 created the impression that +their guns afforded them some protection. But the apparent immunity +extended to them was really policy on Germany's part. She expected, as I +have said, that she would win the war long before the United States +could play an effective rôle in the struggle. It was therefore good +international politics to refrain from any unnecessary acts that would +still further embitter the American people against her. There was also a +considerable pacifist element in our country which Germany was coddling +in the hope of preventing the United States from using against her such +forces as we already had at hand. The reason American armed merchantmen +were not sunk was simply because they were not seriously attacked; I +have already shown how easily Germany could have sunk them if she had +really tried. Any reliance upon armed guards as a protection against +submarines would have been fundamentally a mistake, for the additional +reason that it was a defensive measure; it must be apparent that the +extremely grave situation which we were then facing demanded the most +energetic offensive methods. Yet the arming of merchant ships was +justified as a minor measure. It accomplished the one important end of +forcing the submarine to submerge and to use torpedoes instead of +gunfire. In itself this was a great gain; obviously the Germans would +much prefer to sink ships with projectiles than with torpedoes, for +their supply of these latter missiles was limited.[3] + +In April, 1917, the British navy was fighting the submarine mainly in +two ways: it was constantly sowing mines off the entrance to the +submarine bases, such as Ostend and Zeebrugge, and in the Heligoland +Bight--operations that accomplished little, for the Germans swept them +up almost as fast as they were planted; and it was patrolling the +submarine infested area with anti-submarine craft. The Admiralty was +depending almost exclusively upon this patrol, yet this, the only means +which then seemed to hold forth much promise of defeating the submarine, +was making little progress. + +For this patrol the navy was impressing into service all the destroyers, +yachts, trawlers, sea-going tugs, and other light vessels which could +possibly be assembled; almost any craft which could carry a wireless, a +gun, and depth charges was boldly sent to sea. At this time the vessel +chiefly used was the destroyer. The naval war had demonstrated that the +submarine could not successfully battle with the destroyer; that any +U-boat which came to the surface within fighting range of this alert and +speedy little surface ship ran great risk of being sunk. This is the +fundamental fact--that the destruction of the submarine was highly +probable, in case the destroyer could get a fair chance at her--which +regulated the whole anti-submarine campaign. It is evident, therefore, +that a proper German strategy would consist in so disposing its +submarines that they could conduct their operations with the minimum +risk of meeting their most effective enemies, while a properly conceived +Allied strategy would consist in so controlling the situation that the +submarines would have constantly to meet them. Frankness compels me to +say that, in the early part of 1917, the Germans were maintaining the +upper hand in this strategic game; they were holding the dominating +position in the campaign, since they were constantly attacking Allied +shipping without having to meet the Allied destroyers, while the Allied +destroyers were dispersing their energies over the wide waste of waters. +But the facts in the situation, and not any superior skill on the part +of the German navy, were giving the submarines this advantage. The +British were most heroically struggling against the difficulties imposed +by the mighty task which they had assumed. The British navy, like all +other navies, was only partially prepared for this type of warfare; in +1917 it did not possess destroyers enough both to guard the main +fighting fleet and to protect its commerce from submarines. Up to 1914, +indeed, it was expected that the destroyers would have only one function +to perform in warfare, that of protecting the great surface vessels from +attack, but now the new kind of warfare which Germany was waging on +merchant ships had laid upon the destroyer an entirely new +responsibility; and the plain fact is that the destroyers, in the number +which were required, did not exist. + +The problem which proved so embarrassing can be stated in the simple +terms of arithmetic. Everything, as I have said, reduced itself to the +question of destroyers. In April, 1917, the British navy had in +commission about 200 ships of this indispensable type; many of them were +old and others had been pretty badly worn and weakened by three years of +particularly racking service. It was the problem of the Admiralty to +place these destroyers in those fields in which they could most +successfully serve the Allied cause. The one requirement that +necessarily took precedence over all others was that a flotilla of at +least 100 destroyers must be continuously kept with the Grand Fleet, +ready to go into action at a moment's notice. It is clear from this +statement of the case that the naval policy of the Germans, which +consisted in holding their high seas battle fleet in harbour and in +refusing to fight the Allied navy, had an important bearing upon the +submarine campaign. So long as there was the possibility of such an +engagement, the British Grand Fleet had to keep itself constantly +prepared for such a crisis; and an indispensable part of this +preparation was to maintain always in readiness its flotilla of +protecting destroyers. Had the German fleet seriously engaged in a great +sea battle, it would have unquestionably been defeated; such a defeat +would have meant an even greater disaster than the loss of the +battleships, a loss which in itself would not greatly have changed the +naval situation. But the really fatal effect of such a defeat would have +been that it would no longer have been necessary for the British to +sequestrate a hundred or more destroyers at Scapa Flow. The German +battleships would have been sent to the bottom, and then these +destroyers would have been used in the warfare against the submarines. +By keeping its dreadnought fleet intact, always refusing to give battle +and yet always threatening an engagement, the Germans thus were penning +up 100 British destroyers in the Orkneys--destroyers which otherwise +might have done most destructive work against the German submarines off +the coast of Ireland. The mere fact that the German High Seas Fleet had +once engaged the British Grand Fleet off Jutland was an element in the +submarine situation, for this constantly suggested the likelihood that +the attempt might be repeated, and was thus an influence which tended to +keep these destroyers at Scapa Flow. Many times during that critical +period the Admiralty discussed the question of releasing those +destroyers, or a part of them, for the anti-submarine campaign; yet they +always decided, and they decided wisely, against any such hazardous +division. At that time the German dreadnought fleet was not immeasurably +inferior in numbers to the British; it had a protecting screen of about +100 destroyers; and it would have been madness for the British to have +gone into battle with its own destroyer screen placed several hundred +miles away, off the coast of Ireland. I lay stress upon this +circumstance because I find that in America the British Admiralty has +been criticized for keeping a large destroyer force with the Grand +Fleet, instead of detaching them for battle with the submarine. I think +that I have made clear that this criticism is based upon a misconception +of the whole naval campaign. Without this destroyer screen the British +Grand Fleet might have been destroyed by the Germans; if the Grand Fleet +had been destroyed, the war would have ended in the defeat of the +Allies; not to have maintained these destroyers in northern waters would +thus have amounted simply to betraying the cause of civilization and to +making Germany a free gift of victory. + +Germany likewise practically immobilized a considerable number of +British destroyers by attacking hospital ships. When the news of such +dastardly attacks became known, it was impossible for Americans and +Englishmen to believe at first that they were intentional; they so +callously violated all the rules of warfare and all the agreements for +lessening the horrors of war to which Germany herself had become a party +that there was a tendency in both enlightened countries to give the +enemy the benefit of the doubt. As a matter of fact, not only were the +submarine attacks on hospital ships deliberate, but Germany had +officially informed us that they would be made! The reasons for this +warning are clear enough; again, the all-important rôle which the +destroyers were playing in anti-submarine warfare was the point at +issue. Until we received such warning, hospital ships had put to sea +unescorted by warships, depending for their safety upon the rules of the +Hague Conference. Germany attacked these ships in order to make us +escort them with destroyers, and thereby compel us to divert these +destroyers from the anti-submarine campaign. And, of course, England +was forced to acquiesce in this German programme. Had the Anglo-Saxon +mind resembled the Germanic in all probability we should have accepted +the logic of the situation; we should have refused to be diverted from +the great strategic purpose which meant winning the war--that is, +protecting merchant shipping; in other words, we should have left the +hospital ships to their fate, and justified ourselves and stilled our +consciences by the principle of the greater good. But the British and +the American minds do not operate that way; it was impossible for us to +leave sick and wounded men as prey to submarines. Therefore, after +receiving the German warning, backed up, as it was, by the actual +destruction of unprotected hospital ships, we began providing them with +destroyer escorts. This greatly embarrassed us in the anti-submarine +campaign, for at times, especially during the big drives, we had a large +number of hospital ships to protect. As soon as we adopted this policy, +Germany, having attained her end, which was to keep the destroyers out +of the submarine area, stopped attacking sick and wounded soldiers. Yet +we still were forced to provide these unfortunates with destroyer +escorts, for, had we momentarily withdrawn these protectors, the German +submarines would immediately have renewed their attacks on hospital +ships. + +Not only was the British navy at that time safeguarding the liberties of +mankind at sea, but its army in France was doing its share in +safeguarding them on land. And the fact that Britain had to support this +mighty army had its part in making British shipping at times almost an +easy prey for the German submarines. For next in importance to +maintaining the British Grand Fleet intact it was necessary to keep +secure the channel crossing. Over this little strip of water were +transported the men and the supplies from England to France that kept +the German army at bay; to have suspended these communications, even for +a brief period, would have meant that the Germans would have captured +Paris, overrun the whole of France, and ended the war, at least the war +on land. In the course of four years Great Britain transported about +20,000,000 people across the Channel without the loss of a single soul. +She accomplished this only by constantly using many destroyers and other +light surface craft as escorts for the transports. But this was not the +only responsibility of the kind that rested on the overburdened British +shoulders. There was another part of the seas in which, for practical +and political reasons, the British destroyer fleet had to do protective +duty. In the Mediterranean lay not only the trade routes to the East, +but also the lines of supply which extended to Italy, to Egypt, to +Palestine, and to Mesopotamia. If Germany could have cut off Italy's +food and materials Italy would have been forced to withdraw from the +war. The German and Austrian submarines, escaping from Austria's +Adriatic ports, were constantly assailing this commerce, attempting to +do this very thing. Moreover, the success of the German submarine +campaign in these waters would have compelled the Allies to abandon the +Salonika expedition, which would have left the Central Powers absolute +masters of the Balkans and the Middle East. For these reasons it was +necessary to maintain a considerable force of destroyers in the +Mediterranean. + +For the British navy it was therefore a matter of choice what areas she +would attempt to protect with her destroyer forces; the one thing that +was painfully apparent was that she could not satisfactorily safeguard +all the danger zones. With the inadequate force at her disposal it was +inevitable that certain areas should be left relatively open to the +U-boats; and the decision as to which ones these should be was simply a +matter of balancing the several conflicting interests. In April, 1917, +the Admiralty had decided to give the preference to the Grand Fleet, the +hospital ships, the Channel crossing, and the Mediterranean, practically +in the order mentioned. It is evident from these facts that nearly the +entire destroyer fleet must have been disposed in these areas. This +decision, all things considered, was the only one that was possible; +yet, after placing the destroyers in these selected areas, the great +zone of trans-Atlantic shipping, west and south of Ireland, vitally +important as it was, was necessarily left inadequately protected. So +desperate was the situation that sometimes only four or five British +destroyers were operating in this great stretch of waters; and I do not +think that the number ever exceeded fifteen. Inasmuch as that +represented about the number of German submarines in this same area, the +situation may strike the layman as not particularly desperate. But any +such basis of comparison is absurd. The destroyers were operating on the +surface in full view of the submarines; the submarines could submerge at +any time and make themselves invisible; and herein we have the reason +why the contest was so markedly unequal. But aside from all other +considerations, the method of warfare adopted by the Allies against the +U-boat was necessarily ineffective, but was the best that could be used +until sufficient destroyers became available to convoy shipping. The +so-called submarine patrol, under the circumstances which prevailed at +that time, could accomplish very little. This little fleet of destroyers +was based on Queenstown; from this port they put forth and patrolled the +English Channel and the waters about Ireland in the hope that a German +submarine would stick its nose above the waves. The central idea of the +destroyer patrol was this one of hunting; the destroyer could have sunk +any submarine or driven it away from shipping if the submarine would +only have made its presence known. But of course this was precisely what +the submarine declined to do. It must be evident to the merest novice +that four or five destroyers, rushing around hunting for submarines +which were lying a hundred feet or so under water, could accomplish very +little. The under-water boat could always see its surface enemy long +before it was itself seen and thus could save its life by the simple +process of submerging. It must also be clear that the destroyer patrol +could accomplish much only in case there were a very large number of +destroyers. We figured that, to make the patrol system work with +complete success, it would be necessary to have one destroyer for every +square mile. The area of the destroyer patrol off Queenstown comprised +about 25,000 square miles; it is apparent that the complete protection +of the trans-Atlantic trade routes would have taken about 25,000 +destroyers. And the British, as I have said, had available anywhere from +four to fifteen in this area. + +The destroyer flotilla being so small, it is not surprising that the +German submarines were making ducks and drakes of it. The map of the +sinkings which took place in April brings out an interesting fact: +numerous as these sinkings were, very few merchantmen were torpedoed, in +this month, at the entrance to the Irish Sea or in the English Channel. +These were the narrow waters where shipping was massed and where the +little destroyer patrol was intended to operate. The German submarines +apparently avoided these waters, and made their attacks out in the open +sea, sometimes two and three hundred miles west and south of Ireland. +Their purpose in doing this was to draw the destroyer patrol out into +the open sea and in that way to cause its dispersal. And these tactics +were succeeding. There were six separate steamship "lanes" by which the +merchantmen could approach the English Channel and the Irish Sea. One +day the submarines would attack along one of these lanes; then the +little destroyer fleet would rush to this scene of operations. +Immediately the Germans would depart and attack another route many miles +away; then the destroyers would go pell-mell for that location. Just as +they arrived, however, the U-boats would begin operating elsewhere; and +so it went on, a game of hide and seek in which the advantages lay all +on the side of the warships which possessed that wonderful ability to +make themselves unseen. At this period the submarine campaign and the +anti-submarine campaign was really a case of blindman's buff; the +destroyer could never see the enemy while the enemy could always see the +destroyer; and this is the reason that the Allies were failing and that +the Germans were succeeding. + + +IV + +To show how serious the situation was, let me quote from the reports +which I sent to Washington during this period. I find statements like +these scattered everywhere in my despatches of the spring of 1917: + + "The military situation presented by the enemy submarine campaign + is not only serious but critical." + + "The outstanding fact which cannot be escaped is that we are not + succeeding, or in other words, that the enemy's campaign is proving + successful." + + "The consequences of failure or partial failure of the Allied cause + which we have joined are of such far-reaching character that I am + deeply concerned in insuring that the part played by our country + shall stand every test of analysis before the bar of history. The + situation at present is exceedingly grave. If sufficient United + States naval forces can be thrown into the balance at the present + critical time and place there is little doubt that early success + will be assured." + + "Briefly stated, I consider that at the present moment we are + losing the war."[4] + +And now came another important question: What should the American naval +policy be in this crisis? There were almost as many conflicting opinions +as there were minds. Certain authorities believed that our whole North +Atlantic Fleet should be moved immediately into European waters. Such a +manoeuvre was not only impossible but it would have been strategically +very unwise; indeed such a disposition would have been playing directly +into Germany's hands. What naval experts call the "logistics" of the +situation immediately ruled this idea out of consideration. The one fact +which made it impossible to base the fleet in European waters at that +time was that we could not have kept it supplied, particularly with oil. +The German U-boats were making a particularly successful drive at +tankers with the result that England had the utmost difficulty in +supplying her fleet with this kind of fuel. It is indeed impossible to +exaggerate the seriousness of this oil situation. "Orders have just been +given to use three-fifths speed, except in case of emergency," I +reported to Washington on June 29th, referring to scarcity of oil. "This +simply means that the enemy is winning the war." It was lucky for us +that the Germans knew nothing about this particular disability. Had they +been aware of it, they would have resorted to all kinds of manoeuvres +in the attempt to keep the Grand Fleet constantly steaming at sea, and +in this way they might so have exhausted our oil supply as possibly to +threaten the actual command of the surface. Fortunately for the cause of +civilization, there were certain important facts which the German Secret +Service did not learn. + +But this oil scarcity made it impossible to move the Atlantic Fleet into +European waters, at least at that time. Since most oil supplies were +brought from America, we simply could not have fuelled our +super-dreadnoughts in Europe in the spring and summer of 1917. Moreover, +if we had sent all our big ships to England we should have been obliged +to keep our destroyers constantly stationed with them ready for a great +sea action; and this would have completely fallen in with German plans, +for then these destroyers could not have been used against her +submarines. The British did indeed request that we send five +coal-burning ships to reinforce her fleet and give her that +preponderance which made its ascendancy absolutely secure, and these +ships were subsequently sent; but England could not have made provision +for our greatest dreadnoughts, the oil burners. Indeed our big ships +were of much greater service to the Allied cause stationed on this side +than they would have been if they had been located at a European base. +They were providing a reserve for the British fleet, precisely as our +armies in France were providing a reserve for the Allied armies; and +meanwhile this disposition made it possible for us to send their +destroyer escorts to the submarine zone, where they could participate in +the anti-submarine campaign. In American waters these big ships could be +kept in prime condition, for here they had an open, free sea for +training, and here they could also be used to train the thousands of new +men who were needed for the new ships constructed during the war. + +I early took the stand that our forces should be considered chiefly in +the light of reinforcements to the Allied navies, and that, ignoring all +question of national pride and even what at first might superficially +seem to be national interest, we should exert such offensive power as we +possessed in the way that would best assist the Allies in defeating the +submarine. England's naval resources were much greater than ours; and +therefore, in the nature of the case, we could not expect to maintain +overseas anywhere near the number of ships which England had assembled; +consequently it should be our policy to use such available units as we +possessed to strengthen the weak spots in the Allied line. There were +those who believed that national dignity required that we should build +up an independent navy in European waters, and that we should operate it +as a distinct American unit. But that, I maintained, was not the way to +win the war. If we had adopted this course, we should have been +constructing naval bases and perfecting an organization when the +armistice was signed; indeed, the idea of operating independently of the +Allied fleet was not for a moment to be considered. There were others in +America who thought that it was unwise to put any part of our fleet in +European waters, in view of the dangers that might assail us on our own +coast. There was every expectation that Germany would send submarines to +the western Atlantic, where they could prey upon our shipping and could +possibly bombard our ports; I have already shown that she had submarines +which could make such a long voyage, and the strategy of the situation +in April and May, 1917, demanded that a move of this kind be made. The +predominant element in the submarine defence, as I have pointed out, was +the destroyer. The only way in which the United States could immediately +and effectively help the Allied navies was by sending our whole +destroyer flotilla and all our light surface craft at once. It was +Germany's part, therefore, to resort to every manoeuvre that would +keep our destroyer force on this side of the Atlantic. Such a +performance might be expected to startle our peaceful American +population and inspire a public demand for protection; and in this way +our Government might be compelled to keep all anti-submarine craft in +our own waters. I expected Germany to make such a demonstration +immediately and I therefore cautioned our naval authorities at +Washington not to be deceived. I pointed out that Germany could +accomplish practically nothing by sporadic attacks on American shipping +in American waters; that, indeed, if we could induce the German +Admiralty to concentrate all its submarine efforts on the American +coasts, and leave free the Irish Sea and the English Channel, the war +practically would be won for the Allies. Yet these facts were not +apparent to the popular mind in 1917, and I shall always think that +Germany made a great mistake in not sending submarines to the American +coast immediately on our declaration of war, instead of waiting until +1918. Such attacks, at that time, would have started a public demand for +protection which the Washington authorities might have had great +difficulty in resisting, and which might have actually kept our +destroyer fleet in American waters, to the great detriment of the Allied +cause. Germany evidently refrained from doing so for reasons which I +have already indicated--a desire to deal gently with the United States, +and in that way to delay our military preparations and win the war +without coming into bloody conflict with the American people. + +There were others who thought it unwise to expose any part of our fleet +to the dangers of the European contest; their fear was that, if the +Allies should be defeated, we would then need all our naval forces to +protect the American coast. This point of view, of course, was not only +short-sighted and absurd, but it violated the fundamental principle of +warfare, which is that a belligerent must assail his enemy as quickly as +possible with the greatest striking power which he can assemble. Clearly +our national policy demanded that we should exert all the force we could +collect to make certain a German defeat. The best way to fight Germany +was not to wait until she had vanquished the Allies, but to join hands +with them in a combined effort to annihilate her military power on land +and sea. The situation which confronted us in April, 1917, was one which +demanded an immediate and powerful offensive; the best way to protect +America was to destroy Germany's naval power in European waters and thus +make certain that she could not attack us at home. + +The fact is that few nations have ever been placed in so tragical a +position as that in which Great Britain found herself in the spring and +early summer of 1917. And I think that history records few spectacles +more heroic than that of the great British navy, fighting this hideous +and cowardly form of warfare in half a dozen places with pitifully +inadequate forces, but with an undaunted spirit which remained firm even +against the fearful odds which I have described. What an opportunity for +America! And it was perfectly apparent what we should do. It was our +duty immediately to place all our available anti-submarine craft in +those waters west and south of Ireland in which lay the pathways of the +shipping which meant life or death to the Allied cause--the area which +England, because almost endless demands were being made upon her navy in +other fields, was unable to protect. + +The first four days in London were spent collecting all possible data; I +had no desire to alarm Washington unwarrantably, yet I also believed +that it would be a serious dereliction if all the facts were not +presented precisely as they were. I consulted practically everyone who +could give me essential details and wrote a cable despatch, filling four +foolscap pages, which furnished Washington with its first detailed +account of the serious state of the cause on which we had embarked.[5] + +In this work I had the full co-operation of our Ambassador in London, +Mr. Walter Hines Page. Mr. Page's whole heart and mind were bound up in +the Allied cause; he was zealous that his country should play worthily +its part in this great crisis in history; and he worked unsparingly with +me to get the facts before our Government. A few days after sending a +despatch it occurred to me that a message from our Ambassador might give +emphasis to my own. I therefore wrote such a message and took it down to +Brighton, where the American Ambassador was taking a little rest. I did +not know just how strong a statement Mr. Page would care to become +responsible for, and so I did not make this statement quite as emphatic +as the circumstances justified. + +Mr. Page took the paper and read it carefully. Then he looked up. + +"It isn't strong enough," he said. "I think I can do better than this +myself." + +He sat down and wrote the following cablegram which was immediately sent +to the President: + + From: Ambassador Page. + To: Secretary of State. + Sent: 27 April 1917. + + Very confidential for Secretary and President. + + There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war + caused by the increasing success of the German submarines. I have + it from official sources that during the week ending 22nd April, 88 + ships of 237,000 tons allied and neutral were lost. The number of + vessels unsuccessfully attacked indicated a great increase in the + number of submarines in action. + + This means practically a million tons lost every month till the + shorter days of autumn come. By that time the sea will be about + clear of shipping. Most of the ships are sunk to the westward and + southward of Ireland. The British have in that area every available + anti-submarine craft, but their force is so insufficient that they + hardly discourage the submarines. + + The British transport of troops and supplies is already strained to + the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field is + threatened. There is food enough here to last the civil population + only not more than six weeks or two months. + + Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the + future, or in any theatre of the war, our help is now more + seriously needed in this submarine area for the sake of all the + Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else. + + After talking over this critical situation with the Prime Minister + and other members of the Government, I cannot refrain from most + strongly recommending the immediate sending over of every destroyer + and all other craft that can be of anti-submarine use. This seems + to me the sharpest crisis of the war, and the most dangerous + situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise. + + If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two or three + months the war will be won, and if we can contribute effective help + immediately it will be won directly by our aid. I cannot exaggerate + the pressing and increasing danger of this situation. Thirty or + more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us immediately + would very likely be decisive. + + There is no time to be lost. + +PAGE. + +But Mr. Page and I thought that we had not completely done our duty even +after sending these urgent messages. Whatever might happen, we were +determined that it could never be charged that we had not presented the +Allied situation in its absolutely true light. It seemed likely that an +authoritative statement from the British Government would give added +assurance that our statements were not the result of panic, and with +this idea in mind, Mr. Page and I called upon Mr. Balfour, Foreign +Secretary, who, in response to our request, sent a despatch to +Washington describing the seriousness of the situation. + +All these messages made the same point: that the United States should +immediately assemble all its destroyers and other light craft, and send +them to the port where they could render the greatest service in the +anti-submarine campaign--Queenstown. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The statements published were not false, but they were inconclusive +and intentionally so. They gave the number of British ships sunk, but +not their tonnage, and not the total losses of British, Allied, and +neutral tonnage. + +[2] See Appendices II and III for my cable and letter to the Navy +Department, explaining the submarine situation in detail. + +[3] See Appendix IV for my statement to Washington on arming merchant +ships. + +[4] For specimens of my reports to the Navy Department in these early +days see Appendices II and III. + +[5] See Appendix II. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER" + + +I + +The morning of May 4, 1917, witnessed an important event in the history +of Queenstown. The news had been printed in no British or American +paper, yet in some mysterious way it had reached nearly everybody in the +city. A squadron of American destroyers, which had left Boston on the +evening of April 24th, had already been reported to the westward of +Ireland and was due to reach Queenstown that morning. At almost the +appointed hour a little smudge of smoke appeared in the distance, +visible to the crowds assembled on the hills; then presently another +black spot appeared, and then another; and finally these flecks upon the +horizon assumed the form of six rapidly approaching warships. The Stars +and Stripes were broken out on public buildings, on private houses, and +on nearly all the water craft in the harbour; the populace, armed with +American flags, began to gather on the shore; and the local dignitaries +donned their official robes to welcome the new friends from overseas. +One of the greatest days in Anglo-American history had dawned, for the +first contingent of the American navy was about to arrive in British +waters and join hands with the Allies in the battle against the forces +of darkness and savagery. + +The morning was an unusually brilliant one. The storms which had tossed +our little vessels on the seas for ten days, and which had followed them +nearly to the Irish coast, had suddenly given way to smooth water and a +burst of sunshine. The long and graceful American ships steamed into the +channel amid the cheers of the people and the tooting of all harbour +craft; the sparkling waves, the greenery of the bordering hills, the +fruit trees already in bloom, to say nothing of the smiling and cheery +faces of the welcoming Irish people, seemed to promise a fair beginning +for our great adventure. "Welcome to the American colours," had been the +signal of the _Mary Rose_, a British destroyer which had been sent to +lead the Americans to their anchorage. "Thank you, I am glad of your +company," answered the Yankee commander; and these messages represented +the spirit of the whole proceeding. Indeed there was something in these +strange-looking American ships, quite unlike the British destroyers, +that necessarily inspired enthusiasm and respect. They were long and +slender; the sunlight, falling upon their graceful sides and steel +decks, made them brilliant objects upon the water; and their +business-like guns and torpedo tubes suggested efficiency and readiness. +The fact that they had reached their appointed rendezvous exactly on +time, and that they had sailed up the Queenstown harbour at almost +precisely the moment that preparations had been made to receive them, +emphasized this impression. The appearance of our officers on the decks +in their unfamiliar, closely fitting blouses, and of our men, in their +neat white linen caps, also at once won the hearts of the populace. + +"Sure an' it's our own byes comin' back to us," an Irish woman remarked, +as she delightedly observed the unmistakably Gaelic countenances of a +considerable proportion of the crew. Indeed the natives of Queenstown +seemed to regard these American blue-jackets almost as their own. The +welcome provided by these people was not of a formal kind; they gathered +spontaneously to cheer and to admire. In that part of Ireland there was +probably not a family that did not have relatives or associations in the +United States, and there was scarcely a home that did not possess some +memento of America. The beautiful Queenstown Roman Catholic Cathedral, +which stood out so conspicuously, had been built very largely with +American dollars, and the prosperity of many a local family had the same +trans-Atlantic origin. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that when +our sailors landed for a few hours' liberty many hands were stretched +out to welcome them. Their friends took them arm in arm, marched them to +their homes, and entertained them with food and drink, all the time +plying them with questions about friends and relatives in America. Most +of these young Americans with Irish ancestry had never seen Ireland, +but that did not prevent the warm-hearted people of Queenstown from +hailing them as their own. This cordiality was appreciated, for the trip +across the Atlantic had been very severe, with gales and rainstorms +nearly every day. + +The senior officer in charge was Commander Joseph K. Taussig, whose +flagship was the _Wadsworth_. The other vessels of the division and +their commanding officers were the _Conyngham_, Commander Alfred W. +Johnson; the _Porter_, Lieutenant-Commander Ward K. Wortman; the +_McDougal_, Lieutenant-Commander Arther P. Fairfield; the _Davis_, +Lieutenant-Commander Rufus F. Zogbaum; and the _Wainwright_, +Lieutenant-Commander Fred H. Poteet. On the outbreak of hostilities +these vessels, comprising our Eighth Destroyer Division, had been +stationed at Base 2, in the York River, Virginia; at 7 P.M. of +April 6th, the day that Congress declared war on Germany, their +commander had received the following signal from the _Pennsylvania_, the +flagship of the Atlantic Fleet: "Mobilize for war in accordance with +Department's confidential mobilization plan of March 21st." From that +time events moved rapidly for the Eighth Division. On April 14th, the +very day on which I sent my first report on submarine conditions to +Washington, Commander Taussig received a message to take his flotilla to +Boston and there fit out for "long and distant service." Ten days +afterward he sailed, with instructions to go fifty miles due east of +Cape Cod and there to open his sealed orders. At the indicated spot +Commander Taussig broke the seal, and read the following document--a +paper so important in history, marking as it does the first instructions +any American naval or army officer had received for engaging directly in +hostilities with Germany, that it is worth quoting in full: + + NAVY DEPARTMENT + + Office of Naval Operations + Washington, D. C. + + _Secret and Confidential_ + + To: Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, + U.S.S. _Wadsworth_, Flagship. + + Subject: Protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britain + and Ireland. + + 1. The British Admiralty have requested the co-operation of a + division of American destroyers in the protection of commerce near + the coasts of Great Britain and France. + + 2. Your mission is to assist naval operations of Entente Powers in + every way possible. + + 3. Proceed to Queenstown, Ireland. Report to senior British naval + officer present, and thereafter co-operate fully with the British + navy. Should it be decided that your force act in co-operation with + French naval forces your mission and method of co-operation under + French Admiralty authority remain unchanged. + + Route to Queenstown. + + Boston to latitude 50 N--Long. 20 W to arrive at daybreak then to + latitude 50 N--Long. 12 W thence to Queenstown. + + When within radio communication of the British naval forces off + Ireland, call G CK and inform the Vice-Admiral at Queenstown in + British general code of your position, course, and speed. You will + be met outside of Queenstown. + + 4. Base facilities will be provided by the British Admiralty. + + 5. Communicate your orders and operations to Rear-Admiral Sims at + London and be guided by such instructions as he may give you. Make + no reports of arrival to Navy Department direct. + +JOSEPHUS DANIELS. + +No happier selection for the command of this division could have been +made than that of Commander Taussig. In addition to his qualities as a +sailor, certain personal associations made him particularly acceptable +to the British naval authorities. In 1900, Commander Taussig, then a +midshipman, was a member of the naval forces which the United States +sent to China to co-operate with other powers in putting down the Boxer +Rebellion and rescuing the besieged legations in Pekin. Near Tientsin +this international force saw its hardest fighting, and here Commander +Taussig was wounded. While recovering from his injury, the young +American found himself lying on a cot side by side with an English +captain, then about forty years old, who was in command of the +_Centurion_ and chief-of-staff to Admiral Seymour, who had charge of the +British forces. This British officer was severely wounded; a bullet had +penetrated his lung, and for a considerable period he was unable to lie +down. Naturally this enforced companionship made the two men friends. +Commander Taussig had had many occasions to recall this association +since, for his wounded associate was Captain John R. Jellicoe, whose +advancement in the British navy had been rapid from that day onward. On +this same expedition Captain Jellicoe became a sincere friend also of +Captain McCalla, the American who commanded the _Newark_ and the +American landing force; indeed, Jellicoe's close and cordial association +with the American navy dates from the Boxer expedition. Naturally +Taussig had watched Jellicoe's career with the utmost interest; since he +was only twenty-one at the time, however, and the Englishman was twice +his age, it had never occurred to him that the First Sea Lord would +remember his youthful hospital companion. Yet the very first message he +received, on arriving in Irish waters, was the following letter, brought +to him by Captain Evans, the man designated by the British Admiralty as +liaison officer with the American destroyers: + + ADMIRALTY, WHITEHALL + 1-5-17. + + MY DEAR TAUSSIG: + + I still retain very pleasant and vivid recollections of our + association in China and I am indeed delighted that you should have + been selected for the command of the first force which is coming to + fight for freedom, humanity, and civilization. We shall all have + our work cut out to subdue piracy. My experience in China makes me + feel perfectly convinced that the two nations will work in the + closest co-operation, and I won't flatter you by saying too much + about the value of your help. I must say this, however. There is no + navy in the world that can possibly give us more valuable + assistance, and there is no personnel in any navy that will fight + better than yours. My China experience tells me this. + + If only my dear friend McCalla could have seen this day how glad I + would have been! + + I must offer you and all your officers and men the warmest welcome + possible in the name of the British nation and the British + Admiralty, and add to it every possible good wish from myself. May + every good fortune attend you and speedy victory be with us. + + Yours very sincerely, + J. R. JELLICOE. + +At this same meeting Captain Evans handed the American commander another +letter which was just as characteristic as that of Admiral Jellicoe. The +following lines constitute our officers' first introduction to +Vice-Admiral Bayly, the officer who was to command their operations in +the next eighteen months, and, in its brevity, its entirely +business-like qualities, as well as in its genuine sincerity and +kindness, it gave a fair introduction to the man: + + ADMIRALTY HOUSE, + QUEENSTOWN, + 4-5-17. + + DEAR LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER TAUSSIG: + + I hope that you and the other five officers in command of the U.S. + destroyers in your flotilla will come and dine here to-night, + Friday, at 7.45, and that you and three others will remain to sleep + here so as to get a good rest after your long journey. Allow me to + welcome you and to thank you for coming. + + Yours sincerely, + LEWIS BAYLY. + + Dine in undress; no speeches. + + +The first duty of the officers on arrival was to make the usual +ceremonial calls. The Lord Mayor of Cork had come down from his city, +which is only twelve miles from Queenstown, to receive the Americans, +and now awaited them in the American consulate; and many other citizens +were assembled there to welcome them. One of the most conspicuous +features of the procession was the moving picture operator, whose +presence really had an international significance. The British +Government itself had detailed him for this duty; it regarded the +arrival of our destroyers as a great historical event and therefore +desired to preserve this animated record in the official archives. +Crowds gathered along the street to watch and cheer our officers as they +rode by; and at the consulate the Lord Mayor, Mr. Butterfield, made an +eloquent address, laying particular emphasis upon the close friendship +that had always prevailed between the American and the Irish people. +Other dignitaries made speeches voicing similar sentiments. This welcome +concluded, Commander Taussig and his brother officers started up the +steep hill that leads to Admiralty House, a fine and spacious old +building. + +Here, following out the instructions of the Navy Department, they were +to report to Vice-Admiral Bayly for duty. It is doing no injustice to +Sir Lewis to say that our men regarded this first meeting with some +misgiving. The Admiral's reputation in the British navy was well known +to them. They knew that he was one of the ablest officers in the +service; but they had also heard that he was an extremely exacting man, +somewhat taciturn in his manner, and not inclined to be over familiar +with his subordinates--a man who did not easily give his friendship or +his respect, and altogether, in the anxious minds of these ambitious +young Americans, he was a somewhat forbidding figure. And the appearance +of the Admiral, standing in his doorway awaiting their arrival, rather +accentuated these preconceptions. He was a medium-sized man, with +somewhat swarthy, weather-beaten face and black hair just turning grey; +he stood there gazing rather quizzically at the Americans as they came +trudging up the hill, his hands behind his back, his bright eyes keenly +taking in every detail of the men, his face not showing the slightest +trace of a smile. This struck our young men at first as a somewhat grim +reception; the attitude of the Admiral suggested that he was slightly in +doubt as to the value of his new recruits, that he was entirely willing +to be convinced, but that only deeds and not fine speeches of greeting +would convince him. Yet Admiral Bayly welcomed our men with the utmost +courtesy and dignity, and his face, as he began shaking hands, broke +into a quiet, non-committal smile; there was nothing about his manner +that was effusive, there were no unnecessary words, yet there was a real +cordiality that put our men at ease and made them feel at home in this +strange environment. They knew, of course, that they had come to +Ireland, not for social diversions, but for the serious business of +fighting the Hun, and that indeed was the only thought which could then +find place in Admiral Bayly's mind. Up to this time the welcome to the +Americans had taken the form of lofty oratorical flights, with emphasis +upon the blood ties of Anglo-Saxondom, and the significance to +civilization of America and Great Britain fighting side by side; but +this was not the kind of a greeting our men received from Admiral Bayly. +The Admiral himself, with his somewhat worn uniform and his lack of +ceremony, formed a marked contrast to the official reception by the +Lord Mayor and his suite in their insignia of office. Entirely +characteristic also was the fact that, instead of making a long speech, +he made no speech at all. His chief interest in the Americans at that +time was the assistance which they were likely to bring to the Allied +cause; after courteously greeting the officers, the first question he +asked about these forces was: + +"When will you be ready to go to sea?" + +Even under the most favourable conditions that is an embarrassing +question to ask of a destroyer commander. There is no type of ship that +is so chronically in need of overhauling. Even in peace times the +destroyer usually has under way a long list of repairs; our first +contingent had sailed without having had much opportunity to refit, and +had had an extremely nasty voyage. The fact was that it had been rather +severely battered up, although the flotilla was in excellent condition, +considering its hard experience on the ocean and the six months of hard +work which it had previously had on our coast. One ship had lost its +fire-room ventilator, another had had condenser troubles on the way +across, and there had been other difficulties. Commander Taussig, +however, had sized up Admiral Bayly as a man to whom it would be a +tactical error to make excuses, and promptly replied: + +"We are ready now, sir, that is, as soon as we finish refuelling. Of +course you know how destroyers are--always wanting something done to +them. But this is war, and we are ready to make the best of things and +go to sea immediately." + +The Admiral was naturally pleased with the spirit indicated by this +statement, and, with his customary consideration for his juniors, said: + +"I will give you four days from the time of arrival. Will that be +sufficient?" + +"Yes," answered Taussig, "that will be more than ample time." + +As we discovered afterward, the Admiral had a system of always "testing +out" new men, and it is not improbable that this preliminary interview +was a part of this process. + +During the period of preparation there were certain essential +preliminaries: it was necessary to make and to receive many calls, a +certain amount of tea drinking was inevitable, and there were many +invitations to dinners and to clubs that could not be ignored. Our +officers made a state visit to Cork, going up in Admiral Bayly's barge, +and returned the felicitations of the Mayor and his retinue. + +Naturally both the Americans and their ships became objects of great +interest to their new allies. It was, I think, the first time that a +destroyer flotilla had ever visited Great Britain, and the very +appearance of the vessels themselves aroused the greatest curiosity. +They bore only a general resemblance to the destroyers of the British +navy. The shape of their hulls, the number and location of smoke pipes, +the positions of guns, torpedo tubes, bridges, deckhouse, and other +details gave them quite a contrasting profile. The fact that they were +designed to operate under different conditions from the British ships +accounted for many of these divergences. We build our destroyers with +the widest possible cruising radius; they are expected to go to the West +Indies, to operate from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and in general to +feel at home anywhere in the great stretch of waters that surround our +country. British destroyers, on the other hand, are intended to operate +chiefly in the restricted waters around the British Isles, where the +fuelling and refitting facilities are so extensive that they do not have +to devote much space to supplies of this kind. The result is that our +destroyers can keep the sea longer than the British; on the other hand, +the British are faster than ours, and they can also turn more quickly. +These differences were of course a subject of much discussion among the +observers at Queenstown, and even of animated argument. Naturally, the +interest of the destroyer officers of the two services in the respective +merits of their vessels was very keen. They examined minutely all +features that were new to them in the design and arrangement of guns, +torpedoes, depth charges, and machines, freely exchanged information, +and discussed proposed improvements in the friendliest possible spirit. +Strangely enough, although the American destroyers carried greater fuel +supplies than the British, they were rather more dainty and graceful in +their lines, a fact which inspired a famous retort which rapidly passed +through the ranks of both navies. + +"You know," remarked a British officer to an American, "I like the +British destroyers better than the American. They look so much sturdier. +Yours seem to me rather feminine in appearance." + +"Yes," replied the American, "that's so, but you must remember what +Kipling says, 'The female of the species is more deadly than the male.'" + +The work of the Americans really began on the Sunday which followed +their arrival; by this time they had established cordial relations with +Admiral Bayly and were prepared to trust themselves unreservedly in his +hands. He summoned the officers on this Sunday morning and talked with +them a few moments before they started for the submarine zone; the time +of their departure had been definitely fixed for the next day. In the +matter of ceremonial greetings the Admiral was not strong, but when it +came to discussing the business in hand he was the master of a +convincing eloquence. The subject of his discourse was the +responsibility that lay before our men; he spoke in sharp, staccato +tones, making his points with the utmost precision, using no verbal +flourishes or unnecessary words--looking at our men perhaps a little +fiercely, and certainly impressing them with the fact that the work +which lay before them was to be no summer holiday. As soon as the +destroyers passed beyond the harbour defences, the Admiral began, death +constantly lay before the men until they returned. There was only one +safe rule to follow; days and even weeks might go by without seeing a +submarine, but the men must assume that one was constantly watching +them, looking for a favourable opportunity to discharge its torpedo. +"You must not relax attention for an instant, or you may lose an +opportunity to destroy a submarine or give her a chance to destroy you." +It was the present intention to send the American destroyers out for +periods of six days, giving them two days' rest between trips, and about +once a month they were to have five days in port for boiler cleaning. +And now the Admiral gave some details about the practical work at sea. +Beware, he said, about ramming periscopes; these were frequently mere +decoys for bombs and should be shelled. In picking up survivors of +torpedoed vessels the men must be careful not to stop until thoroughly +convinced that there were no submarines in the neighbourhood: "You must +not risk the loss of your vessel in order to save the lives of a few +people." + +The Admiral proclaimed the grim philosophy of this war when he told our +men that it would be their first duty, should they see a ship torpedoed, +not to go to the rescue of the survivors, but to go after the submarine. +The three imperative duties of the destroyers were, in the order named: +first, to destroy submarines; second, to convoy and protect merchant +shipping; and third, to save the lives of the passengers and crews of +torpedoed ships. No commander should ever miss an opportunity to destroy +a submarine merely because there were a few men and women in small boats +or in the water who might be saved. Admiral Bayly explained that to do +this would be false economy: sinking a submarine meant saving far more +lives than might be involved in a particular instance, for this vessel, +if spared, would simply go on constantly destroying human beings. The +Admiral then gave a large number of instructions in short, pithy +sentences: "Do not use searchlights; do not show any lights whatever at +night; do not strike any matches; never steam at a slower rate than +thirteen knots; always zigzag, thereby preventing the submarine from +plotting your position; always approach a torpedoed vessel with the sun +astern; make only short signals; do not repeat the names of vessels; +carefully watch all fishing vessels--they may be submarines in +disguise--they even put up masts, sails, and funnels in this attempt to +conceal their true character." The Admiral closed his remarks with a +warning based upon his estimate of the character and methods of the +enemy. In substance he said that were it not for the violations of the +dictates of humanity and the well-established chivalry of the sea, he +would have the greatest respect for the German submarine commanders. He +cautioned our officers not to underrate them, and particularly +emphasized their cleverness at what he termed "the art of irregularity." +He explained this by saying that up to that time he had been unable to +deduce from their operations any definite plan or tactics, and advised +our commanders also to guard against any regularity of movement; they +should never, for example, patrol from one corner to another of their +assigned squares in the submarine zone, or adopt any other uniform +practice which the enemy might soon perceive and of which he would +probably take advantage. + +At the very moment that Admiral Bayly was giving these impressive +instructions the submarine campaign had reached its crisis; the fortunes +of the Allies had never struck so low a depth as at that time. An +incident connected with our arrival, not particularly important in +itself, brought home to our men the unsleeping vigilance of the enemy +with whom they had to deal. + +Perhaps the Germans did not actually have advance information of the +arrival of this first detachment of our destroyers; but they certainly +did display great skill in divining what was to happen. At least it was +a remarkable coincidence that for the first time in many months a +submarine laid a mine-field directly off the entrance to Queenstown the +day before our ships arrived. Soon afterward a parent ship of the +destroyers reached this port and encountered the same welcome; and soon +after that a second parent ship found a similar mine-field awaiting her +arrival. The news that our destroyers had reached Queenstown actually +appeared in the German papers several days before we had released it in +the British and American press. Thanks to the vigilance and efficiency +of the British mine-sweepers, however, the enemy gained nothing from all +these preparations, for the channel was cleared of German mines before +our vessels reached port. + +The night before the destroyers arrived, while some of the officers of +my staff were dining with Admiral Bayly, the windows were shaken by +heavy explosions made by the mines which the sweepers were dragging out. +Admiral Bayly jokingly remarked that it was really a pity to interfere +with such a warm welcome as had apparently been planned for our +crusaders. Even the next night, while the destroyer officers were dining +at Admiralty House, several odd mines exploded outside the channel that +had been swept the previous day. This again impressed our men with the +fact that the game which they had now entered was quite a different +affair from their peace-time manoeuvres. + +The Germans at that time were jubilant over the progress of their +submarine campaign and, indeed, they had good reason to be. The week +that our first flotilla reached Irish waters their submarines had +destroyed 240,000 tons of Allied shipping; if the sinking should keep +up at this rate, it meant losses of 1,000,000 tons a month and an early +German victory. + +In looking over my letters of that period, I find many references that +picture the state of the official mind. All that time I was keeping +closely in touch with Ambassador Page, who was energetically seconding +all my efforts to bring more American ships across the Atlantic. + +"It remains a fact," I wrote our Ambassador, "that at present the enemy +is succeeding and that we are failing. Ships are being sunk faster than +they can be replaced by the building facilities of the world. This +simply means that the enemy is winning the war. There is no mystery +about that. The submarines are rapidly cutting the Allies' lines of +communication. When they are cut, or sufficiently interfered with, we +must accept the enemy's terms." + +Six days before our destroyers put in at Queenstown I sent this message +to Mr. Page: + + Allies do not now command the sea. Transport of troops and supplies + strained to the utmost and the maintenance of the armies in the + field is threatened. + +Such, then, was the situation when our little destroyer flotilla first +went to sea to do battle with the submarine. + + +II + +Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, who now became the commander of the American +destroyers at Queenstown, so far as their military operations were +concerned, had spent fifty years in the British navy, forty years of +this time actually at sea. This ripe experience, combined with a great +natural genius for salt water, had made him one of the most efficient +men in the service. In what I have already said, I may have given a +slightly false impression of the man; that he was taciturn, that he was +generally regarded as a hard taskmaster, that he never made friends at +the first meeting, that he was more interested in results than in +persons--all this is true; yet these qualities merely concealed what +was, at bottom, a generous, kindly, and even a warm-hearted character. +Admiral Bayly was so retiring and so modest that he seemed almost to +have assumed these exterior traits to disguise his real nature. When our +men first met the Admiral they saw a man who would exact their last +effort and accept no excuses for failure; when admitted to more intimate +association, however, they discovered that this weather-beaten sailor +had a great love for flowers, for children, for animals, for pictures, +and for books; that he was deeply read in general literature, in +history, and in science, and that he had a knowledge of their own +country and its institutions which many of our own officers did not +possess. Americans have great reason to be proud of the achievements of +their naval men, and one of the most praiseworthy was the fact that they +became such intimate friends of Admiral Bayly. For this man's nature was +so sincere that he could never bring himself to indulge in friendships +which he deemed unworthy. Early in his association with our men, he told +them bluntly that any success he and they might have in getting on +together would depend entirely upon the manner in which they performed +their work. If they acquitted themselves creditably, well and good; if +not, he should not hesitate to find fault with them. It is thus a +tribute to our officers that in a very short time they and Admiral Bayly +had established relations which were not only friendly but affectionate. +Not long after our destroyers arrived at Queenstown most of the British +destroyers left to reinforce the hard-driven flotillas in the Channel +and the North Sea, so that the destroyer forces at Queenstown under +Admiral Bayly became almost exclusively American, though they worked +with many British vessels--sloops, trawlers, sweepers, and mystery +ships, in co-operation with British destroyers and other vessels in the +north and other parts of Ireland. The Admiral watched over our ships and +their men with the jealous eye of a father. He always referred to his +command as "my destroyers" and "my Americans," and woe to anyone who +attempted to interfere with them or do them the slightest injustice! +Admiral Bayly would fight for them, against the combined forces of the +whole British navy, like a tigress for her cubs. He constantly had a +weather eye on Plymouth, the main base of the British destroyers, to see +that the vessels from that station did their fair share of the work. +Once or twice a dispute arose between an American destroyer commander +and a British; in such cases Admiral Bayly vigorously took the part of +the American. "You did perfectly right," he would say to our men, and +then he would turn all his guns against the interfering Britisher. +Relations between the young Americans and the experienced Admiral became +so close that they would sometimes go to him with their personal +troubles; he became not only their commander, but their confidant and +adviser. + +There was something in these bright young chaps from overseas, indeed, +so different from anything which he had ever met before, that greatly +appealed to this seasoned Englishman. One thing that he particularly +enjoyed was their sense of humour. The Admiral himself had a keen wit +and a love of stories; and he also had the advantage, which was not +particularly common in England, of understanding American slang and +American anecdotes. There are certain stories which apparently only an +upbringing on American soil qualifies one to appreciate; yet Admiral +Bayly always instantly got the point. He even took a certain pride in +his ability to comprehend the American joke. One of the regular features +of life at Queenstown was a group of retired British officers--fine, +white-haired old gentlemen who could take no active part in the war but +who used to find much consolation in coming around to smoke their pipes +and to talk things over at Admiralty House. Admiral Bayly invariably +found delight in encouraging our officers to entertain these rare old +souls with American stories; their utter bewilderment furnished him +endless entertainment. The climax of his pleasure came when, after such +an experience, the old men would get the Admiral in a corner, and +whisper to him: "What in the world do they mean?" + +The Admiral was wonderfully quick at repartee, as our men found when +they began "joshing" him on British peculiarities, for as naval attaché +he had travelled extensively in the United States, had observed most of +our national eccentricities, and thus was able promptly "to come back." +In such contests our men did not invariably come off with all the +laurels. Yet, despite these modern tendencies, Admiral Bayly was a +conservative of the conservatives, having that ingrained British respect +for old things simply because they were old. An ancient British custom +requires that at church on Sundays the leading dignitary in each +community shall mount the reading desk and read the lessons of the day; +Admiral Bayly would perform this office with a simplicity and a +reverence which indicated the genuinely religious nature of the man. And +in smaller details he was likewise the ancient, tradition-loving Briton. +He would never think of writing a letter to an equal or superior officer +except in longhand; to use a typewriter for such a purpose would have +been profanation in his eyes. I once criticized a certain Admiral for +consuming an hour or so in laboriously penning a letter which could have +been dictated to a stenographer in a few minutes. + +"How do you ever expect to win the war if you use up time this way?" I +asked. + +"I'd rather lose the war," the Admiral replied, but with a twinkle in +his eye, "than use a typewriter to my chiefs!" + +Our officers liked to chaff the Admiral quietly on this conservatism. He +frequently had a number of them to breakfast, and upon one such occasion +the question was asked as to why the Admiral ate an orange after +breakfast, instead of before, as is the custom in America. + +"I can tell you why," said Commander Zogbaum. + +"Well, why is it?" asked the Admiral. + +"Because that's what William the Conqueror used to do." + +"I can think of no better reason than that for doing it," the Admiral +promptly answered. But this remark tickled him immensely, and became a +byword with him. Ever afterward, whenever he proposed to do something +which the Americans regarded as too conservative, he would say: + +"You know that this is what William the Conqueror used to do!" + +Yet in one respect the Admiral was all American; he was a hard worker +even to the point of hustle. He insisted on the strictest attention to +the task in hand from his subordinates, but at least he never spared +himself. After he had arrived at Queenstown, two years before our +destroyers put in, he proceeded to reorganize Admiralty House on the +most business-like basis. The first thing he pounced upon was the +billiard-room in the basement. He decided that it would make an +excellent plotting-room, and that the billiard-tables could be +transformed into admirable drawing-boards for his staff; he immediately +called the superintendent and told him to make the necessary +transformations. + +"All right," said the superintendent. "We'll start work on them +to-morrow morning." + +"No, you won't," Admiral Bayly replied. "We propose to be established in +this room using these tables to-morrow morning. They must be all ready +for use by eight o'clock." + +And he was as good as his word; the workmen spent the whole night making +the changes. At the expense of considerable personal comfort he also +caused one half of the parlour of Admiralty House to be partitioned off +as an office and the wall thus formed covered with war maps. + +These incidents are significant, not only of Admiral Bayly's methods, +but of his ideals. In his view, if a billiard room could be made to +serve a war purpose, it had no proper place in an Admiralty house which +was the headquarters for fighting German submarines. The chief duty of +all men at that crisis was work, and their one responsibility was the +defeat of the Hun. Admiralty House was always open to our officers; they +spent many a delightful evening there around the Admiral's fire; they +were constantly entertained at lunch and at dinner, and they were +expected to drop in for tea whenever they were in port. But social +festivities in the conventional sense were barred. No ladies, except the +Admiral's relatives, ever visited the place. Some of the furnishings +were rather badly worn, but the Admiral would make no requisitions for +new rugs or chairs; every penny in the British exchequer, he insisted, +should be used to carry on the war. He was scornfully critical of any +naval officers who made a lavish display of silver on their tables; +money should be spent for depth charges, torpedoes, and twelve-inch +shells, not for ostentation. He was scrupulousness itself in observing +all official regulations in the matter of food and other essentials. + +For still another reason the Admiral made an ideal commander of American +naval forces. He was a strict teetotaller. His abstention was not a war +measure; he had always had a strong aversion to alcohol in any form and +had never drank a cocktail or a brandy and soda in his life. Dinners at +Admiralty House, therefore, were absolutely "dry," and in perfect +keeping with American naval regulations. + +Though Admiral Bayly was not athletic--his outdoor games being limited +to tip-and-run cricket in the Admiralty grounds, which he played with a +round bat and a tennis ball--he was a man of wiry physique and a +tireless walker. Indeed the most active young men in our navy had great +difficulty in keeping pace with him. One of his favourite diversions on +a Saturday afternoon was to take a group on a long tramp in the +beautiful country surrounding Queenstown; by the time the party reached +home, the Admiral, though sixty years old, was usually the freshest of +the lot. I still vividly remember a long walk which I took with him in a +pelting rain; I recall how keenly he enjoyed it and how young and nimble +he seemed to be when we reached home, drenched to the skin. A steep hill +led from the shore up to Admiralty House; Sir Lewis used to say that +this was a valuable military asset--it did not matter how angry a man +might be with him when he started for headquarters, by the time he +arrived, this wearisome climb always had the effect of quieting his +antagonism. The Admiral was fond of walking up this hill with our young +officers; he himself usually reached the top as fresh as a daisy, while +his juniors were frequently puffing for breath. + +He enjoyed testing out our men in other ways; nothing delighted him more +than giving them hard jobs to do--especially when they accomplished the +tasks successfully. One day he ordered one of our officers, +Lieutenant-Commander Roger Williams, captain of the _Duncan_, a recent +arrival at Queenstown, to cross the Irish Sea and bring back a ship. The +joke lay in the fact that this man's destroyer had just come in with her +steering gear completely out of commission--a circumstance which Admiral +Bayly well understood. Many officers would have promptly asked to be +excused on this ground, but not this determined American. He knew that +the Admiral was trying to "put something over on him," and he rose to +the occasion. The fact that Queenstown Harbour is long and narrow, not +wide enough for a destroyer to turn around in, made Commander Williams's +problem still more difficult, but by cleverly using his engines, he +succeeded in backing out--the distance required was five miles; he took +another mile and a half to turn his ship and then he went across the sea +and brought back his convoy--all without any steering gear. This officer +never once mentioned to the Admiral the difficulties under which he had +worked, but his achievement completely won Sir Lewis's heart, and from +that time this young man became one of his particular favourites. +Indeed, it was the constant demonstration of this kind of fundamental +character in our naval men which made the Admiral admire them so. + +On occasions Admiral Bayly would go to sea himself--something quite +unprecedented and possibly even reprehensible, for it was about the same +thing as a commanding general going into the front-line trenches. But +the Admiral believed that doing this now and then helped to inspire his +men; and, besides that, he enjoyed it--he was not made for a land +sailor. He had as flagship a cruiser of about 5,000 tons; he had a way +of jumping on board without the slightest ceremony and taking a cruise +up the west coast of Ireland. On occasion the Admiral would personally +lead an expedition which was going to the relief of a torpedoed vessel, +looking for survivors adrift in small boats. One day Admiral Bayly, +Captain Pringle of the U.S.S. _Melville_, Captain Campbell, the +Englishman whose exploits with mystery ships had given him worldwide +fame, and myself went out on the _Active_ to watch certain experiments +with depth charges. It was a highly imprudent thing to do, because a +vessel of such draft was an excellent target for torpedoes, but that +only added to the zest of the occasion from Admiral Bayly's point of +view. + +"What a bag this would be for the Hun!" he chuckled. "The American +Commander-in-Chief, the British Admiral commanding in Irish waters, a +British and an American captain!" + +In our mind's eye we could see our picture in the Berlin papers--four +distinguished prisoners standing in a row. + +A single fact shows with what consideration Admiral Bayly treated his +subordinates. The usual naval regulation demands that an officer, coming +in from a trip, shall immediately seek out his commander and make a +verbal report. Frequently the men came in late in the evening, extremely +fatigued; to make the visit then was a hardship and might deprive them +of much-needed sleep. Admiral Bayly therefore had a fixed rule that +such visits should be made at ten o'clock of the morning following the +day of arrival. On such occasions he would often be found seated +somewhat grimly behind his desk wholly absorbed in the work in hand. If +he were writing or reading his mail he would keep steadily at it, never +glancing up until he had finished. He would listen to the report +stoically, possibly say a word of praise, and then turn again to the +business in hand. Occasionally he would notice that his abruptness had +perhaps pained the young American; then he would break into an +apologetic smile, and ask him to come up to dinner that evening, and +even--this was the greatest honour of all--to spend the night at +Admiralty House. + +These dinners were great occasions for our men, particularly as they +were presided over by Miss Voysey, the Admiral's niece. Miss Voysey, the +little spaniel, Patrick, and the Admiral constituted the "family," and +the three were entirely devoted to one another. Pat in particular was an +indispensable part of this menage; I have never seen any object quite so +crestfallen and woe-begone as this little dog when either Miss Voysey or +the Admiral spent a day or two away from the house. Miss Voysey was a +young woman of great personal charm and cultivation; probably she was +the influence that most contributed to the happiness and comfort of our +officers at Queenstown. From the day of their arrival she entered into +the closest comradeship with the Americans. She kept open house for +them: she was always on hand to serve tea in the afternoon, and she +never overlooked an opportunity to add to their well-being. As a result +of her delightful hospitality Admiralty House really became a home for +our officers. Miss Voysey had a genuine enthusiasm for America and +Americans; possibly the fact that she was herself an Australian made her +feel like one of us; at any rate, there were certain qualities in our +men that she found extremely congenial, and she herself certainly won +all their hearts. Anyone who wishes to start a burst of enthusiasm from +our officers who were stationed at Queenstown need only to mention the +name of Miss Voysey. The dignity with which she presided over the +Admiral's house, and the success with which she looked out for his +comfort, also inspired their respect. Miss Voysey was the leader in all +the war charities at Queenstown, and she and the Admiral made it their +personal duty to look out for the victims of torpedoed ships. At +whatever hour these survivors arrived they were sure of the most +warm-hearted attentions from headquarters. In a large hall in the Custom +House at the landing the Admiral kept a stock of cigarettes and tobacco, +and the necessary gear and supplies for making and serving hot coffee at +short notice, and nothing ever prevented him and his people from +stationing themselves there to greet and serve the survivors as soon as +they arrived--often wet and cold, and sometimes wounded. Even though the +Admiral might be at dinner he and Miss Voysey would leave their meal +half eaten and hurry to the landing to welcome the survivors. The +Admiral and his officers always insisted on serving them, and they would +even wash the dishes and put them away for the next time. The Admiral, +of course, might have ordered others to do this work, but he preferred +to give this personal expression of a real seaman's sympathy for other +seamen in distress. It is unnecessary to say that any American officers +who could get there in time always lent a hand. I am sure that long +after most of the minor incidents of this war have faded from my memory, +I shall still keep a vivid recollection of this kindly gentleman, +Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., Royal Navy, serving +coffee to wretched British, American, French, Italian, Japanese, or +negro sailors, with a cheering word for each, and afterward, with +sleeves tucked up, calmly washing dishes in a big pan of hot water. + +I have my fears that the Admiral will not be particularly pleased by the +fact that I have taken all these pains to introduce him to the American +public. Excessive modesty is one of his most conspicuous traits. When +American correspondents came to Queenstown, Admiral Bayly would receive +them courteously. "You can have all you want about the navy," he would +say, "but remember--not a word about Lewis Bayly." He was so reticent +that he was averse to having his picture taken; even the moving picture +operator detailed to get an historic record of the arrival of our +destroyers did not obtain a good view of the Admiral, for whenever Sir +Lewis saw him coming he would turn his back to the camera! My excuse for +describing this very lovable man, however, is because he became almost +an object of veneration to our American officers, and because, since for +eighteen months he was the commander of the American forces based on +Queenstown, he is an object of legitimate interest to the American +people. The fact that the Admiral was generally known to our officers as +"Uncle Lewis," and that some of those who grew to know him best even +called him that to his face, illustrates the delightful relations which +were established. Any account of the operations of our navy in the +European War would thus be sadly incomplete which ignored the splendid +sailor who was largely responsible for their success. + +Another officer who contributed greatly to the efficiency of the +American forces was Captain E. R. G. R. Evans, R.N., who was detailed by +Admiral Jellicoe at my request to act as liaison officer with our +destroyers. No more fortunate selection could have been made. Captain +Evans had earned fame as second in command of the Scott Antarctic +expedition; he had spent much time in the United States and knew our +people well; indeed when war broke out he was lecturing in our country +on his polar experiences. A few days before our division arrived Captain +Evans had distinguished himself in one of the most brilliant naval +actions of the war. He was commander of the destroyer-leader _Broke_--a +"destroyer-leader" being a destroyer of unusually large size--and in +this battle three British vessels of this type had fought six German +destroyers. Captain Evans's ship sank one German destroyer and rammed +another, passing clear over its stern and cutting it nearly in two. The +whole of England was ringing with this exploit, and it was a decided +tribute to our men that Admiral Jellicoe consented to detail the +commander of the _Broke_. He was a man of great intelligence, great +energy, and, what was almost equally to the point, he was extremely +companionable; whether he was relating his experiences at the South +Pole, or telling us of active life on a destroyer, or swapping yarns +with our officers, or giving us the value of his practical experiences +in the war, Captain Evans was always at home with our men--indeed, he +seemed to be almost one of us. + +The fact that these American destroyers were placed under the command of +a British admiral was somewhat displeasing to certain Americans. I +remember that one rather bumptious American correspondent, on a visit to +Queenstown, was loud in expressing his disapproval of this state of +affairs, and even threatened to "expose" us all in the American press. +The fact that I was specifically commissioned as destroyer commander +also confused the situation. Yet the procedure was entirely proper, +and, in fact, absolutely necessary. My official title was "Commander of +the U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters"; besides this, I was +the representative of our Navy Department at the British Admiralty and +American member of the Allied Naval Council. These duties required my +presence in London, which became the centre of all our operations. I was +commander not only of our destroyers at Queenstown, but of a destroyer +force at Brest, another at Gibraltar, of subchaser forces at Corfu and +Plymouth, of a mixed force at the Azores, of the American battle +squadrons at Scapa Flow and Berehaven, Ireland, certain naval forces at +Murmansk and Archangel in north Russia, and of many other contingents. +Clearly it was impossible for me to devote all my time exclusively to +any one of these commands; so far as actual operations were concerned it +was necessary that particular commanders should control them. All these +destroyer squadrons, including that at Queenstown, were under the +command of the American Admiral stationed in London; whenever they +sailed from Queenstown on specific duty, however, they sailed under +orders from Admiral Bayly. Any time, however, I could withdraw these +destroyers from Queenstown and send them where the particular +necessities required. My position, that is, was precisely the same as +that of General Pershing in France. He sent certain American divisions +to the British army; as long as they acted with the British they were +subject to the orders of Sir Douglas Haig; but General Pershing could +withdraw these men at any time for use elsewhere. The actual supreme +command of all our forces, army and navy, rested in the hands of +Americans; but, for particular operations, they naturally had to take +their orders from the particular officer under whom they were stationed. + + +III + +On May 17th a second American destroyer flotilla of six ships arrived at +Queenstown. From that date until July 5th a new division put in nearly +every week. The six destroyers which escorted our first troopships from +America to France were promptly assigned to duty with our forces in +Irish waters. Meanwhile other ships were added. On May 22nd the +_Melville_, the "Mother Ship" of the destroyers, arrived and became the +flagship of all the American vessels which were stationed at +Queenstown. This repair and supply ship practically took the place of a +dockyard, so far as our destroyer forces were concerned. Queenstown had +been almost abandoned as a navy yard many years before the European War +and its facilities for the repair of warships were consequently very +inadequate. The _Melville_ relieved the British authorities of many +responsibilities of this kind. She was able to do three-quarters of all +this work, except major repairs and those which required docking. Her +resources for repairing destroyers, and for providing for the wants and +comforts of our men, aroused much admiration in British naval circles. +The rapidity with which our forces settled down to work, and the +seamanly skill which they manifested from the very beginning, likewise +made the most favourable impression. By July 5th we had thirty-four +destroyers at Queenstown--a force that remained practically at that +strength until November. In 1918 much of the work of patrolling the seas +and of convoying ships to the west and south of Ireland--the area which, +in many ways, was the most important field of submarine warfare--fell +upon these American ships. The officers and crews began this work with +such zest that by June 1st I was justified in making the following +statement to the Navy Department: "It is gratifying to be able to report +that the operations of our forces in these waters have proved not only +very satisfactory, but also of marked value to the Allies in overcoming +the submarine menace. The equipment and construction of our ships have +proved adequate and sufficient, and the personnel has shown an unusually +high degree of enthusiasm and ability to cope with the situation +presented." + +It is impossible to exaggerate the enthusiasm which the arrival of these +vessels produced upon the British public. America itself experienced +something of a thrill when the news was first published that our +destroyers had reached European waters, but this was mild compared with +the joy which spread all over the British Isles. The feeling of +Americans was mainly one of pride; our people had not yet suffered much +from the European cataclysm, and despite the fact that we were now +active participants, the war still seemed very far off and unreal. The +fact that a German victory would greatly endanger our national freedom +had hardly entered our national consciousness; the idea seemed dim, +abstract, perhaps even absurd; but in Great Britain, with the guns +constantly booming almost within earshot of the people, the horrors of +the situation were acutely realized. For this reason those American +destroyers at Queenstown immediately became a symbol in the minds of the +British people. They represented not only the material assistance which +our limitless resources and our almost inexhaustible supply of men would +bring to a cause which was really in desperate straits; but they stood +also for a great spiritual fact; for the kinship of the two great +Anglo-Saxon peoples, which, although separated politically, had now +joined hands to fight for the ideals upon which the civilization of both +nations rested. In the preceding two years Great Britain had had her +moments of doubt--doubt as to whether the American people had remained +true to the principles that formed the basis of their national life; the +arrival of these ships immediately dispelled all such misgivings. + +Almost instinctively the minds of the British people turned to the day, +nearly three hundred years before, when the _Mayflower_ sailed for the +wilderness beyond the seas. The moving picture film, which depicted the +arrival of our first destroyer division, and which was exhibited all +over Great Britain to enthusiastic crowds, cleverly accentuated this +idea. This film related how, in 1620, a few Englishmen had landed in +North America; how these adventurers had laid the foundations of a new +state based on English conceptions of justice and liberty; how they had +grown great and prosperous; how the stupidity of certain British +statesmen had forced them to declare their independence; how they had +fought for this independence with the utmost heroism; how out of these +disjointed British colonies they had founded one of the mightiest +nations of history; and how now, when the liberties of mankind were +endangered, the descendants of the old _Mayflower_ pioneers had in their +turn crossed the ocean--this time going eastward--to fight for the +traditions of their race. Had Americans been making this film, they +would have illustrated another famous episode in our history that +antedated, by thirteen years, the voyage of the _Mayflower_--that is, +the landing of British colonists in Virginia, in 1607; but in the minds +of the English people the name _Mayflower_ had become merely a symbol of +American progress and all that it represented. This whole story appealed +to the British masses as one of the great miracles of history--a +single, miserable little settlement in Massachusetts Bay expanding into +a continent overflowing with resources and wealth; a shipload of men, +women, and children developing, in less than three centuries, into a +nation of more than 100,000,000 people. And the arrival of our +destroyers, pictured on the film, informed the British people that all +this youth and energy had been thrown upon their side of the battle. + +One circumstance gave a particular appropriateness to the fact that I +commanded these forces. In 1910 I had visited England as captain of the +battleship _Minnesota_, a unit in a fleet which was then cruising in +British and French waters. It was apparent even at that time that +preparations were under way for a European war; on every hand there were +plenty of evidences that Germany was determined to play her great stroke +for the domination of the world. In a report to the Admiral commanding +our division I gave it as my opinion that the great European War would +begin within four years. In a speech at the Guildhall, where 800 of our +sailors were entertained at lunch by the Lord Mayor, Sir Vezey Strong, I +used the words which involved me in a good deal of trouble at the time +and which have been much quoted since. The statement then made was +purely the inspiration of the moment; it came from the heart, not from +the head; probably the evidences that Germany was stealthily preparing +her great blow had something to do with my outburst. I certainly spoke +without any authorization from my Government, and realized at once that +I had committed a great indiscretion. "If the time should ever come," I +said, "when the British Empire is menaced by a European coalition, Great +Britain can rely upon the last ship, the last dollar, the last man, and +the last drop of blood of her kindred beyond the sea." It is not +surprising that the appearance of American ships, commanded by the +American who had spoken these words seven years before, strongly +appealed to the British sense of the dramatic. Indeed, it struck the +British people as a particularly happy fulfilment of prophecy. These +sentences were used as an introduction to the moving picture film +showing the arrival of our first destroyer division, and for weeks after +reaching England I could hardly pick up a newspaper without these words +of my Guildhall speech staring me in the face. + +Of course, any American admiral then commanding American naval forces in +European waters would have been acclaimed as the living symbol of +Anglo-American co-operation; and it was simply as the representative of +the American people and the American navy that the British people +received me so appreciatively. At first the appearance of our uniforms +aroused much curiosity; our tightly fitting blouses were quite different +from the British sack coats, and few people in London, in fact, knew who +we were. After our photographs had appeared in the press, however, the +people always recognized us in the streets. And then something quite +unusual happened. That naval and military men should salute my staff and +me was to have been expected, but that civilians should show this +respect for the American uniform was really unprecedented. Yet we were +frequently greeted in this way. It indicated, almost more than anything +else, how deeply affected the British people were by America's entrance +into the war. All classes and all ages showed this same respect and +gratitude to our country. Necessarily I had to attend many public +dinners and even to make many speeches; the people gathered on such +occasions always rose _en masse_ as a tribute to the uniform which I +wore. Sometimes such meetings were composed of boy scouts, of schoolboys +or schoolgirls, of munition workers, of journalists, or of statesmen; +and all, irrespective of age or social station or occupation, seemed +delighted to pay respect to the American navy. There were many evidences +of interest in the "American Admiral" that were really affecting. Thus +one day a message came from Lady Roberts, widow of the great soldier, +Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, saying that she was desirous of meeting the +"American Admiral." I was very glad to go out in the country and spend a +Sunday afternoon with her. This charming, white-haired old lady was very +feeble, and had to spend most of her time in a wheel-chair. But her mind +was bright as ever, and she had been following the war with the closest +attention. She listened with keen interest as I told her all about the +submarines, and she asked innumerable questions concerning them. She was +particularly affected when she spoke about the part the United States +was playing in the war, and remarked how much our participation would +have delighted the Field-Marshal. + +I have already given my first impressions of Their Majesties the King +and Queen, and time only confirmed them. Neither ever missed an +opportunity to show their appreciation of the part that we were playing. +The zeal with which the King entered into the celebration of our Fourth +of July made him very popular with all our men. He even cultivated a +taste for our national game. Certain of our early contingents of +soldiers encamped near Windsor; here they immediately laid out a +baseball diamond and daily engaged in their favourite sport. The Royal +Family used to watch our men at their play, became interested in the +game, and soon learned to follow it. The Duke of Connaught and the +Princess Patricia, his daughter, had learned baseball through their +several years' residence in Canada, and could watch a match with all the +understanding and enthusiasm of an American "fan." As our sailors and +soldiers arrived in greater numbers, the interest and friendliness of +the Royal Family increased. One of the King's most delightful traits is +his sense of humour. The Queen also showed a great fondness for stories, +and I particularly remember her amusement at the famous remark of the +Australians--perhaps the most ferocious combatants on the Western +Front--about the American soldier, "a good fighter, but a little rough." +Of all the anecdotes connected with our men, none delighted King George +so much as those concerning our coloured troops. A whole literature of +negro yarns spread rapidly over Europe; most of them, I find, have long +since reached the United States. The most lasting impression which I +retain of the head of the British Empire is that he is very much of a +human being. He loved just about the same things as the normal American +or Englishman loves--his family, his friends, his country, a good story, +a pleasant evening with congenial associates. And he had precisely the +same earnestness about the war which one found in every properly +constituted Briton or American; the victories of the Allies exhilarated +King George just as they exhilarated the man in the street, and their +defeats saddened him just as they saddened the humblest citizen. I found +in His Majesty that same solemn sense of comradeship with America which +I found in the English civilians who saluted the American uniform in the +street. + +As an evidence of the exceedingly cordial relations existing between +the two navies the Admiralty proposed, in the latter part of May, that I +should assume Admiral Bayly's command for several days while he took a +little vacation on the west coast of Ireland. Admiral Bayly was the +Commander-in-Chief of all the British forces operating on the Irish +coast. This command thus included far more than that at Queenstown; it +comprised several naval stations and the considerable naval forces in +Irish waters. Never before, so I was informed, had a foreign naval +officer commanded British naval forces in time of war. So far as +exercising any control over sea operations was concerned, this +invitation was not particularly important. Matters were running smoothly +at the Queenstown station; Admiral Bayly's second in command could +easily have kept the machine in working order; it was hardly likely, in +the few days that I was to command, that any changes in policy would be +initiated. The British Admiralty merely took this way of showing a great +courtesy to the American navy, and of emphasizing to the world the +excellent relations that existed between the two services. The act was +intended to symbolize the fact that the British and the American navies +were really one in the thoroughness of their co-operation in subduing +the Prussian menace. Incidentally the British probably hoped that the +publication of this news in the German press would not be without effect +in Germany. On June 18th, therefore, I went to Queenstown, and hoisted +my flag on the staff in front of Admiralty House. I had some hesitation +in doing this, for American navy regulations stipulate that an Admiral's +flag shall be raised only on a ship afloat, but Admiral Bayly was +insistent that his flag should come down and that mine should go up, and +I decided that this technicality might be waived. The incident aroused +great interest in England, but it started many queer rumours in +Queenstown. One was that Admiral Bayly and I had quarrelled, the British +Admiral, strangely enough, having departed in high dudgeon and left me +serenely in control. Another was that I had come to Queenstown, seized +the reins out of Admiral Bayly's hands, thrown him out of the country, +and taken over the government of Ireland on behalf of the United States, +which had now determined to free the island from British oppression! +However, in a few days Admiral Bayly returned and all went on as +before. + +During the nearly two years which the American naval forces spent in +Europe only one element in the population showed them any hostility or +even unfriendliness. At the moment when these lines are being written a +delegation claiming to represent the "Irish Republic" is touring the +United States, asking Americans to extend their sympathy and contribute +money toward the realization of their project. I have great admiration +for the mass of the Irish people, and from the best elements of these +people the American sailors received only kindness. I have therefore +hesitated about telling just how some members of the Sinn Fein Party +treated our men. But it seems that now when this same brotherhood is +attempting to stir up hatred in this country against our Allies in the +war, there is a certain pertinence in informing Americans just what kind +of treatment their brave sailors met with at the hands of the Sinn Fein +in Ireland. + +The people of Queenstown and Cork, as already described, received our +men with genuine Irish cordiality. Yet in a few weeks evidence of +hostility in certain quarters became apparent. The fact is that the part +of Ireland in which the Americans were stationed was a headquarters of +the Sinn Fein. The members of this organization were not only openly +disloyal; they were openly pro-German. They were not even neutral; they +were working day and night for a German victory, for in their misguided +minds a German victory signified an Irish Republic. It was no secret +that the Sinn Feiners were sending information to Germany and constantly +laying plots to interfere with the British and American navies. At first +it might be supposed that the large number of sailors--and some +officers--of Irish extraction on the American destroyers would tend to +make things easier for our men. Quite the contrary proved to be the +case. The Sinn Feiners apparently believed that these so-called +Irish-Americans would sympathize with their cause; in their wildest +moments they even hoped that our naval forces might champion it. But +these splendid sailors were Americans before they were anything else; +their chief ambition was the defeat of the Hun and they could not +understand how any man anywhere could have any other aim in life. They +were disgusted at the large numbers of able-bodied men whom they saw in +the streets, and did not hesitate to ask some of them why they were not +fighting on the Western Front. The behaviour of the American sailors was +good; but the mere fact that they did not openly manifest a hatred of +Great Britain and a love of Germany infuriated the Sinn Feiners. And the +eternal woman question also played its part. Our men had much more money +than the native Irish boys, and could entertain the girls more lavishly +at the movies and ice-cream stands. The men of our fleet and the Irish +girls became excellent friends; the association, from our point of view, +was a very wholesome one, for the moral character of the Irish girls of +Queenstown and Cork--as, indeed, of Irish girls everywhere--is very +high, and their companionship added greatly to the well-being and +contentment of our sailors, not a few of whom found wives among these +young women. But when the Sinn Fein element saw their sweethearts +deserting them for the American boys their hitherto suppressed anger +took the form of overt acts. + +Occasionally an American sailor would be brought from Cork to Queenstown +in a condition that demanded pressing medical attention. When he +regained consciousness he would relate how he had suddenly been set upon +by half a dozen roughs and beaten into a state of insensibility. Several +of our men were severely injured in this way. At other times small +groups were stoned by Sinn Fein sympathizers, and there were many +hostile demonstrations in moving-picture houses and theatres. Even more +frequently attacks were made, not upon the American sailors, but upon +the Irish girls who accompanied them. These chivalrous pro-German +agitators would rush up and attempt to tear the girls away from our +young men; they would pull down their hair, slap them, and even kick +them. Naturally American sailors were hardly the type to tolerate +behaviour of this kind, and some bloody battles took place. This +hostility was increased by one very regrettable occurrence in +Queenstown. An American sailor was promenading the main thoroughfare +with an Irish girl, when an infuriated Sinn Feiner rushed up, began to +abuse his former sweetheart in vile language, and attempted to lay hands +on her. The American struck this hooligan a terrific blow; he fell +backward and struck his head on the curb. The fall fractured the +assailant's skull and in a few hours he was dead. We handed our man +over to the civil authorities for trial, and a jury, composed entirely +of Irishmen, acquitted him. The action of this jury in itself indicated +that there was no sympathy among the decent Irish element, which +constituted the great majority, with this sort of tactics, but naturally +it did not improve relations between our men and the Sinn Fein. The +importance of another incident which took place at the cathedral has +been much exaggerated. It is true that a priest in his Sunday sermon +denounced the American sailors as vandals and betrayers of Irish +womanhood, but it is also true that the Roman Catholics of that section +were themselves the most enraged at this absurd proceeding. A number of +Roman Catholic officers who were present left the church in a body; the +Catholic Bishop of the Diocese called upon Admiral Bayly and apologized +for the insult, and he also punished the offending priest by assigning +him to new duties at a considerable distance from the American ships. + +But even more serious trouble was brewing, for our officers discovered +that the American sailors were making elaborate plans to protect +themselves. Had this discovery not been made in time, something like an +international incident might have resulted. Much to our regret, +therefore, it was found necessary to issue an order that no naval men, +British or American, under the rank of Commander, should be permitted to +go to Cork. Ultimately we had nearly 8,000 American men at this station; +Queenstown itself is a small place of 6,000 or 7,000, so it is apparent +that it did not possess the facilities for giving such a large number of +men those relaxations which were necessary to their efficiency. We +established a club in Queenstown, provided moving pictures and other +entertainments, and did the best we could to keep our sailors contented. +The citizens of Cork also keenly regretted our action. The great +majority had formed a real fondness for our boys; and they regarded it +as a great humiliation that the rowdy element had made it necessary to +keep our men out of their city. Many letters were printed in the Cork +newspapers apologizing to the Americans and calling upon the people to +take action that would justify us in rescinding our order. The loss to +Cork tradesmen was great; our men received not far from $200,000 to +$300,000 a month in pay; they were free spenders, and their presence in +the neighbourhood for nearly two years would have meant a fortune to +many of the local merchants. Yet we were obliged to refuse to accede to +the numerous requests that the American sailors be permitted to visit +this city. + +A committee of distinguished citizens of Cork, led by the Lord Mayor, +came to Admiralty House to plead for the rescinding of this order. +Admiral Bayly cross-examined them very sharply. It appeared that the men +who had committed these offences against American sailors had never been +punished. + +Unless written guarantees were furnished that there would be no hostile +demonstrations against British or Americans, Admiral Bayly refused to +withdraw the ban, and I fully concurred in this decision. Unfortunately +the committee could give no such guarantee. We knew very well that the +first appearance of Americans in Cork would be the signal for a renewal +of hostilities, and the temper of our sailors was such that the most +deplorable consequences might have resulted. We even discovered that the +blacksmiths on the U.S.S. _Melville_ were surreptitiously manufacturing +weapons which our men could conceal on their persons and with which they +proposed to sally forth and do battle with the Sinn Fein! So for the +whole period of our stay in Queenstown our sailors were compelled to +keep away from the dangerous city. But the situation was not without its +humorous aspects. Thus the pretty girls of Cork, finding that the +Americans could not come to them, decided to come to the Americans; +every afternoon a trainload would arrive at the Queenstown station, +where our sailors would greet them, give them a splendid time, and then, +in the evening, escort them to the station and send a happy crowd on +their way home. + +But the Sinn Feiners interfered with us in much more serious ways than +this. They were doing everything in their power to help Germany. With +their assistance German agents and German spies were landed in Ireland. +At one time the situation became so dangerous that I had to take +experienced officers whose services could ill be spared from our +destroyers and assign them to our outlying air stations in Ireland. +This, of course, proportionately weakened our fleet and did its part in +prolonging the war. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY + + +I + +All this time that we were seeking a solution for the submarine problem +we really had that solution in our hands. The seas presented two +impressive spectacles in those terrible months of April, May, and June, +1917. One was the comparative ease with which the German submarines were +sinking merchant vessels; the other was their failure materially to +weaken the Allied fleets. If we wish a counter-picture to that presented +by the Irish Sea and the English Channel, where merchant shipping was +constantly going down, we should look to the North Sea, where the +British Grand Fleet, absolutely intact, was defiantly riding the waves. +The uninformed public explained this apparent security in a way of its +own; it believed that the British dreadnoughts were anchored behind +booms, nets, and mine-fields, through which the submarines could not +penetrate. Yet the fact of the matter was that the Grand Fleet was +frequently cruising in the open sea, in the waters which were known to +be the most infested with submarines. The German submarines had been +attempting to destroy this fleet for two and a half years. It had been +their plan to weaken this great battle force by "attrition"; to sink the +great battleships one by one, and in this way to reduce the fighting +power of the fleet to such a point that the German dreadnoughts could +have some chances of success. Such had been the German programme, widely +heralded at the beginning of the war; nearly three years had now passed, +but how had this pretentious scheme succeeded? The fact was that the +submarines had not destroyed a single dreadnought. It was certainly a +profitable study in contrasts--that of merchant ships constantly being +torpedoed and that of battleships constantly repelling such attacks. +Certainly a careful study of this situation ought to bring out facts +which would assist the Allies in solving the most baffling problem of +the war. + +Yet there was no mystery about the immunity which these great fighting +vessels were enjoying; the submarine problem, so far as it affected the +battle fleet, had already been solved. The explanation was found in the +simple circumstance that, whenever the dreadnoughts went to sea, they +were preceded by a screen of cruisers and destroyers. It almost seemed +as though these surface craft were serving as a kind of impenetrable +wall against which the German U-boats were beating themselves in vain. +Yet to the casual observer there seemed to be no reason why the +submarines should stand in any particular terror of the destroyers. +Externally they looked like the least impressive war vessels afloat. +When they sailed ahead of the battle squadrons, the destroyers were +ungraceful objects upon the surface of the water; the impression which +they conveyed was that of fragility rather than of strength, and the +idea that they could ever be the guardians of the mighty battleships +which sailed behind them at first seemed almost grotesque. Yet these +little vessels really possessed the power of overcoming the submarine. +The war had not progressed far when it became apparent that the U-boat +could not operate anywhere near this speedy little surface vessel +without running serious risk of destruction. + +Until the reports of submarine fighting began to find their way into the +papers, however, the destroyer was probably the one type of warship in +which the public had the smallest interest. It had become, indeed, a +kind of ugly duckling of the Navy. Our Congress had regularly neglected +it; year after year our naval experts had recommended that four +destroyers be built for every battleship, and annually Congress had +appropriated for only one or two. The war had also found Great Britain +without a sufficient number of destroyers for the purpose of +anti-submarine warfare. The Admiralty had provided enough for screening +the Grand Fleet in cruising and in battle, but it had been called upon +to divert so many for the protection of troop transportation, supply +ships, and commerce generally that the efficiency of the fleet had been +greatly undermined. Thus Britain found herself without enough +destroyers to meet the submarine campaign; this situation was not due to +any lack of foresight, but to a failure to foresee that any civilized +nation could ever employ the torpedo in unrestricted warfare against +merchant ships and their crews. + +The one time that this type of vessel had come prominently into notice +was in 1904, when several of them attacked the Russian fleet at Port +Arthur, damaging several powerful vessels and practically ending Russian +sea power in the Far East. The history of the destroyer, however, goes +back much further than 1904. It was created to fulfil a duty not unlike +that which it has played so gloriously in the World War. In the late +seventies and early eighties a new type of war vessel, the torpedo boat, +caused almost as much perturbation as the submarine has caused in recent +years. This speedy little fighter was invented to serve as a medium for +the discharge of a newly perfected engine of naval warfare, the +automobile torpedo. It was its function to creep up to a battleship, +preferably under cover of darkness or in thick weather, and let loose +this weapon against her unsuspecting hulk. The appearance of the torpedo +boat led to the same prediction as that which has been more recently +inspired by the submarine; in the eyes of many it simply meant the end +of the great surface battleship. But naval architects, looking about for +the "answer" to this dangerous craft, designed another type of warship +and appropriately called it the "torpedo boat destroyer." This vessel +was not only larger and speedier than its appointed antagonist, but it +possessed a radius of action and a seaworthiness which enabled it to +accompany the battle fleet. Its draft was so light that a torpedo could +pass harmlessly under the keel, and it carried an armament which had +sufficient power to end the career of any torpedo boat that came its +way. Few types have ever justified their name so successfully as the +torpedo boat destroyer. So completely did it eliminate that little +vessel as a danger to the fighting ships that practically all navies +long since ceased to build torpedo boats. Yet the destroyer promptly +succeeded to the chief function of the discarded vessel, that of +attacking capital ships with torpedoes; and, in addition to this, it +assumed the duty of protecting battleships from similar attack by enemy +vessels of the same type. + +It surprises many people to learn that the destroyer is not a little +boat but a warship of considerable size. This vessel to-day impresses +most people as small only because all ships, those which are used for +commerce and those which are used for war, have increased so greatly in +displacement. The latest specimens of the destroyer carry four-or +five-inch guns and twelve torpedo tubes, each of which launches a +torpedo that weighs more than a ton, and runs as straight as an arrow +for more than six miles. The _Santa Maria_, the largest vessel of the +squadron with which Columbus made his first voyage to America, had a +displacement of about five hundred tons, and thus was about half as +large as a destroyer; and even at the beginning of the clipper ship era +few vessels were much larger. + +Previous to 1914 it was generally believed that torpedo attacks would +play a large part in any great naval engagement, and this was the reason +why all naval advisers insisted that a large number of these vessels +should be constructed as essential units of the fleet. Yet the war had +not made much progress when it became apparent that this versatile craft +had another great part to play, and that it would once more justify its +name in really heroic fashion. Just as it had proved its worth in +driving the surface torpedo boat from the seas, so now it developed into +a very dangerous foe to the torpedo boat that sailed beneath the waves. +Events soon demonstrated that, in all open engagements between submarine +and destroyer, the submarine stood very little chance. The reason for +this was simply that the submarine had no weapon with which it could +successfully resist the attack of the destroyer, whereas the destroyer +had several with which it could attack the submarine. The submarine had +three or four torpedo tubes, and only one or two guns, and with neither +could it afford to risk attacking the more powerfully armed destroyer. +The U-boat was of such a fragile nature that it could never afford to +engage in a combat in which it stood much chance of getting hit. A +destroyer could stand a comparatively severe pounding and still remain +fairly intact, but a single shell, striking a submarine, was a very +serious matter; even though the vessel did not sink as a result, it was +almost inevitable that certain parts of its machinery would be so +injured that it would have difficulty in getting into port. It therefore +became necessary for the submarine always to play safe, to fight only +under conditions in which it had the enemy at such a disadvantage that +it ran little risk itself; and this was the reason why it preferred to +attack merchant and passenger ships rather than vessels, such as the +destroyer, that could energetically defend themselves. + +The comparatively light draft of the destroyer, which is about nine or +ten feet, pretty effectually protects it from the submarine's torpedo, +for this torpedo, to function with its greatest efficiency, must take a +course about fifteen feet under water; if it runs nearer the surface +than this, it comes under the influence of the waves, and does not make +a straight course. More important still, the speed of the destroyer, the +ease with which it turns, circles, and zigzags, makes it all but +impossible for a torpedo to be aimed with much chance of hitting her. +Moreover, the discharge of this missile is a far more complicated +undertaking than is generally supposed. The submarine commander cannot +take position anywhere and discharge his weapon more or less wildly, +running his chances of hitting; he must get his boat in place, calculate +range, course, and speed, and take careful aim. Clearly it is difficult +for him to do this successfully if his intended victim is scurrying +along at the rate of thirty or forty miles an hour. Moreover, the +destroyer is constantly changing its course, making great circles and +indulging in other disconcerting movements. So well did the Germans +understand the difficulty of torpedoing a destroyer that they +practically never attempted so unprofitable and so hazardous an +enterprise. + +Torpedoes are complicated and expensive mechanisms; each one costs about +$8,000 and the average U-boat carried only from eight to twelve; it was +therefore necessary to husband these precious weapons, to use them only +when the chances most favoured success; the U-boat commander who wasted +them in attempts to sink destroyers would probably have been +court-martialled. + +But while the submarine had practically no means of successfully +fighting the destroyer, the destroyer had several ways of putting an end +to the submarine. The advantage which really made the destroyer so +dangerous, as already intimated, was its excessive speed. On the surface +the U-boat made little more than fifteen miles an hour, and under the +surface it made little more than seven or eight. If the destroyer once +discovered its presence, therefore, it could reach its prey in an +incredibly short time. It could attack with its guns, and, if conditions +were favourable, it could ram; and this was no trifling accident, for a +destroyer going at thirty or forty miles could cut a submarine nearly in +two with its strong, razor-like bow. In the early days of the war these +were the main methods upon which it relied to attack, but by the time +that I had reached London, another and much more frightful weapon had +been devised. This was the depth charge, a large can containing about +three hundred pounds of TNT, which, if it exploded anywhere within one +hundred feet of the submarine, would either destroy it entirely or so +injure it that the victim usually had to come to the surface and +surrender. + +I once asked Admiral Jellicoe who was the real inventor of this +annihilating missile. + +"No man in particular," he said. "It came into existence almost +spontaneously, in response to a pressing need. Gunfire can destroy +submarines when they are on the surface, but you know it can accomplish +nothing against them when they are submerged. This fact made it +extremely difficult to sink them in the early days of the war. One day, +when the Grand Fleet was cruising in the North Sea, a submarine fired a +torpedo at one of the cruisers. The cruiser saw the periscope and the +wake of the torpedo, and had little difficulty in so manoeuvring as to +avoid being struck. She then went full speed to the spot from which the +submarine had fired its torpedo, in the hope of ramming it. But by the +time she arrived the submarine had submerged so deeply that the cruiser +passed over her without doing her any harm. Yet the officers and crew +could see the submerged hull; there the enemy lay in full view of her +pursuers, yet perfectly safe! The officers reported this incident to me +in the presence of Admiral Madden, second in command. + +"'Wouldn't it have been fine,' said Madden, 'if they had had on board a +mine so designed that, when dropped overboard, it would have exploded +when it reached the depth at which the submarine was lying?'" + +"That remark," continued Admiral Jellicoe, "gave us the germinal idea of +the depth charge. I asked the Admiralty to get to work and produce a +'mine' that would act in the way that Admiral Madden had suggested. It +proved to be very simple to construct--an ordinary steel cylinder filled +with TNT; this was fitted with a simple firing appliance which was set +off by the pressure of the water, and could be so adjusted that it would +explode the charge at any depth desired. This apparatus was so simple +and so necessary that we at once began to manufacture it." + +The depth charge looked like the innocent domestic ash can, and that was +the name by which it soon came to be popularly known. Each destroyer +eventually carried twenty or thirty of these destructive weapons at the +stern; a mere pull on a lever would make one drop into the water. Many +destroyers also carried strange-looking howitzers, which were made in +the shape of a Y, and from which one ash can could be hurled fifty yards +or more from each side of the vessel. The explosion, when it took place +within the one hundred feet which I have mentioned as usually fatal to +the submarine, would drive the plates inward and sometimes make a leak +so large that the vessel would sink almost instantaneously. At a +somewhat greater distance it frequently produced a leak of such serious +proportions that the submarine would be forced to blow her ballast +tanks, come to the surface, and surrender. Even when the depth charge +exploded considerably more than a hundred feet away, the result might be +equally disastrous, for the concussion might distort the hull and damage +the horizontal rudders, making it impossible to steer, or it might so +injure the essential machinery that the submarine would be rendered +helpless. Sometimes the lights went out, leaving the crew groping in +blackness; necessary parts were shaken from their fastenings; and in +such a case the commander had his choice of two alternatives, one to be +crushed by the pressure of the water, and the other to come up and be +captured or sunk by his surface foe. It is no reflection upon the +courage of the submarine commanders to say that in this embarrassing +situation they usually preferred to throw themselves upon the mercy of +the enemy rather than to be smashed or to die a lingering and agonizing +death under the water. Even when the explosion took place at a distance +so great that the submarine was not seriously damaged, the experience +was a highly disconcerting one for the crew. If a dozen depth charges +were dropped, one after the other, the effect upon the men in the hunted +vessel was particularly demoralizing. In the course of the war several +of our own submarines were depth-charged by our own destroyers, and from +our crews we obtained graphic descriptions of the sensations which +resulted. It was found that men who had passed through such an ordeal +were practically useless for several days, and that sometimes they were +rendered permanently unfit for service. The state of nerves which +followed such an experience was not unlike that new war psychosis known +as shell-shock. One of our officers who had had such an adventure told +me that the explosion of a single depth charge under the water might be +compared to the concussion produced by the simultaneous firing of all +the fourteen-inch guns of a battleship. One can only imagine what the +concussion must have been when produced by ten or twenty depth charges +in succession. Whether or not the submarine was destroyed or seriously +injured, a depth-charged crew became extremely cautious in the future +about getting anywhere in the neighbourhood of a destroyer; and among +the several influences which ultimately disorganized the _moral_ of the +German U-boat service these contacts with depth charges were doubtless +the most important. The hardiest under-water sailor did not care to go +through such frightful moments a second time. + +This statement makes it appear as though the depth charge had settled +the fate of the submarine. Yet that was far from being the case, for +against the ash can, with its 300 pounds of TNT, the submarine possessed +one quality which gave it great defensive power. That was ability to +make itself unseen. Strangely enough, the average layman is inclined to +overlook this fairly apparent fact, and that is the reason why, even at +the risk of repeating myself, I frequently refer to it. Indeed, the only +respect in which the subsurface boat differs essentially from all other +war vessels is in this power of becoming invisible. Whenever it descries +danger from afar, the submarine can disappear under the water in +anywhere from twenty seconds to a minute. And its great advantage is +that it can detect its enemy long before that enemy can detect the +submarine. A U-boat, sailing awash, or sailing with only its +conning-tower exposed, can see a destroyer at a distance of about +fifteen miles if the weather is clear; but, under similar conditions, +the destroyer can see the submarine at a distance of about four miles. +Possessing this great advantage, the submarine can usually decide +whether it will meet the enemy or not; if it decides that it is wise to +avoid an encounter, all it has to do is to duck, remain submerged until +the destroyer has passed on, entirely unconscious of its presence, and +then to resume its real work, which is not that of fighting warships, +but of sinking merchantmen. The chief anxiety of the U-boat commander is +thus to avoid contact with its surface foe and its terrible depth +charge, whereas the business of the destroyer commander is to get within +fighting distance of his quarry. + +Ordinarily, conditions favour the U-boat in this game, simply because +the ocean is so large a place. But there is one situation in which the +destroyer has more than a fighting chance, for the power of the +submarine to keep its presence secret lasts only so long as it remains +out of action. If it makes no attempt to fight, its presence can hardly +ever be detected; but just as soon as it becomes belligerent, it +immediately reveals its whereabouts. If it comes to the surface and +fires its guns, naturally it advertises to its enemy precisely where it +is; but it betrays its location almost as clearly when it discharges a +torpedo. Just as soon as the torpedo leaves the submarine, a wake, +clearly marking its progress, appears upon the surface of the water. +Though most newspaper readers have heard of this tell-tale track, I have +found few who really understand what a conspicuous disturbance it is. +The torpedo is really a little submarine itself; it is propelled by +compressed air, the exhaust of which stirs up the water and produces a +foamy, soapy wake, which is practically the same as that produced by the +propeller of an ocean liner. This trail is four or five feet wide; it is +as white and is as distinct as a chalk line drawn upon a blackboard, +provided the weather is clear and the sun is in the right direction. +Indeed, it is sometimes so distinct that an easily manoeuvred ship, +and even sometimes a merchantman, can avoid the torpedo which it sees +advancing merely by putting over the helm and turning out of its +course. But the chief value of this wake to the submarine hunters is +that it shows the direction in which the submarine was located when the +torpedo started on its course. It stands out on the surface of the water +like a long, ghostly finger pointing to the spot where the foe let loose +its shaft. + +As soon as the destroyer sees this betraying disturbance, the commander +rings for full speed; and one of the greatest advantages of this type of +vessel is that it can attain full speed in an incredibly short time. The +destroyer then dashes down the wake until it reaches the end, which +indicates the point where the submarine lay when it discharged its +missile. At this point the surface vessel drops a depth charge and then +begins cutting a circle, say, to the right. Pains are taken to make this +circle so wide that it will include the submarine, provided it has gone +in that direction. The destroyer then makes another circle to the left. +Every ten or fifteen seconds, while describing these circles, it drops a +depth charge; indeed, not infrequently it drops twenty or thirty in a +few minutes. If there is another destroyer in the neighbourhood it also +follows up the wake and when it reaches the indicated point, it circles +in the opposite direction from the first. Sometimes more than two may +start for the suspected location and, under certain conditions, the +water within a radius of half a mile or more may be seething with +exploding depth charges. + +It is plain from this description that the proceeding develops into an +exceedingly dangerous game for the attacking submarine. It is a simple +matter to calculate the chances of escaping which the enemy has under +these conditions. That opportunity is clearly measured by the time which +elapses from the moment when it discharges its torpedo to the moment +when the destroyer has reached the point at which it was discharged. +This interval gives the subsurface boat a certain chance to get away; +but its under-water speed is moderate, and so by the time the destroyer +reaches the critical spot, the submarine has advanced but a short +distance away from it. How far has she gone? In what direction did she +go? These are the two questions which the destroyer commander must +answer, and the success with which he answers them accurately measures +his success in sinking or damaging his enemy, or in giving him a good +scare. If he always decided these two points accurately, he would almost +always "get" his submarine; the chances of error are very great, +however, and that is the reason why the submarine in most cases gets +away. All that the surface commander knows is that there is a U-boat +somewhere in his neighbourhood, but he does not know its precise +location and so he is fighting more or less in the dark. In the great +majority of cases the submarine does get away, but now and then the +depth charge reaches its goal and ends its career. + +If only one destroyer is hunting, the chances of escape strongly favour +the under-water craft; if several pounce upon her at once, however, the +chances of escaping are much more precarious. If the water is shallow +the U-boat can sometimes outwit the pursuer by sinking to the bottom and +lying there in silent security until its surface enemy tires of the +chase. But in the open sea there is no possibility of concealing itself +and so saving itself in this fashion, for if the submarine sinks beyond +a certain depth the pressure of the water will crush it. + +While the record shows that the U-boat usually succeeded in evading the +depth charges, there were enough sunk or seriously damaged or given a +bad shake-up to serve as a constant reminder to the crews that they ran +great danger in approaching waters which were protected by destroyers. +The U-boat captains, as will appear, avoided such waters regularly; they +much preferred to attack their merchant prey in areas where these +soul-racking depth charges did not interfere with their operations. + +It is now becoming apparent why the great battle fleet, which always +sailed behind a protecting screen of such destroyers, was practically +immune from torpedo attack. In order to assail these battleships the +submarine was always compelled to do the one thing which, above all +others, it was determined to avoid--to get within depth-charge radius of +the surface craft. In discharging the torpedo, distance, as already +intimated, is the all-important consideration. The U-boat carries a +torpedo which has a much shorter range than that of the destroyer; it +was seldom effective if fired at more than 2,000 yards, and beyond that +distance its chances of hitting became very slight. Indeed, a much +shorter distance than that was desirable if the torpedo was to +accomplish its most destructive purpose. So valuable were these missiles +and so necessary was it that every one should be used to good advantage, +that the U-boat's captain had instructions to shoot at no greater +distance than 300 yards, unless the conditions were particularly +favourable. In the early days, the torpedoes which were fired at a +greater distance would often hit the ships on the bow or the stern, and +do comparatively little damage; such vessels could be brought in, +repaired in a short time, and again put to sea. The German Admiralty +discovered that in firing from a comparatively long distance it was +wasting its torpedoes; it therefore ordered its men to get so near the +prey that it could strike the vessel in a vital spot, preferably in the +engine-room; and to do this it was necessary to creep up within 300 +yards. But to get as close as that to the destroyers which screened the +battleships meant almost certain destruction. Thus the one method of +attack which was left to the U-boat was to dive under the destroyer +screen and come up in the midst of the battle fleet itself. A few +minutes after its presence should become known, however, a large number +of destroyers would be dropping depth charges in its neighbourhood, and +its chances of escaping destruction would be almost nil, to say nothing +of its chances of destroying ships. + +The Germans learned the futility of this kind of an operation early in +the war, and the man who taught them this lesson was Commander +Weddingen, the same officer who had first demonstrated the value of the +submarine in practical warfare. It was Otto Weddingen who, in September, +1914, sank the old British cruisers, the _Hogue_, the _Cressy_, and the +_Aboukir_, an exploit which made him one of the great popular heroes of +Germany. A few months afterward Commander Weddingen decided to try an +experiment which was considerably more hazardous than that of sinking +three unescorted cruisers; he aspired to nothing less ambitious than an +attack upon the Grand Fleet itself. On March 18th a part of this fleet +was cruising off Cromarty, Scotland; here Weddingen came with the +_U-29_, dived under the destroyer screen and fired one torpedo, which +passed astern of the _Neptune_. The alarm was immediately sounded, and +presently the battleship _Dreadnought_, which had seen the periscope, +started at full speed for the submarine, rammed the vessel and sent it +promptly to the bottom. As it was sinking the bow rose out of the water, +plainly disclosing the number _U-29_. There was not one survivor. +Weddingen's attempt was an heroic one, but so disastrous to himself and +to his vessel that very few German commanders ever tried to emulate his +example. It clearly proved to the German Admiralty that it was useless +to attempt to destroy the Grand Fleet with submarines, or even to weaken +it piecemeal, and probably this experience had much to do with this new +kind of warfare--that of submarines against unprotected merchant +ships--which the Germans now proceeded to introduce. + +The simple fact is that the battle fleet was never so safe as when it +was cruising in the open sea, screened by destroyers. It was far safer +when it was sailing thus defiantly, constantly inviting attack, than +when it was anchored at its unprotected base at Scapa Flow. Indeed, +until Scapa Flow was impregnably protected by booms and mines, the +British commanders recognized that cruising in the open sea was its best +means of avoiding the German U-boats. No claim is made that the +submarine cannot dive under the destroyer screen and attack a battle +fleet, and possibly torpedo one or more of its vessels. The illustration +which has been given shows that Weddingen nearly "got" the _Neptune_; +and had this torpedo gone a few feet nearer, his experiment might have +shown that, although he subsequently lost his own life, crew, and ship, +he had sunk one British battleship, a proceeding which, in war, might +have been recognized as a fair exchange. But the point which I wish to +emphasize is that the chances of success were so small that the Germans +decided that it was not worth while to make the attempt. Afterward, when +merchant vessels were formed into convoys, a submarine would +occasionally dive under the screen and destroy a ship; but most such +attacks were unsuccessful, and experience taught the Germans that a +persistent effort of this kind would cause the destruction of so many +submarines that their campaign would fail. So the U-boat commanders left +the Grand Fleet alone, either because they lacked nerve or because +their instructions from Berlin were explicit to that effect. + + +II + +Having constantly before my eyes this picture of the Grand Fleet immune +from torpedo attack, naturally the first question I asked, when +discussing the situation with Admiral Jellicoe and others, was this: +"Why not apply this same principle to merchant ships?" + +If destroyers could keep the submarines away from battleships, they +could certainly keep them away from merchantmen. It is clear, from the +description already given, precisely how the battleships had been made +safe from submarines; they had proceeded, as usual, in a close +formation, or "convoy," and their destroyer screen had proved effective. +Thus logic apparently indicated that the convoy system was the "answer" +to the submarine. + +Yet the convoy, as used in previous wars, differed materially from any +application of the idea which could possibly be made to the present +contest. This scheme of sailing vessels in groups, and escorting them by +warships, is almost as old as naval warfare itself. As early as the +thirteenth century, the merchants of the Hanseatic League were compelled +to sail their ships in convoy as a protection against the pirates who +were then constantly lurking in the Baltic Sea. The Government of Venice +used this same device to protect its enormous commerce. In the fifteenth +century the large trade in wool and wine which existed between England +and the Moorish ports of Spain was safeguarded by convoys, and in the +sixteenth century Spain herself regularly depended upon massing her +ships to defend her commerce with the West Indies against the piratical +attacks of English and French adventurers. The escorts provided for +these "flotas" really laid the foundation of the mighty Spanish fleet +which threatened England's existence for more than a hundred years. By +the time of Queen Elizabeth the convoy had thus become the +all-prevailing method of safeguarding merchant shipping, but it was in +the Napoleonic wars that it had reached its greatest usefulness. The +convoys of that period were managed with some military precision; there +were carefully stipulated methods of collecting the ships, of meeting +the cruiser escorts at the appointed rendezvous, and of dispersing them +when the danger zone was passed; and naval officers were systematically +put in charge. The convoys of this period were very large; from 200 to +300 ships were not an unusual gathering, and sometimes 500 or more would +get together at certain important places, such as the entrance to the +Baltic. But these ships, of course, were very small compared with those +of the present time. It was only necessary to supply such aggregations +of vessels with enough protecting cruisers to overwhelm any raiders +which the enemy might send against them. The merchantmen were not +required to sail in any particular formation, nor were they required to +manoeuvre against unseen mysterious foes. Neither was it absolutely +essential that they should keep constantly together; and they could even +spread themselves somewhat loosely over the ocean. If an enemy raider +appeared on the horizon, the escorting cruiser or cruisers left the +convoy and began chase; a battle ensued, the convoy meanwhile passing on +its voyage unharmed. When its protecting vessels had disposed of the +attackers, they rejoined the merchantmen. No unusual seamanship was +demanded of the merchant captains, for the whole responsibility for +their safety rested with the escorting cruisers. + +But the operation of beating off an occasional surface raider, which +necessarily fights in the open, is quite a different procedure from that +of protecting an aggregation of vessels from enemies that discharge +torpedoes under the water. As part protection against such insidious +attacks both the merchant ships and the escorting men-of-war of to-day +had in this war to keep up a perpetual zigzagging. This zigzag, indeed, +was in itself an efficacious method of protection. As already said, the +submarine was forced to attain an advantageous position before it could +discharge its torpedo; it was its favourite practice to approach to +within a few hundred yards in order to hit its victim in a vital spot. +This mere fact shows that zigzagging in itself was one of the best +methods of avoiding destruction. Before this became the general rule, +the task of torpedoing a vessel was comparatively easy. All it was +necessary for the submarine to do was to bring the vessel's masts in +line; that is, to get directly ahead of her, submerge with the small +periscope showing only occasionally, and to fire the torpedo at short +range as the ship passed by. Except in the case of very slow vessels, +she could of course do this only when she was not far from the course of +her advancing prey when she first sighted her. If, however, the vessel +was zigzagging, this pretty game was usually defeated; the submarine +never knew in what direction to go in order to get within torpedoing +distance, and she could not go far because her speed under water is so +slow. The same conditions apply to a zigzagging convoy. This explained +why, as soon as the merchant vessel or convoy entered the submarine +zone, or as soon as a submarine was sighted, it began zigzagging, first +on one side and then on the other, and always irregularly, its course +comprising a disjointed line, which made it a mere chance whether the +submarine could get into a position from which to fire with any +certainty of obtaining results. A vessel sailing alone could manoeuvre +in this way without much difficulty, but it is apparent that twenty or +thirty vessels, sailing in close formation, would not find the operation +a simple one. It was necessary for them to sail in close and regular +formation in order to make it possible to manoeuvre them and screen +them with destroyers, so it is evident that the closer the formation the +fewer the destroyers that would be needed to protect it. These +circumstances make the modern convoy quite a different affair from the +happy-go-lucky proceeding of the Napoleonic era. + +It is perhaps not surprising that the greatest hostility to the convoys +has always come from the merchant captains themselves. In old days they +chafed at the time which was consumed in assembling the ships, at the +necessity for reducing speed to enable the slower vessels to keep up +with the procession, and at the delay in getting their cargoes into +port. In all wars in which convoys have been used it has been very +difficult to keep the merchant captains in line. In Nelson's day these +fine old salts were constantly breaking away from their convoys and +taking their chances of running into port unescorted. If the merchant +master of a century ago rebelled at the comparatively simply managed +convoy of those days it is not strange that their successors of the +present time should not have looked with favour upon the relatively +complicated and difficult arrangement required of them in this war. In +the early discussions with these men at the Admiralty they showed +themselves almost unanimously opposed to the convoy. + +"The merchantmen themselves are the chief obstacle to the convoy," said +Admiral Jellicoe. "We have discussed it with them many times and they +declare that it is impossible. It is all right for war vessels to +manoeuvre in close formation, they say, for we spend our time +practising in these formations, and so they think that it is second +nature to us. But they say that they cannot do it. They particularly +reject the idea that when in formation they can manoeuvre their ships +in the fog or at night without lights. They believe that they would lose +more ships through collisions than the submarines would sink." + +I was told that the whole subject had been completely threshed out at a +meeting which had been held at the Admiralty on February 23, 1917, about +six weeks before America had entered the war. At that time ten masters +of merchant ships had met Admiral Jellicoe and other members of the +Admiralty and had discussed the convoy proposition at length. In laying +the matter before these experienced seamen Admiral Jellicoe emphasized +the necessity of good station-keeping, and he described the close +formation which the vessels would have to maintain. It would be +necessary for the ships to keep together, he explained, otherwise the +submarines could pick off the stragglers. He asked the masters whether +eight merchant ships, which had a speed varying perhaps two knots, could +keep station in line ahead (that is, in single file or column) 500 yards +apart, and sail in two columns down the Channel. + +"It would be absolutely impossible," the ten masters replied, almost in +a chorus. + +A discouraging fact, they said, was that many of the ablest merchant +captains had gone into the navy, and that many of those who had replaced +them could not be depended on to handle their ships in such a formation. + +"We have so few competent deck officers that the captain would have to +be on the bridge the whole twenty-four hours," they said. And the +difficulty was not only with the bridge, but with the engine-room. In +order to keep the ships constantly the same distance apart it would be +necessary accurately to regulate their speed; the battleships could do +this because they had certain elaborate devices, which the merchant +vessels lacked, for timing the revolutions of the engines. The poor +quality of the coal which they were obtaining would also make it +difficult to maintain a regular speed. + +Admiral Jellicoe then asked the masters whether they could sail in twos +or threes and keep station. + +"Two might do it, but three would be too many," was the discouraging +verdict. But the masters were positive that even two merchantmen could +not safely keep station abreast in the night-time without lights; two +such vessels would have to sail in single file, the leading ship showing +a stern light. The masters emphasized their conviction that they +preferred to sail alone, each ship for herself, and to let each one take +her chances of getting into port. + +And there the matter rested. I had the opportunity of discussing the +convoy system with several merchant captains, and in these discussions +they simply echoed the views which had been expressed at this formal +conference. I do not believe that British naval officers came in contact +with a single merchant master who favoured the convoy at that time. They +were not doubtful about the idea; they were openly hostile. The British +merchant captains are a magnificent body of seamen; their first thought +was to serve their country and the Allied cause; their attitude in this +matter was not obstinacy; it simply resulted from their sincere +conviction that the convoy system would entail greater shipping losses +than were then being inflicted by the German submarines. + +Many naval officers at that time shared the same view. They opposed the +convoy not only on these grounds; its introduction would mean +immediately cutting down the tonnage 15 or 20 per cent., because of the +time which would be consumed in assembling the ships and awaiting +escorts and in the slower average speed which they could make. Many ship +owners and directors of steamship companies expressed the same opinions. +They also objected to the convoy on the ground that it would cause +considerable delay and hence would result in loss of earnings. Yet the +attitude of the merchant marine had not entirely eliminated the convoy +from consideration. At the time when I arrived the proposal was still +being discussed; the rate at which the Germans were sinking merchantmen +made this inevitable. And there seemed to be two schools among Allied +naval men, one of which was opposed to the convoy, while the other +insisted that it should be given a trial. The convoy had one +irresistible attraction for the officer which seemed to counterbalance +all the objections which were being urged against it. Its adoption would +mean taking the offensive against the German submarines. The essential +defect of the patrol system, as it was then conducted, was that it was +primarily a defensive measure. Each destroyer cruised around in an +assigned area, ready to assist vessels in distress, escort ships through +her own "square" and, incidentally, to attack a submarine when the +opportunity was presented. But the mere fact that a destroyer was +patrolling a particular area meant only, as already explained, that the +submarine had occasionally to sink out of sight until she had passed by. +Consequently the submarine proceeded to operate whenever a destroyer was +not in sight, and this was necessarily most of the time, for the +submarine zone was such a big place and the Allied destroyer fleet was +so pitifully small that it was impossible to cover it effectively. Under +these conditions there were very few encounters between destroyers and +submarines, at least in the waters south and west of Ireland, for the +submarines took all precautions against getting close enough to be +sighted by the destroyers. + +But the British and French navies were not the only ones which, at this +time, were depending upon the patrol as a protection against the +subsurface boat. The American navy was committing precisely the same +error off our Atlantic coast. As soon as Congress declared war against +Germany we expected that at least a few of the U-boats would cross the +Atlantic and attack American shipping; indeed, many believed that some +had already crossed in anticipation of war; the papers were filled with +silly stories about "submarine bases" in Mexican waters, on the New +England coast, and elsewhere; submarines were even reported entering +Long Island Sound; nets were stretched across the Narrows to keep them +out of New York Harbour; and our coasting vessels saw periscopes and the +wakes of torpedoes everywhere from Maine to Florida. So prevalent was +this apprehension that, in the early days of the war, American +destroyers regularly patrolled our coast looking for these far-flung +submarines. Yet the idea of seeking them this way was absurd. Even had +we known where the submarine was located there would have been little +likelihood that we could ever have sighted it, to say nothing of +getting near it. We might have learned that a German U-boat was +operating off Cape Cod; we might have had the exact latitude and +longitude of the location which it was expected that it would reach at a +particular moment. At the time the message was sent the submarine might +have been lying on the surface ready to attack a passing merchantman, +but even under these conditions the destroyer could never have reached +her quarry, for as soon as the U-boat saw the enemy approaching it would +simply have ducked under the water and remained there in perfect safety. +When all danger had passed it would again have bobbed up to the surface +as serenely as you please, and gone ahead with its appointed task of +sinking merchant ships. One of the astonishing things about this war was +that many of the naval officers of all countries did not seem to +understand until a very late date that it was utterly futile to send +anti-submarine surface craft out into the wide ocean to attack or chase +away submarines. The thing to do, of course, was to make the submarines +come to the anti-submarine craft and fight in order to get merchantmen. + +I have made this point before, and I now repeat the explanation to +emphasize that the patrol system was necessarily unsuccessful, because +it made almost impossible any combats with submarines and afforded very +little protection to shipping. The advantage of the convoy system, as +its advocates now urged, was precisely that it made such combats +inevitable. In other words, it meant offensive warfare. It was proposed +to surround each convoy with a protecting screen of destroyers in +precisely the same way that the battle fleet was protected. Thus we +should compel any submarine which was planning to torpedo a convoyed +ship to do so only in waters that were infested with destroyers. In +order to get into position to discharge its missile the submarine would +have to creep up close to the rim that marked the circle of these +destroyers. Just as soon as the torpedo started on its course and the +tell-tale wake appeared on the surface the protecting ships would +immediately begin sowing the waters with their depth charges. Thus in +the future the Germans would be compelled to fight for every ship which +they should attempt to sink, instead of sinking them conveniently in +waters that were free of destroyers, as had hitherto been their +privilege. Already the British had demonstrated that such a screen of +destroyers could protect merchant ships as well as war vessels. They +were making this fact clear every day in the successful transportation +of troops and supplies across the Channel. In this region they had +established an immune zone, which was constantly patrolled by destroyers +and other anti-submarine craft, and through these the merchant fleets +were constantly passing with complete safety. The proposal to convoy all +merchant ships was a proposal to apply this same system on a much +broader scale. If we should arrange our ships in compact convoys and +protect them with destroyers we would really create another immune zone +of this kind, and this would be different from the one established +across the Channel only in that it would be a movable one. In this way +we should establish about a square mile of the surface of the ocean in +which submarines could not operate without great danger, and then we +could move that square mile along until port was reached. + +The advantages of the convoy were thus so apparent that, despite the +pessimistic attitude of the merchant captains, there were a number of +officers in the British navy who kept insisting that it should be tried. +In this discussion I took my stand emphatically with these officers. +From the beginning I had believed in this method of combating the U-boat +warfare. Certain early experiences had led me to believe that the +merchant captains were wrong in underestimating the quality of their own +seamanship. It was my conviction that these intelligent and hardy men +did not really know how capable they were at handling ships. In my +discussions with them they disclosed an exaggerated idea of the seamanly +ability of naval officers in manoeuvring their large fleets. They +attributed this to the superior training of the men and to the special +manoeuvring qualities of the ship. "Warships are built so that they +can keep station, and turn at any angle at a moment's notice," they +would say, "but we haven't any men on our ships who can do these +things." As a matter of fact, these men were entirely in error and I +knew it. Their practical experience in handling ships of all sizes, +shapes, and speeds under a great variety of conditions is in reality +much more extensive than naval officers can possibly enjoy. I learned +this more than thirty years ago, when stationed on the Pennsylvania +schoolship, teaching the boys navigation. This was one of the most +valuable experiences of my life, for it brought me in every-day contact +with merchant seamen, and it was then that I made the discovery which +proved so valuable to me now. + +It is true that merchant captains had much to learn about steaming and +manoeuvring in formation, but I was sure they could pick it up quickly +and carry it out successfully under the direction of naval officers--the +convoy commander being always a naval officer. + +The naval officer not only has a group of vessels that are practically +uniform in speed and ability to turn around quickly, but he is provided +also with various instruments which enable him to keep the revolutions +of his engines constant, to measure distances and the like. Moreover, as +a junior officer, he is schooled in manoeuvring these very ships for +some years before he is trusted with the command of one of them, and he, +therefore, not only knows their peculiarities, but also those of their +captains--the latter very useful information, by the way. + +Though it was necessary for the merchantmen, on the other hand, to bring +their much clumsier ships into formation with perhaps thirty entirely +strange vessels of different sizes, shapes, speeds, nationalities, and +manoeuvring qualities, yet I was confident that they were competent to +handle them successfully under these difficult conditions. Indeed, +afterward, one of my most experienced destroyer commanders reported that +while he was escorting a convoy of twenty-eight ships they kept their +stations quite as well as battleships, while they were executing two +manoeuvres to avoid a submarine. + +Such influence as I possessed at this time, therefore, I threw in with +the group of British officers which was advocating the convoy. + +There was, however, still one really serious impediment to adopting this +convoy system, and that was that the number of destroyers available was +insufficient. The British, for reasons which have been explained, did +not have the necessary destroyers for this work, and this was what made +so very important the participation of the United States in the naval +war--for our navy possessed the additional vessels that would make +possible the immediate adoption of the convoy system. I do not wish to +say that the convoy would not have been established had we not sent +destroyers for that purpose, yet I do not see how otherwise it could +have been established in any complete and systematic way at such an +early date. And we furnished other ships than destroyers, for besides +providing what I have called the modern convoy--that which protects the +compact mass of vessels from submarines--it was necessary also to +furnish escorts after the old Napoleonic plan. It was the business of +the destroyers to conduct the merchantmen only through the submarine +zone. They did not take them the whole distance across the ocean, for +there was little danger of submarine attack until the ships had arrived +in the infested waters. This would have been impossible in any case with +the limited number of destroyers. But from the time the convoys left the +home port there was a possibility that the same kind of attack would be +launched as that to which convoys were subjected in Nelsonian days; +there was the danger, that is, that surface war vessels, raiders or +cruisers, might escape from their German bases and swoop down upon them. +We always had before our minds the activities of the _Moewe_, and we +therefore deemed it necessary to escort the convoys across the ocean +with battleships and cruisers, just as was the practice a century ago. +The British did not have ships enough available for this purpose, and +here again the American navy was able to supply the lack; for we had a +number of pre-dreadnoughts and cruisers that were ideally adapted to +this kind of work. + + +III + +On April 30th I received a message from Admiral Jellicoe requesting me +to visit him at the Admiralty. When I arrived he said that the projected +study of the convoy system had been made, and he handed me a copy of it. +It had been decided to send one experimental convoy from Gibraltar. The +Admiralty, he added, had not yet definitely decided that the convoy +system should be adopted, but there was every intention of giving it a +thorough and fair trial. That same evening at dinner I met Mr. Lloyd +George, Sir Edward Carson, and Lord Milner, and once more discussed with +them the whole convoy idea. I found the Prime Minister especially +favourable to the plan and, in fact, civilians in general were more +kindly disposed toward the convoy than seamen, because they were less +familiar with the nautical and shipping difficulties which it involved. + +Naval officers were immediately sent to Gibraltar to instruct the +merchant masters in the details of assembling and conducting vessels. +Eight-knot ships were selected for the experiment, and a number of +destroyers were assigned for their protection. The merchant captains, as +was to be expected, regarded the whole enterprise suspiciously, but +entered into it with the proper spirit. + +On May 20th that first convoy arrived at its English destination in +perfect condition. The success with which it made the voyage disproved +all the pessimistic opinions which the merchant sailors had entertained +about themselves. They suddenly discovered, as I had contended, that +they could do practically everything which, in their conferences with +the Admiralty, they had declared that they were unable to do. In those +meetings they had asserted that not more than two ships could keep +station; but now they discovered that the whole convoy could sail with +stipulated distances between the vessels and keep this formation with +little difficulty. They were drilled on the way in zigzagging and +manoeuvring--a practice carried out subsequently with all convoys--and +by the time they reached the danger zone they found that, in obedience +to a prearranged signal, all the ships could turn as a single one, and +perform all the zigzag evolutions which the situation demanded. They had +asserted that they could not sail at night without lights and that an +attempt to do so would result in many collisions, but the experimental +convoy proved that this was merely another case of self-delusion. +Naturally the arrival of this convoy caused the greatest satisfaction in +the Admiralty, but the most delighted men were the merchant captains +themselves, for the whole thing was to them a complete revelation of +their seamanly ability, and naturally it flattered their pride. The news +of this arrival naturally travelled fast in shipping circles; it +completely changed the attitude of the merchant sailors, and the chief +opponents of the convoy now became its most enthusiastic advocates. + +Outside shipping circles, however, nothing about this convoy was known +at that time. Yet May 20th, the date when it reached England safely, +marked one of the great turning-points of the war. That critical voyage +meant nothing less than that the Allies had found the way of defeating +the German submarine. The world might still clamour for a specific +"invention" that would destroy all the submarines overnight, or it might +demand that the Allies should block them in their bases, or suggest that +they might do any number of impossible things, but the naval chiefs of +the Allies discovered, on May 20, 1917, that they could defeat the +German campaign even without these rather uncertain aids. The submarine +danger was by no means ended when this first convoy arrived; many +anxious months still lay ahead of us; other means would have to be +devised that would supplement the convoy; yet the all-important fact was +that the Allied chiefs now realized, for the first time, that the +problem was not an insoluble one; and that, with hard work and infinite +patience, they could keep open the communications that were essential to +victory. The arrival of these weather-beaten ships thus brought the +assurance that the armies and the civilian populations could be supplied +with food and materials, and that the seas could be kept open for the +transportation of American troops to France. In fine, it meant that the +Allies could win the war. + +On May 21st the British Admiralty, which this experimental convoy had +entirely converted, voted to adopt the convoy system for all merchant +shipping. Not long afterward the second convoy arrived safely from +Hampton Roads, and then other convoys began to put in from Scandinavian +ports. On July 21st I was able definitely to report to Washington that +"the success of the convoys so far brought in shows that the system will +defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally and in time." + +But while we recognize the fact that the convoy preserved our +communications and so made possible the continuation of the war, we must +not overlook a vitally important element in its success. In describing +the work of the destroyer, which was the protecting arm of the convoy, I +have said nothing about the forces that really laid the whole foundation +of the anti-submarine campaign. All the time that these destroyers were +fighting off the submarines the power that made possible their +operations was cruising quietly in the North Sea, doing its work so +inconspicuously that the world was hardly aware of its existence. For +back of all these operations lay the mighty force of the Grand Fleet. +Admiral Beatty's dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, which were afterward +supplemented by a fine squadron of American ships, kept the German +surface vessels penned in their harbours and in this way left the ocean +free for the operations of the Allied surface craft. I have already said +that, in April, 1917, the Allied navies, while they controlled the +surface of the water, did not control the subsurface, which at that time +was practically at the disposition of the Germans. Yet the determining +fact, as we were now to learn, was that this control of the surface was +to give us the control of the subsurface also. Only the fact that the +battleships kept the German fleet at bay made it possible for the +destroyers and other surface craft to do their beneficent work. In an +open sea battle their surface navies would have disposed of the German +fleet; but let us suppose for a moment that an earthquake, or some other +great natural disturbance, had engulfed the British fleet at Scapa Flow. +The world would then have been at Germany's mercy and all the destroyers +the Allies could have put upon the sea would have availed them nothing, +for the German battleships and battle cruisers could have sunk them or +driven them into their ports. Then Allied commerce would have been the +prey, not only of the submarines, which could have operated with the +utmost freedom, but of the German surface craft as well. In a few weeks +the British food supplies would have been exhausted. There would have +been an early end to the soldiers and munitions which Britain was +constantly sending to France. The United States could have sent no +forces to the Western Front and the result would have been the surrender +which the Allies themselves, in the spring of 1917, regarded as not a +remote possibility. America would then have been compelled to face the +German power alone, and to face it long before we had had an opportunity +of assembling our resources and of equipping our armies. The world was +preserved from all these calamities because the destroyer and the convoy +solved the problem of the submarine and because back of these agencies +of victory lay Admiral Beatty's squadrons, holding at arm's length the +German surface ships while these comparatively fragile craft were saving +the liberties of the world. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION + + +I + +Our first division of destroyers reached Queenstown on a Friday morning, +May 4, 1917; the following Monday they put to sea on the business of +hunting the submarine and protecting commerce. For the first month or +six weeks they spent practically all their time on patrol duty in +company with British destroyers, sloops, and other patrol vessels. +Though the convoy system was formally adopted in the latter part of May, +it was not operating completely and smoothly until August or September. +Many troop and merchant convoys were formed in the intervening period +and many were conducted through the submarine zone by American +destroyers; but our ships spent much time sailing singly, hunting for +such enemies as might betray their presence, or escorting individual +cargoes. The early experiments had demonstrated the usefulness of the +convoy system, yet a certain number of pessimists still refused to +accept it as the best solution of the shipping problem; and to +reorganize practically all the shipping of the world, scattered +everywhere on the seven seas, necessarily took time. + +But this intervening period furnished indispensable training for our +men. They gained an every-day familiarity with the waters which were to +form the scene of their operations and learned many of the tricks of the +German submarines. It was a strange world in which these young Americans +now found themselves. The life was a hard one, of course, in those +tempestuous Irish waters, with the little destroyers jumping from wave +to wave, sometimes showing daylight beneath their keels, their bows +frequently pointing skyward, or plunged deep into heavy seas, and their +sides occasionally ploughing along under the foamy waves. For days the +men lived in a world of fog and mist; rain in those regions seemed to be +almost the normal state of nature. Much has been written about the +hardships of life aboard the destroyer, and to these narratives our men +could add many details of their own. These hardships, however, did not +weigh heavily upon them, for existence in those waters, though generally +monotonous, possessed at times plenty of interest and excitement. The +very appearance of the sea showed that our men were engaging in a kind +of warfare very different from that for which they had been trained. The +enormous amount of shipping seemed to give the lie to the German reports +that British commerce had been practically arrested. A perpetual stream +of all kinds of vessels, liners, tramps, schooners, and fishing boats, +was passing toward the Irish and the English coasts. Yet here and there +other floating objects on the surface told the story. Now it was a stray +boat filled with the survivors of a torpedoed vessel; now a raft on +which lay the bodies of dead men; now the derelict hulk of a ship which +the Germans had abandoned as sunk, but which persisted in floating +aimlessly around, a constant danger to navigation. Loose mines, bobbing +in the water, hinted at the perils that were constantly threatening our +forces. In the tense imagination of the lookouts floating spars or other +débris easily took the form of periscopes. Queer-looking sailing +vessels, at a distance, aroused suspicions that they might be submarines +in disguise. A phosphorescent trail in the water was sometimes mistaken +for the wake of a torpedo. The cover of a hatchway floating on the +surface, if seen at a distance of a few hundred yards, looked much like +the conning-tower of a submarine, while the back of an occasional whale +gave a life-like representation of a U-boat awash--in fact, so life-like +was it that on one occasion several of our submarine chasers on the +English coast dropped depth charges on a whale and killed it. + +But it was the invisible rather than the visible evidences of warfare +that especially impressed our men. The air all around them was electric +with life and information. One had only to put the receiver of the +wireless to his ear to find himself in a new and animated world. The +atmosphere was constantly spluttering messages of all kinds coming from +all kinds of places. Sometimes these were sent by Admiral Bayly from +Queenstown; they would direct our men to go to an indicated spot and +escort an especially valuable cargo ship; they would tell a particular +commander that a submarine was lying at a designated latitude and +longitude and instruct him to go and "get" it. Running conversations +were frequently necessary between destroyers and the ships which they +had been detailed to escort. "Give me your position," the destroyer +would ask. "What is the name of your assistant surgeon, and who is his +friend on board our ship?" the suspicious vessel would reply--such +precaution being necessary to give assurance that the query had not come +from a German submarine. "Being pursued by a submarine Lat. 50 N., Long. +15 W."--cries of distress like this were common. Another message would +tell of a vessel that was being shelled; another would tell of a ship +that was sinking; while other messages would give the location of +lifeboats which were filled with survivors and ask for speedy help. Our +wireless operators not only received the news of friends, but also the +messages of enemies. Conversations between German submarines frequently +filled the air. They sometimes attempted to deceive us by false "S.O.S." +signals, hoping that in this way they could get an opportunity to +torpedo any vessel that responded to the call. But these attempts were +unsuccessful, for our wireless operators had no difficulty in +recognizing the "spark" of the German instruments. At times the surface +of the ocean might be calm; there would not be a ship in sight or a sign +of human existence anywhere; yet the air itself would be uninterruptedly +filled with these reminders of war. + +The duties of our destroyers, in these earliest days, were to hunt for +submarines, to escort single ships, to pick up survivors in boats, and +to go to the rescue of ships that were being attacked. For the purpose +of patrol the sea was divided into areas thirty miles square; and to +each of these one destroyer, sloop, or other vessel was assigned. The +ship was required to keep within its allotted area, unless the pursuit +of a submarine should lead it into a neighbouring one. This patrol, as I +have described, was not a satisfactory way of fighting submarines. A +vessel would occasionally get a distant glimpse of the enemy, but that +was all; as soon as the U-boat saw the ship, it simply dived to security +beneath the waves. Our destroyers had many chances to fire at the enemy +but usually at very long ranges; some of them had lively scraps, which +perhaps involved the destruction of U-boats, though this was always a +difficult thing to prove. Yet the mere fact that submarines were seldom +sunk by destroyers on patrol, either by ourselves or by the Allies, did +not mean that the latter accomplished nothing. The work chiefly expected +of destroyers on patrol was that they should keep the U-boats under the +surface as much as possible and protect commerce. Normally the submarine +sails on top of the water, looking for its prey. As long as it is beyond +the merchantmen's range of vision, it uses its high surface speed of +about 14 knots to attain a position ahead of the advancing vessel; +before the surface vessel reaches a point where its lookout can see the +submarine, the U-boat dives and awaits the favourable moment for firing +its torpedo. It cannot take these preliminary steps if there is a +destroyer anywhere in the neighbourhood; the mere presence of such a +warship therefore constitutes a considerable protection to any merchant +ship that is within sight. The submarine normally prefers to use its +guns on merchant ships, for the torpedoes are expensive and +comparatively few in number. Destroyers constantly interfered with these +gunning operations. A long distance shot usually was sufficient to make +the under-water vessel submerge and thus lose its power for doing harm. +The early experiences of our destroyers with submarines were of this +kind; but the work of chasing U-boats under the water, escorting a small +proportion of the many cargo ships, and picking up survivors, important +as it was, did not really constitute effective anti-submarine warfare. +It gave our men splendid training, it saved many a merchant ship, it +rescued many victims from the extreme dangers of German ruthlessness, it +sank a small number of submarines, but it could never have won the war. + +This patrol by destroyers and light surface vessels has been criticized +as affording an altogether ineffective method of protecting shipping, +especially when compared with the convoy system. This criticism is, of +course, justified; still we must understand that it was the only +possible method until we had enough anti-submarine craft to make the +convoy practicable. Nor must we forget that this Queenstown patrol was +organized systematically and operated with admirable skill and tireless +energy. Most of this duty fell at this time upon the British destroyers, +sloops, and other patrol vessels, which were under the command of +Admiral Bayly, and these operations were greatly aided by the gallant +actions of the British Q-ships, or "mystery ships." Though some of the +admirable exploits of these vessels will be recorded in due time, it may +be said here that the record which these ships made was not only in all +respects worthy of the traditions of their great service, but also that +they exhibited an endurance, a gallantry, and seamanlike skill that has +few parallels in the history of naval warfare. + + +II + +The headquarters of the convoy system was a room in the British +Admiralty; herein was the mainspring of the elaborate mechanism by which +ten thousand ships were conducted over the seven oceans. Here every +morning those who had been charged with the security of the Allies' +lines of communication reviewed the entire submarine situation. +Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander L. Duff, R.N., bore this heavy +responsibility, ably assisted by a number of British officers. Captain +Byron A. Long, U.S.N., a member of my staff, was associated with Admiral +Duff in this important work. It was Captain Long's duty to co-ordinate +the movements of our convoys with the much more numerous convoys of the +Allies; he performed this task so efficiently that, once the convoy +organization was in successful operation, I eliminated the whole subject +from my anxieties and requested Captain Long not to inform me when troop +convoys sailed from the United States or when they were due to arrive in +France or England. There seemed to be no reason why both of us should +lose sleep over the same cause. + +The most conspicuous feature of the convoy room was a huge chart, +entirely covering the wall on one side of the office; access to this +chart was obtained by ladders not unlike those which are used in shoe +stores. It gave a comprehensive view of the North and South American +coast, the Atlantic Ocean, the British Isles, and a considerable part +of Europe and Africa. The ports which it especially emphasized were +Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax, New York, Hampton Roads, Gibraltar, and +Sierra Leone and Dakar, ports on the west coast of Africa. Thin threads +were stretched from each one of these seven points to certain positions +in the ocean just outside the British Isles, and on these threads were +little paper boats, each one of which represented a convoy. When a +particular convoy started from New York, one of these paper boats was +placed at that point; as it made its way across the ocean, the boat was +moved from day to day in accordance with the convoy's progress. At any +moment, therefore, a mere glance at this chart, with its multitude of +paper boats, gave the spectator the precise location of all the commerce +which was then _en route_ to the scene of war. + +But there were other exhibits on the chart which were even more +conspicuous than these minute representations of convoys. Little circles +were marked off in the waters surrounding the British Isles, each one of +which was intended to show the location of a German submarine. From day +to day each one of these circles was moved in accordance with the +ascertained positions of the submarine which it represented, a straight +line indicating its course on the chart. Perhaps the most remarkable +fact about the Allied convoy service was the minute information which it +possessed about the movements of German submarines. A kind of separate +intelligence bureau devoted its entire attention to this subject. +Readers of detective stories are familiar with the phenomenon known as +"shadowing." It is a common practice in the detective's fascinating +profession to assign a man, known as a "shadow," to the duty of keeping +a particular person under constant observation. With admirable patience +and skill an experienced "shadow" keeps in view this object of his +attention for twenty-four hours; he dogs him through crowded streets, +tracks him up and down high office buildings, accompanies him to +restaurants, trolley cars, theatres, and hotels, and unobtrusively +chases him through dense thoroughfares in cabs and automobiles. "We get +him up in the morning and we put him to bed at night" is the way the +"shadow" describes the assiduous care which he bestows upon his +unsuspecting victim. In much the same fashion did the Allied secret +service "shadow" German submarines; it got each submarine "up in the +morning and put it to bed at night." That is to say, the intelligence +department took charge of Fritz and his crew as they emerged from their +base, and kept an unwearied eye upon them until they sailed back home. +The great chart in the convoy room of the Admiralty showed, within the +reasonable limits of human fallibility, where each submarine was +operating at a particular moment, and it also kept minute track of its +performances. + +Yet it was not so difficult to gather this information as may at first +be supposed. I have already said that there were comparatively few +submarines, perhaps not more than an average of eight or nine, which +were operating at the same time in the waters south and west of Ireland, +the region with which we Americans were most concerned. These boats +betrayed their locations in a multitude of ways. Their commanders were +particularly careless in the use of wireless. The Germanic passion for +conversation could not be suppressed even on the U-boats, even though +this national habit might lead to the most serious consequences. +Possibly also the solitary submarine felt lonely; at any rate, as soon +as it reached the Channel or the North Sea, it started an almost +uninterrupted flow of talk. The U-boats communicated principally with +each other, and also with the Admiralty at home; and, in doing this, +they gave away their positions to the assiduously listening Allies. The +radio-direction finder, an apparatus by which we can instantaneously +locate the position from which a wireless message is sent, was the +mechanism which furnished us much of this information. Of course, the +Germans knew that their messages revealed their locations, for they had +direction finders as well as we, but the fear of discovery did not act +as a curb upon a naturally loquacious nature. And we had other ways of +following their movements. The submarine spends much the larger part of +its time on the surface. Sailing thus conspicuously, it was constantly +being sighted by merchant or military ships, which had explicit +instructions to report immediately the elusive vessel, and to give its +exact location. Again it is obvious that a submarine could not fire at a +merchantman or torpedo one, or even attempt to torpedo one, without +revealing its presence. The wireless operators of all merchant vessels +were supplied at all times with the longitude and latitude of their +ships; their instructions required them immediately to send out this +information whenever they sighted a submarine or were attacked by one. +In these several ways we had little difficulty in "shadowing" the +U-boats. For example, we would hear that the _U-53_ was talking just +outside of Heligoland; this submarine would be immediately plotted on +the chart. As the submarine made only about ten knots on the surface, in +order to save fuel oil, and much less under the surface, we could draw a +circle around this point, and rest assured that the boat must be +somewhere within this circle at a given time. But in a few hours or a +day we would hear from this same boat again; perhaps it was using its +wireless or attacking a merchantman; or perhaps one of our vessels had +spotted it on the surface. The news of this new location would justify +the convoy officers in moving this submarine on our chart to this new +position. Within a short time the convoy officers acquired an +astonishingly intimate knowledge of these boats and the habits of their +commanders. Indeed, the personalities of some of these German officers +ultimately took shape with surprising clearness; for they betrayed their +presence in the ocean by characteristics that often furnished a means of +identifying them. Each submarine behaved in a different way from the +others, the difference, of course, representing the human element in +control. One would deliver his attacks in rapid succession, boldly and +almost recklessly; another would approach his task with the utmost +caution; certain ones would display the meanest traits in human nature; +while others--let us be just--were capable of a certain display of +generosity, and possibly even of chivalry. By studying the individual +traits of each commander we could often tell just which one was +operating at a given time; and this information was extremely valuable +in the game in which we were engaged. + +"Old Hans is out again," the officers in the convoy room would remark. + +They were speaking of Hans Rose, the commander of the _U-53_; this was +that same submarine officer who, in the fall of 1916, brought that boat +to Newport, Rhode Island, and torpedoed five or six ships off Nantucket. +Our men never saw Hans Rose face to face; they had not the faintest +idea whether he was fat or lean, whether he was fair or dark; yet they +knew his military characteristics intimately. He became such a familiar +personality in the convoy room and his methods of operation were so +individual, that we came to have almost a certain liking for the old +chap. Other U-boat commanders would appear off the hunting grounds and +attack ships in more or less easy-going fashion. Then another boat would +suddenly appear, and--bang! bang! bang! Torpedo after torpedo would fly, +four or five ships would sink, and then this disturbing person would +vanish as unexpectedly as he had arrived. Such an experience informed +the convoy officers that Hans Rose was once more at large. We acquired a +certain respect for Hans because he was a brave man who would take +chances which most of his compatriots would avoid; and, above all, +because he played his desperate game with a certain decency. Sometimes, +when he torpedoed a ship, Rose would wait around until all the lifeboats +were filled; he would then throw out a tow line, give the victims food, +and keep all the survivors together until the rescuing destroyer +appeared on the horizon, when he would let go and submerge. This +humanity involved considerable risk to Captain Rose, for a destroyer +anywhere in his neighbourhood, as he well knew, was a serious matter. It +was he who torpedoed our destroyer, the _Jacob Jones_. He took a shot at +her from a distance of two miles--a distance from which a hit is a pure +chance; and the torpedo struck and sank the vessel within a few minutes. +On this occasion Rose acted with his usual decency. The survivors of the +_Jacob Jones_ naturally had no means of communication, since the +wireless had gone down with their ship; and now Rose, at considerable +risk to himself, sent out an "S.O.S." call, giving the latitude and +longitude, and informing Queenstown that the men were floating around in +open boats. It is perhaps not surprising that Rose is one of the few +German U-boat commanders with whom Allied naval officers would be +willing to-day to shake hands. I have heard naval officers say that they +would like to meet him after the war. + +We were able to individualize other commanders; the business of +acquiring this knowledge, learning the location of their submarines and +the characteristics of their boats, and using this vital information in +protecting convoys, was all part of the game which was being played in +London. It was the greatest game of "chess" which history has known--a +game that exacted not only the most faithful and studious care, but one +in which it was necessary that all the activities should be centralized +in one office. This small group of officers in the Admiralty convoy +room, composed of representatives of all the nations concerned, +exercised a control which extended throughout the entire convoy system. +It regulated the dates when convoys sailed from America or other ports +and when they arrived; if it had not taken charge of this whole system, +congestion and confusion would inevitably have resulted. We had only a +limited number of destroyers to escort all troops and other important +convoys arriving in Europe; it was therefore necessary that they should +arrive at regular and predetermined intervals. It was necessary also +that one group of officers should control the routing of all convoys, +otherwise there would have been serious danger of collisions between +outward and inward bound ships, and no possibility of routing them clear +of the known positions of submarines. The great centre of all this +traffic was not New York or Hampton Roads, but London. It was +inevitable, if the convoy system was to succeed, that it should have a +great central headquarters, and it was just as inevitable that this +headquarters should be London. + +On the huge chart already described the convoys, each indicated by a +little boat, were shown steadily making their progress toward the +appointed rendezvous. Eight or nine submarines, likewise indicated on +the chart, were always waiting to intercept them. On that great board +the prospective tragedies of the seas were thus unfolding before our +eyes. Here, for example, was a New York convoy of twenty ships, steaming +toward Liverpool, but steering straight toward the position of a +submarine. The thing to do was perfectly plain. It was a simple matter +to send the convoy a wireless message to take a course fifty miles to +the south where, according to the chart, there were no hidden enemies. +In a few hours the little paper boat, which represented this group of +ships and which was apparently headed for destruction, would suddenly +turn southward, pass around the entirely unconscious submarine, and then +take an unobstructed course for its destination. The Admiralty convoy +board knew so accurately the position of all the submarines that it +could almost always route the convoys around them. It was an extremely +interesting experience to watch the paper ships on this chart deftly +turn out of the course of U-boats, sometimes when they seemed almost on +the point of colliding with them. That we were able constantly to save +the ships by sailing the convoys around the submarines brings out the +interesting fact that, even had there been no destroyer escort, the +convoy in itself would have formed a great protection to merchant +shipping. There were times when we had no escorting vessels to send with +certain convoys; and in such instances we simply routed the ships in +masses, directed them on courses which we knew were free of submarines, +and in this way brought them safely into port. + + +III + +The Admiralty in London was thus the central nervous system of a +complicated but perfectly working organism which reached the remotest +corners of the world. Wherever there was a port, whether in South +America, Australia, or in the most inaccessible parts of India or China, +from which merchantmen sailed to any of the other countries which were +involved in the war, representatives of the British navy and the British +Government were stationed, all working harmoniously with shipping men in +the effort to get their cargoes safely through the danger zones. These +danger zones occupied a comparatively small area surrounding the +belligerent countries, but the safeguarding of the ships was an +elaborate process which began far back in the countries from which the +commerce started. Until about July, 1917, the world's shipping for the +most part had been unregulated; now for the first time it was arranged +in hard and fast routes and despatched in accordance with schedules as +fixed as those of a great railroad. The whole management of convoys, +indeed, bore many resemblances to the method of handling freight cars on +the American system of transcontinental lines. In the United States +there are several great headquarters of freight, sometimes known as +"gateways," places, that is, at which freight cars are assembled from a +thousand places, and from which the great accumulations are routed to +their destinations. Such places are Pittsburg, Buffalo, St. Louis, +Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, San Francisco--to mention only a few. +Shipping destined for the belligerent nations was similarly assembled, +in the years 1917 and 1918, at six or eight great ocean "gateways," and +there formed into convoys for "through routing" to the British Isles, +France, and the Mediterranean. Only a few of the ships that were +exceptionally fast--speed in itself being a particularly efficacious +protection against submarines--were permitted to ignore this routing +system, and dash unprotected through the infested area. This was a +somewhat dangerous procedure even for such ships, however, and they were +escorted whenever destroyers were available. All other vessels, from +whatever parts of the world they might come, were required to sail first +for one of these great assembling points, or "gateways"; and at these +places they were added to one of the constantly forming convoys. Thus +all shipping which normally sailed to Europe around the Cape of Good +Hope proceeded up the west coast of Africa until it reached the port of +Dakar or Sierra Leone, where it joined the convoy. Shipping from the +east coast of South America--ports like Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Buenos +Aires, and Montevideo--instead of sailing directly to Europe, joined the +convoy at this same African town. Vessels which came to Britain and +France by way of Suez and Mediterranean ports found their great stopping +place at Gibraltar--a headquarters of traffic which, in the huge amount +of freight which it "created," became almost the Pittsburg of this +mammoth transportation system. The four "gateways" for North America and +the west coast of South America were Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax, New +York, and Hampton Roads. The grain-laden merchantmen from the St. +Lawrence valley rendezvoused at Sydney and Halifax. Vessels from +Portland, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and other Atlantic points +found their assembling headquarters at New York, while ships from +Baltimore, Norfolk, the Gulf of Mexico, and the west coast of South +America proceeded to the great convoy centre which had been established +at Hampton Roads. + +In the convoy room of the Admiralty these aggregations of ships were +always referred to as the "Dakar convoy," the "Halifax convoy," the +"Hampton Roads convoy," and the like. When the system was completely +established the convoys sailed from their appointed headquarters on +regular schedules, like railroad trains. From New York one convoy +departed every sixteen days for the west coast of England and one left +every sixteen days for the east coast. From Hampton Roads one sailed +every eight days to the west coast and one every eight days to the east +coast, and convoys from all the other convoy points maintained a +similarly rigid schedule. The dates upon which these sailings took place +were fixed, like the arrivals and departures of trains upon a railroad +time-table, except when it became necessary to delay the sailing of a +convoy to avoid congestion of arrivals. According to this programme, the +first convoy to the west coast left New York on August 14, 1917, and its +successors thereafter sailed at intervals of about sixteen days. The +instructions sent to shipmasters all over the world, by way of the +British consulates, gave explicit details concerning the method of +assembling their convoys. + +Here, for example, was a ship at New York, all loaded and ready to sail +for the war zone. The master visited the port officer at the British +consulate, who directed him to proceed to Gravesend Bay, anchor his +vessel, and report to the convoy officers for further instructions. The +merchant captain, reaching this indicated spot, usually found several +other vessels on hand, all of them, like his ship, waiting for the +sailing date. The commander of the gathering convoy, under whose +instructions all the merchantmen were to operate, was a naval officer, +usually of the rank of commodore or captain, who maintained constant +cable communication with the convoy room of the Admiralty and usually +used one of the commercial vessels as his flagship. When the sailing day +arrived usually from twenty to thirty merchantmen had assembled; the +commander summoned all their masters, gave each a blue book containing +instructions for the management of convoyed ships, and frequently +delivered something in the nature of a lecture. Before the aggregation +sailed it was joined by a cruiser or pre-dreadnought battleship of the +American navy, or by a British or French cruiser. This ship was to +accompany the convoy across the Atlantic as far as the danger zone; its +mission was not, as most people mistakenly believed, to protect the +convoy from submarines, but to protect it from any surface German raider +that might have escaped into the high seas. The Allied navies constantly +had before their minds the exploits of the _Emden_; the opportunity to +break up a convoy in mid-ocean by dare-devil enterprises of this kind +was so tempting that it seemed altogether likely that Germany might take +advantage of it. To send twenty or thirty merchant ships across the +Atlantic with no protection against such assaults would have been to +invite a possible disaster. As a matter of fact, the last German raider +that even attempted to gain the high seas was sunk in the North Sea by +the British Patrol Squadron in February, 1917. + +On the appointed day the whole convoy weighed anchor and silently +slipped out to sea. To such spectators as observed its movements it +seemed to be a rather limping, halting procession. The speed of a convoy +was the speed of its slowest ship, and vessels that could easily make +twelve or fourteen knots were obliged to throttle down their engines, +much to the disgust of their masters, in order to keep formation with a +ship that made only eight or ten; though whenever possible vessels of +nearly equal speed sailed together. Little in the newly assembled group +suggested the majesty of the sea. The ships formed a miscellaneous and +ill-assorted company, rusty tramps shamefacedly sailing alongside of +spick-and-span liners; miserable little two-or three-thousand ton ships +attempting to hold up their heads in the same company with other ships +of ten or twelve. The whole mass was sprawled over the sea in most +ungainly fashion; twenty or thirty ships, with spaces of nine hundred or +a thousand yards stretching between them, took up not far from ten +square miles of the ocean surface. Neither at this stage of the voyage +did the aggregation give the idea of efficiency. It presented about as +desirable a target as the submarine could have desired. But the period +taken in crossing the ocean was entirely devoted to education. Under the +tutorship of the convoy commander, the men composing the twenty or +thirty crews went every day to school. For fifteen or twenty days upon +the broad Atlantic they were trained in all the evolutions which were +necessary for coping with the submarine. Every possible situation that +could arise in the danger zone was anticipated and the officers and the +crews were trained to meet it. They perfected themselves in the signal +code; they learned the art of making the sudden manoeuvres which were +instantaneously necessary when a submarine was sighted; they acquired a +mastery in the art of zigzagging; and they became accustomed to sailing +at night without lights. The crews were put through all the drills which +prepared them to meet such crises as the landing of a torpedo in their +engine-room or the sinking of the ship; and they were thoroughly +schooled in getting all hands safely into the boats. Possibly an +occasional scare on the way over may have introduced the element of +reality into these exercises; though no convoys actually met submarines +in the open ocean, the likelihood that they might do so was never +absent, especially after the Germans began sending out their huge +under-water cruisers. + +The convoy commander left his port with sealed orders, which he was +instructed not to open until he was a hundred miles at sea. These +orders, when the seal was broken, gave him the rendezvous assigned by +Captain Long of the convoy board in London. The great chart in the +convoy room at the Admiralty indicated the point to which the convoy was +to proceed and at which it would be met by the destroyer escorts and +taken through the danger zone. This particular New York convoy commander +was now perhaps instructed to cross the thirtieth meridian at the +fifty-second parallel of latitude, where he would be met by his escort. +He laid his course for that point and regulated his speed so as to reach +it at the appointed time. But he well knew that these instructions were +only temporary. The precise point to which he would finally be directed +to sail depended upon the movement and location of the German submarines +at the time of his arrival. If the enemy became particularly active in +the region of this tentative rendezvous, then, as the convoy approached +it, a wireless from London would instruct the commander to steer +abruptly to another point, perhaps a hundred miles to north or south. + +"Getting your convoy" was a searching test of destroyer seamanship, +particularly in heavy or thick weather. It was not the simplest thing to +navigate a group of destroyers through the tempestuous waters of the +North Atlantic, with no other objective than the junction point of a +certain meridian and parallel, and reach the designated spot at a +certain hour. Such a feat demanded navigation ability of a high order; +and the skill which our American naval officers displayed in this +direction aroused great admiration, especially on the part of the +merchant skippers; in particular it aroused the astonishment of the +average doughboy. Many destroyer escorts that went out to meet an +incoming convoy also took out one which was westward bound. A few +mishaps in the course of the war, such as the sinking of the _Justicia_, +which was sailing from Europe to America, created the false notion that +outward-bound convoys were not escorted. It was just as desirable, of +course, to escort the ships going out as it was to escort those which +were coming in. The mere fact that the inbound ships carried troops and +supplies gave stronger reasons, from the humane standpoint, for heavier +escorts, but not from the standpoint of the general war situation. The +Germans were not sinking our ships because they were carrying men and +supplies; they were sinking them simply because they were ships. They +were not seeking to destroy American troops and munitions exclusively; +they were seeking to destroy tonnage. They were aiming to reduce the +world's supply of ships to such a point that the Allies would be +compelled to abandon the conflict for lack of communications. It was +therefore necessary that they should sink the empty ships, which were +going out, as well as the crowded and loaded ships which were coming in. +For the same reason it was necessary that we should protect them, and we +did this as far as practicable without causing undue delays in forming +outward-bound convoys. The _Justicia_, though most people still think +that she was torpedoed because she was unescorted, was, in fact, +protected by a destroyer escort of considerable size. This duty of +escorting outward-bound ships increased considerably the strain on our +destroyer force. The difficulty was that the inbound convoy arrived in a +body, but that the ships could not be unloaded and sent back in a body +without detaining a number of them an undue length of time--and time was +such an important factor in this war that it was necessary to make the +"turn-around" of each important transport as quickly as possible. The +consequence was that returning ships were often despatched in small +convoys as fast as they were unloaded. The escorts which we were able +to supply for such groups were thus much weaker than absolute safety +required, and sometimes we were even forced to send vessels across the +submarine zone with few, if any, escorting warships. This explains why +certain homeward-bound transports were torpedoed, and this was +particularly true of troop and munition convoys to the western ports of +France. Only when we could assemble a large outgoing convoy and despatch +it at such a time that it could meet an incoming one at the western edge +of the submarine zone could we give these vessels the same destroyer +escort as that which we always gave for the loaded convoys bound for +European ports. + +As soon as the destroyers made contact with an inward-bound convoy, the +ocean escort, the cruiser or pre-dreadnought, if an American, abandoned +it and started it back home, sometimes with a westbound convoy if one +had been assembled in time. British escorts went ahead at full speed +into a British port, usually escorted by one or more destroyers. This +abandonment sometimes aroused the wrath of the passengers on the inbound +convoy. Their protector had dropped them just as they had entered the +submarine zone, the very moment its services were really needed! These +passengers did not understand, any more than did the people at home, +that the purpose of the ocean escort was not to protect them from +submarines, but from possible raiders. Inside the danger zone this ocean +escort would become part of the convoy itself and require protection +from submarines, so that its rather summary departure really made the +merchantmen more secure. As the convoy approached the danger zone, after +being drilled all the way across the ocean, its very appearance was more +taut and business-like. The ships were closed up into a much more +compact formation, keeping only such distances apart as were essential +for quick manoeuvring. Generally the convoy was formed in a long +parallelogram, the distance across the front of which was much longer +than the depth or distance along the sides. Usually the formation was a +number of groups of four vessels each, in column or "Indian file," at a +distance of about five hundred yards from ship to ship, and all groups +abreast of each other and about half a mile apart. Thus a convoy of +twenty-four vessels, or six groups of four, would have a width of about +three miles and a depth of one. Most of the destroyers were stationed +on the narrow sides, for it was only on the side, or the beam, that the +submarines could attack with much likelihood of succeeding. It was +usually necessary for a destroyer to be stationed in the rear of a +convoy, for, though the speed of nearly all convoys was faster than that +of a submarine when submerged, the latter while running on the surface +could follow a convoy at night with a fair chance of torpedoing a vessel +at early daylight and escaping to the rear if unhampered by the presence +of a rear-guard destroyer. It was generally impracticable and dangerous +for the submarine to wait ahead, submerge, and launch its torpedoes as +the convoy passed over it. The extent to which purely mechanical details +protected merchant ships is not understood, and this inability to attack +successfully from the front illustrates this point. The submarine +launches its torpedoes from tubes in the bow or stern; it has no tubes +on the beam. If it did possess such side tubes, it could lie in wait +ahead and shoot its broadsides at the convoy as it passed over the spot +where it was concealed. Its length in that case would be parallel to +that of the merchant ships, and thus it would have a comparatively small +part of its area exposed to the danger of ramming. The mere fact that +its torpedo tubes are placed in the bow and stern makes it necessary for +the submarine, if it wishes to attack in the fashion described, to turn +almost at right angles to the course of the convoy, and to manoeuvre +into a favourable position from which to discharge its missile--a +procedure so altogether hazardous that it almost never attempts it. With +certain reservations, which it is hardly necessary to explain in detail +at this point, it may be taken at least as a general rule that the sides +of the convoy not only furnish the U-boats much the best chance to +torpedo ships, but also subject them to the least danger; and this is +the reason why, in the recent war, the destroyers were usually +concentrated at these points. + +I have already compared the convoy system to a great aggregation of +railroads. This comparison holds good of its operation after it had +entered the infested zone. Indeed the very terminology of our railroad +men was used. Every convoy nearly followed one of two main routes, known +at convoy headquarters as the two "trunk lines." The trunk line which +reached the west coast of England usually passed north of Ireland +through the North Channel and down the Irish Sea to Liverpool. Under +certain conditions these convoys passed south of Ireland and thence up +the Irish Sea. The convoys to the east coast took a trunk line that +passed up the English Channel. Practically all shipping from the United +States to Great Britain and France took one of these trunk lines. But, +like our railroad systems, each of these main routes had branch lines. +Thus shipping destined for French ports took the southern route until +off the entrance to the English Channel; here it abandoned the main line +and took a branch route to Brest, Bordeaux, Nantes, and other French +ports. In the Channel likewise several "single-track" branches went to +various English ports, such as Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, and +the like. The whole gigantic enterprise flowed with a precision and a +regularity which I think it is hardly likely that any other +transportation system has ever achieved. + + +IV + +A description of a few actual convoys, and the experiences of our +destroyers with them, will perhaps best make clear the nature of the +mechanism which protected the world's shipping. For this purpose I have +selected typical instances which illustrate the every-day routine +experiences of escorting destroyers, and other experiences in which +their work was more spectacular. + +One day in late October, 1917, a division of American destroyers at +Queenstown received detailed instructions from Admiral Bayly to leave at +a certain hour and escort the outward convoy "O Q 17" and bring into +port the inbound convoy "H S 14." These detailed instructions were based +upon general instructions issued from the Admiralty, where my staff was +in constant attendance and co-operation. The symbols by which these two +groups of ships were designated can be easily interpreted. The O Q +simply meant that convoy "No. 17"--the seventeenth which had left that +port--was Outward bound from Queenstown, and the H S signified that +convoy "No. 14" was Homeward bound from Sydney, Cape Breton. Queenstown +during the first few months was one of those places at which ships, +having discharged their cargoes, assembled in groups for despatching +back to the United States. Later Milford Haven, Liverpool, and other +ports were more often used for this purpose. Vessels had been arriving +here for several days from ports of the Irish Sea and the east coast of +England. These had now been formed into convoy "O Q 17"; they were ready +for a destroyer escort to take them through the submarine zone and start +them on the westward voyage to American ports. + +This escort consisted of eight American destroyers and one British +"special service ship"; the latter was one of that famous company of +decoy vessels, or "mystery ships," which, though to all outward +appearances unprotected merchantmen, really carried concealed armament +of sufficient power to destroy any submarine that came within range. +This special service ship, the _Aubrietia_, was hardly a member of the +protective escort. Her mission was to sail about thirty miles ahead of +the convoy; when observed from the periscope or the conning-tower of a +submarine, the _Aubrietia_ seemed to be merely a helpless merchantman +sailing alone, and as such she presented a particularly tempting target +to the U-boat. But her real purpose in life was to be torpedoed. After +landing its missile in a vessel's side, the submarine usually remained +submerged for a period, while the crew of its victim was getting off in +boats; it then came to the surface, and the men prepared to board the +disabled ship and search her for valuables and delicacies, particularly +for information which would assist them in their campaign, such as +secret codes, sailing instructions, and the like. The mystery ship had +been preparing for this moment, and as soon as the submarine broke +water, the gun ports of the disguised merchantman dropped, and her +hitherto concealed guns began blazing away at the German. By October, +1917, these special service ships had already accounted for several +submarines; and it had now become a frequent practice to attach one or +more to a convoy, either ahead, where she might dispose of the submarine +lying in wait for the approaching aggregation, or in the rear, where a +U-boat might easily mistake her for one of those stragglers which were +an almost inevitable part of every convoy. + +Trawlers and mine-sweepers, as was the invariable custom, spent several +hours sweeping the Queenstown Channel before the sailing of convoy "O Q +17" and its escort. Promptly at the appointed time the eight American +ships sailed out in "Indian file," passing through the net which was +always kept in place at the entrance to the harbour. Their first duty +was to patrol the waters outside for a radius of twelve miles; it was +not improbable that the Germans, having learned that this convoy was to +sail, had stationed a submarine not far from the harbour entrance. +Having finally satisfied himself that there were no lurking enemies in +the neighbourhood, the commander of the destroyer flagship signalled to +the merchant ships, which promptly left the harbour and entered the open +sea. The weather was stormy; the wind was blowing something of a gale +and head seas were breaking over the destroyers' decks. But the convoy +quickly manoeuvred into three columns, the destroyers rapidly closed +around them, and the whole group started for "Rendezvous A"--this being +the designation of that spot on the ocean's surface where the fourteenth +meridian of longitude crosses the forty-ninth parallel of latitude--a +point in the Atlantic about three hundred miles south-west of +Queenstown, regarded at that time as safely beyond the operating zone of +the submarine. Meanwhile, the "mystery ship," sailing far ahead, +disappeared beneath the horizon. + +Convoying ships in the stormy autumn and winter waters, amid the fog and +rain of the eastern Atlantic, was a monotonous and dreary occupation. +Only one or two incidents enlivened this particular voyage. As the +_Parker_, Commander Halsey Powell, was scouting ahead at about two +o'clock in the afternoon, her lookout suddenly sighted a submarine, +bearing down upon the convoy. Immediately the news was wirelessed to +every vessel. As soon as the message was received, the whole convoy, at +a signal from the flagship, turned four points to port. For nearly two +hours the destroyers searched this area for the submerged submarine, but +that crafty boat kept itself safely under the water, and the convoy now +again took up its original course. About two days' sailing brought the +ships to the point at which the protecting destroyers could safely leave +them, as far as submarines were concerned, to continue unescorted to +America; darkness had now set in, and, under its cover, the merchantmen +slipped away from the warships and started westward. Meantime, the +destroyer escort had received a message from the _Cumberland_, the +British cruiser which was acting as ocean escort to convoy "HS 14." +"Convoy is six hours late," she reported, much like the announcer at a +railroad station who informs the waiting crowds that the incoming train +is that much overdue. According to the schedule these ships should reach +the appointed rendezvous at six o'clock the next morning; this message +evidently moved the time of arrival up to noon. The destroyers, slowing +down so that they would not arrive ahead of time, started for the +designated spot. + +Sometimes thick weather made it impossible to fix the position by +astronomical observations, and the convoy might not be at its appointed +rendezvous. For this reason the destroyers now deployed on a north and +south line about twenty miles long for several hours. Somewhat before +the appointed time one of the destroyers sighted a faint cloud of smoke +on the western horizon, and soon afterward thirty-two merchantmen, +sailing in columns of fours, began to assume a definite outline. At a +signal from this destroyer the other destroyers of the escort came in at +full speed and ranged themselves on either side of the convoy--a +manoeuvre that always excited the admiration of the merchant skippers. +This mighty collection of vessels, occupying about ten or twelve square +miles on the ocean, skilfully maintaining its formation, was really a +beautiful and inspiring sight. When the destroyers had gained their +designated positions on either side, the splendid cavalcade sailed +boldly into the area which formed the favourite hunting grounds for the +submarine. + +As soon as this danger zone was reached the whole aggregation, +destroyers and merchant ships, began to zigzag. The commodore on the +flagship hoisted the signal, "Zigzag A," and instantaneously the whole +thirty-two ships began to turn twenty-five degrees to starboard. The +great ships, usually so cumbersome, made this simultaneous turn with all +the deftness, and even with all the grace of a school of fish into which +one has suddenly cast a stone. All the way across the Atlantic they had +been practising such an evolution; most of them had already sailed +through the danger zone more than once, so that the manoeuvre was by +this time an old story. For ten or fifteen minutes they proceeded along +this course, when immediately, like one vessel, the convoy turned twenty +degrees to port, and started in a new direction. And so on for hours, +now a few minutes to the right, now a few minutes to the left, and now +again straight ahead, while all the time the destroyers were cutting +through the water, every eye of the skilled lookouts in each crew fixed +upon the surface for the first glimpse of a periscope. This zigzagging +was carried out according to comprehensive plans which enabled the +convoy to zigzag for hours at a time without signals, the courses and +the time on each course being designated in the particular plan ordered, +all ships' clocks being set exactly alike by time signal. Probably I +have made it clear why these zigzagging evolutions constituted such a +protective measure. All the time the convoy was sailing in the danger +zone it was assumed that a submarine was present, looking for a chance +to torpedo. Even though the officers might know that there was no +submarine within three hundred miles, this was never taken for granted; +the discipline of the whole convoy system rested upon the theory that +the submarine was there, waiting only the favourable moment to start the +work of destruction. But a submarine, as already said, could not strike +without the most thorough preparation. It must get within three or four +hundred yards or the torpedo would stand little chance of hitting the +mark in a vital spot. The commander almost never shot blindly into the +convoy, on the chance of hitting some ship; he carefully selected his +victim; his calculation had to include its speed, the speed of his own +boat and that of his torpedo; above all, he had to be sure of the +direction in which his intended quarry was steaming; and in this +calculation the direction of the merchantman formed perhaps the most +important element. But if the ships were constantly changing their +direction, it is apparent that the submarine could make no calculations +which would have much practical value. + +In the afternoon the _Aubrietia_, the British mystery ship which was +sailing thirty miles ahead of the convoy, reported that she had sighted +a submarine. Two or three destroyers dashed for the indicated area, +searched it thoroughly, found no traces of the hidden boat, and returned +to the convoy. The next morning six British destroyers and one cruiser +arrived from Devonport. Up to this time the convoy had been following +the great "trunk line" which led into the Channel, but it had now +reached the point where the convoys split up, part going to English +ports and part to French. These British destroyers had come to take over +the twenty ships which were bound for their own country, while the +American destroyers were assigned to escort the rest to Brest. The +following conversation--typical of those that were constantly filling +the air in that area--now took place between the American flagship and +the British: + + _Conyngham_ to _Achates_: This is the _Conyngham_, Commander + Johnson. I would like to keep the convoy together until this + evening. I will work under your orders until I leave with convoy + for Brest. + + _Achates_ to _Conyngham_: Please make your own arrangements for + taking French convoy with you to-night. + + _Achates_ to _Conyngham_: What time do you propose leaving with + French convoy to-night? + + _Conyngham_ to _Achates_: About 5 P.M. in order to arrive + in Brest to-night. + + Devonport Commander-in-chief to _Conyngham_: Proceed in execution + Admiralty orders _Achates_ having relieved you. Submarine activity + in Lat. 48.41, Long. 4.51. + +The _Aubrietia_ had already given warning of the danger referred to in +the last words of this final message. It had been flashing the news in +this way: + + 1.15 P.M. _Aubrietia_ to _Conyngham_: Submarine sighted + 49.30 N 6.8 W. Sighted submarine on surface. Speed is not enough. + Course south-west by south magnetic. + + 1.30 P.M. _Conyngham_ to _Achates_: Aubrietia to all + men-of-war and Land's End. Chasing submarine on the surface 49.30 N + 6.8 W, course south-west by south. Waiting to get into range. He is + going faster than I can. + + 2.00 P.M. _Aubrietia_ to all men-of-war. Submarine + submerged 49.20 N 6.12 W. Still searching. + +The fact that nothing more was seen of that submarine may possibly +detract from the thrill of the experience, but in describing the +operations of this convoy I am not attempting to tell a story of wild +adventure, but merely to set forth what happened ninety-nine out of a +hundred times. What made destroyer work so exasperating was that, in +the vast majority of cases, the option of fighting or not fighting lay +with the submarine. Had the submarine decided to approach and attack the +convoy, the chances would have been more than even that it would have +been destroyed. In accordance with its usual practice, however, it chose +to submerge, and that decision ended the affair for the moment. This was +the way in which merchant ships were protected. At the time this +submarine was sighted it was headed directly for this splendid +aggregation of cargo vessels; had not the _Aubrietia_ discovered it and +had not one of the American destroyers started in pursuit, the U-boat +would have made an attack and possibly would have sent one or more ships +to the bottom. The chief business of the escorting ships, all through +the war, was this unspectacular one of chasing the submarines away; and +for every under-water vessel actually destroyed there were hundreds of +experiences such as the one which I have just described. + +The rest of this trip was uneventful. Two American destroyers escorted +H.M.S. _Cumberland_--the ocean escort which had accompanied the convoy +from Sydney--to Devonport; the rest of the American escort took its +quota of merchantmen into Brest, and from that point sailed back to +Queenstown, whence, after three or four days in port, it went out with +another convoy. This was the routine which was repeated until the end of +the war. + +The "O Q 17" and the "H S 14" form an illustration of convoys which made +their trips successfully. Yet these same destroyers had another +experience which pictures other phases of the convoy system. + +On the morning of October 19th, Commander Johnson's division was +escorting a great convoy of British ships on its way to the east coast +of England. Suddenly out of the air came one of those calls which were +daily occurrences in the submarine zone. The _J. L. Luckenback_ +signalled her position, ninety miles ahead of the convoy, and that she +was being shelled by a submarine. In a few minutes the _Nicholson_, one +of the destroyers of the escort, started to the rescue. For the next few +hours our ships began to pick out of the air the messages which detailed +the progress of this adventure--messages which tell the story so +graphically, and which are so typical of the events which were +constantly taking place in those waters, that I reproduce them verbatim: + + 8.50 A.M. S.O.S. _J. L. Luckenback_ being gunned by + submarine. Position 48.08 N 9.31 W. + + 9.25 _Conyngham_ to _Nicholson:_ Proceed to assistance of S.O.S. + ship. + + 9.30 _Luckenback_ to U.S.A.: Am manoeuvring around. + + 9.35 _Luckenback_ to U.S.A.: How far are you away? + + 9.40 _Luckenback_ to U.S.A.: Code books thrown overboard. How soon + will you arrive? + + _Nicholson_ to _Luckenback_: In two hours. + + 9.41 _Luckenback_ to U.S.A.: Look for boats. They are shelling us. + + _Nicholson_ to _Luckenback_: Do not surrender! + + _Luckenback_ to _Nicholson_ Never! + + 11.01 _Nicholson_ to _Luckenback_: Course south magnetic. + + 12.36 P.M. _Nicholson_ to _Conyngham_: Submarine submerged + 47.47 N 10.00 W at 11.20. + + 1.23 _Conyngham_ to _Nicholson:_ What became of steamer? + + 3.41 _Nicholson_ to Admiral (at Queenstown) and _Conyngham_: + _Luckenback_ now joining convoy. Should be able to make port + unassisted. + +I have already said that a great part of the destroyer's duty was to +rescue merchantmen that were being attacked by submarines: this +_Luckenback_ incident vividly illustrates this point. Had the submarine +used its torpedo upon this vessel, it probably would have disposed of it +summarily; but it was the part of wisdom for the submarine to economize +in these weapons because they were so expensive and so comparatively +scarce, and to use its guns whenever the opportunity offered. The +_Luckenback_ was armed, but the fact that the submarine's guns easily +outranged hers made her armament useless. Thus all the German had to do +in this case was to keep away at a safe distance and bombard the +merchantman. The U-boat had been doing this for more than three hours +when the destroyer reached the scene of operations; evidently the +marksmanship was poor, for out of a great many shots fired by the +submarine only about a dozen had hit the vessel. The _Luckenback_ was on +fire, a shell having set aflame her cargo of cotton; certain parts of +the machinery had been damaged, but, in the main, the vessel was +intact. The submarine was always heroic enough when it came to shelling +defenceless merchantmen, but the appearance of a destroyer anywhere in +her neighbourhood made her resort to the one secure road to +safety--diving for protection. The _Nicholson_ immediately trained her +guns on the U-boat, which, on the second shot, disappeared under the +water. The destroyer despatched men to the disabled vessel, the fire was +extinguished, necessary repairs to the machinery were made, and in a few +hours the _Luckenback_ had become a member of the convoy. + +Hardly had she joined the merchant ships and hardly had the _Nicholson_ +taken up her station on the flank when an event still more exciting took +place. It was now late in the afternoon; the sea had quieted down; the +whole atmosphere was one of peace; and there was not the slightest sign +or suggestion of a hostile ship. The _Orama_, the British warship which +had accompanied the convoy from its home port as ocean escort, had taken +up her position as leading ship in the second column. Without the +slightest warning a terrific explosion now took place on her starboard +bow. There was no mystery as to what had happened; indeed, immediately +after the explosion the wake of the torpedo appeared on the surface; +there was no periscope in sight, yet it was clear, from the position of +the wake, that the submarine had crept up to the side of the convoy and +delivered its missile at close range. There was no confusion in the +convoy or its escorting destroyers but there were scenes of great +activity. Immediately after the explosion, a periscope appeared a few +inches out of the water, stayed there only a second or two, and then +disappeared. Brief as was this exposure, the keen eyes of the lookout +and several sailors of the _Conyngham_, the nearest destroyer, had +detected it; it disclosed the fact that the enemy was in the midst of +the convoy itself, looking for other ships to torpedo. The _Conyngham_ +rang for full speed, and dashed for the location of the submarine. Her +officers and men now saw more than the periscope; they saw the vessel +itself. The water was very clear; as the _Conyngham_ circled around the +_Orama_ her officers and men sighted a green, shining, cigar-shaped +thing under the water not far from the starboard side. As she sped by, +the destroyer dropped a depth charge almost directly on top of the +object. After the waters had quieted down pieces of débris were seen +floating upon the surface--boards, spars, and other miscellaneous +wreckage, evidently scraps of the damaged deck of a submarine. All +attempts to save the _Orama_ proved fruitless: the destroyers stood by +for five hours, taking off survivors, and making all possible efforts to +salvage the ship, but at about ten o'clock that evening she disappeared +under the water. In rescuing the survivors the seamanship displayed by +the _Conyngham_ was particularly praiseworthy. The little vessel was +skilfully placed alongside the _Orama_ and some three hundred men were +taken off without accident or casualty while the ship was sinking. + +One of the things that made the work of the destroyer such a thankless +task was that only in the rarest cases was it possible to prove that she +had destroyed the submarine. Only the actual capture of the enemy ship +or some of its crew furnished irrefutable proof that the action had been +successful. The appearance of oil on the surface after a depth charge +attack was not necessarily convincing, for the submarine early learned +the trick of pumping overboard a little oil after such an experience; in +this way it hoped to persuade its pursuer that it had been sunk and thus +induce it to abandon the chase. Even the appearance of wreckage, such as +arose on the surface after this _Conyngham_ attack, did not absolutely +prove that the submarine had been destroyed. Yet, as this submarine was +never heard of again, there is little doubt that Commander Johnson's +depth charge performed its allotted task. The judgment of the British +Government, which awarded him the C.M.G. for his achievement, may be +accepted as final. The Admiralty citation for this decoration reads as +follows: + +"At 5.50 P.M. H.M.S. _Orama_ was torpedoed in convoy. +_Conyngham_ went full speed, circled bow of _Orama_, saw submarine +between lines of convoy, passed right over it so that it was plainly +visible and dropped depth charge. Prompt and correct action of Commander +Johnson saved more ships from being torpedoed and probably destroyed the +submarine." + +One of the greatest difficulties of convoy commanders, especially during +the first months the system was in operation, was with "slacker" +merchantmen; these were vessels which, for various reasons, fell behind +the convoy, a tempting bait for the submarine. At this time certain of +the merchant captains manifested an incurable obstinacy; they affected +to regard the U-boats with contempt, and insisted rather on taking +chances instead of playing the game. In such cases a destroyer would +often have to leave the main division, go back several miles, and +attempt to prod the straggler into joining the convoy, much as a +shepherd dog attempts to force the laggard sheep to keep within the +flock. In some cases, when the merchantman proved particularly obdurate, +the destroyer would slyly drop a depth charge, near enough to give the +backward vessel a considerable shaking up without doing her any injury; +usually such a shock caused the merchantman to start full speed ahead to +rejoin her convoy, firmly believing that a submarine was giving chase. +In certain instances the merchantman fell behind the convoy because the +machinery had broken down or because she had suffered other accidents. +The submarines would follow for days in the track of convoys, looking +for a straggler of this kind, just as a shark will follow a vessel in +the hope that something will be thrown overboard; and for this reason +one destroyer at least was often detached from the escorting division as +a rear guard. In this connection we must keep in mind that at no time +until the armistice was signed was any escort force strong enough to +insure entire safety. If we had had destroyers enough to put a close +screen, or even a double screen, around every convoy, there would have +been almost no danger from submarines. The fact that all escort forces +were very inadequate placed a very heavy responsibility upon the escort +commanders, and made them think twice before detaching a destroyer in +order to protect stragglers. + +One late summer afternoon the American converted yacht _Christabel_ was +performing this duty for the British merchantman _Danae_, a vessel which +had fallen eight miles behind her convoy, bound from La Pallice, France, +to Brest. It was a beautiful evening; the weather was clear, the sea +smooth, and there was not a breath of wind. Under such conditions a +submarine could conceal its presence only with great difficulty; and at +about 5.30 the lookout on the _Christabel_ detected a wake, some six +hundred yards on the port quarter. The _Christabel_ started at full +speed; the wake suddenly ceased, but a few splotches of oil were seen, +and she was steered in the direction of this disturbance. A depth charge +was dropped at the spot where the submarine ought to have been, but it +evidently did not produce the slightest result. The _Christabel_ +rejoined the _Danae_, and the two went along peacefully for nearly four +hours, when suddenly a periscope appeared about two hundred yards away, +on the starboard side. Evidently this persistent German had been +following the ships all that time, looking for a favourable opportunity +to discharge his torpedo. That moment had now arrived; the submarine was +at a distance where a carefully aimed shot meant certain destruction; +the appearance of the periscope meant that the submarine was making +observations in anticipation of delivering this shot. The _Christabel_ +started full speed for the wake of the periscope; this periscope itself +disappeared under the water like a guilty thing, and a disturbance on +the surface showed that the submarine was making frantic efforts to +submerge. The destroyer dropped its depth charge, set to explode at +seventy feet, its radio meantime sending signals broadcast for +assistance. Immediately after the mushroom of water arose from this +charge a secondary explosion was heard; this was a horrible and muffled +sound coming from the deep, more powerful and more terrible than any +that could have been caused by the destroyer's "ash can." An enormous +volcano of water and all kinds of débris arose from the sea, half-way +between the _Christabel_ and the spot where it had dropped its charge. +This secondary explosion shook the _Christabel_ so violently that the +officers thought at first that the ship had been seriously damaged, and +a couple of men were knocked sprawling on the deck. As soon as the water +subsided great masses of heavy black oil began rising to the surface, +and completely splintered wood and other wreckage appeared. In a few +minutes the sea, for a space many hundred yards in diameter, was covered +with dead fish--about ten times as many, the officers reported, as could +have been killed by the usual depth charge. The _Christabel_ and the +ship she was guarding started to rejoin the main convoy, entirely +satisfied with the afternoon's work. Indeed, they had good reason to be; +a day or two afterward a battered submarine, the _U C-56_, crept +painfully into the harbour of Santander, Spain; it was the boat which +had had such an exciting contest with the _Christabel_. She was injured +beyond the possibility of repair; besides, the Spanish Government +interned her for "the duration of the war"; so that for all practical +purposes the vessel was as good as sunk. + + +V + +Discouraging as was this business of hunting an invisible foe, events +occasionally happened with all the unexpectedness of real drama. For the +greater part of the time the destroyers were engaged in battle with oil +slicks, wakes, tide rips, streaks of suds, and suspicious disturbances +on the water; yet now and then there were engagements with actual boats +and flesh and blood human beings. To spend weeks at sea with no foe more +substantial than an occasional foamy excrescence on the surface was the +fate of most sailormen in this war; yet a few exciting moments, when +they finally came, more than compensated for long periods of monotony. + +One afternoon in November, 1917, an American destroyer division, +commanded by Commander Frank Berrien, with the _Nicholson_ as its +flagship, put out of Queenstown on the usual mission of taking a +westbound convoy to its rendezvous and bringing in one that was bound +for British ports. This outward convoy was the "O Q 20" and consisted of +eight fine ships. After the usual preliminary scoutings the vessels +passed through the net in single file, sailed about ten miles to sea, +and began to take up the stipulated formation, four columns of two ships +each. The destroyers were moving around; they were even mingling in the +convoy, carrying messages and giving instructions; by a quarter past +four all the ships had attained their assigned positions, except one, +the _René_, which was closing up to its place as the rear ship of the +first column. Meanwhile, the destroyer _Fanning_ was steaming rapidly to +its post on the rear flank. Suddenly there came a cry from the bridge of +the _Fanning_, where Coxswain David D. Loomis was on lookout: + +"Periscope!" + +Off the starboard side of the _Fanning_, glistening in the smooth water, +a periscope of the "finger" variety, one so small that it could usually +elude all but the sharpest eyes, had darted for a few seconds above the +surface and had then just as suddenly disappeared. Almost directly ahead +lay the _Welshman_, a splendid British merchant ship; the periscope was +so close that a torpedo would almost inevitably have hit this vessel in +the engine-room. The haste with which the German had withdrawn his +periscope, after taking a hurried glance around, was easily explained; +for his lens had revealed not only this tempting bait, but the destroyer +_Fanning_ close aboard and bearing down on him. Under these +circumstances it was not surprising that no torpedo was fired; it was +clearly military wisdom to beat a quick retreat rather than attempt to +attack the merchantman. Lieut. Walter S. Henry, who was the officer of +the deck, acted with the most commendable despatch. It is not the +simplest thing, even when the submarine is so obviously located as this +one apparently was, to reach the spot accurately. + +The destroyer has to make a wide and rapid turn, and there is every +danger, in making this manoeuvre, that the location will be missed. +Subsequent events disclosed that the _Fanning_ was turned with the +utmost accuracy. As the ship darted by the spot at which the periscope +had been sighted, a depth charge went over the stern, and exploded so +violently that the main generator of the _Fanning_ herself was +temporarily disabled. Meanwhile the _Nicholson_ had dashed through the +convoy, made a rapid detour to the left, and dropped another depth +charge a short distance ahead of the _Fanning_. + +The disturbances made on the water by these "ash cans" gradually +subsided; to all outward appearances the submarine had escaped unharmed. +The _Fanning_ and the _Nicholson_ completed their circles and came back +to the danger spot, the officers and crew eagerly scanning the surface +for the usual oil patch and air bubbles, even hoping for a few pieces of +wreckage--those splintered remnants of the submarine's wooden deck that +almost invariably indicated a considerable amount of damage. But none of +these evidences of success, or half-success, rose to the surface; for +ten or fifteen minutes everything was as quiet as the grave. Then +something happened which occurred only a few times in this strange war. +The stern of a submarine appeared out of the water, tilted at about +thirty degrees, clearly revealing its ugly torpedo tubes. Then came the +conning-tower and finally the entire boat, the whole hull taking its +usual position on the surface as neatly and unconcernedly as though no +enemies were near. So far as could be seen the U-boat was in perfect +condition. Its hull looked intact, showing not the slightest indication +of injury; the astonished officers and men on the destroyers could +easily understand now why no oil or wreckage had risen to the top, for +the _U-58_--they could now see this inscription plainly painted on the +conning-tower--was not leaking, and the deck showed no signs of having +come into contact even remotely with a depth charge. The _Fanning_ and +the _Nicholson_ began firing shells at the unexpected visitant, and the +_Nicholson_ extended an additional welcome in the form of a hastily +dropped "ash can." + +Suddenly the conning-tower of the submarine opened and out popped the +rotund face and well-fed form of Kapitän-Leutnant Gustav Amberger, of +the Imperial German Navy. The two arms of the Herr Kapitän immediately +shot heavenward and the Americans on the destroyers could hear certain +guttural ejaculations: + +"Kamerad! Kamerad!" + +A hatchway now opened, and a procession of German sailors emerged, one +after the other, into the sunshine, like ants crawling out of their +hole. As each sailor reached the deck he straightened up, lifted his +arms, and shouted: + +"Kamerad! Kamerad! Kamerad!" + +In all four officers and thirty-five men went through this ceremony. +Were they really surrendering themselves and their boat, or did these +gymnastic exercises conceal some new form of German craftiness? The +American ships ceased firing; the _Fanning_ gingerly approached the +submarine, while the _Nicholson_ stood by, all her four-inch guns +trained upon the German boat, and the machine-guns pointed at the +kamerading Germans, ready to shoot them into ribbons at the first sign +that the surrender was not a genuine one. + +While these preliminaries were taking place, a couple of German sailors +disappeared into the interior of the submarine, stayed there a moment or +two, and then returned to the deck. They had apparently performed a duty +that was characteristically German; for a few minutes after they +appeared again, the _U-58_ began to settle in the water, and soon +afterward sank. These men, obeying orders, had opened the cocks and +scuttled the ship--this after the officers had surrendered her! As the +submarine disappeared, the men and officers dived and started swimming +toward the _Fanning_; four of them became entangled in the radio antennæ +and were dragged under the waves; however, in a few minutes these men +succeeded in disentangling themselves and joined the swimmers. As the +thirty-nine men neared the _Fanning_ it was evident that most of them +were extremely wearied and that some were almost exhausted. The sailors +from the _Fanning_ threw over lines; some still had the strength to +climb up these to the deck, while to others it was necessary to throw +other lines which they could adjust under their arms. These latter, limp +and wet figures, the American sailors pulled up, much as the fisherman +pulls up the inert body of a monster fish. And now an incident took +place which reveals that the American navy has rather different ideals +of humanity from the German. One of the sailors was so exhausted that he +could not adjust the life-lines around his shoulders; he was very +apparently drowning. Like a flash Elxer Harwell, chief pharmacist mate, +and Francis G. Conner, coxswain, jumped overboard, swam to this +floundering German, and adjusted the line around him as solicitously as +though he had been a shipmate. The poor wretch--his name was Franz +Glinder--was pulled aboard, but he was so far gone that all attempts to +resuscitate him failed, and he died on the deck of the _Fanning_. + +Kapitän Amberger, wet and dripping, immediately walked up to Lieut. A. +S. Carpender, the commander of the _Fanning_, clicked his heels +together, saluted in the most ceremonious German fashion, and +surrendered himself, his officers, and his crew. He also gave his parole +for his men. The officers were put in separate staterooms under guard +and each of the crew was placed under the protection of a well-armed +American jackie--who, it may be assumed, immensely enjoyed this new +duty. All the "survivors" were dressed in dry, warm clothes, and good +food and drink were given them. They were even supplied with cigarettes +and something which they valued more than all the delicacies in the +world--soap for a washing, the first soap which they had had for +months, as this was an article which was more scarce in Germany than +even copper or rubber. Our physicians gave the men first aid, and others +attended to all their minor wants. Evidently the fact that they had been +captured did not greatly depress their spirits, for, after eating and +drinking to their heart's content, the assembled Germans burst into +song. + +But what was the explanation of this strange proceeding? The German +officers, at first rather stiff and sullen, ultimately unbent enough to +tell their story. Their submarine had been hanging off the entrance to +Queenstown for nearly two days, waiting for this particular convoy to +emerge. The officers admitted that they were getting ready to torpedo +the _Welshman_ when the discovery that the _Fanning_ was only a short +distance away compelled a sudden change in their plans. Few "ash cans" +dropped in the course of the war reached their objective with the +unerring accuracy of the one which now came from this American +destroyer. It did not crush the submarine but the concussion wrecked the +motors, making it impossible for it to navigate, jammed its diving +rudders, making the boat uncontrollable under the water, and broke the +oil leads, practically shutting off the supply of this indispensable +fuel. Indeed, it would be impossible to conceive of a submarine in a +more helpless and unmanageable state. The officers had the option of two +alternatives: to sink until the pressure of the water crushed the boat +like so much paper, or to blow the ballast tanks, rise to the surface, +and surrender. Even while the commander was mentally debating this +problem, the submarine was rapidly descending to the bottom; when it +reached a depth of two hundred feet, which was about all that it could +stand, the commander decided to take his chances with the Americans. +Rising to the top involved great dangers; but the guns of the destroyers +seemed less formidable to these cornered Germans than the certainty of +the horrible death that awaited them under the waves. + +Admiral Bayly came to meet the _Fanning_ as she sailed into Queenstown +with her unexpected cargo. He went on board the destroyer to +congratulate personally the officers and men upon their achievement. He +published to the assembled company a cablegram just received from the +Admiralty in London: + + Express to commanding officers and men of the United States ship + _Fanning_ their Lordships' high appreciation of their successful + action against enemy submarine. + +I added a telegram of my own, ending up with the words, which seemed to +amuse the officers and men: "Go out and do it again." + +For this action the commanding officer of the _Fanning_, +Lieutenant-Commander Carpender, was recommended by the Admiralty for the +D.S.O., which was subsequently conferred upon him by the King at +Buckingham Palace. + +Only one duty remained: the commanding officer read the burial service +over the body of poor Franz Glinder, the German sailor who had been +drowned in his attempt to swim to the _Fanning_. The _Fanning_ then +steamed out to sea with the body and buried it with all the honours of +war. A letter subsequently written by Kapitän Amberger to a friend in +Germany summed up his opinion of the situation in these words: + +"The Americans were much nicer and more obliging than expected." + + +VI + +So far as convoying merchant ships was concerned, Queenstown was the +largest American base; by the time the movement of troops laid heavy +burdens on the American destroyers Brest became a headquarters almost +equally important. + +In July, 1917, the British Government requested the co-operation of the +American navy in the great work which it had undertaken at Gibraltar; +and on August 6th the U.S.S. _Sacramento_ reached that port, followed +about a week afterward by the _Birmingham_ flying the flag of +Rear-Admiral Henry B. Wilson. Admiral Wilson remained as commander of +this force until November, when he left to assume the direction of +affairs at Brest. On November 25th Rear-Admiral Albert P. Niblack +succeeded to this command, which he retained throughout the war. + +Gibraltar was the "gateway" for more traffic than any other port in the +world. It was estimated that more than one quarter of all the convoys +which reached the Entente nations either rendezvoused at this point or +passed through these Straits. This was the great route to the East by +way of the Suez Canal. From Gibraltar extended the Allied lines of +communication to southern France, Italy, Salonika, Egypt, Palestine, and +Mesopotamia. There were other routes to Bizerta (Tunis), Algiers, the +island of Milo, and a monthly service to the Azores. + +The Allied forces that were detailed to protect this shipping were +chiefly British and American, though they were materially assisted by +French, Japanese, and Italian vessels. They consisted of almost anything +which the hard-pressed navies could assemble from all parts of the +world--antiquated destroyers, yachts, sloops, trawlers, drifters, and +the like. The Gibraltar area was a long distance from the main enemy +submarine bases. The enemy could maintain at sea at any one time only a +relatively small number of submarines; inasmuch as the zone off the +English Channel and Ireland was the most critical one, the Allies +stationed their main destroyer force there. Because of these facts, we +had great difficulty in finding vessels to protect the important +Gibraltar area, and the force which we ultimately got together was +therefore a miscellaneous lot. The United States gathered at this point +forty-one ships, and a personnel which averaged 314 officers and 4,660 +men. This American aggregation contained a variegated assortment of +scout cruisers, gunboats, coastguard cutters, yachts, and five +destroyers of antique type. The straits to which we were reduced for +available vessels for the Gibraltar station--and the British navy was +similarly hard pressed--were illustrated by the fact that we placed +these destroyers at Gibraltar. They were the _Decatur_ and four similar +vessels, each of 420 tons--the modern destroyer is a vessel of from +1,000 to 1,200 tons--and were stationed, when the war broke out, at +Manila, where they were considered fit only for local service; yet the +record which these doughty little ships made is characteristic of the +spirit of our young officers. This little squadron steamed 12,000 miles +from Manila to Gibraltar, and that they arrived in condition immediately +to take up their duties was due to the excellent judgment and seamanship +displayed by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Commander (now +Commander) Harold R. Stark. Subsequently they made 48,000 miles on +escort duty. This makes 60,000 miles for vessels which in peace time had +been consigned to minor duties! Unfortunately one of these gallant +little vessels was subsequently cut down and sunk by a merchant ship +while escorting a convoy. + +For more than a year the Gibraltar force under Admiral Niblack performed +service which reflected high credit upon that commander, his officers, +and his men. During this period of time it escorted, in co-operation +with the British forces, 562 convoys, comprising a total of 10,478 +ships. Besides protecting commerce, chasing submarines, and keeping them +under the surface, many of the vessels making up this squadron had +engagements with submarines that were classified as "successful." On May +15, 1918, the _Wheeling_, a gunboat, and the _Surveyor_ and _Venetia_, +yachts, while escorting a Mediterranean convoy, depth-charged a +submarine which had just torpedoed one of the convoyed vessels; we +credited these little ships with sinking their enemy. The _Venetia_, +under the command of Commander L. B. Porterfield, U.S.N., had an +experience not unlike that of the _Christabel_, already described. On +this occasion she was part of the escort of a Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy. +A British member of this convoy, the _Surveyor_, was torpedoed at six in +the evening; at that time the submarine gave no further evidence of its +existence. The _Venetia_, however, was detailed to remain in the +neighbourhood, attempt to locate the mysterious vessel, and at least to +keep it under the water. The _Venetia_ soon found the wake of the +submerged enemy and dropped the usual depth charges. Three days +afterward a badly injured U-boat put in at Cartagena, Spain, and was +interned for the rest of the war. Thus another submarine was as good as +sunk. The _Lydonia_, a yacht of 500 tons, in conjunction with the +British ship _Basilisk_, sank another U-boat in the western +Mediterranean. This experience illustrates the doubt that enshrouded all +such operations, for it was not until three months after the _Lydonia_ +engagement took place that the Admiralty discovered that the submarine +had been destroyed and recommended Commander Richard P. McCullough, +U.S.N., for a decoration. + +Thus from the first day that this method of convoying ships was adopted +it was an unqualified success in defeating the submarine campaign. By +August 1, 1917, more than 10,000 ships had been convoyed, with losses of +only one-half of 1 per cent. Up to that same date not a single ship +which had left North American ports in convoy had been lost. By August +11th, 261 ships had been sent in convoy from North American ports, and +of these only one had fallen a prey to the submarines. The convoy gave +few opportunities for encounters with their enemies. I have already said +that the great value of this system as a protection to shipping was that +it compelled the under-water boats to fight their deadliest enemies, the +destroyers, every time they tried to sink merchant ships in convoy, and +they did not attempt this often on account of the danger. There were +destroyer commanders who spent months upon the open sea, convoying huge +aggregations of cargo vessels, without even once seeing a submarine. To +a great extent the convoy system did its work in the same way that the +Grand Fleet performed its indispensable service--silently, +unobtrusively, making no dramatic bids for popular favour, and +industriously plodding on, day after day and month after month. All this +time the world had its eyes fixed upon the stirring events of the +Western Front, almost unconscious of the existence of the forces that +made those land operations possible. Yet a few statistics eloquently +disclose the part played by the convoy system in winning the war. In the +latter months of the struggle from 91 to 92 per cent. of Allied shipping +sailed in convoys. The losses in these convoys were less than 1 per +cent. And this figure includes the ships lost after the dispersal of the +convoys; in convoys actually under destroyer escort the losses were less +than one-half of 1 per cent. Military experts would term the convoy +system a defensive-offensive measure. By this they mean that it was a +method of taking a defensive position in order to force the enemy to +meet you and give you an opportunity for the offensive. It is an old +saying that the best defensive measure is a vigorous offensive one. +Unfortunately, owing to the fact that the Allies had not prepared for +the kind of warfare which the Germans saw fit to employ against them, we +could not conduct purely offensive operations; that is, we could not +employ our anti-submarine forces exclusively in the effort to destroy +the submarines. Up to the time of the armistice, despite all the +assistance rendered to the navies by the best scientific brains of the +world, no sure means had been found of keeping track of the submarine +once he submerged. The convoy system was, therefore, our only method of +bringing him into action. I lay stress on this point and reiterate it +because many critics kept insisting during the war--and their voices are +still heard--that the convoy system was purely a defensive or passive +method of opposing the submarine, and was, therefore, not sound tactics. +It is quite true that we had to defend our shipping in order to win the +war, but it is wrong to assume that the method adopted to accomplish +this protection was a purely defensive and passive one. + +As my main purpose is to describe the work of the American navy I have +said little in the above about the activities of the British navy in +convoying merchant ships. But we should not leave this subject with a +false perspective. When the war ended we had seventy-nine destroyers in +European waters, while Great Britain had about 400. These included those +assigned to the Grand Fleet, to the Harwich force, to the Dover patrol, +to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, and other places, many of which were +but incidentally making war on the submarines. As to minor +ships--trawlers, sloops, Q-boats, yachts, drifters, tugs, and the other +miscellaneous types used in this work--the discrepancy was even greater. +In absolute figures our effort thus seems a small one when compared with +that of our great ally. In tonnage of merchant ships convoyed, the work +of the British navy was far greater than ours. Yet the help which we +contributed was indispensable to the success that was attained. For, +judging from the situation before we entered the war, and knowing the +inadequacy of the total Allied anti-submarine forces even after we had +entered, it seems hardly possible that, without the assistance of the +United States navy, the vital lines of communication of the armies in +the field could have been kept open, the civil populations of Great +Britain supplied with food, and men and war materials sent from America +to the Western Front. In other words, I think I am justified in saying +that without the co-operation of the American navy, the Allies could not +have won the war. Our forces stationed at Queenstown actually escorted +through the danger zone about 40 per cent. of all the cargoes which +left North American ports. When I describe the movement of American +troops, it will appear that our destroyers located at Queenstown and +Brest did even a larger share of this work. The latest reports show that +about 205 German submarines were destroyed. Of these it seems probable +that thirteen can be credited to American efforts, the rest to Great +Britain, France, and Italy--the greatest number, of course, to Great +Britain. When we take into consideration the few ships that we had on +the other side, compared with those of the Allies, and the comparatively +brief period in which we were engaged in the war, this must be regarded +as a highly creditable showing. + +I regret that I have not been able to describe the work of all of our +officers and men; to do this, however, would demand more than a single +volume. One of the disappointing aspects of destroyer work was that many +of the finest performances were those that were the least spectacular. +The fact that an attack upon a submarine did not result in a sinking +hardly robbed it of its importance; many of the finest exploits of our +forces did not destroy the enemy, but they will always hold a place in +our naval annals for the daring and skill with which they were +conducted. In this class belong the achievements of the _Sterrett_, +under Lieutenant-Commander Farquhar; of the _Benham_, under +Lieutenant-Commander D. Lyons; of the _O'Brien_, under +Lieutenant-Commander C. A. Blakeley; of the _Parker_, under +Lieutenant-Commander H. Powell; of the _Jacob Jones_, under +Lieutenant-Commander D. W. Bagley; of the _Wadsworth_, under +Lieutenant-Commander Taussig, and afterward I. F. Dortch; of the +_Drayton_, under Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Howard; of the _McDougal_, +under Commander A. L. Fairfield; and of the _Nicholson_, under Commander +F. D. Berrien. The senior destroyer commander at Queenstown was +Commander David C. Hanrahan of the _Cushing_, a fine character and one +of the most experienced officers of his rank in the Navy. He was a tower +of strength at all times, and I shall have occasion to mention him later +in connection with certain important duties. The Chief-of-Staff at +Queenstown, Captain J. R. P. Pringle, was especially commended by +Admiral Bayly for his "tact, energy, and ability." The American naval +forces at Queenstown were under my immediate command. Necessarily, +however, I had to spend the greater part of my time at the London +headquarters, or at the Naval Council in Paris, and it was therefore +necessary that I should be represented at Queenstown by a man of marked +ability. Captain Pringle proved equal to every emergency. He was +responsible for the administration, supplies, and maintenance of the +Queenstown forces, and the state of readiness and efficiency in which +they were constantly maintained was the strongest possible evidence of +his ability. To him was chiefly due also the fact that our men +co-operated so harmoniously and successfully with the British. + +As an example of the impression which our work made I can do no better +than to quote the message sent by Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly to the +Queenstown forces on May 4, 1918: + +"On the anniversary of the arrival of the first United States men-of-war +at Queenstown, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the United States +officers and ratings for the skill, energy, and unfailing good-nature +which they have all consistently shown and which qualities have so +materially assisted in the war by enabling ships of the Allied Powers to +cross the ocean in comparative freedom. + +"To command you is an honour, to work with you is a pleasure, to know +you is to know the best traits of the Anglo-Saxon race." + + + + +CHAPTER V + +DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION + + +I + +My chief purpose in writing this book is to describe the activities +during the World War of the United States naval forces operating in +Europe. Yet it is my intention also to make clear the several ways in +which the war against the submarine was won; and in order to do this it +will be necessary occasionally to depart from the main subject and to +describe certain naval operations of our allies. The most important +agency in frustrating the submarine was the convoy system. An +examination of the tonnage losses in 1917 and in 1918, however, +discloses that this did not entirely prevent the loss of merchant ships. +From April, 1917, to November, 1918, the monthly losses dropped from +875,000 to 101,168 tons. This decrease in sinkings enabled the Allies to +preserve their communications and so win the war; however, it is evident +that these losses, while not necessarily fatal to the Allied cause, +still offered a serious impediment to success. It was therefore +necessary to supplement the convoy system in all possible ways. Every +submarine that could be destroyed, whatever the method of destruction, +represented just that much gain to the Allied cause. Every submarine +that was sent to the bottom amounted in 1917 to a saving of many +thousands of tons per year of the merchant shipping that would have been +sunk by the U-boat if left unhindered to pursue its course. Besides +escorting merchant ships, therefore, the Allied navies developed several +methods of hunting individual submarines; and these methods not only +sank a considerable number of U-boats, but played an important part in +breaking down the German submarine _moral_. For the greater part of the +war the utmost secrecy was observed regarding these expedients; it was +not until the early part of 1918, indeed, that the public heard +anything of the special service vessels that came to be known as the +"mystery" or "Q-ships"--although these had been operating for nearly +three years. It is true that the public knew that there was something in +the wind, for there were announcements that certain naval officers had +received the Victoria Cross, but as there was no citation explaining why +these coveted rewards were given, they were known as "mystery V.C.'s." + +On one of my visits to Queenstown Admiral Bayly showed me a wireless +message which he had recently received from the commanding officer of a +certain mystery ship operating from Queenstown, one of the most +successful of these vessels. It was brief but sufficiently eloquent. + +"Am slowly sinking," it read. "Good-bye, I did my best." + +Though the man who had sent that message was apparently facing death at +the time when it was written, Admiral Bayly told me that he had survived +the ordeal, and that, in fact, he would dine at Admiralty House that +very night. Another fact about this man lifted him above the +commonplace: he was the first Q-boat commander to receive the Victoria +Cross, and one of the very few who wore both the Victoria Cross and the +Distinguished Service Order; and he subsequently won bars for each, not +to mention the Croix de Guerre and the Legion of Honour. When Captain +Gordon Campbell arrived, I found that he was a Britisher of quite the +accepted type. His appearance suggested nothing extraordinary. He was a +short, rather thick-set, phlegmatic Englishman, somewhat non-committal +in his bearing; until he knew a man well, his conversation consisted of +a few monosyllables, and even on closer acquaintance his stolidity and +reticence, especially in the matter of his own exploits, did not +entirely disappear. Yet there was something about the Captain which +suggested the traits that had already made it possible for him to sink +three submarines, and which afterward added other trophies to his +record. It needed no elaborate story of his performances to inform me +that Captain Campbell was about as cool and determined a man as was to +be found in the British navy. His associates declared that his physical +system absolutely lacked nerves; that, when it came to pursuing a German +submarine, his patience and his persistence knew no bounds; and that the +extent to which his mind concentrated upon the task in hand amounted to +little less than genius. When the war began, Captain Campbell, then +about thirty years old, was merely one of several thousand junior +officers in the British navy. He had not distinguished himself in any +way above his associates; and probably none of his superiors had ever +regarded him as in any sense an unusual man. Had the naval war taken the +course of most naval wars, Campbell would probably have served well, but +perhaps not brilliantly. This conflict, however, demanded a new type of +warfare and at the same time it demanded a new type of naval fighter. To +go hunting for the submarine required not only courage of a high order, +but analytical intelligence, patience, and a talent for preparation and +detail. Captain Campbell seemed to have been created for this particular +task. That evening at Queenstown he finally gave way to much urging, and +entertained us for hours with his adventures; he told the stories of his +battles with submarines so quietly, so simply and, indeed, so +impersonally, that at first they impressed his hearers as not +particularly unusual. Yet, after the recital was finished, we realized +that the mystery ship performances represented some of the most +admirable achievements in the whole history of naval warfare. We have +laid great emphasis upon the brutalizing aspects of the European War; it +is well, therefore, that we do not forget that it had its more exalted +phases. Human nature may at times have manifested itself in its most +cowardly traits, but it also reached a level of courage which, I am +confident, it has seldom attained in any other conflict. It was reserved +for this devastating struggle to teach us how brave modern men could +really be. And when the record is complete it seems unlikely that it +will furnish any finer illustration of the heroic than that presented by +Captain Campbell and his compatriots of the mystery ships. + +This type of vessel was a regular ship of His Majesty's navy, yet there +was little about it that suggested warfare. To the outward eye it was +merely one of those several thousand freighters or tramps which, in +normal times, sailed sluggishly from port to port, carrying the larger +part of the world's commerce. It looked like a particularly dirty and +uninviting specimen of the breed. Just who invented this grimy enemy of +the submarine is unknown, as are the inventors of many other devices +developed by the war. It was, however, the natural outcome of a close +study of German naval methods. The man who first had the idea well +understood the peculiar mentality of the U-boat commanders. The Germans +had a fairly easy time in the early days of submarine warfare on +merchant shipping. They sank as many ships as possible with gunfire and +bombs. The prevailing method then was to break surface, and begin +shelling the defenceless enemy. In case the merchant ship was faster +than the submarine she would take to her heels; if, as was usually the +case, she was slower, the passengers and crews lowered the boats and +left the vessel to her fate. In such instances the procedure of the +submarine was invariably the same. It ceased shelling, approached the +lifeboats filled with survivors, and ordered them to take a party of +Germans to the ship. This party then searched the vessel for all kinds +of valuables, and, after depositing time bombs in the hold, rowed back +to the submarine. This procedure was popular with the Germans, because +it was the least expensive form of destroying merchant ships. It was not +necessary to use torpedoes or even a large number of shells; an +inexpensive bomb, properly placed, did the whole job. Even when the +arming of merchant ships interfered with this simple programme, and +compelled the Germans to use long-range gunfire or torpedoes, the +submarine commanders still persisted in rising to the surface near the +sinking ship. Torpedoes were so expensive that the German Admiralty +insisted on having every one accounted for. The word of the commander +that he had destroyed a merchant ship was not accepted at its face +value; in order to have the exploit officially placed to his credit, and +so qualify the commander and crew for the rewards that came to the +successful, it was necessary to prove that the ship had actually gone to +the bottom. A prisoner or two furnished unimpeachable evidence, and, in +default of such trophies, the ship's papers would be accepted. In order +to obtain such proofs of success the submarine had to rise to the +surface and approach its victim. The search for food, especially for +alcoholic liquor, was another motive that led to such a manoeuvre; and +sometimes mere curiosity, the desire to come to close quarters and +inspect the consequences of his handiwork, also impelled the Hun +commander to take what was, as events soon demonstrated, a particularly +hazardous risk. + +This simple fact that the submarine, even when the danger had been +realized, insisted on rising to the surface and approaching the vessel +which it had torpedoed, offered the Allies an opportunity which they +were not slow in seizing. There is hardly anything in warfare which is +more vulnerable than a submarine on the surface within a few hundred +yards of a four-inch gun. A single, well-aimed shot will frequently send +it to the bottom. Indeed, a U-boat caught in such a predicament has only +one chance of escaping: that is represented by the number of seconds +which it takes to get under the water. But before that time has expired +rapidly firing guns can put a dozen shots into its hull; with modern, +well-trained gun crews, therefore, a submarine which exposes itself in +this way stands practically no chance of getting away. Clearly, the +obvious thing for the Allies to do was to send merchant ships, armed +with hidden guns, along the great highways of commerce. The crews of +these ships should be naval officers and men disguised as merchant +masters and sailors. They should duplicate in all details the manners +and the "technique" of a freighter's crew, and, when shelled or +torpedoed by a submarine, they should behave precisely like the +passengers and crews of merchantmen in such a crisis; a part--the only +part visible to the submarine--should leave the vessel in boats, while +the remainder should lie concealed until the submarine rose to the +surface and approached the vessel. When the enemy had come within two or +three hundred yards, the bulwarks should fall down, disclosing the +armament, the white battle ensign go up, and the guns open fire on the +practically helpless enemy. + + +II + +Such was the mystery ship idea in its simplest form. In the early days +it worked according to this programme. The trustful submarine commander +who approached a mystery ship in the manner which I have described +promptly found his resting-place on the bottom of the sea. I have +frequently wondered what must have been the emotions of this first +submarine crew, when, standing on the deck of their boat, steaming +confidently toward their victim, they saw its bulwarks suddenly drop, +and beheld the ship, which to all outward appearances was a helpless, +foundering hulk, become a mass of belching fire and smoke and shot. The +picture of that first submarine, standing upright in the water, reeling +like a drunken man, while the apparently innocent merchant ship kept +pouring volley after volley into its sides, is one that will not quickly +fade from the memory of British naval men. Yet it is evident that the +Allies could not play a game like this indefinitely. They could do so +just as long as the Germans insisted on delivering themselves into their +hands. The complete success of the idea depended at first upon the fact +that the very existence of mystery ships was unknown to the German navy. +All that the Germans knew, in these early days, was that certain U-boats +had sailed from Germany and had not returned. But it was inevitable that +the time should come when a mystery ship attack would fail; the German +submarine would return and report that this new terror of the seas was +at large. And that is precisely what happened. A certain submarine +received a battering which it seemed hardly likely that any U-boat could +survive; yet, almost by a miracle, it crept back to its German base and +reported the manner of its undoing. Clearly the mystery ships in future +were not to have as plain sailing as in the past; the game, if it were +to continue, would become more a battle of wits; henceforth every liner +and merchantman, in German eyes, was a possible enemy in disguise, and +it was to be expected that the U-boat commanders would resort to every +means of protecting their craft against them. That the Germans knew all +about these vessels became apparent when one of their naval publications +fell into our hands, giving complete descriptions and containing +directions to U-boat commanders how to meet this new menace. The German +newspapers and illustrated magazines also began to devote much space to +this kind of anti-submarine fighting, denouncing it in true Germanic +fashion as "barbarous" and contrary to the rules of civilized warfare. +The great significance of this knowledge is at once apparent. The mere +fact that a number of Q-ships were at sea, even if they did not succeed +in sinking many submarines, forced the Germans to make a radical change +in their submarine tactics. As they could no longer bring to, board, and +loot merchant ships, and sink them inexpensively and without danger by +the use of bombs, they were obliged not only to use their precious +torpedoes, but also to torpedo without warning. This was the only +alternative except to abandon the submarine campaign altogether. + +Berlin accordingly instructed the submarine commanders not to approach +on the surface any merchant or passenger vessel closely enough to get +within range of its guns, but to keep at a distance and shell it. Had +the commanders always observed these instructions the success of the +mystery ship in sinking submarines would have ended then and there, +though the influence of their presence upon tactics would have remained +in force. The Allied navies now made elaborate preparations, all for the +purpose of persuading Fritz to approach in the face of a tremendous risk +concerning which he had been accurately informed. Every submarine +commander, after torpedoing his victim, now clearly understood that it +might be a decoy despatched for the particular purpose of entrapping +him; and he knew that an attempt to approach within a short distance of +the foundering vessel might spell his own immediate destruction. The +expert in German mentality must explain why, under these circumstances, +he should have persisted in walking into the jaws of death. The skill +with which the mystery ships and their crews were disguised perhaps +explains this in part. Anyone who might have happened in the open sea +upon Captain Campbell and his slow-moving freighter could not have +believed that they were part and parcel of the Royal Navy. Our own +destroyers were sometimes deceived by them. The _Cushing_ one day hailed +Captain Campbell in the _Pargust_, having mistaken him for a defenceless +tramp. The conversation between the two ships was brief but to the +point: + +_Cushing_: What ship? + +_Pargust_: Gordon Campbell! Please keep out of sight. + +The next morning another enemy submarine met her fate at the hands of +Captain Campbell, and although the _Cushing_ had kept far enough away +not to interfere with the action, she had the honour of escorting the +injured mystery ship into port and of receiving as a reward three +rousing cheers from the crew of the _Pargust_ led by Campbell. A more +villainous-looking gang of seamen than the crews of these ships never +sailed the waves. All men on board were naval officers or enlisted men; +they were all volunteers and comprised men of all ranks--admirals, +captains, commanders, and midshipmen. All had temporarily abandoned His +Majesty's uniform for garments picked up in second-hand clothing stores. +They had made the somewhat disconcerting discovery that carefully +trained gentlemen of the naval forces, when dressed in cast-off clothing +and when neglectful of their beards, differ little in appearance from +the somewhat rough-and-tumble characters of the tramp service. To assume +this external disguise successfully meant that the volunteers had also +to change almost their personal characteristics as well as their +clothes. Whereas the conspicuous traits of a naval man are neatness and +order, these counterfeit merchant sailors had to train themselves in the +casual ways of tramp seamen. They had also to accustom themselves to the +conviction that a periscope was every moment searching their vessel from +stem to stern in an attempt to discover whether there was anything +suspicious about it; they therefore had not only to dress the part of +merchantmen, but to act it, even in its minor details. The genius of +Captain Campbell consisted in the fact that he had made a minute study +of merchantmen, their officers and their crews, and was able to +reproduce them so literally on this vessel that even the expert eye was +deceived. Necessarily such a ship carried a larger crew than the +merchant freighter; nearly all, however, were kept constantly concealed, +the number appearing on deck always representing just about the same +number as would normally have sailed upon a tramp steamer. These men had +to train themselves in slouchiness of behaviour; they would hang over +the rails, and even use merchant terms in conversation with one another; +the officers were "masters," "mates," "pursers," and the like, and their +principal gathering-place was not a wardroom, but a saloon. That +scrupulous deference with which a subordinate officer in the navy treats +his superior was laid aside in this service. It was no longer the custom +to salute before addressing the commander; more frequently the sailor +would slouch up to his superior, his hands in his pockets and his pipe +in his mouth. This attempt to deceive the Hun observer at the periscope +sometimes assumed an even more ludicrous form. When the sailor of a +warship dumps ashes overboard he does it with particular care, so as not +to soil the sides of his immaculate vessel; but a merchant seaman is +much less considerate; he usually hurls overboard anything he does not +want and lets the ship's side take its chances. To have followed the +manner of the navy would at once have given the game away; so the +sailors, in carrying out this domestic duty, performed the act with all +the nonchalance of merchant seamen. To have messed in naval style would +also have been betraying themselves. The ship's cook, therefore, in a +white coat, would come on deck, and have a look around, precisely as he +would do on a freighter. Even when in port officers and men maintained +their disguise. They never visited hotels or clubs or private houses; +they spent practically all their time on board; if they occasionally +went ashore, their merchant outfit so disguised them that even their +best friends would not have recognized them in the street. + +The warlike character of their ships was even more cleverly hidden. In +the early days the guns were placed behind the bulwarks, which, when a +lever was pulled, would fall down, thus giving them an unobstructed +range at the submarine. In order to make the sides of the ships +collapsible, certain seams were unavoidably left in the plates, where +the detachable part joined the main structure. The U-boat commanders +soon learned to look for these betraying seams before coming to the +surface. They would sail submerged around the ship, the periscope +minutely examining the sides, much as a scientist examines his specimens +with a microscope. This practice made it necessary to conceal the guns +more carefully. The places which were most serviceable for this purpose +were the hatchways--those huge wells, extending from the deck to the +bottom, which are used for loading and unloading cargo. Platforms were +erected in these openings, and on these guns were emplaced; a covering +of tarpaulin completely hid them; yet a lever, pulled by the gun crews, +would cause the sides of the hatchway covers to fall instantaneously. +Other guns were placed under lifeboats, which, by a similar mechanism, +would fall apart, or rise in the air, exposing the gun. Perhaps the most +deceptive device of all was a gun placed upon the stern, and, with its +crew, constantly exposed to public gaze. Since most merchantmen carried +such a gun, its absence on a mystery ship would in itself have caused +suspicion; this armament not only helped the disguise, but served a +useful purpose in luring the submarine. At the first glimpse of a U-boat +on the surface, usually several miles away, the gun crew would begin +shooting; but they always took care that the shots fell short, thus +convincing the submarine that it had the advantage of range and so +inducing it to close. + +Captain Campbell and his associates paid as much attention to details in +their ships as in their personal appearance. The ship's wash did not +expose the flannels that are affected by naval men but the dungarees +that are popular with merchant sailors. Sometimes a side of beef would +be hung out in plain view; this not only kept up the fiction that the +ship was an innocent tramp, but it served as a tempting bait to the not +too well-fed crew of the submarine. Particularly tempting cargoes were +occasionally put on deck. One of the ships carried several papier-mâché +freight cars of the small European type covered with legends which +indicated that they were loaded with ammunition and bound for +Mesopotamia. It is easy to imagine how eagerly the Hun would wish to +sink that cargo! + +These ships were so effectively disguised that even the most experienced +eyes could not discover their real character. For weeks they could lie +in dock, the dockmen never suspecting that they were armed to the teeth. +Even the pilots who went aboard to take them into harbour never +discovered that they were not the merchant ships which they pretended to +be. Captain Hanrahan, who commanded the U.S. mystery ship _Santee_, +based on Queenstown, once entertained on board an Irishman from Cork. +The conversation which took place between this American naval +officer--who, in his disguise, was indistinguishable from a tramp +skipper of many years' experience--disclosed the complete ignorance of +the guest concerning the true character of the boat. + +"How do you like these Americans?" Captain Hanrahan innocently asked. + +"They are eating us out of house and home!" the indignant Irishman +remarked. The information was a little inaccurate, since all our food +supplies were brought from the United States; but the remark was +reassuring as proving that the ship's disguise had not been penetrated. +Such precautions were the more necessary in a port like Queenstown where +our forces were surrounded by spies who were in constant communication +with the enemy. + +I can personally testify to the difficulty of identifying a mystery +ship. One day Admiral Bayly suggested that we should go out in the +harbour and visit one of these vessels lying there preparatory to +sailing on a cruise. Several merchantmen were at anchor in port. We +steamed close around one in the Admiral's barge and examined her very +carefully through our glasses from a short distance. Concluding that +this was not the vessel we were seeking, we went to another merchantman. +This did not show any signs of being a mystery ship; we therefore hailed +the skipper, who told us the one which we had first visited was the +mystery ship. We went back, boarded her, and began examining her +appliances. The crew was dressed in the ordinary sloppy clothes of a +merchantman's deck-hands; the officers wore the usual merchant ship +uniform, and everything was as unmilitary as a merchant ship usually is. +The vessel had quite a long deckhouse built of light steel. The captain +told us that two guns were concealed in this structure; he suggested +that we should walk all around it and see if we could point out from a +close inspection the location of the guns. We searched carefully, but +were utterly unable to discover where the guns were. The captain then +sent the crew to quarters and told us to stand clear. At the word of +command one of the plates of the perpendicular side of the deckhouse +slid out of the way as quickly as a flash. The rail at the ship's side +in front of the gun fell down and a boat davit swung out of the way. At +the same time the gun crew swung the gun out and fired a primer to +indicate how quickly they could have fired a real shot. The captain also +showed us a boat upside down on the deckhouse--merchantmen frequently +carry one boat in this position. At a word a lever was pulled down below +and the boat reared up in the air and revealed underneath a gun and its +crew. On the poop was a large crate about 6 x 6 x 8 or 10 feet. At a +touch of the lever the sides of this crate fell down and revealed +another gun. + + +III + +For the greater part of 1917 from twenty to thirty of these ships sailed +back and forth in the Atlantic, always choosing those parts of the seas +where they were most likely to meet submarines. They were "merchantmen" +of all kinds--tramp steamers, coasting vessels, trawlers, and schooners. +Perhaps the most distressing part of existence on one of these ships was +its monotony: day would follow day; week would follow week; and +sometimes months would pass without encountering a single submarine. +Captain Campbell himself spent nine months on his first mystery ship +before even sighting an enemy, and many of his successors had a similar +experience. The mystery boat was a patient fisherman, constantly +expecting a bite and frequently going for long periods without the +slightest nibble. This kind of an existence was not only disappointing +but also exceedingly nerve racking; all during this waiting period the +officers and men had to keep themselves constantly at attention; the +vaudeville show which they were maintaining for the benefit of a +possible periscope had to go on continuously; a moment's forgetfulness +or relaxation might betray their secret, and make their experiment a +failure. The fearful tediousness of this kind of life had a more +nerve-racking effect upon the officers and men than the most exciting +battles, and practically all the mystery ship men who broke down fell +victims not to the dangers of their enterprise, but to this dreadful +tension of sailing for weeks and months without coming to close quarters +with their enemy. + +About the most welcome sight to a mystery ship, after a period of +inactivity, was the wake of a torpedo speeding in its direction. Nothing +could possibly disappoint it more than to see this torpedo pass astern +or forward without hitting the vessel. In such a contingency the genuine +merchant ship would make every possible effort to turn out of the +torpedo's way: the helmsman of the mystery ship, however, would take all +possible precautions to see that his vessel was hit. This, however, he +had to do with the utmost cleverness, else the fact that he was +attempting to collide with several hundred pounds of gun-cotton would in +itself betray him to the submarine. Not improbably several members of +the crew might be killed when the torpedo struck, but that was all part +of the game which they were playing. More important than the lives of +the men was the fate of the ship; if this could remain afloat long +enough to give the gunners a good chance at the submarine, everybody on +board would be satisfied. There was, however, little danger that the +mystery ship would go down immediately; for all available cargo space +had been filled with wood, which gave the vessel sufficient buoyancy +sometimes to survive many torpedoes. + +Of course this, as well as all the other details of the vessel, was +unknown to the skipper of the submerged submarine. Having struck his +victim in a vital spot, he had every reason to believe that it would +disappear beneath the waves within a reasonable period. The business of +the disguised merchantman was to encourage this delusion in every +possible way. From the time that the torpedo struck, the mystery ship +behaved precisely as the every-day cargo carrier, caught in a similar +predicament, would have done. A carefully drilled contingent of the +crew, known as the "panic party," enacted the rôle of the men on a +torpedoed vessel. They ran to and fro on the deck, apparently in a state +of high consternation, now rushing below and emerging with some personal +treasure, perhaps an old suit of clothes tucked under the arm, perhaps +the ship's cat or parrot, or a small handbag hastily stuffed with odds +and ends. Under the control of the navigating officer these men would +make for a lifeboat, which they would lower in realistic +fashion--sometimes going so far, in their stage play, as to upset it, +leaving the men puffing and scrambling in the water. One member of the +crew, usually the navigator, dressed up as the "captain," did his best +to supervise these operations. Finally, after everybody had left, and +the vessel was settling at bow or stern, the "captain" would come to the +side, cast one final glance at his sinking ship, drop a roll of papers +into a lifeboat--ostensibly the precious documents which were so coveted +by the submarine as an evidence of success--lower himself with one or +two companions, and row in the direction of the other lifeboats. +Properly placing these lifeboats, after "abandoning ship," was itself +one of the finest points in the plot. If the submarine rose to the +surface it would invariably steer first for those little boats, looking +for prisoners or the ship's papers; the boats' crews, therefore, had +instructions to take up a station on a bearing from which the ship's +guns could most successfully rake the submarine. That this manoeuvre +involved great danger to the men in the lifeboats was a matter of no +consideration in the desperate enterprise in which they were engaged. + +Thus to all outward appearance this performance was merely the +torpedoing of a helpless merchant vessel. Yet the average German +commander became altogether too wary to accept the situation in that +light. He had no intention of approaching either lifeboats or the ship +until entirely satisfied that he was not dealing with one of the decoy +vessels which he so greatly feared. There was only one way of satisfying +himself: that was to shell the ship so mercilessly that, in his opinion, +if any human beings had remained aboard, they would have been killed or +forced to surrender. The submarine therefore arose at a distance of two +or three miles. Possibly the mystery ship, with one well-aimed shot, +might hit the submarine at this distance, but the chances were +altogether against her. To fire such a shot, of course, would +immediately betray the fact that a gun crew still remained on board, and +that the vessel was a mystery ship; and on this discovery the submarine +would submerge, approach the vessel under water, and give her one or two +more torpedoes. No, whatever the temptation, the crew must "play +'possum," and not by so much as a wink let the submarine know that there +was any living thing on board. But this experience demanded heroism that +almost approaches the sublime. The gun crews lay prone beside their +guns, waiting the word of command to fire; the captain lay on the +screened bridge, watching the whole proceeding through a peephole, with +voice tubes near at hand with which he could constantly talk to his men. +They maintained these positions sometimes for hours, never lifting a +finger in defence, while the submarine, at a safe distance, showered +hundreds of shells upon the ship. These horrible missiles would shriek +above their heads; they would land on the decks, constantly wounding the +men, sometimes killing whole gun crews--yet, although the ship might +become a mass of blood and broken fragments of human bodies, the +survivors would lie low, waiting, with infinite patience, until the +critical moment arrived. This was the way they took to persuade the +submarine that their ship was what it pretended to be, a tramp, that +there was nothing alive on board, and that it could safely come near. +The still cautious German, after an hour or so of this kind of +execution, would submerge and approach within a few hundred yards. All +that the watchful eye at the peephole could see, however, was the +periscope; this would sail all around the vessel, sometimes at a +distance of fifty or a hundred feet. Clearly the German was taking no +chances; he was examining his victim inch by inch, looking for the +slightest sign that the vessel was a decoy. All this time the captain +and crew were lying taut, holding their breath, not moving a muscle, +hardly winking an eyelid, the captain with his mouth at the voice pipe +ready to give the order to let the false works drop the moment the +submarine emerged, the gun crews ready to fire at a second's warning. +But the cautious periscope, having completed the inspection of the ship, +would start in the direction of the drifting lifeboats. This ugly eye +would stick itself up almost in the faces of the anxious crew, evidently +making a microscopical examination of the clothes, faces, and general +personnel, to see if it could detect under their tramp steamer clothes +any traces of naval officers and men. + +Still the anxious question was, would the submarine emerge? Until it +should do so the ship's crew was absolutely helpless. There was no use +in shooting at the submerged boat, as shots do not penetrate the water +but bounce off the surface as they do off solid ice. Everybody knew that +the German under the water was debating that same question. To come up +to the surface so near a mystery ship he knew meant instant death and +the loss of his submarine; yet to go away under water meant that the +sinking ship, if a merchantman, might float long enough to be salvaged, +and it meant also that he would never be able to prove that he had +accomplished anything with his valuable torpedo. Had he not shelled the +derelict so completely that nothing could possibly survive? Had he not +examined the thing minutely and discovered nothing amiss? It must be +remembered that in 1917 a submarine went through this same procedure +with every ship that did not sink very soon after being torpedoed, and +that, in nearly every case, it discovered, after emerging, that it had +been dealing with a real merchantman. Already this same submarine had +wasted hours and immense stores of ammunition on vessels that were not +mystery ships, but harmless tramps, and all these false alarms had made +it impatient and careless. In most cases, therefore, the crew had only +to bide its time. The captain knew that his hidden enemy would finally +rise. + +"Stand by!" + +This command would come softly through the speaking tubes to the men at +the guns. The captain on the bridge had noticed the preliminary +disturbance on the water that preceded the emergence of the submarine. +In a few seconds the whole boat would be floating on top, and the +officers and crews would climb out on the deck, eager for booty. And +this within a hundred yards of four or five guns! + +"Let go!" + +This command came at the top of the voice, for concealment was now no +longer necessary. In a twinkling up went the battle flag, bulwarks fell +down, lifeboats on decks collapsed, revealing guns, sides dropped from +deckhouses, hen-coops, and other innocent-looking structures. The +apparently sinking merchantman became a volcano of smoke and fire; +scores of shells dropped upon the submarine, punching holes in her frail +hull, hurling German sailors high into the air, sometimes decapitating +them or blowing off their arms or legs. The whole horrible scene lasted +only a few seconds before the helpless vessel would take its final +plunge to the depths, leaving perhaps two or three survivors, a mass of +oil and wood, and still more ghastly wreckage, to mark the spot where +another German submarine had paid the penalty of its crimes. + + +IV + +It was entirely characteristic of this strange war that the greatest +exploit of any of the mystery ships was in one sense a failure--that is, +it did not succeed in destroying the submarine which attacked it. + +On an August day in 1917 the British "merchant steamer" _Dunraven_ was +zigzagging across the Bay of Biscay. Even to the expert eye she was a +heavily laden cargo vessel bound for Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, +probably carrying supplies to the severely pressed Allies in Italy and +the East. On her stern a 2-½ pounder gun, clearly visible to all +observers, helped to emphasize this impression. Yet the apparently +innocent _Dunraven_ was a far more serious enemy to the submarine than +appeared on the surface. The mere fact that the commander was not an +experienced merchant salt, but Captain Gordon Campbell, of the Royal +Navy, in itself would have made the _Dunraven_ an object of terror to +any lurking submarine, for Captain Campbell's name was a familiar one to +the Germans by this time. Yet it would have taken a careful +investigation to detect in the rough and unkempt figure of Captain +Campbell any resemblance to an officer of the British navy, or to +identify the untidy seamen as regularly enrolled British sailors. The +armament of the _Dunraven_, could one have detected it, would have +provided the greatest surprises. This vessel represented the final +perfection of the mystery ship. Though seemingly a harmless tramp she +carried a number of guns, also two torpedo tubes, and several depth +charges; but even from her deck nothing was visible except the usual +merchant gun aft. The stern of the _Dunraven_ was a veritable arsenal. +Besides the guns and depth charges, the magazine and shell-rooms were +concealed there; on each side of the ship a masked torpedo tube held its +missile ready for a chance shot at a submarine; and the forward deck +contained other armament. Such was the _Dunraven_, ploughing her way +along, quietly and indifferently, even when, as on this August morning, +a submarine was lying on the horizon, planning to make her its prey. + +As soon as the disguised merchantman spotted this enemy she began to +behave in character. When an armed merchant ship got within range of a +submarine on the surface she frequently let fly a shot on the chance of +a hit. That was therefore the proper thing for the _Dunraven_ to do; it +was really all a part of the game of false pretence in which she was +engaged. However, she took pains that the shell should not reach the +submarine; this was her means of persuading the U-boat that it +outranged the _Dunraven's_ gun and could safely give chase. The decoy +merchantman apparently put on extra steam when the submarine started in +her direction at top speed; here, again, however, the proper manoeuvre +was not to run too fast, for her real mission was to get caught. On the +other hand, had she slowed down perceptibly, that in itself would have +aroused suspicion; her game, therefore, was to decrease speed gradually +so that the U-boat would think that it was overtaking its enemy by its +own exertions. All during this queer kind of a chase the submarine and +the cargo ship were peppering each other with shells, one seriously, the +other merely in pretence. The fact that a naval crew, with such a fine +target as an exposed submarine, could shoot with a conscious effort not +to hit, but merely to lure the enemy to a better position, in itself is +an eloquent evidence of the perfect discipline which prevailed in the +mystery ship service. Not to aim a fair shot upon the detested vessel, +when there was a possibility of hitting it, was almost too much to ask +of human nature. But it was essential to success with these vessels +never to fire with the intention of hitting unless there was a practical +certainty of sinking the submarine; all energies were focussed upon the +supreme task of inducing the enemy to expose itself completely within +three or four hundred yards of the disguised freighter. + +In an hour or two the submarine landed a shot that seemed to have done +serious damage. At least huge clouds of steam arose from the +engine-room, furnishing external evidence that the engines or boilers +had been disabled. The submarine commander did not know that this was a +trick; that the vessel was fitted with a specially arranged pipe around +the engine-room hatch which could emit these bursts of steam at a +moment's notice, all for the purpose of making him believe that the +vitals of the ship had been irreparably damaged. The stopping of the +ship, the blowing off of the safety valve, and the appearance of the +"panic party" immediately after this ostensible hit made the illusion +complete. This "panic party" was particularly panicky; one of the +lifeboats was let go with a run, one fall at a time, thus dumping its +occupants into the sea. Ultimately, however, the struggling swimmers +were picked up and the boat rowed away, taking up a position where a +number of the _Dunraven's_ guns could get a good shot at the submarine +should the Germans follow their usual plan of inspecting the lifeboats +before visiting the sinking merchantman. + +So far everything was taking place according to programme; but presently +the submarine reopened fire and scored a shot which gave the enemy all +the advantages of the situation. I have described in some detail the +stern of the ship--a variegated assortment of depth charges, shell, +guns, and human beings. The danger of such an unavoidable concentration +of armament and men was that a lucky shot might land in the midst of it. +And this is precisely what now happened. Not only one, but three shells +from the submarine one after the other struck this hidden mass of men +and ammunition. The first one exploded a depth charge--300 pounds of +high explosive--which blew one of the officers out of the after-control +station where he lay concealed and landed him on the deck several yards +distant. Here he remained a few moments unconscious; then his associates +saw him, wounded as he was, creeping inch by inch back into his control +position, fortunately out of sight of the Germans. The seaman who was +stationed at the depth charges was also wounded by this shot, but, +despite all efforts to remove him to a more comfortable place, he +insisted on keeping at his post. + +"'Ere I was put in charge of these things," he said, "and 'ere I stays." + +Two more shells, one immediately after the other, now landed on the +stern. Clouds of black smoke began to rise, and below tongues of flame +presently appeared, licking their way in the direction of a large +quantity of ammunition, cordite, and other high explosives. It was not +decoy smoke and decoy flame this time. Captain Campbell, watching the +whole proceeding from the bridge, perhaps felt something in the nature +of a chill creeping up his spine when he realized that the after-part of +the ship, where men, explosives, and guns lay concealed in close +proximity, was on fire. Just at this moment he observed that the +submarine was rapidly approaching; and in a few minutes it lay within +400 yards of his guns. Captain Campbell was just about to give the +orders to open fire when the wind took up the dense smoke of the fire +and wafted it between his ship and the submarine. This precipitated one +of the crises which tested to the utmost the discipline of the mystery +ship. The captain had two alternatives: he could fire at the submarine +through the smoke, taking his chances of hitting an unseen and moving +target, or he could wait until the enemy passed around the ship and came +up on the other side, where there would be no smoke to interfere with +his view. It was the part of wisdom to choose the latter course; but +under existing conditions such a decision involved not only great nerve, +but absolute confidence in his men. For all this time the fire at the +stern was increasing in fierceness; in a brief period, Captain Campbell +knew, a mass of ammunition and depth charges would explode, probably +killing or frightfully wounding every one of the men who were stationed +there. If he should wait until the U-boat made the tour of the ship and +reached the side that was free of smoke the chances were that this +explosion would take place before a gun could be fired. On the other +hand, if he should fire through the smoke, there was little likelihood +of hitting the submarine. + +Those who are acquainted with the practical philosophy which directed +operations in this war will readily foresee the choice which was now +made. The business of mystery ships, as of all anti-submarine craft, was +to sink the enemy. All other considerations amounted to nothing when +this supreme object was involved. The lives of officers and men, +precious as they were under ordinary circumstances, were to be +immediately sacrificed if such a sacrifice would give an opportunity of +destroying the submarine. It was therefore Captain Campbell's duty to +wait for the under-water boat to sail slowly around his ship and appear +in clear view on the starboard side, leaving his brave men at the stern +exposed to the fire, every minute raging more fiercely, and to the +likelihood of a terrific explosion. That he was able to make this +decision, relying confidently upon the spirit of his crew and their +loyal devotion to their leader, again illustrates the iron discipline +which was maintained on the mystery ships. The first explosion had +destroyed the voice tube by means of which Captain Campbell communicated +with this gun crew. He therefore had to make his decision without +keeping his men informed of the progress of events--information very +helpful to men under such a strain; but he well knew that these men +would understand his action and cheerfully accept their rôle in the +game. Yet the agony of their position tested their self-control to the +utmost. The deck on which they lay every moment became hotter; the +leather of their shoes began to smoke, but they refused to budge--for to +flee to a safer place meant revealing themselves to the submarine and +thereby betraying their secret. They took the boxes of cordite shells in +their arms and held them up as high as possible above the smouldering +deck in the hope of preventing an explosion which seemed inevitable. +Never did Christian martyrs, stretched upon a gridiron, suffer with +greater heroism. + + +V + +It was probably something of a relief when the expected explosion took +place. The submarine had to go only 200 yards more to be under the fire +of three guns at a range of 400 yards, but just as it was rounding the +stern the German officers and men, standing on the deck, were greeted +with a terrific roar. Suddenly a conglomeration of men, guns, and +unexploded shells was hurled into the air. The German crew, of course, +had believed that the vessel was a deserted hulk, and this sudden +manifestation of life on board not only tremendously startled them, but +threw them into a panic. The four-inch gun and its crew were blown high +into the air, the gun landing forward on the well deck, and the crew in +various places. One man fell into the water; he was picked up, not +materially the worse for his experience, by the _Dunraven's_ lifeboat, +which, all this time, had been drifting in the neighbourhood. It is one +of the miracles of this war that not one of the members of that crew was +killed. The gashed and bleeding bodies of several were thrown back upon +the deck; but there were none so seriously wounded that they did not +recover. In the minds of these men, however, their own sufferings were +not the most distressing consequences of the explosion; the really +unfortunate fact was that the sudden appearance of men and guns in the +air informed the Germans that they had to deal with one of the ships +which they so greatly dreaded. The game, so far as the _Dunraven_ was +concerned, was apparently up. The submarine vanished under the water; +and the Englishmen well knew that the next move would be the firing of +the torpedo which could confidently be expected to end the Q-boat's +career. Some of the crew who were not incapacitated got a hose and +attempted to put out the fire, while others removed their wounded +comrades to as comfortable quarters as could be found. Presently the +wake of the torpedo could be seen approaching the ship; the explosion +that followed was a terrible one. The concussion of the previous +explosion had set off the "open-fire" buzzers at the gun +positions--these buzzers being the usual signals for dropping the false +work that concealed the guns and beginning the fight. The result was +that, before the torpedo had apparently given the _Dunraven_ its +quietus, all the remaining guns were exposed with their crews. Captain +Campbell now decided to fight to the death. He sent out a message +notifying all destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, as well as all +merchant ships, not to approach within thirty miles. A destroyer, should +she appear, would force the German to keep under water, and thus prevent +the _Dunraven_ from getting a shot. Another merchant ship on the horizon +might prove such a tempting bait to the submarine that it would abandon +the _Dunraven_, now nearly done for--all on fire at one end as she was +and also sinking from her torpedo wound--and so prevent any further +combat. For the resourceful Captain Campbell had already formulated +another final plan by which he might entice the submarine to rise within +range of his guns. To carry out this plan, he wanted plenty of sea room +and no interference; so he drew a circle in the water, with a radius of +thirty miles, inclosing the space which was to serve as the "prize ring" +for the impending contest. + +His idea was to fall in with the German belief that the _Dunraven_ had +reached the end of her tether. A hastily organized second "panic party" +jumped into a remaining lifeboat and a raft and rowed away from the +sinking, burning ship. Here was visible evidence to the Germans that +their enemies had finally abandoned the fight after nearly four hours of +as frightful gruelling as any ship had ever received. But there were +still two guns that were concealed and workable; there were, as already +said, two torpedo tubes, one on each beam; and a handful of men were +kept on board to man these. Meanwhile, Captain Campbell lay prone on the +bridge, looking through a peephole for the appearance of the submarine, +constantly talking to his men through the tubes, even joking them on +their painful vigil. + +"If you know a better 'ole," he would say, quoting Bairnsfather, "go to +it!" + +"Remember, lads," he would call at another time, "that the King has +given this ship the V.C." + +Every situation has its humorous aspects. Thus one gun crew could hardly +restrain its laughter when a blue-jacket called up to Captain Campbell +and asked if he could not take his boots off. He came of a respectable +family, he explained, and did not think it becoming to die with his +boots on. But the roar of the fire, which had now engulfed the larger +part of the ship, and the constantly booming shells, which were +exploding, one after another, like mammoth fire-crackers, interfered +with much conversation. For twenty minutes everybody lay there, hoping +and praying that the U-boat would emerge. + +The German ultimately came up, but he arose cautiously at the stern of +the ship, at a point from which the guns of the _Dunraven_ could not +bear. On the slim chance that a few men might be left aboard, the +submarine shelled it for several minutes, fore and aft, then, to the +agony of the watching Englishmen, it again sank beneath the waves. +Presently the periscope shot up, and began moving slowly around the +blazing derelict, its eye apparently taking in every detail; he was so +cautious, that submarine commander, he did not propose to be outwitted +again! Captain Campbell now saw that he had only one chance; the +conflagration was rapidly destroying his vessel, and he could spend no +more time waiting for the submarine to rise. But he had two torpedoes +and he determined to use these against the submerged submarine. As the +periscope appeared abeam, one of the _Dunraven's_ torpedoes started in +its direction; the watching gunners almost wept when it missed by a few +inches. But the submarine did not see it, and the periscope calmly +appeared on the other side of the ship. The second torpedo was fired; +this also passed just about a foot astern, and the submarine saw it. The +game was up. What was left of the _Dunraven_ was rapidly sinking, and +Captain Campbell sent out a wireless for help. In a few minutes the U.S. +armed yacht _Noma_ and the British destroyers _Alcock_ and +_Christopher_, which had been waiting outside the "prize ring," arrived +and took off the crew. The tension of the situation was somewhat +relieved when a "jackie" in one of the "panic" boats caught sight of his +beloved captain, entirely uninjured, jumping on one of the destroyers. + +"Gawd!" he shouted, in a delighted tone, "if there ain't the skipper +still alive!" + +"We deeply regret the loss of His Majesty's ship," said Captain +Campbell, in his report, "and still more the escape of the enemy. We did +our best, not only to destroy the enemy and save the ship, but also to +show ourselves worthy of the Victoria Cross which the King recently +bestowed on the ship." + +They did indeed. My own opinion of this performance I expressed in a +letter which I could not refrain from writing to Captain Campbell: + + MY DEAR CAPTAIN: + + I have just read your report of the action between the Dunraven and + a submarine on August 8th last. + + I have had the benefit of reading the reports of some of your + former exploits, and Admiral Bayly has told me about them all; but + in my opinion this of the _Dunraven_ is the finest of all as a + military action and the most deserving of complete success. + + It was purely incidental that the sub escaped. That was due, + moreover, to an unfortunate piece of bad luck. The engagement, + judged as a skilful fight, and not measured by its material + results, seems to me to have been perfectly successful, because I + do not think that even you, with all your experience in such + affairs, could conceive of any feature of the action that you would + alter if you had to do it over again. According to my idea about + such matters, the standard set by you and your crew is worth + infinitely more than the destruction of a submarine. Long after we + both are dust and ashes, the story of this last fight will be a + valuable inspiration to British (and American) naval officers and + men--a demonstration of the extraordinary degree to which the + patriotism, loyalty, personal devotion, and bravery of a crew may + be inspired. I know nothing finer in naval history than the conduct + of the after-gun's crew--in fact, the entire crew of the + _Dunraven_. It goes without saying that the credit of this + behaviour is chiefly yours.... + + With my best wishes for your future success, believe me, my dear + Captain, + + Faithfully yours, + WM. S. SIMS. + + +The records show that the mystery ships sank twelve submarines, of which +Captain Campbell accounted for four; yet this was perhaps not their most +important achievement. From the German standpoint they were a terribly +disturbing element in the general submarine situation. Externally a +mystery ship, as already described, was indistinguishable from the most +harmless merchantman. The cleverness with which the Allied officers took +advantage of the vicious practices of the submarine commanders +bewildered them still further. Nothing afloat was sacred to the Hun; and +he seemed to take particular pride in destroying small vessels, even +little sailing vessels. The Navy decided to turn this amiable trait to +good account, and fitted out the _Prize_, a topsail schooner of 200 +tons, and placed her under the command of Lieut. William Sanders, R.N.R. +This little schooner, as was expected, proved an irresistible bait. A +certain submarine, commanded by one of the most experienced U-boat +captains, attacked her by gun fire from a safe distance and, after her +panic party had left, shelled her until she was in a sinking condition; +many of her crew had been killed and wounded, when, confident that she +could not be a Q-ship, the enemy came within less than 100 yards. It was +promptly fired on and disappeared beneath the surface. The panic party +picked up the German captain and two men, apparently the only survivors, +who expressed their high admiration for the bravery of the crew and +assisted them to get their battered craft into port. The captain said to +Lieutenant Sanders: "I take off my hat to you and your men. I would not +have believed that any men could stand such gun fire." For this exploit +Lieutenant Sanders was awarded the Victoria Cross. Within about four +days from the time of this action the Admiralty received an inquiry via +Sweden through the Red Cross asking the whereabouts of the captain of +this submarine. This showed that the vessel had reached her home port, +and illustrated once more the necessity for caution in claiming the +destruction of U-boats and the wisdom of declining to publish the +figures of sinkings. Unfortunately, the plucky little _Prize_ was +subsequently lost with her gallant captain and crew. + +So great was the desire of our people to take some part in the mystery +ship campaign that I took steps to satisfy their legitimate ambition. As +the Navy had fitted out no mystery ships of our own, I requested the +Admiralty to assign one for our use. This was immediately agreed to by +Admiral Jellicoe and, with the approval of the Navy Department, the +vessel was delivered and named the _Santee_, after our old sailing +man-of-war of that name. We called for volunteers, and practically all +the officers and men of the forces based on Queenstown clamoured for +this highly interesting though hazardous service. Commander David C. +Hanrahan was assigned as her commander, and two specially selected men +were taken from each of our vessels, thus forming an exceedingly capable +crew. The ship was disguised with great skill and, with the invaluable +advice of Captain Campbell, the crew was thoroughly trained in all the +fine points of the game. + +One December evening the _Santee_ sailed from Queenstown for Bantry Bay +to carry out intensive training. A short time after she left port she +was struck by a torpedo which caused great damage, but so solidly was +her hull packed with wood that she remained afloat. The panic party got +off in most approved style, and for several hours the _Santee_ awaited +developments, hoping for a glimpse of the submarine. But the under-water +boat never disclosed its presence; not even the tip of a periscope +showed itself; and the _Santee_ was towed back to Queenstown. + +The _Santee's_ experience was that of many mystery ships of 1918. The +Germans had learned their lesson. + +For this reason it is desirable to repeat and emphasize that the most +important accomplishment of the mystery ships was not the actual sinking +of submarines, but their profound influence upon the tactics of the +U-boats. It was manifest in the beginning that the first information +reaching Germany concerning the mystery ships would greatly diminish the +chances of sinking submarines by this means, for it would cause all +submarines to be wary of all mercantile craft. They were therefore +obliged largely to abandon the easy, safe, and cheap methods of sinking +ships by bombs or gun fire, and were consequently forced to incur the +danger of attacking with the scarce and expensive torpedo. Moreover, +barring the very few vessels that could be sunk by long-range gun fire, +they were practically restricted to this method of attack on pain of +abandoning the submarine campaign altogether. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS + + +I + +Who would ever have thought that a little wooden vessel, displacing only +sixty tons, measuring only 110 feet from bow to stern, and manned by +officers and crew very few of whom had ever made an ocean voyage, could +have crossed more than three thousand miles of wintry sea, even with the +help of the efficient naval officers and men who, after training there, +convoyed and guided them across, and could have done excellent work in +hunting the submarines? We built nearly 400 of these little vessels in +eighteen months; and we sent 170 to such widely scattered places as +Plymouth, Queenstown, Brest, Gibraltar, and Corfu. Several enemy +submarines now lie at the bottom of the sea as trophies of their +offensive power; and on the day that hostilities ceased, the Allies +generally recognized that this tiny vessel, with the "listening devices" +which made it so efficient, represented one of the most satisfactory +direct "answers" to the submarine which had been developed by the war. +Had it not been that the war ended before enough destroyers could be +spared from convoy duty to assist, with their greater speed and +offensive power, hunting groups of these tiny craft, it is certain that +they would soon have become a still more important factor in destroying +submarines and interfering with their operations. + +The convoy system, as I have already explained, was essentially an +offensive measure; it compelled the submarine to encounter its most +formidable antagonist, the destroyer, and to risk destruction every time +that it attacked merchant vessels. This system, however, was an indirect +offensive, or, to use the technical phrase, it was a defensive-offensive. +Its great success in protecting merchant shipping, and the indispensable +service which it performed to the cause of civilization, I have already +described. But the fact remained that there could be no final solution +of the submarine problem, barring breaking down the enemy _moral_, until +a definite, direct method of attacking these boats had been found. A +depth charge, fired from the deck of a destroyer, was a serious matter +for the submarine; still the submarine could avoid this deadly weapon at +any time by simply concealing its whereabouts when in danger of attack. +The destroyer could usually sink the submarine whenever it could get +near enough; it was for the under-water boat, however, to decide whether +an engagement should take place. That great advantage in warfare, the +option of fighting or of running away, always lay with the submarine. +Until it was possible for our naval forces to set out to sea, find the +enemy that was constantly assailing our commerce, and destroy him, it +was useless to maintain that we had discovered the anti-submarine +tactics which would drive this pest from the ocean for all time. Though +the convoy, the mine-fields, the mystery ships, the airplane, and +several other methods of fighting the under-water boat had been +developed, the submarine could still utilize that one great quality of +invisibility which made any final method of attacking it such a +difficult problem. + +Thus, despite the wonderful work which had been accomplished by the +convoy, the Allied effort to destroy the submarine was still largely a +game of blind man's buff. In our struggle against the German campaign we +were deprived of one of the senses which for ages had been absolutely +necessary to military operations--that of sight. We were constantly +attempting to destroy an enemy whom we could not see. So far as this +offensive on the water was concerned, the Allies found themselves in the +position of a man who has suddenly gone blind. I make this comparison +advisedly, for it at once suggests that our situation was not entirely +hopeless. The man who loses the use of his eyes suffers a terrible +affliction; yet this calamity does not completely destroy his +usefulness. Such a person, if normally intelligent, gradually learns how +to find his way around in darkness; first he slowly discovers how to +move about his room; then about his house, then about his immediate +neighbourhood; and ultimately he becomes so expert that he can be +trusted to walk alone in crowded streets, to pilot himself up and down +strange buildings, and even to go on long journeys. In time he learns to +read, to play cards and chess, and not infrequently even to resume his +old profession or occupation; indeed his existence, despite the +deprivation of what many regard as the most indispensable of the senses, +becomes again practically a normal process. His whole experience, of +course, is one of the most beautiful demonstrations we have of the +exquisite economy of Nature. What has happened in the case of this +stricken man is that his other senses have come to fill the place of the +one which he has lost. Deprived of sight, he is forced to form his +contacts with the external world by using his other senses, especially +those of touch and hearing. So long as he could see clearly these senses +had lain half developed; he had never used them to any extent that +remotely approached their full powers; but now that they are called into +constant action they gradually increase in strength to a degree that +seems abnormal, precisely as a disused muscle, when regularly exercised, +acquires a hitherto unsuspected vigour. + +This illustration applies to the predicament in which the Allied navies +now found themselves. When they attempted to fight the submarine they +discovered that they had gone hopelessly blind. Like the sightless man, +however, they still had other senses left; and it remained for them to +develop these to take the place of the one of which they had been +deprived. The faculty which it seemed most likely that they could +increase by stimulation was that of hearing. Our men could not detect +the presence of the submarine with their eyes; could they not do so with +their ears? Their enemy could make himself unseen at will, but he could +not make himself unheard, except by stopping his motors. In fact, when +the submarine was under water the vibrations, due to the peculiar shape +of its propellers and hull, and to its electric motors, produced sound +waves that resembled nothing else in art or nature. It now clearly +became the business of naval science to take advantage of this +phenomenon to track the submarine after it had submerged. Once this feat +had been accomplished, the only advantage which the under-water boat +possessed over other warcraft, that of invisibility, would be overcome; +and, inasmuch as the submarine, except for this quality of invisibility, +was a far weaker vessel than any other afloat, the complete elimination +of this advantage would dispose of it as a formidable enemy in war. + +A fact that held forth hopes of success was that water is an excellent +conductor of sound--far better than the atmosphere itself. In the air +there are many crosscurrents and areas of varying temperature which make +sound waves frequently behave in most puzzling fashion, sometimes +travelling in circles, sometimes moving capriciously up or down or even +turning sharp corners. The mariner has learned how deceptive is a +foghorn; when it is blowing he knows that a ship is somewhere in the +general region, but usually he has no definite idea where. The water, +however, is uniform in density and practically uniform in temperature, +and therefore sound in this medium always travels in straight lines. It +also travels more rapidly in water than in the air, it travels farther, +and the sound waves are more distinct. American inventors have been the +pioneers in making practical use of this well-known principle. Before +the war its most valuable applications were the submarine bell and the +vibrator. On many Atlantic and Pacific points these instruments had been +placed under the water, provided with mechanisms which caused them to +sound at regular intervals; an ingenious invention, installed aboard +ships, made it possible for trained listeners to pick up these noises, +and so fix positions, long before lighthouses or lightships came into +view in any but entirely clear weather. For several years the great +trans-Atlantic liners have frequently made Nantucket Lightship by +listening for its submarine bell. From the United States this system was +rapidly extending all over the world. + +American inventors were therefore well qualified to deal with this +problem of communicating by sound under the water. A listening device +placed on board ship, which would reveal to practised ears the noise of +a submarine at a reasonable distance, and which would at the same time +give its direction, would come near to solving the most serious problem +presented by the German tactics. Even before the United States entered +the war, American specialists had started work on their own initiative. +In particular the General Electric Company, the Western Electric +Company, and the Submarine Signal Company had taken up the matter at +their own expense; each had a research department and an experimental +station where a large amount of preliminary work had been done. Soon a +special board was created at Washington to study detection devices, to +which each of these companies was invited to send a representative; the +board eventually took up its headquarters at New London, and was +assisted in this work by some of the leading physicists of our +universities. All through the summer and autumn of 1917 these men kept +industriously at their task; to such good purpose did they labour that +by October of that year several devices had been invented which seemed +to promise satisfactory results. In beginning their labours they had one +great advantage: European scientists had already made considerable +progress in this work, and the results of their studies were at once +placed at our disposal by the Allied Admiralties. Moreover, these +Admiralties sent over several of their experts to co-operate with us. +About that time Captain Richard H. Leigh, U.S.N., who had been assigned +to command the subchaser detachments abroad, was sent to Europe to +confer with the Allied Admiralties, and to test, in actual operations +against submarines, the detection devices which had been developed at +the New London station. Captain Leigh, who after the armistice became my +chief-of-staff at London, was not only one of our ablest officers, but +he had long been interested in detection devices, and was a great +believer in their possibilities. + +The British, of course, received Captain Leigh cordially and gave him +the necessary facilities for experimenting with his devices, but it was +quite apparent that they did not anticipate any very satisfactory +results. The trouble was that so many inventors had presented new ideas +which had proved useless that we were all more or less doubtful. They +had been attempting to solve this problem ever since the beginning of +the war; British inventors had developed several promising hydrophones, +but these instruments had not proved efficient in locating a submarine +with sufficient accuracy to enable us to destroy it with depth charges. +These disappointments quite naturally created an atmosphere of +scepticism which, however, did not diminish the energy which was +devoted to the solution of this important problem. Accordingly, three +British trawlers and a "P"[6] boat were assigned to Captain Leigh, and +with these vessels he spent ten days in the Channel, testing impartially +both the British and American devices. No detailed tactics for groups of +vessels had yet been elaborated for hunting by sound. Though the ships +used were not particularly suitable for the work in hand, these few days +at sea demonstrated that the American contrivances were superior to +anything in the possession of the Allies. They were by no means perfect; +but the ease with which they picked up all kinds of noises, particularly +those made by submarines, astonished everybody who was let into the +secret; the conviction that such a method of tracking the hidden enemy +might ultimately be used with the desired success now became more or +less general. In particular the American "K-tubes" and the "C-tubes" +proved superior to the "Nash-fish" and the "Shark-fin," the two devices +which up to that time had been the favourites in the British navy. The +"K-tubes" easily detected the sound of large vessels at a distance of +twenty miles, while the "C-tubes" were more useful at a shorter +distance. But the greatest advantage which these new listening machines +had over those of other navies was that they could more efficiently +determine not only the sound but also the direction from which it came. +Captain Leigh, after this demonstration, visited several British naval +stations, consulting with the British officers, explaining our +sound-detection devices, and testing the new appliances in all kinds of +conditions. The net result of his trip was a general reversal of opinion +on the value of this method of hunting submarines. The British Admiralty +ordered from the United States large quantities of the American +mechanisms, and also began manufacturing them in England. + +About the time that it was shown that these listening devices would +probably have great practical value, the first "subchasers" were +delivered at New London, Conn. The design of the subchaser type was +based upon what proved to be a misconception as to the cruising +possibilities of the submarine. Just before the beginning of the Great +War most naval officers believed that the limitations of the submarine +were such that it could not operate far from coastal waters. Hardly any +one, except a few experienced submarine officers, had regarded it as +possible that these small boats could successfully attack vessels upon +the high seas or remain for any extended period away from their base. +High authorities condemned them. This is hard to realize, now that we +know so well the offensive possibilities of submarines, but we have +ample evidence as to what former opinions were. For example, a +distinguished naval writer says that at that time "The view of the +majority of admirals and captains probably was that submersible craft +were 'just marvellous toys, good for circus performances in carefully +selected places in fine weather.'" He adds that certain very prominent +naval men of great experience declared that the submarine "could operate +only by day in fair weather; that it was practically useless in misty +weather"; that it had to come to the surface to fire its torpedo; that +its "crowning defect lay in its want of habitability"; that "a week's +peace manoeuvres got to the bottom of the health of officers and men"; +and that "on the high seas the chances [of successful attack] will be +few, and submarines will require for their existence parent ships." The +first triumph of Otto Weddingen, that of sinking the _Cressy_, the +_Hogue_, and the _Aboukir_, did not change this conviction, for these +three warships had been sunk in comparatively restricted waters under +conditions which were very favourable to the submarine. It was not until +the _Audacious_ went to the bottom off the north-west coast of Ireland, +many hundreds of miles from any German submarine base, that the +possibilities of this new weapon were partially understood; for it was +clear that the _Audacious_ had been sunk by a mine, and that that mine +must have been laid by a submarine. Even then many doubted the ability +of the U-boats to operate successfully in the open sea westward of the +British Isles. Therefore the subchaser was designed to fight the +submarine in restricted waters; Great Britain and France ordered more +than 500 smaller (80-foot) vessels of this type, or of approximately +this type, built in the United States; and just before our declaration +of war the United States had designed and contracted for several +hundred of a somewhat larger size (the 110-foot chasers) with the +original idea of using them as patrol boats near the harbours and +coastal waters of our own country. Long before these vessels were +finished, however, it became apparent that Germany could not engage in +any serious, extensive campaign on this side; it was also evident that +any vessel as small as the subchaser had little value in convoy work, +notwithstanding the excellence of its sea-keeping qualities; and we were +all rather doubtful as to just what use we could make of these new +additions to our navy. + +The work of pushing the design and construction of these boats reflects +great credit upon those who were chiefly responsible. The designs were +drawn and the first contracts were placed before the United States had +declared war. The credit for this admirable work belongs chiefly to +Commander Julius A. Furer (Construction Corps) U.S. Navy, and to Mr. A. +Loring Swasey, a yacht architect of Boston, who was enrolled as a +lieutenant-commander in the reserves, and who served throughout the war +as an adviser and assistant to Commander Furer in his specialty as a +small vessel designer, particularly in wood. It speaks well for the +ability of these officers that the small subchasers exhibited such +remarkable sea-keeping qualities; this fact was a pleasant surprise to +all sea-going men, particularly to naval officers who had had little +experience with that type of craft. The listening devices had not been +perfected when they were designed, and this innovation opened up +possibilities for their employment which had not been anticipated; for +these reasons it inevitably took a large amount of time, after the +subchasers had been delivered, to provide the hydrophones and all the +several appliances which were necessary for hunting submarines. +Apparently those who were responsible for constructing these boats had a +rocky road to travel; with the great demand for material and labour for +building destroyers, merchant ships, and for a multitude of war +supplies, it was natural that the demands for the subchasers in the +early days were viewed as a nuisance; the responsible officers, +therefore, deserve credit for delivering these boats in such an +efficient condition and in such a remarkably short time. That winter, as +everyone will recall, was the coldest in the memory of the present +generation. Day after day the poor subchasers, coated with ice almost a +foot thick, many with their engines wrecked, their planking torn and +their propellers crumpled, were towed into the harbour and left at the +first convenient mooring, where the ice immediately began to freeze them +in. As was inevitable under such conditions, the crews, for the most +part, suffered acutely in this terrible weather; they had had absolutely +no training in ordinary seamanship, to say nothing of the detailed +tactics demanded by the difficult work in which they were to engage. + +I do not think that the whole lot contained 1 per cent. of graduates of +Annapolis or 5 per cent. of experienced sailors; for the greater number +that terrible trip in the icy ocean, with the thermometer several +degrees below zero, and with very little artificial heat on board, was +their first experience at sea. Yet there was not the slightest sign of +whimpering or discouragement. Ignorant of salt water as these men at +that time were, they really represented about the finest raw material in +the nation for this service. Practically all, officers and men, were +civilians; a small minority were amateur yachtsmen, but the great mass +were American college undergraduates. Boys of Yale, Harvard, +Princeton--indeed, of practically every college and university in the +land--had dropped their books, left the comforts of their fraternity +houses, and abandoned their athletic fields, eager for the great +adventure against the Hun. If there is any man who still doubts what the +American system of higher education is doing for our country, he should +have spent a few days at sea with these young men. That they knew +nothing at first about navigation and naval technique was not important; +the really important fact was that their minds were alert, their hearts +filled with a tremendous enthusiasm for the cause, their souls clean, +and their bodies ready for the most exhausting tasks. Whenever I get to +talking of the American college boys and other civilians in our navy, I +find myself indulging in what may seem extravagant praise. I have even +been inclined to suggest that it would be well, in the training of naval +officers in future, to combine a college education with a shorter +intensive technical course at the Naval Academy. For these college men +have what technical academies do not usually succeed in giving--a +general education and a general training, which develops the power of +initiative, independent thought, an ability quickly to grasp intricate +situations, and to master, in a short time, almost any practical +problem. At least this proved to be the case with our subchaser forces. +So little experience did these boys have of seafaring that, as soon as +they had completed their first voyage, we had to place a considerable +portion in hospital to recover from seasickness. Yet, a few months +afterward, we could leave these same men on the bridge at night in +command of the ship. When they reached New London they knew no more of +seamanship and navigation than so many babies, but so well were these +boys instructed and trained within a few weeks by the regular officers +in charge that they learned their business sufficiently well to cross +the Atlantic safely in convoy. The early 80-foot subchasers which we +built for Great Britain and France crossed the ocean on the decks of +ocean liners; for it would have been a waste of time, even if +international law had permitted it, to send them under their own power; +but all of the 110-footers which these young men commanded crossed the +ocean under their own power and many in the face of the fierce January +and February gales, almost constantly tossed upon the waves like pieces +of cork. As soon as they were sufficiently trained and prepared to make +the trip, groups were despatched under escort of a naval vessel fitted +to supply them with gasolene at sea. Such matters as gunnery these young +men also learned with lightning speed. The most valuable were those who +had specialized in mathematics, chemistry, and general science; but they +were all a splendid lot, and to their spirit and energy are chiefly due +their remarkable success in learning their various duties. + +"Those boys can't bring a ship across the ocean!" someone remarked to +Captain Cotten, who commanded the first squadron of subchasers to arrive +at Plymouth, after he had related the story of one of these voyages. + +"Perhaps they can't," replied Captain Cotten--himself an Annapolis man +who admires these reservists as much as I do. "But they have." + +And he pointed to thirty-six little vessels lying at anchor in Plymouth +Harbour, just about a hundred yards from the monument which marks the +spot from which the _Mayflower_ sailed for the new world--all of which +were navigated across by youngsters of whom almost none, officers or +men, had had any nautical training until the day the United States +declared war on Germany. + +Capable as they were, however, I am sure that these reservists would be +the first to acknowledge their obligations to the loyal and devoted +regular officers of the Navy, who laboured so diligently to train them +for their work. One of the minor tragedies of the war is that many of +our Annapolis men, whose highest ambition it was to cross the ocean and +engage in the "game," had to stay on this side, in order to instruct +these young men from civil life. + +I wish that I had the space adequately to acknowledge the work in +organization done by Captain John T. Tompkins; in listening devices by +Rear-Admiral S. S. Robison, Captains Frank H. Schofield, Joseph H. +Defrees, Commanders Clyde S. McDowell, and Miles A. Libbey, and the many +scientists who gave us the benefit of their knowledge and experience. It +is impossible to overpraise the work of such men as Captains Arthur J. +Hepburn, Lyman A. Cotten, and William P. Cronan, in "licking" the +splendid raw material into shape. Great credit is also due to +Rear-Admiral T. P. Magruder, Captains David F. Boyd, S. V. Graham, +Arthur Crenshaw, E. P. Jessop, C. M. Tozer, H. G. Sparrow, and C. P. +Nelson, and many others who had the actual responsibility of convoying +these vessels across the ocean. + +I assume that they will receive full credit when the story of the work +of the Navy at home is written; meanwhile, they may be assured of the +appreciation of those of us on the other side who depended so much for +success upon their thorough work of preparation. + + +II + +The sea qualities which the subchaser displayed, and the development of +listening devices which made it possible to detect all kinds of sounds +under water at a considerable distance, immediately laid before us the +possibility of direct offensive operations against the submarine. It +became apparent that these listening devices could be used to the +greatest advantage on these little craft. The tactics which were soon +developed for their use made it necessary that we should have a large +number of vessels; nearly all the destroyers were then engaged in convoy +duty, and we could not entertain the idea of detailing many of them for +this more or less experimental work. Happily the subchasers started +coming off the ways just in time to fill the need; and the several +Allied navies began competing for these new craft in lively fashion. +France demanded them in large numbers to work in co-operation with the +air stations and also to patrol her coastal waters, and there were many +requests from stations in England, Ireland, Gibraltar, Portugal, and +Italy. The question of where we should place them was therefore referred +to the Allied Naval War Council, which, at my suggestion, considered the +matter, not from the standpoint of the individual nation, but from the +standpoint of the Allied cause as a whole. + +A general survey clearly showed that there were three places where the +subchasers might render the most efficient service. The convoy system +had by this time not only greatly reduced the losses, but it was +changing the policy of the submarines. Until this system was adopted, +sinkings on a great scale were taking place far out at sea, sometimes +three or four hundred miles west of Ireland. The submarines had adopted +the policy of meeting the unescorted ships in the Atlantic and of +torpedoing them long before they could reach the zones where the +destroyer patrol might possibly have protected them. But sailing great +groups of merchantmen in convoys, surrounded by destroyers, made this an +unprofitable adventure, and the submarines therefore had to change their +programme. The important point is that the convoys, so long as they +could keep formation, and so long as protecting screens could be +maintained on their flanks, were virtually safe. Under these conditions +sinkings, as already said, were less than one-half of 1 per cent. These +convoys, it will be recalled, came home by way of two "trunk lines," a +southern one extending through the English Channel and a northern one +through the so-called "North Channel"--the latter being the passage +between Ireland and Scotland. As soon as the inward-bound southern +"trunk-line" convoys reached the English Channel they broke up, certain +ships going to Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, and other Channel +ports, and others sailing to Brest, Cherbourg, Havre, and other harbours +in France. In the same fashion, convoys which came in by way of the +North Channel split up as soon as they reached the Irish Sea. In other +words, the convoys, as convoys, necessarily ceased to exist the moment +that they entered these inland waters, and the ships, as individual +ships, or small groups of ships, had to find their way to their +destinations unescorted by destroyers, or escorted most inadequately. +This was the one weak spot in the convoy system, and the Germans were +not slow to turn it to their advantage. They now proceeded to withdraw +most of their submarines from the high seas and to concentrate them in +these restricted waters. In April, 1917, the month which marked the high +tide of German success, not far from a hundred merchant ships were sunk +in an area that extended about 300 miles west of Ireland and about 300 +miles south. A year afterward--in the month of April, 1918--not a single +ship was sent to the bottom in this same section of the sea. That change +measures the extent to which the convoy saved Allied shipping. But if we +examine the situation in inclosed waters--the North Channel, the Irish +Sea, St. George's Channel, and the English Channel--we shall find a less +favourable state of affairs. Practically all the sinkings of April, +1918, occurred in these latter areas. In April, 1917, the waters which +lay between Ireland and England were practically free from depredations; +in the spring of 1918, however, these waters had become a favourite +hunting ground for submarines; while in the English Channel the sinkings +were almost as numerous in April, 1918, as they had been in the same +month the year before. + +Thus we had to deal with an entirely new phase of the submarine +campaign; the new conditions made it practicable to employ light vessels +which existed in large numbers, and which could aggressively hunt out +the submarines even though they were sailing submerged. The subchaser, +when fitted with its listening devices, met these new requirements, +though of course not to the desirable degree of precision we hoped soon +to attain with still further improved hydrophones and larger vessels of +the Eagle class then being built. + +The matter was presented to the Allied Naval Council and, in accordance +with the unanimous opinion of all of the members, they recommended that +of the subchasers then available, a squadron should be based on +Plymouth, where it could be advantageously used against the German +submarines which were still doing great damage in the English Channel, +and that another squadron, based on Queenstown, should similarly be used +against the submarines in the Irish Sea. + +I was therefore requested to concentrate the boats at these two points, +and at once acquiesced in this recommendation. + +But another point, widely separated from British waters, also made a +powerful plea for consideration. In the Mediterranean the submarine +campaign was still a menace. The spring and early summer of 1918 +witnessed large losses of shipping destined to southern France, to +Italy, and to the armies at Salonika and in Palestine. Austrian and +German submarines, operating from their bases at Pola and Cattaro in the +Adriatic, were responsible for this destruction. If we could pen these +pests in the Adriatic, the whole Mediterranean Sea would become an +unobstructed highway for the Allies. A glance at the map indicated the +way in which such a desirable result might be accomplished. At its +southern extremity the Adriatic narrows to a passage only forty miles +wide--the Strait of Otranto--and through this restricted area all the +submarines were obliged to pass before they could reach the water where +they could prey upon Allied commerce. For some time before the Allied +Naval Council began to consider the use of the American subchasers, the +British navy was doing its best to keep submarines from passing this +point. A defensive scheme known, not very accurately, as the "Otranto +barrage" was in operation. The word "barrage" suggests an effective +barrier, but this one at the base of the Adriatic consisted merely of a +few British destroyers of ancient type and a large number of drifters, +which kept up a continuous patrolling of the gateway through which the +submarines made their way into the Mediterranean. It is no reflection +upon the British to say that this barrage was unsatisfactory and +inadequate, and that, for the first few months, it formed a not +particularly formidable obstruction. So many demands were made upon the +British navy in northern waters that it could not spare many vessels for +this work; the Italian navy was holding the majority of its destroyers +intact, momentarily prepared for a sortie by the Austrian battle fleet; +the Otranto barrage, therefore, important as it was to the Allied cause, +was necessarily insufficient. The Italian representatives at the Allied +Council made a strong plea for a contingent of American subchasers to +reinforce the British ships, and the British and French delegates +seconded this request. + +In the spring of 1918 I therefore sent Captain Leigh to southern Italy +to locate and construct a subchaser base in this neighbourhood. After +inspecting the territory in detail Captain Leigh decided that the Bay of +Govino, in the island of Corfu, would best meet our requirements. The +immediate connection which was thus established between New London and +this ancient city of classical Greece fairly illustrates how widely the +Great War had extended the horizon of the American people. There was a +certain appropriateness in the fact that the American college boys who +commanded these little ships--not much larger than the vessel in which +Ulysses had sailed these same waters three thousand years before--should +have made their base on the same island which had served as a naval +station for Athens in the Peloponnesian War, and which, several +centuries afterward, had been used for the same purpose by Augustus in +the struggle with Antony. And probably the sight of the Achelleion, the +Kaiser's palace, which was not far from this new American base, was not +without its influence in constantly reminding our young men of the +meaning of this unexpected association of Yankee-land with the ancient +world. + + +III + +By June 30, 1918, two squadrons of American chasers, comprising +thirty-six boats, had assembled at Plymouth, England, under the command +of Captain Lyman A. Cotten, U.S.N. The U.S. destroyer _Parker_, +commanded by Commander Wilson Brown, had been assigned to this +detachment as a supporting ship. The area which now formed the new field +of operations was one which was causing great anxiety at that time. It +comprehended that section of the Channel which reached from Start Point +to Lizard Head, and included such important shipping ports as Plymouth, +Devonport, and Falmouth. This was the region in which the convoys, after +having been escorted through the submarine zone, were broken up, and +from which the individual ships were obliged to find their way to their +destinations with greatly diminished protection. It was one of the most +important sections in which the Germans, forced to abandon their +submarine campaign on the high seas, were now actively concentrating +their efforts. Until the arrival of the subchasers sinkings had been +taking place in these waters on a considerable scale. In company with a +number of British hunting units, Captain Cotten's detachment kept +steadily at work from June 30th until the middle of August, when it +became necessary to send it elsewhere. The historical fact is that not a +single merchant ship was sunk between Lizard Head and Start Point as +long as these subchasers were assisting in the operations. The one +sinking which at first seemed to have broken this splendid record was +that of the _Stockforce_; this merchantman was destroyed off Dartmouth; +but it was presently announced that the _Stockforce_ was in reality a +"mystery" ship, sent out for the express purpose of being torpedoed, and +that she "got" the submarine which had ended her own career. This +happening therefore hardly detracted from our general satisfaction over +the work done by our little vessels. Since many ships had been sunk in +this area in the month before they arrived, and since the sinkings +started in again after they had left, the immunity which this region +enjoyed during July and August may properly be attributed largely to the +American navy. Not only were no bona-fide merchant ships destroyed, but +no mines were laid from Start Point to Lizard Head during the time that +the American forces maintained their vigil there. That this again was +probably not a mere coincidence was shown by the fact that, the very +night after these chasers were withdrawn from Plymouth, five mines were +laid in front of that harbour, in preparation for a large convoy +scheduled to sail the next day. + +By the time that Captain Cotten's squadron began work the hunting +tactics which had been developed during their training at New London +had been considerably improved. Their procedure represented something +entirely new in naval warfare. Since the chasers had to depend for the +detection of the foe upon an agency so uncertain as the human ear, it +was thought to be necessary, as a safeguard against error, and also to +increase the chances of successful attack, that they should hunt in +groups of at least three. The fight against the submarine, under this +new system, was divided into three parts--the search, the pursuit, and +the attack. The first chapter included those weary hours which the +little group spent drifting on the ocean, the lookout in the crow's nest +scanning the surface for the possible glimpse of a periscope, while the +trained listeners on deck, with strange little instruments which +somewhat resembled telephone receivers glued to their ears, were kept +constantly at tension for any noise which might manifest itself under +water. It was impossible to use these listening devices while the boats +were under way, for the sound of their own propellers and machinery +would drown out any other disturbances. The three little vessels +therefore drifted abreast--at a distance of a mile or two apart--their +propellers hardly moving, and the decks as silent as the grave; they +formed a new kind of fishing expedition, the officers and crews +constantly held taut by the expectation of a "bite." And frequently +their experience was that of the proverbial "fisherman's luck." Hours +passed sometimes without even the encouragement of a "nibble"; then, +suddenly, one of the listeners would hear something which his +experienced ear had learned to identify as the propellers and motors of +a submarine. The great advantage possessed by the American tubes, as +already said, was that they gave not only the sound, but its direction. +The listener would inform his commanding officer that he had picked up a +submarine. "Very faint," he would perhaps report, "direction 97"--the +latter being the angle which it made with the north and south line. +Another appliance which now rendered great service was the wireless +telephone. The commanding officer at once began talking with the other +two boats, asking if they had picked up the noise. Unless all three +vessels had heard the disturbance, nothing was done; but if all +identified it nearly simultaneously, this unanimity was taken as +evidence that something was really moving in the water. When all three +vessels obtained the direction as well as the sound it was a +comparatively simple matter to define pretty accurately its location. +The middle chaser of the three was the flagship and her most interesting +feature was the so-called plotting-room. Here one officer received +constant telephone reports from all three boats, giving the nature of +the sounds, and, more important still, their directions. He transferred +these records to a chart as soon as they came in, rapidly made +calculations, and in a few seconds he was able to give the location of +the submarine. This process was known as obtaining a "fix." The reports +of our chaser commanders are filled constantly with reference to these +"fixes"--the "fix" being that point on the surface of the ocean where +three lines, each giving the direction of the detected sound, cross one +another. The method can be most satisfactorily illustrated by the +following diagram: + +[Illustration: HOW THE LISTENING DEVICES LOCATED A SUBMARINE.] + +In this demonstration the letters A, B, and C, each represent a +subchaser, the central one, B, being the flagship of the division. The +listener on A has picked up a noise, the direction of which is indicated +by the line _a a_. He telephones by wireless this information to the +plotting-room aboard the flagship B. The listeners on this vessel have +picked up the same sound, which comes from the direction indicated by +the line _b b_. The point at which these two lines cross is the "fix"; +it shows the spot in the ocean where the submarine was stationed when +the sound was first detected. The reason for having a report from the +third subchaser C is merely for the purpose of corroborating the work of +the other two; if three observations, made independently, agree in +locating the enemy at this point, the commanding officer may safely +assume that he is not chasing a will o' the wisp. + +But this "fix" is merely the location of the submarine at the time when +it was first heard. In the great majority of cases, however, the +submerged vessel is moving; so, rapidly as the men in the plotting-room +may work, the German has advanced beyond this point by the time they +have finished their calculations. The subchasers, which have been +drifting while these observations were being made, now start their +engines at full speed, and rush up to the neighbourhood of their first +"fix." Arrived there, they stop again, put over their tubes, and begin +listening once more. The chances are now that the noise of the submarine +is louder; the chasers are getting "warmer." It is not unlikely, +however, that the direction has changed, for the submarine, which has +listening devices of its own--though the German hydrophones were +decidedly inferior to the American--may have heard the subchasers and +may be making frantic efforts to elude them. But changing the course +will help it little, for the listeners easily get the new direction, and +send the details to the plotting-room, where the new "fix" is obtained +in a few moments. Thus the subchasers keep inching up to their prey; at +each new "fix" the noise becomes louder, until the hunters are so near +that they feel justified in attacking. Putting on full speed, all three +rush up to the latest "fix," drop depth charges with a lavish hand, fire +the "Y" howitzers, each one of which carries two depth charges, +meanwhile manning their guns on the chance that the submarine may decide +to rise to the surface and give battle. In many of these hunts a +destroyer accompanies the subchasers, always keeping at a considerable +distance, so that the noise of its propellers will not interfere with +the game; once the chasers determine the accurate "fix," they wire the +position to this larger ship, which puts on full steam and dashes with +the speed of an express train to the indicated spot, and adds ten or a +dozen depth charges to those deposited by the chasers. + +Such were the subchaser tactics in their perfection; yet it was only +after much experience that the procedure began to work with clock-like +regularity. At first the new world under the water proved confusing to +the listeners at the tubes. This watery domain was something entirely +new in human experience. When Dr. Alexander Bell invented his first +telephone an attempt was made to establish a complete circuit by using +the earth itself; the result was that a conglomerate of +noises--moanings, shriekings, howlings, and humming sounds--came over +the wire, which seemed to have become the playground of a million +devils. These were the noises, hitherto unknown, which are constantly +being given out by Mother Earth herself. And now it was discovered that +the under-ocean, which we usually think of as a silent place, is in +reality extremely vocal. The listeners at the C- and K-tubes heard many +sounds in addition to the ones which they were seeking. On the K-tubes a +submarine running at full speed was audible from fifteen to twenty +miles, but louder noises could be heard much farther away. The day might +be bright, the water quiet, and there might not be a ship anywhere +within the circle of the horizon, but suddenly the listener at the tube +would hear a terrific explosion, and he would know that a torpedo, +perhaps forty or fifty miles distant, had blown up a merchantman, or +that some merchantman had struck a mine. Again he would catch the +unmistakable "chug! chug! chug!" which he learned to identify as +indicating the industrious and slow progress of a convoy of twenty or +thirty ships. Then a rapid humming noise would come along the wire; that +was the whirling propeller of a destroyer. A faint moan caused some +bewilderment at first; but it was ultimately learned that this came from +a wreck, lying at the bottom, and tossed from side to side by the +current; it sounded like the sigh of a ghost, and the frequency with +which it was heard told how densely the floor of the ocean was covered +with victims of the submarines. The larger animal life of the sea also +registered itself upon the tubes. Our listeners, after a little +training, could identify a whale as soon as the peculiar noise it made +in swimming reached the receivers. At first a school of porpoises +increased their perplexities. The "swish! swish!" which marked their +progress so closely resembled the noise of a submarine that it used to +lead our men astray. But practice in this game was everything; after a +few trips the listener easily distinguished between the porpoise and the +submarine, though the distinction was so fine that he had difficulty in +telling just how he made it. In fact, our men became so expert that, out +of the miscellaneous noises which overwhelmed their ears whenever the +tubes were dropped into the water, they were able almost invariably to +select that of the U-boat. + +In many ingenious ways the chasers supplemented the work of other +anti-submarine craft. Destroyers and other patrol boats kept track of +the foe pretty well so long as he remained on the surface; the business +of the chaser, we must remember, was to find him after he had submerged. +The Commander-in-Chief on shore sometimes sent a radio that a German had +appeared at an indicated spot, and disappeared beneath the waves; the +chasers would then start for this location and begin hunting with their +listeners. Aircraft which sighted submarines would send similar +messages; convoys that had been attacked, individual ships that had been +torpedoed, destroyers which had spotted their prey, only to lose track +of it as soon as it submerged, would call upon the chasers to take up +the battle where they had abandoned it. + +As long as the chasers operated in the waters which I have indicated, +those between Start Point and Lizard Head, they "got" no submarine; the +explanation was simple, for as soon as the chasers and British hunting +vessels became active here, the Germans abandoned this field of +operations. This was the reason that the operative area of the Plymouth +detachment was extended. Some of the chasers were now sent around Land's +End and up the north Cornish coast, where colliers bound from Wales to +France were proving tempting bait for the U-boats; others operated +farther out to sea, off the Scilly Islands and west of Brest. In these +regions their contacts with the submarine were quite frequent. + +There was no U-boat in the German navy which the Allied forces were so +ambitious to "get" as the _U-53_. I have already referred to this +celebrated vessel and its still more celebrated commander, Captain Hans +Rose. It was this submarine, it will be recalled, which had suddenly +paid a ceremonious visit to Newport, R.I., in the autumn of 1916, and +which, on its way back to Germany, had paused long enough off Nantucket +to sink half a dozen British cargo ships. It was the same submarine +which sank our own destroyer, the _Jacob Jones_, by a chance shot with a +torpedo. Thus Americans had a peculiar reason for wishing to see it +driven from the seas. About the middle of August, 1918, we discovered +that the _U-53_ was operating in the Atlantic about 250 miles west of +Brest. At the same time we learned that two German submarines were +coming down the west coast of Ireland. We picked up radio messages which +these three boats were exchanging; this made it quite likely that they +proposed to form a junction west of Brest, and attack American +transports, which were then sailing to France in great numbers. Here was +an opportunity for the subchasers. The distance--250 miles to sea--would +be a severe strain upon their endurance, but we assigned four hunting +units, twelve boats in all, to the task, and also added to this +contingent the destroyers _Wilkes_ and _Parker_. On the morning of +September 2nd one of these subchaser units picked up a suspicious sound. +A little later the lookout on the _Parker_ detected on the surface an +object that looked like a conning-tower, with an upright just forward +which seemed to be a mast and sail; as it was the favourite trick of the +_U-53_ to disguise itself in this way, it seemed certain that the +chasers were now on the track of this esteemed vessel. When this mast +and sail and conning-tower suddenly disappeared under the water, these +suspicions became still stronger. The _Parker_ put on full speed, found +an oilslick where the submarine had evidently been pumping its bilges, +and dropped a barrage of sixteen depth charges. But had these injured +the submarine? Under ordinary conditions there would have been no +satisfactory answer to this question; but now three little wooden boats +came up, advanced about 2,000 yards ahead of the _Parker_, stopped their +engines, put over their tubes, and began to listen. In a few minutes +they conveyed the disappointing news to the _Parker_ that the depth +charges had gone rather wild, that the submarine was still steaming +ahead, and that they had obtained a "fix" of its position. But the +_U-53_, as always, was exceedingly crafty. It knew that the chasers were +on the trail; its propellers were revolving so slowly that almost no +noise was made; the U-boat was stealthily trying to throw its pursuers +off the scent. For two and a half hours the chasers kept up the hunt, +now losing the faint noise of the _U-53_, now again picking it up, now +turning in one direction, then abruptly in another. Late in the +afternoon, however, they obtained a "fix," which disclosed the welcome +fact that the submarine was only about 300 yards north of them. In a few +minutes four depth charges landed on this spot. + +When the waters had quieted the little craft began listening. But +nothing was heard. For several days afterward the radio operators could +hear German submarines calling across the void to the _U-53_, but there +was no answer to their call. Naturally, we believed that this +long-sought enemy had been destroyed; about a week later, however, our +radios caught a message off the extreme northern coast of Scotland, from +the _U-53_, telling its friends in Germany that it was on its way home. +That this vessel had been seriously damaged was evident, for it had made +no attacks after its experience with the subchasers; but it apparently +had as many lives as a cat, for it was able, in its battered condition, +to creep back to Germany around the coast of Scotland, a voyage of more +than a thousand miles. The subchasers, however, at least had the +satisfaction of having ended the active career of this boat. It was +damaged two months before the armistice was signed, but it never +recovered sufficiently from its injuries to make another voyage. Yet I +must do justice to Captain Rose--he did not command the _U-53_ on this +last voyage. It was its only trip during the whole course of the war +when he had not commanded it! + +The story of the _U-53_ ends with a touch which is characteristically +German. It was one of the submarines which were surrendered to the +Allies at the signing of the armistice. Its first visitors, on this +occasion, were the Americans; they were eager to read its log-book, and +to find out just what had happened on this final voyage. The book was on +board, and it contained a record of the _U-53's_ voyages from the day +when it was commissioned up to the day when it was surrendered. Two or +three pages only were missing; the Germans had ripped out that part +which described the encounter with the American subchasers! They were +evidently determined that we should never have the satisfaction of +knowing to just what extent we had damaged the boat; this was the only +revenge they could take on us. + + +IV + +On the morning of September 6th three subchaser units, under the command +of Ensign Ashley D. Adams, U.S.N.R.F., were listening at a point about +150 miles west of Land's End. At about eleven-thirty two of these units +detected what was unquestionably the sound of a submarine. Moreover, the +usual "fixes" disclosed that the enemy was close at hand; so close that +two of the units ran up and dropped their charges. This first attack +produced no result on the submarine; the depth charge from one of the +howitzers, however, unfortunately landed near one of the chasers, and, +though it injured no one, it put that particular unit out of commission. +However, for two hours Ensign Adams's division kept closely on the heels +of the quarry, now stopping to obtain a "fix," now running full speed to +catch up with the fleeing prey. At one o'clock the plotting-room +reported that the submerged boat was just about a hundred yards ahead. +The three chasers laid barrages according to pattern, and the three "Y" +guns shot their depth charges; the region of the "fix" was so generously +sowed with these bombs that it seemed an impossibility that the German +could have escaped. + +As soon as the tumult quieted down, the chasers put out their tubes and +listened. For twenty minutes not a sound issued from the scene of all +this activity. Then a propeller was heard faintly turning or attempting +to turn. The noise this time was not the kind which indicated an effort +to steal away furtively; it conveyed rather the impression of difficulty +and strain. There was a slight grating and squeaking such as might have +been made by damaged machinery. This noise lasted for a few seconds and +then ceased. Presently it started up again and then once more it +stopped. The submarine was making a little progress, but fitfully; she +would go a few yards and then pause. A slight wake now appeared upon the +surface, such as a submerged U-boat usually left when the water was +calm; the listeners at the tube were pleased to note that the location +of this disturbance coincided precisely with their "fix," and thus, in +a way, confirmed their calculations. One of the subchasers promptly ran +ahead and began to drop depth charges on this wake. There was not the +slightest doubt that the surface boat was now directly on top of the +submarine. After one of the depth charges was dropped, a black +cylindrical object, about thirty inches long, suddenly rose from the +depths and jumped sixty feet into the air; just what this unexpected +visitant was no one seems to know, but that it came from the hunted +submarine was clear. + +Under such distressing conditions the U-boat had only a single chance of +saving itself; when the water was sufficiently shallow--not deeper than +three hundred feet--it could safely sink to the bottom and "play dead," +hoping that the chasers, with their accursed listening devices, would +tire of the vigil and return to port. A submarine, if in very good +condition, could remain silently on the bottom for two or three days. +The listeners on the chaser tubes presently heard sounds which suggested +that their enemy was perhaps resorting to this manoeuvre. But there +were other noises which indicated that possibly this sinking to the +bottom was not voluntary. The listeners clearly heard a scraping and a +straining as though the boat was making terrific attempts to rise. There +was a lumbering noise, such as might be made by a heavy object trying to +drag its hulk along the muddy bottom; this was followed by silence, +showing that the wounded vessel could advance only a few yards. A +terrible tragedy was clearly beginning down there in the slime of the +ocean floor; a boat, with twenty-five or thirty human beings on board, +was hopelessly caught, with nothing in sight except the most lingering +death. The listeners on the chasers could follow events almost as +clearly as though the inside of the U-boat could be seen; for every +motion the vessel made, every effort that the crew put forth to rescue +itself from this living hell, was registered on the delicate wires which +reached the ears of the men on the surface. + +Suddenly sharp metallic sounds came up on the wires. They were clearly +made by hammers beating on the steel body of the U-boat. + +"They are trying to make repairs," the listeners reported. + +If our subchasers had had any more depth charges, they would have +promptly put these wretches out of their misery, but they had expended +all their ammunition. Darkness was now closing in; our men saw that +their vigil was to be a long one; they sent two chasers to Penzance, to +get a new supply of bombs, and also sent a radio call for a destroyer. +The spot where the submarine had bottomed was marked by a buoy; lanterns +were hung out on this buoy; and two units of chasers, six boats in all, +prepared to stand guard. At any moment, of course, the struggling U-boat +might come to the surface, and it was necessary to have forces near by +to fight or to accept surrender. All night long the chasers stood by; +now and then the listeners reported scraping and straining noises from +below, but these grew fainter and fainter, seeming almost to register +the despair which must be seizing the hearts of the imprisoned Germans. + +At three o'clock in the morning a British destroyer arrived and +presently the two chasers returned from Penzance with more ammunition. +Meanwhile, the weather had thickened, a fog had fallen, the lights on +the buoy had gone out, and the buoy itself had been pulled under by the +tide. The watching subchasers were tossed about by the weather, and lost +the precise bearing of the sunken submarine. When daylight returned and +the weather calmed down the chasers again put over their tubes and +attempted to "fix" the U-boat. They listened for hours without hearing a +sound; but about five o'clock in the afternoon a sharp piercing noise +came ringing over the wires. It was a sound that made the listeners' +blood run cold. + +Only one thing in the world could make a sound like that. It was the +crack of a revolver. The first report had hardly stilled when another +shot was heard; and then there were more in rapid succession. The +listeners on two different chasers heard these pistol cracks and counted +them; the reports which these two men independently made agreed in every +detail. In all, twenty-five shots came from the bottom of the sea. As +there were from twenty-five to thirty men in a submarine crew the +meaning was all too evident. The larger part of officers and men, +finding themselves shut tightly in their coffin of steel, had resorted +to that escape which was not uncommonly availed of by German submarine +crews in this hideous war. Nearly all of them had committed suicide. + + +V + +Meanwhile, our subchaser detachment at Corfu was performing excellent +service. In these southern waters Captain C. P. Nelson commanded two +squadrons, comprising thirty-six vessels. Indeed, the American navy +possessed few officers more energetic, more efficient, more lovable, or +more personally engaging than Captain Nelson. The mere fact that he was +known among his brother officers as "Juggy Nelson" gives some notion of +the affection which his personality inspired. This nickname did not +indicate, as might at first be suspected, that Captain Nelson possessed +qualities which flew in the face of the prohibitory regulations of our +navy: it was intended, I think, as a description of the physical man. +For Captain Nelson's rotund figure, jocund countenance, and always +buoyant spirits were priceless assets to our naval forces at Corfu. +Living conditions there were not of the best; disease was rampant among +the Serbians, Greeks, and Albanians who made up the civil population; +there were few opportunities for entertainment or relaxation; it was, +therefore, a happy chance that the commander was a man whose very +presence radiated an atmosphere of geniality and enthusiasm. His +conversational powers for many years had made him a man of mark; his +story-telling abilities had long delighted naval officers and statesmen +at Washington; no other selection for commander could have been made +that would have met with more whole-hearted approval from the college +boys and other high-type civilians who so largely made up our forces in +these flotillas. At Corfu, indeed, Captain Nelson quickly became a +popular favourite; his mind was always actively forming plans for the +discomfiture of the German and Austrian submarines; and all our Allies +were as much impressed with his energy as were our own men. For Captain +Nelson was more than a humorist and entertainer: he was pre-eminently a +sailor of the saltiest type, and he had a real barbaric joy in a fight. +Even in his official communications to his officers and men he +invariably referred to the enemy as the "Hun"; the slogan on which he +insisted as the guiding principle of his flotilla was "get the Hun +before he has a chance to get us." He had the supreme gift of firing his +subordinates with the same spirit that possessed himself; and the +vigilance, the constant activity, and the courage of the subchasers' +crews admirably supplemented the sailor-like qualities of the man who +commanded them. + +I have already referred to the sea-going abilities of the subchasers; +but the feat accomplished by those that made the trip to Corfu was the +most admirable of all. These thirty-six boats, little more than motor +launches in size, sailed from New London to Greece--a distance of 6,000 +miles; and, a day or two after their arrival, they began work on the +Otranto barrage. Of course they could not have made this trip without +the assistance of vessels to supply them with gasolene, make the +necessary routine repairs, care for the sick and those suffering from +the inevitable minor accidents; and it is greatly to the credit of the +naval officers who commanded the escorting vessels that they shepherded +these flotillas across the ocean with practically no losses. On their +way through the Straits of Gibraltar they made an attack on a submarine +which so impressed Admiral Niblack that he immediately wired London +headquarters for a squadron to be permanently based on that port. + +As already said, the Otranto Strait was an ideal location for this type +of anti-submarine craft. It was so narrow--about forty miles--that a +force of moderate size could keep practically all of the critical zone +under fairly close observation. Above all, the water was so deep--nearly +600 fathoms (3,600 feet)--that a submarine, once picked up by the +listening devices, could not escape by the method which was so popular +in places where the water was shallow--that of sinking to the bottom and +resting there until the excitement was over. On the other hand, this +great depth made it very difficult to obstruct the passage by a fixed +barrier--a difficulty that was being rapidly overcome by a certain +Franco-Italian type of torpedo net. This barrage, after the arrival of +our chasers, was so reorganized as to make the best use of their +tactical and listening qualities. The several lines of patrolling +vessels extended about thirty-five miles; there were vessels of several +types, the whole making a formidable gauntlet, which the submarines had +to run before they could get from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean. +First came a line of British destroyers; it was their main duty to act +as protectors and to keep the barrage from being raided by German and +Austrian surface ships--a function which they fulfilled splendidly. Next +came a line of trawlers, then drifters, motor launches, and chasers, the +whole being completed by a line of kite balloon sloops. Practically all +these vessels, British as well as American, were provided with the +American devices; and so well did these ingenious mechanisms function +that it was practically impossible for any submarine to pass through the +Otranto barrage in calm weather without being heard. In fact, it became +the regular custom for the enemy to wait for stormy weather before +attempting to slip through this dangerous area, and even under these +conditions he had great difficulty in avoiding detection. + +From July, 1918, until the day of the armistice, our flotilla at this +point kept constantly at work; and the reports of our commanders show +that their sound contacts with the enemy were very frequent. There were +battles that unquestionably ended in the destruction of the submarines; +just how much we had accomplished, however, we did not know until the +Austrians surrendered and our officers, at Cattaro and other places, +came into touch with officers of the Austrian navy. These men, who +showed the most friendly disposition toward their American enemies, +though they displayed the most bitter hostility toward their German +allies, expressed their admiration for the work of our subchasers. These +little boats, the Austrians now informed us, were responsible for a +mutiny in the Austrian submarine force. Two weeks after their arrival it +was impossible to compel an Austrian crew to take a vessel through the +straits, and from that time until the ending of the war not a single +Austrian submarine ventured upon such a voyage. All the submarines that +essayed the experiment after this Austrian mutiny were German. And the +German crews, the Austrian officers said, did not enjoy the experience +any more than their own. There was practically no case in which a +submarine crossed the barrage without being bombed in consequence; the +_moral_ of the German crews steadily went to pieces, until, in the last +month of the war, their officers were obliged to force them into the +submarines at the point of a pistol. The records showed, the Austrian +high officers said, that the Germans had lost six submarines on the +Otranto barrage in the last three months of the war. These figures about +correspond with the estimates which we had made; just how many of these +the British sank and just how many are to be attributed to our own +forces will probably never be known, but the fact that American devices +were attached to all the Allied ships on this duty should be considered +in properly distributing the credit. + +We have evidence--conclusive even though somewhat ludicrous--that the +American device on a British destroyer "got" one of these submarines. +One dark night this vessel, equipped with the C-tube, had pursued a +submarine and bombed it with what seemed to have been satisfactory +results. However, I have several times called attention to one of the +most discouraging aspects of anti-submarine warfare: that only in +exceptional circumstances did we know whether the submarine had been +destroyed. This destroyer was now diligently searching the area of the +battle, the listeners straining every nerve for traces of her foe. For a +time everything was utterly silent; then, suddenly, the listener picked +up a disturbance of an unusual kind. The noise rapidly became louder, +but it was still something very different from any noise ever heard +before. The C-tube consisted of a lead pipe--practically the same as a +water pipe--which was dropped over the side of the ship fifteen or +twenty feet into the sea; this pipe contained the wires which, at one +end, were attached to the devices under the water, and which, at the +other end, reached the listener's ears. In a few seconds this tube +showed signs of lively agitation. It trembled violently and made a +constantly increasing hullabaloo in the ears of the listener. Finally a +huge German, dripping with water like a sea lion, appeared over the side +of the destroyer and astounded our British Allies by throwing up his +arms with "Kamerad!" This visitant from the depths was the only survivor +of the submarine which it now appeared had indubitably been sunk. He had +been blown through the conning tower, or had miraculously escaped in +some other way--he did not himself know just what had taken place--and +while floundering around in the water in the inky darkness had, by one +of those providences which happen so frequently in war time, caught hold +of this tube, and proceeded to pull himself up hand-over-hand until he +reached the deck. Had it not been for his escape, the British would +never have known that they had sunk the submarine! + +This survivor, after shaking off the water, sat down and became very +sociable. He did not seem particularly to dislike the British and +Americans, but he was extremely bitter against the Italians and +Austrians--the first for "deserting" the Germans, the latter for proving +bad allies. + +"How do you get on with the Italians?" he asked the British officer. + +"Very well indeed," the latter replied, giving a very flattering account +of the Italian allies. + +"I guess the Italians are about as useful to you as the Austrians are to +us," the German sea lion replied. + +In writing to our officers about this episode, the British commander +said: + +"We have found a new use for your listening devices--salvaging drowning +Huns." + + +VI + +On September 28, 1918, Captain Nelson received the following +communication from the commander of the Allied naval forces at Brindisi, +Commodore W. A. H. Kelly, R.N.: + +"Can you hold twelve chasers ready to leave Corfu to-morrow (Sunday) for +special service? They should have stores for four days. If unavoidable, +barrage force may be reduced during their absence. Request reply. +Further definite orders will be sent Sunday afternoon." + +To this Captain Nelson sent an answer which was entirely characteristic: + +"Yes." + +The Captain well knew what the enterprise was to which this message +referred. The proposed undertaking was one which was very close to his +heart and one which he had constantly urged. The Austrian port of +Durazzo, on the Adriatic, at that time was playing an important part in +the general conflict. It was a base by which Germany and Austria had +sent supplies to their ally Bulgaria; and in September the Entente had +started the campaign against Bulgaria which finally ended in the +complete humiliation of that country. The destruction of Durazzo as a +base would greatly assist this operation. Several ships lay in the +harbour; there were many buildings used for army stores; the destruction +of all these, as well as the docks and military works, would render the +port useless. The bombardment of Durazzo was, therefore, the undertaking +for which the assistance of our subchasers had been requested. It was +estimated that about one hour's heavy shelling would render this port +valueless as an Austrian base; and to accomplish this destruction the +Italians had detailed three light cruisers, the _San Giorgio_, the +_Pisa_, and the _San Marco_, and the British three light scout cruisers, +the _Lowestoft_, the _Dartmouth_, and the _Weymouth_. According to the +plan agreed upon the Italian ships would arrive at Durazzo at about ten +o'clock on Wednesday morning, October 2nd, bombard the works for an +hour, and then return to Brindisi; when they had finished, it was +proposed that the British cruisers should take their places, bombard for +an hour, and likewise retire. The duty which had been assigned to the +subchasers in this operation was an important one. The Austrians had a +considerable force of submarines at Durazzo; and it was to be expected +that they would send them to attack the bombarding warships. The +chasers, therefore, were to accompany the cruisers, in order to fight +any submarine which attempted to interfere with the game. "Remember the +life of these cruisers depends upon your vigilance and activity," said +Captain Nelson in the instructions issued to the officers who commanded +the little vessels. + +At nine o'clock that Sunday evening twelve chasers slipped through the +net at Corfu and started across the Adriatic; they sailed "in column," +or single file, Captain Nelson heading the procession in subchaser _No. +95_, his second in command, Lt.-Comdr. Paul H. Bastedo, coming next in +chaser _No. 215_. The tiny fleet hardly suggested to the observer +anything in the nature of military operations; they looked more like a +group of motor launches out for a summer cruise. The next morning they +arrived at Brindisi, the gathering place of all the Allied vessels +which were to participate in the operation--that same Brindisi (or +Brundisium) which was one of the most famous ports of antiquity, the +town from which Augustus and Antony, in 42 B.C., started on the +expedition which, at the battle of Philippi, was to win them the mastery +of the ancient world. Upon arriving Captain Nelson went ashore for a +council with Commodore Kelly, who commanded the British cruisers, and +other Allied officers. When he returned Captain Nelson's face was +glowing with happiness and expectation. + +"It's going to be a real party, boys," he informed his subordinate +officers. + +Two days were spent at Brindisi, completing preparations; on Tuesday +evening Captain Nelson called all his officers for a meeting on board +the British destroyer _Badger_, to give them all the details of the +forthcoming "party." If there had been any flagging spirits in that +company when the speech began--which I do not believe--all depression +had vanished when "Juggy" had finished his remarks; every officer left +with his soul filled by the same joy of approaching battle as that which +possessed his chief. + +At 2.30 Wednesday morning the chasers left Brindisi, steering a straight +course to Durazzo. The night was very dark; the harbour was black also +with the smoke from the cruisers and other craft which were making +preparations to get away. After steaming a few hours the officers +obtained with their glasses their first glimpse of Durazzo; at this time +there were no fighting ships in sight except the chasers, as the larger +ships had not yet arrived. Captain Nelson knew that there were two or +three Austrian destroyers at Durazzo, and his first efforts were devoted +to attempts to persuade them to come out and give battle. With this idea +in mind, the chasers engaged in what they called a "war dance" before +the port; they began turning rapidly in a great circle, but all to no +purpose, for the Austrian ships declined to accept the challenge. After +a time the smoke of the Italian cruisers appeared above the horizon; +this was the signal for the chasers to take their stations. Durazzo is +located in an indentation of the coast; at the southern extremity of the +little gulf the land juts out to a point, known as Cape Laghi; at the +northern extremity the corresponding point is Cape Pali; the distance +between these two points is about fifteen miles. Two subchaser units, +six boats, were assigned as a screen to the Italian cruisers while the +bombardment was under way. One unit, three boats, was stationed at Cape +Pali, to the north, to prevent any submarines leaving Durazzo from +attacking the British cruisers, which were to approach the scene of +activities from that quarter, and another unit, three boats, was +stationed off Cape Laghi. Thus the two critical capes were covered +against submarine surprises, and the attacking vessels themselves were +effectively screened. + +The Italian cruisers sailed back and forth for about an hour, blazing +away at Durazzo, destroying shipping in the harbour, knocking down +military buildings, and devastating the place on a liberal scale, all +the time screened in this operation by our chasers. Meantime, unit B, +commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Bastedo, had started for its station +at Cape Pali. The Austrian shore batteries at once opened upon the tiny +craft, the water in their neighbourhood being generously churned up by +the falling shells. Meanwhile, the British cruisers, after steaming for +a while east, turned south in order to take up the bombarding station +which, according to the arranged programme, the Italian warships were +about to abandon. The three screening chasers were steaming in column, +_No. 129_, commanded by Ensign Maclair Jacoby, U.S.N.R.F., bringing up +the rear. Suddenly this little boat turned to the right and started +scampering in the direction of some apparently very definite object. It +moved so abruptly and hastily that it did not take the time even to +signal to its associates the cause of its unexpected manoeuvre. + +On board _No. 215_ there was some question as to what should be done. + +"Let's go," said Commander Bastedo. "Perhaps he's after a submarine." + +_No. 215_ was immediately turned in the direction of the busy _No. 129_, +when the interest of its officers was aroused by a little foamy fountain +of spray moving in the water slightly forward of its port beam. There +was no mystery as to the cause of that feathery disturbance. It was made +by a periscope; it was moving with considerable speed also, entirely +ignoring the subchasers, and shaping its course directly toward the +advancing British cruisers. Commander Bastedo forgot all about subchaser +_No. 129_, which apparently was after game of its own, and headed his +own boat in the direction of this little column of spray. In a few +seconds the periscope itself became visible; Commander Bastedo opened +fire at it with his port gun; at the second shot a column of water and +air arose about six feet--a splendid geyser which informed the pursuer +that the periscope had been shattered. By this time the third chaser, +_No. 128_, was rushing at full speed. The submarine now saw that all +chance of attacking the British ships had gone, and turned to the south +in an effort to get away with a whole skin. But the two subchasers, +_215_ and _128_, quickly turned again and started for their prey; soon +both were dropping depth charges and shooting their "Y" guns; and a huge +circle of the sea was a mass of explosions, whirling water, mighty +eruptions of foam, mist, and débris--and in the mass, steel plates and +other wreckage flew from the depths into the air. + +"That got him!" cried the executive officer from the deck of _No. 215_, +while the crew lifted up its voices in a shout that was reminiscent of a +college yell. + +It was not until this moment that Commander Bastedo and his associates +remembered the _129_, which, when last observed, was speeding through +the water on an independent course of her own. In the midst of the +excitement there came a message from this boat: + +"Submarine sighted!" + +Then a second afterward came another message. + +"My engines are disabled." + +In a short time Bastedo had reached the boat. + +"Where is the submarine?" + +"We just sank it," was the answer. _No. 129_ had dropped eight depth +charges, one directly over the Austrian boat; in the water thrown up the +officers had counted seven pieces of metal plates, and the masses of oil +and bubbles that presently arose completed the story of the destruction. +Meanwhile, the British cruisers had taken up their station at Durazzo +and were finishing the work that made this place useless as a military +headquarters. + +Not a man in the whole American force was injured; in a brief time the +excitement was all over, and the great ships, screened again by the +wasps of chasers, started back to Brindisi. The impression made upon our +Allies was well expressed in the congratulatory message sent to me in +London by Commodore Kelly, who commanded the British cruisers in this +action. + +"Their conduct," he said, "was beyond praise. They all returned safely +without casualties. They thoroughly enjoyed themselves." + +And from the Italians came this message: + +"Italian Naval General Staff expresses highest appreciation of useful +and efficient work performed by United States chasers in protecting +major vessels during action against Durazzo; also vivid admiration of +their brilliant and clever operations which resulted in sinking two +enemy submarines." + +The war was now drawing to a close; a day before the Allied squadrons +started for Durazzo Bulgaria surrendered; about two weeks after the +attack Austria had given up the ghost. The subchasers were about this +time just getting into their stride; the cessation of hostilities, +however, ended their careers at the very moment when they had become +most useful. A squadron of thirty-six under the command of Captain A. J. +Hepburn reached Queenstown in September, but though it had several +interesting contacts with the enemy, and is credited with sending one +German home badly damaged, the armistice was signed before it had really +settled down to work. The final spectacular appearance was at Gibraltar, +in the last four days of the war. The surrender of Austria had left the +German submarines stranded in the Adriatic without a base; and they +started home by way of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar. A squadron of +eighteen chasers had just arrived at the Azores, on the way to reinforce +the flotilla at Plymouth; seven of these were at once despatched to +Gibraltar on the chance that they might bar the passage of these +U-boats. They reached this port at the storm season; yet they went out +in the hardest gales and had several exciting contacts with the fleeing +Germans. The records show that five submarines attempted to get through +the straits; there is good evidence that two of these were sunk, one by +the British patrol and one by our chasers. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[6] A "P" boat is a special type of anti-submarine craft smaller and +slower than a destroyer and having a profile especially designed to +resemble that of a submarine. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE LONDON FLAGSHIP + + +I + +While our naval forces were thus playing their parts in several areas, +the work of creating the central staff of a great naval organization was +going forward in London. The headquarters for controlling extensive +naval operations in many widely dispersed areas, like the headquarters +of an army extending over a wide front, must necessarily be located far +behind the scene of battle. Thus, a number of remodelled dwelling-houses +in Grosvenor Gardens contained the mainspring for an elaborate mechanism +which reached from London to Washington and from Queenstown to Corfu. On +the day of the armistice the American naval forces in European waters +comprised about 370 vessels of all classes, more than 5,000 officers, +regulars and reserves, and more than 75,000 men; we had established +about forty-five bases and were represented in practically every field +of naval operations. The widespread activities of our London +headquarters on that eventful day presented a striking contrast to the +humble beginnings of eighteen months before. + +From April to August, 1917, the American navy had a very small staff +organization in Europe. During these extremely critical four months the +only American naval representatives in London, besides the regular Naval +Attaché and his aides, were my personal aide, Commander J. V. Babcock, +and myself; and our only office in those early days was a small room in +the American Embassy. For a considerable part of this time we had no +stenographers and no clerical assistance of our own, though of course +the Naval Attaché, Captain W. D. MacDougall, and his personnel gave us +all the assistance in their power. Commander Babcock had a small +typewriter, which he was able to work with two fingers, and on this he +laboriously pounded out the reports which first informed the Navy +Department of the seriousness of the submarine situation. The fact that +Commander Babcock was my associate during this critical period was a +fortunate thing for me, and a still more fortunate thing for the United +States. Commander Babcock and I had been closely associated for several +years; in that early period, when we, in our two persons, represented +the American naval forces at the seat of Allied naval activity, we not +only worked together in that little room but we lived together. Our +office was alternately this room in the American Embassy and our +quarters in an hotel. I had already noted Commander Babcock's abilities +when he was on my staff in the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla and when he was +a student at the Naval War College; but our constant companionship +throughout the war, especially during these first few strenuous months +in London, gave me a still greater respect for his qualities. Many men +have made vital contributions to our success in the war of whom the +public scarcely ever hears even the name. A large part of the initiative +and thinking which find expression in successful military action +originates with officers of this type. They labour day after day and +night after night, usually in subordinate positions, unselfishly doing +work which is necessarily credited to other names than their own, daily +lightening the burden of their chiefs, and constantly making suggestions +which may control military operations or affect national policy. +Commander Babcock is a striking representative of this type. My personal +obligations to him are incalculable; and I am indebted to him not only +for his definite services, but for the sympathy, the encouragement, and +the kindly and calculated pessimism which served so well to +counterbalance my temperamental optimism. + +Our relations were so close, working and living together as we did, that +I find it difficult to speak of "Babby's" services with restraint. But +there are particular accomplishments to his credit which should go down +upon this popular record. I have described the first consultations with +the British naval chiefs. These were the meetings which formed the basis +of the reports recommending the conditions upon which the American navy +should co-operate with the Allies. Commander Babcock was constantly at +my elbow during all these consultations, and was all the time +independently conducting investigations in the several departments of +the Admiralty. The original drafts of all my written and cabled +communications to the department--reports which form a connected story +of our participation in the naval war during this period--were prepared +by him. + +Able as Commander Babcock was, human endurance still had its +limitations. A public-spirited American business man in London, Mr. R. +E. Gillmor, who had formerly been an officer in the navy, begged to be +accepted as a volunteer; he brought two of his best stenographers, +English girls, and personally paid their salaries for several weeks +while they were devoting all their time to the American navy. +Subsequently he was enlisted in the naval reserves and performed very +valuable services on the staff throughout nearly the entire period of +the war--until ordered to America, where his technical knowledge was +required in connection with certain important appliances with which he +was familiar. His experience as a business man in London was of great +value to our forces, and his time and energy were devoted to our service +with a zeal and loyalty that endeared him to us all. + +Soon afterward a number of Rhodes scholars and other young Americans +then in Europe, G. B. Stockton, E. H. McCormick, T. B. Kittredge, P. F. +Good, R. M. D. Richardson, H. Millard, L. S. Stevens, and J. C. +Baillargeon, joined our forces as unpaid volunteers and gave us the +benefit of their trained minds and European experience. Two of these, +Kittredge and Stockton, both valuable workers, had been serving under +Hoover in Belgium. They were all later enrolled as reserves and +continued their work throughout the war. Lieutenant Stockton performed +the arduous and important duties of chief business manager, or executive +officer, of headquarters in a most efficient manner, and throughout the +war Kittredge's previous historical training, European experience, and +fine intellectual gifts made his services very valuable in the +Intelligence Department. + +Mr. Page, the American Ambassador, aided and encouraged us in all +possible ways. Immediately after my arrival in London he invited me to +call upon him and his staff for any assistance they could render. In +his enthusiastic and warm-hearted way, he said: "Everything we have is +yours. I will turn the Embassy into the street if necessary"; and +throughout the war he was a tower of strength to the cause. He gave us +his time and the benefit of his great experience and personal prestige +in establishing cordial relations with the various branches of the +British Government--and all this with such an absence of diplomatic +formality, such courteous and forceful efficiency, and such cordial +sympathy and genuine kindness that he immediately excited not only our +sincere admiration but also our personal affection. + +During all this period events of the utmost importance were taking +place; it was within these four months that the convoy system was +adopted, that armed guards were placed on merchant ships, that the first +American troops were escorted to France, and that our destroyers and +other worships began arriving in European waters. In July it became +apparent that the strain of doing the work of a dozen men, which had +been continuous during the past four months, could no longer be +supported by my aide, Commander Babcock. When the destroyers and other +ships arrived, we went through their lists; here and there we hit upon a +man whom we regarded as qualified for responsible staff duty, and +transferred him to the London headquarters. This proceeding was +necessary if our essential administrative work was to be done. Among the +reserves who were subsequently assigned to our forces many excellent +staff officers also were developed for handling the work of +communications, cipher codes, and the like. When the Colonel House +Commission came over in October, 1917, I explained our necessities to +the "skippers" of the two cruisers that brought the party, who promptly +gave us all the desks and office equipment they could spare and sent +them to Grosvenor Gardens. + +In August, however, additional ships and forces began to arrive from +America, and it became necessary to have larger quarters than those +available in the Embassy for handling the increasing administrative +work. At one time the British Government contemplated building us a +temporary structure near the Admiralty, but this was abandoned because +there was a shortage of material. We therefore moved into an unoccupied +dwelling near the American Embassy that seemed adapted to our needs. We +rented this house furnished, just as it stood; a first glimpse of it, +however, suggested refined domesticity rather than naval operations. We +quickly cleared the building of rugs, tapestries, lace curtains, +pictures, and expensive furniture, reduced the twenty-five rooms to +their original bareness, and filled every corner with office equipment. +In a few days the staff was installed in this five-story residence and +the place was humming with the noise of typewriters. At first we +regarded the leasing of this building as something of an extravagance; +it seemed hardly likely that we should ever use it all! But in a few +weeks we had taken the house adjoining, cut holes through the walls and +put in doors; and this, too, was filled up in an incredibly short time, +so rapidly did the administrative work grow. Ultimately we had to take +over six of these private residences and make alterations which +transformed them into one. From August our staff increased at a rapid +rate until, on the day the armistice was signed, we had not far from +1,200 officers, enlisted men, and clerical force, working in our London +establishment, the commissioned staff consisting of about 200 officers, +of which sixty were regulars and the remainder reserves. + +I find that many people are surprised that I had my headquarters in +London. The historic conception of the commander-in-chief of a naval +force located on the quarterdeck of his flagship still holds the popular +imagination. But controlling the operations of extensive and widely +dispersed forces in a campaign of this kind is quite a different +proceeding from that of directing the naval campaigns of Nelson's time, +just as making war on land has changed somewhat from the method in vogue +with Napoleon. The opinion generally prevails that my principal task was +to command in person certain naval forces afloat. The fact is that this +was really no part of my job during the war. The game in which several +great nations were engaged for four years was a game involving organized +direction and co-operation. It is improbable that any one nation could +have won the naval war; that was a task which demanded not only that we +should all exert our fullest energies, but that, so far as it was +humanly possible, we should exert them as a unit. It was the duty of the +United States above all nations to manifest this spirit. We had entered +the war late; we had entered it in a condition of unpreparedness; our +naval forces, when compared to those which had been assembled by the +Allies, were small; we had not been engaged for three years combating an +enemy using new weapons and methods of naval warfare. It was not +unlikely that we could make some original contributions to the Allied +effort; indeed, we early did so; yet it was natural to suppose that the +navies which had been combating the submarines so long understood that +game better than did we, and it was our duty to assist them in this +work, rather than to operate independently. Moreover, this question as +to whether any particular one of our methods might be better or might be +worse than Great Britain's was not the most important one. The point was +that the British navy had developed its own methods of working and that +it was a great "going concern." The crisis was so pressing that we +simply did not have the time to create a separate force of our own; the +most cursory examination of conditions convinced me that we could hope +to accomplish something worth while only by playing the game as it was +then being played, and that any attempt to lay down new rules would +inevitably decrease the effectiveness of our co-operation, and perhaps +result in losing the war. We can even admit, for the sake of the +argument, that the Americans might have created a better organization +than the British; but the question of improving on their methods, or of +not improving on them, was a point that was not worth considering; long +before we could have developed an efficient independent machine the war +would have come to an end. It was thus our duty to take things as they +were, to plunge immediately into the conflict, and to make every ship +and every man tell in the most effective way and in the shortest +possible time. Therefore I decided that our forces should become, for +the purpose of this war, virtually a part of the Allied navies; to place +at the disposal of the Allies our ships to reinforce the weak part of +their lines; to ignore such secondary considerations as national pride, +naval prestige, and personal ambitions; and to subordinate every other +consideration to that of defeating the Hun. I have already described how +in distributing our subchasers I practically placed them at the disposal +of the Allied Council; and this represents the policy that was followed +in all similar matters. + +The naval high commands were located at Washington, London, Paris, and +Rome. Necessarily London was the headquarters of the naval war. Events +which had long preceded the European conflict had made this choice +inevitable. The maritime development of four centuries had prepared +London for the rôle which she was now called upon to play. From all over +the world naval and maritime information flowed to this great capital as +though in obedience to the law of gravity. Even in peace times London +knew where every ship in the world was at any particular time. All other +machinery for handling this great mass of detail was necessarily +accumulated in this great city, and Lloyd's, the world headquarters for +merchant shipping, had now become practically a part of the British +Admiralty. In this war the matter of information and communications was +supremely important. Every decision that was made and every order that +was issued, even those that were the least consequential, rested upon +complete information which was obtainable, in time to be useful, only in +London. I could not have made my headquarters in Washington, or Paris, +or Rome because these cities could not have furnished the military +intelligence which was needed as a preliminary to every act. For the +same reason I could not have efficiently controlled the operations of +all our forces from Queenstown, or Brest, or Gibraltar; the staff +controlling the whole had necessarily to be located in London, and the +tactical commands at these other bases must be exercised by +subordinates. The British placed all their sources of information and +their communications at our disposal. They literally opened their doors +and made us part of their organization. I sat daily in consultation with +British naval chiefs, and our officers had access to all essential +British information just as freely as did the British naval officers +themselves. On the day of my arrival Admiral Jellicoe issued orders that +the Americans should be shown anything which they wished to see. With +all this information, the most complete and detailed in the world, +constantly placed at our disposal, and a spirit of confidence and +friendship always prevailing which has no parallel in history, it would +have defeated the whole purpose of our participation in the war had the +American high command taken up its headquarters anywhere except in +London. + +Incidentally, there was an atmosphere in the London Admiralty which made +a strong appeal to anyone who is interested in naval history. Everything +about the place is reminiscent of great naval achievements. The room in +which our councils met was the same old Admiralty Board room that had +been used for centuries. In accordance with the spirit of British +conservatism, this room is almost exactly the same now, even in its +furnishings, as it was in Nelson's time. The same old wood carvings hang +over the same old fireplace; the table at which we sat is the identical +one at which Nelson must have sat many times, and the very silver +inkstand which Nelson used was used by his successors in this war. The +portrait of this great naval chieftain looked down upon us during our +deliberations. Above the fireplace is painted a huge compass, and about +the centre of this swings an arrow. This was a part of the Admiralty +equipment of a hundred years ago, though it has no usefulness now except +a sentimental one. In old days this arrow was geared to a weather vane +on the roof of the Admiralty, and it constantly showed to the chiefs +assembled in the council room the direction of the wind--a matter of +great importance in the days of sailing ships. + +All general orders and plans concerning the naval operations of British +and American forces came from the Admiralty, and here officers of my +staff were constantly at work. The commanders-in-chief at the various +bases commanded the combined British and American ships based on those +ports only in the sense that they carried out the general instructions +and policies which were formulated in London. These orders, so far as +they affected American forces, could be issued to the commanders-in-chief +only after American headquarters in London had viséd them. Thus the +American staff held the ultimate command over all the American forces +which were based in British waters. The same was true of those at Brest, +Gibraltar, and other stations. The commanders-in-chief executed them, +and were responsible for the manner in which the forces were used in +combating the enemy. The operations of which I was the commander +extended over an immense area. The Plymouth and Queenstown forces +represented only a part of the ultimate American naval strength in +European waters and not the most important part; before the war ended, +Brest, as I shall show, developed into a greater naval base than any of +those which we maintained in the British Isles. Convoys were not only +coming across the Atlantic but they were constantly arriving from the +Mediterranean and from the South Sea, and it was the duty of +headquarters in London, and not the duty of local commanders, to route +these precious argosies, except in special cases, just before they +reached their port of destination. Not infrequently, as previously +described, it was necessary to change destinations, or to slow down +convoys, or to make any number of decisions based on new information; +naturally only the centre of information, the Admiralty convoy room, +could serve as a clearing house for such operations. The point is that +it was necessary for me to exercise the chief command of American forces +through subordinates. My position in this respect was precisely the same +as that of Generals Haig and Pershing; I had to maintain a great +headquarters in the rear, and to depend upon subordinates for the actual +execution of orders. + +The American headquarters in London comprised many separate departments, +each one of which was directly responsible to me as the Force Commander, +through the Chief of Staff; they included such indispensable branches as +the office of the Chief of Staff, Captain N. C. Twining, Chief of Staff; +Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain W. R. Sexton; Intelligence Department, +Commander J. V. Babcock, who also acted as Aide; Convoy Operations +Section, Captain Byron A. Long; Anti-submarine Section, Captain R. H. +Leigh; Aviation Section, Captain H. I. Cone, and afterward, +Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; Personnel Section, Commander H. R. +Stark; Communication Section, Lieutenant-Commander E. G. Blakeslee; +Material Section, Captain E. C. Tobey (S.C.); Repair Section, Captain S. +F. Smith (C.C.), and afterward, L. B. McBride (C.C.); Ordnance Section, +Commander G. L. Schuyler, and afterward, Commander T. A. Thomson; +Medical Section, Captain F. L. Pleadwell (M.C.), and afterward, +Commander Edgar Thompson (M.C.); Legal Section, Commander W. H. McGrann; +and the Scientific Section, Professor H. A. Bumstead, Ph.D. + +I was fortunate in all of my departmental chiefs. The Chief of Staff, +Captain N. C. Twining, would certainly have been a marked man in any +navy; he had a genius for detail, a tireless energy, and a mastery of +all the problems that constantly arose. I used to wonder when Captain +Twining ever found an opportunity to sleep; he seemed to be working +every hour of the day and night; yet, so far as was observable, he never +wearied of his task, and never slackened in his devotion to the Allied +cause. As soon as a matter came up that called for definite decision, +Captain Twining would assemble from the several departments all data and +information which were available concerning the question at issue, spend +a few hours studying this information, and then give his judgment--an +opinion which was invariably sound and which was adopted in the vast +majority of cases; in fact, in all cases except those in which questions +of policy or extraneous considerations dictated a different or modified +decision. Captain Twining is a man of really fine intellect combined +with a remarkable capacity for getting things done; without his constant +presence at my elbow, my work would have been much heavier and much less +successful than it was. He is an officer of such exceptional ability, +such matured experience, and such forceful character as to assure him a +brilliant career in whatever duty he may be called upon to perform. I +can never be sufficiently grateful to him for his loyalty and devotion +and for his indispensable contribution to the efficiency of the forces I +had the honour to command. + +In accordance with my habitual practice, I applied the system of placing +responsibility upon my carefully selected heads of departments, giving +them commensurate authority, and holding them to account for results. +Because the task was such a great one, this was the only possible way in +which the operations of the force could have been successfully +conducted. I say, successfully conducted, because in a "business" of +this kind, "good enough" and "to-morrow" may mean disaster; that is, it +is a case of keeping both information and operations up to the minute. +If the personnel and equipment of the staff are not completely capable +of this, it is more than a partial failure, and the result is an +ever-present danger. There were men in this great war who "went to +pieces" simply because they tried to do everything themselves. This +administrative vice of attempting to control every detail, even +insignificant ones, to which military men seem particularly addicted, it +had always been my policy to avoid. Business at Grosvenor Gardens +developed to such an extent that about a thousand messages were every +day received in our office or sent from it; and of these 60 per cent. +were in code. Obviously it was impossible for the Force Commander to +keep constantly at his finger ends all these details. All department +heads, therefore, were selected because they were officers who could be +depended upon to handle these matters and make decisions independently; +they were all strong men, and it is to their combined efforts that the +success of our operations was due. You would have to search a long time +among the navies of the world before you could find an abler convoy +officer than Captain Byron A. Long; an abler naval constructor than +Captain L. B. McBride; an abler man to have charge of the finances of +our naval forces, the purchase of supplies and all kinds of material +than Captain (S.C.) Eugene C. Tobey; abler aviation officers than +Captain H. I. Cone and Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; an abler +chief of operations than Captain R. H. Leigh, or an abler intelligence +officer than Commander J. V. Babcock. These men, and others of the +fourteen department heads, acted as a kind of cabinet. Many of them +handled matters which, though wholly essential to the success of the +forces, were quite outside of my personal knowledge or experience, and +consequently they had to be men in whose ability to guide me in such +matters I could place complete confidence. As an example of this I may +cite one of the duties of Captain Tobey. Nearly all of the very +considerable financial transactions he was entrusted with were "Greek" +to me, but he had only to show me the right place on the numerous +documents, and I signed my name in absolute confidence that the +interests of the Government were secure. + +All cables, reports, and other communications were referred each day to +the department which they concerned. The head of each department studied +them, attended to the great majority on his own responsibility, and +selected the few that needed more careful attention. A meeting of the +Chief of Staff and all department heads was held each day, at which +these few selected matters were discussed in council and decisions made. +The final results of these deliberations were the only matters that were +referred to me. This system of subdividing responsibility and authority +not only promoted efficiency but it left the Force Commander time to +attend to vitally important questions of general policy, to keep in +personal touch with the high command of the Allied navies, to attend the +Allied naval councils, and, in general, to keep his finger constantly on +the pulse of the whole war situation. Officers of our own and other +navies who were always coming in from the outlying stations, and who +could immediately be placed in touch with the one man who could answer +all their questions and give immediate decisions, testified to the +efficient condition in which the American headquarters was maintained. + +One of our departments was so novel, and performed such valuable +service, that I must describe it in some detail. We took over into our +London organization an idea that is advantageously used in many American +industrial establishments, and had a Planning Section, the first, I +think, which had ever been adopted by any navy. I detached from all +other duties five officers: Captain F. H. Schofield, Captain D. W. Knox, +Captain H. E. Yarnell (who exchanged places afterward with Captain L. +McNamee of the Plans Section of the Navy Department), and Colonel R. H. +Dunlap (of the Marines), who was succeeded by Colonel L. McC. Little, +when ordered to command a regiment of Marines in France. These men made +it their business to advise the Commander-in-Chief on any questions that +might arise. All were graduates of the Naval War College at Newport, and +they applied to the consideration of war problems the lessons which they +had learned at that institution. The business of the Planning Section +was to make studies of particular problems, to prepare plans for future +operations, and also to criticize fully the organization and methods +which were already in existence. The fact that these men had no +administrative duties and that they could therefore devote all their +time to surveying our operations, discovering mistakes, and suggesting +better ways of doing things, as well as the fact that they were +themselves scholarly students of naval warfare, made their labours +exceedingly valuable. I gave them the utmost freedom in finding fault +with the existing regime; there was no department and no office, from +that of the Commander-in-Chief down, upon whose activities they were not +at liberty to submit the fullest and the frankest reports. If anything +could be done in a better way, we certainly wanted to know it. Whenever +any specific problem of importance came up, it was always submitted to +these men for a report. The value of such a report depended upon the +completeness and accuracy of the information available, and it was the +business of the Intelligence Department of the staff to supply this. If +the desired information was not in their files, or the files of the +Allied admiralties, or was not up to date, it was their duty to obtain +it at once. The point is that the Planning Section had no other duties +beyond rendering a decision, based upon a careful analysis of the facts +bearing upon the case, which they submitted in writing. There was no +phase of the naval warfare upon which the officers of the Planning +Section did not give us reports. One of their favourite methods was to +place themselves in the position of the Germans and to decide how, if +they were directing German naval operations, they would frustrate the +tactics of the Allies. Their records contain detailed descriptions of +how merchant ships could be sunk by submarines, and these methods, our +officers believed, represented a great improvement over those used by +the Germans. Indeed, I think that many of these reports, had they fallen +into the hands of the Germans, would have been found by them exceedingly +useful. There was a general impression, in our own navy as well as in +the British, that most of the German submarine commanders handled their +boats unskilfully and obtained inadequate results. All these documents +were given to the responsible men in our forces, as well as to the +British, and had a considerable influence upon operations. The British +also established a Planning Section, which worked harmoniously with our +own. + +A subject upon which our Planning Section liked to speculate was the +possible sortie of the German fleet. The possibility of a great naval +engagement filled the minds of most naval officers; and, after we had +sent five of our battleships to reinforce Admiral Beatty's fleet, this +topic became even more interesting to American naval men. Would the +Germans ever come out? What had they to gain or to lose by such an +undertaking? What were their chances of victory? Where would the +engagement be fought, and what part would the several elements of +modern naval warfare play in it: mines, submarines, battle-cruisers, +airplanes, dirigibles, and destroyers? These were among the questions +with which the Planning Section busied itself, and this problem, like +many others, they approached from the German standpoint. They placed +themselves in the position of the German High Command, and peered into +the Grand Fleet looking for a weakness, which, had they been Germans, +they might turn to account in a general engagement. The only weak spot +our Planning Section could find was one which reflected the greatest +credit upon the British forces. The British commander, Admiral Sir David +Beatty, was a particularly dashing and heroic fighter; could not these +splendid qualities really be turned to the advantage of the Germans? +That Admiral Beatty would fight at the first opportunity, and that he +would run all justifiable risks, if a chance presented of defeating the +German fleet, was as well known to the Germans as to ourselves. The +British Admiral, it was also known, did not entertain much respect for +mines and torpedoes. All navies possessed what was known as a "torpedo +flag." This was an emblem which was to be displayed in case torpedoes +were sighted, for the purpose of warning the ships to change course or, +if necessary, to desist from an attack. It was generally reported that +Admiral Beatty had ordered all these torpedo flags to be destroyed; in +case he once started in pursuit of the German fleet, he proposed to take +his chances, dive straight through a school of approaching torpedoes, or +even to rush full speed over a mine-field, making no efforts to avoid +these hidden dangers. That he would probably lose some ships the Admiral +well knew, but he figured--and probably correctly--that he would +certainly have enough vessels left to annihilate the enemy. Still, in +the judgment of our Planning Section, Admiral Beatty's assumed attitude +toward "torpedo flags" gave the Germans their only possible chance of +seriously injuring the Grand Fleet. They drew up a plan of attack on the +Scapa Flow forces based upon this assumption. Imagining themselves +directors of the German navy, they constructed large numbers of torpedo +boats, submarines, and mine-fields and stationed them in a particularly +advantageous position; they then proposed to send the German fleet in +the direction of Scapa Flow, draw the Grand Fleet to the attack, and +then lead it in the direction of the torpedoes and mines. Probably such +a scheme would never have succeeded; but it represented, in the opinion +of our Planning group, Germany's only chance of crippling the Grand +Fleet and winning the war. In other words, had my staff found itself in +Germany's position, that is the strategy which it would probably have +used. I gave this report unofficially to the British Admiralty simply +because I thought it might afford British officers reading that would +possibly be entertaining. It is an evidence of the co-operation that +existed between the two forces, and of the British disposition to accept +suggestions, that this document was immediately sent to Admiral Beatty. + + +II + +The fact that I was able ultimately to create such an organization and +leave the administration of its individual departments so largely to +their respective heads was especially fortunate because it gave me time +for what was perhaps the most important of my duties. This was my +attendance at the meetings of the Allied Naval Council, not to mention +daily conferences with various officials of the Allies. This naval +council was the great headquarters for combined Allied operations +against the enemy on the sea. It was not officially constituted by the +Allied governments until November 29, 1917, but it had actually been in +continuous operation since the beginning of the war, the heads of the +Allied admiralties having met frequently in conference. At these +meetings every phase of the situation was discussed, and the methods +finally adopted represented the mature judgment of the Allied naval +chiefs who participated in them. Without this council, and without the +co-operation for which it stood, our efforts would have been so +dispersed and would have so overlapped that their efficiency would have +been greatly decreased. This international naval conference not only had +to decide questions of naval strategy, but it also had to concern itself +with a multitude of practical matters which have little interest for the +public, but which are exceedingly important in war. In this struggle +coal, oil, and other materials played a part almost as important as +ships and men; these materials, like ships and men, were limited in +quantity; and it was necessary to apportion them as deliberately and as +economically as the seemingly more important munitions of warfare. The +Germans were constantly changing their tactics; sometimes they would +make their concentrations in a certain area; while at other times their +strength would appear in another field far distant from the first. These +changes made it necessary that we should in each case readjust our +forces to counteract the enemy's tactics. It was a vital necessity that +these readjustments should be made immediately when the enemy's changes +of tactics became known. It is evident that the element necessary to +success was that the earliest and most complete possible information +should be followed by prompt decision and action; and it is manifest +that these requirements could have been satisfied only by a council +which was fully informed and which was on the spot momentarily ready to +act. The Allied Naval Council responded to all these requirements. One +of my first duties, after my arrival, was to attend one of these +councils in Paris; and immediately afterward the meetings became much +more frequent. + +Not only were the proceedings interesting because of the vast importance +of the issues which were discussed, but because they brought me into +intimate contact with some of the ablest minds in the European navies. +Over the first London councils Admiral Jellicoe presided. I have already +given my first impressions of this admirable sailor; subsequent events +only increased my respect for his character and abilities. An English +woman once described Admiral Jellicoe as "a great gentleman"; it is a +description upon which I can hardly improve. The First Lord, Sir Eric +Geddes, though he was by profession an engineer and had been transferred +from the business of building roads and assuring the communications +behind the armies in France to become the civilian head of the British +navy, acquired, in an astonishingly short time, a mastery of the details +of naval administration. Sir Eric is a type of man that we like to think +of as American; perhaps the fact that he had received his business +training in this country, and had served an apprenticeship on the +Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, strengthened this impression. The habitués +of the National Sporting Club in London--of whom I was one--used to look +reproachfully at the giant figure of the First Lord; in their opinion +he had sadly missed his calling. His mighty frame, his hard and supple +muscles, his power of vigorous and rapid movement, his keen eye and his +quick wit--these qualities, in the opinion of those best qualified to +judge, would have made this stupendous Briton one of the greatest +heavyweight prize-fighters in the annals of pugilism. With a little +training I am sure that Sir Eric would even now make a creditable +showing in the professional ring. However, the paths of this business +man and statesman lay in other fields. After returning from America he +had had a brilliant business career in England; he represented the type +which we call "self-made men"; that is, he fought his way to the top +without the aid of influential friends. His elevation to the Admiralty, +in succession to Sir Edward Carson, was something new in British public +life, for Sir Eric had never dabbled in politics, and, until the war +started, he was practically unknown in political circles. But this +crisis in British affairs made it necessary for the Ministry to "draft" +the most capable executives in the nation, irrespective of political +considerations; and Sir Eric, therefore, quite naturally found himself +at the head of the navy. In a short time he had acquired a knowledge of +the naval situation which enabled him to preside over an international +naval council with a very complete grasp of all the problems which were +presented. I have heard the great naval specialists who attended say +that, had they not known the real fact, they would hardly have suspected +that Sir Eric was not a naval man. We admired not only his ability to +direct the course of discussion, and even to take an important part in +it, but also his skill at summing up the results of the whole proceeding +in a few terse and masterly phrases. In fine, the First Lord was a man +after Roosevelt's heart--big, athletic, energetic, with a genius for +reaching the kernel of a question and of getting things done. + +When it came to facility of exposition, however, we Anglo-Saxons made a +poor showing in comparison with most French naval officers and in +particular with Admirals Lacaze and de Bon. Both these gentlemen +represented the Gallic type in its finest aspects. After spending a few +moments with Rear-Admiral Lacaze, it was easy to understand the real +affection which all French naval officers felt for him. He is a small, +slight man, with a grey, pointed beard, and he possesses that +earnestness of spirit, that courtesy of manner, and that sympathy and +charm which we regard as the finest attributes of the cultured +Frenchman. Admiral Lacaze has also a genuine French facility of speech +and that precision of statement which is so characteristic of the French +intellect. A slight acquaintance would make one believe that Admiral +Lacaze would be a model husband and father, perhaps grandfather; it was +with surprise, however, that I learned that he was a bachelor, but I am +sure that he is that kind of bachelor who is an uncle to all of the +children of his acquaintance. As Minister of Marine he was the presiding +officer of the council when it met in Paris. + +In Vice-Admiral de Bon, chief of the French naval staff, Admiral Lacaze +had a worthy colleague; he was really a man of heroic mould, and he +certainly looked the part. His white hair and his white beard, cut +square, gave at first glance an impression of age; yet his clear, pink +skin, not ruffled by a trace of wrinkle, his erect figure, his bright +blue eyes, the vigour of his conversation and the energy of his +movements, betokened rather perpetual youth. Compared with the naval +forces of Great Britain, the French navy was of inconsiderable size, but +in Admiral de Bon it made a contribution to Allied naval strength which +was worth many dreadnoughts. The reputation of this man has scarcely +reached this side of the Atlantic; yet it was the general opinion of +practically all naval men that his was the keenest mind at the Allied +Naval Council. It was certainly the most persuasive in argument, and the +one that had most influence in determining our conclusions. Not that +there was anything about this great French sailor that was arrogant or +offensively self-assertive. On the contrary, his manner was all compact +of charm and courtesy. He was about the most persuasive person I have +ever met. Whenever an important matter arose, there was some influence +that made us turn instinctively to Admiral de Bon for enlightenment; +and, when he rose to talk, the council hung upon his every word. For the +man was a consummate orator. Those who understood French even slightly +had little difficulty in following the Admiral, for he spoke his +delightful language with a precision, a neatness of phrase, and a +clearness of enunciation which made every syllable intelligible. So +perfect did these speeches seem that one would have suspected that +Admiral de Bon had composed them at his leisure, but this was not the +case; the man apparently had only to open his mouth, and his speech +spontaneously flowed forth; he never hesitated for a word. And his words +were not only eloquent, but, as I have said, they were full of +substance. The charm which he manifested on these public occasions he +carried likewise into his domestic life. Whenever the council met in +Paris the Admiral's delightful wife and daughters entertained us at +luncheon--an experience which caused many of us to regret that it did +not always meet in that city. + +The other two members of this interesting group were Rear-Admiral +Funakoshi, representing the Japanese navy, and Vice-Admiral di Revel, +representing the Italian. The Japanese was also naval attaché at London, +and the popularity which he had acquired in this post he also won in the +larger field. In some respects, he was not like the conventional notion +of a Japanese; physically he did not fulfil the accepted rôle, for he +was tall and heavily built; nor was there anything about him that was +"inscrutable"; the fact was that he was exceedingly frank and open, and +apparently loved nothing so much as a good joke. The remark of a London +newspaper that Admiral di Revel, the Italian, "unlike Admiral Sims, +looks every inch the sailor," caused Admiral Funakoshi much amusement; +he could not resist the temptation to chaff me about it. We all became +so well acquainted that, in our lighter moments, we did not mind having +a little fun at one another's expense; and in these passages the +Japanese representative did not always make the poorest showing. The +Italian, di Revel, was a source of continual delight. Someone remarked +that he was in reality an Irishman who had escaped into Italy; and this +facetious characterization was really not inapt. His shock of red hair, +his reddish beard, and his short, stocky figure almost persuaded one +that County Cork was his native soil. He delivered his opinions with an +insistence which indicated that he entertained little doubt about their +soundness; he was not particularly patient if they were called in +question; yet he was so courteous, so energetic, and so entertaining +that he was a general favourite. That his Government appreciated his +services is shown by the fact that it made di Revel a full admiral, a +rank which is rarely bestowed in Italy. + +Such, then, were the men who directed the mighty forces that defeated +the German submarines. The work at the councils was arduous, yet the +opportunity of associating with such men in such a task is one that +comes to few naval officers. They all worked with the most indomitable +spirit; not one of them ever for a moment showed the slightest +discouragement over a situation which was at times disquieting, to say +the least; not one faltered in the determination to force the issue to +the only logical end. History has given few examples of alliances that +worked harmoniously. The Allied Naval Council did its full share in +making harmonious the Allied effort against the submarine. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE + + +I + +It is not improbable that I have given a false impression concerning the +relative merits of the several methods which were developed for fighting +the submarine. Destroyers, patrol boats, subchasers, and mystery ships +all accomplished great things in solving the most baffling problem +presented by the war. The belief is general that the most successful +hunter of the submarine was the destroyer, and, so far as absolute +figures are concerned, this is true. Destroyers, with their depth +charges and their gunfire, sank more U-boats than any other agency. One +type of craft, however, proved a more destructive enemy of the submarine +than even the destroyer. That was a warship of whose achievements in +this direction little has so far been heard. The activities of the +German submarine have completely occupied public attention; and this is +perhaps the reason why few newspaper readers have suspected that there +were other than German and Austrian submarines constantly operating at +sea. Everyone has heard of the U-boats, yet how many have heard anything +of the H-boats, the E-boats, the K-boats, and the L-boats? The H-, E-, +and K-boats were British submarines, and the L-boats were American +submarines. In the destruction of the German under-water craft these +Allied submarines proved more successful than any kind of surface ship. +The Allied destroyers, about 500 in number, sank 34 German submarines +with gunfire and depth charges; auxiliary patrol craft, such as +trawlers, yachts, and the like, about 3,000 in number, sank 31; while +the Allied submarines, which were only about 100 in number, sank 20. +Since, therefore, the Allies had about five times as many destroyers as +submarines at work, it is evident that the record of the latter vessels +surpasses that of the most formidable surface anti-submarine craft. + +Thus the war developed the fact that the most deadly enemy of the +submarine is the submarine itself. Underwater warfare is evidently a +disease in which like cures like. In a way this is the most astonishing +lesson of the naval operations. It is particularly interesting, because +it so completely demolishes all the ideas on this subject with which we +entered the war. From that day in history when the submarine made its +first appearance, the one quality which seemed to distinguish it from +all other kinds of warship was that it could not be used to fight +itself. Writers were fond of pointing out that battleship could fight +battleship, that cruiser could fight cruiser, that destroyer could fight +destroyer, but that submarine could not fight submarine. This supposed +quality, which was constantly emphasized, was what seemed to make the +introduction of this strange vessel such a dangerous thing for the +British Empire. For more than a hundred years the under-water boat was a +weapon which was regarded as valuable almost exclusively to the weaker +sea powers. In the course of the nineteenth century this engine of sea +fighting made many spectacular appearances; and significantly it was +always heralded as the one effective way of destroying British +domination at sea. + +The inventor of the modern submarine was an undergraduate of Yale named +David Bushnell; his famous _Turtle_, according to the great British +authority, Sir William White, formerly Chief Naval Constructor of the +British navy, contained every fundamental principle of "buoyancy, +stability, and control of depth" which are found in the modern +submarine; "it cannot be claimed," he said in 1905, "that any new +principle of design has been discovered or applied since Bushnell.... He +showed the way to all his successors.... Although alternative methods of +fulfilling essentials have been introduced and practically tested, in +the end Bushnell's plans in substance have been found the best." The +chief inspiration of Bushnell's work was a natural hostility to Great +Britain, which was at that time engaged in war with his own country; his +submarine, invented in 1777, was intended to sink the British warships +which were then anchored off the American coast, break the +communications of Great Britain with her revolting colonies, and in this +way win our liberty. Bushnell did not succeed in this ambitious +enterprise for reasons which it is hardly necessary to set forth in this +place; the fact which I wish to emphasize is that he regarded his +submarine as an agency which would make it possible for the young United +States, a weak naval power, to deprive Great Britain, the dominant sea +power, of its supremacy. His successor, Robert Fulton, was inspired by a +similar ambition. In 1801 Fulton took his _Nautilus_ into the harbour of +Brest, and blew a merchant vessel into a thousand pieces; this dramatic +experiment was intended to convince Napoleon that there was one way in +which he could destroy the British fleet and thus deprive England of her +sea control. Dramatic as this demonstration was, it did not convince +Napoleon of the value of the submarine; Fulton therefore took his ship +to England and exhibited it to William Pitt, who was then Prime +Minister. The great statesman was much impressed, but he did not regard +the submarine as an innovation that should arouse much enthusiasm in +England. "If we adopt this kind of fighting," he said, "it will be the +end of all navies." + +Despite his own forebodings, Pitt sent Fulton to St. Vincent, who was +then the First Lord of the Admiralty. + +"Pitt is the biggest fool in the world," remarked the head of the +victorious British navy. "Why does he encourage a kind of warfare which +is useless to those who are the masters of the sea, and which, if it +succeeds, will deprive them of this supremacy?" + +The reason for St. Vincent's opposition is apparent. He formed the +conception of the submarine which has prevailed almost up to the present +time. In his opinion, a submarine was a vessel which could constantly +remain under the surface, approach great warships unseen and blow them +to pieces at will. This being the case, a nation which possessed two or +three successfully working engines of this kind could apparently wipe +out the entire British fleet. It therefore needed no argument to show +that this was a weapon which was hardly likely to prove useful to the +British navy. If the submarine could fulfil its appointed mission, it +would give the control of the sea to that nation which used it +successfully; but since Great Britain already controlled the sea, the +new type of war craft was superfluous to her. In the hands of a weak +naval power, however, which had everything to gain and nothing to lose, +it might supply the means of overthrowing the British Empire. Could one +submarine destroy another, it would present no particular menace, for +then, in order to control the sea, it would merely be necessary to build +a larger under-water fleet than that of any prospective enemy: but how +could vessels which spent all their time under the water, in the dark, +ever get a chance to come to blows? From these considerations it seemed +apparent to St. Vincent and other British experts of his time that the +best interests of the British Empire would be served, not by developing +the submarine, but by suppressing it. Fulton's biographer intimates that +the British Government offered Fulton a considerable amount of money to +take his submarine back to America and forget about it; and there is a +letter of Fulton's to Lord Granville, saying that "not for £20,000 a +year would I do what you suggest." But there seemed to be no market for +his invention, and Fulton therefore returned to America and subsequently +gave all his time to exploiting the steamboat. On the defensive powers +of the under-water vessel he also expressed the prevailing idea. +"Submarine," he said, "cannot fight submarine." + +The man who designed the type of submarine which has become the standard +in all modern navies, John P. Holland, similarly advocated it as the +only means of destroying the British navy. Holland was an American of +Irish origin; he was a member of the Fenian brotherhood, and it was his +idea that his vessel could be used to destroy the British navy, blockade +the British coast, and, as an inevitable consequence, secure freedom for +Ireland. This is the reason why his first successful boat was known as +the _Fenian Ram_, despite the fact that it was not a "ram" at all. And +the point on which Holland always insisted was that the submarine vessel +was a unique vessel in naval warfare, because there was no "answer" to +it. "There is nothing that you can send against it," he gleefully +exclaimed, "not even itself." + +Parliamentary debates in the late nineties indicated that British naval +leaders entertained this same idea. In 1900, Viscount Goschen, who was +then the First Lord of the Admiralty, dismissed the submarine as +unworthy of consideration. "The idea of submarine navigation," he said, +"is a morbid one. We need pay no attention to the submarine in naval +warfare. The submarine is the arm of weaker powers." But Mr. +Arnold-Forster, who was himself soon to become a member of the +Admiralty, took exception to these remarks. "If the First Lord," he +said, "had suggested that we should not build submarines because the +problems which control them are not yet solved, I should have hesitated +to combat his argument. But the First Lord has not said so: he has said +that the Admiralty did not care to undertake any project for submarines +because this type of boat could never be anything but the arm of the +feeble. However, if this boat is made practical, the nation which +possesses it will cease to be feeble and become in reality powerful. +More than any other nation do we have reason to fear the submarine. It +is, therefore, not wise to wait with indifference while other nations +work at the solution of this problem without trying to solve it +ourselves." "The question of the best way of meeting submarine attack," +said Viscount Goschen at another time, "is receiving much consideration. +It is in this direction that practical suggestions would be valuable. It +seems certain that the reply to this weapon must be looked for in other +directions than in building submarine boats ourselves, for it is clear +that one submarine cannot fight another." + +This prepossession dominated all professional naval minds in all +countries, until the outbreak of the Great War. Yet the war had lasted +only a few months when the idea was shown to be absurd. Practical +hostilities soon demonstrated, as already said, that not only was the +submarine able to fight another boat of the same type, but that it was +the most effective anti-submarine agency which we possessed--so +effective that the British Admiralty at once began the design of a +special type of hunting submarine having a high under-water speed. + +The fact is that the popular mind, in its attitude toward this new type +of craft, is still too much under the spell of Jules Verne. There is +still the disposition to look upon the submarine as an insidious vessel +which spends practically all of its time under the water, stealthily +slinks along, never once betraying its presence, creeps up at will to +its enemy and discharges its torpedo. Yet the description which these +pages have already given of its operations shows the falsity of this +idea. It is important that we should keep constantly in mind the fact +that the submarine is only occasionally a submarine; and that for the +greater part of its career it is a surface boat. In the long journeys +which the German U-boats made from the Heligoland Bight around Scotland +and Ireland to those great hunting grounds which lay in the Atlantic +trade routes, they travelled practically all the time on the surface of +the water. The weary weeks during which they cruised around, looking for +their victims, they also spent almost entirely on the surface. There +were virtually only two circumstances which compelled them to disappear +beneath the waves. The first of these was the occasion on which the +submarine detected a merchant ship; in this case it submerged, for the +success of its attempt to torpedo depended entirely upon its operating +unseen. The second occasion which made it necessary to submerge was when +it spied a destroyer or other dangerous patrolling craft; the submarine, +as has been said, could not fight a vessel of this type with much chance +of success. Thus the ability to submerge was merely a quality that was +utilized only in those crises when the submarine either had to escape a +vessel which was stronger than itself or planned to attack one which was +weaker. + +The time taken up by these disappearances amounted to only a fraction of +the total period consumed in a cruise. Yet the fact that the submarine +had to keep itself momentarily ready to make these disappearances is +precisely the reason why it was obliged to spend the larger part of its +time on the surface. The submarine has two sets of engines, one for +surface travel and the other for subsurface travel. An oil-engine +propels it on the top of the water, but this consumes a large amount of +air, and, for this reason, it cannot be used when travelling under the +surface. As soon as the vessel dives, therefore, it changes its motive +power to an electric motor, which makes no inroads on the oxygen needed +for sustaining the life of its crew. But the physical limitation of size +prevents the submarine from carrying large storage batteries, which is +only another way of saying that its cruising radius under the water is +extremely small, not more than fifty or sixty miles. In order to +recharge these batteries and gain motive power for subsurface travel, +the submarine has to come to the surface. Yet the simple fact that the +submarine can accomplish its destructive work only when submerged, and +that it can avoid its enemy only by diving, makes it plain that it must +always hold itself in readiness to submerge on a moment's notice and +remain under water the longest possible time. That is, its storage +batteries must always be kept at their highest efficiency; they must not +be wasted by unnecessary travelling under the water; the submarine, in +other words, must spend all its time on the surface, except those brief +periods when it is attempting to attack a merchant ship or escape an +enemy. Almost the greatest tragedy in the life of a submarine is to meet +a surface enemy, such as a destroyer, when its electric batteries are +exhausted. It cannot submerge, for it can stay submerged only when it is +in motion, unless it is in water shallow enough to permit it to rest on +the bottom. Even though it may have a little electricity, and succeed in +getting under water, it cannot stay there long, for its electric power +will soon be used up, and therefore it is soon faced with the +alternative of coming to the surface and surrendering, or of being +destroyed. The success of the submarine, indeed its very existence, +depends upon the vessel spending the largest possible part of its time +upon the surface, keeping its full supply of electric power constantly +in reserve, so that it may be able to dive at a moment's notice and to +remain under the water for the maximum period. + +This purely mechanical limitation explains why the German submarine was +not a submarine in the popularly accepted meaning of that term. Yet the +fact that this vessel remained for the greater part of its existence on +the surface was no particular disadvantage, so long as it was called +upon to contend only with surface vessels. Even with the larger part of +its decks exposed the U-boat was a comparatively small object on the +vast expanse of the sea. I have already made clear the great +disadvantage under which destroyers and other patrolling vessels +laboured in their attempts to "hunt" this type of enemy. A destroyer, +small as it is, was an immensely larger object than the under-water +boat, and the consequence was that the lookout on a submarine, +proceeding along on the surface, could detect the patrolling vessel +long before it could be observed itself. All the submarine had to do, +therefore, whenever the destroyer appeared on the horizon, was to seek +safety under water, remain there until its pursuer had passed out of +sight, and then rise again and resume its operations. Before the +adoption of the convoy system, when the Allied navies were depending +chiefly upon the patrol--that is, sending destroyers and other surface +craft out upon the high seas to hunt for the enemy--the enemy submarines +frequently operated in the same areas as the patrol vessels, and were +only occasionally inconvenienced by having to keep under the water to +conceal their presence. But let us imagine that the destroyer, in +addition to its depth charges, its torpedoes, its guns, and its ability +to ram, had still another quality. Suppose, for a moment, that, like the +submarine, it could steam submerged, put up a periscope which would +reveal everything within the radius of a wide horizon, and that, when it +had picked up an enemy submarine, it could approach rapidly under the +water, and discharge a torpedo. It is evident that such a manoeuvre as +this would have deprived the German of the only advantage which it +possessed over all other war craft--its ability to make itself unseen. + +No destroyer can accomplish any such magical feat as this: indeed, there +is only one kind of vessel that can do so, and that is another +submarine. This illustration immediately makes it clear why the Allied +submarine itself was the most destructive enemy of the German submarine. +When Robert Fulton, John P. Holland, and other authorities declared that +the under-water vessel could not fight its own kind, it is evident that +they had not themselves foreseen the ways in which their inventions were +to be used. They regarded their craft as ships that would sail the +larger part of the time under the waves, coming up only occasionally to +get their bearings and to take in a fresh supply of air. It was plain to +these pioneers that vessels which spent practically all their time +submerged could not fight each other, for the sufficient reason that +they could not see each other; a combat under these conditions would +resemble a prize-fight between two blindfolded pugilists. Neither would +such vessels fight upon the surface, for, even though they were supplied +with guns--things which did not figure in the early designs of +submarines--one boat could decline the combat simply by submerging. In +the minds of Fulton and Holland an engagement between such craft would +reduce itself to mutual attempts to ram each other under the water, and +many fanciful pictures of the early days portrayed exciting deep-sea +battles of this kind, in which submarines, looking like mighty sea +monsters, provided with huge glaring headlights, made terrific lunges at +each other. None of the inventors foresaw that, in such battles as would +actually take place, the torpedo would be used, and that the submarine +which was defeated would succumb to one of those same stealthy attacks +which it was constantly meditating against surface craft. + +Another point of the highest importance is that in a conflict of +submarine against submarine the Allied boats had one great advantage +over the German. Hans Rose and Valentiner and Moraht and other U-boat +commanders, as already explained, had to spend most of their time on the +surface in order to keep their batteries fully supplied with +electricity, in readiness for the dives that would be necessary when the +Allied destroyers approached. But the Allied submarine commander did not +have to maintain this constant readiness; the reason, it is hardly +necessary to say, is that the Allied submarine had no surface enemies, +for there were no German surface craft operating on the high seas; the +Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow was carefully attending to that very essential +detail. Occasionally, indeed, our submarines were attacked by our own +destroyers, but accidents of this kind, though uncomfortably frequent, +were not numerous enough to interfere with the operation I have in mind. +The statement seems almost like a contradiction in terms, yet it is +entirely true, that, simply because the Allied submarines did not have +to hold themselves constantly ready to submerge, they could in fact +spend a considerable part of their time under the water, for they were +not compelled to economize electric power so strictly. This gave them a +great advantage in hunting the U-boats. British and American submarines +could fully charge their batteries, drop under water and cruise around +with enough speed to maintain a horizontal position at "periscope +depth," that is, a depth just sufficient to enable them to project the +periscope above the water whenever desired. This speed was so very +slow--about one mile an hour--that it could be kept up an entire day +without exhausting the electric batteries. + +The net result was this: The German submarine necessarily sailed most of +the time on the surface with its conning-tower and deck exposed, whereas +the Allied submarine when on its hunting grounds, spent all of the +daylight hours under water, with only the periscope visible from time to +time for a few seconds. Just as the German U-boat could "spot" an Allied +destroyer at a great distance without being itself seen, so could the +periscope invariably see the German submarine on the surface long before +this tiny object came within the view of a U-boat conning-tower. Our +submarine commander could remain submerged, sweep the ocean with his +periscope until he had picked up the German enemy; then, still under +water, and almost invariably unseen, he could steal up to a position +within range, and discharge a torpedo into its fragile side. The German +submarine received that same treatment which it was itself administering +to harmless merchantmen; it was torpedoed without warning; inasmuch, +however, as it was itself a belligerent vessel, the proceeding violated +no principle of international law. + + +II + +The Allied submarines, like many other patrol craft, spent much of their +time in those restricted waters which formed the entrances to the +British Isles. Their favourite places were the English Channel, St. +George's Channel, which forms the southern entrance to the Irish Sea, +and the northern passage-way between Scotland and Ireland. At these +points, it may be remembered, the cargo ships could usually be found +sailing singly, either entirely unescorted, or escorted inadequately, +while on their way to join a convoy or to their destinations after the +dispersal of a convoy; these areas were thus almost the only places +where the German submarines had much chance of attacking single vessels. +The territory was divided into squares, each one of which was indicated +by a letter: and the section assigned to each submarine was known as +its "billet." Under ordinary circumstances, the Allied submarine spent +all its time, while patrolling, on its own particular "billet"; only in +case the pursuit of an enemy led it outside the "square" was it +permissible to leave. Allied submarines also hunted the U-boats in the +North Sea on the routes which the latter had to take in coming out or +returning through the passages in the German mine-fields of the +Heligoland Bight, or through the Skager Rack. + +As previously explained, in the daytime the Allied submarine remained +under the water, its periscope exposed for a short time every fifteen +minutes or so, sweeping the sea for a distance of many miles. As soon as +darkness set in, the boat usually emerged, began taking in new air and +recharging its batteries, the crew seizing the opportunity to stretch +their legs and catch a welcome glimpse of the external world. The simple +fact that the Allied submarines spent the larger part of their time +under water, while the German spent the larger part of their time on the +surface, gave our boats a great military advantage over the foe, but it +likewise made existence in our submarine service more arduous. Even on +the coldest winter days there could be no artificial heat, for the +precious electricity could not be spared for that purpose, and the +temperature inside the submarine was the temperature of the water in +which it sailed. The close atmosphere, heavily laden also with the smell +of oil from the engines and the odours of cooking, and the necessity of +going for days at a time without a bath or even a wash, added to the +discomfort. The stability of a submerged submarine is by no means +perfect; the vessel is constantly rolling, and a certain number of the +crew, even the experienced men, are frequently seasick. This movement +sometimes made it almost impossible to stay in a bunk and sleep for any +reasonable period; the poor seaman would perhaps doze off, but a lurch +of the vessel would send him sprawling on the deck. One could hardly +write, for it was too cold, or read, for there was little light; and +because of the motion of the vessel, it was difficult to focus one's +eyes on the page. A limited amount of smoking was permitted, but the air +was sometimes so vitiated that only the most vigorous and incessant +puffing could keep a cigarette alight. One of the most annoying things +about the submarine existence is the fact that the air condenses on the +sides as the coldness increases, so that practically everything becomes +wet; as the sailor lies in his bunk this moisture is precipitated upon +him like raindrops. This combination of discomforts usually produced, +after spending a few hours under the surface, that mental state commonly +known as "dopey." + +The usual duration of a "cruise" was eight days, and by the end of that +time many of the crew were nearly "all in," and some of them entirely +so. But the physical sufferings were the least discomfiting. Any moment +the boat was likely to hit one of the mines the Germans were always +planting. A danger which was particularly vexatious was that a British +or an American submarine was just about as likely to be attacked by +Allied surface craft as the Germans themselves. At the beginning, +recognition signals were arranged by which it was expected that an +Allied under-water craft, coming to the surface, could make its identity +known to a friendly warship; sometimes these signals succeeded, but more +frequently they failed, and the attacks which British and American +destroyers made upon their own submarines demonstrated that there was no +certainty that such signals would offer any protection. A rather grim +order directed all destroyers and other patrol craft to sink any +submarine on sight, unless there was positive information that a +friendly submarine was operating in the neighbourhood. To a large +extent, therefore, the life of our submarine sailors was the same as +that of the Germans. Our men know how it feels to have a dozen depth +charges explode around them, for not infrequently they have had to +endure this sort of thing from their own comrades. Mistakes of this +sort, even though not very numerous, were so likely to happen at any +time that whenever an Allied submarine saw an Allied destroyer at a +distance, it usually behaved just as a German would have behaved under +the same conditions: it dived precipitately to the safety of deep water. +Our men, that is, did not care to take the risk of a discussion with the +surface craft; it was more prudent to play the part of an enemy. One day +one of the American submarines, lying on the surface, saw an American +destroyer, and, cheered in their loneliness by the sight of such a +friendly vessel, waited for it to approach, making all the +identification signals carefully set down in the books. Instead of a +cordial greeting, however, about twenty rounds of projectiles began +falling about the L-boat, which as hastily as possible dropped to sixty +feet under the surface. In a few minutes depth charges began exploding +around him in profusion, the plates of the vessel shook violently, the +lights went out, and the end seemed near. Making a last effort, the +American submarine rose to the surface, sent up all the recognition +signals the officers could think of, and this time with success. The +destroyer approached, the commander shouting from the bridge: + +"Who are you?" + +"American submarine _A L-10_." + +"Good luck, old man," came a now familiar voice from the bridge. "This +is Bill." + +The commander of the destroyer and the commander of the submarine had +been room-mates at Annapolis! + +In other ways our submarine force passed through the same experiences as +the Germans. Its adventures shed the utmost light upon this campaign +against merchantmen which the Germans had depended upon to win the war. +The observer at the periscope was constantly spotting huge Allied +merchantmen making their way into port. The great ships sailed on, +entirely oblivious of the periscope and the eye of the British or +American watcher fixed upon them. + +"How easy to sink her!" the observer would say to himself. This game in +which the Germans were engaged was a dangerous one, because of Allied +anti-submarine craft; but, when it came to attacking merchant ships, it +was the easiest thing in the world. After a few weeks in a submarine, it +grew upon our men that the wonder was not that the Germans had sunk so +many merchant ships, but that they had sunk so few. Such an experience +emphasized the conviction, which was prevalent in both the British and +American navies, that the Germans were not particularly skilful at the +occupation which seemed to be so congenial to them. Indeed, there are +few things in the world that appear so absolutely helpless as a great +merchant ship when observed through the periscope of an under-water +boat. + +Whenever an Allied submarine met its enemy the contest was usually a +short one. The issue, one way or the other, was determined in a few +minutes. On rare occasions there were attempts to ram; almost +invariably, however, it was the torpedo which settled the conflict. If +our boat happened to be on the surface when it sighted the German, +which, however, was very seldom the case, the first manoeuvre was to +dive as quickly and as unostentatiously as possible. If it succeeded in +getting under before the U-boat discovered its presence, it then crept +up, guided only by the periscope, until it had reached a spot that was +within range. The combat, as was the case so frequently in this war, was +one-sided. The enemy submarine seldom knew its assailant was anywhere in +the neighbourhood; a merchant ship, from its relatively high bridge, +could sometimes see the torpedo approach and turn out of its way; but it +was almost impossible to see a wake from the low conning-tower or +periscope of a submarine, and no one except the observer had a glimpse +of the surface. The small size of the submarine was in itself a great +protection; we launched many torpedoes, but only occasionally scored a +hit. The missile would usually pass a few feet ahead or astern, or would +glide over or under the submerged hulk, perhaps a few inches only saving +it from destruction. Once an American torpedo hit its enemy squarely on +the side but failed to explode! If the torpedo once struck and +functioned, however, it was all over in a few seconds. A huge geyser of +water would leap into the air; and the submarine would sometimes rise at +the same time, or parts of it would fly in a dozen directions; then the +waters would gradually subside, leaving a mammoth oil patch, in which +two or three members of the crew might be discovered struggling in the +waves. Most of the men in the doomed vessel never knew what had struck +them. + +Thus, early one evening in May, 1918, the _E-35_, a British submarine, +was patrolling its billet in the Atlantic, about two hundred miles west +of Gibraltar. About two or three miles on the port beam a long, +low-lying object was distinguished on the surface; the appearance was +nondescript, but, to the practised eye at the periscope, it quickly took +shape as an enemy submarine. As the sea was rather rough, the _E-35_ +dived to forty feet; after a little while it ascended to twenty-six, put +up the periscope, and immediately saw, not far away, a huge enemy +submarine proceeding north at a leisurely pace, never once suspecting +that one of its own kind was on its trail. In order to get within range +and cut the German off, the Britisher dived again to forty feet, went +ahead for twenty minutes with all the speed it could muster, and again +came near enough to the surface to put up its periscope. Now it was +directly astern; still the British submarine was not near enough for a +sure shot, so again it plunged beyond periscope depth, coming up at +intervals during the next hour, each time observing with satisfaction +that it was lessening the distance between itself and its prey. When the +range had been decreased to two hundred and fifty yards, and when the +_E-35_ had succeeded in getting in such a position that it could fire +its torpedo, the missile was launched in the direction of the foe. But +this was only another of the numerous occasions when the shot missed. +Had the German submarine been a surface ship, it would have seen the +wake and probably escaped by flight; but still it sailed nonchalantly on +its way, never suspecting for a moment that a torpedo had missed its +vitals by only a few feet. Soon the _E-35_ crept still closer, and fired +two torpedoes simultaneously from its bow tubes. Both hit at the same +time. Not a glimpse of the German submarine was seen from that moment. A +terrific explosion was heard, a mountain of water rose in the air, then +in a few seconds everything was still. A small patch of oil appeared on +the surface; this gradually expanded in size until it covered a great +area; and then a few German sailors came up and started swimming toward +the British vessel. + +We Americans had seven submarines based on Berehaven, Ireland, whose +"billets" were located in the approaches to the Irish Sea. The most +spectacular achievement of any one of our boats was a curious mix-up +with a German submarine, the details of which have never been accurately +ascertained, but the practical outcome of which was indisputably the +sinking of the German boat. After a week's hard work on patrol, the _A +L-2_ was running back to her base on the surface when the lookout +sighted a periscope. The _A L-2_ at once changed her course, the torpedo +was made ready to fire, when the quiet of the summer afternoon was rent +by a terrific roar and explosion. It was quite apparent that something +exceedingly distressing had happened to the German submarine; the +American turned, and made a steep dive, in an attempt to ram the enemy, +but failed. Listening with the hydrophone, the _A L-2_ could hear now +the whirring of propellers, which indicated that the submarine was +attempting to gain surface and having difficulty in doing so, and now +and then the call letters of the German under-water signal set, which +seemed to show that the vessel was in distress and was sending appeals +for aid. According to the Admiralty records, a German submarine +operating in that area never returned to port; so it seems clear enough +that this German was lost. Commander R. C. Grady, who commanded the +American submarine division, believes that the German spotted the +American boat before it was itself seen, that it launched a torpedo, +that this torpedo made an erratic course (a not infrequent trick of a +torpedo) around our ship, returned and hit the vessel from which it +started. There are others who think that there were two German +submarines in the neighbourhood, that one fired at our boat, missed it, +and that its torpedo sped on and struck its mate. Probably the real +facts about the happening will never be explained. + +Besides the actual sinkings to their credit, the Allied submarines +accomplished strategic results of the utmost importance. We had reason +to believe that the Germans feared them almost more than any other +agency, unless it was the mine. "We got used to your depth charges," +said the commander of a captured submarine, "and did not fear them; but +we lived in constant dread of your submarines. We never knew what moment +a torpedo was going to hit us." So greatly did the Germans fear this +attack that they carefully avoided the areas in which the Allied +under-water boats were operating. We soon learned that we could keep any +section free of the Germans which we were able to patrol with our own +submarines. It also soon appeared that the German U-boats would not +fight our subsurface vessels. At first this may seem rather strange; +certainly a combat between two ships of the same kind, size, and +armament would seem to be an equal one; the disinclination of the German +to give battle under such conditions would probably strike the layman +as sheer cowardice. But in this attitude the Germans were undoubtedly +right. + +The business of their submarines was not to fight warships; it was +exclusively to destroy merchantmen. The demand made upon the U-boat +commanders was to get "tonnage! tonnage!" Germany could win the war in +only one way: that was by destroying Allied shipping to such an extent +that the Allied sea communications would be cut, and the supplies of men +and munitions and food from the United States shut off. For this +tremendous task Germany had an inadequate number of submarines and +torpedoes. Only by economizing to the utmost extent on these vessels and +these weapons could she entertain any hope of success. Had Germany +possessed an unlimited quantity of submarines and torpedoes, she might +perhaps have profitably expended some of them in warfare on British +"H-boats" and American "L-boats"; or, had there been a certainty of +"getting" an Allied submarine with each torpedo fired, it would have +been justifiable to use these weapons, small as was the supply. The fact +was, however, that the Allies expended many torpedoes for every +submarine sunk; and this was clearly a game which Germany could not +afford to play. Evidently the U-boats had orders to slip under the water +whenever an Allied submarine was seen; at least this was the almost +invariable procedure. Thus the Allied submarines compelled their German +enemies to do the one thing which worked most to their disadvantage: +that is, to keep submerged when in the same area with our submarines; +this not only prevented them from attacking merchantmen, but forced them +to consume their electric power, which, as I have already explained, +greatly diminished their efficiency as attacking ships. + +The operations of Allied submarines also greatly diminished the value of +the "cruiser" submarines which Germany began to construct in 1917. These +great subsurface vessels were introduced as an "answer" to the convoy +system. The adoption of the convoy, as I have already explained, made it +ineffective for the Germans to hunt far out at sea. Until the Allies had +put this plan into operation, the relatively small German U-boats could +go two or three hundred miles into the Atlantic and pick off almost at +will the merchant ships, which were then proceeding alone and +unescorted. But now the destroyers went out to a point two or three +hundred miles from the British coast, formed a protecting screen around +the convoy, and escorted the grouped ships into restricted waters. The +result of this was to drive the submarines into these coastal waters; +here again, however, they had their difficulties with destroyers, +subchasers, submarines, and other patrol craft. It will be recalled that +no destroyer escort was provided for the merchant convoys on their way +across the Atlantic; the Allies simply did not have the destroyers for +this purpose. The Germans could not send surface raiders to attack these +convoys in mid-ocean, first, because their surface warships could not +escape from their ports in sufficient numbers to accomplish any decisive +results, and, secondly, because Allied surface warships accompanied +every convoy to protect them against any such attack. There was only one +way in which the Germans could attack the convoys in mid-ocean. A fleet +of great ocean-going submarines, which could keep the sea for two or +three months, might conceivably destroy the whole convoy system at a +blow. The scheme was so obvious that Germany in the summer of 1917 began +building ships of this type. They were about 300 feet long, displaced +about 3,000 tons, carried fuel and supplies enough to maintain +themselves for three or four months from their base, and, besides +torpedoes, had six-inch guns that could outrange a destroyer. By the +time the armistice was signed Germany had built about twenty of these +ships. But they possessed little offensive value against merchantmen. +The Allied submarines and destroyers kept them from operating in the +submarine zone. They are so difficult to manoeuvre that not only could +they not afford to remain in the neighbourhood of our anti-submarine +craft, but they were not successful in attacking merchant vessels. They +never risked torpedoing a convoy, and rarely even a single vessel, but +captured a number by means of their superior gunfire. These huge +"cruiser submarines," which aroused such fear in the civilian mind when +the news of their existence first found its way into print, proved to be +the least harmful of any of the German types. + +The Allied submarines accomplished another result of the utmost +importance. They prevented the German U-boats from hunting in groups or +flotillas. All during 1917 and 1918 the popular mind conjured up +frightful pictures of U-boat squadrons, ten or fifteen together, lying +in wait for our merchantmen or troopships. Hardly a passenger crossed +the ocean without seeing a dozen German submarines constantly pursuing +his ship. In a speech which I made to a group of American editors who +visited England in September, 1918, I touched upon this point. "I do not +know," I told these journalists, "how many submarines you gentlemen saw +on the way over here, but if you had the usual experience, you saw a +great many. I have seen many accounts in our papers on this subject. If +you were to believe these accounts, you could only conclude that many +vessels have crossed the ocean with difficulty because submarines were +so thick that they scraped all the paint off the vessels' sides. All of +these accounts are, of course, unofficial. They get into the American +papers in various ways. It is to be regretted that they should be +published and thereby give a false impression. Some time ago I saw a +letter from one of our men who came over here on a ship bound into the +English Channel. This letter was written to his girl. He said that he +intended to take the letter on shore and slip it into a post box so that +the censor should not see it. The censor did see it and it eventually +came to me. This man was evidently intent on impressing on his girl the +dangers through which he had passed. It related that the vessel on which +he had made the voyage had met two or three submarines a day; that two +spies were found on board and hanged; and it said, 'When we arrived off +our port there were no less than eighteen submarines waiting for us. Can +you beat it?'" + +Perhaps in the early days of the war the German U-boats did hunt in +flotillas; if so, however, they were compelled to abandon the practice +as soon as the Allied submarines began to operate effectively. I have +already indicated the circumstances which reduced their submarine +operations to a lonely enterprise. In the open sea it was impossible to +tell whether a submarine was a friend or an enemy. We never knew whether +a submarine on the surface was one of our own or a German; as a result, +as already said, we gave orders to attack any under-water boat, unless +we had absolute knowledge that it was a friend. Unquestionably the +Germans had the same instructions. It would therefore be dangerous for +them to attempt to operate in groups, for they would have no way of +knowing that their supposed associate was not an Allied or an American +submarine. Possibly, even after our submarines had become exceedingly +active, the Germans may have attempted to cruise in pairs; one +explanation of the strange adventure of the _A L-2_, as said above, was +that there were two U-boats in the neighbourhood; yet the fact remains +that there is no well-established case on record in which they did so. +This circumstance that they had to operate singly was a strategic point +greatly to our advantage, especially, as I shall describe, when we began +transporting American troops. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN THE NORTH SEA + + +I + +Was there no more satisfactory way of destroying submarines than by +pursuing them with destroyers, sloops, chasers, and other craft in the +open seas? It is hardly surprising that our methods impressed certain of +our critics as tedious and ill-conceived, and that a mere glance at a +small map of the North Sea suggested a far more reasonable solution of +the problem. The bases from which the German submarines found their way +to the great centres of shipping were Ostend and Zeebrugge on the +Belgian coast, Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven on the German coast, and the +harbour of Kiel in the Baltic Sea. From all these points the voyage to +the waters that lay west and south of Ireland was a long and difficult +one; in order to reach these hunting grounds the German craft had either +to pass through the Straits of Dover to the south, or through the wide +passage-way of the North Sea that stretched between the Shetland Islands +and Norway, and thence sail around the northern coast of Ireland. We +necessarily had little success in attempting to interfere with the +U-boats while they were making these lengthy open-sea voyages, but +concentrated our efforts on trying to oppose them after they had reached +the critical areas. + +[Illustration: THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE + +Just how many German submarines were sunk in attempting to get by this +barrage will never be known, for it did its work silently without any +observers. It was probably a contributory cause of the mutiny which +demoralized the German fleet in the autumn of 1918. + +Emery Walper Ltd. sc.] + +But a casual glance at the map convinced many people that our procedure +was a mistake. And most newspaper readers in those days were giving much +attention to this map. Many periodicals, published in Great Britain and +the United States, were fond of exhibiting to their readers diagrams of +the North Sea; these diagrams contained one heavy black bar drawn across +the Straits of Dover and another drawn across the northern passage from +Scotland to Norway. The accompanying printed matter informed the public +that these pictures illustrated the one effective "answer" to the +submarine. The black bars of printer's ink represented barrages of mines +and nets, which, if they were once laid between the indicated spots, +would blow to pieces any submarine which attempted to force a way +across. Not a single German U-boat could therefore succeed in getting +out of the North Sea. All the trans-Atlantic ships which contained the +food supplies and war materials so essential to Allied success would +thus be able to land on the west coast of England and France; the +submarine menace would automatically disappear and the war on the sea +would be won. Unfortunately, it was not only the pictorial artists +employed on newspapers and magazines who insisted that this was the +royal road to success. Plenty of naval men, in the United States and in +Europe, were constantly advancing the contention, and statesmen in our +own country and in Allied countries were similarly fascinated by this +programme. When I arrived in London, in April, 1917, the great plan of +confining the submarines to their bases was everywhere a lively topic of +discussion. There was not a London club in which the Admiralty was not +denounced for its stupidity in not adopting such a perfectly obvious +plan. The way to destroy a swarm of hornets--such was the favourite +simile--was to annihilate them in their nests, and not to hunt and +attack them, one by one, after they had escaped into the open. What the +situation needed was not a long and wearisome campaign, involving +unlimited new construction to offset the increasing losses of life and +shipping, and altogether too probable defeat in the end, but a swift and +terrible blow which would end the submarine menace overnight. + +The naval officers who expressed fears that, under the shipping +conditions prevailing in 1917, such a brilliant performance could not +possibly be carried out in time to avoid defeat, merely gained a +reputation for timidity and lack of resourcefulness. When the First Lord +of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, in 1915 declared that the British +fleet would "dig the Germans out of their holes like rats," his remarks +did not greatly impress naval strategists, but they certainly sounded a +note which was popular in England. One fact, not generally known at that +time, demonstrated the futility of the whole idea. Most newspaper +critics assumed that the barrage from Dover to Calais was keeping the +submarines out of the Channel. That the destroyers, aircraft, and other +patrols were safely escorting troopships and other vessels across the +Channel was a fact of which the British public was justly proud. Yet it +did not necessarily follow that the submarines could not use the Channel +as a passage-way from their German bases to their operating areas in the +focus of Allied shipping routes. The mines and nets in the Channel, of +which so much was printed in the first three years of the war, did not +offer an effective barrier to the submarines. This was due to various +reasons too complicated for description in a book of this untechnical +nature. The unusually strong tides and rough weather experienced in the +vicinity of the Straits of Dover are well known. As one British officer +expressed it at the time, "our experience in attempting to close the +Strait has involved both blood and tears"--blood because of the men who +were lost in laying the mines and nets, and tears because the arduous +work of weeks would be swept away in a storm of a single night. In +addition, at this stage of the war the British were still experimenting +with mines; they had discovered gradually that the design which they had +used up to that time--the same design which was used in the American +navy--was defective. But the process of developing new mines in wartime +had proved slow and difficult; and the demands of the army on the +munition factories had prevented the Admiralty from obtaining a +sufficient number. The work of the Dover patrols was a glorious one, as +will appear when all of the facts come to public knowledge. But in 1917 +this patrol was not preventing the U-boats from slipping through the +Channel. The Straits of Dover, at the point where this so-called barrage +was supposed to have existed, is about twenty miles wide. The +passage-way between Scotland and Norway is 250 miles wide. The water in +the Channel has an average depth of a few fathoms; in the northern +expanse of the North Sea it reaches an average depth of 600 feet. Mining +in such deep waters had never been undertaken or even considered before +by any nation. The English Channel is celebrated for its strong tides +and stormy weather, but it is not the scene of the tempestuous gales +which rage so frequently in the winter months in these northern waters. +If the British navy had not succeeded in constructing an effective mine +barrier across the English Channel, what was the likelihood that success +would crown an effort to build a much greater obstruction in the far +more difficult waters to the north? + +The one point which few understood at that time was that the mere +building of the barrage would not in itself prevent the escape of +submarines from the North Sea. Besides building such a barrage, it would +be necessary to protect it with surface vessels. Otherwise German +mine-sweepers could visit the scene, and sweep up enough of the +obstruction to make a hole through which their submarines could pass. It +is evident that, in a barrage extending 250 miles, it would not be +difficult to find some place in which to conduct such sweeping +operations; it is also clear that it would take a considerable number of +patrolling vessels to watch such an extensive barrier and to interfere +with such operations. Moreover, we could not send our mine-layers into +the North Sea without destroyer escort; that is, it would be necessary +to detach a considerable part of our forces to protect these ships while +they were laying their mines. Those responsible for anti-submarine +operations believed that in the spring and summer of 1917 it would have +been unwise to detach these anti-submarine vessels from the area in +which they were performing such indispensable service. The overwhelming +fact was that we needed all the surface craft we could assemble for the +convoy system. The destroyers which we had available for this purpose +were entirely inadequate; to have diverted any of them for other duties +would at that time have meant destruction to the Allied cause. The +object of placing the barrage so far north was to increase the enemy's +difficulty in attempting to sweep a passage through it and facilitate +its defence by our forces. The impossibility of defending a mine barrier +placed too far south was shown by experience in that area of the North +Sea which was known as the "wet triangle." By April, 1917, the British +had laid more than 30,000 mines in the Bight of Heligoland, and were +then increasing these obstructions at the rate of 3,000 mines a month. +Yet this vast explosive field did not prevent the Germans from sending +their submarines to sea. The enemy sweepers were dragging out channels +through the mine-fields almost as rapidly as the British were putting +new fields down; we could not prevent this, because protecting vessels +could not remain so near the German bases without losses from submarine +attacks. Moreover, the Germans also laid mines in the same area in order +to trap the British mine-layers; and these operations resulted in very +considerable losses on each side. These impediments made the egress of a +submarine a difficult and nerve-racking process; it sometimes required +two or three days and the assistance of a dozen or so surface vessels to +get a few submarines through the Heligoland Bight into open waters. +Several were unquestionably destroyed in the operation, yet the activity +of submarines in the Atlantic showed that these mine-fields had by no +means succeeded in proving more than a harassing measure. It was +estimated that the North Sea barrage would require about 400,000 mines, +far more than existed in the world at that time, and far more than all +our manufacturing resources could then produce within a reasonable +period. I have already made the point, and I cannot make it too +frequently, that time is often the essential element in war--and in this +case it was of vital importance. Whether a programme is a wise one or +not depends not only upon the feasibility of the plan itself, but upon +the time and the circumstances in which it is proposed. In the spring +of 1917 the situation which we were facing was that the German +submarines were destroying Allied shipping at the rate of nearly 800,000 +tons a month. The one thing which was certain was that, if this +destruction should continue for four or five months, the Allies would be +obliged to surrender unconditionally. The pressing problem was to find +methods that would check these depredations and that would check them in +time. The convoy system was the one naval plan--the point cannot be made +too emphatically--which in April and May of 1917 held forth the +certainty of immediately accomplishing this result. Other methods of +opposing the submarines were developed which magnificently supplemented +the convoy; but the convoy, at least in the spring and summer of 1917, +was the one sure method of salvation for the Allied cause. To have +started the North Sea barrage in the spring and summer of 1917 would +have meant abandoning the convoy system; and this would have been sheer +madness. + +Thus in 1917 the North Sea barrage was not an answer to the popular +proposal "to dig the Germans out of their holes like rats." We did not +have a mine which could be laid in such deep waters in sufficient +numbers to have formed any barrier at all; and even if we had possessed +one, the construction of the barrage would have demanded such an +enormous number that they could not have been manufactured in time to +finish the barrage until late in the year 1918. Presently the situation +began to change. The principal fact which made possible this great +enterprise was the invention of an entirely new type of mine. The old +mine consisted of a huge steel globe, filled with high explosive, which +could be fired only by contact. That is, it was necessary for the +surface of a ship, such as a submarine, to strike against the surface of +the mine, and in this way start the mechanism which ignited the +explosive charge. The fact that this immediate contact was essential +enormously increased the difficulty of successfully mining waters that +range in depth from 400 to 900 feet. If the mines were laid anywhere +near the surface, the submarine, merely by diving beneath them, could +avoid all danger; if they were laid any considerable depth, it could +sail with complete safety above them. Thus, if such a mine were to be +used at all, we should have had to plant several layers, one under the +other, down to a depth of about 250 feet, so that the submarine, at +whatever depth it might be sailing, would be likely to strike one of +these obstructions. This required such a large number of mines as to +render the whole project impossible. We Americans may take pride in the +fact that it was an American who invented an entirely new type of mine +and therefore solved this difficulty. In the summer of 1917 Mr. Ralph C. +Browne, an electrical engineer of Salem, Mass., offered a submarine gun +for the consideration of Commander S. P. Fullinwider, U.S.N., who was +then in charge of the mining section of the Bureau of Ordnance. As a +submarine gun this invention did not seem to offer many chances of +success, but Commander Fullinwider realized that it comprised a firing +device of excellent promise. The Bureau of Ordnance, assisted by Mr. +Browne, spent the summer and autumn experimenting with this contrivance +and perfecting it; the English mining officers who had been sent to +America to co-operate with our navy expressed great enthusiasm over it; +and some time about the beginning of August, 1917, the Bureau of +Ordnance came to the conclusion that it was a demonstrated success. The +details of Mr. Browne's invention are too intricate for description in +this place, but its main point is comprehensible enough. Its great +advantage was that it was not necessary for the submarine to strike the +mine in order to produce the desired explosion. The mine could be +located at any depth and from it a long "antenna," a thin copper cable, +reached up to within a few feet of the surface, where it was supported +in that position by a small metal buoy. Any metallic substance, such as +the hull of a submarine, simply by striking this antenna at any point, +would produce an electric current, which, instantaneously transmitted to +the mine, would cause this mine to explode. The great advantage of this +device is at once apparent. Only about one fourth the number of mines +required under the old conditions would now be necessary. The Mining +Section estimated that 100,000 mines would form a barrier that would be +extremely dangerous to submarines passing over it or through it, +whereas, under the old conditions, about 400,000 would have been +required. This implies more than a mere saving in manufacturing +resources; it meant that we should need a proportionately smaller number +of mine-laying ships, crews, officers, bases, and supplies--all those +things which are seldom considered by the amateur in warfare, but which +are as essential to its prosecution as the more spectacular details. + +I wish to emphasize the fact that, in laying such a barrage, it was not +our object to make an absolute barrier to the passage of submarines. To +have done this we should have needed such a great number of mines that +the operation would have been impossible. Nor would such an absolute +barrier have been necessary to success; a field that could be depended +upon to destroy one-fourth or one-fifth of the submarines that attempted +the passage would have represented complete success. No enemy could +stand such losses as these; and the _moral_ of no crew could have lasted +long under such conditions. + +Another circumstance which made the barrage a feasible enterprise was +that by the last of the year 1917 it was realized that the submarine had +ceased to be a decisive factor in the war. It still remained a serious +embarrassment, and every measure which could possibly thwart it should +be adopted. But the writings of German officers which have been +published since the war make it apparent that they themselves realized +early in 1918 that they would have to place their hopes of victory on +something else besides the submarine. The convoy system and the other +methods of fighting under-water craft which I have already described had +caused a great decrease in sinkings. In April of 1917 the losses were +nearly 900,000 tons; in November of the same year they were less than +300,000 tons.[7] Meanwhile, the construction of merchant shipping, +largely a result of the tremendous expansion of American shipbuilding +facilities, was increasing at a tremendous rate. A diagram of these, the +two essential factors in the submarine campaign, disclosed such a +rapidly rising curve of new shipping, and such a rapidly falling curve +of sinkings, that the time could be easily foreseen when the net amount +of Allied shipping, after the submarines had done their worst, would +show a promising increase. But, as stated above, the submarines were +still a distinct menace; they were still causing serious losses; and it +was therefore very important that we should leave no stone unturned +toward demonstrating beyond a shadow of doubt that warfare as conducted +by these craft could be entirely put down. The more successfully we +demonstrated this fact and the more energetically we prosecuted every +form of opposition, the earlier would the enemy's general _moral_ break +down and victory be assured. In war, where human lives as well as +national interests are at stake, no thought whatever can be given to +expense. It is impossible to place a value on human life. Therefore, on +November 2, 1917, the so-called "Northern Barrage" project was +officially adopted by both the American and the British Governments. +When I say that the proposed mine-field was as long as the distance from +Washington to New York, some idea of its magnitude may be obtained. +Nothing like it had ever been attempted before. The combined operations +involved a mass of detail which the lay mind can hardly comprehend. The +cost--$40,000,000--is perhaps not an astonishing figure in the +statistics of this war, but it gives some conception of the size of the +undertaking. + + +II + +During the two years preceding the war Captain Reginald R. Belknap +commanded the mine-laying squadron of the Atlantic fleet. Although his +force was small, consisting principally of two antiquated warships, the +_Baltimore_ and the _San Francisco_, Captain Belknap had performed his +duties conscientiously and ably, and his little squadron therefore gave +us an excellent foundation on which to build. Before the European War +the business of mine-laying had been unpopular in the American navy as +well as in the British; such an occupation, as Sir Eric Geddes once +said, had been regarded as something like that of "rat catching"; as +hostilities went on, however, and the mine developed great value as an +anti-submarine weapon, this branch of the service began to receive more +respectful attention. Captain Belknap's work not only provided the +nucleus out of which the great American mine force was developed, but he +was chiefly responsible for organizing this force. The "active front" of +our mine-laying squadron was found in the North Sea; but the sources of +supply lay in a dozen shipyards and several hundred manufacturing plants +in the United States. + +We began this work with practically nothing; we had to obtain ships and +transform them into mine-layers; to enlist and to train their crews; to +manufacture at least 100,000 mines; to create bases both in the United +States and Scotland; to transport all of our supplies more than 3,000 +miles of wintry sea, part of the course lying in the submarine zone; and +we had to do all this before the real business of planting could begin. +The fact that the Navy made contracts for 100,000 of these new mines +before it had had the opportunity of thoroughly testing the design under +service conditions shows the great faith of the Navy Department in this +new invention. More than 500 contractors and sub-contractors, located in +places as far west as the Mississippi River, undertook the work of +filling this huge order. Wire-rope mills, steel factories, foundries, +machine shops, electrical works, and even candy makers, engaged in this +great operation; all had their troubles with labour unions, with the +railroads, and with the weather--that was the terrible winter of +1917-18; but in a few months trainloads of mine cases--great globes of +steel--and other essential parts began to arrive at Norfolk, Virginia. +This port was the place where the mine parts were loaded on ships and +sent abroad. The plant which was ultimately constructed at this point +was able to handle 1,000 mines a day; the industry was not a popular one +in the neighbourhood, particularly after the Halifax explosion had +proved the destructive powers of the materials in which it dealt. In a +few months this establishment had handled 25,000,000 pounds of TNT. The +explosive was melted in steel kettles until it reached about the density +of hasty pudding; with the aid of automatic devices it was then poured +into the mine cases, 300 pounds to a case, and thence moved on a +mechanical conveyor to the end of the pier. Twenty-four cargo vessels, +for the most part taken from the Great Lakes, carried these cargoes to +the western coast of Scotland. Beginning in February, 1918, two or three +of these ships sailed every eight days from Norfolk, armed against +submarines and manned by naval crews. The fact that these vessels were +slow made them an easy prey for the under-water enemy; one indeed was +sunk, with the loss of forty-one men; regrettable as was this mishap, it +represented the only serious loss of the whole expedition. + +The other vital points were Newport, Rhode Island, where the six +mine-layers were assembled; and Fort William and Kyle of Lochalsh on the +western coast of Scotland, which were the disembarking points for the +ships transporting the explosives. Captain Belknap's men were very proud +of their mine-layers, and in many details they represented an +improvement over anything which had been hitherto employed in such a +service. At this point I wish to express my very great appreciation of +the loyal and devoted services rendered by Captain Belknap. An organizer +of rare ability, this officer deserves well of the nation for the +conspicuous part which he played in the development of the North Sea +Mine Barrage from start to finish. Originally, these mine-layers had +been coastwise vessels; two of them were the _Bunker Hill_ and the +_Massachusetts_, which for years had been "outside line" boats, running +from New York to Boston; all had dropped the names which had served them +in civil life and were rechristened for the most part with names which +eloquently testified to their American origin--_Canonicus_, _Shawmut_, +_Quinnebaug_, _Housatonic_, _Saranac_, _Roanoke_, _Aroostook_, and +_Canandaigua_. These changes in names were entirely suitable, for by the +time our forces had completed their alterations the ships bore few +resemblances to their former state. The cabins and saloons had been +gutted, leaving the hulls little more than empty shells; three decks for +carrying mines had been installed; on all these decks little railroad +tracks had been built on which the mines could be rolled along the lower +decks to the elevators and along the upper mine deck to the stern and +dropped into the sea. Particularly novel details, something entirely new +in mine-layers, were the elevators, the purpose of which was to bring +the mines rapidly from the lower decks to the launching track. So +rapidly did the work progress, and so well were the crews trained, that +in May, 1918, the first of these ten ships weighed anchor and started +for their destination in Scotland. Already our navy had selected as +bases the ports of Inverness and Invergordon, on Moray Firth, harbours +which were reasonably near the waters in which the mines were to be +laid. From Invergordon the Highland Railway crosses Scotland to +Lochalsh, and from Inverness the Caledonian Canal runs to Fort William. +These two transportation lines--the Highland Railway and the Caledonian +Canal--served as connecting links in our communications. If we wish a +complete picture of our operation, we must call to mind first the +hundreds of factories in all parts of our country, working day and +night, making the numerous parts of these instruments of destruction and +their attendant mechanisms; then hundreds of freight cars carrying them +to the assembling plant at Norfolk, Virginia; then another small army of +workmen at this point mixing their pasty explosive, heating it to a +boiling point, and pouring the concoction into the spherical steel +cases; then other groups of men moving the partially prepared mines to +the docks and loading them on the cargo ships; then these ships quietly +putting to sea, and, after a voyage of ten days or two weeks, as quietly +slipping into the Scottish towns of Fort William and Kyle; then trains +of freight cars and canal boats taking the cargoes across Scotland to +Inverness and Invergordon, where the mines were completed and placed in +the immense storehouses at the bases and loaded on the mine-layers as +the necessity arose. Thus, when the whole organization was once +established on a working basis, we had uninterrupted communications and +a continuous flow of mines from the American factories to the stormy +waters of the North Sea. + +The towns in which our officers and men found themselves in late May, +1918, are among the most famous in Scottish history and legend. Almost +every foot of land is associated with memories of Macbeth, Mary Queen of +Scots, Cromwell, and the Pretender. "The national anthem woke me," says +Captain Belknap, describing his first morning at his new Scottish base. +"I arose and looked out. What a glorious sight! Green slopes in all +freshness, radiant with broom and yellow gorse; the rocky shore mirrored +in the Firth, which stretched, smooth and cool, wide away to the east +and south; and, in the distance, snow-capped Ben Wyvis. Lying off the +entrance to Munlochy Bay, we had a view along the sloping shores into +the interior of Black Isle, of noted fertility. Farther out were Avoch, +a whitewashed fishing village, and the ancient town of Fortrose, with +its ruined twelfth-century cathedral. Across the Firth lay Culloden +House, where Bonnie Prince Charlie slept before the battle. Substantial, +but softened in outline by the morning haze, the Royal Burgh of +Inverness covered the banks and heights along the Ness River, gleaming +in the bright sunshine. And how peaceful everywhere! The _Canandaigua_ +and the _Sonoma_ lay near by, the _Canonicus_ farther out, but no +movement, no signal, no beat of the engine, no throbbing pumps." The +reception which the natives gave our men was as delightful as the +natural beauty of the location. For miles around the Scots turned out to +make things pleasant for their Yankee guests. The American naval forces +stationed at the mining bases in those two towns numbered about 3,000 +officers and men, and the task of providing relaxations, in the heart of +the Highlands, far removed from theatres and moving-picture houses, +would have been a serious one had it not been for the cordial +co-operation of the people. The spirit manifested during our entire stay +was evidenced on the Fourth of July, when all the shops and business +places closed in honour of American Independence Day and the whole +community for miles around joined our sailors in the celebration. The +officers spent such periods of relaxation as were permitted them on the +excellent golf links and tennis courts in the adjoining country; dances +were provided for the men, almost every evening, the Scottish lassies +showing great adaptability in learning the American steps. Amateur +theatricals, in which both the men from the warships and the Scottish +girls took part, cheered many a crew after its return from the +mine-fields. Baseball was introduced for the first time into the country +of William Wallace and Robert Burns. Great crowds gathered to witness +the matches between the several ships; the Scots quickly learned the +fine points and really developed into "fans," while the small boys of +Inverness and Invergordon were soon playing the game with as much +enthusiasm and cleverness as our own youngsters at home. In general, the +behaviour of our men was excellent and made the most favourable +impression. + +These two mine-assembly bases at Inverness and Invergordon will ever +remain a monumental tribute to the loyal and energetic devotion to duty +of Captain Orin G. Murfin, U.S. Navy, who designed and built them; +originally the bases were intended to handle 12,000 mines, but in +reality Captain Murfin successfully handled as many as 20,000 at one +time. It was here also that each secret firing device was assembled and +installed, very largely by reserve personnel. As many as 1,200 mines +were assembled in one day, which speaks very eloquently for the +foresight with which Captain Murfin planned his bases. + + +III + +But of course baseball and dancing were not the serious business in +hand; these Americans had come this long distance to do their part in +laying the mighty barrage which was to add one more serious obstacle to +the illegal German submarine campaign. Though the operation was a joint +one of the American and British navies, our part was much the larger. +The proposal was to construct this explosive impediment from the Orkney +Islands to the coast of Norway, in the vicinity of Udsire Light, a +distance of about 230 nautical miles. Of this great area about 150 +miles, extending from the Orkneys to 3 degrees east longitude, was the +American field, and the eastern section, which extended fifty nautical +miles to Norway, was taken over by the British. Since an operation of +this magnitude required the supervision of an officer of high rank, +Rear-Admiral Joseph Strauss, who had extended experience in the ordnance +field of the navy, came over in March, 1918, and took command. The +British commander was Rear-Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N. + +The mines were laid in a series of thirteen expeditions, or +"excursions," as our men somewhat cheerfully called them. The ten +mine-layers participated in each "excursion," all ten together laying +about 5,400 mines at every trip. Each trip to the field of action was +practically a duplicate of the others; a description of one will, +therefore, serve for all. After days, and sometimes after weeks of +preparation the squadron, usually on a dark and misty night, showing no +lights or signals, would weigh anchor, slip by the rocky palisades of +Moray Firth, and stealthily creep out to sea. As the ships passed +through the nets and other obstructions and reached open waters, the +speed increased, the gunners took their stations at their batteries, and +suddenly from a dark horizon came a glow of low, rapidly moving vessels; +these were the British destroyers from the Grand Fleet which had been +sent to escort the expedition and protect it from submarines. The +absolute silence of the whole proceeding was impressive; not one of the +destroyers showed a signal or a light; not one of the mine-layers gave +the slightest sign of recognition; all these details had been arranged +in advance, and everything now worked with complete precision. The +swishing of the water on the sides and the slow churning of the +propellers were the only sounds that could possibly betray the ships to +their hidden enemies. After the ships had steamed a few more miles the +dawn began to break; and now a still more inspiring sight met our men. A +squadron of battleships, with scout cruisers and destroyers, suddenly +appeared over the horizon. This fine force likewise swept on, apparently +paying not the slightest attention to our vessels. They steamed steadily +southward, and in an hour or so had entirely disappeared. The observer +would hardly have guessed that this squadron from Admiral Beatty's fleet +at Scapa Flow had anything to do with the American and British +mine-layers. Its business, however, was to establish a wall of steel and +shotted guns between these forces and the German battle fleet at Kiel. +At one time it was believed that the mine forces on the northern barrage +would prove a tempting bait to the German dreadnoughts; and that, +indeed, it might induce the enemy to risk a second general engagement on +the high seas. At any rate, a fleet of converted excursion steamers, +laying mines in the North Sea, could hardly be left exposed to the +attacks of German raiders; our men had the satisfaction of knowing that +while engaged in their engrossing if unenviable task a squadron of +British or American battleships--for Admiral Rodman's forces took their +regular turn in acting as a "screen" in these excursions--was standing a +considerable distance to the south, prepared to make things lively for +any German surface vessels which attempted to interfere with the +operation. + +Now in the open seas the ten mine-layers formed in two columns, abreast +of each other and five hundred yards apart, and started for the waters +of the barrage. Twelve destroyers surrounded them, on the lookout for +submarines, for the ships were now in the track of the U-boats bound for +their hunting ground or returning to their home ports. At a flash from +the flagship all slackened speed, and put out their paravanes--those +under-water outrigger affairs which protected the ships from mines; for +it was not at all unlikely that the Germans would place some of their +own mines in this field, for the benefit of the barrage builders. This +operation took only a few minutes; then another flash, and the squadron +again increased its speed. It steamed the distance across the North Sea +to Udsire Light, then turned west again and headed for that mathematical +spot on the ocean which was known as the "start point"--the place, that +is, where the mine-laying was to begin. In carrying out all these +manoeuvres--sighting the light on the Norwegian coast--the commander +was thinking, not only of the present, but of the future; for the time +would come, after the war had ended, when it would be necessary to +remove all these mines, and it was therefore wise to "fix" them as +accurately as possible in reference to landmarks, so as to know where to +look for them. All this time the men were at their stations, examining +the mines to see that everything was ready, testing the laying +mechanisms, and mentally rehearsing their duties. At about four o'clock +an important signal came from the flagship: + +"Have everything ready, for the squadron will reach 'start point' in an +hour and mine-laying will begin." + +Up to this time the ships were sailing in two columns; when they came +within seven miles of "start point," another signal was broken out; the +ships all wheeled like a company of soldiers, each turning sharply to +the right, so that in a few minutes, instead of two columns, we had +eight ships in line abreast, with the remaining two, also in line +abreast, sailing ahead of them. This splendid array, keeping perfect +position, approached the starting point like a line of racehorses +passing under the wire. Not a ship was off this line by so much as a +quarter length; the whole atmosphere was one of eagerness; the officers +all had their eyes fixed upon the stern of the flagship, for the glimpse +of the red flag which would be the signal to begin. Suddenly the flag +was hauled down, indicating: + +"First mine over." + +If you had been following one of these ships, you would probably have +been surprised at the apparent simplicity of the task. The vessel was +going at its full speed; at intervals of a few seconds a huge black +object, about five feet high, would be observed gliding toward the +stern; at this point it would pause for a second or two, as though +suspended in air; it would then give a mighty lurch, fall head first +into the water, sending up a great splash, and then sink beneath the +waves. By the time the disturbance was over the ship would have advanced +a considerable distance; then, in a few seconds, another black object +would roll toward the stern, make a similar plunge, and disappear. You +might have followed the same ship for two or three hours, watching these +mines fall overboard at intervals of about fifteen seconds. There were +four planters, each of which could and did on several trips lay about +860 mines in three hours and thirty-five minutes, in a single line about +forty-four miles long. These were the _Canandaigua_, the _Canonicus_, +the _Housatonic_, and the _Roanoke_. Occasionally the monotony of this +procedure would be enlivened by a terrible explosion, a great geyser of +water rising where a mine had only recently disappeared; this meant that +the "egg," as the sailors called it, had gone off spontaneously, without +the assistance of any external contact; such accidents were part of the +game, the records showing that about 4 per cent. of all the mines +indulged in such initial premature explosions. For the most part, +however, nothing happened to disturb the steady mechanical routine. The +mines went over with such regularity that, to an observer, the whole +proceeding seemed hardly the work of human agency. Yet every detail had +been arranged months before in the United States; the mines fell into +the sea in accordance with a time-table which had been prepared in +Newport before the vessels started for Scotland. Every man on the ship +had a particular duty to perform and each performed it in the way in +which he had been schooled under the direction of Captain Belknap. + +The spherical mine case, which contains the explosive charge and the +mechanism for igniting it, is only a part of the contrivance. While at +rest on board the ship this case stands upon a box-like affair, about +two feet square, known as the anchor; this anchor sinks to the bottom +after launching and it contains an elaborate arrangement for maintaining +the mine at any desired depth beneath the surface. The bottom of the +"anchor" has four wheels, on which it runs along the little railroad +track on the launching deck to the jumping-off place at the stern. All +along these railroad tracks the mines were stationed one back of +another; as one went overboard, they would all advance a peg, a mine +coming up from below on an elevator to fill up the vacant space at the +end of the procession. It took a crew of hard-working, begrimed, and +sweaty men to keep these mines moving and going over the stern at the +regularly appointed intervals. After three or four hours had been spent +in this way and the ships had started back to their base, the decks +would sometimes be covered with the sleeping figures of these exhausted +men. It would be impossible to speak too appreciatively of the spirit +they displayed; in the whole summer there was not a single mishap of any +importance. The men all felt that they were engaged in a task which had +never been accomplished before, and their exhilaration increased with +almost every mine that was laid. "Nails in the coffin of the Kaiser," +the men called these grim instruments of vengeance. + + +IV + +I have described one of these thirteen summer excursions, and the +description given could be applied to all the rest. Once or twice the +periscope of a submarine was sighted--without any disastrous +results--but in the main this business of mine-laying was uneventful. +Just what was accomplished the chart makes clear. In the summer and +autumn months of 1918 the American forces laid 56,571 mines and the +British 13,546. The operation was to have been a continuous one; had the +war gone on for two years we should probably have laid several hundred +thousand; Admiral Strauss's forces kept at the thing steadily up to the +time of the armistice; they had become so expert and the barrage was +producing such excellent results that we had plans nearly completed for +building another at the Strait of Otranto, which would have completely +closed the Adriatic Sea. Besides this undertaking the American +mine-layer _Baltimore_ laid a mine-field in the North Irish Channel, the +narrow waters which separate Scotland and Ireland; two German submarines +which soon afterward attempted this passage were blown to pieces, and +after this the mine-field was given a wide berth. + +Just what the North Sea barrage accomplished, in the actual destruction +of submarines, will never be definitely known. We have information that +four certainly were destroyed, and in all probability six and possibly +eight; yet these results doubtless measure only a small part of the +German losses. In the majority of cases the Germans had little or no +evidence of sunken submarines. The destroyers, subchasers, and other +patrol boats were usually able to obtain some evidences of injury +inflicted; they could often see their quarry, or the disturbances which +it made on the surface; they could pursue and attack it, and the +resultant oil patches, wreckage, and German prisoners--and sometimes the +recovered submarine itself or its location on the bottom--would tell the +story either of damage or destruction. But the disconcerting thing about +the North Sea barrage, from the viewpoint of the Germans, was that it +could do its work so secretly that no one, friend or enemy, would +necessarily know a thing about it. A German submarine simply left its +home port; attempting to cross the barrage, perhaps at night, it would +strike one of these mines, or its antenna; an explosion would crumple it +up like so much paper; with its crew it would sink to the bottom; and +not a soul, perhaps not even the crew itself, would ever know what had +happened to it. It would in truth be a case of "sinking without a +trace"--though an entirely legitimate one under the rules of warfare. +The German records disclosed anywhere from forty to fifty submarines +sunk which did not appear in the records of the Allies; how these were +destroyed not a soul knows, or ever will know. They simply left their +German ports and were never heard of again. That many of them fell +victims to mines, and some of them to the mines of our barrage, is an +entirely justifiable assumption. That probably even a larger number of +U-boats were injured is also true. A German submarine captain, after the +surrender at Scapa Flow, said that he personally knew of three +submarines, including his own, which had been so badly injured at the +barrage that they had been compelled to limp back to their German ports. + +The results other than the sinking of submarines were exceedingly +important in bringing the war to an end. It was the failure of the +submarine campaign which defeated the German hopes and forced their +surrender; and in this defeat the barrage was an important element. +That submarines frequently crossed it is true; there was no expectation, +when the enterprise was started, that it would absolutely shut the +U-boats in the North Sea; but its influence in breaking down the German +_moral_ must have been great. To understand this, just place yourself +for a moment in the position of a submarine crew. The width of this +barrage ranged from fifteen to thirty-five miles; it took from one to +three hours for a submarine to cross this area on the surface and from +two to six hours under the surface. Not every square foot, it is true, +had been mined; there were certain gaps caused by the spontaneous +explosions to which I have referred; but nobody knew where these +openings were, or where a single mine was located. The officers and +crews knew only that at any moment an explosion might send them to +eternity. A strain of this sort is serious enough if it lasts only a few +minutes; imagine being kept in this state of mind anywhere from one to +six hours! Submarine prisoners constantly told us how they dreaded the +mines; going through such a field, I suppose, was about the most +disagreeable experience in this nerve-racking service. Our North Sea +barrage began to show results almost immediately after our first +planting. The German officers evidently kept informed of our progress +and had a general idea of the territory which had been covered. For a +considerable time a passage-way, sixty miles wide, was kept open for the +Grand Fleet just east of the Orkney Islands; the result was that the +submarines, which had hitherto usually skirted the Norwegian coast, now +changed their route, and attempted to slip through the western +passage-way--a course that enabled them to avoid the mine-field. When +the entire distance from the Orkneys to Norway had been mined, however, +it became impossible to "run around the end." The Germans were now +obliged to sail boldly into this explosive field, taking their chances +of hitting a mine. Stories of this barrage were circulated all over +Germany; sailors who had been in contact with it related their +experiences to their fellows; and the result was extremely demoralizing +to the German submarine flotilla. The North Sea barrage was probably a +contributory cause of the mutiny which demoralized the German fleet in +the autumn of 1918. + +I think I am therefore justified in saying that this enterprise was a +strong factor in overcoming the submarine menace, though the success of +the convoy system had already brought the end in sight, and had thus +made it practicable to assign, without danger of defeat, the tonnage +necessary to lay the barrage and maintain and augment it as long as +might be necessary. The Germans saw the barrage not only as it was in +the autumn of 1918, but as it would be a few months or a year hence. We +had started a steady stream of mines from hundreds of factories in the +United States to our Scottish bases; these establishments were +constantly increasing production, and there was practically no limit to +their possible output. We had developed a mine-laying organization which +was admittedly better than any that had been hitherto known; and this +branch of the service we could now enlarge indefinitely. In time we +could have planted this area so densely with explosives that it would +have been madness for any submarines even to attempt a passage. To be +sure, the Pentland Firth, between the Orkneys and Scotland, was always +open, and could not be mined on account of its swift tides, but besides +being a dangerous passage at best it was constantly patrolled to make it +still more dangerous. + +The loyal devotion to duty and the skilful seamanship which our officers +displayed in this great enterprise were not only thoroughly in keeping +with the highest traditions of the navy, but really established new +standards to guide and inspire those who will follow us. These gallant +officers who actually laid the mines are entitled to the nation's +gratitude, and I take great pleasure in commending the work of Captain +H. V. Butler, commanding the flagship _San Francisco_; Captain J. Harvey +Tomb, commanding the _Aroostook_; Captain A. W. Marshall, commanding the +_Baltimore_; Commander W. H. Reynolds, commanding the _Canandaigua_; +Captain T. L. Johnson, commanding the _Canonicus_; Captain J. W. +Greenslade, commanding the _Housatonic_; Commander D. Pratt Mannix, +commanding the _Quinnebaug_; Captain C. D. Stearns, commanding the +_Roanoke_; Captain Sinclair Gannon, commanding the _Saranac_; and +Captain W. T. Cluverius, commanding the _Shawmut_. + +This splendid squadron, of which the flagship was the _San Francisco_, +was organized by Captain R. R. Belknap and, by order of the Secretary +of the Navy, was placed under his direct command; and he was therefore +responsible for all preparations, tactics, general instructions, special +instructions for each mine-laying "excursion," the intricate navigation +required, and in fact all arrangements necessary for the successful +planting of the mines in their assigned positions. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[7] Complete statistics of shipping losses, new ship construction for +1917 and 1918, will be found in Appendices VIII and IX. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT THE AMERICAN COAST + + +It was in the summer of 1918 that the Germans made their only attempt at +what might be called an offensive against their American enemies. +Between the beginning of May and the end of October, 1918, five German +submarines crossed the Atlantic and torpedoed a few ships on our coast. +That submarines could make this long journey had long been known. +Singularly enough, however, the impression still prevails in this +country that the German U-boats were the first to accomplish the feat. +In the early autumn of 1916 the _U-53_--commanded by that submarine +officer, Hans Rose, who has been previously mentioned in these +pages--crossed the Atlantic, dropped in for a call at Newport, R.I., +and, on the way back, sank a few merchant vessels off Nantucket. A few +months previous the so-called merchant submarine _Deutschland_ had made +its trip to Newport News. The Teutonic press, and even some +Germanophiles in this country, hailed these achievements as marking a +glorious page in the record of the German navy. Doubtless the real +purpose was to show the American people how easily these destructive +vessels could cross the Atlantic; and to impress upon their minds the +fate which awaited them in case they maintained their rights against the +Prussian bully. As a matter of fact, it had been proved, long before the +_Deutschland_ or the _U-53_ had made their voyages, that submarines +could cross the Atlantic. In 1915, not one but ten submarines had gone +from North America to Europe under their own power. Admiral Sir John +Fisher tells about this expedition in his recently published memoirs. In +1914, the British Admiralty had contracted for submarines with Charles M. +Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel Company. As international +law prohibited the construction of war vessels by a nation in wartime +for the use of a belligerent with which it was at peace, the parts of +ten submarines were sent to Canada, where they were put together. These +submarines then crossed the Atlantic under their own power, and were +sent from British ports to the Dardanelles, where they succeeded in +driving Turkish and German shipping out of the Sea of Marmora. Thus a +crossing of the Atlantic by American-built submarines manned by British +crews had been accomplished before the Germans made their voyages. It +was therefore not necessary for the two German submarines to cross the +Atlantic to prove that the thing could be done; but the Germans +doubtless believed that this demonstration of their ability to operate +on the American coast would serve as a warning to the American people. + +We were never at all deceived as to what would be the purpose of such a +visit after our entrance into the war. In the early part of 1917 the +Allies believed that a few German U-boats might assail our coast, and I +so informed the Navy Department at Washington. My cables and letters of +1917 explained fully the reasons why Germany might indulge in such a +gesture. Strategically, as these despatches make clear, such attacks +would have no great military value. To have sent a sufficient number of +submarines to do any considerable damage on the American coast would +have been a great mistake. Germany's one chance of winning the war with +the submarine weapon was to destroy shipping to such an extent that the +communications of the Allies with the outside world, and especially with +the United States, would be cut. The only places where the submarine +warfare could be conducted with some chance of success were the ocean +passage routes which lead to European ports, especially in that area +south and south-west of Ireland in which were focussed the trade routes +for ships sailing from all parts of the world and destined for British +and French ports. With the number of submarines available, the Germans +could keep enough of their U-boats at work in these areas to destroy a +large number of merchant ships. Germany thus needed to concentrate all +of her available submarines at these points; she had an inadequate +number for her purpose; to send any considerable force three thousand +miles across the Atlantic would simply weaken her efforts in the real +scene of warfare and would make her submarine campaign a failure. The +cruises of submarines on the American coast would have been very much +longer and would have been a much more serious strain on the submarines +than were the shorter cruises in the inshore waters of Europe. As has +already been explained, the submarine did not differ from other craft in +its need for constant repairs and careful upkeep, except that perhaps it +was a more delicate instrument of warfare than any other naval craft, +and that it would require longer and more frequent periods of overhaul. +Any operations carried out three thousand miles from their bases, where +alone supplies, spare parts, and repair facilities were available, would +have soon reduced the submarine campaign to comparative uselessness; +each voyage would have resulted in sinking a relatively small amount of +shipping; a great number of submarines would be out of commission at all +times for repairs, or would be lost through accidents. The Germans had +no submarine bases in American waters and could establish none. +Possibly, as the newspaper writer has pointed out, they might have +seized a deserted island off the coast of Maine or in the Caribbean, and +cached there a reservoir of fuel and food; unless, however, they could +also have created at these places adequate facilities for repairing +submarines or supplying them with torpedoes and ammunition, such a place +would not have served the purpose of a base at all. Comparatively few of +the German submarines could have made the cruise to the American coast +and operated successfully there so far away from their bases for any +considerable time. In the time spent in such an enterprise, the same +submarine could make three or four trips in the waters about the British +Isles, or off the coast of France, and could sink four or five times the +tonnage which could be destroyed in the cruise on the Atlantic coast. In +the eastern Atlantic, the submarine could seek its victims in an area +comprising a comparatively few square miles, at points where shipping +was so dense that a submarine had only to take a station and lie in +wait, and be certain, within a short time, of encountering valuable +ships which it could attack successfully with its torpedoes. If the +U-boats should be sent to America, on the other hand, they would have to +patrol up and down three thousand miles of coast, looking for victims; +and even when they found them the ships that they could sink would +usually be those engaged in the coastwise traffic, which were of +infinitely less military importance than the transports which were +carrying food, munitions, and supplies to the Allies and which were +being sunk in the eastern Atlantic. + +Anything resembling an attack in force on American harbours was +therefore improbable. Yet it seemed likely from the first that the +Germans would send an occasional submarine into our waters, as a measure +of propaganda rather than for the direct military result that would be +achieved. American destroyers and other vessels were essential to the +success of the whole anti-submarine campaign of the Allies. The sooner +they could all be sent into the critical European waters the sooner the +German campaign of terrorism would end. If these destroyers, or any +considerable part of them, could be kept indefinitely in American +waters, the Germans might win the war. Any manoeuvre which would have +as its result the keeping of these American vessels, so indispensable to +the Allies, out of the field of active warfare, would thus be more than +justified and, indeed, would indicate the highest wisdom on the part of +the German navy. The Napoleonic principle of dividing your enemy's +forces is just as valuable in naval as in land warfare. For many years +Admiral Mahan had been instructing American naval officers that the +first rule in warfare is not to divide your fighting forces, but always +to keep them together, so as to bring the whole weight at a given moment +against your adversary. Two of the fundamental principles of the science +of warfare, on land and sea alike, are contained in the maxims: Keep +your own forces concentrated, and always endeavour to divide those of +the enemy. Undoubtedly, the best method which Germany could use to keep +our destroyers in our own waters would be to make the American people +believe that their lives and property were in danger; they might +accomplish this by sending a submarine to attack our shipping off New +York and Boston and other Atlantic seaports, and possibly even to +bombard our harbours. The Germans doubtless believed that they might +create such alarm and arouse such public clamour in the United States +that our destroyers and other anti-submarine craft would be kept over +here by the Navy Department, in response to the popular agitation to +protect our own coast. This is the reason why American headquarters in +London, and the Allied admiralties, expected such a visitation. The +Germans obviously endeavoured to create the impression that such an +attack was likely to occur at any time. This was part of their war +propaganda. The press was full of reports that such attacks were about +to be made. German agents were continually circulating these reports. + +Of course it was clear from the first, to the heads of the Allied navies +and to all naval authorities who were informed about the actual +conditions, that these attacks by German submarines on the American +coast would be in the nature of raids for moral effect only. It was also +quite clear from the first, as I pointed out in my despatches to the +Navy Department, that the best place to defend our coast was in the +critical submarine areas in the European Atlantic, through which the +submarines had to pass in setting out for our coast, and in which alone +they could have any hope of succeeding in the military object of the +undersea campaign. It was not necessary to keep our destroyers in +American waters, patrolling the vast expanse of our three thousand miles +of coastline, in a futile effort to find and destroy such enemy +submarines as might operate on the American coast. So long as these +attacks were only sporadic--and carried out by the type of submarine +which used its guns almost exclusively in sinking ships, and which +selected for its victims unarmed and unprotected ships--destroyers and +other anti-submarine craft would be of no possible use on the Atlantic +coast. The submarine could see these craft from a much greater distance +than it could itself be seen by them; and by diving and sailing +submerged it could easily avoid them and sink its victims without ever +being sighted or attacked by our own patrols, however numerous they +might have been. Even in the narrow waters of the English Channel, up to +the very end of the war, submarines were successfully attacking small +merchant craft by gunfire, although the density of patrol craft in this +area was naturally a thousand times greater than we could ever have +provided for the vast expanse of our own coast. Consequently, so long as +the submarine attacks on the American coast were only sporadic, it was +absolutely futile to maintain patrol craft in those waters, as this +could not provide any adequate defence against such scattered +demonstrations. If, on the other hand, the Germans had ever decided to +commit the military mistake of concentrating a considerable number of +submarines off our Atlantic ports, we could always have countered such +a step by sending back from the war zone an adequate number of craft to +protect convoys in and out of the Atlantic ports, in the same manner +that convoys were protected in the submarine danger zone in European +waters. This is a fact which even many naval men did not seem to grasp. +Yet I have already explained that we knew practically where every German +submarine was at any given time. We knew whenever one left a German +port; and we kept track of it day by day until it returned home. No +U-boat ever made a voyage across the Atlantic without our knowledge. The +submarine was a slow traveller, and required a minimum of thirty days +for such a trip; normally, the time would be much longer, for a +submarine on such a long voyage had to economize oil fuel for the return +trip and therefore seldom cruised at more than five knots an hour. Our +destroyers and anti-submarine craft, on the other hand, could easily +cross the Atlantic in ten days and refuel in their home ports. It is +therefore apparent that a flotilla of destroyers stationed in European +waters could protect the American coast from submarines almost as +successfully as if it were stationed at Hampton Roads or Newport. Such a +flotilla would be of no use at these American stations unless there were +submarines attacking shipping off the coast; but as soon as the Germans +started for America--a fact of which we could always be informed, and of +which, as I shall explain, we always were informed--we could send our +destroyers in advance of them. These agile vessels would reach home +waters about three weeks before the submarines arrived; they would thus +have plenty of time to refit and to welcome the uninvited guests. From +any conceivable point of view, therefore, there was no excuse for +keeping destroyers on the American side of the Atlantic for "home +defence." Moreover, the fact that we could keep this close track of +submarines in itself formed a great protection against them. I have +already explained how we routed convoys entering European waters in such +ways that they could sail around the U-boat and thus escape contact. I +think that this simple procedure saved more shipping than any other +method. In the same way we could keep these vessels sailing from +American ports outside of the area in which the submarines were known to +be operating in our own waters. + +Yet the enemy sent no submarines to our coast in 1917; why they did not +do so may seem difficult to understand, for that was just the period +when a campaign of this kind might have served their purpose. During +this time, however, we had repeated indications that the Germans did not +take the American entrance into the war very seriously; moreover, +looking forward to conditions after the peace, they perhaps hoped that +they might soon be able once again to establish friendly relations. In +1917 they therefore refrained from any acts which might arouse popular +hatred against them. We had more than one indication of this attitude. +Early in the summer of 1917 we obtained from one of the captured German +submarines a set of the orders issued to it by the German Admiralty +Staff. Among these was one dated May 8, 1917, in which the submarine +commanders were informed that Germany had not declared war upon the +United States, and that, until further instructions were received, the +submarines were to continue to look upon America and American shipping +as neutral. The submarine commanders were especially warned against +attacking or committing any overt act against such American war vessels +as might be encountered in European waters. The orders explained that no +official confirmation had been received by the German Government of the +news which had been published in the press that America had declared +war, and that, therefore, the Germans, officially, were ignoring our +belligerence. From their own standpoint such a policy of endeavouring +not to offend America, even after she became an enemy, may have seemed +politically wise; from a military point of view, their failure to +attempt the submarine demonstration off our coast in 1917 was a great +mistake; for when they finally started warfare on our coast, the United +States was deeply involved in hostilities, and had already begun the +transportation of the great army which produced such decisive results on +the Western Front. The time had passed, as experience soon showed, when +any demonstration on our coast would disturb the calm of the American +people or affect their will to victory. + +In late April, 1918, I learned through secret-service channels that one +of the large submarines of the _Deutschland_ class had left its German +base on the 19th of April for a long cruise. On the 1st of May, 1918, I +therefore cabled to the Department that there were indications that this +submarine was bound for our own coast. A few days afterward I received +more specific information, through the interception of radio despatches +between Germany and the submarine; and therefore I cabled the +Department, this time informing them that the submarine was the _U-151_, +that it was now well on its way across the Atlantic, and that it could +be expected to begin operations off the American coast any time after +May 20th. I gave a complete description of the vessel, the probable +nature of her cruise, and her essential military characteristics. She +carried a supply of mines, and I therefore invited the attention of the +Department to the fact that the favourite areas for laying mines were +those places where the ships stopped to pick up pilots. Since at +Delaware Bay pilots for large ships were taken on just south of the Five +Fathom Bank Light, I suggested that it was not unlikely that the _U-151_ +would attempt to lay mines in that vicinity. Now the fact is that we +knew that the _U-151_ intended to lay mines at this very place. We had +obtained this piece of information from the radio which we had +intercepted; as there was a possibility that our own cable might fall +into German hands, we did not care to give the news in the precise form +in which we had received it, as we did not intend that they should know +that we had means of keeping so accurately informed. As had been +predicted, the _U-151_ proceeded directly to the vicinity of this Five +Fathom Bank off Delaware Bay, laid her mines, and then, cruising +northward up the coast, began her demonstration on the 25th of May by +sinking two small wooden schooners. These had no radio apparatus, and it +was not until June 2nd that the Navy Department and the country received +the news that the first submarine was operating. On June 29th I informed +Washington that another U-boat was then coming down the west coast of +Ireland, bound for the United States, and that it would arrive some time +after July 15th. Complete reports of this vessel were sent from day to +day, as it made its slow progress across the ocean. On July 6th I cabled +that still another U-boat had started for our coast; and the progress of +this adventurer, with all details as to its character and probable area +of operations, were also forwarded regularly. From the end of May until +October there was nearly always one submarine operating off our coast. +The largest number active at any one time was in August, when for a week +or ten days three were more or less active in attacking coastwise +vessels. These three operated all the way from Cape Hatteras to +Newfoundland, attempting by these tactics to create the impression that +dozens of hostile U-boats were preying upon our commerce and threatening +our shores. These submarines, however, attacked almost exclusively +sailing vessels and small coastwise steamers, rarely, if ever, using +torpedoes. A number of mines were laid at different points off our +ports, on what the Germans believed to be the traffic routes; but the +information which we had concerning them made it possible to counter +successfully their efforts and, from a military point of view, the whole +of the submarine operations off our coast can be dismissed as one of the +minor incidents of the war, as the Secretary of the Navy described it in +his Annual Report. The five submarines sunk in all approximately 110,000 +tons of shipping, but the vessels were, for the most part, small and of +no great military importance. The only real victory was the destruction +of the cruiser _San Diego_, which was sunk by a mine which had been laid +by the _U-156_ off Fire Island. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR + + +The Allied navies were harrowing the submarines not only under the water +and on the surface, but from the air. In the anti-submarine campaign the +several forms of aircraft--airplane, seaplane, dirigible, and kite +balloon--developed great offensive power. Nor did the fact that our +fighters in the heavens made few direct attacks which were successful +diminish the importance of their work. The records of the British +Admiralty attribute the destruction of five submarines to the British +air service; the French Admiralty gives the American forces credit for +destroying one on the French coast. These achievements, compared with +the tremendous efforts involved in equipping air stations, may at first +look like an inconsiderable return; yet the fact remains that aircraft +were an important element in defeating the German campaign against +merchant shipping. + +Like the subchaser and the submarine, the seaplane operated most +successfully in coastal waters. I have already indicated that one +advantage of the convoy system was that it forced the U-boats to seek +their victims closer to the shore. In our several forms of aircraft we +had still another method of interfering with their operation in such +quarters. In order to use these agencies effectively we constructed +aircraft stations in large numbers along the coast of France and the +British Isles, assigned a certain stretch of coastline to each one of +these stations, and kept the indicated area constantly patrolled. The +advantages which were possessed by a fleet of aircraft operating at a +considerable height above the water are at once apparent. The great +speed of seaplanes in itself transformed them into formidable foes. The +submarine on the surface could make a maximum of only 16 knots an hour, +whereas an airplane made anywhere from 60 to 100; it therefore had +little difficulty, once it had sighted the under-water boat, in catching +up with it and starting hostilities. Its great speed also made it +possible for an airplane or dirigible to patrol a much greater area of +water than a surface or a subsurface vessel. An observer located several +hundred feet in the heavens could see the submarine much more easily +than could his comrades on other craft. If the water were clear he could +at once detect it, even though it were submerged; in any event, merely +lifting a man in the air greatly extended his horizon, and made it +possible for him to pick up hostile vessels at a much greater distance. +Moreover, the airplane had that same advantage upon which I have laid +such emphasis in describing the anti-submarine powers of the submarine +itself: that is, it was almost invisible to its under-water foe. If the +U-boat were lying on the surface, a seaplane or a dirigible was readily +seen; but if it were submerged entirely, or even sailing at periscope +depth, the most conspicuous enemy in the heavens was invisible. After +our submarines and our aircraft had settled down to their business of +extermination, existence for those Germans who were operating in coastal +waters became extremely hazardous and nerve-racking; their chief anxiety +was no longer the depth bomb of a destroyer; they lived every moment in +the face of hidden terrors; they never knew when a torpedo would explode +into their vitals, or when an unseen bomb, dropped from the heavens, +would fall upon their fragile decks. + +I have said that the destructive achievements of aircraft figure only +moderately in the statistics of the war; this was because the greater +part of their most valuable work was done in co-operation with war +vessels. Aircraft in the Navy performed a service not unlike that which +it performed in the Army. We are all familiar with the picture of +airplanes sailing over the field of battle, obtaining information which +was wirelessed back to their own forces, "spotting" artillery positions, +and giving ranges. The seaplanes and dirigibles of the Allied navies +performed a similar service on the ocean. To a considerable extent they +became the "eyes" of the destroyers and other surface craft, just as the +airplanes on the land became the "eyes" of the army. As part of their +equipment all the dirigibles had wireless telegraph and wireless +telephone; as soon as a submarine was "spotted," the news was +immediately flashed broadcast, and every offensive warship which was +anywhere in the neighbourhood, as well as the airplane itself, started +for the indicated scene. There are several cases in which the sinking of +submarines by destroyers was attributed to information wirelessed in +this fashion by American aircraft; and since the air service of the +British navy was many times greater than our own, there are many more +such "indirect sinkings" credited to the British effort. + +The following citation, which I submitted to the Navy Department in +recommending Lieutenant John J. Schieffelin for the Distinguished +Service Medal, illustrates this co-operation between air and surface +craft: + + This officer performed many hazardous reconnaissance flights, and + on July 9th, 1918, he attacked an enemy submarine with bombs and + then directed the British destroyers to the spot, which were + successful in seriously damaging the submarine. Again, on July + 19th, 1918, Lieutenant Schieffelin dropped bombs on another enemy + submarine, and then signalled trawlers to the spot, which delivered + a determined attack against the submarine, which attack was + considered highly successful and the submarine seriously damaged, + if not destroyed. This officer was at all times an example of + courageous loyalty. + +Besides scouting and "spotting" and bombing, the aerial hunters of the +submarine developed great value in escorting convoys. A few dirigibles, +located on the flanks of a convoy, protected them almost as effectively +as the destroyers themselves; and even a single airship not infrequently +brought a group of merchantmen and troopships safely into port. +Sometimes the airships operated in this way as auxiliaries to +destroyers, while sometimes they operated alone. In applying this +mechanism of protection to merchant convoys, we were simply adopting the +method which Great Britain had been using for three years in the narrow +passages of the English Channel. Much has been said of the skill with +which the British navy transported about 20,000,000 souls back and forth +between England and France in four years; and in this great movement +seaplanes, dirigibles, and other forms of aircraft played an important +part. In the same way this scheme of protection was found valuable with +the coastal convoys, particularly with the convoys which sailed from one +French port to another, and from British ports to places in Ireland, +Holland, or Scandinavia. I have described the dangers in which these +ships were involved owing to the fact that the groups were obliged to +break up after entering the Channel and the Irish Sea, and thus to +proceed singly to their destinations. Aircraft improved this situation +to a considerable extent, for they could often go to sea, pick up the +ships, and bring them safely home. The circumstance that our seaplanes, +perched high in the air, could see the submarine long before they had +reached torpedoing distance, and could, if necessary, signal to a +destroyer for assistance, made them exceedingly valuable for this kind +of work. + +Early in 1918, at the request of the British Government, we took over a +large seaplane base which had been established by the British at +Killingholme, England, a little sea-coast town at the mouth of the +Humber River. According to the original plan we intended to co-operate +from this point with the British in a joint expedition against enemy +naval bases, employing for this purpose especially constructed towing +lighters, upon which seaplanes were to be towed by destroyers to within +a short flying distance of their objectives. Although this project was +never carried out, Killingholme, because of its geographical location, +became a very important base for seaplanes used in escorting mercantile +convoys to and from Scandinavian ports, patrolling mine-fields while on +the lookout for enemy submarines and making those all-important +reconnaissance flights over the North Sea which were intended to give +advanced warning of any activity of the German High Seas Fleet. These +flights lasted usually from six to eight hours; the record was made by +Ensigns S. C. Kennedy and C. H. Weatherhead, U.S.N., who flew for nine +hours continuously on convoy escort duty. For a routine patrol, this +compares very favourably indeed with the flight of the now famous +trans-Atlantic _NC-4_. + +I can no better describe the splendid work of these enthusiastic and +courageous young Americans than by quoting a few extracts from a report +which was submitted to me by Ensign K. B. Keyes, of a reconnaissance +flight in which he took part, while attached temporarily to a British +seaplane station under post-graduate instruction. The picture given by +Ensign Keyes is typical of the flights which our boys were constantly +making: + + On June 4, 1918, we received orders to carry out a reconnaissance + and hostile aircraft patrol over the North Sea and along the coast + of Holland. It was a perfect day for such work, for the visibility + was extremely good, with a light wind of fifteen knots and clouds + at the high altitude of about eight or ten thousand feet. + + Our three machines from Felixstowe rose from the water at twelve + o'clock, circled into patrol formation, and proceeded north-east by + north along the coast to Yarmouth. Here we were joined by two more + planes, but not without some trouble and slight delay because of a + broken petrol pipe which was subsequently repaired in the air. We + again circled into formation, Capt. Leckie, D.S.O., of Yarmouth, + taking his position as leader of the squadron. + + At one o'clock the squadron proceeded east, our machine, being in + the first division, flew at 1,500 feet and at about half a mile in + the rear of Capt. Leckie's machine, but keeping him on our + starboard quarter. + + We sighted nothing at all until about half-past two, when the Haaks + Light Vessel slowly rose on the horizon, but near this mark and + considerably more to the south we discovered a large fleet of Dutch + fishing smacks. This fleet consisted of more than a hundred smacks. + + Ten minutes later we sighted the Dutch coast, where we changed our + course more to the north-east. We followed the sandy beaches of the + islands of Texel and Vlieland until we came to Terschelling. In + following the coast of Vlieland we were close enough to distinguish + houses on the inside of the island and even to make out breakers + rolling up on the sandy beach. + + At Terschelling we proceeded west in accordance with our orders, + but soon had to turn back because of Capt. Leckie's machine which + had fallen out of formation and come to the water. This machine + landed at three fifteen and we continued to circle around it, + finding that the trouble was with a badly broken petrol pipe, until + about fifteen minutes later, when we sighted five German planes + steering west, a direction which would soon bring them upon us. + + At this time Capt. Barker had the wheel, Lt. Galvayne was seated + beside him, but if we met the opposing forces he was to kneel on + the seat with his eyes above the cowl, where he could see all the + enemy planes and direct the pilot in which direction to proceed. I + was in the front cockpit with one gun and four hundred rounds of + ammunition. In the stern cockpit the engineer and wireless ratings + were to handle three guns. + + We at once took battle formation and went forward to meet the + enemy, but here we were considerably surprised to find that when we + were nearly within range they had turned and were running away from + us. At once we gave chase, but soon found that they were much too + fast for us. Our machine had broken out of the formation and, with + nose down, had crept slightly ahead of Capt. Leckie, and we being + the nearest machine to the enemy, I had the satisfaction of trying + out my gun for a number of rounds. It was quite impossible to tell + whether I had registered any hits or not. + + Our purpose in chasing these planes was to keep them away from the + machine on the water which, if we had not been there, would have + been shot to pieces. Finding that it was useless to follow them, as + they could easily keep out of our range, we turned back and very + shortly we were again circling around our machine on the water. + + It was not long before the enemy again came very close, so we gave + chase the second time. This time, instead of five machines as + before, there were only four, and one small scout could be seen + flying in the direction of Borkum. + + It was the fourth time that we went off in pursuit of the enemy + that we suddenly discovered that a large number of hostile planes + were proceeding towards us, not in the air with the other four + planes but very close to the water. There were ten planes in this + first group, but they were joined a few minutes later by five more. + + We swung into battle formation and steered for the middle of the + group. When we were nearly within range four planes on the port + side and five planes on the starboard side rose to our level of + fifteen hundred feet. Two planes passed directly beneath us firing + upward. Firing was incessant from the beginning and the air seemed + blue with tracer smoke. I gave most of my time to the four planes + on our port side, because they were exactly on the same level with + us and seemed to be within good range, that is about two hundred + yards. When we had passed each other I looked around and noticed + that Lt. Galvayne was in a stooping position, with head and one arm + on his seat, the other arm hanging down as if reaching for + something. I had seen him in this position earlier in the day so + thought nothing of it. All this I had seen in the fraction of a + second, for I had to continue firing. A few minutes later I turned + around again and found with a shock that Lt. Galvayne was in the + same position. It was then that the first inkling of the truth + dawned upon me. By bending lower I discovered that his head was + lying in a pool of blood. + + From this time on I have no clear idea of just what our + manoeuvring was, but evidently we put up a running fight steering + east, then circled until suddenly I found our machine had been cut + off from the formation and we were surrounded by seven enemy + seaplanes. + + This time we were steering west or more to the south-west. We + carried on a running fight for ten miles or so until we drove the + seven planes off. During the last few minutes of the fight our + engine had been popping altogether too frequently and soon the + engineer came forward to tell us that the port engine petrol pipe + had broken. + + By this time I had laid out Lt. Galvayne in the wireless cockpit, + cleaned up the second pilot's seat, and taken it myself. + + The engagement had lasted about half an hour, and the closest range + was one hundred yards while the average range was two hundred. The + boat with Ensign Eaton in it landed between the Islands of Texel + and Vlieland, while the other boat, which had not taken any part in + the fight, was last seen two miles off Vlieland and still taxiing + in toward the beach. + + We descended to the water at five forty-five, ten miles north-west + of Vlieland. During the ten minutes we were on the water I loosened + Lt. Galvayne's clothing, made his position somewhat easier, and + felt for his heart which at that time I was quite sure was beating + feebly. + + When we rose from the water and ascended to fifteen hundred feet, + we sighted two planes which later proved to be the two Yarmouth + boats. We picked them up, swung into formation, and laid our course + for Yarmouth. + + At ten minutes to seven we sighted land and twenty minutes after we + were resting on the water in front of Yarmouth slipway. + + We at once summoned medical aid but found that nothing could be + done. The shot had gone through his head, striking the mouth and + coming out behind his ear, tearing a gash of about two inches in + diameter. + + The boat had been more or less riddled, a number of shots tearing + up the top between the front cockpit and the beginning of the cowl. + + The total duration of the flight was seven hours and ten minutes. + +American naval aviation had a romantic beginning; indeed, the +development of our air service from almost nothing to a force which, in +European waters, comprised 2,500 officers and 22,000 men, is one of the +great accomplishments of the war. It was very largely the outcome of +civilian enterprise and civilian public spirit. In describing our +subchasers I have already paid tribute to the splendid qualities of +reserve officers; and our indebtedness to this type of citizen was +equally great in the aviation service. I can pay no further tribute to +American youth than to say that the great aircraft force which was +ultimately assembled in Europe had its beginnings in a small group of +undergraduates at Yale University. In recommending Mr. Trubee Davison +for a Distinguished Service Medal, the commander of our aviation forces +wrote: "This officer was responsible for the organization of the first +Yale aviation unit of twenty-nine aviators who were later enrolled in +the Naval Reserve Flying Corps.... This group of aviators formed the +nucleus of the first Naval Reserve Flying Corps, and, in fact, may be +considered as the nucleus from which the United States Aviation Forces, +Foreign Service, later grew." This group of college boys acted entirely +on their own initiative. While the United States was still at peace, +encouraged only by their own parents and a few friends, they took up the +study of aviation. It was their conviction that the United States would +certainly get into the war, and they selected this branch as the one in +which they could render greatest service to their country. These young +men worked all through the summer of 1916 at Port Washington, Long +Island, learning how to fly: at this time they were an entirely +unofficial body, paying their own expenses. Ultimately the unit +comprised about twenty men; they kept constantly at work, even after +college opened in the fall of 1916, and when war broke out they were +prepared--for they had actually learned to fly. When the submarine +scares disturbed the Atlantic seaboard in the early months of the war +these Yale undergraduates were sent by the department scouting over Long +Island Sound and other places looking for the imaginary Germans. In +February, 1917, Secretary Daniels recognized their work by making +Davison a member of the Committee on Aeronautics; in March practically +every member of the unit was enrolled in the aviation service; and their +names appear among the first one hundred aviators enrolled in the +Navy--a list that ultimately included several thousand. So proficient +had these undergraduates become that they were used as a nucleus to +train our aircraft forces; they were impressed as instructors at +Buffalo, Bayshore, Hampton Roads, the Massachusetts Institute of +Technology, Key West and Moorhead City. They began to go abroad in the +summer of 1917, and they were employed as instructors in schools in +France and England. These young men not only rendered great material +service, but they manifested an enthusiasm, an earnestness, and a +tireless vigilance which exerted a wonderful influence in strengthening +the _moral_ of the whole aviation department. "I knew that whenever we +had a member of the Yale unit," says Lieutenant-Commander Edwards, who +was aide for aviation at the London headquarters in the latter part of +the war, "everything was all right. Whenever the French and English +asked us to send a couple of our crack men to reinforce a squadron, I +would say, 'Let's get some of the Yale gang.' We never made a mistake +when we did this." + +There were many men in the regular navy to whom the nation is likewise +indebted. Captain T. T. Craven served with very marked distinction as +aide for aviation on the staff of Admiral Wilson, and afterward, after +the armistice was signed, as the senior member of the Board which had +been appointed to settle all claims with the French Government. +Lieutenant (now Commander) Kenneth Whiting was another officer who +rendered great service in aviation. Commander Whiting arrived in St. +Nazaire, France, on the 5th of June, 1917, in command of the first +aeronautic detachment, which consisted of 7 officers and 122 men. + +Such were the modest beginnings of American aviation in France. In a +short time Commander Whiting was assigned to the command of the large +station which was taken over at Killingholme, England, and in October, +1917, Captain Hutch I. Cone came from the United States to take charge +of the great aviation programme which had now been planned. Captain Cone +had for many years enjoyed the reputation of being one of the Navy's +most efficient administrators; while still a lieutenant-commander, he +had held for a considerable time the rank of rear-admiral, as chief of +the Bureau of Steam Engineering; and in 1917 he was commanding naval +officer of the Panama Canal, a position which required organizing +ability of the highest order. It was at my request that he was ordered +abroad to organize our European air forces. Captain Cone now came to +Paris and plunged into the work of organizing naval aviation with all +his usual vigour. + +It subsequently became apparent, however, that London would be a better +place for his work than Paris, and Captain Cone therefore took up his +headquarters in Grosvenor Gardens. Under his administration naval +aviation foreign service grew to the proportions I have indicated and +included in France six seaplane stations, three dirigible stations, two +kite balloon stations, one school of aerial gunnery, one assembly and +repair base, and the United States Naval Northern Bombing Group. In the +British Isles there were established four seaplane stations and one kite +balloon station in Ireland; one seaplane station and one assembly and +repair base in England; and in Italy we occupied, at the request of the +Italian Government, two seaplane stations at Pescara and Porto Corsini +on the Adriatic. From these stations we bombed to good effect Austrian +naval bases in that area. To Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Callan, +U.S.N.R.F., is due much of the credit for the cordial relations which +existed between the Italians and ourselves, as well as for the efficient +conduct of our aviation forces in Italy under his command. + +Probably the most completely equipped aviation centre which we +constructed was that at Pauillac, France, under the command of Captain +F. T. Evans, U.S.N.; here we built accommodation for 20,000 men; we had +here what would have eventually been a great airplane factory; had the +war continued six months longer, we would have been turning out planes +in this place on a scale almost large enough to supply our needs. The +far-sighted judgment and the really extraordinary professional ability +of civil engineers D. G. Copeland and A. W. K. Billings made such work +possible, but only, I might add, with the hearty co-operation of +Lieutenant-Commander Benjamin Briscoe and his small band of loyal and +devoted co-workers. Another great adventure was the establishment of our +Northern Bombing Group, under the command of Captain David C. Hanrahan, +U.S.N.; here we had 112 planes, 305 officers, and more than 2,000 +enlisted personnel, who devoted all of their attention to bombing German +submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. This enterprise was a joint one +with the marines under the command of Major A. A. Cunningham, an +experienced pilot and an able administrator, who performed all of his +various duties not only to my entire satisfaction but in a manner which +reflected the greatest credit to himself as well as to the Marine Corps +of which he was a worthy representative. Due to the fact that the +rapidity of our construction work had exceeded that with which airplanes +were being built at home, we entered into an agreement with the Italian +Government whereby we obtained a number of Caproni planes in exchange +for raw materials. Several of these large bombing airplanes were +successfully flown over the Alps to the fields of Flanders, under the +direction of Lieutenant-Commander E. O. MacDonnell, who deserves the +greatest credit for the energetic and resourceful manner in which he +executed this difficult task. + +In September, 1918, Captain Cone's duties took him to Ireland; the ship +on which he sailed, the _Leinster_, was torpedoed in the Irish Sea; +Captain Cone was picked up unconscious in the water, and, when taken to +the hospital, it was discovered that both his legs were broken. It was +therefore necessary to appoint another officer in his stead, and I +selected Lieutenant W. A. Edwards, who had served with credit on the +destroyer _Cushing_, and who, for some time, had been second in command +to Captain Cone in the aviation section. It was almost unprecedented to +put at the head of such an important branch a young lieutenant who had +only been out of the naval academy for a few years; ordinarily the +duties would have required a man of Admiral's rank. Lieutenant Edwards, +however, was not only extremely capable, but he had the gift of getting +along splendidly with our Allies, particularly the British, with whom +our intercourse was necessarily extensive, and with whom he was very +popular. He remained in charge of the department for the rest of the +war, winning golden opinions from his superiors and his subordinates, +and the Distinguished Service Order from King George. + +The armistice was signed before our aviation work had got completely +into running order. Yet its accomplishments were highly creditable; and +had the war lasted a little longer they would have reached great +proportions. Of the thirty-nine direct attacks made on submarines, ten +were, in varying degrees, "successful." Perhaps the most amazing hit +made by any seaplane in the war was that scored by Ensign Paul F. Ives; +he dropped a bomb upon a submarine, striking it directly on its deck; +the result was partly tragical, partly ludicrous, for the bomb proved to +be a "dud" and did not explode! In commenting upon this and another +creditable attack, the British Admiralty wrote as follows: + + I beg to enclose for your information reports of attacks made on + two enemy submarines on the 25th March by Pilot Ensign J. F. + McNamara, U.S.N., and Pilot Ensign P. F. Ives, U.S.N. + + The Admiralty are of opinion that the submarine attacked by Pilot + Ensign McNamara was damaged and that the attack of Pilot Ensign + Ives might also have been successful had not his bombs failed to + explode, which was due to no fault of his own. + + I should add that Wing Commander, Portsmouth Group has expressed + his appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the United + States Pilots. + +At the cessation of hostilities we had a total of more than 500 planes +of various descriptions actually in commission, a large number of which +were in actual operation over the North Sea, the Irish Sea, the Bay of +Biscay, and the Adriatic; our bombing planes were making frequent +flights over enemy submarine bases, and 2,500 officers and 22,000 +enlisted men were making raids, doing patrols, bombing submarines, +bombing enemy bases, taking photographs, making reconnaissance over +enemy waters, and engaging enemy aircraft. There can be no doubt but +that this great force was a factor in persuading the enemy to +acknowledge defeat when he did. A few simple comparisons will +illustrate the gigantic task which confronted us and the difficulties +which were successfully overcome in the establishment of our naval +aviation force on foreign service. If all the buildings constructed and +used for barracks for officers and men were joined end to end, they +would stretch for a distance of twelve miles. The total cubic contents +of all structures erected and used could be represented by a box 245 ft. +wide, 300 ft. long, and 1,500 ft. high. In such a box more than ten +Woolworth buildings could be easily placed. Twenty-nine telephone +exchanges were installed, and in addition connections were made to +existing long-distance lines in England and France, and approximately +800 miles of long-distance lines were constructed in Ireland, so that +every station could be communicated with from London headquarters. The +lumber used for construction work would provide a board-walk one foot +wide, extending from New York City to the Isle of Malta--a distance of +more than 4,000 miles. + +When we consider the fact that during the war naval aviation abroad grew +in personnel to be more than one-half the size of the entire pre-war +American navy, it is not at all astonishing that all of those regular +officers who had been trained in this service were employed almost +exclusively in an administrative capacity, which naturally excluded them +from taking part in the more exciting work of bombing submarines and +fighting aircraft. To their credit be it said that they chafed +considerably under this enforced restraint, but they were so few in +number that we had to employ them not in command of seaplanes, but of +air stations where they rendered the most valuable service. + +For the reserves I entertain the very highest regard and even personal +affection. Collectively they were magnificent and they reflected the +greatest credit upon the country they served so gallantly and with such +brilliant success. I know of no finer individual exploit in the war than +that of Ensign C. H. Hammon who, while attached to our Air Station at +Porto Corsini, took part in a bombing raid on Pola, in which he engaged +two enemy airplanes and as a result had his plane hit in several places. +During this engagement a colleague, Ensign G. H. Ludlow, was shot down. +Ensign Hammon went to his rescue, landed his boat on the water just +outside of Pola harbour, picked up the stricken aviator, and flew back +to Porto Corsini, a distance of seventy-five miles. A heavy sea made it +highly probable that his frail boat, already damaged by his combat with +the enemy, would collapse and that he would be drowned or captured and +made a prisoner of war. For this act of courageous devotion to duty I +recommended Ensign Hammon for the Congressional Medal of Honour. + +The mention of this officer calls to my mind the exploits of +Lieutenant-Commander A. L. Gates, who was the second of only three +officers attached to the Naval Forces in Europe whom I recommended for +the Congressional Medal of Honour. The citation in the case of Gates +reads as follows and needs no elaboration to prove the calibre of the +man: "This officer commanded the U.S. Naval Air Station, Dunkirk, +France, with very marked efficiency and under almost constant shell and +bomb fire from the enemy. Alone and unescorted he rescued the crew of a +British airplane wrecked in the sea off Ostend, for which he was awarded +the Distinguished Flying Cross by the British Government. This act of +bravery was actually over and above the duties required of this officer +and in itself demonstrates the highest type of courage. +Lieutenant-Commander Gates took part in a number of flights over the +enemy lines and was shot down in combat and taken prisoner by the enemy. +He made several heroic and determined attempts to escape. During all of +his service this officer was a magnificent example of courage, modesty, +and energetic devotion to duty. He at all times upheld the very highest +traditions of the Naval Service." + +Volumes could well be written about the work of these splendid young +Americans--of how Ensign Stephen Potter shot down in flames an enemy +seaplane from a position over Heligoland Bight; unfortunately he made +the supreme sacrifice only a month later when he in turn was shot down +in flames and fell to his resting-place in the North Sea; and of De +Cernea and Wilcox and Ludlow. Theirs was the spirit which dominated the +entire Force and which made it possible to accomplish what seemed at +times to be almost the impossible. It was the superior "will to victory" +which proved to be invincible. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND + + +Besides transporting American troops, the Navy, in one detail of its +work, actually participated in warfare on the Western Front. Though this +feature of our effort has nothing to do with the main subject, the +defeat of the submarine, yet any account of the American navy in the war +which overlooks the achievements of our naval batteries on land would +certainly be incomplete. The use of naval guns in war operations was not +unprecedented; the British used such guns in the Boer War, particularly +at Ladysmith and Spion Kop; and there were occasions in which such +armament rendered excellent service in the Boxer Rebellion. All through +the Great War, British, French, and Germans frequently reinforced their +army artillery with naval batteries. But, compared with the American +naval guns which under the command of Rear-Admiral Charles P. Plunkett +performed such telling deeds against the retreating Germans in the final +phases of the conflict, all previous equipment of naval guns on shore +had been less efficient in one highly important respect. + +For the larger part of the war, the Germans had had a great gun +stationed in Belgium bombarding Dunkirk. The original purpose in sending +American naval batteries to France was to silence this gun. The proposal +was made in November, 1917; but, rapidly as the preparations progressed, +the situation had entirely changed before our five fourteen-inch guns +were ready to leave for France. In the spring of 1918 the Germans began +the great drive which nearly took them to the Channel ports; and under +the conditions which prevailed in that area it was impossible to send +our guns to the Belgian coast. Meanwhile, the enemy had stationed a gun, +having a range of nearly seventy-five miles, in the forest of Compiègne; +the shells from this weapon, constantly falling upon Paris, were having +a more demoralizing effect upon the French populace than was officially +admitted. The demand for the silencing of this gun came from all sides; +and it was a happy coincidence that, at just about the time when this +new peril appeared, the American naval guns were nearly ready to be +transported to France. Encouraged by the success of this long-range gun +on Paris, the Germans were preparing long-range bombardments on several +sections of the front. They had taken huge guns from the new +battle-cruiser _Hindenburg_ and mounted them at convenient points for +bombarding Dunkirk, Chalons-sur-Marne, and Nancy. In all, the Allied +intelligence departments reported that sixteen guns of great calibre had +left Kiel in May, 1918, and that they would soon be trained upon +important objectives in France. For this reason it was welcome news to +the Allies, who were deficient in this type of artillery, that five +naval fourteen-inch guns, with mountings and ammunition and supply +trains, were ready to embark for the European field. The Navy received +an urgent request from General Pershing that these guns should be landed +at St. Nazaire; it was to be their main mission to destroy the "Big +Bertha" which was raining shells on Paris, and to attack specific +points, especially railroad communications and the bridges across the +Rhine. + +The initiative in the design of these mobile railway batteries was taken +by the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department, under Rear-Admiral +Ralph Earle, and the details of the design were worked out by the +officers of that bureau and Admiral Plunkett. The actual construction of +the great gun mounts on the cars from which the guns were to be fired, +and of the specially designed cars of the supply trains for each gun, +was an engineering feat which reflects great credit upon the Baldwin +Locomotive Works and particularly upon its president, Mr. Samuel M. +Vauclain, who undertook the task with the greatest enthusiasm. The +reason why our naval guns represented a greater achievement than +anything of a similar nature accomplished by the Germans was that they +were mobile. Careful observations taken of the bombardment of Dunkirk +revealed the fact that the gun with which it was being done was steadily +losing range. This indicated that the weapon was not a movable one, but +that it was firmly implanted in a fixed position. The seventy-five mile +gun which was bombarding Paris was similarly emplaced. The answering +weapon which our ordnance department now proposed to build was to have +the ability to travel from place to place--to go to any position to +which the railroad system of France could take it. To do this it would +be necessary to build a mounting on a railroad car and to supply cars +which could carry the crews, their sleeping quarters, their food and +ammunition; to construct, indeed, a whole train for each separate gun. +This equipment must be built in the United States, shipped over three +thousand miles of ocean, landed at a French port, assembled there, and +started on French railroads to the several destinations at the front. +The Baldwin Locomotive Works accepted the contract for constructing +these mountings and attendant cars; it began work February 13, 1918; two +months afterward the first mount had been finished and the gun was being +proved at Sandy Hook, New Jersey; and by July all five guns had arrived +at St. Nazaire and were being prepared to be sent forward to the scene +of hostilities. The rapidity with which this work was completed +furnished an illustration of American manufacturing genius at its best. +Meanwhile, Admiral Plunkett had collected and trained his crews; it +speaks well for the _moral_ of the Navy that, when news of this great +operation was first noised about, more than 20,000 officers and men +volunteered for the service. + +At first the French, great as was their admiration for these guns and +the astonishingly accurate marksmanship which they had displayed on +their trials, believed that their railroad beds and their bridges could +not sustain such a weight; the French engineers, indeed, declined at the +beginning to approve our request for the use of their rails. The +constant rain of German shells on Paris, however, modified this +attitude; the situation was so urgent that such assistance as these +American guns promised was welcome. One August morning, therefore, the +first train started for Helles Mouchy, the point from which it was +expected to silence the "Big Bertha." The progress of this train through +France was a triumphant march. Our own confidence in the French road bed +and bridges was not much greater than that of the French themselves; the +train therefore went along slowly, climbed the grades at a snail's pace, +and took the curves with the utmost caution. As they crossed certain of +the bridges, the crews held their breath and sat tight, expecting almost +every moment to crash through. All along the route the French populace +greeted the great battery train with one long cheer, and at the towns +and villages the girls decorated the long muzzle of the gun with +flowers. But there were other spectators than the French. Expertly as +this unusual train had been camouflaged, the German airplane observers +had detected its approach. As it neared the objective the shells that +had been falling on Paris ceased; before the Americans could get to +work, the Germans had removed their mighty weapon, leaving nothing but +an emplacement as a target for our shells. Though our men were therefore +deprived of the privilege of destroying this famous long-range gun, it +is apparent that their arrival saved Paris from further bombardment, for +nothing was heard of the gun for the rest of the war. + +The guns proved exceedingly effective in attacking German railroad +centres, bridges, and other essential positions; and as they could be +fired from any point of the railroad tracks behind the Western Front, +and as they could be shifted from one position to another, with all +their personnel and equipment, as fast as the locomotives could haul +them, it was apparent that the more guns of this design that could be +supplied the better. These qualities were at once recognized by the +Army, which called upon the Navy for assistance in building a large +number of railway batteries; and if the war had continued these great +guns would soon have been thundering all along the Western Front. + +From the time the naval guns were mounted until the armistice Admiral +Plunkett's men were busy on several points of the Allied lines. In this +time the five naval guns fired 782 shells at distances ranging from 18 +to 23 miles. They played great havoc in the railroad yards at Laon, +destroying large stretches of track that were indispensable to the +Germans, and in general making this place practically useless as a +railroad centre. Probably the greatest service which they rendered to +the cause of the Allies was in the region north of Verdun. In late +October three naval batteries were brought up to Charny and Thierville +and began bombarding the railroad which ran through Montmédy, Longuyon, +and Conflans. This was the most important line of communication on the +Western Front; it was the road over which the German army in the east +was supplied, and there was practically no other line by which the great +German armies engaging the Americans could escape. From October 23rd to +the hour when the armistice was signed our fourteen-inch guns were +raining shells upon this road. So successful was this bombardment that +the German traffic was stopped, not only while the firing was taking +place, but for several hours each day after it had ceased. What this +meant to the success of the Allied armies the world now knows. The +result is perfectly summed up in General Pershing's report: + +"Our large calibre guns," he says, "had advanced and were skilfully +brought into position to fire upon the important lines at Montmédy, +Longuyon, and Conflans; the strategical goal which was our highest hope +was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications and +nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from complete +disaster." + +These guns were, of course, only one of many contributing factors, but +that the Navy had its part in this great achievement is another example +of the success with which our two services co-operated with each other +throughout the war--a co-operation which, for efficient and harmonious +devotion to a common cause, has seldom, if ever, been equalled. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +TRANSPORTING TWO MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO FRANCE + + +I + +In March, 1918, it became apparent that the German submarine campaign +had failed. The prospect that confronted the Allied forces at that time, +when compared with the conditions which had faced them in April, 1917, +forms one of the most impressive contrasts in history. In the first part +of the earlier year the cause of the Allied Powers, and consequently the +cause of liberty throughout the world, had reached the point almost of +desperation. On both land and sea the Germans seemed to hold the future +in their hands. In Europe the armies of the Central Powers were +everywhere in the ascendant. The French and British were holding their +own in France, and in the Somme campaign they had apparently inflicted +great damage upon the German forces, yet the disintegration of the +Russian army, the unmistakable signs of which had already appeared, was +bringing nearer the day when they would have to meet the undivided +strength of their enemy. At the time in question, Rumania, Serbia, and +Montenegro were conquered countries, and Italy seemed unable to make any +progress against the Austrians. Bulgaria and Turkey had become +practically German provinces, and the dream of a great Germanic eastern +empire was rapidly approaching realization. So strong was Germany in a +military sense, so little did she apprehend that the United States could +ever assemble her resources and her men in time to make them a decisive +element in the struggle, that the German war lords, in their effort to +bring the European conflict to a quick conclusion, did not hesitate to +take the step which was destined to make our country their enemy. +Probably no nation ever adopted a war measure with more confidence in +its success. The results which the German submarines could accomplish +seemed at that time to be simply a matter of mathematical calculation. +The Germans estimated that they could sink at least 1,000,000 tons a +month, completely cut off Great Britain's supplies of food and war +materials, and thus end the war by October or November of 1917. Even +though the United States should declare war, what could an unprepared +nation like our own accomplish in such a brief period? Millions of +troops we might indeed raise, but we could not train them in three or +four months, and, even though we could perform such a miracle, it was +ridiculous to suppose that we could transport them to Europe through the +submarine danger zone. I have already shown that the Germans were not +alone in thus predicting the course of events. In the month of April, +1917, I had found the Allied officials just about as distressed as the +Germans were jubilant. Already the latter, in sinking merchant ships, +had had successes which almost equalled their own predictions; no +adequate means of defence against the submarine had been devised; and +the chiefs of the British navy made no attempts to disguise their +apprehension for the future. + +Such was the atmosphere of gloom which prevailed in Allied councils in +April, 1917; yet one year later the naval situation had completely +changed. The reasons for that change have been set forth in the +preceding pages. In that brief twelve months the relative position of +the submarine had undergone a marked transformation. Instead of being +usually the pursuer it was now often the pursued. Instead of sailing +jauntily upon the high seas, sinking helpless merchantmen almost at +will, it was half-heartedly lying in wait along the coasts, seeking its +victims in the vessels of dispersed convoys. If it attempted to push out +to sea, and attack a convoy, escorting destroyers were likely to deliver +one of their dangerous attacks; if it sought the shallower coastal +waters, a fleet of yachts, sloops, and subchasers was constantly ready +to assail it with dozens of depth charges. An attempt to pass through +the Straits of Dover meant almost inevitable destruction by mines; an +attempt to escape into the ocean by the northern passage involved the +momentary dread of a similar end or the hazard of navigating the +difficult Pentland Firth. In most of the narrow passages Allied +submarines lay constantly in wait with their torpedoes; a great fleet of +airplanes and dirigibles was always circling above ready to rain a +shower of bombs upon the under-water foe. Already the ocean floor about +the British Isles held not far from 200 sunken submarines, with most of +their crews, amounting to at least 4,000 men, whose deaths involved +perhaps the most hideous tragedies of the war. Bad as was this +situation, it was nothing compared with what it would become a few +months or a year later. American and British shipyards were turning out +anti-submarine craft with great rapidity; the industries of America, +with their enormous output of steel, had been enlisted in the +anti-submarine campaign. The American and British shipbuilding +facilities were neutralizing the German campaign in two ways: they were +not only constructing war vessels on a scale which would soon drive all +the German submarines from the sea, but they were building merchant +tonnage so rapidly that, in March, 1918, more new tonnage was launched +than was being destroyed. Thus by this time the Teutonic hopes of ending +the war by the submarine had utterly collapsed; if the Germans were to +win the war at all, or even to obtain a peace which would not be +disastrous, some other programme must be adopted and adopted quickly. + +Disheartened by their failure at sea, the enemy therefore turned their +eyes once more toward the land. The destruction of Russian military +power had given the German armies a great numerical superiority over +those of the Allies. There seemed little likelihood that the French or +the British, after three years of frightfully gruelling war, could add +materially to their forces. Thus, with the grouping of the Powers, such +as existed in 1917, the Germans had a tremendous advantage on their +side, for Russia, which German statesmen for fifty years had feared as a +source of inexhaustible man-supply to her enemies, had disappeared as a +military power. But a new element in the situation now counterbalanced +this temporary gain; that was the daily increasing importance of the +United States in the war. The Germans, who in 1917 had despised us as an +enemy, immediate or prospective, now despised us no longer. The army +which they declared could never be raised and trained was actually being +raised and trained by the millions. The nation which their publicists +had denounced as lacking cohesion and public spirit had adopted +conscription simultaneously with their declaration of war, and the +people whom the Germans had affected to regard as devoted only to the +pursuit of gain and pleasure had manifested a unity of purpose which +they had never before displayed, and had offered their lives, their +labours, and their wealth without limit to the cause of the Allies. Up +to March, 1918, only a comparatively small part of this American army +had reached Europe, but the Germans had already tested its fighting +quality and had learned to respect it. Yet all these manifestations +would not have disturbed the Germanic calculations except for one +depressing fact. Even a nation of 100,000,000 brave and energetic +people, fully trained and equipped for war, is not a formidable foe so +long as an impassable watery gulf of three thousand miles separates them +from the field of battle. + +For the greater part of 1917 the German people believed that their +submarines could bar the progress of the American armies. By March, +1918, they had awakened from this delusion. Not only was an American +army millions strong in process of formation, but the alarming truth now +dawned upon the Germans that it could be transported to Europe. The +great industries of America could provide munitions and food to supply +any number of soldiers indefinitely, and these, too, could be brought to +the Western Front. Outwardly, the German chiefs might still affect to +despise this new foe, but in their hearts they knew that it spelt their +doom. They were not now dealing with a corrupt Czardom and hordes of +ignorant and passionless Slavs, who could be eliminated by propaganda +and sedition; they were dealing with millions of intelligent and +energetic freemen, all animated by a mighty and almost religious +purpose. Yet the situation, desperate as it seemed, held forth one more +hope. If the German armies, which still greatly outnumbered the French +and British, could strike and win a decisive victory before the +Americans could arrive, then they might still force a satisfactory +peace. "It is a race between Ludendorff and Wilson" is the terse and +accurate way in which Lloyd George summed up the situation. The great +blow fell on March 21, 1918; the British and the French met it with +heroism, but it was quite evident that they were fighting against +terrible odds. At this time the American army in France numbered about +300,000 men; it now became the business of the American navy, assisted +by the British, to transport the American troops who could increase +these forces sufficiently to turn the balance in the Allies' favour. + +The supreme hour, to which all the anti-submarine labours of the +preceding year were merely preliminary, had now arrived. Since the close +of the war there has been much discussion of the part which the American +navy played in bringing it to a successful end. Even during the war +there was some criticism on this point. There were two more or less +definite opinions in the public mind upon this question. One was that +the main business of our war vessels was to convoy the American soldiers +to France; the other emphasized the anti-submarine warfare as its most +important duty. Anyone would suppose, from the detached way in which +these two subjects have been discussed, that the anti-submarine warfare +and the successful transportation of troops were separate matters. An +impression apparently prevails that, at the beginning of the war, the +American navy could have quietly decided whether it would devote its +energies to making warfare on the submarine or to convoying American +armies; yet the absurdity of such a conception must be apparent to +anyone who has read the foregoing pages. The several operations in which +the Allied navies engaged were all part of a comprehensive programme; +they were all interdependent. According to my idea, the business of the +American navy was to join its forces whole-heartedly with those of the +Allies in the effort _to win the war_. Anything which helped to +accomplish this great purpose became automatically our duty. Germany was +basing her chances of success upon the submarine; our business was +therefore to assist in defeating the submarine. The cause of the Allies +was our cause; our cause was the cause of the Allies; anything which +benefited the Allies benefited the United States; and anything which +benefited the United States benefited the Allies. Neither we nor France +nor England were conducting a separate campaign; we were separate units +of an harmonious whole. At the beginning the one pressing duty was to +put an end to the sinking of merchantmen, not because these merchantmen +were for the larger part British, but because the failure to do so would +have meant the elimination of Great Britain from the war, with results +which would have meant defeat for the other Allies. Let us imagine, for +a moment, what the sequence of events would have been had the submarine +campaign against merchant shipping succeeded; in that case Britain and +France would have been compelled to surrender unconditionally and the +United States would therefore have been forced to fight the Central +Empires alone. Germany's terms of peace would have included the +surrender of all the Allied fleets; this would eventually have left the +United States navy to fight the German navy reinforced by the ships of +Great Britain, Austria, France, and Italy. In such a contest we should +have been outnumbered about three or four to one. I have such confidence +in the power and purpose of America as to believe that, even in a +single-handed conflict with Germany, we should have won in the end; but +it is evident that the problem would have been quite a different one +from that of fighting in co-operation with the Allies against the +Germanic foe. + +Simply as a matter of self-interest and strategy it was certainly wisdom +to throw the last ounce of our strength into the scale of the Allied +navies; and it was therefore inevitable that we should first of all use +our anti-submarine craft to protect all shipping sailing to Europe and +to clear the sea of submarines. In doing this we were protecting the +food supply not only of Great Britain, but of France and our other +Allies, for most of the materials which we sent to our European friends +were transported first to England and thence were shipped across the +Channel. Moreover, our twelve months' campaign against the submarine was +an invaluable preliminary to transporting the troops. Does any sane +person believe that we could have put two million Americans into France +had the German submarines maintained until the spring and summer of 1918 +the striking power which had been theirs in the spring of 1917? Merely +to state the question is to answer it. In that same twelve months we had +gained much experience which was exceedingly valuable when we began +transporting troops in great numbers. The most efficacious protection to +merchant shipping, the convoy, was similarly the greatest safeguard to +our military transports. Those methods which had been so successfully +used in shipping food, munitions, and materials were now used in +shipping soldiers. The section of the great headquarters which we had +developed in London for routing convoys was used for routing +transports, and the American naval officer, Captain Byron A. Long, who +had demonstrated such great ability in this respect, was likewise the +master mind in directing the course of the American soldiers to France. + +In other ways we had laid the foundations for this, the greatest troop +movement in history. In the preceding twelve months we had increased the +oil tankage at Brest more than fourfold, sent over repair ships, and +augmented its repair facilities. This port and all of our naval +activities in France were under the command first of Rear-Admiral Wm. B. +Fletcher, and later Rear-Admiral Henry B. Wilson. It was a matter of +regret that we could not earlier have made Brest the main naval base for +the American naval forces in France, for it was in some respects +strategically better located for that purpose than was any other port in +Europe. Even for escorting certain merchant convoys into the Channel +Brest would have provided a better base than either Plymouth or +Queenstown. A glance at the map explains why. To send destroyers from +Queenstown to pick up convoys and escort them into the Channel or to +French ports and thence return to their base involved a long triangular +trip; to send such destroyers from Brest to escort these involved a +smaller amount of steaming and a direct east and west voyage. Similarly, +Queenstown was a much better location for destroyers sent to meet +convoys bound for ports in the Irish Sea over the northern "trunk line." +But unfortunately it was utterly impossible to use the great natural +advantages of Brest in the early days of war; the mere fact that this +French harbour possessed most inadequate tankage facilities put it out +of the question, and it was also very deficient in docks, repair +facilities, and other indispensable features of a naval base. At this +time Brest was hardly more than able to provide for the requirements of +the French, and it would have embarrassed our French allies greatly had +we attempted to establish a large American force there, before we had +supplied the essential oil fuel and repair facilities. The ships which +we did send in the first part of the war were mostly yachts, of the +"dollar-a-year" variety, which their owners had generously given to the +national service; their crews were largely of that type of young +business man and college undergraduate to whose skill and devotion I +have already paid tribute. This little flotilla acquitted itself +splendidly up and down the coast of France. Meanwhile, we were +constructing fuel-oil tanks; and as soon as these were ready and repair +ships were available, we began building up a large force at Brest--a +force which was ultimately larger than the one we maintained at +Queenstown; at the height of the troop movements it comprised about 36 +destroyers, 12 yachts, 3 tenders, and several mine-sweepers and tugs. +The fine work which this detachment accomplished in escorting troop and +supply convoys is sufficient evidence of the skill acquired by the +destroyers and other vessels in carrying out their duties in this +peculiar warfare. + +Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, a great organization had +been created under the able direction of Rear-Admiral Albert Gleaves for +maintaining and administering the fleet of transports and their ocean +escorts. Also, as soon as war was declared the work was begun of +converting into transports those German merchant ships which had been +interned in American ports. The successful completion of this work was, +in itself, a great triumph for the American navy. Of the vessels which +the Germans had left in our hands, seventeen at New York, Boston, +Norfolk, and Philadelphia, seemed to be adapted for transport purposes, +but the Germans had not intended that we should make any such use of +them. The condition of these ships, after their German custodians had +left, was something indescribable; they reflected great discredit upon +German seamanship, for it would have been impossible for any people +which really loved ships to permit them to deteriorate as had these +vessels and to become such cesspools of filth. For three years the +Germans had evidently made no attempt to clean them; the sanitary +conditions were so bad that our workmen could not sleep on board, but +had to have sleeping quarters near the docks; they spent weeks +scrubbing, scraping, and disinfecting, in a finally successful effort to +make the ships suitable habitations for human beings. Not only had the +Germans permitted such liners as the _Vaterland_ and the _Kronprinzessin +Cecilie_ to go neglected, but, on their departure, they had attempted to +injure them in all conceivable ways. The cylinders had been broken, +engines had been smashed, vital parts of the machinery had been removed +and thrown into the sea, ground glass had been placed in the oil cups, +gunpowder had been placed in the coal--evidently in the hope of causing +explosions when the vessels were at sea--and other damage of a more +subtle nature had been done, it evidently being the expectation that the +ships would break down when on the ocean and beyond the possibility of +repair. Although our navy yards had no copies of the plans of these +vessels or their machinery--the Germans having destroyed them all--and +although the missing parts were of peculiarly German design, they +succeeded, in an incredibly short time, in making them even better and +speedier vessels than they had ever been before. + +The national sense of humour did not fail the transport service when it +came to rechristening these ships; the _Princess Irene_ became the +_Pocahontas_, the _Rhein_ the _Susquehanna_; and there was also an +ironic justice in the fact that the _Vaterland_, which had been built by +the Germans partly for the purpose of transporting troops in war, +actually fulfilled this mission, though not quite in the way which the +Germans had anticipated. Meanwhile, both the American and the British +mercantile marines were supplementing this German tonnage. The first +troops which we sent to France, in June, 1917, were transported in ships +of the United Fruit Company; and when the German blow was struck, in +March, 1918, both the United States and Great Britain began collecting +from all parts of the world vessels which could be used as troop +transports. We called in all available vessels from the Atlantic and +Pacific coasts and the Great Lakes; England stripped her trade routes to +South America, Australia, and the East, and France and Italy also made +their contributions. Of all the American troops sent to France from the +beginning of the war, the United States provided transports for 46·25 +per cent., Great Britain for 51·25, the remainder being provided by +France and Italy. Of those sent between March, 1918, and the armistice, +American vessels carried 42·15 per cent., British 55·40 per cent.[8] + +Yet there was one element in the safe transportation of troops which was +even more fundamental than those which I have named. The basis of all +our naval operations was the dreadnoughts and the battle-cruisers of the +Grand Fleet. It was this aggregation, as I have already indicated, +which made possible the operation of all the surface ships that +destroyed the effectiveness of the submarines. Had the Grand Fleet +suddenly disappeared beneath the waves, all these offensive craft would +have been driven from the seas, the Allies' sea lines of communication +would have been cut, and the war would have ended in Germany's favour. +From the time the transportation of troops began the United States had a +squadron of five dreadnought battleships constantly with the Grand +Fleet. The following vessels performed this important duty: the _New +York_, Captain C. F. Hughes, afterward Captain E. L. Beach; the +_Wyoming_, Captain H. A. Wiley, afterward Captain H. H. Christy; the +_Florida_, Captain Thomas Washington, afterward Captain M. M. Taylor; +the _Delaware_, Captain A. H. Scales; the _Arkansas_, Captain W. H. G. +Bullard, afterward Captain L. R. de Steiguer; and the _Texas_, Captain +Victor Blue. These vessels gave this great force an unquestioned +preponderance, and made it practically certain that Germany would not +attempt another general sea battle. Under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, the +American squadron performed excellent service and made the most +favourable impression upon the chiefs of the Allied navies. Under the +general policy of co-operation established throughout our European naval +forces these vessels were quickly made a part of the Grand Fleet in so +far as concerned their military operations. This was, of course, wholly +essential to efficiency--a point the layman does not always +understand--so essential, in fact, that it may be said that, if the +Grand Fleet had gone into battle the day after our vessels joined, the +latter might have decreased rather than increased the fighting +efficiency of the whole; for, though our people and the British spoke +the same language, the languages of the ships, that is, their methods of +communication by signals, were wholly different. It was therefore our +duty to stow our signal flags and books down below, and learn the +British signal language. This they did so well that four days after +their arrival they went out and manoeuvred successfully with the Grand +Fleet. In the same way they adopted the British systems of tactics and +fire control, and in every other way conformed to the established +practices of the British. Too great praise cannot be given the officers +and men of our squadron, not only for their efficiency and the +cordiality of their co-operation, but for the patience with which they +bore the almost continuous restriction to their ships, and the long +vigil without the opportunity of a contact with the enemy forces. Just +how well our ships succeeded in this essential co-operation was +expressed by Admiral Sir David Beatty in the farewell speech which he +made to them upon the day of their departure for home. He said in part: + + "I want, first of all, to thank you, Admiral Rodman, the captains, + officers, and ships' companies of the magnificent squadron, for the + wonderful co-operation and the loyalty you have given to me and to + my admirals; and the assistance that you have given us in every + duty you had to undertake. The support which you have shown is that + of true comradeship; and in time of stress, that is worth a very + great deal. + + "You will return to your own shores; and I hope in the sunshine, + which Admiral Rodman tells me always shines there, you won't forget + your 'comrades of the mist' and your pleasant associations of the + North Sea.... + + "I thank you again and again for the great part the Sixth Battle + Squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in + history. I hope you will give this message to your comrades: 'Come + back soon. Good-bye and good luck!'" + +But these were not the only large battleships which the United States +had sent to European waters. Despite all the precautions which I have +described, there was still one danger which constantly confronted +American troop transports. By June and July, 1918, our troops were +crossing the Atlantic in enormous numbers, about 300,000 a month, and +were accomplishing most decisive results upon the battlefield. A +successful attack upon a convoy, involving the sinking of one or more +transports, would have had no important effect upon the war, but it +would probably have improved German _moral_ and possibly have injured +that of the Americans. There was practically only one way in which such +an attack could be made; one or more German battle-cruisers might slip +out to sea and assail one of our troop convoys. In order to prepare for +such a possibility, the Department sent three of our most powerful +dreadnoughts to Berehaven, Ireland--the _Nevada_, Captain A. T. Long, +afterward Captain W. C. Cole; the _Oklahoma_, Captain M. L. Bristol, +afterward Captain C. B. McVay; and the _Utah_, Captain F. B. Bassett, +the whole division under the command of Rear-Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers. +This port is located in Bantry Bay, on the extreme southwestern coast. +For several months our dreadnoughts lay here, momentarily awaiting the +news that a German raider had escaped, ready to start to sea and give +battle. But the expected did not happen. The fact that this powerful +squadron was ready for the emergency is perhaps the reason why the +Germans never attempted the adventure. + + +II + +A reference to the map which accompanies this chapter will help the +reader to understand why our transports were able to carry American +troops to France so successfully that not a single ingoing ship was ever +struck by a torpedo. This diagram makes it evident that there were two +areas of the Atlantic through which American shipping could reach its +European destination. The line of division was about the forty-ninth +parallel of latitude, the French city of Brest representing its most +familiar landmark. From this point extending southward, as far as the +forty-fifth parallel, which corresponds to the location of the city of +Bordeaux, is a great stretch of ocean, about 200 miles wide. It includes +the larger part of the Bay of Biscay, which forms that huge indentation +with which our school geographies have made us Americans so familiar, +and which has always enjoyed a particular fame for its storms, the +dangers of its coast, and the sturdy and independent character of the +people on its shores. The other distinct area to which the map calls +attention extends northerly from the forty-ninth parallel to the +fifty-second; it comprises the English Channel, and includes both the +French channel ports, the British ports, the southern coast of Ireland, +and the entrance to the Irish Sea. The width of this second section is +very nearly the same as that of the one to the south, or about 200 +miles. + +[Illustration: THE OPTION OFFERED TO THE GERMAN SUBMARINES + +This diagram explains why the American navy succeeded in transporting +more than 2,000,000 American soldiers to France without loss because of +submarines. The Atlantic was divided into two broad areas--shown by the +shaded parts of the diagram. Through the northern area were sent +practically all the merchant ships with supplies of food and materials +for Europe. The southern area, extending roughly from the forty-fifth to +the forty-ninth parallel, was used almost exclusively for troopships. +The Germans could keep only eight or ten U-boats at the same time in the +eastern Atlantic; they thus were forced to choose whether they should +devote these boats to attacking mercantile or troop convoys. The text +explains why, under these circumstances, they were compelled to use +nearly all their forces against merchant ships and leave troop +transports practically alone. + +Emery Walker Ltd. sc] + +Up to the present moment this narrative has been concerned chiefly with +the northernmost of these two great sea pathways. Through this one to +the north passed practically all the merchant shipping which was +destined for the Allies. Consequently, as I have described, it was the +great hunting ground of the German submarines. I have thus far had +little to say of the Bay of Biscay section because, until 1918, there +was comparatively little activity in that part of the ocean. For every +ship which sailed through this bay I suppose that there were at least +100 which came through the Irish Sea and the English Channel. In my +first report to the Department I described the principal scene of +submarine activity as the area of the Atlantic reaching from the French +island of Ushant--which lies just westward of Brest--to the tip of +Scotland, and that remained the chief scene of hostilities to the end. +Along much of the coastline south of Brest the waters were so shallow +that the submarines could operate only with difficulty; it was a long +distance from the German bases; the shipping consisted largely of +coastal convoys; much of this was the coal trade from England; it is +therefore not surprising that the Germans contented themselves with now +and then planting mines off the most important harbours. Since our enemy +was able to maintain only eight or ten U-boats in the Atlantic at one +time it would have been sheer waste of energy to have stationed them off +the western coast of France. They would have put in their time to little +purpose, and meanwhile the ships and cargoes which they were above all +ambitious to destroy would have been safely finding their way into +British ports. + +The fact that we had these two separate areas and that these areas were +so different in character was what made it possible to send our +2,000,000 soldiers to France without losing a single man. From March, +1918, to the conclusion of the war, the American and British navies were +engaged in two distinct transportation operations. The shipment of food +and munitions continued in 1918 as in 1917, and on an even larger scale. +With the passing of time the mechanism of these mercantile convoys +increased in efficiency, and by March, 1918, the management of this +great transportation system had become almost automatic. Shipping from +America came into British ports, it will be remembered, in two great +"trunk lines," one of which ran through the English Channel and the +other up the Irish Sea. But when the time came to bring over the +American troops, we naturally selected the area to the south, both +because it was necessary to send the troops to France and because we had +here a great expanse of ocean which was relatively free of submarines. +Our earliest troop shipments disembarked at St. Nazaire; later, when the +great trans-Atlantic liners, both German and British, were pressed into +service, we landed many tens of thousands at Brest; and all the largest +French ports from Brest to Bordeaux took a share. A smaller number we +sent to England, from which country they were transported across the +Channel into France; when the demands became pressing, indeed, hardly a +ship of any kind was sent to Europe without its quota of American +soldiers; but, on the whole, the business of transportation in 1918 +followed simple and well-defined lines. We sent mercantile convoys in +what I may call the northern "lane" and troop convoys in the southern +"lane." We kept both lines of traffic for the most part distinct; and +this simple procedure offered to our German enemies a pretty problem. + +For, I must repeat, the German navy could maintain in the open Atlantic +an average of only about eight or ten of her efficient U-boats at one +time. The German Admiralty thus had to answer this difficult question: +Shall we use these submarines to attack mercantile convoys or to attack +troop convoys? The submarine flotilla which was actively engaged was so +small that it was absurd to think of sending half into each lane; the +Germans must send most of their submarines against cargo ships or most +of them against troopships. Which should it be? If it were decided to +concentrate on mercantile vessels then the American armies, which the +German chiefs had declared to their people could never get to the +Western Front, would reach France and furnish General Foch the reserves +with which he might crush the German armies before winter. If, on the +other hand, the Germans should decide to concentrate on troopships, then +the food and supplies which were essential to the Allied cause would +flow at an even greater rate into Great Britain and thence to the +European nations. Whether it were more important, in a military sense, +to cut the Allies' commercial lines of communication or to sink troop +transports is an interesting question. It is almost impossible for the +Anglo-Saxon mind to consider this as a purely military matter, apart +from the human factors involved. The sinking of a great transport, with +4,000 or 5,000 American boys on board, would have been a dreadful +calamity and would have struck horror to the American people; it was +something which the Navy was determined to prevent, and which we did +prevent. Considered as a strictly military question, however--and that +was the only consideration which influenced the Germans--it is hard to +see how the loss of one transport, or even the loss of several, would +have materially affected the course of the war. In judging the purely +military results of such a tragedy, we must remember that the Allied +armies were losing from 3,000 to 5,000 men a day; thus the sinking of an +American transport once a week would not have particularly affected the +course of the war. The destruction of merchant shipping in large +quantities, however, represented the one way in which the Germans could +win. There were at least a hundred merchant ships to every one of our +troopships; if a considerable number of the former could be sunk, +Germany would have scored a decisive advantage. From the declaration of +submarine warfare, the objective of the German Admiralty had been for +"tonnage"; by March, 1918, as already said, the chances of destroying +sufficient tonnage to win had become extremely slight; yet it still +represented the one logical mission of the submarine. + +The two alternatives, however, that of attacking mercantile convoys or +troop convoys, hardly existed in fact. Let us suppose for a moment that +the Germans had changed their programme, had taken their group of +operating submarines from the northern trade routes, and had stationed +them to the south, in the track of the troop transports. What would the +results have been? "Lane," though a convenient word for descriptive +purposes, is hardly an accurate one; for this ocean passage-way was +really about 200 miles wide. Imagine eight or ten submarines, stretched +across that expanse and hunting for troopships. At this rate the Germans +would have had about one submarine for every twenty miles. Instead of +finding themselves sailing amid a swarm of surface ships, as they were +when they were stationed in the busy trade routes of the Irish Sea or +the English Channel, the submarines would have found themselves drifting +on a great waste of waters. Our troop convoys averaged not more than +three a week even in the busiest period; in all probability the +submarines would therefore have hung around for a month without catching +a glimpse of one. Even if by some chance the patient vigil should +finally have been rewarded, it is extremely unlikely that the submarine +would ever have found a favourable opportunity to attack. We must keep +in mind that the convoy room at the Admiralty knew, within certain +limits, the location of submarines from day to day; any time one was +located in the track of a troop convoy, therefore, a wireless to the +convoy would have conveyed this information and directed it to reach the +coast of France by another route. + +At the beginning the speediest vessels only were used for transporting +troops. Ships which made less than twelve knots an hour were not deemed +safe for such precious cargoes; when the need for troops became more +and more pressing and when our transport service had demonstrated great +skill in the work, a few slower vessels were used; but the great +majority of our troop transports were those which made twelve knots or +more. Now one of the greatest protections which a ship possesses against +submarine attack is unquestionably high speed. A submarine makes only +eight knots when submerged--and it must submerge immediately if its +attack is to be successful. It must be within at least a mile of its +quarry when it discharges its torpedo; and most successful attacks were +made within three hundred yards. Now take a pencil and a piece of paper +and figure out what must be the location of a submarine, having a speed +of eight knots, when it sights a convoy, which makes twelve knots and +more, if it hopes to approach near enough to launch a torpedo. A little +diagramming will prove that the U-boat must be almost directly in line +of its hoped-for victim if it is to score a hit. But even though the god +of Chance should favour the enemy in this way, the likelihood of sinking +its prey would still be very remote. Like all convoys, the troopships +began zigzagging as soon as they entered the danger zone; and this in +itself made it almost impossible for a submarine to get its bearings and +take good aim. I believe that these circumstances in themselves--the +comparative scarcity of troop transports, the width of the "lane" in +which they travelled, the high speed which they maintained, and their +constant zigzagging, would have defeated most of the attempts which the +Germans could have made to torpedo them. Though I think that most of +them would have reached their destinations unharmed without any other +protection, still this risk, small as it was, could not be taken; and we +therefore gave them one other protection greater than any of those which +I have yet mentioned--the destroyer escort. A convoy of four or five +large troopships would be surrounded by as many as ten or a dozen +destroyers. Very properly, since they were carrying human cargoes, we +gave them an escort at least three times as large per vessel as that +given to large mercantile convoys of twenty or more vessels; and this +fact made them very uninviting baits for the most venturesome U-boat +commanders. + +When the engineers build a Brooklyn bridge they introduce an element +which they call the factor of safety. It is their usual procedure to +estimate the greatest weight which their structure may be called upon to +bear under any conceivable circumstances and then they make it strong +enough to stand a number of times that weight. This additional strength +is the "factor of safety"; it is never called into use, of course, but +the consciousness that it exists gives the public a sense of security +which it could obtain in no other way. We adopted a similar policy in +transporting these millions of American boys to Europe. We also had a +large margin of safety. We did not depend upon one precaution to assure +the lives of our soldiers; we heaped one precautionary measure on +another. From the embarking of the troops at New York or at Hampton +Roads to the disembarkation at Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, +or at one of their other destinations, not the minutest safeguard was +omitted. We necessarily thus somewhat diminished the protection of some +of the mercantile convoys--and properly so. This was done whenever the +arrival of a troop convoy conflicted with the arrival of a merchant +convoy. Also, until they reached the submarine zone, they were attended +by a cruiser or a battleship whose business it was to protect them +against a German raider which might possibly have made its escape into +the ocean; the work performed by these ocean escorts, practically all of +which were American, was for the most part unobtrusive and +unspectacular, but it constitutes a particularly fine example of +efficiency and seamanlike devotion. At Berehaven, Ireland, as described +above, we had stationed three powerful American dreadnoughts, +momentarily prepared to rush to the scene in case one of the great +German battle-cruisers succeeded in breaking into the open sea. Even the +most minute precautions were taken by the transports. + +The soldiers and crews were not permitted to throw anything overboard +which might betray the course of a convoy; the cook's refuse was dropped +at a particular time and in a way that would furnish no clue to a +lurking submarine; even a tin can, if thrown into the sea, was first +pierced with holes to make sure that it would sink. Anyone who struck a +match at night in the danger zone committed a punishable offence. It is +thus apparent why the Germans never "landed" a single one of our +transports. The records show only three or four cases in which even +attempts were made to do this; and those few efforts were feeble and +ineffectual. Of course, the boys all had exciting experiences with +phantom submarines; indeed I don't suppose that there is a single one of +our more than 2,000,000 troops who has not entertained his friends and +relatives with accounts of torpedo streaks and schools of U-boats. + +But the Germans made no concerted campaign against our transports; +fundamental conditions, already described, rendered such an offensive +hopeless; and the skill with which our transport service was organized +and conducted likewise dissuaded them. I have always believed that the +German Admiralty ordered their U-boat captains to let the American +transports alone; or at least not to attack except under very favourable +circumstances, and this belief is rather confirmed by a passage in +General Ludendorff's memoirs. "From our previous experience of the +submarine war," General Ludendorff writes, "I expected strong forces of +Americans to come, but the rapidity with which they actually did arrive +proved surprising. General von Cramon, the German military +representative at the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters, often called me up +and asked me to insist on the sinking of American troopships; public +opinion in Austria-Hungary demanded it. Admiral von Holtzendorff could +only reply that everything was being done to reduce enemy tonnage and to +sink troopships. It was not possible to direct the submarines against +troopships exclusively. They could approach the coasts of Europe +anywhere between the north of England and Gibraltar, a front of some +fourteen hundred nautical miles. It was impossible effectively to close +this area by means of submarines. One could have concentrated them only +on certain routes; but whether the troopships would choose the same +routes at the same time was the question. As soon as the enemy heard of +submarines anywhere he could always send the ships new orders by +wireless and unload at another port. It was, therefore, not certain that +by this method we should meet with a sufficient number of troopships. +The destruction of the enemy's freight tonnage would then have been +undertaken only spasmodically, and would have been set back in an +undesirable manner; and in that way the submarine war would have become +diverted from its original object. The submarine war against commerce +was therefore continued with all the vigour possible." + +Apparently it became the policy of the German Admiralty, as I have +said, to concentrate their U-boats on merchant shipping and leave the +American troopships practically alone--at least those bound to Europe. +Unfortunately, however, at no time did we have enough destroyers to +provide escorts for all of these transports as fast as they were +unloaded and ready to return to America, but as time in the "turn +around" was the all-important consideration in getting the troops over, +the transports were sent back through the submarine zone under the +escort of armed yachts, and occasionally not escorted at all. Under +these conditions the transports could be attacked with much less risk, +as was shown by the fact that five were torpedoed, though of these +happily only three were sunk. + + +III + +The position of the German naval chiefs, as is shown by the quotation +from General Ludendorff's book, was an extremely unhappy one. They had +blatantly promised the German people that their submarines would prevent +the transportation of American troops to Europe. At first they had +ridiculed the idea that undisciplined, unmilitary America could ever +organize an army; after we adopted conscription and began to train our +young men by the millions, they just as vehemently proclaimed that this +army could never be landed in Europe. In this opinion the German +military chieftains were not alone. No such army movement had ever +before been attempted. The discouraging forecast made by a brilliant +British naval authority in July, 1917, reflected the ideas of too many +military people on both sides of the ocean. "I am distressed," he said, +"at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to provide enough +shipping to bring the American army over in hundreds of thousands to +France, and, after they are brought over, to supply the enormous amount +of shipping which will be required to keep them full up with munitions, +food, and equipment." + +It is thus not surprising that the German people accepted as gospel the +promises of their Admiralty; therefore their anger was unbounded when +American troops began to arrive. The German newspapers began to ask the +most embarrassing questions. What had become of their submarines? Had +the German people not been promised that their U-boats would sink any +American troopships that attempted to cross the ocean? As the shipments +increased, and as the effect of these vigorous fresh young troops began +to be manifest upon the Western Front, the outcries in Germany waxed +even more fierce and abusive. Von Capelle and other German naval chiefs +made rambling speeches in the Reichstag, once more promising their +people that the submarines would certainly win the war--speeches that +were followed by ever-increasing arrivals of American soldiers in +France. The success of our transports led directly to the fall of Von +Capelle as Minister of Marine; his successor, Admiral von Mann, who was +evidently driven to desperation by the popular outburst, decided to make +one frantic attempt to attack our men. The new minister, of course, knew +that he could accomplish no definite results; but the sinking of even +one transport with several thousand troops on board would have had a +tremendous effect upon German _moral_. When the great British liner +_Justicia_ was torpedoed, the German Admiralty officially announced that +it was the _Leviathan_, filled with American soldiers; and the +jubilation which followed in the German press, and the subsequent +dejection when it was learned that this was a practically empty +transport, sailing westward, showed that an actual achievement of this +kind would have raised their drooping spirits. Admiral von Mann, +therefore, took several submarines away from the trade routes and sent +them into the transport zone. But they did not succeed even in attacking +a single east-bound troopship. The only result accomplished was the one +which, from what I have already said, would have been expected; the +removal of the submarines from the commercial lane caused a great fall +in the sinking of merchant ships. In August, 1918, these sinkings +amounted to 280,000 tons; in September and October, when this futile +drive was made at American transports, the sinkings fell to 190,000 and +110,000 tons. + +Too much praise cannot be given to the commanders of our troop convoys +and the commanding officers of the troop transports, as well as the +commanders of the cruisers and battleships that escorted them from +America to the western edge of the submarine zone. The success of their +valuable services is evidence of a high degree not only of nautical +skill, judgment, and experience, but of the admirable seamanship +displayed under the very unusual conditions of steaming without lights +while continuously manoeuvring in close formation. Moreover, their +cordial co-operation with the escorts sent to meet them was everything +that could be desired. In this invaluable service these commanding +officers had the loyal and enthusiastic support of the admirable petty +officers and men whose initiative, energy, and devotion throughout the +war enabled us to accomplish results which were not only beyond our +expectations but which demonstrated that they are second to none in the +world in the qualities which make for success in war on the sea. + +On the whole, the safeguarding of American soldiers on the ocean was an +achievement of the American navy. Great Britain provided a slightly +larger amount of tonnage for this purpose than the United States; but +about 82 per cent. of the escorting was done by our own forces. The +cruiser escorts across the ocean to France were almost entirely +American; and the destroyer escorts through the danger zone were +likewise nearly all our own work. And in performing this great feat the +American navy fulfilled its ultimate duty in the war. The transportation +of these American troops brought the great struggle to an end. On the +battlefield they acquitted themselves in a way that aroused the +admiration of their brothers in the naval service. When we were reading, +day by day, the story of their achievements, when we saw the German +battle lines draw nearer and nearer to the Rhine, and, finally, when the +German Government raised its hands in abject surrender, the eighteen +months' warfare against the German submarines, in which the American +navy had been privileged to play its part, appeared in its true +light--as one of the greatest victories against the organized forces of +evil in all history. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] These figures are taken from the Annual Report of the Secretary of +the Navy for 1919, page 207. + + +THE END + + + + +APPENDIX I + +OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO PUBLISH "THE VICTORY AT SEA" + + +U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND + +14 June 1919. + + From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy. + + To: The Secretary of the Navy. + + Subject: Requests Permission to Publish a Book on the Activities of + the U.S. Navy during The Great War. + + Reference (a): Paragraph 1534 of the Articles for the Government of + the Navy of the United States. + +1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) I request +authority to publish in my name a book descriptive of the activities of +the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters during The Great War. + +2. My object in preparing this book is to familiarize the American +people with the great work accomplished by the Navy during the war. It +will be a popular presentation written in a nontechnical style, +illustrated with photographs taken in Europe and various diagrams +indicating the nature of our activities. + +[s] WM. S. SIMS. + +9 July 1919. +APPROVED. +[s] Josephus Daniels. + + +HWS-MEF + +2nd Indorsement. +OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, +Washington, D.C. + +11 July 1919. + + From: Director of Naval Intelligence. + + To: President Naval War College. + + 1. Forwarded. + +[s] A. P. NIBLACK. + + +THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WASHINGTON + +June 26, 1919. + +MY DEAR ADMIRAL: + +I am sending you in the regular official course my approval of your +plan to print and publish a book relative to the operations of the naval +forces under your command during the great war. I am happy that you are +going to undertake this, because I am sure it will be of great value to +the Navy and of interest to the world. + +With sentiments of esteem and high regard, + +Sincerely yours, +[s] JOSEPHUS DANIELS. + +P.S. + +Of course any facilities or assistance that the Navy Department can +render you will be at your disposal. + +Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims, U.S.N., +President Naval War College, +Newport, Rhode Island. + + +_Extract from Navy Regulations, 1913, Article 1534_ + +"(2) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy +Department shall publish or cause or permit to be published, directly or +indirectly, or communicate by interviews, private letters, or otherwise, +except as required by his official duties, any information in regard to +the foreign policy of the United States, or concerning the acts or +measures of any department of the Government or of any officer acting +thereunder, or any comments or criticisms thereon; or the text of any +official instructions, reports, or letters upon any subject whatever, or +furnish copies thereof to any person, without the express permission of +the Navy Department. + +"(4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting officers +from forwarding to the department, through official channels, +well-considered comment and suggestions with a view to promoting the +efficiency of the service and the public interests; on the contrary, +such suggestions are invited, but they should be in regard to things or +methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be +accompanied by a well-digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions, +if approved by the department, will be entered on the officer's record +and he will be duly notified to that effect." + + + + +APPENDIX II + +FIRST CABLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON + + +To: Secretary of the Navy. + +Sent April 14, 1917. +Through: State Department. + +File No. 25-9-2. + +The situation is as follows: + +The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people realize in +America. The recent success of operations and the rapidity of +construction constitute the real crisis of the war. The _moral_ of the +enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four are known to have +been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded. +The reports of our press are greatly in error. Recent reports circulated +concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy _moral_ and results +are [not] very satisfactory. + +Supplies and communications of forces all fronts, including the +Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled. + +German submarines are constantly extending their operations into the +Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian +situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five admirals, captains, +and commanders murdered, and in some armies there is insubordination. + +The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in February was +536,000 tons, in March, 517,000 tons, and in the first ten days of April +205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these losses are +increasing. + +The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape of some +raiders during the long nights, but the chances are better now. + +The Allies were notified that hospital ships will continue to be sunk, +this in order to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines +to convoy hospital ships; in this way causing a large demand for large +convoy forces in all areas not before necessary, and also partially +immobilizing the main fleet. + +On account of the immense theatre and the length and number of lines of +communication, and the material deterioration resulting from three +years' continuous operation in distant fields with inadequate base +facilities, the strength of the naval forces is dangerously strained. +This applies to all of the sea forces outside of the Grand Fleet. The +enemy has six large and sixty-four small submarine mine-layers; the +latter carry eighteen mines and the former thirty-four, also torpedoes +and guns. All classes submarines for actual commission completed at a +rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure defeat of the +submarine campaign immediate active co-operation absolutely necessary. + +The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of +communications in the Eastern Atlantic, therefore I very urgently +recommend the following immediate naval co-operation. + +Maximum number of destroyers to be sent, accompanied by small +anti-submarine craft; the former to patrol designated high seas area +westward to Ireland, based on Queenstown, with an advance base at Bantry +Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol for destroyers: small craft should +be of light draft with as high speed as possible but low speed also +useful. Also repair ships and staff for base. Oil and docks are +available but I advise sending continuous supply of fuel. German main +fleet must be contained, demanding maximum conservation of the British +main fleet. South of Scotland no base is so far available for this +force. + +At present our battleships can serve no useful purpose in this area, +except that two divisions of dreadnoughts might be based on Brest for +moral effect against anticipated raids by heavy enemy ships in the +channel out of reach of the British main fleet. + +The chief other and urgent practical co-operation is merchant tonnage +and a continuous augmentation of anti-submarine craft to reinforce our +advanced forces. There is a serious shortage of the latter craft. For +towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous +areas sea-going tugs would be of great use. + +The co-operation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost +despatch in order to break the enemy submarine _moral_ and accelerate +the accomplishment of the chief American objective. + +It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our +coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep our forces +from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through effect upon +public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the +focussing of shipping on this side will restrict such operations to +minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed, +principally by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine +mines have been anchored as deep as ninety fathoms but majority at not +more than fifty fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth +until from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after they have been laid. + +So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight +of landmarks or lights on account of danger to themselves if location is +not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and anti-submarine work +where most effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity. + +Mr. Hoover informs that there is only sufficient grain supply in this +country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail +stores. In a few days Mr. Hoover will sail for the United States. + +SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX III + +FIRST DETAILED REPORT ON THE ALLIED NAVAL SITUATION + + +LONDON, ENGLAND. +April 19, 1917. + + From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N. + + To: Secretary of the Navy. + + Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams + concerning War situation and recommendations for U.S. Naval + co-operation. + +1. _Reception_: + +My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial and +significant of the seriousness of present situation and the importance +to be attached to the United States' entry into the war. + +I was met at Liverpool by Rear-Admiral Hope, R.N., a member of Admiral +Jellicoe's staff, and the Admiral of the Port, the former having been +sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was +provided which made a record run, and within a few hours after arrival +in London I was received by the First Sea Lord and his principal +assistants in a special conference. + +2. _Conferences_: + +More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full statement +of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account +of its seriousness, combined with a natural reluctance against appearing +to seek assistance, and a hesitancy in taking chances of allowing +information indirectly to reach the enemy, and thereby improve enemy +_moral_. + +I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a +part of the Admiralty organization, and that it was essential to safe +and efficient co-operation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of +the exact situation. + +They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War +Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as regards the +military situation and rate of destruction of merchant shipping. + +I have had daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, both at his office +and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty +and access to all Government Officials. I have freely consulted with +such officials as the following: + +Prime Minister. + +First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson). + +Ministers of Munitions, Shipping, Trade, and other Cabinet officials. + +First Sea Lord, and his assistants. + +Chief of Naval Staff. + +Directors (corresponding to our Chiefs of Bureaus) of Intelligence, +Anti-submarine operations, Torpedoes, Mines, Mining, etc. + +3. _General Statement of the Situation_: + +Since the last declaration of the enemy Government, which from +intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine campaign against +merchant shipping of all Nations has resolved itself into the real issue +of the war and, stated briefly, the Allied Governments have not been +able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation presented. + +4. As stated in my first despatch, the communications and supplies to +all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the +"Command of the Sea" is actually at stake. + +5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine +menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as +probably those of the Department also, had been largely based upon Press +reports and reports of our Attachés and other professional Americans who +have been abroad during the War. All of this information has been either +rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form that it would +be of minimum assistance to enemy _moral_. + +6. The necessity for secrecy, which the British Government has +experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London, and even in the +Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have been remarkable and +unexpected leakages of information throughout the war. Certain neutral +legations of smaller countries are now under strong suspicion. + +7. The extent to which the submarine campaign is being waged is in +itself excellent evidence of the importance attached to it by the enemy, +and of the degree to which they counted, and still are counting, upon +it. + +The Intelligence Department has reliable information (as reliable as can +be) that the enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in +_two_ months through shortage of supplies. + +8. With improved weather and the shorter nights now coming on we may +expect even more enemy submarine success. + +9. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was yesterday in conference +in the Admiralty as to what greater extent destroyers and auxiliaries of +the Fleet may be utilized without endangering its power in the remote +possibility of another fleet engagement. + +The consensus of opinion seems to be that the latter will not occur, but +there is not complete unanimity in this belief, and of course, in any +case, the possibility must be adequately and continuously provided +against. + +_General discussion of situation_: + +10. I delayed [four days] forwarding my first report of the situation +with a view of obtaining the maximum information consistent with the +importance of the time element. I was also somewhat deterred by a +natural reluctance to alter so radically my preconceived views and +opinions as to the situation. + +11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions +such as raids on our coasts or elsewhere, the critical area in which the +war's decision will be made is in the eastern Atlantic at the focus of +all lines of communications. + +The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of construction, +allowing liberal factors for errors of information, renders it +inevitable that the main submarine effort must continue to be +concentrated in the above critical area. + +12. Even in this critical area, it is manifest that the field is +relatively large for the maximum number of submarines which the enemy +can maintain in it. For example, with the present Admiralty policy +(explained below) they are forced to cover all the possible trade routes +of approach between the north of Scotland and Ushant. + +13. From consideration of the above and all other essential information +available, it is apparent that the enemy could not disperse his main +submarine campaign into other quarters of the Globe without diminishing +results in this and all areas to a degree which would mean failure to +accomplish the Mission of the submarine campaign, which can be nothing +else than a final decision of the war. + +14. Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the +Admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce +more substantial and visible results. One of the principal demands is +for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection +within the war zone. + +The answer, which manifestly is not publicly known, is simply that the +necessary vessels are not available, and further that those which are +available are suffering from the effects of three years of arduous +service. + +15. It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not +directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these +convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same--the area +is too large; the necessary vessels are not available. + +16. However, I am now consulting with the Director of Shipping as to the +practicability and advisability of attempting some approach to such a +plan in case the United States is able to put in operation sufficient +tonnage to warrant it. + +17. After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the Admiralty +now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion. They use about six +relatively large avenues or arcs of approach to the United Kingdom and +Channel, changing their limits or area periodically if necessity +demands. + +Generally speaking, one is to the north of Scotland, another to the +north of Ireland, and three or four others covering the Irish Sea and +Channel. Individual ships coming into any of these areas of approach are +instructed, generally before sailing, to cross the twentieth meridian at +certain and different latitudes and thence steer certain courses to +port. + +At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of approach +free of submarines under such conditions as to lead them to concentrate +shipping therein, but invariably the enemy has become aware of the +course pursued. + +18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is +communication with the shipping itself and full co-operation by the +merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either +becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually +changed, and at all times it cannot be counted upon for more than a +fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping +shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent. + +19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant Captains taking +the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least +indifference, for Admiralty instructions. The American Liner _New York_ +upon which I took passage furnishes a typical example. She was +instructed to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she passed it about +nine P.M., thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous +area. + +20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with Merchant masters and +sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "Give us a gun and +let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is +impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in +any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling +their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With +this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a little +experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in +open formations. + +21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of +ships, merchant as well as Naval, is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING, not more than +fifteen minutes on a course. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on +the contrary there is absolutely unanimity of opinion. + +22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, _particularly destroyers_, +and until the enemy submarine _moral_ is broken, there is but one sure +method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete +unanimity--increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small. + +"More Ships! More Ships! More Ships!" is heard on every hand. + +23. It is also significant that until very recently the Admiralty have +been unable completely to convince some members of the Cabinet that the +submarine issue is the deciding factor in the War. The civilian mind, +here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly +until the pinch is felt in real physical ways. + +24. The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion +that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely +sealing up all escape for submarines from their own ports. The fact that +all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve +the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own +Naval forces is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced +the Prime Minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the +situations into which we would be led: namely, that in order to maintain +our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought +against them, until finally the majority if not all of our forces would +be forced into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual +torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favourable to the +enemy. + +25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and always can, +force exits, and thereby nullify the close blockade, the weather is a +serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used +for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of +weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not +hold. They chafe through. In this respect we could be of great +assistance, i.e. in supply of moorings and buoys. + +26. The Channel is not now, and never has been, completely sealed +against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of escape to the +north. Submarines have gone under mine-fields, and have succeeded in +unknown ways in evading and cutting through nets and obstructions. + +27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid, and in +fact escape through, the Channel at any time when the enemy decides that +the necessity or return will justify the risk. Hence the suggestion that +two divisions of our fast Dreadnoughts might be based upon Brest, +primarily for the resulting moral effect against such possible raids. + +I was told yesterday by an important Admiralty official that while he +thought the chances of raids in, or escape through, the Channel by heavy +enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet (North of Scotland) were +very remote, nevertheless the possibility existed and was principally +thwarted on moral grounds, that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the +opposition which would be encountered. He agreed with others, including +the First Sea Lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to +those maintained in southern Channel approaches by the French and +British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the possibility of such +raids. + +28. _Submarine Losses_: + +It has been found necessary to accept _no_ reports of submarine losses +as authentic and certain unless survivors are captured or the submarine +itself is definitely located by dragging. No dependence even is placed +upon evidence of oil on the surface after a submarine has been attacked +and forced down, as there is reason to believe that when an enemy +submarine dives to escape gunfire she is fitted to expel oil for the +particular purpose of conveying the impression that she has been sunk +and thereby avoid further pursuit. It has been shown that the amount of +damage a submarine can stand is surprising and much more than was +anticipated before the experience of the war. Upon a recent occasion a +British submarine was mistaken for an enemy and though struck by several +shells, dived and escaped to port. + +The submarine losses which are certain since outbreak of war are as +given in attached cablegram. + +It is estimated that between thirty and forty submarines operate at a +time in the waters surrounding the British Islands and French Coast. At +least one is now known to be on White Sea trade lanes. + +29. _Best anti-submarine weapons_: + +One of the most efficient weapons now used by all destroyers and patrol +craft against submarines is the so-called "Depth Charge," sample and +drawings of which have been forwarded by our Naval Attaché. These are +merely explosive charges designed to explode at a certain depth, +formerly eighty feet, now about one hundred feet. They are dropped +overboard where a submarine that has submerged is assumed to be and are +counted upon to badly shake up and demoralize if they do not actually +cause serious damage. + +Howitzers and Bomb-throwers of large calibre are under construction, +designed to throw similar depth charges to distances of about 2,000 +yards. Details will be forwarded. + +30. _Torpedo Protection_: + +This subject may be summed up by the statement of the Captain of a +British Dreadnought who said in effect that after a year's experience he +did not fear being sunk by a torpedo. Unless struck by several the worst +to be anticipated is damage to shafts or rudder, thus necessitating +towing. Cruisers have often been struck and been able to reach port. +Vital water-tight doors are kept continuously closed at sea. + +Destroyer officers have been heard to express the curious opinion that +the enemy ships were more or less unsinkable. This is probably to be +explained by the fact that they carry very few supplies; that they have +their storage spaces compartmented or filled with wood or other +water-excluding material; and that when in port, they quarter their +crews in barracks, and when leaving for a cruise carry the minimum +amount of berthing and supply facilities. These points, however, are not +positively known. + +On the contrary, all vessels of the British Fleet must be kept fully +supplied and fuelled at all times for extended cruising. This is +particularly true of Battle-cruisers and Cruisers. + +31. All officers of rank and actual experience consulted are convinced +that the enemy have no unusual methods of protection, or in fact any +"surprises" in ordnance or other fighting equipment. + +32. All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is SPEED +and ZIGZAGGING. + +33. It is a common experience of the Naval as well as Merchant service +that torpedo wakes are reported where none exist. Many reports are +received of torpedoes barely missing ships. This was true in the Jutland +Battle. The Captain on one Battleship said that he received numerous +reports of torpedoes passing just ahead and just astern, nearly all of +which he had reason to believe did not exist. + +Streaks of suds, slicks, etc., are very deceiving and are easily +mistaken for torpedo wakes, particularly when the danger of torpedoes is +present. This accounts for many reports by passengers on liners and +other merchant craft of seeing many torpedoes just miss their mark. + +34. _Submarine versus Submarine_: + +There has always been opposition to using submarines against submarines, +principally on the grounds that the possibilities of their +accomplishments would not be sufficiently great to justify the risk +involved of mistaken identity and resulting damage to friends. + +The Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare believes, however, that such +operations promise well, and the experiment is now being tried with as +many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet. Some enemy +submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually torpedoed. One +valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our +submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe +in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty +is removed the enemy will be forced to keep down more, and to take much +greater precautions against detection. This is an advantage of no small +account. + +In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by +our submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable +information as to the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessels +under the actual conditions existing in the areas in which they operate. +Without this knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to +conjecture which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected +effort. + +(Signed) WM. S. SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX IV + +THE QUESTION OF ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS + + + To: Secretary of the Navy. + + Through Admiralty. From Queenstown. + + Sent: June 28, 1917. + + Admiralty for Secretary Navy Washington, providing it meets + Admiralty's full approval. + + From Admiral Sims. + +Referring to Department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the +effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the +most effective defensive anti-submarine measures, I again submit with +all possible stress the following based on extended [Allied] war +experience. The measures demanded, if enemy defeat in time is to be +assured, are not defensive but offensive defensive. The merchantman's +inherent weakness is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defence +against torpedo attack without warning, which is necessarily the enemy +method of attack against armed ships. In this area alone during the last +six weeks thirty armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine +being seen, although three of these were escorted each by a single +destroyer. The result would of course have been the same no matter how +many guns these ships carried or what their calibre. Three mystery +ships, heavily manned by expert naval crews with much previous +experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without +warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging +submarine with gunfire at six thousand yards but submarine submerged and +approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness +of heaviest batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by +Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their +men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively small number +American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the +enemy's hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on +record of submarines making successful gun attacks from advantageous sun +position against armed ships without ship being able to see submarine. +I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by +offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of +shipping and avoidance of anti-submarine craft. Enemy submarines are now +using for their final approach an auxiliary periscope less than two +inches in diameter. This information just acquired. All of the +experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would +be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the +assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against +submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have +now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent, +convoys from sixteen to twenty ships. This is an offensive measure +against submarines, as the latter will be subject to the attack of our +anti-submarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of +convoyed merchantmen. Moreover it permits of concentrated attack by our +forces and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various +routes of approach. + +Concerning Department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant +shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit +that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new +anti-submarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any +such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly +counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad +weather of autumn, that is, in next three months. Heaviest effort may be +anticipated in July and August. I again submit that protection of our +coastlines and of Allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in +field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the +Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations +in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, +the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and +must continue to operate in order to succeed. + +SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX V + +THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM + + + LONDON, + June 29, 1917. + + From: Commander U.S. Naval Forces operating in European Waters. + + To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations). + + Subject: General report concerning military situation. + +1. I feel that there is little to add to my recent cable despatches +which, in view of the importance of the time element, have been made +full and detailed. + +2. To sum up my despatches briefly, I would repeat that I consider that +the military situation is very grave indeed on account of the success of +the enemy submarine campaign. + +If the shipping losses continue as they have during the past four +months, it is submitted that the Allies will be forced to dire straits +indeed, if they will not actually be forced into an unsatisfactory +peace. + +The present rate of destruction is very much greater than the rate of +building, and the shortage of tonnage is already so great that the +efficiency of the naval forces is already reduced by lack of oil. Orders +have just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in cases of +emergency. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war. + +3. My reasons for being so insistent in my cable despatches have been +because of my conviction that measures of co-operation which we may take +will be inefficient if they are not put into operation immediately, that +is, within a month. + +There is every reason to believe that the maximum enemy submarine effort +will occur between now and the first of November, reaching its height +probably during the latter part of July, if not earlier. + +4. There is certainly no sovereign solution for the submarine menace +except through well-established methods of warfare based upon +fundamental military principles. + +5. It is submitted that the cardinal military principle of +concentration of effort is at present being pursued by the enemy and +not by the Allies. + +6. We are dispersing our forces while the enemy is concentrating his. +The enemy's submarine mission is and must continue to be the destruction +of merchant shipping. The limitations of submarines and the distances +over which they must operate prevent them from attacking our naval +forces, that is, anti-submarine craft. They cannot afford to engage +anti-submarine craft with guns; they must use torpedoes. If they should +do so to any considerable extent their limited supply would greatly +reduce their period of operation away from base, and the number of +merchantmen they could destroy. Their object is to avoid contact with +anti-submarine craft. This they can almost always do, as the submarine +can see the surface craft at many times the distance the surface craft +can see a periscope, particularly one less than two inches in diameter. + +Moreover, the submarine greatly fears the anti-submarine craft because +of the great danger of the depth charges. Our tactics should therefore +be such as to force the submarine to incur this danger in order to get +within range of merchantmen. + +7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only course for us +to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of convoy. This will be +purely an offensive measure, because if we concentrate our shipping into +convoys and protect it with our naval forces we will thereby force the +enemy, in order to carry out his mission, to encounter naval forces +which are not embarrassed with valuable cargoes, and which are a great +danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are wearing down +their personnel and material in an attempted combination of escorting +single ships, when they can be picked up, and also of attempting to seek +and offensively engage an enemy whose object is to avoid such +encounters. With the convoy system the conditions will be reversed. +Although the enemy may easily know when our convoys sail, he can never +know the course they will pursue or the route of approach to their +destinations. Our escorting forces will thus be able to work on a +deliberate prearranged plan, preserving their oil supplies and energy, +while the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces and seek us. In a +word, the handicap we now labour under will be shifted to the enemy; we +will have adopted the essential principal of concentration while the +enemy will lose it. + +8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system made by the +British Admiralty shows clearly that while we may have some losses under +this system, owing to lack of adequate number of anti-submarine craft, +they nevertheless will not be critical as they are at present. + +9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed as a +whole, there is no necessity for any high sea protection on our own +coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses no unusual +characteristics different from those of other naval craft, with the +single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The +difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as +it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea as far +as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy +establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere. + +10. To take an extreme illustration, if the enemy could be led or forced +into diverting part of his submarine effort to the United States coast, +or to any other area distant from the critical area surrounding the +coast of France and the United Kingdom, the anti-submarine campaign +would at once be won. The enemy labours under severe difficulties in +carrying out his campaign, even in this restricted area, owing to the +material limitations and the distances they must operate from their +bases, through extremely dangerous localities. The extent of the United +States coastline and the distances between its principal commercial +ports preclude the possibility of any submarine effort in that part of +the world except limited operations of diversion designed to affect +public opinion, and thereby hold our forces from the vital field of +action. + +11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of course, +considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely dispersed ports +of origin of merchant shipping; the difficulty of communication by +cable; the time involved by communications by mail; and the difficulties +of obtaining a co-operation and co-ordination between Allied +Governments. + +As reported by cable despatch, the British Government has definitely +reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as +its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and +Scandinavian countries are already in operation. Convoys from New York +will be put in operation as soon as ships are available. The British +navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently +recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling convoys +from New York. + +12. The dangers to convoys from high sea raiders is remote, but, of +course, must be provided against, and hence the necessity for escorting +cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is even greater, however, +for anti-submarine craft in the submarine war zone. + +13. As stated in my despatches, the arming of merchantmen is not a +solution of the submarine menace, it serves the single purpose of +forcing the submarine to use torpedoes instead of guns and bombs. The +facts that men-of-war cannot proceed safely at sea without escort, and +that in the Queenstown avenue of approach alone in the past six weeks +there have been thirty armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen the +submarine at all before the attack, seem to be conclusive evidence. A +great mass of other evidence and war experience could be collected in +support of the above. + +14. The week ending June 19th has been one of great submarine activity. +Evidence indicates that fifteen to nineteen of the largest and latest +submarines have been operating, of which ten to thirteen were operating +in the critical area to the west and south-west of the British Isles. +The above numbers are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type of +submarines, and submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are +working to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar. A feature of the +week was the sinking of ships as far west as nineteen degrees. Three +merchant ship convoys are en route from Hampton Roads, the last one, +consisting of eighteen ships, having sailed on the 19th of June. One +hundred and sixteen moored mines have been swept up during the week. + +Twenty-two reports of encounters with enemy submarines in waters +surrounding the United Kingdom have been reported during the week--three +by destroyers, two by cruisers, two by mystery ships, one by French +gunboat, three by submarines, nine by auxiliary patrol vessels, one by +seaplane, and one by merchant vessel. + +There is attached copy of report of operations by anti-submarine craft +based on Queenstown. + +(Signed) WM. S. SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX VI + +THE NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY + + + From: Secretary of Navy. + + To: Vice-Admiral Sims, U.S.S. _Melville_. + + Received: July 10, 1917. + +The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is +quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of +the Department in relation to the co-operation of our naval forces with +those of our Allies. Quote: After careful consideration of the present +naval situation taken in connection with possible future situations +which might arise, the Department is preparing to announce as its +policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies. First, the most hearty +co-operation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in +European or other waters compatible with an adequate defence of our own +home waters. Second, the most hearty co-operation with the Allies to +meet any future situation arising during the present war period. Third, +the realization that while a successful termination of the present war +must always be the first Allied aim, and will probably result in +diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the +United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our +main fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main +military rôle of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding +the line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there +will be generally speaking two classes of vessels engaged: minor craft +and major craft, and two rôles of action, first, offensive and, second, +defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph four, the +Department cannot too strongly insist on its opinion that the offensive +must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy +prepared. But as the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must +perforce belong to the Allied powers, the Navy Department announces as +its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of +action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need. Sixth, +pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as +its general plan of action the following: One, its willingness to send +its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine +chasers, auxiliaries in any number not incompatible with home needs, and +to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint Allied Admiralties +which would not involve a violation of our present state policy. Two, +its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division from +the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the +entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but co-operating unit +when, after joint consultations of all Admiralties concerned, the +emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the +line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European +waters will stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to +discuss more fully plans for joint operations. End of Quote 11009. + +(Sd) JOSEPHUS DANIELS. + + + + +APPENDIX VII + +COMMENTS UPON NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY + + + Office Vice-Admiral, Commanding + U.S. Destroyer Forces + European Waters. + LONDON, + July 16, 1917. + + From: Vice-Admiral Sims. + + To: Secretary of the Navy. + + Subject: Concerning Policy of U.S. Naval co-operation in war, and + allied subjects. + +1. The Department's cablegram of July 10, 1917, quoting a letter which +had been addressed to the Secretary of State concerning naval policy in +relation to the present war, was received on July 10th. + +In view of the nature of certain parts of the policy set forth therein, +I wish to indicate the general policy which has heretofore governed my +recommendation. + +2. I have assumed that our mission was to promote the maximum +co-operation with the Allies in defeating a common enemy. + +All of my despatches and recommendations have been based on the firm +conviction that the above mission could and would be accomplished, and +that hence such questions as the possibility of post war situations, or +of all or part of the Allies being defeated and America being left +alone, were not given consideration--in fact, I cannot see how we could +enter into this war whole-heartedly if such considerations were allowed +to diminish in any way the chances of Allied success. + +3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind is that we +should look upon our service as part of the combined Allied service, of +which the British Grand Fleet is the main body, and all other Allied +naval forces disposed throughout the world, as necessary branches +thereof. + +This conception views our battleship fleet as a support or reserve of +the Allied main body (the British Grand Fleet) and would lead to +utilizing our other forces to fill in weak spots and to strengthen +Allied lines, both offensively and defensively, wherever necessary. + +Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our fleet, and +it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and caution should be +felt in its adoption. + +4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish our mission +without in any way involving the so-called disintegration of our fleet +as a whole. + +In the first instance I have assumed that our aim would be to project, +or prepare to project, our maximum force against the enemy offensively. + +5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy is +depending for success upon breaking down the Allies' lines of +communications by virtue of the submarine campaign. + +A necessary part of such a plan is to divert strength from the main +fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means as coastal raids, +threats of landing operations, air raids, and attacks on hospital ships, +which last necessitates destroyer escort for such vessels. + +The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity concentrated +primarily on the most vital lines of communications, is nevertheless +carried out in such a manner as to lead the Allies to disperse, and not +concentrate, their inadequate anti-submarine Forces. + +The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times, and hence +provide against, the possibility of another main fleet action. + +6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of submarines +available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the Allies' +communications, for both Army and Navy as well as civil needs, shows +clearly that the enemy must direct his main effort in certain restricted +areas. + +These areas, as has repeatedly been reported, are included approximately +in a circle drawn from about Ushant to the north of Scotland. The most +effective field for enemy activity is, of course, close into the Irish +Sea and Channel approaches, where all lines must focus. + +But, as stated above, the enemy also attacks occasionally well out to +sea and in other dispersed areas with a view of scattering the limited +anti-submarine forces available. + +It therefore seems manifest that the war not only is, but must remain, +in European waters, in so far as success or failure is concerned. + +7. Speaking generally, but disregarding for the moment the question of +logistics, our course of action, in order to throw our main strength +against the enemy, would be to move all our forces, including the +battleship fleet, into the war area. + +8. In view of the nature of the present sea warfare as effected by the +submarine, such a movement by the battleships would necessitate a large +force of light craft--much larger than our peace establishment provided. +In addition to all destroyers, adequate protection of the fleet would +require all other available light craft in the service, or which could +be commandeered and put into service--that is, submarines, armed tugs, +trawlers, yachts, torpedo boats, revenue cutters, mine-layers and +mine-sweepers, and in fact any type of small craft which could be used +as protective or offensive screens. + +9. In view of the shipping situation, as affected by the submarine +campaign, it has been impossible to date to see in what way our +battleships could be supplied in case they were sent into the war area. +This refers particularly to oil-burning vessels. It would therefore seem +unwise to recommend such a movement until we could see clearly far +enough ahead to ensure the safety of the lines of communication which +such a force would require. + +10. It is to be observed, however, that even in case the decision were +made to move the battleships into the war area, it would unavoidably be +greatly delayed both in getting together the necessary screening forces +and also in getting such craft across the Atlantic. + +In the meantime, and while awaiting a decision as to the movements of +the battleship fleet, the submarine campaign has become so intensive, +and the available anti-submarine craft have been so inadequate to meet +it, that the necessity for increasing the anti-submarine forces in the +war area to the maximum possible extent has become imperative. + +11. As long, therefore, as the enemy fleet is contained by the stronger +British fleet in a position of readiness, it would not seem a +disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war area all the light +craft of every description which would necessarily have to accompany the +fleet in case it should be needed in this area. + +Such movements of the light craft would not in any way separate them +strategically from the battleships, as they would be operating between +the enemy and our own main body and based in a position to fall back as +the main body approached, or to meet it at an appointed place. This +advance of light forces, strategically, would mean no delay whatever to +our heavy forces, should the time come for their entry into the active +war zone. + +12. Another very important consideration is the fact that, pending the +movement of the battleships themselves, all of the light forces would be +gaining valuable war experience and would be the better prepared for +operations of any nature in the future, either in connection with the +fleet itself or independently. + +It is also considered that it would not constitute a disintegration of +our fleet to advance into the war zone, in co-operation with the British +Grand Fleet or for other duty, certain units of our battleship fleet. +These would merely constitute units advanced for purpose of enemy +defeat, and which would always be in a position to fall back on the main +part of our Fleet, or to join it as it approached the war zone. + +It is for this reason that I recommended, on July 7, 1917, that all +coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in readiness for distant service in +case their juncture with the Grand Fleet might be deemed advisable in +connection with unexpected enemy developments. + +It would, of course, be preferable to advance the entire fleet providing +adequate lines of communications could be established to ensure their +efficient operation. At the present time there is a sufficient coal +supply in England to supply our coal-burning dreadnoughts, but the oil +would be a very difficult problem as it must be brought in through the +submarine zone. + +When notified that the _Chester_, _Birmingham_, and _Salem_ were +available for duty in the war area, I recommended, after consultation +with the Admiralty, that they join the British Light Cruiser Squadrons +in the North Sea, where there is always a constant demand for more +ships, especially to oppose enemy raiding and other operations aimed at +dispersing the Allied sea forces. + +In view of the Department's reference to the Gibraltar situation, and +also in consideration of the sea-keeping qualities of the seven gunboats +of the _Sacramento_ class, it was recommended that they be based on +Gibraltar for duty in assisting to escort convoys clear of the Straits, +and particularly as this would release some British destroyers which are +urgently needed in critical areas to the northward. + +13. The Department's policy, as contained in its letter to the Secretary +of State, refers in the first statement to an adequate defence of our +own home waters. It would seem to be sound reasoning that the most +effective defence which can be afforded to our home waters is an +offensive campaign against the enemy which threatens those waters. Or in +other words, that the place for protection of home waters is the place +in which protection is necessary--that is, where the enemy is operating +and must continue to operate in force. + +As has been stated in numerous despatches, it is considered that home +waters are threatened solely in the submarine zone--in fact are being +attacked solely in that zone, and must continue to be attacked therein +if the enemy is to succeed against us as well as against the European +Entente. + +The number of available enemy submarines is not unlimited, and the +difficulties of obtaining and maintaining bases are fully as difficult +for submarine as for surface craft. + +The difficulties experienced by enemy submarines en route and in +operating as far from their bases as they now do are prodigious. + +Operations on our coast without a base are impracticable, except by very +limited numbers for brief periods, purely as diversions. + +In view of our distance from enemy home bases, the extent of our +coastline, and the distances between our principal ports, it is a safe +assumption that if we could induce the enemy to shift the submarine war +area to our coasts his defeat would be assured, and his present success +would be diminished more than in proportion to the number of submarines +he diverted from the more accessible area where commerce necessarily +focuses. + +14. The Department's policy refers to willingness to extend hearty +co-operation to the Allies, and to discuss plans for joint operations, +and also to its readiness to consider any plans which may be submitted +by the joint Allied Admiralties. + +15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this co-operation, to +discuss plans with the various Admiralties, except in one way--and that +is, to establish what might be termed an advance headquarters in the war +zone composed of Department representatives upon whose recommendations +the Department can depend. + +I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in the +army--that is, the General Headquarters in the field being the advance +headquarters of the War Department at home, and the advance headquarters +must of necessity be left a certain area of discretion and freedom of +action as concerns the details of the measures necessitated by the +military situations as they arise. + +16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements which +enter into military warfare, and hence delays in communications by +written reports, together with the necessity for secrecy, render it very +difficult to discuss plans at long range. The enemy secret service has +proved itself to be of extraordinary efficiency. + +Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon discussion of +military plans by cable, as well as by letter. The necessary inadequacy +of written or cable communications needs no discussion. The +opportunities for misunderstandings are great. It is difficult to be +sure that one has expressed clearly one's meaning in writing, and hence +phrases in a letter are very liable to misinterpretation. They cannot +explain themselves. + +17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and perhaps +of all Allied wars, has been the difficulty of co-ordination and +co-operation in military effort. I am aware of a great mass of +information in this connection which it is practically impossible to +impart except by personal discussion. + +It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if _any +one_ of the Allies--Italy, France, England, or the United States--were +selected to direct all operations, the others merely keeping the one +selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to +complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these +resources. + +18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes necessary +to decide as to the best location in which to establish such advanced +headquarters, or what might be called an advance branch war council at +the front--that is, an advanced branch upon whose advice and decisions +the War Council itself largely depends. + +I fully realize the pressure and the influences which must have been +brought to bear upon the Department from all of the Allies, and from +various and perhaps conflicting sources. + +I also realize that my position here in England renders me open to +suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the British viewpoint of +the war. It should be unnecessary to state that I have done everything +within my ability to maintain a broad viewpoint with the above stated +mission constantly in mind. + +19. From the _naval_ point of view it would seem evident that London is +the best and most central location in the war area for what I have +termed above the Advance Branch of our Naval War Council. + +The British navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the brunt of +the naval war, and hence all naval information concerning the war +therefore reaches and centres in London. + +It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters staff, or +parts or divisions thereof, to visit Paris and other Allied Admiralties +at any time. + +I wish to make it quite clear that up to date it has been wholly +impossible for me, with one military Aide, to perform all of the +functions of such an advanced branch of the Department. + +As stated in my despatches, it has been evident for some time that I +have been approaching a state in which it would be physically impossible +to handle the work without an increase of staff. + +The present state of affairs is such that it is quite within range of +possibility for serious errors to occur which may involve disaster to +our ships, due to the physical impossibility of handling the +administrative and other work with the thoroughness which is essential +to safety. + +20. I consider that a very minimum staff which would be required is +approximately as follows. More officers could be well employed with +resulting increase of efficiency: + + (1) One Chief of Staff, who should be free to carry on a +continuous estimate of the situation, based upon all necessary +information. He would be given the freedom of the Operations Department +of the British and French Admiralties. + + (2) An officer, preferably of the rank of commander, for duties in + connection with shipping and convoy to handle all the numerous + communications in relation to the movements of American shipping, + particularly military shipping, and also other shipping carrying + American troops. + + (3) An officer, at least a lieutenant-commander, for duties in + connection with Anti-Submarine Division operations in order to + insure perfect co-operation in that field of work between our + service and other Allied Services. + + (4) An officer of all-round ability and discretion for duties in + connection with general military intelligence. He should be in + constant touch with the Secret Service Departments of the + Admiralties to insure that all military intelligence, which in any + way affects the Navy Department or our Forces, is properly and + promptly acted upon. + + (5) At least two lieutenants or lieutenant-commanders of the line + in my own office in connection with general administrative + questions in addition to the one now available. The necessity for + these additional officers is imperative. + + (6) One communication officer to take general charge of codes and + communications both with the Department at home, the Allied + Admiralties, and with the various bases of our Forces in the war + area. (At present Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, London, + and Paris.) + + (7) A paymaster to have complete charge of all financial matters + connected with our naval organization abroad. This officer should + be in addition to Paymaster Tobey, who is performing necessary and + invaluable service on my staff in connection with all logistic + questions. + +(Signed) WM. S. SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX VIII + +MONTHLY LOSSES SINCE FEBRUARY, 1917, FROM ENEMY ACTION + + +During the twenty-one months of unrestricted submarine warfare from +February, 1917, to October, 1918, inclusive, 3,843 merchant vessels +(British fishing vessels included) of a total gross tonnage of 8,478,947 +have been sunk by enemy action, a monthly average of 183 vessels +totalling 403,760 gross tons. The October tonnage losses show a decrease +from this average of 291,333 gross tons, or 72 per cent. + +The following gives the tonnage losses by months from February, 1917, to +October, 1918, inclusive: + +=========+===========+==============+==========+==========+========= + | British | Other Allied | Neutral | British | +Period. | Merchant | Merchant | Merchant | Fishing | Total. + | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | +---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- + 1917 | | | | | +February | 313,486 | 84,820 | 135,090 | 3,478 | 536,334 +March | 353,478 | 81,151 | 165,225 | 3,586 | 603,440 +April | 545,282 | 134,448 | 189,373 | 5,920 | 875,023 +May | 352,289 | 102,960 | 137,957 | 1,448 | 594,654 +June | 417,925 | 126,171 | 139,229 | 1,342 | 684,667 +July | 364,858 | 111,683 | 70,370 | 2,736 | 549,647 +August | 329,810 | 128,489 | 53,018 | 242 | 511,559 +September| 196,212 | 119,086 | 29,941 | 245 | 345,484 +October | 276,132 | 127,932 | 54,432 | 227 | 458,723 +November | 173,560 | 87,646 | 31,476 | 87 | 292,769 +December | 253,087 | 86,981 | 54,047 | 413 | 394,528 +---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- + +=========+===========+==============+==========+==========+========= + | British | Other Allied | Neutral | British | +Period. | Merchant | Merchant | Merchant | Fishing | Total. + | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | +---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- +1918 | | | | | +January | 179,973 | 87,078 | 35,037 | 375 | 302,463 +February | 226,896 | 54,904 | 36,374 | 686 | 318,860 +March | 199,458 | 94,321 | 51,035 | 293 | 345,107 +April | 215,453 | 50,879 | 11,361 | 241 | 277,934 +May | 192,436 | 80,826 | 20,757 | 504 | 294,523 +June | 162,990 | 51,173 | 38,474 | 639 | 253,276 +July | 165,449 | 70,900 | 23,552 | 555 | 260,456 +August | 145,721 | 91,209 | 41,946 | 1,455 | 280,331 +September| 136,864 | 39,343 | 10,393 | 142 | 186,742 +October | 57,607 | 41,308 | 13,512 | -- | 112,427 +---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- + + + + +APPENDIX IX + +TONNAGE CONSTRUCTED BY ALLIED AND NEUTRAL NATIONS SINCE AUGUST, 1914 + + +Construction of merchant shipping is shown in the following table, which +gives tonnage completed since the beginning of the war for the United +Kingdom, United States, and for other Allied and Neutral Nations. + +================+===========+============+============+============ + | United | United |Other Allied| + Period. | Kingdom. | States. |and Neutral.|World Total. + |Gross tons.|Gross tons. |Gross tons. |Gross tons. +----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ +1914 | 675,610 | 120,000[1]| 217,310 | 1,012,920 +1915 | 650,919 | 225,122 | 325,959 | 1,202,000 +1916 | 541,552 | 325,413 | 821,036 | 1,688,000 +1917 | 1,163,474 |1,034,296 | 505,585 | 2,703,355 +----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ +1918 1st quarter| 320,280 | 328,541 | 220,496 | 869,317 + 2nd quarter| 442,966 | 559,939 | 240,369 | 1,243,274 + 3rd quarter| 411,395 | 834,250 | 232,127 | 1,477,772 +October | 136,100 | 357,532[1]| 50,000 | 543,632 +----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ +1918 (10 months)| 1,310,741 |2,080,262 | 742,992 | 4,133,995 +----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ +[1: Estimated.] + + + + +INDEX + + +_Aboukir_, _Hogue_ and _Cressy_ torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174 + +_Achates_, with convoy, 122 + +_Active_, flagship of Vice-Adm. Bayly, 58 + +Adams, Ensign Ashley D., in charge of subchaser units, 191 + +Aircraft against submarines, 275 + +_Alcock_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163 + +Allied Naval Council, value of, 218 + +Amberger, Kapitän-Leutnant Gustav, of _U-58_, captured, 131; + comment on treatment, 134 + +American forces in European waters, 204 + +Anti-submarine craft, use of, 26 + +Anti-submarine devices, search for, 8 + +_Arkansas_, on duty with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Arming of merchant vessels, 25 + +_Aroostook_, mine-layer, 254, 264 + +_Aubrietia_, mystery ship, heading convoy, 118; + sights submarine, 121 + +_Audacious_, sunk by mine, 174 + +Aviation, naval, development of, 282; + extent at time of armistice, 286 + + +Babcock, Commr. J. V., sails with Adm. Sims as aide, 2; + at London headquarters, 205, 212, 214 + +_Badger_ in bombardment of Durazzo, 200 + +Bagley, Lt.-Commr. D. W., highly commended, 139 + +Baillargeon, J. C, volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Baldwin Locomotive Works, constructors of the U.S. mobile railway + batteries, 290 + +Balfour, Arthur James, discussion of submarine situation with, 9; + with Commission to the United States, 9; + advises Washington of critical submarine situation, 39 + +_Baltimore_, converted as mine-layer, 252, 261, 264 + +_Basilisk_, assisted by yacht _Lydonia_, sinks submarine, 136 + +Bassett, Capt. F. B., commanding the _Utah_, 305 + +Bastedo, Lt.-Commr. Paul H., in bombardment of Durazzo, 199, 201 + +Bayly, Vice-Adm. Lewis, letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, 45; + welcome to Americans at Queenstown, 46; + instructs Americans as to duties, 49; + characteristics, 52; + meets _Fanning_ and congratulates officers and men on capture of + submarine crew, 133; + message commending American forces at Queenstown, 140; + introduces Capt. G. Campbell of the "mystery ship," 142; + has difficulty in identifying one such ship, 151 + +Beach, Capt. E. L., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Beatty, Adm. Sir David, attitude toward torpedo flags, 217; + farewell speech to American Squadron, 304 + +Belknap, Capt. Reginald R., commanding mine-laying squadron, 252, 260, 264 + +_Benham_, highly commended, 139 + +Berrien, Commr. Frank D., commanding destroyer division, 129; + highly commended, 139 + +"Big Bertha," American naval guns sent to destroy, 290 + +Billings, A. W. K., great work in connection with air service, 285 + +_Birmingham_, at Gibraltar, 134 + +Blakely, Lt.-Commr. C. A., highly commended, 139 + +Blakeslee, Lt.-Commr. E. G., at London headquarters, 212 + +Blue, Capt. Victor, with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Boyd, Capt. David F., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Brest, as destroyer base, 134, 300 + +Brindisi, rendezvous for attack on Durazzo, 200 + +Briscoe, Lt.-Commr. Benjamin, work on air service stations, 285 + +Bristol, Capt. M. L., commanding the _Oklahoma_, 305 + +British Admiralty, commends work of U.S. aviation pilots, 286 + +British Fleet, not in control of the seas, 16; + at Scapa Flow, 28 + +_Broke_, sinks two German destroyers, 61 + +Browne, Ralph C, new type of submarine mine, 250 + +Bruges, submarine base, 19 + +Bullard, Capt. W. H. G., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Bumstead, Prof. H. A., at London headquarters, 213 + +_Bunker Hill_, converted as mine-layer, 254 + +Bushnell, David, inventor of submarine, 225 + +Butler, Capt. H. V., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + + +Callan, Lt.-Commr. J. L., in charge of U.S. air forces in Italy, 284 + +Campbell, Capt. Gordon, at Queenstown, 58; + exploits with mystery ships, 142; + with "mystery ship" _Pargust_, 147; + technique of operation, 148; + heroism on _Dunraven_, 157; + letter from Adm. Sims on _Dunraven_ exploit, 164 + +_Canandaigua_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264 + +_Canonicus_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264 + +Carpender, Lt. A. S., in command of _Fanning_, when submarine crew was + captured, 132; + receives D.S.O., 134 + +Carson, Sir Edward, discussion of submarine, 9; + of convoy system, 95 + +Cecil, Lord Robert, on submarine situation with, 9 + +_Centurion_, in China, commanded by Jellicoe, 43 + +_Christabel_, encounter with submarine, 127 + +_Christopher_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163 + +Christy, Capt. H. H., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., "digging the rats out of their holes," 246 + +Clinton-Baker, Rear-Adm., in command of British mine-laying operations, + 257 + +Cluverius, Capt. W. T., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +Cole, Capt. W. C., commanding the Nevada, 305 + +College boys and subchasers, 168 + +Commerce raiders, guarding against, 94, 112 + +Cone, Capt. Hutch I., at London headquarters, 212, 214; + organizer American air forces, 284; + severely injured on torpedoed _Leinster_, 285 + +Conner, Francis G., jumps overboard from _Fanning_ to save drowning + German from crew of submarine, 132 + +Convoy of shipping to Scandinavia, 22 + +Convoy system, ancient use of, 86; + merchant captains hostile to, 88, 93; + Gibraltar experiment, 96; + merchant captains won over, 96; + the headquarters and staff, 103; + details of operation, 103, 108; + routing of the convoys, 110, 116; + actual convoys described, 117; + success of system, 136; + relative parts taken by Great Britain and the United States, 138; + most important agency in winning the war, 141 + +_Conyngham_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; + with convoy, 122, 124; + destroys submarine, 125 + +Copeland, D. G., great work in connection with air service, 285 + +Corfu, subchaser base established at, 182; + detachment performing excellent service, 194 + +Cork, American destroyer officers make state visit to, 48; + sailors not permitted to visit, 71 + +Cotten, Capt. Lyman A., with subchasers, arrives at Plymouth, 177; + work in training subchaser crews, 178; + commanding subchaser squadrons, 182 + +Craven, Capt. T. T., great service in aviation, 283 + +Crenshaw, Capt. Arthur, good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +_Cressy_, _Aboukir_ and _Hogue_ torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174 + +Cronan, Capt. William P., work in training subchaser crews, 178 + +_Cumberland_, escorting convoy, 119, 123 + +Cunningham, Major A. A., commanding Marine Corps aviation in Northern + Bombing Group, 285 + +_Cushing_, at Queenstown, 139; + deceived by "mystery ship," 147 + + +_Danae_, attempt to torpedo, 128 + +Daniels, Secretary of War, instructs Adm. Sims to sail for England, 1 + +_Dartmouth_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +_Davis_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Davison, Trubee, organizer Yale aviation unit, recommended for + Distinguished Service Medal, 282 + +De Bon, Vice-Adm., Chief of French Naval Staff, 221 + +De Steiguer, Capt. L. R., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +_Decatur_, at Gibraltar, 135 + +Defrees, Capt. Joseph H., work on listening devices, 178 + +_Delaware_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + +Depth charge, origin of, 78; + effects of on submarines, 79 + +Destroyers, scarcity of in British navy, 28; + a new type of war vessel, their history, 75; + size and armament, 76; + high efficiency, 76; + how submarines are attacked, 82; + use of in convoying merchant vessels, 95 + +Destroyers, American, arrive in Queenstown, 40; + copy of sailing orders, 43; + compared with British, 48; + why placed under British Admiral at Queenstown, 61; + number of at Queenstown, 63; + enthusiasm of British public on arrival, 63; + "the return of the _Mayflower_," 64; + in action, 99; + duties of, 101 + +_Deutschland_, "merchant" submarine, visits Newport News, 266 + +Di Revel, Vice-Adm., Italian Member Allied Naval Council, 222 + +Dortch, Lt.-Commr. I. F., highly commended, 139 + +_Drayton_, highly commended, 139 + +Duff, Vice-Adm. Sir Alexander L., in charge of convoy system, 103 + +_Duncan_, American destroyer, at Queenstown, 57 + +Dunlap, Col. R. H., at London headquarters, 215 + +_Dunraven_, mystery ship, heroism of captain and crew, 157; + given Victoria Cross, 163, 164 + +Durazzo, bombardment of, 199 + + +Earle, Rear-Adm., in charge of design of mobile railway batteries for + Western Front, 290 + +Edwards, Lt.-Commr. W. A., at London headquarters, 212, 214; + commands Yale aviation unit, 283; + succeeds Capt. Cone in charge of aviation section, 285 + +Evans, Capt. E. R. G. R., British liaison officer with American + destroyers, 44; + exploit as commander of destroyer _Broke_, 61 + +Evans, Capt. F. T., in command of U.S. aviation centre at Pauillac, + France, 284 + + +Fairfield, Commr. Arthur P., with first American destroyer contingent, 42; + highly commended, 139 + +_Fanning_, captures crew of submarine, 129 + +Farquhar, Lt.-Commr., highly commended, 139 + +_Fenian Ram_, Holland's submarine, 227 + +Fighting submarines from the air, 275 + +Fisher, Adm. Sir John, in charge of department for investigating + anti-submarine devices, 8; + tells of American-built submarines, first to cross Atlantic, 266 + +Fletcher, Rear-Adm. Wm. B., commanding Brest naval base, 300 + +_Florida_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + +Foster, Arnold-, on building of submarines, 228 + +Fullinwider, Commr. S. P., efforts in perfection of new submarine mine, + 250 + +Fulton, Robert, efforts in developing the submarine, 226 + +Funakoshi, Rear-Adm., Japanese member Allied Naval Council, 222 + +Furer, Commr. Julius A., work in development of subchasers, 175 + + +Gannon, Capt. Sinclair, with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +Gates, Lt.-Commr. A. L., exploits at Dunkirk, 288 + +Geddes, Sir Eric, First Lord of the Admiralty, 219 + +George, King, meeting with, 9; + popular with American sailors, 67 + +George, Lloyd, optimistic regarding submarine situation, 10; + on convoy system, 95 + +German interned ships converted into transports, 301 + +Gibraltar, co-operation of American navy with British in operations at, + 134 + +Gillmor, R. E., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Gleaves, Rear-Adm. Albert, organization for transport fleet, 301 + +Glinder, Franz, drowned when crew surrendered to _Fanning_, 134; + buried with honours of war, 134 + +Good, P. F., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Goschen, Viscount, deemed submarine useless, 227 + +Graham, Capt. S. V., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Grand Fleet, British, protected by destroyers, 73; + immune from torpedo attack, 85 + +Greenslade, Capt. J. W., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + + +Hammon, Ensign C. H., exploit at Pola, 287 + +Hanrahan, Commr. David C., highly commended, 139; + commanding American mystery ship _Santee_, 166; + in command of Northern Bombing Group, 285 + +Harwell, Elxer, jumps overboard from _Fanning_ to save drowning German + from crew of submarine, 134 + +Helfferich, Dr. Karl, on effectiveness of the submarine, 14 + +Henry, Lt. Walter S., on _Fanning_, 130 + +Hepburn, Capt. Arthur J., work in training subchaser crews, 178; + commanding squadron of subchasers, reaches Queenstown, 203 + +_Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174 + +Holland, John P., designer of the modern submarine, 227 + +Hope, Rear-Adm., receives Adm. Sims on arrival, 2 + +Hospital ships, torpedoing of, 29 + +_Housatonic_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264 + +Howard, Lt.-Commr. D. L., highly commended, 139 + +Hughes, Capt. C. F., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + + +Inventions, anti-submarine, search for, 8 + +Inverness and Invergordon, mine-assembly bases at, 256 + +Ives, Ensign Paul F., drops a "dud" on deck of submarine, 286 + + +_Jacob Jones_, torpedoed by _U-53_, 107; + highly commended, 139 + +Jacoby, Ensign Maclair, at bombardment of Durazzo, 201 + +Jellicoe, Adm., character and abilities, 5; + statement of tonnage lost to submarines, 6; + in conference with, 8; + wounded in Boxer Rebellion, 43; + letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, 44; + difficulty in having convoy system adopted, 89, 95; + presides over Allied Naval Council, 219 + +Jessop, Capt. E. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Johnson, Commr. Alfred W., with first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Johnson, Capt. T. L., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +_Justicia_, torpedoing of, 114; + torpedoing announced as that of _Leviathan_ by German Admiralty, 314 + + +Kelly, Commodore, in bombardment of Durazzo, 198; + congratulates subchasers in this action, 203 + +Kennedy, Ensign S. C., record seaplane flight, 278 + +Keyes, Ensign K. B., extracts from seaplane flight report, 278 + +Keys, Adm. Sir Roger, reconstructs submarine barrage, 20 + +Killingholme, England, U.S. air station at, 278, 284 + +Kittredge, T. B., volunteers service at London headquarters, 206 + +Knox, Capt. D. W., at London headquarters, 215 + +_Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, converted into transport, 301 + + +Lacaze, Adm., French Minister of Marine, 221 + +Leigh, Capt. Richard H., experiments with listening devices, 172; + sent to Italy to construct subchaser base, 182; + at London headquarters, 212, 214 + +Libbey, Commr. Miles A., work in perfection of listening devices, 178 + +Listening devices, development of, 171; + especially advantageous on subchaser, 178; + method of operation on subchasers, 184; + of great value in the Otranto barrage, 196; + tube climbed by submarine survivor, 197 + +Little, Col. L. McC., at London headquarters, 215 + +London headquarters, 204, 210; + different departments of, 212; + work of the Planning Section, 215 + +Long, Capt. A. T., commanding the _Nevada_, 305 + +Long, Capt. Byron A., at headquarters of convoy system, 103; + at London headquarters, 212, 214; + routing American troops to France, 300 + +Loomis, Coxswain David D., lookout on _Fanning_ when submarine crew was + captured, 129 + +Lord Mayor of Cork, welcomes Americans at Queenstown, 45 + +_Lowestoft_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +_Luckenback_, shelled by submarine, 123 + +Ludlow, Ensign G. H., wounded, rescued from water, 287 + +_Lydonia_, assists in sinking submarine, 136 + +Lyons, Lt.-Commr. D., highly commended, 139 + + +MacDonnell, Lt.-Commr. E. O., in charge of flying Caproni bombers from + Italy to Flanders, 285 + +MacDougall, Capt. W. D., at London headquarters, 204 + +McBride, Capt. L. B., at London headquarters, 212, 214 + +McCalla, Capt., meets Adm. Jellicoe in China, 44 + +McCormick, E. H., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +McCullough, Commr. Richard P., recommended for decoration, 136 + +_McDougal_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; + highly commended, 139 + +McDowell, Commr. Clyde S., work on listening devices, 178 + +McGrann, Commr. W. H., at London headquarters, 212 + +McNamee, Capt. L., at London headquarters, 215 + +McVay, Capt. C. B., commanding the _Oklahoma_, 305 + +Magruder, Rear-Adm. T. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Mannix, Commr. D. Pratt, with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +Marshall, Capt. A. W., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +_Mary Rose_, welcomes American destroyers at Queenstown, 41 + +_Massachusetts_, converted as mine-layer, 254 + +_Melville_, "Mother Ship" of the destroyers at Queenstown, 58, 62 + +Millard, H., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Milner, Lord, on convoy system, 95 + +Mine barrage, at first not effective against submarines, 20, 24 + +Mine barrage in North Sea, American, 245; + immensity of, 252; + how laid, 257 + +Mine laying by German submarines, 51, 273, 274 + +Mines, Americans perfect new type, 250; + immense organization of supply and transport, 252 + +_Moewe_, commerce raider, 95 + +Murfin, Capt. Orin G., designer and builder of mine-assembly bases in + Scotland, 256 + +Mystery ships, greatly aid in combating the submarine, 103; + accompanying convoy, 118; + method of operating, 118; + operations of, 142; + technique, 148; + difficulty of identifying, 151; + number in operation, 152; + heroic fight of the _Dunraven_, 157; + exploit of _Prize_, 165; + American ship _Santee_, 166; + _Stockforce_ destroys submarine, 183 + + +_Nautilus_, submarine of Robert Fulton, 226 + +Naval guns, German, bombarding Dunkirk and Paris, 290 + +Naval guns, U.S., used on the Western Front, 289 + +Nelson, Capt. C. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178; + commanding subchaser squadrons at Corfu, 194; + in bombardment of Durazzo, 199, 200 + +_Neptune_ attacked by _U-29_, 84, 85 + +_Nevada_, guarding transports, 304 + +_New York_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + +Niblack, Rear-Adm. Albert P., commanding forces at Gibraltar, 134; + asks that subchasers be sent to Gibraltar, 195 + +_Nicholson_, in submarine chase, 123; + on convoy duty, 129; + assists _Fanning_ in capture of submarine and crew, 130; + highly commended, 139 + +_Noma_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163 + +Northern Bombing Group, established, 284, 285 + + +_O'Brien_, highly commended, 163 + +Oil, scarcity of, for Great Britain's fleet, 34 + +_Oklahoma_, guarding transports, 305 + +_Orama_, torpedoed, 125 + +Ostend, bombing of submarine base at, 285 + +Otranto barrage, the, 181, 195 + + +Page, Ambassador Walter Hines, asks that high naval representative be + sent to England, 1; + states that England faces defeat by submarines, 8; + on critical submarine situation, 38; + advised of submarine peril, 52; + a tower of strength, 207 + +_Pargust_, "mystery ship," destroys submarine, 147 + +_Parker_, in hunt for submarine, 119; + highly commended, 139; + supporting ship for subchasers at Plymouth, 182; + seriously damages the _U-53_, 189 + +Pauillac, France, U.S. aviation centre at, 284 + +_Pennsylvania_, transmits mobilization orders to destroyer division, 42 + +Pershing, Gen., request for naval guns at St. Nazaire, 290; + report of their skilful use, 293 + +Pescara, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, 284 + +_Pisa_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +Pitt, William, early opinion of the submarine, 226 + +Planning Section at London headquarters, 215 + +Pleadwell, Capt. F. L., at London headquarters, 212 + +Plunkett, Adm. Charles P., commanding naval guns on Western Front, 289; + aids in designing mobile railway batteries, 290 + +Plymouth, subchaser base at, 182 + +_Pocahontas_, converted from German liner to transport, 302 + +_Porter_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Porto Corsini, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, 284 + +Poteet, Lt.-Commr. Fred H., with first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Potter, Ensign Stephen, fight with enemy seaplane, 288 + +Powell, Lt.-Commr. Halsey, of destroyer _Parker_, 119; + highly commended, 139 + +_Princess Irene_, converted into transport, 302 + +Pringle, Capt. J. R. P., at Queenstown, 58; + commended by Adm. Bayly, 139 + +_Prize_, mystery ship, damages submarine and captures captain and two of + crew, 165 + + +Q-ships, _see_ Mystery ships + +Queenstown, a destroyer base, 32; + arrival of first American destroyers, 40; + officially welcomes the Americans, 45 + +_Quinnebaug_, mine-layer, 254, 264 + + +_René_, in westbound convoy, 129 + +Reynolds, Commr. W. H., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +_Rhein_, converted into transport, 302 + +Richardson, R. M. D., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +_Roanoke_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264 + +Roberts, Lady, requests Adm. Sims to call, 66 + +Robison, Rear-Adm. S. S., work on listening devices, 178 + +Rodgers, Rear-Adm. Thomas S., commanding Dreadnought division in Bantry + Bay, 305 + +Rodman, Adm. Hugh, commanding American squadron with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Rose, Hans, humane commander of the _U-53_, 106; + Allied forces ambitious to capture, 189; + not on _U-53_ when depth charged, 190; + visits Newport, and sinks merchantmen off Nantucket, 266 + +Royal Family, interested in American sailors, 67 + + +_Sacramento_, at Gibraltar, 134 + +_San Diego_, sunk by mine off Fire Island, 274 + +_San Francisco_, converted as mine-layer, 252, 264 + +_San Giorgio_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +_San Marco_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +Sanders, Lt. William, commanding mystery ship _Prize_, 165; + awarded Victoria Cross, 165 + +_Santa Maria_, compared in size to modern destroyer, 76 + +_Santee_, U.S. mystery ship, 150, 166 + +_Saranac_, mine-layer, 254, 264 + +Scales, Capt. A. H., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Schieffelin, Lt. John J., recommended for Distinguished Service Medal, 277 + +Schofield, Capt. Frank H., work on listening devices, 178; + at London headquarters, 215 + +Schuyler, Commr. G. L., at London headquarters, 212 + +Schwab, Charles M., fabricates submarines for the Allies, 266 + +Seaplane base at Killingholme, England, taken over by U.S., 278 + +Seaplane stations of U.S. forces in Europe, 284 + +Sexton, Capt. W. R., at London headquarters, 212 + +_Shawmut_, mine-layer, 254, 264 + +Sims, Adm., ordered to England, 1; + notifies Washington that war is being lost, 33; + of the oil scarcity, 34; + favours using U.S. naval forces in conjunction with Allies, 35; + first report of critical submarine situation, 37; + extent of duties in European waters, 62; + significance of the Guildhall speech, 65; + reception accorded by British people, 66; + meets Lady Roberts, 66; + first foreign naval officer to command British forces in war, 68; + works for adoption of convoy system, 93, 95; + congratulates officers and men of _Fanning_ on capture of submarine + and crew, 134; + has difficulty in identifying a "mystery ship," 151; + letter to Capt. Campbell on _Dunraven_ exploit, 164; + warns Navy Department of German submarines visiting U.S. coast, 267 + +Sinn Fein, controversy with American sailors, 69; in league with Germany, + 72 + +Smith, Capt. S. F., at London headquarters, 212 + +Sparrow, Capt. H. G., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Stark, Commr. Harold R., brings small destroyers from Manila to + Gibraltar, 135; + at London headquarters, 212 + +Stearns, Capt. C. D., with mine-laying squadron. 264 + +_Sterrett_, highly commended, 139 + +Stevens, L. S., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +_Stockforce_, mystery ship, destroys submarine, 183 + +Stockton, G. B., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Strauss, Rear-Adm. Joseph, in command of U.S. mine-laying operations, 257 + +Subchasers, number built and bases used, 168; + mobilized at New London, Conn., 173; + great numbers ordered by Great Britain and France, 174, 179; + hardships of the new crews, 176; + trip from New London to Corfu, 195; + an influence in the breakdown of Austria, 196; + in attack on Durazzo, 198; + congratulated on exploits of Durazzo by British Commodore and Italian + Naval General Staff, 203 + +Submarine against submarine, 224; + method of attack, 233 + +Submarine sinkings, gravity of, concealed by British, 2, 6; + losses of shipping, 51, 141 + +Submarines, American built, first to cross Atlantic, 267 + really submersible surface ships, 229; + how operated, 229; + an American invention, 225 + +Submarines, American, their part in the war, 224; + attacked by destroyers through error, 236; + the base at Berehaven, 238; + witnesses U-boat destroy itself, 239 + +Submarines, British, the _H_-, _E_-, and _K_-boats, 224; + destroy a U-boat, 238 + +Submarines, enemy, winning the war, 4, 7; + number of, destroyed, 7; + officers exaggerate sinkings, 13; + difficulty of blockading the United States, 17; + cruising period dependent upon supply of torpedoes, 19; + mines and nets not effective against, 19; + number operating simultaneously, 20, 21, 31; + erroneous impression as to numbers operating, 20; + every movement charted by Allies, 21, 271, 273; + three different types of, 22; + plans to pen in the bases, 23; + playing hide and seek with destroyers, 33; + on American coast, 36, 266; + amount of shipping destroyed, 51; + how attacked by destroyer, 82; + method of attack on battleships, 84; + operating on American coast impracticable, 91; + individual locations and movements plotted each day, 104; + destroyed by depth charges, 126, 128, 130, 136; + decoying by "mystery ship," 142, 183; + not taken seriously until after Weddingen's exploit, 174; + concentrated in enclosed waters, 180; + the Otranto barrage, 181; + sinkings prevented by subchasers, 183; + how located by listening devices, 184; + _U-53_ seriously damaged by destroyer _Parker_, 189; + suicide of entire crew of a depth charged submarine, 193; + two submarines sunk by subchasers in bombardment of Durazzo, 202; + Germans have difficulty in reaching home after Austrian surrender, 203; + number destroyed by Allies and how, 224; + U-boat destroys itself, 239; + the cruiser submarines, 240; + their various bases, 244; + effectiveness of American North Sea mine barrage, 245; + lay mines on American coast, 273, 274; + aircraft an important factor against, 275; + number sunk about British Isles, 296; + forced to choose between transports and merchantmen, 306 + +_Surveyor_, yacht, assists in sinking submarine, 136 + +_Surveyor_, merchantmen torpedoed while being convoyed, 136 + +_Susquehanna_, converted from German liner to transport, 302 + +Swasey, A. Loring, services in designing of subchasers, 175 + + +Taussig, Commr. Joseph K., in charge of first American destroyer + contingent, 42; + copy of sailing orders, 42; + previous record, 43; + welcoming letters from Admirals Jellicoe and Bayly, 44, 45; + reports to Vice-Adm. Bayly at Queenstown, 46; + highly commended, 139 + +Taylor, Capt. M. M., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +_Texas_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + +Thompson, Commr. Edgar, at London headquarters, 212 + +Thomson, Commr. T. A., at London headquarters, 212 + +Tobey, Capt. E. C., at London headquarters, 212, 214 + +Tomb, Capt. J. Harvey, with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +Tompkins, Capt. John T., work in organization of subchaser fleet, 178 + +Torpedo, track or wake made by, 81; + effective range of, 83; + duration of submarine's voyage dependent on number carried, 19; + supply limited, 26; + cost of, 77 + +Torpedo-boat, invention of, 76 + +Tozer, Capt. C. M., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Transporting armies to France, 294; + nationality of ships and percentage carried, 302 + +_Turtle_, first submarine, 225 + +Twining, Capt. N. C., at London headquarters, 212, 213 + + +_U-29_, torpedoes _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, and is later sunk by + _Dreadnought_, 84, 85 + +_U-53_, operates off American coast, 106; + torpedoes the _Jacob Jones_, 107; + seriously damaged by depth charges, 188; + surrendered after armistice, 190; + after visiting Newport, R.I., sinks several merchantmen, 266 + +_U-58_ depth charged and crew captured by _Fanning_ and _Nicholson_, 131 + +_U-151_, lays mines off American coast, 273 + +_U-156_, lays mines off American coast, 274 + +_UC-56_, practically destroyed by depth charge from _Christabel_, 128 + +_Utah_, guarding transports, 305 + + +_Vaterland_, converted into transport, 301 + +Vauclain, Samuel M., great help in turning out mobile railway batteries, + 290 + +_Venetia_, assists in sinking submarine, 136; + seriously damages another, 136 + +Voysey, Miss, niece of Vice-Adm. Bayly, and charming hostess, 59 + + +_Wadsworth_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; + highly commended, 139 + +_Wainwright_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Washington, Capt. Thomas, with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Weatherhead, Ensign C. H., makes record seaplane flight, 278 + +Weddingen, Commr. Otto, torpedoes _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, and + is in turn sunk by battleship _Dreadnought_, 84, 174 + +_Welshman_, narrow escape from being torpedoed, 130, 133 + +_Weymouth_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +_Wheeling_, depth charges submarine, 136 + +White, Sir William, on the submarine, 225 + +Whiting, Commr. Kenneth, great service in aviation, 283 + +Wiley, Capt. H. A., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Wilhelm, Kaiser, on effectiveness of the submarine, 13 + +_Wilkes_, on submarine hunt with _Parker_, 189 + +Williams, Lt.-Commr. Roger, at Queenstown, 57 + +Wilson, Rear-Adm. Henry B., commander of forces at _Gibraltar_, 134; + at Brest, 134; + commanding Brest naval base, 300 + +Wireless telegraphy, of the submarines and destroyers, 100; + messages reveal locations of submarines, 105 + +Wortman, Lieut.-Commr. Ward K., with first American destroyer contingent, + 42 + +_Wyoming_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + + +Y-guns, or howitzers, for hurling depth charges, 79 + +Yachts, good service on French coast, 301 + +Yale aviation unit, organization of, 282; + renders great service, 283 + +Yarnell, Capt. H. E., at London headquarters, 215 + + +Zeebrugge, bombing of submarine base at, 285 + +Zigzagging, efficacious protection against submarines, 87, 120 + +Zogbaum, Lt.-Commr. Rufus F., with first American destroyer contingent, + 42 + + + + +-----------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note: | + | | + | Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the | + | original document have been preserved. | + | | + | Typographical errors corrected in the text: | + | | + | Page 136 Carthagena changed to Cartagena | + | Page 151 out changed to our | + | Page 194 saltest changed to saltiest | + | Page 227 if changed to it | + | Page 264 wift changed to swift | + | Page 271 frm changed to from | + | Page 278 Ensign changed to Ensigns | + | Page 348 de Steigner changed to de Steiguer | + +-----------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Victory At Sea, by +William Sowden Sims and Burton J. 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background-color: inherit; + font-variant: normal;} /* page numbers in poems */ + + + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Victory At Sea, by +William Sowden Sims and Burton J. Hendrick + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Victory At Sea + +Author: William Sowden Sims + Burton J. Hendrick + +Release Date: January 15, 2012 [EBook #38587] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VICTORY AT SEA *** + + + + +Produced by David Edwards, Barbara Kosker and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<div class="img"> +<img border="0" src="images/cover.jpg" width="39%" alt="Book Cover" id='Coverpage' /> +</div> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<h1>THE VICTORY AT SEA</h1> +<br /> +<h2>REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. SIMS<br /> +U.S. NAVY</h2> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>THE VICTORY AT SEA</h3> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<div class="img"> +<img border="0" src="images/frontis.jpg" width="50%" alt="Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims" /><br /> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em; margin-left: 30%; font-size: 85%;"><i>G. Vandyk Ltd. photographers</i></p> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;"><i>Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims<br /> +U.S. Navy<br /></i></p> +</div> + +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<h1>THE VICTORY AT SEA</h1> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<h2>BY REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS<br /> +U.S. NAVY</h2> +<br /> +<br /> +<h4>COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES<br /> +OPERATING IN EUROPEAN WATERS DURING THE GREAT WAR</h4> +<br /> +<br /> + +<h4>IN COLLABORATION WITH BURTON J. HENDRICK</h4> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<h4>WITH PORTRAIT AND PLANS</h4> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<h3>LONDON<br /> +JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.<br/> +1920</h3> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<h5> +<span class="smcap">First Edition</span>, <i>November 1920</i><br /> +<i>Reprinted</i>, <i>December 1920</i><br /> +<br /> +<span class="smcap">All Rights Reserved</span></h5><br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<hr style="width: 30%;" /> +<h5><i>Printed by Hasell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury, England.</i></h5> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + + +<p class="cen"> +TO<br /> +<br /> +THE GALLANT OFFICERS AND MEN<br /> +<br /> +WHOM I HAD THE HONOUR TO COMMAND<br /> +<br /> +DURING THE GREAT WAR<br /> +<br /> +IN<br /> +<br /> +GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF<br /> +<br /> +A LOYAL DEVOTION TO THE CAUSE<br /> +<br /> +THAT GREATLY LIGHTENED THE<br /> +<br /> +RESPONSIBILITY<br /> +<br /> +BORNE BY<br /> +<br /> +"THE OLD MAN"<br /></p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">[Pg xi]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>PREFACE</h2> +<br /> + +<p>This is not in any sense a history of the operations of our naval forces +in Europe during the Great War, much less a history of the naval +operations as a whole. That would require not only many volumes, but +prolonged and careful research by competent historians. When such a work +is completed, our people will realize for the first time the admirable +initiative with which the gallant personnel of our navy responded to the +requirements of an unprecedented naval situation.</p> + +<p>But in the meantime this story has been written in response to a demand +for some account of the very generally misunderstood submarine campaign +and, particularly, of the means by which it was defeated. The interest +of the public in such a story is due to the fact that during the war the +sea forces were compelled to take all possible precautions to keep the +enemy from learning anything about the various devices and means used to +oppose or destroy the under-water craft. This necessity for the utmost +secrecy was owing to the peculiar nature of the sea warfare. When the +armies first made use of airplane bombs, or poison gas, or tanks, or +mobile railroad batteries, the existence of these weapons and the manner +of their use were necessarily at once revealed to the enemy, and the +press was permitted to publish full accounts of them and, to a certain +extent, of their effect and the means used to oppose them. Moreover, all +general movements of the contending armies that resulted in engagements +were known with fair accuracy on both sides within a short time after +they occurred and were promptly reported to an anxious public.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">[Pg xii]</a></span>But this situation bore almost no resemblance to the struggle between +the U-boats and the anti-submarine forces of the Allies. Barring a few +naval actions between surface vessels, such as the battles of Jutland +and of the Falkland Islands, the naval war was, for the most part, a +succession of contests between single vessels or small groups of +vessels. The enemy submarines sought to win the war by sinking the +merchant shipping upon which depended the essential supplies of the +allied populations and armies; and it was the effort of the Allies to +prevent this, and to destroy submarines when possible, that constituted +the vitally important naval activities of the war. By means of +strategical and tactical dispositions, and various weapons and devices, +now no longer secret, such as the depth charge, the mystery ship, +hydrophones, mine-fields, explosive mine nets, special hunting +submarines, and so forth, it was frequently possible either to destroy +submarines with their entire crews, or to capture the few men who +escaped when their boats were sunk, and thus keep from the German +Admiralty all knowledge of the means by which their U-boats had met +their fate. Thus the mystery ships, or decoy ships, as the Germans +called them, destroyed a number of submarines before the enemy knew that +such dangerous vessels existed. And even after they had acquired this +knowledge, the mystery ships used various devices that enabled them to +continue their successes until some unsuccessfully attacked submarine +carried word of the new danger back to her home port.</p> + +<p>Under such unprecedented conditions of warfare, it is apparent that the +Allied navies could not safely tell the public just what they were doing +or how they were doing it. All articles written for the press had to be +carefully censored, and all of these interesting matters ruthlessly +suppressed; but now that the ban has been removed, it is desirable to +give the relatives and friends of the fine chaps who did the good work +sufficient information to enable them to understand the difficulty of +the problem that was presented to the anti-submarine forces of the +Allies, the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiii" id="Page_xiii">[Pg xiii]</a></span>manner in which it was solved, and the various means +invented and employed.</p> + +<p>The subject is of course largely technical, but an effort has been made +to present the story in such form that the layman can readily understand +it. As it is difficult, if not quite impossible, for a naval officer to +determine just which of the details that are a part of his daily life, +and what incidents of sea experience would interest his civilian +friends, the story has been written in collaboration with Mr. Burton J. +Hendrick, to whom I am greatly indebted for invaluable assistance; and +who, being an experienced hand at this writing business, deserves all +the credit the reader may be disposed to accord him for both the form +and such graces of descriptive style as he may be able to detect.</p> + +<p>While opinions may differ to a certain extent as to the influence +exerted upon the campaign by the various forms of tactics, the means and +weapons employed, and the general strategy adopted, I have given what I +believe to be a consensus of the best informed opinion upon these +matters; and I have taken advantage of all of the information now +available to insure accuracy in the account of the conditions that +confronted the European naval forces, and in the description of the +various operations that have been selected as typical examples of this +very extraordinary warfare.</p> + +<p>It is probably unnecessary to add that this book is published with the +full approval of the Navy Department. My correspondence on this subject +with the Secretary will be found in the Appendix.</p> + +<p class="right">W. S. S.</p> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xiv" id="Page_xiv">[Pg xiv]</a></span> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xv" id="Page_xv">[Pg xv]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CONTENTS</h2> + +<div class="centered"> +<table border="0" width="70%" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="Table of Contents"> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp" width="10%" style="font-size: 80%;">CHAPTER</td> + <td class="tdl" width="80%"> </td> + <td class="tdr" width="10%" style="font-size: 80%;">PAGE</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">I.</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">When Germany Was Winning the War</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">II</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">The Return of the "Mayflower"</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_40">40</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">III</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">The Adoption of the Convoy</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_73">73</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">IV</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">American Destroyers in Action</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_99">99</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">V</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">Decoying Submarines to Destruction</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_141">141</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">VI</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">American College Boys and Subchasers</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_168">168</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">VII</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">The London Flagship</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_204">204</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">VIII</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">Submarine Against Submarine</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_224">224</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp" style="vertical-align: top;">IX</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">The American Mine Barrage in the North Sea</td> + <td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_244">244</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp" style="vertical-align: top;">X</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">German Submarines Visit the American Coast</td> + <td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_266">266</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">XI</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">Fighting Submarines from the Air</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_275">275</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp">XII</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">The Navy Fighting on the Land</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_289">289</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp" style="vertical-align: top;">XIII</td> + <td class="tdl smcap">Transporting Two Million American Soldiers to France</td> + <td class="tdrb"><a href="#Page_294">294</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"> </td> + <td class="tdl smcap">Appendix</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_316">316</a></td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdrp"> </td> + <td class="tdl smcap">Index</td> + <td class="tdr"><a href="#Page_347">347</a></td> + </tr> +</table> +</div> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_xvi" id="Page_xvi">[Pg xvi]</a></span> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">[Pg 1]</a></span> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>THE VICTORY AT SEA</h2> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>In the latter part of March, 1917, a message from the Navy Department +came to me at Newport, where I was stationed as president of the Naval +War College, summoning me immediately to Washington. The international +atmosphere at that time was extremely tense, and the form in which these +instructions were cast showed that something extraordinary was +impending. The orders directed me to make my visit as unostentatious as +possible; to keep all my movements secret, and, on my arrival in +Washington, not to appear at the Navy Department, but to telephone +headquarters. I promptly complied with these orders; and, after I got in +touch with the navy chiefs, it took but a few moments to explain the +situation. It seemed inevitable, I was informed, that the United States +would soon be at war with Germany. Ambassador Page had cabled that it +would be desirable, under the existing circumstances, that the American +navy be represented by an officer of higher rank than any of those who +were stationed in London at that time. The Department therefore wished +me to leave immediately for England, to get in touch with the British +Admiralty, to study the naval situation and learn how we could best and +most quickly co-operate in the naval war. At this moment we were still +technically at peace with Germany. Mr. Daniels, the Secretary of the +Navy, therefore thought it wise that there should be no publicity about +my movements. I was to remain ostensibly as head of the War College, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">[Pg 2]</a></span>and, in order that no suspicions should be aroused, my wife and family +were still to occupy the official residence of its president. I was +directed to sail on a merchant vessel, to travel under an assumed name, +to wear civilian clothes and to take no uniform. On reaching the other +side I was to get immediately in communication with the British +Admiralty, and send to Washington detailed reports on prevailing +conditions.</p> + +<p>A few days after this interview in Washington two commonplace-looking +gentlemen, dressed in civilian clothes, secretly boarded the American +steamship <i>New York</i>. They were entered upon the passenger list as V. J. +Richardson and S. W. Davidson. A day or two out an enterprising steward +noticed that the initials on the pyjamas of one of these passengers +differed from those of the name under which he was sailing and reported +him to the captain as a suspicious character. The captain had a quiet +laugh over this discovery, for he knew that Mr. Davidson was +Rear-Admiral Sims, of the United States Navy, and that his companion who +possessed the two sets of conflicting initials was Commander J. V. +Babcock, the Admiral's <i>aide</i>. The voyage itself was an uneventful one, +but a good deal of history was made in those few days that we spent upon +the sea. Our ship reached England on April 9th; one week previously +President Wilson had gone before Congress and asked for the declaration +of a state of war with Germany. We had a slight reminder that a war was +under way as we neared Liverpool, for a mine struck our vessel as we +approached the outer harbour. The damage was not irreparable; the +passengers were transferred to another steamer and we safely reached +port, where I found a representative of the British Admiralty, +Rear-Admiral Hope, waiting to receive me. The Admiralty had also +provided a special train, in which we left immediately for London.</p> + +<p>Whenever I think of the naval situation as it existed in April, 1917, I +always have before my mind two contrasting pictures—one that of the +British public, as represented in their press and in their social +gatherings in London, and the other that of British officialdom, as +represented in my confidential meetings with British statesmen and +British naval officers. For the larger part the English newspapers were +publishing optimistic statements about the German <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">[Pg 3]</a></span>submarine campaign. +In these they generally scouted the idea that this new form of piracy +really threatened in any way the safety of the British Empire. They +accompanied these rather cheerful outgivings by weekly statistics of +submarine sinkings; figures which, while not particularly reassuring, +hardly indicated that any serious inroads had yet been made on the +British mercantile marine. The Admiralty was publishing tables showing +that four or five thousand ships were arriving at British ports and +leaving them every week, while other tables disclosed the number of +British ships of less than sixteen hundred tons and more than sixteen +hundred tons that were going down every seven days. Thus the week of my +arrival I learned from these figures that Great Britain had lost +seventeen ships above that size, and two ships below; that 2,406 vessels +had arrived at British ports, that 2,367 had left, and that, in +addition, seven fishing vessels had fallen victims to the German +submarines. Such figures were worthless, for they did not include +neutral ships and did not give the amount of tonnage sunk, details, of +course, which it was necessary to keep from the enemy. The facts which +the Government thus permitted to come to public knowledge did not +indicate that the situation was particularly alarming. Indeed the +newspapers all over the British Isles showed no signs of perturbation; +on the contrary, they were drawing favourable conclusions from these +statistics. Here and there one of them may have sounded a more +apprehensive note; yet the generally prevailing feeling both in the +press and in general discussions of the war seemed to be that the +submarine campaign had already failed, that Germany's last desperate +attempt to win the war had already broken down, and that peace would +probably not be long delayed. The newspapers found considerable +satisfaction in the fact that the "volume of British shipping was being +maintained"; they displayed such headlines as "improvement continues"; +they printed prominently the encouraging speeches of certain British +statesmen, and in this way were apparently quieting popular apprehension +concerning the outcome. This same atmosphere of cheerful ignorance I +found everywhere in London society. The fear of German submarines was +not disturbing the London season, which had now reached its height; the +theatres <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">[Pg 4]</a></span>were packed every night; everywhere, indeed, the men and women +of the upper classes were apparently giving little thought to any danger +that might be hanging over their country. Before arriving in England I +myself had not known the gravity of the situation. I had followed the +war from the beginning with the greatest interest; I had read +practically everything printed about it in the American and foreign +press, and I had had access to such official information as was +available on our side of the Atlantic. The result was that, when I +sailed for England in March, I felt little fear about the outcome. All +the fundamental facts in the case made it appear impossible that the +Germans could win the war. Sea power apparently rested practically +unchallenged in the hands of the Allies; and that in itself, according +to the unvarying lessons of history, was an absolute assurance of +ultimate victory. The statistics of shipping losses had been regularly +printed in the American press, and, while such wanton destruction of +life and property seemed appalling, there was apparently nothing in +these figures that was likely to make any material change in the result. +Indeed it appeared to be altogether probable that the war would end +before the United States could exert any material influence upon the +outcome. My conclusions were shared by most American naval officers whom +I knew, students of warfare, who, like myself, had the utmost respect +for the British fleet and believed that it had the naval situation well +in hand.</p> + +<p>Yet a few days spent in London clearly showed that all this confidence +in the defeat of the Germans rested upon a misapprehension. The Germans, +it now appeared, were not losing the war—they were winning it. The +British Admiralty now placed before the American representative facts +and figures which it had not given to the British press. These documents +disclosed the astounding fact that, unless the appalling destruction of +merchant tonnage which was then taking place could be materially +checked, the unconditional surrender of the British Empire would +inevitably take place within a few months.</p> + +<p>On the day of my arrival in London I had my first interview with Admiral +Jellicoe, who was at that time the First Sea Lord. Admiral Jellicoe and +I needed no introduction. I had known him for many years and for a +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">[Pg 5]</a></span>considerable period we had been more or less regular correspondents. I +had first made his acquaintance in China in 1901; at that time Jellicoe +was a captain and was already recognized as one of the coming men of the +British navy. He was an expert in ordnance and gunnery, a subject in +which I was greatly interested; and this fact had brought us together +and made us friends. The admiration which I had then conceived for the +Admiral's character and intelligence I have never lost. He was then, as +he has been ever since, an indefatigable worker, and more than a worker, +for he was a profound student of everything which pertained to ships and +gunnery, and a man who joined to a splendid intellect the real ability +of command. I had known him in his own home with his wife and babies, as +well as on shipboard among his men, and had observed at close hand the +gracious personality which had the power to draw everyone to him and +make him the idol both of his own children and the officers and jackies +of the British fleet. Simplicity and directness were his two most +outstanding points; though few men had risen so rapidly in the Royal +Navy, success had made him only more quiet, soft spoken, and +unostentatiously dignified; there was nothing of the blustering seadog +about the Admiral, but he was all courtesy, all brain, and, of all the +men I have ever met, there have been none more approachable, more frank, +and more open-minded.</p> + +<p>Physically Admiral Jellicoe is a small man, but as powerful in frame as +he is in mind, and there are few men in the navy who can match him in +tennis. His smooth-shaven face, when I met him that morning in April, +1917, was, as usual, calm, smiling, and imperturbable. One could never +divine his thoughts by any outward display of emotion. Neither did he +give any signs that he was bearing a great burden, though it is not too +much to say that at this moment the safety of the British Empire rested +chiefly upon Admiral Jellicoe's shoulders. I find the absurd notion +prevalent in this country that his change from Commander of the Grand +Fleet to First Sea Lord was something in the nature of a demotion; but +nothing could be farther from the truth. As First Sea Lord, Jellicoe +controlled the operations, not only of the Grand Fleet, but also of the +entire British navy; he had no <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">[Pg 6]</a></span>superior officer, for the First Lord of +the Admiralty, the position in England that corresponds to our Secretary +of the Navy, has no power to give any order whatever to the fleet—a +power which our Secretary possesses. Thus the defeat of the German +submarines was a direct responsibility which Admiral Jellicoe could +divide with no other official. Great as this duty was, and appalling as +was the submarine situation at the time of this interview, there was +nothing about the Admiral's bearing which betrayed any depression of +spirits. He manifested great seriousness indeed, possibly some +apprehension, but British stoicism and the usual British refusal to +succumb to discouragement were qualities that were keeping him +tenaciously at his job.</p> + +<p>After the usual greetings, Admiral Jellicoe took a paper out of his +drawer and handed it to me. It was a record of tonnage losses for the +last few months. This showed that the total sinkings, British and +neutral, had reached 536,000 tons in February and 603,000 in March; it +further disclosed that sinkings were taking place in April which +indicated the destruction of nearly 900,000 tons. These figures +indicated that the losses were three and four times as large as those +which were then being published in the press.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> + +<p>It is expressing it mildly to say that I was surprised by this +disclosure. I was fairly astounded; for I had never imagined anything so +terrible. I expressed my consternation to Admiral Jellicoe.</p> + +<p>"Yes," he said, as quietly as though he were discussing the weather and +not the future of the British Empire. "It is impossible for us to go on +with the war if losses like this continue."</p> + +<p>"What are you doing about it?" I asked.</p> + +<p>"Everything that we can. We are increasing our anti-submarine forces in +every possible way. We are using every possible craft we can find with +which to fight submarines. We are building destroyers, trawlers, and +other like craft as fast as we can. But the situation is very serious +and we shall need all the assistance we can get."</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">[Pg 7]</a></span>"It looks as though the Germans were winning the war," I remarked.</p> + +<p>"They will win, unless we can stop these losses—and stop them soon," +the Admiral replied.</p> + +<p>"Is there no solution for the problem?" I asked.</p> + +<p>"Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe announced. He described +the work of destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, but he showed no +confidence that they would be able to control the depredations of the +U-boats.</p> + +<p>The newspapers for several months had been publishing stories that +submarines in large numbers were being sunk; and these stories I now +found to be untrue. The Admiralty records showed that only fifty-four +German submarines were positively known to have been sunk since the +beginning of the war; the German shipyards, I was now informed, were +turning out new submarines at the rate of three a week. The newspapers +had also published accounts of the voluntary surrender of German +U-boats; but not one such surrender, Admiral Jellicoe said, had ever +taken place; the stories had been circulated merely for the purpose of +depreciating enemy <i>moral</i>. I even found that members of the Government, +all of whom should have been better informed, and also British naval +officers, believed that many captured German submarines had been +carefully stowed away at the Portsmouth and Plymouth navy yards. Yet the +disconcerting facts which faced the Allies were that the supplies and +communications of the forces on all fronts were threatened; that German +submarines were constantly extending their operations farther and +farther out into the Atlantic; that German raiders were escaping into +the open sea; that three years' constant operations had seriously +threatened the strength of the British navy, and that Great Britain's +control of the sea was actually at stake. Nor did Admiral Jellicoe +indulge in any false expectations concerning the future. Bad as the +situation then was, he had every expectation that it would grow worse. +The season which was now approaching would make easier the German +operations, for the submarines would soon have the long daylight of the +British summer and the more favourable weather. The next few months, +indeed, both in the estimation of the Germans and the British, would +witness <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">[Pg 8]</a></span>the great crisis of the war; the basis of the ruthless campaign +upon which the submarines had entered was that they could reach the +decision before winter closed in. So far as I could learn there was a +general belief in British naval circles that this plan would succeed. +The losses were now approaching a million tons a month; it was thus a +matter of very simple arithmetic to determine the length of time the +Allies could stand such a strain. According to the authorities the limit +of endurance would be reached about November 1, 1917; in other words, +unless some method of successfully fighting submarines could be +discovered almost immediately, Great Britain would have to lay down her +arms before a victorious Germany.</p> + +<p>"What we are facing is the defeat of Great Britain," said Ambassador +Walter H. Page, after the situation had been explained to him.</p> + +<p>In the next few weeks I had many interviews with Admiral Jellicoe and +other members of the Admiralty. Sitting in conference with them every +morning, I became, for all practical purposes, a member of their +organization. There were no secrets of the British navy which were not +disclosed to their new American ally. This policy was in accordance with +the broad-minded attitude of the British Government; there was a general +desire that the United States should understand the situation +completely, and from the beginning matters were discussed with the +utmost frankness. Everywhere was manifested a willingness to receive +suggestions and to try any expedient that promised to be even remotely +successful; yet the feeling prevailed that there was no quick and easy +way to defeat the submarine, that anything even faintly resembling the +much-sought "answer" had not yet appeared on the horizon. The prevailing +impression that any new invention could control the submarine in time to +be effective was deprecated. The American press was at that time +constantly calling upon Edison and other great American inventors to +solve this problem, and, in fact, inventors in every part of two +hemispheres were turning out devices by the thousands. A regular +department of the Admiralty which was headed by Admiral Fisher had +charge of investigating their proposals; in a few months it had received +and examined not far from 40,000 inventions, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">[Pg 9]</a></span>none of which answered the +purpose, though many of them were exceedingly ingenious. British naval +officers were not hostile to such projects; they declared, however, that +it would be absurd to depend upon new devices for defeating the German +campaign. The overshadowing fact—a fact which I find that many naval +men have not yet sufficiently grasped—is that time was the +all-important element. It was necessary not only that a way be found of +curbing the submarine, but of accomplishing this result at once. The +salvation of the great cause in which we had engaged was a matter of +only a few months. A mechanical device, or a new type of ship which +might destroy this menace six months hence, would not have helped us, +for by that time Germany would have won the war.</p> + +<p>I discussed the situation also with members of the Cabinet, such as Mr. +Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, and Sir Edward Carson. Their attitude to me +was very different from the attitude which they were taking publicly; +these men naturally would say nothing in the newspapers that would +improve the enemy <i>moral</i>; but in explaining the situation to me they +repeated practically everything that Jellicoe had said. It was the +seriousness of this situation that soon afterward sent Mr. Balfour and +the British Commission to the United States. The world does not yet +understand what a dark moment that was in the history of the Allied +cause. Not only were the German submarines sweeping British commerce +from the seas, but the German armies were also defeating the British and +French on the battlefields in France. It is only when we recall that the +Germans were attaining the high peak of success with the U-boats at the +very moment that General Nivelle's offensive had failed on the Western +Front that we can get some idea of the real tragedy of the Allied +situation in the spring of 1917.</p> + +<p>"Things were dark when I took that trip to America," Mr. Balfour said to +me afterward. "The submarines were constantly on my mind. I could think +of nothing but the number of ships which they were sinking. At that time +it certainly looked as though we were going to lose the war."</p> + +<p>One of the men who most keenly realized the state of affairs was the +King. I met His Majesty first in the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">[Pg 10]</a></span>vestibule of St. Paul's, on that +memorable occasion in April, 1917, when the English people held a +thanksgiving service to commemorate America's entrance into the war. +Then, as at several subsequent meetings, the King impressed me as a +simple, courteous, unaffected English gentleman. He was dressed in +khaki, like any other English officer, and his manner was warm-hearted, +sincere, and even democratic.</p> + +<p>"It gives me great pleasure to meet you on an occasion like this," said +His Majesty, referring to the great Anglo-American memorial service. "I +am also glad to greet an American admiral on such a mission as yours. +And I wish you all success."</p> + +<p>On that occasion we naturally had little time to discuss the submarines, +but a few days afterward I was invited to spend the night at Windsor +Castle. The King in his own home proved to be even more cordial, if that +were possible, than at our first meeting. After dinner we adjourned to a +small room and there, over our cigars, we discussed the situation at +considerable length. The King is a rapid and animated talker; he was +kept constantly informed on the submarine situation, and discussed it +that night in all its details. I was at first surprised by his +familiarity with all naval questions and the intimate touch which he was +evidently maintaining with the British fleet. Yet this was not really +surprising, for His Majesty himself is a sailor; in his early youth he +joined the navy, in which he worked up like any other British boy. He +seemed almost as well informed about the American navy as about the +British; he displayed the utmost interest in our preparations on land +and sea, and he was particularly solicitous that I, as the American +representative, should have complete access to the Admiralty Office. +About the submarine campaign, the King was just as outspoken as Jellicoe +and the other members of the Admiralty. The thing must be stopped, or +the Allies could never win the war.</p> + +<p>Of all the influential men in British public life there was only one who +at that time took an optimistic attitude. This was Mr. Lloyd George. I +met the Prime Minister frequently at dinners, at his own country place +and elsewhere, and the most lasting impression which I retain of this +wonderful man was his irrepressible gaiety of spirits. I think of the +Prime Minister of Great Britain as a great, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">[Pg 11]</a></span>big, exuberant boy, always +laughing and joking, constantly indulging in repartee and by-play, and +even in this crisis, perhaps the darkest one of British history, showing +no signs of depression. His face, which was clear in its complexion as a +girl's, never betrayed the slightest anxiety, and his eyes, which were +always sparkling, never disclosed the faintest shadow. It was a picture +which I shall never forget—that of this man, upon whose shoulders the +destiny of the Empire chiefly rested, apparently refusing to admit, even +to himself, the dangers that were seemingly overwhelming it, heroically +devoting all his energies to uplifting the spirits of his countrymen, +and, in his private intercourse with his associates, even in the most +fateful moments, finding time to tell funny stories, to recall +entertaining anecdotes of his own political career, to poke fun at the +mistakes of his opponents, and to turn the general conversation a +thousand miles away from the Western Front and the German submarines. It +was the most inspiring instance of self-control that I have ever known; +indeed only one other case in history can be compared with it; Lloyd +George's attitude at this period constantly reminded me of Lincoln in +the darkest hours of the Civil War, when, after receiving news of such +calamities as Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville, he would entertain his +cabinet by reading selections from Artemus Ward, interlarded with +humorous sayings and anecdotes of his own. Perhaps Lloyd George's +cheerfulness is explained by another trait which he likewise possessed +in common with Lincoln; there is a Welsh mysticism in his nature which, +I am told, sometimes takes the form of religious exaltation. Lloyd +George's faith in God and in a divine ordering of history was evidently +so profound that the idea of German victory probably never seized his +mind as a reality; we all know that Lincoln's absolute confidence in the +triumph of the North rested upon a similar basis. Certainly only some +such deep-set conviction as this could explain Lloyd George's serenity +and optimism in the face of the most frightful calamities. I attended a +small dinner at which the Premier was present four days after the +Germans had made their terrible attack in March, 1918. Even on this +occasion he showed no evidences of strain; as usual his animated spirits +held the upper hand; he was talking incessantly, but he never even +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">[Pg 12]</a></span>mentioned the subject that was absorbing the thoughts of the rest of +the world at that moment; instead he rattled along, touching upon the +Irish question, discussing the impression which Irish conscription would +make in America, and, now and then, pausing to pass some bantering +remark to Mr. Balfour. This was the way that I always saw the head of +the British Government; never did I meet him when he was fagged or +discouraged, or when he saw any end to the war but a favourable one.</p> + +<p>On several occasions I attempted to impress Mr. Lloyd George with the +gravity of the situation; he always refused to acknowledge that it was +grave.</p> + +<p>"Oh, yes, things are bad," he would say with a smile and a sweep of his +hand. "But we shall get the best of the submarines—never fear!"</p> + +<p>The cheerfulness of the Prime Minister, however, was exceptional; all +his associates hardly concealed their apprehension. On the other hand, a +wave of enthusiasm was at that time sweeping over Germany. Americans +still have an idea that the German Government adopted the submarine +campaign as the last despairing gambler's chance, and that they only +half believed in its success themselves. There is an impression here +that the Germans never would have staked their Empire on this desperate +final throw had they foreseen that the United States would have +mobilized against them all its men and resources. This conviction is +entirely wrong. The Germans did not think that they were taking any +chances when they announced their unrestricted campaign; the ultimate +result seemed to them to be a certainty. They calculated the available +shipping which the Allies and the neutral nations had afloat; they knew +just how many ships their submarines could sink every month, and from +these statistics they mathematically deduced, with real German +precision, the moment when the war would end. They did not like the idea +of adding the United States to their enemies, but this was because they +were thinking of conditions after the war; for they would have preferred +to have had American friendship in the period of readjustment. But they +did not fear that we could do them much injury in the course of the war +itself. This again was not because they really despised our fighting +power; they knew that we would prove a formidable enemy on <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">[Pg 13]</a></span>the +battlefield; but the obvious fact, to their eyes, was that our armies +could never get to the front in time. The submarine campaign, they said, +would finish the thing in three or four months; and certainly in that +period the unprepared United States could never summon any military +power that could affect the result. Thus from a purely military +standpoint the entrance of 100,000,000 Americans affected them about as +much as would a declaration of war from the planet Mars.</p> + +<p>We confirmed this point of view from the commanders of the occasionally +captured submarines. These men would be brought to London and +questioned; they showed the utmost confidence in the result.</p> + +<p>"Yes, you've got <i>us</i>," they would say, "but what difference does that +make? There are plenty more submarines coming out. You will get a few, +but we can build a dozen for every one that you can capture or sink. +Anyway, the war will all be over in two or three months and we shall be +sent back home."</p> + +<p>All these captives laughed at the merest suggestion of German defeat; +their attitude was not that of prisoners, but of conquerors. They also +regarded themselves as heroes, and they gloried in the achievements of +their submarine service. For the most part they exaggerated the sinkings +and estimated that the war would end about the first of July or August. +Similarly the Berlin Government exaggerated the extent of their success. +This was not surprising, for one peculiarity of the submarine is that +only the commander, stationed at the periscope, knows what is going on. +He can report sinking a 5,000 ton ship and no one can contradict his +statement, for the crew and the other officers do not see the surface of +the water. Not unnaturally the commander does not depreciate his own +achievements, and thus the amount of sunken tonnage reported in Berlin +considerably exceeded the actual losses.</p> + +<p>The speeches of German dignitaries resounded with the same confidence.</p> + +<p>"In the impending decisive battle," said the Kaiser, "the task falls +upon my navy of turning the English war method of starvation, with which +our most hated and most obstinate enemy intends to overthrow the German +people, against him and his allies by combating their sea <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">[Pg 14]</a></span>traffic with +all the means in our power. In this work the submarine will stand in the +first rank. I expect that this weapon, technically developed with wise +forethought at our admirable yards, in co-operation with all our other +naval fighting weapons and supported by the spirit which, during the +whole course of the war, has enabled us to perform brilliant deeds, will +break our enemy's war will."</p> + +<p>"In this life and death struggle by hunger," said Dr. Karl Helfferich, +Imperial Secretary of the Interior, "England believed herself to be far +beyond the reach of any anxiety about food. A year ago it was supposed +that England would be able to use the acres of the whole world, bidding +with them against the German acres. To-day England sees herself in a +situation unparalleled in her history. Her acres across sea disappear as +a result of the blockade which our submarines are daily making more +effective around England. We have considered, we have dared. Certain of +the result, we shall not allow it to be taken from us by anybody or +anything."</p> + +<p>These statements now read almost like ancient history, yet they were +made in February, 1917. At that time, Americans and Englishmen read them +with a smile; they seemed to be the kind of German rodomontade with +which the war had made us so familiar; they seemed to be empty mouthings +put out to bolster up the drooping German spirit. That the Kaiser and +his advisers could really believe such rubbish was generally regarded as +absurd. Yet not only did they believe what they were saying but, as +already explained, they also had every reason for believing it. The +Kaiser and his associates had figured that the war would end about July +1st or August 1st; and English officials with whom I came in contact +placed the date at November 1st—always provided, of course, that no +method were found for checking the submarine.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>How, then, could we defeat the submarine? Before approaching this +subject, it is well to understand precisely what was taking place in the +spring and summer of 1917 in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">[Pg 15]</a></span>those waters surrounding the British +Isles. What was this strange new type of warfare that was bringing the +Allied cause to its knees? Nothing like it had ever been known in +recorded time; nothing like it had been foreseen when, on August 4, +1914, the British Government threw all its resources and all its people +against the great enemy of mankind.</p> + +<p>Leaving entirely out of consideration international law and humanity, it +must be admitted that strategically the German submarine campaign was +well conceived. Its purpose was to marshal on the German side that force +which has always proved to be the determining one in great international +conflicts—sea power. The advantages which the control of the sea gives +the nation which possesses it are apparent. In the first place, it makes +secure such a nation's communications with the outside world and its own +allies, and, at the same time, it cuts the communications of its enemy. +It enables the nation dominant at sea to levy upon the resources of the +entire world; to obtain food for its civilian population, raw materials +for its manufactures, munitions for its armies; and, at the same time, +to maintain that commerce upon which its very economic life may depend. +It enables such a power also to transport troops into any field of +action where they may be required. At the very time that sea power is +heaping all these blessings upon the dominant nation, it enables such a +nation to deny these same advantages to its enemy. For the second great +resource of sea power is the blockade. If the enemy is agriculturally +and industrially dependent upon the outside world, sea power can +transform it into a beleaguered fortress and sooner or later compel its +unconditional surrender. Its operations are not spectacular, but they +work with the inevitable remorselessness of death itself.</p> + +<p>This fact is so familiar that I insist upon it here only for the purpose +of inviting attention to another fact which is not so apparent. Perhaps +the greatest commonplace of the war, from the newspaper standpoint, was +that the British fleet controlled the seas. This mere circumstance, as I +have already said, was the reason why all students of history were firm +in their belief that Britain could never be defeated. It was not until +the spring of 1917 that we really awoke to the actual situation; it was +not until I <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">[Pg 16]</a></span>had spent several days in England that I made the +all-important discovery, which was this—that Britain did <i>not</i> control +the seas. She still controlled the seas in the old Nelsonian sense; that +is, her Grand Fleet successfully "contained" the German battle squadrons +and kept them, for the greater part of the war, penned up in their +German harbours. In the old days such a display of sea power would have +easily won the war for the Allies. But that is not control of the seas +in the modern sense; it is merely control of the <i>surface</i> of the seas. +Under modern methods of naval warfare sea control means far more than +controlling the top of the water. For there is another type of ship, +which sails stealthily under the waves, revealing its presence only at +certain intervals, and capable of shooting a terrible weapon which can +sink the proudest surface ship in a few minutes. The existence of this +new type of warship makes control of the seas to-day a very different +thing from what it was in Nelson's time. As long as such a warship can +operate under the water almost at will—and this was the case in a +considerable area of the ocean in the early part of 1917—it is +ridiculous to say that any navy controls the seas. For this subsurface +vessel, when used as successfully as it was used by the Germans in 1917, +deprives the surface navy of that advantage which has proved most +decisive in other wars. That is, the surface navy can no longer +completely protect communications as it could protect them in Nelson's +and Farragut's times. It no longer guarantees a belligerent its food, +its munitions, its raw materials of manufacture and commerce, or the +free movement of its troops. It is obviously absurd to say that a +belligerent which was losing 800,000 or 900,000 tons of shipping a +month, as was the case with the Allies in the spring of 1917, was the +undisputed mistress of the seas. Had the German submarine campaign +continued to succeed at this rate, the United States could not have +transported its army to France, and the food and materials which we were +sending to Europe, and which were essential to winning the war, could +never have crossed the ocean.</p> + +<p>That is to say, complete control of the subsurface by Germany would have +turned against England the blockade, the very power with which she had +planned to reduce the German Empire. Instead of isolating Germany from +the rest of the world, she would herself be isolated.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">[Pg 17]</a></span>In due course I shall attempt to show the immediate connexion that +exists between control of the surface and control of the subsurface; +this narrative will disclose, indeed, that the nation which possesses +the first also potentially possesses the second. In the early spring of +1917, however, this principle was not effective, so far as merchant +shipping was concerned.</p> + +<p>Germany's purpose in adopting the ruthless submarine warfare was, of +course, the one which I have indicated: to deprive the Allied armies in +the field, and their civilian populations, of these supplies from +overseas which were essential to victory. Nature had been kind to this +German programme when she created the British Isles. Indeed this tight +little kingdom and the waters which surround it provided an ideal field +for operations of this character. For purposes of contrast, let us +consider our own geographical situation. A glance at the map discloses +that it would be almost impossible to blockade the United States with +submarines. In the first place, the operation of submarines more than +three thousand miles from their bases would present almost insuperable +difficulties. That Germany could send an occasional submarine to our +coasts she demonstrated in the war, but it would be hardly possible to +maintain anything like a regular and persistent campaign. Even if she +could have kept a force constantly engaged in our waters, other natural +difficulties would have defeated their most determined efforts. The +trade routes approach our Atlantic sea-coast in the shape of a fan, of +which different sticks point to such ports as Boston, New York, +Philadelphia, Norfolk, and the ports of the Gulf of Mexico. To destroy +shipping to American ports it would be necessary for the enemy to cover +all these routes with submarines, a project which is so vast that it is +hardly worth the trial. In addition we have numerous Pacific ports to +which we could divert shipping in case our enemy should attempt to +blockade us on the Atlantic coast; our splendid system of +transcontinental railroads would make internal distribution not a +particularly difficult matter. Above all such considerations, of course, +is the fact that the United States is an industrial and agricultural +entity, self-supporting and self-feeding, and, therefore, it could not +be starved into surrender even though the enemy should surmount these +practically insuperable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">[Pg 18]</a></span>obstacles to a submarine blockade. But the +situation of the British Isles is entirely different. They obtain from +overseas the larger part of their food and a considerable part of their +raw materials, and in April of 1917, according to reliable statements +made at that time, England had enough food on hand for only six weeks or +two months. The trade routes over which these supplies came made the +submarine blockade a comparatively simple matter. Instead of the sticks +of a fan, the comparison which I have suggested with our own coast, we +now have to deal with the neck of a bottle. The trade routes to our +Atlantic coast spread out, as they approach our ports; on the other +hand, the trade routes to Great Britain converge almost to a point. The +far-flung steamship lanes which bring Britain her food and raw materials +from half a dozen continents focus in the Irish Sea and the English +Channel. To cut the communications of Great Britain, therefore, the +submarines do not have to patrol two or three thousand miles of +sea-coast, as would be necessary in the case of the United States; they +merely need to hover around the extremely restricted waters west and +south of Ireland.</p> + +<p>This was precisely the area which the Germans had selected for their +main field of activity. It was here that their so-called U-boats were +operating with the most deadly effect; these waters constituted their +happy hunting grounds, for here came the great cargo ships, with food +and supplies from America, which were bound for Liverpool and the great +Channel ports. The submarines that did destruction in this region were +the type that have gained universal fame as the U-boats. There were +other types, which I shall describe, but the U-boats were the main +reliance of the German navy; they were fairly large vessels, of about +800 tons, and carried from eight to twelve torpedoes and enough fuel and +supplies to keep the sea for three or four weeks. And here let me +correct one universal misapprehension. These U-boats did not have bases +off the Irish and Spanish coasts, as most people still believe. Such +bases would have been of no particular use to them. The cruising period +of a submarine did not depend, as is the prevailing impression, upon its +supply of fuel oil and food, for almost any under-water boat was able to +carry enough of these essential materials for a practically indefinite +period; the average U-boat, moreover, could easily make the voyage +across the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">[Pg 19]</a></span>Atlantic and back. The cruising period depended upon its +supply of torpedoes. A submarine returned to its base only after it had +exhausted its supply of these destructive missiles; if it should shoot +them all in twenty-four hours, then a single day would end that +particular cruise; if the torpedoes lasted a month, then the submarine +stayed out for that length of time. For these reasons bases on the Irish +coast would have been useful only in case they could replenish the +torpedoes, and this was obviously an impossibility. No, there was not +the slightest mystery concerning the bases of the U-boats. When the +Germans captured the city of Bruges in Belgium they transformed it into +a headquarters for submarines; here many of the U-boats were assembled, +and here facilities were provided for docking, repairing, and supplying +them. Bruges was thus one of the main headquarters for the destructive +campaign which was waged against British commerce. Bruges itself is an +inland town, but from it two canals extend, one to Ostend and the other +to Zeebrugge, and in this way the interior submarine base formed the +apex of a triangle. It was by way of these canals that the U-boats +reached the open sea.</p> + +<p>Once in the English Channel, the submarines had their choice of two +routes to the hunting grounds off the west and south of Ireland. A large +number made the apparently unnecessarily long detour across the North +Sea and around Scotland, going through the Fair Island Passage, between +the Orkney and the Shetland islands, along the Hebrides, where they +sometimes made a landfall, and so around the west coast of Ireland. This +looks like a long and difficult trip, yet the time was not entirely +wasted, for the U-boats, as the map of sinkings shows, usually destroyed +several vessels on the way to their favourite hunting grounds. But there +was another and shorter route to this area available to the U-boats. And +here I must correct another widely prevailing misapprehension. While the +war was going on many accounts were published in the newspapers +describing the barrage across the English Channel, from Dover to Calais, +and the belief was general that this barrier kept the U-boats from +passing through. Unfortunately this was not the case. The surface boats +did succeed in transporting almost at will troops and supplies across +this narrow passage-way; but the mines, nets, and other obstructions +that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">[Pg 20]</a></span>were intended to prevent the passage of submarines were not +particularly effective. The British navy knew little about mines in +1914; British naval men had always rather despised them as the "weapons +of the weaker power," and it is therefore not surprising that the +so-called mine barrage at the Channel crossing was not successful. A +large part of it was carried away by the strong tide and storms, and the +mines were so defective that oysters and other sea growths, which +attached themselves to their prongs, made many of them harmless. In +1918, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes reconstructed this barrage with a new type +of mine and transformed it into a really effective barrier; but in the +spring of 1917, the German U-boats had little difficulty in slipping +through, particularly in the night time. And from this point the +distance to the trade routes south and west of Ireland was relatively a +short one.</p> + +<p>Yet, terribly destructive as these U-boats were, the number which were +operating simultaneously in this and in other fields was never very +large. The extent to which the waters were infested with German +submarines was another particularly ludicrous and particularly prevalent +misapprehension. Merchant vessels constantly reported that they had been +assailed by "submarines in shoals," and most civilians still believe +that they sailed together in flotillas, like schools of fish. There is +hardly an American doughboy who did not see at least a dozen submarines +on his way across the Atlantic; every streak of suds which was caused by +a "tide rip," and every swimming porpoise, was immediately mistaken for +the wake of a torpedo; and every bit of driftwood, in the fervid +imagination of trans-Atlantic voyagers, immediately assumed the shape of +a periscope. Yet it is a fact that we knew almost every time a German +submarine slunk from its base into the ocean. The Allied secret service +was immeasurably superior to that of the Germans, and in saying this I +pay particular tribute to the British Naval Intelligence Department. We +always knew how many submarines the Germans had and we could usually +tell pretty definitely their locations at a particular time; we also had +accurate information about building operations in Germany; thus we could +estimate how many they were building and where they were building them, +and we could also describe their essential characteristics, and the +stage of progress they which had reached at almost any day.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">[Pg 21]</a></span>It was not the simplest thing to pilot a submarine out of its base. The +Allies were constantly laying mines at these outlets; and before the +U-boat could safely make its exit elaborate sweeping operations were +necessary. It often took a squadron of nine or ten surface ships, +working for several hours, to manœuvre a submarine out of its base +and to start it on its journey. For these reasons we could keep a +careful watch upon its movements; we always knew when one of our enemies +came out; we knew which one it was, and not infrequently we had learned +the name of the commander and other valuable details. Moreover, we knew +where it went, and we kept charts on which we plotted from day to day +the voyage of each particular submarine.</p> + +<p>"Why didn't you sink it then?" is the question usually asked when I make +this statement—a question which, as I shall show, merely reflects the +ignorance which prevails everywhere on the underlying facts of submarine +warfare.</p> + +<p>Now in this densely packed shipping area, which extended from the north +of Ireland to Brest, there were seldom more than eight or ten submarines +engaged in their peculiar form of warfare at one time. The largest +number which I had any record of was fifteen; and this was an +exceptional force; the usual number was four, six, eight, or perhaps +ten. Yet the men upon our merchant convoys and troopships saw submarines +scattered all over the sea. We estimated that the convoys and troopships +reported that they had sighted about 300 submarines for every submarine +which was actually in the field. Yet we knew that for every hundred +submarines which the Germans possessed they could keep only ten or a +dozen at work in the open sea. The rest were on their way to the hunting +grounds, or returning, or they were in port being refitted and taking on +supplies. Could Germany have kept fifty submarines constantly at work on +the great shipping routes in the winter and spring of 1917—before we +had learned how to handle the situation—nothing could have prevented +her from winning the war. Instead of sinking 850,000 tons in a single +month, she would have sunk 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 tons. The fact is that +Germany, with all her microscopic preparations for war, neglected to +provide herself with the one instrumentality with which she might have +won it.</p> + +<p>This circumstance, that so few submarines could accomplish such +destructive results, shows how formidable was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">[Pg 22]</a></span>the problem which +confronted us. Germany could do this, of course, because the restricted +field in which she was able to operate was so constantly and so densely +infested with valuable shipping.</p> + +<p>In the above I have been describing the operations of the U-boats in the +great area to the west and south of Ireland. But there were other +hunting fields, particularly that which lay on the east coast of +England, in the area extending from Harwich to Newcastle. This part of +the North Sea was constantly filled with ships passing between the North +Sea ports of England and Norway and Sweden, carrying essential products +like lumber and many manufactured articles. Every four days a convoy of +from forty to sixty ships left some port in this region for Scandinavia; +I use the word "convoy," but the operation was a convoy only in the +sense that the ships sailed in groups, for the navy was not able to +provide them with an adequate escort—seldom furnishing them more than +one or two destroyers, or a few yachts or trawlers. Smaller types of +submarines which were known as UB's and UC's and which issued from +Wilhelmshaven and the Skager Rack constantly preyed upon this coastal +shipping. These submarines differed from the U-boats in that they were +smaller, displacing about 350 and 400 tons, and in that they also +carried mines, which they were constantly laying. They were much handier +than the larger types; they could rush out much more quickly from their +bases and get back, and they did an immense amount of damage to this +coastal trade. The value of the shipping sunk in these waters was +unimportant when compared with the losses which Great Britain was +suffering on the great trans-Atlantic routes, but the problem was still +a serious one, because the supplies which these ships brought from the +Scandinavian countries were essential to the military operations in +France.</p> + +<p>Besides these two types, the U-boats and the UB's and UC's, the Germans +had another type of submarine, the great ocean cruisers. These ships +were as long as a small surface cruiser and were half again as long as a +destroyer, and their displacement sometimes reached 3,000 tons. They +carried crews of seventy men, could cross the Atlantic three or four +times without putting into port, and some actually remained away from +their bases for three or four months. But they were vessels very +difficult to manage; <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">[Pg 23]</a></span>it took them a relatively long time to submerge, +and, for this reason, they could not operate around the Channel and +other places where the anti-submarine craft were most numerous. In fact, +these vessels, of which the Germans had in commission perhaps half a +dozen when the armistice was signed, accomplished little in the war. The +purpose for which they were built was chiefly a strategic one. One or +two were usually stationed off the Azores, not in any expectation that +they would destroy much shipping—the fact is that they sank very few +merchantmen—but in the hope that they might divert anti-submarine craft +from the main theatre of operations. In this purpose, however, they were +not successful; in fact, I cannot see that these great cruisers +accomplished anything that justified the expense and the trouble which +were involved in building them.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">III</p> + +<p>This, then, was the type of warfare which the German submarines were +waging upon the shipping of the Allied nations. What were the Allied +navies doing to check them in this terrible month of April, 1917? What +anti-submarine methods had been developed up to that time?</p> + +<p>The most popular game on both sides of the Atlantic was devising means +of checking the under-water ship. Every newspaper, every magazine, every +public man, and every gentleman at his club had a favourite scheme for +defeating the U-boat campaign. All that any one needed for this engaging +pastime was a map of the North Sea, and the solution appeared to be as +clear as daylight. As Sir Eric Geddes once remarked to me, nothing is +quite so deceptive as geography. All of us are too likely to base our +conception of naval problems on the maps which we studied at school. On +these maps the North Sea is such a little place! A young lady once +declared in my hearing that she didn't see how the submarines could +operate in the English Channel, it was so narrow! She didn't see how +there was room enough to turn around! The fact that it is twenty miles +wide at the shortest crossing and not far from two hundred at the widest +is something which it is apparently difficult to grasp.</p> + +<p>The plan which was most popular in those days was to pen the submarines +in their bases and so prevent their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">[Pg 24]</a></span>egress into the North Sea. +Obviously the best way to handle the situation was to sink the whole +German submarine fleet; that was apparently impossible, and the next +best thing was to keep them in their home ports and prevent them from +sailing the high seas. It was not only the man in the street who was +advocating this programme. I had a long talk with several prominent +Government officials, in which they asked me why this could not be done.</p> + +<p>"I can give you fourteen reasons why it is impossible," I answered. "We +shall first have to capture the bases, and it would be simply suicidal +to attempt it, and it would be playing directly into Germany's hands. +Those bases are protected by powerful 15-, 11-, and 8-inch guns. These +are secreted behind hills or located in pits on the seashore, where no +approaching vessel can see them. Moreover, those guns have a range of +40,000 yards, but the guns on no ships have a range of more than 30,000 +yards; they are stationary, whereas ours would be moving. For our ships +to go up against such emplacements would be like putting a blind +prize-fighter up against an antagonist who can see and who has arms +twice as long as his enemy's. We can send as many ships as we wish on +such an expedition, and they will all be destroyed. The German guns +would probably get them on the first salvo, certainly on the second. +There is nothing the Germans would so much like to have us try."</p> + +<p>Another idea suggested by a glance at the map was the construction of a +barrage across the North Sea from the Orkneys to the coast of Norway. +The distance did not seem so very great—on the map; in reality, it was +two hundred and thirty miles and the water is from 360 to 960 feet in +depth. If we cannot pen the rats up in their holes, said the newspaper +strategist, certainly we can do the next best thing: we can pen them up +in the North Sea. Then we can route all our shipping to points on the +west coast of England, and the problem is solved.</p> + +<p>I discussed this proposition with British navy men and their answer was +quite to the point.</p> + +<p>"If we haven't mines enough to build a successful barrage across the +Straits of Dover, which is only twenty miles wide, how can we construct +a barrage across the North Sea, which is 230?"</p> + +<p>A year afterward, as will be shown later, this plan came <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">[Pg 25]</a></span>up in more +practical form, but in 1917 the idea was not among the +possibilities—there were not mines enough in the world to build such a +barrage, nor had a mine then been invented that was suitable for the +purpose.</p> + +<p>The belief prevailed in the United States, and, to a certain extent, in +England itself, that the most effective means of meeting the submarine +was to place guns and gun crews on all the mercantile vessels. Even some +of the old British merchant salts maintained this view. "Give us a gun, +and we'll take care of the submarines all right," they kept saying to +the Admiralty. But the idea was fundamentally fallacious. In the +American Congress, just prior to the declaration of war, the arming of +merchant ships became a great political issue; scores of pages in the +<i>Congressional Record</i> are filled with debates on this subject, yet, so +far as affording any protection to shipping was concerned, all this was +wasted oratory. Those who advocated arming the merchant ships as an +effective method of counteracting submarine campaigns had simply failed +to grasp the fundamental elements of submarine warfare. They apparently +did not understand the all-important fact that the quality which makes +the submarine so difficult to deal with is its invisibility. The great +political issue which was involved in the submarine controversy, and the +issue which brought the United States into the war, was that the Germans +were sinking merchant ships without warning. And it was because of this +very fact—this sinking without warning—that a dozen guns on a merchant +ship afforded practically no protection. The lookout on a merchantman +could not see the submarine, for the all-sufficient reason that the +submarine was concealed beneath the water; it was only by a happy chance +that the most penetrating eye could detect the periscope, provided that +one were exposed. The first intimation which was given the merchantman +that a U-boat was in his neighbourhood was the explosion of the torpedo +in his hull. In six weeks, in the spring and early summer of 1917, +thirty armed merchantmen were torpedoed and sunk off Queenstown, and in +no case was a periscope or a conning-tower seen. The English never +trusted their battleships at sea without destroyer escort, and certainly +if a battleship with its powerful armament could not protect itself from +submarines, it was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">[Pg 26]</a></span>too much to expect that an ordinary armed +merchantman would be able to do so. I think the fact that few American +armed ships were attacked and sunk in 1917 created the impression that +their guns afforded them some protection. But the apparent immunity +extended to them was really policy on Germany's part. She expected, as I +have said, that she would win the war long before the United States +could play an effective rôle in the struggle. It was therefore good +international politics to refrain from any unnecessary acts that would +still further embitter the American people against her. There was also a +considerable pacifist element in our country which Germany was coddling +in the hope of preventing the United States from using against her such +forces as we already had at hand. The reason American armed merchantmen +were not sunk was simply because they were not seriously attacked; I +have already shown how easily Germany could have sunk them if she had +really tried. Any reliance upon armed guards as a protection against +submarines would have been fundamentally a mistake, for the additional +reason that it was a defensive measure; it must be apparent that the +extremely grave situation which we were then facing demanded the most +energetic offensive methods. Yet the arming of merchant ships was +justified as a minor measure. It accomplished the one important end of +forcing the submarine to submerge and to use torpedoes instead of +gunfire. In itself this was a great gain; obviously the Germans would +much prefer to sink ships with projectiles than with torpedoes, for +their supply of these latter missiles was limited.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<p>In April, 1917, the British navy was fighting the submarine mainly in +two ways: it was constantly sowing mines off the entrance to the +submarine bases, such as Ostend and Zeebrugge, and in the Heligoland +Bight—operations that accomplished little, for the Germans swept them +up almost as fast as they were planted; and it was patrolling the +submarine infested area with anti-submarine craft. The Admiralty was +depending almost exclusively upon this patrol, yet this, the only means +which then seemed to hold forth much promise of defeating the submarine, +was making little progress.</p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">[Pg 27]</a></span> + +<p>For this patrol the navy was impressing into service all the destroyers, +yachts, trawlers, sea-going tugs, and other light vessels which could +possibly be assembled; almost any craft which could carry a wireless, a +gun, and depth charges was boldly sent to sea. At this time the vessel +chiefly used was the destroyer. The naval war had demonstrated that the +submarine could not successfully battle with the destroyer; that any +U-boat which came to the surface within fighting range of this alert and +speedy little surface ship ran great risk of being sunk. This is the +fundamental fact—that the destruction of the submarine was highly +probable, in case the destroyer could get a fair chance at her—which +regulated the whole anti-submarine campaign. It is evident, therefore, +that a proper German strategy would consist in so disposing its +submarines that they could conduct their operations with the minimum +risk of meeting their most effective enemies, while a properly conceived +Allied strategy would consist in so controlling the situation that the +submarines would have constantly to meet them. Frankness compels me to +say that, in the early part of 1917, the Germans were maintaining the +upper hand in this strategic game; they were holding the dominating +position in the campaign, since they were constantly attacking Allied +shipping without having to meet the Allied destroyers, while the Allied +destroyers were dispersing their energies over the wide waste of waters. +But the facts in the situation, and not any superior skill on the part +of the German navy, were giving the submarines this advantage. The +British were most heroically struggling against the difficulties imposed +by the mighty task which they had assumed. The British navy, like all +other navies, was only partially prepared for this type of warfare; in +1917 it did not possess destroyers enough both to guard the main +fighting fleet and to protect its commerce from submarines. Up to 1914, +indeed, it was expected that the destroyers would have only one function +to perform in warfare, that of protecting the great surface vessels from +attack, but now the new kind of warfare which Germany was waging on +merchant ships had laid upon the destroyer an entirely new +responsibility; and the plain fact is that the destroyers, in the number +which were required, did not exist.</p> + +<p>The problem which proved so embarrassing can be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">[Pg 28]</a></span>stated in the simple +terms of arithmetic. Everything, as I have said, reduced itself to the +question of destroyers. In April, 1917, the British navy had in +commission about 200 ships of this indispensable type; many of them were +old and others had been pretty badly worn and weakened by three years of +particularly racking service. It was the problem of the Admiralty to +place these destroyers in those fields in which they could most +successfully serve the Allied cause. The one requirement that +necessarily took precedence over all others was that a flotilla of at +least 100 destroyers must be continuously kept with the Grand Fleet, +ready to go into action at a moment's notice. It is clear from this +statement of the case that the naval policy of the Germans, which +consisted in holding their high seas battle fleet in harbour and in +refusing to fight the Allied navy, had an important bearing upon the +submarine campaign. So long as there was the possibility of such an +engagement, the British Grand Fleet had to keep itself constantly +prepared for such a crisis; and an indispensable part of this +preparation was to maintain always in readiness its flotilla of +protecting destroyers. Had the German fleet seriously engaged in a great +sea battle, it would have unquestionably been defeated; such a defeat +would have meant an even greater disaster than the loss of the +battleships, a loss which in itself would not greatly have changed the +naval situation. But the really fatal effect of such a defeat would have +been that it would no longer have been necessary for the British to +sequestrate a hundred or more destroyers at Scapa Flow. The German +battleships would have been sent to the bottom, and then these +destroyers would have been used in the warfare against the submarines. +By keeping its dreadnought fleet intact, always refusing to give battle +and yet always threatening an engagement, the Germans thus were penning +up 100 British destroyers in the Orkneys—destroyers which otherwise +might have done most destructive work against the German submarines off +the coast of Ireland. The mere fact that the German High Seas Fleet had +once engaged the British Grand Fleet off Jutland was an element in the +submarine situation, for this constantly suggested the likelihood that +the attempt might be repeated, and was thus an influence which tended to +keep these destroyers at Scapa Flow. Many times during that critical +period <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">[Pg 29]</a></span>the Admiralty discussed the question of releasing those +destroyers, or a part of them, for the anti-submarine campaign; yet they +always decided, and they decided wisely, against any such hazardous +division. At that time the German dreadnought fleet was not immeasurably +inferior in numbers to the British; it had a protecting screen of about +100 destroyers; and it would have been madness for the British to have +gone into battle with its own destroyer screen placed several hundred +miles away, off the coast of Ireland. I lay stress upon this +circumstance because I find that in America the British Admiralty has +been criticized for keeping a large destroyer force with the Grand +Fleet, instead of detaching them for battle with the submarine. I think +that I have made clear that this criticism is based upon a misconception +of the whole naval campaign. Without this destroyer screen the British +Grand Fleet might have been destroyed by the Germans; if the Grand Fleet +had been destroyed, the war would have ended in the defeat of the +Allies; not to have maintained these destroyers in northern waters would +thus have amounted simply to betraying the cause of civilization and to +making Germany a free gift of victory.</p> + +<p>Germany likewise practically immobilized a considerable number of +British destroyers by attacking hospital ships. When the news of such +dastardly attacks became known, it was impossible for Americans and +Englishmen to believe at first that they were intentional; they so +callously violated all the rules of warfare and all the agreements for +lessening the horrors of war to which Germany herself had become a party +that there was a tendency in both enlightened countries to give the +enemy the benefit of the doubt. As a matter of fact, not only were the +submarine attacks on hospital ships deliberate, but Germany had +officially informed us that they would be made! The reasons for this +warning are clear enough; again, the all-important rôle which the +destroyers were playing in anti-submarine warfare was the point at +issue. Until we received such warning, hospital ships had put to sea +unescorted by warships, depending for their safety upon the rules of the +Hague Conference. Germany attacked these ships in order to make us +escort them with destroyers, and thereby compel us to divert these +destroyers from the anti-submarine campaign. And, of course, England +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">[Pg 30]</a></span>was forced to acquiesce in this German programme. Had the Anglo-Saxon +mind resembled the Germanic in all probability we should have accepted +the logic of the situation; we should have refused to be diverted from +the great strategic purpose which meant winning the war—that is, +protecting merchant shipping; in other words, we should have left the +hospital ships to their fate, and justified ourselves and stilled our +consciences by the principle of the greater good. But the British and +the American minds do not operate that way; it was impossible for us to +leave sick and wounded men as prey to submarines. Therefore, after +receiving the German warning, backed up, as it was, by the actual +destruction of unprotected hospital ships, we began providing them with +destroyer escorts. This greatly embarrassed us in the anti-submarine +campaign, for at times, especially during the big drives, we had a large +number of hospital ships to protect. As soon as we adopted this policy, +Germany, having attained her end, which was to keep the destroyers out +of the submarine area, stopped attacking sick and wounded soldiers. Yet +we still were forced to provide these unfortunates with destroyer +escorts, for, had we momentarily withdrawn these protectors, the German +submarines would immediately have renewed their attacks on hospital +ships.</p> + +<p>Not only was the British navy at that time safeguarding the liberties of +mankind at sea, but its army in France was doing its share in +safeguarding them on land. And the fact that Britain had to support this +mighty army had its part in making British shipping at times almost an +easy prey for the German submarines. For next in importance to +maintaining the British Grand Fleet intact it was necessary to keep +secure the channel crossing. Over this little strip of water were +transported the men and the supplies from England to France that kept +the German army at bay; to have suspended these communications, even for +a brief period, would have meant that the Germans would have captured +Paris, overrun the whole of France, and ended the war, at least the war +on land. In the course of four years Great Britain transported about +20,000,000 people across the Channel without the loss of a single soul. +She accomplished this only by constantly using many destroyers and other +light surface craft as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">[Pg 31]</a></span>escorts for the transports. But this was not the +only responsibility of the kind that rested on the overburdened British +shoulders. There was another part of the seas in which, for practical +and political reasons, the British destroyer fleet had to do protective +duty. In the Mediterranean lay not only the trade routes to the East, +but also the lines of supply which extended to Italy, to Egypt, to +Palestine, and to Mesopotamia. If Germany could have cut off Italy's +food and materials Italy would have been forced to withdraw from the +war. The German and Austrian submarines, escaping from Austria's +Adriatic ports, were constantly assailing this commerce, attempting to +do this very thing. Moreover, the success of the German submarine +campaign in these waters would have compelled the Allies to abandon the +Salonika expedition, which would have left the Central Powers absolute +masters of the Balkans and the Middle East. For these reasons it was +necessary to maintain a considerable force of destroyers in the +Mediterranean.</p> + +<p>For the British navy it was therefore a matter of choice what areas she +would attempt to protect with her destroyer forces; the one thing that +was painfully apparent was that she could not satisfactorily safeguard +all the danger zones. With the inadequate force at her disposal it was +inevitable that certain areas should be left relatively open to the +U-boats; and the decision as to which ones these should be was simply a +matter of balancing the several conflicting interests. In April, 1917, +the Admiralty had decided to give the preference to the Grand Fleet, the +hospital ships, the Channel crossing, and the Mediterranean, practically +in the order mentioned. It is evident from these facts that nearly the +entire destroyer fleet must have been disposed in these areas. This +decision, all things considered, was the only one that was possible; +yet, after placing the destroyers in these selected areas, the great +zone of trans-Atlantic shipping, west and south of Ireland, vitally +important as it was, was necessarily left inadequately protected. So +desperate was the situation that sometimes only four or five British +destroyers were operating in this great stretch of waters; and I do not +think that the number ever exceeded fifteen. Inasmuch as that +represented about the number of German submarines in this same area, the +situation may strike <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">[Pg 32]</a></span>the layman as not particularly desperate. But any +such basis of comparison is absurd. The destroyers were operating on the +surface in full view of the submarines; the submarines could submerge at +any time and make themselves invisible; and herein we have the reason +why the contest was so markedly unequal. But aside from all other +considerations, the method of warfare adopted by the Allies against the +U-boat was necessarily ineffective, but was the best that could be used +until sufficient destroyers became available to convoy shipping. The +so-called submarine patrol, under the circumstances which prevailed at +that time, could accomplish very little. This little fleet of destroyers +was based on Queenstown; from this port they put forth and patrolled the +English Channel and the waters about Ireland in the hope that a German +submarine would stick its nose above the waves. The central idea of the +destroyer patrol was this one of hunting; the destroyer could have sunk +any submarine or driven it away from shipping if the submarine would +only have made its presence known. But of course this was precisely what +the submarine declined to do. It must be evident to the merest novice +that four or five destroyers, rushing around hunting for submarines +which were lying a hundred feet or so under water, could accomplish very +little. The under-water boat could always see its surface enemy long +before it was itself seen and thus could save its life by the simple +process of submerging. It must also be clear that the destroyer patrol +could accomplish much only in case there were a very large number of +destroyers. We figured that, to make the patrol system work with +complete success, it would be necessary to have one destroyer for every +square mile. The area of the destroyer patrol off Queenstown comprised +about 25,000 square miles; it is apparent that the complete protection +of the trans-Atlantic trade routes would have taken about 25,000 +destroyers. And the British, as I have said, had available anywhere from +four to fifteen in this area.</p> + +<p>The destroyer flotilla being so small, it is not surprising that the +German submarines were making ducks and drakes of it. The map of the +sinkings which took place in April brings out an interesting fact: +numerous as these sinkings were, very few merchantmen were torpedoed, in +this month, at the entrance to the Irish Sea or in the English Channel. +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">[Pg 33]</a></span>These were the narrow waters where shipping was massed and where the +little destroyer patrol was intended to operate. The German submarines +apparently avoided these waters, and made their attacks out in the open +sea, sometimes two and three hundred miles west and south of Ireland. +Their purpose in doing this was to draw the destroyer patrol out into +the open sea and in that way to cause its dispersal. And these tactics +were succeeding. There were six separate steamship "lanes" by which the +merchantmen could approach the English Channel and the Irish Sea. One +day the submarines would attack along one of these lanes; then the +little destroyer fleet would rush to this scene of operations. +Immediately the Germans would depart and attack another route many miles +away; then the destroyers would go pell-mell for that location. Just as +they arrived, however, the U-boats would begin operating elsewhere; and +so it went on, a game of hide and seek in which the advantages lay all +on the side of the warships which possessed that wonderful ability to +make themselves unseen. At this period the submarine campaign and the +anti-submarine campaign was really a case of blindman's buff; the +destroyer could never see the enemy while the enemy could always see the +destroyer; and this is the reason that the Allies were failing and that +the Germans were succeeding.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">IV</p> + +<p>To show how serious the situation was, let me quote from the reports +which I sent to Washington during this period. I find statements like +these scattered everywhere in my despatches of the spring of 1917:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"The military situation presented by the enemy submarine campaign +is not only serious but critical."</p> + +<p>"The outstanding fact which cannot be escaped is that we are not +succeeding, or in other words, that the enemy's campaign is proving +successful."</p> + +<p>"The consequences of failure or partial failure of the Allied cause +which we have joined are of such far-reaching character that I am +deeply concerned in insuring that the part played by our country +shall stand every test of analysis before the bar of history. The +situation at present is exceedingly grave. If sufficient United +States naval <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">[Pg 34]</a></span>forces can be thrown into the balance at the present +critical time and place there is little doubt that early success +will be assured."</p> + +<p>"Briefly stated, I consider that at the present moment we are +losing the war."<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p></div> + +<p>And now came another important question: What should the American naval +policy be in this crisis? There were almost as many conflicting opinions +as there were minds. Certain authorities believed that our whole North +Atlantic Fleet should be moved immediately into European waters. Such a +manœuvre was not only impossible but it would have been strategically +very unwise; indeed such a disposition would have been playing directly +into Germany's hands. What naval experts call the "logistics" of the +situation immediately ruled this idea out of consideration. The one fact +which made it impossible to base the fleet in European waters at that +time was that we could not have kept it supplied, particularly with oil. +The German U-boats were making a particularly successful drive at +tankers with the result that England had the utmost difficulty in +supplying her fleet with this kind of fuel. It is indeed impossible to +exaggerate the seriousness of this oil situation. "Orders have just been +given to use three-fifths speed, except in case of emergency," I +reported to Washington on June 29th, referring to scarcity of oil. "This +simply means that the enemy is winning the war." It was lucky for us +that the Germans knew nothing about this particular disability. Had they +been aware of it, they would have resorted to all kinds of manœuvres +in the attempt to keep the Grand Fleet constantly steaming at sea, and +in this way they might so have exhausted our oil supply as possibly to +threaten the actual command of the surface. Fortunately for the cause of +civilization, there were certain important facts which the German Secret +Service did not learn.</p> + +<p>But this oil scarcity made it impossible to move the Atlantic Fleet into +European waters, at least at that time. Since most oil supplies were +brought from America, we simply could not have fuelled our +super-dreadnoughts in Europe in the spring and summer of 1917. Moreover, +if <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">[Pg 35]</a></span>we had sent all our big ships to England we should have been obliged +to keep our destroyers constantly stationed with them ready for a great +sea action; and this would have completely fallen in with German plans, +for then these destroyers could not have been used against her +submarines. The British did indeed request that we send five +coal-burning ships to reinforce her fleet and give her that +preponderance which made its ascendancy absolutely secure, and these +ships were subsequently sent; but England could not have made provision +for our greatest dreadnoughts, the oil burners. Indeed our big ships +were of much greater service to the Allied cause stationed on this side +than they would have been if they had been located at a European base. +They were providing a reserve for the British fleet, precisely as our +armies in France were providing a reserve for the Allied armies; and +meanwhile this disposition made it possible for us to send their +destroyer escorts to the submarine zone, where they could participate in +the anti-submarine campaign. In American waters these big ships could be +kept in prime condition, for here they had an open, free sea for +training, and here they could also be used to train the thousands of new +men who were needed for the new ships constructed during the war.</p> + +<p>I early took the stand that our forces should be considered chiefly in +the light of reinforcements to the Allied navies, and that, ignoring all +question of national pride and even what at first might superficially +seem to be national interest, we should exert such offensive power as we +possessed in the way that would best assist the Allies in defeating the +submarine. England's naval resources were much greater than ours; and +therefore, in the nature of the case, we could not expect to maintain +overseas anywhere near the number of ships which England had assembled; +consequently it should be our policy to use such available units as we +possessed to strengthen the weak spots in the Allied line. There were +those who believed that national dignity required that we should build +up an independent navy in European waters, and that we should operate it +as a distinct American unit. But that, I maintained, was not the way to +win the war. If we had adopted this course, we should have been +constructing naval bases and perfecting an organization when <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">[Pg 36]</a></span>the +armistice was signed; indeed, the idea of operating independently of the +Allied fleet was not for a moment to be considered. There were others in +America who thought that it was unwise to put any part of our fleet in +European waters, in view of the dangers that might assail us on our own +coast. There was every expectation that Germany would send submarines to +the western Atlantic, where they could prey upon our shipping and could +possibly bombard our ports; I have already shown that she had submarines +which could make such a long voyage, and the strategy of the situation +in April and May, 1917, demanded that a move of this kind be made. The +predominant element in the submarine defence, as I have pointed out, was +the destroyer. The only way in which the United States could immediately +and effectively help the Allied navies was by sending our whole +destroyer flotilla and all our light surface craft at once. It was +Germany's part, therefore, to resort to every manœuvre that would +keep our destroyer force on this side of the Atlantic. Such a +performance might be expected to startle our peaceful American +population and inspire a public demand for protection; and in this way +our Government might be compelled to keep all anti-submarine craft in +our own waters. I expected Germany to make such a demonstration +immediately and I therefore cautioned our naval authorities at +Washington not to be deceived. I pointed out that Germany could +accomplish practically nothing by sporadic attacks on American shipping +in American waters; that, indeed, if we could induce the German +Admiralty to concentrate all its submarine efforts on the American +coasts, and leave free the Irish Sea and the English Channel, the war +practically would be won for the Allies. Yet these facts were not +apparent to the popular mind in 1917, and I shall always think that +Germany made a great mistake in not sending submarines to the American +coast immediately on our declaration of war, instead of waiting until +1918. Such attacks, at that time, would have started a public demand for +protection which the Washington authorities might have had great +difficulty in resisting, and which might have actually kept our +destroyer fleet in American waters, to the great detriment of the Allied +cause. Germany evidently refrained from doing so for reasons which I +have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">[Pg 37]</a></span>already indicated—a desire to deal gently with the United States, +and in that way to delay our military preparations and win the war +without coming into bloody conflict with the American people.</p> + +<p>There were others who thought it unwise to expose any part of our fleet +to the dangers of the European contest; their fear was that, if the +Allies should be defeated, we would then need all our naval forces to +protect the American coast. This point of view, of course, was not only +short-sighted and absurd, but it violated the fundamental principle of +warfare, which is that a belligerent must assail his enemy as quickly as +possible with the greatest striking power which he can assemble. Clearly +our national policy demanded that we should exert all the force we could +collect to make certain a German defeat. The best way to fight Germany +was not to wait until she had vanquished the Allies, but to join hands +with them in a combined effort to annihilate her military power on land +and sea. The situation which confronted us in April, 1917, was one which +demanded an immediate and powerful offensive; the best way to protect +America was to destroy Germany's naval power in European waters and thus +make certain that she could not attack us at home.</p> + +<p>The fact is that few nations have ever been placed in so tragical a +position as that in which Great Britain found herself in the spring and +early summer of 1917. And I think that history records few spectacles +more heroic than that of the great British navy, fighting this hideous +and cowardly form of warfare in half a dozen places with pitifully +inadequate forces, but with an undaunted spirit which remained firm even +against the fearful odds which I have described. What an opportunity for +America! And it was perfectly apparent what we should do. It was our +duty immediately to place all our available anti-submarine craft in +those waters west and south of Ireland in which lay the pathways of the +shipping which meant life or death to the Allied cause—the area which +England, because almost endless demands were being made upon her navy in +other fields, was unable to protect.</p> + +<p>The first four days in London were spent collecting all possible data; I +had no desire to alarm Washington unwarrantably, yet I also believed +that it would be a serious dereliction if all the facts were not +presented precisely as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">[Pg 38]</a></span>they were. I consulted practically everyone who +could give me essential details and wrote a cable despatch, filling four +foolscap pages, which furnished Washington with its first detailed +account of the serious state of the cause on which we had embarked.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p> + +<p>In this work I had the full co-operation of our Ambassador in London, +Mr. Walter Hines Page. Mr. Page's whole heart and mind were bound up in +the Allied cause; he was zealous that his country should play worthily +its part in this great crisis in history; and he worked unsparingly with +me to get the facts before our Government. A few days after sending a +despatch it occurred to me that a message from our Ambassador might give +emphasis to my own. I therefore wrote such a message and took it down to +Brighton, where the American Ambassador was taking a little rest. I did +not know just how strong a statement Mr. Page would care to become +responsible for, and so I did not make this statement quite as emphatic +as the circumstances justified.</p> + +<p>Mr. Page took the paper and read it carefully. Then he looked up.</p> + +<p>"It isn't strong enough," he said. "I think I can do better than this +myself."</p> + +<p>He sat down and wrote the following cablegram which was immediately sent +to the President:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="noin">From: Ambassador Page.<br /> +To: Secretary of State.<br /> +Sent: 27 April 1917. </p> + +<p>Very confidential for Secretary and President.</p> + +<p>There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war +caused by the increasing success of the German submarines. I have +it from official sources that during the week ending 22nd April, 88 +ships of 237,000 tons allied and neutral were lost. The number of +vessels unsuccessfully attacked indicated a great increase in the +number of submarines in action.</p> + +<p>This means practically a million tons lost every month till the +shorter days of autumn come. By that time the sea will be about +clear of shipping. Most of the ships are sunk to the westward and +southward of Ireland. The British have in that area every available +anti-submarine <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">[Pg 39]</a></span>craft, but their force is so insufficient that they +hardly discourage the submarines.</p> + +<p>The British transport of troops and supplies is already strained to +the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field is +threatened. There is food enough here to last the civil population +only not more than six weeks or two months.</p> + +<p>Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the +future, or in any theatre of the war, our help is now more +seriously needed in this submarine area for the sake of all the +Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else.</p> + +<p>After talking over this critical situation with the Prime Minister +and other members of the Government, I cannot refrain from most +strongly recommending the immediate sending over of every destroyer +and all other craft that can be of anti-submarine use. This seems +to me the sharpest crisis of the war, and the most dangerous +situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise.</p> + +<p>If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two or three +months the war will be won, and if we can contribute effective help +immediately it will be won directly by our aid. I cannot exaggerate +the pressing and increasing danger of this situation. Thirty or +more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us immediately +would very likely be decisive.</p> + +<p>There is no time to be lost.</p> + +<p class="right smcap">Page.</p></div> + +<p>But Mr. Page and I thought that we had not completely done our duty even +after sending these urgent messages. Whatever might happen, we were +determined that it could never be charged that we had not presented the +Allied situation in its absolutely true light. It seemed likely that an +authoritative statement from the British Government would give added +assurance that our statements were not the result of panic, and with +this idea in mind, Mr. Page and I called upon Mr. Balfour, Foreign +Secretary, who, in response to our request, sent a despatch to +Washington describing the seriousness of the situation.</p> + +<p>All these messages made the same point: that the United States should +immediately assemble all its destroyers and other light craft, and send +them to the port where they could render the greatest service in the +anti-submarine campaign—Queenstown.</p> + +<h4>FOOTNOTES:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> The statements published were not false, but they were +inconclusive and intentionally so. They gave the number of British ships +sunk, but not their tonnage, and not the total losses of British, +Allied, and neutral tonnage.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> See Appendices II and III for my cable and letter to the +Navy Department, explaining the submarine situation in detail.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> See Appendix IV for my statement to Washington on arming +merchant ships.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> For specimens of my reports to the Navy Department in these +early days see Appendices II and III.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> See Appendix II.</p></div> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">[Pg 40]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER"</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>The morning of May 4, 1917, witnessed an important event in the history +of Queenstown. The news had been printed in no British or American +paper, yet in some mysterious way it had reached nearly everybody in the +city. A squadron of American destroyers, which had left Boston on the +evening of April 24th, had already been reported to the westward of +Ireland and was due to reach Queenstown that morning. At almost the +appointed hour a little smudge of smoke appeared in the distance, +visible to the crowds assembled on the hills; then presently another +black spot appeared, and then another; and finally these flecks upon the +horizon assumed the form of six rapidly approaching warships. The Stars +and Stripes were broken out on public buildings, on private houses, and +on nearly all the water craft in the harbour; the populace, armed with +American flags, began to gather on the shore; and the local dignitaries +donned their official robes to welcome the new friends from overseas. +One of the greatest days in Anglo-American history had dawned, for the +first contingent of the American navy was about to arrive in British +waters and join hands with the Allies in the battle against the forces +of darkness and savagery.</p> + +<p>The morning was an unusually brilliant one. The storms which had tossed +our little vessels on the seas for ten days, and which had followed them +nearly to the Irish coast, had suddenly given way to smooth water and a +burst of sunshine. The long and graceful American ships steamed into the +channel amid the cheers of the people and the tooting of all harbour +craft; the sparkling waves, the greenery of the bordering hills, the +fruit trees already in bloom, to say nothing of the smiling and cheery +faces <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">[Pg 41]</a></span>of the welcoming Irish people, seemed to promise a fair beginning +for our great adventure. "Welcome to the American colours," had been the +signal of the <i>Mary Rose</i>, a British destroyer which had been sent to +lead the Americans to their anchorage. "Thank you, I am glad of your +company," answered the Yankee commander; and these messages represented +the spirit of the whole proceeding. Indeed there was something in these +strange-looking American ships, quite unlike the British destroyers, +that necessarily inspired enthusiasm and respect. They were long and +slender; the sunlight, falling upon their graceful sides and steel +decks, made them brilliant objects upon the water; and their +business-like guns and torpedo tubes suggested efficiency and readiness. +The fact that they had reached their appointed rendezvous exactly on +time, and that they had sailed up the Queenstown harbour at almost +precisely the moment that preparations had been made to receive them, +emphasized this impression. The appearance of our officers on the decks +in their unfamiliar, closely fitting blouses, and of our men, in their +neat white linen caps, also at once won the hearts of the populace.</p> + +<p>"Sure an' it's our own byes comin' back to us," an Irish woman remarked, +as she delightedly observed the unmistakably Gaelic countenances of a +considerable proportion of the crew. Indeed the natives of Queenstown +seemed to regard these American blue-jackets almost as their own. The +welcome provided by these people was not of a formal kind; they gathered +spontaneously to cheer and to admire. In that part of Ireland there was +probably not a family that did not have relatives or associations in the +United States, and there was scarcely a home that did not possess some +memento of America. The beautiful Queenstown Roman Catholic Cathedral, +which stood out so conspicuously, had been built very largely with +American dollars, and the prosperity of many a local family had the same +trans-Atlantic origin. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that when +our sailors landed for a few hours' liberty many hands were stretched +out to welcome them. Their friends took them arm in arm, marched them to +their homes, and entertained them with food and drink, all the time +plying them with questions about friends and relatives in America. Most +of these young Americans with Irish ancestry had <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">[Pg 42]</a></span>never seen Ireland, +but that did not prevent the warm-hearted people of Queenstown from +hailing them as their own. This cordiality was appreciated, for the trip +across the Atlantic had been very severe, with gales and rainstorms +nearly every day.</p> + +<p>The senior officer in charge was Commander Joseph K. Taussig, whose +flagship was the <i>Wadsworth</i>. The other vessels of the division and +their commanding officers were the <i>Conyngham</i>, Commander Alfred W. +Johnson; the <i>Porter</i>, Lieutenant-Commander Ward K. Wortman; the +<i>McDougal</i>, Lieutenant-Commander Arther P. Fairfield; the <i>Davis</i>, +Lieutenant-Commander Rufus F. Zogbaum; and the <i>Wainwright</i>, +Lieutenant-Commander Fred H. Poteet. On the outbreak of hostilities +these vessels, comprising our Eighth Destroyer Division, had been +stationed at Base 2, in the York River, Virginia; at <span class="smcap">7 P.M.</span> of +April 6th, the day that Congress declared war on Germany, their +commander had received the following signal from the <i>Pennsylvania</i>, the +flagship of the Atlantic Fleet: "Mobilize for war in accordance with +Department's confidential mobilization plan of March 21st." From that +time events moved rapidly for the Eighth Division. On April 14th, the +very day on which I sent my first report on submarine conditions to +Washington, Commander Taussig received a message to take his flotilla to +Boston and there fit out for "long and distant service." Ten days +afterward he sailed, with instructions to go fifty miles due east of +Cape Cod and there to open his sealed orders. At the indicated spot +Commander Taussig broke the seal, and read the following document—a +paper so important in history, marking as it does the first instructions +any American naval or army officer had received for engaging directly in +hostilities with Germany, that it is worth quoting in full:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="cen">NAVY DEPARTMENT<br /> +Office of Naval Operations<br /> +Washington, D. C.</p> + +<p class="noin"><i>Secret and Confidential</i></p> + +<p class="noin">To: Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, +U.S.S. <i>Wadsworth</i>, Flagship.</p> + +<p class="noin">Subject: Protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britain +and Ireland.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">[Pg 43]</a></span>1. The British Admiralty have requested the co-operation of a +division of American destroyers in the protection of commerce near +the coasts of Great Britain and France.</p> + +<p>2. Your mission is to assist naval operations of Entente Powers in +every way possible.</p> + +<p>3. Proceed to Queenstown, Ireland. Report to senior British naval +officer present, and thereafter co-operate fully with the British +navy. Should it be decided that your force act in co-operation with +French naval forces your mission and method of co-operation under +French Admiralty authority remain unchanged.</p> + +<p>Route to Queenstown.</p> + +<p>Boston to latitude 50 N—Long. 20 W to arrive at daybreak then to +latitude 50 N—Long. 12 W thence to Queenstown.</p> + +<p>When within radio communication of the British naval forces off +Ireland, call G CK and inform the Vice-Admiral at Queenstown in +British general code of your position, course, and speed. You will +be met outside of Queenstown.</p> + +<p>4. Base facilities will be provided by the British Admiralty.</p> + +<p>5. Communicate your orders and operations to Rear-Admiral Sims at +London and be guided by such instructions as he may give you. Make +no reports of arrival to Navy Department direct.</p> + +<p class="right smcap">Josephus Daniels.</p></div> + +<p>No happier selection for the command of this division could have been +made than that of Commander Taussig. In addition to his qualities as a +sailor, certain personal associations made him particularly acceptable +to the British naval authorities. In 1900, Commander Taussig, then a +midshipman, was a member of the naval forces which the United States +sent to China to co-operate with other powers in putting down the Boxer +Rebellion and rescuing the besieged legations in Pekin. Near Tientsin +this international force saw its hardest fighting, and here Commander +Taussig was wounded. While recovering from his injury, the young +American found himself lying on a cot side by side with an English +captain, then about forty years old, who was in command of the +<i>Centurion</i> and chief-of-staff to Admiral Seymour, who had charge of the +British forces. This British officer was severely wounded; a bullet had +penetrated his lung, and for a considerable period he was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">[Pg 44]</a></span>unable to lie +down. Naturally this enforced companionship made the two men friends. +Commander Taussig had had many occasions to recall this association +since, for his wounded associate was Captain John R. Jellicoe, whose +advancement in the British navy had been rapid from that day onward. On +this same expedition Captain Jellicoe became a sincere friend also of +Captain McCalla, the American who commanded the <i>Newark</i> and the +American landing force; indeed, Jellicoe's close and cordial association +with the American navy dates from the Boxer expedition. Naturally +Taussig had watched Jellicoe's career with the utmost interest; since he +was only twenty-one at the time, however, and the Englishman was twice +his age, it had never occurred to him that the First Sea Lord would +remember his youthful hospital companion. Yet the very first message he +received, on arriving in Irish waters, was the following letter, brought +to him by Captain Evans, the man designated by the British Admiralty as +liaison officer with the American destroyers:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"><span class="smcap">Admiralty, Whitehall</span><br /> +1-5-17.</p> + +<p class="noin smcap">My Dear Taussig:</p> + +<p>I still retain very pleasant and vivid recollections of our +association in China and I am indeed delighted that you should have +been selected for the command of the first force which is coming to +fight for freedom, humanity, and civilization. We shall all have +our work cut out to subdue piracy. My experience in China makes me +feel perfectly convinced that the two nations will work in the +closest co-operation, and I won't flatter you by saying too much +about the value of your help. I must say this, however. There is no +navy in the world that can possibly give us more valuable +assistance, and there is no personnel in any navy that will fight +better than yours. My China experience tells me this.</p> + +<p>If only my dear friend McCalla could have seen this day how glad I +would have been!</p> + +<p>I must offer you and all your officers and men the warmest welcome +possible in the name of the British nation and the British +Admiralty, and add to it every possible good wish from myself. May +every good fortune attend you and speedy victory be with us.</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="padding-right: 8em;">Yours very sincerely,</span><br /> +<span style="padding-right: 6em;"><span class="smcap">J. R. Jellicoe</span>.</span><br /> +</p></div> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">[Pg 45]</a></span>At this same meeting Captain Evans handed the American commander another +letter which was just as characteristic as that of Admiral Jellicoe. The +following lines constitute our officers' first introduction to +Vice-Admiral Bayly, the officer who was to command their operations in +the next eighteen months, and, in its brevity, its entirely +business-like qualities, as well as in its genuine sincerity and +kindness, it gave a fair introduction to the man:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="right"> +<span class="smcap" style="padding-right: 4em;">Admiralty House,</span><br /> +<span class="smcap" style="padding-right: 3em;">Queenstown,</span><br /> +<span style="padding-right: 1em;">4-5-17.</span></p> + +<p><span class="smcap noin">Dear Lieutenant-Commander Taussig</span>:</p> + +<p>I hope that you and the other five officers in command of the U.S. +destroyers in your flotilla will come and dine here to-night, +Friday, at 7.45, and that you and three others will remain to sleep +here so as to get a good rest after your long journey. Allow me to +welcome you and to thank you for coming.</p> + +<p class="right"><span style="padding-right: 9em;">Yours sincerely,</span><br /> +<span class="smcap"><span style="padding-right: 6em;">Lewis Bayly.</span></span></p> + +<p class="noin">Dine in undress; no speeches.<br /> +</p></div> + +<p>The first duty of the officers on arrival was to make the usual +ceremonial calls. The Lord Mayor of Cork had come down from his city, +which is only twelve miles from Queenstown, to receive the Americans, +and now awaited them in the American consulate; and many other citizens +were assembled there to welcome them. One of the most conspicuous +features of the procession was the moving picture operator, whose +presence really had an international significance. The British +Government itself had detailed him for this duty; it regarded the +arrival of our destroyers as a great historical event and therefore +desired to preserve this animated record in the official archives. +Crowds gathered along the street to watch and cheer our officers as they +rode by; and at the consulate the Lord Mayor, Mr. Butterfield, made an +eloquent address, laying particular emphasis upon the close friendship +that had always prevailed between the American and the Irish people. +Other dignitaries made speeches voicing similar sentiments. This welcome +concluded, Commander Taussig and his brother officers started up the +steep hill that leads to Admiralty House, a fine and spacious old +building.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">[Pg 46]</a></span>Here, following out the instructions of the Navy Department, they were +to report to Vice-Admiral Bayly for duty. It is doing no injustice to +Sir Lewis to say that our men regarded this first meeting with some +misgiving. The Admiral's reputation in the British navy was well known +to them. They knew that he was one of the ablest officers in the +service; but they had also heard that he was an extremely exacting man, +somewhat taciturn in his manner, and not inclined to be over familiar +with his subordinates—a man who did not easily give his friendship or +his respect, and altogether, in the anxious minds of these ambitious +young Americans, he was a somewhat forbidding figure. And the appearance +of the Admiral, standing in his doorway awaiting their arrival, rather +accentuated these preconceptions. He was a medium-sized man, with +somewhat swarthy, weather-beaten face and black hair just turning grey; +he stood there gazing rather quizzically at the Americans as they came +trudging up the hill, his hands behind his back, his bright eyes keenly +taking in every detail of the men, his face not showing the slightest +trace of a smile. This struck our young men at first as a somewhat grim +reception; the attitude of the Admiral suggested that he was slightly in +doubt as to the value of his new recruits, that he was entirely willing +to be convinced, but that only deeds and not fine speeches of greeting +would convince him. Yet Admiral Bayly welcomed our men with the utmost +courtesy and dignity, and his face, as he began shaking hands, broke +into a quiet, non-committal smile; there was nothing about his manner +that was effusive, there were no unnecessary words, yet there was a real +cordiality that put our men at ease and made them feel at home in this +strange environment. They knew, of course, that they had come to +Ireland, not for social diversions, but for the serious business of +fighting the Hun, and that indeed was the only thought which could then +find place in Admiral Bayly's mind. Up to this time the welcome to the +Americans had taken the form of lofty oratorical flights, with emphasis +upon the blood ties of Anglo-Saxondom, and the significance to +civilization of America and Great Britain fighting side by side; but +this was not the kind of a greeting our men received from Admiral Bayly. +The Admiral himself, with his somewhat worn uniform and his lack of +ceremony, formed a marked contrast to the official reception by the +Lord <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">[Pg 47]</a></span>Mayor and his suite in their insignia of office. Entirely +characteristic also was the fact that, instead of making a long speech, +he made no speech at all. His chief interest in the Americans at that +time was the assistance which they were likely to bring to the Allied +cause; after courteously greeting the officers, the first question he +asked about these forces was:</p> + +<p>"When will you be ready to go to sea?"</p> + +<p>Even under the most favourable conditions that is an embarrassing +question to ask of a destroyer commander. There is no type of ship that +is so chronically in need of overhauling. Even in peace times the +destroyer usually has under way a long list of repairs; our first +contingent had sailed without having had much opportunity to refit, and +had had an extremely nasty voyage. The fact was that it had been rather +severely battered up, although the flotilla was in excellent condition, +considering its hard experience on the ocean and the six months of hard +work which it had previously had on our coast. One ship had lost its +fire-room ventilator, another had had condenser troubles on the way +across, and there had been other difficulties. Commander Taussig, +however, had sized up Admiral Bayly as a man to whom it would be a +tactical error to make excuses, and promptly replied:</p> + +<p>"We are ready now, sir, that is, as soon as we finish refuelling. Of +course you know how destroyers are—always wanting something done to +them. But this is war, and we are ready to make the best of things and +go to sea immediately."</p> + +<p>The Admiral was naturally pleased with the spirit indicated by this +statement, and, with his customary consideration for his juniors, said:</p> + +<p>"I will give you four days from the time of arrival. Will that be +sufficient?"</p> + +<p>"Yes," answered Taussig, "that will be more than ample time."</p> + +<p>As we discovered afterward, the Admiral had a system of always "testing +out" new men, and it is not improbable that this preliminary interview +was a part of this process.</p> + +<p>During the period of preparation there were certain essential +preliminaries: it was necessary to make and to receive many calls, a +certain amount of tea drinking was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">[Pg 48]</a></span>inevitable, and there were many +invitations to dinners and to clubs that could not be ignored. Our +officers made a state visit to Cork, going up in Admiral Bayly's barge, +and returned the felicitations of the Mayor and his retinue.</p> + +<p>Naturally both the Americans and their ships became objects of great +interest to their new allies. It was, I think, the first time that a +destroyer flotilla had ever visited Great Britain, and the very +appearance of the vessels themselves aroused the greatest curiosity. +They bore only a general resemblance to the destroyers of the British +navy. The shape of their hulls, the number and location of smoke pipes, +the positions of guns, torpedo tubes, bridges, deckhouse, and other +details gave them quite a contrasting profile. The fact that they were +designed to operate under different conditions from the British ships +accounted for many of these divergences. We build our destroyers with +the widest possible cruising radius; they are expected to go to the West +Indies, to operate from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and in general to +feel at home anywhere in the great stretch of waters that surround our +country. British destroyers, on the other hand, are intended to operate +chiefly in the restricted waters around the British Isles, where the +fuelling and refitting facilities are so extensive that they do not have +to devote much space to supplies of this kind. The result is that our +destroyers can keep the sea longer than the British; on the other hand, +the British are faster than ours, and they can also turn more quickly. +These differences were of course a subject of much discussion among the +observers at Queenstown, and even of animated argument. Naturally, the +interest of the destroyer officers of the two services in the respective +merits of their vessels was very keen. They examined minutely all +features that were new to them in the design and arrangement of guns, +torpedoes, depth charges, and machines, freely exchanged information, +and discussed proposed improvements in the friendliest possible spirit. +Strangely enough, although the American destroyers carried greater fuel +supplies than the British, they were rather more dainty and graceful in +their lines, a fact which inspired a famous retort which rapidly passed +through the ranks of both navies.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">[Pg 49]</a></span>"You know," remarked a British officer to an American, "I like the +British destroyers better than the American. They look so much sturdier. +Yours seem to me rather feminine in appearance."</p> + +<p>"Yes," replied the American, "that's so, but you must remember what +Kipling says, 'The female of the species is more deadly than the male.'"</p> + +<p>The work of the Americans really began on the Sunday which followed +their arrival; by this time they had established cordial relations with +Admiral Bayly and were prepared to trust themselves unreservedly in his +hands. He summoned the officers on this Sunday morning and talked with +them a few moments before they started for the submarine zone; the time +of their departure had been definitely fixed for the next day. In the +matter of ceremonial greetings the Admiral was not strong, but when it +came to discussing the business in hand he was the master of a +convincing eloquence. The subject of his discourse was the +responsibility that lay before our men; he spoke in sharp, staccato +tones, making his points with the utmost precision, using no verbal +flourishes or unnecessary words—looking at our men perhaps a little +fiercely, and certainly impressing them with the fact that the work +which lay before them was to be no summer holiday. As soon as the +destroyers passed beyond the harbour defences, the Admiral began, death +constantly lay before the men until they returned. There was only one +safe rule to follow; days and even weeks might go by without seeing a +submarine, but the men must assume that one was constantly watching +them, looking for a favourable opportunity to discharge its torpedo. +"You must not relax attention for an instant, or you may lose an +opportunity to destroy a submarine or give her a chance to destroy you." +It was the present intention to send the American destroyers out for +periods of six days, giving them two days' rest between trips, and about +once a month they were to have five days in port for boiler cleaning. +And now the Admiral gave some details about the practical work at sea. +Beware, he said, about ramming periscopes; these were frequently mere +decoys for bombs and should be shelled. In picking up survivors of +torpedoed vessels the men must be careful not to stop until thoroughly +convinced that there were no submarines <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">[Pg 50]</a></span>in the neighbourhood: "You must +not risk the loss of your vessel in order to save the lives of a few +people."</p> + +<p>The Admiral proclaimed the grim philosophy of this war when he told our +men that it would be their first duty, should they see a ship torpedoed, +not to go to the rescue of the survivors, but to go after the submarine. +The three imperative duties of the destroyers were, in the order named: +first, to destroy submarines; second, to convoy and protect merchant +shipping; and third, to save the lives of the passengers and crews of +torpedoed ships. No commander should ever miss an opportunity to destroy +a submarine merely because there were a few men and women in small boats +or in the water who might be saved. Admiral Bayly explained that to do +this would be false economy: sinking a submarine meant saving far more +lives than might be involved in a particular instance, for this vessel, +if spared, would simply go on constantly destroying human beings. The +Admiral then gave a large number of instructions in short, pithy +sentences: "Do not use searchlights; do not show any lights whatever at +night; do not strike any matches; never steam at a slower rate than +thirteen knots; always zigzag, thereby preventing the submarine from +plotting your position; always approach a torpedoed vessel with the sun +astern; make only short signals; do not repeat the names of vessels; +carefully watch all fishing vessels—they may be submarines in +disguise—they even put up masts, sails, and funnels in this attempt to +conceal their true character." The Admiral closed his remarks with a +warning based upon his estimate of the character and methods of the +enemy. In substance he said that were it not for the violations of the +dictates of humanity and the well-established chivalry of the sea, he +would have the greatest respect for the German submarine commanders. He +cautioned our officers not to underrate them, and particularly +emphasized their cleverness at what he termed "the art of irregularity." +He explained this by saying that up to that time he had been unable to +deduce from their operations any definite plan or tactics, and advised +our commanders also to guard against any regularity of movement; they +should never, for example, patrol from one corner to another of their +assigned squares in the submarine zone, or adopt any other uniform +practice <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">[Pg 51]</a></span>which the enemy might soon perceive and of which he would +probably take advantage.</p> + +<p>At the very moment that Admiral Bayly was giving these impressive +instructions the submarine campaign had reached its crisis; the fortunes +of the Allies had never struck so low a depth as at that time. An +incident connected with our arrival, not particularly important in +itself, brought home to our men the unsleeping vigilance of the enemy +with whom they had to deal.</p> + +<p>Perhaps the Germans did not actually have advance information of the +arrival of this first detachment of our destroyers; but they certainly +did display great skill in divining what was to happen. At least it was +a remarkable coincidence that for the first time in many months a +submarine laid a mine-field directly off the entrance to Queenstown the +day before our ships arrived. Soon afterward a parent ship of the +destroyers reached this port and encountered the same welcome; and soon +after that a second parent ship found a similar mine-field awaiting her +arrival. The news that our destroyers had reached Queenstown actually +appeared in the German papers several days before we had released it in +the British and American press. Thanks to the vigilance and efficiency +of the British mine-sweepers, however, the enemy gained nothing from all +these preparations, for the channel was cleared of German mines before +our vessels reached port.</p> + +<p>The night before the destroyers arrived, while some of the officers of +my staff were dining with Admiral Bayly, the windows were shaken by +heavy explosions made by the mines which the sweepers were dragging out. +Admiral Bayly jokingly remarked that it was really a pity to interfere +with such a warm welcome as had apparently been planned for our +crusaders. Even the next night, while the destroyer officers were dining +at Admiralty House, several odd mines exploded outside the channel that +had been swept the previous day. This again impressed our men with the +fact that the game which they had now entered was quite a different +affair from their peace-time manœuvres.</p> + +<p>The Germans at that time were jubilant over the progress of their +submarine campaign and, indeed, they had good reason to be. The week +that our first flotilla reached Irish waters their submarines had +destroyed 240,000 tons of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">[Pg 52]</a></span>Allied shipping; if the sinking should keep +up at this rate, it meant losses of 1,000,000 tons a month and an early +German victory.</p> + +<p>In looking over my letters of that period, I find many references that +picture the state of the official mind. All that time I was keeping +closely in touch with Ambassador Page, who was energetically seconding +all my efforts to bring more American ships across the Atlantic.</p> + +<p>"It remains a fact," I wrote our Ambassador, "that at present the enemy +is succeeding and that we are failing. Ships are being sunk faster than +they can be replaced by the building facilities of the world. This +simply means that the enemy is winning the war. There is no mystery +about that. The submarines are rapidly cutting the Allies' lines of +communication. When they are cut, or sufficiently interfered with, we +must accept the enemy's terms."</p> + +<p>Six days before our destroyers put in at Queenstown I sent this message +to Mr. Page:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Allies do not now command the sea. Transport of troops and supplies +strained to the utmost and the maintenance of the armies in the +field is threatened.</p></div> + +<p>Such, then, was the situation when our little destroyer flotilla first +went to sea to do battle with the submarine.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, who now became the commander of the American +destroyers at Queenstown, so far as their military operations were +concerned, had spent fifty years in the British navy, forty years of +this time actually at sea. This ripe experience, combined with a great +natural genius for salt water, had made him one of the most efficient +men in the service. In what I have already said, I may have given a +slightly false impression of the man; that he was taciturn, that he was +generally regarded as a hard taskmaster, that he never made friends at +the first meeting, that he was more interested in results than in +persons—all this is true; yet these qualities merely concealed what +was, at bottom, a generous, kindly, and even a warm-hearted character. +Admiral Bayly was so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">[Pg 53]</a></span>retiring and so modest that he seemed almost to +have assumed these exterior traits to disguise his real nature. When our +men first met the Admiral they saw a man who would exact their last +effort and accept no excuses for failure; when admitted to more intimate +association, however, they discovered that this weather-beaten sailor +had a great love for flowers, for children, for animals, for pictures, +and for books; that he was deeply read in general literature, in +history, and in science, and that he had a knowledge of their own +country and its institutions which many of our own officers did not +possess. Americans have great reason to be proud of the achievements of +their naval men, and one of the most praiseworthy was the fact that they +became such intimate friends of Admiral Bayly. For this man's nature was +so sincere that he could never bring himself to indulge in friendships +which he deemed unworthy. Early in his association with our men, he told +them bluntly that any success he and they might have in getting on +together would depend entirely upon the manner in which they performed +their work. If they acquitted themselves creditably, well and good; if +not, he should not hesitate to find fault with them. It is thus a +tribute to our officers that in a very short time they and Admiral Bayly +had established relations which were not only friendly but affectionate. +Not long after our destroyers arrived at Queenstown most of the British +destroyers left to reinforce the hard-driven flotillas in the Channel +and the North Sea, so that the destroyer forces at Queenstown under +Admiral Bayly became almost exclusively American, though they worked +with many British vessels—sloops, trawlers, sweepers, and mystery +ships, in co-operation with British destroyers and other vessels in the +north and other parts of Ireland. The Admiral watched over our ships and +their men with the jealous eye of a father. He always referred to his +command as "my destroyers" and "my Americans," and woe to anyone who +attempted to interfere with them or do them the slightest injustice! +Admiral Bayly would fight for them, against the combined forces of the +whole British navy, like a tigress for her cubs. He constantly had a +weather eye on Plymouth, the main base of the British destroyers, to see +that the vessels from that station did their fair share of the work. +Once or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">[Pg 54]</a></span>twice a dispute arose between an American destroyer commander +and a British; in such cases Admiral Bayly vigorously took the part of +the American. "You did perfectly right," he would say to our men, and +then he would turn all his guns against the interfering Britisher. +Relations between the young Americans and the experienced Admiral became +so close that they would sometimes go to him with their personal +troubles; he became not only their commander, but their confidant and +adviser.</p> + +<p>There was something in these bright young chaps from overseas, indeed, +so different from anything which he had ever met before, that greatly +appealed to this seasoned Englishman. One thing that he particularly +enjoyed was their sense of humour. The Admiral himself had a keen wit +and a love of stories; and he also had the advantage, which was not +particularly common in England, of understanding American slang and +American anecdotes. There are certain stories which apparently only an +upbringing on American soil qualifies one to appreciate; yet Admiral +Bayly always instantly got the point. He even took a certain pride in +his ability to comprehend the American joke. One of the regular features +of life at Queenstown was a group of retired British officers—fine, +white-haired old gentlemen who could take no active part in the war but +who used to find much consolation in coming around to smoke their pipes +and to talk things over at Admiralty House. Admiral Bayly invariably +found delight in encouraging our officers to entertain these rare old +souls with American stories; their utter bewilderment furnished him +endless entertainment. The climax of his pleasure came when, after such +an experience, the old men would get the Admiral in a corner, and +whisper to him: "What in the world do they mean?"</p> + +<p>The Admiral was wonderfully quick at repartee, as our men found when +they began "joshing" him on British peculiarities, for as naval attaché +he had travelled extensively in the United States, had observed most of +our national eccentricities, and thus was able promptly "to come back." +In such contests our men did not invariably come off with all the +laurels. Yet, despite these modern tendencies, Admiral Bayly was a +conservative of the conservatives, having that ingrained British respect +for old things simply because they were old. An ancient British <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">[Pg 55]</a></span>custom +requires that at church on Sundays the leading dignitary in each +community shall mount the reading desk and read the lessons of the day; +Admiral Bayly would perform this office with a simplicity and a +reverence which indicated the genuinely religious nature of the man. And +in smaller details he was likewise the ancient, tradition-loving Briton. +He would never think of writing a letter to an equal or superior officer +except in longhand; to use a typewriter for such a purpose would have +been profanation in his eyes. I once criticized a certain Admiral for +consuming an hour or so in laboriously penning a letter which could have +been dictated to a stenographer in a few minutes.</p> + +<p>"How do you ever expect to win the war if you use up time this way?" I +asked.</p> + +<p>"I'd rather lose the war," the Admiral replied, but with a twinkle in +his eye, "than use a typewriter to my chiefs!"</p> + +<p>Our officers liked to chaff the Admiral quietly on this conservatism. He +frequently had a number of them to breakfast, and upon one such occasion +the question was asked as to why the Admiral ate an orange after +breakfast, instead of before, as is the custom in America.</p> + +<p>"I can tell you why," said Commander Zogbaum.</p> + +<p>"Well, why is it?" asked the Admiral.</p> + +<p>"Because that's what William the Conqueror used to do."</p> + +<p>"I can think of no better reason than that for doing it," the Admiral +promptly answered. But this remark tickled him immensely, and became a +byword with him. Ever afterward, whenever he proposed to do something +which the Americans regarded as too conservative, he would say:</p> + +<p>"You know that this is what William the Conqueror used to do!"</p> + +<p>Yet in one respect the Admiral was all American; he was a hard worker +even to the point of hustle. He insisted on the strictest attention to +the task in hand from his subordinates, but at least he never spared +himself. After he had arrived at Queenstown, two years before our +destroyers put in, he proceeded to reorganize Admiralty House on the +most business-like basis. The first thing he pounced upon was the +billiard-room in the basement. He decided that it would make an +excellent plotting-room, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">[Pg 56]</a></span>and that the billiard-tables could be +transformed into admirable drawing-boards for his staff; he immediately +called the superintendent and told him to make the necessary +transformations.</p> + +<p>"All right," said the superintendent. "We'll start work on them +to-morrow morning."</p> + +<p>"No, you won't," Admiral Bayly replied. "We propose to be established in +this room using these tables to-morrow morning. They must be all ready +for use by eight o'clock."</p> + +<p>And he was as good as his word; the workmen spent the whole night making +the changes. At the expense of considerable personal comfort he also +caused one half of the parlour of Admiralty House to be partitioned off +as an office and the wall thus formed covered with war maps.</p> + +<p>These incidents are significant, not only of Admiral Bayly's methods, +but of his ideals. In his view, if a billiard room could be made to +serve a war purpose, it had no proper place in an Admiralty house which +was the headquarters for fighting German submarines. The chief duty of +all men at that crisis was work, and their one responsibility was the +defeat of the Hun. Admiralty House was always open to our officers; they +spent many a delightful evening there around the Admiral's fire; they +were constantly entertained at lunch and at dinner, and they were +expected to drop in for tea whenever they were in port. But social +festivities in the conventional sense were barred. No ladies, except the +Admiral's relatives, ever visited the place. Some of the furnishings +were rather badly worn, but the Admiral would make no requisitions for +new rugs or chairs; every penny in the British exchequer, he insisted, +should be used to carry on the war. He was scornfully critical of any +naval officers who made a lavish display of silver on their tables; +money should be spent for depth charges, torpedoes, and twelve-inch +shells, not for ostentation. He was scrupulousness itself in observing +all official regulations in the matter of food and other essentials.</p> + +<p>For still another reason the Admiral made an ideal commander of American +naval forces. He was a strict teetotaller. His abstention was not a war +measure; he had always had a strong aversion to alcohol in any form and +had never drank a cocktail or a brandy and soda in his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">[Pg 57]</a></span>life. Dinners at +Admiralty House, therefore, were absolutely "dry," and in perfect +keeping with American naval regulations.</p> + +<p>Though Admiral Bayly was not athletic—his outdoor games being limited +to tip-and-run cricket in the Admiralty grounds, which he played with a +round bat and a tennis ball—he was a man of wiry physique and a +tireless walker. Indeed the most active young men in our navy had great +difficulty in keeping pace with him. One of his favourite diversions on +a Saturday afternoon was to take a group on a long tramp in the +beautiful country surrounding Queenstown; by the time the party reached +home, the Admiral, though sixty years old, was usually the freshest of +the lot. I still vividly remember a long walk which I took with him in a +pelting rain; I recall how keenly he enjoyed it and how young and nimble +he seemed to be when we reached home, drenched to the skin. A steep hill +led from the shore up to Admiralty House; Sir Lewis used to say that +this was a valuable military asset—it did not matter how angry a man +might be with him when he started for headquarters, by the time he +arrived, this wearisome climb always had the effect of quieting his +antagonism. The Admiral was fond of walking up this hill with our young +officers; he himself usually reached the top as fresh as a daisy, while +his juniors were frequently puffing for breath.</p> + +<p>He enjoyed testing out our men in other ways; nothing delighted him more +than giving them hard jobs to do—especially when they accomplished the +tasks successfully. One day he ordered one of our officers, +Lieutenant-Commander Roger Williams, captain of the <i>Duncan</i>, a recent +arrival at Queenstown, to cross the Irish Sea and bring back a ship. The +joke lay in the fact that this man's destroyer had just come in with her +steering gear completely out of commission—a circumstance which Admiral +Bayly well understood. Many officers would have promptly asked to be +excused on this ground, but not this determined American. He knew that +the Admiral was trying to "put something over on him," and he rose to +the occasion. The fact that Queenstown Harbour is long and narrow, not +wide enough for a destroyer to turn around in, made Commander Williams's +problem still more difficult, but by cleverly using his engines, he +succeeded <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">[Pg 58]</a></span>in backing out—the distance required was five miles; he took +another mile and a half to turn his ship and then he went across the sea +and brought back his convoy—all without any steering gear. This officer +never once mentioned to the Admiral the difficulties under which he had +worked, but his achievement completely won Sir Lewis's heart, and from +that time this young man became one of his particular favourites. +Indeed, it was the constant demonstration of this kind of fundamental +character in our naval men which made the Admiral admire them so.</p> + +<p>On occasions Admiral Bayly would go to sea himself—something quite +unprecedented and possibly even reprehensible, for it was about the same +thing as a commanding general going into the front-line trenches. But +the Admiral believed that doing this now and then helped to inspire his +men; and, besides that, he enjoyed it—he was not made for a land +sailor. He had as flagship a cruiser of about 5,000 tons; he had a way +of jumping on board without the slightest ceremony and taking a cruise +up the west coast of Ireland. On occasion the Admiral would personally +lead an expedition which was going to the relief of a torpedoed vessel, +looking for survivors adrift in small boats. One day Admiral Bayly, +Captain Pringle of the U.S.S. <i>Melville</i>, Captain Campbell, the +Englishman whose exploits with mystery ships had given him worldwide +fame, and myself went out on the <i>Active</i> to watch certain experiments +with depth charges. It was a highly imprudent thing to do, because a +vessel of such draft was an excellent target for torpedoes, but that +only added to the zest of the occasion from Admiral Bayly's point of +view.</p> + +<p>"What a bag this would be for the Hun!" he chuckled. "The American +Commander-in-Chief, the British Admiral commanding in Irish waters, a +British and an American captain!"</p> + +<p>In our mind's eye we could see our picture in the Berlin papers—four +distinguished prisoners standing in a row.</p> + +<p>A single fact shows with what consideration Admiral Bayly treated his +subordinates. The usual naval regulation demands that an officer, coming +in from a trip, shall immediately seek out his commander and make a +verbal report. Frequently the men came in late in the evening, extremely +fatigued; to make the visit then was a hardship and might deprive them +of much-needed sleep. Admiral <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">[Pg 59]</a></span>Bayly therefore had a fixed rule that +such visits should be made at ten o'clock of the morning following the +day of arrival. On such occasions he would often be found seated +somewhat grimly behind his desk wholly absorbed in the work in hand. If +he were writing or reading his mail he would keep steadily at it, never +glancing up until he had finished. He would listen to the report +stoically, possibly say a word of praise, and then turn again to the +business in hand. Occasionally he would notice that his abruptness had +perhaps pained the young American; then he would break into an +apologetic smile, and ask him to come up to dinner that evening, and +even—this was the greatest honour of all—to spend the night at +Admiralty House.</p> + +<p>These dinners were great occasions for our men, particularly as they +were presided over by Miss Voysey, the Admiral's niece. Miss Voysey, the +little spaniel, Patrick, and the Admiral constituted the "family," and +the three were entirely devoted to one another. Pat in particular was an +indispensable part of this menage; I have never seen any object quite so +crestfallen and woe-begone as this little dog when either Miss Voysey or +the Admiral spent a day or two away from the house. Miss Voysey was a +young woman of great personal charm and cultivation; probably she was +the influence that most contributed to the happiness and comfort of our +officers at Queenstown. From the day of their arrival she entered into +the closest comradeship with the Americans. She kept open house for +them: she was always on hand to serve tea in the afternoon, and she +never overlooked an opportunity to add to their well-being. As a result +of her delightful hospitality Admiralty House really became a home for +our officers. Miss Voysey had a genuine enthusiasm for America and +Americans; possibly the fact that she was herself an Australian made her +feel like one of us; at any rate, there were certain qualities in our +men that she found extremely congenial, and she herself certainly won +all their hearts. Anyone who wishes to start a burst of enthusiasm from +our officers who were stationed at Queenstown need only to mention the +name of Miss Voysey. The dignity with which she presided over the +Admiral's house, and the success with which she looked out for his +comfort, also inspired their respect. Miss Voysey was the leader in all +the war charities at Queenstown, and she and the Admiral made it their +personal duty to look out for the victims of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">[Pg 60]</a></span>torpedoed ships. At +whatever hour these survivors arrived they were sure of the most +warm-hearted attentions from headquarters. In a large hall in the Custom +House at the landing the Admiral kept a stock of cigarettes and tobacco, +and the necessary gear and supplies for making and serving hot coffee at +short notice, and nothing ever prevented him and his people from +stationing themselves there to greet and serve the survivors as soon as +they arrived—often wet and cold, and sometimes wounded. Even though the +Admiral might be at dinner he and Miss Voysey would leave their meal +half eaten and hurry to the landing to welcome the survivors. The +Admiral and his officers always insisted on serving them, and they would +even wash the dishes and put them away for the next time. The Admiral, +of course, might have ordered others to do this work, but he preferred +to give this personal expression of a real seaman's sympathy for other +seamen in distress. It is unnecessary to say that any American officers +who could get there in time always lent a hand. I am sure that long +after most of the minor incidents of this war have faded from my memory, +I shall still keep a vivid recollection of this kindly gentleman, +Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., Royal Navy, serving +coffee to wretched British, American, French, Italian, Japanese, or +negro sailors, with a cheering word for each, and afterward, with +sleeves tucked up, calmly washing dishes in a big pan of hot water.</p> + +<p>I have my fears that the Admiral will not be particularly pleased by the +fact that I have taken all these pains to introduce him to the American +public. Excessive modesty is one of his most conspicuous traits. When +American correspondents came to Queenstown, Admiral Bayly would receive +them courteously. "You can have all you want about the navy," he would +say, "but remember—not a word about Lewis Bayly." He was so reticent +that he was averse to having his picture taken; even the moving picture +operator detailed to get an historic record of the arrival of our +destroyers did not obtain a good view of the Admiral, for whenever Sir +Lewis saw him coming he would turn his back to the camera! My excuse for +describing this very lovable man, however, is because he became almost +an object of veneration to our American officers, and because, since for +eighteen months he was the commander of the American forces based on +Queenstown, he is an object of legitimate <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">[Pg 61]</a></span>interest to the American +people. The fact that the Admiral was generally known to our officers as +"Uncle Lewis," and that some of those who grew to know him best even +called him that to his face, illustrates the delightful relations which +were established. Any account of the operations of our navy in the +European War would thus be sadly incomplete which ignored the splendid +sailor who was largely responsible for their success.</p> + +<p>Another officer who contributed greatly to the efficiency of the +American forces was Captain E. R. G. R. Evans, R.N., who was detailed by +Admiral Jellicoe at my request to act as liaison officer with our +destroyers. No more fortunate selection could have been made. Captain +Evans had earned fame as second in command of the Scott Antarctic +expedition; he had spent much time in the United States and knew our +people well; indeed when war broke out he was lecturing in our country +on his polar experiences. A few days before our division arrived Captain +Evans had distinguished himself in one of the most brilliant naval +actions of the war. He was commander of the destroyer-leader <i>Broke</i>—a +"destroyer-leader" being a destroyer of unusually large size—and in +this battle three British vessels of this type had fought six German +destroyers. Captain Evans's ship sank one German destroyer and rammed +another, passing clear over its stern and cutting it nearly in two. The +whole of England was ringing with this exploit, and it was a decided +tribute to our men that Admiral Jellicoe consented to detail the +commander of the <i>Broke</i>. He was a man of great intelligence, great +energy, and, what was almost equally to the point, he was extremely +companionable; whether he was relating his experiences at the South +Pole, or telling us of active life on a destroyer, or swapping yarns +with our officers, or giving us the value of his practical experiences +in the war, Captain Evans was always at home with our men—indeed, he +seemed to be almost one of us.</p> + +<p>The fact that these American destroyers were placed under the command of +a British admiral was somewhat displeasing to certain Americans. I +remember that one rather bumptious American correspondent, on a visit to +Queenstown, was loud in expressing his disapproval of this state of +affairs, and even threatened to "expose" us all in the American press. +The fact that I was specifically commissioned as destroyer commander +also confused the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">[Pg 62]</a></span>situation. Yet the procedure was entirely proper, +and, in fact, absolutely necessary. My official title was "Commander of +the U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters"; besides this, I was +the representative of our Navy Department at the British Admiralty and +American member of the Allied Naval Council. These duties required my +presence in London, which became the centre of all our operations. I was +commander not only of our destroyers at Queenstown, but of a destroyer +force at Brest, another at Gibraltar, of subchaser forces at Corfu and +Plymouth, of a mixed force at the Azores, of the American battle +squadrons at Scapa Flow and Berehaven, Ireland, certain naval forces at +Murmansk and Archangel in north Russia, and of many other contingents. +Clearly it was impossible for me to devote all my time exclusively to +any one of these commands; so far as actual operations were concerned it +was necessary that particular commanders should control them. All these +destroyer squadrons, including that at Queenstown, were under the +command of the American Admiral stationed in London; whenever they +sailed from Queenstown on specific duty, however, they sailed under +orders from Admiral Bayly. Any time, however, I could withdraw these +destroyers from Queenstown and send them where the particular +necessities required. My position, that is, was precisely the same as +that of General Pershing in France. He sent certain American divisions +to the British army; as long as they acted with the British they were +subject to the orders of Sir Douglas Haig; but General Pershing could +withdraw these men at any time for use elsewhere. The actual supreme +command of all our forces, army and navy, rested in the hands of +Americans; but, for particular operations, they naturally had to take +their orders from the particular officer under whom they were stationed.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">III</p> + +<p>On May 17th a second American destroyer flotilla of six ships arrived at +Queenstown. From that date until July 5th a new division put in nearly +every week. The six destroyers which escorted our first troopships from +America to France were promptly assigned to duty with our forces in +Irish waters. Meanwhile other ships were added. On May 22nd the +<i>Melville</i>, the "Mother Ship" of the destroyers, arrived and became the +flagship of all the American <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">[Pg 63]</a></span>vessels which were stationed at +Queenstown. This repair and supply ship practically took the place of a +dockyard, so far as our destroyer forces were concerned. Queenstown had +been almost abandoned as a navy yard many years before the European War +and its facilities for the repair of warships were consequently very +inadequate. The <i>Melville</i> relieved the British authorities of many +responsibilities of this kind. She was able to do three-quarters of all +this work, except major repairs and those which required docking. Her +resources for repairing destroyers, and for providing for the wants and +comforts of our men, aroused much admiration in British naval circles. +The rapidity with which our forces settled down to work, and the +seamanly skill which they manifested from the very beginning, likewise +made the most favourable impression. By July 5th we had thirty-four +destroyers at Queenstown—a force that remained practically at that +strength until November. In 1918 much of the work of patrolling the seas +and of convoying ships to the west and south of Ireland—the area which, +in many ways, was the most important field of submarine warfare—fell +upon these American ships. The officers and crews began this work with +such zest that by June 1st I was justified in making the following +statement to the Navy Department: "It is gratifying to be able to report +that the operations of our forces in these waters have proved not only +very satisfactory, but also of marked value to the Allies in overcoming +the submarine menace. The equipment and construction of our ships have +proved adequate and sufficient, and the personnel has shown an unusually +high degree of enthusiasm and ability to cope with the situation +presented."</p> + +<p>It is impossible to exaggerate the enthusiasm which the arrival of these +vessels produced upon the British public. America itself experienced +something of a thrill when the news was first published that our +destroyers had reached European waters, but this was mild compared with +the joy which spread all over the British Isles. The feeling of +Americans was mainly one of pride; our people had not yet suffered much +from the European cataclysm, and despite the fact that we were now +active participants, the war still seemed very far off and unreal. The +fact that a German victory would greatly endanger our national freedom +had hardly entered our national consciousness; the idea seemed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">[Pg 64]</a></span>dim, +abstract, perhaps even absurd; but in Great Britain, with the guns +constantly booming almost within earshot of the people, the horrors of +the situation were acutely realized. For this reason those American +destroyers at Queenstown immediately became a symbol in the minds of the +British people. They represented not only the material assistance which +our limitless resources and our almost inexhaustible supply of men would +bring to a cause which was really in desperate straits; but they stood +also for a great spiritual fact; for the kinship of the two great +Anglo-Saxon peoples, which, although separated politically, had now +joined hands to fight for the ideals upon which the civilization of both +nations rested. In the preceding two years Great Britain had had her +moments of doubt—doubt as to whether the American people had remained +true to the principles that formed the basis of their national life; the +arrival of these ships immediately dispelled all such misgivings.</p> + +<p>Almost instinctively the minds of the British people turned to the day, +nearly three hundred years before, when the <i>Mayflower</i> sailed for the +wilderness beyond the seas. The moving picture film, which depicted the +arrival of our first destroyer division, and which was exhibited all +over Great Britain to enthusiastic crowds, cleverly accentuated this +idea. This film related how, in 1620, a few Englishmen had landed in +North America; how these adventurers had laid the foundations of a new +state based on English conceptions of justice and liberty; how they had +grown great and prosperous; how the stupidity of certain British +statesmen had forced them to declare their independence; how they had +fought for this independence with the utmost heroism; how out of these +disjointed British colonies they had founded one of the mightiest +nations of history; and how now, when the liberties of mankind were +endangered, the descendants of the old <i>Mayflower</i> pioneers had in their +turn crossed the ocean—this time going eastward—to fight for the +traditions of their race. Had Americans been making this film, they +would have illustrated another famous episode in our history that +antedated, by thirteen years, the voyage of the <i>Mayflower</i>—that is, +the landing of British colonists in Virginia, in 1607; but in the minds +of the English people the name <i>Mayflower</i> had become merely a symbol of +American progress and all that it represented. This whole story appealed +to the British masses as one of the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">[Pg 65]</a></span>great miracles of history—a +single, miserable little settlement in Massachusetts Bay expanding into +a continent overflowing with resources and wealth; a shipload of men, +women, and children developing, in less than three centuries, into a +nation of more than 100,000,000 people. And the arrival of our +destroyers, pictured on the film, informed the British people that all +this youth and energy had been thrown upon their side of the battle.</p> + +<p>One circumstance gave a particular appropriateness to the fact that I +commanded these forces. In 1910 I had visited England as captain of the +battleship <i>Minnesota</i>, a unit in a fleet which was then cruising in +British and French waters. It was apparent even at that time that +preparations were under way for a European war; on every hand there were +plenty of evidences that Germany was determined to play her great stroke +for the domination of the world. In a report to the Admiral commanding +our division I gave it as my opinion that the great European War would +begin within four years. In a speech at the Guildhall, where 800 of our +sailors were entertained at lunch by the Lord Mayor, Sir Vezey Strong, I +used the words which involved me in a good deal of trouble at the time +and which have been much quoted since. The statement then made was +purely the inspiration of the moment; it came from the heart, not from +the head; probably the evidences that Germany was stealthily preparing +her great blow had something to do with my outburst. I certainly spoke +without any authorization from my Government, and realized at once that +I had committed a great indiscretion. "If the time should ever come," I +said, "when the British Empire is menaced by a European coalition, Great +Britain can rely upon the last ship, the last dollar, the last man, and +the last drop of blood of her kindred beyond the sea." It is not +surprising that the appearance of American ships, commanded by the +American who had spoken these words seven years before, strongly +appealed to the British sense of the dramatic. Indeed, it struck the +British people as a particularly happy fulfilment of prophecy. These +sentences were used as an introduction to the moving picture film +showing the arrival of our first destroyer division, and for weeks after +reaching England I could hardly pick up a newspaper without these words +of my Guildhall speech staring me in the face.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">[Pg 66]</a></span>Of course, any American admiral then commanding American naval forces in +European waters would have been acclaimed as the living symbol of +Anglo-American co-operation; and it was simply as the representative of +the American people and the American navy that the British people +received me so appreciatively. At first the appearance of our uniforms +aroused much curiosity; our tightly fitting blouses were quite different +from the British sack coats, and few people in London, in fact, knew who +we were. After our photographs had appeared in the press, however, the +people always recognized us in the streets. And then something quite +unusual happened. That naval and military men should salute my staff and +me was to have been expected, but that civilians should show this +respect for the American uniform was really unprecedented. Yet we were +frequently greeted in this way. It indicated, almost more than anything +else, how deeply affected the British people were by America's entrance +into the war. All classes and all ages showed this same respect and +gratitude to our country. Necessarily I had to attend many public +dinners and even to make many speeches; the people gathered on such +occasions always rose <i>en masse</i> as a tribute to the uniform which I +wore. Sometimes such meetings were composed of boy scouts, of schoolboys +or schoolgirls, of munition workers, of journalists, or of statesmen; +and all, irrespective of age or social station or occupation, seemed +delighted to pay respect to the American navy. There were many evidences +of interest in the "American Admiral" that were really affecting. Thus +one day a message came from Lady Roberts, widow of the great soldier, +Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, saying that she was desirous of meeting the +"American Admiral." I was very glad to go out in the country and spend a +Sunday afternoon with her. This charming, white-haired old lady was very +feeble, and had to spend most of her time in a wheel-chair. But her mind +was bright as ever, and she had been following the war with the closest +attention. She listened with keen interest as I told her all about the +submarines, and she asked innumerable questions concerning them. She was +particularly affected when she spoke about the part the United States +was playing in the war, and remarked how much our participation would +have delighted the Field-Marshal.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">[Pg 67]</a></span>I have already given my first impressions of Their Majesties the King +and Queen, and time only confirmed them. Neither ever missed an +opportunity to show their appreciation of the part that we were playing. +The zeal with which the King entered into the celebration of our Fourth +of July made him very popular with all our men. He even cultivated a +taste for our national game. Certain of our early contingents of +soldiers encamped near Windsor; here they immediately laid out a +baseball diamond and daily engaged in their favourite sport. The Royal +Family used to watch our men at their play, became interested in the +game, and soon learned to follow it. The Duke of Connaught and the +Princess Patricia, his daughter, had learned baseball through their +several years' residence in Canada, and could watch a match with all the +understanding and enthusiasm of an American "fan." As our sailors and +soldiers arrived in greater numbers, the interest and friendliness of +the Royal Family increased. One of the King's most delightful traits is +his sense of humour. The Queen also showed a great fondness for stories, +and I particularly remember her amusement at the famous remark of the +Australians—perhaps the most ferocious combatants on the Western +Front—about the American soldier, "a good fighter, but a little rough." +Of all the anecdotes connected with our men, none delighted King George +so much as those concerning our coloured troops. A whole literature of +negro yarns spread rapidly over Europe; most of them, I find, have long +since reached the United States. The most lasting impression which I +retain of the head of the British Empire is that he is very much of a +human being. He loved just about the same things as the normal American +or Englishman loves—his family, his friends, his country, a good story, +a pleasant evening with congenial associates. And he had precisely the +same earnestness about the war which one found in every properly +constituted Briton or American; the victories of the Allies exhilarated +King George just as they exhilarated the man in the street, and their +defeats saddened him just as they saddened the humblest citizen. I found +in His Majesty that same solemn sense of comradeship with America which +I found in the English civilians who saluted the American uniform in the +street.</p> + +<p>As an evidence of the exceedingly cordial relations <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">[Pg 68]</a></span>existing between +the two navies the Admiralty proposed, in the latter part of May, that I +should assume Admiral Bayly's command for several days while he took a +little vacation on the west coast of Ireland. Admiral Bayly was the +Commander-in-Chief of all the British forces operating on the Irish +coast. This command thus included far more than that at Queenstown; it +comprised several naval stations and the considerable naval forces in +Irish waters. Never before, so I was informed, had a foreign naval +officer commanded British naval forces in time of war. So far as +exercising any control over sea operations was concerned, this +invitation was not particularly important. Matters were running smoothly +at the Queenstown station; Admiral Bayly's second in command could +easily have kept the machine in working order; it was hardly likely, in +the few days that I was to command, that any changes in policy would be +initiated. The British Admiralty merely took this way of showing a great +courtesy to the American navy, and of emphasizing to the world the +excellent relations that existed between the two services. The act was +intended to symbolize the fact that the British and the American navies +were really one in the thoroughness of their co-operation in subduing +the Prussian menace. Incidentally the British probably hoped that the +publication of this news in the German press would not be without effect +in Germany. On June 18th, therefore, I went to Queenstown, and hoisted +my flag on the staff in front of Admiralty House. I had some hesitation +in doing this, for American navy regulations stipulate that an Admiral's +flag shall be raised only on a ship afloat, but Admiral Bayly was +insistent that his flag should come down and that mine should go up, and +I decided that this technicality might be waived. The incident aroused +great interest in England, but it started many queer rumours in +Queenstown. One was that Admiral Bayly and I had quarrelled, the British +Admiral, strangely enough, having departed in high dudgeon and left me +serenely in control. Another was that I had come to Queenstown, seized +the reins out of Admiral Bayly's hands, thrown him out of the country, +and taken over the government of Ireland on behalf of the United States, +which had now determined to free the island from British oppression! +However, in a few days Admiral Bayly returned and all went on as +before.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">[Pg 69]</a></span>During the nearly two years which the American naval forces spent in +Europe only one element in the population showed them any hostility or +even unfriendliness. At the moment when these lines are being written a +delegation claiming to represent the "Irish Republic" is touring the +United States, asking Americans to extend their sympathy and contribute +money toward the realization of their project. I have great admiration +for the mass of the Irish people, and from the best elements of these +people the American sailors received only kindness. I have therefore +hesitated about telling just how some members of the Sinn Fein Party +treated our men. But it seems that now when this same brotherhood is +attempting to stir up hatred in this country against our Allies in the +war, there is a certain pertinence in informing Americans just what kind +of treatment their brave sailors met with at the hands of the Sinn Fein +in Ireland.</p> + +<p>The people of Queenstown and Cork, as already described, received our +men with genuine Irish cordiality. Yet in a few weeks evidence of +hostility in certain quarters became apparent. The fact is that the part +of Ireland in which the Americans were stationed was a headquarters of +the Sinn Fein. The members of this organization were not only openly +disloyal; they were openly pro-German. They were not even neutral; they +were working day and night for a German victory, for in their misguided +minds a German victory signified an Irish Republic. It was no secret +that the Sinn Feiners were sending information to Germany and constantly +laying plots to interfere with the British and American navies. At first +it might be supposed that the large number of sailors—and some +officers—of Irish extraction on the American destroyers would tend to +make things easier for our men. Quite the contrary proved to be the +case. The Sinn Feiners apparently believed that these so-called +Irish-Americans would sympathize with their cause; in their wildest +moments they even hoped that our naval forces might champion it. But +these splendid sailors were Americans before they were anything else; +their chief ambition was the defeat of the Hun and they could not +understand how any man anywhere could have any other aim in life. They +were disgusted at the large numbers of able-bodied men whom they saw in +the streets, and did not hesitate to ask some <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">[Pg 70]</a></span>of them why they were not +fighting on the Western Front. The behaviour of the American sailors was +good; but the mere fact that they did not openly manifest a hatred of +Great Britain and a love of Germany infuriated the Sinn Feiners. And the +eternal woman question also played its part. Our men had much more money +than the native Irish boys, and could entertain the girls more lavishly +at the movies and ice-cream stands. The men of our fleet and the Irish +girls became excellent friends; the association, from our point of view, +was a very wholesome one, for the moral character of the Irish girls of +Queenstown and Cork—as, indeed, of Irish girls everywhere—is very +high, and their companionship added greatly to the well-being and +contentment of our sailors, not a few of whom found wives among these +young women. But when the Sinn Fein element saw their sweethearts +deserting them for the American boys their hitherto suppressed anger +took the form of overt acts.</p> + +<p>Occasionally an American sailor would be brought from Cork to Queenstown +in a condition that demanded pressing medical attention. When he +regained consciousness he would relate how he had suddenly been set upon +by half a dozen roughs and beaten into a state of insensibility. Several +of our men were severely injured in this way. At other times small +groups were stoned by Sinn Fein sympathizers, and there were many +hostile demonstrations in moving-picture houses and theatres. Even more +frequently attacks were made, not upon the American sailors, but upon +the Irish girls who accompanied them. These chivalrous pro-German +agitators would rush up and attempt to tear the girls away from our +young men; they would pull down their hair, slap them, and even kick +them. Naturally American sailors were hardly the type to tolerate +behaviour of this kind, and some bloody battles took place. This +hostility was increased by one very regrettable occurrence in +Queenstown. An American sailor was promenading the main thoroughfare +with an Irish girl, when an infuriated Sinn Feiner rushed up, began to +abuse his former sweetheart in vile language, and attempted to lay hands +on her. The American struck this hooligan a terrific blow; he fell +backward and struck his head on the curb. The fall fractured the +assailant's skull and in a few hours he was dead. We handed our <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">[Pg 71]</a></span>man +over to the civil authorities for trial, and a jury, composed entirely +of Irishmen, acquitted him. The action of this jury in itself indicated +that there was no sympathy among the decent Irish element, which +constituted the great majority, with this sort of tactics, but naturally +it did not improve relations between our men and the Sinn Fein. The +importance of another incident which took place at the cathedral has +been much exaggerated. It is true that a priest in his Sunday sermon +denounced the American sailors as vandals and betrayers of Irish +womanhood, but it is also true that the Roman Catholics of that section +were themselves the most enraged at this absurd proceeding. A number of +Roman Catholic officers who were present left the church in a body; the +Catholic Bishop of the Diocese called upon Admiral Bayly and apologized +for the insult, and he also punished the offending priest by assigning +him to new duties at a considerable distance from the American ships.</p> + +<p>But even more serious trouble was brewing, for our officers discovered +that the American sailors were making elaborate plans to protect +themselves. Had this discovery not been made in time, something like an +international incident might have resulted. Much to our regret, +therefore, it was found necessary to issue an order that no naval men, +British or American, under the rank of Commander, should be permitted to +go to Cork. Ultimately we had nearly 8,000 American men at this station; +Queenstown itself is a small place of 6,000 or 7,000, so it is apparent +that it did not possess the facilities for giving such a large number of +men those relaxations which were necessary to their efficiency. We +established a club in Queenstown, provided moving pictures and other +entertainments, and did the best we could to keep our sailors contented. +The citizens of Cork also keenly regretted our action. The great +majority had formed a real fondness for our boys; and they regarded it +as a great humiliation that the rowdy element had made it necessary to +keep our men out of their city. Many letters were printed in the Cork +newspapers apologizing to the Americans and calling upon the people to +take action that would justify us in rescinding our order. The loss to +Cork tradesmen was great; our men received not far from $200,000 to +$300,000 a month in pay; they were free spenders, and their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">[Pg 72]</a></span>presence in +the neighbourhood for nearly two years would have meant a fortune to +many of the local merchants. Yet we were obliged to refuse to accede to +the numerous requests that the American sailors be permitted to visit +this city.</p> + +<p>A committee of distinguished citizens of Cork, led by the Lord Mayor, +came to Admiralty House to plead for the rescinding of this order. +Admiral Bayly cross-examined them very sharply. It appeared that the men +who had committed these offences against American sailors had never been +punished.</p> + +<p>Unless written guarantees were furnished that there would be no hostile +demonstrations against British or Americans, Admiral Bayly refused to +withdraw the ban, and I fully concurred in this decision. Unfortunately +the committee could give no such guarantee. We knew very well that the +first appearance of Americans in Cork would be the signal for a renewal +of hostilities, and the temper of our sailors was such that the most +deplorable consequences might have resulted. We even discovered that the +blacksmiths on the U.S.S. <i>Melville</i> were surreptitiously manufacturing +weapons which our men could conceal on their persons and with which they +proposed to sally forth and do battle with the Sinn Fein! So for the +whole period of our stay in Queenstown our sailors were compelled to +keep away from the dangerous city. But the situation was not without its +humorous aspects. Thus the pretty girls of Cork, finding that the +Americans could not come to them, decided to come to the Americans; +every afternoon a trainload would arrive at the Queenstown station, +where our sailors would greet them, give them a splendid time, and then, +in the evening, escort them to the station and send a happy crowd on +their way home.</p> + +<p>But the Sinn Feiners interfered with us in much more serious ways than +this. They were doing everything in their power to help Germany. With +their assistance German agents and German spies were landed in Ireland. +At one time the situation became so dangerous that I had to take +experienced officers whose services could ill be spared from our +destroyers and assign them to our outlying air stations in Ireland. +This, of course, proportionately weakened our fleet and did its part in +prolonging the war.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">[Pg 73]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>All this time that we were seeking a solution for the submarine problem +we really had that solution in our hands. The seas presented two +impressive spectacles in those terrible months of April, May, and June, +1917. One was the comparative ease with which the German submarines were +sinking merchant vessels; the other was their failure materially to +weaken the Allied fleets. If we wish a counter-picture to that presented +by the Irish Sea and the English Channel, where merchant shipping was +constantly going down, we should look to the North Sea, where the +British Grand Fleet, absolutely intact, was defiantly riding the waves. +The uninformed public explained this apparent security in a way of its +own; it believed that the British dreadnoughts were anchored behind +booms, nets, and mine-fields, through which the submarines could not +penetrate. Yet the fact of the matter was that the Grand Fleet was +frequently cruising in the open sea, in the waters which were known to +be the most infested with submarines. The German submarines had been +attempting to destroy this fleet for two and a half years. It had been +their plan to weaken this great battle force by "attrition"; to sink the +great battleships one by one, and in this way to reduce the fighting +power of the fleet to such a point that the German dreadnoughts could +have some chances of success. Such had been the German programme, widely +heralded at the beginning of the war; nearly three years had now passed, +but how had this pretentious scheme succeeded? The fact was that the +submarines had not destroyed a single dreadnought. It was certainly a +profitable study in contrasts—that of merchant ships constantly being +torpedoed and that of battleships constantly repelling such attacks. +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">[Pg 74]</a></span>Certainly a careful study of this situation ought to bring out facts +which would assist the Allies in solving the most baffling problem of +the war.</p> + +<p>Yet there was no mystery about the immunity which these great fighting +vessels were enjoying; the submarine problem, so far as it affected the +battle fleet, had already been solved. The explanation was found in the +simple circumstance that, whenever the dreadnoughts went to sea, they +were preceded by a screen of cruisers and destroyers. It almost seemed +as though these surface craft were serving as a kind of impenetrable +wall against which the German U-boats were beating themselves in vain. +Yet to the casual observer there seemed to be no reason why the +submarines should stand in any particular terror of the destroyers. +Externally they looked like the least impressive war vessels afloat. +When they sailed ahead of the battle squadrons, the destroyers were +ungraceful objects upon the surface of the water; the impression which +they conveyed was that of fragility rather than of strength, and the +idea that they could ever be the guardians of the mighty battleships +which sailed behind them at first seemed almost grotesque. Yet these +little vessels really possessed the power of overcoming the submarine. +The war had not progressed far when it became apparent that the U-boat +could not operate anywhere near this speedy little surface vessel +without running serious risk of destruction.</p> + +<p>Until the reports of submarine fighting began to find their way into the +papers, however, the destroyer was probably the one type of warship in +which the public had the smallest interest. It had become, indeed, a +kind of ugly duckling of the Navy. Our Congress had regularly neglected +it; year after year our naval experts had recommended that four +destroyers be built for every battleship, and annually Congress had +appropriated for only one or two. The war had also found Great Britain +without a sufficient number of destroyers for the purpose of +anti-submarine warfare. The Admiralty had provided enough for screening +the Grand Fleet in cruising and in battle, but it had been called upon +to divert so many for the protection of troop transportation, supply +ships, and commerce generally that the efficiency of the fleet had been +greatly undermined. Thus Britain found herself <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">[Pg 75]</a></span>without enough +destroyers to meet the submarine campaign; this situation was not due to +any lack of foresight, but to a failure to foresee that any civilized +nation could ever employ the torpedo in unrestricted warfare against +merchant ships and their crews.</p> + +<p>The one time that this type of vessel had come prominently into notice +was in 1904, when several of them attacked the Russian fleet at Port +Arthur, damaging several powerful vessels and practically ending Russian +sea power in the Far East. The history of the destroyer, however, goes +back much further than 1904. It was created to fulfil a duty not unlike +that which it has played so gloriously in the World War. In the late +seventies and early eighties a new type of war vessel, the torpedo boat, +caused almost as much perturbation as the submarine has caused in recent +years. This speedy little fighter was invented to serve as a medium for +the discharge of a newly perfected engine of naval warfare, the +automobile torpedo. It was its function to creep up to a battleship, +preferably under cover of darkness or in thick weather, and let loose +this weapon against her unsuspecting hulk. The appearance of the torpedo +boat led to the same prediction as that which has been more recently +inspired by the submarine; in the eyes of many it simply meant the end +of the great surface battleship. But naval architects, looking about for +the "answer" to this dangerous craft, designed another type of warship +and appropriately called it the "torpedo boat destroyer." This vessel +was not only larger and speedier than its appointed antagonist, but it +possessed a radius of action and a seaworthiness which enabled it to +accompany the battle fleet. Its draft was so light that a torpedo could +pass harmlessly under the keel, and it carried an armament which had +sufficient power to end the career of any torpedo boat that came its +way. Few types have ever justified their name so successfully as the +torpedo boat destroyer. So completely did it eliminate that little +vessel as a danger to the fighting ships that practically all navies +long since ceased to build torpedo boats. Yet the destroyer promptly +succeeded to the chief function of the discarded vessel, that of +attacking capital ships with torpedoes; and, in addition to this, it +assumed the duty of protecting battleships from similar attack by enemy +vessels of the same type.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">[Pg 76]</a></span>It surprises many people to learn that the destroyer is not a little +boat but a warship of considerable size. This vessel to-day impresses +most people as small only because all ships, those which are used for +commerce and those which are used for war, have increased so greatly in +displacement. The latest specimens of the destroyer carry four-or +five-inch guns and twelve torpedo tubes, each of which launches a +torpedo that weighs more than a ton, and runs as straight as an arrow +for more than six miles. The <i>Santa Maria</i>, the largest vessel of the +squadron with which Columbus made his first voyage to America, had a +displacement of about five hundred tons, and thus was about half as +large as a destroyer; and even at the beginning of the clipper ship era +few vessels were much larger.</p> + +<p>Previous to 1914 it was generally believed that torpedo attacks would +play a large part in any great naval engagement, and this was the reason +why all naval advisers insisted that a large number of these vessels +should be constructed as essential units of the fleet. Yet the war had +not made much progress when it became apparent that this versatile craft +had another great part to play, and that it would once more justify its +name in really heroic fashion. Just as it had proved its worth in +driving the surface torpedo boat from the seas, so now it developed into +a very dangerous foe to the torpedo boat that sailed beneath the waves. +Events soon demonstrated that, in all open engagements between submarine +and destroyer, the submarine stood very little chance. The reason for +this was simply that the submarine had no weapon with which it could +successfully resist the attack of the destroyer, whereas the destroyer +had several with which it could attack the submarine. The submarine had +three or four torpedo tubes, and only one or two guns, and with neither +could it afford to risk attacking the more powerfully armed destroyer. +The U-boat was of such a fragile nature that it could never afford to +engage in a combat in which it stood much chance of getting hit. A +destroyer could stand a comparatively severe pounding and still remain +fairly intact, but a single shell, striking a submarine, was a very +serious matter; even though the vessel did not sink as a result, it was +almost inevitable that certain parts of its machinery would be so +injured that it would have difficulty in getting into port. It therefore +became <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">[Pg 77]</a></span>necessary for the submarine always to play safe, to fight only +under conditions in which it had the enemy at such a disadvantage that +it ran little risk itself; and this was the reason why it preferred to +attack merchant and passenger ships rather than vessels, such as the +destroyer, that could energetically defend themselves.</p> + +<p>The comparatively light draft of the destroyer, which is about nine or +ten feet, pretty effectually protects it from the submarine's torpedo, +for this torpedo, to function with its greatest efficiency, must take a +course about fifteen feet under water; if it runs nearer the surface +than this, it comes under the influence of the waves, and does not make +a straight course. More important still, the speed of the destroyer, the +ease with which it turns, circles, and zigzags, makes it all but +impossible for a torpedo to be aimed with much chance of hitting her. +Moreover, the discharge of this missile is a far more complicated +undertaking than is generally supposed. The submarine commander cannot +take position anywhere and discharge his weapon more or less wildly, +running his chances of hitting; he must get his boat in place, calculate +range, course, and speed, and take careful aim. Clearly it is difficult +for him to do this successfully if his intended victim is scurrying +along at the rate of thirty or forty miles an hour. Moreover, the +destroyer is constantly changing its course, making great circles and +indulging in other disconcerting movements. So well did the Germans +understand the difficulty of torpedoing a destroyer that they +practically never attempted so unprofitable and so hazardous an +enterprise.</p> + +<p>Torpedoes are complicated and expensive mechanisms; each one costs about +$8,000 and the average U-boat carried only from eight to twelve; it was +therefore necessary to husband these precious weapons, to use them only +when the chances most favoured success; the U-boat commander who wasted +them in attempts to sink destroyers would probably have been +court-martialled.</p> + +<p>But while the submarine had practically no means of successfully +fighting the destroyer, the destroyer had several ways of putting an end +to the submarine. The advantage which really made the destroyer so +dangerous, as already intimated, was its excessive speed. On the surface +the U-boat made little more than fifteen miles an <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">[Pg 78]</a></span>hour, and under the +surface it made little more than seven or eight. If the destroyer once +discovered its presence, therefore, it could reach its prey in an +incredibly short time. It could attack with its guns, and, if conditions +were favourable, it could ram; and this was no trifling accident, for a +destroyer going at thirty or forty miles could cut a submarine nearly in +two with its strong, razor-like bow. In the early days of the war these +were the main methods upon which it relied to attack, but by the time +that I had reached London, another and much more frightful weapon had +been devised. This was the depth charge, a large can containing about +three hundred pounds of TNT, which, if it exploded anywhere within one +hundred feet of the submarine, would either destroy it entirely or so +injure it that the victim usually had to come to the surface and +surrender.</p> + +<p>I once asked Admiral Jellicoe who was the real inventor of this +annihilating missile.</p> + +<p>"No man in particular," he said. "It came into existence almost +spontaneously, in response to a pressing need. Gunfire can destroy +submarines when they are on the surface, but you know it can accomplish +nothing against them when they are submerged. This fact made it +extremely difficult to sink them in the early days of the war. One day, +when the Grand Fleet was cruising in the North Sea, a submarine fired a +torpedo at one of the cruisers. The cruiser saw the periscope and the +wake of the torpedo, and had little difficulty in so manœuvring as to +avoid being struck. She then went full speed to the spot from which the +submarine had fired its torpedo, in the hope of ramming it. But by the +time she arrived the submarine had submerged so deeply that the cruiser +passed over her without doing her any harm. Yet the officers and crew +could see the submerged hull; there the enemy lay in full view of her +pursuers, yet perfectly safe! The officers reported this incident to me +in the presence of Admiral Madden, second in command.</p> + +<p>"'Wouldn't it have been fine,' said Madden, 'if they had had on board a +mine so designed that, when dropped overboard, it would have exploded +when it reached the depth at which the submarine was lying?'"</p> + +<p>"That remark," continued Admiral Jellicoe, "gave us the germinal idea of +the depth charge. I asked the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">[Pg 79]</a></span>Admiralty to get to work and produce a +'mine' that would act in the way that Admiral Madden had suggested. It +proved to be very simple to construct—an ordinary steel cylinder filled +with TNT; this was fitted with a simple firing appliance which was set +off by the pressure of the water, and could be so adjusted that it would +explode the charge at any depth desired. This apparatus was so simple +and so necessary that we at once began to manufacture it."</p> + +<p>The depth charge looked like the innocent domestic ash can, and that was +the name by which it soon came to be popularly known. Each destroyer +eventually carried twenty or thirty of these destructive weapons at the +stern; a mere pull on a lever would make one drop into the water. Many +destroyers also carried strange-looking howitzers, which were made in +the shape of a Y, and from which one ash can could be hurled fifty yards +or more from each side of the vessel. The explosion, when it took place +within the one hundred feet which I have mentioned as usually fatal to +the submarine, would drive the plates inward and sometimes make a leak +so large that the vessel would sink almost instantaneously. At a +somewhat greater distance it frequently produced a leak of such serious +proportions that the submarine would be forced to blow her ballast +tanks, come to the surface, and surrender. Even when the depth charge +exploded considerably more than a hundred feet away, the result might be +equally disastrous, for the concussion might distort the hull and damage +the horizontal rudders, making it impossible to steer, or it might so +injure the essential machinery that the submarine would be rendered +helpless. Sometimes the lights went out, leaving the crew groping in +blackness; necessary parts were shaken from their fastenings; and in +such a case the commander had his choice of two alternatives, one to be +crushed by the pressure of the water, and the other to come up and be +captured or sunk by his surface foe. It is no reflection upon the +courage of the submarine commanders to say that in this embarrassing +situation they usually preferred to throw themselves upon the mercy of +the enemy rather than to be smashed or to die a lingering and agonizing +death under the water. Even when the explosion took place at a distance +so great that the submarine was not <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">[Pg 80]</a></span>seriously damaged, the experience +was a highly disconcerting one for the crew. If a dozen depth charges +were dropped, one after the other, the effect upon the men in the hunted +vessel was particularly demoralizing. In the course of the war several +of our own submarines were depth-charged by our own destroyers, and from +our crews we obtained graphic descriptions of the sensations which +resulted. It was found that men who had passed through such an ordeal +were practically useless for several days, and that sometimes they were +rendered permanently unfit for service. The state of nerves which +followed such an experience was not unlike that new war psychosis known +as shell-shock. One of our officers who had had such an adventure told +me that the explosion of a single depth charge under the water might be +compared to the concussion produced by the simultaneous firing of all +the fourteen-inch guns of a battleship. One can only imagine what the +concussion must have been when produced by ten or twenty depth charges +in succession. Whether or not the submarine was destroyed or seriously +injured, a depth-charged crew became extremely cautious in the future +about getting anywhere in the neighbourhood of a destroyer; and among +the several influences which ultimately disorganized the <i>moral</i> of the +German U-boat service these contacts with depth charges were doubtless +the most important. The hardiest under-water sailor did not care to go +through such frightful moments a second time.</p> + +<p>This statement makes it appear as though the depth charge had settled +the fate of the submarine. Yet that was far from being the case, for +against the ash can, with its 300 pounds of TNT, the submarine possessed +one quality which gave it great defensive power. That was ability to +make itself unseen. Strangely enough, the average layman is inclined to +overlook this fairly apparent fact, and that is the reason why, even at +the risk of repeating myself, I frequently refer to it. Indeed, the only +respect in which the subsurface boat differs essentially from all other +war vessels is in this power of becoming invisible. Whenever it descries +danger from afar, the submarine can disappear under the water in +anywhere from twenty seconds to a minute. And its great advantage is +that it can detect its enemy long before <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">[Pg 81]</a></span>that enemy can detect the +submarine. A U-boat, sailing awash, or sailing with only its +conning-tower exposed, can see a destroyer at a distance of about +fifteen miles if the weather is clear; but, under similar conditions, +the destroyer can see the submarine at a distance of about four miles. +Possessing this great advantage, the submarine can usually decide +whether it will meet the enemy or not; if it decides that it is wise to +avoid an encounter, all it has to do is to duck, remain submerged until +the destroyer has passed on, entirely unconscious of its presence, and +then to resume its real work, which is not that of fighting warships, +but of sinking merchantmen. The chief anxiety of the U-boat commander is +thus to avoid contact with its surface foe and its terrible depth +charge, whereas the business of the destroyer commander is to get within +fighting distance of his quarry.</p> + +<p>Ordinarily, conditions favour the U-boat in this game, simply because +the ocean is so large a place. But there is one situation in which the +destroyer has more than a fighting chance, for the power of the +submarine to keep its presence secret lasts only so long as it remains +out of action. If it makes no attempt to fight, its presence can hardly +ever be detected; but just as soon as it becomes belligerent, it +immediately reveals its whereabouts. If it comes to the surface and +fires its guns, naturally it advertises to its enemy precisely where it +is; but it betrays its location almost as clearly when it discharges a +torpedo. Just as soon as the torpedo leaves the submarine, a wake, +clearly marking its progress, appears upon the surface of the water. +Though most newspaper readers have heard of this tell-tale track, I have +found few who really understand what a conspicuous disturbance it is. +The torpedo is really a little submarine itself; it is propelled by +compressed air, the exhaust of which stirs up the water and produces a +foamy, soapy wake, which is practically the same as that produced by the +propeller of an ocean liner. This trail is four or five feet wide; it is +as white and is as distinct as a chalk line drawn upon a blackboard, +provided the weather is clear and the sun is in the right direction. +Indeed, it is sometimes so distinct that an easily manœuvred ship, +and even sometimes a merchantman, can avoid the torpedo which it sees +advancing merely by putting over the helm and turning out of its +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">[Pg 82]</a></span>course. But the chief value of this wake to the submarine hunters is +that it shows the direction in which the submarine was located when the +torpedo started on its course. It stands out on the surface of the water +like a long, ghostly finger pointing to the spot where the foe let loose +its shaft.</p> + +<p>As soon as the destroyer sees this betraying disturbance, the commander +rings for full speed; and one of the greatest advantages of this type of +vessel is that it can attain full speed in an incredibly short time. The +destroyer then dashes down the wake until it reaches the end, which +indicates the point where the submarine lay when it discharged its +missile. At this point the surface vessel drops a depth charge and then +begins cutting a circle, say, to the right. Pains are taken to make this +circle so wide that it will include the submarine, provided it has gone +in that direction. The destroyer then makes another circle to the left. +Every ten or fifteen seconds, while describing these circles, it drops a +depth charge; indeed, not infrequently it drops twenty or thirty in a +few minutes. If there is another destroyer in the neighbourhood it also +follows up the wake and when it reaches the indicated point, it circles +in the opposite direction from the first. Sometimes more than two may +start for the suspected location and, under certain conditions, the +water within a radius of half a mile or more may be seething with +exploding depth charges.</p> + +<p>It is plain from this description that the proceeding develops into an +exceedingly dangerous game for the attacking submarine. It is a simple +matter to calculate the chances of escaping which the enemy has under +these conditions. That opportunity is clearly measured by the time which +elapses from the moment when it discharges its torpedo to the moment +when the destroyer has reached the point at which it was discharged. +This interval gives the subsurface boat a certain chance to get away; +but its under-water speed is moderate, and so by the time the destroyer +reaches the critical spot, the submarine has advanced but a short +distance away from it. How far has she gone? In what direction did she +go? These are the two questions which the destroyer commander must +answer, and the success with which he answers them accurately measures +his success in sinking or damaging <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">[Pg 83]</a></span>his enemy, or in giving him a good +scare. If he always decided these two points accurately, he would almost +always "get" his submarine; the chances of error are very great, +however, and that is the reason why the submarine in most cases gets +away. All that the surface commander knows is that there is a U-boat +somewhere in his neighbourhood, but he does not know its precise +location and so he is fighting more or less in the dark. In the great +majority of cases the submarine does get away, but now and then the +depth charge reaches its goal and ends its career.</p> + +<p>If only one destroyer is hunting, the chances of escape strongly favour +the under-water craft; if several pounce upon her at once, however, the +chances of escaping are much more precarious. If the water is shallow +the U-boat can sometimes outwit the pursuer by sinking to the bottom and +lying there in silent security until its surface enemy tires of the +chase. But in the open sea there is no possibility of concealing itself +and so saving itself in this fashion, for if the submarine sinks beyond +a certain depth the pressure of the water will crush it.</p> + +<p>While the record shows that the U-boat usually succeeded in evading the +depth charges, there were enough sunk or seriously damaged or given a +bad shake-up to serve as a constant reminder to the crews that they ran +great danger in approaching waters which were protected by destroyers. +The U-boat captains, as will appear, avoided such waters regularly; they +much preferred to attack their merchant prey in areas where these +soul-racking depth charges did not interfere with their operations.</p> + +<p>It is now becoming apparent why the great battle fleet, which always +sailed behind a protecting screen of such destroyers, was practically +immune from torpedo attack. In order to assail these battleships the +submarine was always compelled to do the one thing which, above all +others, it was determined to avoid—to get within depth-charge radius of +the surface craft. In discharging the torpedo, distance, as already +intimated, is the all-important consideration. The U-boat carries a +torpedo which has a much shorter range than that of the destroyer; it +was seldom effective if fired at more than 2,000 yards, and beyond that +distance its chances of hitting became <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">[Pg 84]</a></span>very slight. Indeed, a much +shorter distance than that was desirable if the torpedo was to +accomplish its most destructive purpose. So valuable were these missiles +and so necessary was it that every one should be used to good advantage, +that the U-boat's captain had instructions to shoot at no greater +distance than 300 yards, unless the conditions were particularly +favourable. In the early days, the torpedoes which were fired at a +greater distance would often hit the ships on the bow or the stern, and +do comparatively little damage; such vessels could be brought in, +repaired in a short time, and again put to sea. The German Admiralty +discovered that in firing from a comparatively long distance it was +wasting its torpedoes; it therefore ordered its men to get so near the +prey that it could strike the vessel in a vital spot, preferably in the +engine-room; and to do this it was necessary to creep up within 300 +yards. But to get as close as that to the destroyers which screened the +battleships meant almost certain destruction. Thus the one method of +attack which was left to the U-boat was to dive under the destroyer +screen and come up in the midst of the battle fleet itself. A few +minutes after its presence should become known, however, a large number +of destroyers would be dropping depth charges in its neighbourhood, and +its chances of escaping destruction would be almost nil, to say nothing +of its chances of destroying ships.</p> + +<p>The Germans learned the futility of this kind of an operation early in +the war, and the man who taught them this lesson was Commander +Weddingen, the same officer who had first demonstrated the value of the +submarine in practical warfare. It was Otto Weddingen who, in September, +1914, sank the old British cruisers, the <i>Hogue</i>, the <i>Cressy</i>, and the +<i>Aboukir</i>, an exploit which made him one of the great popular heroes of +Germany. A few months afterward Commander Weddingen decided to try an +experiment which was considerably more hazardous than that of sinking +three unescorted cruisers; he aspired to nothing less ambitious than an +attack upon the Grand Fleet itself. On March 18th a part of this fleet +was cruising off Cromarty, Scotland; here Weddingen came with the +<i>U-29</i>, dived under the destroyer screen and fired one torpedo, which +passed astern of the <i>Neptune</i>. The <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">[Pg 85]</a></span>alarm was immediately sounded, and +presently the battleship <i>Dreadnought</i>, which had seen the periscope, +started at full speed for the submarine, rammed the vessel and sent it +promptly to the bottom. As it was sinking the bow rose out of the water, +plainly disclosing the number <i>U-29</i>. There was not one survivor. +Weddingen's attempt was an heroic one, but so disastrous to himself and +to his vessel that very few German commanders ever tried to emulate his +example. It clearly proved to the German Admiralty that it was useless +to attempt to destroy the Grand Fleet with submarines, or even to weaken +it piecemeal, and probably this experience had much to do with this new +kind of warfare—that of submarines against unprotected merchant +ships—which the Germans now proceeded to introduce.</p> + +<p>The simple fact is that the battle fleet was never so safe as when it +was cruising in the open sea, screened by destroyers. It was far safer +when it was sailing thus defiantly, constantly inviting attack, than +when it was anchored at its unprotected base at Scapa Flow. Indeed, +until Scapa Flow was impregnably protected by booms and mines, the +British commanders recognized that cruising in the open sea was its best +means of avoiding the German U-boats. No claim is made that the +submarine cannot dive under the destroyer screen and attack a battle +fleet, and possibly torpedo one or more of its vessels. The illustration +which has been given shows that Weddingen nearly "got" the <i>Neptune</i>; +and had this torpedo gone a few feet nearer, his experiment might have +shown that, although he subsequently lost his own life, crew, and ship, +he had sunk one British battleship, a proceeding which, in war, might +have been recognized as a fair exchange. But the point which I wish to +emphasize is that the chances of success were so small that the Germans +decided that it was not worth while to make the attempt. Afterward, when +merchant vessels were formed into convoys, a submarine would +occasionally dive under the screen and destroy a ship; but most such +attacks were unsuccessful, and experience taught the Germans that a +persistent effort of this kind would cause the destruction of so many +submarines that their campaign would fail. So the U-boat commanders left +the Grand Fleet alone, either because they lacked nerve <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">[Pg 86]</a></span>or because +their instructions from Berlin were explicit to that effect.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>Having constantly before my eyes this picture of the Grand Fleet immune +from torpedo attack, naturally the first question I asked, when +discussing the situation with Admiral Jellicoe and others, was this: +"Why not apply this same principle to merchant ships?"</p> + +<p>If destroyers could keep the submarines away from battleships, they +could certainly keep them away from merchantmen. It is clear, from the +description already given, precisely how the battleships had been made +safe from submarines; they had proceeded, as usual, in a close +formation, or "convoy," and their destroyer screen had proved effective. +Thus logic apparently indicated that the convoy system was the "answer" +to the submarine.</p> + +<p>Yet the convoy, as used in previous wars, differed materially from any +application of the idea which could possibly be made to the present +contest. This scheme of sailing vessels in groups, and escorting them by +warships, is almost as old as naval warfare itself. As early as the +thirteenth century, the merchants of the Hanseatic League were compelled +to sail their ships in convoy as a protection against the pirates who +were then constantly lurking in the Baltic Sea. The Government of Venice +used this same device to protect its enormous commerce. In the fifteenth +century the large trade in wool and wine which existed between England +and the Moorish ports of Spain was safeguarded by convoys, and in the +sixteenth century Spain herself regularly depended upon massing her +ships to defend her commerce with the West Indies against the piratical +attacks of English and French adventurers. The escorts provided for +these "flotas" really laid the foundation of the mighty Spanish fleet +which threatened England's existence for more than a hundred years. By +the time of Queen Elizabeth the convoy had thus become the +all-prevailing method of safeguarding merchant shipping, but it was in +the Napoleonic wars that it had reached its greatest usefulness. The +convoys of that period were managed with some military precision; there +were carefully stipulated methods of collecting the ships, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">[Pg 87]</a></span>of meeting +the cruiser escorts at the appointed rendezvous, and of dispersing them +when the danger zone was passed; and naval officers were systematically +put in charge. The convoys of this period were very large; from 200 to +300 ships were not an unusual gathering, and sometimes 500 or more would +get together at certain important places, such as the entrance to the +Baltic. But these ships, of course, were very small compared with those +of the present time. It was only necessary to supply such aggregations +of vessels with enough protecting cruisers to overwhelm any raiders +which the enemy might send against them. The merchantmen were not +required to sail in any particular formation, nor were they required to +manœuvre against unseen mysterious foes. Neither was it absolutely +essential that they should keep constantly together; and they could even +spread themselves somewhat loosely over the ocean. If an enemy raider +appeared on the horizon, the escorting cruiser or cruisers left the +convoy and began chase; a battle ensued, the convoy meanwhile passing on +its voyage unharmed. When its protecting vessels had disposed of the +attackers, they rejoined the merchantmen. No unusual seamanship was +demanded of the merchant captains, for the whole responsibility for +their safety rested with the escorting cruisers.</p> + +<p>But the operation of beating off an occasional surface raider, which +necessarily fights in the open, is quite a different procedure from that +of protecting an aggregation of vessels from enemies that discharge +torpedoes under the water. As part protection against such insidious +attacks both the merchant ships and the escorting men-of-war of to-day +had in this war to keep up a perpetual zigzagging. This zigzag, indeed, +was in itself an efficacious method of protection. As already said, the +submarine was forced to attain an advantageous position before it could +discharge its torpedo; it was its favourite practice to approach to +within a few hundred yards in order to hit its victim in a vital spot. +This mere fact shows that zigzagging in itself was one of the best +methods of avoiding destruction. Before this became the general rule, +the task of torpedoing a vessel was comparatively easy. All it was +necessary for the submarine to do was to bring the vessel's masts in +line; that is, to get directly ahead of her, submerge with the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">[Pg 88]</a></span>small +periscope showing only occasionally, and to fire the torpedo at short +range as the ship passed by. Except in the case of very slow vessels, +she could of course do this only when she was not far from the course of +her advancing prey when she first sighted her. If, however, the vessel +was zigzagging, this pretty game was usually defeated; the submarine +never knew in what direction to go in order to get within torpedoing +distance, and she could not go far because her speed under water is so +slow. The same conditions apply to a zigzagging convoy. This explained +why, as soon as the merchant vessel or convoy entered the submarine +zone, or as soon as a submarine was sighted, it began zigzagging, first +on one side and then on the other, and always irregularly, its course +comprising a disjointed line, which made it a mere chance whether the +submarine could get into a position from which to fire with any +certainty of obtaining results. A vessel sailing alone could manœuvre +in this way without much difficulty, but it is apparent that twenty or +thirty vessels, sailing in close formation, would not find the operation +a simple one. It was necessary for them to sail in close and regular +formation in order to make it possible to manœuvre them and screen +them with destroyers, so it is evident that the closer the formation the +fewer the destroyers that would be needed to protect it. These +circumstances make the modern convoy quite a different affair from the +happy-go-lucky proceeding of the Napoleonic era.</p> + +<p>It is perhaps not surprising that the greatest hostility to the convoys +has always come from the merchant captains themselves. In old days they +chafed at the time which was consumed in assembling the ships, at the +necessity for reducing speed to enable the slower vessels to keep up +with the procession, and at the delay in getting their cargoes into +port. In all wars in which convoys have been used it has been very +difficult to keep the merchant captains in line. In Nelson's day these +fine old salts were constantly breaking away from their convoys and +taking their chances of running into port unescorted. If the merchant +master of a century ago rebelled at the comparatively simply managed +convoy of those days it is not strange that their successors of the +present time should not have looked with favour upon the relatively +complicated and difficult arrangement required of them in this war. In +the early discussions with these men <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">[Pg 89]</a></span>at the Admiralty they showed +themselves almost unanimously opposed to the convoy.</p> + +<p>"The merchantmen themselves are the chief obstacle to the convoy," said +Admiral Jellicoe. "We have discussed it with them many times and they +declare that it is impossible. It is all right for war vessels to +manœuvre in close formation, they say, for we spend our time +practising in these formations, and so they think that it is second +nature to us. But they say that they cannot do it. They particularly +reject the idea that when in formation they can manœuvre their ships +in the fog or at night without lights. They believe that they would lose +more ships through collisions than the submarines would sink."</p> + +<p>I was told that the whole subject had been completely threshed out at a +meeting which had been held at the Admiralty on February 23, 1917, about +six weeks before America had entered the war. At that time ten masters +of merchant ships had met Admiral Jellicoe and other members of the +Admiralty and had discussed the convoy proposition at length. In laying +the matter before these experienced seamen Admiral Jellicoe emphasized +the necessity of good station-keeping, and he described the close +formation which the vessels would have to maintain. It would be +necessary for the ships to keep together, he explained, otherwise the +submarines could pick off the stragglers. He asked the masters whether +eight merchant ships, which had a speed varying perhaps two knots, could +keep station in line ahead (that is, in single file or column) 500 yards +apart, and sail in two columns down the Channel.</p> + +<p>"It would be absolutely impossible," the ten masters replied, almost in +a chorus.</p> + +<p>A discouraging fact, they said, was that many of the ablest merchant +captains had gone into the navy, and that many of those who had replaced +them could not be depended on to handle their ships in such a formation.</p> + +<p>"We have so few competent deck officers that the captain would have to +be on the bridge the whole twenty-four hours," they said. And the +difficulty was not only with the bridge, but with the engine-room. In +order to keep the ships constantly the same distance apart it would be +necessary accurately to regulate their speed; the battleships could do +this because they had certain elaborate devices, which the merchant +vessels lacked, for timing the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">[Pg 90]</a></span>revolutions of the engines. The poor +quality of the coal which they were obtaining would also make it +difficult to maintain a regular speed.</p> + +<p>Admiral Jellicoe then asked the masters whether they could sail in twos +or threes and keep station.</p> + +<p>"Two might do it, but three would be too many," was the discouraging +verdict. But the masters were positive that even two merchantmen could +not safely keep station abreast in the night-time without lights; two +such vessels would have to sail in single file, the leading ship showing +a stern light. The masters emphasized their conviction that they +preferred to sail alone, each ship for herself, and to let each one take +her chances of getting into port.</p> + +<p>And there the matter rested. I had the opportunity of discussing the +convoy system with several merchant captains, and in these discussions +they simply echoed the views which had been expressed at this formal +conference. I do not believe that British naval officers came in contact +with a single merchant master who favoured the convoy at that time. They +were not doubtful about the idea; they were openly hostile. The British +merchant captains are a magnificent body of seamen; their first thought +was to serve their country and the Allied cause; their attitude in this +matter was not obstinacy; it simply resulted from their sincere +conviction that the convoy system would entail greater shipping losses +than were then being inflicted by the German submarines.</p> + +<p>Many naval officers at that time shared the same view. They opposed the +convoy not only on these grounds; its introduction would mean +immediately cutting down the tonnage 15 or 20 per cent., because of the +time which would be consumed in assembling the ships and awaiting +escorts and in the slower average speed which they could make. Many ship +owners and directors of steamship companies expressed the same opinions. +They also objected to the convoy on the ground that it would cause +considerable delay and hence would result in loss of earnings. Yet the +attitude of the merchant marine had not entirely eliminated the convoy +from consideration. At the time when I arrived the proposal was still +being discussed; the rate at which the Germans were sinking merchantmen +made this inevitable. And there seemed to be two schools among Allied +naval men, one of which was opposed to the convoy, while the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">[Pg 91]</a></span>other +insisted that it should be given a trial. The convoy had one +irresistible attraction for the officer which seemed to counterbalance +all the objections which were being urged against it. Its adoption would +mean taking the offensive against the German submarines. The essential +defect of the patrol system, as it was then conducted, was that it was +primarily a defensive measure. Each destroyer cruised around in an +assigned area, ready to assist vessels in distress, escort ships through +her own "square" and, incidentally, to attack a submarine when the +opportunity was presented. But the mere fact that a destroyer was +patrolling a particular area meant only, as already explained, that the +submarine had occasionally to sink out of sight until she had passed by. +Consequently the submarine proceeded to operate whenever a destroyer was +not in sight, and this was necessarily most of the time, for the +submarine zone was such a big place and the Allied destroyer fleet was +so pitifully small that it was impossible to cover it effectively. Under +these conditions there were very few encounters between destroyers and +submarines, at least in the waters south and west of Ireland, for the +submarines took all precautions against getting close enough to be +sighted by the destroyers.</p> + +<p>But the British and French navies were not the only ones which, at this +time, were depending upon the patrol as a protection against the +subsurface boat. The American navy was committing precisely the same +error off our Atlantic coast. As soon as Congress declared war against +Germany we expected that at least a few of the U-boats would cross the +Atlantic and attack American shipping; indeed, many believed that some +had already crossed in anticipation of war; the papers were filled with +silly stories about "submarine bases" in Mexican waters, on the New +England coast, and elsewhere; submarines were even reported entering +Long Island Sound; nets were stretched across the Narrows to keep them +out of New York Harbour; and our coasting vessels saw periscopes and the +wakes of torpedoes everywhere from Maine to Florida. So prevalent was +this apprehension that, in the early days of the war, American +destroyers regularly patrolled our coast looking for these far-flung +submarines. Yet the idea of seeking them this way was absurd. Even had +we known where the submarine was located there would have been little +likelihood that we could ever have sighted it, to say nothing of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">[Pg 92]</a></span>getting near it. We might have learned that a German U-boat was +operating off Cape Cod; we might have had the exact latitude and +longitude of the location which it was expected that it would reach at a +particular moment. At the time the message was sent the submarine might +have been lying on the surface ready to attack a passing merchantman, +but even under these conditions the destroyer could never have reached +her quarry, for as soon as the U-boat saw the enemy approaching it would +simply have ducked under the water and remained there in perfect safety. +When all danger had passed it would again have bobbed up to the surface +as serenely as you please, and gone ahead with its appointed task of +sinking merchant ships. One of the astonishing things about this war was +that many of the naval officers of all countries did not seem to +understand until a very late date that it was utterly futile to send +anti-submarine surface craft out into the wide ocean to attack or chase +away submarines. The thing to do, of course, was to make the submarines +come to the anti-submarine craft and fight in order to get merchantmen.</p> + +<p>I have made this point before, and I now repeat the explanation to +emphasize that the patrol system was necessarily unsuccessful, because +it made almost impossible any combats with submarines and afforded very +little protection to shipping. The advantage of the convoy system, as +its advocates now urged, was precisely that it made such combats +inevitable. In other words, it meant offensive warfare. It was proposed +to surround each convoy with a protecting screen of destroyers in +precisely the same way that the battle fleet was protected. Thus we +should compel any submarine which was planning to torpedo a convoyed +ship to do so only in waters that were infested with destroyers. In +order to get into position to discharge its missile the submarine would +have to creep up close to the rim that marked the circle of these +destroyers. Just as soon as the torpedo started on its course and the +tell-tale wake appeared on the surface the protecting ships would +immediately begin sowing the waters with their depth charges. Thus in +the future the Germans would be compelled to fight for every ship which +they should attempt to sink, instead of sinking them conveniently in +waters that were free of destroyers, as had hitherto been their +privilege. Already the British had demonstrated that such a screen of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_93" id="Page_93">[Pg 93]</a></span>destroyers could protect merchant ships as well as war vessels. They +were making this fact clear every day in the successful transportation +of troops and supplies across the Channel. In this region they had +established an immune zone, which was constantly patrolled by destroyers +and other anti-submarine craft, and through these the merchant fleets +were constantly passing with complete safety. The proposal to convoy all +merchant ships was a proposal to apply this same system on a much +broader scale. If we should arrange our ships in compact convoys and +protect them with destroyers we would really create another immune zone +of this kind, and this would be different from the one established +across the Channel only in that it would be a movable one. In this way +we should establish about a square mile of the surface of the ocean in +which submarines could not operate without great danger, and then we +could move that square mile along until port was reached.</p> + +<p>The advantages of the convoy were thus so apparent that, despite the +pessimistic attitude of the merchant captains, there were a number of +officers in the British navy who kept insisting that it should be tried. +In this discussion I took my stand emphatically with these officers. +From the beginning I had believed in this method of combating the U-boat +warfare. Certain early experiences had led me to believe that the +merchant captains were wrong in underestimating the quality of their own +seamanship. It was my conviction that these intelligent and hardy men +did not really know how capable they were at handling ships. In my +discussions with them they disclosed an exaggerated idea of the seamanly +ability of naval officers in manœuvring their large fleets. They +attributed this to the superior training of the men and to the special +manœuvring qualities of the ship. "Warships are built so that they +can keep station, and turn at any angle at a moment's notice," they +would say, "but we haven't any men on our ships who can do these +things." As a matter of fact, these men were entirely in error and I +knew it. Their practical experience in handling ships of all sizes, +shapes, and speeds under a great variety of conditions is in reality +much more extensive than naval officers can possibly enjoy. I learned +this more than thirty years ago, when stationed on the Pennsylvania +schoolship, teaching the boys navigation. This was one of the most +valuable experiences of my life, for it brought <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_94" id="Page_94">[Pg 94]</a></span>me in every-day contact +with merchant seamen, and it was then that I made the discovery which +proved so valuable to me now.</p> + +<p>It is true that merchant captains had much to learn about steaming and +manœuvring in formation, but I was sure they could pick it up quickly +and carry it out successfully under the direction of naval officers—the +convoy commander being always a naval officer.</p> + +<p>The naval officer not only has a group of vessels that are practically +uniform in speed and ability to turn around quickly, but he is provided +also with various instruments which enable him to keep the revolutions +of his engines constant, to measure distances and the like. Moreover, as +a junior officer, he is schooled in manœuvring these very ships for +some years before he is trusted with the command of one of them, and he, +therefore, not only knows their peculiarities, but also those of their +captains—the latter very useful information, by the way.</p> + +<p>Though it was necessary for the merchantmen, on the other hand, to bring +their much clumsier ships into formation with perhaps thirty entirely +strange vessels of different sizes, shapes, speeds, nationalities, and +manœuvring qualities, yet I was confident that they were competent to +handle them successfully under these difficult conditions. Indeed, +afterward, one of my most experienced destroyer commanders reported that +while he was escorting a convoy of twenty-eight ships they kept their +stations quite as well as battleships, while they were executing two +manœuvres to avoid a submarine.</p> + +<p>Such influence as I possessed at this time, therefore, I threw in with +the group of British officers which was advocating the convoy.</p> + +<p>There was, however, still one really serious impediment to adopting this +convoy system, and that was that the number of destroyers available was +insufficient. The British, for reasons which have been explained, did +not have the necessary destroyers for this work, and this was what made +so very important the participation of the United States in the naval +war—for our navy possessed the additional vessels that would make +possible the immediate adoption of the convoy system. I do not wish to +say that the convoy would not have been established had we not sent +destroyers for that purpose, yet I do not see how otherwise it could +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_95" id="Page_95">[Pg 95]</a></span>have been established in any complete and systematic way at such an +early date. And we furnished other ships than destroyers, for besides +providing what I have called the modern convoy—that which protects the +compact mass of vessels from submarines—it was necessary also to +furnish escorts after the old Napoleonic plan. It was the business of +the destroyers to conduct the merchantmen only through the submarine +zone. They did not take them the whole distance across the ocean, for +there was little danger of submarine attack until the ships had arrived +in the infested waters. This would have been impossible in any case with +the limited number of destroyers. But from the time the convoys left the +home port there was a possibility that the same kind of attack would be +launched as that to which convoys were subjected in Nelsonian days; +there was the danger, that is, that surface war vessels, raiders or +cruisers, might escape from their German bases and swoop down upon them. +We always had before our minds the activities of the <i>Moewe</i>, and we +therefore deemed it necessary to escort the convoys across the ocean +with battleships and cruisers, just as was the practice a century ago. +The British did not have ships enough available for this purpose, and +here again the American navy was able to supply the lack; for we had a +number of pre-dreadnoughts and cruisers that were ideally adapted to +this kind of work.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">III</p> + +<p>On April 30th I received a message from Admiral Jellicoe requesting me +to visit him at the Admiralty. When I arrived he said that the projected +study of the convoy system had been made, and he handed me a copy of it. +It had been decided to send one experimental convoy from Gibraltar. The +Admiralty, he added, had not yet definitely decided that the convoy +system should be adopted, but there was every intention of giving it a +thorough and fair trial. That same evening at dinner I met Mr. Lloyd +George, Sir Edward Carson, and Lord Milner, and once more discussed with +them the whole convoy idea. I found the Prime Minister especially +favourable to the plan and, in fact, civilians in general were more +kindly disposed toward the convoy than seamen, because they were less +familiar with the nautical and shipping difficulties which it involved.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_96" id="Page_96">[Pg 96]</a></span>Naval officers were immediately sent to Gibraltar to instruct the +merchant masters in the details of assembling and conducting vessels. +Eight-knot ships were selected for the experiment, and a number of +destroyers were assigned for their protection. The merchant captains, as +was to be expected, regarded the whole enterprise suspiciously, but +entered into it with the proper spirit.</p> + +<p>On May 20th that first convoy arrived at its English destination in +perfect condition. The success with which it made the voyage disproved +all the pessimistic opinions which the merchant sailors had entertained +about themselves. They suddenly discovered, as I had contended, that +they could do practically everything which, in their conferences with +the Admiralty, they had declared that they were unable to do. In those +meetings they had asserted that not more than two ships could keep +station; but now they discovered that the whole convoy could sail with +stipulated distances between the vessels and keep this formation with +little difficulty. They were drilled on the way in zigzagging and +manœuvring—a practice carried out subsequently with all convoys—and +by the time they reached the danger zone they found that, in obedience +to a prearranged signal, all the ships could turn as a single one, and +perform all the zigzag evolutions which the situation demanded. They had +asserted that they could not sail at night without lights and that an +attempt to do so would result in many collisions, but the experimental +convoy proved that this was merely another case of self-delusion. +Naturally the arrival of this convoy caused the greatest satisfaction in +the Admiralty, but the most delighted men were the merchant captains +themselves, for the whole thing was to them a complete revelation of +their seamanly ability, and naturally it flattered their pride. The news +of this arrival naturally travelled fast in shipping circles; it +completely changed the attitude of the merchant sailors, and the chief +opponents of the convoy now became its most enthusiastic advocates.</p> + +<p>Outside shipping circles, however, nothing about this convoy was known +at that time. Yet May 20th, the date when it reached England safely, +marked one of the great turning-points of the war. That critical voyage +meant nothing less than that the Allies had found the way of defeating +the German submarine. The world might still <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_97" id="Page_97">[Pg 97]</a></span>clamour for a specific +"invention" that would destroy all the submarines overnight, or it might +demand that the Allies should block them in their bases, or suggest that +they might do any number of impossible things, but the naval chiefs of +the Allies discovered, on May 20, 1917, that they could defeat the +German campaign even without these rather uncertain aids. The submarine +danger was by no means ended when this first convoy arrived; many +anxious months still lay ahead of us; other means would have to be +devised that would supplement the convoy; yet the all-important fact was +that the Allied chiefs now realized, for the first time, that the +problem was not an insoluble one; and that, with hard work and infinite +patience, they could keep open the communications that were essential to +victory. The arrival of these weather-beaten ships thus brought the +assurance that the armies and the civilian populations could be supplied +with food and materials, and that the seas could be kept open for the +transportation of American troops to France. In fine, it meant that the +Allies could win the war.</p> + +<p>On May 21st the British Admiralty, which this experimental convoy had +entirely converted, voted to adopt the convoy system for all merchant +shipping. Not long afterward the second convoy arrived safely from +Hampton Roads, and then other convoys began to put in from Scandinavian +ports. On July 21st I was able definitely to report to Washington that +"the success of the convoys so far brought in shows that the system will +defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally and in time."</p> + +<p>But while we recognize the fact that the convoy preserved our +communications and so made possible the continuation of the war, we must +not overlook a vitally important element in its success. In describing +the work of the destroyer, which was the protecting arm of the convoy, I +have said nothing about the forces that really laid the whole foundation +of the anti-submarine campaign. All the time that these destroyers were +fighting off the submarines the power that made possible their +operations was cruising quietly in the North Sea, doing its work so +inconspicuously that the world was hardly aware of its existence. For +back of all these operations lay the mighty force of the Grand Fleet. +Admiral Beatty's dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, which were afterward +supplemented <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_98" id="Page_98">[Pg 98]</a></span>by a fine squadron of American ships, kept the German +surface vessels penned in their harbours and in this way left the ocean +free for the operations of the Allied surface craft. I have already said +that, in April, 1917, the Allied navies, while they controlled the +surface of the water, did not control the subsurface, which at that time +was practically at the disposition of the Germans. Yet the determining +fact, as we were now to learn, was that this control of the surface was +to give us the control of the subsurface also. Only the fact that the +battleships kept the German fleet at bay made it possible for the +destroyers and other surface craft to do their beneficent work. In an +open sea battle their surface navies would have disposed of the German +fleet; but let us suppose for a moment that an earthquake, or some other +great natural disturbance, had engulfed the British fleet at Scapa Flow. +The world would then have been at Germany's mercy and all the destroyers +the Allies could have put upon the sea would have availed them nothing, +for the German battleships and battle cruisers could have sunk them or +driven them into their ports. Then Allied commerce would have been the +prey, not only of the submarines, which could have operated with the +utmost freedom, but of the German surface craft as well. In a few weeks +the British food supplies would have been exhausted. There would have +been an early end to the soldiers and munitions which Britain was +constantly sending to France. The United States could have sent no +forces to the Western Front and the result would have been the surrender +which the Allies themselves, in the spring of 1917, regarded as not a +remote possibility. America would then have been compelled to face the +German power alone, and to face it long before we had had an opportunity +of assembling our resources and of equipping our armies. The world was +preserved from all these calamities because the destroyer and the convoy +solved the problem of the submarine and because back of these agencies +of victory lay Admiral Beatty's squadrons, holding at arm's length the +German surface ships while these comparatively fragile craft were saving +the liberties of the world.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_99" id="Page_99">[Pg 99]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER IV</h2> + +<h3>AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>Our first division of destroyers reached Queenstown on a Friday morning, +May 4, 1917; the following Monday they put to sea on the business of +hunting the submarine and protecting commerce. For the first month or +six weeks they spent practically all their time on patrol duty in +company with British destroyers, sloops, and other patrol vessels. +Though the convoy system was formally adopted in the latter part of May, +it was not operating completely and smoothly until August or September. +Many troop and merchant convoys were formed in the intervening period +and many were conducted through the submarine zone by American +destroyers; but our ships spent much time sailing singly, hunting for +such enemies as might betray their presence, or escorting individual +cargoes. The early experiments had demonstrated the usefulness of the +convoy system, yet a certain number of pessimists still refused to +accept it as the best solution of the shipping problem; and to +reorganize practically all the shipping of the world, scattered +everywhere on the seven seas, necessarily took time.</p> + +<p>But this intervening period furnished indispensable training for our +men. They gained an every-day familiarity with the waters which were to +form the scene of their operations and learned many of the tricks of the +German submarines. It was a strange world in which these young Americans +now found themselves. The life was a hard one, of course, in those +tempestuous Irish waters, with the little destroyers jumping from wave +to wave, sometimes showing daylight beneath their keels, their bows +frequently pointing skyward, or plunged deep into heavy seas, and their +sides occasionally ploughing along <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_100" id="Page_100">[Pg 100]</a></span>under the foamy waves. For days the +men lived in a world of fog and mist; rain in those regions seemed to be +almost the normal state of nature. Much has been written about the +hardships of life aboard the destroyer, and to these narratives our men +could add many details of their own. These hardships, however, did not +weigh heavily upon them, for existence in those waters, though generally +monotonous, possessed at times plenty of interest and excitement. The +very appearance of the sea showed that our men were engaging in a kind +of warfare very different from that for which they had been trained. The +enormous amount of shipping seemed to give the lie to the German reports +that British commerce had been practically arrested. A perpetual stream +of all kinds of vessels, liners, tramps, schooners, and fishing boats, +was passing toward the Irish and the English coasts. Yet here and there +other floating objects on the surface told the story. Now it was a stray +boat filled with the survivors of a torpedoed vessel; now a raft on +which lay the bodies of dead men; now the derelict hulk of a ship which +the Germans had abandoned as sunk, but which persisted in floating +aimlessly around, a constant danger to navigation. Loose mines, bobbing +in the water, hinted at the perils that were constantly threatening our +forces. In the tense imagination of the lookouts floating spars or other +débris easily took the form of periscopes. Queer-looking sailing +vessels, at a distance, aroused suspicions that they might be submarines +in disguise. A phosphorescent trail in the water was sometimes mistaken +for the wake of a torpedo. The cover of a hatchway floating on the +surface, if seen at a distance of a few hundred yards, looked much like +the conning-tower of a submarine, while the back of an occasional whale +gave a life-like representation of a U-boat awash—in fact, so life-like +was it that on one occasion several of our submarine chasers on the +English coast dropped depth charges on a whale and killed it.</p> + +<p>But it was the invisible rather than the visible evidences of warfare +that especially impressed our men. The air all around them was electric +with life and information. One had only to put the receiver of the +wireless to his ear to find himself in a new and animated world. The +atmosphere was constantly spluttering messages of all kinds coming <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_101" id="Page_101">[Pg 101]</a></span>from +all kinds of places. Sometimes these were sent by Admiral Bayly from +Queenstown; they would direct our men to go to an indicated spot and +escort an especially valuable cargo ship; they would tell a particular +commander that a submarine was lying at a designated latitude and +longitude and instruct him to go and "get" it. Running conversations +were frequently necessary between destroyers and the ships which they +had been detailed to escort. "Give me your position," the destroyer +would ask. "What is the name of your assistant surgeon, and who is his +friend on board our ship?" the suspicious vessel would reply—such +precaution being necessary to give assurance that the query had not come +from a German submarine. "Being pursued by a submarine Lat. 50 N., Long. +15 W."—cries of distress like this were common. Another message would +tell of a vessel that was being shelled; another would tell of a ship +that was sinking; while other messages would give the location of +lifeboats which were filled with survivors and ask for speedy help. Our +wireless operators not only received the news of friends, but also the +messages of enemies. Conversations between German submarines frequently +filled the air. They sometimes attempted to deceive us by false "S.O.S." +signals, hoping that in this way they could get an opportunity to +torpedo any vessel that responded to the call. But these attempts were +unsuccessful, for our wireless operators had no difficulty in +recognizing the "spark" of the German instruments. At times the surface +of the ocean might be calm; there would not be a ship in sight or a sign +of human existence anywhere; yet the air itself would be uninterruptedly +filled with these reminders of war.</p> + +<p>The duties of our destroyers, in these earliest days, were to hunt for +submarines, to escort single ships, to pick up survivors in boats, and +to go to the rescue of ships that were being attacked. For the purpose +of patrol the sea was divided into areas thirty miles square; and to +each of these one destroyer, sloop, or other vessel was assigned. The +ship was required to keep within its allotted area, unless the pursuit +of a submarine should lead it into a neighbouring one. This patrol, as I +have described, was not a satisfactory way of fighting submarines. A +vessel would occasionally get a distant glimpse of the enemy, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_102" id="Page_102">[Pg 102]</a></span>but that +was all; as soon as the U-boat saw the ship, it simply dived to security +beneath the waves. Our destroyers had many chances to fire at the enemy +but usually at very long ranges; some of them had lively scraps, which +perhaps involved the destruction of U-boats, though this was always a +difficult thing to prove. Yet the mere fact that submarines were seldom +sunk by destroyers on patrol, either by ourselves or by the Allies, did +not mean that the latter accomplished nothing. The work chiefly expected +of destroyers on patrol was that they should keep the U-boats under the +surface as much as possible and protect commerce. Normally the submarine +sails on top of the water, looking for its prey. As long as it is beyond +the merchantmen's range of vision, it uses its high surface speed of +about 14 knots to attain a position ahead of the advancing vessel; +before the surface vessel reaches a point where its lookout can see the +submarine, the U-boat dives and awaits the favourable moment for firing +its torpedo. It cannot take these preliminary steps if there is a +destroyer anywhere in the neighbourhood; the mere presence of such a +warship therefore constitutes a considerable protection to any merchant +ship that is within sight. The submarine normally prefers to use its +guns on merchant ships, for the torpedoes are expensive and +comparatively few in number. Destroyers constantly interfered with these +gunning operations. A long distance shot usually was sufficient to make +the under-water vessel submerge and thus lose its power for doing harm. +The early experiences of our destroyers with submarines were of this +kind; but the work of chasing U-boats under the water, escorting a small +proportion of the many cargo ships, and picking up survivors, important +as it was, did not really constitute effective anti-submarine warfare. +It gave our men splendid training, it saved many a merchant ship, it +rescued many victims from the extreme dangers of German ruthlessness, it +sank a small number of submarines, but it could never have won the war.</p> + +<p>This patrol by destroyers and light surface vessels has been criticized +as affording an altogether ineffective method of protecting shipping, +especially when compared with the convoy system. This criticism is, of +course, justified; still we must understand that it was the only +possible method until we had enough anti-submarine craft <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_103" id="Page_103">[Pg 103]</a></span>to make the +convoy practicable. Nor must we forget that this Queenstown patrol was +organized systematically and operated with admirable skill and tireless +energy. Most of this duty fell at this time upon the British destroyers, +sloops, and other patrol vessels, which were under the command of +Admiral Bayly, and these operations were greatly aided by the gallant +actions of the British Q-ships, or "mystery ships." Though some of the +admirable exploits of these vessels will be recorded in due time, it may +be said here that the record which these ships made was not only in all +respects worthy of the traditions of their great service, but also that +they exhibited an endurance, a gallantry, and seamanlike skill that has +few parallels in the history of naval warfare.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>The headquarters of the convoy system was a room in the British +Admiralty; herein was the mainspring of the elaborate mechanism by which +ten thousand ships were conducted over the seven oceans. Here every +morning those who had been charged with the security of the Allies' +lines of communication reviewed the entire submarine situation. +Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander L. Duff, R.N., bore this heavy +responsibility, ably assisted by a number of British officers. Captain +Byron A. Long, U.S.N., a member of my staff, was associated with Admiral +Duff in this important work. It was Captain Long's duty to co-ordinate +the movements of our convoys with the much more numerous convoys of the +Allies; he performed this task so efficiently that, once the convoy +organization was in successful operation, I eliminated the whole subject +from my anxieties and requested Captain Long not to inform me when troop +convoys sailed from the United States or when they were due to arrive in +France or England. There seemed to be no reason why both of us should +lose sleep over the same cause.</p> + +<p>The most conspicuous feature of the convoy room was a huge chart, +entirely covering the wall on one side of the office; access to this +chart was obtained by ladders not unlike those which are used in shoe +stores. It gave a comprehensive view of the North and South American +coast, the Atlantic Ocean, the British Isles, and a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_104" id="Page_104">[Pg 104]</a></span>considerable part +of Europe and Africa. The ports which it especially emphasized were +Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax, New York, Hampton Roads, Gibraltar, and +Sierra Leone and Dakar, ports on the west coast of Africa. Thin threads +were stretched from each one of these seven points to certain positions +in the ocean just outside the British Isles, and on these threads were +little paper boats, each one of which represented a convoy. When a +particular convoy started from New York, one of these paper boats was +placed at that point; as it made its way across the ocean, the boat was +moved from day to day in accordance with the convoy's progress. At any +moment, therefore, a mere glance at this chart, with its multitude of +paper boats, gave the spectator the precise location of all the commerce +which was then <i>en route</i> to the scene of war.</p> + +<p>But there were other exhibits on the chart which were even more +conspicuous than these minute representations of convoys. Little circles +were marked off in the waters surrounding the British Isles, each one of +which was intended to show the location of a German submarine. From day +to day each one of these circles was moved in accordance with the +ascertained positions of the submarine which it represented, a straight +line indicating its course on the chart. Perhaps the most remarkable +fact about the Allied convoy service was the minute information which it +possessed about the movements of German submarines. A kind of separate +intelligence bureau devoted its entire attention to this subject. +Readers of detective stories are familiar with the phenomenon known as +"shadowing." It is a common practice in the detective's fascinating +profession to assign a man, known as a "shadow," to the duty of keeping +a particular person under constant observation. With admirable patience +and skill an experienced "shadow" keeps in view this object of his +attention for twenty-four hours; he dogs him through crowded streets, +tracks him up and down high office buildings, accompanies him to +restaurants, trolley cars, theatres, and hotels, and unobtrusively +chases him through dense thoroughfares in cabs and automobiles. "We get +him up in the morning and we put him to bed at night" is the way the +"shadow" describes the assiduous care which he bestows upon his +unsuspecting victim. In much the same fashion did the Allied secret +service <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_105" id="Page_105">[Pg 105]</a></span>"shadow" German submarines; it got each submarine "up in the +morning and put it to bed at night." That is to say, the intelligence +department took charge of Fritz and his crew as they emerged from their +base, and kept an unwearied eye upon them until they sailed back home. +The great chart in the convoy room of the Admiralty showed, within the +reasonable limits of human fallibility, where each submarine was +operating at a particular moment, and it also kept minute track of its +performances.</p> + +<p>Yet it was not so difficult to gather this information as may at first +be supposed. I have already said that there were comparatively few +submarines, perhaps not more than an average of eight or nine, which +were operating at the same time in the waters south and west of Ireland, +the region with which we Americans were most concerned. These boats +betrayed their locations in a multitude of ways. Their commanders were +particularly careless in the use of wireless. The Germanic passion for +conversation could not be suppressed even on the U-boats, even though +this national habit might lead to the most serious consequences. +Possibly also the solitary submarine felt lonely; at any rate, as soon +as it reached the Channel or the North Sea, it started an almost +uninterrupted flow of talk. The U-boats communicated principally with +each other, and also with the Admiralty at home; and, in doing this, +they gave away their positions to the assiduously listening Allies. The +radio-direction finder, an apparatus by which we can instantaneously +locate the position from which a wireless message is sent, was the +mechanism which furnished us much of this information. Of course, the +Germans knew that their messages revealed their locations, for they had +direction finders as well as we, but the fear of discovery did not act +as a curb upon a naturally loquacious nature. And we had other ways of +following their movements. The submarine spends much the larger part of +its time on the surface. Sailing thus conspicuously, it was constantly +being sighted by merchant or military ships, which had explicit +instructions to report immediately the elusive vessel, and to give its +exact location. Again it is obvious that a submarine could not fire at a +merchantman or torpedo one, or even attempt to torpedo one, without +revealing its presence. The wireless operators of all merchant vessels +were supplied <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_106" id="Page_106">[Pg 106]</a></span>at all times with the longitude and latitude of their +ships; their instructions required them immediately to send out this +information whenever they sighted a submarine or were attacked by one. +In these several ways we had little difficulty in "shadowing" the +U-boats. For example, we would hear that the <i>U-53</i> was talking just +outside of Heligoland; this submarine would be immediately plotted on +the chart. As the submarine made only about ten knots on the surface, in +order to save fuel oil, and much less under the surface, we could draw a +circle around this point, and rest assured that the boat must be +somewhere within this circle at a given time. But in a few hours or a +day we would hear from this same boat again; perhaps it was using its +wireless or attacking a merchantman; or perhaps one of our vessels had +spotted it on the surface. The news of this new location would justify +the convoy officers in moving this submarine on our chart to this new +position. Within a short time the convoy officers acquired an +astonishingly intimate knowledge of these boats and the habits of their +commanders. Indeed, the personalities of some of these German officers +ultimately took shape with surprising clearness; for they betrayed their +presence in the ocean by characteristics that often furnished a means of +identifying them. Each submarine behaved in a different way from the +others, the difference, of course, representing the human element in +control. One would deliver his attacks in rapid succession, boldly and +almost recklessly; another would approach his task with the utmost +caution; certain ones would display the meanest traits in human nature; +while others—let us be just—were capable of a certain display of +generosity, and possibly even of chivalry. By studying the individual +traits of each commander we could often tell just which one was +operating at a given time; and this information was extremely valuable +in the game in which we were engaged.</p> + +<p>"Old Hans is out again," the officers in the convoy room would remark.</p> + +<p>They were speaking of Hans Rose, the commander of the <i>U-53</i>; this was +that same submarine officer who, in the fall of 1916, brought that boat +to Newport, Rhode Island, and torpedoed five or six ships off Nantucket. +Our men never saw Hans Rose face to face; they had <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_107" id="Page_107">[Pg 107]</a></span>not the faintest +idea whether he was fat or lean, whether he was fair or dark; yet they +knew his military characteristics intimately. He became such a familiar +personality in the convoy room and his methods of operation were so +individual, that we came to have almost a certain liking for the old +chap. Other U-boat commanders would appear off the hunting grounds and +attack ships in more or less easy-going fashion. Then another boat would +suddenly appear, and—bang! bang! bang! Torpedo after torpedo would fly, +four or five ships would sink, and then this disturbing person would +vanish as unexpectedly as he had arrived. Such an experience informed +the convoy officers that Hans Rose was once more at large. We acquired a +certain respect for Hans because he was a brave man who would take +chances which most of his compatriots would avoid; and, above all, +because he played his desperate game with a certain decency. Sometimes, +when he torpedoed a ship, Rose would wait around until all the lifeboats +were filled; he would then throw out a tow line, give the victims food, +and keep all the survivors together until the rescuing destroyer +appeared on the horizon, when he would let go and submerge. This +humanity involved considerable risk to Captain Rose, for a destroyer +anywhere in his neighbourhood, as he well knew, was a serious matter. It +was he who torpedoed our destroyer, the <i>Jacob Jones</i>. He took a shot at +her from a distance of two miles—a distance from which a hit is a pure +chance; and the torpedo struck and sank the vessel within a few minutes. +On this occasion Rose acted with his usual decency. The survivors of the +<i>Jacob Jones</i> naturally had no means of communication, since the +wireless had gone down with their ship; and now Rose, at considerable +risk to himself, sent out an "S.O.S." call, giving the latitude and +longitude, and informing Queenstown that the men were floating around in +open boats. It is perhaps not surprising that Rose is one of the few +German U-boat commanders with whom Allied naval officers would be +willing to-day to shake hands. I have heard naval officers say that they +would like to meet him after the war.</p> + +<p>We were able to individualize other commanders; the business of +acquiring this knowledge, learning the location of their submarines and +the characteristics of their boats, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_108" id="Page_108">[Pg 108]</a></span>and using this vital information in +protecting convoys, was all part of the game which was being played in +London. It was the greatest game of "chess" which history has known—a +game that exacted not only the most faithful and studious care, but one +in which it was necessary that all the activities should be centralized +in one office. This small group of officers in the Admiralty convoy +room, composed of representatives of all the nations concerned, +exercised a control which extended throughout the entire convoy system. +It regulated the dates when convoys sailed from America or other ports +and when they arrived; if it had not taken charge of this whole system, +congestion and confusion would inevitably have resulted. We had only a +limited number of destroyers to escort all troops and other important +convoys arriving in Europe; it was therefore necessary that they should +arrive at regular and predetermined intervals. It was necessary also +that one group of officers should control the routing of all convoys, +otherwise there would have been serious danger of collisions between +outward and inward bound ships, and no possibility of routing them clear +of the known positions of submarines. The great centre of all this +traffic was not New York or Hampton Roads, but London. It was +inevitable, if the convoy system was to succeed, that it should have a +great central headquarters, and it was just as inevitable that this +headquarters should be London.</p> + +<p>On the huge chart already described the convoys, each indicated by a +little boat, were shown steadily making their progress toward the +appointed rendezvous. Eight or nine submarines, likewise indicated on +the chart, were always waiting to intercept them. On that great board +the prospective tragedies of the seas were thus unfolding before our +eyes. Here, for example, was a New York convoy of twenty ships, steaming +toward Liverpool, but steering straight toward the position of a +submarine. The thing to do was perfectly plain. It was a simple matter +to send the convoy a wireless message to take a course fifty miles to +the south where, according to the chart, there were no hidden enemies. +In a few hours the little paper boat, which represented this group of +ships and which was apparently headed for destruction, would suddenly +turn southward, pass around the entirely unconscious submarine, and then +take an unobstructed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_109" id="Page_109">[Pg 109]</a></span>course for its destination. The Admiralty convoy +board knew so accurately the position of all the submarines that it +could almost always route the convoys around them. It was an extremely +interesting experience to watch the paper ships on this chart deftly +turn out of the course of U-boats, sometimes when they seemed almost on +the point of colliding with them. That we were able constantly to save +the ships by sailing the convoys around the submarines brings out the +interesting fact that, even had there been no destroyer escort, the +convoy in itself would have formed a great protection to merchant +shipping. There were times when we had no escorting vessels to send with +certain convoys; and in such instances we simply routed the ships in +masses, directed them on courses which we knew were free of submarines, +and in this way brought them safely into port.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">III</p> + +<p>The Admiralty in London was thus the central nervous system of a +complicated but perfectly working organism which reached the remotest +corners of the world. Wherever there was a port, whether in South +America, Australia, or in the most inaccessible parts of India or China, +from which merchantmen sailed to any of the other countries which were +involved in the war, representatives of the British navy and the British +Government were stationed, all working harmoniously with shipping men in +the effort to get their cargoes safely through the danger zones. These +danger zones occupied a comparatively small area surrounding the +belligerent countries, but the safeguarding of the ships was an +elaborate process which began far back in the countries from which the +commerce started. Until about July, 1917, the world's shipping for the +most part had been unregulated; now for the first time it was arranged +in hard and fast routes and despatched in accordance with schedules as +fixed as those of a great railroad. The whole management of convoys, +indeed, bore many resemblances to the method of handling freight cars on +the American system of transcontinental lines. In the United States +there are several great headquarters of freight, sometimes known as +"gateways," places, that is, at which freight cars are assembled from a +thousand <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_110" id="Page_110">[Pg 110]</a></span>places, and from which the great accumulations are routed to +their destinations. Such places are Pittsburg, Buffalo, St. Louis, +Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, San Francisco—to mention only a few. +Shipping destined for the belligerent nations was similarly assembled, +in the years 1917 and 1918, at six or eight great ocean "gateways," and +there formed into convoys for "through routing" to the British Isles, +France, and the Mediterranean. Only a few of the ships that were +exceptionally fast—speed in itself being a particularly efficacious +protection against submarines—were permitted to ignore this routing +system, and dash unprotected through the infested area. This was a +somewhat dangerous procedure even for such ships, however, and they were +escorted whenever destroyers were available. All other vessels, from +whatever parts of the world they might come, were required to sail first +for one of these great assembling points, or "gateways"; and at these +places they were added to one of the constantly forming convoys. Thus +all shipping which normally sailed to Europe around the Cape of Good +Hope proceeded up the west coast of Africa until it reached the port of +Dakar or Sierra Leone, where it joined the convoy. Shipping from the +east coast of South America—ports like Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Buenos +Aires, and Montevideo—instead of sailing directly to Europe, joined the +convoy at this same African town. Vessels which came to Britain and +France by way of Suez and Mediterranean ports found their great stopping +place at Gibraltar—a headquarters of traffic which, in the huge amount +of freight which it "created," became almost the Pittsburg of this +mammoth transportation system. The four "gateways" for North America and +the west coast of South America were Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax, New +York, and Hampton Roads. The grain-laden merchantmen from the St. +Lawrence valley rendezvoused at Sydney and Halifax. Vessels from +Portland, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and other Atlantic points +found their assembling headquarters at New York, while ships from +Baltimore, Norfolk, the Gulf of Mexico, and the west coast of South +America proceeded to the great convoy centre which had been established +at Hampton Roads.</p> + +<p>In the convoy room of the Admiralty these aggregations of ships were +always referred to as the "Dakar convoy," <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_111" id="Page_111">[Pg 111]</a></span>the "Halifax convoy," the +"Hampton Roads convoy," and the like. When the system was completely +established the convoys sailed from their appointed headquarters on +regular schedules, like railroad trains. From New York one convoy +departed every sixteen days for the west coast of England and one left +every sixteen days for the east coast. From Hampton Roads one sailed +every eight days to the west coast and one every eight days to the east +coast, and convoys from all the other convoy points maintained a +similarly rigid schedule. The dates upon which these sailings took place +were fixed, like the arrivals and departures of trains upon a railroad +time-table, except when it became necessary to delay the sailing of a +convoy to avoid congestion of arrivals. According to this programme, the +first convoy to the west coast left New York on August 14, 1917, and its +successors thereafter sailed at intervals of about sixteen days. The +instructions sent to shipmasters all over the world, by way of the +British consulates, gave explicit details concerning the method of +assembling their convoys.</p> + +<p>Here, for example, was a ship at New York, all loaded and ready to sail +for the war zone. The master visited the port officer at the British +consulate, who directed him to proceed to Gravesend Bay, anchor his +vessel, and report to the convoy officers for further instructions. The +merchant captain, reaching this indicated spot, usually found several +other vessels on hand, all of them, like his ship, waiting for the +sailing date. The commander of the gathering convoy, under whose +instructions all the merchantmen were to operate, was a naval officer, +usually of the rank of commodore or captain, who maintained constant +cable communication with the convoy room of the Admiralty and usually +used one of the commercial vessels as his flagship. When the sailing day +arrived usually from twenty to thirty merchantmen had assembled; the +commander summoned all their masters, gave each a blue book containing +instructions for the management of convoyed ships, and frequently +delivered something in the nature of a lecture. Before the aggregation +sailed it was joined by a cruiser or pre-dreadnought battleship of the +American navy, or by a British or French cruiser. This ship was to +accompany the convoy across the Atlantic as far as the danger zone; its +mission was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_112" id="Page_112">[Pg 112]</a></span>not, as most people mistakenly believed, to protect the +convoy from submarines, but to protect it from any surface German raider +that might have escaped into the high seas. The Allied navies constantly +had before their minds the exploits of the <i>Emden</i>; the opportunity to +break up a convoy in mid-ocean by dare-devil enterprises of this kind +was so tempting that it seemed altogether likely that Germany might take +advantage of it. To send twenty or thirty merchant ships across the +Atlantic with no protection against such assaults would have been to +invite a possible disaster. As a matter of fact, the last German raider +that even attempted to gain the high seas was sunk in the North Sea by +the British Patrol Squadron in February, 1917.</p> + +<p>On the appointed day the whole convoy weighed anchor and silently +slipped out to sea. To such spectators as observed its movements it +seemed to be a rather limping, halting procession. The speed of a convoy +was the speed of its slowest ship, and vessels that could easily make +twelve or fourteen knots were obliged to throttle down their engines, +much to the disgust of their masters, in order to keep formation with a +ship that made only eight or ten; though whenever possible vessels of +nearly equal speed sailed together. Little in the newly assembled group +suggested the majesty of the sea. The ships formed a miscellaneous and +ill-assorted company, rusty tramps shamefacedly sailing alongside of +spick-and-span liners; miserable little two-or three-thousand ton ships +attempting to hold up their heads in the same company with other ships +of ten or twelve. The whole mass was sprawled over the sea in most +ungainly fashion; twenty or thirty ships, with spaces of nine hundred or +a thousand yards stretching between them, took up not far from ten +square miles of the ocean surface. Neither at this stage of the voyage +did the aggregation give the idea of efficiency. It presented about as +desirable a target as the submarine could have desired. But the period +taken in crossing the ocean was entirely devoted to education. Under the +tutorship of the convoy commander, the men composing the twenty or +thirty crews went every day to school. For fifteen or twenty days upon +the broad Atlantic they were trained in all the evolutions which were +necessary for coping with the submarine. Every possible situation <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_113" id="Page_113">[Pg 113]</a></span>that +could arise in the danger zone was anticipated and the officers and the +crews were trained to meet it. They perfected themselves in the signal +code; they learned the art of making the sudden manœuvres which were +instantaneously necessary when a submarine was sighted; they acquired a +mastery in the art of zigzagging; and they became accustomed to sailing +at night without lights. The crews were put through all the drills which +prepared them to meet such crises as the landing of a torpedo in their +engine-room or the sinking of the ship; and they were thoroughly +schooled in getting all hands safely into the boats. Possibly an +occasional scare on the way over may have introduced the element of +reality into these exercises; though no convoys actually met submarines +in the open ocean, the likelihood that they might do so was never +absent, especially after the Germans began sending out their huge +under-water cruisers.</p> + +<p>The convoy commander left his port with sealed orders, which he was +instructed not to open until he was a hundred miles at sea. These +orders, when the seal was broken, gave him the rendezvous assigned by +Captain Long of the convoy board in London. The great chart in the +convoy room at the Admiralty indicated the point to which the convoy was +to proceed and at which it would be met by the destroyer escorts and +taken through the danger zone. This particular New York convoy commander +was now perhaps instructed to cross the thirtieth meridian at the +fifty-second parallel of latitude, where he would be met by his escort. +He laid his course for that point and regulated his speed so as to reach +it at the appointed time. But he well knew that these instructions were +only temporary. The precise point to which he would finally be directed +to sail depended upon the movement and location of the German submarines +at the time of his arrival. If the enemy became particularly active in +the region of this tentative rendezvous, then, as the convoy approached +it, a wireless from London would instruct the commander to steer +abruptly to another point, perhaps a hundred miles to north or south.</p> + +<p>"Getting your convoy" was a searching test of destroyer seamanship, +particularly in heavy or thick weather. It was not the simplest thing to +navigate a group of destroyers through the tempestuous waters of the +North Atlantic, with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_114" id="Page_114">[Pg 114]</a></span>no other objective than the junction point of a +certain meridian and parallel, and reach the designated spot at a +certain hour. Such a feat demanded navigation ability of a high order; +and the skill which our American naval officers displayed in this +direction aroused great admiration, especially on the part of the +merchant skippers; in particular it aroused the astonishment of the +average doughboy. Many destroyer escorts that went out to meet an +incoming convoy also took out one which was westward bound. A few +mishaps in the course of the war, such as the sinking of the <i>Justicia</i>, +which was sailing from Europe to America, created the false notion that +outward-bound convoys were not escorted. It was just as desirable, of +course, to escort the ships going out as it was to escort those which +were coming in. The mere fact that the inbound ships carried troops and +supplies gave stronger reasons, from the humane standpoint, for heavier +escorts, but not from the standpoint of the general war situation. The +Germans were not sinking our ships because they were carrying men and +supplies; they were sinking them simply because they were ships. They +were not seeking to destroy American troops and munitions exclusively; +they were seeking to destroy tonnage. They were aiming to reduce the +world's supply of ships to such a point that the Allies would be +compelled to abandon the conflict for lack of communications. It was +therefore necessary that they should sink the empty ships, which were +going out, as well as the crowded and loaded ships which were coming in. +For the same reason it was necessary that we should protect them, and we +did this as far as practicable without causing undue delays in forming +outward-bound convoys. The <i>Justicia</i>, though most people still think +that she was torpedoed because she was unescorted, was, in fact, +protected by a destroyer escort of considerable size. This duty of +escorting outward-bound ships increased considerably the strain on our +destroyer force. The difficulty was that the inbound convoy arrived in a +body, but that the ships could not be unloaded and sent back in a body +without detaining a number of them an undue length of time—and time was +such an important factor in this war that it was necessary to make the +"turn-around" of each important transport as quickly as possible. The +consequence was that returning ships were often despatched in small +convoys as fast as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_115" id="Page_115">[Pg 115]</a></span>they were unloaded. The escorts which we were able +to supply for such groups were thus much weaker than absolute safety +required, and sometimes we were even forced to send vessels across the +submarine zone with few, if any, escorting warships. This explains why +certain homeward-bound transports were torpedoed, and this was +particularly true of troop and munition convoys to the western ports of +France. Only when we could assemble a large outgoing convoy and despatch +it at such a time that it could meet an incoming one at the western edge +of the submarine zone could we give these vessels the same destroyer +escort as that which we always gave for the loaded convoys bound for +European ports.</p> + +<p>As soon as the destroyers made contact with an inward-bound convoy, the +ocean escort, the cruiser or pre-dreadnought, if an American, abandoned +it and started it back home, sometimes with a westbound convoy if one +had been assembled in time. British escorts went ahead at full speed +into a British port, usually escorted by one or more destroyers. This +abandonment sometimes aroused the wrath of the passengers on the inbound +convoy. Their protector had dropped them just as they had entered the +submarine zone, the very moment its services were really needed! These +passengers did not understand, any more than did the people at home, +that the purpose of the ocean escort was not to protect them from +submarines, but from possible raiders. Inside the danger zone this ocean +escort would become part of the convoy itself and require protection +from submarines, so that its rather summary departure really made the +merchantmen more secure. As the convoy approached the danger zone, after +being drilled all the way across the ocean, its very appearance was more +taut and business-like. The ships were closed up into a much more +compact formation, keeping only such distances apart as were essential +for quick manœuvring. Generally the convoy was formed in a long +parallelogram, the distance across the front of which was much longer +than the depth or distance along the sides. Usually the formation was a +number of groups of four vessels each, in column or "Indian file," at a +distance of about five hundred yards from ship to ship, and all groups +abreast of each other and about half a mile apart. Thus a convoy of +twenty-four vessels, or six groups of four, would have a width of about +three miles and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_116" id="Page_116">[Pg 116]</a></span>a depth of one. Most of the destroyers were stationed +on the narrow sides, for it was only on the side, or the beam, that the +submarines could attack with much likelihood of succeeding. It was +usually necessary for a destroyer to be stationed in the rear of a +convoy, for, though the speed of nearly all convoys was faster than that +of a submarine when submerged, the latter while running on the surface +could follow a convoy at night with a fair chance of torpedoing a vessel +at early daylight and escaping to the rear if unhampered by the presence +of a rear-guard destroyer. It was generally impracticable and dangerous +for the submarine to wait ahead, submerge, and launch its torpedoes as +the convoy passed over it. The extent to which purely mechanical details +protected merchant ships is not understood, and this inability to attack +successfully from the front illustrates this point. The submarine +launches its torpedoes from tubes in the bow or stern; it has no tubes +on the beam. If it did possess such side tubes, it could lie in wait +ahead and shoot its broadsides at the convoy as it passed over the spot +where it was concealed. Its length in that case would be parallel to +that of the merchant ships, and thus it would have a comparatively small +part of its area exposed to the danger of ramming. The mere fact that +its torpedo tubes are placed in the bow and stern makes it necessary for +the submarine, if it wishes to attack in the fashion described, to turn +almost at right angles to the course of the convoy, and to manœuvre +into a favourable position from which to discharge its missile—a +procedure so altogether hazardous that it almost never attempts it. With +certain reservations, which it is hardly necessary to explain in detail +at this point, it may be taken at least as a general rule that the sides +of the convoy not only furnish the U-boats much the best chance to +torpedo ships, but also subject them to the least danger; and this is +the reason why, in the recent war, the destroyers were usually +concentrated at these points.</p> + +<p>I have already compared the convoy system to a great aggregation of +railroads. This comparison holds good of its operation after it had +entered the infested zone. Indeed the very terminology of our railroad +men was used. Every convoy nearly followed one of two main routes, known +at convoy headquarters as the two "trunk lines." The trunk line which +reached the west coast of England usually passed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_117" id="Page_117">[Pg 117]</a></span>north of Ireland +through the North Channel and down the Irish Sea to Liverpool. Under +certain conditions these convoys passed south of Ireland and thence up +the Irish Sea. The convoys to the east coast took a trunk line that +passed up the English Channel. Practically all shipping from the United +States to Great Britain and France took one of these trunk lines. But, +like our railroad systems, each of these main routes had branch lines. +Thus shipping destined for French ports took the southern route until +off the entrance to the English Channel; here it abandoned the main line +and took a branch route to Brest, Bordeaux, Nantes, and other French +ports. In the Channel likewise several "single-track" branches went to +various English ports, such as Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, and +the like. The whole gigantic enterprise flowed with a precision and a +regularity which I think it is hardly likely that any other +transportation system has ever achieved.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">IV</p> + +<p>A description of a few actual convoys, and the experiences of our +destroyers with them, will perhaps best make clear the nature of the +mechanism which protected the world's shipping. For this purpose I have +selected typical instances which illustrate the every-day routine +experiences of escorting destroyers, and other experiences in which +their work was more spectacular.</p> + +<p>One day in late October, 1917, a division of American destroyers at +Queenstown received detailed instructions from Admiral Bayly to leave at +a certain hour and escort the outward convoy "O Q 17" and bring into +port the inbound convoy "H S 14." These detailed instructions were based +upon general instructions issued from the Admiralty, where my staff was +in constant attendance and co-operation. The symbols by which these two +groups of ships were designated can be easily interpreted. The O Q +simply meant that convoy "No. 17"—the seventeenth which had left that +port—was Outward bound from Queenstown, and the H S signified that +convoy "No. 14" was Homeward bound from Sydney, Cape Breton. Queenstown +during the first few months was one of those places at which ships, +having discharged their cargoes, assembled in groups for despatching +back to the United States. Later <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_118" id="Page_118">[Pg 118]</a></span>Milford Haven, Liverpool, and other +ports were more often used for this purpose. Vessels had been arriving +here for several days from ports of the Irish Sea and the east coast of +England. These had now been formed into convoy "O Q 17"; they were ready +for a destroyer escort to take them through the submarine zone and start +them on the westward voyage to American ports.</p> + +<p>This escort consisted of eight American destroyers and one British +"special service ship"; the latter was one of that famous company of +decoy vessels, or "mystery ships," which, though to all outward +appearances unprotected merchantmen, really carried concealed armament +of sufficient power to destroy any submarine that came within range. +This special service ship, the <i>Aubrietia</i>, was hardly a member of the +protective escort. Her mission was to sail about thirty miles ahead of +the convoy; when observed from the periscope or the conning-tower of a +submarine, the <i>Aubrietia</i> seemed to be merely a helpless merchantman +sailing alone, and as such she presented a particularly tempting target +to the U-boat. But her real purpose in life was to be torpedoed. After +landing its missile in a vessel's side, the submarine usually remained +submerged for a period, while the crew of its victim was getting off in +boats; it then came to the surface, and the men prepared to board the +disabled ship and search her for valuables and delicacies, particularly +for information which would assist them in their campaign, such as +secret codes, sailing instructions, and the like. The mystery ship had +been preparing for this moment, and as soon as the submarine broke +water, the gun ports of the disguised merchantman dropped, and her +hitherto concealed guns began blazing away at the German. By October, +1917, these special service ships had already accounted for several +submarines; and it had now become a frequent practice to attach one or +more to a convoy, either ahead, where she might dispose of the submarine +lying in wait for the approaching aggregation, or in the rear, where a +U-boat might easily mistake her for one of those stragglers which were +an almost inevitable part of every convoy.</p> + +<p>Trawlers and mine-sweepers, as was the invariable custom, spent several +hours sweeping the Queenstown Channel before the sailing of convoy "O Q +17" and its escort. Promptly at the appointed time the eight American +ships <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_119" id="Page_119">[Pg 119]</a></span>sailed out in "Indian file," passing through the net which was +always kept in place at the entrance to the harbour. Their first duty +was to patrol the waters outside for a radius of twelve miles; it was +not improbable that the Germans, having learned that this convoy was to +sail, had stationed a submarine not far from the harbour entrance. +Having finally satisfied himself that there were no lurking enemies in +the neighbourhood, the commander of the destroyer flagship signalled to +the merchant ships, which promptly left the harbour and entered the open +sea. The weather was stormy; the wind was blowing something of a gale +and head seas were breaking over the destroyers' decks. But the convoy +quickly manœuvred into three columns, the destroyers rapidly closed +around them, and the whole group started for "Rendezvous A"—this being +the designation of that spot on the ocean's surface where the fourteenth +meridian of longitude crosses the forty-ninth parallel of latitude—a +point in the Atlantic about three hundred miles south-west of +Queenstown, regarded at that time as safely beyond the operating zone of +the submarine. Meanwhile, the "mystery ship," sailing far ahead, +disappeared beneath the horizon.</p> + +<p>Convoying ships in the stormy autumn and winter waters, amid the fog and +rain of the eastern Atlantic, was a monotonous and dreary occupation. +Only one or two incidents enlivened this particular voyage. As the +<i>Parker</i>, Commander Halsey Powell, was scouting ahead at about two +o'clock in the afternoon, her lookout suddenly sighted a submarine, +bearing down upon the convoy. Immediately the news was wirelessed to +every vessel. As soon as the message was received, the whole convoy, at +a signal from the flagship, turned four points to port. For nearly two +hours the destroyers searched this area for the submerged submarine, but +that crafty boat kept itself safely under the water, and the convoy now +again took up its original course. About two days' sailing brought the +ships to the point at which the protecting destroyers could safely leave +them, as far as submarines were concerned, to continue unescorted to +America; darkness had now set in, and, under its cover, the merchantmen +slipped away from the warships and started westward. Meantime, the +destroyer escort had received a message from the <i>Cumberland</i>, the +British cruiser which was acting as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_120" id="Page_120">[Pg 120]</a></span>ocean escort to convoy "HS 14." +"Convoy is six hours late," she reported, much like the announcer at a +railroad station who informs the waiting crowds that the incoming train +is that much overdue. According to the schedule these ships should reach +the appointed rendezvous at six o'clock the next morning; this message +evidently moved the time of arrival up to noon. The destroyers, slowing +down so that they would not arrive ahead of time, started for the +designated spot.</p> + +<p>Sometimes thick weather made it impossible to fix the position by +astronomical observations, and the convoy might not be at its appointed +rendezvous. For this reason the destroyers now deployed on a north and +south line about twenty miles long for several hours. Somewhat before +the appointed time one of the destroyers sighted a faint cloud of smoke +on the western horizon, and soon afterward thirty-two merchantmen, +sailing in columns of fours, began to assume a definite outline. At a +signal from this destroyer the other destroyers of the escort came in at +full speed and ranged themselves on either side of the convoy—a +manœuvre that always excited the admiration of the merchant skippers. +This mighty collection of vessels, occupying about ten or twelve square +miles on the ocean, skilfully maintaining its formation, was really a +beautiful and inspiring sight. When the destroyers had gained their +designated positions on either side, the splendid cavalcade sailed +boldly into the area which formed the favourite hunting grounds for the +submarine.</p> + +<p>As soon as this danger zone was reached the whole aggregation, +destroyers and merchant ships, began to zigzag. The commodore on the +flagship hoisted the signal, "Zigzag A," and instantaneously the whole +thirty-two ships began to turn twenty-five degrees to starboard. The +great ships, usually so cumbersome, made this simultaneous turn with all +the deftness, and even with all the grace of a school of fish into which +one has suddenly cast a stone. All the way across the Atlantic they had +been practising such an evolution; most of them had already sailed +through the danger zone more than once, so that the manœuvre was by +this time an old story. For ten or fifteen minutes they proceeded along +this course, when immediately, like one vessel, the convoy turned twenty +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_121" id="Page_121">[Pg 121]</a></span>degrees to port, and started in a new direction. And so on for hours, +now a few minutes to the right, now a few minutes to the left, and now +again straight ahead, while all the time the destroyers were cutting +through the water, every eye of the skilled lookouts in each crew fixed +upon the surface for the first glimpse of a periscope. This zigzagging +was carried out according to comprehensive plans which enabled the +convoy to zigzag for hours at a time without signals, the courses and +the time on each course being designated in the particular plan ordered, +all ships' clocks being set exactly alike by time signal. Probably I +have made it clear why these zigzagging evolutions constituted such a +protective measure. All the time the convoy was sailing in the danger +zone it was assumed that a submarine was present, looking for a chance +to torpedo. Even though the officers might know that there was no +submarine within three hundred miles, this was never taken for granted; +the discipline of the whole convoy system rested upon the theory that +the submarine was there, waiting only the favourable moment to start the +work of destruction. But a submarine, as already said, could not strike +without the most thorough preparation. It must get within three or four +hundred yards or the torpedo would stand little chance of hitting the +mark in a vital spot. The commander almost never shot blindly into the +convoy, on the chance of hitting some ship; he carefully selected his +victim; his calculation had to include its speed, the speed of his own +boat and that of his torpedo; above all, he had to be sure of the +direction in which his intended quarry was steaming; and in this +calculation the direction of the merchantman formed perhaps the most +important element. But if the ships were constantly changing their +direction, it is apparent that the submarine could make no calculations +which would have much practical value.</p> + +<p>In the afternoon the <i>Aubrietia</i>, the British mystery ship which was +sailing thirty miles ahead of the convoy, reported that she had sighted +a submarine. Two or three destroyers dashed for the indicated area, +searched it thoroughly, found no traces of the hidden boat, and returned +to the convoy. The next morning six British destroyers and one cruiser +arrived from Devonport. Up to this time the convoy had been following +the great "trunk line" which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_122" id="Page_122">[Pg 122]</a></span>led into the Channel, but it had now +reached the point where the convoys split up, part going to English +ports and part to French. These British destroyers had come to take over +the twenty ships which were bound for their own country, while the +American destroyers were assigned to escort the rest to Brest. The +following conversation—typical of those that were constantly filling +the air in that area—now took place between the American flagship and +the British:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p><i>Conyngham</i> to <i>Achates</i>: This is the <i>Conyngham</i>, Commander +Johnson. I would like to keep the convoy together until this +evening. I will work under your orders until I leave with convoy +for Brest.</p> + +<p><i>Achates</i> to <i>Conyngham</i>: Please make your own arrangements for +taking French convoy with you to-night.</p> + +<p><i>Achates</i> to <i>Conyngham</i>: What time do you propose leaving with +French convoy to-night?</p> + +<p><i>Conyngham</i> to <i>Achates</i>: About 5 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> in order to arrive +in Brest to-night.</p> + +<p>Devonport Commander-in-chief to <i>Conyngham</i>: Proceed in execution +Admiralty orders <i>Achates</i> having relieved you. Submarine activity +in Lat. 48.41, Long. 4.51.</p></div> + +<p>The <i>Aubrietia</i> had already given warning of the danger referred to in +the last words of this final message. It had been flashing the news in +this way:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>1.15 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> <i>Aubrietia</i> to <i>Conyngham</i>: Submarine sighted +49.30 N 6.8 W. Sighted submarine on surface. Speed is not enough. +Course south-west by south magnetic.</p> + +<p>1.30 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> <i>Conyngham</i> to <i>Achates</i>: Aubrietia to all +men-of-war and Land's End. Chasing submarine on the surface 49.30 N +6.8 W, course south-west by south. Waiting to get into range. He is +going faster than I can.</p> + +<p>2.00 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> <i>Aubrietia</i> to all men-of-war. Submarine +submerged 49.20 N 6.12 W. Still searching.</p></div> + +<p>The fact that nothing more was seen of that submarine may possibly +detract from the thrill of the experience, but in describing the +operations of this convoy I am not attempting to tell a story of wild +adventure, but merely to set forth what happened ninety-nine out of a +hundred <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_123" id="Page_123">[Pg 123]</a></span>times. What made destroyer work so exasperating was that, in +the vast majority of cases, the option of fighting or not fighting lay +with the submarine. Had the submarine decided to approach and attack the +convoy, the chances would have been more than even that it would have +been destroyed. In accordance with its usual practice, however, it chose +to submerge, and that decision ended the affair for the moment. This was +the way in which merchant ships were protected. At the time this +submarine was sighted it was headed directly for this splendid +aggregation of cargo vessels; had not the <i>Aubrietia</i> discovered it and +had not one of the American destroyers started in pursuit, the U-boat +would have made an attack and possibly would have sent one or more ships +to the bottom. The chief business of the escorting ships, all through +the war, was this unspectacular one of chasing the submarines away; and +for every under-water vessel actually destroyed there were hundreds of +experiences such as the one which I have just described.</p> + +<p>The rest of this trip was uneventful. Two American destroyers escorted +H.M.S. <i>Cumberland</i>—the ocean escort which had accompanied the convoy +from Sydney—to Devonport; the rest of the American escort took its +quota of merchantmen into Brest, and from that point sailed back to +Queenstown, whence, after three or four days in port, it went out with +another convoy. This was the routine which was repeated until the end of +the war.</p> + +<p>The "O Q 17" and the "H S 14" form an illustration of convoys which made +their trips successfully. Yet these same destroyers had another +experience which pictures other phases of the convoy system.</p> + +<p>On the morning of October 19th, Commander Johnson's division was +escorting a great convoy of British ships on its way to the east coast +of England. Suddenly out of the air came one of those calls which were +daily occurrences in the submarine zone. The <i>J. L. Luckenback</i> +signalled her position, ninety miles ahead of the convoy, and that she +was being shelled by a submarine. In a few minutes the <i>Nicholson</i>, one +of the destroyers of the escort, started to the rescue. For the next few +hours our ships began to pick out of the air the messages which detailed +the progress of this adventure—messages which tell the story so +graphically, and which are so typical of the events <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_124" id="Page_124">[Pg 124]</a></span>which were +constantly taking place in those waters, that I reproduce them verbatim:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>8.50 <span class="smcap">A.M.</span> S.O.S. <i>J. L. Luckenback</i> being gunned by +submarine. Position 48.08 N 9.31 W.</p> + +<p>9.25 <i>Conyngham</i> to <i>Nicholson:</i> Proceed to assistance of S.O.S. +ship.</p> + +<p>9.30 <i>Luckenback</i> to U.S.A.: Am manœuvring around.</p> + +<p>9.35 <i>Luckenback</i> to U.S.A.: How far are you away?</p> + +<p>9.40 <i>Luckenback</i> to U.S.A.: Code books thrown overboard. How soon +will you arrive?</p> + +<p><i>Nicholson</i> to <i>Luckenback</i>: In two hours.</p> + +<p>9.41 <i>Luckenback</i> to U.S.A.: Look for boats. They are shelling us.</p> + +<p><i>Nicholson</i> to <i>Luckenback</i>: Do not surrender!</p> + +<p><i>Luckenback</i> to <i>Nicholson</i> Never!</p> + +<p>11.01 <i>Nicholson</i> to <i>Luckenback</i>: Course south magnetic.</p> + +<p>12.36 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> <i>Nicholson</i> to <i>Conyngham</i>: Submarine submerged +47.47 N 10.00 W at 11.20.</p> + +<p>1.23 <i>Conyngham</i> to <i>Nicholson:</i> What became of steamer?</p> + +<p>3.41 <i>Nicholson</i> to Admiral (at Queenstown) and <i>Conyngham</i>: +<i>Luckenback</i> now joining convoy. Should be able to make port +unassisted.</p></div> + +<p>I have already said that a great part of the destroyer's duty was to +rescue merchantmen that were being attacked by submarines: this +<i>Luckenback</i> incident vividly illustrates this point. Had the submarine +used its torpedo upon this vessel, it probably would have disposed of it +summarily; but it was the part of wisdom for the submarine to economize +in these weapons because they were so expensive and so comparatively +scarce, and to use its guns whenever the opportunity offered. The +<i>Luckenback</i> was armed, but the fact that the submarine's guns easily +outranged hers made her armament useless. Thus all the German had to do +in this case was to keep away at a safe distance and bombard the +merchantman. The U-boat had been doing this for more than three hours +when the destroyer reached the scene of operations; evidently the +marksmanship was poor, for out of a great many shots fired by the +submarine only about a dozen had hit the vessel. The <i>Luckenback</i> was on +fire, a shell having set aflame her cargo of cotton; certain parts of +the machinery <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_125" id="Page_125">[Pg 125]</a></span>had been damaged, but, in the main, the vessel was +intact. The submarine was always heroic enough when it came to shelling +defenceless merchantmen, but the appearance of a destroyer anywhere in +her neighbourhood made her resort to the one secure road to +safety—diving for protection. The <i>Nicholson</i> immediately trained her +guns on the U-boat, which, on the second shot, disappeared under the +water. The destroyer despatched men to the disabled vessel, the fire was +extinguished, necessary repairs to the machinery were made, and in a few +hours the <i>Luckenback</i> had become a member of the convoy.</p> + +<p>Hardly had she joined the merchant ships and hardly had the <i>Nicholson</i> +taken up her station on the flank when an event still more exciting took +place. It was now late in the afternoon; the sea had quieted down; the +whole atmosphere was one of peace; and there was not the slightest sign +or suggestion of a hostile ship. The <i>Orama</i>, the British warship which +had accompanied the convoy from its home port as ocean escort, had taken +up her position as leading ship in the second column. Without the +slightest warning a terrific explosion now took place on her starboard +bow. There was no mystery as to what had happened; indeed, immediately +after the explosion the wake of the torpedo appeared on the surface; +there was no periscope in sight, yet it was clear, from the position of +the wake, that the submarine had crept up to the side of the convoy and +delivered its missile at close range. There was no confusion in the +convoy or its escorting destroyers but there were scenes of great +activity. Immediately after the explosion, a periscope appeared a few +inches out of the water, stayed there only a second or two, and then +disappeared. Brief as was this exposure, the keen eyes of the lookout +and several sailors of the <i>Conyngham</i>, the nearest destroyer, had +detected it; it disclosed the fact that the enemy was in the midst of +the convoy itself, looking for other ships to torpedo. The <i>Conyngham</i> +rang for full speed, and dashed for the location of the submarine. Her +officers and men now saw more than the periscope; they saw the vessel +itself. The water was very clear; as the <i>Conyngham</i> circled around the +<i>Orama</i> her officers and men sighted a green, shining, cigar-shaped +thing under the water not far from the starboard side. As she sped by, +the destroyer dropped a depth <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_126" id="Page_126">[Pg 126]</a></span>charge almost directly on top of the +object. After the waters had quieted down pieces of débris were seen +floating upon the surface—boards, spars, and other miscellaneous +wreckage, evidently scraps of the damaged deck of a submarine. All +attempts to save the <i>Orama</i> proved fruitless: the destroyers stood by +for five hours, taking off survivors, and making all possible efforts to +salvage the ship, but at about ten o'clock that evening she disappeared +under the water. In rescuing the survivors the seamanship displayed by +the <i>Conyngham</i> was particularly praiseworthy. The little vessel was +skilfully placed alongside the <i>Orama</i> and some three hundred men were +taken off without accident or casualty while the ship was sinking.</p> + +<p>One of the things that made the work of the destroyer such a thankless +task was that only in the rarest cases was it possible to prove that she +had destroyed the submarine. Only the actual capture of the enemy ship +or some of its crew furnished irrefutable proof that the action had been +successful. The appearance of oil on the surface after a depth charge +attack was not necessarily convincing, for the submarine early learned +the trick of pumping overboard a little oil after such an experience; in +this way it hoped to persuade its pursuer that it had been sunk and thus +induce it to abandon the chase. Even the appearance of wreckage, such as +arose on the surface after this <i>Conyngham</i> attack, did not absolutely +prove that the submarine had been destroyed. Yet, as this submarine was +never heard of again, there is little doubt that Commander Johnson's +depth charge performed its allotted task. The judgment of the British +Government, which awarded him the C.M.G. for his achievement, may be +accepted as final. The Admiralty citation for this decoration reads as +follows:</p> + +<p>"At 5.50 <span class="smcap">P.M.</span> H.M.S. <i>Orama</i> was torpedoed in convoy. +<i>Conyngham</i> went full speed, circled bow of <i>Orama</i>, saw submarine +between lines of convoy, passed right over it so that it was plainly +visible and dropped depth charge. Prompt and correct action of Commander +Johnson saved more ships from being torpedoed and probably destroyed the +submarine."</p> + +<p>One of the greatest difficulties of convoy commanders, especially during +the first months the system was in operation, was with "slacker" +merchantmen; these were <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_127" id="Page_127">[Pg 127]</a></span>vessels which, for various reasons, fell behind +the convoy, a tempting bait for the submarine. At this time certain of +the merchant captains manifested an incurable obstinacy; they affected +to regard the U-boats with contempt, and insisted rather on taking +chances instead of playing the game. In such cases a destroyer would +often have to leave the main division, go back several miles, and +attempt to prod the straggler into joining the convoy, much as a +shepherd dog attempts to force the laggard sheep to keep within the +flock. In some cases, when the merchantman proved particularly obdurate, +the destroyer would slyly drop a depth charge, near enough to give the +backward vessel a considerable shaking up without doing her any injury; +usually such a shock caused the merchantman to start full speed ahead to +rejoin her convoy, firmly believing that a submarine was giving chase. +In certain instances the merchantman fell behind the convoy because the +machinery had broken down or because she had suffered other accidents. +The submarines would follow for days in the track of convoys, looking +for a straggler of this kind, just as a shark will follow a vessel in +the hope that something will be thrown overboard; and for this reason +one destroyer at least was often detached from the escorting division as +a rear guard. In this connection we must keep in mind that at no time +until the armistice was signed was any escort force strong enough to +insure entire safety. If we had had destroyers enough to put a close +screen, or even a double screen, around every convoy, there would have +been almost no danger from submarines. The fact that all escort forces +were very inadequate placed a very heavy responsibility upon the escort +commanders, and made them think twice before detaching a destroyer in +order to protect stragglers.</p> + +<p>One late summer afternoon the American converted yacht <i>Christabel</i> was +performing this duty for the British merchantman <i>Danae</i>, a vessel which +had fallen eight miles behind her convoy, bound from La Pallice, France, +to Brest. It was a beautiful evening; the weather was clear, the sea +smooth, and there was not a breath of wind. Under such conditions a +submarine could conceal its presence only with great difficulty; and at +about 5.30 the lookout on the <i>Christabel</i> detected a wake, some six +hundred yards on the port quarter. The <i>Christabel</i> started <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_128" id="Page_128">[Pg 128]</a></span>at full +speed; the wake suddenly ceased, but a few splotches of oil were seen, +and she was steered in the direction of this disturbance. A depth charge +was dropped at the spot where the submarine ought to have been, but it +evidently did not produce the slightest result. The <i>Christabel</i> +rejoined the <i>Danae</i>, and the two went along peacefully for nearly four +hours, when suddenly a periscope appeared about two hundred yards away, +on the starboard side. Evidently this persistent German had been +following the ships all that time, looking for a favourable opportunity +to discharge his torpedo. That moment had now arrived; the submarine was +at a distance where a carefully aimed shot meant certain destruction; +the appearance of the periscope meant that the submarine was making +observations in anticipation of delivering this shot. The <i>Christabel</i> +started full speed for the wake of the periscope; this periscope itself +disappeared under the water like a guilty thing, and a disturbance on +the surface showed that the submarine was making frantic efforts to +submerge. The destroyer dropped its depth charge, set to explode at +seventy feet, its radio meantime sending signals broadcast for +assistance. Immediately after the mushroom of water arose from this +charge a secondary explosion was heard; this was a horrible and muffled +sound coming from the deep, more powerful and more terrible than any +that could have been caused by the destroyer's "ash can." An enormous +volcano of water and all kinds of débris arose from the sea, half-way +between the <i>Christabel</i> and the spot where it had dropped its charge. +This secondary explosion shook the <i>Christabel</i> so violently that the +officers thought at first that the ship had been seriously damaged, and +a couple of men were knocked sprawling on the deck. As soon as the water +subsided great masses of heavy black oil began rising to the surface, +and completely splintered wood and other wreckage appeared. In a few +minutes the sea, for a space many hundred yards in diameter, was covered +with dead fish—about ten times as many, the officers reported, as could +have been killed by the usual depth charge. The <i>Christabel</i> and the +ship she was guarding started to rejoin the main convoy, entirely +satisfied with the afternoon's work. Indeed, they had good reason to be; +a day or two afterward a battered submarine, the <i>U C-56</i>, crept +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_129" id="Page_129">[Pg 129]</a></span>painfully into the harbour of Santander, Spain; it was the boat which +had had such an exciting contest with the <i>Christabel</i>. She was injured +beyond the possibility of repair; besides, the Spanish Government +interned her for "the duration of the war"; so that for all practical +purposes the vessel was as good as sunk.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">V</p> + +<p>Discouraging as was this business of hunting an invisible foe, events +occasionally happened with all the unexpectedness of real drama. For the +greater part of the time the destroyers were engaged in battle with oil +slicks, wakes, tide rips, streaks of suds, and suspicious disturbances +on the water; yet now and then there were engagements with actual boats +and flesh and blood human beings. To spend weeks at sea with no foe more +substantial than an occasional foamy excrescence on the surface was the +fate of most sailormen in this war; yet a few exciting moments, when +they finally came, more than compensated for long periods of monotony.</p> + +<p>One afternoon in November, 1917, an American destroyer division, +commanded by Commander Frank Berrien, with the <i>Nicholson</i> as its +flagship, put out of Queenstown on the usual mission of taking a +westbound convoy to its rendezvous and bringing in one that was bound +for British ports. This outward convoy was the "O Q 20" and consisted of +eight fine ships. After the usual preliminary scoutings the vessels +passed through the net in single file, sailed about ten miles to sea, +and began to take up the stipulated formation, four columns of two ships +each. The destroyers were moving around; they were even mingling in the +convoy, carrying messages and giving instructions; by a quarter past +four all the ships had attained their assigned positions, except one, +the <i>René</i>, which was closing up to its place as the rear ship of the +first column. Meanwhile, the destroyer <i>Fanning</i> was steaming rapidly to +its post on the rear flank. Suddenly there came a cry from the bridge of +the <i>Fanning</i>, where Coxswain David D. Loomis was on lookout:</p> + +<p>"Periscope!"</p> + +<p>Off the starboard side of the <i>Fanning</i>, glistening in the smooth water, +a periscope of the "finger" variety, one <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_130" id="Page_130">[Pg 130]</a></span>so small that it could usually +elude all but the sharpest eyes, had darted for a few seconds above the +surface and had then just as suddenly disappeared. Almost directly ahead +lay the <i>Welshman</i>, a splendid British merchant ship; the periscope was +so close that a torpedo would almost inevitably have hit this vessel in +the engine-room. The haste with which the German had withdrawn his +periscope, after taking a hurried glance around, was easily explained; +for his lens had revealed not only this tempting bait, but the destroyer +<i>Fanning</i> close aboard and bearing down on him. Under these +circumstances it was not surprising that no torpedo was fired; it was +clearly military wisdom to beat a quick retreat rather than attempt to +attack the merchantman. Lieut. Walter S. Henry, who was the officer of +the deck, acted with the most commendable despatch. It is not the +simplest thing, even when the submarine is so obviously located as this +one apparently was, to reach the spot accurately.</p> + +<p>The destroyer has to make a wide and rapid turn, and there is every +danger, in making this manœuvre, that the location will be missed. +Subsequent events disclosed that the <i>Fanning</i> was turned with the +utmost accuracy. As the ship darted by the spot at which the periscope +had been sighted, a depth charge went over the stern, and exploded so +violently that the main generator of the <i>Fanning</i> herself was +temporarily disabled. Meanwhile the <i>Nicholson</i> had dashed through the +convoy, made a rapid detour to the left, and dropped another depth +charge a short distance ahead of the <i>Fanning</i>.</p> + +<p>The disturbances made on the water by these "ash cans" gradually +subsided; to all outward appearances the submarine had escaped unharmed. +The <i>Fanning</i> and the <i>Nicholson</i> completed their circles and came back +to the danger spot, the officers and crew eagerly scanning the surface +for the usual oil patch and air bubbles, even hoping for a few pieces of +wreckage—those splintered remnants of the submarine's wooden deck that +almost invariably indicated a considerable amount of damage. But none of +these evidences of success, or half-success, rose to the surface; for +ten or fifteen minutes everything was as quiet as the grave. Then +something happened which occurred only a few times in this strange war. +The stern of a submarine appeared out of the water, tilted at <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_131" id="Page_131">[Pg 131]</a></span>about +thirty degrees, clearly revealing its ugly torpedo tubes. Then came the +conning-tower and finally the entire boat, the whole hull taking its +usual position on the surface as neatly and unconcernedly as though no +enemies were near. So far as could be seen the U-boat was in perfect +condition. Its hull looked intact, showing not the slightest indication +of injury; the astonished officers and men on the destroyers could +easily understand now why no oil or wreckage had risen to the top, for +the <i>U-58</i>—they could now see this inscription plainly painted on the +conning-tower—was not leaking, and the deck showed no signs of having +come into contact even remotely with a depth charge. The <i>Fanning</i> and +the <i>Nicholson</i> began firing shells at the unexpected visitant, and the +<i>Nicholson</i> extended an additional welcome in the form of a hastily +dropped "ash can."</p> + +<p>Suddenly the conning-tower of the submarine opened and out popped the +rotund face and well-fed form of Kapitän-Leutnant Gustav Amberger, of +the Imperial German Navy. The two arms of the Herr Kapitän immediately +shot heavenward and the Americans on the destroyers could hear certain +guttural ejaculations:</p> + +<p>"Kamerad! Kamerad!"</p> + +<p>A hatchway now opened, and a procession of German sailors emerged, one +after the other, into the sunshine, like ants crawling out of their +hole. As each sailor reached the deck he straightened up, lifted his +arms, and shouted:</p> + +<p>"Kamerad! Kamerad! Kamerad!"</p> + +<p>In all four officers and thirty-five men went through this ceremony. +Were they really surrendering themselves and their boat, or did these +gymnastic exercises conceal some new form of German craftiness? The +American ships ceased firing; the <i>Fanning</i> gingerly approached the +submarine, while the <i>Nicholson</i> stood by, all her four-inch guns +trained upon the German boat, and the machine-guns pointed at the +kamerading Germans, ready to shoot them into ribbons at the first sign +that the surrender was not a genuine one.</p> + +<p>While these preliminaries were taking place, a couple of German sailors +disappeared into the interior of the submarine, stayed there a moment or +two, and then returned to the deck. They had apparently performed a duty +that was characteristically German; for a few <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_132" id="Page_132">[Pg 132]</a></span>minutes after they +appeared again, the <i>U-58</i> began to settle in the water, and soon +afterward sank. These men, obeying orders, had opened the cocks and +scuttled the ship—this after the officers had surrendered her! As the +submarine disappeared, the men and officers dived and started swimming +toward the <i>Fanning</i>; four of them became entangled in the radio antennæ +and were dragged under the waves; however, in a few minutes these men +succeeded in disentangling themselves and joined the swimmers. As the +thirty-nine men neared the <i>Fanning</i> it was evident that most of them +were extremely wearied and that some were almost exhausted. The sailors +from the <i>Fanning</i> threw over lines; some still had the strength to +climb up these to the deck, while to others it was necessary to throw +other lines which they could adjust under their arms. These latter, limp +and wet figures, the American sailors pulled up, much as the fisherman +pulls up the inert body of a monster fish. And now an incident took +place which reveals that the American navy has rather different ideals +of humanity from the German. One of the sailors was so exhausted that he +could not adjust the life-lines around his shoulders; he was very +apparently drowning. Like a flash Elxer Harwell, chief pharmacist mate, +and Francis G. Conner, coxswain, jumped overboard, swam to this +floundering German, and adjusted the line around him as solicitously as +though he had been a shipmate. The poor wretch—his name was Franz +Glinder—was pulled aboard, but he was so far gone that all attempts to +resuscitate him failed, and he died on the deck of the <i>Fanning</i>.</p> + +<p>Kapitän Amberger, wet and dripping, immediately walked up to Lieut. A. +S. Carpender, the commander of the <i>Fanning</i>, clicked his heels +together, saluted in the most ceremonious German fashion, and +surrendered himself, his officers, and his crew. He also gave his parole +for his men. The officers were put in separate staterooms under guard +and each of the crew was placed under the protection of a well-armed +American jackie—who, it may be assumed, immensely enjoyed this new +duty. All the "survivors" were dressed in dry, warm clothes, and good +food and drink were given them. They were even supplied with cigarettes +and something which they valued more than all the delicacies in the +world—soap for a washing, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_133" id="Page_133">[Pg 133]</a></span>the first soap which they had had for +months, as this was an article which was more scarce in Germany than +even copper or rubber. Our physicians gave the men first aid, and others +attended to all their minor wants. Evidently the fact that they had been +captured did not greatly depress their spirits, for, after eating and +drinking to their heart's content, the assembled Germans burst into +song.</p> + +<p>But what was the explanation of this strange proceeding? The German +officers, at first rather stiff and sullen, ultimately unbent enough to +tell their story. Their submarine had been hanging off the entrance to +Queenstown for nearly two days, waiting for this particular convoy to +emerge. The officers admitted that they were getting ready to torpedo +the <i>Welshman</i> when the discovery that the <i>Fanning</i> was only a short +distance away compelled a sudden change in their plans. Few "ash cans" +dropped in the course of the war reached their objective with the +unerring accuracy of the one which now came from this American +destroyer. It did not crush the submarine but the concussion wrecked the +motors, making it impossible for it to navigate, jammed its diving +rudders, making the boat uncontrollable under the water, and broke the +oil leads, practically shutting off the supply of this indispensable +fuel. Indeed, it would be impossible to conceive of a submarine in a +more helpless and unmanageable state. The officers had the option of two +alternatives: to sink until the pressure of the water crushed the boat +like so much paper, or to blow the ballast tanks, rise to the surface, +and surrender. Even while the commander was mentally debating this +problem, the submarine was rapidly descending to the bottom; when it +reached a depth of two hundred feet, which was about all that it could +stand, the commander decided to take his chances with the Americans. +Rising to the top involved great dangers; but the guns of the destroyers +seemed less formidable to these cornered Germans than the certainty of +the horrible death that awaited them under the waves.</p> + +<p>Admiral Bayly came to meet the <i>Fanning</i> as she sailed into Queenstown +with her unexpected cargo. He went on board the destroyer to +congratulate personally the officers and men upon their achievement. He +published to the assembled company a cablegram just received from the +Admiralty in London:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>Express to commanding officers and men of the United States ship<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_134" id="Page_134">[Pg 134]</a></span> +<i>Fanning</i> their Lordships' high appreciation of their successful +action against enemy submarine.</p></div> + +<p>I added a telegram of my own, ending up with the words, which seemed to +amuse the officers and men: "Go out and do it again."</p> + +<p>For this action the commanding officer of the <i>Fanning</i>, +Lieutenant-Commander Carpender, was recommended by the Admiralty for the +D.S.O., which was subsequently conferred upon him by the King at +Buckingham Palace.</p> + +<p>Only one duty remained: the commanding officer read the burial service +over the body of poor Franz Glinder, the German sailor who had been +drowned in his attempt to swim to the <i>Fanning</i>. The <i>Fanning</i> then +steamed out to sea with the body and buried it with all the honours of +war. A letter subsequently written by Kapitän Amberger to a friend in +Germany summed up his opinion of the situation in these words:</p> + +<p>"The Americans were much nicer and more obliging than expected."</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">VI</p> + +<p>So far as convoying merchant ships was concerned, Queenstown was the +largest American base; by the time the movement of troops laid heavy +burdens on the American destroyers Brest became a headquarters almost +equally important.</p> + +<p>In July, 1917, the British Government requested the co-operation of the +American navy in the great work which it had undertaken at Gibraltar; +and on August 6th the U.S.S. <i>Sacramento</i> reached that port, followed +about a week afterward by the <i>Birmingham</i> flying the flag of +Rear-Admiral Henry B. Wilson. Admiral Wilson remained as commander of +this force until November, when he left to assume the direction of +affairs at Brest. On November 25th Rear-Admiral Albert P. Niblack +succeeded to this command, which he retained throughout the war.</p> + +<p>Gibraltar was the "gateway" for more traffic than any other port in the +world. It was estimated that more than one quarter of all the convoys +which reached the Entente nations either rendezvoused at this point or +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_135" id="Page_135">[Pg 135]</a></span>passed through these Straits. This was the great route to the East by +way of the Suez Canal. From Gibraltar extended the Allied lines of +communication to southern France, Italy, Salonika, Egypt, Palestine, and +Mesopotamia. There were other routes to Bizerta (Tunis), Algiers, the +island of Milo, and a monthly service to the Azores.</p> + +<p>The Allied forces that were detailed to protect this shipping were +chiefly British and American, though they were materially assisted by +French, Japanese, and Italian vessels. They consisted of almost anything +which the hard-pressed navies could assemble from all parts of the +world—antiquated destroyers, yachts, sloops, trawlers, drifters, and +the like. The Gibraltar area was a long distance from the main enemy +submarine bases. The enemy could maintain at sea at any one time only a +relatively small number of submarines; inasmuch as the zone off the +English Channel and Ireland was the most critical one, the Allies +stationed their main destroyer force there. Because of these facts, we +had great difficulty in finding vessels to protect the important +Gibraltar area, and the force which we ultimately got together was +therefore a miscellaneous lot. The United States gathered at this point +forty-one ships, and a personnel which averaged 314 officers and 4,660 +men. This American aggregation contained a variegated assortment of +scout cruisers, gunboats, coastguard cutters, yachts, and five +destroyers of antique type. The straits to which we were reduced for +available vessels for the Gibraltar station—and the British navy was +similarly hard pressed—were illustrated by the fact that we placed +these destroyers at Gibraltar. They were the <i>Decatur</i> and four similar +vessels, each of 420 tons—the modern destroyer is a vessel of from +1,000 to 1,200 tons—and were stationed, when the war broke out, at +Manila, where they were considered fit only for local service; yet the +record which these doughty little ships made is characteristic of the +spirit of our young officers. This little squadron steamed 12,000 miles +from Manila to Gibraltar, and that they arrived in condition immediately +to take up their duties was due to the excellent judgment and seamanship +displayed by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Commander (now +Commander) Harold R. Stark. Subsequently they made 48,000 miles <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_136" id="Page_136">[Pg 136]</a></span>on +escort duty. This makes 60,000 miles for vessels which in peace time had +been consigned to minor duties! Unfortunately one of these gallant +little vessels was subsequently cut down and sunk by a merchant ship +while escorting a convoy.</p> + +<p>For more than a year the Gibraltar force under Admiral Niblack performed +service which reflected high credit upon that commander, his officers, +and his men. During this period of time it escorted, in co-operation +with the British forces, 562 convoys, comprising a total of 10,478 +ships. Besides protecting commerce, chasing submarines, and keeping them +under the surface, many of the vessels making up this squadron had +engagements with submarines that were classified as "successful." On May +15, 1918, the <i>Wheeling</i>, a gunboat, and the <i>Surveyor</i> and <i>Venetia</i>, +yachts, while escorting a Mediterranean convoy, depth-charged a +submarine which had just torpedoed one of the convoyed vessels; we +credited these little ships with sinking their enemy. The <i>Venetia</i>, +under the command of Commander L. B. Porterfield, U.S.N., had an +experience not unlike that of the <i>Christabel</i>, already described. On +this occasion she was part of the escort of a Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy. +A British member of this convoy, the <i>Surveyor</i>, was torpedoed at six in +the evening; at that time the submarine gave no further evidence of its +existence. The <i>Venetia</i>, however, was detailed to remain in the +neighbourhood, attempt to locate the mysterious vessel, and at least to +keep it under the water. The <i>Venetia</i> soon found the wake of the +submerged enemy and dropped the usual depth charges. Three days +afterward a badly injured U-boat put in at Cartagena, Spain, and was +interned for the rest of the war. Thus another submarine was as good as +sunk. The <i>Lydonia</i>, a yacht of 500 tons, in conjunction with the +British ship <i>Basilisk</i>, sank another U-boat in the western +Mediterranean. This experience illustrates the doubt that enshrouded all +such operations, for it was not until three months after the <i>Lydonia</i> +engagement took place that the Admiralty discovered that the submarine +had been destroyed and recommended Commander Richard P. McCullough, +U.S.N., for a decoration.</p> + +<p>Thus from the first day that this method of convoying ships was adopted +it was an unqualified success in defeating <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_137" id="Page_137">[Pg 137]</a></span>the submarine campaign. By +August 1, 1917, more than 10,000 ships had been convoyed, with losses of +only one-half of 1 per cent. Up to that same date not a single ship +which had left North American ports in convoy had been lost. By August +11th, 261 ships had been sent in convoy from North American ports, and +of these only one had fallen a prey to the submarines. The convoy gave +few opportunities for encounters with their enemies. I have already said +that the great value of this system as a protection to shipping was that +it compelled the under-water boats to fight their deadliest enemies, the +destroyers, every time they tried to sink merchant ships in convoy, and +they did not attempt this often on account of the danger. There were +destroyer commanders who spent months upon the open sea, convoying huge +aggregations of cargo vessels, without even once seeing a submarine. To +a great extent the convoy system did its work in the same way that the +Grand Fleet performed its indispensable service—silently, +unobtrusively, making no dramatic bids for popular favour, and +industriously plodding on, day after day and month after month. All this +time the world had its eyes fixed upon the stirring events of the +Western Front, almost unconscious of the existence of the forces that +made those land operations possible. Yet a few statistics eloquently +disclose the part played by the convoy system in winning the war. In the +latter months of the struggle from 91 to 92 per cent. of Allied shipping +sailed in convoys. The losses in these convoys were less than 1 per +cent. And this figure includes the ships lost after the dispersal of the +convoys; in convoys actually under destroyer escort the losses were less +than one-half of 1 per cent. Military experts would term the convoy +system a defensive-offensive measure. By this they mean that it was a +method of taking a defensive position in order to force the enemy to +meet you and give you an opportunity for the offensive. It is an old +saying that the best defensive measure is a vigorous offensive one. +Unfortunately, owing to the fact that the Allies had not prepared for +the kind of warfare which the Germans saw fit to employ against them, we +could not conduct purely offensive operations; that is, we could not +employ our anti-submarine forces exclusively in the effort to destroy +the submarines. Up to the time of the armistice, despite <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_138" id="Page_138">[Pg 138]</a></span>all the +assistance rendered to the navies by the best scientific brains of the +world, no sure means had been found of keeping track of the submarine +once he submerged. The convoy system was, therefore, our only method of +bringing him into action. I lay stress on this point and reiterate it +because many critics kept insisting during the war—and their voices are +still heard—that the convoy system was purely a defensive or passive +method of opposing the submarine, and was, therefore, not sound tactics. +It is quite true that we had to defend our shipping in order to win the +war, but it is wrong to assume that the method adopted to accomplish +this protection was a purely defensive and passive one.</p> + +<p>As my main purpose is to describe the work of the American navy I have +said little in the above about the activities of the British navy in +convoying merchant ships. But we should not leave this subject with a +false perspective. When the war ended we had seventy-nine destroyers in +European waters, while Great Britain had about 400. These included those +assigned to the Grand Fleet, to the Harwich force, to the Dover patrol, +to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, and other places, many of which were +but incidentally making war on the submarines. As to minor +ships—trawlers, sloops, Q-boats, yachts, drifters, tugs, and the other +miscellaneous types used in this work—the discrepancy was even greater. +In absolute figures our effort thus seems a small one when compared with +that of our great ally. In tonnage of merchant ships convoyed, the work +of the British navy was far greater than ours. Yet the help which we +contributed was indispensable to the success that was attained. For, +judging from the situation before we entered the war, and knowing the +inadequacy of the total Allied anti-submarine forces even after we had +entered, it seems hardly possible that, without the assistance of the +United States navy, the vital lines of communication of the armies in +the field could have been kept open, the civil populations of Great +Britain supplied with food, and men and war materials sent from America +to the Western Front. In other words, I think I am justified in saying +that without the co-operation of the American navy, the Allies could not +have won the war. Our forces stationed at Queenstown actually escorted +through the danger zone about 40 per cent. of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_139" id="Page_139">[Pg 139]</a></span>all the cargoes which +left North American ports. When I describe the movement of American +troops, it will appear that our destroyers located at Queenstown and +Brest did even a larger share of this work. The latest reports show that +about 205 German submarines were destroyed. Of these it seems probable +that thirteen can be credited to American efforts, the rest to Great +Britain, France, and Italy—the greatest number, of course, to Great +Britain. When we take into consideration the few ships that we had on +the other side, compared with those of the Allies, and the comparatively +brief period in which we were engaged in the war, this must be regarded +as a highly creditable showing.</p> + +<p>I regret that I have not been able to describe the work of all of our +officers and men; to do this, however, would demand more than a single +volume. One of the disappointing aspects of destroyer work was that many +of the finest performances were those that were the least spectacular. +The fact that an attack upon a submarine did not result in a sinking +hardly robbed it of its importance; many of the finest exploits of our +forces did not destroy the enemy, but they will always hold a place in +our naval annals for the daring and skill with which they were +conducted. In this class belong the achievements of the <i>Sterrett</i>, +under Lieutenant-Commander Farquhar; of the <i>Benham</i>, under +Lieutenant-Commander D. Lyons; of the <i>O'Brien</i>, under +Lieutenant-Commander C. A. Blakeley; of the <i>Parker</i>, under +Lieutenant-Commander H. Powell; of the <i>Jacob Jones</i>, under +Lieutenant-Commander D. W. Bagley; of the <i>Wadsworth</i>, under +Lieutenant-Commander Taussig, and afterward I. F. Dortch; of the +<i>Drayton</i>, under Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Howard; of the <i>McDougal</i>, +under Commander A. L. Fairfield; and of the <i>Nicholson</i>, under Commander +F. D. Berrien. The senior destroyer commander at Queenstown was +Commander David C. Hanrahan of the <i>Cushing</i>, a fine character and one +of the most experienced officers of his rank in the Navy. He was a tower +of strength at all times, and I shall have occasion to mention him later +in connection with certain important duties. The Chief-of-Staff at +Queenstown, Captain J. R. P. Pringle, was especially commended by +Admiral Bayly for his "tact, energy, and ability." The American naval +forces at Queenstown were under my <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_140" id="Page_140">[Pg 140]</a></span>immediate command. Necessarily, +however, I had to spend the greater part of my time at the London +headquarters, or at the Naval Council in Paris, and it was therefore +necessary that I should be represented at Queenstown by a man of marked +ability. Captain Pringle proved equal to every emergency. He was +responsible for the administration, supplies, and maintenance of the +Queenstown forces, and the state of readiness and efficiency in which +they were constantly maintained was the strongest possible evidence of +his ability. To him was chiefly due also the fact that our men +co-operated so harmoniously and successfully with the British.</p> + +<p>As an example of the impression which our work made I can do no better +than to quote the message sent by Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly to the +Queenstown forces on May 4, 1918:</p> + +<p>"On the anniversary of the arrival of the first United States men-of-war +at Queenstown, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the United States +officers and ratings for the skill, energy, and unfailing good-nature +which they have all consistently shown and which qualities have so +materially assisted in the war by enabling ships of the Allied Powers to +cross the ocean in comparative freedom.</p> + +<p>"To command you is an honour, to work with you is a pleasure, to know +you is to know the best traits of the Anglo-Saxon race."</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_141" id="Page_141">[Pg 141]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER V</h2> + +<h3>DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>My chief purpose in writing this book is to describe the activities +during the World War of the United States naval forces operating in +Europe. Yet it is my intention also to make clear the several ways in +which the war against the submarine was won; and in order to do this it +will be necessary occasionally to depart from the main subject and to +describe certain naval operations of our allies. The most important +agency in frustrating the submarine was the convoy system. An +examination of the tonnage losses in 1917 and in 1918, however, +discloses that this did not entirely prevent the loss of merchant ships. +From April, 1917, to November, 1918, the monthly losses dropped from +875,000 to 101,168 tons. This decrease in sinkings enabled the Allies to +preserve their communications and so win the war; however, it is evident +that these losses, while not necessarily fatal to the Allied cause, +still offered a serious impediment to success. It was therefore +necessary to supplement the convoy system in all possible ways. Every +submarine that could be destroyed, whatever the method of destruction, +represented just that much gain to the Allied cause. Every submarine +that was sent to the bottom amounted in 1917 to a saving of many +thousands of tons per year of the merchant shipping that would have been +sunk by the U-boat if left unhindered to pursue its course. Besides +escorting merchant ships, therefore, the Allied navies developed several +methods of hunting individual submarines; and these methods not only +sank a considerable number of U-boats, but played an important part in +breaking down the German submarine <i>moral</i>. For the greater part of the +war the utmost secrecy was observed regarding these expedients; it was +not until the early part <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_142" id="Page_142">[Pg 142]</a></span>of 1918, indeed, that the public heard +anything of the special service vessels that came to be known as the +"mystery" or "Q-ships"—although these had been operating for nearly +three years. It is true that the public knew that there was something in +the wind, for there were announcements that certain naval officers had +received the Victoria Cross, but as there was no citation explaining why +these coveted rewards were given, they were known as "mystery V.C.'s."</p> + +<p>On one of my visits to Queenstown Admiral Bayly showed me a wireless +message which he had recently received from the commanding officer of a +certain mystery ship operating from Queenstown, one of the most +successful of these vessels. It was brief but sufficiently eloquent.</p> + +<p>"Am slowly sinking," it read. "Good-bye, I did my best."</p> + +<p>Though the man who had sent that message was apparently facing death at +the time when it was written, Admiral Bayly told me that he had survived +the ordeal, and that, in fact, he would dine at Admiralty House that +very night. Another fact about this man lifted him above the +commonplace: he was the first Q-boat commander to receive the Victoria +Cross, and one of the very few who wore both the Victoria Cross and the +Distinguished Service Order; and he subsequently won bars for each, not +to mention the Croix de Guerre and the Legion of Honour. When Captain +Gordon Campbell arrived, I found that he was a Britisher of quite the +accepted type. His appearance suggested nothing extraordinary. He was a +short, rather thick-set, phlegmatic Englishman, somewhat non-committal +in his bearing; until he knew a man well, his conversation consisted of +a few monosyllables, and even on closer acquaintance his stolidity and +reticence, especially in the matter of his own exploits, did not +entirely disappear. Yet there was something about the Captain which +suggested the traits that had already made it possible for him to sink +three submarines, and which afterward added other trophies to his +record. It needed no elaborate story of his performances to inform me +that Captain Campbell was about as cool and determined a man as was to +be found in the British navy. His associates declared that his physical +system absolutely lacked nerves; that, when it came to pursuing a German +submarine, his patience and his persistence knew no bounds; and that the +extent to which his mind <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_143" id="Page_143">[Pg 143]</a></span>concentrated upon the task in hand amounted to +little less than genius. When the war began, Captain Campbell, then +about thirty years old, was merely one of several thousand junior +officers in the British navy. He had not distinguished himself in any +way above his associates; and probably none of his superiors had ever +regarded him as in any sense an unusual man. Had the naval war taken the +course of most naval wars, Campbell would probably have served well, but +perhaps not brilliantly. This conflict, however, demanded a new type of +warfare and at the same time it demanded a new type of naval fighter. To +go hunting for the submarine required not only courage of a high order, +but analytical intelligence, patience, and a talent for preparation and +detail. Captain Campbell seemed to have been created for this particular +task. That evening at Queenstown he finally gave way to much urging, and +entertained us for hours with his adventures; he told the stories of his +battles with submarines so quietly, so simply and, indeed, so +impersonally, that at first they impressed his hearers as not +particularly unusual. Yet, after the recital was finished, we realized +that the mystery ship performances represented some of the most +admirable achievements in the whole history of naval warfare. We have +laid great emphasis upon the brutalizing aspects of the European War; it +is well, therefore, that we do not forget that it had its more exalted +phases. Human nature may at times have manifested itself in its most +cowardly traits, but it also reached a level of courage which, I am +confident, it has seldom attained in any other conflict. It was reserved +for this devastating struggle to teach us how brave modern men could +really be. And when the record is complete it seems unlikely that it +will furnish any finer illustration of the heroic than that presented by +Captain Campbell and his compatriots of the mystery ships.</p> + +<p>This type of vessel was a regular ship of His Majesty's navy, yet there +was little about it that suggested warfare. To the outward eye it was +merely one of those several thousand freighters or tramps which, in +normal times, sailed sluggishly from port to port, carrying the larger +part of the world's commerce. It looked like a particularly dirty and +uninviting specimen of the breed. Just who invented this grimy enemy of +the submarine is unknown, as are the inventors of many other devices +developed by the war. It <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_144" id="Page_144">[Pg 144]</a></span>was, however, the natural outcome of a close +study of German naval methods. The man who first had the idea well +understood the peculiar mentality of the U-boat commanders. The Germans +had a fairly easy time in the early days of submarine warfare on +merchant shipping. They sank as many ships as possible with gunfire and +bombs. The prevailing method then was to break surface, and begin +shelling the defenceless enemy. In case the merchant ship was faster +than the submarine she would take to her heels; if, as was usually the +case, she was slower, the passengers and crews lowered the boats and +left the vessel to her fate. In such instances the procedure of the +submarine was invariably the same. It ceased shelling, approached the +lifeboats filled with survivors, and ordered them to take a party of +Germans to the ship. This party then searched the vessel for all kinds +of valuables, and, after depositing time bombs in the hold, rowed back +to the submarine. This procedure was popular with the Germans, because +it was the least expensive form of destroying merchant ships. It was not +necessary to use torpedoes or even a large number of shells; an +inexpensive bomb, properly placed, did the whole job. Even when the +arming of merchant ships interfered with this simple programme, and +compelled the Germans to use long-range gunfire or torpedoes, the +submarine commanders still persisted in rising to the surface near the +sinking ship. Torpedoes were so expensive that the German Admiralty +insisted on having every one accounted for. The word of the commander +that he had destroyed a merchant ship was not accepted at its face +value; in order to have the exploit officially placed to his credit, and +so qualify the commander and crew for the rewards that came to the +successful, it was necessary to prove that the ship had actually gone to +the bottom. A prisoner or two furnished unimpeachable evidence, and, in +default of such trophies, the ship's papers would be accepted. In order +to obtain such proofs of success the submarine had to rise to the +surface and approach its victim. The search for food, especially for +alcoholic liquor, was another motive that led to such a manœuvre; and +sometimes mere curiosity, the desire to come to close quarters and +inspect the consequences of his handiwork, also impelled the Hun +commander to take what was, as events soon demonstrated, a particularly +hazardous risk.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_145" id="Page_145">[Pg 145]</a></span>This simple fact that the submarine, even when the danger had been +realized, insisted on rising to the surface and approaching the vessel +which it had torpedoed, offered the Allies an opportunity which they +were not slow in seizing. There is hardly anything in warfare which is +more vulnerable than a submarine on the surface within a few hundred +yards of a four-inch gun. A single, well-aimed shot will frequently send +it to the bottom. Indeed, a U-boat caught in such a predicament has only +one chance of escaping: that is represented by the number of seconds +which it takes to get under the water. But before that time has expired +rapidly firing guns can put a dozen shots into its hull; with modern, +well-trained gun crews, therefore, a submarine which exposes itself in +this way stands practically no chance of getting away. Clearly, the +obvious thing for the Allies to do was to send merchant ships, armed +with hidden guns, along the great highways of commerce. The crews of +these ships should be naval officers and men disguised as merchant +masters and sailors. They should duplicate in all details the manners +and the "technique" of a freighter's crew, and, when shelled or +torpedoed by a submarine, they should behave precisely like the +passengers and crews of merchantmen in such a crisis; a part—the only +part visible to the submarine—should leave the vessel in boats, while +the remainder should lie concealed until the submarine rose to the +surface and approached the vessel. When the enemy had come within two or +three hundred yards, the bulwarks should fall down, disclosing the +armament, the white battle ensign go up, and the guns open fire on the +practically helpless enemy.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>Such was the mystery ship idea in its simplest form. In the early days +it worked according to this programme. The trustful submarine commander +who approached a mystery ship in the manner which I have described +promptly found his resting-place on the bottom of the sea. I have +frequently wondered what must have been the emotions of this first +submarine crew, when, standing on the deck of their boat, steaming +confidently toward their victim, they saw its bulwarks suddenly drop, +and beheld the ship, which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_146" id="Page_146">[Pg 146]</a></span>to all outward appearances was a helpless, +foundering hulk, become a mass of belching fire and smoke and shot. The +picture of that first submarine, standing upright in the water, reeling +like a drunken man, while the apparently innocent merchant ship kept +pouring volley after volley into its sides, is one that will not quickly +fade from the memory of British naval men. Yet it is evident that the +Allies could not play a game like this indefinitely. They could do so +just as long as the Germans insisted on delivering themselves into their +hands. The complete success of the idea depended at first upon the fact +that the very existence of mystery ships was unknown to the German navy. +All that the Germans knew, in these early days, was that certain U-boats +had sailed from Germany and had not returned. But it was inevitable that +the time should come when a mystery ship attack would fail; the German +submarine would return and report that this new terror of the seas was +at large. And that is precisely what happened. A certain submarine +received a battering which it seemed hardly likely that any U-boat could +survive; yet, almost by a miracle, it crept back to its German base and +reported the manner of its undoing. Clearly the mystery ships in future +were not to have as plain sailing as in the past; the game, if it were +to continue, would become more a battle of wits; henceforth every liner +and merchantman, in German eyes, was a possible enemy in disguise, and +it was to be expected that the U-boat commanders would resort to every +means of protecting their craft against them. That the Germans knew all +about these vessels became apparent when one of their naval publications +fell into our hands, giving complete descriptions and containing +directions to U-boat commanders how to meet this new menace. The German +newspapers and illustrated magazines also began to devote much space to +this kind of anti-submarine fighting, denouncing it in true Germanic +fashion as "barbarous" and contrary to the rules of civilized warfare. +The great significance of this knowledge is at once apparent. The mere +fact that a number of Q-ships were at sea, even if they did not succeed +in sinking many submarines, forced the Germans to make a radical change +in their submarine tactics. As they could no longer bring to, board, and +loot merchant ships, and sink them inexpensively and without danger by +the use of bombs, they were obliged not only to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_147" id="Page_147">[Pg 147]</a></span>use their precious +torpedoes, but also to torpedo without warning. This was the only +alternative except to abandon the submarine campaign altogether.</p> + +<p>Berlin accordingly instructed the submarine commanders not to approach +on the surface any merchant or passenger vessel closely enough to get +within range of its guns, but to keep at a distance and shell it. Had +the commanders always observed these instructions the success of the +mystery ship in sinking submarines would have ended then and there, +though the influence of their presence upon tactics would have remained +in force. The Allied navies now made elaborate preparations, all for the +purpose of persuading Fritz to approach in the face of a tremendous risk +concerning which he had been accurately informed. Every submarine +commander, after torpedoing his victim, now clearly understood that it +might be a decoy despatched for the particular purpose of entrapping +him; and he knew that an attempt to approach within a short distance of +the foundering vessel might spell his own immediate destruction. The +expert in German mentality must explain why, under these circumstances, +he should have persisted in walking into the jaws of death. The skill +with which the mystery ships and their crews were disguised perhaps +explains this in part. Anyone who might have happened in the open sea +upon Captain Campbell and his slow-moving freighter could not have +believed that they were part and parcel of the Royal Navy. Our own +destroyers were sometimes deceived by them. The <i>Cushing</i> one day hailed +Captain Campbell in the <i>Pargust</i>, having mistaken him for a defenceless +tramp. The conversation between the two ships was brief but to the +point:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="noin"><i>Cushing</i>: What ship?<br /> + +<i>Pargust</i>: Gordon Campbell! Please keep out of sight.</p></div> + +<p>The next morning another enemy submarine met her fate at the hands of +Captain Campbell, and although the <i>Cushing</i> had kept far enough away +not to interfere with the action, she had the honour of escorting the +injured mystery ship into port and of receiving as a reward three +rousing cheers from the crew of the <i>Pargust</i> led by Campbell. A more +villainous-looking gang of seamen than the crews <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_148" id="Page_148">[Pg 148]</a></span>of these ships never +sailed the waves. All men on board were naval officers or enlisted men; +they were all volunteers and comprised men of all ranks—admirals, +captains, commanders, and midshipmen. All had temporarily abandoned His +Majesty's uniform for garments picked up in second-hand clothing stores. +They had made the somewhat disconcerting discovery that carefully +trained gentlemen of the naval forces, when dressed in cast-off clothing +and when neglectful of their beards, differ little in appearance from +the somewhat rough-and-tumble characters of the tramp service. To assume +this external disguise successfully meant that the volunteers had also +to change almost their personal characteristics as well as their +clothes. Whereas the conspicuous traits of a naval man are neatness and +order, these counterfeit merchant sailors had to train themselves in the +casual ways of tramp seamen. They had also to accustom themselves to the +conviction that a periscope was every moment searching their vessel from +stem to stern in an attempt to discover whether there was anything +suspicious about it; they therefore had not only to dress the part of +merchantmen, but to act it, even in its minor details. The genius of +Captain Campbell consisted in the fact that he had made a minute study +of merchantmen, their officers and their crews, and was able to +reproduce them so literally on this vessel that even the expert eye was +deceived. Necessarily such a ship carried a larger crew than the +merchant freighter; nearly all, however, were kept constantly concealed, +the number appearing on deck always representing just about the same +number as would normally have sailed upon a tramp steamer. These men had +to train themselves in slouchiness of behaviour; they would hang over +the rails, and even use merchant terms in conversation with one another; +the officers were "masters," "mates," "pursers," and the like, and their +principal gathering-place was not a wardroom, but a saloon. That +scrupulous deference with which a subordinate officer in the navy treats +his superior was laid aside in this service. It was no longer the custom +to salute before addressing the commander; more frequently the sailor +would slouch up to his superior, his hands in his pockets and his pipe +in his mouth. This attempt to deceive the Hun observer at the periscope +sometimes assumed an even more ludicrous form. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_149" id="Page_149">[Pg 149]</a></span>When the sailor of a +warship dumps ashes overboard he does it with particular care, so as not +to soil the sides of his immaculate vessel; but a merchant seaman is +much less considerate; he usually hurls overboard anything he does not +want and lets the ship's side take its chances. To have followed the +manner of the navy would at once have given the game away; so the +sailors, in carrying out this domestic duty, performed the act with all +the nonchalance of merchant seamen. To have messed in naval style would +also have been betraying themselves. The ship's cook, therefore, in a +white coat, would come on deck, and have a look around, precisely as he +would do on a freighter. Even when in port officers and men maintained +their disguise. They never visited hotels or clubs or private houses; +they spent practically all their time on board; if they occasionally +went ashore, their merchant outfit so disguised them that even their +best friends would not have recognized them in the street.</p> + +<p>The warlike character of their ships was even more cleverly hidden. In +the early days the guns were placed behind the bulwarks, which, when a +lever was pulled, would fall down, thus giving them an unobstructed +range at the submarine. In order to make the sides of the ships +collapsible, certain seams were unavoidably left in the plates, where +the detachable part joined the main structure. The U-boat commanders +soon learned to look for these betraying seams before coming to the +surface. They would sail submerged around the ship, the periscope +minutely examining the sides, much as a scientist examines his specimens +with a microscope. This practice made it necessary to conceal the guns +more carefully. The places which were most serviceable for this purpose +were the hatchways—those huge wells, extending from the deck to the +bottom, which are used for loading and unloading cargo. Platforms were +erected in these openings, and on these guns were emplaced; a covering +of tarpaulin completely hid them; yet a lever, pulled by the gun crews, +would cause the sides of the hatchway covers to fall instantaneously. +Other guns were placed under lifeboats, which, by a similar mechanism, +would fall apart, or rise in the air, exposing the gun. Perhaps the most +deceptive device of all was a gun placed upon the stern, and, with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_150" id="Page_150">[Pg 150]</a></span>its +crew, constantly exposed to public gaze. Since most merchantmen carried +such a gun, its absence on a mystery ship would in itself have caused +suspicion; this armament not only helped the disguise, but served a +useful purpose in luring the submarine. At the first glimpse of a U-boat +on the surface, usually several miles away, the gun crew would begin +shooting; but they always took care that the shots fell short, thus +convincing the submarine that it had the advantage of range and so +inducing it to close.</p> + +<p>Captain Campbell and his associates paid as much attention to details in +their ships as in their personal appearance. The ship's wash did not +expose the flannels that are affected by naval men but the dungarees +that are popular with merchant sailors. Sometimes a side of beef would +be hung out in plain view; this not only kept up the fiction that the +ship was an innocent tramp, but it served as a tempting bait to the not +too well-fed crew of the submarine. Particularly tempting cargoes were +occasionally put on deck. One of the ships carried several papier-mâché +freight cars of the small European type covered with legends which +indicated that they were loaded with ammunition and bound for +Mesopotamia. It is easy to imagine how eagerly the Hun would wish to +sink that cargo!</p> + +<p>These ships were so effectively disguised that even the most experienced +eyes could not discover their real character. For weeks they could lie +in dock, the dockmen never suspecting that they were armed to the teeth. +Even the pilots who went aboard to take them into harbour never +discovered that they were not the merchant ships which they pretended to +be. Captain Hanrahan, who commanded the U.S. mystery ship <i>Santee</i>, +based on Queenstown, once entertained on board an Irishman from Cork. +The conversation which took place between this American naval +officer—who, in his disguise, was indistinguishable from a tramp +skipper of many years' experience—disclosed the complete ignorance of +the guest concerning the true character of the boat.</p> + +<p>"How do you like these Americans?" Captain Hanrahan innocently asked.</p> + +<p>"They are eating us out of house and home!" the indignant Irishman +remarked. The information was a little inaccurate, since all our food +supplies were brought <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_151" id="Page_151">[Pg 151]</a></span>from the United States; but the remark was +reassuring as proving that the ship's disguise had not been penetrated. +Such precautions were the more necessary in a port like Queenstown where +our forces were surrounded by spies who were in constant communication +with the enemy.</p> + +<p>I can personally testify to the difficulty of identifying a mystery +ship. One day Admiral Bayly suggested that we should go out in the +harbour and visit one of these vessels lying there preparatory to +sailing on a cruise. Several merchantmen were at anchor in port. We +steamed close around one in the Admiral's barge and examined her very +carefully through our glasses from a short distance. Concluding that +this was not the vessel we were seeking, we went to another merchantman. +This did not show any signs of being a mystery ship; we therefore hailed +the skipper, who told us the one which we had first visited was the +mystery ship. We went back, boarded her, and began examining her +appliances. The crew was dressed in the ordinary sloppy clothes of a +merchantman's deck-hands; the officers wore the usual merchant ship +uniform, and everything was as unmilitary as a merchant ship usually is. +The vessel had quite a long deckhouse built of light steel. The captain +told us that two guns were concealed in this structure; he suggested +that we should walk all around it and see if we could point out from a +close inspection the location of the guns. We searched carefully, but +were utterly unable to discover where the guns were. The captain then +sent the crew to quarters and told us to stand clear. At the word of +command one of the plates of the perpendicular side of the deckhouse +slid out of the way as quickly as a flash. The rail at the ship's side +in front of the gun fell down and a boat davit swung out of the way. At +the same time the gun crew swung the gun out and fired a primer to +indicate how quickly they could have fired a real shot. The captain also +showed us a boat upside down on the deckhouse—merchantmen frequently +carry one boat in this position. At a word a lever was pulled down below +and the boat reared up in the air and revealed underneath a gun and its +crew. On the poop was a large crate about 6 x 6 x 8 or 10 feet. At a +touch of the lever the sides of this crate fell down and revealed +another gun.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen"><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_152" id="Page_152">[Pg 152]</a></span>III</p> + +<p>For the greater part of 1917 from twenty to thirty of these ships sailed +back and forth in the Atlantic, always choosing those parts of the seas +where they were most likely to meet submarines. They were "merchantmen" +of all kinds—tramp steamers, coasting vessels, trawlers, and schooners. +Perhaps the most distressing part of existence on one of these ships was +its monotony: day would follow day; week would follow week; and +sometimes months would pass without encountering a single submarine. +Captain Campbell himself spent nine months on his first mystery ship +before even sighting an enemy, and many of his successors had a similar +experience. The mystery boat was a patient fisherman, constantly +expecting a bite and frequently going for long periods without the +slightest nibble. This kind of an existence was not only disappointing +but also exceedingly nerve racking; all during this waiting period the +officers and men had to keep themselves constantly at attention; the +vaudeville show which they were maintaining for the benefit of a +possible periscope had to go on continuously; a moment's forgetfulness +or relaxation might betray their secret, and make their experiment a +failure. The fearful tediousness of this kind of life had a more +nerve-racking effect upon the officers and men than the most exciting +battles, and practically all the mystery ship men who broke down fell +victims not to the dangers of their enterprise, but to this dreadful +tension of sailing for weeks and months without coming to close quarters +with their enemy.</p> + +<p>About the most welcome sight to a mystery ship, after a period of +inactivity, was the wake of a torpedo speeding in its direction. Nothing +could possibly disappoint it more than to see this torpedo pass astern +or forward without hitting the vessel. In such a contingency the genuine +merchant ship would make every possible effort to turn out of the +torpedo's way: the helmsman of the mystery ship, however, would take all +possible precautions to see that his vessel was hit. This, however, he +had to do with the utmost cleverness, else the fact that he was +attempting to collide with several hundred pounds of gun-cotton would in +itself betray him to the submarine. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_153" id="Page_153">[Pg 153]</a></span>Not improbably several members of +the crew might be killed when the torpedo struck, but that was all part +of the game which they were playing. More important than the lives of +the men was the fate of the ship; if this could remain afloat long +enough to give the gunners a good chance at the submarine, everybody on +board would be satisfied. There was, however, little danger that the +mystery ship would go down immediately; for all available cargo space +had been filled with wood, which gave the vessel sufficient buoyancy +sometimes to survive many torpedoes.</p> + +<p>Of course this, as well as all the other details of the vessel, was +unknown to the skipper of the submerged submarine. Having struck his +victim in a vital spot, he had every reason to believe that it would +disappear beneath the waves within a reasonable period. The business of +the disguised merchantman was to encourage this delusion in every +possible way. From the time that the torpedo struck, the mystery ship +behaved precisely as the every-day cargo carrier, caught in a similar +predicament, would have done. A carefully drilled contingent of the +crew, known as the "panic party," enacted the rôle of the men on a +torpedoed vessel. They ran to and fro on the deck, apparently in a state +of high consternation, now rushing below and emerging with some personal +treasure, perhaps an old suit of clothes tucked under the arm, perhaps +the ship's cat or parrot, or a small handbag hastily stuffed with odds +and ends. Under the control of the navigating officer these men would +make for a lifeboat, which they would lower in realistic +fashion—sometimes going so far, in their stage play, as to upset it, +leaving the men puffing and scrambling in the water. One member of the +crew, usually the navigator, dressed up as the "captain," did his best +to supervise these operations. Finally, after everybody had left, and +the vessel was settling at bow or stern, the "captain" would come to the +side, cast one final glance at his sinking ship, drop a roll of papers +into a lifeboat—ostensibly the precious documents which were so coveted +by the submarine as an evidence of success—lower himself with one or +two companions, and row in the direction of the other lifeboats. +Properly placing these lifeboats, after "abandoning ship," was itself +one of the finest points in the plot. If the submarine rose <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_154" id="Page_154">[Pg 154]</a></span>to the +surface it would invariably steer first for those little boats, looking +for prisoners or the ship's papers; the boats' crews, therefore, had +instructions to take up a station on a bearing from which the ship's +guns could most successfully rake the submarine. That this manœuvre +involved great danger to the men in the lifeboats was a matter of no +consideration in the desperate enterprise in which they were engaged.</p> + +<p>Thus to all outward appearance this performance was merely the +torpedoing of a helpless merchant vessel. Yet the average German +commander became altogether too wary to accept the situation in that +light. He had no intention of approaching either lifeboats or the ship +until entirely satisfied that he was not dealing with one of the decoy +vessels which he so greatly feared. There was only one way of satisfying +himself: that was to shell the ship so mercilessly that, in his opinion, +if any human beings had remained aboard, they would have been killed or +forced to surrender. The submarine therefore arose at a distance of two +or three miles. Possibly the mystery ship, with one well-aimed shot, +might hit the submarine at this distance, but the chances were +altogether against her. To fire such a shot, of course, would +immediately betray the fact that a gun crew still remained on board, and +that the vessel was a mystery ship; and on this discovery the submarine +would submerge, approach the vessel under water, and give her one or two +more torpedoes. No, whatever the temptation, the crew must "play +'possum," and not by so much as a wink let the submarine know that there +was any living thing on board. But this experience demanded heroism that +almost approaches the sublime. The gun crews lay prone beside their +guns, waiting the word of command to fire; the captain lay on the +screened bridge, watching the whole proceeding through a peephole, with +voice tubes near at hand with which he could constantly talk to his men. +They maintained these positions sometimes for hours, never lifting a +finger in defence, while the submarine, at a safe distance, showered +hundreds of shells upon the ship. These horrible missiles would shriek +above their heads; they would land on the decks, constantly wounding the +men, sometimes killing whole gun crews—yet, although the ship might +become a mass of blood and broken fragments of human <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_155" id="Page_155">[Pg 155]</a></span>bodies, the +survivors would lie low, waiting, with infinite patience, until the +critical moment arrived. This was the way they took to persuade the +submarine that their ship was what it pretended to be, a tramp, that +there was nothing alive on board, and that it could safely come near. +The still cautious German, after an hour or so of this kind of +execution, would submerge and approach within a few hundred yards. All +that the watchful eye at the peephole could see, however, was the +periscope; this would sail all around the vessel, sometimes at a +distance of fifty or a hundred feet. Clearly the German was taking no +chances; he was examining his victim inch by inch, looking for the +slightest sign that the vessel was a decoy. All this time the captain +and crew were lying taut, holding their breath, not moving a muscle, +hardly winking an eyelid, the captain with his mouth at the voice pipe +ready to give the order to let the false works drop the moment the +submarine emerged, the gun crews ready to fire at a second's warning. +But the cautious periscope, having completed the inspection of the ship, +would start in the direction of the drifting lifeboats. This ugly eye +would stick itself up almost in the faces of the anxious crew, evidently +making a microscopical examination of the clothes, faces, and general +personnel, to see if it could detect under their tramp steamer clothes +any traces of naval officers and men.</p> + +<p>Still the anxious question was, would the submarine emerge? Until it +should do so the ship's crew was absolutely helpless. There was no use +in shooting at the submerged boat, as shots do not penetrate the water +but bounce off the surface as they do off solid ice. Everybody knew that +the German under the water was debating that same question. To come up +to the surface so near a mystery ship he knew meant instant death and +the loss of his submarine; yet to go away under water meant that the +sinking ship, if a merchantman, might float long enough to be salvaged, +and it meant also that he would never be able to prove that he had +accomplished anything with his valuable torpedo. Had he not shelled the +derelict so completely that nothing could possibly survive? Had he not +examined the thing minutely and discovered nothing amiss? It must be +remembered that in 1917 a submarine went through this same procedure +with every <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_156" id="Page_156">[Pg 156]</a></span>ship that did not sink very soon after being torpedoed, and +that, in nearly every case, it discovered, after emerging, that it had +been dealing with a real merchantman. Already this same submarine had +wasted hours and immense stores of ammunition on vessels that were not +mystery ships, but harmless tramps, and all these false alarms had made +it impatient and careless. In most cases, therefore, the crew had only +to bide its time. The captain knew that his hidden enemy would finally +rise.</p> + +<p>"Stand by!"</p> + +<p>This command would come softly through the speaking tubes to the men at +the guns. The captain on the bridge had noticed the preliminary +disturbance on the water that preceded the emergence of the submarine. +In a few seconds the whole boat would be floating on top, and the +officers and crews would climb out on the deck, eager for booty. And +this within a hundred yards of four or five guns!</p> + +<p>"Let go!"</p> + +<p>This command came at the top of the voice, for concealment was now no +longer necessary. In a twinkling up went the battle flag, bulwarks fell +down, lifeboats on decks collapsed, revealing guns, sides dropped from +deckhouses, hen-coops, and other innocent-looking structures. The +apparently sinking merchantman became a volcano of smoke and fire; +scores of shells dropped upon the submarine, punching holes in her frail +hull, hurling German sailors high into the air, sometimes decapitating +them or blowing off their arms or legs. The whole horrible scene lasted +only a few seconds before the helpless vessel would take its final +plunge to the depths, leaving perhaps two or three survivors, a mass of +oil and wood, and still more ghastly wreckage, to mark the spot where +another German submarine had paid the penalty of its crimes.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">IV</p> + +<p>It was entirely characteristic of this strange war that the greatest +exploit of any of the mystery ships was in one sense a failure—that is, +it did not succeed in destroying the submarine which attacked it.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_157" id="Page_157">[Pg 157]</a></span>On an August day in 1917 the British "merchant steamer" <i>Dunraven</i> was +zigzagging across the Bay of Biscay. Even to the expert eye she was a +heavily laden cargo vessel bound for Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, +probably carrying supplies to the severely pressed Allies in Italy and +the East. On her stern a 2½-pounder gun, clearly visible to all +observers, helped to emphasize this impression. Yet the apparently +innocent <i>Dunraven</i> was a far more serious enemy to the submarine than +appeared on the surface. The mere fact that the commander was not an +experienced merchant salt, but Captain Gordon Campbell, of the Royal +Navy, in itself would have made the <i>Dunraven</i> an object of terror to +any lurking submarine, for Captain Campbell's name was a familiar one to +the Germans by this time. Yet it would have taken a careful +investigation to detect in the rough and unkempt figure of Captain +Campbell any resemblance to an officer of the British navy, or to +identify the untidy seamen as regularly enrolled British sailors. The +armament of the <i>Dunraven</i>, could one have detected it, would have +provided the greatest surprises. This vessel represented the final +perfection of the mystery ship. Though seemingly a harmless tramp she +carried a number of guns, also two torpedo tubes, and several depth +charges; but even from her deck nothing was visible except the usual +merchant gun aft. The stern of the <i>Dunraven</i> was a veritable arsenal. +Besides the guns and depth charges, the magazine and shell-rooms were +concealed there; on each side of the ship a masked torpedo tube held its +missile ready for a chance shot at a submarine; and the forward deck +contained other armament. Such was the <i>Dunraven</i>, ploughing her way +along, quietly and indifferently, even when, as on this August morning, +a submarine was lying on the horizon, planning to make her its prey.</p> + +<p>As soon as the disguised merchantman spotted this enemy she began to +behave in character. When an armed merchant ship got within range of a +submarine on the surface she frequently let fly a shot on the chance of +a hit. That was therefore the proper thing for the <i>Dunraven</i> to do; it +was really all a part of the game of false pretence in which she was +engaged. However, she took pains that the shell should not reach the +submarine; this was her means of persuading the U-boat <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_158" id="Page_158">[Pg 158]</a></span>that it +outranged the <i>Dunraven's</i> gun and could safely give chase. The decoy +merchantman apparently put on extra steam when the submarine started in +her direction at top speed; here, again, however, the proper manœuvre +was not to run too fast, for her real mission was to get caught. On the +other hand, had she slowed down perceptibly, that in itself would have +aroused suspicion; her game, therefore, was to decrease speed gradually +so that the U-boat would think that it was overtaking its enemy by its +own exertions. All during this queer kind of a chase the submarine and +the cargo ship were peppering each other with shells, one seriously, the +other merely in pretence. The fact that a naval crew, with such a fine +target as an exposed submarine, could shoot with a conscious effort not +to hit, but merely to lure the enemy to a better position, in itself is +an eloquent evidence of the perfect discipline which prevailed in the +mystery ship service. Not to aim a fair shot upon the detested vessel, +when there was a possibility of hitting it, was almost too much to ask +of human nature. But it was essential to success with these vessels +never to fire with the intention of hitting unless there was a practical +certainty of sinking the submarine; all energies were focussed upon the +supreme task of inducing the enemy to expose itself completely within +three or four hundred yards of the disguised freighter.</p> + +<p>In an hour or two the submarine landed a shot that seemed to have done +serious damage. At least huge clouds of steam arose from the +engine-room, furnishing external evidence that the engines or boilers +had been disabled. The submarine commander did not know that this was a +trick; that the vessel was fitted with a specially arranged pipe around +the engine-room hatch which could emit these bursts of steam at a +moment's notice, all for the purpose of making him believe that the +vitals of the ship had been irreparably damaged. The stopping of the +ship, the blowing off of the safety valve, and the appearance of the +"panic party" immediately after this ostensible hit made the illusion +complete. This "panic party" was particularly panicky; one of the +lifeboats was let go with a run, one fall at a time, thus dumping its +occupants into the sea. Ultimately, however, the struggling swimmers +were picked up and the boat rowed away, taking up a position where a +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_159" id="Page_159">[Pg 159]</a></span>number of the <i>Dunraven's</i> guns could get a good shot at the submarine +should the Germans follow their usual plan of inspecting the lifeboats +before visiting the sinking merchantman.</p> + +<p>So far everything was taking place according to programme; but presently +the submarine reopened fire and scored a shot which gave the enemy all +the advantages of the situation. I have described in some detail the +stern of the ship—a variegated assortment of depth charges, shell, +guns, and human beings. The danger of such an unavoidable concentration +of armament and men was that a lucky shot might land in the midst of it. +And this is precisely what now happened. Not only one, but three shells +from the submarine one after the other struck this hidden mass of men +and ammunition. The first one exploded a depth charge—300 pounds of +high explosive—which blew one of the officers out of the after-control +station where he lay concealed and landed him on the deck several yards +distant. Here he remained a few moments unconscious; then his associates +saw him, wounded as he was, creeping inch by inch back into his control +position, fortunately out of sight of the Germans. The seaman who was +stationed at the depth charges was also wounded by this shot, but, +despite all efforts to remove him to a more comfortable place, he +insisted on keeping at his post.</p> + +<p>"'Ere I was put in charge of these things," he said, "and 'ere I stays."</p> + +<p>Two more shells, one immediately after the other, now landed on the +stern. Clouds of black smoke began to rise, and below tongues of flame +presently appeared, licking their way in the direction of a large +quantity of ammunition, cordite, and other high explosives. It was not +decoy smoke and decoy flame this time. Captain Campbell, watching the +whole proceeding from the bridge, perhaps felt something in the nature +of a chill creeping up his spine when he realized that the after-part of +the ship, where men, explosives, and guns lay concealed in close +proximity, was on fire. Just at this moment he observed that the +submarine was rapidly approaching; and in a few minutes it lay within +400 yards of his guns. Captain Campbell was just about to give the +orders to open fire when the wind took up the dense smoke of the fire +and wafted it between his ship and the submarine. This precipitated one +of the crises which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_160" id="Page_160">[Pg 160]</a></span>tested to the utmost the discipline of the mystery +ship. The captain had two alternatives: he could fire at the submarine +through the smoke, taking his chances of hitting an unseen and moving +target, or he could wait until the enemy passed around the ship and came +up on the other side, where there would be no smoke to interfere with +his view. It was the part of wisdom to choose the latter course; but +under existing conditions such a decision involved not only great nerve, +but absolute confidence in his men. For all this time the fire at the +stern was increasing in fierceness; in a brief period, Captain Campbell +knew, a mass of ammunition and depth charges would explode, probably +killing or frightfully wounding every one of the men who were stationed +there. If he should wait until the U-boat made the tour of the ship and +reached the side that was free of smoke the chances were that this +explosion would take place before a gun could be fired. On the other +hand, if he should fire through the smoke, there was little likelihood +of hitting the submarine.</p> + +<p>Those who are acquainted with the practical philosophy which directed +operations in this war will readily foresee the choice which was now +made. The business of mystery ships, as of all anti-submarine craft, was +to sink the enemy. All other considerations amounted to nothing when +this supreme object was involved. The lives of officers and men, +precious as they were under ordinary circumstances, were to be +immediately sacrificed if such a sacrifice would give an opportunity of +destroying the submarine. It was therefore Captain Campbell's duty to +wait for the under-water boat to sail slowly around his ship and appear +in clear view on the starboard side, leaving his brave men at the stern +exposed to the fire, every minute raging more fiercely, and to the +likelihood of a terrific explosion. That he was able to make this +decision, relying confidently upon the spirit of his crew and their +loyal devotion to their leader, again illustrates the iron discipline +which was maintained on the mystery ships. The first explosion had +destroyed the voice tube by means of which Captain Campbell communicated +with this gun crew. He therefore had to make his decision without +keeping his men informed of the progress of events—information very +helpful to men under such a strain; but he well knew that these men +would understand his action and cheerfully accept their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_161" id="Page_161">[Pg 161]</a></span>rôle in the +game. Yet the agony of their position tested their self-control to the +utmost. The deck on which they lay every moment became hotter; the +leather of their shoes began to smoke, but they refused to budge—for to +flee to a safer place meant revealing themselves to the submarine and +thereby betraying their secret. They took the boxes of cordite shells in +their arms and held them up as high as possible above the smouldering +deck in the hope of preventing an explosion which seemed inevitable. +Never did Christian martyrs, stretched upon a gridiron, suffer with +greater heroism.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">V</p> + +<p>It was probably something of a relief when the expected explosion took +place. The submarine had to go only 200 yards more to be under the fire +of three guns at a range of 400 yards, but just as it was rounding the +stern the German officers and men, standing on the deck, were greeted +with a terrific roar. Suddenly a conglomeration of men, guns, and +unexploded shells was hurled into the air. The German crew, of course, +had believed that the vessel was a deserted hulk, and this sudden +manifestation of life on board not only tremendously startled them, but +threw them into a panic. The four-inch gun and its crew were blown high +into the air, the gun landing forward on the well deck, and the crew in +various places. One man fell into the water; he was picked up, not +materially the worse for his experience, by the <i>Dunraven's</i> lifeboat, +which, all this time, had been drifting in the neighbourhood. It is one +of the miracles of this war that not one of the members of that crew was +killed. The gashed and bleeding bodies of several were thrown back upon +the deck; but there were none so seriously wounded that they did not +recover. In the minds of these men, however, their own sufferings were +not the most distressing consequences of the explosion; the really +unfortunate fact was that the sudden appearance of men and guns in the +air informed the Germans that they had to deal with one of the ships +which they so greatly dreaded. The game, so far as the <i>Dunraven</i> was +concerned, was apparently up. The submarine vanished under the water; +and the Englishmen well knew that the next move would be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_162" id="Page_162">[Pg 162]</a></span>the firing of +the torpedo which could confidently be expected to end the Q-boat's +career. Some of the crew who were not incapacitated got a hose and +attempted to put out the fire, while others removed their wounded +comrades to as comfortable quarters as could be found. Presently the +wake of the torpedo could be seen approaching the ship; the explosion +that followed was a terrible one. The concussion of the previous +explosion had set off the "open-fire" buzzers at the gun +positions—these buzzers being the usual signals for dropping the false +work that concealed the guns and beginning the fight. The result was +that, before the torpedo had apparently given the <i>Dunraven</i> its +quietus, all the remaining guns were exposed with their crews. Captain +Campbell now decided to fight to the death. He sent out a message +notifying all destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, as well as all +merchant ships, not to approach within thirty miles. A destroyer, should +she appear, would force the German to keep under water, and thus prevent +the <i>Dunraven</i> from getting a shot. Another merchant ship on the horizon +might prove such a tempting bait to the submarine that it would abandon +the <i>Dunraven</i>, now nearly done for—all on fire at one end as she was +and also sinking from her torpedo wound—and so prevent any further +combat. For the resourceful Captain Campbell had already formulated +another final plan by which he might entice the submarine to rise within +range of his guns. To carry out this plan, he wanted plenty of sea room +and no interference; so he drew a circle in the water, with a radius of +thirty miles, inclosing the space which was to serve as the "prize ring" +for the impending contest.</p> + +<p>His idea was to fall in with the German belief that the <i>Dunraven</i> had +reached the end of her tether. A hastily organized second "panic party" +jumped into a remaining lifeboat and a raft and rowed away from the +sinking, burning ship. Here was visible evidence to the Germans that +their enemies had finally abandoned the fight after nearly four hours of +as frightful gruelling as any ship had ever received. But there were +still two guns that were concealed and workable; there were, as already +said, two torpedo tubes, one on each beam; and a handful of men were +kept on board to man these. Meanwhile, Captain Campbell lay prone on the +bridge, looking through a peephole for the appearance of the submarine, +constantly talking <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_163" id="Page_163">[Pg 163]</a></span>to his men through the tubes, even joking them on +their painful vigil.</p> + +<p>"If you know a better 'ole," he would say, quoting Bairnsfather, "go to +it!"</p> + +<p>"Remember, lads," he would call at another time, "that the King has +given this ship the V.C."</p> + +<p>Every situation has its humorous aspects. Thus one gun crew could hardly +restrain its laughter when a blue-jacket called up to Captain Campbell +and asked if he could not take his boots off. He came of a respectable +family, he explained, and did not think it becoming to die with his +boots on. But the roar of the fire, which had now engulfed the larger +part of the ship, and the constantly booming shells, which were +exploding, one after another, like mammoth fire-crackers, interfered +with much conversation. For twenty minutes everybody lay there, hoping +and praying that the U-boat would emerge.</p> + +<p>The German ultimately came up, but he arose cautiously at the stern of +the ship, at a point from which the guns of the <i>Dunraven</i> could not +bear. On the slim chance that a few men might be left aboard, the +submarine shelled it for several minutes, fore and aft, then, to the +agony of the watching Englishmen, it again sank beneath the waves. +Presently the periscope shot up, and began moving slowly around the +blazing derelict, its eye apparently taking in every detail; he was so +cautious, that submarine commander, he did not propose to be outwitted +again! Captain Campbell now saw that he had only one chance; the +conflagration was rapidly destroying his vessel, and he could spend no +more time waiting for the submarine to rise. But he had two torpedoes +and he determined to use these against the submerged submarine. As the +periscope appeared abeam, one of the <i>Dunraven's</i> torpedoes started in +its direction; the watching gunners almost wept when it missed by a few +inches. But the submarine did not see it, and the periscope calmly +appeared on the other side of the ship. The second torpedo was fired; +this also passed just about a foot astern, and the submarine saw it. The +game was up. What was left of the <i>Dunraven</i> was rapidly sinking, and +Captain Campbell sent out a wireless for help. In a few minutes the U.S. +armed yacht <i>Noma</i> and the British destroyers <i>Alcock</i> and +<i>Christopher</i>, which had been waiting outside the "prize ring," arrived +and took off the crew. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_164" id="Page_164">[Pg 164]</a></span>The tension of the situation was somewhat +relieved when a "jackie" in one of the "panic" boats caught sight of his +beloved captain, entirely uninjured, jumping on one of the destroyers.</p> + +<p>"Gawd!" he shouted, in a delighted tone, "if there ain't the skipper +still alive!"</p> + +<p>"We deeply regret the loss of His Majesty's ship," said Captain +Campbell, in his report, "and still more the escape of the enemy. We did +our best, not only to destroy the enemy and save the ship, but also to +show ourselves worthy of the Victoria Cross which the King recently +bestowed on the ship."</p> + +<p>They did indeed. My own opinion of this performance I expressed in a +letter which I could not refrain from writing to Captain Campbell:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p class="noin"><span class="smcap">My dear Captain:</span></p> + +<p>I have just read your report of the action between the Dunraven and +a submarine on August 8th last.</p> + +<p>I have had the benefit of reading the reports of some of your +former exploits, and Admiral Bayly has told me about them all; but +in my opinion this of the <i>Dunraven</i> is the finest of all as a +military action and the most deserving of complete success.</p> + +<p>It was purely incidental that the sub escaped. That was due, +moreover, to an unfortunate piece of bad luck. The engagement, +judged as a skilful fight, and not measured by its material +results, seems to me to have been perfectly successful, because I +do not think that even you, with all your experience in such +affairs, could conceive of any feature of the action that you would +alter if you had to do it over again. According to my idea about +such matters, the standard set by you and your crew is worth +infinitely more than the destruction of a submarine. Long after we +both are dust and ashes, the story of this last fight will be a +valuable inspiration to British (and American) naval officers and +men—a demonstration of the extraordinary degree to which the +patriotism, loyalty, personal devotion, and bravery of a crew may +be inspired. I know nothing finer in naval history than the conduct +of the after-gun's crew—in fact, the entire crew of the +<i>Dunraven</i>. It goes without saying that the credit of this +behaviour is chiefly yours....</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_165" id="Page_165">[Pg 165]</a></span>With my best wishes for your future success, believe me, my dear +Captain,</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="padding-right: 6em;">Faithfully yours,</span><br /> +<span class="smcap"><span style="padding-right: 3em;">Wm. S. Sims</span>.</span><br /> +</p></div> + +<p>The records show that the mystery ships sank twelve submarines, of which +Captain Campbell accounted for four; yet this was perhaps not their most +important achievement. From the German standpoint they were a terribly +disturbing element in the general submarine situation. Externally a +mystery ship, as already described, was indistinguishable from the most +harmless merchantman. The cleverness with which the Allied officers took +advantage of the vicious practices of the submarine commanders +bewildered them still further. Nothing afloat was sacred to the Hun; and +he seemed to take particular pride in destroying small vessels, even +little sailing vessels. The Navy decided to turn this amiable trait to +good account, and fitted out the <i>Prize</i>, a topsail schooner of 200 +tons, and placed her under the command of Lieut. William Sanders, R.N.R. +This little schooner, as was expected, proved an irresistible bait. A +certain submarine, commanded by one of the most experienced U-boat +captains, attacked her by gun fire from a safe distance and, after her +panic party had left, shelled her until she was in a sinking condition; +many of her crew had been killed and wounded, when, confident that she +could not be a Q-ship, the enemy came within less than 100 yards. It was +promptly fired on and disappeared beneath the surface. The panic party +picked up the German captain and two men, apparently the only survivors, +who expressed their high admiration for the bravery of the crew and +assisted them to get their battered craft into port. The captain said to +Lieutenant Sanders: "I take off my hat to you and your men. I would not +have believed that any men could stand such gun fire." For this exploit +Lieutenant Sanders was awarded the Victoria Cross. Within about four +days from the time of this action the Admiralty received an inquiry via +Sweden through the Red Cross asking the whereabouts of the captain of +this submarine. This showed that the vessel had reached her home port, +and illustrated once more the necessity for caution in claiming the +destruction <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_166" id="Page_166">[Pg 166]</a></span>of U-boats and the wisdom of declining to publish the +figures of sinkings. Unfortunately, the plucky little <i>Prize</i> was +subsequently lost with her gallant captain and crew.</p> + +<p>So great was the desire of our people to take some part in the mystery +ship campaign that I took steps to satisfy their legitimate ambition. As +the Navy had fitted out no mystery ships of our own, I requested the +Admiralty to assign one for our use. This was immediately agreed to by +Admiral Jellicoe and, with the approval of the Navy Department, the +vessel was delivered and named the <i>Santee</i>, after our old sailing +man-of-war of that name. We called for volunteers, and practically all +the officers and men of the forces based on Queenstown clamoured for +this highly interesting though hazardous service. Commander David C. +Hanrahan was assigned as her commander, and two specially selected men +were taken from each of our vessels, thus forming an exceedingly capable +crew. The ship was disguised with great skill and, with the invaluable +advice of Captain Campbell, the crew was thoroughly trained in all the +fine points of the game.</p> + +<p>One December evening the <i>Santee</i> sailed from Queenstown for Bantry Bay +to carry out intensive training. A short time after she left port she +was struck by a torpedo which caused great damage, but so solidly was +her hull packed with wood that she remained afloat. The panic party got +off in most approved style, and for several hours the <i>Santee</i> awaited +developments, hoping for a glimpse of the submarine. But the under-water +boat never disclosed its presence; not even the tip of a periscope +showed itself; and the <i>Santee</i> was towed back to Queenstown.</p> + +<p>The <i>Santee's</i> experience was that of many mystery ships of 1918. The +Germans had learned their lesson.</p> + +<p>For this reason it is desirable to repeat and emphasize that the most +important accomplishment of the mystery ships was not the actual sinking +of submarines, but their profound influence upon the tactics of the +U-boats. It was manifest in the beginning that the first information +reaching Germany concerning the mystery ships would greatly diminish the +chances of sinking submarines by this means, for it would cause all +submarines to be wary of all mercantile craft. They were therefore +obliged largely to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_167" id="Page_167">[Pg 167]</a></span>abandon the easy, safe, and cheap methods of sinking +ships by bombs or gun fire, and were consequently forced to incur the +danger of attacking with the scarce and expensive torpedo. Moreover, +barring the very few vessels that could be sunk by long-range gun fire, +they were practically restricted to this method of attack on pain of +abandoning the submarine campaign altogether.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_168" id="Page_168">[Pg 168]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER VI</h2> + +<h3>AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>Who would ever have thought that a little wooden vessel, displacing only +sixty tons, measuring only 110 feet from bow to stern, and manned by +officers and crew very few of whom had ever made an ocean voyage, could +have crossed more than three thousand miles of wintry sea, even with the +help of the efficient naval officers and men who, after training there, +convoyed and guided them across, and could have done excellent work in +hunting the submarines? We built nearly 400 of these little vessels in +eighteen months; and we sent 170 to such widely scattered places as +Plymouth, Queenstown, Brest, Gibraltar, and Corfu. Several enemy +submarines now lie at the bottom of the sea as trophies of their +offensive power; and on the day that hostilities ceased, the Allies +generally recognized that this tiny vessel, with the "listening devices" +which made it so efficient, represented one of the most satisfactory +direct "answers" to the submarine which had been developed by the war. +Had it not been that the war ended before enough destroyers could be +spared from convoy duty to assist, with their greater speed and +offensive power, hunting groups of these tiny craft, it is certain that +they would soon have become a still more important factor in destroying +submarines and interfering with their operations.</p> + +<p>The convoy system, as I have already explained, was essentially an +offensive measure; it compelled the submarine to encounter its most +formidable antagonist, the destroyer, and to risk destruction every time +that it attacked merchant vessels. This system, however, was an indirect +offensive, or, to use the technical phrase, it was a +defensive-offensive. Its great success in protecting <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_169" id="Page_169">[Pg 169]</a></span>merchant shipping, +and the indispensable service which it performed to the cause of +civilization, I have already described. But the fact remained that there +could be no final solution of the submarine problem, barring breaking +down the enemy <i>moral</i>, until a definite, direct method of attacking +these boats had been found. A depth charge, fired from the deck of a +destroyer, was a serious matter for the submarine; still the submarine +could avoid this deadly weapon at any time by simply concealing its +whereabouts when in danger of attack. The destroyer could usually sink +the submarine whenever it could get near enough; it was for the +under-water boat, however, to decide whether an engagement should take +place. That great advantage in warfare, the option of fighting or of +running away, always lay with the submarine. Until it was possible for +our naval forces to set out to sea, find the enemy that was constantly +assailing our commerce, and destroy him, it was useless to maintain that +we had discovered the anti-submarine tactics which would drive this pest +from the ocean for all time. Though the convoy, the mine-fields, the +mystery ships, the airplane, and several other methods of fighting the +under-water boat had been developed, the submarine could still utilize +that one great quality of invisibility which made any final method of +attacking it such a difficult problem.</p> + +<p>Thus, despite the wonderful work which had been accomplished by the +convoy, the Allied effort to destroy the submarine was still largely a +game of blind man's buff. In our struggle against the German campaign we +were deprived of one of the senses which for ages had been absolutely +necessary to military operations—that of sight. We were constantly +attempting to destroy an enemy whom we could not see. So far as this +offensive on the water was concerned, the Allies found themselves in the +position of a man who has suddenly gone blind. I make this comparison +advisedly, for it at once suggests that our situation was not entirely +hopeless. The man who loses the use of his eyes suffers a terrible +affliction; yet this calamity does not completely destroy his +usefulness. Such a person, if normally intelligent, gradually learns how +to find his way around in darkness; first he slowly discovers how to +move about his room; then about his house, then about his immediate +neighbourhood; and ultimately he <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_170" id="Page_170">[Pg 170]</a></span>becomes so expert that he can be +trusted to walk alone in crowded streets, to pilot himself up and down +strange buildings, and even to go on long journeys. In time he learns to +read, to play cards and chess, and not infrequently even to resume his +old profession or occupation; indeed his existence, despite the +deprivation of what many regard as the most indispensable of the senses, +becomes again practically a normal process. His whole experience, of +course, is one of the most beautiful demonstrations we have of the +exquisite economy of Nature. What has happened in the case of this +stricken man is that his other senses have come to fill the place of the +one which he has lost. Deprived of sight, he is forced to form his +contacts with the external world by using his other senses, especially +those of touch and hearing. So long as he could see clearly these senses +had lain half developed; he had never used them to any extent that +remotely approached their full powers; but now that they are called into +constant action they gradually increase in strength to a degree that +seems abnormal, precisely as a disused muscle, when regularly exercised, +acquires a hitherto unsuspected vigour.</p> + +<p>This illustration applies to the predicament in which the Allied navies +now found themselves. When they attempted to fight the submarine they +discovered that they had gone hopelessly blind. Like the sightless man, +however, they still had other senses left; and it remained for them to +develop these to take the place of the one of which they had been +deprived. The faculty which it seemed most likely that they could +increase by stimulation was that of hearing. Our men could not detect +the presence of the submarine with their eyes; could they not do so with +their ears? Their enemy could make himself unseen at will, but he could +not make himself unheard, except by stopping his motors. In fact, when +the submarine was under water the vibrations, due to the peculiar shape +of its propellers and hull, and to its electric motors, produced sound +waves that resembled nothing else in art or nature. It now clearly +became the business of naval science to take advantage of this +phenomenon to track the submarine after it had submerged. Once this feat +had been accomplished, the only advantage which the under-water boat +possessed over other warcraft, that <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_171" id="Page_171">[Pg 171]</a></span>of invisibility, would be overcome; +and, inasmuch as the submarine, except for this quality of invisibility, +was a far weaker vessel than any other afloat, the complete elimination +of this advantage would dispose of it as a formidable enemy in war.</p> + +<p>A fact that held forth hopes of success was that water is an excellent +conductor of sound—far better than the atmosphere itself. In the air +there are many crosscurrents and areas of varying temperature which make +sound waves frequently behave in most puzzling fashion, sometimes +travelling in circles, sometimes moving capriciously up or down or even +turning sharp corners. The mariner has learned how deceptive is a +foghorn; when it is blowing he knows that a ship is somewhere in the +general region, but usually he has no definite idea where. The water, +however, is uniform in density and practically uniform in temperature, +and therefore sound in this medium always travels in straight lines. It +also travels more rapidly in water than in the air, it travels farther, +and the sound waves are more distinct. American inventors have been the +pioneers in making practical use of this well-known principle. Before +the war its most valuable applications were the submarine bell and the +vibrator. On many Atlantic and Pacific points these instruments had been +placed under the water, provided with mechanisms which caused them to +sound at regular intervals; an ingenious invention, installed aboard +ships, made it possible for trained listeners to pick up these noises, +and so fix positions, long before lighthouses or lightships came into +view in any but entirely clear weather. For several years the great +trans-Atlantic liners have frequently made Nantucket Lightship by +listening for its submarine bell. From the United States this system was +rapidly extending all over the world.</p> + +<p>American inventors were therefore well qualified to deal with this +problem of communicating by sound under the water. A listening device +placed on board ship, which would reveal to practised ears the noise of +a submarine at a reasonable distance, and which would at the same time +give its direction, would come near to solving the most serious problem +presented by the German tactics. Even before the United States entered +the war, American specialists had started work on their own initiative. +In <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_172" id="Page_172">[Pg 172]</a></span>particular the General Electric Company, the Western Electric +Company, and the Submarine Signal Company had taken up the matter at +their own expense; each had a research department and an experimental +station where a large amount of preliminary work had been done. Soon a +special board was created at Washington to study detection devices, to +which each of these companies was invited to send a representative; the +board eventually took up its headquarters at New London, and was +assisted in this work by some of the leading physicists of our +universities. All through the summer and autumn of 1917 these men kept +industriously at their task; to such good purpose did they labour that +by October of that year several devices had been invented which seemed +to promise satisfactory results. In beginning their labours they had one +great advantage: European scientists had already made considerable +progress in this work, and the results of their studies were at once +placed at our disposal by the Allied Admiralties. Moreover, these +Admiralties sent over several of their experts to co-operate with us. +About that time Captain Richard H. Leigh, U.S.N., who had been assigned +to command the subchaser detachments abroad, was sent to Europe to +confer with the Allied Admiralties, and to test, in actual operations +against submarines, the detection devices which had been developed at +the New London station. Captain Leigh, who after the armistice became my +chief-of-staff at London, was not only one of our ablest officers, but +he had long been interested in detection devices, and was a great +believer in their possibilities.</p> + +<p>The British, of course, received Captain Leigh cordially and gave him +the necessary facilities for experimenting with his devices, but it was +quite apparent that they did not anticipate any very satisfactory +results. The trouble was that so many inventors had presented new ideas +which had proved useless that we were all more or less doubtful. They +had been attempting to solve this problem ever since the beginning of +the war; British inventors had developed several promising hydrophones, +but these instruments had not proved efficient in locating a submarine +with sufficient accuracy to enable us to destroy it with depth charges. +These disappointments quite naturally created an atmosphere of +scepticism which, however, did <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_173" id="Page_173">[Pg 173]</a></span>not diminish the energy which was +devoted to the solution of this important problem. Accordingly, three +British trawlers and a "P"<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> boat were assigned to Captain Leigh, and +with these vessels he spent ten days in the Channel, testing impartially +both the British and American devices. No detailed tactics for groups of +vessels had yet been elaborated for hunting by sound. Though the ships +used were not particularly suitable for the work in hand, these few days +at sea demonstrated that the American contrivances were superior to +anything in the possession of the Allies. They were by no means perfect; +but the ease with which they picked up all kinds of noises, particularly +those made by submarines, astonished everybody who was let into the +secret; the conviction that such a method of tracking the hidden enemy +might ultimately be used with the desired success now became more or +less general. In particular the American "K-tubes" and the "C-tubes" +proved superior to the "Nash-fish" and the "Shark-fin," the two devices +which up to that time had been the favourites in the British navy. The +"K-tubes" easily detected the sound of large vessels at a distance of +twenty miles, while the "C-tubes" were more useful at a shorter +distance. But the greatest advantage which these new listening machines +had over those of other navies was that they could more efficiently +determine not only the sound but also the direction from which it came. +Captain Leigh, after this demonstration, visited several British naval +stations, consulting with the British officers, explaining our +sound-detection devices, and testing the new appliances in all kinds of +conditions. The net result of his trip was a general reversal of opinion +on the value of this method of hunting submarines. The British Admiralty +ordered from the United States large quantities of the American +mechanisms, and also began manufacturing them in England.</p> + +<p>About the time that it was shown that these listening devices would +probably have great practical value, the first "subchasers" were +delivered at New London, Conn. The design of the subchaser type was +based upon what proved to be a misconception as to the cruising +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_174" id="Page_174">[Pg 174]</a></span>possibilities of the submarine. Just before the beginning of the Great +War most naval officers believed that the limitations of the submarine +were such that it could not operate far from coastal waters. Hardly any +one, except a few experienced submarine officers, had regarded it as +possible that these small boats could successfully attack vessels upon +the high seas or remain for any extended period away from their base. +High authorities condemned them. This is hard to realize, now that we +know so well the offensive possibilities of submarines, but we have +ample evidence as to what former opinions were. For example, a +distinguished naval writer says that at that time "The view of the +majority of admirals and captains probably was that submersible craft +were 'just marvellous toys, good for circus performances in carefully +selected places in fine weather.'" He adds that certain very prominent +naval men of great experience declared that the submarine "could operate +only by day in fair weather; that it was practically useless in misty +weather"; that it had to come to the surface to fire its torpedo; that +its "crowning defect lay in its want of habitability"; that "a week's +peace manœuvres got to the bottom of the health of officers and men"; +and that "on the high seas the chances [of successful attack] will be +few, and submarines will require for their existence parent ships." The +first triumph of Otto Weddingen, that of sinking the <i>Cressy</i>, the +<i>Hogue</i>, and the <i>Aboukir</i>, did not change this conviction, for these +three warships had been sunk in comparatively restricted waters under +conditions which were very favourable to the submarine. It was not until +the <i>Audacious</i> went to the bottom off the north-west coast of Ireland, +many hundreds of miles from any German submarine base, that the +possibilities of this new weapon were partially understood; for it was +clear that the <i>Audacious</i> had been sunk by a mine, and that that mine +must have been laid by a submarine. Even then many doubted the ability +of the U-boats to operate successfully in the open sea westward of the +British Isles. Therefore the subchaser was designed to fight the +submarine in restricted waters; Great Britain and France ordered more +than 500 smaller (80-foot) vessels of this type, or of approximately +this type, built in the United States; and just before our declaration +of war the United States had <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_175" id="Page_175">[Pg 175]</a></span>designed and contracted for several +hundred of a somewhat larger size (the 110-foot chasers) with the +original idea of using them as patrol boats near the harbours and +coastal waters of our own country. Long before these vessels were +finished, however, it became apparent that Germany could not engage in +any serious, extensive campaign on this side; it was also evident that +any vessel as small as the subchaser had little value in convoy work, +notwithstanding the excellence of its sea-keeping qualities; and we were +all rather doubtful as to just what use we could make of these new +additions to our navy.</p> + +<p>The work of pushing the design and construction of these boats reflects +great credit upon those who were chiefly responsible. The designs were +drawn and the first contracts were placed before the United States had +declared war. The credit for this admirable work belongs chiefly to +Commander Julius A. Furer (Construction Corps) U.S. Navy, and to Mr. A. +Loring Swasey, a yacht architect of Boston, who was enrolled as a +lieutenant-commander in the reserves, and who served throughout the war +as an adviser and assistant to Commander Furer in his specialty as a +small vessel designer, particularly in wood. It speaks well for the +ability of these officers that the small subchasers exhibited such +remarkable sea-keeping qualities; this fact was a pleasant surprise to +all sea-going men, particularly to naval officers who had had little +experience with that type of craft. The listening devices had not been +perfected when they were designed, and this innovation opened up +possibilities for their employment which had not been anticipated; for +these reasons it inevitably took a large amount of time, after the +subchasers had been delivered, to provide the hydrophones and all the +several appliances which were necessary for hunting submarines. +Apparently those who were responsible for constructing these boats had a +rocky road to travel; with the great demand for material and labour for +building destroyers, merchant ships, and for a multitude of war +supplies, it was natural that the demands for the subchasers in the +early days were viewed as a nuisance; the responsible officers, +therefore, deserve credit for delivering these boats in such an +efficient condition and in such a remarkably short time. That winter, as +everyone will recall, was the coldest in the memory of the present +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_176" id="Page_176">[Pg 176]</a></span>generation. Day after day the poor subchasers, coated with ice almost a +foot thick, many with their engines wrecked, their planking torn and +their propellers crumpled, were towed into the harbour and left at the +first convenient mooring, where the ice immediately began to freeze them +in. As was inevitable under such conditions, the crews, for the most +part, suffered acutely in this terrible weather; they had had absolutely +no training in ordinary seamanship, to say nothing of the detailed +tactics demanded by the difficult work in which they were to engage.</p> + +<p>I do not think that the whole lot contained 1 per cent. of graduates of +Annapolis or 5 per cent. of experienced sailors; for the greater number +that terrible trip in the icy ocean, with the thermometer several +degrees below zero, and with very little artificial heat on board, was +their first experience at sea. Yet there was not the slightest sign of +whimpering or discouragement. Ignorant of salt water as these men at +that time were, they really represented about the finest raw material in +the nation for this service. Practically all, officers and men, were +civilians; a small minority were amateur yachtsmen, but the great mass +were American college undergraduates. Boys of Yale, Harvard, +Princeton—indeed, of practically every college and university in the +land—had dropped their books, left the comforts of their fraternity +houses, and abandoned their athletic fields, eager for the great +adventure against the Hun. If there is any man who still doubts what the +American system of higher education is doing for our country, he should +have spent a few days at sea with these young men. That they knew +nothing at first about navigation and naval technique was not important; +the really important fact was that their minds were alert, their hearts +filled with a tremendous enthusiasm for the cause, their souls clean, +and their bodies ready for the most exhausting tasks. Whenever I get to +talking of the American college boys and other civilians in our navy, I +find myself indulging in what may seem extravagant praise. I have even +been inclined to suggest that it would be well, in the training of naval +officers in future, to combine a college education with a shorter +intensive technical course at the Naval Academy. For these college men +have what technical academies do not usually succeed in giving—a +general education and a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_177" id="Page_177">[Pg 177]</a></span>general training, which develops the power of +initiative, independent thought, an ability quickly to grasp intricate +situations, and to master, in a short time, almost any practical +problem. At least this proved to be the case with our subchaser forces. +So little experience did these boys have of seafaring that, as soon as +they had completed their first voyage, we had to place a considerable +portion in hospital to recover from seasickness. Yet, a few months +afterward, we could leave these same men on the bridge at night in +command of the ship. When they reached New London they knew no more of +seamanship and navigation than so many babies, but so well were these +boys instructed and trained within a few weeks by the regular officers +in charge that they learned their business sufficiently well to cross +the Atlantic safely in convoy. The early 80-foot subchasers which we +built for Great Britain and France crossed the ocean on the decks of +ocean liners; for it would have been a waste of time, even if +international law had permitted it, to send them under their own power; +but all of the 110-footers which these young men commanded crossed the +ocean under their own power and many in the face of the fierce January +and February gales, almost constantly tossed upon the waves like pieces +of cork. As soon as they were sufficiently trained and prepared to make +the trip, groups were despatched under escort of a naval vessel fitted +to supply them with gasolene at sea. Such matters as gunnery these young +men also learned with lightning speed. The most valuable were those who +had specialized in mathematics, chemistry, and general science; but they +were all a splendid lot, and to their spirit and energy are chiefly due +their remarkable success in learning their various duties.</p> + +<p>"Those boys can't bring a ship across the ocean!" someone remarked to +Captain Cotten, who commanded the first squadron of subchasers to arrive +at Plymouth, after he had related the story of one of these voyages.</p> + +<p>"Perhaps they can't," replied Captain Cotten—himself an Annapolis man +who admires these reservists as much as I do. "But they have."</p> + +<p>And he pointed to thirty-six little vessels lying at anchor in Plymouth +Harbour, just about a hundred yards from the monument which marks the +spot from which the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_178" id="Page_178">[Pg 178]</a></span><i>Mayflower</i> sailed for the new world—all of which +were navigated across by youngsters of whom almost none, officers or +men, had had any nautical training until the day the United States +declared war on Germany.</p> + +<p>Capable as they were, however, I am sure that these reservists would be +the first to acknowledge their obligations to the loyal and devoted +regular officers of the Navy, who laboured so diligently to train them +for their work. One of the minor tragedies of the war is that many of +our Annapolis men, whose highest ambition it was to cross the ocean and +engage in the "game," had to stay on this side, in order to instruct +these young men from civil life.</p> + +<p>I wish that I had the space adequately to acknowledge the work in +organization done by Captain John T. Tompkins; in listening devices by +Rear-Admiral S. S. Robison, Captains Frank H. Schofield, Joseph H. +Defrees, Commanders Clyde S. McDowell, and Miles A. Libbey, and the many +scientists who gave us the benefit of their knowledge and experience. It +is impossible to overpraise the work of such men as Captains Arthur J. +Hepburn, Lyman A. Cotten, and William P. Cronan, in "licking" the +splendid raw material into shape. Great credit is also due to +Rear-Admiral T. P. Magruder, Captains David F. Boyd, S. V. Graham, +Arthur Crenshaw, E. P. Jessop, C. M. Tozer, H. G. Sparrow, and C. P. +Nelson, and many others who had the actual responsibility of convoying +these vessels across the ocean.</p> + +<p>I assume that they will receive full credit when the story of the work +of the Navy at home is written; meanwhile, they may be assured of the +appreciation of those of us on the other side who depended so much for +success upon their thorough work of preparation.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>The sea qualities which the subchaser displayed, and the development of +listening devices which made it possible to detect all kinds of sounds +under water at a considerable distance, immediately laid before us the +possibility of direct offensive operations against the submarine. It +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_179" id="Page_179">[Pg 179]</a></span>became apparent that these listening devices could be used to the +greatest advantage on these little craft. The tactics which were soon +developed for their use made it necessary that we should have a large +number of vessels; nearly all the destroyers were then engaged in convoy +duty, and we could not entertain the idea of detailing many of them for +this more or less experimental work. Happily the subchasers started +coming off the ways just in time to fill the need; and the several +Allied navies began competing for these new craft in lively fashion. +France demanded them in large numbers to work in co-operation with the +air stations and also to patrol her coastal waters, and there were many +requests from stations in England, Ireland, Gibraltar, Portugal, and +Italy. The question of where we should place them was therefore referred +to the Allied Naval War Council, which, at my suggestion, considered the +matter, not from the standpoint of the individual nation, but from the +standpoint of the Allied cause as a whole.</p> + +<p>A general survey clearly showed that there were three places where the +subchasers might render the most efficient service. The convoy system +had by this time not only greatly reduced the losses, but it was +changing the policy of the submarines. Until this system was adopted, +sinkings on a great scale were taking place far out at sea, sometimes +three or four hundred miles west of Ireland. The submarines had adopted +the policy of meeting the unescorted ships in the Atlantic and of +torpedoing them long before they could reach the zones where the +destroyer patrol might possibly have protected them. But sailing great +groups of merchantmen in convoys, surrounded by destroyers, made this an +unprofitable adventure, and the submarines therefore had to change their +programme. The important point is that the convoys, so long as they +could keep formation, and so long as protecting screens could be +maintained on their flanks, were virtually safe. Under these conditions +sinkings, as already said, were less than one-half of 1 per cent. These +convoys, it will be recalled, came home by way of two "trunk lines," a +southern one extending through the English Channel and a northern one +through the so-called "North Channel"—the latter being the passage +between Ireland and Scotland. As soon as the inward-bound southern +"trunk-line" <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_180" id="Page_180">[Pg 180]</a></span>convoys reached the English Channel they broke up, certain +ships going to Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, and other Channel +ports, and others sailing to Brest, Cherbourg, Havre, and other harbours +in France. In the same fashion, convoys which came in by way of the +North Channel split up as soon as they reached the Irish Sea. In other +words, the convoys, as convoys, necessarily ceased to exist the moment +that they entered these inland waters, and the ships, as individual +ships, or small groups of ships, had to find their way to their +destinations unescorted by destroyers, or escorted most inadequately. +This was the one weak spot in the convoy system, and the Germans were +not slow to turn it to their advantage. They now proceeded to withdraw +most of their submarines from the high seas and to concentrate them in +these restricted waters. In April, 1917, the month which marked the high +tide of German success, not far from a hundred merchant ships were sunk +in an area that extended about 300 miles west of Ireland and about 300 +miles south. A year afterward—in the month of April, 1918—not a single +ship was sent to the bottom in this same section of the sea. That change +measures the extent to which the convoy saved Allied shipping. But if we +examine the situation in inclosed waters—the North Channel, the Irish +Sea, St. George's Channel, and the English Channel—we shall find a less +favourable state of affairs. Practically all the sinkings of April, +1918, occurred in these latter areas. In April, 1917, the waters which +lay between Ireland and England were practically free from depredations; +in the spring of 1918, however, these waters had become a favourite +hunting ground for submarines; while in the English Channel the sinkings +were almost as numerous in April, 1918, as they had been in the same +month the year before.</p> + +<p>Thus we had to deal with an entirely new phase of the submarine +campaign; the new conditions made it practicable to employ light vessels +which existed in large numbers, and which could aggressively hunt out +the submarines even though they were sailing submerged. The subchaser, +when fitted with its listening devices, met these new requirements, +though of course not to the desirable degree of precision we hoped soon +to attain with still further improved hydrophones and larger vessels of +the Eagle class then being built.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_181" id="Page_181">[Pg 181]</a></span>The matter was presented to the Allied Naval Council and, in accordance +with the unanimous opinion of all of the members, they recommended that +of the subchasers then available, a squadron should be based on +Plymouth, where it could be advantageously used against the German +submarines which were still doing great damage in the English Channel, +and that another squadron, based on Queenstown, should similarly be used +against the submarines in the Irish Sea.</p> + +<p>I was therefore requested to concentrate the boats at these two points, +and at once acquiesced in this recommendation.</p> + +<p>But another point, widely separated from British waters, also made a +powerful plea for consideration. In the Mediterranean the submarine +campaign was still a menace. The spring and early summer of 1918 +witnessed large losses of shipping destined to southern France, to +Italy, and to the armies at Salonika and in Palestine. Austrian and +German submarines, operating from their bases at Pola and Cattaro in the +Adriatic, were responsible for this destruction. If we could pen these +pests in the Adriatic, the whole Mediterranean Sea would become an +unobstructed highway for the Allies. A glance at the map indicated the +way in which such a desirable result might be accomplished. At its +southern extremity the Adriatic narrows to a passage only forty miles +wide—the Strait of Otranto—and through this restricted area all the +submarines were obliged to pass before they could reach the water where +they could prey upon Allied commerce. For some time before the Allied +Naval Council began to consider the use of the American subchasers, the +British navy was doing its best to keep submarines from passing this +point. A defensive scheme known, not very accurately, as the "Otranto +barrage" was in operation. The word "barrage" suggests an effective +barrier, but this one at the base of the Adriatic consisted merely of a +few British destroyers of ancient type and a large number of drifters, +which kept up a continuous patrolling of the gateway through which the +submarines made their way into the Mediterranean. It is no reflection +upon the British to say that this barrage was unsatisfactory and +inadequate, and that, for the first few months, it formed a not +particularly formidable obstruction. So many <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_182" id="Page_182">[Pg 182]</a></span>demands were made upon the +British navy in northern waters that it could not spare many vessels for +this work; the Italian navy was holding the majority of its destroyers +intact, momentarily prepared for a sortie by the Austrian battle fleet; +the Otranto barrage, therefore, important as it was to the Allied cause, +was necessarily insufficient. The Italian representatives at the Allied +Council made a strong plea for a contingent of American subchasers to +reinforce the British ships, and the British and French delegates +seconded this request.</p> + +<p>In the spring of 1918 I therefore sent Captain Leigh to southern Italy +to locate and construct a subchaser base in this neighbourhood. After +inspecting the territory in detail Captain Leigh decided that the Bay of +Govino, in the island of Corfu, would best meet our requirements. The +immediate connection which was thus established between New London and +this ancient city of classical Greece fairly illustrates how widely the +Great War had extended the horizon of the American people. There was a +certain appropriateness in the fact that the American college boys who +commanded these little ships—not much larger than the vessel in which +Ulysses had sailed these same waters three thousand years before—should +have made their base on the same island which had served as a naval +station for Athens in the Peloponnesian War, and which, several +centuries afterward, had been used for the same purpose by Augustus in +the struggle with Antony. And probably the sight of the Achelleion, the +Kaiser's palace, which was not far from this new American base, was not +without its influence in constantly reminding our young men of the +meaning of this unexpected association of Yankee-land with the ancient +world.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">III</p> + +<p>By June 30, 1918, two squadrons of American chasers, comprising +thirty-six boats, had assembled at Plymouth, England, under the command +of Captain Lyman A. Cotten, U.S.N. The U.S. destroyer <i>Parker</i>, +commanded by Commander Wilson Brown, had been assigned to this +detachment as a supporting ship. The area which now formed the new field +of operations was one which was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_183" id="Page_183">[Pg 183]</a></span>causing great anxiety at that time. It +comprehended that section of the Channel which reached from Start Point +to Lizard Head, and included such important shipping ports as Plymouth, +Devonport, and Falmouth. This was the region in which the convoys, after +having been escorted through the submarine zone, were broken up, and +from which the individual ships were obliged to find their way to their +destinations with greatly diminished protection. It was one of the most +important sections in which the Germans, forced to abandon their +submarine campaign on the high seas, were now actively concentrating +their efforts. Until the arrival of the subchasers sinkings had been +taking place in these waters on a considerable scale. In company with a +number of British hunting units, Captain Cotten's detachment kept +steadily at work from June 30th until the middle of August, when it +became necessary to send it elsewhere. The historical fact is that not a +single merchant ship was sunk between Lizard Head and Start Point as +long as these subchasers were assisting in the operations. The one +sinking which at first seemed to have broken this splendid record was +that of the <i>Stockforce</i>; this merchantman was destroyed off Dartmouth; +but it was presently announced that the <i>Stockforce</i> was in reality a +"mystery" ship, sent out for the express purpose of being torpedoed, and +that she "got" the submarine which had ended her own career. This +happening therefore hardly detracted from our general satisfaction over +the work done by our little vessels. Since many ships had been sunk in +this area in the month before they arrived, and since the sinkings +started in again after they had left, the immunity which this region +enjoyed during July and August may properly be attributed largely to the +American navy. Not only were no bona-fide merchant ships destroyed, but +no mines were laid from Start Point to Lizard Head during the time that +the American forces maintained their vigil there. That this again was +probably not a mere coincidence was shown by the fact that, the very +night after these chasers were withdrawn from Plymouth, five mines were +laid in front of that harbour, in preparation for a large convoy +scheduled to sail the next day.</p> + +<p>By the time that Captain Cotten's squadron began work the hunting +tactics which had been developed during <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_184" id="Page_184">[Pg 184]</a></span>their training at New London +had been considerably improved. Their procedure represented something +entirely new in naval warfare. Since the chasers had to depend for the +detection of the foe upon an agency so uncertain as the human ear, it +was thought to be necessary, as a safeguard against error, and also to +increase the chances of successful attack, that they should hunt in +groups of at least three. The fight against the submarine, under this +new system, was divided into three parts—the search, the pursuit, and +the attack. The first chapter included those weary hours which the +little group spent drifting on the ocean, the lookout in the crow's nest +scanning the surface for the possible glimpse of a periscope, while the +trained listeners on deck, with strange little instruments which +somewhat resembled telephone receivers glued to their ears, were kept +constantly at tension for any noise which might manifest itself under +water. It was impossible to use these listening devices while the boats +were under way, for the sound of their own propellers and machinery +would drown out any other disturbances. The three little vessels +therefore drifted abreast—at a distance of a mile or two apart—their +propellers hardly moving, and the decks as silent as the grave; they +formed a new kind of fishing expedition, the officers and crews +constantly held taut by the expectation of a "bite." And frequently +their experience was that of the proverbial "fisherman's luck." Hours +passed sometimes without even the encouragement of a "nibble"; then, +suddenly, one of the listeners would hear something which his +experienced ear had learned to identify as the propellers and motors of +a submarine. The great advantage possessed by the American tubes, as +already said, was that they gave not only the sound, but its direction. +The listener would inform his commanding officer that he had picked up a +submarine. "Very faint," he would perhaps report, "direction 97"—the +latter being the angle which it made with the north and south line. +Another appliance which now rendered great service was the wireless +telephone. The commanding officer at once began talking with the other +two boats, asking if they had picked up the noise. Unless all three +vessels had heard the disturbance, nothing was done; but if all +identified it nearly simultaneously, this unanimity was taken as +evidence that something was really moving in the water. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_185" id="Page_185">[Pg 185]</a></span>When all three +vessels obtained the direction as well as the sound it was a +comparatively simple matter to define pretty accurately its location. +The middle chaser of the three was the flagship and her most interesting +feature was the so-called plotting-room. Here one officer received +constant telephone reports from all three boats, giving the nature of +the sounds, and, more important still, their directions. He transferred +these records to a chart as soon as they came in, rapidly made +calculations, and in a few seconds he was able to give the location of +the submarine. This process was known as obtaining a "fix." The reports +of our chaser commanders are filled constantly with reference to these +"fixes"—the "fix" being that point on the surface of the ocean where +three lines, each giving the direction of the detected sound, cross one +another. The method can be most satisfactorily illustrated by the +following diagram:</p> + +<div class="img"> +<a href="images/imagep185.png"> +<img border="0" src="images/imagep185.png" width="45%" alt="HOW THE LISTENING DEVICES LOCATED A SUBMARINE." /></a><br /> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">HOW THE LISTENING DEVICES LOCATED A SUBMARINE.</p> +</div> + +<p>In this demonstration the letters A, B, and C, each represent a +subchaser, the central one, B, being the flagship of the division. The +listener on A has picked up a noise, the direction of which is indicated +by the line <i>a a</i>. He telephones by wireless this information to the +plotting-room aboard the flagship B. The listeners on this vessel <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_186" id="Page_186">[Pg 186]</a></span>have +picked up the same sound, which comes from the direction indicated by +the line <i>b b</i>. The point at which these two lines cross is the "fix"; +it shows the spot in the ocean where the submarine was stationed when +the sound was first detected. The reason for having a report from the +third subchaser C is merely for the purpose of corroborating the work of +the other two; if three observations, made independently, agree in +locating the enemy at this point, the commanding officer may safely +assume that he is not chasing a will o' the wisp.</p> + +<p>But this "fix" is merely the location of the submarine at the time when +it was first heard. In the great majority of cases, however, the +submerged vessel is moving; so, rapidly as the men in the plotting-room +may work, the German has advanced beyond this point by the time they +have finished their calculations. The subchasers, which have been +drifting while these observations were being made, now start their +engines at full speed, and rush up to the neighbourhood of their first +"fix." Arrived there, they stop again, put over their tubes, and begin +listening once more. The chances are now that the noise of the submarine +is louder; the chasers are getting "warmer." It is not unlikely, +however, that the direction has changed, for the submarine, which has +listening devices of its own—though the German hydrophones were +decidedly inferior to the American—may have heard the subchasers and +may be making frantic efforts to elude them. But changing the course +will help it little, for the listeners easily get the new direction, and +send the details to the plotting-room, where the new "fix" is obtained +in a few moments. Thus the subchasers keep inching up to their prey; at +each new "fix" the noise becomes louder, until the hunters are so near +that they feel justified in attacking. Putting on full speed, all three +rush up to the latest "fix," drop depth charges with a lavish hand, fire +the "Y" howitzers, each one of which carries two depth charges, +meanwhile manning their guns on the chance that the submarine may decide +to rise to the surface and give battle. In many of these hunts a +destroyer accompanies the subchasers, always keeping at a considerable +distance, so that the noise of its propellers will not interfere with +the game; once the chasers determine the accurate "fix," they wire the +position to this larger ship, which puts on full steam <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_187" id="Page_187">[Pg 187]</a></span>and dashes with +the speed of an express train to the indicated spot, and adds ten or a +dozen depth charges to those deposited by the chasers.</p> + +<p>Such were the subchaser tactics in their perfection; yet it was only +after much experience that the procedure began to work with clock-like +regularity. At first the new world under the water proved confusing to +the listeners at the tubes. This watery domain was something entirely +new in human experience. When Dr. Alexander Bell invented his first +telephone an attempt was made to establish a complete circuit by using +the earth itself; the result was that a conglomerate of +noises—moanings, shriekings, howlings, and humming sounds—came over +the wire, which seemed to have become the playground of a million +devils. These were the noises, hitherto unknown, which are constantly +being given out by Mother Earth herself. And now it was discovered that +the under-ocean, which we usually think of as a silent place, is in +reality extremely vocal. The listeners at the C- and K-tubes heard many +sounds in addition to the ones which they were seeking. On the K-tubes a +submarine running at full speed was audible from fifteen to twenty +miles, but louder noises could be heard much farther away. The day might +be bright, the water quiet, and there might not be a ship anywhere +within the circle of the horizon, but suddenly the listener at the tube +would hear a terrific explosion, and he would know that a torpedo, +perhaps forty or fifty miles distant, had blown up a merchantman, or +that some merchantman had struck a mine. Again he would catch the +unmistakable "chug! chug! chug!" which he learned to identify as +indicating the industrious and slow progress of a convoy of twenty or +thirty ships. Then a rapid humming noise would come along the wire; that +was the whirling propeller of a destroyer. A faint moan caused some +bewilderment at first; but it was ultimately learned that this came from +a wreck, lying at the bottom, and tossed from side to side by the +current; it sounded like the sigh of a ghost, and the frequency with +which it was heard told how densely the floor of the ocean was covered +with victims of the submarines. The larger animal life of the sea also +registered itself upon the tubes. Our listeners, after a little +training, could identify a whale as soon as the peculiar noise it made +in swimming reached the receivers. At first a school of porpoises +increased their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_188" id="Page_188">[Pg 188]</a></span>perplexities. The "swish! swish!" which marked their +progress so closely resembled the noise of a submarine that it used to +lead our men astray. But practice in this game was everything; after a +few trips the listener easily distinguished between the porpoise and the +submarine, though the distinction was so fine that he had difficulty in +telling just how he made it. In fact, our men became so expert that, out +of the miscellaneous noises which overwhelmed their ears whenever the +tubes were dropped into the water, they were able almost invariably to +select that of the U-boat.</p> + +<p>In many ingenious ways the chasers supplemented the work of other +anti-submarine craft. Destroyers and other patrol boats kept track of +the foe pretty well so long as he remained on the surface; the business +of the chaser, we must remember, was to find him after he had submerged. +The Commander-in-Chief on shore sometimes sent a radio that a German had +appeared at an indicated spot, and disappeared beneath the waves; the +chasers would then start for this location and begin hunting with their +listeners. Aircraft which sighted submarines would send similar +messages; convoys that had been attacked, individual ships that had been +torpedoed, destroyers which had spotted their prey, only to lose track +of it as soon as it submerged, would call upon the chasers to take up +the battle where they had abandoned it.</p> + +<p>As long as the chasers operated in the waters which I have indicated, +those between Start Point and Lizard Head, they "got" no submarine; the +explanation was simple, for as soon as the chasers and British hunting +vessels became active here, the Germans abandoned this field of +operations. This was the reason that the operative area of the Plymouth +detachment was extended. Some of the chasers were now sent around Land's +End and up the north Cornish coast, where colliers bound from Wales to +France were proving tempting bait for the U-boats; others operated +farther out to sea, off the Scilly Islands and west of Brest. In these +regions their contacts with the submarine were quite frequent.</p> + +<p>There was no U-boat in the German navy which the Allied forces were so +ambitious to "get" as the <i>U-53</i>. I have already referred to this +celebrated vessel and its still more celebrated commander, Captain Hans +Rose. It was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_189" id="Page_189">[Pg 189]</a></span>this submarine, it will be recalled, which had suddenly +paid a ceremonious visit to Newport, R.I., in the autumn of 1916, and +which, on its way back to Germany, had paused long enough off Nantucket +to sink half a dozen British cargo ships. It was the same submarine +which sank our own destroyer, the <i>Jacob Jones</i>, by a chance shot with a +torpedo. Thus Americans had a peculiar reason for wishing to see it +driven from the seas. About the middle of August, 1918, we discovered +that the <i>U-53</i> was operating in the Atlantic about 250 miles west of +Brest. At the same time we learned that two German submarines were +coming down the west coast of Ireland. We picked up radio messages which +these three boats were exchanging; this made it quite likely that they +proposed to form a junction west of Brest, and attack American +transports, which were then sailing to France in great numbers. Here was +an opportunity for the subchasers. The distance—250 miles to sea—would +be a severe strain upon their endurance, but we assigned four hunting +units, twelve boats in all, to the task, and also added to this +contingent the destroyers <i>Wilkes</i> and <i>Parker</i>. On the morning of +September 2nd one of these subchaser units picked up a suspicious sound. +A little later the lookout on the <i>Parker</i> detected on the surface an +object that looked like a conning-tower, with an upright just forward +which seemed to be a mast and sail; as it was the favourite trick of the +<i>U-53</i> to disguise itself in this way, it seemed certain that the +chasers were now on the track of this esteemed vessel. When this mast +and sail and conning-tower suddenly disappeared under the water, these +suspicions became still stronger. The <i>Parker</i> put on full speed, found +an oilslick where the submarine had evidently been pumping its bilges, +and dropped a barrage of sixteen depth charges. But had these injured +the submarine? Under ordinary conditions there would have been no +satisfactory answer to this question; but now three little wooden boats +came up, advanced about 2,000 yards ahead of the <i>Parker</i>, stopped their +engines, put over their tubes, and began to listen. In a few minutes +they conveyed the disappointing news to the <i>Parker</i> that the depth +charges had gone rather wild, that the submarine was still steaming +ahead, and that they had obtained a "fix" of its position. But the +<i>U-53</i>, as always, was exceedingly crafty. It knew that the chasers were +on the trail; its propellers were <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_190" id="Page_190">[Pg 190]</a></span>revolving so slowly that almost no +noise was made; the U-boat was stealthily trying to throw its pursuers +off the scent. For two and a half hours the chasers kept up the hunt, +now losing the faint noise of the <i>U-53</i>, now again picking it up, now +turning in one direction, then abruptly in another. Late in the +afternoon, however, they obtained a "fix," which disclosed the welcome +fact that the submarine was only about 300 yards north of them. In a few +minutes four depth charges landed on this spot.</p> + +<p>When the waters had quieted the little craft began listening. But +nothing was heard. For several days afterward the radio operators could +hear German submarines calling across the void to the <i>U-53</i>, but there +was no answer to their call. Naturally, we believed that this +long-sought enemy had been destroyed; about a week later, however, our +radios caught a message off the extreme northern coast of Scotland, from +the <i>U-53</i>, telling its friends in Germany that it was on its way home. +That this vessel had been seriously damaged was evident, for it had made +no attacks after its experience with the subchasers; but it apparently +had as many lives as a cat, for it was able, in its battered condition, +to creep back to Germany around the coast of Scotland, a voyage of more +than a thousand miles. The subchasers, however, at least had the +satisfaction of having ended the active career of this boat. It was +damaged two months before the armistice was signed, but it never +recovered sufficiently from its injuries to make another voyage. Yet I +must do justice to Captain Rose—he did not command the <i>U-53</i> on this +last voyage. It was its only trip during the whole course of the war +when he had not commanded it!</p> + +<p>The story of the <i>U-53</i> ends with a touch which is characteristically +German. It was one of the submarines which were surrendered to the +Allies at the signing of the armistice. Its first visitors, on this +occasion, were the Americans; they were eager to read its log-book, and +to find out just what had happened on this final voyage. The book was on +board, and it contained a record of the <i>U-53's</i> voyages from the day +when it was commissioned up to the day when it was surrendered. Two or +three pages only were missing; the Germans had ripped out that part +which described the encounter with the American subchasers! They were +evidently determined that we should never have the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_191" id="Page_191">[Pg 191]</a></span>satisfaction of +knowing to just what extent we had damaged the boat; this was the only +revenge they could take on us.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">IV</p> + +<p>On the morning of September 6th three subchaser units, under the command +of Ensign Ashley D. Adams, U.S.N.R.F., were listening at a point about +150 miles west of Land's End. At about eleven-thirty two of these units +detected what was unquestionably the sound of a submarine. Moreover, the +usual "fixes" disclosed that the enemy was close at hand; so close that +two of the units ran up and dropped their charges. This first attack +produced no result on the submarine; the depth charge from one of the +howitzers, however, unfortunately landed near one of the chasers, and, +though it injured no one, it put that particular unit out of commission. +However, for two hours Ensign Adams's division kept closely on the heels +of the quarry, now stopping to obtain a "fix," now running full speed to +catch up with the fleeing prey. At one o'clock the plotting-room +reported that the submerged boat was just about a hundred yards ahead. +The three chasers laid barrages according to pattern, and the three "Y" +guns shot their depth charges; the region of the "fix" was so generously +sowed with these bombs that it seemed an impossibility that the German +could have escaped.</p> + +<p>As soon as the tumult quieted down, the chasers put out their tubes and +listened. For twenty minutes not a sound issued from the scene of all +this activity. Then a propeller was heard faintly turning or attempting +to turn. The noise this time was not the kind which indicated an effort +to steal away furtively; it conveyed rather the impression of difficulty +and strain. There was a slight grating and squeaking such as might have +been made by damaged machinery. This noise lasted for a few seconds and +then ceased. Presently it started up again and then once more it +stopped. The submarine was making a little progress, but fitfully; she +would go a few yards and then pause. A slight wake now appeared upon the +surface, such as a submerged U-boat usually left when the water was +calm; the listeners at the tube were pleased to note that the location +of this disturbance coincided precisely with their "fix," <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_192" id="Page_192">[Pg 192]</a></span>and thus, in +a way, confirmed their calculations. One of the subchasers promptly ran +ahead and began to drop depth charges on this wake. There was not the +slightest doubt that the surface boat was now directly on top of the +submarine. After one of the depth charges was dropped, a black +cylindrical object, about thirty inches long, suddenly rose from the +depths and jumped sixty feet into the air; just what this unexpected +visitant was no one seems to know, but that it came from the hunted +submarine was clear.</p> + +<p>Under such distressing conditions the U-boat had only a single chance of +saving itself; when the water was sufficiently shallow—not deeper than +three hundred feet—it could safely sink to the bottom and "play dead," +hoping that the chasers, with their accursed listening devices, would +tire of the vigil and return to port. A submarine, if in very good +condition, could remain silently on the bottom for two or three days. +The listeners on the chaser tubes presently heard sounds which suggested +that their enemy was perhaps resorting to this manœuvre. But there +were other noises which indicated that possibly this sinking to the +bottom was not voluntary. The listeners clearly heard a scraping and a +straining as though the boat was making terrific attempts to rise. There +was a lumbering noise, such as might be made by a heavy object trying to +drag its hulk along the muddy bottom; this was followed by silence, +showing that the wounded vessel could advance only a few yards. A +terrible tragedy was clearly beginning down there in the slime of the +ocean floor; a boat, with twenty-five or thirty human beings on board, +was hopelessly caught, with nothing in sight except the most lingering +death. The listeners on the chasers could follow events almost as +clearly as though the inside of the U-boat could be seen; for every +motion the vessel made, every effort that the crew put forth to rescue +itself from this living hell, was registered on the delicate wires which +reached the ears of the men on the surface.</p> + +<p>Suddenly sharp metallic sounds came up on the wires. They were clearly +made by hammers beating on the steel body of the U-boat.</p> + +<p>"They are trying to make repairs," the listeners reported.</p> + +<p>If our subchasers had had any more depth charges, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_193" id="Page_193">[Pg 193]</a></span>they would have +promptly put these wretches out of their misery, but they had expended +all their ammunition. Darkness was now closing in; our men saw that +their vigil was to be a long one; they sent two chasers to Penzance, to +get a new supply of bombs, and also sent a radio call for a destroyer. +The spot where the submarine had bottomed was marked by a buoy; lanterns +were hung out on this buoy; and two units of chasers, six boats in all, +prepared to stand guard. At any moment, of course, the struggling U-boat +might come to the surface, and it was necessary to have forces near by +to fight or to accept surrender. All night long the chasers stood by; +now and then the listeners reported scraping and straining noises from +below, but these grew fainter and fainter, seeming almost to register +the despair which must be seizing the hearts of the imprisoned Germans.</p> + +<p>At three o'clock in the morning a British destroyer arrived and +presently the two chasers returned from Penzance with more ammunition. +Meanwhile, the weather had thickened, a fog had fallen, the lights on +the buoy had gone out, and the buoy itself had been pulled under by the +tide. The watching subchasers were tossed about by the weather, and lost +the precise bearing of the sunken submarine. When daylight returned and +the weather calmed down the chasers again put over their tubes and +attempted to "fix" the U-boat. They listened for hours without hearing a +sound; but about five o'clock in the afternoon a sharp piercing noise +came ringing over the wires. It was a sound that made the listeners' +blood run cold.</p> + +<p>Only one thing in the world could make a sound like that. It was the +crack of a revolver. The first report had hardly stilled when another +shot was heard; and then there were more in rapid succession. The +listeners on two different chasers heard these pistol cracks and counted +them; the reports which these two men independently made agreed in every +detail. In all, twenty-five shots came from the bottom of the sea. As +there were from twenty-five to thirty men in a submarine crew the +meaning was all too evident. The larger part of officers and men, +finding themselves shut tightly in their coffin of steel, had resorted +to that escape which was not uncommonly availed of by German submarine +crews in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_194" id="Page_194">[Pg 194]</a></span>this hideous war. Nearly all of them had committed suicide.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">V</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, our subchaser detachment at Corfu was performing excellent +service. In these southern waters Captain C. P. Nelson commanded two +squadrons, comprising thirty-six vessels. Indeed, the American navy +possessed few officers more energetic, more efficient, more lovable, or +more personally engaging than Captain Nelson. The mere fact that he was +known among his brother officers as "Juggy Nelson" gives some notion of +the affection which his personality inspired. This nickname did not +indicate, as might at first be suspected, that Captain Nelson possessed +qualities which flew in the face of the prohibitory regulations of our +navy: it was intended, I think, as a description of the physical man. +For Captain Nelson's rotund figure, jocund countenance, and always +buoyant spirits were priceless assets to our naval forces at Corfu. +Living conditions there were not of the best; disease was rampant among +the Serbians, Greeks, and Albanians who made up the civil population; +there were few opportunities for entertainment or relaxation; it was, +therefore, a happy chance that the commander was a man whose very +presence radiated an atmosphere of geniality and enthusiasm. His +conversational powers for many years had made him a man of mark; his +story-telling abilities had long delighted naval officers and statesmen +at Washington; no other selection for commander could have been made +that would have met with more whole-hearted approval from the college +boys and other high-type civilians who so largely made up our forces in +these flotillas. At Corfu, indeed, Captain Nelson quickly became a +popular favourite; his mind was always actively forming plans for the +discomfiture of the German and Austrian submarines; and all our Allies +were as much impressed with his energy as were our own men. For Captain +Nelson was more than a humorist and entertainer: he was pre-eminently a +sailor of the saltiest type, and he had a real barbaric joy in a fight. +Even in his official communications to his officers and men he +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_195" id="Page_195">[Pg 195]</a></span>invariably referred to the enemy as the "Hun"; the slogan on which he +insisted as the guiding principle of his flotilla was "get the Hun +before he has a chance to get us." He had the supreme gift of firing his +subordinates with the same spirit that possessed himself; and the +vigilance, the constant activity, and the courage of the subchasers' +crews admirably supplemented the sailor-like qualities of the man who +commanded them.</p> + +<p>I have already referred to the sea-going abilities of the subchasers; +but the feat accomplished by those that made the trip to Corfu was the +most admirable of all. These thirty-six boats, little more than motor +launches in size, sailed from New London to Greece—a distance of 6,000 +miles; and, a day or two after their arrival, they began work on the +Otranto barrage. Of course they could not have made this trip without +the assistance of vessels to supply them with gasolene, make the +necessary routine repairs, care for the sick and those suffering from +the inevitable minor accidents; and it is greatly to the credit of the +naval officers who commanded the escorting vessels that they shepherded +these flotillas across the ocean with practically no losses. On their +way through the Straits of Gibraltar they made an attack on a submarine +which so impressed Admiral Niblack that he immediately wired London +headquarters for a squadron to be permanently based on that port.</p> + +<p>As already said, the Otranto Strait was an ideal location for this type +of anti-submarine craft. It was so narrow—about forty miles—that a +force of moderate size could keep practically all of the critical zone +under fairly close observation. Above all, the water was so deep—nearly +600 fathoms (3,600 feet)—that a submarine, once picked up by the +listening devices, could not escape by the method which was so popular +in places where the water was shallow—that of sinking to the bottom and +resting there until the excitement was over. On the other hand, this +great depth made it very difficult to obstruct the passage by a fixed +barrier—a difficulty that was being rapidly overcome by a certain +Franco-Italian type of torpedo net. This barrage, after the arrival of +our chasers, was so reorganized as to make the best use of their +tactical and listening qualities. The several lines of patrolling +vessels extended about thirty-five miles; there were vessels of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_196" id="Page_196">[Pg 196]</a></span>several +types, the whole making a formidable gauntlet, which the submarines had +to run before they could get from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean. +First came a line of British destroyers; it was their main duty to act +as protectors and to keep the barrage from being raided by German and +Austrian surface ships—a function which they fulfilled splendidly. Next +came a line of trawlers, then drifters, motor launches, and chasers, the +whole being completed by a line of kite balloon sloops. Practically all +these vessels, British as well as American, were provided with the +American devices; and so well did these ingenious mechanisms function +that it was practically impossible for any submarine to pass through the +Otranto barrage in calm weather without being heard. In fact, it became +the regular custom for the enemy to wait for stormy weather before +attempting to slip through this dangerous area, and even under these +conditions he had great difficulty in avoiding detection.</p> + +<p>From July, 1918, until the day of the armistice, our flotilla at this +point kept constantly at work; and the reports of our commanders show +that their sound contacts with the enemy were very frequent. There were +battles that unquestionably ended in the destruction of the submarines; +just how much we had accomplished, however, we did not know until the +Austrians surrendered and our officers, at Cattaro and other places, +came into touch with officers of the Austrian navy. These men, who +showed the most friendly disposition toward their American enemies, +though they displayed the most bitter hostility toward their German +allies, expressed their admiration for the work of our subchasers. These +little boats, the Austrians now informed us, were responsible for a +mutiny in the Austrian submarine force. Two weeks after their arrival it +was impossible to compel an Austrian crew to take a vessel through the +straits, and from that time until the ending of the war not a single +Austrian submarine ventured upon such a voyage. All the submarines that +essayed the experiment after this Austrian mutiny were German. And the +German crews, the Austrian officers said, did not enjoy the experience +any more than their own. There was practically no case in which a +submarine crossed the barrage without being bombed in consequence; the +<i>moral</i> of the German crews steadily went to pieces, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_197" id="Page_197">[Pg 197]</a></span>until, in the last +month of the war, their officers were obliged to force them into the +submarines at the point of a pistol. The records showed, the Austrian +high officers said, that the Germans had lost six submarines on the +Otranto barrage in the last three months of the war. These figures about +correspond with the estimates which we had made; just how many of these +the British sank and just how many are to be attributed to our own +forces will probably never be known, but the fact that American devices +were attached to all the Allied ships on this duty should be considered +in properly distributing the credit.</p> + +<p>We have evidence—conclusive even though somewhat ludicrous—that the +American device on a British destroyer "got" one of these submarines. +One dark night this vessel, equipped with the C-tube, had pursued a +submarine and bombed it with what seemed to have been satisfactory +results. However, I have several times called attention to one of the +most discouraging aspects of anti-submarine warfare: that only in +exceptional circumstances did we know whether the submarine had been +destroyed. This destroyer was now diligently searching the area of the +battle, the listeners straining every nerve for traces of her foe. For a +time everything was utterly silent; then, suddenly, the listener picked +up a disturbance of an unusual kind. The noise rapidly became louder, +but it was still something very different from any noise ever heard +before. The C-tube consisted of a lead pipe—practically the same as a +water pipe—which was dropped over the side of the ship fifteen or +twenty feet into the sea; this pipe contained the wires which, at one +end, were attached to the devices under the water, and which, at the +other end, reached the listener's ears. In a few seconds this tube +showed signs of lively agitation. It trembled violently and made a +constantly increasing hullabaloo in the ears of the listener. Finally a +huge German, dripping with water like a sea lion, appeared over the side +of the destroyer and astounded our British Allies by throwing up his +arms with "Kamerad!" This visitant from the depths was the only survivor +of the submarine which it now appeared had indubitably been sunk. He had +been blown through the conning tower, or had miraculously escaped in +some other way—he did not himself know just what had taken place—and +while floundering around in the water in the inky <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_198" id="Page_198">[Pg 198]</a></span>darkness had, by one +of those providences which happen so frequently in war time, caught hold +of this tube, and proceeded to pull himself up hand-over-hand until he +reached the deck. Had it not been for his escape, the British would +never have known that they had sunk the submarine!</p> + +<p>This survivor, after shaking off the water, sat down and became very +sociable. He did not seem particularly to dislike the British and +Americans, but he was extremely bitter against the Italians and +Austrians—the first for "deserting" the Germans, the latter for proving +bad allies.</p> + +<p>"How do you get on with the Italians?" he asked the British officer.</p> + +<p>"Very well indeed," the latter replied, giving a very flattering account +of the Italian allies.</p> + +<p>"I guess the Italians are about as useful to you as the Austrians are to +us," the German sea lion replied.</p> + +<p>In writing to our officers about this episode, the British commander +said:</p> + +<p>"We have found a new use for your listening devices—salvaging drowning +Huns."</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">VI</p> + +<p>On September 28, 1918, Captain Nelson received the following +communication from the commander of the Allied naval forces at Brindisi, +Commodore W. A. H. Kelly, R.N.:</p> + +<p>"Can you hold twelve chasers ready to leave Corfu to-morrow (Sunday) for +special service? They should have stores for four days. If unavoidable, +barrage force may be reduced during their absence. Request reply. +Further definite orders will be sent Sunday afternoon."</p> + +<p>To this Captain Nelson sent an answer which was entirely characteristic:</p> + +<p>"Yes."</p> + +<p>The Captain well knew what the enterprise was to which this message +referred. The proposed undertaking was one which was very close to his +heart and one which he had constantly urged. The Austrian port of +Durazzo, on the Adriatic, at that time was playing an important <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_199" id="Page_199">[Pg 199]</a></span>part in +the general conflict. It was a base by which Germany and Austria had +sent supplies to their ally Bulgaria; and in September the Entente had +started the campaign against Bulgaria which finally ended in the +complete humiliation of that country. The destruction of Durazzo as a +base would greatly assist this operation. Several ships lay in the +harbour; there were many buildings used for army stores; the destruction +of all these, as well as the docks and military works, would render the +port useless. The bombardment of Durazzo was, therefore, the undertaking +for which the assistance of our subchasers had been requested. It was +estimated that about one hour's heavy shelling would render this port +valueless as an Austrian base; and to accomplish this destruction the +Italians had detailed three light cruisers, the <i>San Giorgio</i>, the +<i>Pisa</i>, and the <i>San Marco</i>, and the British three light scout cruisers, +the <i>Lowestoft</i>, the <i>Dartmouth</i>, and the <i>Weymouth</i>. According to the +plan agreed upon the Italian ships would arrive at Durazzo at about ten +o'clock on Wednesday morning, October 2nd, bombard the works for an +hour, and then return to Brindisi; when they had finished, it was +proposed that the British cruisers should take their places, bombard for +an hour, and likewise retire. The duty which had been assigned to the +subchasers in this operation was an important one. The Austrians had a +considerable force of submarines at Durazzo; and it was to be expected +that they would send them to attack the bombarding warships. The +chasers, therefore, were to accompany the cruisers, in order to fight +any submarine which attempted to interfere with the game. "Remember the +life of these cruisers depends upon your vigilance and activity," said +Captain Nelson in the instructions issued to the officers who commanded +the little vessels.</p> + +<p>At nine o'clock that Sunday evening twelve chasers slipped through the +net at Corfu and started across the Adriatic; they sailed "in column," +or single file, Captain Nelson heading the procession in subchaser <i>No. +95</i>, his second in command, Lt.-Comdr. Paul H. Bastedo, coming next in +chaser <i>No. 215</i>. The tiny fleet hardly suggested to the observer +anything in the nature of military operations; they looked more like a +group of motor launches out for a summer cruise. The next morning they +arrived <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_200" id="Page_200">[Pg 200]</a></span>at Brindisi, the gathering place of all the Allied vessels +which were to participate in the operation—that same Brindisi (or +Brundisium) which was one of the most famous ports of antiquity, the +town from which Augustus and Antony, in 42 <span class="smcap">B.C.</span>, started on the +expedition which, at the battle of Philippi, was to win them the mastery +of the ancient world. Upon arriving Captain Nelson went ashore for a +council with Commodore Kelly, who commanded the British cruisers, and +other Allied officers. When he returned Captain Nelson's face was +glowing with happiness and expectation.</p> + +<p>"It's going to be a real party, boys," he informed his subordinate +officers.</p> + +<p>Two days were spent at Brindisi, completing preparations; on Tuesday +evening Captain Nelson called all his officers for a meeting on board +the British destroyer <i>Badger</i>, to give them all the details of the +forthcoming "party." If there had been any flagging spirits in that +company when the speech began—which I do not believe—all depression +had vanished when "Juggy" had finished his remarks; every officer left +with his soul filled by the same joy of approaching battle as that which +possessed his chief.</p> + +<p>At 2.30 Wednesday morning the chasers left Brindisi, steering a straight +course to Durazzo. The night was very dark; the harbour was black also +with the smoke from the cruisers and other craft which were making +preparations to get away. After steaming a few hours the officers +obtained with their glasses their first glimpse of Durazzo; at this time +there were no fighting ships in sight except the chasers, as the larger +ships had not yet arrived. Captain Nelson knew that there were two or +three Austrian destroyers at Durazzo, and his first efforts were devoted +to attempts to persuade them to come out and give battle. With this idea +in mind, the chasers engaged in what they called a "war dance" before +the port; they began turning rapidly in a great circle, but all to no +purpose, for the Austrian ships declined to accept the challenge. After +a time the smoke of the Italian cruisers appeared above the horizon; +this was the signal for the chasers to take their stations. Durazzo is +located in an indentation of the coast; at the southern extremity of the +little gulf the land juts out to a point, known as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_201" id="Page_201">[Pg 201]</a></span>Cape Laghi; at the +northern extremity the corresponding point is Cape Pali; the distance +between these two points is about fifteen miles. Two subchaser units, +six boats, were assigned as a screen to the Italian cruisers while the +bombardment was under way. One unit, three boats, was stationed at Cape +Pali, to the north, to prevent any submarines leaving Durazzo from +attacking the British cruisers, which were to approach the scene of +activities from that quarter, and another unit, three boats, was +stationed off Cape Laghi. Thus the two critical capes were covered +against submarine surprises, and the attacking vessels themselves were +effectively screened.</p> + +<p>The Italian cruisers sailed back and forth for about an hour, blazing +away at Durazzo, destroying shipping in the harbour, knocking down +military buildings, and devastating the place on a liberal scale, all +the time screened in this operation by our chasers. Meantime, unit B, +commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Bastedo, had started for its station +at Cape Pali. The Austrian shore batteries at once opened upon the tiny +craft, the water in their neighbourhood being generously churned up by +the falling shells. Meanwhile, the British cruisers, after steaming for +a while east, turned south in order to take up the bombarding station +which, according to the arranged programme, the Italian warships were +about to abandon. The three screening chasers were steaming in column, +<i>No. 129</i>, commanded by Ensign Maclair Jacoby, U.S.N.R.F., bringing up +the rear. Suddenly this little boat turned to the right and started +scampering in the direction of some apparently very definite object. It +moved so abruptly and hastily that it did not take the time even to +signal to its associates the cause of its unexpected manœuvre.</p> + +<p>On board <i>No. 215</i> there was some question as to what should be done.</p> + +<p>"Let's go," said Commander Bastedo. "Perhaps he's after a submarine."</p> + +<p><i>No. 215</i> was immediately turned in the direction of the busy <i>No. 129</i>, +when the interest of its officers was aroused by a little foamy fountain +of spray moving in the water slightly forward of its port beam. There +was no mystery as to the cause of that feathery disturbance. It was made +by a periscope; it was moving with considerable <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_202" id="Page_202">[Pg 202]</a></span>speed also, entirely +ignoring the subchasers, and shaping its course directly toward the +advancing British cruisers. Commander Bastedo forgot all about subchaser +<i>No. 129</i>, which apparently was after game of its own, and headed his +own boat in the direction of this little column of spray. In a few +seconds the periscope itself became visible; Commander Bastedo opened +fire at it with his port gun; at the second shot a column of water and +air arose about six feet—a splendid geyser which informed the pursuer +that the periscope had been shattered. By this time the third chaser, +<i>No. 128</i>, was rushing at full speed. The submarine now saw that all +chance of attacking the British ships had gone, and turned to the south +in an effort to get away with a whole skin. But the two subchasers, +<i>215</i> and <i>128</i>, quickly turned again and started for their prey; soon +both were dropping depth charges and shooting their "Y" guns; and a huge +circle of the sea was a mass of explosions, whirling water, mighty +eruptions of foam, mist, and débris—and in the mass, steel plates and +other wreckage flew from the depths into the air.</p> + +<p>"That got him!" cried the executive officer from the deck of <i>No. 215</i>, +while the crew lifted up its voices in a shout that was reminiscent of a +college yell.</p> + +<p>It was not until this moment that Commander Bastedo and his associates +remembered the <i>129</i>, which, when last observed, was speeding through +the water on an independent course of her own. In the midst of the +excitement there came a message from this boat:</p> + +<p>"Submarine sighted!"</p> + +<p>Then a second afterward came another message.</p> + +<p>"My engines are disabled."</p> + +<p>In a short time Bastedo had reached the boat.</p> + +<p>"Where is the submarine?"</p> + +<p>"We just sank it," was the answer. <i>No. 129</i> had dropped eight depth +charges, one directly over the Austrian boat; in the water thrown up the +officers had counted seven pieces of metal plates, and the masses of oil +and bubbles that presently arose completed the story of the destruction. +Meanwhile, the British cruisers had taken up their station at Durazzo +and were finishing the work that made this place useless as a military +headquarters.</p> + +<p>Not a man in the whole American force was injured; in a brief time the +excitement was all over, and the great <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_203" id="Page_203">[Pg 203]</a></span>ships, screened again by the +wasps of chasers, started back to Brindisi. The impression made upon our +Allies was well expressed in the congratulatory message sent to me in +London by Commodore Kelly, who commanded the British cruisers in this +action.</p> + +<p>"Their conduct," he said, "was beyond praise. They all returned safely +without casualties. They thoroughly enjoyed themselves."</p> + +<p>And from the Italians came this message:</p> + +<p>"Italian Naval General Staff expresses highest appreciation of useful +and efficient work performed by United States chasers in protecting +major vessels during action against Durazzo; also vivid admiration of +their brilliant and clever operations which resulted in sinking two +enemy submarines."</p> + +<p>The war was now drawing to a close; a day before the Allied squadrons +started for Durazzo Bulgaria surrendered; about two weeks after the +attack Austria had given up the ghost. The subchasers were about this +time just getting into their stride; the cessation of hostilities, +however, ended their careers at the very moment when they had become +most useful. A squadron of thirty-six under the command of Captain A. J. +Hepburn reached Queenstown in September, but though it had several +interesting contacts with the enemy, and is credited with sending one +German home badly damaged, the armistice was signed before it had really +settled down to work. The final spectacular appearance was at Gibraltar, +in the last four days of the war. The surrender of Austria had left the +German submarines stranded in the Adriatic without a base; and they +started home by way of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar. A squadron of +eighteen chasers had just arrived at the Azores, on the way to reinforce +the flotilla at Plymouth; seven of these were at once despatched to +Gibraltar on the chance that they might bar the passage of these +U-boats. They reached this port at the storm season; yet they went out +in the hardest gales and had several exciting contacts with the fleeing +Germans. The records show that five submarines attempted to get through +the straits; there is good evidence that two of these were sunk, one by +the British patrol and one by our chasers.</p> + +<h4>FOOTNOTE:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> A "P" boat is a special type of anti-submarine craft +smaller and slower than a destroyer and having a profile especially +designed to resemble that of a submarine.</p></div> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_204" id="Page_204">[Pg 204]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER VII</h2> + +<h3>THE LONDON FLAGSHIP</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>While our naval forces were thus playing their parts in several areas, +the work of creating the central staff of a great naval organization was +going forward in London. The headquarters for controlling extensive +naval operations in many widely dispersed areas, like the headquarters +of an army extending over a wide front, must necessarily be located far +behind the scene of battle. Thus, a number of remodelled dwelling-houses +in Grosvenor Gardens contained the mainspring for an elaborate mechanism +which reached from London to Washington and from Queenstown to Corfu. On +the day of the armistice the American naval forces in European waters +comprised about 370 vessels of all classes, more than 5,000 officers, +regulars and reserves, and more than 75,000 men; we had established +about forty-five bases and were represented in practically every field +of naval operations. The widespread activities of our London +headquarters on that eventful day presented a striking contrast to the +humble beginnings of eighteen months before.</p> + +<p>From April to August, 1917, the American navy had a very small staff +organization in Europe. During these extremely critical four months the +only American naval representatives in London, besides the regular Naval +Attaché and his aides, were my personal aide, Commander J. V. Babcock, +and myself; and our only office in those early days was a small room in +the American Embassy. For a considerable part of this time we had no +stenographers and no clerical assistance of our own, though of course +the Naval Attaché, Captain W. D. MacDougall, and his personnel gave us +all the assistance in their power. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_205" id="Page_205">[Pg 205]</a></span>Commander Babcock had a small +typewriter, which he was able to work with two fingers, and on this he +laboriously pounded out the reports which first informed the Navy +Department of the seriousness of the submarine situation. The fact that +Commander Babcock was my associate during this critical period was a +fortunate thing for me, and a still more fortunate thing for the United +States. Commander Babcock and I had been closely associated for several +years; in that early period, when we, in our two persons, represented +the American naval forces at the seat of Allied naval activity, we not +only worked together in that little room but we lived together. Our +office was alternately this room in the American Embassy and our +quarters in an hotel. I had already noted Commander Babcock's abilities +when he was on my staff in the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla and when he was +a student at the Naval War College; but our constant companionship +throughout the war, especially during these first few strenuous months +in London, gave me a still greater respect for his qualities. Many men +have made vital contributions to our success in the war of whom the +public scarcely ever hears even the name. A large part of the initiative +and thinking which find expression in successful military action +originates with officers of this type. They labour day after day and +night after night, usually in subordinate positions, unselfishly doing +work which is necessarily credited to other names than their own, daily +lightening the burden of their chiefs, and constantly making suggestions +which may control military operations or affect national policy. +Commander Babcock is a striking representative of this type. My personal +obligations to him are incalculable; and I am indebted to him not only +for his definite services, but for the sympathy, the encouragement, and +the kindly and calculated pessimism which served so well to +counterbalance my temperamental optimism.</p> + +<p>Our relations were so close, working and living together as we did, that +I find it difficult to speak of "Babby's" services with restraint. But +there are particular accomplishments to his credit which should go down +upon this popular record. I have described the first consultations with +the British naval chiefs. These were the meetings which formed the basis +of the reports recommending the conditions upon which the American navy +should <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_206" id="Page_206">[Pg 206]</a></span>co-operate with the Allies. Commander Babcock was constantly at +my elbow during all these consultations, and was all the time +independently conducting investigations in the several departments of +the Admiralty. The original drafts of all my written and cabled +communications to the department—reports which form a connected story +of our participation in the naval war during this period—were prepared +by him.</p> + +<p>Able as Commander Babcock was, human endurance still had its +limitations. A public-spirited American business man in London, Mr. R. +E. Gillmor, who had formerly been an officer in the navy, begged to be +accepted as a volunteer; he brought two of his best stenographers, +English girls, and personally paid their salaries for several weeks +while they were devoting all their time to the American navy. +Subsequently he was enlisted in the naval reserves and performed very +valuable services on the staff throughout nearly the entire period of +the war—until ordered to America, where his technical knowledge was +required in connection with certain important appliances with which he +was familiar. His experience as a business man in London was of great +value to our forces, and his time and energy were devoted to our service +with a zeal and loyalty that endeared him to us all.</p> + +<p>Soon afterward a number of Rhodes scholars and other young Americans +then in Europe, G. B. Stockton, E. H. McCormick, T. B. Kittredge, P. F. +Good, R. M. D. Richardson, H. Millard, L. S. Stevens, and J. C. +Baillargeon, joined our forces as unpaid volunteers and gave us the +benefit of their trained minds and European experience. Two of these, +Kittredge and Stockton, both valuable workers, had been serving under +Hoover in Belgium. They were all later enrolled as reserves and +continued their work throughout the war. Lieutenant Stockton performed +the arduous and important duties of chief business manager, or executive +officer, of headquarters in a most efficient manner, and throughout the +war Kittredge's previous historical training, European experience, and +fine intellectual gifts made his services very valuable in the +Intelligence Department.</p> + +<p>Mr. Page, the American Ambassador, aided and encouraged us in all +possible ways. Immediately after my arrival in London he invited me to +call upon him and his <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_207" id="Page_207">[Pg 207]</a></span>staff for any assistance they could render. In +his enthusiastic and warm-hearted way, he said: "Everything we have is +yours. I will turn the Embassy into the street if necessary"; and +throughout the war he was a tower of strength to the cause. He gave us +his time and the benefit of his great experience and personal prestige +in establishing cordial relations with the various branches of the +British Government—and all this with such an absence of diplomatic +formality, such courteous and forceful efficiency, and such cordial +sympathy and genuine kindness that he immediately excited not only our +sincere admiration but also our personal affection.</p> + +<p>During all this period events of the utmost importance were taking +place; it was within these four months that the convoy system was +adopted, that armed guards were placed on merchant ships, that the first +American troops were escorted to France, and that our destroyers and +other worships began arriving in European waters. In July it became +apparent that the strain of doing the work of a dozen men, which had +been continuous during the past four months, could no longer be +supported by my aide, Commander Babcock. When the destroyers and other +ships arrived, we went through their lists; here and there we hit upon a +man whom we regarded as qualified for responsible staff duty, and +transferred him to the London headquarters. This proceeding was +necessary if our essential administrative work was to be done. Among the +reserves who were subsequently assigned to our forces many excellent +staff officers also were developed for handling the work of +communications, cipher codes, and the like. When the Colonel House +Commission came over in October, 1917, I explained our necessities to +the "skippers" of the two cruisers that brought the party, who promptly +gave us all the desks and office equipment they could spare and sent +them to Grosvenor Gardens.</p> + +<p>In August, however, additional ships and forces began to arrive from +America, and it became necessary to have larger quarters than those +available in the Embassy for handling the increasing administrative +work. At one time the British Government contemplated building us a +temporary structure near the Admiralty, but this was abandoned because +there was a shortage of material. We therefore moved into an unoccupied +dwelling near the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_208" id="Page_208">[Pg 208]</a></span>American Embassy that seemed adapted to our needs. We +rented this house furnished, just as it stood; a first glimpse of it, +however, suggested refined domesticity rather than naval operations. We +quickly cleared the building of rugs, tapestries, lace curtains, +pictures, and expensive furniture, reduced the twenty-five rooms to +their original bareness, and filled every corner with office equipment. +In a few days the staff was installed in this five-story residence and +the place was humming with the noise of typewriters. At first we +regarded the leasing of this building as something of an extravagance; +it seemed hardly likely that we should ever use it all! But in a few +weeks we had taken the house adjoining, cut holes through the walls and +put in doors; and this, too, was filled up in an incredibly short time, +so rapidly did the administrative work grow. Ultimately we had to take +over six of these private residences and make alterations which +transformed them into one. From August our staff increased at a rapid +rate until, on the day the armistice was signed, we had not far from +1,200 officers, enlisted men, and clerical force, working in our London +establishment, the commissioned staff consisting of about 200 officers, +of which sixty were regulars and the remainder reserves.</p> + +<p>I find that many people are surprised that I had my headquarters in +London. The historic conception of the commander-in-chief of a naval +force located on the quarterdeck of his flagship still holds the popular +imagination. But controlling the operations of extensive and widely +dispersed forces in a campaign of this kind is quite a different +proceeding from that of directing the naval campaigns of Nelson's time, +just as making war on land has changed somewhat from the method in vogue +with Napoleon. The opinion generally prevails that my principal task was +to command in person certain naval forces afloat. The fact is that this +was really no part of my job during the war. The game in which several +great nations were engaged for four years was a game involving organized +direction and co-operation. It is improbable that any one nation could +have won the naval war; that was a task which demanded not only that we +should all exert our fullest energies, but that, so far as it was +humanly possible, we should exert them as a unit. It was the duty of the +United States above all nations to manifest this spirit. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_209" id="Page_209">[Pg 209]</a></span>We had entered +the war late; we had entered it in a condition of unpreparedness; our +naval forces, when compared to those which had been assembled by the +Allies, were small; we had not been engaged for three years combating an +enemy using new weapons and methods of naval warfare. It was not +unlikely that we could make some original contributions to the Allied +effort; indeed, we early did so; yet it was natural to suppose that the +navies which had been combating the submarines so long understood that +game better than did we, and it was our duty to assist them in this +work, rather than to operate independently. Moreover, this question as +to whether any particular one of our methods might be better or might be +worse than Great Britain's was not the most important one. The point was +that the British navy had developed its own methods of working and that +it was a great "going concern." The crisis was so pressing that we +simply did not have the time to create a separate force of our own; the +most cursory examination of conditions convinced me that we could hope +to accomplish something worth while only by playing the game as it was +then being played, and that any attempt to lay down new rules would +inevitably decrease the effectiveness of our co-operation, and perhaps +result in losing the war. We can even admit, for the sake of the +argument, that the Americans might have created a better organization +than the British; but the question of improving on their methods, or of +not improving on them, was a point that was not worth considering; long +before we could have developed an efficient independent machine the war +would have come to an end. It was thus our duty to take things as they +were, to plunge immediately into the conflict, and to make every ship +and every man tell in the most effective way and in the shortest +possible time. Therefore I decided that our forces should become, for +the purpose of this war, virtually a part of the Allied navies; to place +at the disposal of the Allies our ships to reinforce the weak part of +their lines; to ignore such secondary considerations as national pride, +naval prestige, and personal ambitions; and to subordinate every other +consideration to that of defeating the Hun. I have already described how +in distributing our subchasers I practically placed them at the disposal +of the Allied <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_210" id="Page_210">[Pg 210]</a></span>Council; and this represents the policy that was followed +in all similar matters.</p> + +<p>The naval high commands were located at Washington, London, Paris, and +Rome. Necessarily London was the headquarters of the naval war. Events +which had long preceded the European conflict had made this choice +inevitable. The maritime development of four centuries had prepared +London for the rôle which she was now called upon to play. From all over +the world naval and maritime information flowed to this great capital as +though in obedience to the law of gravity. Even in peace times London +knew where every ship in the world was at any particular time. All other +machinery for handling this great mass of detail was necessarily +accumulated in this great city, and Lloyd's, the world headquarters for +merchant shipping, had now become practically a part of the British +Admiralty. In this war the matter of information and communications was +supremely important. Every decision that was made and every order that +was issued, even those that were the least consequential, rested upon +complete information which was obtainable, in time to be useful, only in +London. I could not have made my headquarters in Washington, or Paris, +or Rome because these cities could not have furnished the military +intelligence which was needed as a preliminary to every act. For the +same reason I could not have efficiently controlled the operations of +all our forces from Queenstown, or Brest, or Gibraltar; the staff +controlling the whole had necessarily to be located in London, and the +tactical commands at these other bases must be exercised by +subordinates. The British placed all their sources of information and +their communications at our disposal. They literally opened their doors +and made us part of their organization. I sat daily in consultation with +British naval chiefs, and our officers had access to all essential +British information just as freely as did the British naval officers +themselves. On the day of my arrival Admiral Jellicoe issued orders that +the Americans should be shown anything which they wished to see. With +all this information, the most complete and detailed in the world, +constantly placed at our disposal, and a spirit of confidence and +friendship always prevailing which has no parallel in history, it would +have defeated the whole <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_211" id="Page_211">[Pg 211]</a></span>purpose of our participation in the war had the +American high command taken up its headquarters anywhere except in +London.</p> + +<p>Incidentally, there was an atmosphere in the London Admiralty which made +a strong appeal to anyone who is interested in naval history. Everything +about the place is reminiscent of great naval achievements. The room in +which our councils met was the same old Admiralty Board room that had +been used for centuries. In accordance with the spirit of British +conservatism, this room is almost exactly the same now, even in its +furnishings, as it was in Nelson's time. The same old wood carvings hang +over the same old fireplace; the table at which we sat is the identical +one at which Nelson must have sat many times, and the very silver +inkstand which Nelson used was used by his successors in this war. The +portrait of this great naval chieftain looked down upon us during our +deliberations. Above the fireplace is painted a huge compass, and about +the centre of this swings an arrow. This was a part of the Admiralty +equipment of a hundred years ago, though it has no usefulness now except +a sentimental one. In old days this arrow was geared to a weather vane +on the roof of the Admiralty, and it constantly showed to the chiefs +assembled in the council room the direction of the wind—a matter of +great importance in the days of sailing ships.</p> + +<p>All general orders and plans concerning the naval operations of British +and American forces came from the Admiralty, and here officers of my +staff were constantly at work. The commanders-in-chief at the various +bases commanded the combined British and American ships based on those +ports only in the sense that they carried out the general instructions +and policies which were formulated in London. These orders, so far as +they affected American forces, could be issued to the +commanders-in-chief only after American headquarters in London had viséd +them. Thus the American staff held the ultimate command over all the +American forces which were based in British waters. The same was true of +those at Brest, Gibraltar, and other stations. The commanders-in-chief +executed them, and were responsible for the manner in which the forces +were used in combating the enemy. The operations of which I was the +commander <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_212" id="Page_212">[Pg 212]</a></span>extended over an immense area. The Plymouth and Queenstown +forces represented only a part of the ultimate American naval strength +in European waters and not the most important part; before the war +ended, Brest, as I shall show, developed into a greater naval base than +any of those which we maintained in the British Isles. Convoys were not +only coming across the Atlantic but they were constantly arriving from +the Mediterranean and from the South Sea, and it was the duty of +headquarters in London, and not the duty of local commanders, to route +these precious argosies, except in special cases, just before they +reached their port of destination. Not infrequently, as previously +described, it was necessary to change destinations, or to slow down +convoys, or to make any number of decisions based on new information; +naturally only the centre of information, the Admiralty convoy room, +could serve as a clearing house for such operations. The point is that +it was necessary for me to exercise the chief command of American forces +through subordinates. My position in this respect was precisely the same +as that of Generals Haig and Pershing; I had to maintain a great +headquarters in the rear, and to depend upon subordinates for the actual +execution of orders.</p> + +<p>The American headquarters in London comprised many separate departments, +each one of which was directly responsible to me as the Force Commander, +through the Chief of Staff; they included such indispensable branches as +the office of the Chief of Staff, Captain N. C. Twining, Chief of Staff; +Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain W. R. Sexton; Intelligence Department, +Commander J. V. Babcock, who also acted as Aide; Convoy Operations +Section, Captain Byron A. Long; Anti-submarine Section, Captain R. H. +Leigh; Aviation Section, Captain H. I. Cone, and afterward, +Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; Personnel Section, Commander H. R. +Stark; Communication Section, Lieutenant-Commander E. G. Blakeslee; +Material Section, Captain E. C. Tobey (S.C.); Repair Section, Captain S. +F. Smith (C.C.), and afterward, L. B. McBride (C.C.); Ordnance Section, +Commander G. L. Schuyler, and afterward, Commander T. A. Thomson; +Medical Section, Captain F. L. Pleadwell (M.C.), and afterward, +Commander Edgar Thompson (M.C.); Legal Section, Commander W. H. McGrann; +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_213" id="Page_213">[Pg 213]</a></span>and the Scientific Section, Professor H. A. Bumstead, Ph.D.</p> + +<p>I was fortunate in all of my departmental chiefs. The Chief of Staff, +Captain N. C. Twining, would certainly have been a marked man in any +navy; he had a genius for detail, a tireless energy, and a mastery of +all the problems that constantly arose. I used to wonder when Captain +Twining ever found an opportunity to sleep; he seemed to be working +every hour of the day and night; yet, so far as was observable, he never +wearied of his task, and never slackened in his devotion to the Allied +cause. As soon as a matter came up that called for definite decision, +Captain Twining would assemble from the several departments all data and +information which were available concerning the question at issue, spend +a few hours studying this information, and then give his judgment—an +opinion which was invariably sound and which was adopted in the vast +majority of cases; in fact, in all cases except those in which questions +of policy or extraneous considerations dictated a different or modified +decision. Captain Twining is a man of really fine intellect combined +with a remarkable capacity for getting things done; without his constant +presence at my elbow, my work would have been much heavier and much less +successful than it was. He is an officer of such exceptional ability, +such matured experience, and such forceful character as to assure him a +brilliant career in whatever duty he may be called upon to perform. I +can never be sufficiently grateful to him for his loyalty and devotion +and for his indispensable contribution to the efficiency of the forces I +had the honour to command.</p> + +<p>In accordance with my habitual practice, I applied the system of placing +responsibility upon my carefully selected heads of departments, giving +them commensurate authority, and holding them to account for results. +Because the task was such a great one, this was the only possible way in +which the operations of the force could have been successfully +conducted. I say, successfully conducted, because in a "business" of +this kind, "good enough" and "to-morrow" may mean disaster; that is, it +is a case of keeping both information and operations up to the minute. +If the personnel and equipment of the staff are not completely capable +of this, it is more than a partial failure, and the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_214" id="Page_214">[Pg 214]</a></span>result is an +ever-present danger. There were men in this great war who "went to +pieces" simply because they tried to do everything themselves. This +administrative vice of attempting to control every detail, even +insignificant ones, to which military men seem particularly addicted, it +had always been my policy to avoid. Business at Grosvenor Gardens +developed to such an extent that about a thousand messages were every +day received in our office or sent from it; and of these 60 per cent. +were in code. Obviously it was impossible for the Force Commander to +keep constantly at his finger ends all these details. All department +heads, therefore, were selected because they were officers who could be +depended upon to handle these matters and make decisions independently; +they were all strong men, and it is to their combined efforts that the +success of our operations was due. You would have to search a long time +among the navies of the world before you could find an abler convoy +officer than Captain Byron A. Long; an abler naval constructor than +Captain L. B. McBride; an abler man to have charge of the finances of +our naval forces, the purchase of supplies and all kinds of material +than Captain (S.C.) Eugene C. Tobey; abler aviation officers than +Captain H. I. Cone and Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; an abler +chief of operations than Captain R. H. Leigh, or an abler intelligence +officer than Commander J. V. Babcock. These men, and others of the +fourteen department heads, acted as a kind of cabinet. Many of them +handled matters which, though wholly essential to the success of the +forces, were quite outside of my personal knowledge or experience, and +consequently they had to be men in whose ability to guide me in such +matters I could place complete confidence. As an example of this I may +cite one of the duties of Captain Tobey. Nearly all of the very +considerable financial transactions he was entrusted with were "Greek" +to me, but he had only to show me the right place on the numerous +documents, and I signed my name in absolute confidence that the +interests of the Government were secure.</p> + +<p>All cables, reports, and other communications were referred each day to +the department which they concerned. The head of each department studied +them, attended to the great majority on his own responsibility, and +selected the few that needed more careful attention. A meeting of the +Chief of Staff and all department heads was held each day, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_215" id="Page_215">[Pg 215]</a></span>at which +these few selected matters were discussed in council and decisions made. +The final results of these deliberations were the only matters that were +referred to me. This system of subdividing responsibility and authority +not only promoted efficiency but it left the Force Commander time to +attend to vitally important questions of general policy, to keep in +personal touch with the high command of the Allied navies, to attend the +Allied naval councils, and, in general, to keep his finger constantly on +the pulse of the whole war situation. Officers of our own and other +navies who were always coming in from the outlying stations, and who +could immediately be placed in touch with the one man who could answer +all their questions and give immediate decisions, testified to the +efficient condition in which the American headquarters was maintained.</p> + +<p>One of our departments was so novel, and performed such valuable +service, that I must describe it in some detail. We took over into our +London organization an idea that is advantageously used in many American +industrial establishments, and had a Planning Section, the first, I +think, which had ever been adopted by any navy. I detached from all +other duties five officers: Captain F. H. Schofield, Captain D. W. Knox, +Captain H. E. Yarnell (who exchanged places afterward with Captain L. +McNamee of the Plans Section of the Navy Department), and Colonel R. H. +Dunlap (of the Marines), who was succeeded by Colonel L. McC. Little, +when ordered to command a regiment of Marines in France. These men made +it their business to advise the Commander-in-Chief on any questions that +might arise. All were graduates of the Naval War College at Newport, and +they applied to the consideration of war problems the lessons which they +had learned at that institution. The business of the Planning Section +was to make studies of particular problems, to prepare plans for future +operations, and also to criticize fully the organization and methods +which were already in existence. The fact that these men had no +administrative duties and that they could therefore devote all their +time to surveying our operations, discovering mistakes, and suggesting +better ways of doing things, as well as the fact that they were +themselves scholarly students of naval warfare, made their labours +exceedingly valuable. I gave them the utmost freedom in finding fault +with the existing regime; there was no department and no office, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_216" id="Page_216">[Pg 216]</a></span>from +that of the Commander-in-Chief down, upon whose activities they were not +at liberty to submit the fullest and the frankest reports. If anything +could be done in a better way, we certainly wanted to know it. Whenever +any specific problem of importance came up, it was always submitted to +these men for a report. The value of such a report depended upon the +completeness and accuracy of the information available, and it was the +business of the Intelligence Department of the staff to supply this. If +the desired information was not in their files, or the files of the +Allied admiralties, or was not up to date, it was their duty to obtain +it at once. The point is that the Planning Section had no other duties +beyond rendering a decision, based upon a careful analysis of the facts +bearing upon the case, which they submitted in writing. There was no +phase of the naval warfare upon which the officers of the Planning +Section did not give us reports. One of their favourite methods was to +place themselves in the position of the Germans and to decide how, if +they were directing German naval operations, they would frustrate the +tactics of the Allies. Their records contain detailed descriptions of +how merchant ships could be sunk by submarines, and these methods, our +officers believed, represented a great improvement over those used by +the Germans. Indeed, I think that many of these reports, had they fallen +into the hands of the Germans, would have been found by them exceedingly +useful. There was a general impression, in our own navy as well as in +the British, that most of the German submarine commanders handled their +boats unskilfully and obtained inadequate results. All these documents +were given to the responsible men in our forces, as well as to the +British, and had a considerable influence upon operations. The British +also established a Planning Section, which worked harmoniously with our +own.</p> + +<p>A subject upon which our Planning Section liked to speculate was the +possible sortie of the German fleet. The possibility of a great naval +engagement filled the minds of most naval officers; and, after we had +sent five of our battleships to reinforce Admiral Beatty's fleet, this +topic became even more interesting to American naval men. Would the +Germans ever come out? What had they to gain or to lose by such an +undertaking? What were their chances of victory? Where would the +engagement be <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_217" id="Page_217">[Pg 217]</a></span>fought, and what part would the several elements of +modern naval warfare play in it: mines, submarines, battle-cruisers, +airplanes, dirigibles, and destroyers? These were among the questions +with which the Planning Section busied itself, and this problem, like +many others, they approached from the German standpoint. They placed +themselves in the position of the German High Command, and peered into +the Grand Fleet looking for a weakness, which, had they been Germans, +they might turn to account in a general engagement. The only weak spot +our Planning Section could find was one which reflected the greatest +credit upon the British forces. The British commander, Admiral Sir David +Beatty, was a particularly dashing and heroic fighter; could not these +splendid qualities really be turned to the advantage of the Germans? +That Admiral Beatty would fight at the first opportunity, and that he +would run all justifiable risks, if a chance presented of defeating the +German fleet, was as well known to the Germans as to ourselves. The +British Admiral, it was also known, did not entertain much respect for +mines and torpedoes. All navies possessed what was known as a "torpedo +flag." This was an emblem which was to be displayed in case torpedoes +were sighted, for the purpose of warning the ships to change course or, +if necessary, to desist from an attack. It was generally reported that +Admiral Beatty had ordered all these torpedo flags to be destroyed; in +case he once started in pursuit of the German fleet, he proposed to take +his chances, dive straight through a school of approaching torpedoes, or +even to rush full speed over a mine-field, making no efforts to avoid +these hidden dangers. That he would probably lose some ships the Admiral +well knew, but he figured—and probably correctly—that he would +certainly have enough vessels left to annihilate the enemy. Still, in +the judgment of our Planning Section, Admiral Beatty's assumed attitude +toward "torpedo flags" gave the Germans their only possible chance of +seriously injuring the Grand Fleet. They drew up a plan of attack on the +Scapa Flow forces based upon this assumption. Imagining themselves +directors of the German navy, they constructed large numbers of torpedo +boats, submarines, and mine-fields and stationed them in a particularly +advantageous position; they then proposed to send the German fleet in +the direction of Scapa Flow, draw the Grand <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_218" id="Page_218">[Pg 218]</a></span>Fleet to the attack, and +then lead it in the direction of the torpedoes and mines. Probably such +a scheme would never have succeeded; but it represented, in the opinion +of our Planning group, Germany's only chance of crippling the Grand +Fleet and winning the war. In other words, had my staff found itself in +Germany's position, that is the strategy which it would probably have +used. I gave this report unofficially to the British Admiralty simply +because I thought it might afford British officers reading that would +possibly be entertaining. It is an evidence of the co-operation that +existed between the two forces, and of the British disposition to accept +suggestions, that this document was immediately sent to Admiral Beatty.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>The fact that I was able ultimately to create such an organization and +leave the administration of its individual departments so largely to +their respective heads was especially fortunate because it gave me time +for what was perhaps the most important of my duties. This was my +attendance at the meetings of the Allied Naval Council, not to mention +daily conferences with various officials of the Allies. This naval +council was the great headquarters for combined Allied operations +against the enemy on the sea. It was not officially constituted by the +Allied governments until November 29, 1917, but it had actually been in +continuous operation since the beginning of the war, the heads of the +Allied admiralties having met frequently in conference. At these +meetings every phase of the situation was discussed, and the methods +finally adopted represented the mature judgment of the Allied naval +chiefs who participated in them. Without this council, and without the +co-operation for which it stood, our efforts would have been so +dispersed and would have so overlapped that their efficiency would have +been greatly decreased. This international naval conference not only had +to decide questions of naval strategy, but it also had to concern itself +with a multitude of practical matters which have little interest for the +public, but which are exceedingly important in war. In this struggle +coal, oil, and other materials played a part almost as important as +ships and men; these materials, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_219" id="Page_219">[Pg 219]</a></span>like ships and men, were limited in +quantity; and it was necessary to apportion them as deliberately and as +economically as the seemingly more important munitions of warfare. The +Germans were constantly changing their tactics; sometimes they would +make their concentrations in a certain area; while at other times their +strength would appear in another field far distant from the first. These +changes made it necessary that we should in each case readjust our +forces to counteract the enemy's tactics. It was a vital necessity that +these readjustments should be made immediately when the enemy's changes +of tactics became known. It is evident that the element necessary to +success was that the earliest and most complete possible information +should be followed by prompt decision and action; and it is manifest +that these requirements could have been satisfied only by a council +which was fully informed and which was on the spot momentarily ready to +act. The Allied Naval Council responded to all these requirements. One +of my first duties, after my arrival, was to attend one of these +councils in Paris; and immediately afterward the meetings became much +more frequent.</p> + +<p>Not only were the proceedings interesting because of the vast importance +of the issues which were discussed, but because they brought me into +intimate contact with some of the ablest minds in the European navies. +Over the first London councils Admiral Jellicoe presided. I have already +given my first impressions of this admirable sailor; subsequent events +only increased my respect for his character and abilities. An English +woman once described Admiral Jellicoe as "a great gentleman"; it is a +description upon which I can hardly improve. The First Lord, Sir Eric +Geddes, though he was by profession an engineer and had been transferred +from the business of building roads and assuring the communications +behind the armies in France to become the civilian head of the British +navy, acquired, in an astonishingly short time, a mastery of the details +of naval administration. Sir Eric is a type of man that we like to think +of as American; perhaps the fact that he had received his business +training in this country, and had served an apprenticeship on the +Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, strengthened this impression. The habitués +of the National Sporting Club in London—of whom I was one—used to look +reproachfully <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_220" id="Page_220">[Pg 220]</a></span>at the giant figure of the First Lord; in their opinion +he had sadly missed his calling. His mighty frame, his hard and supple +muscles, his power of vigorous and rapid movement, his keen eye and his +quick wit—these qualities, in the opinion of those best qualified to +judge, would have made this stupendous Briton one of the greatest +heavyweight prize-fighters in the annals of pugilism. With a little +training I am sure that Sir Eric would even now make a creditable +showing in the professional ring. However, the paths of this business +man and statesman lay in other fields. After returning from America he +had had a brilliant business career in England; he represented the type +which we call "self-made men"; that is, he fought his way to the top +without the aid of influential friends. His elevation to the Admiralty, +in succession to Sir Edward Carson, was something new in British public +life, for Sir Eric had never dabbled in politics, and, until the war +started, he was practically unknown in political circles. But this +crisis in British affairs made it necessary for the Ministry to "draft" +the most capable executives in the nation, irrespective of political +considerations; and Sir Eric, therefore, quite naturally found himself +at the head of the navy. In a short time he had acquired a knowledge of +the naval situation which enabled him to preside over an international +naval council with a very complete grasp of all the problems which were +presented. I have heard the great naval specialists who attended say +that, had they not known the real fact, they would hardly have suspected +that Sir Eric was not a naval man. We admired not only his ability to +direct the course of discussion, and even to take an important part in +it, but also his skill at summing up the results of the whole proceeding +in a few terse and masterly phrases. In fine, the First Lord was a man +after Roosevelt's heart—big, athletic, energetic, with a genius for +reaching the kernel of a question and of getting things done.</p> + +<p>When it came to facility of exposition, however, we Anglo-Saxons made a +poor showing in comparison with most French naval officers and in +particular with Admirals Lacaze and de Bon. Both these gentlemen +represented the Gallic type in its finest aspects. After spending a few +moments with Rear-Admiral Lacaze, it was easy to <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_221" id="Page_221">[Pg 221]</a></span>understand the real +affection which all French naval officers felt for him. He is a small, +slight man, with a grey, pointed beard, and he possesses that +earnestness of spirit, that courtesy of manner, and that sympathy and +charm which we regard as the finest attributes of the cultured +Frenchman. Admiral Lacaze has also a genuine French facility of speech +and that precision of statement which is so characteristic of the French +intellect. A slight acquaintance would make one believe that Admiral +Lacaze would be a model husband and father, perhaps grandfather; it was +with surprise, however, that I learned that he was a bachelor, but I am +sure that he is that kind of bachelor who is an uncle to all of the +children of his acquaintance. As Minister of Marine he was the presiding +officer of the council when it met in Paris.</p> + +<p>In Vice-Admiral de Bon, chief of the French naval staff, Admiral Lacaze +had a worthy colleague; he was really a man of heroic mould, and he +certainly looked the part. His white hair and his white beard, cut +square, gave at first glance an impression of age; yet his clear, pink +skin, not ruffled by a trace of wrinkle, his erect figure, his bright +blue eyes, the vigour of his conversation and the energy of his +movements, betokened rather perpetual youth. Compared with the naval +forces of Great Britain, the French navy was of inconsiderable size, but +in Admiral de Bon it made a contribution to Allied naval strength which +was worth many dreadnoughts. The reputation of this man has scarcely +reached this side of the Atlantic; yet it was the general opinion of +practically all naval men that his was the keenest mind at the Allied +Naval Council. It was certainly the most persuasive in argument, and the +one that had most influence in determining our conclusions. Not that +there was anything about this great French sailor that was arrogant or +offensively self-assertive. On the contrary, his manner was all compact +of charm and courtesy. He was about the most persuasive person I have +ever met. Whenever an important matter arose, there was some influence +that made us turn instinctively to Admiral de Bon for enlightenment; +and, when he rose to talk, the council hung upon his every word. For the +man was a consummate orator. Those who understood French even slightly +had little difficulty in following the Admiral, for he spoke his +delightful language <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_222" id="Page_222">[Pg 222]</a></span>with a precision, a neatness of phrase, and a +clearness of enunciation which made every syllable intelligible. So +perfect did these speeches seem that one would have suspected that +Admiral de Bon had composed them at his leisure, but this was not the +case; the man apparently had only to open his mouth, and his speech +spontaneously flowed forth; he never hesitated for a word. And his words +were not only eloquent, but, as I have said, they were full of +substance. The charm which he manifested on these public occasions he +carried likewise into his domestic life. Whenever the council met in +Paris the Admiral's delightful wife and daughters entertained us at +luncheon—an experience which caused many of us to regret that it did +not always meet in that city.</p> + +<p>The other two members of this interesting group were Rear-Admiral +Funakoshi, representing the Japanese navy, and Vice-Admiral di Revel, +representing the Italian. The Japanese was also naval attaché at London, +and the popularity which he had acquired in this post he also won in the +larger field. In some respects, he was not like the conventional notion +of a Japanese; physically he did not fulfil the accepted rôle, for he +was tall and heavily built; nor was there anything about him that was +"inscrutable"; the fact was that he was exceedingly frank and open, and +apparently loved nothing so much as a good joke. The remark of a London +newspaper that Admiral di Revel, the Italian, "unlike Admiral Sims, +looks every inch the sailor," caused Admiral Funakoshi much amusement; +he could not resist the temptation to chaff me about it. We all became +so well acquainted that, in our lighter moments, we did not mind having +a little fun at one another's expense; and in these passages the +Japanese representative did not always make the poorest showing. The +Italian, di Revel, was a source of continual delight. Someone remarked +that he was in reality an Irishman who had escaped into Italy; and this +facetious characterization was really not inapt. His shock of red hair, +his reddish beard, and his short, stocky figure almost persuaded one +that County Cork was his native soil. He delivered his opinions with an +insistence which indicated that he entertained little doubt about their +soundness; he was not particularly patient if they were called in +question; yet he was so courteous, so energetic, and so <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_223" id="Page_223">[Pg 223]</a></span>entertaining +that he was a general favourite. That his Government appreciated his +services is shown by the fact that it made di Revel a full admiral, a +rank which is rarely bestowed in Italy.</p> + +<p>Such, then, were the men who directed the mighty forces that defeated +the German submarines. The work at the councils was arduous, yet the +opportunity of associating with such men in such a task is one that +comes to few naval officers. They all worked with the most indomitable +spirit; not one of them ever for a moment showed the slightest +discouragement over a situation which was at times disquieting, to say +the least; not one faltered in the determination to force the issue to +the only logical end. History has given few examples of alliances that +worked harmoniously. The Allied Naval Council did its full share in +making harmonious the Allied effort against the submarine.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_224" id="Page_224">[Pg 224]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER VIII</h2> + +<h3>SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>It is not improbable that I have given a false impression concerning the +relative merits of the several methods which were developed for fighting +the submarine. Destroyers, patrol boats, subchasers, and mystery ships +all accomplished great things in solving the most baffling problem +presented by the war. The belief is general that the most successful +hunter of the submarine was the destroyer, and, so far as absolute +figures are concerned, this is true. Destroyers, with their depth +charges and their gunfire, sank more U-boats than any other agency. One +type of craft, however, proved a more destructive enemy of the submarine +than even the destroyer. That was a warship of whose achievements in +this direction little has so far been heard. The activities of the +German submarine have completely occupied public attention; and this is +perhaps the reason why few newspaper readers have suspected that there +were other than German and Austrian submarines constantly operating at +sea. Everyone has heard of the U-boats, yet how many have heard anything +of the H-boats, the E-boats, the K-boats, and the L-boats? The H-, E-, +and K-boats were British submarines, and the L-boats were American +submarines. In the destruction of the German under-water craft these +Allied submarines proved more successful than any kind of surface ship. +The Allied destroyers, about 500 in number, sank 34 German submarines +with gunfire and depth charges; auxiliary patrol craft, such as +trawlers, yachts, and the like, about 3,000 in number, sank 31; while +the Allied submarines, which were only about 100 in number, sank 20. +Since, therefore, the Allies had about five times as many destroyers as +submarines at <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_225" id="Page_225">[Pg 225]</a></span>work, it is evident that the record of the latter vessels +surpasses that of the most formidable surface anti-submarine craft.</p> + +<p>Thus the war developed the fact that the most deadly enemy of the +submarine is the submarine itself. Underwater warfare is evidently a +disease in which like cures like. In a way this is the most astonishing +lesson of the naval operations. It is particularly interesting, because +it so completely demolishes all the ideas on this subject with which we +entered the war. From that day in history when the submarine made its +first appearance, the one quality which seemed to distinguish it from +all other kinds of warship was that it could not be used to fight +itself. Writers were fond of pointing out that battleship could fight +battleship, that cruiser could fight cruiser, that destroyer could fight +destroyer, but that submarine could not fight submarine. This supposed +quality, which was constantly emphasized, was what seemed to make the +introduction of this strange vessel such a dangerous thing for the +British Empire. For more than a hundred years the under-water boat was a +weapon which was regarded as valuable almost exclusively to the weaker +sea powers. In the course of the nineteenth century this engine of sea +fighting made many spectacular appearances; and significantly it was +always heralded as the one effective way of destroying British +domination at sea.</p> + +<p>The inventor of the modern submarine was an undergraduate of Yale named +David Bushnell; his famous <i>Turtle</i>, according to the great British +authority, Sir William White, formerly Chief Naval Constructor of the +British navy, contained every fundamental principle of "buoyancy, +stability, and control of depth" which are found in the modern +submarine; "it cannot be claimed," he said in 1905, "that any new +principle of design has been discovered or applied since Bushnell.... He +showed the way to all his successors.... Although alternative methods of +fulfilling essentials have been introduced and practically tested, in +the end Bushnell's plans in substance have been found the best." The +chief inspiration of Bushnell's work was a natural hostility to Great +Britain, which was at that time engaged in war with his own country; his +submarine, invented in 1777, was intended to sink the British warships +which were then anchored <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_226" id="Page_226">[Pg 226]</a></span>off the American coast, break the +communications of Great Britain with her revolting colonies, and in this +way win our liberty. Bushnell did not succeed in this ambitious +enterprise for reasons which it is hardly necessary to set forth in this +place; the fact which I wish to emphasize is that he regarded his +submarine as an agency which would make it possible for the young United +States, a weak naval power, to deprive Great Britain, the dominant sea +power, of its supremacy. His successor, Robert Fulton, was inspired by a +similar ambition. In 1801 Fulton took his <i>Nautilus</i> into the harbour of +Brest, and blew a merchant vessel into a thousand pieces; this dramatic +experiment was intended to convince Napoleon that there was one way in +which he could destroy the British fleet and thus deprive England of her +sea control. Dramatic as this demonstration was, it did not convince +Napoleon of the value of the submarine; Fulton therefore took his ship +to England and exhibited it to William Pitt, who was then Prime +Minister. The great statesman was much impressed, but he did not regard +the submarine as an innovation that should arouse much enthusiasm in +England. "If we adopt this kind of fighting," he said, "it will be the +end of all navies."</p> + +<p>Despite his own forebodings, Pitt sent Fulton to St. Vincent, who was +then the First Lord of the Admiralty.</p> + +<p>"Pitt is the biggest fool in the world," remarked the head of the +victorious British navy. "Why does he encourage a kind of warfare which +is useless to those who are the masters of the sea, and which, if it +succeeds, will deprive them of this supremacy?"</p> + +<p>The reason for St. Vincent's opposition is apparent. He formed the +conception of the submarine which has prevailed almost up to the present +time. In his opinion, a submarine was a vessel which could constantly +remain under the surface, approach great warships unseen and blow them +to pieces at will. This being the case, a nation which possessed two or +three successfully working engines of this kind could apparently wipe +out the entire British fleet. It therefore needed no argument to show +that this was a weapon which was hardly likely to prove useful to the +British navy. If the submarine could fulfil its appointed mission, it +would give the control of the sea to that nation which used it +successfully; but since Great <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_227" id="Page_227">[Pg 227]</a></span>Britain already controlled the sea, the +new type of war craft was superfluous to her. In the hands of a weak +naval power, however, which had everything to gain and nothing to lose, +it might supply the means of overthrowing the British Empire. Could one +submarine destroy another, it would present no particular menace, for +then, in order to control the sea, it would merely be necessary to build +a larger under-water fleet than that of any prospective enemy: but how +could vessels which spent all their time under the water, in the dark, +ever get a chance to come to blows? From these considerations it seemed +apparent to St. Vincent and other British experts of his time that the +best interests of the British Empire would be served, not by developing +the submarine, but by suppressing it. Fulton's biographer intimates that +the British Government offered Fulton a considerable amount of money to +take his submarine back to America and forget about it; and there is a +letter of Fulton's to Lord Granville, saying that "not for £20,000 a +year would I do what you suggest." But there seemed to be no market for +his invention, and Fulton therefore returned to America and subsequently +gave all his time to exploiting the steamboat. On the defensive powers +of the under-water vessel he also expressed the prevailing idea. +"Submarine," he said, "cannot fight submarine."</p> + +<p>The man who designed the type of submarine which has become the standard +in all modern navies, John P. Holland, similarly advocated it as the +only means of destroying the British navy. Holland was an American of +Irish origin; he was a member of the Fenian brotherhood, and it was his +idea that his vessel could be used to destroy the British navy, blockade +the British coast, and, as an inevitable consequence, secure freedom for +Ireland. This is the reason why his first successful boat was known as +the <i>Fenian Ram</i>, despite the fact that it was not a "ram" at all. And +the point on which Holland always insisted was that the submarine vessel +was a unique vessel in naval warfare, because there was no "answer" to +it. "There is nothing that you can send against it," he gleefully +exclaimed, "not even itself."</p> + +<p>Parliamentary debates in the late nineties indicated that British naval +leaders entertained this same idea. In 1900, Viscount Goschen, who was +then the First Lord of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_228" id="Page_228">[Pg 228]</a></span>the Admiralty, dismissed the submarine as +unworthy of consideration. "The idea of submarine navigation," he said, +"is a morbid one. We need pay no attention to the submarine in naval +warfare. The submarine is the arm of weaker powers." But Mr. +Arnold-Forster, who was himself soon to become a member of the +Admiralty, took exception to these remarks. "If the First Lord," he +said, "had suggested that we should not build submarines because the +problems which control them are not yet solved, I should have hesitated +to combat his argument. But the First Lord has not said so: he has said +that the Admiralty did not care to undertake any project for submarines +because this type of boat could never be anything but the arm of the +feeble. However, if this boat is made practical, the nation which +possesses it will cease to be feeble and become in reality powerful. +More than any other nation do we have reason to fear the submarine. It +is, therefore, not wise to wait with indifference while other nations +work at the solution of this problem without trying to solve it +ourselves." "The question of the best way of meeting submarine attack," +said Viscount Goschen at another time, "is receiving much consideration. +It is in this direction that practical suggestions would be valuable. It +seems certain that the reply to this weapon must be looked for in other +directions than in building submarine boats ourselves, for it is clear +that one submarine cannot fight another."</p> + +<p>This prepossession dominated all professional naval minds in all +countries, until the outbreak of the Great War. Yet the war had lasted +only a few months when the idea was shown to be absurd. Practical +hostilities soon demonstrated, as already said, that not only was the +submarine able to fight another boat of the same type, but that it was +the most effective anti-submarine agency which we possessed—so +effective that the British Admiralty at once began the design of a +special type of hunting submarine having a high under-water speed.</p> + +<p>The fact is that the popular mind, in its attitude toward this new type +of craft, is still too much under the spell of Jules Verne. There is +still the disposition to look upon the submarine as an insidious vessel +which spends practically all of its time under the water, stealthily +slinks along, never once betraying its presence, creeps up at will to +its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_229" id="Page_229">[Pg 229]</a></span>enemy and discharges its torpedo. Yet the description which these +pages have already given of its operations shows the falsity of this +idea. It is important that we should keep constantly in mind the fact +that the submarine is only occasionally a submarine; and that for the +greater part of its career it is a surface boat. In the long journeys +which the German U-boats made from the Heligoland Bight around Scotland +and Ireland to those great hunting grounds which lay in the Atlantic +trade routes, they travelled practically all the time on the surface of +the water. The weary weeks during which they cruised around, looking for +their victims, they also spent almost entirely on the surface. There +were virtually only two circumstances which compelled them to disappear +beneath the waves. The first of these was the occasion on which the +submarine detected a merchant ship; in this case it submerged, for the +success of its attempt to torpedo depended entirely upon its operating +unseen. The second occasion which made it necessary to submerge was when +it spied a destroyer or other dangerous patrolling craft; the submarine, +as has been said, could not fight a vessel of this type with much chance +of success. Thus the ability to submerge was merely a quality that was +utilized only in those crises when the submarine either had to escape a +vessel which was stronger than itself or planned to attack one which was +weaker.</p> + +<p>The time taken up by these disappearances amounted to only a fraction of +the total period consumed in a cruise. Yet the fact that the submarine +had to keep itself momentarily ready to make these disappearances is +precisely the reason why it was obliged to spend the larger part of its +time on the surface. The submarine has two sets of engines, one for +surface travel and the other for subsurface travel. An oil-engine +propels it on the top of the water, but this consumes a large amount of +air, and, for this reason, it cannot be used when travelling under the +surface. As soon as the vessel dives, therefore, it changes its motive +power to an electric motor, which makes no inroads on the oxygen needed +for sustaining the life of its crew. But the physical limitation of size +prevents the submarine from carrying large storage batteries, which is +only another way of saying that its cruising radius under the water is +extremely small, not more than fifty <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_230" id="Page_230">[Pg 230]</a></span>or sixty miles. In order to +recharge these batteries and gain motive power for subsurface travel, +the submarine has to come to the surface. Yet the simple fact that the +submarine can accomplish its destructive work only when submerged, and +that it can avoid its enemy only by diving, makes it plain that it must +always hold itself in readiness to submerge on a moment's notice and +remain under water the longest possible time. That is, its storage +batteries must always be kept at their highest efficiency; they must not +be wasted by unnecessary travelling under the water; the submarine, in +other words, must spend all its time on the surface, except those brief +periods when it is attempting to attack a merchant ship or escape an +enemy. Almost the greatest tragedy in the life of a submarine is to meet +a surface enemy, such as a destroyer, when its electric batteries are +exhausted. It cannot submerge, for it can stay submerged only when it is +in motion, unless it is in water shallow enough to permit it to rest on +the bottom. Even though it may have a little electricity, and succeed in +getting under water, it cannot stay there long, for its electric power +will soon be used up, and therefore it is soon faced with the +alternative of coming to the surface and surrendering, or of being +destroyed. The success of the submarine, indeed its very existence, +depends upon the vessel spending the largest possible part of its time +upon the surface, keeping its full supply of electric power constantly +in reserve, so that it may be able to dive at a moment's notice and to +remain under the water for the maximum period.</p> + +<p>This purely mechanical limitation explains why the German submarine was +not a submarine in the popularly accepted meaning of that term. Yet the +fact that this vessel remained for the greater part of its existence on +the surface was no particular disadvantage, so long as it was called +upon to contend only with surface vessels. Even with the larger part of +its decks exposed the U-boat was a comparatively small object on the +vast expanse of the sea. I have already made clear the great +disadvantage under which destroyers and other patrolling vessels +laboured in their attempts to "hunt" this type of enemy. A destroyer, +small as it is, was an immensely larger object than the under-water +boat, and the consequence was that the lookout on a submarine, +proceeding along on the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_231" id="Page_231">[Pg 231]</a></span>surface, could detect the patrolling vessel +long before it could be observed itself. All the submarine had to do, +therefore, whenever the destroyer appeared on the horizon, was to seek +safety under water, remain there until its pursuer had passed out of +sight, and then rise again and resume its operations. Before the +adoption of the convoy system, when the Allied navies were depending +chiefly upon the patrol—that is, sending destroyers and other surface +craft out upon the high seas to hunt for the enemy—the enemy submarines +frequently operated in the same areas as the patrol vessels, and were +only occasionally inconvenienced by having to keep under the water to +conceal their presence. But let us imagine that the destroyer, in +addition to its depth charges, its torpedoes, its guns, and its ability +to ram, had still another quality. Suppose, for a moment, that, like the +submarine, it could steam submerged, put up a periscope which would +reveal everything within the radius of a wide horizon, and that, when it +had picked up an enemy submarine, it could approach rapidly under the +water, and discharge a torpedo. It is evident that such a manœuvre as +this would have deprived the German of the only advantage which it +possessed over all other war craft—its ability to make itself unseen.</p> + +<p>No destroyer can accomplish any such magical feat as this: indeed, there +is only one kind of vessel that can do so, and that is another +submarine. This illustration immediately makes it clear why the Allied +submarine itself was the most destructive enemy of the German submarine. +When Robert Fulton, John P. Holland, and other authorities declared that +the under-water vessel could not fight its own kind, it is evident that +they had not themselves foreseen the ways in which their inventions were +to be used. They regarded their craft as ships that would sail the +larger part of the time under the waves, coming up only occasionally to +get their bearings and to take in a fresh supply of air. It was plain to +these pioneers that vessels which spent practically all their time +submerged could not fight each other, for the sufficient reason that +they could not see each other; a combat under these conditions would +resemble a prize-fight between two blindfolded pugilists. Neither would +such vessels fight upon the surface, for, even though they were supplied +with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_232" id="Page_232">[Pg 232]</a></span>guns—things which did not figure in the early designs of +submarines—one boat could decline the combat simply by submerging. In +the minds of Fulton and Holland an engagement between such craft would +reduce itself to mutual attempts to ram each other under the water, and +many fanciful pictures of the early days portrayed exciting deep-sea +battles of this kind, in which submarines, looking like mighty sea +monsters, provided with huge glaring headlights, made terrific lunges at +each other. None of the inventors foresaw that, in such battles as would +actually take place, the torpedo would be used, and that the submarine +which was defeated would succumb to one of those same stealthy attacks +which it was constantly meditating against surface craft.</p> + +<p>Another point of the highest importance is that in a conflict of +submarine against submarine the Allied boats had one great advantage +over the German. Hans Rose and Valentiner and Moraht and other U-boat +commanders, as already explained, had to spend most of their time on the +surface in order to keep their batteries fully supplied with +electricity, in readiness for the dives that would be necessary when the +Allied destroyers approached. But the Allied submarine commander did not +have to maintain this constant readiness; the reason, it is hardly +necessary to say, is that the Allied submarine had no surface enemies, +for there were no German surface craft operating on the high seas; the +Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow was carefully attending to that very essential +detail. Occasionally, indeed, our submarines were attacked by our own +destroyers, but accidents of this kind, though uncomfortably frequent, +were not numerous enough to interfere with the operation I have in mind. +The statement seems almost like a contradiction in terms, yet it is +entirely true, that, simply because the Allied submarines did not have +to hold themselves constantly ready to submerge, they could in fact +spend a considerable part of their time under the water, for they were +not compelled to economize electric power so strictly. This gave them a +great advantage in hunting the U-boats. British and American submarines +could fully charge their batteries, drop under water and cruise around +with enough speed to maintain a horizontal position at "periscope +depth," that is, a depth just sufficient to enable them to project <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_233" id="Page_233">[Pg 233]</a></span>the +periscope above the water whenever desired. This speed was so very +slow—about one mile an hour—that it could be kept up an entire day +without exhausting the electric batteries.</p> + +<p>The net result was this: The German submarine necessarily sailed most of +the time on the surface with its conning-tower and deck exposed, whereas +the Allied submarine when on its hunting grounds, spent all of the +daylight hours under water, with only the periscope visible from time to +time for a few seconds. Just as the German U-boat could "spot" an Allied +destroyer at a great distance without being itself seen, so could the +periscope invariably see the German submarine on the surface long before +this tiny object came within the view of a U-boat conning-tower. Our +submarine commander could remain submerged, sweep the ocean with his +periscope until he had picked up the German enemy; then, still under +water, and almost invariably unseen, he could steal up to a position +within range, and discharge a torpedo into its fragile side. The German +submarine received that same treatment which it was itself administering +to harmless merchantmen; it was torpedoed without warning; inasmuch, +however, as it was itself a belligerent vessel, the proceeding violated +no principle of international law.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>The Allied submarines, like many other patrol craft, spent much of their +time in those restricted waters which formed the entrances to the +British Isles. Their favourite places were the English Channel, St. +George's Channel, which forms the southern entrance to the Irish Sea, +and the northern passage-way between Scotland and Ireland. At these +points, it may be remembered, the cargo ships could usually be found +sailing singly, either entirely unescorted, or escorted inadequately, +while on their way to join a convoy or to their destinations after the +dispersal of a convoy; these areas were thus almost the only places +where the German submarines had much chance of attacking single vessels. +The territory was divided into squares, each one of which was indicated +by a letter: and the section assigned to each submarine was known as +its <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_234" id="Page_234">[Pg 234]</a></span>"billet." Under ordinary circumstances, the Allied submarine spent +all its time, while patrolling, on its own particular "billet"; only in +case the pursuit of an enemy led it outside the "square" was it +permissible to leave. Allied submarines also hunted the U-boats in the +North Sea on the routes which the latter had to take in coming out or +returning through the passages in the German mine-fields of the +Heligoland Bight, or through the Skager Rack.</p> + +<p>As previously explained, in the daytime the Allied submarine remained +under the water, its periscope exposed for a short time every fifteen +minutes or so, sweeping the sea for a distance of many miles. As soon as +darkness set in, the boat usually emerged, began taking in new air and +recharging its batteries, the crew seizing the opportunity to stretch +their legs and catch a welcome glimpse of the external world. The simple +fact that the Allied submarines spent the larger part of their time +under water, while the German spent the larger part of their time on the +surface, gave our boats a great military advantage over the foe, but it +likewise made existence in our submarine service more arduous. Even on +the coldest winter days there could be no artificial heat, for the +precious electricity could not be spared for that purpose, and the +temperature inside the submarine was the temperature of the water in +which it sailed. The close atmosphere, heavily laden also with the smell +of oil from the engines and the odours of cooking, and the necessity of +going for days at a time without a bath or even a wash, added to the +discomfort. The stability of a submerged submarine is by no means +perfect; the vessel is constantly rolling, and a certain number of the +crew, even the experienced men, are frequently seasick. This movement +sometimes made it almost impossible to stay in a bunk and sleep for any +reasonable period; the poor seaman would perhaps doze off, but a lurch +of the vessel would send him sprawling on the deck. One could hardly +write, for it was too cold, or read, for there was little light; and +because of the motion of the vessel, it was difficult to focus one's +eyes on the page. A limited amount of smoking was permitted, but the air +was sometimes so vitiated that only the most vigorous and incessant +puffing could keep a cigarette alight. One of the most annoying things +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_235" id="Page_235">[Pg 235]</a></span>about the submarine existence is the fact that the air condenses on the +sides as the coldness increases, so that practically everything becomes +wet; as the sailor lies in his bunk this moisture is precipitated upon +him like raindrops. This combination of discomforts usually produced, +after spending a few hours under the surface, that mental state commonly +known as "dopey."</p> + +<p>The usual duration of a "cruise" was eight days, and by the end of that +time many of the crew were nearly "all in," and some of them entirely +so. But the physical sufferings were the least discomfiting. Any moment +the boat was likely to hit one of the mines the Germans were always +planting. A danger which was particularly vexatious was that a British +or an American submarine was just about as likely to be attacked by +Allied surface craft as the Germans themselves. At the beginning, +recognition signals were arranged by which it was expected that an +Allied under-water craft, coming to the surface, could make its identity +known to a friendly warship; sometimes these signals succeeded, but more +frequently they failed, and the attacks which British and American +destroyers made upon their own submarines demonstrated that there was no +certainty that such signals would offer any protection. A rather grim +order directed all destroyers and other patrol craft to sink any +submarine on sight, unless there was positive information that a +friendly submarine was operating in the neighbourhood. To a large +extent, therefore, the life of our submarine sailors was the same as +that of the Germans. Our men know how it feels to have a dozen depth +charges explode around them, for not infrequently they have had to +endure this sort of thing from their own comrades. Mistakes of this +sort, even though not very numerous, were so likely to happen at any +time that whenever an Allied submarine saw an Allied destroyer at a +distance, it usually behaved just as a German would have behaved under +the same conditions: it dived precipitately to the safety of deep water. +Our men, that is, did not care to take the risk of a discussion with the +surface craft; it was more prudent to play the part of an enemy. One day +one of the American submarines, lying on the surface, saw an American +destroyer, and, cheered in their loneliness by the sight of such a +friendly vessel, waited for it to approach, making <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_236" id="Page_236">[Pg 236]</a></span>all the +identification signals carefully set down in the books. Instead of a +cordial greeting, however, about twenty rounds of projectiles began +falling about the L-boat, which as hastily as possible dropped to sixty +feet under the surface. In a few minutes depth charges began exploding +around him in profusion, the plates of the vessel shook violently, the +lights went out, and the end seemed near. Making a last effort, the +American submarine rose to the surface, sent up all the recognition +signals the officers could think of, and this time with success. The +destroyer approached, the commander shouting from the bridge:</p> + +<p>"Who are you?"</p> + +<p>"American submarine <i>A L-10</i>."</p> + +<p>"Good luck, old man," came a now familiar voice from the bridge. "This +is Bill."</p> + +<p>The commander of the destroyer and the commander of the submarine had +been room-mates at Annapolis!</p> + +<p>In other ways our submarine force passed through the same experiences as +the Germans. Its adventures shed the utmost light upon this campaign +against merchantmen which the Germans had depended upon to win the war. +The observer at the periscope was constantly spotting huge Allied +merchantmen making their way into port. The great ships sailed on, +entirely oblivious of the periscope and the eye of the British or +American watcher fixed upon them.</p> + +<p>"How easy to sink her!" the observer would say to himself. This game in +which the Germans were engaged was a dangerous one, because of Allied +anti-submarine craft; but, when it came to attacking merchant ships, it +was the easiest thing in the world. After a few weeks in a submarine, it +grew upon our men that the wonder was not that the Germans had sunk so +many merchant ships, but that they had sunk so few. Such an experience +emphasized the conviction, which was prevalent in both the British and +American navies, that the Germans were not particularly skilful at the +occupation which seemed to be so congenial to them. Indeed, there are +few things in the world that appear so absolutely helpless as a great +merchant ship when observed through the periscope of an under-water +boat.</p> + +<p>Whenever an Allied submarine met its enemy the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_237" id="Page_237">[Pg 237]</a></span>contest was usually a +short one. The issue, one way or the other, was determined in a few +minutes. On rare occasions there were attempts to ram; almost +invariably, however, it was the torpedo which settled the conflict. If +our boat happened to be on the surface when it sighted the German, +which, however, was very seldom the case, the first manœuvre was to +dive as quickly and as unostentatiously as possible. If it succeeded in +getting under before the U-boat discovered its presence, it then crept +up, guided only by the periscope, until it had reached a spot that was +within range. The combat, as was the case so frequently in this war, was +one-sided. The enemy submarine seldom knew its assailant was anywhere in +the neighbourhood; a merchant ship, from its relatively high bridge, +could sometimes see the torpedo approach and turn out of its way; but it +was almost impossible to see a wake from the low conning-tower or +periscope of a submarine, and no one except the observer had a glimpse +of the surface. The small size of the submarine was in itself a great +protection; we launched many torpedoes, but only occasionally scored a +hit. The missile would usually pass a few feet ahead or astern, or would +glide over or under the submerged hulk, perhaps a few inches only saving +it from destruction. Once an American torpedo hit its enemy squarely on +the side but failed to explode! If the torpedo once struck and +functioned, however, it was all over in a few seconds. A huge geyser of +water would leap into the air; and the submarine would sometimes rise at +the same time, or parts of it would fly in a dozen directions; then the +waters would gradually subside, leaving a mammoth oil patch, in which +two or three members of the crew might be discovered struggling in the +waves. Most of the men in the doomed vessel never knew what had struck +them.</p> + +<p>Thus, early one evening in May, 1918, the <i>E-35</i>, a British submarine, +was patrolling its billet in the Atlantic, about two hundred miles west +of Gibraltar. About two or three miles on the port beam a long, +low-lying object was distinguished on the surface; the appearance was +nondescript, but, to the practised eye at the periscope, it quickly took +shape as an enemy submarine. As the sea was rather rough, the <i>E-35</i> +dived to forty feet; after a little while it ascended to twenty-six, put +up the periscope, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_238" id="Page_238">[Pg 238]</a></span>and immediately saw, not far away, a huge enemy +submarine proceeding north at a leisurely pace, never once suspecting +that one of its own kind was on its trail. In order to get within range +and cut the German off, the Britisher dived again to forty feet, went +ahead for twenty minutes with all the speed it could muster, and again +came near enough to the surface to put up its periscope. Now it was +directly astern; still the British submarine was not near enough for a +sure shot, so again it plunged beyond periscope depth, coming up at +intervals during the next hour, each time observing with satisfaction +that it was lessening the distance between itself and its prey. When the +range had been decreased to two hundred and fifty yards, and when the +<i>E-35</i> had succeeded in getting in such a position that it could fire +its torpedo, the missile was launched in the direction of the foe. But +this was only another of the numerous occasions when the shot missed. +Had the German submarine been a surface ship, it would have seen the +wake and probably escaped by flight; but still it sailed nonchalantly on +its way, never suspecting for a moment that a torpedo had missed its +vitals by only a few feet. Soon the <i>E-35</i> crept still closer, and fired +two torpedoes simultaneously from its bow tubes. Both hit at the same +time. Not a glimpse of the German submarine was seen from that moment. A +terrific explosion was heard, a mountain of water rose in the air, then +in a few seconds everything was still. A small patch of oil appeared on +the surface; this gradually expanded in size until it covered a great +area; and then a few German sailors came up and started swimming toward +the British vessel.</p> + +<p>We Americans had seven submarines based on Berehaven, Ireland, whose +"billets" were located in the approaches to the Irish Sea. The most +spectacular achievement of any one of our boats was a curious mix-up +with a German submarine, the details of which have never been accurately +ascertained, but the practical outcome of which was indisputably the +sinking of the German boat. After a week's hard work on patrol, the <i>A +L-2</i> was running back to her base on the surface when the lookout +sighted a periscope. The <i>A L-2</i> at once changed her course, the torpedo +was made ready to fire, when the quiet of the summer afternoon was rent +by a terrific roar and explosion. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_239" id="Page_239">[Pg 239]</a></span>It was quite apparent that something +exceedingly distressing had happened to the German submarine; the +American turned, and made a steep dive, in an attempt to ram the enemy, +but failed. Listening with the hydrophone, the <i>A L-2</i> could hear now +the whirring of propellers, which indicated that the submarine was +attempting to gain surface and having difficulty in doing so, and now +and then the call letters of the German under-water signal set, which +seemed to show that the vessel was in distress and was sending appeals +for aid. According to the Admiralty records, a German submarine +operating in that area never returned to port; so it seems clear enough +that this German was lost. Commander R. C. Grady, who commanded the +American submarine division, believes that the German spotted the +American boat before it was itself seen, that it launched a torpedo, +that this torpedo made an erratic course (a not infrequent trick of a +torpedo) around our ship, returned and hit the vessel from which it +started. There are others who think that there were two German +submarines in the neighbourhood, that one fired at our boat, missed it, +and that its torpedo sped on and struck its mate. Probably the real +facts about the happening will never be explained.</p> + +<p>Besides the actual sinkings to their credit, the Allied submarines +accomplished strategic results of the utmost importance. We had reason +to believe that the Germans feared them almost more than any other +agency, unless it was the mine. "We got used to your depth charges," +said the commander of a captured submarine, "and did not fear them; but +we lived in constant dread of your submarines. We never knew what moment +a torpedo was going to hit us." So greatly did the Germans fear this +attack that they carefully avoided the areas in which the Allied +under-water boats were operating. We soon learned that we could keep any +section free of the Germans which we were able to patrol with our own +submarines. It also soon appeared that the German U-boats would not +fight our subsurface vessels. At first this may seem rather strange; +certainly a combat between two ships of the same kind, size, and +armament would seem to be an equal one; the disinclination of the German +to give battle under such conditions would probably strike the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_240" id="Page_240">[Pg 240]</a></span>layman +as sheer cowardice. But in this attitude the Germans were undoubtedly +right.</p> + +<p>The business of their submarines was not to fight warships; it was +exclusively to destroy merchantmen. The demand made upon the U-boat +commanders was to get "tonnage! tonnage!" Germany could win the war in +only one way: that was by destroying Allied shipping to such an extent +that the Allied sea communications would be cut, and the supplies of men +and munitions and food from the United States shut off. For this +tremendous task Germany had an inadequate number of submarines and +torpedoes. Only by economizing to the utmost extent on these vessels and +these weapons could she entertain any hope of success. Had Germany +possessed an unlimited quantity of submarines and torpedoes, she might +perhaps have profitably expended some of them in warfare on British +"H-boats" and American "L-boats"; or, had there been a certainty of +"getting" an Allied submarine with each torpedo fired, it would have +been justifiable to use these weapons, small as was the supply. The fact +was, however, that the Allies expended many torpedoes for every +submarine sunk; and this was clearly a game which Germany could not +afford to play. Evidently the U-boats had orders to slip under the water +whenever an Allied submarine was seen; at least this was the almost +invariable procedure. Thus the Allied submarines compelled their German +enemies to do the one thing which worked most to their disadvantage: +that is, to keep submerged when in the same area with our submarines; +this not only prevented them from attacking merchantmen, but forced them +to consume their electric power, which, as I have already explained, +greatly diminished their efficiency as attacking ships.</p> + +<p>The operations of Allied submarines also greatly diminished the value of +the "cruiser" submarines which Germany began to construct in 1917. These +great subsurface vessels were introduced as an "answer" to the convoy +system. The adoption of the convoy, as I have already explained, made it +ineffective for the Germans to hunt far out at sea. Until the Allies had +put this plan into operation, the relatively small German U-boats could +go two or three hundred miles into the Atlantic and pick off almost at +will the merchant ships, which were then <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_241" id="Page_241">[Pg 241]</a></span>proceeding alone and +unescorted. But now the destroyers went out to a point two or three +hundred miles from the British coast, formed a protecting screen around +the convoy, and escorted the grouped ships into restricted waters. The +result of this was to drive the submarines into these coastal waters; +here again, however, they had their difficulties with destroyers, +subchasers, submarines, and other patrol craft. It will be recalled that +no destroyer escort was provided for the merchant convoys on their way +across the Atlantic; the Allies simply did not have the destroyers for +this purpose. The Germans could not send surface raiders to attack these +convoys in mid-ocean, first, because their surface warships could not +escape from their ports in sufficient numbers to accomplish any decisive +results, and, secondly, because Allied surface warships accompanied +every convoy to protect them against any such attack. There was only one +way in which the Germans could attack the convoys in mid-ocean. A fleet +of great ocean-going submarines, which could keep the sea for two or +three months, might conceivably destroy the whole convoy system at a +blow. The scheme was so obvious that Germany in the summer of 1917 began +building ships of this type. They were about 300 feet long, displaced +about 3,000 tons, carried fuel and supplies enough to maintain +themselves for three or four months from their base, and, besides +torpedoes, had six-inch guns that could outrange a destroyer. By the +time the armistice was signed Germany had built about twenty of these +ships. But they possessed little offensive value against merchantmen. +The Allied submarines and destroyers kept them from operating in the +submarine zone. They are so difficult to manœuvre that not only could +they not afford to remain in the neighbourhood of our anti-submarine +craft, but they were not successful in attacking merchant vessels. They +never risked torpedoing a convoy, and rarely even a single vessel, but +captured a number by means of their superior gunfire. These huge +"cruiser submarines," which aroused such fear in the civilian mind when +the news of their existence first found its way into print, proved to be +the least harmful of any of the German types.</p> + +<p>The Allied submarines accomplished another result of the utmost +importance. They prevented the German <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_242" id="Page_242">[Pg 242]</a></span>U-boats from hunting in groups or +flotillas. All during 1917 and 1918 the popular mind conjured up +frightful pictures of U-boat squadrons, ten or fifteen together, lying +in wait for our merchantmen or troopships. Hardly a passenger crossed +the ocean without seeing a dozen German submarines constantly pursuing +his ship. In a speech which I made to a group of American editors who +visited England in September, 1918, I touched upon this point. "I do not +know," I told these journalists, "how many submarines you gentlemen saw +on the way over here, but if you had the usual experience, you saw a +great many. I have seen many accounts in our papers on this subject. If +you were to believe these accounts, you could only conclude that many +vessels have crossed the ocean with difficulty because submarines were +so thick that they scraped all the paint off the vessels' sides. All of +these accounts are, of course, unofficial. They get into the American +papers in various ways. It is to be regretted that they should be +published and thereby give a false impression. Some time ago I saw a +letter from one of our men who came over here on a ship bound into the +English Channel. This letter was written to his girl. He said that he +intended to take the letter on shore and slip it into a post box so that +the censor should not see it. The censor did see it and it eventually +came to me. This man was evidently intent on impressing on his girl the +dangers through which he had passed. It related that the vessel on which +he had made the voyage had met two or three submarines a day; that two +spies were found on board and hanged; and it said, 'When we arrived off +our port there were no less than eighteen submarines waiting for us. Can +you beat it?'"</p> + +<p>Perhaps in the early days of the war the German U-boats did hunt in +flotillas; if so, however, they were compelled to abandon the practice +as soon as the Allied submarines began to operate effectively. I have +already indicated the circumstances which reduced their submarine +operations to a lonely enterprise. In the open sea it was impossible to +tell whether a submarine was a friend or an enemy. We never knew whether +a submarine on the surface was one of our own or a German; as a result, +as already said, we gave orders to attack any under-water boat, unless +we had absolute knowledge that it was a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_243" id="Page_243">[Pg 243]</a></span>friend. Unquestionably the +Germans had the same instructions. It would therefore be dangerous for +them to attempt to operate in groups, for they would have no way of +knowing that their supposed associate was not an Allied or an American +submarine. Possibly, even after our submarines had become exceedingly +active, the Germans may have attempted to cruise in pairs; one +explanation of the strange adventure of the <i>A L-2</i>, as said above, was +that there were two U-boats in the neighbourhood; yet the fact remains +that there is no well-established case on record in which they did so. +This circumstance that they had to operate singly was a strategic point +greatly to our advantage, especially, as I shall describe, when we began +transporting American troops.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_244" id="Page_244">[Pg 244]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER IX</h2> + +<h3>THE AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN THE NORTH SEA</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>Was there no more satisfactory way of destroying submarines than by +pursuing them with destroyers, sloops, chasers, and other craft in the +open seas? It is hardly surprising that our methods impressed certain of +our critics as tedious and ill-conceived, and that a mere glance at a +small map of the North Sea suggested a far more reasonable solution of +the problem. The bases from which the German submarines found their way +to the great centres of shipping were Ostend and Zeebrugge on the +Belgian coast, Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven on the German coast, and the +harbour of Kiel in the Baltic Sea. From all these points the voyage to +the waters that lay west and south of Ireland was a long and difficult +one; in order to reach these hunting grounds the German craft had either +to pass through the Straits of Dover to the south, or through the wide +passage-way of the North Sea that stretched between the Shetland Islands +and Norway, and thence sail around the northern coast of Ireland. We +necessarily had little success in attempting to interfere with the +U-boats while they were making these lengthy open-sea voyages, but +concentrated our efforts on trying to oppose them after they had reached +the critical areas.</p> + +<div class="img"> +<a href="images/map1.jpg"> +<img border="0" src="images/map1.jpg" width="75%" alt="THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE" /></a><br /> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em; margin-left: 50%; font-size: 85%;">Emery Walper Ltd. sc.</p> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE</p> +<p class="noin" style="margin-top: .2em; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%;">Just how many German submarines were sunk in attempting to get by this +barrage will never be known, for it did its work silently without any +observers. It was probably a contributory cause of the mutiny which +demoralized the German fleet in the autumn of 1918.</p> +</div> + +<p>But a casual glance at the map convinced many people that our procedure +was a mistake. And most newspaper readers in those days were giving much +attention to this map. Many periodicals, published in Great Britain and +the United States, were fond of exhibiting to their readers diagrams of +the North Sea; these diagrams contained one heavy black bar drawn across +the Straits of Dover and another drawn across the northern passage from +Scotland to Norway. The accompanying printed matter informed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_245" id="Page_245">[Pg 245]</a></span>the public +that these pictures illustrated the one effective "answer" to the +submarine. The black bars of printer's ink represented barrages of mines +and nets, which, if they were once laid between the indicated spots, +would blow to pieces any submarine which attempted to force a way +across. Not a single German U-boat could therefore succeed in getting +out of the North Sea. All the trans-Atlantic ships which contained the +food supplies and war materials so essential to Allied success would +thus be able to land on the west coast of England and France; the +submarine menace would automatically disappear and the war on the sea +would be won. Unfortunately, it was not only the pictorial artists +employed on newspapers and magazines who insisted that this was the +royal road to success. Plenty of naval men, in the United States and in +Europe, were constantly advancing the contention, and statesmen in our +own country and in Allied countries were similarly fascinated by this +programme. When I arrived in London, in April, 1917, the great plan of +confining the submarines to their bases was everywhere a lively topic of +discussion. There was not a London club in which the Admiralty was not +denounced for its stupidity in not adopting such a perfectly obvious +plan. The way <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_246" id="Page_246">[Pg 246]</a></span>to destroy a swarm of hornets—such was the favourite +simile—was to annihilate them in their nests, and not to hunt and +attack them, one by one, after they had escaped into the open. What the +situation needed was not a long and wearisome campaign, involving +unlimited new construction to offset the increasing losses of life and +shipping, and altogether too probable defeat in the end, but a swift and +terrible blow which would end the submarine menace overnight.</p> + +<p>The naval officers who expressed fears that, under the shipping +conditions prevailing in 1917, such a brilliant performance could not +possibly be carried out in time to avoid defeat, merely gained a +reputation for timidity and lack of resourcefulness. When the First Lord +of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, in 1915 declared that the British +fleet would "dig the Germans out of their holes like rats," his remarks +did not greatly impress naval strategists, but they certainly sounded a +note which was popular in England. One fact, not generally known at that +time, demonstrated the futility of the whole idea. Most newspaper +critics assumed that the barrage from Dover to Calais was keeping the +submarines out of the Channel. That the destroyers, aircraft, and other +patrols were safely escorting troopships and other vessels across the +Channel was a fact of which the British public was justly proud. Yet it +did not necessarily follow that the submarines could not use the Channel +as a passage-way from their German bases to their operating areas in the +focus of Allied shipping routes. The mines and nets in the Channel, of +which so much was printed in the first three years of the war, did not +offer an effective barrier to the submarines. This was due to various +reasons too complicated for description in a book of this untechnical +nature. The unusually strong tides and rough weather experienced in the +vicinity of the Straits of Dover are well known. As one British officer +expressed it at the time, "our experience in attempting to close the +Strait has involved both blood and tears"—blood because of the men who +were lost in laying the mines and nets, and tears because the arduous +work of weeks would be swept away in a storm of a single night. In +addition, at this stage of the war the British were still experimenting +with mines; they had discovered gradually that the design which they had +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_247" id="Page_247">[Pg 247]</a></span>used up to that time—the same design which was used in the American +navy—was defective. But the process of developing new mines in wartime +had proved slow and difficult; and the demands of the army on the +munition factories had prevented the Admiralty from obtaining a +sufficient number. The work of the Dover patrols was a glorious one, as +will appear when all of the facts come to public knowledge. But in 1917 +this patrol was not preventing the U-boats from slipping through the +Channel. The Straits of Dover, at the point where this so-called barrage +was supposed to have existed, is about twenty miles wide. The +passage-way between Scotland and Norway is 250 miles wide. The water in +the Channel has an average depth of a few fathoms; in the northern +expanse of the North Sea it reaches an average depth of 600 feet. Mining +in such deep waters had never been undertaken or even considered before +by any nation. The English Channel is celebrated for its strong tides +and stormy weather, but it is not the scene of the tempestuous gales +which rage so frequently in the winter months in these northern waters. +If the British navy had not succeeded in constructing an effective mine +barrier across the English Channel, what was the likelihood that success +would crown an effort to build a much greater obstruction in the far +more difficult waters to the north?</p> + +<p>The one point which few understood at that time was that the mere +building of the barrage would not in itself prevent the escape of +submarines from the North Sea. Besides building such a barrage, it would +be necessary to protect it with surface vessels. Otherwise German +mine-sweepers could visit the scene, and sweep up enough of the +obstruction to make a hole through which their submarines could pass. It +is evident that, in a barrage extending 250 miles, it would not be +difficult to find some place in which to conduct such sweeping +operations; it is also clear that it would take a considerable number of +patrolling vessels to watch such an extensive barrier and to interfere +with such operations. Moreover, we could not send our mine-layers into +the North Sea without destroyer escort; that is, it would be necessary +to detach a considerable part of our forces to protect these ships while +they were laying their mines. Those responsible for anti-submarine +operations believed that in the spring and summer of 1917 it would <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_248" id="Page_248">[Pg 248]</a></span>have +been unwise to detach these anti-submarine vessels from the area in +which they were performing such indispensable service. The overwhelming +fact was that we needed all the surface craft we could assemble for the +convoy system. The destroyers which we had available for this purpose +were entirely inadequate; to have diverted any of them for other duties +would at that time have meant destruction to the Allied cause. The +object of placing the barrage so far north was to increase the enemy's +difficulty in attempting to sweep a passage through it and facilitate +its defence by our forces. The impossibility of defending a mine barrier +placed too far south was shown by experience in that area of the North +Sea which was known as the "wet triangle." By April, 1917, the British +had laid more than 30,000 mines in the Bight of Heligoland, and were +then increasing these obstructions at the rate of 3,000 mines a month. +Yet this vast explosive field did not prevent the Germans from sending +their submarines to sea. The enemy sweepers were dragging out channels +through the mine-fields almost as rapidly as the British were putting +new fields down; we could not prevent this, because protecting vessels +could not remain so near the German bases without losses from submarine +attacks. Moreover, the Germans also laid mines in the same area in order +to trap the British mine-layers; and these operations resulted in very +considerable losses on each side. These impediments made the egress of a +submarine a difficult and nerve-racking process; it sometimes required +two or three days and the assistance of a dozen or so surface vessels to +get a few submarines through the Heligoland Bight into open waters. +Several were unquestionably destroyed in the operation, yet the activity +of submarines in the Atlantic showed that these mine-fields had by no +means succeeded in proving more than a harassing measure. It was +estimated that the North Sea barrage would require about 400,000 mines, +far more than existed in the world at that time, and far more than all +our manufacturing resources could then produce within a reasonable +period. I have already made the point, and I cannot make it too +frequently, that time is often the essential element in war—and in this +case it was of vital importance. Whether a programme is a wise one or +not depends not only upon the feasibility of the plan itself, but upon +the time and the circumstances in which it is proposed. In <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_249" id="Page_249">[Pg 249]</a></span>the spring +of 1917 the situation which we were facing was that the German +submarines were destroying Allied shipping at the rate of nearly 800,000 +tons a month. The one thing which was certain was that, if this +destruction should continue for four or five months, the Allies would be +obliged to surrender unconditionally. The pressing problem was to find +methods that would check these depredations and that would check them in +time. The convoy system was the one naval plan—the point cannot be made +too emphatically—which in April and May of 1917 held forth the +certainty of immediately accomplishing this result. Other methods of +opposing the submarines were developed which magnificently supplemented +the convoy; but the convoy, at least in the spring and summer of 1917, +was the one sure method of salvation for the Allied cause. To have +started the North Sea barrage in the spring and summer of 1917 would +have meant abandoning the convoy system; and this would have been sheer +madness.</p> + +<p>Thus in 1917 the North Sea barrage was not an answer to the popular +proposal "to dig the Germans out of their holes like rats." We did not +have a mine which could be laid in such deep waters in sufficient +numbers to have formed any barrier at all; and even if we had possessed +one, the construction of the barrage would have demanded such an +enormous number that they could not have been manufactured in time to +finish the barrage until late in the year 1918. Presently the situation +began to change. The principal fact which made possible this great +enterprise was the invention of an entirely new type of mine. The old +mine consisted of a huge steel globe, filled with high explosive, which +could be fired only by contact. That is, it was necessary for the +surface of a ship, such as a submarine, to strike against the surface of +the mine, and in this way start the mechanism which ignited the +explosive charge. The fact that this immediate contact was essential +enormously increased the difficulty of successfully mining waters that +range in depth from 400 to 900 feet. If the mines were laid anywhere +near the surface, the submarine, merely by diving beneath them, could +avoid all danger; if they were laid any considerable depth, it could +sail with complete safety above them. Thus, if such a mine were to be +used at all, we should have had to plant several layers, one under the +other, down to a depth of about 250 feet, so that the submarine, at +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_250" id="Page_250">[Pg 250]</a></span>whatever depth it might be sailing, would be likely to strike one of +these obstructions. This required such a large number of mines as to +render the whole project impossible. We Americans may take pride in the +fact that it was an American who invented an entirely new type of mine +and therefore solved this difficulty. In the summer of 1917 Mr. Ralph C. +Browne, an electrical engineer of Salem, Mass., offered a submarine gun +for the consideration of Commander S. P. Fullinwider, U.S.N., who was +then in charge of the mining section of the Bureau of Ordnance. As a +submarine gun this invention did not seem to offer many chances of +success, but Commander Fullinwider realized that it comprised a firing +device of excellent promise. The Bureau of Ordnance, assisted by Mr. +Browne, spent the summer and autumn experimenting with this contrivance +and perfecting it; the English mining officers who had been sent to +America to co-operate with our navy expressed great enthusiasm over it; +and some time about the beginning of August, 1917, the Bureau of +Ordnance came to the conclusion that it was a demonstrated success. The +details of Mr. Browne's invention are too intricate for description in +this place, but its main point is comprehensible enough. Its great +advantage was that it was not necessary for the submarine to strike the +mine in order to produce the desired explosion. The mine could be +located at any depth and from it a long "antenna," a thin copper cable, +reached up to within a few feet of the surface, where it was supported +in that position by a small metal buoy. Any metallic substance, such as +the hull of a submarine, simply by striking this antenna at any point, +would produce an electric current, which, instantaneously transmitted to +the mine, would cause this mine to explode. The great advantage of this +device is at once apparent. Only about one fourth the number of mines +required under the old conditions would now be necessary. The Mining +Section estimated that 100,000 mines would form a barrier that would be +extremely dangerous to submarines passing over it or through it, +whereas, under the old conditions, about 400,000 would have been +required. This implies more than a mere saving in manufacturing +resources; it meant that we should need a proportionately smaller number +of mine-laying ships, crews, officers, bases, and supplies—all those +things which are seldom considered by the amateur in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_251" id="Page_251">[Pg 251]</a></span>warfare, but which +are as essential to its prosecution as the more spectacular details.</p> + +<p>I wish to emphasize the fact that, in laying such a barrage, it was not +our object to make an absolute barrier to the passage of submarines. To +have done this we should have needed such a great number of mines that +the operation would have been impossible. Nor would such an absolute +barrier have been necessary to success; a field that could be depended +upon to destroy one-fourth or one-fifth of the submarines that attempted +the passage would have represented complete success. No enemy could +stand such losses as these; and the <i>moral</i> of no crew could have lasted +long under such conditions.</p> + +<p>Another circumstance which made the barrage a feasible enterprise was +that by the last of the year 1917 it was realized that the submarine had +ceased to be a decisive factor in the war. It still remained a serious +embarrassment, and every measure which could possibly thwart it should +be adopted. But the writings of German officers which have been +published since the war make it apparent that they themselves realized +early in 1918 that they would have to place their hopes of victory on +something else besides the submarine. The convoy system and the other +methods of fighting under-water craft which I have already described had +caused a great decrease in sinkings. In April of 1917 the losses were +nearly 900,000 tons; in November of the same year they were less than +300,000 tons.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a> Meanwhile, the construction of merchant shipping, +largely a result of the tremendous expansion of American shipbuilding +facilities, was increasing at a tremendous rate. A diagram of these, the +two essential factors in the submarine campaign, disclosed such a +rapidly rising curve of new shipping, and such a rapidly falling curve +of sinkings, that the time could be easily foreseen when the net amount +of Allied shipping, after the submarines had done their worst, would +show a promising increase. But, as stated above, the submarines were +still a distinct menace; they were still causing serious losses; and it +was therefore very important that we should leave no stone unturned +toward demonstrating beyond a shadow of doubt that warfare as conducted +by these craft could be entirely put down. The more successfully we +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_252" id="Page_252">[Pg 252]</a></span>demonstrated this fact and the more energetically we prosecuted every +form of opposition, the earlier would the enemy's general <i>moral</i> break +down and victory be assured. In war, where human lives as well as +national interests are at stake, no thought whatever can be given to +expense. It is impossible to place a value on human life. Therefore, on +November 2, 1917, the so-called "Northern Barrage" project was +officially adopted by both the American and the British Governments. +When I say that the proposed mine-field was as long as the distance from +Washington to New York, some idea of its magnitude may be obtained. +Nothing like it had ever been attempted before. The combined operations +involved a mass of detail which the lay mind can hardly comprehend. The +cost—$40,000,000—is perhaps not an astonishing figure in the +statistics of this war, but it gives some conception of the size of the +undertaking.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>During the two years preceding the war Captain Reginald R. Belknap +commanded the mine-laying squadron of the Atlantic fleet. Although his +force was small, consisting principally of two antiquated warships, the +<i>Baltimore</i> and the <i>San Francisco</i>, Captain Belknap had performed his +duties conscientiously and ably, and his little squadron therefore gave +us an excellent foundation on which to build. Before the European War +the business of mine-laying had been unpopular in the American navy as +well as in the British; such an occupation, as Sir Eric Geddes once +said, had been regarded as something like that of "rat catching"; as +hostilities went on, however, and the mine developed great value as an +anti-submarine weapon, this branch of the service began to receive more +respectful attention. Captain Belknap's work not only provided the +nucleus out of which the great American mine force was developed, but he +was chiefly responsible for organizing this force. The "active front" of +our mine-laying squadron was found in the North Sea; but the sources of +supply lay in a dozen shipyards and several hundred manufacturing plants +in the United States.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_253" id="Page_253">[Pg 253]</a></span>We began this work with practically nothing; we had to obtain ships and +transform them into mine-layers; to enlist and to train their crews; to +manufacture at least 100,000 mines; to create bases both in the United +States and Scotland; to transport all of our supplies more than 3,000 +miles of wintry sea, part of the course lying in the submarine zone; and +we had to do all this before the real business of planting could begin. +The fact that the Navy made contracts for 100,000 of these new mines +before it had had the opportunity of thoroughly testing the design under +service conditions shows the great faith of the Navy Department in this +new invention. More than 500 contractors and sub-contractors, located in +places as far west as the Mississippi River, undertook the work of +filling this huge order. Wire-rope mills, steel factories, foundries, +machine shops, electrical works, and even candy makers, engaged in this +great operation; all had their troubles with labour unions, with the +railroads, and with the weather—that was the terrible winter of +1917-18; but in a few months trainloads of mine cases—great globes of +steel—and other essential parts began to arrive at Norfolk, Virginia. +This port was the place where the mine parts were loaded on ships and +sent abroad. The plant which was ultimately constructed at this point +was able to handle 1,000 mines a day; the industry was not a popular one +in the neighbourhood, particularly after the Halifax explosion had +proved the destructive powers of the materials in which it dealt. In a +few months this establishment had handled 25,000,000 pounds of TNT. The +explosive was melted in steel kettles until it reached about the density +of hasty pudding; with the aid of automatic devices it was then poured +into the mine cases, 300 pounds to a case, and thence moved on a +mechanical conveyor to the end of the pier. Twenty-four cargo vessels, +for the most part taken from the Great Lakes, carried these cargoes to +the western coast of Scotland. Beginning in February, 1918, two or three +of these ships sailed every eight days from Norfolk, armed against +submarines and manned by naval crews. The fact that these vessels were +slow made them an easy prey for the under-water enemy; one indeed was +sunk, with the loss of forty-one men; regrettable as was this mishap, it +represented the only serious loss of the whole expedition.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_254" id="Page_254">[Pg 254]</a></span>The other vital points were Newport, Rhode Island, where the six +mine-layers were assembled; and Fort William and Kyle of Lochalsh on the +western coast of Scotland, which were the disembarking points for the +ships transporting the explosives. Captain Belknap's men were very proud +of their mine-layers, and in many details they represented an +improvement over anything which had been hitherto employed in such a +service. At this point I wish to express my very great appreciation of +the loyal and devoted services rendered by Captain Belknap. An organizer +of rare ability, this officer deserves well of the nation for the +conspicuous part which he played in the development of the North Sea +Mine Barrage from start to finish. Originally, these mine-layers had +been coastwise vessels; two of them were the <i>Bunker Hill</i> and the +<i>Massachusetts</i>, which for years had been "outside line" boats, running +from New York to Boston; all had dropped the names which had served them +in civil life and were rechristened for the most part with names which +eloquently testified to their American origin—<i>Canonicus</i>, <i>Shawmut</i>, +<i>Quinnebaug</i>, <i>Housatonic</i>, <i>Saranac</i>, <i>Roanoke</i>, <i>Aroostook</i>, and +<i>Canandaigua</i>. These changes in names were entirely suitable, for by the +time our forces had completed their alterations the ships bore few +resemblances to their former state. The cabins and saloons had been +gutted, leaving the hulls little more than empty shells; three decks for +carrying mines had been installed; on all these decks little railroad +tracks had been built on which the mines could be rolled along the lower +decks to the elevators and along the upper mine deck to the stern and +dropped into the sea. Particularly novel details, something entirely new +in mine-layers, were the elevators, the purpose of which was to bring +the mines rapidly from the lower decks to the launching track. So +rapidly did the work progress, and so well were the crews trained, that +in May, 1918, the first of these ten ships weighed anchor and started +for their destination in Scotland. Already our navy had selected as +bases the ports of Inverness and Invergordon, on Moray Firth, harbours +which were reasonably near the waters in which the mines were to be +laid. From Invergordon the Highland Railway crosses Scotland to +Lochalsh, and from Inverness the Caledonian Canal runs to Fort William. +These two <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_255" id="Page_255">[Pg 255]</a></span>transportation lines—the Highland Railway and the Caledonian +Canal—served as connecting links in our communications. If we wish a +complete picture of our operation, we must call to mind first the +hundreds of factories in all parts of our country, working day and +night, making the numerous parts of these instruments of destruction and +their attendant mechanisms; then hundreds of freight cars carrying them +to the assembling plant at Norfolk, Virginia; then another small army of +workmen at this point mixing their pasty explosive, heating it to a +boiling point, and pouring the concoction into the spherical steel +cases; then other groups of men moving the partially prepared mines to +the docks and loading them on the cargo ships; then these ships quietly +putting to sea, and, after a voyage of ten days or two weeks, as quietly +slipping into the Scottish towns of Fort William and Kyle; then trains +of freight cars and canal boats taking the cargoes across Scotland to +Inverness and Invergordon, where the mines were completed and placed in +the immense storehouses at the bases and loaded on the mine-layers as +the necessity arose. Thus, when the whole organization was once +established on a working basis, we had uninterrupted communications and +a continuous flow of mines from the American factories to the stormy +waters of the North Sea.</p> + +<p>The towns in which our officers and men found themselves in late May, +1918, are among the most famous in Scottish history and legend. Almost +every foot of land is associated with memories of Macbeth, Mary Queen of +Scots, Cromwell, and the Pretender. "The national anthem woke me," says +Captain Belknap, describing his first morning at his new Scottish base. +"I arose and looked out. What a glorious sight! Green slopes in all +freshness, radiant with broom and yellow gorse; the rocky shore mirrored +in the Firth, which stretched, smooth and cool, wide away to the east +and south; and, in the distance, snow-capped Ben Wyvis. Lying off the +entrance to Munlochy Bay, we had a view along the sloping shores into +the interior of Black Isle, of noted fertility. Farther out were Avoch, +a whitewashed fishing village, and the ancient town of Fortrose, with +its ruined twelfth-century cathedral. Across the Firth lay Culloden +House, where Bonnie Prince Charlie slept before the battle. Substantial, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_256" id="Page_256">[Pg 256]</a></span>but softened in outline by the morning haze, the Royal Burgh of +Inverness covered the banks and heights along the Ness River, gleaming +in the bright sunshine. And how peaceful everywhere! The <i>Canandaigua</i> +and the <i>Sonoma</i> lay near by, the <i>Canonicus</i> farther out, but no +movement, no signal, no beat of the engine, no throbbing pumps." The +reception which the natives gave our men was as delightful as the +natural beauty of the location. For miles around the Scots turned out to +make things pleasant for their Yankee guests. The American naval forces +stationed at the mining bases in those two towns numbered about 3,000 +officers and men, and the task of providing relaxations, in the heart of +the Highlands, far removed from theatres and moving-picture houses, +would have been a serious one had it not been for the cordial +co-operation of the people. The spirit manifested during our entire stay +was evidenced on the Fourth of July, when all the shops and business +places closed in honour of American Independence Day and the whole +community for miles around joined our sailors in the celebration. The +officers spent such periods of relaxation as were permitted them on the +excellent golf links and tennis courts in the adjoining country; dances +were provided for the men, almost every evening, the Scottish lassies +showing great adaptability in learning the American steps. Amateur +theatricals, in which both the men from the warships and the Scottish +girls took part, cheered many a crew after its return from the +mine-fields. Baseball was introduced for the first time into the country +of William Wallace and Robert Burns. Great crowds gathered to witness +the matches between the several ships; the Scots quickly learned the +fine points and really developed into "fans," while the small boys of +Inverness and Invergordon were soon playing the game with as much +enthusiasm and cleverness as our own youngsters at home. In general, the +behaviour of our men was excellent and made the most favourable +impression.</p> + +<p>These two mine-assembly bases at Inverness and Invergordon will ever +remain a monumental tribute to the loyal and energetic devotion to duty +of Captain Orin G. Murfin, U.S. Navy, who designed and built them; +originally the bases were intended to handle 12,000 mines, but in +reality Captain Murfin successfully handled as many as 20,000 at <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_257" id="Page_257">[Pg 257]</a></span>one +time. It was here also that each secret firing device was assembled and +installed, very largely by reserve personnel. As many as 1,200 mines +were assembled in one day, which speaks very eloquently for the +foresight with which Captain Murfin planned his bases.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">III</p> + +<p>But of course baseball and dancing were not the serious business in +hand; these Americans had come this long distance to do their part in +laying the mighty barrage which was to add one more serious obstacle to +the illegal German submarine campaign. Though the operation was a joint +one of the American and British navies, our part was much the larger. +The proposal was to construct this explosive impediment from the Orkney +Islands to the coast of Norway, in the vicinity of Udsire Light, a +distance of about 230 nautical miles. Of this great area about 150 +miles, extending from the Orkneys to 3 degrees east longitude, was the +American field, and the eastern section, which extended fifty nautical +miles to Norway, was taken over by the British. Since an operation of +this magnitude required the supervision of an officer of high rank, +Rear-Admiral Joseph Strauss, who had extended experience in the ordnance +field of the navy, came over in March, 1918, and took command. The +British commander was Rear-Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N.</p> + +<p>The mines were laid in a series of thirteen expeditions, or +"excursions," as our men somewhat cheerfully called them. The ten +mine-layers participated in each "excursion," all ten together laying +about 5,400 mines at every trip. Each trip to the field of action was +practically a duplicate of the others; a description of one will, +therefore, serve for all. After days, and sometimes after weeks of +preparation the squadron, usually on a dark and misty night, showing no +lights or signals, would weigh anchor, slip by the rocky palisades of +Moray Firth, and stealthily creep out to sea. As the ships passed +through the nets and other obstructions and reached open waters, the +speed increased, the gunners took their stations at their batteries, and +suddenly from a dark horizon came a glow of low, rapidly moving vessels; +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_258" id="Page_258">[Pg 258]</a></span>these were the British destroyers from the Grand Fleet which had been +sent to escort the expedition and protect it from submarines. The +absolute silence of the whole proceeding was impressive; not one of the +destroyers showed a signal or a light; not one of the mine-layers gave +the slightest sign of recognition; all these details had been arranged +in advance, and everything now worked with complete precision. The +swishing of the water on the sides and the slow churning of the +propellers were the only sounds that could possibly betray the ships to +their hidden enemies. After the ships had steamed a few more miles the +dawn began to break; and now a still more inspiring sight met our men. A +squadron of battleships, with scout cruisers and destroyers, suddenly +appeared over the horizon. This fine force likewise swept on, apparently +paying not the slightest attention to our vessels. They steamed steadily +southward, and in an hour or so had entirely disappeared. The observer +would hardly have guessed that this squadron from Admiral Beatty's fleet +at Scapa Flow had anything to do with the American and British +mine-layers. Its business, however, was to establish a wall of steel and +shotted guns between these forces and the German battle fleet at Kiel. +At one time it was believed that the mine forces on the northern barrage +would prove a tempting bait to the German dreadnoughts; and that, +indeed, it might induce the enemy to risk a second general engagement on +the high seas. At any rate, a fleet of converted excursion steamers, +laying mines in the North Sea, could hardly be left exposed to the +attacks of German raiders; our men had the satisfaction of knowing that +while engaged in their engrossing if unenviable task a squadron of +British or American battleships—for Admiral Rodman's forces took their +regular turn in acting as a "screen" in these excursions—was standing a +considerable distance to the south, prepared to make things lively for +any German surface vessels which attempted to interfere with the +operation.</p> + +<p>Now in the open seas the ten mine-layers formed in two columns, abreast +of each other and five hundred yards apart, and started for the waters +of the barrage. Twelve destroyers surrounded them, on the lookout for +submarines, for the ships were now in the track of the U-boats bound for +their hunting ground or returning to their home ports. At a flash from +the flagship all slackened speed, and put out <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_259" id="Page_259">[Pg 259]</a></span>their paravanes—those +under-water outrigger affairs which protected the ships from mines; for +it was not at all unlikely that the Germans would place some of their +own mines in this field, for the benefit of the barrage builders. This +operation took only a few minutes; then another flash, and the squadron +again increased its speed. It steamed the distance across the North Sea +to Udsire Light, then turned west again and headed for that mathematical +spot on the ocean which was known as the "start point"—the place, that +is, where the mine-laying was to begin. In carrying out all these +manœuvres—sighting the light on the Norwegian coast—the commander +was thinking, not only of the present, but of the future; for the time +would come, after the war had ended, when it would be necessary to +remove all these mines, and it was therefore wise to "fix" them as +accurately as possible in reference to landmarks, so as to know where to +look for them. All this time the men were at their stations, examining +the mines to see that everything was ready, testing the laying +mechanisms, and mentally rehearsing their duties. At about four o'clock +an important signal came from the flagship:</p> + +<p>"Have everything ready, for the squadron will reach 'start point' in an +hour and mine-laying will begin."</p> + +<p>Up to this time the ships were sailing in two columns; when they came +within seven miles of "start point," another signal was broken out; the +ships all wheeled like a company of soldiers, each turning sharply to +the right, so that in a few minutes, instead of two columns, we had +eight ships in line abreast, with the remaining two, also in line +abreast, sailing ahead of them. This splendid array, keeping perfect +position, approached the starting point like a line of racehorses +passing under the wire. Not a ship was off this line by so much as a +quarter length; the whole atmosphere was one of eagerness; the officers +all had their eyes fixed upon the stern of the flagship, for the glimpse +of the red flag which would be the signal to begin. Suddenly the flag +was hauled down, indicating:</p> + +<p>"First mine over."</p> + +<p>If you had been following one of these ships, you would probably have +been surprised at the apparent simplicity of the task. The vessel was +going at its full speed; at intervals of a few seconds a huge black +object, about five <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_260" id="Page_260">[Pg 260]</a></span>feet high, would be observed gliding toward the +stern; at this point it would pause for a second or two, as though +suspended in air; it would then give a mighty lurch, fall head first +into the water, sending up a great splash, and then sink beneath the +waves. By the time the disturbance was over the ship would have advanced +a considerable distance; then, in a few seconds, another black object +would roll toward the stern, make a similar plunge, and disappear. You +might have followed the same ship for two or three hours, watching these +mines fall overboard at intervals of about fifteen seconds. There were +four planters, each of which could and did on several trips lay about +860 mines in three hours and thirty-five minutes, in a single line about +forty-four miles long. These were the <i>Canandaigua</i>, the <i>Canonicus</i>, +the <i>Housatonic</i>, and the <i>Roanoke</i>. Occasionally the monotony of this +procedure would be enlivened by a terrible explosion, a great geyser of +water rising where a mine had only recently disappeared; this meant that +the "egg," as the sailors called it, had gone off spontaneously, without +the assistance of any external contact; such accidents were part of the +game, the records showing that about 4 per cent. of all the mines +indulged in such initial premature explosions. For the most part, +however, nothing happened to disturb the steady mechanical routine. The +mines went over with such regularity that, to an observer, the whole +proceeding seemed hardly the work of human agency. Yet every detail had +been arranged months before in the United States; the mines fell into +the sea in accordance with a time-table which had been prepared in +Newport before the vessels started for Scotland. Every man on the ship +had a particular duty to perform and each performed it in the way in +which he had been schooled under the direction of Captain Belknap.</p> + +<p>The spherical mine case, which contains the explosive charge and the +mechanism for igniting it, is only a part of the contrivance. While at +rest on board the ship this case stands upon a box-like affair, about +two feet square, known as the anchor; this anchor sinks to the bottom +after launching and it contains an elaborate arrangement for maintaining +the mine at any desired depth beneath the surface. The bottom of the +"anchor" has four wheels, on which it runs along the little railroad +track on the launching deck to the jumping-off place at the stern. All +along these railroad <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_261" id="Page_261">[Pg 261]</a></span>tracks the mines were stationed one back of +another; as one went overboard, they would all advance a peg, a mine +coming up from below on an elevator to fill up the vacant space at the +end of the procession. It took a crew of hard-working, begrimed, and +sweaty men to keep these mines moving and going over the stern at the +regularly appointed intervals. After three or four hours had been spent +in this way and the ships had started back to their base, the decks +would sometimes be covered with the sleeping figures of these exhausted +men. It would be impossible to speak too appreciatively of the spirit +they displayed; in the whole summer there was not a single mishap of any +importance. The men all felt that they were engaged in a task which had +never been accomplished before, and their exhilaration increased with +almost every mine that was laid. "Nails in the coffin of the Kaiser," +the men called these grim instruments of vengeance.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">IV</p> + +<p>I have described one of these thirteen summer excursions, and the +description given could be applied to all the rest. Once or twice the +periscope of a submarine was sighted—without any disastrous +results—but in the main this business of mine-laying was uneventful. +Just what was accomplished the chart makes clear. In the summer and +autumn months of 1918 the American forces laid 56,571 mines and the +British 13,546. The operation was to have been a continuous one; had the +war gone on for two years we should probably have laid several hundred +thousand; Admiral Strauss's forces kept at the thing steadily up to the +time of the armistice; they had become so expert and the barrage was +producing such excellent results that we had plans nearly completed for +building another at the Strait of Otranto, which would have completely +closed the Adriatic Sea. Besides this undertaking the American +mine-layer <i>Baltimore</i> laid a mine-field in the North Irish Channel, the +narrow waters which separate Scotland and Ireland; two German submarines +which soon afterward attempted this passage were blown to pieces, and +after this the mine-field was given a wide berth.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_262" id="Page_262">[Pg 262]</a></span>Just what the North Sea barrage accomplished, in the actual destruction +of submarines, will never be definitely known. We have information that +four certainly were destroyed, and in all probability six and possibly +eight; yet these results doubtless measure only a small part of the +German losses. In the majority of cases the Germans had little or no +evidence of sunken submarines. The destroyers, subchasers, and other +patrol boats were usually able to obtain some evidences of injury +inflicted; they could often see their quarry, or the disturbances which +it made on the surface; they could pursue and attack it, and the +resultant oil patches, wreckage, and German prisoners—and sometimes the +recovered submarine itself or its location on the bottom—would tell the +story either of damage or destruction. But the disconcerting thing about +the North Sea barrage, from the viewpoint of the Germans, was that it +could do its work so secretly that no one, friend or enemy, would +necessarily know a thing about it. A German submarine simply left its +home port; attempting to cross the barrage, perhaps at night, it would +strike one of these mines, or its antenna; an explosion would crumple it +up like so much paper; with its crew it would sink to the bottom; and +not a soul, perhaps not even the crew itself, would ever know what had +happened to it. It would in truth be a case of "sinking without a +trace"—though an entirely legitimate one under the rules of warfare. +The German records disclosed anywhere from forty to fifty submarines +sunk which did not appear in the records of the Allies; how these were +destroyed not a soul knows, or ever will know. They simply left their +German ports and were never heard of again. That many of them fell +victims to mines, and some of them to the mines of our barrage, is an +entirely justifiable assumption. That probably even a larger number of +U-boats were injured is also true. A German submarine captain, after the +surrender at Scapa Flow, said that he personally knew of three +submarines, including his own, which had been so badly injured at the +barrage that they had been compelled to limp back to their German ports.</p> + +<p>The results other than the sinking of submarines were exceedingly +important in bringing the war to an end. It was the failure of the +submarine campaign which defeated the German hopes and forced their +surrender; and in this <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_263" id="Page_263">[Pg 263]</a></span>defeat the barrage was an important element. +That submarines frequently crossed it is true; there was no expectation, +when the enterprise was started, that it would absolutely shut the +U-boats in the North Sea; but its influence in breaking down the German +<i>moral</i> must have been great. To understand this, just place yourself +for a moment in the position of a submarine crew. The width of this +barrage ranged from fifteen to thirty-five miles; it took from one to +three hours for a submarine to cross this area on the surface and from +two to six hours under the surface. Not every square foot, it is true, +had been mined; there were certain gaps caused by the spontaneous +explosions to which I have referred; but nobody knew where these +openings were, or where a single mine was located. The officers and +crews knew only that at any moment an explosion might send them to +eternity. A strain of this sort is serious enough if it lasts only a few +minutes; imagine being kept in this state of mind anywhere from one to +six hours! Submarine prisoners constantly told us how they dreaded the +mines; going through such a field, I suppose, was about the most +disagreeable experience in this nerve-racking service. Our North Sea +barrage began to show results almost immediately after our first +planting. The German officers evidently kept informed of our progress +and had a general idea of the territory which had been covered. For a +considerable time a passage-way, sixty miles wide, was kept open for the +Grand Fleet just east of the Orkney Islands; the result was that the +submarines, which had hitherto usually skirted the Norwegian coast, now +changed their route, and attempted to slip through the western +passage-way—a course that enabled them to avoid the mine-field. When +the entire distance from the Orkneys to Norway had been mined, however, +it became impossible to "run around the end." The Germans were now +obliged to sail boldly into this explosive field, taking their chances +of hitting a mine. Stories of this barrage were circulated all over +Germany; sailors who had been in contact with it related their +experiences to their fellows; and the result was extremely demoralizing +to the German submarine flotilla. The North Sea barrage was probably a +contributory cause of the mutiny which demoralized the German fleet in +the autumn of 1918.</p> + +<p>I think I am therefore justified in saying that this <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_264" id="Page_264">[Pg 264]</a></span>enterprise was a +strong factor in overcoming the submarine menace, though the success of +the convoy system had already brought the end in sight, and had thus +made it practicable to assign, without danger of defeat, the tonnage +necessary to lay the barrage and maintain and augment it as long as +might be necessary. The Germans saw the barrage not only as it was in +the autumn of 1918, but as it would be a few months or a year hence. We +had started a steady stream of mines from hundreds of factories in the +United States to our Scottish bases; these establishments were +constantly increasing production, and there was practically no limit to +their possible output. We had developed a mine-laying organization which +was admittedly better than any that had been hitherto known; and this +branch of the service we could now enlarge indefinitely. In time we +could have planted this area so densely with explosives that it would +have been madness for any submarines even to attempt a passage. To be +sure, the Pentland Firth, between the Orkneys and Scotland, was always +open, and could not be mined on account of its swift tides, but besides +being a dangerous passage at best it was constantly patrolled to make it +still more dangerous.</p> + +<p>The loyal devotion to duty and the skilful seamanship which our officers +displayed in this great enterprise were not only thoroughly in keeping +with the highest traditions of the navy, but really established new +standards to guide and inspire those who will follow us. These gallant +officers who actually laid the mines are entitled to the nation's +gratitude, and I take great pleasure in commending the work of Captain +H. V. Butler, commanding the flagship <i>San Francisco</i>; Captain J. Harvey +Tomb, commanding the <i>Aroostook</i>; Captain A. W. Marshall, commanding the +<i>Baltimore</i>; Commander W. H. Reynolds, commanding the <i>Canandaigua</i>; +Captain T. L. Johnson, commanding the <i>Canonicus</i>; Captain J. W. +Greenslade, commanding the <i>Housatonic</i>; Commander D. Pratt Mannix, +commanding the <i>Quinnebaug</i>; Captain C. D. Stearns, commanding the +<i>Roanoke</i>; Captain Sinclair Gannon, commanding the <i>Saranac</i>; and +Captain W. T. Cluverius, commanding the <i>Shawmut</i>.</p> + +<p>This splendid squadron, of which the flagship was the <i>San Francisco</i>, +was organized by Captain R. R. Belknap and, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_265" id="Page_265">[Pg 265]</a></span>by order of the Secretary +of the Navy, was placed under his direct command; and he was therefore +responsible for all preparations, tactics, general instructions, special +instructions for each mine-laying "excursion," the intricate navigation +required, and in fact all arrangements necessary for the successful +planting of the mines in their assigned positions.</p> + +<h4>FOOTNOTE:</h4> + +<div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> Complete statistics of shipping losses, new ship +construction for 1917 and 1918, will be found in Appendices VIII and +IX.</p></div> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_266" id="Page_266">[Pg 266]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<h3>GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT THE AMERICAN COAST</h3> +<br /> + +<p>It was in the summer of 1918 that the Germans made their only attempt at +what might be called an offensive against their American enemies. +Between the beginning of May and the end of October, 1918, five German +submarines crossed the Atlantic and torpedoed a few ships on our coast. +That submarines could make this long journey had long been known. +Singularly enough, however, the impression still prevails in this +country that the German U-boats were the first to accomplish the feat. +In the early autumn of 1916 the <i>U-53</i>—commanded by that submarine +officer, Hans Rose, who has been previously mentioned in these +pages—crossed the Atlantic, dropped in for a call at Newport, R.I., +and, on the way back, sank a few merchant vessels off Nantucket. A few +months previous the so-called merchant submarine <i>Deutschland</i> had made +its trip to Newport News. The Teutonic press, and even some +Germanophiles in this country, hailed these achievements as marking a +glorious page in the record of the German navy. Doubtless the real +purpose was to show the American people how easily these destructive +vessels could cross the Atlantic; and to impress upon their minds the +fate which awaited them in case they maintained their rights against the +Prussian bully. As a matter of fact, it had been proved, long before the +<i>Deutschland</i> or the <i>U-53</i> had made their voyages, that submarines +could cross the Atlantic. In 1915, not one but ten submarines had gone +from North America to Europe under their own power. Admiral Sir John +Fisher tells about this expedition in his recently published memoirs. In +1914, the British Admiralty had contracted for submarines with Charles +M. Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel Company. As international +law prohibited the construction of war vessels by a nation in wartime +for the use of a <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_267" id="Page_267">[Pg 267]</a></span>belligerent with which it was at peace, the parts of +ten submarines were sent to Canada, where they were put together. These +submarines then crossed the Atlantic under their own power, and were +sent from British ports to the Dardanelles, where they succeeded in +driving Turkish and German shipping out of the Sea of Marmora. Thus a +crossing of the Atlantic by American-built submarines manned by British +crews had been accomplished before the Germans made their voyages. It +was therefore not necessary for the two German submarines to cross the +Atlantic to prove that the thing could be done; but the Germans +doubtless believed that this demonstration of their ability to operate +on the American coast would serve as a warning to the American people.</p> + +<p>We were never at all deceived as to what would be the purpose of such a +visit after our entrance into the war. In the early part of 1917 the +Allies believed that a few German U-boats might assail our coast, and I +so informed the Navy Department at Washington. My cables and letters of +1917 explained fully the reasons why Germany might indulge in such a +gesture. Strategically, as these despatches make clear, such attacks +would have no great military value. To have sent a sufficient number of +submarines to do any considerable damage on the American coast would +have been a great mistake. Germany's one chance of winning the war with +the submarine weapon was to destroy shipping to such an extent that the +communications of the Allies with the outside world, and especially with +the United States, would be cut. The only places where the submarine +warfare could be conducted with some chance of success were the ocean +passage routes which lead to European ports, especially in that area +south and south-west of Ireland in which were focussed the trade routes +for ships sailing from all parts of the world and destined for British +and French ports. With the number of submarines available, the Germans +could keep enough of their U-boats at work in these areas to destroy a +large number of merchant ships. Germany thus needed to concentrate all +of her available submarines at these points; she had an inadequate +number for her purpose; to send any considerable force three thousand +miles across the Atlantic would simply weaken her efforts in the real +scene of warfare and would make her submarine campaign a failure. The +cruises of submarines on the <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_268" id="Page_268">[Pg 268]</a></span>American coast would have been very much +longer and would have been a much more serious strain on the submarines +than were the shorter cruises in the inshore waters of Europe. As has +already been explained, the submarine did not differ from other craft in +its need for constant repairs and careful upkeep, except that perhaps it +was a more delicate instrument of warfare than any other naval craft, +and that it would require longer and more frequent periods of overhaul. +Any operations carried out three thousand miles from their bases, where +alone supplies, spare parts, and repair facilities were available, would +have soon reduced the submarine campaign to comparative uselessness; +each voyage would have resulted in sinking a relatively small amount of +shipping; a great number of submarines would be out of commission at all +times for repairs, or would be lost through accidents. The Germans had +no submarine bases in American waters and could establish none. +Possibly, as the newspaper writer has pointed out, they might have +seized a deserted island off the coast of Maine or in the Caribbean, and +cached there a reservoir of fuel and food; unless, however, they could +also have created at these places adequate facilities for repairing +submarines or supplying them with torpedoes and ammunition, such a place +would not have served the purpose of a base at all. Comparatively few of +the German submarines could have made the cruise to the American coast +and operated successfully there so far away from their bases for any +considerable time. In the time spent in such an enterprise, the same +submarine could make three or four trips in the waters about the British +Isles, or off the coast of France, and could sink four or five times the +tonnage which could be destroyed in the cruise on the Atlantic coast. In +the eastern Atlantic, the submarine could seek its victims in an area +comprising a comparatively few square miles, at points where shipping +was so dense that a submarine had only to take a station and lie in +wait, and be certain, within a short time, of encountering valuable +ships which it could attack successfully with its torpedoes. If the +U-boats should be sent to America, on the other hand, they would have to +patrol up and down three thousand miles of coast, looking for victims; +and even when they found them the ships that they could sink would +usually be those engaged in the coastwise traffic, which were of +infinitely less military <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_269" id="Page_269">[Pg 269]</a></span>importance than the transports which were +carrying food, munitions, and supplies to the Allies and which were +being sunk in the eastern Atlantic.</p> + +<p>Anything resembling an attack in force on American harbours was +therefore improbable. Yet it seemed likely from the first that the +Germans would send an occasional submarine into our waters, as a measure +of propaganda rather than for the direct military result that would be +achieved. American destroyers and other vessels were essential to the +success of the whole anti-submarine campaign of the Allies. The sooner +they could all be sent into the critical European waters the sooner the +German campaign of terrorism would end. If these destroyers, or any +considerable part of them, could be kept indefinitely in American +waters, the Germans might win the war. Any manœuvre which would have +as its result the keeping of these American vessels, so indispensable to +the Allies, out of the field of active warfare, would thus be more than +justified and, indeed, would indicate the highest wisdom on the part of +the German navy. The Napoleonic principle of dividing your enemy's +forces is just as valuable in naval as in land warfare. For many years +Admiral Mahan had been instructing American naval officers that the +first rule in warfare is not to divide your fighting forces, but always +to keep them together, so as to bring the whole weight at a given moment +against your adversary. Two of the fundamental principles of the science +of warfare, on land and sea alike, are contained in the maxims: Keep +your own forces concentrated, and always endeavour to divide those of +the enemy. Undoubtedly, the best method which Germany could use to keep +our destroyers in our own waters would be to make the American people +believe that their lives and property were in danger; they might +accomplish this by sending a submarine to attack our shipping off New +York and Boston and other Atlantic seaports, and possibly even to +bombard our harbours. The Germans doubtless believed that they might +create such alarm and arouse such public clamour in the United States +that our destroyers and other anti-submarine craft would be kept over +here by the Navy Department, in response to the popular agitation to +protect our own coast. This is the reason why American headquarters in +London, and the Allied admiralties, expected such a visitation. The +Germans obviously endeavoured <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_270" id="Page_270">[Pg 270]</a></span>to create the impression that such an +attack was likely to occur at any time. This was part of their war +propaganda. The press was full of reports that such attacks were about +to be made. German agents were continually circulating these reports.</p> + +<p>Of course it was clear from the first, to the heads of the Allied navies +and to all naval authorities who were informed about the actual +conditions, that these attacks by German submarines on the American +coast would be in the nature of raids for moral effect only. It was also +quite clear from the first, as I pointed out in my despatches to the +Navy Department, that the best place to defend our coast was in the +critical submarine areas in the European Atlantic, through which the +submarines had to pass in setting out for our coast, and in which alone +they could have any hope of succeeding in the military object of the +undersea campaign. It was not necessary to keep our destroyers in +American waters, patrolling the vast expanse of our three thousand miles +of coastline, in a futile effort to find and destroy such enemy +submarines as might operate on the American coast. So long as these +attacks were only sporadic—and carried out by the type of submarine +which used its guns almost exclusively in sinking ships, and which +selected for its victims unarmed and unprotected ships—destroyers and +other anti-submarine craft would be of no possible use on the Atlantic +coast. The submarine could see these craft from a much greater distance +than it could itself be seen by them; and by diving and sailing +submerged it could easily avoid them and sink its victims without ever +being sighted or attacked by our own patrols, however numerous they +might have been. Even in the narrow waters of the English Channel, up to +the very end of the war, submarines were successfully attacking small +merchant craft by gunfire, although the density of patrol craft in this +area was naturally a thousand times greater than we could ever have +provided for the vast expanse of our own coast. Consequently, so long as +the submarine attacks on the American coast were only sporadic, it was +absolutely futile to maintain patrol craft in those waters, as this +could not provide any adequate defence against such scattered +demonstrations. If, on the other hand, the Germans had ever decided to +commit the military mistake of concentrating a considerable number of +submarines off our Atlantic ports, we could always have <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_271" id="Page_271">[Pg 271]</a></span>countered such +a step by sending back from the war zone an adequate number of craft to +protect convoys in and out of the Atlantic ports, in the same manner +that convoys were protected in the submarine danger zone in European +waters. This is a fact which even many naval men did not seem to grasp. +Yet I have already explained that we knew practically where every German +submarine was at any given time. We knew whenever one left a German +port; and we kept track of it day by day until it returned home. No +U-boat ever made a voyage across the Atlantic without our knowledge. The +submarine was a slow traveller, and required a minimum of thirty days +for such a trip; normally, the time would be much longer, for a +submarine on such a long voyage had to economize oil fuel for the return +trip and therefore seldom cruised at more than five knots an hour. Our +destroyers and anti-submarine craft, on the other hand, could easily +cross the Atlantic in ten days and refuel in their home ports. It is +therefore apparent that a flotilla of destroyers stationed in European +waters could protect the American coast from submarines almost as +successfully as if it were stationed at Hampton Roads or Newport. Such a +flotilla would be of no use at these American stations unless there were +submarines attacking shipping off the coast; but as soon as the Germans +started for America—a fact of which we could always be informed, and of +which, as I shall explain, we always were informed—we could send our +destroyers in advance of them. These agile vessels would reach home +waters about three weeks before the submarines arrived; they would thus +have plenty of time to refit and to welcome the uninvited guests. From +any conceivable point of view, therefore, there was no excuse for +keeping destroyers on the American side of the Atlantic for "home +defence." Moreover, the fact that we could keep this close track of +submarines in itself formed a great protection against them. I have +already explained how we routed convoys entering European waters in such +ways that they could sail around the U-boat and thus escape contact. I +think that this simple procedure saved more shipping than any other +method. In the same way we could keep these vessels sailing from +American ports outside of the area in which the submarines were known to +be operating in our own waters.</p> + +<p>Yet the enemy sent no submarines to our coast in 1917; <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_272" id="Page_272">[Pg 272]</a></span>why they did not +do so may seem difficult to understand, for that was just the period +when a campaign of this kind might have served their purpose. During +this time, however, we had repeated indications that the Germans did not +take the American entrance into the war very seriously; moreover, +looking forward to conditions after the peace, they perhaps hoped that +they might soon be able once again to establish friendly relations. In +1917 they therefore refrained from any acts which might arouse popular +hatred against them. We had more than one indication of this attitude. +Early in the summer of 1917 we obtained from one of the captured German +submarines a set of the orders issued to it by the German Admiralty +Staff. Among these was one dated May 8, 1917, in which the submarine +commanders were informed that Germany had not declared war upon the +United States, and that, until further instructions were received, the +submarines were to continue to look upon America and American shipping +as neutral. The submarine commanders were especially warned against +attacking or committing any overt act against such American war vessels +as might be encountered in European waters. The orders explained that no +official confirmation had been received by the German Government of the +news which had been published in the press that America had declared +war, and that, therefore, the Germans, officially, were ignoring our +belligerence. From their own standpoint such a policy of endeavouring +not to offend America, even after she became an enemy, may have seemed +politically wise; from a military point of view, their failure to +attempt the submarine demonstration off our coast in 1917 was a great +mistake; for when they finally started warfare on our coast, the United +States was deeply involved in hostilities, and had already begun the +transportation of the great army which produced such decisive results on +the Western Front. The time had passed, as experience soon showed, when +any demonstration on our coast would disturb the calm of the American +people or affect their will to victory.</p> + +<p>In late April, 1918, I learned through secret-service channels that one +of the large submarines of the <i>Deutschland</i> class had left its German +base on the 19th of April for a long cruise. On the 1st of May, 1918, I +therefore cabled to the Department that there were indications that this +submarine <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_273" id="Page_273">[Pg 273]</a></span>was bound for our own coast. A few days afterward I received +more specific information, through the interception of radio despatches +between Germany and the submarine; and therefore I cabled the +Department, this time informing them that the submarine was the <i>U-151</i>, +that it was now well on its way across the Atlantic, and that it could +be expected to begin operations off the American coast any time after +May 20th. I gave a complete description of the vessel, the probable +nature of her cruise, and her essential military characteristics. She +carried a supply of mines, and I therefore invited the attention of the +Department to the fact that the favourite areas for laying mines were +those places where the ships stopped to pick up pilots. Since at +Delaware Bay pilots for large ships were taken on just south of the Five +Fathom Bank Light, I suggested that it was not unlikely that the <i>U-151</i> +would attempt to lay mines in that vicinity. Now the fact is that we +knew that the <i>U-151</i> intended to lay mines at this very place. We had +obtained this piece of information from the radio which we had +intercepted; as there was a possibility that our own cable might fall +into German hands, we did not care to give the news in the precise form +in which we had received it, as we did not intend that they should know +that we had means of keeping so accurately informed. As had been +predicted, the <i>U-151</i> proceeded directly to the vicinity of this Five +Fathom Bank off Delaware Bay, laid her mines, and then, cruising +northward up the coast, began her demonstration on the 25th of May by +sinking two small wooden schooners. These had no radio apparatus, and it +was not until June 2nd that the Navy Department and the country received +the news that the first submarine was operating. On June 29th I informed +Washington that another U-boat was then coming down the west coast of +Ireland, bound for the United States, and that it would arrive some time +after July 15th. Complete reports of this vessel were sent from day to +day, as it made its slow progress across the ocean. On July 6th I cabled +that still another U-boat had started for our coast; and the progress of +this adventurer, with all details as to its character and probable area +of operations, were also forwarded regularly. From the end of May until +October there was nearly always one submarine operating off our coast. +The largest number active at any one time was in August, when for a week +or <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_274" id="Page_274">[Pg 274]</a></span>ten days three were more or less active in attacking coastwise +vessels. These three operated all the way from Cape Hatteras to +Newfoundland, attempting by these tactics to create the impression that +dozens of hostile U-boats were preying upon our commerce and threatening +our shores. These submarines, however, attacked almost exclusively +sailing vessels and small coastwise steamers, rarely, if ever, using +torpedoes. A number of mines were laid at different points off our +ports, on what the Germans believed to be the traffic routes; but the +information which we had concerning them made it possible to counter +successfully their efforts and, from a military point of view, the whole +of the submarine operations off our coast can be dismissed as one of the +minor incidents of the war, as the Secretary of the Navy described it in +his Annual Report. The five submarines sunk in all approximately 110,000 +tons of shipping, but the vessels were, for the most part, small and of +no great military importance. The only real victory was the destruction +of the cruiser <i>San Diego</i>, which was sunk by a mine which had been laid +by the <i>U-156</i> off Fire Island.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_275" id="Page_275">[Pg 275]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER XI</h2> + +<h3>FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR</h3> +<br /> + +<p>The Allied navies were harrowing the submarines not only under the water +and on the surface, but from the air. In the anti-submarine campaign the +several forms of aircraft—airplane, seaplane, dirigible, and kite +balloon—developed great offensive power. Nor did the fact that our +fighters in the heavens made few direct attacks which were successful +diminish the importance of their work. The records of the British +Admiralty attribute the destruction of five submarines to the British +air service; the French Admiralty gives the American forces credit for +destroying one on the French coast. These achievements, compared with +the tremendous efforts involved in equipping air stations, may at first +look like an inconsiderable return; yet the fact remains that aircraft +were an important element in defeating the German campaign against +merchant shipping.</p> + +<p>Like the subchaser and the submarine, the seaplane operated most +successfully in coastal waters. I have already indicated that one +advantage of the convoy system was that it forced the U-boats to seek +their victims closer to the shore. In our several forms of aircraft we +had still another method of interfering with their operation in such +quarters. In order to use these agencies effectively we constructed +aircraft stations in large numbers along the coast of France and the +British Isles, assigned a certain stretch of coastline to each one of +these stations, and kept the indicated area constantly patrolled. The +advantages which were possessed by a fleet of aircraft operating at a +considerable height above the water are at once apparent. The great +speed of seaplanes in itself transformed them into formidable foes. The +submarine on the surface could make a maximum of only 16 knots an hour, +whereas an airplane <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_276" id="Page_276">[Pg 276]</a></span>made anywhere from 60 to 100; it therefore had +little difficulty, once it had sighted the under-water boat, in catching +up with it and starting hostilities. Its great speed also made it +possible for an airplane or dirigible to patrol a much greater area of +water than a surface or a subsurface vessel. An observer located several +hundred feet in the heavens could see the submarine much more easily +than could his comrades on other craft. If the water were clear he could +at once detect it, even though it were submerged; in any event, merely +lifting a man in the air greatly extended his horizon, and made it +possible for him to pick up hostile vessels at a much greater distance. +Moreover, the airplane had that same advantage upon which I have laid +such emphasis in describing the anti-submarine powers of the submarine +itself: that is, it was almost invisible to its under-water foe. If the +U-boat were lying on the surface, a seaplane or a dirigible was readily +seen; but if it were submerged entirely, or even sailing at periscope +depth, the most conspicuous enemy in the heavens was invisible. After +our submarines and our aircraft had settled down to their business of +extermination, existence for those Germans who were operating in coastal +waters became extremely hazardous and nerve-racking; their chief anxiety +was no longer the depth bomb of a destroyer; they lived every moment in +the face of hidden terrors; they never knew when a torpedo would explode +into their vitals, or when an unseen bomb, dropped from the heavens, +would fall upon their fragile decks.</p> + +<p>I have said that the destructive achievements of aircraft figure only +moderately in the statistics of the war; this was because the greater +part of their most valuable work was done in co-operation with war +vessels. Aircraft in the Navy performed a service not unlike that which +it performed in the Army. We are all familiar with the picture of +airplanes sailing over the field of battle, obtaining information which +was wirelessed back to their own forces, "spotting" artillery positions, +and giving ranges. The seaplanes and dirigibles of the Allied navies +performed a similar service on the ocean. To a considerable extent they +became the "eyes" of the destroyers and other surface craft, just as the +airplanes on the land became the "eyes" of the army. As part of their +equipment all the dirigibles had wireless telegraph and wireless +telephone; as soon as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_277" id="Page_277">[Pg 277]</a></span>a submarine was "spotted," the news was +immediately flashed broadcast, and every offensive warship which was +anywhere in the neighbourhood, as well as the airplane itself, started +for the indicated scene. There are several cases in which the sinking of +submarines by destroyers was attributed to information wirelessed in +this fashion by American aircraft; and since the air service of the +British navy was many times greater than our own, there are many more +such "indirect sinkings" credited to the British effort.</p> + +<p>The following citation, which I submitted to the Navy Department in +recommending Lieutenant John J. Schieffelin for the Distinguished +Service Medal, illustrates this co-operation between air and surface +craft:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>This officer performed many hazardous reconnaissance flights, and +on July 9th, 1918, he attacked an enemy submarine with bombs and +then directed the British destroyers to the spot, which were +successful in seriously damaging the submarine. Again, on July +19th, 1918, Lieutenant Schieffelin dropped bombs on another enemy +submarine, and then signalled trawlers to the spot, which delivered +a determined attack against the submarine, which attack was +considered highly successful and the submarine seriously damaged, +if not destroyed. This officer was at all times an example of +courageous loyalty.</p></div> + +<p>Besides scouting and "spotting" and bombing, the aerial hunters of the +submarine developed great value in escorting convoys. A few dirigibles, +located on the flanks of a convoy, protected them almost as effectively +as the destroyers themselves; and even a single airship not infrequently +brought a group of merchantmen and troopships safely into port. +Sometimes the airships operated in this way as auxiliaries to +destroyers, while sometimes they operated alone. In applying this +mechanism of protection to merchant convoys, we were simply adopting the +method which Great Britain had been using for three years in the narrow +passages of the English Channel. Much has been said of the skill with +which the British navy transported about 20,000,000 souls back and forth +between England and France in four years; and in this great movement +seaplanes, dirigibles, and other forms of aircraft played an important +part. In the same way this scheme of protection <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_278" id="Page_278">[Pg 278]</a></span>was found valuable with +the coastal convoys, particularly with the convoys which sailed from one +French port to another, and from British ports to places in Ireland, +Holland, or Scandinavia. I have described the dangers in which these +ships were involved owing to the fact that the groups were obliged to +break up after entering the Channel and the Irish Sea, and thus to +proceed singly to their destinations. Aircraft improved this situation +to a considerable extent, for they could often go to sea, pick up the +ships, and bring them safely home. The circumstance that our seaplanes, +perched high in the air, could see the submarine long before they had +reached torpedoing distance, and could, if necessary, signal to a +destroyer for assistance, made them exceedingly valuable for this kind +of work.</p> + +<p>Early in 1918, at the request of the British Government, we took over a +large seaplane base which had been established by the British at +Killingholme, England, a little sea-coast town at the mouth of the +Humber River. According to the original plan we intended to co-operate +from this point with the British in a joint expedition against enemy +naval bases, employing for this purpose especially constructed towing +lighters, upon which seaplanes were to be towed by destroyers to within +a short flying distance of their objectives. Although this project was +never carried out, Killingholme, because of its geographical location, +became a very important base for seaplanes used in escorting mercantile +convoys to and from Scandinavian ports, patrolling mine-fields while on +the lookout for enemy submarines and making those all-important +reconnaissance flights over the North Sea which were intended to give +advanced warning of any activity of the German High Seas Fleet. These +flights lasted usually from six to eight hours; the record was made by +Ensigns S. C. Kennedy and C. H. Weatherhead, U.S.N., who flew for nine +hours continuously on convoy escort duty. For a routine patrol, this +compares very favourably indeed with the flight of the now famous +trans-Atlantic <i>NC-4</i>.</p> + +<p>I can no better describe the splendid work of these enthusiastic and +courageous young Americans than by quoting a few extracts from a report +which was submitted to me by Ensign K. B. Keyes, of a reconnaissance +flight in which he took part, while attached temporarily to a British +seaplane station under post-graduate instruction. The picture given <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_279" id="Page_279">[Pg 279]</a></span>by +Ensign Keyes is typical of the flights which our boys were constantly +making:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>On June 4, 1918, we received orders to carry out a reconnaissance +and hostile aircraft patrol over the North Sea and along the coast +of Holland. It was a perfect day for such work, for the visibility +was extremely good, with a light wind of fifteen knots and clouds +at the high altitude of about eight or ten thousand feet.</p> + +<p>Our three machines from Felixstowe rose from the water at twelve +o'clock, circled into patrol formation, and proceeded north-east by +north along the coast to Yarmouth. Here we were joined by two more +planes, but not without some trouble and slight delay because of a +broken petrol pipe which was subsequently repaired in the air. We +again circled into formation, Capt. Leckie, D.S.O., of Yarmouth, +taking his position as leader of the squadron.</p> + +<p>At one o'clock the squadron proceeded east, our machine, being in +the first division, flew at 1,500 feet and at about half a mile in +the rear of Capt. Leckie's machine, but keeping him on our +starboard quarter.</p> + +<p>We sighted nothing at all until about half-past two, when the Haaks +Light Vessel slowly rose on the horizon, but near this mark and +considerably more to the south we discovered a large fleet of Dutch +fishing smacks. This fleet consisted of more than a hundred smacks.</p> + +<p>Ten minutes later we sighted the Dutch coast, where we changed our +course more to the north-east. We followed the sandy beaches of the +islands of Texel and Vlieland until we came to Terschelling. In +following the coast of Vlieland we were close enough to distinguish +houses on the inside of the island and even to make out breakers +rolling up on the sandy beach.</p> + +<p>At Terschelling we proceeded west in accordance with our orders, +but soon had to turn back because of Capt. Leckie's machine which +had fallen out of formation and come to the water. This machine +landed at three fifteen and we continued to circle around it, +finding that the trouble was with a badly broken petrol pipe, until +about fifteen minutes later, when we sighted five German planes +steering west, a direction which would soon bring them upon us.</p> + +<p>At this time Capt. Barker had the wheel, Lt. Galvayne was seated +beside him, but if we met the opposing forces he <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_280" id="Page_280">[Pg 280]</a></span>was to kneel on +the seat with his eyes above the cowl, where he could see all the +enemy planes and direct the pilot in which direction to proceed. I +was in the front cockpit with one gun and four hundred rounds of +ammunition. In the stern cockpit the engineer and wireless ratings +were to handle three guns.</p> + +<p>We at once took battle formation and went forward to meet the +enemy, but here we were considerably surprised to find that when we +were nearly within range they had turned and were running away from +us. At once we gave chase, but soon found that they were much too +fast for us. Our machine had broken out of the formation and, with +nose down, had crept slightly ahead of Capt. Leckie, and we being +the nearest machine to the enemy, I had the satisfaction of trying +out my gun for a number of rounds. It was quite impossible to tell +whether I had registered any hits or not.</p> + +<p>Our purpose in chasing these planes was to keep them away from the +machine on the water which, if we had not been there, would have +been shot to pieces. Finding that it was useless to follow them, as +they could easily keep out of our range, we turned back and very +shortly we were again circling around our machine on the water.</p> + +<p>It was not long before the enemy again came very close, so we gave +chase the second time. This time, instead of five machines as +before, there were only four, and one small scout could be seen +flying in the direction of Borkum.</p> + +<p>It was the fourth time that we went off in pursuit of the enemy +that we suddenly discovered that a large number of hostile planes +were proceeding towards us, not in the air with the other four +planes but very close to the water. There were ten planes in this +first group, but they were joined a few minutes later by five more.</p> + +<p>We swung into battle formation and steered for the middle of the +group. When we were nearly within range four planes on the port +side and five planes on the starboard side rose to our level of +fifteen hundred feet. Two planes passed directly beneath us firing +upward. Firing was incessant from the beginning and the air seemed +blue with tracer smoke. I gave most of my time to the four planes +on our port side, because they were exactly on the same level with +us and seemed to be within good range, that is about two hundred +yards. When we had passed each other <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_281" id="Page_281">[Pg 281]</a></span>I looked around and noticed +that Lt. Galvayne was in a stooping position, with head and one arm +on his seat, the other arm hanging down as if reaching for +something. I had seen him in this position earlier in the day so +thought nothing of it. All this I had seen in the fraction of a +second, for I had to continue firing. A few minutes later I turned +around again and found with a shock that Lt. Galvayne was in the +same position. It was then that the first inkling of the truth +dawned upon me. By bending lower I discovered that his head was +lying in a pool of blood.</p> + +<p>From this time on I have no clear idea of just what our +manœuvring was, but evidently we put up a running fight steering +east, then circled until suddenly I found our machine had been cut +off from the formation and we were surrounded by seven enemy +seaplanes.</p> + +<p>This time we were steering west or more to the south-west. We +carried on a running fight for ten miles or so until we drove the +seven planes off. During the last few minutes of the fight our +engine had been popping altogether too frequently and soon the +engineer came forward to tell us that the port engine petrol pipe +had broken.</p> + +<p>By this time I had laid out Lt. Galvayne in the wireless cockpit, +cleaned up the second pilot's seat, and taken it myself.</p> + +<p>The engagement had lasted about half an hour, and the closest range +was one hundred yards while the average range was two hundred. The +boat with Ensign Eaton in it landed between the Islands of Texel +and Vlieland, while the other boat, which had not taken any part in +the fight, was last seen two miles off Vlieland and still taxiing +in toward the beach.</p> + +<p>We descended to the water at five forty-five, ten miles north-west +of Vlieland. During the ten minutes we were on the water I loosened +Lt. Galvayne's clothing, made his position somewhat easier, and +felt for his heart which at that time I was quite sure was beating +feebly.</p> + +<p>When we rose from the water and ascended to fifteen hundred feet, +we sighted two planes which later proved to be the two Yarmouth +boats. We picked them up, swung into formation, and laid our course +for Yarmouth.</p> + +<p>At ten minutes to seven we sighted land and twenty minutes after we +were resting on the water in front of Yarmouth slipway.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_282" id="Page_282">[Pg 282]</a></span>We at once summoned medical aid but found that nothing could be +done. The shot had gone through his head, striking the mouth and +coming out behind his ear, tearing a gash of about two inches in +diameter.</p> + +<p>The boat had been more or less riddled, a number of shots tearing +up the top between the front cockpit and the beginning of the cowl.</p> + +<p>The total duration of the flight was seven hours and ten minutes.</p></div> + +<p>American naval aviation had a romantic beginning; indeed, the +development of our air service from almost nothing to a force which, in +European waters, comprised 2,500 officers and 22,000 men, is one of the +great accomplishments of the war. It was very largely the outcome of +civilian enterprise and civilian public spirit. In describing our +subchasers I have already paid tribute to the splendid qualities of +reserve officers; and our indebtedness to this type of citizen was +equally great in the aviation service. I can pay no further tribute to +American youth than to say that the great aircraft force which was +ultimately assembled in Europe had its beginnings in a small group of +undergraduates at Yale University. In recommending Mr. Trubee Davison +for a Distinguished Service Medal, the commander of our aviation forces +wrote: "This officer was responsible for the organization of the first +Yale aviation unit of twenty-nine aviators who were later enrolled in +the Naval Reserve Flying Corps.... This group of aviators formed the +nucleus of the first Naval Reserve Flying Corps, and, in fact, may be +considered as the nucleus from which the United States Aviation Forces, +Foreign Service, later grew." This group of college boys acted entirely +on their own initiative. While the United States was still at peace, +encouraged only by their own parents and a few friends, they took up the +study of aviation. It was their conviction that the United States would +certainly get into the war, and they selected this branch as the one in +which they could render greatest service to their country. These young +men worked all through the summer of 1916 at Port Washington, Long +Island, learning how to fly: at this time they were an entirely +unofficial body, paying their own expenses. Ultimately the unit +comprised about twenty men; they kept constantly at work, even after +college opened in the fall of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_283" id="Page_283">[Pg 283]</a></span>1916, and when war broke out they were +prepared—for they had actually learned to fly. When the submarine +scares disturbed the Atlantic seaboard in the early months of the war +these Yale undergraduates were sent by the department scouting over Long +Island Sound and other places looking for the imaginary Germans. In +February, 1917, Secretary Daniels recognized their work by making +Davison a member of the Committee on Aeronautics; in March practically +every member of the unit was enrolled in the aviation service; and their +names appear among the first one hundred aviators enrolled in the +Navy—a list that ultimately included several thousand. So proficient +had these undergraduates become that they were used as a nucleus to +train our aircraft forces; they were impressed as instructors at +Buffalo, Bayshore, Hampton Roads, the Massachusetts Institute of +Technology, Key West and Moorhead City. They began to go abroad in the +summer of 1917, and they were employed as instructors in schools in +France and England. These young men not only rendered great material +service, but they manifested an enthusiasm, an earnestness, and a +tireless vigilance which exerted a wonderful influence in strengthening +the <i>moral</i> of the whole aviation department. "I knew that whenever we +had a member of the Yale unit," says Lieutenant-Commander Edwards, who +was aide for aviation at the London headquarters in the latter part of +the war, "everything was all right. Whenever the French and English +asked us to send a couple of our crack men to reinforce a squadron, I +would say, 'Let's get some of the Yale gang.' We never made a mistake +when we did this."</p> + +<p>There were many men in the regular navy to whom the nation is likewise +indebted. Captain T. T. Craven served with very marked distinction as +aide for aviation on the staff of Admiral Wilson, and afterward, after +the armistice was signed, as the senior member of the Board which had +been appointed to settle all claims with the French Government. +Lieutenant (now Commander) Kenneth Whiting was another officer who +rendered great service in aviation. Commander Whiting arrived in St. +Nazaire, France, on the 5th of June, 1917, in command of the first +aeronautic detachment, which consisted of 7 officers and 122 men.</p> + +<p>Such were the modest beginnings of American aviation in France. In a +short time Commander Whiting was assigned <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_284" id="Page_284">[Pg 284]</a></span>to the command of the large +station which was taken over at Killingholme, England, and in October, +1917, Captain Hutch I. Cone came from the United States to take charge +of the great aviation programme which had now been planned. Captain Cone +had for many years enjoyed the reputation of being one of the Navy's +most efficient administrators; while still a lieutenant-commander, he +had held for a considerable time the rank of rear-admiral, as chief of +the Bureau of Steam Engineering; and in 1917 he was commanding naval +officer of the Panama Canal, a position which required organizing +ability of the highest order. It was at my request that he was ordered +abroad to organize our European air forces. Captain Cone now came to +Paris and plunged into the work of organizing naval aviation with all +his usual vigour.</p> + +<p>It subsequently became apparent, however, that London would be a better +place for his work than Paris, and Captain Cone therefore took up his +headquarters in Grosvenor Gardens. Under his administration naval +aviation foreign service grew to the proportions I have indicated and +included in France six seaplane stations, three dirigible stations, two +kite balloon stations, one school of aerial gunnery, one assembly and +repair base, and the United States Naval Northern Bombing Group. In the +British Isles there were established four seaplane stations and one kite +balloon station in Ireland; one seaplane station and one assembly and +repair base in England; and in Italy we occupied, at the request of the +Italian Government, two seaplane stations at Pescara and Porto Corsini +on the Adriatic. From these stations we bombed to good effect Austrian +naval bases in that area. To Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Callan, +U.S.N.R.F., is due much of the credit for the cordial relations which +existed between the Italians and ourselves, as well as for the efficient +conduct of our aviation forces in Italy under his command.</p> + +<p>Probably the most completely equipped aviation centre which we +constructed was that at Pauillac, France, under the command of Captain +F. T. Evans, U.S.N.; here we built accommodation for 20,000 men; we had +here what would have eventually been a great airplane factory; had the +war continued six months longer, we would have been turning out planes +in this place on a scale almost large enough to supply our needs. The +far-sighted judgment and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_285" id="Page_285">[Pg 285]</a></span>the really extraordinary professional ability +of civil engineers D. G. Copeland and A. W. K. Billings made such work +possible, but only, I might add, with the hearty co-operation of +Lieutenant-Commander Benjamin Briscoe and his small band of loyal and +devoted co-workers. Another great adventure was the establishment of our +Northern Bombing Group, under the command of Captain David C. Hanrahan, +U.S.N.; here we had 112 planes, 305 officers, and more than 2,000 +enlisted personnel, who devoted all of their attention to bombing German +submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. This enterprise was a joint one +with the marines under the command of Major A. A. Cunningham, an +experienced pilot and an able administrator, who performed all of his +various duties not only to my entire satisfaction but in a manner which +reflected the greatest credit to himself as well as to the Marine Corps +of which he was a worthy representative. Due to the fact that the +rapidity of our construction work had exceeded that with which airplanes +were being built at home, we entered into an agreement with the Italian +Government whereby we obtained a number of Caproni planes in exchange +for raw materials. Several of these large bombing airplanes were +successfully flown over the Alps to the fields of Flanders, under the +direction of Lieutenant-Commander E. O. MacDonnell, who deserves the +greatest credit for the energetic and resourceful manner in which he +executed this difficult task.</p> + +<p>In September, 1918, Captain Cone's duties took him to Ireland; the ship +on which he sailed, the <i>Leinster</i>, was torpedoed in the Irish Sea; +Captain Cone was picked up unconscious in the water, and, when taken to +the hospital, it was discovered that both his legs were broken. It was +therefore necessary to appoint another officer in his stead, and I +selected Lieutenant W. A. Edwards, who had served with credit on the +destroyer <i>Cushing</i>, and who, for some time, had been second in command +to Captain Cone in the aviation section. It was almost unprecedented to +put at the head of such an important branch a young lieutenant who had +only been out of the naval academy for a few years; ordinarily the +duties would have required a man of Admiral's rank. Lieutenant Edwards, +however, was not only extremely capable, but he had the gift of getting +along splendidly with our Allies, particularly the British, with whom +our intercourse was necessarily extensive, and with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_286" id="Page_286">[Pg 286]</a></span>whom he was very +popular. He remained in charge of the department for the rest of the +war, winning golden opinions from his superiors and his subordinates, +and the Distinguished Service Order from King George.</p> + +<p>The armistice was signed before our aviation work had got completely +into running order. Yet its accomplishments were highly creditable; and +had the war lasted a little longer they would have reached great +proportions. Of the thirty-nine direct attacks made on submarines, ten +were, in varying degrees, "successful." Perhaps the most amazing hit +made by any seaplane in the war was that scored by Ensign Paul F. Ives; +he dropped a bomb upon a submarine, striking it directly on its deck; +the result was partly tragical, partly ludicrous, for the bomb proved to +be a "dud" and did not explode! In commenting upon this and another +creditable attack, the British Admiralty wrote as follows:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>I beg to enclose for your information reports of attacks made on +two enemy submarines on the 25th March by Pilot Ensign J. F. +McNamara, U.S.N., and Pilot Ensign P. F. Ives, U.S.N.</p> + +<p>The Admiralty are of opinion that the submarine attacked by Pilot +Ensign McNamara was damaged and that the attack of Pilot Ensign +Ives might also have been successful had not his bombs failed to +explode, which was due to no fault of his own.</p> + +<p>I should add that Wing Commander, Portsmouth Group has expressed +his appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the United +States Pilots.</p></div> + +<p>At the cessation of hostilities we had a total of more than 500 planes +of various descriptions actually in commission, a large number of which +were in actual operation over the North Sea, the Irish Sea, the Bay of +Biscay, and the Adriatic; our bombing planes were making frequent +flights over enemy submarine bases, and 2,500 officers and 22,000 +enlisted men were making raids, doing patrols, bombing submarines, +bombing enemy bases, taking photographs, making reconnaissance over +enemy waters, and engaging enemy aircraft. There can be no doubt but +that this great force was a factor in persuading the enemy to +acknowledge defeat when he did. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_287" id="Page_287">[Pg 287]</a></span>A few simple comparisons will +illustrate the gigantic task which confronted us and the difficulties +which were successfully overcome in the establishment of our naval +aviation force on foreign service. If all the buildings constructed and +used for barracks for officers and men were joined end to end, they +would stretch for a distance of twelve miles. The total cubic contents +of all structures erected and used could be represented by a box 245 ft. +wide, 300 ft. long, and 1,500 ft. high. In such a box more than ten +Woolworth buildings could be easily placed. Twenty-nine telephone +exchanges were installed, and in addition connections were made to +existing long-distance lines in England and France, and approximately +800 miles of long-distance lines were constructed in Ireland, so that +every station could be communicated with from London headquarters. The +lumber used for construction work would provide a board-walk one foot +wide, extending from New York City to the Isle of Malta—a distance of +more than 4,000 miles.</p> + +<p>When we consider the fact that during the war naval aviation abroad grew +in personnel to be more than one-half the size of the entire pre-war +American navy, it is not at all astonishing that all of those regular +officers who had been trained in this service were employed almost +exclusively in an administrative capacity, which naturally excluded them +from taking part in the more exciting work of bombing submarines and +fighting aircraft. To their credit be it said that they chafed +considerably under this enforced restraint, but they were so few in +number that we had to employ them not in command of seaplanes, but of +air stations where they rendered the most valuable service.</p> + +<p>For the reserves I entertain the very highest regard and even personal +affection. Collectively they were magnificent and they reflected the +greatest credit upon the country they served so gallantly and with such +brilliant success. I know of no finer individual exploit in the war than +that of Ensign C. H. Hammon who, while attached to our Air Station at +Porto Corsini, took part in a bombing raid on Pola, in which he engaged +two enemy airplanes and as a result had his plane hit in several places. +During this engagement a colleague, Ensign G. H. Ludlow, was shot down. +Ensign Hammon went to his rescue, landed his boat on the water just +outside of Pola harbour, picked up the stricken aviator, and flew back +to Porto Corsini, a distance of seventy-five <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_288" id="Page_288">[Pg 288]</a></span>miles. A heavy sea made it +highly probable that his frail boat, already damaged by his combat with +the enemy, would collapse and that he would be drowned or captured and +made a prisoner of war. For this act of courageous devotion to duty I +recommended Ensign Hammon for the Congressional Medal of Honour.</p> + +<p>The mention of this officer calls to my mind the exploits of +Lieutenant-Commander A. L. Gates, who was the second of only three +officers attached to the Naval Forces in Europe whom I recommended for +the Congressional Medal of Honour. The citation in the case of Gates +reads as follows and needs no elaboration to prove the calibre of the +man: "This officer commanded the U.S. Naval Air Station, Dunkirk, +France, with very marked efficiency and under almost constant shell and +bomb fire from the enemy. Alone and unescorted he rescued the crew of a +British airplane wrecked in the sea off Ostend, for which he was awarded +the Distinguished Flying Cross by the British Government. This act of +bravery was actually over and above the duties required of this officer +and in itself demonstrates the highest type of courage. +Lieutenant-Commander Gates took part in a number of flights over the +enemy lines and was shot down in combat and taken prisoner by the enemy. +He made several heroic and determined attempts to escape. During all of +his service this officer was a magnificent example of courage, modesty, +and energetic devotion to duty. He at all times upheld the very highest +traditions of the Naval Service."</p> + +<p>Volumes could well be written about the work of these splendid young +Americans—of how Ensign Stephen Potter shot down in flames an enemy +seaplane from a position over Heligoland Bight; unfortunately he made +the supreme sacrifice only a month later when he in turn was shot down +in flames and fell to his resting-place in the North Sea; and of De +Cernea and Wilcox and Ludlow. Theirs was the spirit which dominated the +entire Force and which made it possible to accomplish what seemed at +times to be almost the impossible. It was the superior "will to victory" +which proved to be invincible.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_289" id="Page_289">[Pg 289]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER XII</h2> + +<h3>THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND</h3> +<br /> + +<p>Besides transporting American troops, the Navy, in one detail of its +work, actually participated in warfare on the Western Front. Though this +feature of our effort has nothing to do with the main subject, the +defeat of the submarine, yet any account of the American navy in the war +which overlooks the achievements of our naval batteries on land would +certainly be incomplete. The use of naval guns in war operations was not +unprecedented; the British used such guns in the Boer War, particularly +at Ladysmith and Spion Kop; and there were occasions in which such +armament rendered excellent service in the Boxer Rebellion. All through +the Great War, British, French, and Germans frequently reinforced their +army artillery with naval batteries. But, compared with the American +naval guns which under the command of Rear-Admiral Charles P. Plunkett +performed such telling deeds against the retreating Germans in the final +phases of the conflict, all previous equipment of naval guns on shore +had been less efficient in one highly important respect.</p> + +<p>For the larger part of the war, the Germans had had a great gun +stationed in Belgium bombarding Dunkirk. The original purpose in sending +American naval batteries to France was to silence this gun. The proposal +was made in November, 1917; but, rapidly as the preparations progressed, +the situation had entirely changed before our five fourteen-inch guns +were ready to leave for France. In the spring of 1918 the Germans began +the great drive which nearly took them to the Channel ports; and under +the conditions which prevailed in that area it was impossible to send +our guns to the Belgian coast. Meanwhile, the enemy had stationed a gun, +having a range of nearly seventy-five miles, in the forest of Compiègne; +the shells from this weapon, constantly <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_290" id="Page_290">[Pg 290]</a></span>falling upon Paris, were having +a more demoralizing effect upon the French populace than was officially +admitted. The demand for the silencing of this gun came from all sides; +and it was a happy coincidence that, at just about the time when this +new peril appeared, the American naval guns were nearly ready to be +transported to France. Encouraged by the success of this long-range gun +on Paris, the Germans were preparing long-range bombardments on several +sections of the front. They had taken huge guns from the new +battle-cruiser <i>Hindenburg</i> and mounted them at convenient points for +bombarding Dunkirk, Chalons-sur-Marne, and Nancy. In all, the Allied +intelligence departments reported that sixteen guns of great calibre had +left Kiel in May, 1918, and that they would soon be trained upon +important objectives in France. For this reason it was welcome news to +the Allies, who were deficient in this type of artillery, that five +naval fourteen-inch guns, with mountings and ammunition and supply +trains, were ready to embark for the European field. The Navy received +an urgent request from General Pershing that these guns should be landed +at St. Nazaire; it was to be their main mission to destroy the "Big +Bertha" which was raining shells on Paris, and to attack specific +points, especially railroad communications and the bridges across the +Rhine.</p> + +<p>The initiative in the design of these mobile railway batteries was taken +by the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department, under Rear-Admiral +Ralph Earle, and the details of the design were worked out by the +officers of that bureau and Admiral Plunkett. The actual construction of +the great gun mounts on the cars from which the guns were to be fired, +and of the specially designed cars of the supply trains for each gun, +was an engineering feat which reflects great credit upon the Baldwin +Locomotive Works and particularly upon its president, Mr. Samuel M. +Vauclain, who undertook the task with the greatest enthusiasm. The +reason why our naval guns represented a greater achievement than +anything of a similar nature accomplished by the Germans was that they +were mobile. Careful observations taken of the bombardment of Dunkirk +revealed the fact that the gun with which it was being done was steadily +losing range. This indicated that the weapon was not a movable one, but +that it was firmly implanted in a fixed position. The seventy-five mile +gun which was <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_291" id="Page_291">[Pg 291]</a></span>bombarding Paris was similarly emplaced. The answering +weapon which our ordnance department now proposed to build was to have +the ability to travel from place to place—to go to any position to +which the railroad system of France could take it. To do this it would +be necessary to build a mounting on a railroad car and to supply cars +which could carry the crews, their sleeping quarters, their food and +ammunition; to construct, indeed, a whole train for each separate gun. +This equipment must be built in the United States, shipped over three +thousand miles of ocean, landed at a French port, assembled there, and +started on French railroads to the several destinations at the front. +The Baldwin Locomotive Works accepted the contract for constructing +these mountings and attendant cars; it began work February 13, 1918; two +months afterward the first mount had been finished and the gun was being +proved at Sandy Hook, New Jersey; and by July all five guns had arrived +at St. Nazaire and were being prepared to be sent forward to the scene +of hostilities. The rapidity with which this work was completed +furnished an illustration of American manufacturing genius at its best. +Meanwhile, Admiral Plunkett had collected and trained his crews; it +speaks well for the <i>moral</i> of the Navy that, when news of this great +operation was first noised about, more than 20,000 officers and men +volunteered for the service.</p> + +<p>At first the French, great as was their admiration for these guns and +the astonishingly accurate marksmanship which they had displayed on +their trials, believed that their railroad beds and their bridges could +not sustain such a weight; the French engineers, indeed, declined at the +beginning to approve our request for the use of their rails. The +constant rain of German shells on Paris, however, modified this +attitude; the situation was so urgent that such assistance as these +American guns promised was welcome. One August morning, therefore, the +first train started for Helles Mouchy, the point from which it was +expected to silence the "Big Bertha." The progress of this train through +France was a triumphant march. Our own confidence in the French road bed +and bridges was not much greater than that of the French themselves; the +train therefore went along slowly, climbed the grades at a snail's pace, +and took the curves with the utmost caution. As they crossed certain of +the bridges, the crews held their breath and sat tight, expecting almost +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_292" id="Page_292">[Pg 292]</a></span>every moment to crash through. All along the route the French populace +greeted the great battery train with one long cheer, and at the towns +and villages the girls decorated the long muzzle of the gun with +flowers. But there were other spectators than the French. Expertly as +this unusual train had been camouflaged, the German airplane observers +had detected its approach. As it neared the objective the shells that +had been falling on Paris ceased; before the Americans could get to +work, the Germans had removed their mighty weapon, leaving nothing but +an emplacement as a target for our shells. Though our men were therefore +deprived of the privilege of destroying this famous long-range gun, it +is apparent that their arrival saved Paris from further bombardment, for +nothing was heard of the gun for the rest of the war.</p> + +<p>The guns proved exceedingly effective in attacking German railroad +centres, bridges, and other essential positions; and as they could be +fired from any point of the railroad tracks behind the Western Front, +and as they could be shifted from one position to another, with all +their personnel and equipment, as fast as the locomotives could haul +them, it was apparent that the more guns of this design that could be +supplied the better. These qualities were at once recognized by the +Army, which called upon the Navy for assistance in building a large +number of railway batteries; and if the war had continued these great +guns would soon have been thundering all along the Western Front.</p> + +<p>From the time the naval guns were mounted until the armistice Admiral +Plunkett's men were busy on several points of the Allied lines. In this +time the five naval guns fired 782 shells at distances ranging from 18 +to 23 miles. They played great havoc in the railroad yards at Laon, +destroying large stretches of track that were indispensable to the +Germans, and in general making this place practically useless as a +railroad centre. Probably the greatest service which they rendered to +the cause of the Allies was in the region north of Verdun. In late +October three naval batteries were brought up to Charny and Thierville +and began bombarding the railroad which ran through Montmédy, Longuyon, +and Conflans. This was the most important line of communication on the +Western Front; it was the road over which the German army in the east +was supplied, and there was practically no other line by which the great +German <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_293" id="Page_293">[Pg 293]</a></span>armies engaging the Americans could escape. From October 23rd to +the hour when the armistice was signed our fourteen-inch guns were +raining shells upon this road. So successful was this bombardment that +the German traffic was stopped, not only while the firing was taking +place, but for several hours each day after it had ceased. What this +meant to the success of the Allied armies the world now knows. The +result is perfectly summed up in General Pershing's report:</p> + +<p>"Our large calibre guns," he says, "had advanced and were skilfully +brought into position to fire upon the important lines at Montmédy, +Longuyon, and Conflans; the strategical goal which was our highest hope +was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications and +nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from complete +disaster."</p> + +<p>These guns were, of course, only one of many contributing factors, but +that the Navy had its part in this great achievement is another example +of the success with which our two services co-operated with each other +throughout the war—a co-operation which, for efficient and harmonious +devotion to a common cause, has seldom, if ever, been equalled.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_294" id="Page_294">[Pg 294]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>CHAPTER XIII</h2> + +<h3>TRANSPORTING TWO MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO FRANCE</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">I</p> + +<p>In March, 1918, it became apparent that the German submarine campaign +had failed. The prospect that confronted the Allied forces at that time, +when compared with the conditions which had faced them in April, 1917, +forms one of the most impressive contrasts in history. In the first part +of the earlier year the cause of the Allied Powers, and consequently the +cause of liberty throughout the world, had reached the point almost of +desperation. On both land and sea the Germans seemed to hold the future +in their hands. In Europe the armies of the Central Powers were +everywhere in the ascendant. The French and British were holding their +own in France, and in the Somme campaign they had apparently inflicted +great damage upon the German forces, yet the disintegration of the +Russian army, the unmistakable signs of which had already appeared, was +bringing nearer the day when they would have to meet the undivided +strength of their enemy. At the time in question, Rumania, Serbia, and +Montenegro were conquered countries, and Italy seemed unable to make any +progress against the Austrians. Bulgaria and Turkey had become +practically German provinces, and the dream of a great Germanic eastern +empire was rapidly approaching realization. So strong was Germany in a +military sense, so little did she apprehend that the United States could +ever assemble her resources and her men in time to make them a decisive +element in the struggle, that the German war lords, in their effort to +bring the European conflict to a quick conclusion, did not hesitate to +take the step which <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_295" id="Page_295">[Pg 295]</a></span>was destined to make our country their enemy. +Probably no nation ever adopted a war measure with more confidence in +its success. The results which the German submarines could accomplish +seemed at that time to be simply a matter of mathematical calculation. +The Germans estimated that they could sink at least 1,000,000 tons a +month, completely cut off Great Britain's supplies of food and war +materials, and thus end the war by October or November of 1917. Even +though the United States should declare war, what could an unprepared +nation like our own accomplish in such a brief period? Millions of +troops we might indeed raise, but we could not train them in three or +four months, and, even though we could perform such a miracle, it was +ridiculous to suppose that we could transport them to Europe through the +submarine danger zone. I have already shown that the Germans were not +alone in thus predicting the course of events. In the month of April, +1917, I had found the Allied officials just about as distressed as the +Germans were jubilant. Already the latter, in sinking merchant ships, +had had successes which almost equalled their own predictions; no +adequate means of defence against the submarine had been devised; and +the chiefs of the British navy made no attempts to disguise their +apprehension for the future.</p> + +<p>Such was the atmosphere of gloom which prevailed in Allied councils in +April, 1917; yet one year later the naval situation had completely +changed. The reasons for that change have been set forth in the +preceding pages. In that brief twelve months the relative position of +the submarine had undergone a marked transformation. Instead of being +usually the pursuer it was now often the pursued. Instead of sailing +jauntily upon the high seas, sinking helpless merchantmen almost at +will, it was half-heartedly lying in wait along the coasts, seeking its +victims in the vessels of dispersed convoys. If it attempted to push out +to sea, and attack a convoy, escorting destroyers were likely to deliver +one of their dangerous attacks; if it sought the shallower coastal +waters, a fleet of yachts, sloops, and subchasers was constantly ready +to assail it with dozens of depth charges. An attempt to pass through +the Straits of Dover meant almost inevitable destruction by mines; an +attempt to escape into the ocean by the northern passage involved the +momentary dread of a similar end or the hazard of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_296" id="Page_296">[Pg 296]</a></span>navigating the +difficult Pentland Firth. In most of the narrow passages Allied +submarines lay constantly in wait with their torpedoes; a great fleet of +airplanes and dirigibles was always circling above ready to rain a +shower of bombs upon the under-water foe. Already the ocean floor about +the British Isles held not far from 200 sunken submarines, with most of +their crews, amounting to at least 4,000 men, whose deaths involved +perhaps the most hideous tragedies of the war. Bad as was this +situation, it was nothing compared with what it would become a few +months or a year later. American and British shipyards were turning out +anti-submarine craft with great rapidity; the industries of America, +with their enormous output of steel, had been enlisted in the +anti-submarine campaign. The American and British shipbuilding +facilities were neutralizing the German campaign in two ways: they were +not only constructing war vessels on a scale which would soon drive all +the German submarines from the sea, but they were building merchant +tonnage so rapidly that, in March, 1918, more new tonnage was launched +than was being destroyed. Thus by this time the Teutonic hopes of ending +the war by the submarine had utterly collapsed; if the Germans were to +win the war at all, or even to obtain a peace which would not be +disastrous, some other programme must be adopted and adopted quickly.</p> + +<p>Disheartened by their failure at sea, the enemy therefore turned their +eyes once more toward the land. The destruction of Russian military +power had given the German armies a great numerical superiority over +those of the Allies. There seemed little likelihood that the French or +the British, after three years of frightfully gruelling war, could add +materially to their forces. Thus, with the grouping of the Powers, such +as existed in 1917, the Germans had a tremendous advantage on their +side, for Russia, which German statesmen for fifty years had feared as a +source of inexhaustible man-supply to her enemies, had disappeared as a +military power. But a new element in the situation now counterbalanced +this temporary gain; that was the daily increasing importance of the +United States in the war. The Germans, who in 1917 had despised us as an +enemy, immediate or prospective, now despised us no longer. The army +which they declared could never be raised and trained was actually being +raised and trained by the millions. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_297" id="Page_297">[Pg 297]</a></span>The nation which their publicists +had denounced as lacking cohesion and public spirit had adopted +conscription simultaneously with their declaration of war, and the +people whom the Germans had affected to regard as devoted only to the +pursuit of gain and pleasure had manifested a unity of purpose which +they had never before displayed, and had offered their lives, their +labours, and their wealth without limit to the cause of the Allies. Up +to March, 1918, only a comparatively small part of this American army +had reached Europe, but the Germans had already tested its fighting +quality and had learned to respect it. Yet all these manifestations +would not have disturbed the Germanic calculations except for one +depressing fact. Even a nation of 100,000,000 brave and energetic +people, fully trained and equipped for war, is not a formidable foe so +long as an impassable watery gulf of three thousand miles separates them +from the field of battle.</p> + +<p>For the greater part of 1917 the German people believed that their +submarines could bar the progress of the American armies. By March, +1918, they had awakened from this delusion. Not only was an American +army millions strong in process of formation, but the alarming truth now +dawned upon the Germans that it could be transported to Europe. The +great industries of America could provide munitions and food to supply +any number of soldiers indefinitely, and these, too, could be brought to +the Western Front. Outwardly, the German chiefs might still affect to +despise this new foe, but in their hearts they knew that it spelt their +doom. They were not now dealing with a corrupt Czardom and hordes of +ignorant and passionless Slavs, who could be eliminated by propaganda +and sedition; they were dealing with millions of intelligent and +energetic freemen, all animated by a mighty and almost religious +purpose. Yet the situation, desperate as it seemed, held forth one more +hope. If the German armies, which still greatly outnumbered the French +and British, could strike and win a decisive victory before the +Americans could arrive, then they might still force a satisfactory +peace. "It is a race between Ludendorff and Wilson" is the terse and +accurate way in which Lloyd George summed up the situation. The great +blow fell on March 21, 1918; the British and the French met it with +heroism, but it was quite evident that they were fighting against +terrible odds. At <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_298" id="Page_298">[Pg 298]</a></span>this time the American army in France numbered about +300,000 men; it now became the business of the American navy, assisted +by the British, to transport the American troops who could increase +these forces sufficiently to turn the balance in the Allies' favour.</p> + +<p>The supreme hour, to which all the anti-submarine labours of the +preceding year were merely preliminary, had now arrived. Since the close +of the war there has been much discussion of the part which the American +navy played in bringing it to a successful end. Even during the war +there was some criticism on this point. There were two more or less +definite opinions in the public mind upon this question. One was that +the main business of our war vessels was to convoy the American soldiers +to France; the other emphasized the anti-submarine warfare as its most +important duty. Anyone would suppose, from the detached way in which +these two subjects have been discussed, that the anti-submarine warfare +and the successful transportation of troops were separate matters. An +impression apparently prevails that, at the beginning of the war, the +American navy could have quietly decided whether it would devote its +energies to making warfare on the submarine or to convoying American +armies; yet the absurdity of such a conception must be apparent to +anyone who has read the foregoing pages. The several operations in which +the Allied navies engaged were all part of a comprehensive programme; +they were all interdependent. According to my idea, the business of the +American navy was to join its forces whole-heartedly with those of the +Allies in the effort <i>to win the war</i>. Anything which helped to +accomplish this great purpose became automatically our duty. Germany was +basing her chances of success upon the submarine; our business was +therefore to assist in defeating the submarine. The cause of the Allies +was our cause; our cause was the cause of the Allies; anything which +benefited the Allies benefited the United States; and anything which +benefited the United States benefited the Allies. Neither we nor France +nor England were conducting a separate campaign; we were separate units +of an harmonious whole. At the beginning the one pressing duty was to +put an end to the sinking of merchantmen, not because these merchantmen +were for the larger part British, but because the failure to do so would +have meant the elimination of Great Britain from the war, with <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_299" id="Page_299">[Pg 299]</a></span>results +which would have meant defeat for the other Allies. Let us imagine, for +a moment, what the sequence of events would have been had the submarine +campaign against merchant shipping succeeded; in that case Britain and +France would have been compelled to surrender unconditionally and the +United States would therefore have been forced to fight the Central +Empires alone. Germany's terms of peace would have included the +surrender of all the Allied fleets; this would eventually have left the +United States navy to fight the German navy reinforced by the ships of +Great Britain, Austria, France, and Italy. In such a contest we should +have been outnumbered about three or four to one. I have such confidence +in the power and purpose of America as to believe that, even in a +single-handed conflict with Germany, we should have won in the end; but +it is evident that the problem would have been quite a different one +from that of fighting in co-operation with the Allies against the +Germanic foe.</p> + +<p>Simply as a matter of self-interest and strategy it was certainly wisdom +to throw the last ounce of our strength into the scale of the Allied +navies; and it was therefore inevitable that we should first of all use +our anti-submarine craft to protect all shipping sailing to Europe and +to clear the sea of submarines. In doing this we were protecting the +food supply not only of Great Britain, but of France and our other +Allies, for most of the materials which we sent to our European friends +were transported first to England and thence were shipped across the +Channel. Moreover, our twelve months' campaign against the submarine was +an invaluable preliminary to transporting the troops. Does any sane +person believe that we could have put two million Americans into France +had the German submarines maintained until the spring and summer of 1918 +the striking power which had been theirs in the spring of 1917? Merely +to state the question is to answer it. In that same twelve months we had +gained much experience which was exceedingly valuable when we began +transporting troops in great numbers. The most efficacious protection to +merchant shipping, the convoy, was similarly the greatest safeguard to +our military transports. Those methods which had been so successfully +used in shipping food, munitions, and materials were now used in +shipping soldiers. The section of the great headquarters which we had +developed in London <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_300" id="Page_300">[Pg 300]</a></span>for routing convoys was used for routing +transports, and the American naval officer, Captain Byron A. Long, who +had demonstrated such great ability in this respect, was likewise the +master mind in directing the course of the American soldiers to France.</p> + +<p>In other ways we had laid the foundations for this, the greatest troop +movement in history. In the preceding twelve months we had increased the +oil tankage at Brest more than fourfold, sent over repair ships, and +augmented its repair facilities. This port and all of our naval +activities in France were under the command first of Rear-Admiral Wm. B. +Fletcher, and later Rear-Admiral Henry B. Wilson. It was a matter of +regret that we could not earlier have made Brest the main naval base for +the American naval forces in France, for it was in some respects +strategically better located for that purpose than was any other port in +Europe. Even for escorting certain merchant convoys into the Channel +Brest would have provided a better base than either Plymouth or +Queenstown. A glance at the map explains why. To send destroyers from +Queenstown to pick up convoys and escort them into the Channel or to +French ports and thence return to their base involved a long triangular +trip; to send such destroyers from Brest to escort these involved a +smaller amount of steaming and a direct east and west voyage. Similarly, +Queenstown was a much better location for destroyers sent to meet +convoys bound for ports in the Irish Sea over the northern "trunk line." +But unfortunately it was utterly impossible to use the great natural +advantages of Brest in the early days of war; the mere fact that this +French harbour possessed most inadequate tankage facilities put it out +of the question, and it was also very deficient in docks, repair +facilities, and other indispensable features of a naval base. At this +time Brest was hardly more than able to provide for the requirements of +the French, and it would have embarrassed our French allies greatly had +we attempted to establish a large American force there, before we had +supplied the essential oil fuel and repair facilities. The ships which +we did send in the first part of the war were mostly yachts, of the +"dollar-a-year" variety, which their owners had generously given to the +national service; their crews were largely of that type of young +business man and college undergraduate to whose skill and devotion I +have already paid <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_301" id="Page_301">[Pg 301]</a></span>tribute. This little flotilla acquitted itself +splendidly up and down the coast of France. Meanwhile, we were +constructing fuel-oil tanks; and as soon as these were ready and repair +ships were available, we began building up a large force at Brest—a +force which was ultimately larger than the one we maintained at +Queenstown; at the height of the troop movements it comprised about 36 +destroyers, 12 yachts, 3 tenders, and several mine-sweepers and tugs. +The fine work which this detachment accomplished in escorting troop and +supply convoys is sufficient evidence of the skill acquired by the +destroyers and other vessels in carrying out their duties in this +peculiar warfare.</p> + +<p>Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, a great organization had +been created under the able direction of Rear-Admiral Albert Gleaves for +maintaining and administering the fleet of transports and their ocean +escorts. Also, as soon as war was declared the work was begun of +converting into transports those German merchant ships which had been +interned in American ports. The successful completion of this work was, +in itself, a great triumph for the American navy. Of the vessels which +the Germans had left in our hands, seventeen at New York, Boston, +Norfolk, and Philadelphia, seemed to be adapted for transport purposes, +but the Germans had not intended that we should make any such use of +them. The condition of these ships, after their German custodians had +left, was something indescribable; they reflected great discredit upon +German seamanship, for it would have been impossible for any people +which really loved ships to permit them to deteriorate as had these +vessels and to become such cesspools of filth. For three years the +Germans had evidently made no attempt to clean them; the sanitary +conditions were so bad that our workmen could not sleep on board, but +had to have sleeping quarters near the docks; they spent weeks +scrubbing, scraping, and disinfecting, in a finally successful effort to +make the ships suitable habitations for human beings. Not only had the +Germans permitted such liners as the <i>Vaterland</i> and the <i>Kronprinzessin +Cecilie</i> to go neglected, but, on their departure, they had attempted to +injure them in all conceivable ways. The cylinders had been broken, +engines had been smashed, vital parts of the machinery had been removed +and thrown into the sea, ground glass had been placed in the oil cups, +gunpowder had been placed in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_302" id="Page_302">[Pg 302]</a></span>the coal—evidently in the hope of causing +explosions when the vessels were at sea—and other damage of a more +subtle nature had been done, it evidently being the expectation that the +ships would break down when on the ocean and beyond the possibility of +repair. Although our navy yards had no copies of the plans of these +vessels or their machinery—the Germans having destroyed them all—and +although the missing parts were of peculiarly German design, they +succeeded, in an incredibly short time, in making them even better and +speedier vessels than they had ever been before.</p> + +<p>The national sense of humour did not fail the transport service when it +came to rechristening these ships; the <i>Princess Irene</i> became the +<i>Pocahontas</i>, the <i>Rhein</i> the <i>Susquehanna</i>; and there was also an +ironic justice in the fact that the <i>Vaterland</i>, which had been built by +the Germans partly for the purpose of transporting troops in war, +actually fulfilled this mission, though not quite in the way which the +Germans had anticipated. Meanwhile, both the American and the British +mercantile marines were supplementing this German tonnage. The first +troops which we sent to France, in June, 1917, were transported in ships +of the United Fruit Company; and when the German blow was struck, in +March, 1918, both the United States and Great Britain began collecting +from all parts of the world vessels which could be used as troop +transports. We called in all available vessels from the Atlantic and +Pacific coasts and the Great Lakes; England stripped her trade routes to +South America, Australia, and the East, and France and Italy also made +their contributions. Of all the American troops sent to France from the +beginning of the war, the United States provided transports for 46·25 +per cent., Great Britain for 51·25, the remainder being provided by +France and Italy. Of those sent between March, 1918, and the armistice, +American vessels carried 42·15 per cent., British 55·40 per cent.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> + +<p>Yet there was one element in the safe transportation of troops which was +even more fundamental than those which I have named. The basis of all +our naval operations was the dreadnoughts and the battle-cruisers of the +Grand Fleet. It was this aggregation, as I have already indicated, +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_303" id="Page_303">[Pg 303]</a></span>which made possible the operation of all the surface ships that +destroyed the effectiveness of the submarines. Had the Grand Fleet +suddenly disappeared beneath the waves, all these offensive craft would +have been driven from the seas, the Allies' sea lines of communication +would have been cut, and the war would have ended in Germany's favour. +From the time the transportation of troops began the United States had a +squadron of five dreadnought battleships constantly with the Grand +Fleet. The following vessels performed this important duty: the <i>New +York</i>, Captain C. F. Hughes, afterward Captain E. L. Beach; the +<i>Wyoming</i>, Captain H. A. Wiley, afterward Captain H. H. Christy; the +<i>Florida</i>, Captain Thomas Washington, afterward Captain M. M. Taylor; +the <i>Delaware</i>, Captain A. H. Scales; the <i>Arkansas</i>, Captain W. H. G. +Bullard, afterward Captain L. R. de Steiguer; and the <i>Texas</i>, Captain +Victor Blue. These vessels gave this great force an unquestioned +preponderance, and made it practically certain that Germany would not +attempt another general sea battle. Under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, the +American squadron performed excellent service and made the most +favourable impression upon the chiefs of the Allied navies. Under the +general policy of co-operation established throughout our European naval +forces these vessels were quickly made a part of the Grand Fleet in so +far as concerned their military operations. This was, of course, wholly +essential to efficiency—a point the layman does not always +understand—so essential, in fact, that it may be said that, if the +Grand Fleet had gone into battle the day after our vessels joined, the +latter might have decreased rather than increased the fighting +efficiency of the whole; for, though our people and the British spoke +the same language, the languages of the ships, that is, their methods of +communication by signals, were wholly different. It was therefore our +duty to stow our signal flags and books down below, and learn the +British signal language. This they did so well that four days after +their arrival they went out and manœuvred successfully with the Grand +Fleet. In the same way they adopted the British systems of tactics and +fire control, and in every other way conformed to the established +practices of the British. Too great praise cannot be given the officers +and men of our squadron, not only for their efficiency and the +cordiality of their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_304" id="Page_304">[Pg 304]</a></span>co-operation, but for the patience with which they +bore the almost continuous restriction to their ships, and the long +vigil without the opportunity of a contact with the enemy forces. Just +how well our ships succeeded in this essential co-operation was +expressed by Admiral Sir David Beatty in the farewell speech which he +made to them upon the day of their departure for home. He said in part:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"I want, first of all, to thank you, Admiral Rodman, the captains, +officers, and ships' companies of the magnificent squadron, for the +wonderful co-operation and the loyalty you have given to me and to +my admirals; and the assistance that you have given us in every +duty you had to undertake. The support which you have shown is that +of true comradeship; and in time of stress, that is worth a very +great deal.</p> + +<p>"You will return to your own shores; and I hope in the sunshine, +which Admiral Rodman tells me always shines there, you won't forget +your 'comrades of the mist' and your pleasant associations of the +North Sea....</p> + +<p>"I thank you again and again for the great part the Sixth Battle +Squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in +history. I hope you will give this message to your comrades: 'Come +back soon. Good-bye and good luck!'"</p></div> + +<p>But these were not the only large battleships which the United States +had sent to European waters. Despite all the precautions which I have +described, there was still one danger which constantly confronted +American troop transports. By June and July, 1918, our troops were +crossing the Atlantic in enormous numbers, about 300,000 a month, and +were accomplishing most decisive results upon the battlefield. A +successful attack upon a convoy, involving the sinking of one or more +transports, would have had no important effect upon the war, but it +would probably have improved German <i>moral</i> and possibly have injured +that of the Americans. There was practically only one way in which such +an attack could be made; one or more German battle-cruisers might slip +out to sea and assail one of our troop convoys. In order to prepare for +such a possibility, the Department sent three of our most powerful +dreadnoughts to Berehaven, Ireland—the <i>Nevada</i>, Captain <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_305" id="Page_305">[Pg 305]</a></span>A. T. Long, +afterward Captain W. C. Cole; the <i>Oklahoma</i>, Captain M. L. Bristol, +afterward Captain C. B. McVay; and the <i>Utah</i>, Captain F. B. Bassett, +the whole division under the command of Rear-Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers. +This port is located in Bantry Bay, on the extreme southwestern coast. +For several months our dreadnoughts lay here, momentarily awaiting the +news that a German raider had escaped, ready to start to sea and give +battle. But the expected did not happen. The fact that this powerful +squadron was ready for the emergency is perhaps the reason why the +Germans never attempted the adventure.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">II</p> + +<p>A reference to the map which accompanies this chapter will help the +reader to understand why our transports were able to carry American +troops to France so successfully that not a single ingoing ship was ever +struck by a torpedo. This diagram makes it evident that there were two +areas of the Atlantic through which American shipping could reach its +European destination. The line of division was about the forty-ninth +parallel of latitude, the French city of Brest representing its most +familiar landmark. From this point extending southward, as far as the +forty-fifth parallel, which corresponds to the location of the city of +Bordeaux, is a great stretch of ocean, about 200 miles wide. It includes +the larger part of the Bay of Biscay, which forms that huge indentation +with which our school geographies have made us Americans so familiar, +and which has always enjoyed a particular fame for its storms, the +dangers of its coast, and the sturdy and independent character of the +people on its shores. The other distinct area to which the map calls +attention extends northerly from the forty-ninth parallel to the +fifty-second; it comprises the English Channel, and includes both the +French channel ports, the British ports, the southern coast of Ireland, +and the entrance to the Irish Sea. The width of this second section is +very nearly the same as that of the one to the south, or about 200 +miles.</p> + +<div class="img"> +<a href="images/map2.jpg"> +<img border="0" src="images/map2.jpg" width="75%" alt="THE OPTION OFFERED TO THE GERMAN SUBMARINES" /></a><br /> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em; margin-left: 50%; font-size: 85%;">Emery Walper Ltd. sc.</p> +<p class="cen" style="margin-top: .2em;">THE OPTION OFFERED TO THE GERMAN SUBMARINES</p> +<p class="noin" style="margin-top: .2em; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%;">This diagram explains why the American navy succeeded in transporting +more than 2,000,000 American soldiers to France without loss because of +submarines. The Atlantic was divided into two broad areas—shown by the +shaded parts of the diagram. Through the northern area were sent +practically all the merchant ships with supplies of food and materials +for Europe. The southern area, extending roughly from the forty-fifth to +the forty-ninth parallel, was used almost exclusively for troopships. +The Germans could keep only eight or ten U-boats at the same time in the +eastern Atlantic; they thus were forced to choose whether they should +devote these boats to attacking mercantile or troop convoys. The text +explains why, under these circumstances, they were compelled to use +nearly all their forces against merchant ships and leave troop +transports practically alone.</p> +</div> + +<p>Up to the present moment this narrative has been concerned chiefly with +the northernmost of these two great sea pathways. Through this one to +the north passed practically all the merchant shipping which was +destined for the Allies. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_306" id="Page_306">[Pg 306]</a></span>Consequently, as I have described, it was the +great hunting ground of the German submarines. I have thus far had +little to say of the Bay of Biscay section because, until 1918, there +was comparatively little activity in that part of the ocean. For every +ship which sailed through this bay I suppose that there were at least +100 which came through the Irish Sea and the English Channel. In my +first report to the Department I described the principal scene of +submarine activity as the area of the Atlantic reaching from the French +island of Ushant—which lies just westward of Brest—to the tip of +Scotland, and that remained the chief scene of hostilities to the end. +Along much of the coastline <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_307" id="Page_307">[Pg 307]</a></span>south of Brest the waters were so shallow +that the submarines could operate only with difficulty; it was a long +distance from the German bases; the shipping consisted largely of +coastal convoys; much of this was the coal trade from England; it is +therefore not surprising that the Germans contented themselves with now +and then planting mines off the most important harbours. Since our enemy +was able to maintain only eight or ten U-boats in the Atlantic at one +time it would have been sheer waste of energy to have stationed them off +the western coast of France. They would have put in their time to little +purpose, and meanwhile the ships and cargoes which they were above all +ambitious to destroy would have been safely finding their way into +British ports.</p> + +<p>The fact that we had these two separate areas and that these areas were +so different in character was what made it possible to send our +2,000,000 soldiers to France without losing a single man. From March, +1918, to the conclusion of the war, the American and British navies were +engaged in two distinct transportation operations. The shipment of food +and munitions continued in 1918 as in 1917, and on an even larger scale. +With the passing of time the mechanism of these mercantile convoys +increased in efficiency, and by March, 1918, the management of this +great transportation system had become almost automatic. Shipping from +America came into British ports, it will be remembered, in two great +"trunk lines," one of which ran through the English Channel and the +other up the Irish Sea. But when the time came to bring over the +American troops, we naturally selected the area to the south, both +because it was necessary to send the troops to France and because we had +here a great expanse of ocean which was relatively free of submarines. +Our earliest troop shipments disembarked at St. Nazaire; later, when the +great trans-Atlantic liners, both German and British, were pressed into +service, we landed many tens of thousands at Brest; and all the largest +French ports from Brest to Bordeaux took a share. A smaller number we +sent to England, from which country they were transported across the +Channel into France; when the demands became pressing, indeed, hardly a +ship of any kind was sent to Europe without its quota of American +soldiers; but, on the whole, the business of transportation in 1918 +followed simple and well-defined lines. We <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_308" id="Page_308">[Pg 308]</a></span>sent mercantile convoys in +what I may call the northern "lane" and troop convoys in the southern +"lane." We kept both lines of traffic for the most part distinct; and +this simple procedure offered to our German enemies a pretty problem.</p> + +<p>For, I must repeat, the German navy could maintain in the open Atlantic +an average of only about eight or ten of her efficient U-boats at one +time. The German Admiralty thus had to answer this difficult question: +Shall we use these submarines to attack mercantile convoys or to attack +troop convoys? The submarine flotilla which was actively engaged was so +small that it was absurd to think of sending half into each lane; the +Germans must send most of their submarines against cargo ships or most +of them against troopships. Which should it be? If it were decided to +concentrate on mercantile vessels then the American armies, which the +German chiefs had declared to their people could never get to the +Western Front, would reach France and furnish General Foch the reserves +with which he might crush the German armies before winter. If, on the +other hand, the Germans should decide to concentrate on troopships, then +the food and supplies which were essential to the Allied cause would +flow at an even greater rate into Great Britain and thence to the +European nations. Whether it were more important, in a military sense, +to cut the Allies' commercial lines of communication or to sink troop +transports is an interesting question. It is almost impossible for the +Anglo-Saxon mind to consider this as a purely military matter, apart +from the human factors involved. The sinking of a great transport, with +4,000 or 5,000 American boys on board, would have been a dreadful +calamity and would have struck horror to the American people; it was +something which the Navy was determined to prevent, and which we did +prevent. Considered as a strictly military question, however—and that +was the only consideration which influenced the Germans—it is hard to +see how the loss of one transport, or even the loss of several, would +have materially affected the course of the war. In judging the purely +military results of such a tragedy, we must remember that the Allied +armies were losing from 3,000 to 5,000 men a day; thus the sinking of an +American transport once a week would not have particularly affected the +course of the war. The destruction of merchant shipping in large +quantities, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_309" id="Page_309">[Pg 309]</a></span>however, represented the one way in which the Germans could +win. There were at least a hundred merchant ships to every one of our +troopships; if a considerable number of the former could be sunk, +Germany would have scored a decisive advantage. From the declaration of +submarine warfare, the objective of the German Admiralty had been for +"tonnage"; by March, 1918, as already said, the chances of destroying +sufficient tonnage to win had become extremely slight; yet it still +represented the one logical mission of the submarine.</p> + +<p>The two alternatives, however, that of attacking mercantile convoys or +troop convoys, hardly existed in fact. Let us suppose for a moment that +the Germans had changed their programme, had taken their group of +operating submarines from the northern trade routes, and had stationed +them to the south, in the track of the troop transports. What would the +results have been? "Lane," though a convenient word for descriptive +purposes, is hardly an accurate one; for this ocean passage-way was +really about 200 miles wide. Imagine eight or ten submarines, stretched +across that expanse and hunting for troopships. At this rate the Germans +would have had about one submarine for every twenty miles. Instead of +finding themselves sailing amid a swarm of surface ships, as they were +when they were stationed in the busy trade routes of the Irish Sea or +the English Channel, the submarines would have found themselves drifting +on a great waste of waters. Our troop convoys averaged not more than +three a week even in the busiest period; in all probability the +submarines would therefore have hung around for a month without catching +a glimpse of one. Even if by some chance the patient vigil should +finally have been rewarded, it is extremely unlikely that the submarine +would ever have found a favourable opportunity to attack. We must keep +in mind that the convoy room at the Admiralty knew, within certain +limits, the location of submarines from day to day; any time one was +located in the track of a troop convoy, therefore, a wireless to the +convoy would have conveyed this information and directed it to reach the +coast of France by another route.</p> + +<p>At the beginning the speediest vessels only were used for transporting +troops. Ships which made less than twelve knots an hour were not deemed +safe for such precious <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_310" id="Page_310">[Pg 310]</a></span>cargoes; when the need for troops became more +and more pressing and when our transport service had demonstrated great +skill in the work, a few slower vessels were used; but the great +majority of our troop transports were those which made twelve knots or +more. Now one of the greatest protections which a ship possesses against +submarine attack is unquestionably high speed. A submarine makes only +eight knots when submerged—and it must submerge immediately if its +attack is to be successful. It must be within at least a mile of its +quarry when it discharges its torpedo; and most successful attacks were +made within three hundred yards. Now take a pencil and a piece of paper +and figure out what must be the location of a submarine, having a speed +of eight knots, when it sights a convoy, which makes twelve knots and +more, if it hopes to approach near enough to launch a torpedo. A little +diagramming will prove that the U-boat must be almost directly in line +of its hoped-for victim if it is to score a hit. But even though the god +of Chance should favour the enemy in this way, the likelihood of sinking +its prey would still be very remote. Like all convoys, the troopships +began zigzagging as soon as they entered the danger zone; and this in +itself made it almost impossible for a submarine to get its bearings and +take good aim. I believe that these circumstances in themselves—the +comparative scarcity of troop transports, the width of the "lane" in +which they travelled, the high speed which they maintained, and their +constant zigzagging, would have defeated most of the attempts which the +Germans could have made to torpedo them. Though I think that most of +them would have reached their destinations unharmed without any other +protection, still this risk, small as it was, could not be taken; and we +therefore gave them one other protection greater than any of those which +I have yet mentioned—the destroyer escort. A convoy of four or five +large troopships would be surrounded by as many as ten or a dozen +destroyers. Very properly, since they were carrying human cargoes, we +gave them an escort at least three times as large per vessel as that +given to large mercantile convoys of twenty or more vessels; and this +fact made them very uninviting baits for the most venturesome U-boat +commanders.</p> + +<p>When the engineers build a Brooklyn bridge they introduce an element +which they call the factor of safety. It is <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_311" id="Page_311">[Pg 311]</a></span>their usual procedure to +estimate the greatest weight which their structure may be called upon to +bear under any conceivable circumstances and then they make it strong +enough to stand a number of times that weight. This additional strength +is the "factor of safety"; it is never called into use, of course, but +the consciousness that it exists gives the public a sense of security +which it could obtain in no other way. We adopted a similar policy in +transporting these millions of American boys to Europe. We also had a +large margin of safety. We did not depend upon one precaution to assure +the lives of our soldiers; we heaped one precautionary measure on +another. From the embarking of the troops at New York or at Hampton +Roads to the disembarkation at Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, +or at one of their other destinations, not the minutest safeguard was +omitted. We necessarily thus somewhat diminished the protection of some +of the mercantile convoys—and properly so. This was done whenever the +arrival of a troop convoy conflicted with the arrival of a merchant +convoy. Also, until they reached the submarine zone, they were attended +by a cruiser or a battleship whose business it was to protect them +against a German raider which might possibly have made its escape into +the ocean; the work performed by these ocean escorts, practically all of +which were American, was for the most part unobtrusive and +unspectacular, but it constitutes a particularly fine example of +efficiency and seamanlike devotion. At Berehaven, Ireland, as described +above, we had stationed three powerful American dreadnoughts, +momentarily prepared to rush to the scene in case one of the great +German battle-cruisers succeeded in breaking into the open sea. Even the +most minute precautions were taken by the transports.</p> + +<p>The soldiers and crews were not permitted to throw anything overboard +which might betray the course of a convoy; the cook's refuse was dropped +at a particular time and in a way that would furnish no clue to a +lurking submarine; even a tin can, if thrown into the sea, was first +pierced with holes to make sure that it would sink. Anyone who struck a +match at night in the danger zone committed a punishable offence. It is +thus apparent why the Germans never "landed" a single one of our +transports. The records show only three or four cases in which even +attempts were made to do this; and those few efforts were feeble and +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_312" id="Page_312">[Pg 312]</a></span>ineffectual. Of course, the boys all had exciting experiences with +phantom submarines; indeed I don't suppose that there is a single one of +our more than 2,000,000 troops who has not entertained his friends and +relatives with accounts of torpedo streaks and schools of U-boats.</p> + +<p>But the Germans made no concerted campaign against our transports; +fundamental conditions, already described, rendered such an offensive +hopeless; and the skill with which our transport service was organized +and conducted likewise dissuaded them. I have always believed that the +German Admiralty ordered their U-boat captains to let the American +transports alone; or at least not to attack except under very favourable +circumstances, and this belief is rather confirmed by a passage in +General Ludendorff's memoirs. "From our previous experience of the +submarine war," General Ludendorff writes, "I expected strong forces of +Americans to come, but the rapidity with which they actually did arrive +proved surprising. General von Cramon, the German military +representative at the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters, often called me up +and asked me to insist on the sinking of American troopships; public +opinion in Austria-Hungary demanded it. Admiral von Holtzendorff could +only reply that everything was being done to reduce enemy tonnage and to +sink troopships. It was not possible to direct the submarines against +troopships exclusively. They could approach the coasts of Europe +anywhere between the north of England and Gibraltar, a front of some +fourteen hundred nautical miles. It was impossible effectively to close +this area by means of submarines. One could have concentrated them only +on certain routes; but whether the troopships would choose the same +routes at the same time was the question. As soon as the enemy heard of +submarines anywhere he could always send the ships new orders by +wireless and unload at another port. It was, therefore, not certain that +by this method we should meet with a sufficient number of troopships. +The destruction of the enemy's freight tonnage would then have been +undertaken only spasmodically, and would have been set back in an +undesirable manner; and in that way the submarine war would have become +diverted from its original object. The submarine war against commerce +was therefore continued with all the vigour possible."</p> + +<p>Apparently it became the policy of the German Admiralty, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_313" id="Page_313">[Pg 313]</a></span>as I have +said, to concentrate their U-boats on merchant shipping and leave the +American troopships practically alone—at least those bound to Europe. +Unfortunately, however, at no time did we have enough destroyers to +provide escorts for all of these transports as fast as they were +unloaded and ready to return to America, but as time in the "turn +around" was the all-important consideration in getting the troops over, +the transports were sent back through the submarine zone under the +escort of armed yachts, and occasionally not escorted at all. Under +these conditions the transports could be attacked with much less risk, +as was shown by the fact that five were torpedoed, though of these +happily only three were sunk.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">III</p> + +<p>The position of the German naval chiefs, as is shown by the quotation +from General Ludendorff's book, was an extremely unhappy one. They had +blatantly promised the German people that their submarines would prevent +the transportation of American troops to Europe. At first they had +ridiculed the idea that undisciplined, unmilitary America could ever +organize an army; after we adopted conscription and began to train our +young men by the millions, they just as vehemently proclaimed that this +army could never be landed in Europe. In this opinion the German +military chieftains were not alone. No such army movement had ever +before been attempted. The discouraging forecast made by a brilliant +British naval authority in July, 1917, reflected the ideas of too many +military people on both sides of the ocean. "I am distressed," he said, +"at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to provide enough +shipping to bring the American army over in hundreds of thousands to +France, and, after they are brought over, to supply the enormous amount +of shipping which will be required to keep them full up with munitions, +food, and equipment."</p> + +<p>It is thus not surprising that the German people accepted as gospel the +promises of their Admiralty; therefore their anger was unbounded when +American troops began to arrive. The German newspapers began to ask the +most embarrassing questions. What had become of their <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_314" id="Page_314">[Pg 314]</a></span>submarines? Had +the German people not been promised that their U-boats would sink any +American troopships that attempted to cross the ocean? As the shipments +increased, and as the effect of these vigorous fresh young troops began +to be manifest upon the Western Front, the outcries in Germany waxed +even more fierce and abusive. Von Capelle and other German naval chiefs +made rambling speeches in the Reichstag, once more promising their +people that the submarines would certainly win the war—speeches that +were followed by ever-increasing arrivals of American soldiers in +France. The success of our transports led directly to the fall of Von +Capelle as Minister of Marine; his successor, Admiral von Mann, who was +evidently driven to desperation by the popular outburst, decided to make +one frantic attempt to attack our men. The new minister, of course, knew +that he could accomplish no definite results; but the sinking of even +one transport with several thousand troops on board would have had a +tremendous effect upon German <i>moral</i>. When the great British liner +<i>Justicia</i> was torpedoed, the German Admiralty officially announced that +it was the <i>Leviathan</i>, filled with American soldiers; and the +jubilation which followed in the German press, and the subsequent +dejection when it was learned that this was a practically empty +transport, sailing westward, showed that an actual achievement of this +kind would have raised their drooping spirits. Admiral von Mann, +therefore, took several submarines away from the trade routes and sent +them into the transport zone. But they did not succeed even in attacking +a single east-bound troopship. The only result accomplished was the one +which, from what I have already said, would have been expected; the +removal of the submarines from the commercial lane caused a great fall +in the sinking of merchant ships. In August, 1918, these sinkings +amounted to 280,000 tons; in September and October, when this futile +drive was made at American transports, the sinkings fell to 190,000 and +110,000 tons.</p> + +<p>Too much praise cannot be given to the commanders of our troop convoys +and the commanding officers of the troop transports, as well as the +commanders of the cruisers and battleships that escorted them from +America to the western edge of the submarine zone. The success of their +valuable services is evidence of a high degree not only of nautical +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_315" id="Page_315">[Pg 315]</a></span>skill, judgment, and experience, but of the admirable seamanship +displayed under the very unusual conditions of steaming without lights +while continuously manœuvring in close formation. Moreover, their +cordial co-operation with the escorts sent to meet them was everything +that could be desired. In this invaluable service these commanding +officers had the loyal and enthusiastic support of the admirable petty +officers and men whose initiative, energy, and devotion throughout the +war enabled us to accomplish results which were not only beyond our +expectations but which demonstrated that they are second to none in the +world in the qualities which make for success in war on the sea.</p> + +<p>On the whole, the safeguarding of American soldiers on the ocean was an +achievement of the American navy. Great Britain provided a slightly +larger amount of tonnage for this purpose than the United States; but +about 82 per cent. of the escorting was done by our own forces. The +cruiser escorts across the ocean to France were almost entirely +American; and the destroyer escorts through the danger zone were +likewise nearly all our own work. And in performing this great feat the +American navy fulfilled its ultimate duty in the war. The transportation +of these American troops brought the great struggle to an end. On the +battlefield they acquitted themselves in a way that aroused the +admiration of their brothers in the naval service. When we were reading, +day by day, the story of their achievements, when we saw the German +battle lines draw nearer and nearer to the Rhine, and, finally, when the +German Government raised its hands in abject surrender, the eighteen +months' warfare against the German submarines, in which the American +navy had been privileged to play its part, appeared in its true +light—as one of the greatest victories against the organized forces of +evil in all history.</p> + +<h4>FOOTNOTE:</h4><div class="footnote"><p class="noin"><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> These figures are taken from the Annual Report of the +Secretary of the Navy for 1919, page 207.</p></div> +<br /> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">THE END</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_316" id="Page_316">[Pg 316]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>APPENDIX I</h2> + +<h3>OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO PUBLISH "THE VICTORY AT SEA"</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="cen">U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE,<br /> NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND</p> + +<p class="right">14 June 1919.</p> + +<p class="noin">From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy.<br /> +<br /> +To: The Secretary of the Navy.<br /> +<br /> +Subject: Requests Permission to Publish a Book on the Activities of +the U.S. Navy during The Great War.<br /> +<br /> +Reference (a): Paragraph 1534 of the Articles for the Government of +the Navy of the United States.</p> + + +<p>1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) I request +authority to publish in my name a book descriptive of the activities of +the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters during The Great War.</p> + +<p>2. My object in preparing this book is to familiarize the American +people with the great work accomplished by the Navy during the war. It +will be a popular presentation written in a nontechnical style, +illustrated with photographs taken in Europe and various diagrams +indicating the nature of our activities.</p> + +<p class="right"> +[s] <span class="smcap">Wm. S. Sims.</span></p> + +<p class="noin"> +9 July 1919.<br /> +APPROVED.<br /> +[s] Josephus Daniels.</p> +<br /> + +<p class="noin">HWS-MEF</p> + +<p class="cen">2nd Indorsement.<br /> +OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE,<br /> +Washington, D.C.</p><br /> + +<p class="right">11 July 1919.<br /></p> + +<p class="noin">From: Director of Naval Intelligence.<br /> +<br /> +To: President Naval War College.</p> + +<p>1. Forwarded.</p> + +<p class="right"> +[s] <span class="smcap">A. P. Niblack.</span></p> +<br /> +<br /> +<p class="cen">THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,<br /> WASHINGTON</p> + +<p class="right">June 26, 1919.<br /> +</p> + +<p class="noin"><span class="smcap">My Dear Admiral</span>:</p> + +<p>I am sending you in the regular official course my approval of <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_317" id="Page_317">[Pg 317]</a></span>your +plan to print and publish a book relative to the operations of the naval +forces under your command during the great war. I am happy that you are +going to undertake this, because I am sure it will be of great value to +the Navy and of interest to the world.</p> + +<p>With sentiments of esteem and high regard,</p> + +<p class="right"> +<span style="padding-right: 11em;">Sincerely yours,</span><br /> +<span style="padding-right: 5em;">[s] <span class="smcap">Josephus Daniels</span>.</span><br /> +</p> + +<p class="noin">P.S.</p> + +<p>Of course any facilities or assistance that the Navy Department can +render you will be at your disposal.</p> + +<p class="noin"> +Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims, U.S.N.,<br /> +President Naval War College,<br /> +Newport, Rhode Island.<br /></p> +<br /> + +<p class="cen"><i>Extract from Navy Regulations, 1913, Article 1534</i></p> + +<p>"(2) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy +Department shall publish or cause or permit to be published, directly or +indirectly, or communicate by interviews, private letters, or otherwise, +except as required by his official duties, any information in regard to +the foreign policy of the United States, or concerning the acts or +measures of any department of the Government or of any officer acting +thereunder, or any comments or criticisms thereon; or the text of any +official instructions, reports, or letters upon any subject whatever, or +furnish copies thereof to any person, without the express permission of +the Navy Department.</p> + +<p>"(4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting officers +from forwarding to the department, through official channels, +well-considered comment and suggestions with a view to promoting the +efficiency of the service and the public interests; on the contrary, +such suggestions are invited, but they should be in regard to things or +methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be +accompanied by a well-digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions, +if approved by the department, will be entered on the officer's record +and he will be duly notified to that effect."</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_318" id="Page_318">[Pg 318]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>APPENDIX II</h2> + +<h3>FIRST CABLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON</h3> + + +<p class="cen">To: Secretary of the Navy.</p> + +<p class="noin">Sent April 14, 1917.<br /> +Through: State Department.</p> + +<p class="right">File No. 25-9-2.</p> + +<p>The situation is as follows:</p> + +<p>The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people realize in +America. The recent success of operations and the rapidity of +construction constitute the real crisis of the war. The <i>moral</i> of the +enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four are known to have +been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded. +The reports of our press are greatly in error. Recent reports circulated +concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy <i>moral</i> and results +are [not] very satisfactory.</p> + +<p>Supplies and communications of forces all fronts, including the +Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled.</p> + +<p>German submarines are constantly extending their operations into the +Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian +situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five admirals, captains, +and commanders murdered, and in some armies there is insubordination.</p> + +<p>The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in February was +536,000 tons, in March, 517,000 tons, and in the first ten days of April +205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these losses are +increasing.</p> + +<p>The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape of some +raiders during the long nights, but the chances are better now.</p> + +<p>The Allies were notified that hospital ships will continue to be sunk, +this in order to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines +to convoy hospital ships; in this way causing a large demand for large +convoy forces in all areas not before necessary, and also partially +immobilizing the main fleet.</p> + +<p>On account of the immense theatre and the length and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_319" id="Page_319">[Pg 319]</a></span>number of lines of +communication, and the material deterioration resulting from three +years' continuous operation in distant fields with inadequate base +facilities, the strength of the naval forces is dangerously strained. +This applies to all of the sea forces outside of the Grand Fleet. The +enemy has six large and sixty-four small submarine mine-layers; the +latter carry eighteen mines and the former thirty-four, also torpedoes +and guns. All classes submarines for actual commission completed at a +rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure defeat of the +submarine campaign immediate active co-operation absolutely necessary.</p> + +<p>The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of +communications in the Eastern Atlantic, therefore I very urgently +recommend the following immediate naval co-operation.</p> + +<p>Maximum number of destroyers to be sent, accompanied by small +anti-submarine craft; the former to patrol designated high seas area +westward to Ireland, based on Queenstown, with an advance base at Bantry +Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol for destroyers: small craft should +be of light draft with as high speed as possible but low speed also +useful. Also repair ships and staff for base. Oil and docks are +available but I advise sending continuous supply of fuel. German main +fleet must be contained, demanding maximum conservation of the British +main fleet. South of Scotland no base is so far available for this +force.</p> + +<p>At present our battleships can serve no useful purpose in this area, +except that two divisions of dreadnoughts might be based on Brest for +moral effect against anticipated raids by heavy enemy ships in the +channel out of reach of the British main fleet.</p> + +<p>The chief other and urgent practical co-operation is merchant tonnage +and a continuous augmentation of anti-submarine craft to reinforce our +advanced forces. There is a serious shortage of the latter craft. For +towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous +areas sea-going tugs would be of great use.</p> + +<p>The co-operation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost +despatch in order to break the enemy submarine <i>moral</i> and accelerate +the accomplishment of the chief American objective.</p> + +<p>It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our +coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep our forces +from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through effect upon +public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the +focussing of shipping on this side will restrict such operations to +minor importance, although <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_320" id="Page_320">[Pg 320]</a></span>they should be effectively opposed, +principally by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine +mines have been anchored as deep as ninety fathoms but majority at not +more than fifty fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth +until from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after they have been laid.</p> + +<p>So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight +of landmarks or lights on account of danger to themselves if location is +not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and anti-submarine work +where most effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity.</p> + +<p>Mr. Hoover informs that there is only sufficient grain supply in this +country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail +stores. In a few days Mr. Hoover will sail for the United States.</p> + +<p class="right smcap">Sims.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_321" id="Page_321">[Pg 321]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br/> +<h2>APPENDIX III</h2> + +<h3>FIRST DETAILED REPORT ON THE ALLIED NAVAL SITUATION</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="right"> +<span class="smcap">London, England.</span><br /> +April 19, 1917.</p> + +<p class="noin">From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N.<br /> +To: Secretary of the Navy.<br /> +Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams +concerning War situation and recommendations for U.S. Naval +co-operation.</p> + +<p>1. <i>Reception</i>:</p> + +<p>My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial and +significant of the seriousness of present situation and the importance +to be attached to the United States' entry into the war.</p> + +<p>I was met at Liverpool by Rear-Admiral Hope, R.N., a member of Admiral +Jellicoe's staff, and the Admiral of the Port, the former having been +sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was +provided which made a record run, and within a few hours after arrival +in London I was received by the First Sea Lord and his principal +assistants in a special conference.</p> + +<p>2. <i>Conferences</i>:</p> + +<p>More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full statement +of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account +of its seriousness, combined with a natural reluctance against appearing +to seek assistance, and a hesitancy in taking chances of allowing +information indirectly to reach the enemy, and thereby improve enemy +<i>moral</i>.</p> + +<p>I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a +part of the Admiralty organization, and that it was essential to safe +and efficient co-operation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of +the exact situation.</p> + +<p>They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War +Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_322" id="Page_322">[Pg 322]</a></span>regards the +military situation and rate of destruction of merchant shipping.</p> + +<p>I have had daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, both at his office +and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty +and access to all Government Officials. I have freely consulted with +such officials as the following:</p> + +<p>Prime Minister.</p> + +<p>First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson).</p> + +<p>Ministers of Munitions, Shipping, Trade, and other Cabinet officials.</p> + +<p>First Sea Lord, and his assistants.</p> + +<p>Chief of Naval Staff.</p> + +<p>Directors (corresponding to our Chiefs of Bureaus) of Intelligence, +Anti-submarine operations, Torpedoes, Mines, Mining, etc.</p> + +<p>3. <i>General Statement of the Situation</i>:</p> + +<p>Since the last declaration of the enemy Government, which from +intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine campaign against +merchant shipping of all Nations has resolved itself into the real issue +of the war and, stated briefly, the Allied Governments have not been +able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation presented.</p> + +<p>4. As stated in my first despatch, the communications and supplies to +all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the +"Command of the Sea" is actually at stake.</p> + +<p>5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine +menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as +probably those of the Department also, had been largely based upon Press +reports and reports of our Attachés and other professional Americans who +have been abroad during the War. All of this information has been either +rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form that it would +be of minimum assistance to enemy <i>moral</i>.</p> + +<p>6. The necessity for secrecy, which the British Government has +experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London, and even in the +Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have been remarkable and +unexpected leakages of information throughout the war. Certain neutral +legations of smaller countries are now under strong suspicion.</p> + +<p>7. The extent to which the submarine campaign is being waged is in +itself excellent evidence of the importance attached to it by the enemy, +and of the degree to which they counted, and still are counting, upon +it.</p> + +<p>The Intelligence Department has reliable information (as reliable as can +be) that the enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in +<i>two</i> months through shortage of supplies.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_323" id="Page_323">[Pg 323]</a></span>8. With improved weather and the shorter nights now coming on we may +expect even more enemy submarine success.</p> + +<p>9. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was yesterday in conference +in the Admiralty as to what greater extent destroyers and auxiliaries of +the Fleet may be utilized without endangering its power in the remote +possibility of another fleet engagement.</p> + +<p>The consensus of opinion seems to be that the latter will not occur, but +there is not complete unanimity in this belief, and of course, in any +case, the possibility must be adequately and continuously provided +against.</p> + +<p><i>General discussion of situation</i>:</p> + +<p>10. I delayed [four days] forwarding my first report of the situation +with a view of obtaining the maximum information consistent with the +importance of the time element. I was also somewhat deterred by a +natural reluctance to alter so radically my preconceived views and +opinions as to the situation.</p> + +<p>11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions +such as raids on our coasts or elsewhere, the critical area in which the +war's decision will be made is in the eastern Atlantic at the focus of +all lines of communications.</p> + +<p>The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of construction, +allowing liberal factors for errors of information, renders it +inevitable that the main submarine effort must continue to be +concentrated in the above critical area.</p> + +<p>12. Even in this critical area, it is manifest that the field is +relatively large for the maximum number of submarines which the enemy +can maintain in it. For example, with the present Admiralty policy +(explained below) they are forced to cover all the possible trade routes +of approach between the north of Scotland and Ushant.</p> + +<p>13. From consideration of the above and all other essential information +available, it is apparent that the enemy could not disperse his main +submarine campaign into other quarters of the Globe without diminishing +results in this and all areas to a degree which would mean failure to +accomplish the Mission of the submarine campaign, which can be nothing +else than a final decision of the war.</p> + +<p>14. Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the +Admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce +more substantial and visible results. One of the principal demands is +for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection +within the war zone.</p> + +<p>The answer, which manifestly is not publicly known, is simply that the +necessary vessels are not available, and further that those which are +available are suffering from the effects of three years of arduous +service.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_324" id="Page_324">[Pg 324]</a></span>15. It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not +directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these +convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same—the area +is too large; the necessary vessels are not available.</p> + +<p>16. However, I am now consulting with the Director of Shipping as to the +practicability and advisability of attempting some approach to such a +plan in case the United States is able to put in operation sufficient +tonnage to warrant it.</p> + +<p>17. After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the Admiralty +now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion. They use about six +relatively large avenues or arcs of approach to the United Kingdom and +Channel, changing their limits or area periodically if necessity +demands.</p> + +<p>Generally speaking, one is to the north of Scotland, another to the +north of Ireland, and three or four others covering the Irish Sea and +Channel. Individual ships coming into any of these areas of approach are +instructed, generally before sailing, to cross the twentieth meridian at +certain and different latitudes and thence steer certain courses to +port.</p> + +<p>At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of approach +free of submarines under such conditions as to lead them to concentrate +shipping therein, but invariably the enemy has become aware of the +course pursued.</p> + +<p>18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is +communication with the shipping itself and full co-operation by the +merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either +becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually +changed, and at all times it cannot be counted upon for more than a +fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping +shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent.</p> + +<p>19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant Captains taking +the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least +indifference, for Admiralty instructions. The American Liner <i>New York</i> +upon which I took passage furnishes a typical example. She was +instructed to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she passed it about +nine <span class="smcap">P.M.</span>, thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous +area.</p> + +<p>20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with Merchant masters and +sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "Give us a gun and +let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is +impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in +any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling +their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_325" id="Page_325">[Pg 325]</a></span>With +this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a little +experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in +open formations.</p> + +<p>21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of +ships, merchant as well as Naval, is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING, not more than +fifteen minutes on a course. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on +the contrary there is absolutely unanimity of opinion.</p> + +<p>22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, <i>particularly destroyers</i>, +and until the enemy submarine <i>moral</i> is broken, there is but one sure +method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete +unanimity—increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small.</p> + +<p>"More Ships! More Ships! More Ships!" is heard on every hand.</p> + +<p>23. It is also significant that until very recently the Admiralty have +been unable completely to convince some members of the Cabinet that the +submarine issue is the deciding factor in the War. The civilian mind, +here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly +until the pinch is felt in real physical ways.</p> + +<p>24. The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion +that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely +sealing up all escape for submarines from their own ports. The fact that +all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve +the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own +Naval forces is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced +the Prime Minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the +situations into which we would be led: namely, that in order to maintain +our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought +against them, until finally the majority if not all of our forces would +be forced into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual +torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favourable to the +enemy.</p> + +<p>25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and always can, +force exits, and thereby nullify the close blockade, the weather is a +serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used +for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of +weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not +hold. They chafe through. In this respect we could be of great +assistance, i.e. in supply of moorings and buoys.</p> + +<p>26. The Channel is not now, and never has been, completely sealed +against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of escape to the +north. Submarines have gone under mine-fields, <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_326" id="Page_326">[Pg 326]</a></span>and have succeeded in +unknown ways in evading and cutting through nets and obstructions.</p> + +<p>27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid, and in +fact escape through, the Channel at any time when the enemy decides that +the necessity or return will justify the risk. Hence the suggestion that +two divisions of our fast Dreadnoughts might be based upon Brest, +primarily for the resulting moral effect against such possible raids.</p> + +<p>I was told yesterday by an important Admiralty official that while he +thought the chances of raids in, or escape through, the Channel by heavy +enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet (North of Scotland) were +very remote, nevertheless the possibility existed and was principally +thwarted on moral grounds, that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the +opposition which would be encountered. He agreed with others, including +the First Sea Lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to +those maintained in southern Channel approaches by the French and +British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the possibility of such +raids.</p> + +<p>28. <i>Submarine Losses</i>:</p> + +<p>It has been found necessary to accept <i>no</i> reports of submarine losses +as authentic and certain unless survivors are captured or the submarine +itself is definitely located by dragging. No dependence even is placed +upon evidence of oil on the surface after a submarine has been attacked +and forced down, as there is reason to believe that when an enemy +submarine dives to escape gunfire she is fitted to expel oil for the +particular purpose of conveying the impression that she has been sunk +and thereby avoid further pursuit. It has been shown that the amount of +damage a submarine can stand is surprising and much more than was +anticipated before the experience of the war. Upon a recent occasion a +British submarine was mistaken for an enemy and though struck by several +shells, dived and escaped to port.</p> + +<p>The submarine losses which are certain since outbreak of war are as +given in attached cablegram.</p> + +<p>It is estimated that between thirty and forty submarines operate at a +time in the waters surrounding the British Islands and French Coast. At +least one is now known to be on White Sea trade lanes.</p> + +<p>29. <i>Best anti-submarine weapons</i>:</p> + +<p>One of the most efficient weapons now used by all destroyers and patrol +craft against submarines is the so-called "Depth Charge," sample and +drawings of which have been forwarded by our Naval Attaché. These are +merely explosive charges designed to explode at a certain depth, +formerly eighty feet, now about one hundred feet. They are dropped +overboard where a submarine that has submerged is assumed to be and <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_327" id="Page_327">[Pg 327]</a></span>are +counted upon to badly shake up and demoralize if they do not actually +cause serious damage.</p> + +<p>Howitzers and Bomb-throwers of large calibre are under construction, +designed to throw similar depth charges to distances of about 2,000 +yards. Details will be forwarded.</p> + +<p>30. <i>Torpedo Protection</i>:</p> + +<p>This subject may be summed up by the statement of the Captain of a +British Dreadnought who said in effect that after a year's experience he +did not fear being sunk by a torpedo. Unless struck by several the worst +to be anticipated is damage to shafts or rudder, thus necessitating +towing. Cruisers have often been struck and been able to reach port. +Vital water-tight doors are kept continuously closed at sea.</p> + +<p>Destroyer officers have been heard to express the curious opinion that +the enemy ships were more or less unsinkable. This is probably to be +explained by the fact that they carry very few supplies; that they have +their storage spaces compartmented or filled with wood or other +water-excluding material; and that when in port, they quarter their +crews in barracks, and when leaving for a cruise carry the minimum +amount of berthing and supply facilities. These points, however, are not +positively known.</p> + +<p>On the contrary, all vessels of the British Fleet must be kept fully +supplied and fuelled at all times for extended cruising. This is +particularly true of Battle-cruisers and Cruisers.</p> + +<p>31. All officers of rank and actual experience consulted are convinced +that the enemy have no unusual methods of protection, or in fact any +"surprises" in ordnance or other fighting equipment.</p> + +<p>32. All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is SPEED +and ZIGZAGGING.</p> + +<p>33. It is a common experience of the Naval as well as Merchant service +that torpedo wakes are reported where none exist. Many reports are +received of torpedoes barely missing ships. This was true in the Jutland +Battle. The Captain on one Battleship said that he received numerous +reports of torpedoes passing just ahead and just astern, nearly all of +which he had reason to believe did not exist.</p> + +<p>Streaks of suds, slicks, etc., are very deceiving and are easily +mistaken for torpedo wakes, particularly when the danger of torpedoes is +present. This accounts for many reports by passengers on liners and +other merchant craft of seeing many torpedoes just miss their mark.</p> + +<p>34. <i>Submarine versus Submarine</i>:</p> + +<p>There has always been opposition to using submarines against submarines, +principally on the grounds that the possibilities of their +accomplishments would not be sufficiently great to justify <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_328" id="Page_328">[Pg 328]</a></span>the risk +involved of mistaken identity and resulting damage to friends.</p> + +<p>The Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare believes, however, that such +operations promise well, and the experiment is now being tried with as +many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet. Some enemy +submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually torpedoed. One +valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our +submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe +in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty +is removed the enemy will be forced to keep down more, and to take much +greater precautions against detection. This is an advantage of no small +account.</p> + +<p>In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by +our submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable +information as to the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessels +under the actual conditions existing in the areas in which they operate. +Without this knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to +conjecture which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected +effort.</p> + +<p class="right"> +(Signed) <span class="smcap">Wm. S. Sims</span>.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_329" id="Page_329">[Pg 329]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>APPENDIX IV</h2> + +<h3>THE QUESTION OF ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="noin">To: Secretary of the Navy.<br /> +Through Admiralty. From Queenstown.<br /> +Sent: June 28, 1917.<br /> +Admiralty for Secretary Navy Washington, providing it meets +Admiralty's full approval.<br /> +From Admiral Sims.</p> +<br /> + +<p>Referring to Department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the +effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the +most effective defensive anti-submarine measures, I again submit with +all possible stress the following based on extended [Allied] war +experience. The measures demanded, if enemy defeat in time is to be +assured, are not defensive but offensive defensive. The merchantman's +inherent weakness is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defence +against torpedo attack without warning, which is necessarily the enemy +method of attack against armed ships. In this area alone during the last +six weeks thirty armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine +being seen, although three of these were escorted each by a single +destroyer. The result would of course have been the same no matter how +many guns these ships carried or what their calibre. Three mystery +ships, heavily manned by expert naval crews with much previous +experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without +warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging +submarine with gunfire at six thousand yards but submarine submerged and +approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness +of heaviest batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by +Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their +men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively small number +American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the +enemy's hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on +record of submarines making successful gun attacks from advantageous sun +position against armed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_330" id="Page_330">[Pg 330]</a></span>ships without ship being able to see submarine. +I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by +offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of +shipping and avoidance of anti-submarine craft. Enemy submarines are now +using for their final approach an auxiliary periscope less than two +inches in diameter. This information just acquired. All of the +experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would +be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the +assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against +submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have +now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent, +convoys from sixteen to twenty ships. This is an offensive measure +against submarines, as the latter will be subject to the attack of our +anti-submarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of +convoyed merchantmen. Moreover it permits of concentrated attack by our +forces and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various +routes of approach.</p> + +<p>Concerning Department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant +shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit +that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new +anti-submarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any +such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly +counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad +weather of autumn, that is, in next three months. Heaviest effort may be +anticipated in July and August. I again submit that protection of our +coastlines and of Allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in +field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the +Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations +in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, +the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and +must continue to operate in order to succeed.</p> + +<p class="right smcap">Sims.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_331" id="Page_331">[Pg 331]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>APPENDIX V</h2> + +<h3>THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="right"> +<span class="smcap">London</span>,<br /> +June 29, 1917.</p> + +<p class="noin">From: Commander U.S. Naval Forces operating in European Waters.<br /> +To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations).<br /> +Subject: General report concerning military situation.</p> + +<p>1. I feel that there is little to add to my recent cable despatches +which, in view of the importance of the time element, have been made +full and detailed.</p> + +<p>2. To sum up my despatches briefly, I would repeat that I consider that +the military situation is very grave indeed on account of the success of +the enemy submarine campaign.</p> + +<p>If the shipping losses continue as they have during the past four +months, it is submitted that the Allies will be forced to dire straits +indeed, if they will not actually be forced into an unsatisfactory +peace.</p> + +<p>The present rate of destruction is very much greater than the rate of +building, and the shortage of tonnage is already so great that the +efficiency of the naval forces is already reduced by lack of oil. Orders +have just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in cases of +emergency. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war.</p> + +<p>3. My reasons for being so insistent in my cable despatches have been +because of my conviction that measures of co-operation which we may take +will be inefficient if they are not put into operation immediately, that +is, within a month.</p> + +<p>There is every reason to believe that the maximum enemy submarine effort +will occur between now and the first of November, reaching its height +probably during the latter part of July, if not earlier.</p> + +<p>4. There is certainly no sovereign solution for the submarine menace +except through well-established methods of warfare based upon +fundamental military principles.</p> + +<p>5. It is submitted that the cardinal military principle of +<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_332" id="Page_332">[Pg 332]</a></span>concentration of effort is at present being pursued by the enemy and +not by the Allies.</p> + +<p>6. We are dispersing our forces while the enemy is concentrating his. +The enemy's submarine mission is and must continue to be the destruction +of merchant shipping. The limitations of submarines and the distances +over which they must operate prevent them from attacking our naval +forces, that is, anti-submarine craft. They cannot afford to engage +anti-submarine craft with guns; they must use torpedoes. If they should +do so to any considerable extent their limited supply would greatly +reduce their period of operation away from base, and the number of +merchantmen they could destroy. Their object is to avoid contact with +anti-submarine craft. This they can almost always do, as the submarine +can see the surface craft at many times the distance the surface craft +can see a periscope, particularly one less than two inches in diameter.</p> + +<p>Moreover, the submarine greatly fears the anti-submarine craft because +of the great danger of the depth charges. Our tactics should therefore +be such as to force the submarine to incur this danger in order to get +within range of merchantmen.</p> + +<p>7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only course for us +to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of convoy. This will be +purely an offensive measure, because if we concentrate our shipping into +convoys and protect it with our naval forces we will thereby force the +enemy, in order to carry out his mission, to encounter naval forces +which are not embarrassed with valuable cargoes, and which are a great +danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are wearing down +their personnel and material in an attempted combination of escorting +single ships, when they can be picked up, and also of attempting to seek +and offensively engage an enemy whose object is to avoid such +encounters. With the convoy system the conditions will be reversed. +Although the enemy may easily know when our convoys sail, he can never +know the course they will pursue or the route of approach to their +destinations. Our escorting forces will thus be able to work on a +deliberate prearranged plan, preserving their oil supplies and energy, +while the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces and seek us. In a +word, the handicap we now labour under will be shifted to the enemy; we +will have adopted the essential principal of concentration while the +enemy will lose it.</p> + +<p>8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system made by the +British Admiralty shows clearly that while we may have some losses under +this system, owing to lack of adequate number of anti-submarine craft, +they nevertheless will not be critical as they are at present.</p> + +<p>9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_333" id="Page_333">[Pg 333]</a></span>as a +whole, there is no necessity for any high sea protection on our own +coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses no unusual +characteristics different from those of other naval craft, with the +single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The +difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as +it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea as far +as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy +establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere.</p> + +<p>10. To take an extreme illustration, if the enemy could be led or forced +into diverting part of his submarine effort to the United States coast, +or to any other area distant from the critical area surrounding the +coast of France and the United Kingdom, the anti-submarine campaign +would at once be won. The enemy labours under severe difficulties in +carrying out his campaign, even in this restricted area, owing to the +material limitations and the distances they must operate from their +bases, through extremely dangerous localities. The extent of the United +States coastline and the distances between its principal commercial +ports preclude the possibility of any submarine effort in that part of +the world except limited operations of diversion designed to affect +public opinion, and thereby hold our forces from the vital field of +action.</p> + +<p>11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of course, +considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely dispersed ports +of origin of merchant shipping; the difficulty of communication by +cable; the time involved by communications by mail; and the difficulties +of obtaining a co-operation and co-ordination between Allied +Governments.</p> + +<p>As reported by cable despatch, the British Government has definitely +reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as +its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and +Scandinavian countries are already in operation. Convoys from New York +will be put in operation as soon as ships are available. The British +navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently +recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling convoys +from New York.</p> + +<p>12. The dangers to convoys from high sea raiders is remote, but, of +course, must be provided against, and hence the necessity for escorting +cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is even greater, however, +for anti-submarine craft in the submarine war zone.</p> + +<p>13. As stated in my despatches, the arming of merchantmen is not a +solution of the submarine menace, it serves the single purpose of +forcing the submarine to use torpedoes instead of guns and bombs. The +facts that men-of-war cannot proceed <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_334" id="Page_334">[Pg 334]</a></span>safely at sea without escort, and +that in the Queenstown avenue of approach alone in the past six weeks +there have been thirty armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen the +submarine at all before the attack, seem to be conclusive evidence. A +great mass of other evidence and war experience could be collected in +support of the above.</p> + +<p>14. The week ending June 19th has been one of great submarine activity. +Evidence indicates that fifteen to nineteen of the largest and latest +submarines have been operating, of which ten to thirteen were operating +in the critical area to the west and south-west of the British Isles. +The above numbers are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type of +submarines, and submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are +working to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar. A feature of the +week was the sinking of ships as far west as nineteen degrees. Three +merchant ship convoys are en route from Hampton Roads, the last one, +consisting of eighteen ships, having sailed on the 19th of June. One +hundred and sixteen moored mines have been swept up during the week.</p> + +<p>Twenty-two reports of encounters with enemy submarines in waters +surrounding the United Kingdom have been reported during the week—three +by destroyers, two by cruisers, two by mystery ships, one by French +gunboat, three by submarines, nine by auxiliary patrol vessels, one by +seaplane, and one by merchant vessel.</p> + +<p>There is attached copy of report of operations by anti-submarine craft +based on Queenstown.</p> + +<p class="right">(Signed) <span class="smcap">Wm. S. Sims</span>.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_335" id="Page_335">[Pg 335]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>APPENDIX VI</h2> + +<h3>THE NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="noin">From: Secretary of Navy.<br /> +To: Vice-Admiral Sims, U.S.S. <i>Melville</i>.<br /> +Received: July 10, 1917.</p> + +<p>The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is +quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of +the Department in relation to the co-operation of our naval forces with +those of our Allies. Quote: After careful consideration of the present +naval situation taken in connection with possible future situations +which might arise, the Department is preparing to announce as its +policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies. First, the most hearty +co-operation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in +European or other waters compatible with an adequate defence of our own +home waters. Second, the most hearty co-operation with the Allies to +meet any future situation arising during the present war period. Third, +the realization that while a successful termination of the present war +must always be the first Allied aim, and will probably result in +diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the +United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our +main fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main +military rôle of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding +the line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there +will be generally speaking two classes of vessels engaged: minor craft +and major craft, and two rôles of action, first, offensive and, second, +defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the rôle set forth in paragraph four, the +Department cannot too strongly insist on its opinion that the offensive +must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy +prepared. But as the primary rôle in all offensive preparations must +perforce belong to the Allied powers, the Navy Department announces as +its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of +action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need. Sixth, +pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_336" id="Page_336">[Pg 336]</a></span>Department announces as +its general plan of action the following: One, its willingness to send +its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine +chasers, auxiliaries in any number not incompatible with home needs, and +to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint Allied Admiralties +which would not involve a violation of our present state policy. Two, +its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division from +the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the +entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but co-operating unit +when, after joint consultations of all Admiralties concerned, the +emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the +line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European +waters will stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to +discuss more fully plans for joint operations. End of Quote 11009.</p> + +<p class="right"> +(Sd) <span class="smcap">Josephus Daniels</span>.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_337" id="Page_337">[Pg 337]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>APPENDIX VII</h2> + +<h3>COMMENTS UPON NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY</h3> +<br /> + +<p class="right"> +Office Vice-Admiral, Commanding<br /> +U.S. Destroyer Forces<br /> +European Waters.<br /> +<span class="smcap">London</span>,<br /> +July 16, 1917.</p> + +<p class="noin">From: Vice-Admiral Sims.<br /> +To: Secretary of the Navy.<br /> +Subject: Concerning Policy of U.S. Naval co-operation in war, and +allied subjects.</p> + +<p>1. The Department's cablegram of July 10, 1917, quoting a letter which +had been addressed to the Secretary of State concerning naval policy in +relation to the present war, was received on July 10th.</p> + +<p>In view of the nature of certain parts of the policy set forth therein, +I wish to indicate the general policy which has heretofore governed my +recommendation.</p> + +<p>2. I have assumed that our mission was to promote the maximum +co-operation with the Allies in defeating a common enemy.</p> + +<p>All of my despatches and recommendations have been based on the firm +conviction that the above mission could and would be accomplished, and +that hence such questions as the possibility of post war situations, or +of all or part of the Allies being defeated and America being left +alone, were not given consideration—in fact, I cannot see how we could +enter into this war whole-heartedly if such considerations were allowed +to diminish in any way the chances of Allied success.</p> + +<p>3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind is that we +should look upon our service as part of the combined Allied service, of +which the British Grand Fleet is the main body, and all other Allied +naval forces disposed throughout the world, as necessary branches +thereof.</p> + +<p>This conception views our battleship fleet as a support or reserve of +the Allied main body (the British Grand Fleet) and would lead to +utilizing our other forces to fill in weak spots <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_338" id="Page_338">[Pg 338]</a></span>and to strengthen +Allied lines, both offensively and defensively, wherever necessary.</p> + +<p>Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our fleet, and +it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and caution should be +felt in its adoption.</p> + +<p>4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish our mission +without in any way involving the so-called disintegration of our fleet +as a whole.</p> + +<p>In the first instance I have assumed that our aim would be to project, +or prepare to project, our maximum force against the enemy offensively.</p> + +<p>5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy is +depending for success upon breaking down the Allies' lines of +communications by virtue of the submarine campaign.</p> + +<p>A necessary part of such a plan is to divert strength from the main +fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means as coastal raids, +threats of landing operations, air raids, and attacks on hospital ships, +which last necessitates destroyer escort for such vessels.</p> + +<p>The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity concentrated +primarily on the most vital lines of communications, is nevertheless +carried out in such a manner as to lead the Allies to disperse, and not +concentrate, their inadequate anti-submarine Forces.</p> + +<p>The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times, and hence +provide against, the possibility of another main fleet action.</p> + +<p>6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of submarines +available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the Allies' +communications, for both Army and Navy as well as civil needs, shows +clearly that the enemy must direct his main effort in certain restricted +areas.</p> + +<p>These areas, as has repeatedly been reported, are included approximately +in a circle drawn from about Ushant to the north of Scotland. The most +effective field for enemy activity is, of course, close into the Irish +Sea and Channel approaches, where all lines must focus.</p> + +<p>But, as stated above, the enemy also attacks occasionally well out to +sea and in other dispersed areas with a view of scattering the limited +anti-submarine forces available.</p> + +<p>It therefore seems manifest that the war not only is, but must remain, +in European waters, in so far as success or failure is concerned.</p> + +<p>7. Speaking generally, but disregarding for the moment the question of +logistics, our course of action, in order to throw our main strength +against the enemy, would be to move all our forces, including the +battleship fleet, into the war area.</p> + +<p><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_339" id="Page_339">[Pg 339]</a></span>8. In view of the nature of the present sea warfare as effected by the +submarine, such a movement by the battleships would necessitate a large +force of light craft—much larger than our peace establishment provided. +In addition to all destroyers, adequate protection of the fleet would +require all other available light craft in the service, or which could +be commandeered and put into service—that is, submarines, armed tugs, +trawlers, yachts, torpedo boats, revenue cutters, mine-layers and +mine-sweepers, and in fact any type of small craft which could be used +as protective or offensive screens.</p> + +<p>9. In view of the shipping situation, as affected by the submarine +campaign, it has been impossible to date to see in what way our +battleships could be supplied in case they were sent into the war area. +This refers particularly to oil-burning vessels. It would therefore seem +unwise to recommend such a movement until we could see clearly far +enough ahead to ensure the safety of the lines of communication which +such a force would require.</p> + +<p>10. It is to be observed, however, that even in case the decision were +made to move the battleships into the war area, it would unavoidably be +greatly delayed both in getting together the necessary screening forces +and also in getting such craft across the Atlantic.</p> + +<p>In the meantime, and while awaiting a decision as to the movements of +the battleship fleet, the submarine campaign has become so intensive, +and the available anti-submarine craft have been so inadequate to meet +it, that the necessity for increasing the anti-submarine forces in the +war area to the maximum possible extent has become imperative.</p> + +<p>11. As long, therefore, as the enemy fleet is contained by the stronger +British fleet in a position of readiness, it would not seem a +disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war area all the light +craft of every description which would necessarily have to accompany the +fleet in case it should be needed in this area.</p> + +<p>Such movements of the light craft would not in any way separate them +strategically from the battleships, as they would be operating between +the enemy and our own main body and based in a position to fall back as +the main body approached, or to meet it at an appointed place. This +advance of light forces, strategically, would mean no delay whatever to +our heavy forces, should the time come for their entry into the active +war zone.</p> + +<p>12. Another very important consideration is the fact that, pending the +movement of the battleships themselves, all of the light forces would be +gaining valuable war experience and would be the better prepared for +operations of any nature in <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_340" id="Page_340">[Pg 340]</a></span>the future, either in connection with the +fleet itself or independently.</p> + +<p>It is also considered that it would not constitute a disintegration of +our fleet to advance into the war zone, in co-operation with the British +Grand Fleet or for other duty, certain units of our battleship fleet. +These would merely constitute units advanced for purpose of enemy +defeat, and which would always be in a position to fall back on the main +part of our Fleet, or to join it as it approached the war zone.</p> + +<p>It is for this reason that I recommended, on July 7, 1917, that all +coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in readiness for distant service in +case their juncture with the Grand Fleet might be deemed advisable in +connection with unexpected enemy developments.</p> + +<p>It would, of course, be preferable to advance the entire fleet providing +adequate lines of communications could be established to ensure their +efficient operation. At the present time there is a sufficient coal +supply in England to supply our coal-burning dreadnoughts, but the oil +would be a very difficult problem as it must be brought in through the +submarine zone.</p> + +<p>When notified that the <i>Chester</i>, <i>Birmingham</i>, and <i>Salem</i> were +available for duty in the war area, I recommended, after consultation +with the Admiralty, that they join the British Light Cruiser Squadrons +in the North Sea, where there is always a constant demand for more +ships, especially to oppose enemy raiding and other operations aimed at +dispersing the Allied sea forces.</p> + +<p>In view of the Department's reference to the Gibraltar situation, and +also in consideration of the sea-keeping qualities of the seven gunboats +of the <i>Sacramento</i> class, it was recommended that they be based on +Gibraltar for duty in assisting to escort convoys clear of the Straits, +and particularly as this would release some British destroyers which are +urgently needed in critical areas to the northward.</p> + +<p>13. The Department's policy, as contained in its letter to the Secretary +of State, refers in the first statement to an adequate defence of our +own home waters. It would seem to be sound reasoning that the most +effective defence which can be afforded to our home waters is an +offensive campaign against the enemy which threatens those waters. Or in +other words, that the place for protection of home waters is the place +in which protection is necessary—that is, where the enemy is operating +and must continue to operate in force.</p> + +<p>As has been stated in numerous despatches, it is considered that home +waters are threatened solely in the submarine zone—in fact are being +attacked solely in that zone, and must continue <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_341" id="Page_341">[Pg 341]</a></span>to be attacked therein +if the enemy is to succeed against us as well as against the European +Entente.</p> + +<p>The number of available enemy submarines is not unlimited, and the +difficulties of obtaining and maintaining bases are fully as difficult +for submarine as for surface craft.</p> + +<p>The difficulties experienced by enemy submarines en route and in +operating as far from their bases as they now do are prodigious.</p> + +<p>Operations on our coast without a base are impracticable, except by very +limited numbers for brief periods, purely as diversions.</p> + +<p>In view of our distance from enemy home bases, the extent of our +coastline, and the distances between our principal ports, it is a safe +assumption that if we could induce the enemy to shift the submarine war +area to our coasts his defeat would be assured, and his present success +would be diminished more than in proportion to the number of submarines +he diverted from the more accessible area where commerce necessarily +focuses.</p> + +<p>14. The Department's policy refers to willingness to extend hearty +co-operation to the Allies, and to discuss plans for joint operations, +and also to its readiness to consider any plans which may be submitted +by the joint Allied Admiralties.</p> + +<p>15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this co-operation, to +discuss plans with the various Admiralties, except in one way—and that +is, to establish what might be termed an advance headquarters in the war +zone composed of Department representatives upon whose recommendations +the Department can depend.</p> + +<p>I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in the +army—that is, the General Headquarters in the field being the advance +headquarters of the War Department at home, and the advance headquarters +must of necessity be left a certain area of discretion and freedom of +action as concerns the details of the measures necessitated by the +military situations as they arise.</p> + +<p>16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements which +enter into military warfare, and hence delays in communications by +written reports, together with the necessity for secrecy, render it very +difficult to discuss plans at long range. The enemy secret service has +proved itself to be of extraordinary efficiency.</p> + +<p>Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon discussion of +military plans by cable, as well as by letter. The necessary inadequacy +of written or cable communications needs no discussion. The +opportunities for misunderstandings are great. It is difficult to be +sure that one has expressed clearly one's meaning in writing, and hence +phrases in a letter <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_342" id="Page_342">[Pg 342]</a></span>are very liable to misinterpretation. They cannot +explain themselves.</p> + +<p>17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and perhaps +of all Allied wars, has been the difficulty of co-ordination and +co-operation in military effort. I am aware of a great mass of +information in this connection which it is practically impossible to +impart except by personal discussion.</p> + +<p>It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if <i>any +one</i> of the Allies—Italy, France, England, or the United States—were +selected to direct all operations, the others merely keeping the one +selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to +complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these +resources.</p> + +<p>18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes necessary +to decide as to the best location in which to establish such advanced +headquarters, or what might be called an advance branch war council at +the front—that is, an advanced branch upon whose advice and decisions +the War Council itself largely depends.</p> + +<p>I fully realize the pressure and the influences which must have been +brought to bear upon the Department from all of the Allies, and from +various and perhaps conflicting sources.</p> + +<p>I also realize that my position here in England renders me open to +suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the British viewpoint of +the war. It should be unnecessary to state that I have done everything +within my ability to maintain a broad viewpoint with the above stated +mission constantly in mind.</p> + +<p>19. From the <i>naval</i> point of view it would seem evident that London is +the best and most central location in the war area for what I have +termed above the Advance Branch of our Naval War Council.</p> + +<p>The British navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the brunt of +the naval war, and hence all naval information concerning the war +therefore reaches and centres in London.</p> + +<p>It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters staff, or +parts or divisions thereof, to visit Paris and other Allied Admiralties +at any time.</p> + +<p>I wish to make it quite clear that up to date it has been wholly +impossible for me, with one military Aide, to perform all of the +functions of such an advanced branch of the Department.</p> + +<p>As stated in my despatches, it has been evident for some time that I +have been approaching a state in which it would be physically impossible +to handle the work without an increase of staff.</p> + +<p>The present state of affairs is such that it is quite within range of +possibility for serious errors to occur which may involve <span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_343" id="Page_343">[Pg 343]</a></span>disaster to +our ships, due to the physical impossibility of handling the +administrative and other work with the thoroughness which is essential +to safety.</p> + +<p>20. I consider that a very minimum staff which would be required is +approximately as follows. More officers could be well employed with +resulting increase of efficiency:</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>(1) One Chief of Staff, who should be free to carry on a +continuous estimate of the situation, based upon all necessary +information. He would be given the freedom of the Operations Department +of the British and French Admiralties.</p> + +<p>(2) An officer, preferably of the rank of commander, for duties in +connection with shipping and convoy to handle all the numerous +communications in relation to the movements of American shipping, +particularly military shipping, and also other shipping carrying +American troops.</p> + +<p>(3) An officer, at least a lieutenant-commander, for duties in +connection with Anti-Submarine Division operations in order to +insure perfect co-operation in that field of work between our +service and other Allied Services.</p> + +<p>(4) An officer of all-round ability and discretion for duties in +connection with general military intelligence. He should be in +constant touch with the Secret Service Departments of the +Admiralties to insure that all military intelligence, which in any +way affects the Navy Department or our Forces, is properly and +promptly acted upon.</p> + +<p>(5) At least two lieutenants or lieutenant-commanders of the line +in my own office in connection with general administrative +questions in addition to the one now available. The necessity for +these additional officers is imperative.</p> + +<p>(6) One communication officer to take general charge of codes and +communications both with the Department at home, the Allied +Admiralties, and with the various bases of our Forces in the war +area. (At present Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, London, +and Paris.)</p> + +<p>(7) A paymaster to have complete charge of all financial matters +connected with our naval organization abroad. This officer should +be in addition to Paymaster Tobey, who is performing necessary and +invaluable service on my staff in connection with all logistic +questions.</p></div> + +<p class="right"> +(Signed) <span class="smcap">Wm. S. Sims</span>.</p> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_344" id="Page_344">[Pg 344]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>APPENDIX VIII</h2> + +<h3>MONTHLY LOSSES SINCE FEBRUARY, 1917, FROM ENEMY ACTION</h3> +<br /> + +<p>During the twenty-one months of unrestricted submarine warfare from +February, 1917, to October, 1918, inclusive, 3,843 merchant vessels +(British fishing vessels included) of a total gross tonnage of 8,478,947 +have been sunk by enemy action, a monthly average of 183 vessels +totalling 403,760 gross tons. The October tonnage losses show a decrease +from this average of 291,333 gross tons, or 72 per cent.</p> + +<p>The following gives the tonnage losses by months from February, 1917, to +October, 1918, inclusive:</p> + +<div class="centered"> +<table border="0" width="80%" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="png 357a"> + <tr> + <td class="tdctb" width="16%">Period.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="17%">British Merchant Vessels.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="17%">Other Allied Merchant Vessels.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="17%">Neutral Merchant Vessels.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="17%">British Fishing Vessels.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="16%">Total</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc">1917</td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">February</td> + <td class="tdcl">313,486</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 84,820</td> + <td class="tdcl">135,090</td> + <td class="tdcl">3,478</td> + <td class="tdcl">536,334</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">March</td> + <td class="tdcl">353,478</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 81,151</td> + <td class="tdcl">165,225</td> + <td class="tdcl">3,586</td> + <td class="tdcl">603,440</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">April</td> + <td class="tdcl">545,282</td> + <td class="tdcl">134,448</td> + <td class="tdcl">189,373</td> + <td class="tdcl">5,920</td> + <td class="tdcl">875,023</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">May</td> + <td class="tdcl">352,289</td> + <td class="tdcl">102,960</td> + <td class="tdcl">137,957</td> + <td class="tdcl">1,448</td> + <td class="tdcl">594,654</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">June</td> + <td class="tdcl">417,925</td> + <td class="tdcl">126,171</td> + <td class="tdcl">139,229</td> + <td class="tdcl">1,342</td> + <td class="tdcl">684,667</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">July</td> + <td class="tdcl">364,858</td> + <td class="tdcl">111,683</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 70,370</td> + <td class="tdcl">2,736</td> + <td class="tdcl">549,647</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">August</td> + <td class="tdcl">329,810</td> + <td class="tdcl">128,489</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 53,018</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 242</td> + <td class="tdcl">511,559</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">September</td> + <td class="tdcl">196,212</td> + <td class="tdcl">119,086</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 29,941</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 245</td> + <td class="tdcl">345,484</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">November</td> + <td class="tdcl">173,560</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 87,646</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 31,476</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 87</td> + <td class="tdcl">292,769</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdlb">December</td> + <td class="tdclb">253,087</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 86,981</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 54,047</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 413</td> + <td class="tdclb">394,528</td> + </tr> +</table> +</div> +<br /> + +<div class="centered"> +<table border="0" width="80%" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="png 357b"> + <tr> + <td class="tdctb" width="16%">Period.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="17%">British Merchant Vessels.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="17%">Other Allied Merchant Vessels.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="17%">Neutral Merchant Vessels.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="17%">British Fishing Vessels.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="16%">Total</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdc">1918</td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + <td class="tdcl"> </td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">January</td> + <td class="tdcl">179,973</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 87,078</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 35,037</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 375</td> + <td class="tdcl">302,463</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">February</td> + <td class="tdcl">226,896</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 54,904</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 36,374</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 686</td> + <td class="tdcl">318,860</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">March</td> + <td class="tdcl">199,458</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 94,321</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 51,035</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 293</td> + <td class="tdcl">345,107</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">April</td> + <td class="tdcl">215,453</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 50,879</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 11,361</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 241</td> + <td class="tdcl">277,934</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">May</td> + <td class="tdcl">192,436</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 80,826</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 20,757</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 504</td> + <td class="tdcl">294,523</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">June</td> + <td class="tdcl">162,990</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 51,173</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 38,474</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 639</td> + <td class="tdcl">253,276</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">July</td> + <td class="tdcl">165,449</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 70,900</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 23,552</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 555</td> + <td class="tdcl">260,456</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">August</td> + <td class="tdcl">145,721</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 91,209</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 41,946</td> + <td class="tdcl">1,455</td> + <td class="tdcl">280,331</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">September</td> + <td class="tdcl">136,864</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 39,343</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 10,393</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 142</td> + <td class="tdcl">186,742</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdlb">October</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 57,607</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 41,308</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 13,512</td> + <td class="tdclb">—</td> + <td class="tdclb">112,427</td> + </tr> +</table> +</div> +<br /> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_345" id="Page_345">[Pg 345]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>APPENDIX IX</h2> + +<h3>TONNAGE CONSTRUCTED BY ALLIED AND NEUTRAL NATIONS SINCE AUGUST, 1914</h3> +<br /> + +<p>Construction of merchant shipping is shown in the following table, which +gives tonnage completed since the beginning of the war for the United +Kingdom, United States, and for other Allied and Neutral Nations.</p> + +<div class="centered"> +<table border="0" width="80%" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" summary="png 358"> + <tr> + <td class="tdctb" width="24%">Period.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="19%">United Kingdom.<br />Gross tons.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="19%">United States.<br />Gross tons.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="19%">Other Allied and Neutral.<br />Gross tons.</td> + <td class="tdctlb" width="19%">World Total.<br />Gross tons.</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">1914</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 675,610</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 120,000[1]</td> + <td class="tdcl">217,310</td> + <td class="tdcl">1,012,920</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">1915</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 650,919</td> + <td class="tdcl">225,122 </td> + <td class="tdcl">325,959</td> + <td class="tdcl">1,202,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">1916</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 541,552</td> + <td class="tdcl">325,413 </td> + <td class="tdcl">821,036</td> + <td class="tdcl">1,688,000</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdlb">1917</td> + <td class="tdclb">1,163,474</td> + <td class="tdclb">1,034,296 </td> + <td class="tdclb">505,585</td> + <td class="tdclb">2,703,355</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl">1918 1st quarter</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 320,280</td> + <td class="tdcl">328,541 </td> + <td class="tdcl">220,496</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 869,317</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl"> 2nd quarter</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 442,966</td> + <td class="tdcl">559,939 </td> + <td class="tdcl">240,369</td> + <td class="tdcl">1,243,274</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl"> 3rd quarter</td> + <td class="tdcl"> 411,395</td> + <td class="tdcl">834,250 </td> + <td class="tdcl">232,127</td> + <td class="tdcl">1,477,772</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdlb">October</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 136,100</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 357,532[1]</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 50,000</td> + <td class="tdclb"> 543,632</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdlb">1918 (10 months)</td> + <td class="tdclb">1,310,741</td> + <td class="tdclb">2,080,262 </td> + <td class="tdclb">742,992</td> + <td class="tdclb">4,133,995</td> + </tr> + <tr> + <td class="tdl" colspan="5">[1] Estimated.</td> + </tr> +</table> +</div> +<br /> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_346" id="Page_346">[Pg 346]</a></span> +<br /><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_347" id="Page_347">[Pg 347]</a></span> +<br /> + +<hr /> +<br /> +<h2>INDEX</h2> + + +<ul><li><i>Aboukir</i>, <i>Hogue</i> and <i>Cressy</i> torpedoed by <i>U-29</i>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> + +<li><i>Achates</i>, with convoy, <a href="#Page_122">122</a></li> + +<li><i>Active</i>, flagship of Vice-Adm. Bayly, <a href="#Page_58">58</a></li> + +<li>Adams, Ensign Ashley D., in charge of subchaser units, <a href="#Page_191">191</a></li> + +<li>Aircraft against submarines, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li><i>Alcock</i>, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship <i>Dunraven</i>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> + +<li>Allied Naval Council, value of, <a href="#Page_218">218</a></li> + +<li>Amberger, Kapitän-Leutnant Gustav, of <i>U-58</i>, captured, <a href="#Page_131">131</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> comment on treatment, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>American forces in European waters, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> + +<li>Anti-submarine craft, use of, <a href="#Page_26">26</a></li> + +<li>Anti-submarine devices, search for, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li><i>Arkansas</i>, on duty with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Arming of merchant vessels, <a href="#Page_25">25</a></li> + +<li><i>Aroostook</i>, mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>Aubrietia</i>, mystery ship, heading convoy, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> sights submarine, <a href="#Page_121">121</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Audacious</i>, sunk by mine, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> + +<li>Aviation, naval, development of, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> extent at time of armistice, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> + </ul> +<br /> +</li> + + +<li>Babcock, Commr. J. V., sails with Adm. Sims as aide, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_205">205</a>, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Badger</i> in bombardment of Durazzo, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + +<li>Bagley, Lt.-Commr. D. W., highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li>Baillargeon, J. C, volunteers services at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li>Baldwin Locomotive Works, constructors of the U.S. mobile railway batteries, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li>Balfour, Arthur James, discussion of submarine situation with, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> with Commission to the United States, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>;</li> + <li> advises Washington of critical submarine situation, <a href="#Page_39">39</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Baltimore</i>, converted as mine-layer, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_261">261</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>Basilisk</i>, assisted by yacht <i>Lydonia</i>, sinks submarine, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li>Bassett, Capt. F. B., commanding the <i>Utah</i>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> + +<li>Bastedo, Lt.-Commr. Paul H., in bombardment of Durazzo, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> + +<li>Bayly, Vice-Adm. Lewis, letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> welcome to Americans at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> + <li> instructs Americans as to duties, <a href="#Page_49">49</a>;</li> + <li> characteristics, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> + <li> meets <i>Fanning</i> and congratulates officers and men on capture of submarine crew, <a href="#Page_133">133</a>;</li> + <li> message commending American forces at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_140">140</a>;</li> + <li> introduces Capt. G. Campbell of the "mystery ship," <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li> + <li> has difficulty in identifying one such ship, <a href="#Page_151">151</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Beach, Capt. E. L., with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Beatty, Adm. Sir David, attitude toward torpedo flags, <a href="#Page_217">217</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> farewell speech to American Squadron, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Belknap, Capt. Reginald R., commanding mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>Benham</i>, highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li>Berrien, Commr. Frank D., commanding destroyer division, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>"Big Bertha," American naval guns sent to destroy, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li>Billings, A. W. K., great work in connection with air service, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + +<li><i>Birmingham</i>, at Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> + +<li>Blakely, Lt.-Commr. C. A., highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li>Blakeslee, Lt.-Commr. E. G., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li>Blue, Capt. Victor, with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Boyd, Capt. David F., good work in convoying subchasers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Brest, as destroyer base, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li>Brindisi, rendezvous for attack on Durazzo, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + +<li>Briscoe, Lt.-Commr. Benjamin, work on air service stations, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + +<li>Bristol, Capt. M. L., commanding the <i>Oklahoma</i>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> + +<li>British Admiralty, commends work of U.S. aviation pilots, <a href="#Page_286">286</a></li> + +<li>British Fleet, not in control of the seas, <a href="#Page_16">16</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> at Scapa Flow, <a href="#Page_28">28</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Broke</i>, sinks two German destroyers, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> + +<li>Browne, Ralph C, new type of submarine mine, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> + +<li>Bruges, submarine base, <a href="#Page_19">19</a></li> + +<li>Bullard, Capt. W. H. G., with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Bumstead, Prof. H. A., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_213">213</a></li> + +<li><i>Bunker Hill</i>, converted as mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> + +<li>Bushnell, David, inventor of submarine, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> + +<li>Butler, Capt. H. V., with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Callan, Lt.-Commr. J. L., in charge of U.S. air forces in Italy, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> + +<li>Campbell, Capt. Gordon, at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> exploits with mystery ships, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li> + <li> with "mystery ship" <i>Pargust</i>, <a href="#Page_147">147</a>;</li> + <li> technique of operation, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> + <li> heroism on <i>Dunraven</i>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> + <li> letter from Adm. Sims on <i>Dunraven</i> exploit, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Canandaigua</i>, mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>Canonicus</i>, mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Carpender, Lt. A. S., in command of <i>Fanning</i>, when submarine crew was captured, <a href="#Page_132">132</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> receives D.S.O., <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Carson, Sir Edward, discussion of submarine, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> of convoy system, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Cecil, Lord Robert, on submarine situation with, <a href="#Page_9">9</a></li> + +<li><i>Centurion</i>, in China, commanded by Jellicoe, <a href="#Page_43">43</a></li> + +<li><i>Christabel</i>, encounter with submarine, <a href="#Page_127">127</a></li> + +<li><i>Christopher</i>, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship <i>Dunraven</i>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> + +<li>Christy, Capt. H. H., with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_348" id="Page_348">[Pg 348]</a></span></li> + +<li>Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., "digging the rats out of their holes," <a href="#Page_246">246</a></li> + +<li>Clinton-Baker, Rear-Adm., in command of British mine-laying operations, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li> + +<li>Cluverius, Capt. W. T., with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Cole, Capt. W. C., commanding the Nevada, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> + +<li>College boys and subchasers, <a href="#Page_168">168</a></li> + +<li>Commerce raiders, guarding against, <a href="#Page_94">94</a>, <a href="#Page_112">112</a></li> + +<li>Cone, Capt. Hutch I., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> organizer American air forces, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>;</li> + <li> severely injured on torpedoed <i>Leinster</i>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Conner, Francis G., jumps overboard from <i>Fanning</i> to save drowning German from crew of submarine, <a href="#Page_132">132</a></li> + +<li>Convoy of shipping to Scandinavia, <a href="#Page_22">22</a></li> + +<li>Convoy system, ancient use of, <a href="#Page_86">86</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> merchant captains hostile to, <a href="#Page_88">88</a>, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>;</li> + <li> Gibraltar experiment, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</li> + <li> merchant captains won over, <a href="#Page_96">96</a>;</li> + <li> the headquarters and staff, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>;</li> + <li> details of operation, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>, <a href="#Page_108">108</a>;</li> + <li> routing of the convoys, <a href="#Page_110">110</a>, <a href="#Page_116">116</a>;</li> + <li> actual convoys described, <a href="#Page_117">117</a>;</li> + <li> success of system, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;</li> + <li> relative parts taken by Great Britain and the United States, <a href="#Page_138">138</a>;</li> + <li> most important agency in winning the war, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Conyngham</i>, in first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> with convoy, <a href="#Page_122">122</a>, <a href="#Page_124">124</a>;</li> + <li> destroys submarine, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Copeland, D. G., great work in connection with air service, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + +<li>Corfu, subchaser base established at, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> detachment performing excellent service, <a href="#Page_194">194</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Cork, American destroyer officers make state visit to, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> sailors not permitted to visit, <a href="#Page_71">71</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Cotten, Capt. Lyman A., with subchasers, arrives at Plymouth, <a href="#Page_177">177</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> work in training subchaser crews, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>;</li> + <li> commanding subchaser squadrons, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Craven, Capt. T. T., great service in aviation, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + +<li>Crenshaw, Capt. Arthur, good work in convoying subchasers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li><i>Cressy</i>, <i>Aboukir</i> and <i>Hogue</i> torpedoed by <i>U-29</i>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> + +<li>Cronan, Capt. William P., work in training subchaser crews, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li><i>Cumberland</i>, escorting convoy, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> + +<li>Cunningham, Major A. A., commanding Marine Corps aviation in Northern Bombing Group, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + +<li><i>Cushing</i>, at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> deceived by "mystery ship," <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> + </ul> +<br /> +</li> + + +<li><i>Danae</i>, attempt to torpedo, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> + +<li>Daniels, Secretary of War, instructs Adm. Sims to sail for England, <a href="#Page_1">1</a></li> + +<li><i>Dartmouth</i>, in attack on Durazzo, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li><i>Davis</i>, in first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li>Davison, Trubee, organizer Yale aviation unit, recommended for Distinguished Service Medal, <a href="#Page_282">282</a></li> + +<li>De Bon, Vice-Adm., Chief of French Naval Staff, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> + +<li>De Steiguer, Capt. L. R., with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li><i>Decatur</i>, at Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_135">135</a></li> + +<li>Defrees, Capt. Joseph H., work on listening devices, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li><i>Delaware</i>, on duty with Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Depth charge, origin of, <a href="#Page_78">78</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> effects of on submarines, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Destroyers, scarcity of in British navy, <a href="#Page_28">28</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> a new type of war vessel, their history, <a href="#Page_75">75</a>;</li> + <li> size and armament, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li> + <li> high efficiency, <a href="#Page_76">76</a>;</li> + <li> how submarines are attacked, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li> + <li> use of in convoying merchant vessels, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Destroyers, American, arrive in Queenstown, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> copy of sailing orders, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li> + <li> compared with British, <a href="#Page_48">48</a>;</li> + <li> why placed under British Admiral at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_61">61</a>;</li> + <li> number of at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</li> + <li> enthusiasm of British public on arrival, <a href="#Page_63">63</a>;</li> + <li> "the return of the <i>Mayflower</i>," <a href="#Page_64">64</a>;</li> + <li> in action, <a href="#Page_99">99</a>;</li> + <li> duties of, <a href="#Page_101">101</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Deutschland</i>, "merchant" submarine, visits Newport News, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> + +<li>Di Revel, Vice-Adm., Italian Member Allied Naval Council, <a href="#Page_222">222</a></li> + +<li>Dortch, Lt.-Commr. I. F., highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li><i>Drayton</i>, highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li>Duff, Vice-Adm. Sir Alexander L., in charge of convoy system, <a href="#Page_103">103</a></li> + +<li><i>Duncan</i>, American destroyer, at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li>Dunlap, Col. R. H., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + +<li><i>Dunraven</i>, mystery ship, heroism of captain and crew, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> given Victoria Cross, <a href="#Page_163">163</a>, <a href="#Page_164">164</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Durazzo, bombardment of, <a href="#Page_199">199</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Earle, Rear-Adm., in charge of design of mobile railway batteries for Western Front, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li>Edwards, Lt.-Commr. W. A., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> commands Yale aviation unit, <a href="#Page_283">283</a>;</li> + <li> succeeds Capt. Cone in charge of aviation section, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Evans, Capt. E. R. G. R., British liaison officer with American destroyers, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> exploit as commander of destroyer <i>Broke</i>, <a href="#Page_61">61</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Evans, Capt. F. T., in command of U.S. aviation centre at Pauillac, France, <a href="#Page_284">284</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Fairfield, Commr. Arthur P., with first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Fanning</i>, captures crew of submarine, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li>Farquhar, Lt.-Commr., highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li><i>Fenian Ram</i>, Holland's submarine, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> + +<li>Fighting submarines from the air, <a href="#Page_275">275</a></li> + +<li>Fisher, Adm. Sir John, in charge of department for investigating anti-submarine devices, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> tells of American-built submarines, first to cross Atlantic, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Fletcher, Rear-Adm. Wm. B., commanding Brest naval base, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + +<li><i>Florida</i>, on duty with Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Foster, Arnold-, on building of submarines, <a href="#Page_228">228</a></li> + +<li>Fullinwider, Commr. S. P., efforts in perfection of new submarine mine, <a href="#Page_250">250</a></li> + +<li>Fulton, Robert, efforts in developing the submarine, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> + +<li>Funakoshi, Rear-Adm., Japanese member Allied Naval Council, <a href="#Page_222">222</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_349" id="Page_349">[Pg 349]</a></span></li> + +<li>Furer, Commr. Julius A., work in development of subchasers, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Gannon, Capt. Sinclair, with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Gates, Lt.-Commr. A. L., exploits at Dunkirk, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> + +<li>Geddes, Sir Eric, First Lord of the Admiralty, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> + +<li>George, King, meeting with, <a href="#Page_9">9</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> popular with American sailors, <a href="#Page_67">67</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>George, Lloyd, optimistic regarding submarine situation, <a href="#Page_10">10</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> on convoy system, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>German interned ships converted into transports, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> + +<li>Gibraltar, co-operation of American navy with British in operations at, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> + +<li>Gillmor, R. E., volunteers services at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li>Gleaves, Rear-Adm. Albert, organization for transport fleet, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> + +<li>Glinder, Franz, drowned when crew surrendered to <i>Fanning</i>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li> +<li> buried with honours of war, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> + +<li>Good, P. F., volunteers services at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li>Goschen, Viscount, deemed submarine useless, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> + +<li>Graham, Capt. S. V., good work in convoying subchasers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Grand Fleet, British, protected by destroyers, <a href="#Page_73">73</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> immune from torpedo attack, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Greenslade, Capt. J. W., with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Hammon, Ensign C. H., exploit at Pola, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> + +<li>Hanrahan, Commr. David C., highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> commanding American mystery ship <i>Santee</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</li> + <li> in command of Northern Bombing Group, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Harwell, Elxer, jumps overboard from <i>Fanning</i> to save drowning German from crew of submarine, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> + +<li>Helfferich, Dr. Karl, on effectiveness of the submarine, <a href="#Page_14">14</a></li> + +<li>Henry, Lt. Walter S., on <i>Fanning</i>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a></li> + +<li>Hepburn, Capt. Arthur J., work in training subchaser crews, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> commanding squadron of subchasers, reaches Queenstown, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Hogue</i>, <i>Cressy</i> and <i>Aboukir</i>, torpedoed by <i>U-29</i>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> + +<li>Holland, John P., designer of the modern submarine, <a href="#Page_227">227</a></li> + +<li>Hope, Rear-Adm., receives Adm. Sims on arrival, <a href="#Page_2">2</a></li> + +<li>Hospital ships, torpedoing of, <a href="#Page_29">29</a></li> + +<li><i>Housatonic</i>, mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Howard, Lt.-Commr. D. L., highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li>Hughes, Capt. C. F., with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Inventions, anti-submarine, search for, <a href="#Page_8">8</a></li> + +<li>Inverness and Invergordon, mine-assembly bases at, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> + +<li>Ives, Ensign Paul F., drops a "dud" on deck of submarine, <a href="#Page_286">286</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li><i>Jacob Jones</i>, torpedoed by <i>U-53</i>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Jacoby, Ensign Maclair, at bombardment of Durazzo, <a href="#Page_201">201</a></li> + +<li>Jellicoe, Adm., character and abilities, <a href="#Page_5">5</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> statement of tonnage lost to submarines, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>;</li> + <li> in conference with, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li> + <li> wounded in Boxer Rebellion, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li> + <li> letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>;</li> + <li> difficulty in having convoy system adopted, <a href="#Page_89">89</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li> + <li> presides over Allied Naval Council, <a href="#Page_219">219</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Jessop, Capt. E. P., good work in convoying subchasers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Johnson, Commr. Alfred W., with first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li>Johnson, Capt. T. L., with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>Justicia</i>, torpedoing of, <a href="#Page_114">114</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> torpedoing announced as that of <i>Leviathan</i> by German Admiralty, <a href="#Page_314">314</a></li> + </ul> +<br /> +</li> + + +<li>Kelly, Commodore, in bombardment of Durazzo, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> congratulates subchasers in this action, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Kennedy, Ensign S. C., record seaplane flight, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> + +<li>Keyes, Ensign K. B., extracts from seaplane flight report, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> + +<li>Keys, Adm. Sir Roger, reconstructs submarine barrage, <a href="#Page_20">20</a></li> + +<li>Killingholme, England, U.S. air station at, <a href="#Page_278">278</a>, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> + +<li>Kittredge, T. B., volunteers service at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li>Knox, Capt. D. W., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + +<li><i>Kronprinzessin Cecilie</i>, converted into transport, <a href="#Page_301">301</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Lacaze, Adm., French Minister of Marine, <a href="#Page_221">221</a></li> + +<li>Leigh, Capt. Richard H., experiments with listening devices, <a href="#Page_172">172</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> sent to Italy to construct subchaser base, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</li> + <li> at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Libbey, Commr. Miles A., work in perfection of listening devices, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Listening devices, development of, <a href="#Page_171">171</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> especially advantageous on subchaser, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>;</li> + <li> method of operation on subchasers, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li> + <li> of great value in the Otranto barrage, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>;</li> + <li> tube climbed by submarine survivor, <a href="#Page_197">197</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Little, Col. L. McC., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + +<li>London headquarters, <a href="#Page_204">204</a>, <a href="#Page_210">210</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> different departments of, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>;</li> + <li> work of the Planning Section, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Long, Capt. A. T., commanding the <i>Nevada</i>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> + +<li>Long, Capt. Byron A., at headquarters of convoy system, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a>;</li> + <li> routing American troops to France, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Loomis, Coxswain David D., lookout on <i>Fanning</i> when submarine crew was captured, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li>Lord Mayor of Cork, welcomes Americans at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + +<li><i>Lowestoft</i>, in attack on Durazzo, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li><i>Luckenback</i>, shelled by submarine, <a href="#Page_123">123</a></li> + +<li>Ludlow, Ensign G. H., wounded, rescued from water, <a href="#Page_287">287</a></li> + +<li><i>Lydonia</i>, assists in sinking submarine, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li>Lyons, Lt.-Commr. D., highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>MacDonnell, Lt.-Commr. E. O., in charge of flying Caproni bombers from Italy to Flanders, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_350" id="Page_350">[Pg 350]</a></span></li> + +<li>MacDougall, Capt. W. D., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_204">204</a></li> + +<li>McBride, Capt. L. B., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> + +<li>McCalla, Capt., meets Adm. Jellicoe in China, <a href="#Page_44">44</a></li> + +<li>McCormick, E. H., volunteers services at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li>McCullough, Commr. Richard P., recommended for decoration, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li><i>McDougal</i>, in first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>McDowell, Commr. Clyde S., work on listening devices, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>McGrann, Commr. W. H., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li>McNamee, Capt. L., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + +<li>McVay, Capt. C. B., commanding the <i>Oklahoma</i>, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> + +<li>Magruder, Rear-Adm. T. P., good work in convoying subchasers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Mannix, Commr. D. Pratt, with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Marshall, Capt. A. W., with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>Mary Rose</i>, welcomes American destroyers at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_41">41</a></li> + +<li><i>Massachusetts</i>, converted as mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a></li> + +<li><i>Melville</i>, "Mother Ship" of the destroyers at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>, <a href="#Page_62">62</a></li> + +<li>Millard, H., volunteers services at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li>Milner, Lord, on convoy system, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> + +<li>Mine barrage, at first not effective against submarines, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_24">24</a></li> + +<li>Mine barrage in North Sea, American, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> immensity of, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>;</li> + <li> how laid, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Mine laying by German submarines, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li>Mines, Americans perfect new type, <a href="#Page_250">250</a>; + <ul class="nest"> +<li> immense organization of supply and transport, <a href="#Page_252">252</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Moewe</i>, commerce raider, <a href="#Page_95">95</a></li> + +<li>Murfin, Capt. Orin G., designer and builder of mine-assembly bases in Scotland, <a href="#Page_256">256</a></li> + +<li>Mystery ships, greatly aid in combating the submarine, <a href="#Page_103">103</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> accompanying convoy, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> + <li> method of operating, <a href="#Page_118">118</a>;</li> + <li> operations of, <a href="#Page_142">142</a>;</li> + <li> technique, <a href="#Page_148">148</a>;</li> + <li> difficulty of identifying, <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> + <li> number in operation, <a href="#Page_152">152</a>;</li> + <li> heroic fight of the <i>Dunraven</i>, <a href="#Page_157">157</a>;</li> + <li> exploit of <i>Prize</i>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>;</li> + <li> American ship <i>Santee</i>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a>;</li> + <li> <i>Stockforce</i> destroys submarine, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li> + </ul> +<br /> +</li> + + +<li><i>Nautilus</i>, submarine of Robert Fulton, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> + +<li>Naval guns, German, bombarding Dunkirk and Paris, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li>Naval guns, U.S., used on the Western Front, <a href="#Page_289">289</a></li> + +<li>Nelson, Capt. C. P., good work in convoying subchasers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> commanding subchaser squadrons at Corfu, <a href="#Page_194">194</a>;</li> + <li> in bombardment of Durazzo, <a href="#Page_199">199</a>, <a href="#Page_200">200</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Neptune</i> attacked by <i>U-29</i>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> + +<li><i>Nevada</i>, guarding transports, <a href="#Page_304">304</a></li> + +<li><i>New York</i>, on duty with Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Niblack, Rear-Adm. Albert P., commanding forces at Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> asks that subchasers be sent to Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_195">195</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Nicholson</i>, in submarine chase, <a href="#Page_123">123</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> on convoy duty, <a href="#Page_129">129</a>;</li> + <li> assists <i>Fanning</i> in capture of submarine and crew, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>;</li> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Noma</i>, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship <i>Dunraven</i>, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> + +<li>Northern Bombing Group, established, <a href="#Page_284">284</a>, <a href="#Page_285">285</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li><i>O'Brien</i>, highly commended, <a href="#Page_163">163</a></li> + +<li>Oil, scarcity of, for Great Britain's fleet, <a href="#Page_34">34</a></li> + +<li><i>Oklahoma</i>, guarding transports, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> + +<li><i>Orama</i>, torpedoed, <a href="#Page_125">125</a></li> + +<li>Ostend, bombing of submarine base at, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + +<li>Otranto barrage, the, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>, <a href="#Page_195">195</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Page, Ambassador Walter Hines, asks that high naval representative be sent to England, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> states that England faces defeat by submarines, <a href="#Page_8">8</a>;</li> + <li> on critical submarine situation, <a href="#Page_38">38</a>;</li> + <li> advised of submarine peril, <a href="#Page_52">52</a>;</li> + <li> a tower of strength, <a href="#Page_207">207</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Pargust</i>, "mystery ship," destroys submarine, <a href="#Page_147">147</a></li> + +<li><i>Parker</i>, in hunt for submarine, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a>;</li> + <li> supporting ship for subchasers at Plymouth, <a href="#Page_182">182</a>;</li> + <li> seriously damages the <i>U-53</i>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Pauillac, France, U.S. aviation centre at, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> + +<li><i>Pennsylvania</i>, transmits mobilization orders to destroyer division, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li>Pershing, Gen., request for naval guns at St. Nazaire, <a href="#Page_290">290</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> report of their skilful use, <a href="#Page_293">293</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Pescara, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> + +<li><i>Pisa</i>, in attack on Durazzo, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li>Pitt, William, early opinion of the submarine, <a href="#Page_226">226</a></li> + +<li>Planning Section at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + +<li>Pleadwell, Capt. F. L., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li>Plunkett, Adm. Charles P., commanding naval guns on Western Front, <a href="#Page_289">289</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> aids in designing mobile railway batteries, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Plymouth, subchaser base at, <a href="#Page_182">182</a></li> + +<li><i>Pocahontas</i>, converted from German liner to transport, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> + +<li><i>Porter</i>, in first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li>Porto Corsini, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> + +<li>Poteet, Lt.-Commr. Fred H., with first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li>Potter, Ensign Stephen, fight with enemy seaplane, <a href="#Page_288">288</a></li> + +<li>Powell, Lt.-Commr. Halsey, of destroyer <i>Parker</i>, <a href="#Page_119">119</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Princess Irene</i>, converted into transport, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> + +<li>Pringle, Capt. J. R. P., at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_58">58</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> commended by Adm. Bayly, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Prize</i>, mystery ship, damages submarine and captures captain and two of crew, <a href="#Page_165">165</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Q-ships, <i>see</i> Mystery ships</li> + +<li>Queenstown, a destroyer base, <a href="#Page_32">32</a>;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_351" id="Page_351">[Pg 351]</a></span> + <ul class="nest"> + <li> arrival of first American destroyers, <a href="#Page_40">40</a>;</li> + <li> officially welcomes the Americans, <a href="#Page_45">45</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Quinnebaug</i>, mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li><i>René</i>, in westbound convoy, <a href="#Page_129">129</a></li> + +<li>Reynolds, Commr. W. H., with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>Rhein</i>, converted into transport, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> + +<li>Richardson, R. M. D., volunteers services at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li><i>Roanoke</i>, mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_260">260</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Roberts, Lady, requests Adm. Sims to call, <a href="#Page_66">66</a></li> + +<li>Robison, Rear-Adm. S. S., work on listening devices, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Rodgers, Rear-Adm. Thomas S., commanding Dreadnought division in Bantry Bay, <a href="#Page_305">305</a></li> + +<li>Rodman, Adm. Hugh, commanding American squadron with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Rose, Hans, humane commander of the <i>U-53</i>, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> Allied forces ambitious to capture, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</li> + <li> not on <i>U-53</i> when depth charged, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>;</li> + <li> visits Newport, and sinks merchantmen off Nantucket, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Royal Family, interested in American sailors, <a href="#Page_67">67</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li><i>Sacramento</i>, at Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_134">134</a></li> + +<li><i>San Diego</i>, sunk by mine off Fire Island, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li><i>San Francisco</i>, converted as mine-layer, <a href="#Page_252">252</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>San Giorgio</i>, in attack on Durazzo, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li><i>San Marco</i>, in attack on Durazzo, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li>Sanders, Lt. William, commanding mystery ship <i>Prize</i>, <a href="#Page_165">165</a>; + <ul class="nest"> +<li> awarded Victoria Cross, <a href="#Page_165">165</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Santa Maria</i>, compared in size to modern destroyer, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li> + +<li><i>Santee</i>, U.S. mystery ship, <a href="#Page_150">150</a>, <a href="#Page_166">166</a></li> + +<li><i>Saranac</i>, mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Scales, Capt. A. H., with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Schieffelin, Lt. John J., recommended for Distinguished Service Medal, <a href="#Page_277">277</a></li> + +<li>Schofield, Capt. Frank H., work on listening devices, <a href="#Page_178">178</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_215">215</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Schuyler, Commr. G. L., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li>Schwab, Charles M., fabricates submarines for the Allies, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> + +<li>Seaplane base at Killingholme, England, taken over by U.S., <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> + +<li>Seaplane stations of U.S. forces in Europe, <a href="#Page_284">284</a></li> + +<li>Sexton, Capt. W. R., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li><i>Shawmut</i>, mine-layer, <a href="#Page_254">254</a>, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Sims, Adm., ordered to England, <a href="#Page_1">1</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> notifies Washington that war is being lost, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li> + <li> of the oil scarcity, <a href="#Page_34">34</a>;</li> + <li> favours using U.S. naval forces in conjunction with Allies, <a href="#Page_35">35</a>;</li> + <li> first report of critical submarine situation, <a href="#Page_37">37</a>;</li> + <li> extent of duties in European waters, <a href="#Page_62">62</a>;</li> + <li> significance of the Guildhall speech, <a href="#Page_65">65</a>;</li> + <li> reception accorded by British people, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</li> + <li> meets Lady Roberts, <a href="#Page_66">66</a>;</li> + <li> first foreign naval officer to command British forces in war, <a href="#Page_68">68</a>;</li> + <li> works for adoption of convoy system, <a href="#Page_93">93</a>, <a href="#Page_95">95</a>;</li> + <li> congratulates officers and men of <i>Fanning</i> on capture of submarine and crew, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li> + <li> has difficulty in identifying a "mystery ship," <a href="#Page_151">151</a>;</li> + <li> letter to Capt. Campbell on <i>Dunraven</i> exploit, <a href="#Page_164">164</a>;</li> + <li> warns Navy Department of German submarines visiting U.S. coast, <a href="#Page_267">267</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Sinn Fein, controversy with American sailors, <a href="#Page_69">69</a>; in league with Germany, <a href="#Page_72">72</a></li> + +<li>Smith, Capt. S. F., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li>Sparrow, Capt. H. G., good work in convoying subchasers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Stark, Commr. Harold R., brings small destroyers from Manila to Gibraltar, <a href="#Page_135">135</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Stearns, Capt. C. D., with mine-laying squadron. <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li><i>Sterrett</i>, highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + +<li>Stevens, L. S., volunteers services at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li><i>Stockforce</i>, mystery ship, destroys submarine, <a href="#Page_183">183</a></li> + +<li>Stockton, G. B., volunteers services at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_206">206</a></li> + +<li>Strauss, Rear-Adm. Joseph, in command of U.S. mine-laying operations, <a href="#Page_257">257</a></li> + +<li>Subchasers, number built and bases used, <a href="#Page_168">168</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> mobilized at New London, Conn., <a href="#Page_173">173</a>;</li> + <li> great numbers ordered by Great Britain and France, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>, <a href="#Page_179">179</a>;</li> + <li> hardships of the new crews, <a href="#Page_176">176</a>;</li> + <li> trip from New London to Corfu, <a href="#Page_195">195</a>;</li> + <li> an influence in the breakdown of Austria, <a href="#Page_196">196</a>;</li> + <li> in attack on Durazzo, <a href="#Page_198">198</a>;</li> + <li> congratulated on exploits of Durazzo by British Commodore and Italian Naval General Staff, <a href="#Page_203">203</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Submarine against submarine, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>; + <ul class="nest"> +<li> method of attack, <a href="#Page_233">233</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Submarine sinkings, gravity of, concealed by British, <a href="#Page_2">2</a>, <a href="#Page_6">6</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> losses of shipping, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>, <a href="#Page_141">141</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Submarines, American built, first to cross Atlantic, <a href="#Page_267">267</a> + <ul class="nest"> + <li> really submersible surface ships, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li> + <li> how operated, <a href="#Page_229">229</a>;</li> + <li> an American invention, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Submarines, American, their part in the war, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> attacked by destroyers through error, <a href="#Page_236">236</a>;</li> + <li> the base at Berehaven, <a href="#Page_238">238</a>;</li> + <li> witnesses U-boat destroy itself, <a href="#Page_239">239</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Submarines, British, the <i>H</i>-, <i>E</i>-, and <i>K</i>-boats, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> destroy a U-boat, <a href="#Page_238">238</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Submarines, enemy, winning the war, <a href="#Page_4">4</a>, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> number of, destroyed, <a href="#Page_7">7</a>;</li> + <li> officers exaggerate sinkings, <a href="#Page_13">13</a>;</li> + <li> difficulty of blockading the United States, <a href="#Page_17">17</a>;</li> + <li> cruising period dependent upon supply of torpedoes, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> + <li> mines and nets not effective against, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> + <li> number operating simultaneously, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_31">31</a>;</li> + <li> erroneous impression as to numbers operating, <a href="#Page_20">20</a>;</li> + <li> every movement charted by Allies, <a href="#Page_21">21</a>, <a href="#Page_271">271</a>, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>;</li> + <li> three different types of, <a href="#Page_22">22</a>;</li> + <li> plans to pen in the bases, <a href="#Page_23">23</a>;</li> + <li> playing hide and seek with destroyers, <a href="#Page_33">33</a>;</li> + <li> on American coast, <a href="#Page_36">36</a>, <a href="#Page_266">266</a>;</li> + <li> amount of shipping destroyed, <a href="#Page_51">51</a>;</li> + <li> how attacked by destroyer, <a href="#Page_82">82</a>;</li> + <li> method of attack on battleships, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>;</li> + <li> operating on American coast impracticable, <a href="#Page_91">91</a>;</li> + <li> individual locations and movements plotted each day, <a href="#Page_104">104</a>;<span class='pagenum'><a name="Page_352" id="Page_352">[Pg 352]</a></span></li> + <li> destroyed by depth charges, <a href="#Page_126">126</a>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a>, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>;</li> + <li> decoying by "mystery ship," <a href="#Page_142">142</a>, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</li> + <li> not taken seriously until after Weddingen's exploit, <a href="#Page_174">174</a>;</li> + <li> concentrated in enclosed waters, <a href="#Page_180">180</a>;</li> + <li> the Otranto barrage, <a href="#Page_181">181</a>;</li> + <li> sinkings prevented by subchasers, <a href="#Page_183">183</a>;</li> + <li> how located by listening devices, <a href="#Page_184">184</a>;</li> + <li> <i>U-53</i> seriously damaged by destroyer <i>Parker</i>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a>;</li> + <li> suicide of entire crew of a depth charged submarine, <a href="#Page_193">193</a>;</li> + <li> two submarines sunk by subchasers in bombardment of Durazzo, <a href="#Page_202">202</a>;</li> + <li> Germans have difficulty in reaching home after Austrian surrender, <a href="#Page_203">203</a>;</li> + <li> number destroyed by Allies and how, <a href="#Page_224">224</a>;</li> + <li> U-boat destroys itself, <a href="#Page_239">239</a>;</li> + <li> the cruiser submarines, <a href="#Page_240">240</a>;</li> + <li> their various bases, <a href="#Page_244">244</a>;</li> + <li> effectiveness of American North Sea mine barrage, <a href="#Page_245">245</a>;</li> + <li> lay mines on American coast, <a href="#Page_273">273</a>, <a href="#Page_274">274</a>;</li> + <li> aircraft an important factor against, <a href="#Page_275">275</a>;</li> + <li> number sunk about British Isles, <a href="#Page_296">296</a>;</li> + <li> forced to choose between transports and merchantmen, <a href="#Page_306">306</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Surveyor</i>, yacht, assists in sinking submarine, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li><i>Surveyor</i>, merchantmen torpedoed while being convoyed, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li><i>Susquehanna</i>, converted from German liner to transport, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> + +<li>Swasey, A. Loring, services in designing of subchasers, <a href="#Page_175">175</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Taussig, Commr. Joseph K., in charge of first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> copy of sailing orders, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>;</li> + <li> previous record, <a href="#Page_43">43</a>;</li> + <li> welcoming letters from Admirals Jellicoe and Bayly, <a href="#Page_44">44</a>, <a href="#Page_45">45</a>;</li> + <li> reports to Vice-Adm. Bayly at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_46">46</a>;</li> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Taylor, Capt. M. M., with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li><i>Texas</i>, on duty with Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Thompson, Commr. Edgar, at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li>Thomson, Commr. T. A., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a></li> + +<li>Tobey, Capt. E. C., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_214">214</a></li> + +<li>Tomb, Capt. J. Harvey, with mine-laying squadron, <a href="#Page_264">264</a></li> + +<li>Tompkins, Capt. John T., work in organization of subchaser fleet, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Torpedo, track or wake made by, <a href="#Page_81">81</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> effective range of, <a href="#Page_83">83</a>;</li> + <li> duration of submarine's voyage dependent on number carried, <a href="#Page_19">19</a>;</li> + <li> supply limited, <a href="#Page_26">26</a>;</li> + <li> cost of, <a href="#Page_77">77</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Torpedo-boat, invention of, <a href="#Page_76">76</a></li> + +<li>Tozer, Capt. C. M., good work in convoying subchasers, <a href="#Page_178">178</a></li> + +<li>Transporting armies to France, <a href="#Page_294">294</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> nationality of ships and percentage carried, <a href="#Page_302">302</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Turtle</i>, first submarine, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> + +<li>Twining, Capt. N. C., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_212">212</a>, <a href="#Page_213">213</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li><i>U-29</i>, torpedoes <i>Hogue</i>, <i>Cressy</i> and <i>Aboukir</i>, and is later sunk by <i>Dreadnought</i>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_85">85</a></li> + +<li><i>U-53</i>, operates off American coast, <a href="#Page_106">106</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> torpedoes the <i>Jacob Jones</i>, <a href="#Page_107">107</a>;</li> + <li> seriously damaged by depth charges, <a href="#Page_188">188</a>;</li> + <li> surrendered after armistice, <a href="#Page_190">190</a>;</li> + <li> after visiting Newport, R.I., sinks several merchantmen, <a href="#Page_266">266</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>U-58</i> depth charged and crew captured by <i>Fanning</i> and <i>Nicholson</i>, <a href="#Page_131">131</a></li> + +<li><i>U-151</i>, lays mines off American coast, <a href="#Page_273">273</a></li> + +<li><i>U-156</i>, lays mines off American coast, <a href="#Page_274">274</a></li> + +<li><i>UC-56</i>, practically destroyed by depth charge from <i>Christabel</i>, <a href="#Page_128">128</a></li> + +<li><i>Utah</i>, guarding transports, <a href="#Page_305">305</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li><i>Vaterland</i>, converted into transport, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> + +<li>Vauclain, Samuel M., great help in turning out mobile railway batteries, <a href="#Page_290">290</a></li> + +<li><i>Venetia</i>, assists in sinking submarine, <a href="#Page_136">136</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> seriously damages another, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Voysey, Miss, niece of Vice-Adm. Bayly, and charming hostess, <a href="#Page_59">59</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li><i>Wadsworth</i>, in first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> highly commended, <a href="#Page_139">139</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li><i>Wainwright</i>, in first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li>Washington, Capt. Thomas, with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Weatherhead, Ensign C. H., makes record seaplane flight, <a href="#Page_278">278</a></li> + +<li>Weddingen, Commr. Otto, torpedoes <i>Hogue</i>, <i>Cressy</i> and <i>Aboukir</i>, and is in turn sunk by battleship <i>Dreadnought</i>, <a href="#Page_84">84</a>, <a href="#Page_174">174</a></li> + +<li><i>Welshman</i>, narrow escape from being torpedoed, <a href="#Page_130">130</a>, <a href="#Page_133">133</a></li> + +<li><i>Weymouth</i>, in attack on Durazzo, <a href="#Page_199">199</a></li> + +<li><i>Wheeling</i>, depth charges submarine, <a href="#Page_136">136</a></li> + +<li>White, Sir William, on the submarine, <a href="#Page_225">225</a></li> + +<li>Whiting, Commr. Kenneth, great service in aviation, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + +<li>Wiley, Capt. H. A., with the Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a></li> + +<li>Wilhelm, Kaiser, on effectiveness of the submarine, <a href="#Page_13">13</a></li> + +<li><i>Wilkes</i>, on submarine hunt with <i>Parker</i>, <a href="#Page_189">189</a></li> + +<li>Williams, Lt.-Commr. Roger, at Queenstown, <a href="#Page_57">57</a></li> + +<li>Wilson, Rear-Adm. Henry B., commander of forces at <i>Gibraltar</i>, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> at Brest, <a href="#Page_134">134</a>;</li> + <li> commanding Brest naval base, <a href="#Page_300">300</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Wireless telegraphy, of the submarines and destroyers, <a href="#Page_100">100</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> messages reveal locations of submarines, <a href="#Page_105">105</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Wortman, Lieut.-Commr. Ward K., with first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> + +<li><i>Wyoming</i>, on duty with Grand Fleet, <a href="#Page_303">303</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Y-guns, or howitzers, for hurling depth charges, <a href="#Page_79">79</a></li> + +<li>Yachts, good service on French coast, <a href="#Page_301">301</a></li> + +<li>Yale aviation unit, organization of, <a href="#Page_282">282</a>; + <ul class="nest"> + <li> renders great service, <a href="#Page_283">283</a></li> + </ul> +</li> + +<li>Yarnell, Capt. H. E., at London headquarters, <a href="#Page_215">215</a><br /><br /></li> + + +<li>Zeebrugge, bombing of submarine base at, <a href="#Page_285">285</a></li> + +<li>Zigzagging, efficacious protection against submarines, <a href="#Page_87">87</a>, <a href="#Page_120">120</a></li> + +<li>Zogbaum, Lt.-Commr. Rufus F., with first American destroyer contingent, <a href="#Page_42">42</a></li> +</ul> +<br /> +<br/> +<br/> +<br /> + +<div class="tr"> +<p class="cen"><a name="TN" id="TN"></a>Transcriber's Note</p> +<br /> +Some inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in +the original document has been preserved.<br /> +<br /> +Typographical errors corrected in the text:<br /> +<br /> +Page 136 Carthagena changed to Cartagena<br /> +Page 151 out changed to our<br /> +Page 194 saltest changed to saltiest<br /> +Page 227 if changed to it<br /> +Page 264 wift changed to swift<br /> +Page 271 frm changed to from<br /> +Page 278 Ensign changed to Ensigns<br /> +Page 348 de Steigner changed to de Steiguer<br /> +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Victory At Sea, by +William Sowden Sims and Burton J. 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Hendrick + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Victory At Sea + +Author: William Sowden Sims + Burton J. Hendrick + +Release Date: January 15, 2012 [EBook #38587] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE VICTORY AT SEA *** + + + + +Produced by David Edwards, Barbara Kosker and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + + +THE VICTORY AT SEA + +REAR-ADMIRAL W. S. SIMS +U.S. NAVY + + + + +THE VICTORY AT SEA + +[Illustration: _Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims U.S. Navy_ +_G. Vandyk Ltd. photographers_] + + + + +THE +VICTORY AT SEA + + + + +BY REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS +U.S. NAVY + +COMMANDER OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL FORCES OPERATING +IN EUROPEAN WATERS DURING THE GREAT WAR + + + + +IN COLLABORATION WITH +BURTON J. HENDRICK + +WITH PORTRAIT AND PLANS + + + + +LONDON +JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W. +1920 + + + + +FIRST EDITION _November 1920_ +_Reprinted_ _December 1920_ + +ALL RIGHTS RESERVED + +_Printed by Hasell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury, England._ + + + + +TO + +THE GALLANT OFFICERS AND MEN + +WHOM I HAD THE HONOUR TO COMMAND + +DURING THE GREAT WAR + +IN + +GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF + +A LOYAL DEVOTION TO THE CAUSE + +THAT GREATLY LIGHTENED THE + +RESPONSIBILITY + +BORNE BY + +"THE OLD MAN" + + + + +PREFACE + + +This is not in any sense a history of the operations of our naval forces +in Europe during the Great War, much less a history of the naval +operations as a whole. That would require not only many volumes, but +prolonged and careful research by competent historians. When such a work +is completed, our people will realize for the first time the admirable +initiative with which the gallant personnel of our navy responded to the +requirements of an unprecedented naval situation. + +But in the meantime this story has been written in response to a demand +for some account of the very generally misunderstood submarine campaign +and, particularly, of the means by which it was defeated. The interest +of the public in such a story is due to the fact that during the war the +sea forces were compelled to take all possible precautions to keep the +enemy from learning anything about the various devices and means used to +oppose or destroy the under-water craft. This necessity for the utmost +secrecy was owing to the peculiar nature of the sea warfare. When the +armies first made use of airplane bombs, or poison gas, or tanks, or +mobile railroad batteries, the existence of these weapons and the manner +of their use were necessarily at once revealed to the enemy, and the +press was permitted to publish full accounts of them and, to a certain +extent, of their effect and the means used to oppose them. Moreover, all +general movements of the contending armies that resulted in engagements +were known with fair accuracy on both sides within a short time after +they occurred and were promptly reported to an anxious public. + +But this situation bore almost no resemblance to the struggle between +the U-boats and the anti-submarine forces of the Allies. Barring a few +naval actions between surface vessels, such as the battles of Jutland +and of the Falkland Islands, the naval war was, for the most part, a +succession of contests between single vessels or small groups of +vessels. The enemy submarines sought to win the war by sinking the +merchant shipping upon which depended the essential supplies of the +allied populations and armies; and it was the effort of the Allies to +prevent this, and to destroy submarines when possible, that constituted +the vitally important naval activities of the war. By means of +strategical and tactical dispositions, and various weapons and devices, +now no longer secret, such as the depth charge, the mystery ship, +hydrophones, mine-fields, explosive mine nets, special hunting +submarines, and so forth, it was frequently possible either to destroy +submarines with their entire crews, or to capture the few men who +escaped when their boats were sunk, and thus keep from the German +Admiralty all knowledge of the means by which their U-boats had met +their fate. Thus the mystery ships, or decoy ships, as the Germans +called them, destroyed a number of submarines before the enemy knew that +such dangerous vessels existed. And even after they had acquired this +knowledge, the mystery ships used various devices that enabled them to +continue their successes until some unsuccessfully attacked submarine +carried word of the new danger back to her home port. + +Under such unprecedented conditions of warfare, it is apparent that the +Allied navies could not safely tell the public just what they were doing +or how they were doing it. All articles written for the press had to be +carefully censored, and all of these interesting matters ruthlessly +suppressed; but now that the ban has been removed, it is desirable to +give the relatives and friends of the fine chaps who did the good work +sufficient information to enable them to understand the difficulty of +the problem that was presented to the anti-submarine forces of the +Allies, the manner in which it was solved, and the various means +invented and employed. + +The subject is of course largely technical, but an effort has been made +to present the story in such form that the layman can readily understand +it. As it is difficult, if not quite impossible, for a naval officer to +determine just which of the details that are a part of his daily life, +and what incidents of sea experience would interest his civilian +friends, the story has been written in collaboration with Mr. Burton J. +Hendrick, to whom I am greatly indebted for invaluable assistance; and +who, being an experienced hand at this writing business, deserves all +the credit the reader may be disposed to accord him for both the form +and such graces of descriptive style as he may be able to detect. + +While opinions may differ to a certain extent as to the influence +exerted upon the campaign by the various forms of tactics, the means and +weapons employed, and the general strategy adopted, I have given what I +believe to be a consensus of the best informed opinion upon these +matters; and I have taken advantage of all of the information now +available to insure accuracy in the account of the conditions that +confronted the European naval forces, and in the description of the +various operations that have been selected as typical examples of this +very extraordinary warfare. + +It is probably unnecessary to add that this book is published with the +full approval of the Navy Department. My correspondence on this subject +with the Secretary will be found in the Appendix. + +W. S. S. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +CHAPTER PAGE + + I. WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR 1 + + II. THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER" 40 + + III. THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY 78 + + IV. AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION 99 + + V. DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION 141 + + VI. AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS 168 + + VII. THE LONDON FLAGSHIP 204 + +VIII. SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE 224 + + IX. THE AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN THE NORTH SEA 244 + + X. GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT THE AMERICAN COAST 266 + + XI. FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR 275 + + XII. THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND 289 + +XIII. TRANSPORTING TWO MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO FRANCE 294 + + APPENDIX 316 + + INDEX 347 + + + + +THE VICTORY AT SEA + + + + +CHAPTER I + +WHEN GERMANY WAS WINNING THE WAR + + +I + +In the latter part of March, 1917, a message from the Navy Department +came to me at Newport, where I was stationed as president of the Naval +War College, summoning me immediately to Washington. The international +atmosphere at that time was extremely tense, and the form in which these +instructions were cast showed that something extraordinary was +impending. The orders directed me to make my visit as unostentatious as +possible; to keep all my movements secret, and, on my arrival in +Washington, not to appear at the Navy Department, but to telephone +headquarters. I promptly complied with these orders; and, after I got in +touch with the navy chiefs, it took but a few moments to explain the +situation. It seemed inevitable, I was informed, that the United States +would soon be at war with Germany. Ambassador Page had cabled that it +would be desirable, under the existing circumstances, that the American +navy be represented by an officer of higher rank than any of those who +were stationed in London at that time. The Department therefore wished +me to leave immediately for England, to get in touch with the British +Admiralty, to study the naval situation and learn how we could best and +most quickly co-operate in the naval war. At this moment we were still +technically at peace with Germany. Mr. Daniels, the Secretary of the +Navy, therefore thought it wise that there should be no publicity about +my movements. I was to remain ostensibly as head of the War College, +and, in order that no suspicions should be aroused, my wife and family +were still to occupy the official residence of its president. I was +directed to sail on a merchant vessel, to travel under an assumed name, +to wear civilian clothes and to take no uniform. On reaching the other +side I was to get immediately in communication with the British +Admiralty, and send to Washington detailed reports on prevailing +conditions. + +A few days after this interview in Washington two commonplace-looking +gentlemen, dressed in civilian clothes, secretly boarded the American +steamship _New York_. They were entered upon the passenger list as V. J. +Richardson and S. W. Davidson. A day or two out an enterprising steward +noticed that the initials on the pyjamas of one of these passengers +differed from those of the name under which he was sailing and reported +him to the captain as a suspicious character. The captain had a quiet +laugh over this discovery, for he knew that Mr. Davidson was +Rear-Admiral Sims, of the United States Navy, and that his companion who +possessed the two sets of conflicting initials was Commander J. V. +Babcock, the Admiral's _aide_. The voyage itself was an uneventful one, +but a good deal of history was made in those few days that we spent upon +the sea. Our ship reached England on April 9th; one week previously +President Wilson had gone before Congress and asked for the declaration +of a state of war with Germany. We had a slight reminder that a war was +under way as we neared Liverpool, for a mine struck our vessel as we +approached the outer harbour. The damage was not irreparable; the +passengers were transferred to another steamer and we safely reached +port, where I found a representative of the British Admiralty, +Rear-Admiral Hope, waiting to receive me. The Admiralty had also +provided a special train, in which we left immediately for London. + +Whenever I think of the naval situation as it existed in April, 1917, I +always have before my mind two contrasting pictures--one that of the +British public, as represented in their press and in their social +gatherings in London, and the other that of British officialdom, as +represented in my confidential meetings with British statesmen and +British naval officers. For the larger part the English newspapers were +publishing optimistic statements about the German submarine campaign. +In these they generally scouted the idea that this new form of piracy +really threatened in any way the safety of the British Empire. They +accompanied these rather cheerful outgivings by weekly statistics of +submarine sinkings; figures which, while not particularly reassuring, +hardly indicated that any serious inroads had yet been made on the +British mercantile marine. The Admiralty was publishing tables showing +that four or five thousand ships were arriving at British ports and +leaving them every week, while other tables disclosed the number of +British ships of less than sixteen hundred tons and more than sixteen +hundred tons that were going down every seven days. Thus the week of my +arrival I learned from these figures that Great Britain had lost +seventeen ships above that size, and two ships below; that 2,406 vessels +had arrived at British ports, that 2,367 had left, and that, in +addition, seven fishing vessels had fallen victims to the German +submarines. Such figures were worthless, for they did not include +neutral ships and did not give the amount of tonnage sunk, details, of +course, which it was necessary to keep from the enemy. The facts which +the Government thus permitted to come to public knowledge did not +indicate that the situation was particularly alarming. Indeed the +newspapers all over the British Isles showed no signs of perturbation; +on the contrary, they were drawing favourable conclusions from these +statistics. Here and there one of them may have sounded a more +apprehensive note; yet the generally prevailing feeling both in the +press and in general discussions of the war seemed to be that the +submarine campaign had already failed, that Germany's last desperate +attempt to win the war had already broken down, and that peace would +probably not be long delayed. The newspapers found considerable +satisfaction in the fact that the "volume of British shipping was being +maintained"; they displayed such headlines as "improvement continues"; +they printed prominently the encouraging speeches of certain British +statesmen, and in this way were apparently quieting popular apprehension +concerning the outcome. This same atmosphere of cheerful ignorance I +found everywhere in London society. The fear of German submarines was +not disturbing the London season, which had now reached its height; the +theatres were packed every night; everywhere, indeed, the men and women +of the upper classes were apparently giving little thought to any danger +that might be hanging over their country. Before arriving in England I +myself had not known the gravity of the situation. I had followed the +war from the beginning with the greatest interest; I had read +practically everything printed about it in the American and foreign +press, and I had had access to such official information as was +available on our side of the Atlantic. The result was that, when I +sailed for England in March, I felt little fear about the outcome. All +the fundamental facts in the case made it appear impossible that the +Germans could win the war. Sea power apparently rested practically +unchallenged in the hands of the Allies; and that in itself, according +to the unvarying lessons of history, was an absolute assurance of +ultimate victory. The statistics of shipping losses had been regularly +printed in the American press, and, while such wanton destruction of +life and property seemed appalling, there was apparently nothing in +these figures that was likely to make any material change in the result. +Indeed it appeared to be altogether probable that the war would end +before the United States could exert any material influence upon the +outcome. My conclusions were shared by most American naval officers whom +I knew, students of warfare, who, like myself, had the utmost respect +for the British fleet and believed that it had the naval situation well +in hand. + +Yet a few days spent in London clearly showed that all this confidence +in the defeat of the Germans rested upon a misapprehension. The Germans, +it now appeared, were not losing the war--they were winning it. The +British Admiralty now placed before the American representative facts +and figures which it had not given to the British press. These documents +disclosed the astounding fact that, unless the appalling destruction of +merchant tonnage which was then taking place could be materially +checked, the unconditional surrender of the British Empire would +inevitably take place within a few months. + +On the day of my arrival in London I had my first interview with Admiral +Jellicoe, who was at that time the First Sea Lord. Admiral Jellicoe and +I needed no introduction. I had known him for many years and for a +considerable period we had been more or less regular correspondents. I +had first made his acquaintance in China in 1901; at that time Jellicoe +was a captain and was already recognized as one of the coming men of the +British navy. He was an expert in ordnance and gunnery, a subject in +which I was greatly interested; and this fact had brought us together +and made us friends. The admiration which I had then conceived for the +Admiral's character and intelligence I have never lost. He was then, as +he has been ever since, an indefatigable worker, and more than a worker, +for he was a profound student of everything which pertained to ships and +gunnery, and a man who joined to a splendid intellect the real ability +of command. I had known him in his own home with his wife and babies, as +well as on shipboard among his men, and had observed at close hand the +gracious personality which had the power to draw everyone to him and +make him the idol both of his own children and the officers and jackies +of the British fleet. Simplicity and directness were his two most +outstanding points; though few men had risen so rapidly in the Royal +Navy, success had made him only more quiet, soft spoken, and +unostentatiously dignified; there was nothing of the blustering seadog +about the Admiral, but he was all courtesy, all brain, and, of all the +men I have ever met, there have been none more approachable, more frank, +and more open-minded. + +Physically Admiral Jellicoe is a small man, but as powerful in frame as +he is in mind, and there are few men in the navy who can match him in +tennis. His smooth-shaven face, when I met him that morning in April, +1917, was, as usual, calm, smiling, and imperturbable. One could never +divine his thoughts by any outward display of emotion. Neither did he +give any signs that he was bearing a great burden, though it is not too +much to say that at this moment the safety of the British Empire rested +chiefly upon Admiral Jellicoe's shoulders. I find the absurd notion +prevalent in this country that his change from Commander of the Grand +Fleet to First Sea Lord was something in the nature of a demotion; but +nothing could be farther from the truth. As First Sea Lord, Jellicoe +controlled the operations, not only of the Grand Fleet, but also of the +entire British navy; he had no superior officer, for the First Lord of +the Admiralty, the position in England that corresponds to our Secretary +of the Navy, has no power to give any order whatever to the fleet--a +power which our Secretary possesses. Thus the defeat of the German +submarines was a direct responsibility which Admiral Jellicoe could +divide with no other official. Great as this duty was, and appalling as +was the submarine situation at the time of this interview, there was +nothing about the Admiral's bearing which betrayed any depression of +spirits. He manifested great seriousness indeed, possibly some +apprehension, but British stoicism and the usual British refusal to +succumb to discouragement were qualities that were keeping him +tenaciously at his job. + +After the usual greetings, Admiral Jellicoe took a paper out of his +drawer and handed it to me. It was a record of tonnage losses for the +last few months. This showed that the total sinkings, British and +neutral, had reached 536,000 tons in February and 603,000 in March; it +further disclosed that sinkings were taking place in April which +indicated the destruction of nearly 900,000 tons. These figures +indicated that the losses were three and four times as large as those +which were then being published in the press.[1] + +It is expressing it mildly to say that I was surprised by this +disclosure. I was fairly astounded; for I had never imagined anything so +terrible. I expressed my consternation to Admiral Jellicoe. + +"Yes," he said, as quietly as though he were discussing the weather and +not the future of the British Empire. "It is impossible for us to go on +with the war if losses like this continue." + +"What are you doing about it?" I asked. + +"Everything that we can. We are increasing our anti-submarine forces in +every possible way. We are using every possible craft we can find with +which to fight submarines. We are building destroyers, trawlers, and +other like craft as fast as we can. But the situation is very serious +and we shall need all the assistance we can get." + +"It looks as though the Germans were winning the war," I remarked. + +"They will win, unless we can stop these losses--and stop them soon," +the Admiral replied. + +"Is there no solution for the problem?" I asked. + +"Absolutely none that we can see now," Jellicoe announced. He described +the work of destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, but he showed no +confidence that they would be able to control the depredations of the +U-boats. + +The newspapers for several months had been publishing stories that +submarines in large numbers were being sunk; and these stories I now +found to be untrue. The Admiralty records showed that only fifty-four +German submarines were positively known to have been sunk since the +beginning of the war; the German shipyards, I was now informed, were +turning out new submarines at the rate of three a week. The newspapers +had also published accounts of the voluntary surrender of German +U-boats; but not one such surrender, Admiral Jellicoe said, had ever +taken place; the stories had been circulated merely for the purpose of +depreciating enemy _moral_. I even found that members of the Government, +all of whom should have been better informed, and also British naval +officers, believed that many captured German submarines had been +carefully stowed away at the Portsmouth and Plymouth navy yards. Yet the +disconcerting facts which faced the Allies were that the supplies and +communications of the forces on all fronts were threatened; that German +submarines were constantly extending their operations farther and +farther out into the Atlantic; that German raiders were escaping into +the open sea; that three years' constant operations had seriously +threatened the strength of the British navy, and that Great Britain's +control of the sea was actually at stake. Nor did Admiral Jellicoe +indulge in any false expectations concerning the future. Bad as the +situation then was, he had every expectation that it would grow worse. +The season which was now approaching would make easier the German +operations, for the submarines would soon have the long daylight of the +British summer and the more favourable weather. The next few months, +indeed, both in the estimation of the Germans and the British, would +witness the great crisis of the war; the basis of the ruthless campaign +upon which the submarines had entered was that they could reach the +decision before winter closed in. So far as I could learn there was a +general belief in British naval circles that this plan would succeed. +The losses were now approaching a million tons a month; it was thus a +matter of very simple arithmetic to determine the length of time the +Allies could stand such a strain. According to the authorities the limit +of endurance would be reached about November 1, 1917; in other words, +unless some method of successfully fighting submarines could be +discovered almost immediately, Great Britain would have to lay down her +arms before a victorious Germany. + +"What we are facing is the defeat of Great Britain," said Ambassador +Walter H. Page, after the situation had been explained to him. + +In the next few weeks I had many interviews with Admiral Jellicoe and +other members of the Admiralty. Sitting in conference with them every +morning, I became, for all practical purposes, a member of their +organization. There were no secrets of the British navy which were not +disclosed to their new American ally. This policy was in accordance with +the broad-minded attitude of the British Government; there was a general +desire that the United States should understand the situation +completely, and from the beginning matters were discussed with the +utmost frankness. Everywhere was manifested a willingness to receive +suggestions and to try any expedient that promised to be even remotely +successful; yet the feeling prevailed that there was no quick and easy +way to defeat the submarine, that anything even faintly resembling the +much-sought "answer" had not yet appeared on the horizon. The prevailing +impression that any new invention could control the submarine in time to +be effective was deprecated. The American press was at that time +constantly calling upon Edison and other great American inventors to +solve this problem, and, in fact, inventors in every part of two +hemispheres were turning out devices by the thousands. A regular +department of the Admiralty which was headed by Admiral Fisher had +charge of investigating their proposals; in a few months it had received +and examined not far from 40,000 inventions, none of which answered the +purpose, though many of them were exceedingly ingenious. British naval +officers were not hostile to such projects; they declared, however, that +it would be absurd to depend upon new devices for defeating the German +campaign. The overshadowing fact--a fact which I find that many naval +men have not yet sufficiently grasped--is that time was the +all-important element. It was necessary not only that a way be found of +curbing the submarine, but of accomplishing this result at once. The +salvation of the great cause in which we had engaged was a matter of +only a few months. A mechanical device, or a new type of ship which +might destroy this menace six months hence, would not have helped us, +for by that time Germany would have won the war. + +I discussed the situation also with members of the Cabinet, such as Mr. +Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, and Sir Edward Carson. Their attitude to me +was very different from the attitude which they were taking publicly; +these men naturally would say nothing in the newspapers that would +improve the enemy _moral_; but in explaining the situation to me they +repeated practically everything that Jellicoe had said. It was the +seriousness of this situation that soon afterward sent Mr. Balfour and +the British Commission to the United States. The world does not yet +understand what a dark moment that was in the history of the Allied +cause. Not only were the German submarines sweeping British commerce +from the seas, but the German armies were also defeating the British and +French on the battlefields in France. It is only when we recall that the +Germans were attaining the high peak of success with the U-boats at the +very moment that General Nivelle's offensive had failed on the Western +Front that we can get some idea of the real tragedy of the Allied +situation in the spring of 1917. + +"Things were dark when I took that trip to America," Mr. Balfour said to +me afterward. "The submarines were constantly on my mind. I could think +of nothing but the number of ships which they were sinking. At that time +it certainly looked as though we were going to lose the war." + +One of the men who most keenly realized the state of affairs was the +King. I met His Majesty first in the vestibule of St. Paul's, on that +memorable occasion in April, 1917, when the English people held a +thanksgiving service to commemorate America's entrance into the war. +Then, as at several subsequent meetings, the King impressed me as a +simple, courteous, unaffected English gentleman. He was dressed in +khaki, like any other English officer, and his manner was warm-hearted, +sincere, and even democratic. + +"It gives me great pleasure to meet you on an occasion like this," said +His Majesty, referring to the great Anglo-American memorial service. "I +am also glad to greet an American admiral on such a mission as yours. +And I wish you all success." + +On that occasion we naturally had little time to discuss the submarines, +but a few days afterward I was invited to spend the night at Windsor +Castle. The King in his own home proved to be even more cordial, if that +were possible, than at our first meeting. After dinner we adjourned to a +small room and there, over our cigars, we discussed the situation at +considerable length. The King is a rapid and animated talker; he was +kept constantly informed on the submarine situation, and discussed it +that night in all its details. I was at first surprised by his +familiarity with all naval questions and the intimate touch which he was +evidently maintaining with the British fleet. Yet this was not really +surprising, for His Majesty himself is a sailor; in his early youth he +joined the navy, in which he worked up like any other British boy. He +seemed almost as well informed about the American navy as about the +British; he displayed the utmost interest in our preparations on land +and sea, and he was particularly solicitous that I, as the American +representative, should have complete access to the Admiralty Office. +About the submarine campaign, the King was just as outspoken as Jellicoe +and the other members of the Admiralty. The thing must be stopped, or +the Allies could never win the war. + +Of all the influential men in British public life there was only one who +at that time took an optimistic attitude. This was Mr. Lloyd George. I +met the Prime Minister frequently at dinners, at his own country place +and elsewhere, and the most lasting impression which I retain of this +wonderful man was his irrepressible gaiety of spirits. I think of the +Prime Minister of Great Britain as a great, big, exuberant boy, always +laughing and joking, constantly indulging in repartee and by-play, and +even in this crisis, perhaps the darkest one of British history, showing +no signs of depression. His face, which was clear in its complexion as a +girl's, never betrayed the slightest anxiety, and his eyes, which were +always sparkling, never disclosed the faintest shadow. It was a picture +which I shall never forget--that of this man, upon whose shoulders the +destiny of the Empire chiefly rested, apparently refusing to admit, even +to himself, the dangers that were seemingly overwhelming it, heroically +devoting all his energies to uplifting the spirits of his countrymen, +and, in his private intercourse with his associates, even in the most +fateful moments, finding time to tell funny stories, to recall +entertaining anecdotes of his own political career, to poke fun at the +mistakes of his opponents, and to turn the general conversation a +thousand miles away from the Western Front and the German submarines. It +was the most inspiring instance of self-control that I have ever known; +indeed only one other case in history can be compared with it; Lloyd +George's attitude at this period constantly reminded me of Lincoln in +the darkest hours of the Civil War, when, after receiving news of such +calamities as Fredericksburg or Chancellorsville, he would entertain his +cabinet by reading selections from Artemus Ward, interlarded with +humorous sayings and anecdotes of his own. Perhaps Lloyd George's +cheerfulness is explained by another trait which he likewise possessed +in common with Lincoln; there is a Welsh mysticism in his nature which, +I am told, sometimes takes the form of religious exaltation. Lloyd +George's faith in God and in a divine ordering of history was evidently +so profound that the idea of German victory probably never seized his +mind as a reality; we all know that Lincoln's absolute confidence in the +triumph of the North rested upon a similar basis. Certainly only some +such deep-set conviction as this could explain Lloyd George's serenity +and optimism in the face of the most frightful calamities. I attended a +small dinner at which the Premier was present four days after the +Germans had made their terrible attack in March, 1918. Even on this +occasion he showed no evidences of strain; as usual his animated spirits +held the upper hand; he was talking incessantly, but he never even +mentioned the subject that was absorbing the thoughts of the rest of +the world at that moment; instead he rattled along, touching upon the +Irish question, discussing the impression which Irish conscription would +make in America, and, now and then, pausing to pass some bantering +remark to Mr. Balfour. This was the way that I always saw the head of +the British Government; never did I meet him when he was fagged or +discouraged, or when he saw any end to the war but a favourable one. + +On several occasions I attempted to impress Mr. Lloyd George with the +gravity of the situation; he always refused to acknowledge that it was +grave. + +"Oh, yes, things are bad," he would say with a smile and a sweep of his +hand. "But we shall get the best of the submarines--never fear!" + +The cheerfulness of the Prime Minister, however, was exceptional; all +his associates hardly concealed their apprehension. On the other hand, a +wave of enthusiasm was at that time sweeping over Germany. Americans +still have an idea that the German Government adopted the submarine +campaign as the last despairing gambler's chance, and that they only +half believed in its success themselves. There is an impression here +that the Germans never would have staked their Empire on this desperate +final throw had they foreseen that the United States would have +mobilized against them all its men and resources. This conviction is +entirely wrong. The Germans did not think that they were taking any +chances when they announced their unrestricted campaign; the ultimate +result seemed to them to be a certainty. They calculated the available +shipping which the Allies and the neutral nations had afloat; they knew +just how many ships their submarines could sink every month, and from +these statistics they mathematically deduced, with real German +precision, the moment when the war would end. They did not like the idea +of adding the United States to their enemies, but this was because they +were thinking of conditions after the war; for they would have preferred +to have had American friendship in the period of readjustment. But they +did not fear that we could do them much injury in the course of the war +itself. This again was not because they really despised our fighting +power; they knew that we would prove a formidable enemy on the +battlefield; but the obvious fact, to their eyes, was that our armies +could never get to the front in time. The submarine campaign, they said, +would finish the thing in three or four months; and certainly in that +period the unprepared United States could never summon any military +power that could affect the result. Thus from a purely military +standpoint the entrance of 100,000,000 Americans affected them about as +much as would a declaration of war from the planet Mars. + +We confirmed this point of view from the commanders of the occasionally +captured submarines. These men would be brought to London and +questioned; they showed the utmost confidence in the result. + +"Yes, you've got _us_," they would say, "but what difference does that +make? There are plenty more submarines coming out. You will get a few, +but we can build a dozen for every one that you can capture or sink. +Anyway, the war will all be over in two or three months and we shall be +sent back home." + +All these captives laughed at the merest suggestion of German defeat; +their attitude was not that of prisoners, but of conquerors. They also +regarded themselves as heroes, and they gloried in the achievements of +their submarine service. For the most part they exaggerated the sinkings +and estimated that the war would end about the first of July or August. +Similarly the Berlin Government exaggerated the extent of their success. +This was not surprising, for one peculiarity of the submarine is that +only the commander, stationed at the periscope, knows what is going on. +He can report sinking a 5,000 ton ship and no one can contradict his +statement, for the crew and the other officers do not see the surface of +the water. Not unnaturally the commander does not depreciate his own +achievements, and thus the amount of sunken tonnage reported in Berlin +considerably exceeded the actual losses. + +The speeches of German dignitaries resounded with the same confidence. + +"In the impending decisive battle," said the Kaiser, "the task falls +upon my navy of turning the English war method of starvation, with which +our most hated and most obstinate enemy intends to overthrow the German +people, against him and his allies by combating their sea traffic with +all the means in our power. In this work the submarine will stand in the +first rank. I expect that this weapon, technically developed with wise +forethought at our admirable yards, in co-operation with all our other +naval fighting weapons and supported by the spirit which, during the +whole course of the war, has enabled us to perform brilliant deeds, will +break our enemy's war will." + +"In this life and death struggle by hunger," said Dr. Karl Helfferich, +Imperial Secretary of the Interior, "England believed herself to be far +beyond the reach of any anxiety about food. A year ago it was supposed +that England would be able to use the acres of the whole world, bidding +with them against the German acres. To-day England sees herself in a +situation unparalleled in her history. Her acres across sea disappear as +a result of the blockade which our submarines are daily making more +effective around England. We have considered, we have dared. Certain of +the result, we shall not allow it to be taken from us by anybody or +anything." + +These statements now read almost like ancient history, yet they were +made in February, 1917. At that time, Americans and Englishmen read them +with a smile; they seemed to be the kind of German rodomontade with +which the war had made us so familiar; they seemed to be empty mouthings +put out to bolster up the drooping German spirit. That the Kaiser and +his advisers could really believe such rubbish was generally regarded as +absurd. Yet not only did they believe what they were saying but, as +already explained, they also had every reason for believing it. The +Kaiser and his associates had figured that the war would end about July +1st or August 1st; and English officials with whom I came in contact +placed the date at November 1st--always provided, of course, that no +method were found for checking the submarine.[2] + + +II + +How, then, could we defeat the submarine? Before approaching this +subject, it is well to understand precisely what was taking place in the +spring and summer of 1917 in those waters surrounding the British +Isles. What was this strange new type of warfare that was bringing the +Allied cause to its knees? Nothing like it had ever been known in +recorded time; nothing like it had been foreseen when, on August 4, +1914, the British Government threw all its resources and all its people +against the great enemy of mankind. + +Leaving entirely out of consideration international law and humanity, it +must be admitted that strategically the German submarine campaign was +well conceived. Its purpose was to marshal on the German side that force +which has always proved to be the determining one in great international +conflicts--sea power. The advantages which the control of the sea gives +the nation which possesses it are apparent. In the first place, it makes +secure such a nation's communications with the outside world and its own +allies, and, at the same time, it cuts the communications of its enemy. +It enables the nation dominant at sea to levy upon the resources of the +entire world; to obtain food for its civilian population, raw materials +for its manufactures, munitions for its armies; and, at the same time, +to maintain that commerce upon which its very economic life may depend. +It enables such a power also to transport troops into any field of +action where they may be required. At the very time that sea power is +heaping all these blessings upon the dominant nation, it enables such a +nation to deny these same advantages to its enemy. For the second great +resource of sea power is the blockade. If the enemy is agriculturally +and industrially dependent upon the outside world, sea power can +transform it into a beleaguered fortress and sooner or later compel its +unconditional surrender. Its operations are not spectacular, but they +work with the inevitable remorselessness of death itself. + +This fact is so familiar that I insist upon it here only for the purpose +of inviting attention to another fact which is not so apparent. Perhaps +the greatest commonplace of the war, from the newspaper standpoint, was +that the British fleet controlled the seas. This mere circumstance, as I +have already said, was the reason why all students of history were firm +in their belief that Britain could never be defeated. It was not until +the spring of 1917 that we really awoke to the actual situation; it was +not until I had spent several days in England that I made the +all-important discovery, which was this--that Britain did _not_ control +the seas. She still controlled the seas in the old Nelsonian sense; that +is, her Grand Fleet successfully "contained" the German battle squadrons +and kept them, for the greater part of the war, penned up in their +German harbours. In the old days such a display of sea power would have +easily won the war for the Allies. But that is not control of the seas +in the modern sense; it is merely control of the _surface_ of the seas. +Under modern methods of naval warfare sea control means far more than +controlling the top of the water. For there is another type of ship, +which sails stealthily under the waves, revealing its presence only at +certain intervals, and capable of shooting a terrible weapon which can +sink the proudest surface ship in a few minutes. The existence of this +new type of warship makes control of the seas to-day a very different +thing from what it was in Nelson's time. As long as such a warship can +operate under the water almost at will--and this was the case in a +considerable area of the ocean in the early part of 1917--it is +ridiculous to say that any navy controls the seas. For this subsurface +vessel, when used as successfully as it was used by the Germans in 1917, +deprives the surface navy of that advantage which has proved most +decisive in other wars. That is, the surface navy can no longer +completely protect communications as it could protect them in Nelson's +and Farragut's times. It no longer guarantees a belligerent its food, +its munitions, its raw materials of manufacture and commerce, or the +free movement of its troops. It is obviously absurd to say that a +belligerent which was losing 800,000 or 900,000 tons of shipping a +month, as was the case with the Allies in the spring of 1917, was the +undisputed mistress of the seas. Had the German submarine campaign +continued to succeed at this rate, the United States could not have +transported its army to France, and the food and materials which we were +sending to Europe, and which were essential to winning the war, could +never have crossed the ocean. + +That is to say, complete control of the subsurface by Germany would have +turned against England the blockade, the very power with which she had +planned to reduce the German Empire. Instead of isolating Germany from +the rest of the world, she would herself be isolated. + +In due course I shall attempt to show the immediate connexion that +exists between control of the surface and control of the subsurface; +this narrative will disclose, indeed, that the nation which possesses +the first also potentially possesses the second. In the early spring of +1917, however, this principle was not effective, so far as merchant +shipping was concerned. + +Germany's purpose in adopting the ruthless submarine warfare was, of +course, the one which I have indicated: to deprive the Allied armies in +the field, and their civilian populations, of these supplies from +overseas which were essential to victory. Nature had been kind to this +German programme when she created the British Isles. Indeed this tight +little kingdom and the waters which surround it provided an ideal field +for operations of this character. For purposes of contrast, let us +consider our own geographical situation. A glance at the map discloses +that it would be almost impossible to blockade the United States with +submarines. In the first place, the operation of submarines more than +three thousand miles from their bases would present almost insuperable +difficulties. That Germany could send an occasional submarine to our +coasts she demonstrated in the war, but it would be hardly possible to +maintain anything like a regular and persistent campaign. Even if she +could have kept a force constantly engaged in our waters, other natural +difficulties would have defeated their most determined efforts. The +trade routes approach our Atlantic sea-coast in the shape of a fan, of +which different sticks point to such ports as Boston, New York, +Philadelphia, Norfolk, and the ports of the Gulf of Mexico. To destroy +shipping to American ports it would be necessary for the enemy to cover +all these routes with submarines, a project which is so vast that it is +hardly worth the trial. In addition we have numerous Pacific ports to +which we could divert shipping in case our enemy should attempt to +blockade us on the Atlantic coast; our splendid system of +transcontinental railroads would make internal distribution not a +particularly difficult matter. Above all such considerations, of course, +is the fact that the United States is an industrial and agricultural +entity, self-supporting and self-feeding, and, therefore, it could not +be starved into surrender even though the enemy should surmount these +practically insuperable obstacles to a submarine blockade. But the +situation of the British Isles is entirely different. They obtain from +overseas the larger part of their food and a considerable part of their +raw materials, and in April of 1917, according to reliable statements +made at that time, England had enough food on hand for only six weeks or +two months. The trade routes over which these supplies came made the +submarine blockade a comparatively simple matter. Instead of the sticks +of a fan, the comparison which I have suggested with our own coast, we +now have to deal with the neck of a bottle. The trade routes to our +Atlantic coast spread out, as they approach our ports; on the other +hand, the trade routes to Great Britain converge almost to a point. The +far-flung steamship lanes which bring Britain her food and raw materials +from half a dozen continents focus in the Irish Sea and the English +Channel. To cut the communications of Great Britain, therefore, the +submarines do not have to patrol two or three thousand miles of +sea-coast, as would be necessary in the case of the United States; they +merely need to hover around the extremely restricted waters west and +south of Ireland. + +This was precisely the area which the Germans had selected for their +main field of activity. It was here that their so-called U-boats were +operating with the most deadly effect; these waters constituted their +happy hunting grounds, for here came the great cargo ships, with food +and supplies from America, which were bound for Liverpool and the great +Channel ports. The submarines that did destruction in this region were +the type that have gained universal fame as the U-boats. There were +other types, which I shall describe, but the U-boats were the main +reliance of the German navy; they were fairly large vessels, of about +800 tons, and carried from eight to twelve torpedoes and enough fuel and +supplies to keep the sea for three or four weeks. And here let me +correct one universal misapprehension. These U-boats did not have bases +off the Irish and Spanish coasts, as most people still believe. Such +bases would have been of no particular use to them. The cruising period +of a submarine did not depend, as is the prevailing impression, upon its +supply of fuel oil and food, for almost any under-water boat was able to +carry enough of these essential materials for a practically indefinite +period; the average U-boat, moreover, could easily make the voyage +across the Atlantic and back. The cruising period depended upon its +supply of torpedoes. A submarine returned to its base only after it had +exhausted its supply of these destructive missiles; if it should shoot +them all in twenty-four hours, then a single day would end that +particular cruise; if the torpedoes lasted a month, then the submarine +stayed out for that length of time. For these reasons bases on the Irish +coast would have been useful only in case they could replenish the +torpedoes, and this was obviously an impossibility. No, there was not +the slightest mystery concerning the bases of the U-boats. When the +Germans captured the city of Bruges in Belgium they transformed it into +a headquarters for submarines; here many of the U-boats were assembled, +and here facilities were provided for docking, repairing, and supplying +them. Bruges was thus one of the main headquarters for the destructive +campaign which was waged against British commerce. Bruges itself is an +inland town, but from it two canals extend, one to Ostend and the other +to Zeebrugge, and in this way the interior submarine base formed the +apex of a triangle. It was by way of these canals that the U-boats +reached the open sea. + +Once in the English Channel, the submarines had their choice of two +routes to the hunting grounds off the west and south of Ireland. A large +number made the apparently unnecessarily long detour across the North +Sea and around Scotland, going through the Fair Island Passage, between +the Orkney and the Shetland islands, along the Hebrides, where they +sometimes made a landfall, and so around the west coast of Ireland. This +looks like a long and difficult trip, yet the time was not entirely +wasted, for the U-boats, as the map of sinkings shows, usually destroyed +several vessels on the way to their favourite hunting grounds. But there +was another and shorter route to this area available to the U-boats. And +here I must correct another widely prevailing misapprehension. While the +war was going on many accounts were published in the newspapers +describing the barrage across the English Channel, from Dover to Calais, +and the belief was general that this barrier kept the U-boats from +passing through. Unfortunately this was not the case. The surface boats +did succeed in transporting almost at will troops and supplies across +this narrow passage-way; but the mines, nets, and other obstructions +that were intended to prevent the passage of submarines were not +particularly effective. The British navy knew little about mines in +1914; British naval men had always rather despised them as the "weapons +of the weaker power," and it is therefore not surprising that the +so-called mine barrage at the Channel crossing was not successful. A +large part of it was carried away by the strong tide and storms, and the +mines were so defective that oysters and other sea growths, which +attached themselves to their prongs, made many of them harmless. In +1918, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes reconstructed this barrage with a new type +of mine and transformed it into a really effective barrier; but in the +spring of 1917, the German U-boats had little difficulty in slipping +through, particularly in the night time. And from this point the +distance to the trade routes south and west of Ireland was relatively a +short one. + +Yet, terribly destructive as these U-boats were, the number which were +operating simultaneously in this and in other fields was never very +large. The extent to which the waters were infested with German +submarines was another particularly ludicrous and particularly prevalent +misapprehension. Merchant vessels constantly reported that they had been +assailed by "submarines in shoals," and most civilians still believe +that they sailed together in flotillas, like schools of fish. There is +hardly an American doughboy who did not see at least a dozen submarines +on his way across the Atlantic; every streak of suds which was caused by +a "tide rip," and every swimming porpoise, was immediately mistaken for +the wake of a torpedo; and every bit of driftwood, in the fervid +imagination of trans-Atlantic voyagers, immediately assumed the shape of +a periscope. Yet it is a fact that we knew almost every time a German +submarine slunk from its base into the ocean. The Allied secret service +was immeasurably superior to that of the Germans, and in saying this I +pay particular tribute to the British Naval Intelligence Department. We +always knew how many submarines the Germans had and we could usually +tell pretty definitely their locations at a particular time; we also had +accurate information about building operations in Germany; thus we could +estimate how many they were building and where they were building them, +and we could also describe their essential characteristics, and the +stage of progress they which had reached at almost any day. + +It was not the simplest thing to pilot a submarine out of its base. The +Allies were constantly laying mines at these outlets; and before the +U-boat could safely make its exit elaborate sweeping operations were +necessary. It often took a squadron of nine or ten surface ships, +working for several hours, to manoeuvre a submarine out of its base +and to start it on its journey. For these reasons we could keep a +careful watch upon its movements; we always knew when one of our enemies +came out; we knew which one it was, and not infrequently we had learned +the name of the commander and other valuable details. Moreover, we knew +where it went, and we kept charts on which we plotted from day to day +the voyage of each particular submarine. + +"Why didn't you sink it then?" is the question usually asked when I make +this statement--a question which, as I shall show, merely reflects the +ignorance which prevails everywhere on the underlying facts of submarine +warfare. + +Now in this densely packed shipping area, which extended from the north +of Ireland to Brest, there were seldom more than eight or ten submarines +engaged in their peculiar form of warfare at one time. The largest +number which I had any record of was fifteen; and this was an +exceptional force; the usual number was four, six, eight, or perhaps +ten. Yet the men upon our merchant convoys and troopships saw submarines +scattered all over the sea. We estimated that the convoys and troopships +reported that they had sighted about 300 submarines for every submarine +which was actually in the field. Yet we knew that for every hundred +submarines which the Germans possessed they could keep only ten or a +dozen at work in the open sea. The rest were on their way to the hunting +grounds, or returning, or they were in port being refitted and taking on +supplies. Could Germany have kept fifty submarines constantly at work on +the great shipping routes in the winter and spring of 1917--before we +had learned how to handle the situation--nothing could have prevented +her from winning the war. Instead of sinking 850,000 tons in a single +month, she would have sunk 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 tons. The fact is that +Germany, with all her microscopic preparations for war, neglected to +provide herself with the one instrumentality with which she might have +won it. + +This circumstance, that so few submarines could accomplish such +destructive results, shows how formidable was the problem which +confronted us. Germany could do this, of course, because the restricted +field in which she was able to operate was so constantly and so densely +infested with valuable shipping. + +In the above I have been describing the operations of the U-boats in the +great area to the west and south of Ireland. But there were other +hunting fields, particularly that which lay on the east coast of +England, in the area extending from Harwich to Newcastle. This part of +the North Sea was constantly filled with ships passing between the North +Sea ports of England and Norway and Sweden, carrying essential products +like lumber and many manufactured articles. Every four days a convoy of +from forty to sixty ships left some port in this region for Scandinavia; +I use the word "convoy," but the operation was a convoy only in the +sense that the ships sailed in groups, for the navy was not able to +provide them with an adequate escort--seldom furnishing them more than +one or two destroyers, or a few yachts or trawlers. Smaller types of +submarines which were known as UB's and UC's and which issued from +Wilhelmshaven and the Skager Rack constantly preyed upon this coastal +shipping. These submarines differed from the U-boats in that they were +smaller, displacing about 350 and 400 tons, and in that they also +carried mines, which they were constantly laying. They were much handier +than the larger types; they could rush out much more quickly from their +bases and get back, and they did an immense amount of damage to this +coastal trade. The value of the shipping sunk in these waters was +unimportant when compared with the losses which Great Britain was +suffering on the great trans-Atlantic routes, but the problem was still +a serious one, because the supplies which these ships brought from the +Scandinavian countries were essential to the military operations in +France. + +Besides these two types, the U-boats and the UB's and UC's, the Germans +had another type of submarine, the great ocean cruisers. These ships +were as long as a small surface cruiser and were half again as long as a +destroyer, and their displacement sometimes reached 3,000 tons. They +carried crews of seventy men, could cross the Atlantic three or four +times without putting into port, and some actually remained away from +their bases for three or four months. But they were vessels very +difficult to manage; it took them a relatively long time to submerge, +and, for this reason, they could not operate around the Channel and +other places where the anti-submarine craft were most numerous. In fact, +these vessels, of which the Germans had in commission perhaps half a +dozen when the armistice was signed, accomplished little in the war. The +purpose for which they were built was chiefly a strategic one. One or +two were usually stationed off the Azores, not in any expectation that +they would destroy much shipping--the fact is that they sank very few +merchantmen--but in the hope that they might divert anti-submarine craft +from the main theatre of operations. In this purpose, however, they were +not successful; in fact, I cannot see that these great cruisers +accomplished anything that justified the expense and the trouble which +were involved in building them. + + +III + +This, then, was the type of warfare which the German submarines were +waging upon the shipping of the Allied nations. What were the Allied +navies doing to check them in this terrible month of April, 1917? What +anti-submarine methods had been developed up to that time? + +The most popular game on both sides of the Atlantic was devising means +of checking the under-water ship. Every newspaper, every magazine, every +public man, and every gentleman at his club had a favourite scheme for +defeating the U-boat campaign. All that any one needed for this engaging +pastime was a map of the North Sea, and the solution appeared to be as +clear as daylight. As Sir Eric Geddes once remarked to me, nothing is +quite so deceptive as geography. All of us are too likely to base our +conception of naval problems on the maps which we studied at school. On +these maps the North Sea is such a little place! A young lady once +declared in my hearing that she didn't see how the submarines could +operate in the English Channel, it was so narrow! She didn't see how +there was room enough to turn around! The fact that it is twenty miles +wide at the shortest crossing and not far from two hundred at the widest +is something which it is apparently difficult to grasp. + +The plan which was most popular in those days was to pen the submarines +in their bases and so prevent their egress into the North Sea. +Obviously the best way to handle the situation was to sink the whole +German submarine fleet; that was apparently impossible, and the next +best thing was to keep them in their home ports and prevent them from +sailing the high seas. It was not only the man in the street who was +advocating this programme. I had a long talk with several prominent +Government officials, in which they asked me why this could not be done. + +"I can give you fourteen reasons why it is impossible," I answered. "We +shall first have to capture the bases, and it would be simply suicidal +to attempt it, and it would be playing directly into Germany's hands. +Those bases are protected by powerful 15-, 11-, and 8-inch guns. These +are secreted behind hills or located in pits on the seashore, where no +approaching vessel can see them. Moreover, those guns have a range of +40,000 yards, but the guns on no ships have a range of more than 30,000 +yards; they are stationary, whereas ours would be moving. For our ships +to go up against such emplacements would be like putting a blind +prize-fighter up against an antagonist who can see and who has arms +twice as long as his enemy's. We can send as many ships as we wish on +such an expedition, and they will all be destroyed. The German guns +would probably get them on the first salvo, certainly on the second. +There is nothing the Germans would so much like to have us try." + +Another idea suggested by a glance at the map was the construction of a +barrage across the North Sea from the Orkneys to the coast of Norway. +The distance did not seem so very great--on the map; in reality, it was +two hundred and thirty miles and the water is from 360 to 960 feet in +depth. If we cannot pen the rats up in their holes, said the newspaper +strategist, certainly we can do the next best thing: we can pen them up +in the North Sea. Then we can route all our shipping to points on the +west coast of England, and the problem is solved. + +I discussed this proposition with British navy men and their answer was +quite to the point. + +"If we haven't mines enough to build a successful barrage across the +Straits of Dover, which is only twenty miles wide, how can we construct +a barrage across the North Sea, which is 230?" + +A year afterward, as will be shown later, this plan came up in more +practical form, but in 1917 the idea was not among the +possibilities--there were not mines enough in the world to build such a +barrage, nor had a mine then been invented that was suitable for the +purpose. + +The belief prevailed in the United States, and, to a certain extent, in +England itself, that the most effective means of meeting the submarine +was to place guns and gun crews on all the mercantile vessels. Even some +of the old British merchant salts maintained this view. "Give us a gun, +and we'll take care of the submarines all right," they kept saying to +the Admiralty. But the idea was fundamentally fallacious. In the +American Congress, just prior to the declaration of war, the arming of +merchant ships became a great political issue; scores of pages in the +_Congressional Record_ are filled with debates on this subject, yet, so +far as affording any protection to shipping was concerned, all this was +wasted oratory. Those who advocated arming the merchant ships as an +effective method of counteracting submarine campaigns had simply failed +to grasp the fundamental elements of submarine warfare. They apparently +did not understand the all-important fact that the quality which makes +the submarine so difficult to deal with is its invisibility. The great +political issue which was involved in the submarine controversy, and the +issue which brought the United States into the war, was that the Germans +were sinking merchant ships without warning. And it was because of this +very fact--this sinking without warning--that a dozen guns on a merchant +ship afforded practically no protection. The lookout on a merchantman +could not see the submarine, for the all-sufficient reason that the +submarine was concealed beneath the water; it was only by a happy chance +that the most penetrating eye could detect the periscope, provided that +one were exposed. The first intimation which was given the merchantman +that a U-boat was in his neighbourhood was the explosion of the torpedo +in his hull. In six weeks, in the spring and early summer of 1917, +thirty armed merchantmen were torpedoed and sunk off Queenstown, and in +no case was a periscope or a conning-tower seen. The English never +trusted their battleships at sea without destroyer escort, and certainly +if a battleship with its powerful armament could not protect itself from +submarines, it was too much to expect that an ordinary armed +merchantman would be able to do so. I think the fact that few American +armed ships were attacked and sunk in 1917 created the impression that +their guns afforded them some protection. But the apparent immunity +extended to them was really policy on Germany's part. She expected, as I +have said, that she would win the war long before the United States +could play an effective role in the struggle. It was therefore good +international politics to refrain from any unnecessary acts that would +still further embitter the American people against her. There was also a +considerable pacifist element in our country which Germany was coddling +in the hope of preventing the United States from using against her such +forces as we already had at hand. The reason American armed merchantmen +were not sunk was simply because they were not seriously attacked; I +have already shown how easily Germany could have sunk them if she had +really tried. Any reliance upon armed guards as a protection against +submarines would have been fundamentally a mistake, for the additional +reason that it was a defensive measure; it must be apparent that the +extremely grave situation which we were then facing demanded the most +energetic offensive methods. Yet the arming of merchant ships was +justified as a minor measure. It accomplished the one important end of +forcing the submarine to submerge and to use torpedoes instead of +gunfire. In itself this was a great gain; obviously the Germans would +much prefer to sink ships with projectiles than with torpedoes, for +their supply of these latter missiles was limited.[3] + +In April, 1917, the British navy was fighting the submarine mainly in +two ways: it was constantly sowing mines off the entrance to the +submarine bases, such as Ostend and Zeebrugge, and in the Heligoland +Bight--operations that accomplished little, for the Germans swept them +up almost as fast as they were planted; and it was patrolling the +submarine infested area with anti-submarine craft. The Admiralty was +depending almost exclusively upon this patrol, yet this, the only means +which then seemed to hold forth much promise of defeating the submarine, +was making little progress. + +For this patrol the navy was impressing into service all the destroyers, +yachts, trawlers, sea-going tugs, and other light vessels which could +possibly be assembled; almost any craft which could carry a wireless, a +gun, and depth charges was boldly sent to sea. At this time the vessel +chiefly used was the destroyer. The naval war had demonstrated that the +submarine could not successfully battle with the destroyer; that any +U-boat which came to the surface within fighting range of this alert and +speedy little surface ship ran great risk of being sunk. This is the +fundamental fact--that the destruction of the submarine was highly +probable, in case the destroyer could get a fair chance at her--which +regulated the whole anti-submarine campaign. It is evident, therefore, +that a proper German strategy would consist in so disposing its +submarines that they could conduct their operations with the minimum +risk of meeting their most effective enemies, while a properly conceived +Allied strategy would consist in so controlling the situation that the +submarines would have constantly to meet them. Frankness compels me to +say that, in the early part of 1917, the Germans were maintaining the +upper hand in this strategic game; they were holding the dominating +position in the campaign, since they were constantly attacking Allied +shipping without having to meet the Allied destroyers, while the Allied +destroyers were dispersing their energies over the wide waste of waters. +But the facts in the situation, and not any superior skill on the part +of the German navy, were giving the submarines this advantage. The +British were most heroically struggling against the difficulties imposed +by the mighty task which they had assumed. The British navy, like all +other navies, was only partially prepared for this type of warfare; in +1917 it did not possess destroyers enough both to guard the main +fighting fleet and to protect its commerce from submarines. Up to 1914, +indeed, it was expected that the destroyers would have only one function +to perform in warfare, that of protecting the great surface vessels from +attack, but now the new kind of warfare which Germany was waging on +merchant ships had laid upon the destroyer an entirely new +responsibility; and the plain fact is that the destroyers, in the number +which were required, did not exist. + +The problem which proved so embarrassing can be stated in the simple +terms of arithmetic. Everything, as I have said, reduced itself to the +question of destroyers. In April, 1917, the British navy had in +commission about 200 ships of this indispensable type; many of them were +old and others had been pretty badly worn and weakened by three years of +particularly racking service. It was the problem of the Admiralty to +place these destroyers in those fields in which they could most +successfully serve the Allied cause. The one requirement that +necessarily took precedence over all others was that a flotilla of at +least 100 destroyers must be continuously kept with the Grand Fleet, +ready to go into action at a moment's notice. It is clear from this +statement of the case that the naval policy of the Germans, which +consisted in holding their high seas battle fleet in harbour and in +refusing to fight the Allied navy, had an important bearing upon the +submarine campaign. So long as there was the possibility of such an +engagement, the British Grand Fleet had to keep itself constantly +prepared for such a crisis; and an indispensable part of this +preparation was to maintain always in readiness its flotilla of +protecting destroyers. Had the German fleet seriously engaged in a great +sea battle, it would have unquestionably been defeated; such a defeat +would have meant an even greater disaster than the loss of the +battleships, a loss which in itself would not greatly have changed the +naval situation. But the really fatal effect of such a defeat would have +been that it would no longer have been necessary for the British to +sequestrate a hundred or more destroyers at Scapa Flow. The German +battleships would have been sent to the bottom, and then these +destroyers would have been used in the warfare against the submarines. +By keeping its dreadnought fleet intact, always refusing to give battle +and yet always threatening an engagement, the Germans thus were penning +up 100 British destroyers in the Orkneys--destroyers which otherwise +might have done most destructive work against the German submarines off +the coast of Ireland. The mere fact that the German High Seas Fleet had +once engaged the British Grand Fleet off Jutland was an element in the +submarine situation, for this constantly suggested the likelihood that +the attempt might be repeated, and was thus an influence which tended to +keep these destroyers at Scapa Flow. Many times during that critical +period the Admiralty discussed the question of releasing those +destroyers, or a part of them, for the anti-submarine campaign; yet they +always decided, and they decided wisely, against any such hazardous +division. At that time the German dreadnought fleet was not immeasurably +inferior in numbers to the British; it had a protecting screen of about +100 destroyers; and it would have been madness for the British to have +gone into battle with its own destroyer screen placed several hundred +miles away, off the coast of Ireland. I lay stress upon this +circumstance because I find that in America the British Admiralty has +been criticized for keeping a large destroyer force with the Grand +Fleet, instead of detaching them for battle with the submarine. I think +that I have made clear that this criticism is based upon a misconception +of the whole naval campaign. Without this destroyer screen the British +Grand Fleet might have been destroyed by the Germans; if the Grand Fleet +had been destroyed, the war would have ended in the defeat of the +Allies; not to have maintained these destroyers in northern waters would +thus have amounted simply to betraying the cause of civilization and to +making Germany a free gift of victory. + +Germany likewise practically immobilized a considerable number of +British destroyers by attacking hospital ships. When the news of such +dastardly attacks became known, it was impossible for Americans and +Englishmen to believe at first that they were intentional; they so +callously violated all the rules of warfare and all the agreements for +lessening the horrors of war to which Germany herself had become a party +that there was a tendency in both enlightened countries to give the +enemy the benefit of the doubt. As a matter of fact, not only were the +submarine attacks on hospital ships deliberate, but Germany had +officially informed us that they would be made! The reasons for this +warning are clear enough; again, the all-important role which the +destroyers were playing in anti-submarine warfare was the point at +issue. Until we received such warning, hospital ships had put to sea +unescorted by warships, depending for their safety upon the rules of the +Hague Conference. Germany attacked these ships in order to make us +escort them with destroyers, and thereby compel us to divert these +destroyers from the anti-submarine campaign. And, of course, England +was forced to acquiesce in this German programme. Had the Anglo-Saxon +mind resembled the Germanic in all probability we should have accepted +the logic of the situation; we should have refused to be diverted from +the great strategic purpose which meant winning the war--that is, +protecting merchant shipping; in other words, we should have left the +hospital ships to their fate, and justified ourselves and stilled our +consciences by the principle of the greater good. But the British and +the American minds do not operate that way; it was impossible for us to +leave sick and wounded men as prey to submarines. Therefore, after +receiving the German warning, backed up, as it was, by the actual +destruction of unprotected hospital ships, we began providing them with +destroyer escorts. This greatly embarrassed us in the anti-submarine +campaign, for at times, especially during the big drives, we had a large +number of hospital ships to protect. As soon as we adopted this policy, +Germany, having attained her end, which was to keep the destroyers out +of the submarine area, stopped attacking sick and wounded soldiers. Yet +we still were forced to provide these unfortunates with destroyer +escorts, for, had we momentarily withdrawn these protectors, the German +submarines would immediately have renewed their attacks on hospital +ships. + +Not only was the British navy at that time safeguarding the liberties of +mankind at sea, but its army in France was doing its share in +safeguarding them on land. And the fact that Britain had to support this +mighty army had its part in making British shipping at times almost an +easy prey for the German submarines. For next in importance to +maintaining the British Grand Fleet intact it was necessary to keep +secure the channel crossing. Over this little strip of water were +transported the men and the supplies from England to France that kept +the German army at bay; to have suspended these communications, even for +a brief period, would have meant that the Germans would have captured +Paris, overrun the whole of France, and ended the war, at least the war +on land. In the course of four years Great Britain transported about +20,000,000 people across the Channel without the loss of a single soul. +She accomplished this only by constantly using many destroyers and other +light surface craft as escorts for the transports. But this was not the +only responsibility of the kind that rested on the overburdened British +shoulders. There was another part of the seas in which, for practical +and political reasons, the British destroyer fleet had to do protective +duty. In the Mediterranean lay not only the trade routes to the East, +but also the lines of supply which extended to Italy, to Egypt, to +Palestine, and to Mesopotamia. If Germany could have cut off Italy's +food and materials Italy would have been forced to withdraw from the +war. The German and Austrian submarines, escaping from Austria's +Adriatic ports, were constantly assailing this commerce, attempting to +do this very thing. Moreover, the success of the German submarine +campaign in these waters would have compelled the Allies to abandon the +Salonika expedition, which would have left the Central Powers absolute +masters of the Balkans and the Middle East. For these reasons it was +necessary to maintain a considerable force of destroyers in the +Mediterranean. + +For the British navy it was therefore a matter of choice what areas she +would attempt to protect with her destroyer forces; the one thing that +was painfully apparent was that she could not satisfactorily safeguard +all the danger zones. With the inadequate force at her disposal it was +inevitable that certain areas should be left relatively open to the +U-boats; and the decision as to which ones these should be was simply a +matter of balancing the several conflicting interests. In April, 1917, +the Admiralty had decided to give the preference to the Grand Fleet, the +hospital ships, the Channel crossing, and the Mediterranean, practically +in the order mentioned. It is evident from these facts that nearly the +entire destroyer fleet must have been disposed in these areas. This +decision, all things considered, was the only one that was possible; +yet, after placing the destroyers in these selected areas, the great +zone of trans-Atlantic shipping, west and south of Ireland, vitally +important as it was, was necessarily left inadequately protected. So +desperate was the situation that sometimes only four or five British +destroyers were operating in this great stretch of waters; and I do not +think that the number ever exceeded fifteen. Inasmuch as that +represented about the number of German submarines in this same area, the +situation may strike the layman as not particularly desperate. But any +such basis of comparison is absurd. The destroyers were operating on the +surface in full view of the submarines; the submarines could submerge at +any time and make themselves invisible; and herein we have the reason +why the contest was so markedly unequal. But aside from all other +considerations, the method of warfare adopted by the Allies against the +U-boat was necessarily ineffective, but was the best that could be used +until sufficient destroyers became available to convoy shipping. The +so-called submarine patrol, under the circumstances which prevailed at +that time, could accomplish very little. This little fleet of destroyers +was based on Queenstown; from this port they put forth and patrolled the +English Channel and the waters about Ireland in the hope that a German +submarine would stick its nose above the waves. The central idea of the +destroyer patrol was this one of hunting; the destroyer could have sunk +any submarine or driven it away from shipping if the submarine would +only have made its presence known. But of course this was precisely what +the submarine declined to do. It must be evident to the merest novice +that four or five destroyers, rushing around hunting for submarines +which were lying a hundred feet or so under water, could accomplish very +little. The under-water boat could always see its surface enemy long +before it was itself seen and thus could save its life by the simple +process of submerging. It must also be clear that the destroyer patrol +could accomplish much only in case there were a very large number of +destroyers. We figured that, to make the patrol system work with +complete success, it would be necessary to have one destroyer for every +square mile. The area of the destroyer patrol off Queenstown comprised +about 25,000 square miles; it is apparent that the complete protection +of the trans-Atlantic trade routes would have taken about 25,000 +destroyers. And the British, as I have said, had available anywhere from +four to fifteen in this area. + +The destroyer flotilla being so small, it is not surprising that the +German submarines were making ducks and drakes of it. The map of the +sinkings which took place in April brings out an interesting fact: +numerous as these sinkings were, very few merchantmen were torpedoed, in +this month, at the entrance to the Irish Sea or in the English Channel. +These were the narrow waters where shipping was massed and where the +little destroyer patrol was intended to operate. The German submarines +apparently avoided these waters, and made their attacks out in the open +sea, sometimes two and three hundred miles west and south of Ireland. +Their purpose in doing this was to draw the destroyer patrol out into +the open sea and in that way to cause its dispersal. And these tactics +were succeeding. There were six separate steamship "lanes" by which the +merchantmen could approach the English Channel and the Irish Sea. One +day the submarines would attack along one of these lanes; then the +little destroyer fleet would rush to this scene of operations. +Immediately the Germans would depart and attack another route many miles +away; then the destroyers would go pell-mell for that location. Just as +they arrived, however, the U-boats would begin operating elsewhere; and +so it went on, a game of hide and seek in which the advantages lay all +on the side of the warships which possessed that wonderful ability to +make themselves unseen. At this period the submarine campaign and the +anti-submarine campaign was really a case of blindman's buff; the +destroyer could never see the enemy while the enemy could always see the +destroyer; and this is the reason that the Allies were failing and that +the Germans were succeeding. + + +IV + +To show how serious the situation was, let me quote from the reports +which I sent to Washington during this period. I find statements like +these scattered everywhere in my despatches of the spring of 1917: + + "The military situation presented by the enemy submarine campaign + is not only serious but critical." + + "The outstanding fact which cannot be escaped is that we are not + succeeding, or in other words, that the enemy's campaign is proving + successful." + + "The consequences of failure or partial failure of the Allied cause + which we have joined are of such far-reaching character that I am + deeply concerned in insuring that the part played by our country + shall stand every test of analysis before the bar of history. The + situation at present is exceedingly grave. If sufficient United + States naval forces can be thrown into the balance at the present + critical time and place there is little doubt that early success + will be assured." + + "Briefly stated, I consider that at the present moment we are + losing the war."[4] + +And now came another important question: What should the American naval +policy be in this crisis? There were almost as many conflicting opinions +as there were minds. Certain authorities believed that our whole North +Atlantic Fleet should be moved immediately into European waters. Such a +manoeuvre was not only impossible but it would have been strategically +very unwise; indeed such a disposition would have been playing directly +into Germany's hands. What naval experts call the "logistics" of the +situation immediately ruled this idea out of consideration. The one fact +which made it impossible to base the fleet in European waters at that +time was that we could not have kept it supplied, particularly with oil. +The German U-boats were making a particularly successful drive at +tankers with the result that England had the utmost difficulty in +supplying her fleet with this kind of fuel. It is indeed impossible to +exaggerate the seriousness of this oil situation. "Orders have just been +given to use three-fifths speed, except in case of emergency," I +reported to Washington on June 29th, referring to scarcity of oil. "This +simply means that the enemy is winning the war." It was lucky for us +that the Germans knew nothing about this particular disability. Had they +been aware of it, they would have resorted to all kinds of manoeuvres +in the attempt to keep the Grand Fleet constantly steaming at sea, and +in this way they might so have exhausted our oil supply as possibly to +threaten the actual command of the surface. Fortunately for the cause of +civilization, there were certain important facts which the German Secret +Service did not learn. + +But this oil scarcity made it impossible to move the Atlantic Fleet into +European waters, at least at that time. Since most oil supplies were +brought from America, we simply could not have fuelled our +super-dreadnoughts in Europe in the spring and summer of 1917. Moreover, +if we had sent all our big ships to England we should have been obliged +to keep our destroyers constantly stationed with them ready for a great +sea action; and this would have completely fallen in with German plans, +for then these destroyers could not have been used against her +submarines. The British did indeed request that we send five +coal-burning ships to reinforce her fleet and give her that +preponderance which made its ascendancy absolutely secure, and these +ships were subsequently sent; but England could not have made provision +for our greatest dreadnoughts, the oil burners. Indeed our big ships +were of much greater service to the Allied cause stationed on this side +than they would have been if they had been located at a European base. +They were providing a reserve for the British fleet, precisely as our +armies in France were providing a reserve for the Allied armies; and +meanwhile this disposition made it possible for us to send their +destroyer escorts to the submarine zone, where they could participate in +the anti-submarine campaign. In American waters these big ships could be +kept in prime condition, for here they had an open, free sea for +training, and here they could also be used to train the thousands of new +men who were needed for the new ships constructed during the war. + +I early took the stand that our forces should be considered chiefly in +the light of reinforcements to the Allied navies, and that, ignoring all +question of national pride and even what at first might superficially +seem to be national interest, we should exert such offensive power as we +possessed in the way that would best assist the Allies in defeating the +submarine. England's naval resources were much greater than ours; and +therefore, in the nature of the case, we could not expect to maintain +overseas anywhere near the number of ships which England had assembled; +consequently it should be our policy to use such available units as we +possessed to strengthen the weak spots in the Allied line. There were +those who believed that national dignity required that we should build +up an independent navy in European waters, and that we should operate it +as a distinct American unit. But that, I maintained, was not the way to +win the war. If we had adopted this course, we should have been +constructing naval bases and perfecting an organization when the +armistice was signed; indeed, the idea of operating independently of the +Allied fleet was not for a moment to be considered. There were others in +America who thought that it was unwise to put any part of our fleet in +European waters, in view of the dangers that might assail us on our own +coast. There was every expectation that Germany would send submarines to +the western Atlantic, where they could prey upon our shipping and could +possibly bombard our ports; I have already shown that she had submarines +which could make such a long voyage, and the strategy of the situation +in April and May, 1917, demanded that a move of this kind be made. The +predominant element in the submarine defence, as I have pointed out, was +the destroyer. The only way in which the United States could immediately +and effectively help the Allied navies was by sending our whole +destroyer flotilla and all our light surface craft at once. It was +Germany's part, therefore, to resort to every manoeuvre that would +keep our destroyer force on this side of the Atlantic. Such a +performance might be expected to startle our peaceful American +population and inspire a public demand for protection; and in this way +our Government might be compelled to keep all anti-submarine craft in +our own waters. I expected Germany to make such a demonstration +immediately and I therefore cautioned our naval authorities at +Washington not to be deceived. I pointed out that Germany could +accomplish practically nothing by sporadic attacks on American shipping +in American waters; that, indeed, if we could induce the German +Admiralty to concentrate all its submarine efforts on the American +coasts, and leave free the Irish Sea and the English Channel, the war +practically would be won for the Allies. Yet these facts were not +apparent to the popular mind in 1917, and I shall always think that +Germany made a great mistake in not sending submarines to the American +coast immediately on our declaration of war, instead of waiting until +1918. Such attacks, at that time, would have started a public demand for +protection which the Washington authorities might have had great +difficulty in resisting, and which might have actually kept our +destroyer fleet in American waters, to the great detriment of the Allied +cause. Germany evidently refrained from doing so for reasons which I +have already indicated--a desire to deal gently with the United States, +and in that way to delay our military preparations and win the war +without coming into bloody conflict with the American people. + +There were others who thought it unwise to expose any part of our fleet +to the dangers of the European contest; their fear was that, if the +Allies should be defeated, we would then need all our naval forces to +protect the American coast. This point of view, of course, was not only +short-sighted and absurd, but it violated the fundamental principle of +warfare, which is that a belligerent must assail his enemy as quickly as +possible with the greatest striking power which he can assemble. Clearly +our national policy demanded that we should exert all the force we could +collect to make certain a German defeat. The best way to fight Germany +was not to wait until she had vanquished the Allies, but to join hands +with them in a combined effort to annihilate her military power on land +and sea. The situation which confronted us in April, 1917, was one which +demanded an immediate and powerful offensive; the best way to protect +America was to destroy Germany's naval power in European waters and thus +make certain that she could not attack us at home. + +The fact is that few nations have ever been placed in so tragical a +position as that in which Great Britain found herself in the spring and +early summer of 1917. And I think that history records few spectacles +more heroic than that of the great British navy, fighting this hideous +and cowardly form of warfare in half a dozen places with pitifully +inadequate forces, but with an undaunted spirit which remained firm even +against the fearful odds which I have described. What an opportunity for +America! And it was perfectly apparent what we should do. It was our +duty immediately to place all our available anti-submarine craft in +those waters west and south of Ireland in which lay the pathways of the +shipping which meant life or death to the Allied cause--the area which +England, because almost endless demands were being made upon her navy in +other fields, was unable to protect. + +The first four days in London were spent collecting all possible data; I +had no desire to alarm Washington unwarrantably, yet I also believed +that it would be a serious dereliction if all the facts were not +presented precisely as they were. I consulted practically everyone who +could give me essential details and wrote a cable despatch, filling four +foolscap pages, which furnished Washington with its first detailed +account of the serious state of the cause on which we had embarked.[5] + +In this work I had the full co-operation of our Ambassador in London, +Mr. Walter Hines Page. Mr. Page's whole heart and mind were bound up in +the Allied cause; he was zealous that his country should play worthily +its part in this great crisis in history; and he worked unsparingly with +me to get the facts before our Government. A few days after sending a +despatch it occurred to me that a message from our Ambassador might give +emphasis to my own. I therefore wrote such a message and took it down to +Brighton, where the American Ambassador was taking a little rest. I did +not know just how strong a statement Mr. Page would care to become +responsible for, and so I did not make this statement quite as emphatic +as the circumstances justified. + +Mr. Page took the paper and read it carefully. Then he looked up. + +"It isn't strong enough," he said. "I think I can do better than this +myself." + +He sat down and wrote the following cablegram which was immediately sent +to the President: + + From: Ambassador Page. + To: Secretary of State. + Sent: 27 April 1917. + + Very confidential for Secretary and President. + + There is reason for the greatest alarm about the issue of the war + caused by the increasing success of the German submarines. I have + it from official sources that during the week ending 22nd April, 88 + ships of 237,000 tons allied and neutral were lost. The number of + vessels unsuccessfully attacked indicated a great increase in the + number of submarines in action. + + This means practically a million tons lost every month till the + shorter days of autumn come. By that time the sea will be about + clear of shipping. Most of the ships are sunk to the westward and + southward of Ireland. The British have in that area every available + anti-submarine craft, but their force is so insufficient that they + hardly discourage the submarines. + + The British transport of troops and supplies is already strained to + the utmost, and the maintenance of the armies in the field is + threatened. There is food enough here to last the civil population + only not more than six weeks or two months. + + Whatever help the United States may render at any time in the + future, or in any theatre of the war, our help is now more + seriously needed in this submarine area for the sake of all the + Allies than it can ever be needed again, or anywhere else. + + After talking over this critical situation with the Prime Minister + and other members of the Government, I cannot refrain from most + strongly recommending the immediate sending over of every destroyer + and all other craft that can be of anti-submarine use. This seems + to me the sharpest crisis of the war, and the most dangerous + situation for the Allies that has arisen or could arise. + + If enough submarines can be destroyed in the next two or three + months the war will be won, and if we can contribute effective help + immediately it will be won directly by our aid. I cannot exaggerate + the pressing and increasing danger of this situation. Thirty or + more destroyers and other similar craft sent by us immediately + would very likely be decisive. + + There is no time to be lost. + +PAGE. + +But Mr. Page and I thought that we had not completely done our duty even +after sending these urgent messages. Whatever might happen, we were +determined that it could never be charged that we had not presented the +Allied situation in its absolutely true light. It seemed likely that an +authoritative statement from the British Government would give added +assurance that our statements were not the result of panic, and with +this idea in mind, Mr. Page and I called upon Mr. Balfour, Foreign +Secretary, who, in response to our request, sent a despatch to +Washington describing the seriousness of the situation. + +All these messages made the same point: that the United States should +immediately assemble all its destroyers and other light craft, and send +them to the port where they could render the greatest service in the +anti-submarine campaign--Queenstown. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The statements published were not false, but they were inconclusive +and intentionally so. They gave the number of British ships sunk, but +not their tonnage, and not the total losses of British, Allied, and +neutral tonnage. + +[2] See Appendices II and III for my cable and letter to the Navy +Department, explaining the submarine situation in detail. + +[3] See Appendix IV for my statement to Washington on arming merchant +ships. + +[4] For specimens of my reports to the Navy Department in these early +days see Appendices II and III. + +[5] See Appendix II. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +THE RETURN OF THE "MAYFLOWER" + + +I + +The morning of May 4, 1917, witnessed an important event in the history +of Queenstown. The news had been printed in no British or American +paper, yet in some mysterious way it had reached nearly everybody in the +city. A squadron of American destroyers, which had left Boston on the +evening of April 24th, had already been reported to the westward of +Ireland and was due to reach Queenstown that morning. At almost the +appointed hour a little smudge of smoke appeared in the distance, +visible to the crowds assembled on the hills; then presently another +black spot appeared, and then another; and finally these flecks upon the +horizon assumed the form of six rapidly approaching warships. The Stars +and Stripes were broken out on public buildings, on private houses, and +on nearly all the water craft in the harbour; the populace, armed with +American flags, began to gather on the shore; and the local dignitaries +donned their official robes to welcome the new friends from overseas. +One of the greatest days in Anglo-American history had dawned, for the +first contingent of the American navy was about to arrive in British +waters and join hands with the Allies in the battle against the forces +of darkness and savagery. + +The morning was an unusually brilliant one. The storms which had tossed +our little vessels on the seas for ten days, and which had followed them +nearly to the Irish coast, had suddenly given way to smooth water and a +burst of sunshine. The long and graceful American ships steamed into the +channel amid the cheers of the people and the tooting of all harbour +craft; the sparkling waves, the greenery of the bordering hills, the +fruit trees already in bloom, to say nothing of the smiling and cheery +faces of the welcoming Irish people, seemed to promise a fair beginning +for our great adventure. "Welcome to the American colours," had been the +signal of the _Mary Rose_, a British destroyer which had been sent to +lead the Americans to their anchorage. "Thank you, I am glad of your +company," answered the Yankee commander; and these messages represented +the spirit of the whole proceeding. Indeed there was something in these +strange-looking American ships, quite unlike the British destroyers, +that necessarily inspired enthusiasm and respect. They were long and +slender; the sunlight, falling upon their graceful sides and steel +decks, made them brilliant objects upon the water; and their +business-like guns and torpedo tubes suggested efficiency and readiness. +The fact that they had reached their appointed rendezvous exactly on +time, and that they had sailed up the Queenstown harbour at almost +precisely the moment that preparations had been made to receive them, +emphasized this impression. The appearance of our officers on the decks +in their unfamiliar, closely fitting blouses, and of our men, in their +neat white linen caps, also at once won the hearts of the populace. + +"Sure an' it's our own byes comin' back to us," an Irish woman remarked, +as she delightedly observed the unmistakably Gaelic countenances of a +considerable proportion of the crew. Indeed the natives of Queenstown +seemed to regard these American blue-jackets almost as their own. The +welcome provided by these people was not of a formal kind; they gathered +spontaneously to cheer and to admire. In that part of Ireland there was +probably not a family that did not have relatives or associations in the +United States, and there was scarcely a home that did not possess some +memento of America. The beautiful Queenstown Roman Catholic Cathedral, +which stood out so conspicuously, had been built very largely with +American dollars, and the prosperity of many a local family had the same +trans-Atlantic origin. It was hardly surprising, therefore, that when +our sailors landed for a few hours' liberty many hands were stretched +out to welcome them. Their friends took them arm in arm, marched them to +their homes, and entertained them with food and drink, all the time +plying them with questions about friends and relatives in America. Most +of these young Americans with Irish ancestry had never seen Ireland, +but that did not prevent the warm-hearted people of Queenstown from +hailing them as their own. This cordiality was appreciated, for the trip +across the Atlantic had been very severe, with gales and rainstorms +nearly every day. + +The senior officer in charge was Commander Joseph K. Taussig, whose +flagship was the _Wadsworth_. The other vessels of the division and +their commanding officers were the _Conyngham_, Commander Alfred W. +Johnson; the _Porter_, Lieutenant-Commander Ward K. Wortman; the +_McDougal_, Lieutenant-Commander Arther P. Fairfield; the _Davis_, +Lieutenant-Commander Rufus F. Zogbaum; and the _Wainwright_, +Lieutenant-Commander Fred H. Poteet. On the outbreak of hostilities +these vessels, comprising our Eighth Destroyer Division, had been +stationed at Base 2, in the York River, Virginia; at 7 P.M. of +April 6th, the day that Congress declared war on Germany, their +commander had received the following signal from the _Pennsylvania_, the +flagship of the Atlantic Fleet: "Mobilize for war in accordance with +Department's confidential mobilization plan of March 21st." From that +time events moved rapidly for the Eighth Division. On April 14th, the +very day on which I sent my first report on submarine conditions to +Washington, Commander Taussig received a message to take his flotilla to +Boston and there fit out for "long and distant service." Ten days +afterward he sailed, with instructions to go fifty miles due east of +Cape Cod and there to open his sealed orders. At the indicated spot +Commander Taussig broke the seal, and read the following document--a +paper so important in history, marking as it does the first instructions +any American naval or army officer had received for engaging directly in +hostilities with Germany, that it is worth quoting in full: + + NAVY DEPARTMENT + + Office of Naval Operations + Washington, D. C. + + _Secret and Confidential_ + + To: Commander, Eighth Division, Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet, + U.S.S. _Wadsworth_, Flagship. + + Subject: Protection of commerce near the coasts of Great Britain + and Ireland. + + 1. The British Admiralty have requested the co-operation of a + division of American destroyers in the protection of commerce near + the coasts of Great Britain and France. + + 2. Your mission is to assist naval operations of Entente Powers in + every way possible. + + 3. Proceed to Queenstown, Ireland. Report to senior British naval + officer present, and thereafter co-operate fully with the British + navy. Should it be decided that your force act in co-operation with + French naval forces your mission and method of co-operation under + French Admiralty authority remain unchanged. + + Route to Queenstown. + + Boston to latitude 50 N--Long. 20 W to arrive at daybreak then to + latitude 50 N--Long. 12 W thence to Queenstown. + + When within radio communication of the British naval forces off + Ireland, call G CK and inform the Vice-Admiral at Queenstown in + British general code of your position, course, and speed. You will + be met outside of Queenstown. + + 4. Base facilities will be provided by the British Admiralty. + + 5. Communicate your orders and operations to Rear-Admiral Sims at + London and be guided by such instructions as he may give you. Make + no reports of arrival to Navy Department direct. + +JOSEPHUS DANIELS. + +No happier selection for the command of this division could have been +made than that of Commander Taussig. In addition to his qualities as a +sailor, certain personal associations made him particularly acceptable +to the British naval authorities. In 1900, Commander Taussig, then a +midshipman, was a member of the naval forces which the United States +sent to China to co-operate with other powers in putting down the Boxer +Rebellion and rescuing the besieged legations in Pekin. Near Tientsin +this international force saw its hardest fighting, and here Commander +Taussig was wounded. While recovering from his injury, the young +American found himself lying on a cot side by side with an English +captain, then about forty years old, who was in command of the +_Centurion_ and chief-of-staff to Admiral Seymour, who had charge of the +British forces. This British officer was severely wounded; a bullet had +penetrated his lung, and for a considerable period he was unable to lie +down. Naturally this enforced companionship made the two men friends. +Commander Taussig had had many occasions to recall this association +since, for his wounded associate was Captain John R. Jellicoe, whose +advancement in the British navy had been rapid from that day onward. On +this same expedition Captain Jellicoe became a sincere friend also of +Captain McCalla, the American who commanded the _Newark_ and the +American landing force; indeed, Jellicoe's close and cordial association +with the American navy dates from the Boxer expedition. Naturally +Taussig had watched Jellicoe's career with the utmost interest; since he +was only twenty-one at the time, however, and the Englishman was twice +his age, it had never occurred to him that the First Sea Lord would +remember his youthful hospital companion. Yet the very first message he +received, on arriving in Irish waters, was the following letter, brought +to him by Captain Evans, the man designated by the British Admiralty as +liaison officer with the American destroyers: + + ADMIRALTY, WHITEHALL + 1-5-17. + + MY DEAR TAUSSIG: + + I still retain very pleasant and vivid recollections of our + association in China and I am indeed delighted that you should have + been selected for the command of the first force which is coming to + fight for freedom, humanity, and civilization. We shall all have + our work cut out to subdue piracy. My experience in China makes me + feel perfectly convinced that the two nations will work in the + closest co-operation, and I won't flatter you by saying too much + about the value of your help. I must say this, however. There is no + navy in the world that can possibly give us more valuable + assistance, and there is no personnel in any navy that will fight + better than yours. My China experience tells me this. + + If only my dear friend McCalla could have seen this day how glad I + would have been! + + I must offer you and all your officers and men the warmest welcome + possible in the name of the British nation and the British + Admiralty, and add to it every possible good wish from myself. May + every good fortune attend you and speedy victory be with us. + + Yours very sincerely, + J. R. JELLICOE. + +At this same meeting Captain Evans handed the American commander another +letter which was just as characteristic as that of Admiral Jellicoe. The +following lines constitute our officers' first introduction to +Vice-Admiral Bayly, the officer who was to command their operations in +the next eighteen months, and, in its brevity, its entirely +business-like qualities, as well as in its genuine sincerity and +kindness, it gave a fair introduction to the man: + + ADMIRALTY HOUSE, + QUEENSTOWN, + 4-5-17. + + DEAR LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER TAUSSIG: + + I hope that you and the other five officers in command of the U.S. + destroyers in your flotilla will come and dine here to-night, + Friday, at 7.45, and that you and three others will remain to sleep + here so as to get a good rest after your long journey. Allow me to + welcome you and to thank you for coming. + + Yours sincerely, + LEWIS BAYLY. + + Dine in undress; no speeches. + + +The first duty of the officers on arrival was to make the usual +ceremonial calls. The Lord Mayor of Cork had come down from his city, +which is only twelve miles from Queenstown, to receive the Americans, +and now awaited them in the American consulate; and many other citizens +were assembled there to welcome them. One of the most conspicuous +features of the procession was the moving picture operator, whose +presence really had an international significance. The British +Government itself had detailed him for this duty; it regarded the +arrival of our destroyers as a great historical event and therefore +desired to preserve this animated record in the official archives. +Crowds gathered along the street to watch and cheer our officers as they +rode by; and at the consulate the Lord Mayor, Mr. Butterfield, made an +eloquent address, laying particular emphasis upon the close friendship +that had always prevailed between the American and the Irish people. +Other dignitaries made speeches voicing similar sentiments. This welcome +concluded, Commander Taussig and his brother officers started up the +steep hill that leads to Admiralty House, a fine and spacious old +building. + +Here, following out the instructions of the Navy Department, they were +to report to Vice-Admiral Bayly for duty. It is doing no injustice to +Sir Lewis to say that our men regarded this first meeting with some +misgiving. The Admiral's reputation in the British navy was well known +to them. They knew that he was one of the ablest officers in the +service; but they had also heard that he was an extremely exacting man, +somewhat taciturn in his manner, and not inclined to be over familiar +with his subordinates--a man who did not easily give his friendship or +his respect, and altogether, in the anxious minds of these ambitious +young Americans, he was a somewhat forbidding figure. And the appearance +of the Admiral, standing in his doorway awaiting their arrival, rather +accentuated these preconceptions. He was a medium-sized man, with +somewhat swarthy, weather-beaten face and black hair just turning grey; +he stood there gazing rather quizzically at the Americans as they came +trudging up the hill, his hands behind his back, his bright eyes keenly +taking in every detail of the men, his face not showing the slightest +trace of a smile. This struck our young men at first as a somewhat grim +reception; the attitude of the Admiral suggested that he was slightly in +doubt as to the value of his new recruits, that he was entirely willing +to be convinced, but that only deeds and not fine speeches of greeting +would convince him. Yet Admiral Bayly welcomed our men with the utmost +courtesy and dignity, and his face, as he began shaking hands, broke +into a quiet, non-committal smile; there was nothing about his manner +that was effusive, there were no unnecessary words, yet there was a real +cordiality that put our men at ease and made them feel at home in this +strange environment. They knew, of course, that they had come to +Ireland, not for social diversions, but for the serious business of +fighting the Hun, and that indeed was the only thought which could then +find place in Admiral Bayly's mind. Up to this time the welcome to the +Americans had taken the form of lofty oratorical flights, with emphasis +upon the blood ties of Anglo-Saxondom, and the significance to +civilization of America and Great Britain fighting side by side; but +this was not the kind of a greeting our men received from Admiral Bayly. +The Admiral himself, with his somewhat worn uniform and his lack of +ceremony, formed a marked contrast to the official reception by the +Lord Mayor and his suite in their insignia of office. Entirely +characteristic also was the fact that, instead of making a long speech, +he made no speech at all. His chief interest in the Americans at that +time was the assistance which they were likely to bring to the Allied +cause; after courteously greeting the officers, the first question he +asked about these forces was: + +"When will you be ready to go to sea?" + +Even under the most favourable conditions that is an embarrassing +question to ask of a destroyer commander. There is no type of ship that +is so chronically in need of overhauling. Even in peace times the +destroyer usually has under way a long list of repairs; our first +contingent had sailed without having had much opportunity to refit, and +had had an extremely nasty voyage. The fact was that it had been rather +severely battered up, although the flotilla was in excellent condition, +considering its hard experience on the ocean and the six months of hard +work which it had previously had on our coast. One ship had lost its +fire-room ventilator, another had had condenser troubles on the way +across, and there had been other difficulties. Commander Taussig, +however, had sized up Admiral Bayly as a man to whom it would be a +tactical error to make excuses, and promptly replied: + +"We are ready now, sir, that is, as soon as we finish refuelling. Of +course you know how destroyers are--always wanting something done to +them. But this is war, and we are ready to make the best of things and +go to sea immediately." + +The Admiral was naturally pleased with the spirit indicated by this +statement, and, with his customary consideration for his juniors, said: + +"I will give you four days from the time of arrival. Will that be +sufficient?" + +"Yes," answered Taussig, "that will be more than ample time." + +As we discovered afterward, the Admiral had a system of always "testing +out" new men, and it is not improbable that this preliminary interview +was a part of this process. + +During the period of preparation there were certain essential +preliminaries: it was necessary to make and to receive many calls, a +certain amount of tea drinking was inevitable, and there were many +invitations to dinners and to clubs that could not be ignored. Our +officers made a state visit to Cork, going up in Admiral Bayly's barge, +and returned the felicitations of the Mayor and his retinue. + +Naturally both the Americans and their ships became objects of great +interest to their new allies. It was, I think, the first time that a +destroyer flotilla had ever visited Great Britain, and the very +appearance of the vessels themselves aroused the greatest curiosity. +They bore only a general resemblance to the destroyers of the British +navy. The shape of their hulls, the number and location of smoke pipes, +the positions of guns, torpedo tubes, bridges, deckhouse, and other +details gave them quite a contrasting profile. The fact that they were +designed to operate under different conditions from the British ships +accounted for many of these divergences. We build our destroyers with +the widest possible cruising radius; they are expected to go to the West +Indies, to operate from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and in general to +feel at home anywhere in the great stretch of waters that surround our +country. British destroyers, on the other hand, are intended to operate +chiefly in the restricted waters around the British Isles, where the +fuelling and refitting facilities are so extensive that they do not have +to devote much space to supplies of this kind. The result is that our +destroyers can keep the sea longer than the British; on the other hand, +the British are faster than ours, and they can also turn more quickly. +These differences were of course a subject of much discussion among the +observers at Queenstown, and even of animated argument. Naturally, the +interest of the destroyer officers of the two services in the respective +merits of their vessels was very keen. They examined minutely all +features that were new to them in the design and arrangement of guns, +torpedoes, depth charges, and machines, freely exchanged information, +and discussed proposed improvements in the friendliest possible spirit. +Strangely enough, although the American destroyers carried greater fuel +supplies than the British, they were rather more dainty and graceful in +their lines, a fact which inspired a famous retort which rapidly passed +through the ranks of both navies. + +"You know," remarked a British officer to an American, "I like the +British destroyers better than the American. They look so much sturdier. +Yours seem to me rather feminine in appearance." + +"Yes," replied the American, "that's so, but you must remember what +Kipling says, 'The female of the species is more deadly than the male.'" + +The work of the Americans really began on the Sunday which followed +their arrival; by this time they had established cordial relations with +Admiral Bayly and were prepared to trust themselves unreservedly in his +hands. He summoned the officers on this Sunday morning and talked with +them a few moments before they started for the submarine zone; the time +of their departure had been definitely fixed for the next day. In the +matter of ceremonial greetings the Admiral was not strong, but when it +came to discussing the business in hand he was the master of a +convincing eloquence. The subject of his discourse was the +responsibility that lay before our men; he spoke in sharp, staccato +tones, making his points with the utmost precision, using no verbal +flourishes or unnecessary words--looking at our men perhaps a little +fiercely, and certainly impressing them with the fact that the work +which lay before them was to be no summer holiday. As soon as the +destroyers passed beyond the harbour defences, the Admiral began, death +constantly lay before the men until they returned. There was only one +safe rule to follow; days and even weeks might go by without seeing a +submarine, but the men must assume that one was constantly watching +them, looking for a favourable opportunity to discharge its torpedo. +"You must not relax attention for an instant, or you may lose an +opportunity to destroy a submarine or give her a chance to destroy you." +It was the present intention to send the American destroyers out for +periods of six days, giving them two days' rest between trips, and about +once a month they were to have five days in port for boiler cleaning. +And now the Admiral gave some details about the practical work at sea. +Beware, he said, about ramming periscopes; these were frequently mere +decoys for bombs and should be shelled. In picking up survivors of +torpedoed vessels the men must be careful not to stop until thoroughly +convinced that there were no submarines in the neighbourhood: "You must +not risk the loss of your vessel in order to save the lives of a few +people." + +The Admiral proclaimed the grim philosophy of this war when he told our +men that it would be their first duty, should they see a ship torpedoed, +not to go to the rescue of the survivors, but to go after the submarine. +The three imperative duties of the destroyers were, in the order named: +first, to destroy submarines; second, to convoy and protect merchant +shipping; and third, to save the lives of the passengers and crews of +torpedoed ships. No commander should ever miss an opportunity to destroy +a submarine merely because there were a few men and women in small boats +or in the water who might be saved. Admiral Bayly explained that to do +this would be false economy: sinking a submarine meant saving far more +lives than might be involved in a particular instance, for this vessel, +if spared, would simply go on constantly destroying human beings. The +Admiral then gave a large number of instructions in short, pithy +sentences: "Do not use searchlights; do not show any lights whatever at +night; do not strike any matches; never steam at a slower rate than +thirteen knots; always zigzag, thereby preventing the submarine from +plotting your position; always approach a torpedoed vessel with the sun +astern; make only short signals; do not repeat the names of vessels; +carefully watch all fishing vessels--they may be submarines in +disguise--they even put up masts, sails, and funnels in this attempt to +conceal their true character." The Admiral closed his remarks with a +warning based upon his estimate of the character and methods of the +enemy. In substance he said that were it not for the violations of the +dictates of humanity and the well-established chivalry of the sea, he +would have the greatest respect for the German submarine commanders. He +cautioned our officers not to underrate them, and particularly +emphasized their cleverness at what he termed "the art of irregularity." +He explained this by saying that up to that time he had been unable to +deduce from their operations any definite plan or tactics, and advised +our commanders also to guard against any regularity of movement; they +should never, for example, patrol from one corner to another of their +assigned squares in the submarine zone, or adopt any other uniform +practice which the enemy might soon perceive and of which he would +probably take advantage. + +At the very moment that Admiral Bayly was giving these impressive +instructions the submarine campaign had reached its crisis; the fortunes +of the Allies had never struck so low a depth as at that time. An +incident connected with our arrival, not particularly important in +itself, brought home to our men the unsleeping vigilance of the enemy +with whom they had to deal. + +Perhaps the Germans did not actually have advance information of the +arrival of this first detachment of our destroyers; but they certainly +did display great skill in divining what was to happen. At least it was +a remarkable coincidence that for the first time in many months a +submarine laid a mine-field directly off the entrance to Queenstown the +day before our ships arrived. Soon afterward a parent ship of the +destroyers reached this port and encountered the same welcome; and soon +after that a second parent ship found a similar mine-field awaiting her +arrival. The news that our destroyers had reached Queenstown actually +appeared in the German papers several days before we had released it in +the British and American press. Thanks to the vigilance and efficiency +of the British mine-sweepers, however, the enemy gained nothing from all +these preparations, for the channel was cleared of German mines before +our vessels reached port. + +The night before the destroyers arrived, while some of the officers of +my staff were dining with Admiral Bayly, the windows were shaken by +heavy explosions made by the mines which the sweepers were dragging out. +Admiral Bayly jokingly remarked that it was really a pity to interfere +with such a warm welcome as had apparently been planned for our +crusaders. Even the next night, while the destroyer officers were dining +at Admiralty House, several odd mines exploded outside the channel that +had been swept the previous day. This again impressed our men with the +fact that the game which they had now entered was quite a different +affair from their peace-time manoeuvres. + +The Germans at that time were jubilant over the progress of their +submarine campaign and, indeed, they had good reason to be. The week +that our first flotilla reached Irish waters their submarines had +destroyed 240,000 tons of Allied shipping; if the sinking should keep +up at this rate, it meant losses of 1,000,000 tons a month and an early +German victory. + +In looking over my letters of that period, I find many references that +picture the state of the official mind. All that time I was keeping +closely in touch with Ambassador Page, who was energetically seconding +all my efforts to bring more American ships across the Atlantic. + +"It remains a fact," I wrote our Ambassador, "that at present the enemy +is succeeding and that we are failing. Ships are being sunk faster than +they can be replaced by the building facilities of the world. This +simply means that the enemy is winning the war. There is no mystery +about that. The submarines are rapidly cutting the Allies' lines of +communication. When they are cut, or sufficiently interfered with, we +must accept the enemy's terms." + +Six days before our destroyers put in at Queenstown I sent this message +to Mr. Page: + + Allies do not now command the sea. Transport of troops and supplies + strained to the utmost and the maintenance of the armies in the + field is threatened. + +Such, then, was the situation when our little destroyer flotilla first +went to sea to do battle with the submarine. + + +II + +Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, who now became the commander of the American +destroyers at Queenstown, so far as their military operations were +concerned, had spent fifty years in the British navy, forty years of +this time actually at sea. This ripe experience, combined with a great +natural genius for salt water, had made him one of the most efficient +men in the service. In what I have already said, I may have given a +slightly false impression of the man; that he was taciturn, that he was +generally regarded as a hard taskmaster, that he never made friends at +the first meeting, that he was more interested in results than in +persons--all this is true; yet these qualities merely concealed what +was, at bottom, a generous, kindly, and even a warm-hearted character. +Admiral Bayly was so retiring and so modest that he seemed almost to +have assumed these exterior traits to disguise his real nature. When our +men first met the Admiral they saw a man who would exact their last +effort and accept no excuses for failure; when admitted to more intimate +association, however, they discovered that this weather-beaten sailor +had a great love for flowers, for children, for animals, for pictures, +and for books; that he was deeply read in general literature, in +history, and in science, and that he had a knowledge of their own +country and its institutions which many of our own officers did not +possess. Americans have great reason to be proud of the achievements of +their naval men, and one of the most praiseworthy was the fact that they +became such intimate friends of Admiral Bayly. For this man's nature was +so sincere that he could never bring himself to indulge in friendships +which he deemed unworthy. Early in his association with our men, he told +them bluntly that any success he and they might have in getting on +together would depend entirely upon the manner in which they performed +their work. If they acquitted themselves creditably, well and good; if +not, he should not hesitate to find fault with them. It is thus a +tribute to our officers that in a very short time they and Admiral Bayly +had established relations which were not only friendly but affectionate. +Not long after our destroyers arrived at Queenstown most of the British +destroyers left to reinforce the hard-driven flotillas in the Channel +and the North Sea, so that the destroyer forces at Queenstown under +Admiral Bayly became almost exclusively American, though they worked +with many British vessels--sloops, trawlers, sweepers, and mystery +ships, in co-operation with British destroyers and other vessels in the +north and other parts of Ireland. The Admiral watched over our ships and +their men with the jealous eye of a father. He always referred to his +command as "my destroyers" and "my Americans," and woe to anyone who +attempted to interfere with them or do them the slightest injustice! +Admiral Bayly would fight for them, against the combined forces of the +whole British navy, like a tigress for her cubs. He constantly had a +weather eye on Plymouth, the main base of the British destroyers, to see +that the vessels from that station did their fair share of the work. +Once or twice a dispute arose between an American destroyer commander +and a British; in such cases Admiral Bayly vigorously took the part of +the American. "You did perfectly right," he would say to our men, and +then he would turn all his guns against the interfering Britisher. +Relations between the young Americans and the experienced Admiral became +so close that they would sometimes go to him with their personal +troubles; he became not only their commander, but their confidant and +adviser. + +There was something in these bright young chaps from overseas, indeed, +so different from anything which he had ever met before, that greatly +appealed to this seasoned Englishman. One thing that he particularly +enjoyed was their sense of humour. The Admiral himself had a keen wit +and a love of stories; and he also had the advantage, which was not +particularly common in England, of understanding American slang and +American anecdotes. There are certain stories which apparently only an +upbringing on American soil qualifies one to appreciate; yet Admiral +Bayly always instantly got the point. He even took a certain pride in +his ability to comprehend the American joke. One of the regular features +of life at Queenstown was a group of retired British officers--fine, +white-haired old gentlemen who could take no active part in the war but +who used to find much consolation in coming around to smoke their pipes +and to talk things over at Admiralty House. Admiral Bayly invariably +found delight in encouraging our officers to entertain these rare old +souls with American stories; their utter bewilderment furnished him +endless entertainment. The climax of his pleasure came when, after such +an experience, the old men would get the Admiral in a corner, and +whisper to him: "What in the world do they mean?" + +The Admiral was wonderfully quick at repartee, as our men found when +they began "joshing" him on British peculiarities, for as naval attache +he had travelled extensively in the United States, had observed most of +our national eccentricities, and thus was able promptly "to come back." +In such contests our men did not invariably come off with all the +laurels. Yet, despite these modern tendencies, Admiral Bayly was a +conservative of the conservatives, having that ingrained British respect +for old things simply because they were old. An ancient British custom +requires that at church on Sundays the leading dignitary in each +community shall mount the reading desk and read the lessons of the day; +Admiral Bayly would perform this office with a simplicity and a +reverence which indicated the genuinely religious nature of the man. And +in smaller details he was likewise the ancient, tradition-loving Briton. +He would never think of writing a letter to an equal or superior officer +except in longhand; to use a typewriter for such a purpose would have +been profanation in his eyes. I once criticized a certain Admiral for +consuming an hour or so in laboriously penning a letter which could have +been dictated to a stenographer in a few minutes. + +"How do you ever expect to win the war if you use up time this way?" I +asked. + +"I'd rather lose the war," the Admiral replied, but with a twinkle in +his eye, "than use a typewriter to my chiefs!" + +Our officers liked to chaff the Admiral quietly on this conservatism. He +frequently had a number of them to breakfast, and upon one such occasion +the question was asked as to why the Admiral ate an orange after +breakfast, instead of before, as is the custom in America. + +"I can tell you why," said Commander Zogbaum. + +"Well, why is it?" asked the Admiral. + +"Because that's what William the Conqueror used to do." + +"I can think of no better reason than that for doing it," the Admiral +promptly answered. But this remark tickled him immensely, and became a +byword with him. Ever afterward, whenever he proposed to do something +which the Americans regarded as too conservative, he would say: + +"You know that this is what William the Conqueror used to do!" + +Yet in one respect the Admiral was all American; he was a hard worker +even to the point of hustle. He insisted on the strictest attention to +the task in hand from his subordinates, but at least he never spared +himself. After he had arrived at Queenstown, two years before our +destroyers put in, he proceeded to reorganize Admiralty House on the +most business-like basis. The first thing he pounced upon was the +billiard-room in the basement. He decided that it would make an +excellent plotting-room, and that the billiard-tables could be +transformed into admirable drawing-boards for his staff; he immediately +called the superintendent and told him to make the necessary +transformations. + +"All right," said the superintendent. "We'll start work on them +to-morrow morning." + +"No, you won't," Admiral Bayly replied. "We propose to be established in +this room using these tables to-morrow morning. They must be all ready +for use by eight o'clock." + +And he was as good as his word; the workmen spent the whole night making +the changes. At the expense of considerable personal comfort he also +caused one half of the parlour of Admiralty House to be partitioned off +as an office and the wall thus formed covered with war maps. + +These incidents are significant, not only of Admiral Bayly's methods, +but of his ideals. In his view, if a billiard room could be made to +serve a war purpose, it had no proper place in an Admiralty house which +was the headquarters for fighting German submarines. The chief duty of +all men at that crisis was work, and their one responsibility was the +defeat of the Hun. Admiralty House was always open to our officers; they +spent many a delightful evening there around the Admiral's fire; they +were constantly entertained at lunch and at dinner, and they were +expected to drop in for tea whenever they were in port. But social +festivities in the conventional sense were barred. No ladies, except the +Admiral's relatives, ever visited the place. Some of the furnishings +were rather badly worn, but the Admiral would make no requisitions for +new rugs or chairs; every penny in the British exchequer, he insisted, +should be used to carry on the war. He was scornfully critical of any +naval officers who made a lavish display of silver on their tables; +money should be spent for depth charges, torpedoes, and twelve-inch +shells, not for ostentation. He was scrupulousness itself in observing +all official regulations in the matter of food and other essentials. + +For still another reason the Admiral made an ideal commander of American +naval forces. He was a strict teetotaller. His abstention was not a war +measure; he had always had a strong aversion to alcohol in any form and +had never drank a cocktail or a brandy and soda in his life. Dinners at +Admiralty House, therefore, were absolutely "dry," and in perfect +keeping with American naval regulations. + +Though Admiral Bayly was not athletic--his outdoor games being limited +to tip-and-run cricket in the Admiralty grounds, which he played with a +round bat and a tennis ball--he was a man of wiry physique and a +tireless walker. Indeed the most active young men in our navy had great +difficulty in keeping pace with him. One of his favourite diversions on +a Saturday afternoon was to take a group on a long tramp in the +beautiful country surrounding Queenstown; by the time the party reached +home, the Admiral, though sixty years old, was usually the freshest of +the lot. I still vividly remember a long walk which I took with him in a +pelting rain; I recall how keenly he enjoyed it and how young and nimble +he seemed to be when we reached home, drenched to the skin. A steep hill +led from the shore up to Admiralty House; Sir Lewis used to say that +this was a valuable military asset--it did not matter how angry a man +might be with him when he started for headquarters, by the time he +arrived, this wearisome climb always had the effect of quieting his +antagonism. The Admiral was fond of walking up this hill with our young +officers; he himself usually reached the top as fresh as a daisy, while +his juniors were frequently puffing for breath. + +He enjoyed testing out our men in other ways; nothing delighted him more +than giving them hard jobs to do--especially when they accomplished the +tasks successfully. One day he ordered one of our officers, +Lieutenant-Commander Roger Williams, captain of the _Duncan_, a recent +arrival at Queenstown, to cross the Irish Sea and bring back a ship. The +joke lay in the fact that this man's destroyer had just come in with her +steering gear completely out of commission--a circumstance which Admiral +Bayly well understood. Many officers would have promptly asked to be +excused on this ground, but not this determined American. He knew that +the Admiral was trying to "put something over on him," and he rose to +the occasion. The fact that Queenstown Harbour is long and narrow, not +wide enough for a destroyer to turn around in, made Commander Williams's +problem still more difficult, but by cleverly using his engines, he +succeeded in backing out--the distance required was five miles; he took +another mile and a half to turn his ship and then he went across the sea +and brought back his convoy--all without any steering gear. This officer +never once mentioned to the Admiral the difficulties under which he had +worked, but his achievement completely won Sir Lewis's heart, and from +that time this young man became one of his particular favourites. +Indeed, it was the constant demonstration of this kind of fundamental +character in our naval men which made the Admiral admire them so. + +On occasions Admiral Bayly would go to sea himself--something quite +unprecedented and possibly even reprehensible, for it was about the same +thing as a commanding general going into the front-line trenches. But +the Admiral believed that doing this now and then helped to inspire his +men; and, besides that, he enjoyed it--he was not made for a land +sailor. He had as flagship a cruiser of about 5,000 tons; he had a way +of jumping on board without the slightest ceremony and taking a cruise +up the west coast of Ireland. On occasion the Admiral would personally +lead an expedition which was going to the relief of a torpedoed vessel, +looking for survivors adrift in small boats. One day Admiral Bayly, +Captain Pringle of the U.S.S. _Melville_, Captain Campbell, the +Englishman whose exploits with mystery ships had given him worldwide +fame, and myself went out on the _Active_ to watch certain experiments +with depth charges. It was a highly imprudent thing to do, because a +vessel of such draft was an excellent target for torpedoes, but that +only added to the zest of the occasion from Admiral Bayly's point of +view. + +"What a bag this would be for the Hun!" he chuckled. "The American +Commander-in-Chief, the British Admiral commanding in Irish waters, a +British and an American captain!" + +In our mind's eye we could see our picture in the Berlin papers--four +distinguished prisoners standing in a row. + +A single fact shows with what consideration Admiral Bayly treated his +subordinates. The usual naval regulation demands that an officer, coming +in from a trip, shall immediately seek out his commander and make a +verbal report. Frequently the men came in late in the evening, extremely +fatigued; to make the visit then was a hardship and might deprive them +of much-needed sleep. Admiral Bayly therefore had a fixed rule that +such visits should be made at ten o'clock of the morning following the +day of arrival. On such occasions he would often be found seated +somewhat grimly behind his desk wholly absorbed in the work in hand. If +he were writing or reading his mail he would keep steadily at it, never +glancing up until he had finished. He would listen to the report +stoically, possibly say a word of praise, and then turn again to the +business in hand. Occasionally he would notice that his abruptness had +perhaps pained the young American; then he would break into an +apologetic smile, and ask him to come up to dinner that evening, and +even--this was the greatest honour of all--to spend the night at +Admiralty House. + +These dinners were great occasions for our men, particularly as they +were presided over by Miss Voysey, the Admiral's niece. Miss Voysey, the +little spaniel, Patrick, and the Admiral constituted the "family," and +the three were entirely devoted to one another. Pat in particular was an +indispensable part of this menage; I have never seen any object quite so +crestfallen and woe-begone as this little dog when either Miss Voysey or +the Admiral spent a day or two away from the house. Miss Voysey was a +young woman of great personal charm and cultivation; probably she was +the influence that most contributed to the happiness and comfort of our +officers at Queenstown. From the day of their arrival she entered into +the closest comradeship with the Americans. She kept open house for +them: she was always on hand to serve tea in the afternoon, and she +never overlooked an opportunity to add to their well-being. As a result +of her delightful hospitality Admiralty House really became a home for +our officers. Miss Voysey had a genuine enthusiasm for America and +Americans; possibly the fact that she was herself an Australian made her +feel like one of us; at any rate, there were certain qualities in our +men that she found extremely congenial, and she herself certainly won +all their hearts. Anyone who wishes to start a burst of enthusiasm from +our officers who were stationed at Queenstown need only to mention the +name of Miss Voysey. The dignity with which she presided over the +Admiral's house, and the success with which she looked out for his +comfort, also inspired their respect. Miss Voysey was the leader in all +the war charities at Queenstown, and she and the Admiral made it their +personal duty to look out for the victims of torpedoed ships. At +whatever hour these survivors arrived they were sure of the most +warm-hearted attentions from headquarters. In a large hall in the Custom +House at the landing the Admiral kept a stock of cigarettes and tobacco, +and the necessary gear and supplies for making and serving hot coffee at +short notice, and nothing ever prevented him and his people from +stationing themselves there to greet and serve the survivors as soon as +they arrived--often wet and cold, and sometimes wounded. Even though the +Admiral might be at dinner he and Miss Voysey would leave their meal +half eaten and hurry to the landing to welcome the survivors. The +Admiral and his officers always insisted on serving them, and they would +even wash the dishes and put them away for the next time. The Admiral, +of course, might have ordered others to do this work, but he preferred +to give this personal expression of a real seaman's sympathy for other +seamen in distress. It is unnecessary to say that any American officers +who could get there in time always lent a hand. I am sure that long +after most of the minor incidents of this war have faded from my memory, +I shall still keep a vivid recollection of this kindly gentleman, +Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., C.V.O., Royal Navy, serving +coffee to wretched British, American, French, Italian, Japanese, or +negro sailors, with a cheering word for each, and afterward, with +sleeves tucked up, calmly washing dishes in a big pan of hot water. + +I have my fears that the Admiral will not be particularly pleased by the +fact that I have taken all these pains to introduce him to the American +public. Excessive modesty is one of his most conspicuous traits. When +American correspondents came to Queenstown, Admiral Bayly would receive +them courteously. "You can have all you want about the navy," he would +say, "but remember--not a word about Lewis Bayly." He was so reticent +that he was averse to having his picture taken; even the moving picture +operator detailed to get an historic record of the arrival of our +destroyers did not obtain a good view of the Admiral, for whenever Sir +Lewis saw him coming he would turn his back to the camera! My excuse for +describing this very lovable man, however, is because he became almost +an object of veneration to our American officers, and because, since for +eighteen months he was the commander of the American forces based on +Queenstown, he is an object of legitimate interest to the American +people. The fact that the Admiral was generally known to our officers as +"Uncle Lewis," and that some of those who grew to know him best even +called him that to his face, illustrates the delightful relations which +were established. Any account of the operations of our navy in the +European War would thus be sadly incomplete which ignored the splendid +sailor who was largely responsible for their success. + +Another officer who contributed greatly to the efficiency of the +American forces was Captain E. R. G. R. Evans, R.N., who was detailed by +Admiral Jellicoe at my request to act as liaison officer with our +destroyers. No more fortunate selection could have been made. Captain +Evans had earned fame as second in command of the Scott Antarctic +expedition; he had spent much time in the United States and knew our +people well; indeed when war broke out he was lecturing in our country +on his polar experiences. A few days before our division arrived Captain +Evans had distinguished himself in one of the most brilliant naval +actions of the war. He was commander of the destroyer-leader _Broke_--a +"destroyer-leader" being a destroyer of unusually large size--and in +this battle three British vessels of this type had fought six German +destroyers. Captain Evans's ship sank one German destroyer and rammed +another, passing clear over its stern and cutting it nearly in two. The +whole of England was ringing with this exploit, and it was a decided +tribute to our men that Admiral Jellicoe consented to detail the +commander of the _Broke_. He was a man of great intelligence, great +energy, and, what was almost equally to the point, he was extremely +companionable; whether he was relating his experiences at the South +Pole, or telling us of active life on a destroyer, or swapping yarns +with our officers, or giving us the value of his practical experiences +in the war, Captain Evans was always at home with our men--indeed, he +seemed to be almost one of us. + +The fact that these American destroyers were placed under the command of +a British admiral was somewhat displeasing to certain Americans. I +remember that one rather bumptious American correspondent, on a visit to +Queenstown, was loud in expressing his disapproval of this state of +affairs, and even threatened to "expose" us all in the American press. +The fact that I was specifically commissioned as destroyer commander +also confused the situation. Yet the procedure was entirely proper, +and, in fact, absolutely necessary. My official title was "Commander of +the U.S. Naval Forces Operating in European Waters"; besides this, I was +the representative of our Navy Department at the British Admiralty and +American member of the Allied Naval Council. These duties required my +presence in London, which became the centre of all our operations. I was +commander not only of our destroyers at Queenstown, but of a destroyer +force at Brest, another at Gibraltar, of subchaser forces at Corfu and +Plymouth, of a mixed force at the Azores, of the American battle +squadrons at Scapa Flow and Berehaven, Ireland, certain naval forces at +Murmansk and Archangel in north Russia, and of many other contingents. +Clearly it was impossible for me to devote all my time exclusively to +any one of these commands; so far as actual operations were concerned it +was necessary that particular commanders should control them. All these +destroyer squadrons, including that at Queenstown, were under the +command of the American Admiral stationed in London; whenever they +sailed from Queenstown on specific duty, however, they sailed under +orders from Admiral Bayly. Any time, however, I could withdraw these +destroyers from Queenstown and send them where the particular +necessities required. My position, that is, was precisely the same as +that of General Pershing in France. He sent certain American divisions +to the British army; as long as they acted with the British they were +subject to the orders of Sir Douglas Haig; but General Pershing could +withdraw these men at any time for use elsewhere. The actual supreme +command of all our forces, army and navy, rested in the hands of +Americans; but, for particular operations, they naturally had to take +their orders from the particular officer under whom they were stationed. + + +III + +On May 17th a second American destroyer flotilla of six ships arrived at +Queenstown. From that date until July 5th a new division put in nearly +every week. The six destroyers which escorted our first troopships from +America to France were promptly assigned to duty with our forces in +Irish waters. Meanwhile other ships were added. On May 22nd the +_Melville_, the "Mother Ship" of the destroyers, arrived and became the +flagship of all the American vessels which were stationed at +Queenstown. This repair and supply ship practically took the place of a +dockyard, so far as our destroyer forces were concerned. Queenstown had +been almost abandoned as a navy yard many years before the European War +and its facilities for the repair of warships were consequently very +inadequate. The _Melville_ relieved the British authorities of many +responsibilities of this kind. She was able to do three-quarters of all +this work, except major repairs and those which required docking. Her +resources for repairing destroyers, and for providing for the wants and +comforts of our men, aroused much admiration in British naval circles. +The rapidity with which our forces settled down to work, and the +seamanly skill which they manifested from the very beginning, likewise +made the most favourable impression. By July 5th we had thirty-four +destroyers at Queenstown--a force that remained practically at that +strength until November. In 1918 much of the work of patrolling the seas +and of convoying ships to the west and south of Ireland--the area which, +in many ways, was the most important field of submarine warfare--fell +upon these American ships. The officers and crews began this work with +such zest that by June 1st I was justified in making the following +statement to the Navy Department: "It is gratifying to be able to report +that the operations of our forces in these waters have proved not only +very satisfactory, but also of marked value to the Allies in overcoming +the submarine menace. The equipment and construction of our ships have +proved adequate and sufficient, and the personnel has shown an unusually +high degree of enthusiasm and ability to cope with the situation +presented." + +It is impossible to exaggerate the enthusiasm which the arrival of these +vessels produced upon the British public. America itself experienced +something of a thrill when the news was first published that our +destroyers had reached European waters, but this was mild compared with +the joy which spread all over the British Isles. The feeling of +Americans was mainly one of pride; our people had not yet suffered much +from the European cataclysm, and despite the fact that we were now +active participants, the war still seemed very far off and unreal. The +fact that a German victory would greatly endanger our national freedom +had hardly entered our national consciousness; the idea seemed dim, +abstract, perhaps even absurd; but in Great Britain, with the guns +constantly booming almost within earshot of the people, the horrors of +the situation were acutely realized. For this reason those American +destroyers at Queenstown immediately became a symbol in the minds of the +British people. They represented not only the material assistance which +our limitless resources and our almost inexhaustible supply of men would +bring to a cause which was really in desperate straits; but they stood +also for a great spiritual fact; for the kinship of the two great +Anglo-Saxon peoples, which, although separated politically, had now +joined hands to fight for the ideals upon which the civilization of both +nations rested. In the preceding two years Great Britain had had her +moments of doubt--doubt as to whether the American people had remained +true to the principles that formed the basis of their national life; the +arrival of these ships immediately dispelled all such misgivings. + +Almost instinctively the minds of the British people turned to the day, +nearly three hundred years before, when the _Mayflower_ sailed for the +wilderness beyond the seas. The moving picture film, which depicted the +arrival of our first destroyer division, and which was exhibited all +over Great Britain to enthusiastic crowds, cleverly accentuated this +idea. This film related how, in 1620, a few Englishmen had landed in +North America; how these adventurers had laid the foundations of a new +state based on English conceptions of justice and liberty; how they had +grown great and prosperous; how the stupidity of certain British +statesmen had forced them to declare their independence; how they had +fought for this independence with the utmost heroism; how out of these +disjointed British colonies they had founded one of the mightiest +nations of history; and how now, when the liberties of mankind were +endangered, the descendants of the old _Mayflower_ pioneers had in their +turn crossed the ocean--this time going eastward--to fight for the +traditions of their race. Had Americans been making this film, they +would have illustrated another famous episode in our history that +antedated, by thirteen years, the voyage of the _Mayflower_--that is, +the landing of British colonists in Virginia, in 1607; but in the minds +of the English people the name _Mayflower_ had become merely a symbol of +American progress and all that it represented. This whole story appealed +to the British masses as one of the great miracles of history--a +single, miserable little settlement in Massachusetts Bay expanding into +a continent overflowing with resources and wealth; a shipload of men, +women, and children developing, in less than three centuries, into a +nation of more than 100,000,000 people. And the arrival of our +destroyers, pictured on the film, informed the British people that all +this youth and energy had been thrown upon their side of the battle. + +One circumstance gave a particular appropriateness to the fact that I +commanded these forces. In 1910 I had visited England as captain of the +battleship _Minnesota_, a unit in a fleet which was then cruising in +British and French waters. It was apparent even at that time that +preparations were under way for a European war; on every hand there were +plenty of evidences that Germany was determined to play her great stroke +for the domination of the world. In a report to the Admiral commanding +our division I gave it as my opinion that the great European War would +begin within four years. In a speech at the Guildhall, where 800 of our +sailors were entertained at lunch by the Lord Mayor, Sir Vezey Strong, I +used the words which involved me in a good deal of trouble at the time +and which have been much quoted since. The statement then made was +purely the inspiration of the moment; it came from the heart, not from +the head; probably the evidences that Germany was stealthily preparing +her great blow had something to do with my outburst. I certainly spoke +without any authorization from my Government, and realized at once that +I had committed a great indiscretion. "If the time should ever come," I +said, "when the British Empire is menaced by a European coalition, Great +Britain can rely upon the last ship, the last dollar, the last man, and +the last drop of blood of her kindred beyond the sea." It is not +surprising that the appearance of American ships, commanded by the +American who had spoken these words seven years before, strongly +appealed to the British sense of the dramatic. Indeed, it struck the +British people as a particularly happy fulfilment of prophecy. These +sentences were used as an introduction to the moving picture film +showing the arrival of our first destroyer division, and for weeks after +reaching England I could hardly pick up a newspaper without these words +of my Guildhall speech staring me in the face. + +Of course, any American admiral then commanding American naval forces in +European waters would have been acclaimed as the living symbol of +Anglo-American co-operation; and it was simply as the representative of +the American people and the American navy that the British people +received me so appreciatively. At first the appearance of our uniforms +aroused much curiosity; our tightly fitting blouses were quite different +from the British sack coats, and few people in London, in fact, knew who +we were. After our photographs had appeared in the press, however, the +people always recognized us in the streets. And then something quite +unusual happened. That naval and military men should salute my staff and +me was to have been expected, but that civilians should show this +respect for the American uniform was really unprecedented. Yet we were +frequently greeted in this way. It indicated, almost more than anything +else, how deeply affected the British people were by America's entrance +into the war. All classes and all ages showed this same respect and +gratitude to our country. Necessarily I had to attend many public +dinners and even to make many speeches; the people gathered on such +occasions always rose _en masse_ as a tribute to the uniform which I +wore. Sometimes such meetings were composed of boy scouts, of schoolboys +or schoolgirls, of munition workers, of journalists, or of statesmen; +and all, irrespective of age or social station or occupation, seemed +delighted to pay respect to the American navy. There were many evidences +of interest in the "American Admiral" that were really affecting. Thus +one day a message came from Lady Roberts, widow of the great soldier, +Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, saying that she was desirous of meeting the +"American Admiral." I was very glad to go out in the country and spend a +Sunday afternoon with her. This charming, white-haired old lady was very +feeble, and had to spend most of her time in a wheel-chair. But her mind +was bright as ever, and she had been following the war with the closest +attention. She listened with keen interest as I told her all about the +submarines, and she asked innumerable questions concerning them. She was +particularly affected when she spoke about the part the United States +was playing in the war, and remarked how much our participation would +have delighted the Field-Marshal. + +I have already given my first impressions of Their Majesties the King +and Queen, and time only confirmed them. Neither ever missed an +opportunity to show their appreciation of the part that we were playing. +The zeal with which the King entered into the celebration of our Fourth +of July made him very popular with all our men. He even cultivated a +taste for our national game. Certain of our early contingents of +soldiers encamped near Windsor; here they immediately laid out a +baseball diamond and daily engaged in their favourite sport. The Royal +Family used to watch our men at their play, became interested in the +game, and soon learned to follow it. The Duke of Connaught and the +Princess Patricia, his daughter, had learned baseball through their +several years' residence in Canada, and could watch a match with all the +understanding and enthusiasm of an American "fan." As our sailors and +soldiers arrived in greater numbers, the interest and friendliness of +the Royal Family increased. One of the King's most delightful traits is +his sense of humour. The Queen also showed a great fondness for stories, +and I particularly remember her amusement at the famous remark of the +Australians--perhaps the most ferocious combatants on the Western +Front--about the American soldier, "a good fighter, but a little rough." +Of all the anecdotes connected with our men, none delighted King George +so much as those concerning our coloured troops. A whole literature of +negro yarns spread rapidly over Europe; most of them, I find, have long +since reached the United States. The most lasting impression which I +retain of the head of the British Empire is that he is very much of a +human being. He loved just about the same things as the normal American +or Englishman loves--his family, his friends, his country, a good story, +a pleasant evening with congenial associates. And he had precisely the +same earnestness about the war which one found in every properly +constituted Briton or American; the victories of the Allies exhilarated +King George just as they exhilarated the man in the street, and their +defeats saddened him just as they saddened the humblest citizen. I found +in His Majesty that same solemn sense of comradeship with America which +I found in the English civilians who saluted the American uniform in the +street. + +As an evidence of the exceedingly cordial relations existing between +the two navies the Admiralty proposed, in the latter part of May, that I +should assume Admiral Bayly's command for several days while he took a +little vacation on the west coast of Ireland. Admiral Bayly was the +Commander-in-Chief of all the British forces operating on the Irish +coast. This command thus included far more than that at Queenstown; it +comprised several naval stations and the considerable naval forces in +Irish waters. Never before, so I was informed, had a foreign naval +officer commanded British naval forces in time of war. So far as +exercising any control over sea operations was concerned, this +invitation was not particularly important. Matters were running smoothly +at the Queenstown station; Admiral Bayly's second in command could +easily have kept the machine in working order; it was hardly likely, in +the few days that I was to command, that any changes in policy would be +initiated. The British Admiralty merely took this way of showing a great +courtesy to the American navy, and of emphasizing to the world the +excellent relations that existed between the two services. The act was +intended to symbolize the fact that the British and the American navies +were really one in the thoroughness of their co-operation in subduing +the Prussian menace. Incidentally the British probably hoped that the +publication of this news in the German press would not be without effect +in Germany. On June 18th, therefore, I went to Queenstown, and hoisted +my flag on the staff in front of Admiralty House. I had some hesitation +in doing this, for American navy regulations stipulate that an Admiral's +flag shall be raised only on a ship afloat, but Admiral Bayly was +insistent that his flag should come down and that mine should go up, and +I decided that this technicality might be waived. The incident aroused +great interest in England, but it started many queer rumours in +Queenstown. One was that Admiral Bayly and I had quarrelled, the British +Admiral, strangely enough, having departed in high dudgeon and left me +serenely in control. Another was that I had come to Queenstown, seized +the reins out of Admiral Bayly's hands, thrown him out of the country, +and taken over the government of Ireland on behalf of the United States, +which had now determined to free the island from British oppression! +However, in a few days Admiral Bayly returned and all went on as +before. + +During the nearly two years which the American naval forces spent in +Europe only one element in the population showed them any hostility or +even unfriendliness. At the moment when these lines are being written a +delegation claiming to represent the "Irish Republic" is touring the +United States, asking Americans to extend their sympathy and contribute +money toward the realization of their project. I have great admiration +for the mass of the Irish people, and from the best elements of these +people the American sailors received only kindness. I have therefore +hesitated about telling just how some members of the Sinn Fein Party +treated our men. But it seems that now when this same brotherhood is +attempting to stir up hatred in this country against our Allies in the +war, there is a certain pertinence in informing Americans just what kind +of treatment their brave sailors met with at the hands of the Sinn Fein +in Ireland. + +The people of Queenstown and Cork, as already described, received our +men with genuine Irish cordiality. Yet in a few weeks evidence of +hostility in certain quarters became apparent. The fact is that the part +of Ireland in which the Americans were stationed was a headquarters of +the Sinn Fein. The members of this organization were not only openly +disloyal; they were openly pro-German. They were not even neutral; they +were working day and night for a German victory, for in their misguided +minds a German victory signified an Irish Republic. It was no secret +that the Sinn Feiners were sending information to Germany and constantly +laying plots to interfere with the British and American navies. At first +it might be supposed that the large number of sailors--and some +officers--of Irish extraction on the American destroyers would tend to +make things easier for our men. Quite the contrary proved to be the +case. The Sinn Feiners apparently believed that these so-called +Irish-Americans would sympathize with their cause; in their wildest +moments they even hoped that our naval forces might champion it. But +these splendid sailors were Americans before they were anything else; +their chief ambition was the defeat of the Hun and they could not +understand how any man anywhere could have any other aim in life. They +were disgusted at the large numbers of able-bodied men whom they saw in +the streets, and did not hesitate to ask some of them why they were not +fighting on the Western Front. The behaviour of the American sailors was +good; but the mere fact that they did not openly manifest a hatred of +Great Britain and a love of Germany infuriated the Sinn Feiners. And the +eternal woman question also played its part. Our men had much more money +than the native Irish boys, and could entertain the girls more lavishly +at the movies and ice-cream stands. The men of our fleet and the Irish +girls became excellent friends; the association, from our point of view, +was a very wholesome one, for the moral character of the Irish girls of +Queenstown and Cork--as, indeed, of Irish girls everywhere--is very +high, and their companionship added greatly to the well-being and +contentment of our sailors, not a few of whom found wives among these +young women. But when the Sinn Fein element saw their sweethearts +deserting them for the American boys their hitherto suppressed anger +took the form of overt acts. + +Occasionally an American sailor would be brought from Cork to Queenstown +in a condition that demanded pressing medical attention. When he +regained consciousness he would relate how he had suddenly been set upon +by half a dozen roughs and beaten into a state of insensibility. Several +of our men were severely injured in this way. At other times small +groups were stoned by Sinn Fein sympathizers, and there were many +hostile demonstrations in moving-picture houses and theatres. Even more +frequently attacks were made, not upon the American sailors, but upon +the Irish girls who accompanied them. These chivalrous pro-German +agitators would rush up and attempt to tear the girls away from our +young men; they would pull down their hair, slap them, and even kick +them. Naturally American sailors were hardly the type to tolerate +behaviour of this kind, and some bloody battles took place. This +hostility was increased by one very regrettable occurrence in +Queenstown. An American sailor was promenading the main thoroughfare +with an Irish girl, when an infuriated Sinn Feiner rushed up, began to +abuse his former sweetheart in vile language, and attempted to lay hands +on her. The American struck this hooligan a terrific blow; he fell +backward and struck his head on the curb. The fall fractured the +assailant's skull and in a few hours he was dead. We handed our man +over to the civil authorities for trial, and a jury, composed entirely +of Irishmen, acquitted him. The action of this jury in itself indicated +that there was no sympathy among the decent Irish element, which +constituted the great majority, with this sort of tactics, but naturally +it did not improve relations between our men and the Sinn Fein. The +importance of another incident which took place at the cathedral has +been much exaggerated. It is true that a priest in his Sunday sermon +denounced the American sailors as vandals and betrayers of Irish +womanhood, but it is also true that the Roman Catholics of that section +were themselves the most enraged at this absurd proceeding. A number of +Roman Catholic officers who were present left the church in a body; the +Catholic Bishop of the Diocese called upon Admiral Bayly and apologized +for the insult, and he also punished the offending priest by assigning +him to new duties at a considerable distance from the American ships. + +But even more serious trouble was brewing, for our officers discovered +that the American sailors were making elaborate plans to protect +themselves. Had this discovery not been made in time, something like an +international incident might have resulted. Much to our regret, +therefore, it was found necessary to issue an order that no naval men, +British or American, under the rank of Commander, should be permitted to +go to Cork. Ultimately we had nearly 8,000 American men at this station; +Queenstown itself is a small place of 6,000 or 7,000, so it is apparent +that it did not possess the facilities for giving such a large number of +men those relaxations which were necessary to their efficiency. We +established a club in Queenstown, provided moving pictures and other +entertainments, and did the best we could to keep our sailors contented. +The citizens of Cork also keenly regretted our action. The great +majority had formed a real fondness for our boys; and they regarded it +as a great humiliation that the rowdy element had made it necessary to +keep our men out of their city. Many letters were printed in the Cork +newspapers apologizing to the Americans and calling upon the people to +take action that would justify us in rescinding our order. The loss to +Cork tradesmen was great; our men received not far from $200,000 to +$300,000 a month in pay; they were free spenders, and their presence in +the neighbourhood for nearly two years would have meant a fortune to +many of the local merchants. Yet we were obliged to refuse to accede to +the numerous requests that the American sailors be permitted to visit +this city. + +A committee of distinguished citizens of Cork, led by the Lord Mayor, +came to Admiralty House to plead for the rescinding of this order. +Admiral Bayly cross-examined them very sharply. It appeared that the men +who had committed these offences against American sailors had never been +punished. + +Unless written guarantees were furnished that there would be no hostile +demonstrations against British or Americans, Admiral Bayly refused to +withdraw the ban, and I fully concurred in this decision. Unfortunately +the committee could give no such guarantee. We knew very well that the +first appearance of Americans in Cork would be the signal for a renewal +of hostilities, and the temper of our sailors was such that the most +deplorable consequences might have resulted. We even discovered that the +blacksmiths on the U.S.S. _Melville_ were surreptitiously manufacturing +weapons which our men could conceal on their persons and with which they +proposed to sally forth and do battle with the Sinn Fein! So for the +whole period of our stay in Queenstown our sailors were compelled to +keep away from the dangerous city. But the situation was not without its +humorous aspects. Thus the pretty girls of Cork, finding that the +Americans could not come to them, decided to come to the Americans; +every afternoon a trainload would arrive at the Queenstown station, +where our sailors would greet them, give them a splendid time, and then, +in the evening, escort them to the station and send a happy crowd on +their way home. + +But the Sinn Feiners interfered with us in much more serious ways than +this. They were doing everything in their power to help Germany. With +their assistance German agents and German spies were landed in Ireland. +At one time the situation became so dangerous that I had to take +experienced officers whose services could ill be spared from our +destroyers and assign them to our outlying air stations in Ireland. +This, of course, proportionately weakened our fleet and did its part in +prolonging the war. + + + + +CHAPTER III + +THE ADOPTION OF THE CONVOY + + +I + +All this time that we were seeking a solution for the submarine problem +we really had that solution in our hands. The seas presented two +impressive spectacles in those terrible months of April, May, and June, +1917. One was the comparative ease with which the German submarines were +sinking merchant vessels; the other was their failure materially to +weaken the Allied fleets. If we wish a counter-picture to that presented +by the Irish Sea and the English Channel, where merchant shipping was +constantly going down, we should look to the North Sea, where the +British Grand Fleet, absolutely intact, was defiantly riding the waves. +The uninformed public explained this apparent security in a way of its +own; it believed that the British dreadnoughts were anchored behind +booms, nets, and mine-fields, through which the submarines could not +penetrate. Yet the fact of the matter was that the Grand Fleet was +frequently cruising in the open sea, in the waters which were known to +be the most infested with submarines. The German submarines had been +attempting to destroy this fleet for two and a half years. It had been +their plan to weaken this great battle force by "attrition"; to sink the +great battleships one by one, and in this way to reduce the fighting +power of the fleet to such a point that the German dreadnoughts could +have some chances of success. Such had been the German programme, widely +heralded at the beginning of the war; nearly three years had now passed, +but how had this pretentious scheme succeeded? The fact was that the +submarines had not destroyed a single dreadnought. It was certainly a +profitable study in contrasts--that of merchant ships constantly being +torpedoed and that of battleships constantly repelling such attacks. +Certainly a careful study of this situation ought to bring out facts +which would assist the Allies in solving the most baffling problem of +the war. + +Yet there was no mystery about the immunity which these great fighting +vessels were enjoying; the submarine problem, so far as it affected the +battle fleet, had already been solved. The explanation was found in the +simple circumstance that, whenever the dreadnoughts went to sea, they +were preceded by a screen of cruisers and destroyers. It almost seemed +as though these surface craft were serving as a kind of impenetrable +wall against which the German U-boats were beating themselves in vain. +Yet to the casual observer there seemed to be no reason why the +submarines should stand in any particular terror of the destroyers. +Externally they looked like the least impressive war vessels afloat. +When they sailed ahead of the battle squadrons, the destroyers were +ungraceful objects upon the surface of the water; the impression which +they conveyed was that of fragility rather than of strength, and the +idea that they could ever be the guardians of the mighty battleships +which sailed behind them at first seemed almost grotesque. Yet these +little vessels really possessed the power of overcoming the submarine. +The war had not progressed far when it became apparent that the U-boat +could not operate anywhere near this speedy little surface vessel +without running serious risk of destruction. + +Until the reports of submarine fighting began to find their way into the +papers, however, the destroyer was probably the one type of warship in +which the public had the smallest interest. It had become, indeed, a +kind of ugly duckling of the Navy. Our Congress had regularly neglected +it; year after year our naval experts had recommended that four +destroyers be built for every battleship, and annually Congress had +appropriated for only one or two. The war had also found Great Britain +without a sufficient number of destroyers for the purpose of +anti-submarine warfare. The Admiralty had provided enough for screening +the Grand Fleet in cruising and in battle, but it had been called upon +to divert so many for the protection of troop transportation, supply +ships, and commerce generally that the efficiency of the fleet had been +greatly undermined. Thus Britain found herself without enough +destroyers to meet the submarine campaign; this situation was not due to +any lack of foresight, but to a failure to foresee that any civilized +nation could ever employ the torpedo in unrestricted warfare against +merchant ships and their crews. + +The one time that this type of vessel had come prominently into notice +was in 1904, when several of them attacked the Russian fleet at Port +Arthur, damaging several powerful vessels and practically ending Russian +sea power in the Far East. The history of the destroyer, however, goes +back much further than 1904. It was created to fulfil a duty not unlike +that which it has played so gloriously in the World War. In the late +seventies and early eighties a new type of war vessel, the torpedo boat, +caused almost as much perturbation as the submarine has caused in recent +years. This speedy little fighter was invented to serve as a medium for +the discharge of a newly perfected engine of naval warfare, the +automobile torpedo. It was its function to creep up to a battleship, +preferably under cover of darkness or in thick weather, and let loose +this weapon against her unsuspecting hulk. The appearance of the torpedo +boat led to the same prediction as that which has been more recently +inspired by the submarine; in the eyes of many it simply meant the end +of the great surface battleship. But naval architects, looking about for +the "answer" to this dangerous craft, designed another type of warship +and appropriately called it the "torpedo boat destroyer." This vessel +was not only larger and speedier than its appointed antagonist, but it +possessed a radius of action and a seaworthiness which enabled it to +accompany the battle fleet. Its draft was so light that a torpedo could +pass harmlessly under the keel, and it carried an armament which had +sufficient power to end the career of any torpedo boat that came its +way. Few types have ever justified their name so successfully as the +torpedo boat destroyer. So completely did it eliminate that little +vessel as a danger to the fighting ships that practically all navies +long since ceased to build torpedo boats. Yet the destroyer promptly +succeeded to the chief function of the discarded vessel, that of +attacking capital ships with torpedoes; and, in addition to this, it +assumed the duty of protecting battleships from similar attack by enemy +vessels of the same type. + +It surprises many people to learn that the destroyer is not a little +boat but a warship of considerable size. This vessel to-day impresses +most people as small only because all ships, those which are used for +commerce and those which are used for war, have increased so greatly in +displacement. The latest specimens of the destroyer carry four-or +five-inch guns and twelve torpedo tubes, each of which launches a +torpedo that weighs more than a ton, and runs as straight as an arrow +for more than six miles. The _Santa Maria_, the largest vessel of the +squadron with which Columbus made his first voyage to America, had a +displacement of about five hundred tons, and thus was about half as +large as a destroyer; and even at the beginning of the clipper ship era +few vessels were much larger. + +Previous to 1914 it was generally believed that torpedo attacks would +play a large part in any great naval engagement, and this was the reason +why all naval advisers insisted that a large number of these vessels +should be constructed as essential units of the fleet. Yet the war had +not made much progress when it became apparent that this versatile craft +had another great part to play, and that it would once more justify its +name in really heroic fashion. Just as it had proved its worth in +driving the surface torpedo boat from the seas, so now it developed into +a very dangerous foe to the torpedo boat that sailed beneath the waves. +Events soon demonstrated that, in all open engagements between submarine +and destroyer, the submarine stood very little chance. The reason for +this was simply that the submarine had no weapon with which it could +successfully resist the attack of the destroyer, whereas the destroyer +had several with which it could attack the submarine. The submarine had +three or four torpedo tubes, and only one or two guns, and with neither +could it afford to risk attacking the more powerfully armed destroyer. +The U-boat was of such a fragile nature that it could never afford to +engage in a combat in which it stood much chance of getting hit. A +destroyer could stand a comparatively severe pounding and still remain +fairly intact, but a single shell, striking a submarine, was a very +serious matter; even though the vessel did not sink as a result, it was +almost inevitable that certain parts of its machinery would be so +injured that it would have difficulty in getting into port. It therefore +became necessary for the submarine always to play safe, to fight only +under conditions in which it had the enemy at such a disadvantage that +it ran little risk itself; and this was the reason why it preferred to +attack merchant and passenger ships rather than vessels, such as the +destroyer, that could energetically defend themselves. + +The comparatively light draft of the destroyer, which is about nine or +ten feet, pretty effectually protects it from the submarine's torpedo, +for this torpedo, to function with its greatest efficiency, must take a +course about fifteen feet under water; if it runs nearer the surface +than this, it comes under the influence of the waves, and does not make +a straight course. More important still, the speed of the destroyer, the +ease with which it turns, circles, and zigzags, makes it all but +impossible for a torpedo to be aimed with much chance of hitting her. +Moreover, the discharge of this missile is a far more complicated +undertaking than is generally supposed. The submarine commander cannot +take position anywhere and discharge his weapon more or less wildly, +running his chances of hitting; he must get his boat in place, calculate +range, course, and speed, and take careful aim. Clearly it is difficult +for him to do this successfully if his intended victim is scurrying +along at the rate of thirty or forty miles an hour. Moreover, the +destroyer is constantly changing its course, making great circles and +indulging in other disconcerting movements. So well did the Germans +understand the difficulty of torpedoing a destroyer that they +practically never attempted so unprofitable and so hazardous an +enterprise. + +Torpedoes are complicated and expensive mechanisms; each one costs about +$8,000 and the average U-boat carried only from eight to twelve; it was +therefore necessary to husband these precious weapons, to use them only +when the chances most favoured success; the U-boat commander who wasted +them in attempts to sink destroyers would probably have been +court-martialled. + +But while the submarine had practically no means of successfully +fighting the destroyer, the destroyer had several ways of putting an end +to the submarine. The advantage which really made the destroyer so +dangerous, as already intimated, was its excessive speed. On the surface +the U-boat made little more than fifteen miles an hour, and under the +surface it made little more than seven or eight. If the destroyer once +discovered its presence, therefore, it could reach its prey in an +incredibly short time. It could attack with its guns, and, if conditions +were favourable, it could ram; and this was no trifling accident, for a +destroyer going at thirty or forty miles could cut a submarine nearly in +two with its strong, razor-like bow. In the early days of the war these +were the main methods upon which it relied to attack, but by the time +that I had reached London, another and much more frightful weapon had +been devised. This was the depth charge, a large can containing about +three hundred pounds of TNT, which, if it exploded anywhere within one +hundred feet of the submarine, would either destroy it entirely or so +injure it that the victim usually had to come to the surface and +surrender. + +I once asked Admiral Jellicoe who was the real inventor of this +annihilating missile. + +"No man in particular," he said. "It came into existence almost +spontaneously, in response to a pressing need. Gunfire can destroy +submarines when they are on the surface, but you know it can accomplish +nothing against them when they are submerged. This fact made it +extremely difficult to sink them in the early days of the war. One day, +when the Grand Fleet was cruising in the North Sea, a submarine fired a +torpedo at one of the cruisers. The cruiser saw the periscope and the +wake of the torpedo, and had little difficulty in so manoeuvring as to +avoid being struck. She then went full speed to the spot from which the +submarine had fired its torpedo, in the hope of ramming it. But by the +time she arrived the submarine had submerged so deeply that the cruiser +passed over her without doing her any harm. Yet the officers and crew +could see the submerged hull; there the enemy lay in full view of her +pursuers, yet perfectly safe! The officers reported this incident to me +in the presence of Admiral Madden, second in command. + +"'Wouldn't it have been fine,' said Madden, 'if they had had on board a +mine so designed that, when dropped overboard, it would have exploded +when it reached the depth at which the submarine was lying?'" + +"That remark," continued Admiral Jellicoe, "gave us the germinal idea of +the depth charge. I asked the Admiralty to get to work and produce a +'mine' that would act in the way that Admiral Madden had suggested. It +proved to be very simple to construct--an ordinary steel cylinder filled +with TNT; this was fitted with a simple firing appliance which was set +off by the pressure of the water, and could be so adjusted that it would +explode the charge at any depth desired. This apparatus was so simple +and so necessary that we at once began to manufacture it." + +The depth charge looked like the innocent domestic ash can, and that was +the name by which it soon came to be popularly known. Each destroyer +eventually carried twenty or thirty of these destructive weapons at the +stern; a mere pull on a lever would make one drop into the water. Many +destroyers also carried strange-looking howitzers, which were made in +the shape of a Y, and from which one ash can could be hurled fifty yards +or more from each side of the vessel. The explosion, when it took place +within the one hundred feet which I have mentioned as usually fatal to +the submarine, would drive the plates inward and sometimes make a leak +so large that the vessel would sink almost instantaneously. At a +somewhat greater distance it frequently produced a leak of such serious +proportions that the submarine would be forced to blow her ballast +tanks, come to the surface, and surrender. Even when the depth charge +exploded considerably more than a hundred feet away, the result might be +equally disastrous, for the concussion might distort the hull and damage +the horizontal rudders, making it impossible to steer, or it might so +injure the essential machinery that the submarine would be rendered +helpless. Sometimes the lights went out, leaving the crew groping in +blackness; necessary parts were shaken from their fastenings; and in +such a case the commander had his choice of two alternatives, one to be +crushed by the pressure of the water, and the other to come up and be +captured or sunk by his surface foe. It is no reflection upon the +courage of the submarine commanders to say that in this embarrassing +situation they usually preferred to throw themselves upon the mercy of +the enemy rather than to be smashed or to die a lingering and agonizing +death under the water. Even when the explosion took place at a distance +so great that the submarine was not seriously damaged, the experience +was a highly disconcerting one for the crew. If a dozen depth charges +were dropped, one after the other, the effect upon the men in the hunted +vessel was particularly demoralizing. In the course of the war several +of our own submarines were depth-charged by our own destroyers, and from +our crews we obtained graphic descriptions of the sensations which +resulted. It was found that men who had passed through such an ordeal +were practically useless for several days, and that sometimes they were +rendered permanently unfit for service. The state of nerves which +followed such an experience was not unlike that new war psychosis known +as shell-shock. One of our officers who had had such an adventure told +me that the explosion of a single depth charge under the water might be +compared to the concussion produced by the simultaneous firing of all +the fourteen-inch guns of a battleship. One can only imagine what the +concussion must have been when produced by ten or twenty depth charges +in succession. Whether or not the submarine was destroyed or seriously +injured, a depth-charged crew became extremely cautious in the future +about getting anywhere in the neighbourhood of a destroyer; and among +the several influences which ultimately disorganized the _moral_ of the +German U-boat service these contacts with depth charges were doubtless +the most important. The hardiest under-water sailor did not care to go +through such frightful moments a second time. + +This statement makes it appear as though the depth charge had settled +the fate of the submarine. Yet that was far from being the case, for +against the ash can, with its 300 pounds of TNT, the submarine possessed +one quality which gave it great defensive power. That was ability to +make itself unseen. Strangely enough, the average layman is inclined to +overlook this fairly apparent fact, and that is the reason why, even at +the risk of repeating myself, I frequently refer to it. Indeed, the only +respect in which the subsurface boat differs essentially from all other +war vessels is in this power of becoming invisible. Whenever it descries +danger from afar, the submarine can disappear under the water in +anywhere from twenty seconds to a minute. And its great advantage is +that it can detect its enemy long before that enemy can detect the +submarine. A U-boat, sailing awash, or sailing with only its +conning-tower exposed, can see a destroyer at a distance of about +fifteen miles if the weather is clear; but, under similar conditions, +the destroyer can see the submarine at a distance of about four miles. +Possessing this great advantage, the submarine can usually decide +whether it will meet the enemy or not; if it decides that it is wise to +avoid an encounter, all it has to do is to duck, remain submerged until +the destroyer has passed on, entirely unconscious of its presence, and +then to resume its real work, which is not that of fighting warships, +but of sinking merchantmen. The chief anxiety of the U-boat commander is +thus to avoid contact with its surface foe and its terrible depth +charge, whereas the business of the destroyer commander is to get within +fighting distance of his quarry. + +Ordinarily, conditions favour the U-boat in this game, simply because +the ocean is so large a place. But there is one situation in which the +destroyer has more than a fighting chance, for the power of the +submarine to keep its presence secret lasts only so long as it remains +out of action. If it makes no attempt to fight, its presence can hardly +ever be detected; but just as soon as it becomes belligerent, it +immediately reveals its whereabouts. If it comes to the surface and +fires its guns, naturally it advertises to its enemy precisely where it +is; but it betrays its location almost as clearly when it discharges a +torpedo. Just as soon as the torpedo leaves the submarine, a wake, +clearly marking its progress, appears upon the surface of the water. +Though most newspaper readers have heard of this tell-tale track, I have +found few who really understand what a conspicuous disturbance it is. +The torpedo is really a little submarine itself; it is propelled by +compressed air, the exhaust of which stirs up the water and produces a +foamy, soapy wake, which is practically the same as that produced by the +propeller of an ocean liner. This trail is four or five feet wide; it is +as white and is as distinct as a chalk line drawn upon a blackboard, +provided the weather is clear and the sun is in the right direction. +Indeed, it is sometimes so distinct that an easily manoeuvred ship, +and even sometimes a merchantman, can avoid the torpedo which it sees +advancing merely by putting over the helm and turning out of its +course. But the chief value of this wake to the submarine hunters is +that it shows the direction in which the submarine was located when the +torpedo started on its course. It stands out on the surface of the water +like a long, ghostly finger pointing to the spot where the foe let loose +its shaft. + +As soon as the destroyer sees this betraying disturbance, the commander +rings for full speed; and one of the greatest advantages of this type of +vessel is that it can attain full speed in an incredibly short time. The +destroyer then dashes down the wake until it reaches the end, which +indicates the point where the submarine lay when it discharged its +missile. At this point the surface vessel drops a depth charge and then +begins cutting a circle, say, to the right. Pains are taken to make this +circle so wide that it will include the submarine, provided it has gone +in that direction. The destroyer then makes another circle to the left. +Every ten or fifteen seconds, while describing these circles, it drops a +depth charge; indeed, not infrequently it drops twenty or thirty in a +few minutes. If there is another destroyer in the neighbourhood it also +follows up the wake and when it reaches the indicated point, it circles +in the opposite direction from the first. Sometimes more than two may +start for the suspected location and, under certain conditions, the +water within a radius of half a mile or more may be seething with +exploding depth charges. + +It is plain from this description that the proceeding develops into an +exceedingly dangerous game for the attacking submarine. It is a simple +matter to calculate the chances of escaping which the enemy has under +these conditions. That opportunity is clearly measured by the time which +elapses from the moment when it discharges its torpedo to the moment +when the destroyer has reached the point at which it was discharged. +This interval gives the subsurface boat a certain chance to get away; +but its under-water speed is moderate, and so by the time the destroyer +reaches the critical spot, the submarine has advanced but a short +distance away from it. How far has she gone? In what direction did she +go? These are the two questions which the destroyer commander must +answer, and the success with which he answers them accurately measures +his success in sinking or damaging his enemy, or in giving him a good +scare. If he always decided these two points accurately, he would almost +always "get" his submarine; the chances of error are very great, +however, and that is the reason why the submarine in most cases gets +away. All that the surface commander knows is that there is a U-boat +somewhere in his neighbourhood, but he does not know its precise +location and so he is fighting more or less in the dark. In the great +majority of cases the submarine does get away, but now and then the +depth charge reaches its goal and ends its career. + +If only one destroyer is hunting, the chances of escape strongly favour +the under-water craft; if several pounce upon her at once, however, the +chances of escaping are much more precarious. If the water is shallow +the U-boat can sometimes outwit the pursuer by sinking to the bottom and +lying there in silent security until its surface enemy tires of the +chase. But in the open sea there is no possibility of concealing itself +and so saving itself in this fashion, for if the submarine sinks beyond +a certain depth the pressure of the water will crush it. + +While the record shows that the U-boat usually succeeded in evading the +depth charges, there were enough sunk or seriously damaged or given a +bad shake-up to serve as a constant reminder to the crews that they ran +great danger in approaching waters which were protected by destroyers. +The U-boat captains, as will appear, avoided such waters regularly; they +much preferred to attack their merchant prey in areas where these +soul-racking depth charges did not interfere with their operations. + +It is now becoming apparent why the great battle fleet, which always +sailed behind a protecting screen of such destroyers, was practically +immune from torpedo attack. In order to assail these battleships the +submarine was always compelled to do the one thing which, above all +others, it was determined to avoid--to get within depth-charge radius of +the surface craft. In discharging the torpedo, distance, as already +intimated, is the all-important consideration. The U-boat carries a +torpedo which has a much shorter range than that of the destroyer; it +was seldom effective if fired at more than 2,000 yards, and beyond that +distance its chances of hitting became very slight. Indeed, a much +shorter distance than that was desirable if the torpedo was to +accomplish its most destructive purpose. So valuable were these missiles +and so necessary was it that every one should be used to good advantage, +that the U-boat's captain had instructions to shoot at no greater +distance than 300 yards, unless the conditions were particularly +favourable. In the early days, the torpedoes which were fired at a +greater distance would often hit the ships on the bow or the stern, and +do comparatively little damage; such vessels could be brought in, +repaired in a short time, and again put to sea. The German Admiralty +discovered that in firing from a comparatively long distance it was +wasting its torpedoes; it therefore ordered its men to get so near the +prey that it could strike the vessel in a vital spot, preferably in the +engine-room; and to do this it was necessary to creep up within 300 +yards. But to get as close as that to the destroyers which screened the +battleships meant almost certain destruction. Thus the one method of +attack which was left to the U-boat was to dive under the destroyer +screen and come up in the midst of the battle fleet itself. A few +minutes after its presence should become known, however, a large number +of destroyers would be dropping depth charges in its neighbourhood, and +its chances of escaping destruction would be almost nil, to say nothing +of its chances of destroying ships. + +The Germans learned the futility of this kind of an operation early in +the war, and the man who taught them this lesson was Commander +Weddingen, the same officer who had first demonstrated the value of the +submarine in practical warfare. It was Otto Weddingen who, in September, +1914, sank the old British cruisers, the _Hogue_, the _Cressy_, and the +_Aboukir_, an exploit which made him one of the great popular heroes of +Germany. A few months afterward Commander Weddingen decided to try an +experiment which was considerably more hazardous than that of sinking +three unescorted cruisers; he aspired to nothing less ambitious than an +attack upon the Grand Fleet itself. On March 18th a part of this fleet +was cruising off Cromarty, Scotland; here Weddingen came with the +_U-29_, dived under the destroyer screen and fired one torpedo, which +passed astern of the _Neptune_. The alarm was immediately sounded, and +presently the battleship _Dreadnought_, which had seen the periscope, +started at full speed for the submarine, rammed the vessel and sent it +promptly to the bottom. As it was sinking the bow rose out of the water, +plainly disclosing the number _U-29_. There was not one survivor. +Weddingen's attempt was an heroic one, but so disastrous to himself and +to his vessel that very few German commanders ever tried to emulate his +example. It clearly proved to the German Admiralty that it was useless +to attempt to destroy the Grand Fleet with submarines, or even to weaken +it piecemeal, and probably this experience had much to do with this new +kind of warfare--that of submarines against unprotected merchant +ships--which the Germans now proceeded to introduce. + +The simple fact is that the battle fleet was never so safe as when it +was cruising in the open sea, screened by destroyers. It was far safer +when it was sailing thus defiantly, constantly inviting attack, than +when it was anchored at its unprotected base at Scapa Flow. Indeed, +until Scapa Flow was impregnably protected by booms and mines, the +British commanders recognized that cruising in the open sea was its best +means of avoiding the German U-boats. No claim is made that the +submarine cannot dive under the destroyer screen and attack a battle +fleet, and possibly torpedo one or more of its vessels. The illustration +which has been given shows that Weddingen nearly "got" the _Neptune_; +and had this torpedo gone a few feet nearer, his experiment might have +shown that, although he subsequently lost his own life, crew, and ship, +he had sunk one British battleship, a proceeding which, in war, might +have been recognized as a fair exchange. But the point which I wish to +emphasize is that the chances of success were so small that the Germans +decided that it was not worth while to make the attempt. Afterward, when +merchant vessels were formed into convoys, a submarine would +occasionally dive under the screen and destroy a ship; but most such +attacks were unsuccessful, and experience taught the Germans that a +persistent effort of this kind would cause the destruction of so many +submarines that their campaign would fail. So the U-boat commanders left +the Grand Fleet alone, either because they lacked nerve or because +their instructions from Berlin were explicit to that effect. + + +II + +Having constantly before my eyes this picture of the Grand Fleet immune +from torpedo attack, naturally the first question I asked, when +discussing the situation with Admiral Jellicoe and others, was this: +"Why not apply this same principle to merchant ships?" + +If destroyers could keep the submarines away from battleships, they +could certainly keep them away from merchantmen. It is clear, from the +description already given, precisely how the battleships had been made +safe from submarines; they had proceeded, as usual, in a close +formation, or "convoy," and their destroyer screen had proved effective. +Thus logic apparently indicated that the convoy system was the "answer" +to the submarine. + +Yet the convoy, as used in previous wars, differed materially from any +application of the idea which could possibly be made to the present +contest. This scheme of sailing vessels in groups, and escorting them by +warships, is almost as old as naval warfare itself. As early as the +thirteenth century, the merchants of the Hanseatic League were compelled +to sail their ships in convoy as a protection against the pirates who +were then constantly lurking in the Baltic Sea. The Government of Venice +used this same device to protect its enormous commerce. In the fifteenth +century the large trade in wool and wine which existed between England +and the Moorish ports of Spain was safeguarded by convoys, and in the +sixteenth century Spain herself regularly depended upon massing her +ships to defend her commerce with the West Indies against the piratical +attacks of English and French adventurers. The escorts provided for +these "flotas" really laid the foundation of the mighty Spanish fleet +which threatened England's existence for more than a hundred years. By +the time of Queen Elizabeth the convoy had thus become the +all-prevailing method of safeguarding merchant shipping, but it was in +the Napoleonic wars that it had reached its greatest usefulness. The +convoys of that period were managed with some military precision; there +were carefully stipulated methods of collecting the ships, of meeting +the cruiser escorts at the appointed rendezvous, and of dispersing them +when the danger zone was passed; and naval officers were systematically +put in charge. The convoys of this period were very large; from 200 to +300 ships were not an unusual gathering, and sometimes 500 or more would +get together at certain important places, such as the entrance to the +Baltic. But these ships, of course, were very small compared with those +of the present time. It was only necessary to supply such aggregations +of vessels with enough protecting cruisers to overwhelm any raiders +which the enemy might send against them. The merchantmen were not +required to sail in any particular formation, nor were they required to +manoeuvre against unseen mysterious foes. Neither was it absolutely +essential that they should keep constantly together; and they could even +spread themselves somewhat loosely over the ocean. If an enemy raider +appeared on the horizon, the escorting cruiser or cruisers left the +convoy and began chase; a battle ensued, the convoy meanwhile passing on +its voyage unharmed. When its protecting vessels had disposed of the +attackers, they rejoined the merchantmen. No unusual seamanship was +demanded of the merchant captains, for the whole responsibility for +their safety rested with the escorting cruisers. + +But the operation of beating off an occasional surface raider, which +necessarily fights in the open, is quite a different procedure from that +of protecting an aggregation of vessels from enemies that discharge +torpedoes under the water. As part protection against such insidious +attacks both the merchant ships and the escorting men-of-war of to-day +had in this war to keep up a perpetual zigzagging. This zigzag, indeed, +was in itself an efficacious method of protection. As already said, the +submarine was forced to attain an advantageous position before it could +discharge its torpedo; it was its favourite practice to approach to +within a few hundred yards in order to hit its victim in a vital spot. +This mere fact shows that zigzagging in itself was one of the best +methods of avoiding destruction. Before this became the general rule, +the task of torpedoing a vessel was comparatively easy. All it was +necessary for the submarine to do was to bring the vessel's masts in +line; that is, to get directly ahead of her, submerge with the small +periscope showing only occasionally, and to fire the torpedo at short +range as the ship passed by. Except in the case of very slow vessels, +she could of course do this only when she was not far from the course of +her advancing prey when she first sighted her. If, however, the vessel +was zigzagging, this pretty game was usually defeated; the submarine +never knew in what direction to go in order to get within torpedoing +distance, and she could not go far because her speed under water is so +slow. The same conditions apply to a zigzagging convoy. This explained +why, as soon as the merchant vessel or convoy entered the submarine +zone, or as soon as a submarine was sighted, it began zigzagging, first +on one side and then on the other, and always irregularly, its course +comprising a disjointed line, which made it a mere chance whether the +submarine could get into a position from which to fire with any +certainty of obtaining results. A vessel sailing alone could manoeuvre +in this way without much difficulty, but it is apparent that twenty or +thirty vessels, sailing in close formation, would not find the operation +a simple one. It was necessary for them to sail in close and regular +formation in order to make it possible to manoeuvre them and screen +them with destroyers, so it is evident that the closer the formation the +fewer the destroyers that would be needed to protect it. These +circumstances make the modern convoy quite a different affair from the +happy-go-lucky proceeding of the Napoleonic era. + +It is perhaps not surprising that the greatest hostility to the convoys +has always come from the merchant captains themselves. In old days they +chafed at the time which was consumed in assembling the ships, at the +necessity for reducing speed to enable the slower vessels to keep up +with the procession, and at the delay in getting their cargoes into +port. In all wars in which convoys have been used it has been very +difficult to keep the merchant captains in line. In Nelson's day these +fine old salts were constantly breaking away from their convoys and +taking their chances of running into port unescorted. If the merchant +master of a century ago rebelled at the comparatively simply managed +convoy of those days it is not strange that their successors of the +present time should not have looked with favour upon the relatively +complicated and difficult arrangement required of them in this war. In +the early discussions with these men at the Admiralty they showed +themselves almost unanimously opposed to the convoy. + +"The merchantmen themselves are the chief obstacle to the convoy," said +Admiral Jellicoe. "We have discussed it with them many times and they +declare that it is impossible. It is all right for war vessels to +manoeuvre in close formation, they say, for we spend our time +practising in these formations, and so they think that it is second +nature to us. But they say that they cannot do it. They particularly +reject the idea that when in formation they can manoeuvre their ships +in the fog or at night without lights. They believe that they would lose +more ships through collisions than the submarines would sink." + +I was told that the whole subject had been completely threshed out at a +meeting which had been held at the Admiralty on February 23, 1917, about +six weeks before America had entered the war. At that time ten masters +of merchant ships had met Admiral Jellicoe and other members of the +Admiralty and had discussed the convoy proposition at length. In laying +the matter before these experienced seamen Admiral Jellicoe emphasized +the necessity of good station-keeping, and he described the close +formation which the vessels would have to maintain. It would be +necessary for the ships to keep together, he explained, otherwise the +submarines could pick off the stragglers. He asked the masters whether +eight merchant ships, which had a speed varying perhaps two knots, could +keep station in line ahead (that is, in single file or column) 500 yards +apart, and sail in two columns down the Channel. + +"It would be absolutely impossible," the ten masters replied, almost in +a chorus. + +A discouraging fact, they said, was that many of the ablest merchant +captains had gone into the navy, and that many of those who had replaced +them could not be depended on to handle their ships in such a formation. + +"We have so few competent deck officers that the captain would have to +be on the bridge the whole twenty-four hours," they said. And the +difficulty was not only with the bridge, but with the engine-room. In +order to keep the ships constantly the same distance apart it would be +necessary accurately to regulate their speed; the battleships could do +this because they had certain elaborate devices, which the merchant +vessels lacked, for timing the revolutions of the engines. The poor +quality of the coal which they were obtaining would also make it +difficult to maintain a regular speed. + +Admiral Jellicoe then asked the masters whether they could sail in twos +or threes and keep station. + +"Two might do it, but three would be too many," was the discouraging +verdict. But the masters were positive that even two merchantmen could +not safely keep station abreast in the night-time without lights; two +such vessels would have to sail in single file, the leading ship showing +a stern light. The masters emphasized their conviction that they +preferred to sail alone, each ship for herself, and to let each one take +her chances of getting into port. + +And there the matter rested. I had the opportunity of discussing the +convoy system with several merchant captains, and in these discussions +they simply echoed the views which had been expressed at this formal +conference. I do not believe that British naval officers came in contact +with a single merchant master who favoured the convoy at that time. They +were not doubtful about the idea; they were openly hostile. The British +merchant captains are a magnificent body of seamen; their first thought +was to serve their country and the Allied cause; their attitude in this +matter was not obstinacy; it simply resulted from their sincere +conviction that the convoy system would entail greater shipping losses +than were then being inflicted by the German submarines. + +Many naval officers at that time shared the same view. They opposed the +convoy not only on these grounds; its introduction would mean +immediately cutting down the tonnage 15 or 20 per cent., because of the +time which would be consumed in assembling the ships and awaiting +escorts and in the slower average speed which they could make. Many ship +owners and directors of steamship companies expressed the same opinions. +They also objected to the convoy on the ground that it would cause +considerable delay and hence would result in loss of earnings. Yet the +attitude of the merchant marine had not entirely eliminated the convoy +from consideration. At the time when I arrived the proposal was still +being discussed; the rate at which the Germans were sinking merchantmen +made this inevitable. And there seemed to be two schools among Allied +naval men, one of which was opposed to the convoy, while the other +insisted that it should be given a trial. The convoy had one +irresistible attraction for the officer which seemed to counterbalance +all the objections which were being urged against it. Its adoption would +mean taking the offensive against the German submarines. The essential +defect of the patrol system, as it was then conducted, was that it was +primarily a defensive measure. Each destroyer cruised around in an +assigned area, ready to assist vessels in distress, escort ships through +her own "square" and, incidentally, to attack a submarine when the +opportunity was presented. But the mere fact that a destroyer was +patrolling a particular area meant only, as already explained, that the +submarine had occasionally to sink out of sight until she had passed by. +Consequently the submarine proceeded to operate whenever a destroyer was +not in sight, and this was necessarily most of the time, for the +submarine zone was such a big place and the Allied destroyer fleet was +so pitifully small that it was impossible to cover it effectively. Under +these conditions there were very few encounters between destroyers and +submarines, at least in the waters south and west of Ireland, for the +submarines took all precautions against getting close enough to be +sighted by the destroyers. + +But the British and French navies were not the only ones which, at this +time, were depending upon the patrol as a protection against the +subsurface boat. The American navy was committing precisely the same +error off our Atlantic coast. As soon as Congress declared war against +Germany we expected that at least a few of the U-boats would cross the +Atlantic and attack American shipping; indeed, many believed that some +had already crossed in anticipation of war; the papers were filled with +silly stories about "submarine bases" in Mexican waters, on the New +England coast, and elsewhere; submarines were even reported entering +Long Island Sound; nets were stretched across the Narrows to keep them +out of New York Harbour; and our coasting vessels saw periscopes and the +wakes of torpedoes everywhere from Maine to Florida. So prevalent was +this apprehension that, in the early days of the war, American +destroyers regularly patrolled our coast looking for these far-flung +submarines. Yet the idea of seeking them this way was absurd. Even had +we known where the submarine was located there would have been little +likelihood that we could ever have sighted it, to say nothing of +getting near it. We might have learned that a German U-boat was +operating off Cape Cod; we might have had the exact latitude and +longitude of the location which it was expected that it would reach at a +particular moment. At the time the message was sent the submarine might +have been lying on the surface ready to attack a passing merchantman, +but even under these conditions the destroyer could never have reached +her quarry, for as soon as the U-boat saw the enemy approaching it would +simply have ducked under the water and remained there in perfect safety. +When all danger had passed it would again have bobbed up to the surface +as serenely as you please, and gone ahead with its appointed task of +sinking merchant ships. One of the astonishing things about this war was +that many of the naval officers of all countries did not seem to +understand until a very late date that it was utterly futile to send +anti-submarine surface craft out into the wide ocean to attack or chase +away submarines. The thing to do, of course, was to make the submarines +come to the anti-submarine craft and fight in order to get merchantmen. + +I have made this point before, and I now repeat the explanation to +emphasize that the patrol system was necessarily unsuccessful, because +it made almost impossible any combats with submarines and afforded very +little protection to shipping. The advantage of the convoy system, as +its advocates now urged, was precisely that it made such combats +inevitable. In other words, it meant offensive warfare. It was proposed +to surround each convoy with a protecting screen of destroyers in +precisely the same way that the battle fleet was protected. Thus we +should compel any submarine which was planning to torpedo a convoyed +ship to do so only in waters that were infested with destroyers. In +order to get into position to discharge its missile the submarine would +have to creep up close to the rim that marked the circle of these +destroyers. Just as soon as the torpedo started on its course and the +tell-tale wake appeared on the surface the protecting ships would +immediately begin sowing the waters with their depth charges. Thus in +the future the Germans would be compelled to fight for every ship which +they should attempt to sink, instead of sinking them conveniently in +waters that were free of destroyers, as had hitherto been their +privilege. Already the British had demonstrated that such a screen of +destroyers could protect merchant ships as well as war vessels. They +were making this fact clear every day in the successful transportation +of troops and supplies across the Channel. In this region they had +established an immune zone, which was constantly patrolled by destroyers +and other anti-submarine craft, and through these the merchant fleets +were constantly passing with complete safety. The proposal to convoy all +merchant ships was a proposal to apply this same system on a much +broader scale. If we should arrange our ships in compact convoys and +protect them with destroyers we would really create another immune zone +of this kind, and this would be different from the one established +across the Channel only in that it would be a movable one. In this way +we should establish about a square mile of the surface of the ocean in +which submarines could not operate without great danger, and then we +could move that square mile along until port was reached. + +The advantages of the convoy were thus so apparent that, despite the +pessimistic attitude of the merchant captains, there were a number of +officers in the British navy who kept insisting that it should be tried. +In this discussion I took my stand emphatically with these officers. +From the beginning I had believed in this method of combating the U-boat +warfare. Certain early experiences had led me to believe that the +merchant captains were wrong in underestimating the quality of their own +seamanship. It was my conviction that these intelligent and hardy men +did not really know how capable they were at handling ships. In my +discussions with them they disclosed an exaggerated idea of the seamanly +ability of naval officers in manoeuvring their large fleets. They +attributed this to the superior training of the men and to the special +manoeuvring qualities of the ship. "Warships are built so that they +can keep station, and turn at any angle at a moment's notice," they +would say, "but we haven't any men on our ships who can do these +things." As a matter of fact, these men were entirely in error and I +knew it. Their practical experience in handling ships of all sizes, +shapes, and speeds under a great variety of conditions is in reality +much more extensive than naval officers can possibly enjoy. I learned +this more than thirty years ago, when stationed on the Pennsylvania +schoolship, teaching the boys navigation. This was one of the most +valuable experiences of my life, for it brought me in every-day contact +with merchant seamen, and it was then that I made the discovery which +proved so valuable to me now. + +It is true that merchant captains had much to learn about steaming and +manoeuvring in formation, but I was sure they could pick it up quickly +and carry it out successfully under the direction of naval officers--the +convoy commander being always a naval officer. + +The naval officer not only has a group of vessels that are practically +uniform in speed and ability to turn around quickly, but he is provided +also with various instruments which enable him to keep the revolutions +of his engines constant, to measure distances and the like. Moreover, as +a junior officer, he is schooled in manoeuvring these very ships for +some years before he is trusted with the command of one of them, and he, +therefore, not only knows their peculiarities, but also those of their +captains--the latter very useful information, by the way. + +Though it was necessary for the merchantmen, on the other hand, to bring +their much clumsier ships into formation with perhaps thirty entirely +strange vessels of different sizes, shapes, speeds, nationalities, and +manoeuvring qualities, yet I was confident that they were competent to +handle them successfully under these difficult conditions. Indeed, +afterward, one of my most experienced destroyer commanders reported that +while he was escorting a convoy of twenty-eight ships they kept their +stations quite as well as battleships, while they were executing two +manoeuvres to avoid a submarine. + +Such influence as I possessed at this time, therefore, I threw in with +the group of British officers which was advocating the convoy. + +There was, however, still one really serious impediment to adopting this +convoy system, and that was that the number of destroyers available was +insufficient. The British, for reasons which have been explained, did +not have the necessary destroyers for this work, and this was what made +so very important the participation of the United States in the naval +war--for our navy possessed the additional vessels that would make +possible the immediate adoption of the convoy system. I do not wish to +say that the convoy would not have been established had we not sent +destroyers for that purpose, yet I do not see how otherwise it could +have been established in any complete and systematic way at such an +early date. And we furnished other ships than destroyers, for besides +providing what I have called the modern convoy--that which protects the +compact mass of vessels from submarines--it was necessary also to +furnish escorts after the old Napoleonic plan. It was the business of +the destroyers to conduct the merchantmen only through the submarine +zone. They did not take them the whole distance across the ocean, for +there was little danger of submarine attack until the ships had arrived +in the infested waters. This would have been impossible in any case with +the limited number of destroyers. But from the time the convoys left the +home port there was a possibility that the same kind of attack would be +launched as that to which convoys were subjected in Nelsonian days; +there was the danger, that is, that surface war vessels, raiders or +cruisers, might escape from their German bases and swoop down upon them. +We always had before our minds the activities of the _Moewe_, and we +therefore deemed it necessary to escort the convoys across the ocean +with battleships and cruisers, just as was the practice a century ago. +The British did not have ships enough available for this purpose, and +here again the American navy was able to supply the lack; for we had a +number of pre-dreadnoughts and cruisers that were ideally adapted to +this kind of work. + + +III + +On April 30th I received a message from Admiral Jellicoe requesting me +to visit him at the Admiralty. When I arrived he said that the projected +study of the convoy system had been made, and he handed me a copy of it. +It had been decided to send one experimental convoy from Gibraltar. The +Admiralty, he added, had not yet definitely decided that the convoy +system should be adopted, but there was every intention of giving it a +thorough and fair trial. That same evening at dinner I met Mr. Lloyd +George, Sir Edward Carson, and Lord Milner, and once more discussed with +them the whole convoy idea. I found the Prime Minister especially +favourable to the plan and, in fact, civilians in general were more +kindly disposed toward the convoy than seamen, because they were less +familiar with the nautical and shipping difficulties which it involved. + +Naval officers were immediately sent to Gibraltar to instruct the +merchant masters in the details of assembling and conducting vessels. +Eight-knot ships were selected for the experiment, and a number of +destroyers were assigned for their protection. The merchant captains, as +was to be expected, regarded the whole enterprise suspiciously, but +entered into it with the proper spirit. + +On May 20th that first convoy arrived at its English destination in +perfect condition. The success with which it made the voyage disproved +all the pessimistic opinions which the merchant sailors had entertained +about themselves. They suddenly discovered, as I had contended, that +they could do practically everything which, in their conferences with +the Admiralty, they had declared that they were unable to do. In those +meetings they had asserted that not more than two ships could keep +station; but now they discovered that the whole convoy could sail with +stipulated distances between the vessels and keep this formation with +little difficulty. They were drilled on the way in zigzagging and +manoeuvring--a practice carried out subsequently with all convoys--and +by the time they reached the danger zone they found that, in obedience +to a prearranged signal, all the ships could turn as a single one, and +perform all the zigzag evolutions which the situation demanded. They had +asserted that they could not sail at night without lights and that an +attempt to do so would result in many collisions, but the experimental +convoy proved that this was merely another case of self-delusion. +Naturally the arrival of this convoy caused the greatest satisfaction in +the Admiralty, but the most delighted men were the merchant captains +themselves, for the whole thing was to them a complete revelation of +their seamanly ability, and naturally it flattered their pride. The news +of this arrival naturally travelled fast in shipping circles; it +completely changed the attitude of the merchant sailors, and the chief +opponents of the convoy now became its most enthusiastic advocates. + +Outside shipping circles, however, nothing about this convoy was known +at that time. Yet May 20th, the date when it reached England safely, +marked one of the great turning-points of the war. That critical voyage +meant nothing less than that the Allies had found the way of defeating +the German submarine. The world might still clamour for a specific +"invention" that would destroy all the submarines overnight, or it might +demand that the Allies should block them in their bases, or suggest that +they might do any number of impossible things, but the naval chiefs of +the Allies discovered, on May 20, 1917, that they could defeat the +German campaign even without these rather uncertain aids. The submarine +danger was by no means ended when this first convoy arrived; many +anxious months still lay ahead of us; other means would have to be +devised that would supplement the convoy; yet the all-important fact was +that the Allied chiefs now realized, for the first time, that the +problem was not an insoluble one; and that, with hard work and infinite +patience, they could keep open the communications that were essential to +victory. The arrival of these weather-beaten ships thus brought the +assurance that the armies and the civilian populations could be supplied +with food and materials, and that the seas could be kept open for the +transportation of American troops to France. In fine, it meant that the +Allies could win the war. + +On May 21st the British Admiralty, which this experimental convoy had +entirely converted, voted to adopt the convoy system for all merchant +shipping. Not long afterward the second convoy arrived safely from +Hampton Roads, and then other convoys began to put in from Scandinavian +ports. On July 21st I was able definitely to report to Washington that +"the success of the convoys so far brought in shows that the system will +defeat the submarine campaign if applied generally and in time." + +But while we recognize the fact that the convoy preserved our +communications and so made possible the continuation of the war, we must +not overlook a vitally important element in its success. In describing +the work of the destroyer, which was the protecting arm of the convoy, I +have said nothing about the forces that really laid the whole foundation +of the anti-submarine campaign. All the time that these destroyers were +fighting off the submarines the power that made possible their +operations was cruising quietly in the North Sea, doing its work so +inconspicuously that the world was hardly aware of its existence. For +back of all these operations lay the mighty force of the Grand Fleet. +Admiral Beatty's dreadnoughts and battle cruisers, which were afterward +supplemented by a fine squadron of American ships, kept the German +surface vessels penned in their harbours and in this way left the ocean +free for the operations of the Allied surface craft. I have already said +that, in April, 1917, the Allied navies, while they controlled the +surface of the water, did not control the subsurface, which at that time +was practically at the disposition of the Germans. Yet the determining +fact, as we were now to learn, was that this control of the surface was +to give us the control of the subsurface also. Only the fact that the +battleships kept the German fleet at bay made it possible for the +destroyers and other surface craft to do their beneficent work. In an +open sea battle their surface navies would have disposed of the German +fleet; but let us suppose for a moment that an earthquake, or some other +great natural disturbance, had engulfed the British fleet at Scapa Flow. +The world would then have been at Germany's mercy and all the destroyers +the Allies could have put upon the sea would have availed them nothing, +for the German battleships and battle cruisers could have sunk them or +driven them into their ports. Then Allied commerce would have been the +prey, not only of the submarines, which could have operated with the +utmost freedom, but of the German surface craft as well. In a few weeks +the British food supplies would have been exhausted. There would have +been an early end to the soldiers and munitions which Britain was +constantly sending to France. The United States could have sent no +forces to the Western Front and the result would have been the surrender +which the Allies themselves, in the spring of 1917, regarded as not a +remote possibility. America would then have been compelled to face the +German power alone, and to face it long before we had had an opportunity +of assembling our resources and of equipping our armies. The world was +preserved from all these calamities because the destroyer and the convoy +solved the problem of the submarine and because back of these agencies +of victory lay Admiral Beatty's squadrons, holding at arm's length the +German surface ships while these comparatively fragile craft were saving +the liberties of the world. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +AMERICAN DESTROYERS IN ACTION + + +I + +Our first division of destroyers reached Queenstown on a Friday morning, +May 4, 1917; the following Monday they put to sea on the business of +hunting the submarine and protecting commerce. For the first month or +six weeks they spent practically all their time on patrol duty in +company with British destroyers, sloops, and other patrol vessels. +Though the convoy system was formally adopted in the latter part of May, +it was not operating completely and smoothly until August or September. +Many troop and merchant convoys were formed in the intervening period +and many were conducted through the submarine zone by American +destroyers; but our ships spent much time sailing singly, hunting for +such enemies as might betray their presence, or escorting individual +cargoes. The early experiments had demonstrated the usefulness of the +convoy system, yet a certain number of pessimists still refused to +accept it as the best solution of the shipping problem; and to +reorganize practically all the shipping of the world, scattered +everywhere on the seven seas, necessarily took time. + +But this intervening period furnished indispensable training for our +men. They gained an every-day familiarity with the waters which were to +form the scene of their operations and learned many of the tricks of the +German submarines. It was a strange world in which these young Americans +now found themselves. The life was a hard one, of course, in those +tempestuous Irish waters, with the little destroyers jumping from wave +to wave, sometimes showing daylight beneath their keels, their bows +frequently pointing skyward, or plunged deep into heavy seas, and their +sides occasionally ploughing along under the foamy waves. For days the +men lived in a world of fog and mist; rain in those regions seemed to be +almost the normal state of nature. Much has been written about the +hardships of life aboard the destroyer, and to these narratives our men +could add many details of their own. These hardships, however, did not +weigh heavily upon them, for existence in those waters, though generally +monotonous, possessed at times plenty of interest and excitement. The +very appearance of the sea showed that our men were engaging in a kind +of warfare very different from that for which they had been trained. The +enormous amount of shipping seemed to give the lie to the German reports +that British commerce had been practically arrested. A perpetual stream +of all kinds of vessels, liners, tramps, schooners, and fishing boats, +was passing toward the Irish and the English coasts. Yet here and there +other floating objects on the surface told the story. Now it was a stray +boat filled with the survivors of a torpedoed vessel; now a raft on +which lay the bodies of dead men; now the derelict hulk of a ship which +the Germans had abandoned as sunk, but which persisted in floating +aimlessly around, a constant danger to navigation. Loose mines, bobbing +in the water, hinted at the perils that were constantly threatening our +forces. In the tense imagination of the lookouts floating spars or other +debris easily took the form of periscopes. Queer-looking sailing +vessels, at a distance, aroused suspicions that they might be submarines +in disguise. A phosphorescent trail in the water was sometimes mistaken +for the wake of a torpedo. The cover of a hatchway floating on the +surface, if seen at a distance of a few hundred yards, looked much like +the conning-tower of a submarine, while the back of an occasional whale +gave a life-like representation of a U-boat awash--in fact, so life-like +was it that on one occasion several of our submarine chasers on the +English coast dropped depth charges on a whale and killed it. + +But it was the invisible rather than the visible evidences of warfare +that especially impressed our men. The air all around them was electric +with life and information. One had only to put the receiver of the +wireless to his ear to find himself in a new and animated world. The +atmosphere was constantly spluttering messages of all kinds coming from +all kinds of places. Sometimes these were sent by Admiral Bayly from +Queenstown; they would direct our men to go to an indicated spot and +escort an especially valuable cargo ship; they would tell a particular +commander that a submarine was lying at a designated latitude and +longitude and instruct him to go and "get" it. Running conversations +were frequently necessary between destroyers and the ships which they +had been detailed to escort. "Give me your position," the destroyer +would ask. "What is the name of your assistant surgeon, and who is his +friend on board our ship?" the suspicious vessel would reply--such +precaution being necessary to give assurance that the query had not come +from a German submarine. "Being pursued by a submarine Lat. 50 N., Long. +15 W."--cries of distress like this were common. Another message would +tell of a vessel that was being shelled; another would tell of a ship +that was sinking; while other messages would give the location of +lifeboats which were filled with survivors and ask for speedy help. Our +wireless operators not only received the news of friends, but also the +messages of enemies. Conversations between German submarines frequently +filled the air. They sometimes attempted to deceive us by false "S.O.S." +signals, hoping that in this way they could get an opportunity to +torpedo any vessel that responded to the call. But these attempts were +unsuccessful, for our wireless operators had no difficulty in +recognizing the "spark" of the German instruments. At times the surface +of the ocean might be calm; there would not be a ship in sight or a sign +of human existence anywhere; yet the air itself would be uninterruptedly +filled with these reminders of war. + +The duties of our destroyers, in these earliest days, were to hunt for +submarines, to escort single ships, to pick up survivors in boats, and +to go to the rescue of ships that were being attacked. For the purpose +of patrol the sea was divided into areas thirty miles square; and to +each of these one destroyer, sloop, or other vessel was assigned. The +ship was required to keep within its allotted area, unless the pursuit +of a submarine should lead it into a neighbouring one. This patrol, as I +have described, was not a satisfactory way of fighting submarines. A +vessel would occasionally get a distant glimpse of the enemy, but that +was all; as soon as the U-boat saw the ship, it simply dived to security +beneath the waves. Our destroyers had many chances to fire at the enemy +but usually at very long ranges; some of them had lively scraps, which +perhaps involved the destruction of U-boats, though this was always a +difficult thing to prove. Yet the mere fact that submarines were seldom +sunk by destroyers on patrol, either by ourselves or by the Allies, did +not mean that the latter accomplished nothing. The work chiefly expected +of destroyers on patrol was that they should keep the U-boats under the +surface as much as possible and protect commerce. Normally the submarine +sails on top of the water, looking for its prey. As long as it is beyond +the merchantmen's range of vision, it uses its high surface speed of +about 14 knots to attain a position ahead of the advancing vessel; +before the surface vessel reaches a point where its lookout can see the +submarine, the U-boat dives and awaits the favourable moment for firing +its torpedo. It cannot take these preliminary steps if there is a +destroyer anywhere in the neighbourhood; the mere presence of such a +warship therefore constitutes a considerable protection to any merchant +ship that is within sight. The submarine normally prefers to use its +guns on merchant ships, for the torpedoes are expensive and +comparatively few in number. Destroyers constantly interfered with these +gunning operations. A long distance shot usually was sufficient to make +the under-water vessel submerge and thus lose its power for doing harm. +The early experiences of our destroyers with submarines were of this +kind; but the work of chasing U-boats under the water, escorting a small +proportion of the many cargo ships, and picking up survivors, important +as it was, did not really constitute effective anti-submarine warfare. +It gave our men splendid training, it saved many a merchant ship, it +rescued many victims from the extreme dangers of German ruthlessness, it +sank a small number of submarines, but it could never have won the war. + +This patrol by destroyers and light surface vessels has been criticized +as affording an altogether ineffective method of protecting shipping, +especially when compared with the convoy system. This criticism is, of +course, justified; still we must understand that it was the only +possible method until we had enough anti-submarine craft to make the +convoy practicable. Nor must we forget that this Queenstown patrol was +organized systematically and operated with admirable skill and tireless +energy. Most of this duty fell at this time upon the British destroyers, +sloops, and other patrol vessels, which were under the command of +Admiral Bayly, and these operations were greatly aided by the gallant +actions of the British Q-ships, or "mystery ships." Though some of the +admirable exploits of these vessels will be recorded in due time, it may +be said here that the record which these ships made was not only in all +respects worthy of the traditions of their great service, but also that +they exhibited an endurance, a gallantry, and seamanlike skill that has +few parallels in the history of naval warfare. + + +II + +The headquarters of the convoy system was a room in the British +Admiralty; herein was the mainspring of the elaborate mechanism by which +ten thousand ships were conducted over the seven oceans. Here every +morning those who had been charged with the security of the Allies' +lines of communication reviewed the entire submarine situation. +Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander L. Duff, R.N., bore this heavy +responsibility, ably assisted by a number of British officers. Captain +Byron A. Long, U.S.N., a member of my staff, was associated with Admiral +Duff in this important work. It was Captain Long's duty to co-ordinate +the movements of our convoys with the much more numerous convoys of the +Allies; he performed this task so efficiently that, once the convoy +organization was in successful operation, I eliminated the whole subject +from my anxieties and requested Captain Long not to inform me when troop +convoys sailed from the United States or when they were due to arrive in +France or England. There seemed to be no reason why both of us should +lose sleep over the same cause. + +The most conspicuous feature of the convoy room was a huge chart, +entirely covering the wall on one side of the office; access to this +chart was obtained by ladders not unlike those which are used in shoe +stores. It gave a comprehensive view of the North and South American +coast, the Atlantic Ocean, the British Isles, and a considerable part +of Europe and Africa. The ports which it especially emphasized were +Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax, New York, Hampton Roads, Gibraltar, and +Sierra Leone and Dakar, ports on the west coast of Africa. Thin threads +were stretched from each one of these seven points to certain positions +in the ocean just outside the British Isles, and on these threads were +little paper boats, each one of which represented a convoy. When a +particular convoy started from New York, one of these paper boats was +placed at that point; as it made its way across the ocean, the boat was +moved from day to day in accordance with the convoy's progress. At any +moment, therefore, a mere glance at this chart, with its multitude of +paper boats, gave the spectator the precise location of all the commerce +which was then _en route_ to the scene of war. + +But there were other exhibits on the chart which were even more +conspicuous than these minute representations of convoys. Little circles +were marked off in the waters surrounding the British Isles, each one of +which was intended to show the location of a German submarine. From day +to day each one of these circles was moved in accordance with the +ascertained positions of the submarine which it represented, a straight +line indicating its course on the chart. Perhaps the most remarkable +fact about the Allied convoy service was the minute information which it +possessed about the movements of German submarines. A kind of separate +intelligence bureau devoted its entire attention to this subject. +Readers of detective stories are familiar with the phenomenon known as +"shadowing." It is a common practice in the detective's fascinating +profession to assign a man, known as a "shadow," to the duty of keeping +a particular person under constant observation. With admirable patience +and skill an experienced "shadow" keeps in view this object of his +attention for twenty-four hours; he dogs him through crowded streets, +tracks him up and down high office buildings, accompanies him to +restaurants, trolley cars, theatres, and hotels, and unobtrusively +chases him through dense thoroughfares in cabs and automobiles. "We get +him up in the morning and we put him to bed at night" is the way the +"shadow" describes the assiduous care which he bestows upon his +unsuspecting victim. In much the same fashion did the Allied secret +service "shadow" German submarines; it got each submarine "up in the +morning and put it to bed at night." That is to say, the intelligence +department took charge of Fritz and his crew as they emerged from their +base, and kept an unwearied eye upon them until they sailed back home. +The great chart in the convoy room of the Admiralty showed, within the +reasonable limits of human fallibility, where each submarine was +operating at a particular moment, and it also kept minute track of its +performances. + +Yet it was not so difficult to gather this information as may at first +be supposed. I have already said that there were comparatively few +submarines, perhaps not more than an average of eight or nine, which +were operating at the same time in the waters south and west of Ireland, +the region with which we Americans were most concerned. These boats +betrayed their locations in a multitude of ways. Their commanders were +particularly careless in the use of wireless. The Germanic passion for +conversation could not be suppressed even on the U-boats, even though +this national habit might lead to the most serious consequences. +Possibly also the solitary submarine felt lonely; at any rate, as soon +as it reached the Channel or the North Sea, it started an almost +uninterrupted flow of talk. The U-boats communicated principally with +each other, and also with the Admiralty at home; and, in doing this, +they gave away their positions to the assiduously listening Allies. The +radio-direction finder, an apparatus by which we can instantaneously +locate the position from which a wireless message is sent, was the +mechanism which furnished us much of this information. Of course, the +Germans knew that their messages revealed their locations, for they had +direction finders as well as we, but the fear of discovery did not act +as a curb upon a naturally loquacious nature. And we had other ways of +following their movements. The submarine spends much the larger part of +its time on the surface. Sailing thus conspicuously, it was constantly +being sighted by merchant or military ships, which had explicit +instructions to report immediately the elusive vessel, and to give its +exact location. Again it is obvious that a submarine could not fire at a +merchantman or torpedo one, or even attempt to torpedo one, without +revealing its presence. The wireless operators of all merchant vessels +were supplied at all times with the longitude and latitude of their +ships; their instructions required them immediately to send out this +information whenever they sighted a submarine or were attacked by one. +In these several ways we had little difficulty in "shadowing" the +U-boats. For example, we would hear that the _U-53_ was talking just +outside of Heligoland; this submarine would be immediately plotted on +the chart. As the submarine made only about ten knots on the surface, in +order to save fuel oil, and much less under the surface, we could draw a +circle around this point, and rest assured that the boat must be +somewhere within this circle at a given time. But in a few hours or a +day we would hear from this same boat again; perhaps it was using its +wireless or attacking a merchantman; or perhaps one of our vessels had +spotted it on the surface. The news of this new location would justify +the convoy officers in moving this submarine on our chart to this new +position. Within a short time the convoy officers acquired an +astonishingly intimate knowledge of these boats and the habits of their +commanders. Indeed, the personalities of some of these German officers +ultimately took shape with surprising clearness; for they betrayed their +presence in the ocean by characteristics that often furnished a means of +identifying them. Each submarine behaved in a different way from the +others, the difference, of course, representing the human element in +control. One would deliver his attacks in rapid succession, boldly and +almost recklessly; another would approach his task with the utmost +caution; certain ones would display the meanest traits in human nature; +while others--let us be just--were capable of a certain display of +generosity, and possibly even of chivalry. By studying the individual +traits of each commander we could often tell just which one was +operating at a given time; and this information was extremely valuable +in the game in which we were engaged. + +"Old Hans is out again," the officers in the convoy room would remark. + +They were speaking of Hans Rose, the commander of the _U-53_; this was +that same submarine officer who, in the fall of 1916, brought that boat +to Newport, Rhode Island, and torpedoed five or six ships off Nantucket. +Our men never saw Hans Rose face to face; they had not the faintest +idea whether he was fat or lean, whether he was fair or dark; yet they +knew his military characteristics intimately. He became such a familiar +personality in the convoy room and his methods of operation were so +individual, that we came to have almost a certain liking for the old +chap. Other U-boat commanders would appear off the hunting grounds and +attack ships in more or less easy-going fashion. Then another boat would +suddenly appear, and--bang! bang! bang! Torpedo after torpedo would fly, +four or five ships would sink, and then this disturbing person would +vanish as unexpectedly as he had arrived. Such an experience informed +the convoy officers that Hans Rose was once more at large. We acquired a +certain respect for Hans because he was a brave man who would take +chances which most of his compatriots would avoid; and, above all, +because he played his desperate game with a certain decency. Sometimes, +when he torpedoed a ship, Rose would wait around until all the lifeboats +were filled; he would then throw out a tow line, give the victims food, +and keep all the survivors together until the rescuing destroyer +appeared on the horizon, when he would let go and submerge. This +humanity involved considerable risk to Captain Rose, for a destroyer +anywhere in his neighbourhood, as he well knew, was a serious matter. It +was he who torpedoed our destroyer, the _Jacob Jones_. He took a shot at +her from a distance of two miles--a distance from which a hit is a pure +chance; and the torpedo struck and sank the vessel within a few minutes. +On this occasion Rose acted with his usual decency. The survivors of the +_Jacob Jones_ naturally had no means of communication, since the +wireless had gone down with their ship; and now Rose, at considerable +risk to himself, sent out an "S.O.S." call, giving the latitude and +longitude, and informing Queenstown that the men were floating around in +open boats. It is perhaps not surprising that Rose is one of the few +German U-boat commanders with whom Allied naval officers would be +willing to-day to shake hands. I have heard naval officers say that they +would like to meet him after the war. + +We were able to individualize other commanders; the business of +acquiring this knowledge, learning the location of their submarines and +the characteristics of their boats, and using this vital information in +protecting convoys, was all part of the game which was being played in +London. It was the greatest game of "chess" which history has known--a +game that exacted not only the most faithful and studious care, but one +in which it was necessary that all the activities should be centralized +in one office. This small group of officers in the Admiralty convoy +room, composed of representatives of all the nations concerned, +exercised a control which extended throughout the entire convoy system. +It regulated the dates when convoys sailed from America or other ports +and when they arrived; if it had not taken charge of this whole system, +congestion and confusion would inevitably have resulted. We had only a +limited number of destroyers to escort all troops and other important +convoys arriving in Europe; it was therefore necessary that they should +arrive at regular and predetermined intervals. It was necessary also +that one group of officers should control the routing of all convoys, +otherwise there would have been serious danger of collisions between +outward and inward bound ships, and no possibility of routing them clear +of the known positions of submarines. The great centre of all this +traffic was not New York or Hampton Roads, but London. It was +inevitable, if the convoy system was to succeed, that it should have a +great central headquarters, and it was just as inevitable that this +headquarters should be London. + +On the huge chart already described the convoys, each indicated by a +little boat, were shown steadily making their progress toward the +appointed rendezvous. Eight or nine submarines, likewise indicated on +the chart, were always waiting to intercept them. On that great board +the prospective tragedies of the seas were thus unfolding before our +eyes. Here, for example, was a New York convoy of twenty ships, steaming +toward Liverpool, but steering straight toward the position of a +submarine. The thing to do was perfectly plain. It was a simple matter +to send the convoy a wireless message to take a course fifty miles to +the south where, according to the chart, there were no hidden enemies. +In a few hours the little paper boat, which represented this group of +ships and which was apparently headed for destruction, would suddenly +turn southward, pass around the entirely unconscious submarine, and then +take an unobstructed course for its destination. The Admiralty convoy +board knew so accurately the position of all the submarines that it +could almost always route the convoys around them. It was an extremely +interesting experience to watch the paper ships on this chart deftly +turn out of the course of U-boats, sometimes when they seemed almost on +the point of colliding with them. That we were able constantly to save +the ships by sailing the convoys around the submarines brings out the +interesting fact that, even had there been no destroyer escort, the +convoy in itself would have formed a great protection to merchant +shipping. There were times when we had no escorting vessels to send with +certain convoys; and in such instances we simply routed the ships in +masses, directed them on courses which we knew were free of submarines, +and in this way brought them safely into port. + + +III + +The Admiralty in London was thus the central nervous system of a +complicated but perfectly working organism which reached the remotest +corners of the world. Wherever there was a port, whether in South +America, Australia, or in the most inaccessible parts of India or China, +from which merchantmen sailed to any of the other countries which were +involved in the war, representatives of the British navy and the British +Government were stationed, all working harmoniously with shipping men in +the effort to get their cargoes safely through the danger zones. These +danger zones occupied a comparatively small area surrounding the +belligerent countries, but the safeguarding of the ships was an +elaborate process which began far back in the countries from which the +commerce started. Until about July, 1917, the world's shipping for the +most part had been unregulated; now for the first time it was arranged +in hard and fast routes and despatched in accordance with schedules as +fixed as those of a great railroad. The whole management of convoys, +indeed, bore many resemblances to the method of handling freight cars on +the American system of transcontinental lines. In the United States +there are several great headquarters of freight, sometimes known as +"gateways," places, that is, at which freight cars are assembled from a +thousand places, and from which the great accumulations are routed to +their destinations. Such places are Pittsburg, Buffalo, St. Louis, +Chicago, Minneapolis, Denver, San Francisco--to mention only a few. +Shipping destined for the belligerent nations was similarly assembled, +in the years 1917 and 1918, at six or eight great ocean "gateways," and +there formed into convoys for "through routing" to the British Isles, +France, and the Mediterranean. Only a few of the ships that were +exceptionally fast--speed in itself being a particularly efficacious +protection against submarines--were permitted to ignore this routing +system, and dash unprotected through the infested area. This was a +somewhat dangerous procedure even for such ships, however, and they were +escorted whenever destroyers were available. All other vessels, from +whatever parts of the world they might come, were required to sail first +for one of these great assembling points, or "gateways"; and at these +places they were added to one of the constantly forming convoys. Thus +all shipping which normally sailed to Europe around the Cape of Good +Hope proceeded up the west coast of Africa until it reached the port of +Dakar or Sierra Leone, where it joined the convoy. Shipping from the +east coast of South America--ports like Rio de Janeiro, Bahia, Buenos +Aires, and Montevideo--instead of sailing directly to Europe, joined the +convoy at this same African town. Vessels which came to Britain and +France by way of Suez and Mediterranean ports found their great stopping +place at Gibraltar--a headquarters of traffic which, in the huge amount +of freight which it "created," became almost the Pittsburg of this +mammoth transportation system. The four "gateways" for North America and +the west coast of South America were Sydney (Cape Breton), Halifax, New +York, and Hampton Roads. The grain-laden merchantmen from the St. +Lawrence valley rendezvoused at Sydney and Halifax. Vessels from +Portland, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and other Atlantic points +found their assembling headquarters at New York, while ships from +Baltimore, Norfolk, the Gulf of Mexico, and the west coast of South +America proceeded to the great convoy centre which had been established +at Hampton Roads. + +In the convoy room of the Admiralty these aggregations of ships were +always referred to as the "Dakar convoy," the "Halifax convoy," the +"Hampton Roads convoy," and the like. When the system was completely +established the convoys sailed from their appointed headquarters on +regular schedules, like railroad trains. From New York one convoy +departed every sixteen days for the west coast of England and one left +every sixteen days for the east coast. From Hampton Roads one sailed +every eight days to the west coast and one every eight days to the east +coast, and convoys from all the other convoy points maintained a +similarly rigid schedule. The dates upon which these sailings took place +were fixed, like the arrivals and departures of trains upon a railroad +time-table, except when it became necessary to delay the sailing of a +convoy to avoid congestion of arrivals. According to this programme, the +first convoy to the west coast left New York on August 14, 1917, and its +successors thereafter sailed at intervals of about sixteen days. The +instructions sent to shipmasters all over the world, by way of the +British consulates, gave explicit details concerning the method of +assembling their convoys. + +Here, for example, was a ship at New York, all loaded and ready to sail +for the war zone. The master visited the port officer at the British +consulate, who directed him to proceed to Gravesend Bay, anchor his +vessel, and report to the convoy officers for further instructions. The +merchant captain, reaching this indicated spot, usually found several +other vessels on hand, all of them, like his ship, waiting for the +sailing date. The commander of the gathering convoy, under whose +instructions all the merchantmen were to operate, was a naval officer, +usually of the rank of commodore or captain, who maintained constant +cable communication with the convoy room of the Admiralty and usually +used one of the commercial vessels as his flagship. When the sailing day +arrived usually from twenty to thirty merchantmen had assembled; the +commander summoned all their masters, gave each a blue book containing +instructions for the management of convoyed ships, and frequently +delivered something in the nature of a lecture. Before the aggregation +sailed it was joined by a cruiser or pre-dreadnought battleship of the +American navy, or by a British or French cruiser. This ship was to +accompany the convoy across the Atlantic as far as the danger zone; its +mission was not, as most people mistakenly believed, to protect the +convoy from submarines, but to protect it from any surface German raider +that might have escaped into the high seas. The Allied navies constantly +had before their minds the exploits of the _Emden_; the opportunity to +break up a convoy in mid-ocean by dare-devil enterprises of this kind +was so tempting that it seemed altogether likely that Germany might take +advantage of it. To send twenty or thirty merchant ships across the +Atlantic with no protection against such assaults would have been to +invite a possible disaster. As a matter of fact, the last German raider +that even attempted to gain the high seas was sunk in the North Sea by +the British Patrol Squadron in February, 1917. + +On the appointed day the whole convoy weighed anchor and silently +slipped out to sea. To such spectators as observed its movements it +seemed to be a rather limping, halting procession. The speed of a convoy +was the speed of its slowest ship, and vessels that could easily make +twelve or fourteen knots were obliged to throttle down their engines, +much to the disgust of their masters, in order to keep formation with a +ship that made only eight or ten; though whenever possible vessels of +nearly equal speed sailed together. Little in the newly assembled group +suggested the majesty of the sea. The ships formed a miscellaneous and +ill-assorted company, rusty tramps shamefacedly sailing alongside of +spick-and-span liners; miserable little two-or three-thousand ton ships +attempting to hold up their heads in the same company with other ships +of ten or twelve. The whole mass was sprawled over the sea in most +ungainly fashion; twenty or thirty ships, with spaces of nine hundred or +a thousand yards stretching between them, took up not far from ten +square miles of the ocean surface. Neither at this stage of the voyage +did the aggregation give the idea of efficiency. It presented about as +desirable a target as the submarine could have desired. But the period +taken in crossing the ocean was entirely devoted to education. Under the +tutorship of the convoy commander, the men composing the twenty or +thirty crews went every day to school. For fifteen or twenty days upon +the broad Atlantic they were trained in all the evolutions which were +necessary for coping with the submarine. Every possible situation that +could arise in the danger zone was anticipated and the officers and the +crews were trained to meet it. They perfected themselves in the signal +code; they learned the art of making the sudden manoeuvres which were +instantaneously necessary when a submarine was sighted; they acquired a +mastery in the art of zigzagging; and they became accustomed to sailing +at night without lights. The crews were put through all the drills which +prepared them to meet such crises as the landing of a torpedo in their +engine-room or the sinking of the ship; and they were thoroughly +schooled in getting all hands safely into the boats. Possibly an +occasional scare on the way over may have introduced the element of +reality into these exercises; though no convoys actually met submarines +in the open ocean, the likelihood that they might do so was never +absent, especially after the Germans began sending out their huge +under-water cruisers. + +The convoy commander left his port with sealed orders, which he was +instructed not to open until he was a hundred miles at sea. These +orders, when the seal was broken, gave him the rendezvous assigned by +Captain Long of the convoy board in London. The great chart in the +convoy room at the Admiralty indicated the point to which the convoy was +to proceed and at which it would be met by the destroyer escorts and +taken through the danger zone. This particular New York convoy commander +was now perhaps instructed to cross the thirtieth meridian at the +fifty-second parallel of latitude, where he would be met by his escort. +He laid his course for that point and regulated his speed so as to reach +it at the appointed time. But he well knew that these instructions were +only temporary. The precise point to which he would finally be directed +to sail depended upon the movement and location of the German submarines +at the time of his arrival. If the enemy became particularly active in +the region of this tentative rendezvous, then, as the convoy approached +it, a wireless from London would instruct the commander to steer +abruptly to another point, perhaps a hundred miles to north or south. + +"Getting your convoy" was a searching test of destroyer seamanship, +particularly in heavy or thick weather. It was not the simplest thing to +navigate a group of destroyers through the tempestuous waters of the +North Atlantic, with no other objective than the junction point of a +certain meridian and parallel, and reach the designated spot at a +certain hour. Such a feat demanded navigation ability of a high order; +and the skill which our American naval officers displayed in this +direction aroused great admiration, especially on the part of the +merchant skippers; in particular it aroused the astonishment of the +average doughboy. Many destroyer escorts that went out to meet an +incoming convoy also took out one which was westward bound. A few +mishaps in the course of the war, such as the sinking of the _Justicia_, +which was sailing from Europe to America, created the false notion that +outward-bound convoys were not escorted. It was just as desirable, of +course, to escort the ships going out as it was to escort those which +were coming in. The mere fact that the inbound ships carried troops and +supplies gave stronger reasons, from the humane standpoint, for heavier +escorts, but not from the standpoint of the general war situation. The +Germans were not sinking our ships because they were carrying men and +supplies; they were sinking them simply because they were ships. They +were not seeking to destroy American troops and munitions exclusively; +they were seeking to destroy tonnage. They were aiming to reduce the +world's supply of ships to such a point that the Allies would be +compelled to abandon the conflict for lack of communications. It was +therefore necessary that they should sink the empty ships, which were +going out, as well as the crowded and loaded ships which were coming in. +For the same reason it was necessary that we should protect them, and we +did this as far as practicable without causing undue delays in forming +outward-bound convoys. The _Justicia_, though most people still think +that she was torpedoed because she was unescorted, was, in fact, +protected by a destroyer escort of considerable size. This duty of +escorting outward-bound ships increased considerably the strain on our +destroyer force. The difficulty was that the inbound convoy arrived in a +body, but that the ships could not be unloaded and sent back in a body +without detaining a number of them an undue length of time--and time was +such an important factor in this war that it was necessary to make the +"turn-around" of each important transport as quickly as possible. The +consequence was that returning ships were often despatched in small +convoys as fast as they were unloaded. The escorts which we were able +to supply for such groups were thus much weaker than absolute safety +required, and sometimes we were even forced to send vessels across the +submarine zone with few, if any, escorting warships. This explains why +certain homeward-bound transports were torpedoed, and this was +particularly true of troop and munition convoys to the western ports of +France. Only when we could assemble a large outgoing convoy and despatch +it at such a time that it could meet an incoming one at the western edge +of the submarine zone could we give these vessels the same destroyer +escort as that which we always gave for the loaded convoys bound for +European ports. + +As soon as the destroyers made contact with an inward-bound convoy, the +ocean escort, the cruiser or pre-dreadnought, if an American, abandoned +it and started it back home, sometimes with a westbound convoy if one +had been assembled in time. British escorts went ahead at full speed +into a British port, usually escorted by one or more destroyers. This +abandonment sometimes aroused the wrath of the passengers on the inbound +convoy. Their protector had dropped them just as they had entered the +submarine zone, the very moment its services were really needed! These +passengers did not understand, any more than did the people at home, +that the purpose of the ocean escort was not to protect them from +submarines, but from possible raiders. Inside the danger zone this ocean +escort would become part of the convoy itself and require protection +from submarines, so that its rather summary departure really made the +merchantmen more secure. As the convoy approached the danger zone, after +being drilled all the way across the ocean, its very appearance was more +taut and business-like. The ships were closed up into a much more +compact formation, keeping only such distances apart as were essential +for quick manoeuvring. Generally the convoy was formed in a long +parallelogram, the distance across the front of which was much longer +than the depth or distance along the sides. Usually the formation was a +number of groups of four vessels each, in column or "Indian file," at a +distance of about five hundred yards from ship to ship, and all groups +abreast of each other and about half a mile apart. Thus a convoy of +twenty-four vessels, or six groups of four, would have a width of about +three miles and a depth of one. Most of the destroyers were stationed +on the narrow sides, for it was only on the side, or the beam, that the +submarines could attack with much likelihood of succeeding. It was +usually necessary for a destroyer to be stationed in the rear of a +convoy, for, though the speed of nearly all convoys was faster than that +of a submarine when submerged, the latter while running on the surface +could follow a convoy at night with a fair chance of torpedoing a vessel +at early daylight and escaping to the rear if unhampered by the presence +of a rear-guard destroyer. It was generally impracticable and dangerous +for the submarine to wait ahead, submerge, and launch its torpedoes as +the convoy passed over it. The extent to which purely mechanical details +protected merchant ships is not understood, and this inability to attack +successfully from the front illustrates this point. The submarine +launches its torpedoes from tubes in the bow or stern; it has no tubes +on the beam. If it did possess such side tubes, it could lie in wait +ahead and shoot its broadsides at the convoy as it passed over the spot +where it was concealed. Its length in that case would be parallel to +that of the merchant ships, and thus it would have a comparatively small +part of its area exposed to the danger of ramming. The mere fact that +its torpedo tubes are placed in the bow and stern makes it necessary for +the submarine, if it wishes to attack in the fashion described, to turn +almost at right angles to the course of the convoy, and to manoeuvre +into a favourable position from which to discharge its missile--a +procedure so altogether hazardous that it almost never attempts it. With +certain reservations, which it is hardly necessary to explain in detail +at this point, it may be taken at least as a general rule that the sides +of the convoy not only furnish the U-boats much the best chance to +torpedo ships, but also subject them to the least danger; and this is +the reason why, in the recent war, the destroyers were usually +concentrated at these points. + +I have already compared the convoy system to a great aggregation of +railroads. This comparison holds good of its operation after it had +entered the infested zone. Indeed the very terminology of our railroad +men was used. Every convoy nearly followed one of two main routes, known +at convoy headquarters as the two "trunk lines." The trunk line which +reached the west coast of England usually passed north of Ireland +through the North Channel and down the Irish Sea to Liverpool. Under +certain conditions these convoys passed south of Ireland and thence up +the Irish Sea. The convoys to the east coast took a trunk line that +passed up the English Channel. Practically all shipping from the United +States to Great Britain and France took one of these trunk lines. But, +like our railroad systems, each of these main routes had branch lines. +Thus shipping destined for French ports took the southern route until +off the entrance to the English Channel; here it abandoned the main line +and took a branch route to Brest, Bordeaux, Nantes, and other French +ports. In the Channel likewise several "single-track" branches went to +various English ports, such as Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, and +the like. The whole gigantic enterprise flowed with a precision and a +regularity which I think it is hardly likely that any other +transportation system has ever achieved. + + +IV + +A description of a few actual convoys, and the experiences of our +destroyers with them, will perhaps best make clear the nature of the +mechanism which protected the world's shipping. For this purpose I have +selected typical instances which illustrate the every-day routine +experiences of escorting destroyers, and other experiences in which +their work was more spectacular. + +One day in late October, 1917, a division of American destroyers at +Queenstown received detailed instructions from Admiral Bayly to leave at +a certain hour and escort the outward convoy "O Q 17" and bring into +port the inbound convoy "H S 14." These detailed instructions were based +upon general instructions issued from the Admiralty, where my staff was +in constant attendance and co-operation. The symbols by which these two +groups of ships were designated can be easily interpreted. The O Q +simply meant that convoy "No. 17"--the seventeenth which had left that +port--was Outward bound from Queenstown, and the H S signified that +convoy "No. 14" was Homeward bound from Sydney, Cape Breton. Queenstown +during the first few months was one of those places at which ships, +having discharged their cargoes, assembled in groups for despatching +back to the United States. Later Milford Haven, Liverpool, and other +ports were more often used for this purpose. Vessels had been arriving +here for several days from ports of the Irish Sea and the east coast of +England. These had now been formed into convoy "O Q 17"; they were ready +for a destroyer escort to take them through the submarine zone and start +them on the westward voyage to American ports. + +This escort consisted of eight American destroyers and one British +"special service ship"; the latter was one of that famous company of +decoy vessels, or "mystery ships," which, though to all outward +appearances unprotected merchantmen, really carried concealed armament +of sufficient power to destroy any submarine that came within range. +This special service ship, the _Aubrietia_, was hardly a member of the +protective escort. Her mission was to sail about thirty miles ahead of +the convoy; when observed from the periscope or the conning-tower of a +submarine, the _Aubrietia_ seemed to be merely a helpless merchantman +sailing alone, and as such she presented a particularly tempting target +to the U-boat. But her real purpose in life was to be torpedoed. After +landing its missile in a vessel's side, the submarine usually remained +submerged for a period, while the crew of its victim was getting off in +boats; it then came to the surface, and the men prepared to board the +disabled ship and search her for valuables and delicacies, particularly +for information which would assist them in their campaign, such as +secret codes, sailing instructions, and the like. The mystery ship had +been preparing for this moment, and as soon as the submarine broke +water, the gun ports of the disguised merchantman dropped, and her +hitherto concealed guns began blazing away at the German. By October, +1917, these special service ships had already accounted for several +submarines; and it had now become a frequent practice to attach one or +more to a convoy, either ahead, where she might dispose of the submarine +lying in wait for the approaching aggregation, or in the rear, where a +U-boat might easily mistake her for one of those stragglers which were +an almost inevitable part of every convoy. + +Trawlers and mine-sweepers, as was the invariable custom, spent several +hours sweeping the Queenstown Channel before the sailing of convoy "O Q +17" and its escort. Promptly at the appointed time the eight American +ships sailed out in "Indian file," passing through the net which was +always kept in place at the entrance to the harbour. Their first duty +was to patrol the waters outside for a radius of twelve miles; it was +not improbable that the Germans, having learned that this convoy was to +sail, had stationed a submarine not far from the harbour entrance. +Having finally satisfied himself that there were no lurking enemies in +the neighbourhood, the commander of the destroyer flagship signalled to +the merchant ships, which promptly left the harbour and entered the open +sea. The weather was stormy; the wind was blowing something of a gale +and head seas were breaking over the destroyers' decks. But the convoy +quickly manoeuvred into three columns, the destroyers rapidly closed +around them, and the whole group started for "Rendezvous A"--this being +the designation of that spot on the ocean's surface where the fourteenth +meridian of longitude crosses the forty-ninth parallel of latitude--a +point in the Atlantic about three hundred miles south-west of +Queenstown, regarded at that time as safely beyond the operating zone of +the submarine. Meanwhile, the "mystery ship," sailing far ahead, +disappeared beneath the horizon. + +Convoying ships in the stormy autumn and winter waters, amid the fog and +rain of the eastern Atlantic, was a monotonous and dreary occupation. +Only one or two incidents enlivened this particular voyage. As the +_Parker_, Commander Halsey Powell, was scouting ahead at about two +o'clock in the afternoon, her lookout suddenly sighted a submarine, +bearing down upon the convoy. Immediately the news was wirelessed to +every vessel. As soon as the message was received, the whole convoy, at +a signal from the flagship, turned four points to port. For nearly two +hours the destroyers searched this area for the submerged submarine, but +that crafty boat kept itself safely under the water, and the convoy now +again took up its original course. About two days' sailing brought the +ships to the point at which the protecting destroyers could safely leave +them, as far as submarines were concerned, to continue unescorted to +America; darkness had now set in, and, under its cover, the merchantmen +slipped away from the warships and started westward. Meantime, the +destroyer escort had received a message from the _Cumberland_, the +British cruiser which was acting as ocean escort to convoy "HS 14." +"Convoy is six hours late," she reported, much like the announcer at a +railroad station who informs the waiting crowds that the incoming train +is that much overdue. According to the schedule these ships should reach +the appointed rendezvous at six o'clock the next morning; this message +evidently moved the time of arrival up to noon. The destroyers, slowing +down so that they would not arrive ahead of time, started for the +designated spot. + +Sometimes thick weather made it impossible to fix the position by +astronomical observations, and the convoy might not be at its appointed +rendezvous. For this reason the destroyers now deployed on a north and +south line about twenty miles long for several hours. Somewhat before +the appointed time one of the destroyers sighted a faint cloud of smoke +on the western horizon, and soon afterward thirty-two merchantmen, +sailing in columns of fours, began to assume a definite outline. At a +signal from this destroyer the other destroyers of the escort came in at +full speed and ranged themselves on either side of the convoy--a +manoeuvre that always excited the admiration of the merchant skippers. +This mighty collection of vessels, occupying about ten or twelve square +miles on the ocean, skilfully maintaining its formation, was really a +beautiful and inspiring sight. When the destroyers had gained their +designated positions on either side, the splendid cavalcade sailed +boldly into the area which formed the favourite hunting grounds for the +submarine. + +As soon as this danger zone was reached the whole aggregation, +destroyers and merchant ships, began to zigzag. The commodore on the +flagship hoisted the signal, "Zigzag A," and instantaneously the whole +thirty-two ships began to turn twenty-five degrees to starboard. The +great ships, usually so cumbersome, made this simultaneous turn with all +the deftness, and even with all the grace of a school of fish into which +one has suddenly cast a stone. All the way across the Atlantic they had +been practising such an evolution; most of them had already sailed +through the danger zone more than once, so that the manoeuvre was by +this time an old story. For ten or fifteen minutes they proceeded along +this course, when immediately, like one vessel, the convoy turned twenty +degrees to port, and started in a new direction. And so on for hours, +now a few minutes to the right, now a few minutes to the left, and now +again straight ahead, while all the time the destroyers were cutting +through the water, every eye of the skilled lookouts in each crew fixed +upon the surface for the first glimpse of a periscope. This zigzagging +was carried out according to comprehensive plans which enabled the +convoy to zigzag for hours at a time without signals, the courses and +the time on each course being designated in the particular plan ordered, +all ships' clocks being set exactly alike by time signal. Probably I +have made it clear why these zigzagging evolutions constituted such a +protective measure. All the time the convoy was sailing in the danger +zone it was assumed that a submarine was present, looking for a chance +to torpedo. Even though the officers might know that there was no +submarine within three hundred miles, this was never taken for granted; +the discipline of the whole convoy system rested upon the theory that +the submarine was there, waiting only the favourable moment to start the +work of destruction. But a submarine, as already said, could not strike +without the most thorough preparation. It must get within three or four +hundred yards or the torpedo would stand little chance of hitting the +mark in a vital spot. The commander almost never shot blindly into the +convoy, on the chance of hitting some ship; he carefully selected his +victim; his calculation had to include its speed, the speed of his own +boat and that of his torpedo; above all, he had to be sure of the +direction in which his intended quarry was steaming; and in this +calculation the direction of the merchantman formed perhaps the most +important element. But if the ships were constantly changing their +direction, it is apparent that the submarine could make no calculations +which would have much practical value. + +In the afternoon the _Aubrietia_, the British mystery ship which was +sailing thirty miles ahead of the convoy, reported that she had sighted +a submarine. Two or three destroyers dashed for the indicated area, +searched it thoroughly, found no traces of the hidden boat, and returned +to the convoy. The next morning six British destroyers and one cruiser +arrived from Devonport. Up to this time the convoy had been following +the great "trunk line" which led into the Channel, but it had now +reached the point where the convoys split up, part going to English +ports and part to French. These British destroyers had come to take over +the twenty ships which were bound for their own country, while the +American destroyers were assigned to escort the rest to Brest. The +following conversation--typical of those that were constantly filling +the air in that area--now took place between the American flagship and +the British: + + _Conyngham_ to _Achates_: This is the _Conyngham_, Commander + Johnson. I would like to keep the convoy together until this + evening. I will work under your orders until I leave with convoy + for Brest. + + _Achates_ to _Conyngham_: Please make your own arrangements for + taking French convoy with you to-night. + + _Achates_ to _Conyngham_: What time do you propose leaving with + French convoy to-night? + + _Conyngham_ to _Achates_: About 5 P.M. in order to arrive + in Brest to-night. + + Devonport Commander-in-chief to _Conyngham_: Proceed in execution + Admiralty orders _Achates_ having relieved you. Submarine activity + in Lat. 48.41, Long. 4.51. + +The _Aubrietia_ had already given warning of the danger referred to in +the last words of this final message. It had been flashing the news in +this way: + + 1.15 P.M. _Aubrietia_ to _Conyngham_: Submarine sighted + 49.30 N 6.8 W. Sighted submarine on surface. Speed is not enough. + Course south-west by south magnetic. + + 1.30 P.M. _Conyngham_ to _Achates_: Aubrietia to all + men-of-war and Land's End. Chasing submarine on the surface 49.30 N + 6.8 W, course south-west by south. Waiting to get into range. He is + going faster than I can. + + 2.00 P.M. _Aubrietia_ to all men-of-war. Submarine + submerged 49.20 N 6.12 W. Still searching. + +The fact that nothing more was seen of that submarine may possibly +detract from the thrill of the experience, but in describing the +operations of this convoy I am not attempting to tell a story of wild +adventure, but merely to set forth what happened ninety-nine out of a +hundred times. What made destroyer work so exasperating was that, in +the vast majority of cases, the option of fighting or not fighting lay +with the submarine. Had the submarine decided to approach and attack the +convoy, the chances would have been more than even that it would have +been destroyed. In accordance with its usual practice, however, it chose +to submerge, and that decision ended the affair for the moment. This was +the way in which merchant ships were protected. At the time this +submarine was sighted it was headed directly for this splendid +aggregation of cargo vessels; had not the _Aubrietia_ discovered it and +had not one of the American destroyers started in pursuit, the U-boat +would have made an attack and possibly would have sent one or more ships +to the bottom. The chief business of the escorting ships, all through +the war, was this unspectacular one of chasing the submarines away; and +for every under-water vessel actually destroyed there were hundreds of +experiences such as the one which I have just described. + +The rest of this trip was uneventful. Two American destroyers escorted +H.M.S. _Cumberland_--the ocean escort which had accompanied the convoy +from Sydney--to Devonport; the rest of the American escort took its +quota of merchantmen into Brest, and from that point sailed back to +Queenstown, whence, after three or four days in port, it went out with +another convoy. This was the routine which was repeated until the end of +the war. + +The "O Q 17" and the "H S 14" form an illustration of convoys which made +their trips successfully. Yet these same destroyers had another +experience which pictures other phases of the convoy system. + +On the morning of October 19th, Commander Johnson's division was +escorting a great convoy of British ships on its way to the east coast +of England. Suddenly out of the air came one of those calls which were +daily occurrences in the submarine zone. The _J. L. Luckenback_ +signalled her position, ninety miles ahead of the convoy, and that she +was being shelled by a submarine. In a few minutes the _Nicholson_, one +of the destroyers of the escort, started to the rescue. For the next few +hours our ships began to pick out of the air the messages which detailed +the progress of this adventure--messages which tell the story so +graphically, and which are so typical of the events which were +constantly taking place in those waters, that I reproduce them verbatim: + + 8.50 A.M. S.O.S. _J. L. Luckenback_ being gunned by + submarine. Position 48.08 N 9.31 W. + + 9.25 _Conyngham_ to _Nicholson:_ Proceed to assistance of S.O.S. + ship. + + 9.30 _Luckenback_ to U.S.A.: Am manoeuvring around. + + 9.35 _Luckenback_ to U.S.A.: How far are you away? + + 9.40 _Luckenback_ to U.S.A.: Code books thrown overboard. How soon + will you arrive? + + _Nicholson_ to _Luckenback_: In two hours. + + 9.41 _Luckenback_ to U.S.A.: Look for boats. They are shelling us. + + _Nicholson_ to _Luckenback_: Do not surrender! + + _Luckenback_ to _Nicholson_ Never! + + 11.01 _Nicholson_ to _Luckenback_: Course south magnetic. + + 12.36 P.M. _Nicholson_ to _Conyngham_: Submarine submerged + 47.47 N 10.00 W at 11.20. + + 1.23 _Conyngham_ to _Nicholson:_ What became of steamer? + + 3.41 _Nicholson_ to Admiral (at Queenstown) and _Conyngham_: + _Luckenback_ now joining convoy. Should be able to make port + unassisted. + +I have already said that a great part of the destroyer's duty was to +rescue merchantmen that were being attacked by submarines: this +_Luckenback_ incident vividly illustrates this point. Had the submarine +used its torpedo upon this vessel, it probably would have disposed of it +summarily; but it was the part of wisdom for the submarine to economize +in these weapons because they were so expensive and so comparatively +scarce, and to use its guns whenever the opportunity offered. The +_Luckenback_ was armed, but the fact that the submarine's guns easily +outranged hers made her armament useless. Thus all the German had to do +in this case was to keep away at a safe distance and bombard the +merchantman. The U-boat had been doing this for more than three hours +when the destroyer reached the scene of operations; evidently the +marksmanship was poor, for out of a great many shots fired by the +submarine only about a dozen had hit the vessel. The _Luckenback_ was on +fire, a shell having set aflame her cargo of cotton; certain parts of +the machinery had been damaged, but, in the main, the vessel was +intact. The submarine was always heroic enough when it came to shelling +defenceless merchantmen, but the appearance of a destroyer anywhere in +her neighbourhood made her resort to the one secure road to +safety--diving for protection. The _Nicholson_ immediately trained her +guns on the U-boat, which, on the second shot, disappeared under the +water. The destroyer despatched men to the disabled vessel, the fire was +extinguished, necessary repairs to the machinery were made, and in a few +hours the _Luckenback_ had become a member of the convoy. + +Hardly had she joined the merchant ships and hardly had the _Nicholson_ +taken up her station on the flank when an event still more exciting took +place. It was now late in the afternoon; the sea had quieted down; the +whole atmosphere was one of peace; and there was not the slightest sign +or suggestion of a hostile ship. The _Orama_, the British warship which +had accompanied the convoy from its home port as ocean escort, had taken +up her position as leading ship in the second column. Without the +slightest warning a terrific explosion now took place on her starboard +bow. There was no mystery as to what had happened; indeed, immediately +after the explosion the wake of the torpedo appeared on the surface; +there was no periscope in sight, yet it was clear, from the position of +the wake, that the submarine had crept up to the side of the convoy and +delivered its missile at close range. There was no confusion in the +convoy or its escorting destroyers but there were scenes of great +activity. Immediately after the explosion, a periscope appeared a few +inches out of the water, stayed there only a second or two, and then +disappeared. Brief as was this exposure, the keen eyes of the lookout +and several sailors of the _Conyngham_, the nearest destroyer, had +detected it; it disclosed the fact that the enemy was in the midst of +the convoy itself, looking for other ships to torpedo. The _Conyngham_ +rang for full speed, and dashed for the location of the submarine. Her +officers and men now saw more than the periscope; they saw the vessel +itself. The water was very clear; as the _Conyngham_ circled around the +_Orama_ her officers and men sighted a green, shining, cigar-shaped +thing under the water not far from the starboard side. As she sped by, +the destroyer dropped a depth charge almost directly on top of the +object. After the waters had quieted down pieces of debris were seen +floating upon the surface--boards, spars, and other miscellaneous +wreckage, evidently scraps of the damaged deck of a submarine. All +attempts to save the _Orama_ proved fruitless: the destroyers stood by +for five hours, taking off survivors, and making all possible efforts to +salvage the ship, but at about ten o'clock that evening she disappeared +under the water. In rescuing the survivors the seamanship displayed by +the _Conyngham_ was particularly praiseworthy. The little vessel was +skilfully placed alongside the _Orama_ and some three hundred men were +taken off without accident or casualty while the ship was sinking. + +One of the things that made the work of the destroyer such a thankless +task was that only in the rarest cases was it possible to prove that she +had destroyed the submarine. Only the actual capture of the enemy ship +or some of its crew furnished irrefutable proof that the action had been +successful. The appearance of oil on the surface after a depth charge +attack was not necessarily convincing, for the submarine early learned +the trick of pumping overboard a little oil after such an experience; in +this way it hoped to persuade its pursuer that it had been sunk and thus +induce it to abandon the chase. Even the appearance of wreckage, such as +arose on the surface after this _Conyngham_ attack, did not absolutely +prove that the submarine had been destroyed. Yet, as this submarine was +never heard of again, there is little doubt that Commander Johnson's +depth charge performed its allotted task. The judgment of the British +Government, which awarded him the C.M.G. for his achievement, may be +accepted as final. The Admiralty citation for this decoration reads as +follows: + +"At 5.50 P.M. H.M.S. _Orama_ was torpedoed in convoy. +_Conyngham_ went full speed, circled bow of _Orama_, saw submarine +between lines of convoy, passed right over it so that it was plainly +visible and dropped depth charge. Prompt and correct action of Commander +Johnson saved more ships from being torpedoed and probably destroyed the +submarine." + +One of the greatest difficulties of convoy commanders, especially during +the first months the system was in operation, was with "slacker" +merchantmen; these were vessels which, for various reasons, fell behind +the convoy, a tempting bait for the submarine. At this time certain of +the merchant captains manifested an incurable obstinacy; they affected +to regard the U-boats with contempt, and insisted rather on taking +chances instead of playing the game. In such cases a destroyer would +often have to leave the main division, go back several miles, and +attempt to prod the straggler into joining the convoy, much as a +shepherd dog attempts to force the laggard sheep to keep within the +flock. In some cases, when the merchantman proved particularly obdurate, +the destroyer would slyly drop a depth charge, near enough to give the +backward vessel a considerable shaking up without doing her any injury; +usually such a shock caused the merchantman to start full speed ahead to +rejoin her convoy, firmly believing that a submarine was giving chase. +In certain instances the merchantman fell behind the convoy because the +machinery had broken down or because she had suffered other accidents. +The submarines would follow for days in the track of convoys, looking +for a straggler of this kind, just as a shark will follow a vessel in +the hope that something will be thrown overboard; and for this reason +one destroyer at least was often detached from the escorting division as +a rear guard. In this connection we must keep in mind that at no time +until the armistice was signed was any escort force strong enough to +insure entire safety. If we had had destroyers enough to put a close +screen, or even a double screen, around every convoy, there would have +been almost no danger from submarines. The fact that all escort forces +were very inadequate placed a very heavy responsibility upon the escort +commanders, and made them think twice before detaching a destroyer in +order to protect stragglers. + +One late summer afternoon the American converted yacht _Christabel_ was +performing this duty for the British merchantman _Danae_, a vessel which +had fallen eight miles behind her convoy, bound from La Pallice, France, +to Brest. It was a beautiful evening; the weather was clear, the sea +smooth, and there was not a breath of wind. Under such conditions a +submarine could conceal its presence only with great difficulty; and at +about 5.30 the lookout on the _Christabel_ detected a wake, some six +hundred yards on the port quarter. The _Christabel_ started at full +speed; the wake suddenly ceased, but a few splotches of oil were seen, +and she was steered in the direction of this disturbance. A depth charge +was dropped at the spot where the submarine ought to have been, but it +evidently did not produce the slightest result. The _Christabel_ +rejoined the _Danae_, and the two went along peacefully for nearly four +hours, when suddenly a periscope appeared about two hundred yards away, +on the starboard side. Evidently this persistent German had been +following the ships all that time, looking for a favourable opportunity +to discharge his torpedo. That moment had now arrived; the submarine was +at a distance where a carefully aimed shot meant certain destruction; +the appearance of the periscope meant that the submarine was making +observations in anticipation of delivering this shot. The _Christabel_ +started full speed for the wake of the periscope; this periscope itself +disappeared under the water like a guilty thing, and a disturbance on +the surface showed that the submarine was making frantic efforts to +submerge. The destroyer dropped its depth charge, set to explode at +seventy feet, its radio meantime sending signals broadcast for +assistance. Immediately after the mushroom of water arose from this +charge a secondary explosion was heard; this was a horrible and muffled +sound coming from the deep, more powerful and more terrible than any +that could have been caused by the destroyer's "ash can." An enormous +volcano of water and all kinds of debris arose from the sea, half-way +between the _Christabel_ and the spot where it had dropped its charge. +This secondary explosion shook the _Christabel_ so violently that the +officers thought at first that the ship had been seriously damaged, and +a couple of men were knocked sprawling on the deck. As soon as the water +subsided great masses of heavy black oil began rising to the surface, +and completely splintered wood and other wreckage appeared. In a few +minutes the sea, for a space many hundred yards in diameter, was covered +with dead fish--about ten times as many, the officers reported, as could +have been killed by the usual depth charge. The _Christabel_ and the +ship she was guarding started to rejoin the main convoy, entirely +satisfied with the afternoon's work. Indeed, they had good reason to be; +a day or two afterward a battered submarine, the _U C-56_, crept +painfully into the harbour of Santander, Spain; it was the boat which +had had such an exciting contest with the _Christabel_. She was injured +beyond the possibility of repair; besides, the Spanish Government +interned her for "the duration of the war"; so that for all practical +purposes the vessel was as good as sunk. + + +V + +Discouraging as was this business of hunting an invisible foe, events +occasionally happened with all the unexpectedness of real drama. For the +greater part of the time the destroyers were engaged in battle with oil +slicks, wakes, tide rips, streaks of suds, and suspicious disturbances +on the water; yet now and then there were engagements with actual boats +and flesh and blood human beings. To spend weeks at sea with no foe more +substantial than an occasional foamy excrescence on the surface was the +fate of most sailormen in this war; yet a few exciting moments, when +they finally came, more than compensated for long periods of monotony. + +One afternoon in November, 1917, an American destroyer division, +commanded by Commander Frank Berrien, with the _Nicholson_ as its +flagship, put out of Queenstown on the usual mission of taking a +westbound convoy to its rendezvous and bringing in one that was bound +for British ports. This outward convoy was the "O Q 20" and consisted of +eight fine ships. After the usual preliminary scoutings the vessels +passed through the net in single file, sailed about ten miles to sea, +and began to take up the stipulated formation, four columns of two ships +each. The destroyers were moving around; they were even mingling in the +convoy, carrying messages and giving instructions; by a quarter past +four all the ships had attained their assigned positions, except one, +the _Rene_, which was closing up to its place as the rear ship of the +first column. Meanwhile, the destroyer _Fanning_ was steaming rapidly to +its post on the rear flank. Suddenly there came a cry from the bridge of +the _Fanning_, where Coxswain David D. Loomis was on lookout: + +"Periscope!" + +Off the starboard side of the _Fanning_, glistening in the smooth water, +a periscope of the "finger" variety, one so small that it could usually +elude all but the sharpest eyes, had darted for a few seconds above the +surface and had then just as suddenly disappeared. Almost directly ahead +lay the _Welshman_, a splendid British merchant ship; the periscope was +so close that a torpedo would almost inevitably have hit this vessel in +the engine-room. The haste with which the German had withdrawn his +periscope, after taking a hurried glance around, was easily explained; +for his lens had revealed not only this tempting bait, but the destroyer +_Fanning_ close aboard and bearing down on him. Under these +circumstances it was not surprising that no torpedo was fired; it was +clearly military wisdom to beat a quick retreat rather than attempt to +attack the merchantman. Lieut. Walter S. Henry, who was the officer of +the deck, acted with the most commendable despatch. It is not the +simplest thing, even when the submarine is so obviously located as this +one apparently was, to reach the spot accurately. + +The destroyer has to make a wide and rapid turn, and there is every +danger, in making this manoeuvre, that the location will be missed. +Subsequent events disclosed that the _Fanning_ was turned with the +utmost accuracy. As the ship darted by the spot at which the periscope +had been sighted, a depth charge went over the stern, and exploded so +violently that the main generator of the _Fanning_ herself was +temporarily disabled. Meanwhile the _Nicholson_ had dashed through the +convoy, made a rapid detour to the left, and dropped another depth +charge a short distance ahead of the _Fanning_. + +The disturbances made on the water by these "ash cans" gradually +subsided; to all outward appearances the submarine had escaped unharmed. +The _Fanning_ and the _Nicholson_ completed their circles and came back +to the danger spot, the officers and crew eagerly scanning the surface +for the usual oil patch and air bubbles, even hoping for a few pieces of +wreckage--those splintered remnants of the submarine's wooden deck that +almost invariably indicated a considerable amount of damage. But none of +these evidences of success, or half-success, rose to the surface; for +ten or fifteen minutes everything was as quiet as the grave. Then +something happened which occurred only a few times in this strange war. +The stern of a submarine appeared out of the water, tilted at about +thirty degrees, clearly revealing its ugly torpedo tubes. Then came the +conning-tower and finally the entire boat, the whole hull taking its +usual position on the surface as neatly and unconcernedly as though no +enemies were near. So far as could be seen the U-boat was in perfect +condition. Its hull looked intact, showing not the slightest indication +of injury; the astonished officers and men on the destroyers could +easily understand now why no oil or wreckage had risen to the top, for +the _U-58_--they could now see this inscription plainly painted on the +conning-tower--was not leaking, and the deck showed no signs of having +come into contact even remotely with a depth charge. The _Fanning_ and +the _Nicholson_ began firing shells at the unexpected visitant, and the +_Nicholson_ extended an additional welcome in the form of a hastily +dropped "ash can." + +Suddenly the conning-tower of the submarine opened and out popped the +rotund face and well-fed form of Kapitaen-Leutnant Gustav Amberger, of +the Imperial German Navy. The two arms of the Herr Kapitaen immediately +shot heavenward and the Americans on the destroyers could hear certain +guttural ejaculations: + +"Kamerad! Kamerad!" + +A hatchway now opened, and a procession of German sailors emerged, one +after the other, into the sunshine, like ants crawling out of their +hole. As each sailor reached the deck he straightened up, lifted his +arms, and shouted: + +"Kamerad! Kamerad! Kamerad!" + +In all four officers and thirty-five men went through this ceremony. +Were they really surrendering themselves and their boat, or did these +gymnastic exercises conceal some new form of German craftiness? The +American ships ceased firing; the _Fanning_ gingerly approached the +submarine, while the _Nicholson_ stood by, all her four-inch guns +trained upon the German boat, and the machine-guns pointed at the +kamerading Germans, ready to shoot them into ribbons at the first sign +that the surrender was not a genuine one. + +While these preliminaries were taking place, a couple of German sailors +disappeared into the interior of the submarine, stayed there a moment or +two, and then returned to the deck. They had apparently performed a duty +that was characteristically German; for a few minutes after they +appeared again, the _U-58_ began to settle in the water, and soon +afterward sank. These men, obeying orders, had opened the cocks and +scuttled the ship--this after the officers had surrendered her! As the +submarine disappeared, the men and officers dived and started swimming +toward the _Fanning_; four of them became entangled in the radio antennae +and were dragged under the waves; however, in a few minutes these men +succeeded in disentangling themselves and joined the swimmers. As the +thirty-nine men neared the _Fanning_ it was evident that most of them +were extremely wearied and that some were almost exhausted. The sailors +from the _Fanning_ threw over lines; some still had the strength to +climb up these to the deck, while to others it was necessary to throw +other lines which they could adjust under their arms. These latter, limp +and wet figures, the American sailors pulled up, much as the fisherman +pulls up the inert body of a monster fish. And now an incident took +place which reveals that the American navy has rather different ideals +of humanity from the German. One of the sailors was so exhausted that he +could not adjust the life-lines around his shoulders; he was very +apparently drowning. Like a flash Elxer Harwell, chief pharmacist mate, +and Francis G. Conner, coxswain, jumped overboard, swam to this +floundering German, and adjusted the line around him as solicitously as +though he had been a shipmate. The poor wretch--his name was Franz +Glinder--was pulled aboard, but he was so far gone that all attempts to +resuscitate him failed, and he died on the deck of the _Fanning_. + +Kapitaen Amberger, wet and dripping, immediately walked up to Lieut. A. +S. Carpender, the commander of the _Fanning_, clicked his heels +together, saluted in the most ceremonious German fashion, and +surrendered himself, his officers, and his crew. He also gave his parole +for his men. The officers were put in separate staterooms under guard +and each of the crew was placed under the protection of a well-armed +American jackie--who, it may be assumed, immensely enjoyed this new +duty. All the "survivors" were dressed in dry, warm clothes, and good +food and drink were given them. They were even supplied with cigarettes +and something which they valued more than all the delicacies in the +world--soap for a washing, the first soap which they had had for +months, as this was an article which was more scarce in Germany than +even copper or rubber. Our physicians gave the men first aid, and others +attended to all their minor wants. Evidently the fact that they had been +captured did not greatly depress their spirits, for, after eating and +drinking to their heart's content, the assembled Germans burst into +song. + +But what was the explanation of this strange proceeding? The German +officers, at first rather stiff and sullen, ultimately unbent enough to +tell their story. Their submarine had been hanging off the entrance to +Queenstown for nearly two days, waiting for this particular convoy to +emerge. The officers admitted that they were getting ready to torpedo +the _Welshman_ when the discovery that the _Fanning_ was only a short +distance away compelled a sudden change in their plans. Few "ash cans" +dropped in the course of the war reached their objective with the +unerring accuracy of the one which now came from this American +destroyer. It did not crush the submarine but the concussion wrecked the +motors, making it impossible for it to navigate, jammed its diving +rudders, making the boat uncontrollable under the water, and broke the +oil leads, practically shutting off the supply of this indispensable +fuel. Indeed, it would be impossible to conceive of a submarine in a +more helpless and unmanageable state. The officers had the option of two +alternatives: to sink until the pressure of the water crushed the boat +like so much paper, or to blow the ballast tanks, rise to the surface, +and surrender. Even while the commander was mentally debating this +problem, the submarine was rapidly descending to the bottom; when it +reached a depth of two hundred feet, which was about all that it could +stand, the commander decided to take his chances with the Americans. +Rising to the top involved great dangers; but the guns of the destroyers +seemed less formidable to these cornered Germans than the certainty of +the horrible death that awaited them under the waves. + +Admiral Bayly came to meet the _Fanning_ as she sailed into Queenstown +with her unexpected cargo. He went on board the destroyer to +congratulate personally the officers and men upon their achievement. He +published to the assembled company a cablegram just received from the +Admiralty in London: + + Express to commanding officers and men of the United States ship + _Fanning_ their Lordships' high appreciation of their successful + action against enemy submarine. + +I added a telegram of my own, ending up with the words, which seemed to +amuse the officers and men: "Go out and do it again." + +For this action the commanding officer of the _Fanning_, +Lieutenant-Commander Carpender, was recommended by the Admiralty for the +D.S.O., which was subsequently conferred upon him by the King at +Buckingham Palace. + +Only one duty remained: the commanding officer read the burial service +over the body of poor Franz Glinder, the German sailor who had been +drowned in his attempt to swim to the _Fanning_. The _Fanning_ then +steamed out to sea with the body and buried it with all the honours of +war. A letter subsequently written by Kapitaen Amberger to a friend in +Germany summed up his opinion of the situation in these words: + +"The Americans were much nicer and more obliging than expected." + + +VI + +So far as convoying merchant ships was concerned, Queenstown was the +largest American base; by the time the movement of troops laid heavy +burdens on the American destroyers Brest became a headquarters almost +equally important. + +In July, 1917, the British Government requested the co-operation of the +American navy in the great work which it had undertaken at Gibraltar; +and on August 6th the U.S.S. _Sacramento_ reached that port, followed +about a week afterward by the _Birmingham_ flying the flag of +Rear-Admiral Henry B. Wilson. Admiral Wilson remained as commander of +this force until November, when he left to assume the direction of +affairs at Brest. On November 25th Rear-Admiral Albert P. Niblack +succeeded to this command, which he retained throughout the war. + +Gibraltar was the "gateway" for more traffic than any other port in the +world. It was estimated that more than one quarter of all the convoys +which reached the Entente nations either rendezvoused at this point or +passed through these Straits. This was the great route to the East by +way of the Suez Canal. From Gibraltar extended the Allied lines of +communication to southern France, Italy, Salonika, Egypt, Palestine, and +Mesopotamia. There were other routes to Bizerta (Tunis), Algiers, the +island of Milo, and a monthly service to the Azores. + +The Allied forces that were detailed to protect this shipping were +chiefly British and American, though they were materially assisted by +French, Japanese, and Italian vessels. They consisted of almost anything +which the hard-pressed navies could assemble from all parts of the +world--antiquated destroyers, yachts, sloops, trawlers, drifters, and +the like. The Gibraltar area was a long distance from the main enemy +submarine bases. The enemy could maintain at sea at any one time only a +relatively small number of submarines; inasmuch as the zone off the +English Channel and Ireland was the most critical one, the Allies +stationed their main destroyer force there. Because of these facts, we +had great difficulty in finding vessels to protect the important +Gibraltar area, and the force which we ultimately got together was +therefore a miscellaneous lot. The United States gathered at this point +forty-one ships, and a personnel which averaged 314 officers and 4,660 +men. This American aggregation contained a variegated assortment of +scout cruisers, gunboats, coastguard cutters, yachts, and five +destroyers of antique type. The straits to which we were reduced for +available vessels for the Gibraltar station--and the British navy was +similarly hard pressed--were illustrated by the fact that we placed +these destroyers at Gibraltar. They were the _Decatur_ and four similar +vessels, each of 420 tons--the modern destroyer is a vessel of from +1,000 to 1,200 tons--and were stationed, when the war broke out, at +Manila, where they were considered fit only for local service; yet the +record which these doughty little ships made is characteristic of the +spirit of our young officers. This little squadron steamed 12,000 miles +from Manila to Gibraltar, and that they arrived in condition immediately +to take up their duties was due to the excellent judgment and seamanship +displayed by their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Commander (now +Commander) Harold R. Stark. Subsequently they made 48,000 miles on +escort duty. This makes 60,000 miles for vessels which in peace time had +been consigned to minor duties! Unfortunately one of these gallant +little vessels was subsequently cut down and sunk by a merchant ship +while escorting a convoy. + +For more than a year the Gibraltar force under Admiral Niblack performed +service which reflected high credit upon that commander, his officers, +and his men. During this period of time it escorted, in co-operation +with the British forces, 562 convoys, comprising a total of 10,478 +ships. Besides protecting commerce, chasing submarines, and keeping them +under the surface, many of the vessels making up this squadron had +engagements with submarines that were classified as "successful." On May +15, 1918, the _Wheeling_, a gunboat, and the _Surveyor_ and _Venetia_, +yachts, while escorting a Mediterranean convoy, depth-charged a +submarine which had just torpedoed one of the convoyed vessels; we +credited these little ships with sinking their enemy. The _Venetia_, +under the command of Commander L. B. Porterfield, U.S.N., had an +experience not unlike that of the _Christabel_, already described. On +this occasion she was part of the escort of a Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy. +A British member of this convoy, the _Surveyor_, was torpedoed at six in +the evening; at that time the submarine gave no further evidence of its +existence. The _Venetia_, however, was detailed to remain in the +neighbourhood, attempt to locate the mysterious vessel, and at least to +keep it under the water. The _Venetia_ soon found the wake of the +submerged enemy and dropped the usual depth charges. Three days +afterward a badly injured U-boat put in at Cartagena, Spain, and was +interned for the rest of the war. Thus another submarine was as good as +sunk. The _Lydonia_, a yacht of 500 tons, in conjunction with the +British ship _Basilisk_, sank another U-boat in the western +Mediterranean. This experience illustrates the doubt that enshrouded all +such operations, for it was not until three months after the _Lydonia_ +engagement took place that the Admiralty discovered that the submarine +had been destroyed and recommended Commander Richard P. McCullough, +U.S.N., for a decoration. + +Thus from the first day that this method of convoying ships was adopted +it was an unqualified success in defeating the submarine campaign. By +August 1, 1917, more than 10,000 ships had been convoyed, with losses of +only one-half of 1 per cent. Up to that same date not a single ship +which had left North American ports in convoy had been lost. By August +11th, 261 ships had been sent in convoy from North American ports, and +of these only one had fallen a prey to the submarines. The convoy gave +few opportunities for encounters with their enemies. I have already said +that the great value of this system as a protection to shipping was that +it compelled the under-water boats to fight their deadliest enemies, the +destroyers, every time they tried to sink merchant ships in convoy, and +they did not attempt this often on account of the danger. There were +destroyer commanders who spent months upon the open sea, convoying huge +aggregations of cargo vessels, without even once seeing a submarine. To +a great extent the convoy system did its work in the same way that the +Grand Fleet performed its indispensable service--silently, +unobtrusively, making no dramatic bids for popular favour, and +industriously plodding on, day after day and month after month. All this +time the world had its eyes fixed upon the stirring events of the +Western Front, almost unconscious of the existence of the forces that +made those land operations possible. Yet a few statistics eloquently +disclose the part played by the convoy system in winning the war. In the +latter months of the struggle from 91 to 92 per cent. of Allied shipping +sailed in convoys. The losses in these convoys were less than 1 per +cent. And this figure includes the ships lost after the dispersal of the +convoys; in convoys actually under destroyer escort the losses were less +than one-half of 1 per cent. Military experts would term the convoy +system a defensive-offensive measure. By this they mean that it was a +method of taking a defensive position in order to force the enemy to +meet you and give you an opportunity for the offensive. It is an old +saying that the best defensive measure is a vigorous offensive one. +Unfortunately, owing to the fact that the Allies had not prepared for +the kind of warfare which the Germans saw fit to employ against them, we +could not conduct purely offensive operations; that is, we could not +employ our anti-submarine forces exclusively in the effort to destroy +the submarines. Up to the time of the armistice, despite all the +assistance rendered to the navies by the best scientific brains of the +world, no sure means had been found of keeping track of the submarine +once he submerged. The convoy system was, therefore, our only method of +bringing him into action. I lay stress on this point and reiterate it +because many critics kept insisting during the war--and their voices are +still heard--that the convoy system was purely a defensive or passive +method of opposing the submarine, and was, therefore, not sound tactics. +It is quite true that we had to defend our shipping in order to win the +war, but it is wrong to assume that the method adopted to accomplish +this protection was a purely defensive and passive one. + +As my main purpose is to describe the work of the American navy I have +said little in the above about the activities of the British navy in +convoying merchant ships. But we should not leave this subject with a +false perspective. When the war ended we had seventy-nine destroyers in +European waters, while Great Britain had about 400. These included those +assigned to the Grand Fleet, to the Harwich force, to the Dover patrol, +to Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, and other places, many of which were +but incidentally making war on the submarines. As to minor +ships--trawlers, sloops, Q-boats, yachts, drifters, tugs, and the other +miscellaneous types used in this work--the discrepancy was even greater. +In absolute figures our effort thus seems a small one when compared with +that of our great ally. In tonnage of merchant ships convoyed, the work +of the British navy was far greater than ours. Yet the help which we +contributed was indispensable to the success that was attained. For, +judging from the situation before we entered the war, and knowing the +inadequacy of the total Allied anti-submarine forces even after we had +entered, it seems hardly possible that, without the assistance of the +United States navy, the vital lines of communication of the armies in +the field could have been kept open, the civil populations of Great +Britain supplied with food, and men and war materials sent from America +to the Western Front. In other words, I think I am justified in saying +that without the co-operation of the American navy, the Allies could not +have won the war. Our forces stationed at Queenstown actually escorted +through the danger zone about 40 per cent. of all the cargoes which +left North American ports. When I describe the movement of American +troops, it will appear that our destroyers located at Queenstown and +Brest did even a larger share of this work. The latest reports show that +about 205 German submarines were destroyed. Of these it seems probable +that thirteen can be credited to American efforts, the rest to Great +Britain, France, and Italy--the greatest number, of course, to Great +Britain. When we take into consideration the few ships that we had on +the other side, compared with those of the Allies, and the comparatively +brief period in which we were engaged in the war, this must be regarded +as a highly creditable showing. + +I regret that I have not been able to describe the work of all of our +officers and men; to do this, however, would demand more than a single +volume. One of the disappointing aspects of destroyer work was that many +of the finest performances were those that were the least spectacular. +The fact that an attack upon a submarine did not result in a sinking +hardly robbed it of its importance; many of the finest exploits of our +forces did not destroy the enemy, but they will always hold a place in +our naval annals for the daring and skill with which they were +conducted. In this class belong the achievements of the _Sterrett_, +under Lieutenant-Commander Farquhar; of the _Benham_, under +Lieutenant-Commander D. Lyons; of the _O'Brien_, under +Lieutenant-Commander C. A. Blakeley; of the _Parker_, under +Lieutenant-Commander H. Powell; of the _Jacob Jones_, under +Lieutenant-Commander D. W. Bagley; of the _Wadsworth_, under +Lieutenant-Commander Taussig, and afterward I. F. Dortch; of the +_Drayton_, under Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Howard; of the _McDougal_, +under Commander A. L. Fairfield; and of the _Nicholson_, under Commander +F. D. Berrien. The senior destroyer commander at Queenstown was +Commander David C. Hanrahan of the _Cushing_, a fine character and one +of the most experienced officers of his rank in the Navy. He was a tower +of strength at all times, and I shall have occasion to mention him later +in connection with certain important duties. The Chief-of-Staff at +Queenstown, Captain J. R. P. Pringle, was especially commended by +Admiral Bayly for his "tact, energy, and ability." The American naval +forces at Queenstown were under my immediate command. Necessarily, +however, I had to spend the greater part of my time at the London +headquarters, or at the Naval Council in Paris, and it was therefore +necessary that I should be represented at Queenstown by a man of marked +ability. Captain Pringle proved equal to every emergency. He was +responsible for the administration, supplies, and maintenance of the +Queenstown forces, and the state of readiness and efficiency in which +they were constantly maintained was the strongest possible evidence of +his ability. To him was chiefly due also the fact that our men +co-operated so harmoniously and successfully with the British. + +As an example of the impression which our work made I can do no better +than to quote the message sent by Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly to the +Queenstown forces on May 4, 1918: + +"On the anniversary of the arrival of the first United States men-of-war +at Queenstown, I wish to express my deep gratitude to the United States +officers and ratings for the skill, energy, and unfailing good-nature +which they have all consistently shown and which qualities have so +materially assisted in the war by enabling ships of the Allied Powers to +cross the ocean in comparative freedom. + +"To command you is an honour, to work with you is a pleasure, to know +you is to know the best traits of the Anglo-Saxon race." + + + + +CHAPTER V + +DECOYING SUBMARINES TO DESTRUCTION + + +I + +My chief purpose in writing this book is to describe the activities +during the World War of the United States naval forces operating in +Europe. Yet it is my intention also to make clear the several ways in +which the war against the submarine was won; and in order to do this it +will be necessary occasionally to depart from the main subject and to +describe certain naval operations of our allies. The most important +agency in frustrating the submarine was the convoy system. An +examination of the tonnage losses in 1917 and in 1918, however, +discloses that this did not entirely prevent the loss of merchant ships. +From April, 1917, to November, 1918, the monthly losses dropped from +875,000 to 101,168 tons. This decrease in sinkings enabled the Allies to +preserve their communications and so win the war; however, it is evident +that these losses, while not necessarily fatal to the Allied cause, +still offered a serious impediment to success. It was therefore +necessary to supplement the convoy system in all possible ways. Every +submarine that could be destroyed, whatever the method of destruction, +represented just that much gain to the Allied cause. Every submarine +that was sent to the bottom amounted in 1917 to a saving of many +thousands of tons per year of the merchant shipping that would have been +sunk by the U-boat if left unhindered to pursue its course. Besides +escorting merchant ships, therefore, the Allied navies developed several +methods of hunting individual submarines; and these methods not only +sank a considerable number of U-boats, but played an important part in +breaking down the German submarine _moral_. For the greater part of the +war the utmost secrecy was observed regarding these expedients; it was +not until the early part of 1918, indeed, that the public heard +anything of the special service vessels that came to be known as the +"mystery" or "Q-ships"--although these had been operating for nearly +three years. It is true that the public knew that there was something in +the wind, for there were announcements that certain naval officers had +received the Victoria Cross, but as there was no citation explaining why +these coveted rewards were given, they were known as "mystery V.C.'s." + +On one of my visits to Queenstown Admiral Bayly showed me a wireless +message which he had recently received from the commanding officer of a +certain mystery ship operating from Queenstown, one of the most +successful of these vessels. It was brief but sufficiently eloquent. + +"Am slowly sinking," it read. "Good-bye, I did my best." + +Though the man who had sent that message was apparently facing death at +the time when it was written, Admiral Bayly told me that he had survived +the ordeal, and that, in fact, he would dine at Admiralty House that +very night. Another fact about this man lifted him above the +commonplace: he was the first Q-boat commander to receive the Victoria +Cross, and one of the very few who wore both the Victoria Cross and the +Distinguished Service Order; and he subsequently won bars for each, not +to mention the Croix de Guerre and the Legion of Honour. When Captain +Gordon Campbell arrived, I found that he was a Britisher of quite the +accepted type. His appearance suggested nothing extraordinary. He was a +short, rather thick-set, phlegmatic Englishman, somewhat non-committal +in his bearing; until he knew a man well, his conversation consisted of +a few monosyllables, and even on closer acquaintance his stolidity and +reticence, especially in the matter of his own exploits, did not +entirely disappear. Yet there was something about the Captain which +suggested the traits that had already made it possible for him to sink +three submarines, and which afterward added other trophies to his +record. It needed no elaborate story of his performances to inform me +that Captain Campbell was about as cool and determined a man as was to +be found in the British navy. His associates declared that his physical +system absolutely lacked nerves; that, when it came to pursuing a German +submarine, his patience and his persistence knew no bounds; and that the +extent to which his mind concentrated upon the task in hand amounted to +little less than genius. When the war began, Captain Campbell, then +about thirty years old, was merely one of several thousand junior +officers in the British navy. He had not distinguished himself in any +way above his associates; and probably none of his superiors had ever +regarded him as in any sense an unusual man. Had the naval war taken the +course of most naval wars, Campbell would probably have served well, but +perhaps not brilliantly. This conflict, however, demanded a new type of +warfare and at the same time it demanded a new type of naval fighter. To +go hunting for the submarine required not only courage of a high order, +but analytical intelligence, patience, and a talent for preparation and +detail. Captain Campbell seemed to have been created for this particular +task. That evening at Queenstown he finally gave way to much urging, and +entertained us for hours with his adventures; he told the stories of his +battles with submarines so quietly, so simply and, indeed, so +impersonally, that at first they impressed his hearers as not +particularly unusual. Yet, after the recital was finished, we realized +that the mystery ship performances represented some of the most +admirable achievements in the whole history of naval warfare. We have +laid great emphasis upon the brutalizing aspects of the European War; it +is well, therefore, that we do not forget that it had its more exalted +phases. Human nature may at times have manifested itself in its most +cowardly traits, but it also reached a level of courage which, I am +confident, it has seldom attained in any other conflict. It was reserved +for this devastating struggle to teach us how brave modern men could +really be. And when the record is complete it seems unlikely that it +will furnish any finer illustration of the heroic than that presented by +Captain Campbell and his compatriots of the mystery ships. + +This type of vessel was a regular ship of His Majesty's navy, yet there +was little about it that suggested warfare. To the outward eye it was +merely one of those several thousand freighters or tramps which, in +normal times, sailed sluggishly from port to port, carrying the larger +part of the world's commerce. It looked like a particularly dirty and +uninviting specimen of the breed. Just who invented this grimy enemy of +the submarine is unknown, as are the inventors of many other devices +developed by the war. It was, however, the natural outcome of a close +study of German naval methods. The man who first had the idea well +understood the peculiar mentality of the U-boat commanders. The Germans +had a fairly easy time in the early days of submarine warfare on +merchant shipping. They sank as many ships as possible with gunfire and +bombs. The prevailing method then was to break surface, and begin +shelling the defenceless enemy. In case the merchant ship was faster +than the submarine she would take to her heels; if, as was usually the +case, she was slower, the passengers and crews lowered the boats and +left the vessel to her fate. In such instances the procedure of the +submarine was invariably the same. It ceased shelling, approached the +lifeboats filled with survivors, and ordered them to take a party of +Germans to the ship. This party then searched the vessel for all kinds +of valuables, and, after depositing time bombs in the hold, rowed back +to the submarine. This procedure was popular with the Germans, because +it was the least expensive form of destroying merchant ships. It was not +necessary to use torpedoes or even a large number of shells; an +inexpensive bomb, properly placed, did the whole job. Even when the +arming of merchant ships interfered with this simple programme, and +compelled the Germans to use long-range gunfire or torpedoes, the +submarine commanders still persisted in rising to the surface near the +sinking ship. Torpedoes were so expensive that the German Admiralty +insisted on having every one accounted for. The word of the commander +that he had destroyed a merchant ship was not accepted at its face +value; in order to have the exploit officially placed to his credit, and +so qualify the commander and crew for the rewards that came to the +successful, it was necessary to prove that the ship had actually gone to +the bottom. A prisoner or two furnished unimpeachable evidence, and, in +default of such trophies, the ship's papers would be accepted. In order +to obtain such proofs of success the submarine had to rise to the +surface and approach its victim. The search for food, especially for +alcoholic liquor, was another motive that led to such a manoeuvre; and +sometimes mere curiosity, the desire to come to close quarters and +inspect the consequences of his handiwork, also impelled the Hun +commander to take what was, as events soon demonstrated, a particularly +hazardous risk. + +This simple fact that the submarine, even when the danger had been +realized, insisted on rising to the surface and approaching the vessel +which it had torpedoed, offered the Allies an opportunity which they +were not slow in seizing. There is hardly anything in warfare which is +more vulnerable than a submarine on the surface within a few hundred +yards of a four-inch gun. A single, well-aimed shot will frequently send +it to the bottom. Indeed, a U-boat caught in such a predicament has only +one chance of escaping: that is represented by the number of seconds +which it takes to get under the water. But before that time has expired +rapidly firing guns can put a dozen shots into its hull; with modern, +well-trained gun crews, therefore, a submarine which exposes itself in +this way stands practically no chance of getting away. Clearly, the +obvious thing for the Allies to do was to send merchant ships, armed +with hidden guns, along the great highways of commerce. The crews of +these ships should be naval officers and men disguised as merchant +masters and sailors. They should duplicate in all details the manners +and the "technique" of a freighter's crew, and, when shelled or +torpedoed by a submarine, they should behave precisely like the +passengers and crews of merchantmen in such a crisis; a part--the only +part visible to the submarine--should leave the vessel in boats, while +the remainder should lie concealed until the submarine rose to the +surface and approached the vessel. When the enemy had come within two or +three hundred yards, the bulwarks should fall down, disclosing the +armament, the white battle ensign go up, and the guns open fire on the +practically helpless enemy. + + +II + +Such was the mystery ship idea in its simplest form. In the early days +it worked according to this programme. The trustful submarine commander +who approached a mystery ship in the manner which I have described +promptly found his resting-place on the bottom of the sea. I have +frequently wondered what must have been the emotions of this first +submarine crew, when, standing on the deck of their boat, steaming +confidently toward their victim, they saw its bulwarks suddenly drop, +and beheld the ship, which to all outward appearances was a helpless, +foundering hulk, become a mass of belching fire and smoke and shot. The +picture of that first submarine, standing upright in the water, reeling +like a drunken man, while the apparently innocent merchant ship kept +pouring volley after volley into its sides, is one that will not quickly +fade from the memory of British naval men. Yet it is evident that the +Allies could not play a game like this indefinitely. They could do so +just as long as the Germans insisted on delivering themselves into their +hands. The complete success of the idea depended at first upon the fact +that the very existence of mystery ships was unknown to the German navy. +All that the Germans knew, in these early days, was that certain U-boats +had sailed from Germany and had not returned. But it was inevitable that +the time should come when a mystery ship attack would fail; the German +submarine would return and report that this new terror of the seas was +at large. And that is precisely what happened. A certain submarine +received a battering which it seemed hardly likely that any U-boat could +survive; yet, almost by a miracle, it crept back to its German base and +reported the manner of its undoing. Clearly the mystery ships in future +were not to have as plain sailing as in the past; the game, if it were +to continue, would become more a battle of wits; henceforth every liner +and merchantman, in German eyes, was a possible enemy in disguise, and +it was to be expected that the U-boat commanders would resort to every +means of protecting their craft against them. That the Germans knew all +about these vessels became apparent when one of their naval publications +fell into our hands, giving complete descriptions and containing +directions to U-boat commanders how to meet this new menace. The German +newspapers and illustrated magazines also began to devote much space to +this kind of anti-submarine fighting, denouncing it in true Germanic +fashion as "barbarous" and contrary to the rules of civilized warfare. +The great significance of this knowledge is at once apparent. The mere +fact that a number of Q-ships were at sea, even if they did not succeed +in sinking many submarines, forced the Germans to make a radical change +in their submarine tactics. As they could no longer bring to, board, and +loot merchant ships, and sink them inexpensively and without danger by +the use of bombs, they were obliged not only to use their precious +torpedoes, but also to torpedo without warning. This was the only +alternative except to abandon the submarine campaign altogether. + +Berlin accordingly instructed the submarine commanders not to approach +on the surface any merchant or passenger vessel closely enough to get +within range of its guns, but to keep at a distance and shell it. Had +the commanders always observed these instructions the success of the +mystery ship in sinking submarines would have ended then and there, +though the influence of their presence upon tactics would have remained +in force. The Allied navies now made elaborate preparations, all for the +purpose of persuading Fritz to approach in the face of a tremendous risk +concerning which he had been accurately informed. Every submarine +commander, after torpedoing his victim, now clearly understood that it +might be a decoy despatched for the particular purpose of entrapping +him; and he knew that an attempt to approach within a short distance of +the foundering vessel might spell his own immediate destruction. The +expert in German mentality must explain why, under these circumstances, +he should have persisted in walking into the jaws of death. The skill +with which the mystery ships and their crews were disguised perhaps +explains this in part. Anyone who might have happened in the open sea +upon Captain Campbell and his slow-moving freighter could not have +believed that they were part and parcel of the Royal Navy. Our own +destroyers were sometimes deceived by them. The _Cushing_ one day hailed +Captain Campbell in the _Pargust_, having mistaken him for a defenceless +tramp. The conversation between the two ships was brief but to the +point: + +_Cushing_: What ship? + +_Pargust_: Gordon Campbell! Please keep out of sight. + +The next morning another enemy submarine met her fate at the hands of +Captain Campbell, and although the _Cushing_ had kept far enough away +not to interfere with the action, she had the honour of escorting the +injured mystery ship into port and of receiving as a reward three +rousing cheers from the crew of the _Pargust_ led by Campbell. A more +villainous-looking gang of seamen than the crews of these ships never +sailed the waves. All men on board were naval officers or enlisted men; +they were all volunteers and comprised men of all ranks--admirals, +captains, commanders, and midshipmen. All had temporarily abandoned His +Majesty's uniform for garments picked up in second-hand clothing stores. +They had made the somewhat disconcerting discovery that carefully +trained gentlemen of the naval forces, when dressed in cast-off clothing +and when neglectful of their beards, differ little in appearance from +the somewhat rough-and-tumble characters of the tramp service. To assume +this external disguise successfully meant that the volunteers had also +to change almost their personal characteristics as well as their +clothes. Whereas the conspicuous traits of a naval man are neatness and +order, these counterfeit merchant sailors had to train themselves in the +casual ways of tramp seamen. They had also to accustom themselves to the +conviction that a periscope was every moment searching their vessel from +stem to stern in an attempt to discover whether there was anything +suspicious about it; they therefore had not only to dress the part of +merchantmen, but to act it, even in its minor details. The genius of +Captain Campbell consisted in the fact that he had made a minute study +of merchantmen, their officers and their crews, and was able to +reproduce them so literally on this vessel that even the expert eye was +deceived. Necessarily such a ship carried a larger crew than the +merchant freighter; nearly all, however, were kept constantly concealed, +the number appearing on deck always representing just about the same +number as would normally have sailed upon a tramp steamer. These men had +to train themselves in slouchiness of behaviour; they would hang over +the rails, and even use merchant terms in conversation with one another; +the officers were "masters," "mates," "pursers," and the like, and their +principal gathering-place was not a wardroom, but a saloon. That +scrupulous deference with which a subordinate officer in the navy treats +his superior was laid aside in this service. It was no longer the custom +to salute before addressing the commander; more frequently the sailor +would slouch up to his superior, his hands in his pockets and his pipe +in his mouth. This attempt to deceive the Hun observer at the periscope +sometimes assumed an even more ludicrous form. When the sailor of a +warship dumps ashes overboard he does it with particular care, so as not +to soil the sides of his immaculate vessel; but a merchant seaman is +much less considerate; he usually hurls overboard anything he does not +want and lets the ship's side take its chances. To have followed the +manner of the navy would at once have given the game away; so the +sailors, in carrying out this domestic duty, performed the act with all +the nonchalance of merchant seamen. To have messed in naval style would +also have been betraying themselves. The ship's cook, therefore, in a +white coat, would come on deck, and have a look around, precisely as he +would do on a freighter. Even when in port officers and men maintained +their disguise. They never visited hotels or clubs or private houses; +they spent practically all their time on board; if they occasionally +went ashore, their merchant outfit so disguised them that even their +best friends would not have recognized them in the street. + +The warlike character of their ships was even more cleverly hidden. In +the early days the guns were placed behind the bulwarks, which, when a +lever was pulled, would fall down, thus giving them an unobstructed +range at the submarine. In order to make the sides of the ships +collapsible, certain seams were unavoidably left in the plates, where +the detachable part joined the main structure. The U-boat commanders +soon learned to look for these betraying seams before coming to the +surface. They would sail submerged around the ship, the periscope +minutely examining the sides, much as a scientist examines his specimens +with a microscope. This practice made it necessary to conceal the guns +more carefully. The places which were most serviceable for this purpose +were the hatchways--those huge wells, extending from the deck to the +bottom, which are used for loading and unloading cargo. Platforms were +erected in these openings, and on these guns were emplaced; a covering +of tarpaulin completely hid them; yet a lever, pulled by the gun crews, +would cause the sides of the hatchway covers to fall instantaneously. +Other guns were placed under lifeboats, which, by a similar mechanism, +would fall apart, or rise in the air, exposing the gun. Perhaps the most +deceptive device of all was a gun placed upon the stern, and, with its +crew, constantly exposed to public gaze. Since most merchantmen carried +such a gun, its absence on a mystery ship would in itself have caused +suspicion; this armament not only helped the disguise, but served a +useful purpose in luring the submarine. At the first glimpse of a U-boat +on the surface, usually several miles away, the gun crew would begin +shooting; but they always took care that the shots fell short, thus +convincing the submarine that it had the advantage of range and so +inducing it to close. + +Captain Campbell and his associates paid as much attention to details in +their ships as in their personal appearance. The ship's wash did not +expose the flannels that are affected by naval men but the dungarees +that are popular with merchant sailors. Sometimes a side of beef would +be hung out in plain view; this not only kept up the fiction that the +ship was an innocent tramp, but it served as a tempting bait to the not +too well-fed crew of the submarine. Particularly tempting cargoes were +occasionally put on deck. One of the ships carried several papier-mache +freight cars of the small European type covered with legends which +indicated that they were loaded with ammunition and bound for +Mesopotamia. It is easy to imagine how eagerly the Hun would wish to +sink that cargo! + +These ships were so effectively disguised that even the most experienced +eyes could not discover their real character. For weeks they could lie +in dock, the dockmen never suspecting that they were armed to the teeth. +Even the pilots who went aboard to take them into harbour never +discovered that they were not the merchant ships which they pretended to +be. Captain Hanrahan, who commanded the U.S. mystery ship _Santee_, +based on Queenstown, once entertained on board an Irishman from Cork. +The conversation which took place between this American naval +officer--who, in his disguise, was indistinguishable from a tramp +skipper of many years' experience--disclosed the complete ignorance of +the guest concerning the true character of the boat. + +"How do you like these Americans?" Captain Hanrahan innocently asked. + +"They are eating us out of house and home!" the indignant Irishman +remarked. The information was a little inaccurate, since all our food +supplies were brought from the United States; but the remark was +reassuring as proving that the ship's disguise had not been penetrated. +Such precautions were the more necessary in a port like Queenstown where +our forces were surrounded by spies who were in constant communication +with the enemy. + +I can personally testify to the difficulty of identifying a mystery +ship. One day Admiral Bayly suggested that we should go out in the +harbour and visit one of these vessels lying there preparatory to +sailing on a cruise. Several merchantmen were at anchor in port. We +steamed close around one in the Admiral's barge and examined her very +carefully through our glasses from a short distance. Concluding that +this was not the vessel we were seeking, we went to another merchantman. +This did not show any signs of being a mystery ship; we therefore hailed +the skipper, who told us the one which we had first visited was the +mystery ship. We went back, boarded her, and began examining her +appliances. The crew was dressed in the ordinary sloppy clothes of a +merchantman's deck-hands; the officers wore the usual merchant ship +uniform, and everything was as unmilitary as a merchant ship usually is. +The vessel had quite a long deckhouse built of light steel. The captain +told us that two guns were concealed in this structure; he suggested +that we should walk all around it and see if we could point out from a +close inspection the location of the guns. We searched carefully, but +were utterly unable to discover where the guns were. The captain then +sent the crew to quarters and told us to stand clear. At the word of +command one of the plates of the perpendicular side of the deckhouse +slid out of the way as quickly as a flash. The rail at the ship's side +in front of the gun fell down and a boat davit swung out of the way. At +the same time the gun crew swung the gun out and fired a primer to +indicate how quickly they could have fired a real shot. The captain also +showed us a boat upside down on the deckhouse--merchantmen frequently +carry one boat in this position. At a word a lever was pulled down below +and the boat reared up in the air and revealed underneath a gun and its +crew. On the poop was a large crate about 6 x 6 x 8 or 10 feet. At a +touch of the lever the sides of this crate fell down and revealed +another gun. + + +III + +For the greater part of 1917 from twenty to thirty of these ships sailed +back and forth in the Atlantic, always choosing those parts of the seas +where they were most likely to meet submarines. They were "merchantmen" +of all kinds--tramp steamers, coasting vessels, trawlers, and schooners. +Perhaps the most distressing part of existence on one of these ships was +its monotony: day would follow day; week would follow week; and +sometimes months would pass without encountering a single submarine. +Captain Campbell himself spent nine months on his first mystery ship +before even sighting an enemy, and many of his successors had a similar +experience. The mystery boat was a patient fisherman, constantly +expecting a bite and frequently going for long periods without the +slightest nibble. This kind of an existence was not only disappointing +but also exceedingly nerve racking; all during this waiting period the +officers and men had to keep themselves constantly at attention; the +vaudeville show which they were maintaining for the benefit of a +possible periscope had to go on continuously; a moment's forgetfulness +or relaxation might betray their secret, and make their experiment a +failure. The fearful tediousness of this kind of life had a more +nerve-racking effect upon the officers and men than the most exciting +battles, and practically all the mystery ship men who broke down fell +victims not to the dangers of their enterprise, but to this dreadful +tension of sailing for weeks and months without coming to close quarters +with their enemy. + +About the most welcome sight to a mystery ship, after a period of +inactivity, was the wake of a torpedo speeding in its direction. Nothing +could possibly disappoint it more than to see this torpedo pass astern +or forward without hitting the vessel. In such a contingency the genuine +merchant ship would make every possible effort to turn out of the +torpedo's way: the helmsman of the mystery ship, however, would take all +possible precautions to see that his vessel was hit. This, however, he +had to do with the utmost cleverness, else the fact that he was +attempting to collide with several hundred pounds of gun-cotton would in +itself betray him to the submarine. Not improbably several members of +the crew might be killed when the torpedo struck, but that was all part +of the game which they were playing. More important than the lives of +the men was the fate of the ship; if this could remain afloat long +enough to give the gunners a good chance at the submarine, everybody on +board would be satisfied. There was, however, little danger that the +mystery ship would go down immediately; for all available cargo space +had been filled with wood, which gave the vessel sufficient buoyancy +sometimes to survive many torpedoes. + +Of course this, as well as all the other details of the vessel, was +unknown to the skipper of the submerged submarine. Having struck his +victim in a vital spot, he had every reason to believe that it would +disappear beneath the waves within a reasonable period. The business of +the disguised merchantman was to encourage this delusion in every +possible way. From the time that the torpedo struck, the mystery ship +behaved precisely as the every-day cargo carrier, caught in a similar +predicament, would have done. A carefully drilled contingent of the +crew, known as the "panic party," enacted the role of the men on a +torpedoed vessel. They ran to and fro on the deck, apparently in a state +of high consternation, now rushing below and emerging with some personal +treasure, perhaps an old suit of clothes tucked under the arm, perhaps +the ship's cat or parrot, or a small handbag hastily stuffed with odds +and ends. Under the control of the navigating officer these men would +make for a lifeboat, which they would lower in realistic +fashion--sometimes going so far, in their stage play, as to upset it, +leaving the men puffing and scrambling in the water. One member of the +crew, usually the navigator, dressed up as the "captain," did his best +to supervise these operations. Finally, after everybody had left, and +the vessel was settling at bow or stern, the "captain" would come to the +side, cast one final glance at his sinking ship, drop a roll of papers +into a lifeboat--ostensibly the precious documents which were so coveted +by the submarine as an evidence of success--lower himself with one or +two companions, and row in the direction of the other lifeboats. +Properly placing these lifeboats, after "abandoning ship," was itself +one of the finest points in the plot. If the submarine rose to the +surface it would invariably steer first for those little boats, looking +for prisoners or the ship's papers; the boats' crews, therefore, had +instructions to take up a station on a bearing from which the ship's +guns could most successfully rake the submarine. That this manoeuvre +involved great danger to the men in the lifeboats was a matter of no +consideration in the desperate enterprise in which they were engaged. + +Thus to all outward appearance this performance was merely the +torpedoing of a helpless merchant vessel. Yet the average German +commander became altogether too wary to accept the situation in that +light. He had no intention of approaching either lifeboats or the ship +until entirely satisfied that he was not dealing with one of the decoy +vessels which he so greatly feared. There was only one way of satisfying +himself: that was to shell the ship so mercilessly that, in his opinion, +if any human beings had remained aboard, they would have been killed or +forced to surrender. The submarine therefore arose at a distance of two +or three miles. Possibly the mystery ship, with one well-aimed shot, +might hit the submarine at this distance, but the chances were +altogether against her. To fire such a shot, of course, would +immediately betray the fact that a gun crew still remained on board, and +that the vessel was a mystery ship; and on this discovery the submarine +would submerge, approach the vessel under water, and give her one or two +more torpedoes. No, whatever the temptation, the crew must "play +'possum," and not by so much as a wink let the submarine know that there +was any living thing on board. But this experience demanded heroism that +almost approaches the sublime. The gun crews lay prone beside their +guns, waiting the word of command to fire; the captain lay on the +screened bridge, watching the whole proceeding through a peephole, with +voice tubes near at hand with which he could constantly talk to his men. +They maintained these positions sometimes for hours, never lifting a +finger in defence, while the submarine, at a safe distance, showered +hundreds of shells upon the ship. These horrible missiles would shriek +above their heads; they would land on the decks, constantly wounding the +men, sometimes killing whole gun crews--yet, although the ship might +become a mass of blood and broken fragments of human bodies, the +survivors would lie low, waiting, with infinite patience, until the +critical moment arrived. This was the way they took to persuade the +submarine that their ship was what it pretended to be, a tramp, that +there was nothing alive on board, and that it could safely come near. +The still cautious German, after an hour or so of this kind of +execution, would submerge and approach within a few hundred yards. All +that the watchful eye at the peephole could see, however, was the +periscope; this would sail all around the vessel, sometimes at a +distance of fifty or a hundred feet. Clearly the German was taking no +chances; he was examining his victim inch by inch, looking for the +slightest sign that the vessel was a decoy. All this time the captain +and crew were lying taut, holding their breath, not moving a muscle, +hardly winking an eyelid, the captain with his mouth at the voice pipe +ready to give the order to let the false works drop the moment the +submarine emerged, the gun crews ready to fire at a second's warning. +But the cautious periscope, having completed the inspection of the ship, +would start in the direction of the drifting lifeboats. This ugly eye +would stick itself up almost in the faces of the anxious crew, evidently +making a microscopical examination of the clothes, faces, and general +personnel, to see if it could detect under their tramp steamer clothes +any traces of naval officers and men. + +Still the anxious question was, would the submarine emerge? Until it +should do so the ship's crew was absolutely helpless. There was no use +in shooting at the submerged boat, as shots do not penetrate the water +but bounce off the surface as they do off solid ice. Everybody knew that +the German under the water was debating that same question. To come up +to the surface so near a mystery ship he knew meant instant death and +the loss of his submarine; yet to go away under water meant that the +sinking ship, if a merchantman, might float long enough to be salvaged, +and it meant also that he would never be able to prove that he had +accomplished anything with his valuable torpedo. Had he not shelled the +derelict so completely that nothing could possibly survive? Had he not +examined the thing minutely and discovered nothing amiss? It must be +remembered that in 1917 a submarine went through this same procedure +with every ship that did not sink very soon after being torpedoed, and +that, in nearly every case, it discovered, after emerging, that it had +been dealing with a real merchantman. Already this same submarine had +wasted hours and immense stores of ammunition on vessels that were not +mystery ships, but harmless tramps, and all these false alarms had made +it impatient and careless. In most cases, therefore, the crew had only +to bide its time. The captain knew that his hidden enemy would finally +rise. + +"Stand by!" + +This command would come softly through the speaking tubes to the men at +the guns. The captain on the bridge had noticed the preliminary +disturbance on the water that preceded the emergence of the submarine. +In a few seconds the whole boat would be floating on top, and the +officers and crews would climb out on the deck, eager for booty. And +this within a hundred yards of four or five guns! + +"Let go!" + +This command came at the top of the voice, for concealment was now no +longer necessary. In a twinkling up went the battle flag, bulwarks fell +down, lifeboats on decks collapsed, revealing guns, sides dropped from +deckhouses, hen-coops, and other innocent-looking structures. The +apparently sinking merchantman became a volcano of smoke and fire; +scores of shells dropped upon the submarine, punching holes in her frail +hull, hurling German sailors high into the air, sometimes decapitating +them or blowing off their arms or legs. The whole horrible scene lasted +only a few seconds before the helpless vessel would take its final +plunge to the depths, leaving perhaps two or three survivors, a mass of +oil and wood, and still more ghastly wreckage, to mark the spot where +another German submarine had paid the penalty of its crimes. + + +IV + +It was entirely characteristic of this strange war that the greatest +exploit of any of the mystery ships was in one sense a failure--that is, +it did not succeed in destroying the submarine which attacked it. + +On an August day in 1917 the British "merchant steamer" _Dunraven_ was +zigzagging across the Bay of Biscay. Even to the expert eye she was a +heavily laden cargo vessel bound for Gibraltar and the Mediterranean, +probably carrying supplies to the severely pressed Allies in Italy and +the East. On her stern a 2-1/2 pounder gun, clearly visible to all +observers, helped to emphasize this impression. Yet the apparently +innocent _Dunraven_ was a far more serious enemy to the submarine than +appeared on the surface. The mere fact that the commander was not an +experienced merchant salt, but Captain Gordon Campbell, of the Royal +Navy, in itself would have made the _Dunraven_ an object of terror to +any lurking submarine, for Captain Campbell's name was a familiar one to +the Germans by this time. Yet it would have taken a careful +investigation to detect in the rough and unkempt figure of Captain +Campbell any resemblance to an officer of the British navy, or to +identify the untidy seamen as regularly enrolled British sailors. The +armament of the _Dunraven_, could one have detected it, would have +provided the greatest surprises. This vessel represented the final +perfection of the mystery ship. Though seemingly a harmless tramp she +carried a number of guns, also two torpedo tubes, and several depth +charges; but even from her deck nothing was visible except the usual +merchant gun aft. The stern of the _Dunraven_ was a veritable arsenal. +Besides the guns and depth charges, the magazine and shell-rooms were +concealed there; on each side of the ship a masked torpedo tube held its +missile ready for a chance shot at a submarine; and the forward deck +contained other armament. Such was the _Dunraven_, ploughing her way +along, quietly and indifferently, even when, as on this August morning, +a submarine was lying on the horizon, planning to make her its prey. + +As soon as the disguised merchantman spotted this enemy she began to +behave in character. When an armed merchant ship got within range of a +submarine on the surface she frequently let fly a shot on the chance of +a hit. That was therefore the proper thing for the _Dunraven_ to do; it +was really all a part of the game of false pretence in which she was +engaged. However, she took pains that the shell should not reach the +submarine; this was her means of persuading the U-boat that it +outranged the _Dunraven's_ gun and could safely give chase. The decoy +merchantman apparently put on extra steam when the submarine started in +her direction at top speed; here, again, however, the proper manoeuvre +was not to run too fast, for her real mission was to get caught. On the +other hand, had she slowed down perceptibly, that in itself would have +aroused suspicion; her game, therefore, was to decrease speed gradually +so that the U-boat would think that it was overtaking its enemy by its +own exertions. All during this queer kind of a chase the submarine and +the cargo ship were peppering each other with shells, one seriously, the +other merely in pretence. The fact that a naval crew, with such a fine +target as an exposed submarine, could shoot with a conscious effort not +to hit, but merely to lure the enemy to a better position, in itself is +an eloquent evidence of the perfect discipline which prevailed in the +mystery ship service. Not to aim a fair shot upon the detested vessel, +when there was a possibility of hitting it, was almost too much to ask +of human nature. But it was essential to success with these vessels +never to fire with the intention of hitting unless there was a practical +certainty of sinking the submarine; all energies were focussed upon the +supreme task of inducing the enemy to expose itself completely within +three or four hundred yards of the disguised freighter. + +In an hour or two the submarine landed a shot that seemed to have done +serious damage. At least huge clouds of steam arose from the +engine-room, furnishing external evidence that the engines or boilers +had been disabled. The submarine commander did not know that this was a +trick; that the vessel was fitted with a specially arranged pipe around +the engine-room hatch which could emit these bursts of steam at a +moment's notice, all for the purpose of making him believe that the +vitals of the ship had been irreparably damaged. The stopping of the +ship, the blowing off of the safety valve, and the appearance of the +"panic party" immediately after this ostensible hit made the illusion +complete. This "panic party" was particularly panicky; one of the +lifeboats was let go with a run, one fall at a time, thus dumping its +occupants into the sea. Ultimately, however, the struggling swimmers +were picked up and the boat rowed away, taking up a position where a +number of the _Dunraven's_ guns could get a good shot at the submarine +should the Germans follow their usual plan of inspecting the lifeboats +before visiting the sinking merchantman. + +So far everything was taking place according to programme; but presently +the submarine reopened fire and scored a shot which gave the enemy all +the advantages of the situation. I have described in some detail the +stern of the ship--a variegated assortment of depth charges, shell, +guns, and human beings. The danger of such an unavoidable concentration +of armament and men was that a lucky shot might land in the midst of it. +And this is precisely what now happened. Not only one, but three shells +from the submarine one after the other struck this hidden mass of men +and ammunition. The first one exploded a depth charge--300 pounds of +high explosive--which blew one of the officers out of the after-control +station where he lay concealed and landed him on the deck several yards +distant. Here he remained a few moments unconscious; then his associates +saw him, wounded as he was, creeping inch by inch back into his control +position, fortunately out of sight of the Germans. The seaman who was +stationed at the depth charges was also wounded by this shot, but, +despite all efforts to remove him to a more comfortable place, he +insisted on keeping at his post. + +"'Ere I was put in charge of these things," he said, "and 'ere I stays." + +Two more shells, one immediately after the other, now landed on the +stern. Clouds of black smoke began to rise, and below tongues of flame +presently appeared, licking their way in the direction of a large +quantity of ammunition, cordite, and other high explosives. It was not +decoy smoke and decoy flame this time. Captain Campbell, watching the +whole proceeding from the bridge, perhaps felt something in the nature +of a chill creeping up his spine when he realized that the after-part of +the ship, where men, explosives, and guns lay concealed in close +proximity, was on fire. Just at this moment he observed that the +submarine was rapidly approaching; and in a few minutes it lay within +400 yards of his guns. Captain Campbell was just about to give the +orders to open fire when the wind took up the dense smoke of the fire +and wafted it between his ship and the submarine. This precipitated one +of the crises which tested to the utmost the discipline of the mystery +ship. The captain had two alternatives: he could fire at the submarine +through the smoke, taking his chances of hitting an unseen and moving +target, or he could wait until the enemy passed around the ship and came +up on the other side, where there would be no smoke to interfere with +his view. It was the part of wisdom to choose the latter course; but +under existing conditions such a decision involved not only great nerve, +but absolute confidence in his men. For all this time the fire at the +stern was increasing in fierceness; in a brief period, Captain Campbell +knew, a mass of ammunition and depth charges would explode, probably +killing or frightfully wounding every one of the men who were stationed +there. If he should wait until the U-boat made the tour of the ship and +reached the side that was free of smoke the chances were that this +explosion would take place before a gun could be fired. On the other +hand, if he should fire through the smoke, there was little likelihood +of hitting the submarine. + +Those who are acquainted with the practical philosophy which directed +operations in this war will readily foresee the choice which was now +made. The business of mystery ships, as of all anti-submarine craft, was +to sink the enemy. All other considerations amounted to nothing when +this supreme object was involved. The lives of officers and men, +precious as they were under ordinary circumstances, were to be +immediately sacrificed if such a sacrifice would give an opportunity of +destroying the submarine. It was therefore Captain Campbell's duty to +wait for the under-water boat to sail slowly around his ship and appear +in clear view on the starboard side, leaving his brave men at the stern +exposed to the fire, every minute raging more fiercely, and to the +likelihood of a terrific explosion. That he was able to make this +decision, relying confidently upon the spirit of his crew and their +loyal devotion to their leader, again illustrates the iron discipline +which was maintained on the mystery ships. The first explosion had +destroyed the voice tube by means of which Captain Campbell communicated +with this gun crew. He therefore had to make his decision without +keeping his men informed of the progress of events--information very +helpful to men under such a strain; but he well knew that these men +would understand his action and cheerfully accept their role in the +game. Yet the agony of their position tested their self-control to the +utmost. The deck on which they lay every moment became hotter; the +leather of their shoes began to smoke, but they refused to budge--for to +flee to a safer place meant revealing themselves to the submarine and +thereby betraying their secret. They took the boxes of cordite shells in +their arms and held them up as high as possible above the smouldering +deck in the hope of preventing an explosion which seemed inevitable. +Never did Christian martyrs, stretched upon a gridiron, suffer with +greater heroism. + + +V + +It was probably something of a relief when the expected explosion took +place. The submarine had to go only 200 yards more to be under the fire +of three guns at a range of 400 yards, but just as it was rounding the +stern the German officers and men, standing on the deck, were greeted +with a terrific roar. Suddenly a conglomeration of men, guns, and +unexploded shells was hurled into the air. The German crew, of course, +had believed that the vessel was a deserted hulk, and this sudden +manifestation of life on board not only tremendously startled them, but +threw them into a panic. The four-inch gun and its crew were blown high +into the air, the gun landing forward on the well deck, and the crew in +various places. One man fell into the water; he was picked up, not +materially the worse for his experience, by the _Dunraven's_ lifeboat, +which, all this time, had been drifting in the neighbourhood. It is one +of the miracles of this war that not one of the members of that crew was +killed. The gashed and bleeding bodies of several were thrown back upon +the deck; but there were none so seriously wounded that they did not +recover. In the minds of these men, however, their own sufferings were +not the most distressing consequences of the explosion; the really +unfortunate fact was that the sudden appearance of men and guns in the +air informed the Germans that they had to deal with one of the ships +which they so greatly dreaded. The game, so far as the _Dunraven_ was +concerned, was apparently up. The submarine vanished under the water; +and the Englishmen well knew that the next move would be the firing of +the torpedo which could confidently be expected to end the Q-boat's +career. Some of the crew who were not incapacitated got a hose and +attempted to put out the fire, while others removed their wounded +comrades to as comfortable quarters as could be found. Presently the +wake of the torpedo could be seen approaching the ship; the explosion +that followed was a terrible one. The concussion of the previous +explosion had set off the "open-fire" buzzers at the gun +positions--these buzzers being the usual signals for dropping the false +work that concealed the guns and beginning the fight. The result was +that, before the torpedo had apparently given the _Dunraven_ its +quietus, all the remaining guns were exposed with their crews. Captain +Campbell now decided to fight to the death. He sent out a message +notifying all destroyers and other anti-submarine craft, as well as all +merchant ships, not to approach within thirty miles. A destroyer, should +she appear, would force the German to keep under water, and thus prevent +the _Dunraven_ from getting a shot. Another merchant ship on the horizon +might prove such a tempting bait to the submarine that it would abandon +the _Dunraven_, now nearly done for--all on fire at one end as she was +and also sinking from her torpedo wound--and so prevent any further +combat. For the resourceful Captain Campbell had already formulated +another final plan by which he might entice the submarine to rise within +range of his guns. To carry out this plan, he wanted plenty of sea room +and no interference; so he drew a circle in the water, with a radius of +thirty miles, inclosing the space which was to serve as the "prize ring" +for the impending contest. + +His idea was to fall in with the German belief that the _Dunraven_ had +reached the end of her tether. A hastily organized second "panic party" +jumped into a remaining lifeboat and a raft and rowed away from the +sinking, burning ship. Here was visible evidence to the Germans that +their enemies had finally abandoned the fight after nearly four hours of +as frightful gruelling as any ship had ever received. But there were +still two guns that were concealed and workable; there were, as already +said, two torpedo tubes, one on each beam; and a handful of men were +kept on board to man these. Meanwhile, Captain Campbell lay prone on the +bridge, looking through a peephole for the appearance of the submarine, +constantly talking to his men through the tubes, even joking them on +their painful vigil. + +"If you know a better 'ole," he would say, quoting Bairnsfather, "go to +it!" + +"Remember, lads," he would call at another time, "that the King has +given this ship the V.C." + +Every situation has its humorous aspects. Thus one gun crew could hardly +restrain its laughter when a blue-jacket called up to Captain Campbell +and asked if he could not take his boots off. He came of a respectable +family, he explained, and did not think it becoming to die with his +boots on. But the roar of the fire, which had now engulfed the larger +part of the ship, and the constantly booming shells, which were +exploding, one after another, like mammoth fire-crackers, interfered +with much conversation. For twenty minutes everybody lay there, hoping +and praying that the U-boat would emerge. + +The German ultimately came up, but he arose cautiously at the stern of +the ship, at a point from which the guns of the _Dunraven_ could not +bear. On the slim chance that a few men might be left aboard, the +submarine shelled it for several minutes, fore and aft, then, to the +agony of the watching Englishmen, it again sank beneath the waves. +Presently the periscope shot up, and began moving slowly around the +blazing derelict, its eye apparently taking in every detail; he was so +cautious, that submarine commander, he did not propose to be outwitted +again! Captain Campbell now saw that he had only one chance; the +conflagration was rapidly destroying his vessel, and he could spend no +more time waiting for the submarine to rise. But he had two torpedoes +and he determined to use these against the submerged submarine. As the +periscope appeared abeam, one of the _Dunraven's_ torpedoes started in +its direction; the watching gunners almost wept when it missed by a few +inches. But the submarine did not see it, and the periscope calmly +appeared on the other side of the ship. The second torpedo was fired; +this also passed just about a foot astern, and the submarine saw it. The +game was up. What was left of the _Dunraven_ was rapidly sinking, and +Captain Campbell sent out a wireless for help. In a few minutes the U.S. +armed yacht _Noma_ and the British destroyers _Alcock_ and +_Christopher_, which had been waiting outside the "prize ring," arrived +and took off the crew. The tension of the situation was somewhat +relieved when a "jackie" in one of the "panic" boats caught sight of his +beloved captain, entirely uninjured, jumping on one of the destroyers. + +"Gawd!" he shouted, in a delighted tone, "if there ain't the skipper +still alive!" + +"We deeply regret the loss of His Majesty's ship," said Captain +Campbell, in his report, "and still more the escape of the enemy. We did +our best, not only to destroy the enemy and save the ship, but also to +show ourselves worthy of the Victoria Cross which the King recently +bestowed on the ship." + +They did indeed. My own opinion of this performance I expressed in a +letter which I could not refrain from writing to Captain Campbell: + + MY DEAR CAPTAIN: + + I have just read your report of the action between the Dunraven and + a submarine on August 8th last. + + I have had the benefit of reading the reports of some of your + former exploits, and Admiral Bayly has told me about them all; but + in my opinion this of the _Dunraven_ is the finest of all as a + military action and the most deserving of complete success. + + It was purely incidental that the sub escaped. That was due, + moreover, to an unfortunate piece of bad luck. The engagement, + judged as a skilful fight, and not measured by its material + results, seems to me to have been perfectly successful, because I + do not think that even you, with all your experience in such + affairs, could conceive of any feature of the action that you would + alter if you had to do it over again. According to my idea about + such matters, the standard set by you and your crew is worth + infinitely more than the destruction of a submarine. Long after we + both are dust and ashes, the story of this last fight will be a + valuable inspiration to British (and American) naval officers and + men--a demonstration of the extraordinary degree to which the + patriotism, loyalty, personal devotion, and bravery of a crew may + be inspired. I know nothing finer in naval history than the conduct + of the after-gun's crew--in fact, the entire crew of the + _Dunraven_. It goes without saying that the credit of this + behaviour is chiefly yours.... + + With my best wishes for your future success, believe me, my dear + Captain, + + Faithfully yours, + WM. S. SIMS. + + +The records show that the mystery ships sank twelve submarines, of which +Captain Campbell accounted for four; yet this was perhaps not their most +important achievement. From the German standpoint they were a terribly +disturbing element in the general submarine situation. Externally a +mystery ship, as already described, was indistinguishable from the most +harmless merchantman. The cleverness with which the Allied officers took +advantage of the vicious practices of the submarine commanders +bewildered them still further. Nothing afloat was sacred to the Hun; and +he seemed to take particular pride in destroying small vessels, even +little sailing vessels. The Navy decided to turn this amiable trait to +good account, and fitted out the _Prize_, a topsail schooner of 200 +tons, and placed her under the command of Lieut. William Sanders, R.N.R. +This little schooner, as was expected, proved an irresistible bait. A +certain submarine, commanded by one of the most experienced U-boat +captains, attacked her by gun fire from a safe distance and, after her +panic party had left, shelled her until she was in a sinking condition; +many of her crew had been killed and wounded, when, confident that she +could not be a Q-ship, the enemy came within less than 100 yards. It was +promptly fired on and disappeared beneath the surface. The panic party +picked up the German captain and two men, apparently the only survivors, +who expressed their high admiration for the bravery of the crew and +assisted them to get their battered craft into port. The captain said to +Lieutenant Sanders: "I take off my hat to you and your men. I would not +have believed that any men could stand such gun fire." For this exploit +Lieutenant Sanders was awarded the Victoria Cross. Within about four +days from the time of this action the Admiralty received an inquiry via +Sweden through the Red Cross asking the whereabouts of the captain of +this submarine. This showed that the vessel had reached her home port, +and illustrated once more the necessity for caution in claiming the +destruction of U-boats and the wisdom of declining to publish the +figures of sinkings. Unfortunately, the plucky little _Prize_ was +subsequently lost with her gallant captain and crew. + +So great was the desire of our people to take some part in the mystery +ship campaign that I took steps to satisfy their legitimate ambition. As +the Navy had fitted out no mystery ships of our own, I requested the +Admiralty to assign one for our use. This was immediately agreed to by +Admiral Jellicoe and, with the approval of the Navy Department, the +vessel was delivered and named the _Santee_, after our old sailing +man-of-war of that name. We called for volunteers, and practically all +the officers and men of the forces based on Queenstown clamoured for +this highly interesting though hazardous service. Commander David C. +Hanrahan was assigned as her commander, and two specially selected men +were taken from each of our vessels, thus forming an exceedingly capable +crew. The ship was disguised with great skill and, with the invaluable +advice of Captain Campbell, the crew was thoroughly trained in all the +fine points of the game. + +One December evening the _Santee_ sailed from Queenstown for Bantry Bay +to carry out intensive training. A short time after she left port she +was struck by a torpedo which caused great damage, but so solidly was +her hull packed with wood that she remained afloat. The panic party got +off in most approved style, and for several hours the _Santee_ awaited +developments, hoping for a glimpse of the submarine. But the under-water +boat never disclosed its presence; not even the tip of a periscope +showed itself; and the _Santee_ was towed back to Queenstown. + +The _Santee's_ experience was that of many mystery ships of 1918. The +Germans had learned their lesson. + +For this reason it is desirable to repeat and emphasize that the most +important accomplishment of the mystery ships was not the actual sinking +of submarines, but their profound influence upon the tactics of the +U-boats. It was manifest in the beginning that the first information +reaching Germany concerning the mystery ships would greatly diminish the +chances of sinking submarines by this means, for it would cause all +submarines to be wary of all mercantile craft. They were therefore +obliged largely to abandon the easy, safe, and cheap methods of sinking +ships by bombs or gun fire, and were consequently forced to incur the +danger of attacking with the scarce and expensive torpedo. Moreover, +barring the very few vessels that could be sunk by long-range gun fire, +they were practically restricted to this method of attack on pain of +abandoning the submarine campaign altogether. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +AMERICAN COLLEGE BOYS AND SUBCHASERS + + +I + +Who would ever have thought that a little wooden vessel, displacing only +sixty tons, measuring only 110 feet from bow to stern, and manned by +officers and crew very few of whom had ever made an ocean voyage, could +have crossed more than three thousand miles of wintry sea, even with the +help of the efficient naval officers and men who, after training there, +convoyed and guided them across, and could have done excellent work in +hunting the submarines? We built nearly 400 of these little vessels in +eighteen months; and we sent 170 to such widely scattered places as +Plymouth, Queenstown, Brest, Gibraltar, and Corfu. Several enemy +submarines now lie at the bottom of the sea as trophies of their +offensive power; and on the day that hostilities ceased, the Allies +generally recognized that this tiny vessel, with the "listening devices" +which made it so efficient, represented one of the most satisfactory +direct "answers" to the submarine which had been developed by the war. +Had it not been that the war ended before enough destroyers could be +spared from convoy duty to assist, with their greater speed and +offensive power, hunting groups of these tiny craft, it is certain that +they would soon have become a still more important factor in destroying +submarines and interfering with their operations. + +The convoy system, as I have already explained, was essentially an +offensive measure; it compelled the submarine to encounter its most +formidable antagonist, the destroyer, and to risk destruction every time +that it attacked merchant vessels. This system, however, was an indirect +offensive, or, to use the technical phrase, it was a defensive-offensive. +Its great success in protecting merchant shipping, and the indispensable +service which it performed to the cause of civilization, I have already +described. But the fact remained that there could be no final solution +of the submarine problem, barring breaking down the enemy _moral_, until +a definite, direct method of attacking these boats had been found. A +depth charge, fired from the deck of a destroyer, was a serious matter +for the submarine; still the submarine could avoid this deadly weapon at +any time by simply concealing its whereabouts when in danger of attack. +The destroyer could usually sink the submarine whenever it could get +near enough; it was for the under-water boat, however, to decide whether +an engagement should take place. That great advantage in warfare, the +option of fighting or of running away, always lay with the submarine. +Until it was possible for our naval forces to set out to sea, find the +enemy that was constantly assailing our commerce, and destroy him, it +was useless to maintain that we had discovered the anti-submarine +tactics which would drive this pest from the ocean for all time. Though +the convoy, the mine-fields, the mystery ships, the airplane, and +several other methods of fighting the under-water boat had been +developed, the submarine could still utilize that one great quality of +invisibility which made any final method of attacking it such a +difficult problem. + +Thus, despite the wonderful work which had been accomplished by the +convoy, the Allied effort to destroy the submarine was still largely a +game of blind man's buff. In our struggle against the German campaign we +were deprived of one of the senses which for ages had been absolutely +necessary to military operations--that of sight. We were constantly +attempting to destroy an enemy whom we could not see. So far as this +offensive on the water was concerned, the Allies found themselves in the +position of a man who has suddenly gone blind. I make this comparison +advisedly, for it at once suggests that our situation was not entirely +hopeless. The man who loses the use of his eyes suffers a terrible +affliction; yet this calamity does not completely destroy his +usefulness. Such a person, if normally intelligent, gradually learns how +to find his way around in darkness; first he slowly discovers how to +move about his room; then about his house, then about his immediate +neighbourhood; and ultimately he becomes so expert that he can be +trusted to walk alone in crowded streets, to pilot himself up and down +strange buildings, and even to go on long journeys. In time he learns to +read, to play cards and chess, and not infrequently even to resume his +old profession or occupation; indeed his existence, despite the +deprivation of what many regard as the most indispensable of the senses, +becomes again practically a normal process. His whole experience, of +course, is one of the most beautiful demonstrations we have of the +exquisite economy of Nature. What has happened in the case of this +stricken man is that his other senses have come to fill the place of the +one which he has lost. Deprived of sight, he is forced to form his +contacts with the external world by using his other senses, especially +those of touch and hearing. So long as he could see clearly these senses +had lain half developed; he had never used them to any extent that +remotely approached their full powers; but now that they are called into +constant action they gradually increase in strength to a degree that +seems abnormal, precisely as a disused muscle, when regularly exercised, +acquires a hitherto unsuspected vigour. + +This illustration applies to the predicament in which the Allied navies +now found themselves. When they attempted to fight the submarine they +discovered that they had gone hopelessly blind. Like the sightless man, +however, they still had other senses left; and it remained for them to +develop these to take the place of the one of which they had been +deprived. The faculty which it seemed most likely that they could +increase by stimulation was that of hearing. Our men could not detect +the presence of the submarine with their eyes; could they not do so with +their ears? Their enemy could make himself unseen at will, but he could +not make himself unheard, except by stopping his motors. In fact, when +the submarine was under water the vibrations, due to the peculiar shape +of its propellers and hull, and to its electric motors, produced sound +waves that resembled nothing else in art or nature. It now clearly +became the business of naval science to take advantage of this +phenomenon to track the submarine after it had submerged. Once this feat +had been accomplished, the only advantage which the under-water boat +possessed over other warcraft, that of invisibility, would be overcome; +and, inasmuch as the submarine, except for this quality of invisibility, +was a far weaker vessel than any other afloat, the complete elimination +of this advantage would dispose of it as a formidable enemy in war. + +A fact that held forth hopes of success was that water is an excellent +conductor of sound--far better than the atmosphere itself. In the air +there are many crosscurrents and areas of varying temperature which make +sound waves frequently behave in most puzzling fashion, sometimes +travelling in circles, sometimes moving capriciously up or down or even +turning sharp corners. The mariner has learned how deceptive is a +foghorn; when it is blowing he knows that a ship is somewhere in the +general region, but usually he has no definite idea where. The water, +however, is uniform in density and practically uniform in temperature, +and therefore sound in this medium always travels in straight lines. It +also travels more rapidly in water than in the air, it travels farther, +and the sound waves are more distinct. American inventors have been the +pioneers in making practical use of this well-known principle. Before +the war its most valuable applications were the submarine bell and the +vibrator. On many Atlantic and Pacific points these instruments had been +placed under the water, provided with mechanisms which caused them to +sound at regular intervals; an ingenious invention, installed aboard +ships, made it possible for trained listeners to pick up these noises, +and so fix positions, long before lighthouses or lightships came into +view in any but entirely clear weather. For several years the great +trans-Atlantic liners have frequently made Nantucket Lightship by +listening for its submarine bell. From the United States this system was +rapidly extending all over the world. + +American inventors were therefore well qualified to deal with this +problem of communicating by sound under the water. A listening device +placed on board ship, which would reveal to practised ears the noise of +a submarine at a reasonable distance, and which would at the same time +give its direction, would come near to solving the most serious problem +presented by the German tactics. Even before the United States entered +the war, American specialists had started work on their own initiative. +In particular the General Electric Company, the Western Electric +Company, and the Submarine Signal Company had taken up the matter at +their own expense; each had a research department and an experimental +station where a large amount of preliminary work had been done. Soon a +special board was created at Washington to study detection devices, to +which each of these companies was invited to send a representative; the +board eventually took up its headquarters at New London, and was +assisted in this work by some of the leading physicists of our +universities. All through the summer and autumn of 1917 these men kept +industriously at their task; to such good purpose did they labour that +by October of that year several devices had been invented which seemed +to promise satisfactory results. In beginning their labours they had one +great advantage: European scientists had already made considerable +progress in this work, and the results of their studies were at once +placed at our disposal by the Allied Admiralties. Moreover, these +Admiralties sent over several of their experts to co-operate with us. +About that time Captain Richard H. Leigh, U.S.N., who had been assigned +to command the subchaser detachments abroad, was sent to Europe to +confer with the Allied Admiralties, and to test, in actual operations +against submarines, the detection devices which had been developed at +the New London station. Captain Leigh, who after the armistice became my +chief-of-staff at London, was not only one of our ablest officers, but +he had long been interested in detection devices, and was a great +believer in their possibilities. + +The British, of course, received Captain Leigh cordially and gave him +the necessary facilities for experimenting with his devices, but it was +quite apparent that they did not anticipate any very satisfactory +results. The trouble was that so many inventors had presented new ideas +which had proved useless that we were all more or less doubtful. They +had been attempting to solve this problem ever since the beginning of +the war; British inventors had developed several promising hydrophones, +but these instruments had not proved efficient in locating a submarine +with sufficient accuracy to enable us to destroy it with depth charges. +These disappointments quite naturally created an atmosphere of +scepticism which, however, did not diminish the energy which was +devoted to the solution of this important problem. Accordingly, three +British trawlers and a "P"[6] boat were assigned to Captain Leigh, and +with these vessels he spent ten days in the Channel, testing impartially +both the British and American devices. No detailed tactics for groups of +vessels had yet been elaborated for hunting by sound. Though the ships +used were not particularly suitable for the work in hand, these few days +at sea demonstrated that the American contrivances were superior to +anything in the possession of the Allies. They were by no means perfect; +but the ease with which they picked up all kinds of noises, particularly +those made by submarines, astonished everybody who was let into the +secret; the conviction that such a method of tracking the hidden enemy +might ultimately be used with the desired success now became more or +less general. In particular the American "K-tubes" and the "C-tubes" +proved superior to the "Nash-fish" and the "Shark-fin," the two devices +which up to that time had been the favourites in the British navy. The +"K-tubes" easily detected the sound of large vessels at a distance of +twenty miles, while the "C-tubes" were more useful at a shorter +distance. But the greatest advantage which these new listening machines +had over those of other navies was that they could more efficiently +determine not only the sound but also the direction from which it came. +Captain Leigh, after this demonstration, visited several British naval +stations, consulting with the British officers, explaining our +sound-detection devices, and testing the new appliances in all kinds of +conditions. The net result of his trip was a general reversal of opinion +on the value of this method of hunting submarines. The British Admiralty +ordered from the United States large quantities of the American +mechanisms, and also began manufacturing them in England. + +About the time that it was shown that these listening devices would +probably have great practical value, the first "subchasers" were +delivered at New London, Conn. The design of the subchaser type was +based upon what proved to be a misconception as to the cruising +possibilities of the submarine. Just before the beginning of the Great +War most naval officers believed that the limitations of the submarine +were such that it could not operate far from coastal waters. Hardly any +one, except a few experienced submarine officers, had regarded it as +possible that these small boats could successfully attack vessels upon +the high seas or remain for any extended period away from their base. +High authorities condemned them. This is hard to realize, now that we +know so well the offensive possibilities of submarines, but we have +ample evidence as to what former opinions were. For example, a +distinguished naval writer says that at that time "The view of the +majority of admirals and captains probably was that submersible craft +were 'just marvellous toys, good for circus performances in carefully +selected places in fine weather.'" He adds that certain very prominent +naval men of great experience declared that the submarine "could operate +only by day in fair weather; that it was practically useless in misty +weather"; that it had to come to the surface to fire its torpedo; that +its "crowning defect lay in its want of habitability"; that "a week's +peace manoeuvres got to the bottom of the health of officers and men"; +and that "on the high seas the chances [of successful attack] will be +few, and submarines will require for their existence parent ships." The +first triumph of Otto Weddingen, that of sinking the _Cressy_, the +_Hogue_, and the _Aboukir_, did not change this conviction, for these +three warships had been sunk in comparatively restricted waters under +conditions which were very favourable to the submarine. It was not until +the _Audacious_ went to the bottom off the north-west coast of Ireland, +many hundreds of miles from any German submarine base, that the +possibilities of this new weapon were partially understood; for it was +clear that the _Audacious_ had been sunk by a mine, and that that mine +must have been laid by a submarine. Even then many doubted the ability +of the U-boats to operate successfully in the open sea westward of the +British Isles. Therefore the subchaser was designed to fight the +submarine in restricted waters; Great Britain and France ordered more +than 500 smaller (80-foot) vessels of this type, or of approximately +this type, built in the United States; and just before our declaration +of war the United States had designed and contracted for several +hundred of a somewhat larger size (the 110-foot chasers) with the +original idea of using them as patrol boats near the harbours and +coastal waters of our own country. Long before these vessels were +finished, however, it became apparent that Germany could not engage in +any serious, extensive campaign on this side; it was also evident that +any vessel as small as the subchaser had little value in convoy work, +notwithstanding the excellence of its sea-keeping qualities; and we were +all rather doubtful as to just what use we could make of these new +additions to our navy. + +The work of pushing the design and construction of these boats reflects +great credit upon those who were chiefly responsible. The designs were +drawn and the first contracts were placed before the United States had +declared war. The credit for this admirable work belongs chiefly to +Commander Julius A. Furer (Construction Corps) U.S. Navy, and to Mr. A. +Loring Swasey, a yacht architect of Boston, who was enrolled as a +lieutenant-commander in the reserves, and who served throughout the war +as an adviser and assistant to Commander Furer in his specialty as a +small vessel designer, particularly in wood. It speaks well for the +ability of these officers that the small subchasers exhibited such +remarkable sea-keeping qualities; this fact was a pleasant surprise to +all sea-going men, particularly to naval officers who had had little +experience with that type of craft. The listening devices had not been +perfected when they were designed, and this innovation opened up +possibilities for their employment which had not been anticipated; for +these reasons it inevitably took a large amount of time, after the +subchasers had been delivered, to provide the hydrophones and all the +several appliances which were necessary for hunting submarines. +Apparently those who were responsible for constructing these boats had a +rocky road to travel; with the great demand for material and labour for +building destroyers, merchant ships, and for a multitude of war +supplies, it was natural that the demands for the subchasers in the +early days were viewed as a nuisance; the responsible officers, +therefore, deserve credit for delivering these boats in such an +efficient condition and in such a remarkably short time. That winter, as +everyone will recall, was the coldest in the memory of the present +generation. Day after day the poor subchasers, coated with ice almost a +foot thick, many with their engines wrecked, their planking torn and +their propellers crumpled, were towed into the harbour and left at the +first convenient mooring, where the ice immediately began to freeze them +in. As was inevitable under such conditions, the crews, for the most +part, suffered acutely in this terrible weather; they had had absolutely +no training in ordinary seamanship, to say nothing of the detailed +tactics demanded by the difficult work in which they were to engage. + +I do not think that the whole lot contained 1 per cent. of graduates of +Annapolis or 5 per cent. of experienced sailors; for the greater number +that terrible trip in the icy ocean, with the thermometer several +degrees below zero, and with very little artificial heat on board, was +their first experience at sea. Yet there was not the slightest sign of +whimpering or discouragement. Ignorant of salt water as these men at +that time were, they really represented about the finest raw material in +the nation for this service. Practically all, officers and men, were +civilians; a small minority were amateur yachtsmen, but the great mass +were American college undergraduates. Boys of Yale, Harvard, +Princeton--indeed, of practically every college and university in the +land--had dropped their books, left the comforts of their fraternity +houses, and abandoned their athletic fields, eager for the great +adventure against the Hun. If there is any man who still doubts what the +American system of higher education is doing for our country, he should +have spent a few days at sea with these young men. That they knew +nothing at first about navigation and naval technique was not important; +the really important fact was that their minds were alert, their hearts +filled with a tremendous enthusiasm for the cause, their souls clean, +and their bodies ready for the most exhausting tasks. Whenever I get to +talking of the American college boys and other civilians in our navy, I +find myself indulging in what may seem extravagant praise. I have even +been inclined to suggest that it would be well, in the training of naval +officers in future, to combine a college education with a shorter +intensive technical course at the Naval Academy. For these college men +have what technical academies do not usually succeed in giving--a +general education and a general training, which develops the power of +initiative, independent thought, an ability quickly to grasp intricate +situations, and to master, in a short time, almost any practical +problem. At least this proved to be the case with our subchaser forces. +So little experience did these boys have of seafaring that, as soon as +they had completed their first voyage, we had to place a considerable +portion in hospital to recover from seasickness. Yet, a few months +afterward, we could leave these same men on the bridge at night in +command of the ship. When they reached New London they knew no more of +seamanship and navigation than so many babies, but so well were these +boys instructed and trained within a few weeks by the regular officers +in charge that they learned their business sufficiently well to cross +the Atlantic safely in convoy. The early 80-foot subchasers which we +built for Great Britain and France crossed the ocean on the decks of +ocean liners; for it would have been a waste of time, even if +international law had permitted it, to send them under their own power; +but all of the 110-footers which these young men commanded crossed the +ocean under their own power and many in the face of the fierce January +and February gales, almost constantly tossed upon the waves like pieces +of cork. As soon as they were sufficiently trained and prepared to make +the trip, groups were despatched under escort of a naval vessel fitted +to supply them with gasolene at sea. Such matters as gunnery these young +men also learned with lightning speed. The most valuable were those who +had specialized in mathematics, chemistry, and general science; but they +were all a splendid lot, and to their spirit and energy are chiefly due +their remarkable success in learning their various duties. + +"Those boys can't bring a ship across the ocean!" someone remarked to +Captain Cotten, who commanded the first squadron of subchasers to arrive +at Plymouth, after he had related the story of one of these voyages. + +"Perhaps they can't," replied Captain Cotten--himself an Annapolis man +who admires these reservists as much as I do. "But they have." + +And he pointed to thirty-six little vessels lying at anchor in Plymouth +Harbour, just about a hundred yards from the monument which marks the +spot from which the _Mayflower_ sailed for the new world--all of which +were navigated across by youngsters of whom almost none, officers or +men, had had any nautical training until the day the United States +declared war on Germany. + +Capable as they were, however, I am sure that these reservists would be +the first to acknowledge their obligations to the loyal and devoted +regular officers of the Navy, who laboured so diligently to train them +for their work. One of the minor tragedies of the war is that many of +our Annapolis men, whose highest ambition it was to cross the ocean and +engage in the "game," had to stay on this side, in order to instruct +these young men from civil life. + +I wish that I had the space adequately to acknowledge the work in +organization done by Captain John T. Tompkins; in listening devices by +Rear-Admiral S. S. Robison, Captains Frank H. Schofield, Joseph H. +Defrees, Commanders Clyde S. McDowell, and Miles A. Libbey, and the many +scientists who gave us the benefit of their knowledge and experience. It +is impossible to overpraise the work of such men as Captains Arthur J. +Hepburn, Lyman A. Cotten, and William P. Cronan, in "licking" the +splendid raw material into shape. Great credit is also due to +Rear-Admiral T. P. Magruder, Captains David F. Boyd, S. V. Graham, +Arthur Crenshaw, E. P. Jessop, C. M. Tozer, H. G. Sparrow, and C. P. +Nelson, and many others who had the actual responsibility of convoying +these vessels across the ocean. + +I assume that they will receive full credit when the story of the work +of the Navy at home is written; meanwhile, they may be assured of the +appreciation of those of us on the other side who depended so much for +success upon their thorough work of preparation. + + +II + +The sea qualities which the subchaser displayed, and the development of +listening devices which made it possible to detect all kinds of sounds +under water at a considerable distance, immediately laid before us the +possibility of direct offensive operations against the submarine. It +became apparent that these listening devices could be used to the +greatest advantage on these little craft. The tactics which were soon +developed for their use made it necessary that we should have a large +number of vessels; nearly all the destroyers were then engaged in convoy +duty, and we could not entertain the idea of detailing many of them for +this more or less experimental work. Happily the subchasers started +coming off the ways just in time to fill the need; and the several +Allied navies began competing for these new craft in lively fashion. +France demanded them in large numbers to work in co-operation with the +air stations and also to patrol her coastal waters, and there were many +requests from stations in England, Ireland, Gibraltar, Portugal, and +Italy. The question of where we should place them was therefore referred +to the Allied Naval War Council, which, at my suggestion, considered the +matter, not from the standpoint of the individual nation, but from the +standpoint of the Allied cause as a whole. + +A general survey clearly showed that there were three places where the +subchasers might render the most efficient service. The convoy system +had by this time not only greatly reduced the losses, but it was +changing the policy of the submarines. Until this system was adopted, +sinkings on a great scale were taking place far out at sea, sometimes +three or four hundred miles west of Ireland. The submarines had adopted +the policy of meeting the unescorted ships in the Atlantic and of +torpedoing them long before they could reach the zones where the +destroyer patrol might possibly have protected them. But sailing great +groups of merchantmen in convoys, surrounded by destroyers, made this an +unprofitable adventure, and the submarines therefore had to change their +programme. The important point is that the convoys, so long as they +could keep formation, and so long as protecting screens could be +maintained on their flanks, were virtually safe. Under these conditions +sinkings, as already said, were less than one-half of 1 per cent. These +convoys, it will be recalled, came home by way of two "trunk lines," a +southern one extending through the English Channel and a northern one +through the so-called "North Channel"--the latter being the passage +between Ireland and Scotland. As soon as the inward-bound southern +"trunk-line" convoys reached the English Channel they broke up, certain +ships going to Plymouth, Portsmouth, Southampton, and other Channel +ports, and others sailing to Brest, Cherbourg, Havre, and other harbours +in France. In the same fashion, convoys which came in by way of the +North Channel split up as soon as they reached the Irish Sea. In other +words, the convoys, as convoys, necessarily ceased to exist the moment +that they entered these inland waters, and the ships, as individual +ships, or small groups of ships, had to find their way to their +destinations unescorted by destroyers, or escorted most inadequately. +This was the one weak spot in the convoy system, and the Germans were +not slow to turn it to their advantage. They now proceeded to withdraw +most of their submarines from the high seas and to concentrate them in +these restricted waters. In April, 1917, the month which marked the high +tide of German success, not far from a hundred merchant ships were sunk +in an area that extended about 300 miles west of Ireland and about 300 +miles south. A year afterward--in the month of April, 1918--not a single +ship was sent to the bottom in this same section of the sea. That change +measures the extent to which the convoy saved Allied shipping. But if we +examine the situation in inclosed waters--the North Channel, the Irish +Sea, St. George's Channel, and the English Channel--we shall find a less +favourable state of affairs. Practically all the sinkings of April, +1918, occurred in these latter areas. In April, 1917, the waters which +lay between Ireland and England were practically free from depredations; +in the spring of 1918, however, these waters had become a favourite +hunting ground for submarines; while in the English Channel the sinkings +were almost as numerous in April, 1918, as they had been in the same +month the year before. + +Thus we had to deal with an entirely new phase of the submarine +campaign; the new conditions made it practicable to employ light vessels +which existed in large numbers, and which could aggressively hunt out +the submarines even though they were sailing submerged. The subchaser, +when fitted with its listening devices, met these new requirements, +though of course not to the desirable degree of precision we hoped soon +to attain with still further improved hydrophones and larger vessels of +the Eagle class then being built. + +The matter was presented to the Allied Naval Council and, in accordance +with the unanimous opinion of all of the members, they recommended that +of the subchasers then available, a squadron should be based on +Plymouth, where it could be advantageously used against the German +submarines which were still doing great damage in the English Channel, +and that another squadron, based on Queenstown, should similarly be used +against the submarines in the Irish Sea. + +I was therefore requested to concentrate the boats at these two points, +and at once acquiesced in this recommendation. + +But another point, widely separated from British waters, also made a +powerful plea for consideration. In the Mediterranean the submarine +campaign was still a menace. The spring and early summer of 1918 +witnessed large losses of shipping destined to southern France, to +Italy, and to the armies at Salonika and in Palestine. Austrian and +German submarines, operating from their bases at Pola and Cattaro in the +Adriatic, were responsible for this destruction. If we could pen these +pests in the Adriatic, the whole Mediterranean Sea would become an +unobstructed highway for the Allies. A glance at the map indicated the +way in which such a desirable result might be accomplished. At its +southern extremity the Adriatic narrows to a passage only forty miles +wide--the Strait of Otranto--and through this restricted area all the +submarines were obliged to pass before they could reach the water where +they could prey upon Allied commerce. For some time before the Allied +Naval Council began to consider the use of the American subchasers, the +British navy was doing its best to keep submarines from passing this +point. A defensive scheme known, not very accurately, as the "Otranto +barrage" was in operation. The word "barrage" suggests an effective +barrier, but this one at the base of the Adriatic consisted merely of a +few British destroyers of ancient type and a large number of drifters, +which kept up a continuous patrolling of the gateway through which the +submarines made their way into the Mediterranean. It is no reflection +upon the British to say that this barrage was unsatisfactory and +inadequate, and that, for the first few months, it formed a not +particularly formidable obstruction. So many demands were made upon the +British navy in northern waters that it could not spare many vessels for +this work; the Italian navy was holding the majority of its destroyers +intact, momentarily prepared for a sortie by the Austrian battle fleet; +the Otranto barrage, therefore, important as it was to the Allied cause, +was necessarily insufficient. The Italian representatives at the Allied +Council made a strong plea for a contingent of American subchasers to +reinforce the British ships, and the British and French delegates +seconded this request. + +In the spring of 1918 I therefore sent Captain Leigh to southern Italy +to locate and construct a subchaser base in this neighbourhood. After +inspecting the territory in detail Captain Leigh decided that the Bay of +Govino, in the island of Corfu, would best meet our requirements. The +immediate connection which was thus established between New London and +this ancient city of classical Greece fairly illustrates how widely the +Great War had extended the horizon of the American people. There was a +certain appropriateness in the fact that the American college boys who +commanded these little ships--not much larger than the vessel in which +Ulysses had sailed these same waters three thousand years before--should +have made their base on the same island which had served as a naval +station for Athens in the Peloponnesian War, and which, several +centuries afterward, had been used for the same purpose by Augustus in +the struggle with Antony. And probably the sight of the Achelleion, the +Kaiser's palace, which was not far from this new American base, was not +without its influence in constantly reminding our young men of the +meaning of this unexpected association of Yankee-land with the ancient +world. + + +III + +By June 30, 1918, two squadrons of American chasers, comprising +thirty-six boats, had assembled at Plymouth, England, under the command +of Captain Lyman A. Cotten, U.S.N. The U.S. destroyer _Parker_, +commanded by Commander Wilson Brown, had been assigned to this +detachment as a supporting ship. The area which now formed the new field +of operations was one which was causing great anxiety at that time. It +comprehended that section of the Channel which reached from Start Point +to Lizard Head, and included such important shipping ports as Plymouth, +Devonport, and Falmouth. This was the region in which the convoys, after +having been escorted through the submarine zone, were broken up, and +from which the individual ships were obliged to find their way to their +destinations with greatly diminished protection. It was one of the most +important sections in which the Germans, forced to abandon their +submarine campaign on the high seas, were now actively concentrating +their efforts. Until the arrival of the subchasers sinkings had been +taking place in these waters on a considerable scale. In company with a +number of British hunting units, Captain Cotten's detachment kept +steadily at work from June 30th until the middle of August, when it +became necessary to send it elsewhere. The historical fact is that not a +single merchant ship was sunk between Lizard Head and Start Point as +long as these subchasers were assisting in the operations. The one +sinking which at first seemed to have broken this splendid record was +that of the _Stockforce_; this merchantman was destroyed off Dartmouth; +but it was presently announced that the _Stockforce_ was in reality a +"mystery" ship, sent out for the express purpose of being torpedoed, and +that she "got" the submarine which had ended her own career. This +happening therefore hardly detracted from our general satisfaction over +the work done by our little vessels. Since many ships had been sunk in +this area in the month before they arrived, and since the sinkings +started in again after they had left, the immunity which this region +enjoyed during July and August may properly be attributed largely to the +American navy. Not only were no bona-fide merchant ships destroyed, but +no mines were laid from Start Point to Lizard Head during the time that +the American forces maintained their vigil there. That this again was +probably not a mere coincidence was shown by the fact that, the very +night after these chasers were withdrawn from Plymouth, five mines were +laid in front of that harbour, in preparation for a large convoy +scheduled to sail the next day. + +By the time that Captain Cotten's squadron began work the hunting +tactics which had been developed during their training at New London +had been considerably improved. Their procedure represented something +entirely new in naval warfare. Since the chasers had to depend for the +detection of the foe upon an agency so uncertain as the human ear, it +was thought to be necessary, as a safeguard against error, and also to +increase the chances of successful attack, that they should hunt in +groups of at least three. The fight against the submarine, under this +new system, was divided into three parts--the search, the pursuit, and +the attack. The first chapter included those weary hours which the +little group spent drifting on the ocean, the lookout in the crow's nest +scanning the surface for the possible glimpse of a periscope, while the +trained listeners on deck, with strange little instruments which +somewhat resembled telephone receivers glued to their ears, were kept +constantly at tension for any noise which might manifest itself under +water. It was impossible to use these listening devices while the boats +were under way, for the sound of their own propellers and machinery +would drown out any other disturbances. The three little vessels +therefore drifted abreast--at a distance of a mile or two apart--their +propellers hardly moving, and the decks as silent as the grave; they +formed a new kind of fishing expedition, the officers and crews +constantly held taut by the expectation of a "bite." And frequently +their experience was that of the proverbial "fisherman's luck." Hours +passed sometimes without even the encouragement of a "nibble"; then, +suddenly, one of the listeners would hear something which his +experienced ear had learned to identify as the propellers and motors of +a submarine. The great advantage possessed by the American tubes, as +already said, was that they gave not only the sound, but its direction. +The listener would inform his commanding officer that he had picked up a +submarine. "Very faint," he would perhaps report, "direction 97"--the +latter being the angle which it made with the north and south line. +Another appliance which now rendered great service was the wireless +telephone. The commanding officer at once began talking with the other +two boats, asking if they had picked up the noise. Unless all three +vessels had heard the disturbance, nothing was done; but if all +identified it nearly simultaneously, this unanimity was taken as +evidence that something was really moving in the water. When all three +vessels obtained the direction as well as the sound it was a +comparatively simple matter to define pretty accurately its location. +The middle chaser of the three was the flagship and her most interesting +feature was the so-called plotting-room. Here one officer received +constant telephone reports from all three boats, giving the nature of +the sounds, and, more important still, their directions. He transferred +these records to a chart as soon as they came in, rapidly made +calculations, and in a few seconds he was able to give the location of +the submarine. This process was known as obtaining a "fix." The reports +of our chaser commanders are filled constantly with reference to these +"fixes"--the "fix" being that point on the surface of the ocean where +three lines, each giving the direction of the detected sound, cross one +another. The method can be most satisfactorily illustrated by the +following diagram: + +[Illustration: HOW THE LISTENING DEVICES LOCATED A SUBMARINE.] + +In this demonstration the letters A, B, and C, each represent a +subchaser, the central one, B, being the flagship of the division. The +listener on A has picked up a noise, the direction of which is indicated +by the line _a a_. He telephones by wireless this information to the +plotting-room aboard the flagship B. The listeners on this vessel have +picked up the same sound, which comes from the direction indicated by +the line _b b_. The point at which these two lines cross is the "fix"; +it shows the spot in the ocean where the submarine was stationed when +the sound was first detected. The reason for having a report from the +third subchaser C is merely for the purpose of corroborating the work of +the other two; if three observations, made independently, agree in +locating the enemy at this point, the commanding officer may safely +assume that he is not chasing a will o' the wisp. + +But this "fix" is merely the location of the submarine at the time when +it was first heard. In the great majority of cases, however, the +submerged vessel is moving; so, rapidly as the men in the plotting-room +may work, the German has advanced beyond this point by the time they +have finished their calculations. The subchasers, which have been +drifting while these observations were being made, now start their +engines at full speed, and rush up to the neighbourhood of their first +"fix." Arrived there, they stop again, put over their tubes, and begin +listening once more. The chances are now that the noise of the submarine +is louder; the chasers are getting "warmer." It is not unlikely, +however, that the direction has changed, for the submarine, which has +listening devices of its own--though the German hydrophones were +decidedly inferior to the American--may have heard the subchasers and +may be making frantic efforts to elude them. But changing the course +will help it little, for the listeners easily get the new direction, and +send the details to the plotting-room, where the new "fix" is obtained +in a few moments. Thus the subchasers keep inching up to their prey; at +each new "fix" the noise becomes louder, until the hunters are so near +that they feel justified in attacking. Putting on full speed, all three +rush up to the latest "fix," drop depth charges with a lavish hand, fire +the "Y" howitzers, each one of which carries two depth charges, +meanwhile manning their guns on the chance that the submarine may decide +to rise to the surface and give battle. In many of these hunts a +destroyer accompanies the subchasers, always keeping at a considerable +distance, so that the noise of its propellers will not interfere with +the game; once the chasers determine the accurate "fix," they wire the +position to this larger ship, which puts on full steam and dashes with +the speed of an express train to the indicated spot, and adds ten or a +dozen depth charges to those deposited by the chasers. + +Such were the subchaser tactics in their perfection; yet it was only +after much experience that the procedure began to work with clock-like +regularity. At first the new world under the water proved confusing to +the listeners at the tubes. This watery domain was something entirely +new in human experience. When Dr. Alexander Bell invented his first +telephone an attempt was made to establish a complete circuit by using +the earth itself; the result was that a conglomerate of +noises--moanings, shriekings, howlings, and humming sounds--came over +the wire, which seemed to have become the playground of a million +devils. These were the noises, hitherto unknown, which are constantly +being given out by Mother Earth herself. And now it was discovered that +the under-ocean, which we usually think of as a silent place, is in +reality extremely vocal. The listeners at the C- and K-tubes heard many +sounds in addition to the ones which they were seeking. On the K-tubes a +submarine running at full speed was audible from fifteen to twenty +miles, but louder noises could be heard much farther away. The day might +be bright, the water quiet, and there might not be a ship anywhere +within the circle of the horizon, but suddenly the listener at the tube +would hear a terrific explosion, and he would know that a torpedo, +perhaps forty or fifty miles distant, had blown up a merchantman, or +that some merchantman had struck a mine. Again he would catch the +unmistakable "chug! chug! chug!" which he learned to identify as +indicating the industrious and slow progress of a convoy of twenty or +thirty ships. Then a rapid humming noise would come along the wire; that +was the whirling propeller of a destroyer. A faint moan caused some +bewilderment at first; but it was ultimately learned that this came from +a wreck, lying at the bottom, and tossed from side to side by the +current; it sounded like the sigh of a ghost, and the frequency with +which it was heard told how densely the floor of the ocean was covered +with victims of the submarines. The larger animal life of the sea also +registered itself upon the tubes. Our listeners, after a little +training, could identify a whale as soon as the peculiar noise it made +in swimming reached the receivers. At first a school of porpoises +increased their perplexities. The "swish! swish!" which marked their +progress so closely resembled the noise of a submarine that it used to +lead our men astray. But practice in this game was everything; after a +few trips the listener easily distinguished between the porpoise and the +submarine, though the distinction was so fine that he had difficulty in +telling just how he made it. In fact, our men became so expert that, out +of the miscellaneous noises which overwhelmed their ears whenever the +tubes were dropped into the water, they were able almost invariably to +select that of the U-boat. + +In many ingenious ways the chasers supplemented the work of other +anti-submarine craft. Destroyers and other patrol boats kept track of +the foe pretty well so long as he remained on the surface; the business +of the chaser, we must remember, was to find him after he had submerged. +The Commander-in-Chief on shore sometimes sent a radio that a German had +appeared at an indicated spot, and disappeared beneath the waves; the +chasers would then start for this location and begin hunting with their +listeners. Aircraft which sighted submarines would send similar +messages; convoys that had been attacked, individual ships that had been +torpedoed, destroyers which had spotted their prey, only to lose track +of it as soon as it submerged, would call upon the chasers to take up +the battle where they had abandoned it. + +As long as the chasers operated in the waters which I have indicated, +those between Start Point and Lizard Head, they "got" no submarine; the +explanation was simple, for as soon as the chasers and British hunting +vessels became active here, the Germans abandoned this field of +operations. This was the reason that the operative area of the Plymouth +detachment was extended. Some of the chasers were now sent around Land's +End and up the north Cornish coast, where colliers bound from Wales to +France were proving tempting bait for the U-boats; others operated +farther out to sea, off the Scilly Islands and west of Brest. In these +regions their contacts with the submarine were quite frequent. + +There was no U-boat in the German navy which the Allied forces were so +ambitious to "get" as the _U-53_. I have already referred to this +celebrated vessel and its still more celebrated commander, Captain Hans +Rose. It was this submarine, it will be recalled, which had suddenly +paid a ceremonious visit to Newport, R.I., in the autumn of 1916, and +which, on its way back to Germany, had paused long enough off Nantucket +to sink half a dozen British cargo ships. It was the same submarine +which sank our own destroyer, the _Jacob Jones_, by a chance shot with a +torpedo. Thus Americans had a peculiar reason for wishing to see it +driven from the seas. About the middle of August, 1918, we discovered +that the _U-53_ was operating in the Atlantic about 250 miles west of +Brest. At the same time we learned that two German submarines were +coming down the west coast of Ireland. We picked up radio messages which +these three boats were exchanging; this made it quite likely that they +proposed to form a junction west of Brest, and attack American +transports, which were then sailing to France in great numbers. Here was +an opportunity for the subchasers. The distance--250 miles to sea--would +be a severe strain upon their endurance, but we assigned four hunting +units, twelve boats in all, to the task, and also added to this +contingent the destroyers _Wilkes_ and _Parker_. On the morning of +September 2nd one of these subchaser units picked up a suspicious sound. +A little later the lookout on the _Parker_ detected on the surface an +object that looked like a conning-tower, with an upright just forward +which seemed to be a mast and sail; as it was the favourite trick of the +_U-53_ to disguise itself in this way, it seemed certain that the +chasers were now on the track of this esteemed vessel. When this mast +and sail and conning-tower suddenly disappeared under the water, these +suspicions became still stronger. The _Parker_ put on full speed, found +an oilslick where the submarine had evidently been pumping its bilges, +and dropped a barrage of sixteen depth charges. But had these injured +the submarine? Under ordinary conditions there would have been no +satisfactory answer to this question; but now three little wooden boats +came up, advanced about 2,000 yards ahead of the _Parker_, stopped their +engines, put over their tubes, and began to listen. In a few minutes +they conveyed the disappointing news to the _Parker_ that the depth +charges had gone rather wild, that the submarine was still steaming +ahead, and that they had obtained a "fix" of its position. But the +_U-53_, as always, was exceedingly crafty. It knew that the chasers were +on the trail; its propellers were revolving so slowly that almost no +noise was made; the U-boat was stealthily trying to throw its pursuers +off the scent. For two and a half hours the chasers kept up the hunt, +now losing the faint noise of the _U-53_, now again picking it up, now +turning in one direction, then abruptly in another. Late in the +afternoon, however, they obtained a "fix," which disclosed the welcome +fact that the submarine was only about 300 yards north of them. In a few +minutes four depth charges landed on this spot. + +When the waters had quieted the little craft began listening. But +nothing was heard. For several days afterward the radio operators could +hear German submarines calling across the void to the _U-53_, but there +was no answer to their call. Naturally, we believed that this +long-sought enemy had been destroyed; about a week later, however, our +radios caught a message off the extreme northern coast of Scotland, from +the _U-53_, telling its friends in Germany that it was on its way home. +That this vessel had been seriously damaged was evident, for it had made +no attacks after its experience with the subchasers; but it apparently +had as many lives as a cat, for it was able, in its battered condition, +to creep back to Germany around the coast of Scotland, a voyage of more +than a thousand miles. The subchasers, however, at least had the +satisfaction of having ended the active career of this boat. It was +damaged two months before the armistice was signed, but it never +recovered sufficiently from its injuries to make another voyage. Yet I +must do justice to Captain Rose--he did not command the _U-53_ on this +last voyage. It was its only trip during the whole course of the war +when he had not commanded it! + +The story of the _U-53_ ends with a touch which is characteristically +German. It was one of the submarines which were surrendered to the +Allies at the signing of the armistice. Its first visitors, on this +occasion, were the Americans; they were eager to read its log-book, and +to find out just what had happened on this final voyage. The book was on +board, and it contained a record of the _U-53's_ voyages from the day +when it was commissioned up to the day when it was surrendered. Two or +three pages only were missing; the Germans had ripped out that part +which described the encounter with the American subchasers! They were +evidently determined that we should never have the satisfaction of +knowing to just what extent we had damaged the boat; this was the only +revenge they could take on us. + + +IV + +On the morning of September 6th three subchaser units, under the command +of Ensign Ashley D. Adams, U.S.N.R.F., were listening at a point about +150 miles west of Land's End. At about eleven-thirty two of these units +detected what was unquestionably the sound of a submarine. Moreover, the +usual "fixes" disclosed that the enemy was close at hand; so close that +two of the units ran up and dropped their charges. This first attack +produced no result on the submarine; the depth charge from one of the +howitzers, however, unfortunately landed near one of the chasers, and, +though it injured no one, it put that particular unit out of commission. +However, for two hours Ensign Adams's division kept closely on the heels +of the quarry, now stopping to obtain a "fix," now running full speed to +catch up with the fleeing prey. At one o'clock the plotting-room +reported that the submerged boat was just about a hundred yards ahead. +The three chasers laid barrages according to pattern, and the three "Y" +guns shot their depth charges; the region of the "fix" was so generously +sowed with these bombs that it seemed an impossibility that the German +could have escaped. + +As soon as the tumult quieted down, the chasers put out their tubes and +listened. For twenty minutes not a sound issued from the scene of all +this activity. Then a propeller was heard faintly turning or attempting +to turn. The noise this time was not the kind which indicated an effort +to steal away furtively; it conveyed rather the impression of difficulty +and strain. There was a slight grating and squeaking such as might have +been made by damaged machinery. This noise lasted for a few seconds and +then ceased. Presently it started up again and then once more it +stopped. The submarine was making a little progress, but fitfully; she +would go a few yards and then pause. A slight wake now appeared upon the +surface, such as a submerged U-boat usually left when the water was +calm; the listeners at the tube were pleased to note that the location +of this disturbance coincided precisely with their "fix," and thus, in +a way, confirmed their calculations. One of the subchasers promptly ran +ahead and began to drop depth charges on this wake. There was not the +slightest doubt that the surface boat was now directly on top of the +submarine. After one of the depth charges was dropped, a black +cylindrical object, about thirty inches long, suddenly rose from the +depths and jumped sixty feet into the air; just what this unexpected +visitant was no one seems to know, but that it came from the hunted +submarine was clear. + +Under such distressing conditions the U-boat had only a single chance of +saving itself; when the water was sufficiently shallow--not deeper than +three hundred feet--it could safely sink to the bottom and "play dead," +hoping that the chasers, with their accursed listening devices, would +tire of the vigil and return to port. A submarine, if in very good +condition, could remain silently on the bottom for two or three days. +The listeners on the chaser tubes presently heard sounds which suggested +that their enemy was perhaps resorting to this manoeuvre. But there +were other noises which indicated that possibly this sinking to the +bottom was not voluntary. The listeners clearly heard a scraping and a +straining as though the boat was making terrific attempts to rise. There +was a lumbering noise, such as might be made by a heavy object trying to +drag its hulk along the muddy bottom; this was followed by silence, +showing that the wounded vessel could advance only a few yards. A +terrible tragedy was clearly beginning down there in the slime of the +ocean floor; a boat, with twenty-five or thirty human beings on board, +was hopelessly caught, with nothing in sight except the most lingering +death. The listeners on the chasers could follow events almost as +clearly as though the inside of the U-boat could be seen; for every +motion the vessel made, every effort that the crew put forth to rescue +itself from this living hell, was registered on the delicate wires which +reached the ears of the men on the surface. + +Suddenly sharp metallic sounds came up on the wires. They were clearly +made by hammers beating on the steel body of the U-boat. + +"They are trying to make repairs," the listeners reported. + +If our subchasers had had any more depth charges, they would have +promptly put these wretches out of their misery, but they had expended +all their ammunition. Darkness was now closing in; our men saw that +their vigil was to be a long one; they sent two chasers to Penzance, to +get a new supply of bombs, and also sent a radio call for a destroyer. +The spot where the submarine had bottomed was marked by a buoy; lanterns +were hung out on this buoy; and two units of chasers, six boats in all, +prepared to stand guard. At any moment, of course, the struggling U-boat +might come to the surface, and it was necessary to have forces near by +to fight or to accept surrender. All night long the chasers stood by; +now and then the listeners reported scraping and straining noises from +below, but these grew fainter and fainter, seeming almost to register +the despair which must be seizing the hearts of the imprisoned Germans. + +At three o'clock in the morning a British destroyer arrived and +presently the two chasers returned from Penzance with more ammunition. +Meanwhile, the weather had thickened, a fog had fallen, the lights on +the buoy had gone out, and the buoy itself had been pulled under by the +tide. The watching subchasers were tossed about by the weather, and lost +the precise bearing of the sunken submarine. When daylight returned and +the weather calmed down the chasers again put over their tubes and +attempted to "fix" the U-boat. They listened for hours without hearing a +sound; but about five o'clock in the afternoon a sharp piercing noise +came ringing over the wires. It was a sound that made the listeners' +blood run cold. + +Only one thing in the world could make a sound like that. It was the +crack of a revolver. The first report had hardly stilled when another +shot was heard; and then there were more in rapid succession. The +listeners on two different chasers heard these pistol cracks and counted +them; the reports which these two men independently made agreed in every +detail. In all, twenty-five shots came from the bottom of the sea. As +there were from twenty-five to thirty men in a submarine crew the +meaning was all too evident. The larger part of officers and men, +finding themselves shut tightly in their coffin of steel, had resorted +to that escape which was not uncommonly availed of by German submarine +crews in this hideous war. Nearly all of them had committed suicide. + + +V + +Meanwhile, our subchaser detachment at Corfu was performing excellent +service. In these southern waters Captain C. P. Nelson commanded two +squadrons, comprising thirty-six vessels. Indeed, the American navy +possessed few officers more energetic, more efficient, more lovable, or +more personally engaging than Captain Nelson. The mere fact that he was +known among his brother officers as "Juggy Nelson" gives some notion of +the affection which his personality inspired. This nickname did not +indicate, as might at first be suspected, that Captain Nelson possessed +qualities which flew in the face of the prohibitory regulations of our +navy: it was intended, I think, as a description of the physical man. +For Captain Nelson's rotund figure, jocund countenance, and always +buoyant spirits were priceless assets to our naval forces at Corfu. +Living conditions there were not of the best; disease was rampant among +the Serbians, Greeks, and Albanians who made up the civil population; +there were few opportunities for entertainment or relaxation; it was, +therefore, a happy chance that the commander was a man whose very +presence radiated an atmosphere of geniality and enthusiasm. His +conversational powers for many years had made him a man of mark; his +story-telling abilities had long delighted naval officers and statesmen +at Washington; no other selection for commander could have been made +that would have met with more whole-hearted approval from the college +boys and other high-type civilians who so largely made up our forces in +these flotillas. At Corfu, indeed, Captain Nelson quickly became a +popular favourite; his mind was always actively forming plans for the +discomfiture of the German and Austrian submarines; and all our Allies +were as much impressed with his energy as were our own men. For Captain +Nelson was more than a humorist and entertainer: he was pre-eminently a +sailor of the saltiest type, and he had a real barbaric joy in a fight. +Even in his official communications to his officers and men he +invariably referred to the enemy as the "Hun"; the slogan on which he +insisted as the guiding principle of his flotilla was "get the Hun +before he has a chance to get us." He had the supreme gift of firing his +subordinates with the same spirit that possessed himself; and the +vigilance, the constant activity, and the courage of the subchasers' +crews admirably supplemented the sailor-like qualities of the man who +commanded them. + +I have already referred to the sea-going abilities of the subchasers; +but the feat accomplished by those that made the trip to Corfu was the +most admirable of all. These thirty-six boats, little more than motor +launches in size, sailed from New London to Greece--a distance of 6,000 +miles; and, a day or two after their arrival, they began work on the +Otranto barrage. Of course they could not have made this trip without +the assistance of vessels to supply them with gasolene, make the +necessary routine repairs, care for the sick and those suffering from +the inevitable minor accidents; and it is greatly to the credit of the +naval officers who commanded the escorting vessels that they shepherded +these flotillas across the ocean with practically no losses. On their +way through the Straits of Gibraltar they made an attack on a submarine +which so impressed Admiral Niblack that he immediately wired London +headquarters for a squadron to be permanently based on that port. + +As already said, the Otranto Strait was an ideal location for this type +of anti-submarine craft. It was so narrow--about forty miles--that a +force of moderate size could keep practically all of the critical zone +under fairly close observation. Above all, the water was so deep--nearly +600 fathoms (3,600 feet)--that a submarine, once picked up by the +listening devices, could not escape by the method which was so popular +in places where the water was shallow--that of sinking to the bottom and +resting there until the excitement was over. On the other hand, this +great depth made it very difficult to obstruct the passage by a fixed +barrier--a difficulty that was being rapidly overcome by a certain +Franco-Italian type of torpedo net. This barrage, after the arrival of +our chasers, was so reorganized as to make the best use of their +tactical and listening qualities. The several lines of patrolling +vessels extended about thirty-five miles; there were vessels of several +types, the whole making a formidable gauntlet, which the submarines had +to run before they could get from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean. +First came a line of British destroyers; it was their main duty to act +as protectors and to keep the barrage from being raided by German and +Austrian surface ships--a function which they fulfilled splendidly. Next +came a line of trawlers, then drifters, motor launches, and chasers, the +whole being completed by a line of kite balloon sloops. Practically all +these vessels, British as well as American, were provided with the +American devices; and so well did these ingenious mechanisms function +that it was practically impossible for any submarine to pass through the +Otranto barrage in calm weather without being heard. In fact, it became +the regular custom for the enemy to wait for stormy weather before +attempting to slip through this dangerous area, and even under these +conditions he had great difficulty in avoiding detection. + +From July, 1918, until the day of the armistice, our flotilla at this +point kept constantly at work; and the reports of our commanders show +that their sound contacts with the enemy were very frequent. There were +battles that unquestionably ended in the destruction of the submarines; +just how much we had accomplished, however, we did not know until the +Austrians surrendered and our officers, at Cattaro and other places, +came into touch with officers of the Austrian navy. These men, who +showed the most friendly disposition toward their American enemies, +though they displayed the most bitter hostility toward their German +allies, expressed their admiration for the work of our subchasers. These +little boats, the Austrians now informed us, were responsible for a +mutiny in the Austrian submarine force. Two weeks after their arrival it +was impossible to compel an Austrian crew to take a vessel through the +straits, and from that time until the ending of the war not a single +Austrian submarine ventured upon such a voyage. All the submarines that +essayed the experiment after this Austrian mutiny were German. And the +German crews, the Austrian officers said, did not enjoy the experience +any more than their own. There was practically no case in which a +submarine crossed the barrage without being bombed in consequence; the +_moral_ of the German crews steadily went to pieces, until, in the last +month of the war, their officers were obliged to force them into the +submarines at the point of a pistol. The records showed, the Austrian +high officers said, that the Germans had lost six submarines on the +Otranto barrage in the last three months of the war. These figures about +correspond with the estimates which we had made; just how many of these +the British sank and just how many are to be attributed to our own +forces will probably never be known, but the fact that American devices +were attached to all the Allied ships on this duty should be considered +in properly distributing the credit. + +We have evidence--conclusive even though somewhat ludicrous--that the +American device on a British destroyer "got" one of these submarines. +One dark night this vessel, equipped with the C-tube, had pursued a +submarine and bombed it with what seemed to have been satisfactory +results. However, I have several times called attention to one of the +most discouraging aspects of anti-submarine warfare: that only in +exceptional circumstances did we know whether the submarine had been +destroyed. This destroyer was now diligently searching the area of the +battle, the listeners straining every nerve for traces of her foe. For a +time everything was utterly silent; then, suddenly, the listener picked +up a disturbance of an unusual kind. The noise rapidly became louder, +but it was still something very different from any noise ever heard +before. The C-tube consisted of a lead pipe--practically the same as a +water pipe--which was dropped over the side of the ship fifteen or +twenty feet into the sea; this pipe contained the wires which, at one +end, were attached to the devices under the water, and which, at the +other end, reached the listener's ears. In a few seconds this tube +showed signs of lively agitation. It trembled violently and made a +constantly increasing hullabaloo in the ears of the listener. Finally a +huge German, dripping with water like a sea lion, appeared over the side +of the destroyer and astounded our British Allies by throwing up his +arms with "Kamerad!" This visitant from the depths was the only survivor +of the submarine which it now appeared had indubitably been sunk. He had +been blown through the conning tower, or had miraculously escaped in +some other way--he did not himself know just what had taken place--and +while floundering around in the water in the inky darkness had, by one +of those providences which happen so frequently in war time, caught hold +of this tube, and proceeded to pull himself up hand-over-hand until he +reached the deck. Had it not been for his escape, the British would +never have known that they had sunk the submarine! + +This survivor, after shaking off the water, sat down and became very +sociable. He did not seem particularly to dislike the British and +Americans, but he was extremely bitter against the Italians and +Austrians--the first for "deserting" the Germans, the latter for proving +bad allies. + +"How do you get on with the Italians?" he asked the British officer. + +"Very well indeed," the latter replied, giving a very flattering account +of the Italian allies. + +"I guess the Italians are about as useful to you as the Austrians are to +us," the German sea lion replied. + +In writing to our officers about this episode, the British commander +said: + +"We have found a new use for your listening devices--salvaging drowning +Huns." + + +VI + +On September 28, 1918, Captain Nelson received the following +communication from the commander of the Allied naval forces at Brindisi, +Commodore W. A. H. Kelly, R.N.: + +"Can you hold twelve chasers ready to leave Corfu to-morrow (Sunday) for +special service? They should have stores for four days. If unavoidable, +barrage force may be reduced during their absence. Request reply. +Further definite orders will be sent Sunday afternoon." + +To this Captain Nelson sent an answer which was entirely characteristic: + +"Yes." + +The Captain well knew what the enterprise was to which this message +referred. The proposed undertaking was one which was very close to his +heart and one which he had constantly urged. The Austrian port of +Durazzo, on the Adriatic, at that time was playing an important part in +the general conflict. It was a base by which Germany and Austria had +sent supplies to their ally Bulgaria; and in September the Entente had +started the campaign against Bulgaria which finally ended in the +complete humiliation of that country. The destruction of Durazzo as a +base would greatly assist this operation. Several ships lay in the +harbour; there were many buildings used for army stores; the destruction +of all these, as well as the docks and military works, would render the +port useless. The bombardment of Durazzo was, therefore, the undertaking +for which the assistance of our subchasers had been requested. It was +estimated that about one hour's heavy shelling would render this port +valueless as an Austrian base; and to accomplish this destruction the +Italians had detailed three light cruisers, the _San Giorgio_, the +_Pisa_, and the _San Marco_, and the British three light scout cruisers, +the _Lowestoft_, the _Dartmouth_, and the _Weymouth_. According to the +plan agreed upon the Italian ships would arrive at Durazzo at about ten +o'clock on Wednesday morning, October 2nd, bombard the works for an +hour, and then return to Brindisi; when they had finished, it was +proposed that the British cruisers should take their places, bombard for +an hour, and likewise retire. The duty which had been assigned to the +subchasers in this operation was an important one. The Austrians had a +considerable force of submarines at Durazzo; and it was to be expected +that they would send them to attack the bombarding warships. The +chasers, therefore, were to accompany the cruisers, in order to fight +any submarine which attempted to interfere with the game. "Remember the +life of these cruisers depends upon your vigilance and activity," said +Captain Nelson in the instructions issued to the officers who commanded +the little vessels. + +At nine o'clock that Sunday evening twelve chasers slipped through the +net at Corfu and started across the Adriatic; they sailed "in column," +or single file, Captain Nelson heading the procession in subchaser _No. +95_, his second in command, Lt.-Comdr. Paul H. Bastedo, coming next in +chaser _No. 215_. The tiny fleet hardly suggested to the observer +anything in the nature of military operations; they looked more like a +group of motor launches out for a summer cruise. The next morning they +arrived at Brindisi, the gathering place of all the Allied vessels +which were to participate in the operation--that same Brindisi (or +Brundisium) which was one of the most famous ports of antiquity, the +town from which Augustus and Antony, in 42 B.C., started on the +expedition which, at the battle of Philippi, was to win them the mastery +of the ancient world. Upon arriving Captain Nelson went ashore for a +council with Commodore Kelly, who commanded the British cruisers, and +other Allied officers. When he returned Captain Nelson's face was +glowing with happiness and expectation. + +"It's going to be a real party, boys," he informed his subordinate +officers. + +Two days were spent at Brindisi, completing preparations; on Tuesday +evening Captain Nelson called all his officers for a meeting on board +the British destroyer _Badger_, to give them all the details of the +forthcoming "party." If there had been any flagging spirits in that +company when the speech began--which I do not believe--all depression +had vanished when "Juggy" had finished his remarks; every officer left +with his soul filled by the same joy of approaching battle as that which +possessed his chief. + +At 2.30 Wednesday morning the chasers left Brindisi, steering a straight +course to Durazzo. The night was very dark; the harbour was black also +with the smoke from the cruisers and other craft which were making +preparations to get away. After steaming a few hours the officers +obtained with their glasses their first glimpse of Durazzo; at this time +there were no fighting ships in sight except the chasers, as the larger +ships had not yet arrived. Captain Nelson knew that there were two or +three Austrian destroyers at Durazzo, and his first efforts were devoted +to attempts to persuade them to come out and give battle. With this idea +in mind, the chasers engaged in what they called a "war dance" before +the port; they began turning rapidly in a great circle, but all to no +purpose, for the Austrian ships declined to accept the challenge. After +a time the smoke of the Italian cruisers appeared above the horizon; +this was the signal for the chasers to take their stations. Durazzo is +located in an indentation of the coast; at the southern extremity of the +little gulf the land juts out to a point, known as Cape Laghi; at the +northern extremity the corresponding point is Cape Pali; the distance +between these two points is about fifteen miles. Two subchaser units, +six boats, were assigned as a screen to the Italian cruisers while the +bombardment was under way. One unit, three boats, was stationed at Cape +Pali, to the north, to prevent any submarines leaving Durazzo from +attacking the British cruisers, which were to approach the scene of +activities from that quarter, and another unit, three boats, was +stationed off Cape Laghi. Thus the two critical capes were covered +against submarine surprises, and the attacking vessels themselves were +effectively screened. + +The Italian cruisers sailed back and forth for about an hour, blazing +away at Durazzo, destroying shipping in the harbour, knocking down +military buildings, and devastating the place on a liberal scale, all +the time screened in this operation by our chasers. Meantime, unit B, +commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Bastedo, had started for its station +at Cape Pali. The Austrian shore batteries at once opened upon the tiny +craft, the water in their neighbourhood being generously churned up by +the falling shells. Meanwhile, the British cruisers, after steaming for +a while east, turned south in order to take up the bombarding station +which, according to the arranged programme, the Italian warships were +about to abandon. The three screening chasers were steaming in column, +_No. 129_, commanded by Ensign Maclair Jacoby, U.S.N.R.F., bringing up +the rear. Suddenly this little boat turned to the right and started +scampering in the direction of some apparently very definite object. It +moved so abruptly and hastily that it did not take the time even to +signal to its associates the cause of its unexpected manoeuvre. + +On board _No. 215_ there was some question as to what should be done. + +"Let's go," said Commander Bastedo. "Perhaps he's after a submarine." + +_No. 215_ was immediately turned in the direction of the busy _No. 129_, +when the interest of its officers was aroused by a little foamy fountain +of spray moving in the water slightly forward of its port beam. There +was no mystery as to the cause of that feathery disturbance. It was made +by a periscope; it was moving with considerable speed also, entirely +ignoring the subchasers, and shaping its course directly toward the +advancing British cruisers. Commander Bastedo forgot all about subchaser +_No. 129_, which apparently was after game of its own, and headed his +own boat in the direction of this little column of spray. In a few +seconds the periscope itself became visible; Commander Bastedo opened +fire at it with his port gun; at the second shot a column of water and +air arose about six feet--a splendid geyser which informed the pursuer +that the periscope had been shattered. By this time the third chaser, +_No. 128_, was rushing at full speed. The submarine now saw that all +chance of attacking the British ships had gone, and turned to the south +in an effort to get away with a whole skin. But the two subchasers, +_215_ and _128_, quickly turned again and started for their prey; soon +both were dropping depth charges and shooting their "Y" guns; and a huge +circle of the sea was a mass of explosions, whirling water, mighty +eruptions of foam, mist, and debris--and in the mass, steel plates and +other wreckage flew from the depths into the air. + +"That got him!" cried the executive officer from the deck of _No. 215_, +while the crew lifted up its voices in a shout that was reminiscent of a +college yell. + +It was not until this moment that Commander Bastedo and his associates +remembered the _129_, which, when last observed, was speeding through +the water on an independent course of her own. In the midst of the +excitement there came a message from this boat: + +"Submarine sighted!" + +Then a second afterward came another message. + +"My engines are disabled." + +In a short time Bastedo had reached the boat. + +"Where is the submarine?" + +"We just sank it," was the answer. _No. 129_ had dropped eight depth +charges, one directly over the Austrian boat; in the water thrown up the +officers had counted seven pieces of metal plates, and the masses of oil +and bubbles that presently arose completed the story of the destruction. +Meanwhile, the British cruisers had taken up their station at Durazzo +and were finishing the work that made this place useless as a military +headquarters. + +Not a man in the whole American force was injured; in a brief time the +excitement was all over, and the great ships, screened again by the +wasps of chasers, started back to Brindisi. The impression made upon our +Allies was well expressed in the congratulatory message sent to me in +London by Commodore Kelly, who commanded the British cruisers in this +action. + +"Their conduct," he said, "was beyond praise. They all returned safely +without casualties. They thoroughly enjoyed themselves." + +And from the Italians came this message: + +"Italian Naval General Staff expresses highest appreciation of useful +and efficient work performed by United States chasers in protecting +major vessels during action against Durazzo; also vivid admiration of +their brilliant and clever operations which resulted in sinking two +enemy submarines." + +The war was now drawing to a close; a day before the Allied squadrons +started for Durazzo Bulgaria surrendered; about two weeks after the +attack Austria had given up the ghost. The subchasers were about this +time just getting into their stride; the cessation of hostilities, +however, ended their careers at the very moment when they had become +most useful. A squadron of thirty-six under the command of Captain A. J. +Hepburn reached Queenstown in September, but though it had several +interesting contacts with the enemy, and is credited with sending one +German home badly damaged, the armistice was signed before it had really +settled down to work. The final spectacular appearance was at Gibraltar, +in the last four days of the war. The surrender of Austria had left the +German submarines stranded in the Adriatic without a base; and they +started home by way of the Mediterranean and Gibraltar. A squadron of +eighteen chasers had just arrived at the Azores, on the way to reinforce +the flotilla at Plymouth; seven of these were at once despatched to +Gibraltar on the chance that they might bar the passage of these +U-boats. They reached this port at the storm season; yet they went out +in the hardest gales and had several exciting contacts with the fleeing +Germans. The records show that five submarines attempted to get through +the straits; there is good evidence that two of these were sunk, one by +the British patrol and one by our chasers. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[6] A "P" boat is a special type of anti-submarine craft smaller and +slower than a destroyer and having a profile especially designed to +resemble that of a submarine. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +THE LONDON FLAGSHIP + + +I + +While our naval forces were thus playing their parts in several areas, +the work of creating the central staff of a great naval organization was +going forward in London. The headquarters for controlling extensive +naval operations in many widely dispersed areas, like the headquarters +of an army extending over a wide front, must necessarily be located far +behind the scene of battle. Thus, a number of remodelled dwelling-houses +in Grosvenor Gardens contained the mainspring for an elaborate mechanism +which reached from London to Washington and from Queenstown to Corfu. On +the day of the armistice the American naval forces in European waters +comprised about 370 vessels of all classes, more than 5,000 officers, +regulars and reserves, and more than 75,000 men; we had established +about forty-five bases and were represented in practically every field +of naval operations. The widespread activities of our London +headquarters on that eventful day presented a striking contrast to the +humble beginnings of eighteen months before. + +From April to August, 1917, the American navy had a very small staff +organization in Europe. During these extremely critical four months the +only American naval representatives in London, besides the regular Naval +Attache and his aides, were my personal aide, Commander J. V. Babcock, +and myself; and our only office in those early days was a small room in +the American Embassy. For a considerable part of this time we had no +stenographers and no clerical assistance of our own, though of course +the Naval Attache, Captain W. D. MacDougall, and his personnel gave us +all the assistance in their power. Commander Babcock had a small +typewriter, which he was able to work with two fingers, and on this he +laboriously pounded out the reports which first informed the Navy +Department of the seriousness of the submarine situation. The fact that +Commander Babcock was my associate during this critical period was a +fortunate thing for me, and a still more fortunate thing for the United +States. Commander Babcock and I had been closely associated for several +years; in that early period, when we, in our two persons, represented +the American naval forces at the seat of Allied naval activity, we not +only worked together in that little room but we lived together. Our +office was alternately this room in the American Embassy and our +quarters in an hotel. I had already noted Commander Babcock's abilities +when he was on my staff in the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla and when he was +a student at the Naval War College; but our constant companionship +throughout the war, especially during these first few strenuous months +in London, gave me a still greater respect for his qualities. Many men +have made vital contributions to our success in the war of whom the +public scarcely ever hears even the name. A large part of the initiative +and thinking which find expression in successful military action +originates with officers of this type. They labour day after day and +night after night, usually in subordinate positions, unselfishly doing +work which is necessarily credited to other names than their own, daily +lightening the burden of their chiefs, and constantly making suggestions +which may control military operations or affect national policy. +Commander Babcock is a striking representative of this type. My personal +obligations to him are incalculable; and I am indebted to him not only +for his definite services, but for the sympathy, the encouragement, and +the kindly and calculated pessimism which served so well to +counterbalance my temperamental optimism. + +Our relations were so close, working and living together as we did, that +I find it difficult to speak of "Babby's" services with restraint. But +there are particular accomplishments to his credit which should go down +upon this popular record. I have described the first consultations with +the British naval chiefs. These were the meetings which formed the basis +of the reports recommending the conditions upon which the American navy +should co-operate with the Allies. Commander Babcock was constantly at +my elbow during all these consultations, and was all the time +independently conducting investigations in the several departments of +the Admiralty. The original drafts of all my written and cabled +communications to the department--reports which form a connected story +of our participation in the naval war during this period--were prepared +by him. + +Able as Commander Babcock was, human endurance still had its +limitations. A public-spirited American business man in London, Mr. R. +E. Gillmor, who had formerly been an officer in the navy, begged to be +accepted as a volunteer; he brought two of his best stenographers, +English girls, and personally paid their salaries for several weeks +while they were devoting all their time to the American navy. +Subsequently he was enlisted in the naval reserves and performed very +valuable services on the staff throughout nearly the entire period of +the war--until ordered to America, where his technical knowledge was +required in connection with certain important appliances with which he +was familiar. His experience as a business man in London was of great +value to our forces, and his time and energy were devoted to our service +with a zeal and loyalty that endeared him to us all. + +Soon afterward a number of Rhodes scholars and other young Americans +then in Europe, G. B. Stockton, E. H. McCormick, T. B. Kittredge, P. F. +Good, R. M. D. Richardson, H. Millard, L. S. Stevens, and J. C. +Baillargeon, joined our forces as unpaid volunteers and gave us the +benefit of their trained minds and European experience. Two of these, +Kittredge and Stockton, both valuable workers, had been serving under +Hoover in Belgium. They were all later enrolled as reserves and +continued their work throughout the war. Lieutenant Stockton performed +the arduous and important duties of chief business manager, or executive +officer, of headquarters in a most efficient manner, and throughout the +war Kittredge's previous historical training, European experience, and +fine intellectual gifts made his services very valuable in the +Intelligence Department. + +Mr. Page, the American Ambassador, aided and encouraged us in all +possible ways. Immediately after my arrival in London he invited me to +call upon him and his staff for any assistance they could render. In +his enthusiastic and warm-hearted way, he said: "Everything we have is +yours. I will turn the Embassy into the street if necessary"; and +throughout the war he was a tower of strength to the cause. He gave us +his time and the benefit of his great experience and personal prestige +in establishing cordial relations with the various branches of the +British Government--and all this with such an absence of diplomatic +formality, such courteous and forceful efficiency, and such cordial +sympathy and genuine kindness that he immediately excited not only our +sincere admiration but also our personal affection. + +During all this period events of the utmost importance were taking +place; it was within these four months that the convoy system was +adopted, that armed guards were placed on merchant ships, that the first +American troops were escorted to France, and that our destroyers and +other worships began arriving in European waters. In July it became +apparent that the strain of doing the work of a dozen men, which had +been continuous during the past four months, could no longer be +supported by my aide, Commander Babcock. When the destroyers and other +ships arrived, we went through their lists; here and there we hit upon a +man whom we regarded as qualified for responsible staff duty, and +transferred him to the London headquarters. This proceeding was +necessary if our essential administrative work was to be done. Among the +reserves who were subsequently assigned to our forces many excellent +staff officers also were developed for handling the work of +communications, cipher codes, and the like. When the Colonel House +Commission came over in October, 1917, I explained our necessities to +the "skippers" of the two cruisers that brought the party, who promptly +gave us all the desks and office equipment they could spare and sent +them to Grosvenor Gardens. + +In August, however, additional ships and forces began to arrive from +America, and it became necessary to have larger quarters than those +available in the Embassy for handling the increasing administrative +work. At one time the British Government contemplated building us a +temporary structure near the Admiralty, but this was abandoned because +there was a shortage of material. We therefore moved into an unoccupied +dwelling near the American Embassy that seemed adapted to our needs. We +rented this house furnished, just as it stood; a first glimpse of it, +however, suggested refined domesticity rather than naval operations. We +quickly cleared the building of rugs, tapestries, lace curtains, +pictures, and expensive furniture, reduced the twenty-five rooms to +their original bareness, and filled every corner with office equipment. +In a few days the staff was installed in this five-story residence and +the place was humming with the noise of typewriters. At first we +regarded the leasing of this building as something of an extravagance; +it seemed hardly likely that we should ever use it all! But in a few +weeks we had taken the house adjoining, cut holes through the walls and +put in doors; and this, too, was filled up in an incredibly short time, +so rapidly did the administrative work grow. Ultimately we had to take +over six of these private residences and make alterations which +transformed them into one. From August our staff increased at a rapid +rate until, on the day the armistice was signed, we had not far from +1,200 officers, enlisted men, and clerical force, working in our London +establishment, the commissioned staff consisting of about 200 officers, +of which sixty were regulars and the remainder reserves. + +I find that many people are surprised that I had my headquarters in +London. The historic conception of the commander-in-chief of a naval +force located on the quarterdeck of his flagship still holds the popular +imagination. But controlling the operations of extensive and widely +dispersed forces in a campaign of this kind is quite a different +proceeding from that of directing the naval campaigns of Nelson's time, +just as making war on land has changed somewhat from the method in vogue +with Napoleon. The opinion generally prevails that my principal task was +to command in person certain naval forces afloat. The fact is that this +was really no part of my job during the war. The game in which several +great nations were engaged for four years was a game involving organized +direction and co-operation. It is improbable that any one nation could +have won the naval war; that was a task which demanded not only that we +should all exert our fullest energies, but that, so far as it was +humanly possible, we should exert them as a unit. It was the duty of the +United States above all nations to manifest this spirit. We had entered +the war late; we had entered it in a condition of unpreparedness; our +naval forces, when compared to those which had been assembled by the +Allies, were small; we had not been engaged for three years combating an +enemy using new weapons and methods of naval warfare. It was not +unlikely that we could make some original contributions to the Allied +effort; indeed, we early did so; yet it was natural to suppose that the +navies which had been combating the submarines so long understood that +game better than did we, and it was our duty to assist them in this +work, rather than to operate independently. Moreover, this question as +to whether any particular one of our methods might be better or might be +worse than Great Britain's was not the most important one. The point was +that the British navy had developed its own methods of working and that +it was a great "going concern." The crisis was so pressing that we +simply did not have the time to create a separate force of our own; the +most cursory examination of conditions convinced me that we could hope +to accomplish something worth while only by playing the game as it was +then being played, and that any attempt to lay down new rules would +inevitably decrease the effectiveness of our co-operation, and perhaps +result in losing the war. We can even admit, for the sake of the +argument, that the Americans might have created a better organization +than the British; but the question of improving on their methods, or of +not improving on them, was a point that was not worth considering; long +before we could have developed an efficient independent machine the war +would have come to an end. It was thus our duty to take things as they +were, to plunge immediately into the conflict, and to make every ship +and every man tell in the most effective way and in the shortest +possible time. Therefore I decided that our forces should become, for +the purpose of this war, virtually a part of the Allied navies; to place +at the disposal of the Allies our ships to reinforce the weak part of +their lines; to ignore such secondary considerations as national pride, +naval prestige, and personal ambitions; and to subordinate every other +consideration to that of defeating the Hun. I have already described how +in distributing our subchasers I practically placed them at the disposal +of the Allied Council; and this represents the policy that was followed +in all similar matters. + +The naval high commands were located at Washington, London, Paris, and +Rome. Necessarily London was the headquarters of the naval war. Events +which had long preceded the European conflict had made this choice +inevitable. The maritime development of four centuries had prepared +London for the role which she was now called upon to play. From all over +the world naval and maritime information flowed to this great capital as +though in obedience to the law of gravity. Even in peace times London +knew where every ship in the world was at any particular time. All other +machinery for handling this great mass of detail was necessarily +accumulated in this great city, and Lloyd's, the world headquarters for +merchant shipping, had now become practically a part of the British +Admiralty. In this war the matter of information and communications was +supremely important. Every decision that was made and every order that +was issued, even those that were the least consequential, rested upon +complete information which was obtainable, in time to be useful, only in +London. I could not have made my headquarters in Washington, or Paris, +or Rome because these cities could not have furnished the military +intelligence which was needed as a preliminary to every act. For the +same reason I could not have efficiently controlled the operations of +all our forces from Queenstown, or Brest, or Gibraltar; the staff +controlling the whole had necessarily to be located in London, and the +tactical commands at these other bases must be exercised by +subordinates. The British placed all their sources of information and +their communications at our disposal. They literally opened their doors +and made us part of their organization. I sat daily in consultation with +British naval chiefs, and our officers had access to all essential +British information just as freely as did the British naval officers +themselves. On the day of my arrival Admiral Jellicoe issued orders that +the Americans should be shown anything which they wished to see. With +all this information, the most complete and detailed in the world, +constantly placed at our disposal, and a spirit of confidence and +friendship always prevailing which has no parallel in history, it would +have defeated the whole purpose of our participation in the war had the +American high command taken up its headquarters anywhere except in +London. + +Incidentally, there was an atmosphere in the London Admiralty which made +a strong appeal to anyone who is interested in naval history. Everything +about the place is reminiscent of great naval achievements. The room in +which our councils met was the same old Admiralty Board room that had +been used for centuries. In accordance with the spirit of British +conservatism, this room is almost exactly the same now, even in its +furnishings, as it was in Nelson's time. The same old wood carvings hang +over the same old fireplace; the table at which we sat is the identical +one at which Nelson must have sat many times, and the very silver +inkstand which Nelson used was used by his successors in this war. The +portrait of this great naval chieftain looked down upon us during our +deliberations. Above the fireplace is painted a huge compass, and about +the centre of this swings an arrow. This was a part of the Admiralty +equipment of a hundred years ago, though it has no usefulness now except +a sentimental one. In old days this arrow was geared to a weather vane +on the roof of the Admiralty, and it constantly showed to the chiefs +assembled in the council room the direction of the wind--a matter of +great importance in the days of sailing ships. + +All general orders and plans concerning the naval operations of British +and American forces came from the Admiralty, and here officers of my +staff were constantly at work. The commanders-in-chief at the various +bases commanded the combined British and American ships based on those +ports only in the sense that they carried out the general instructions +and policies which were formulated in London. These orders, so far as +they affected American forces, could be issued to the commanders-in-chief +only after American headquarters in London had vised them. Thus the +American staff held the ultimate command over all the American forces +which were based in British waters. The same was true of those at Brest, +Gibraltar, and other stations. The commanders-in-chief executed them, +and were responsible for the manner in which the forces were used in +combating the enemy. The operations of which I was the commander +extended over an immense area. The Plymouth and Queenstown forces +represented only a part of the ultimate American naval strength in +European waters and not the most important part; before the war ended, +Brest, as I shall show, developed into a greater naval base than any of +those which we maintained in the British Isles. Convoys were not only +coming across the Atlantic but they were constantly arriving from the +Mediterranean and from the South Sea, and it was the duty of +headquarters in London, and not the duty of local commanders, to route +these precious argosies, except in special cases, just before they +reached their port of destination. Not infrequently, as previously +described, it was necessary to change destinations, or to slow down +convoys, or to make any number of decisions based on new information; +naturally only the centre of information, the Admiralty convoy room, +could serve as a clearing house for such operations. The point is that +it was necessary for me to exercise the chief command of American forces +through subordinates. My position in this respect was precisely the same +as that of Generals Haig and Pershing; I had to maintain a great +headquarters in the rear, and to depend upon subordinates for the actual +execution of orders. + +The American headquarters in London comprised many separate departments, +each one of which was directly responsible to me as the Force Commander, +through the Chief of Staff; they included such indispensable branches as +the office of the Chief of Staff, Captain N. C. Twining, Chief of Staff; +Assistant Chief of Staff, Captain W. R. Sexton; Intelligence Department, +Commander J. V. Babcock, who also acted as Aide; Convoy Operations +Section, Captain Byron A. Long; Anti-submarine Section, Captain R. H. +Leigh; Aviation Section, Captain H. I. Cone, and afterward, +Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; Personnel Section, Commander H. R. +Stark; Communication Section, Lieutenant-Commander E. G. Blakeslee; +Material Section, Captain E. C. Tobey (S.C.); Repair Section, Captain S. +F. Smith (C.C.), and afterward, L. B. McBride (C.C.); Ordnance Section, +Commander G. L. Schuyler, and afterward, Commander T. A. Thomson; +Medical Section, Captain F. L. Pleadwell (M.C.), and afterward, +Commander Edgar Thompson (M.C.); Legal Section, Commander W. H. McGrann; +and the Scientific Section, Professor H. A. Bumstead, Ph.D. + +I was fortunate in all of my departmental chiefs. The Chief of Staff, +Captain N. C. Twining, would certainly have been a marked man in any +navy; he had a genius for detail, a tireless energy, and a mastery of +all the problems that constantly arose. I used to wonder when Captain +Twining ever found an opportunity to sleep; he seemed to be working +every hour of the day and night; yet, so far as was observable, he never +wearied of his task, and never slackened in his devotion to the Allied +cause. As soon as a matter came up that called for definite decision, +Captain Twining would assemble from the several departments all data and +information which were available concerning the question at issue, spend +a few hours studying this information, and then give his judgment--an +opinion which was invariably sound and which was adopted in the vast +majority of cases; in fact, in all cases except those in which questions +of policy or extraneous considerations dictated a different or modified +decision. Captain Twining is a man of really fine intellect combined +with a remarkable capacity for getting things done; without his constant +presence at my elbow, my work would have been much heavier and much less +successful than it was. He is an officer of such exceptional ability, +such matured experience, and such forceful character as to assure him a +brilliant career in whatever duty he may be called upon to perform. I +can never be sufficiently grateful to him for his loyalty and devotion +and for his indispensable contribution to the efficiency of the forces I +had the honour to command. + +In accordance with my habitual practice, I applied the system of placing +responsibility upon my carefully selected heads of departments, giving +them commensurate authority, and holding them to account for results. +Because the task was such a great one, this was the only possible way in +which the operations of the force could have been successfully +conducted. I say, successfully conducted, because in a "business" of +this kind, "good enough" and "to-morrow" may mean disaster; that is, it +is a case of keeping both information and operations up to the minute. +If the personnel and equipment of the staff are not completely capable +of this, it is more than a partial failure, and the result is an +ever-present danger. There were men in this great war who "went to +pieces" simply because they tried to do everything themselves. This +administrative vice of attempting to control every detail, even +insignificant ones, to which military men seem particularly addicted, it +had always been my policy to avoid. Business at Grosvenor Gardens +developed to such an extent that about a thousand messages were every +day received in our office or sent from it; and of these 60 per cent. +were in code. Obviously it was impossible for the Force Commander to +keep constantly at his finger ends all these details. All department +heads, therefore, were selected because they were officers who could be +depended upon to handle these matters and make decisions independently; +they were all strong men, and it is to their combined efforts that the +success of our operations was due. You would have to search a long time +among the navies of the world before you could find an abler convoy +officer than Captain Byron A. Long; an abler naval constructor than +Captain L. B. McBride; an abler man to have charge of the finances of +our naval forces, the purchase of supplies and all kinds of material +than Captain (S.C.) Eugene C. Tobey; abler aviation officers than +Captain H. I. Cone and Lieutenant-Commander W. A. Edwards; an abler +chief of operations than Captain R. H. Leigh, or an abler intelligence +officer than Commander J. V. Babcock. These men, and others of the +fourteen department heads, acted as a kind of cabinet. Many of them +handled matters which, though wholly essential to the success of the +forces, were quite outside of my personal knowledge or experience, and +consequently they had to be men in whose ability to guide me in such +matters I could place complete confidence. As an example of this I may +cite one of the duties of Captain Tobey. Nearly all of the very +considerable financial transactions he was entrusted with were "Greek" +to me, but he had only to show me the right place on the numerous +documents, and I signed my name in absolute confidence that the +interests of the Government were secure. + +All cables, reports, and other communications were referred each day to +the department which they concerned. The head of each department studied +them, attended to the great majority on his own responsibility, and +selected the few that needed more careful attention. A meeting of the +Chief of Staff and all department heads was held each day, at which +these few selected matters were discussed in council and decisions made. +The final results of these deliberations were the only matters that were +referred to me. This system of subdividing responsibility and authority +not only promoted efficiency but it left the Force Commander time to +attend to vitally important questions of general policy, to keep in +personal touch with the high command of the Allied navies, to attend the +Allied naval councils, and, in general, to keep his finger constantly on +the pulse of the whole war situation. Officers of our own and other +navies who were always coming in from the outlying stations, and who +could immediately be placed in touch with the one man who could answer +all their questions and give immediate decisions, testified to the +efficient condition in which the American headquarters was maintained. + +One of our departments was so novel, and performed such valuable +service, that I must describe it in some detail. We took over into our +London organization an idea that is advantageously used in many American +industrial establishments, and had a Planning Section, the first, I +think, which had ever been adopted by any navy. I detached from all +other duties five officers: Captain F. H. Schofield, Captain D. W. Knox, +Captain H. E. Yarnell (who exchanged places afterward with Captain L. +McNamee of the Plans Section of the Navy Department), and Colonel R. H. +Dunlap (of the Marines), who was succeeded by Colonel L. McC. Little, +when ordered to command a regiment of Marines in France. These men made +it their business to advise the Commander-in-Chief on any questions that +might arise. All were graduates of the Naval War College at Newport, and +they applied to the consideration of war problems the lessons which they +had learned at that institution. The business of the Planning Section +was to make studies of particular problems, to prepare plans for future +operations, and also to criticize fully the organization and methods +which were already in existence. The fact that these men had no +administrative duties and that they could therefore devote all their +time to surveying our operations, discovering mistakes, and suggesting +better ways of doing things, as well as the fact that they were +themselves scholarly students of naval warfare, made their labours +exceedingly valuable. I gave them the utmost freedom in finding fault +with the existing regime; there was no department and no office, from +that of the Commander-in-Chief down, upon whose activities they were not +at liberty to submit the fullest and the frankest reports. If anything +could be done in a better way, we certainly wanted to know it. Whenever +any specific problem of importance came up, it was always submitted to +these men for a report. The value of such a report depended upon the +completeness and accuracy of the information available, and it was the +business of the Intelligence Department of the staff to supply this. If +the desired information was not in their files, or the files of the +Allied admiralties, or was not up to date, it was their duty to obtain +it at once. The point is that the Planning Section had no other duties +beyond rendering a decision, based upon a careful analysis of the facts +bearing upon the case, which they submitted in writing. There was no +phase of the naval warfare upon which the officers of the Planning +Section did not give us reports. One of their favourite methods was to +place themselves in the position of the Germans and to decide how, if +they were directing German naval operations, they would frustrate the +tactics of the Allies. Their records contain detailed descriptions of +how merchant ships could be sunk by submarines, and these methods, our +officers believed, represented a great improvement over those used by +the Germans. Indeed, I think that many of these reports, had they fallen +into the hands of the Germans, would have been found by them exceedingly +useful. There was a general impression, in our own navy as well as in +the British, that most of the German submarine commanders handled their +boats unskilfully and obtained inadequate results. All these documents +were given to the responsible men in our forces, as well as to the +British, and had a considerable influence upon operations. The British +also established a Planning Section, which worked harmoniously with our +own. + +A subject upon which our Planning Section liked to speculate was the +possible sortie of the German fleet. The possibility of a great naval +engagement filled the minds of most naval officers; and, after we had +sent five of our battleships to reinforce Admiral Beatty's fleet, this +topic became even more interesting to American naval men. Would the +Germans ever come out? What had they to gain or to lose by such an +undertaking? What were their chances of victory? Where would the +engagement be fought, and what part would the several elements of +modern naval warfare play in it: mines, submarines, battle-cruisers, +airplanes, dirigibles, and destroyers? These were among the questions +with which the Planning Section busied itself, and this problem, like +many others, they approached from the German standpoint. They placed +themselves in the position of the German High Command, and peered into +the Grand Fleet looking for a weakness, which, had they been Germans, +they might turn to account in a general engagement. The only weak spot +our Planning Section could find was one which reflected the greatest +credit upon the British forces. The British commander, Admiral Sir David +Beatty, was a particularly dashing and heroic fighter; could not these +splendid qualities really be turned to the advantage of the Germans? +That Admiral Beatty would fight at the first opportunity, and that he +would run all justifiable risks, if a chance presented of defeating the +German fleet, was as well known to the Germans as to ourselves. The +British Admiral, it was also known, did not entertain much respect for +mines and torpedoes. All navies possessed what was known as a "torpedo +flag." This was an emblem which was to be displayed in case torpedoes +were sighted, for the purpose of warning the ships to change course or, +if necessary, to desist from an attack. It was generally reported that +Admiral Beatty had ordered all these torpedo flags to be destroyed; in +case he once started in pursuit of the German fleet, he proposed to take +his chances, dive straight through a school of approaching torpedoes, or +even to rush full speed over a mine-field, making no efforts to avoid +these hidden dangers. That he would probably lose some ships the Admiral +well knew, but he figured--and probably correctly--that he would +certainly have enough vessels left to annihilate the enemy. Still, in +the judgment of our Planning Section, Admiral Beatty's assumed attitude +toward "torpedo flags" gave the Germans their only possible chance of +seriously injuring the Grand Fleet. They drew up a plan of attack on the +Scapa Flow forces based upon this assumption. Imagining themselves +directors of the German navy, they constructed large numbers of torpedo +boats, submarines, and mine-fields and stationed them in a particularly +advantageous position; they then proposed to send the German fleet in +the direction of Scapa Flow, draw the Grand Fleet to the attack, and +then lead it in the direction of the torpedoes and mines. Probably such +a scheme would never have succeeded; but it represented, in the opinion +of our Planning group, Germany's only chance of crippling the Grand +Fleet and winning the war. In other words, had my staff found itself in +Germany's position, that is the strategy which it would probably have +used. I gave this report unofficially to the British Admiralty simply +because I thought it might afford British officers reading that would +possibly be entertaining. It is an evidence of the co-operation that +existed between the two forces, and of the British disposition to accept +suggestions, that this document was immediately sent to Admiral Beatty. + + +II + +The fact that I was able ultimately to create such an organization and +leave the administration of its individual departments so largely to +their respective heads was especially fortunate because it gave me time +for what was perhaps the most important of my duties. This was my +attendance at the meetings of the Allied Naval Council, not to mention +daily conferences with various officials of the Allies. This naval +council was the great headquarters for combined Allied operations +against the enemy on the sea. It was not officially constituted by the +Allied governments until November 29, 1917, but it had actually been in +continuous operation since the beginning of the war, the heads of the +Allied admiralties having met frequently in conference. At these +meetings every phase of the situation was discussed, and the methods +finally adopted represented the mature judgment of the Allied naval +chiefs who participated in them. Without this council, and without the +co-operation for which it stood, our efforts would have been so +dispersed and would have so overlapped that their efficiency would have +been greatly decreased. This international naval conference not only had +to decide questions of naval strategy, but it also had to concern itself +with a multitude of practical matters which have little interest for the +public, but which are exceedingly important in war. In this struggle +coal, oil, and other materials played a part almost as important as +ships and men; these materials, like ships and men, were limited in +quantity; and it was necessary to apportion them as deliberately and as +economically as the seemingly more important munitions of warfare. The +Germans were constantly changing their tactics; sometimes they would +make their concentrations in a certain area; while at other times their +strength would appear in another field far distant from the first. These +changes made it necessary that we should in each case readjust our +forces to counteract the enemy's tactics. It was a vital necessity that +these readjustments should be made immediately when the enemy's changes +of tactics became known. It is evident that the element necessary to +success was that the earliest and most complete possible information +should be followed by prompt decision and action; and it is manifest +that these requirements could have been satisfied only by a council +which was fully informed and which was on the spot momentarily ready to +act. The Allied Naval Council responded to all these requirements. One +of my first duties, after my arrival, was to attend one of these +councils in Paris; and immediately afterward the meetings became much +more frequent. + +Not only were the proceedings interesting because of the vast importance +of the issues which were discussed, but because they brought me into +intimate contact with some of the ablest minds in the European navies. +Over the first London councils Admiral Jellicoe presided. I have already +given my first impressions of this admirable sailor; subsequent events +only increased my respect for his character and abilities. An English +woman once described Admiral Jellicoe as "a great gentleman"; it is a +description upon which I can hardly improve. The First Lord, Sir Eric +Geddes, though he was by profession an engineer and had been transferred +from the business of building roads and assuring the communications +behind the armies in France to become the civilian head of the British +navy, acquired, in an astonishingly short time, a mastery of the details +of naval administration. Sir Eric is a type of man that we like to think +of as American; perhaps the fact that he had received his business +training in this country, and had served an apprenticeship on the +Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, strengthened this impression. The habitues +of the National Sporting Club in London--of whom I was one--used to look +reproachfully at the giant figure of the First Lord; in their opinion +he had sadly missed his calling. His mighty frame, his hard and supple +muscles, his power of vigorous and rapid movement, his keen eye and his +quick wit--these qualities, in the opinion of those best qualified to +judge, would have made this stupendous Briton one of the greatest +heavyweight prize-fighters in the annals of pugilism. With a little +training I am sure that Sir Eric would even now make a creditable +showing in the professional ring. However, the paths of this business +man and statesman lay in other fields. After returning from America he +had had a brilliant business career in England; he represented the type +which we call "self-made men"; that is, he fought his way to the top +without the aid of influential friends. His elevation to the Admiralty, +in succession to Sir Edward Carson, was something new in British public +life, for Sir Eric had never dabbled in politics, and, until the war +started, he was practically unknown in political circles. But this +crisis in British affairs made it necessary for the Ministry to "draft" +the most capable executives in the nation, irrespective of political +considerations; and Sir Eric, therefore, quite naturally found himself +at the head of the navy. In a short time he had acquired a knowledge of +the naval situation which enabled him to preside over an international +naval council with a very complete grasp of all the problems which were +presented. I have heard the great naval specialists who attended say +that, had they not known the real fact, they would hardly have suspected +that Sir Eric was not a naval man. We admired not only his ability to +direct the course of discussion, and even to take an important part in +it, but also his skill at summing up the results of the whole proceeding +in a few terse and masterly phrases. In fine, the First Lord was a man +after Roosevelt's heart--big, athletic, energetic, with a genius for +reaching the kernel of a question and of getting things done. + +When it came to facility of exposition, however, we Anglo-Saxons made a +poor showing in comparison with most French naval officers and in +particular with Admirals Lacaze and de Bon. Both these gentlemen +represented the Gallic type in its finest aspects. After spending a few +moments with Rear-Admiral Lacaze, it was easy to understand the real +affection which all French naval officers felt for him. He is a small, +slight man, with a grey, pointed beard, and he possesses that +earnestness of spirit, that courtesy of manner, and that sympathy and +charm which we regard as the finest attributes of the cultured +Frenchman. Admiral Lacaze has also a genuine French facility of speech +and that precision of statement which is so characteristic of the French +intellect. A slight acquaintance would make one believe that Admiral +Lacaze would be a model husband and father, perhaps grandfather; it was +with surprise, however, that I learned that he was a bachelor, but I am +sure that he is that kind of bachelor who is an uncle to all of the +children of his acquaintance. As Minister of Marine he was the presiding +officer of the council when it met in Paris. + +In Vice-Admiral de Bon, chief of the French naval staff, Admiral Lacaze +had a worthy colleague; he was really a man of heroic mould, and he +certainly looked the part. His white hair and his white beard, cut +square, gave at first glance an impression of age; yet his clear, pink +skin, not ruffled by a trace of wrinkle, his erect figure, his bright +blue eyes, the vigour of his conversation and the energy of his +movements, betokened rather perpetual youth. Compared with the naval +forces of Great Britain, the French navy was of inconsiderable size, but +in Admiral de Bon it made a contribution to Allied naval strength which +was worth many dreadnoughts. The reputation of this man has scarcely +reached this side of the Atlantic; yet it was the general opinion of +practically all naval men that his was the keenest mind at the Allied +Naval Council. It was certainly the most persuasive in argument, and the +one that had most influence in determining our conclusions. Not that +there was anything about this great French sailor that was arrogant or +offensively self-assertive. On the contrary, his manner was all compact +of charm and courtesy. He was about the most persuasive person I have +ever met. Whenever an important matter arose, there was some influence +that made us turn instinctively to Admiral de Bon for enlightenment; +and, when he rose to talk, the council hung upon his every word. For the +man was a consummate orator. Those who understood French even slightly +had little difficulty in following the Admiral, for he spoke his +delightful language with a precision, a neatness of phrase, and a +clearness of enunciation which made every syllable intelligible. So +perfect did these speeches seem that one would have suspected that +Admiral de Bon had composed them at his leisure, but this was not the +case; the man apparently had only to open his mouth, and his speech +spontaneously flowed forth; he never hesitated for a word. And his words +were not only eloquent, but, as I have said, they were full of +substance. The charm which he manifested on these public occasions he +carried likewise into his domestic life. Whenever the council met in +Paris the Admiral's delightful wife and daughters entertained us at +luncheon--an experience which caused many of us to regret that it did +not always meet in that city. + +The other two members of this interesting group were Rear-Admiral +Funakoshi, representing the Japanese navy, and Vice-Admiral di Revel, +representing the Italian. The Japanese was also naval attache at London, +and the popularity which he had acquired in this post he also won in the +larger field. In some respects, he was not like the conventional notion +of a Japanese; physically he did not fulfil the accepted role, for he +was tall and heavily built; nor was there anything about him that was +"inscrutable"; the fact was that he was exceedingly frank and open, and +apparently loved nothing so much as a good joke. The remark of a London +newspaper that Admiral di Revel, the Italian, "unlike Admiral Sims, +looks every inch the sailor," caused Admiral Funakoshi much amusement; +he could not resist the temptation to chaff me about it. We all became +so well acquainted that, in our lighter moments, we did not mind having +a little fun at one another's expense; and in these passages the +Japanese representative did not always make the poorest showing. The +Italian, di Revel, was a source of continual delight. Someone remarked +that he was in reality an Irishman who had escaped into Italy; and this +facetious characterization was really not inapt. His shock of red hair, +his reddish beard, and his short, stocky figure almost persuaded one +that County Cork was his native soil. He delivered his opinions with an +insistence which indicated that he entertained little doubt about their +soundness; he was not particularly patient if they were called in +question; yet he was so courteous, so energetic, and so entertaining +that he was a general favourite. That his Government appreciated his +services is shown by the fact that it made di Revel a full admiral, a +rank which is rarely bestowed in Italy. + +Such, then, were the men who directed the mighty forces that defeated +the German submarines. The work at the councils was arduous, yet the +opportunity of associating with such men in such a task is one that +comes to few naval officers. They all worked with the most indomitable +spirit; not one of them ever for a moment showed the slightest +discouragement over a situation which was at times disquieting, to say +the least; not one faltered in the determination to force the issue to +the only logical end. History has given few examples of alliances that +worked harmoniously. The Allied Naval Council did its full share in +making harmonious the Allied effort against the submarine. + + + + +CHAPTER VIII + +SUBMARINE AGAINST SUBMARINE + + +I + +It is not improbable that I have given a false impression concerning the +relative merits of the several methods which were developed for fighting +the submarine. Destroyers, patrol boats, subchasers, and mystery ships +all accomplished great things in solving the most baffling problem +presented by the war. The belief is general that the most successful +hunter of the submarine was the destroyer, and, so far as absolute +figures are concerned, this is true. Destroyers, with their depth +charges and their gunfire, sank more U-boats than any other agency. One +type of craft, however, proved a more destructive enemy of the submarine +than even the destroyer. That was a warship of whose achievements in +this direction little has so far been heard. The activities of the +German submarine have completely occupied public attention; and this is +perhaps the reason why few newspaper readers have suspected that there +were other than German and Austrian submarines constantly operating at +sea. Everyone has heard of the U-boats, yet how many have heard anything +of the H-boats, the E-boats, the K-boats, and the L-boats? The H-, E-, +and K-boats were British submarines, and the L-boats were American +submarines. In the destruction of the German under-water craft these +Allied submarines proved more successful than any kind of surface ship. +The Allied destroyers, about 500 in number, sank 34 German submarines +with gunfire and depth charges; auxiliary patrol craft, such as +trawlers, yachts, and the like, about 3,000 in number, sank 31; while +the Allied submarines, which were only about 100 in number, sank 20. +Since, therefore, the Allies had about five times as many destroyers as +submarines at work, it is evident that the record of the latter vessels +surpasses that of the most formidable surface anti-submarine craft. + +Thus the war developed the fact that the most deadly enemy of the +submarine is the submarine itself. Underwater warfare is evidently a +disease in which like cures like. In a way this is the most astonishing +lesson of the naval operations. It is particularly interesting, because +it so completely demolishes all the ideas on this subject with which we +entered the war. From that day in history when the submarine made its +first appearance, the one quality which seemed to distinguish it from +all other kinds of warship was that it could not be used to fight +itself. Writers were fond of pointing out that battleship could fight +battleship, that cruiser could fight cruiser, that destroyer could fight +destroyer, but that submarine could not fight submarine. This supposed +quality, which was constantly emphasized, was what seemed to make the +introduction of this strange vessel such a dangerous thing for the +British Empire. For more than a hundred years the under-water boat was a +weapon which was regarded as valuable almost exclusively to the weaker +sea powers. In the course of the nineteenth century this engine of sea +fighting made many spectacular appearances; and significantly it was +always heralded as the one effective way of destroying British +domination at sea. + +The inventor of the modern submarine was an undergraduate of Yale named +David Bushnell; his famous _Turtle_, according to the great British +authority, Sir William White, formerly Chief Naval Constructor of the +British navy, contained every fundamental principle of "buoyancy, +stability, and control of depth" which are found in the modern +submarine; "it cannot be claimed," he said in 1905, "that any new +principle of design has been discovered or applied since Bushnell.... He +showed the way to all his successors.... Although alternative methods of +fulfilling essentials have been introduced and practically tested, in +the end Bushnell's plans in substance have been found the best." The +chief inspiration of Bushnell's work was a natural hostility to Great +Britain, which was at that time engaged in war with his own country; his +submarine, invented in 1777, was intended to sink the British warships +which were then anchored off the American coast, break the +communications of Great Britain with her revolting colonies, and in this +way win our liberty. Bushnell did not succeed in this ambitious +enterprise for reasons which it is hardly necessary to set forth in this +place; the fact which I wish to emphasize is that he regarded his +submarine as an agency which would make it possible for the young United +States, a weak naval power, to deprive Great Britain, the dominant sea +power, of its supremacy. His successor, Robert Fulton, was inspired by a +similar ambition. In 1801 Fulton took his _Nautilus_ into the harbour of +Brest, and blew a merchant vessel into a thousand pieces; this dramatic +experiment was intended to convince Napoleon that there was one way in +which he could destroy the British fleet and thus deprive England of her +sea control. Dramatic as this demonstration was, it did not convince +Napoleon of the value of the submarine; Fulton therefore took his ship +to England and exhibited it to William Pitt, who was then Prime +Minister. The great statesman was much impressed, but he did not regard +the submarine as an innovation that should arouse much enthusiasm in +England. "If we adopt this kind of fighting," he said, "it will be the +end of all navies." + +Despite his own forebodings, Pitt sent Fulton to St. Vincent, who was +then the First Lord of the Admiralty. + +"Pitt is the biggest fool in the world," remarked the head of the +victorious British navy. "Why does he encourage a kind of warfare which +is useless to those who are the masters of the sea, and which, if it +succeeds, will deprive them of this supremacy?" + +The reason for St. Vincent's opposition is apparent. He formed the +conception of the submarine which has prevailed almost up to the present +time. In his opinion, a submarine was a vessel which could constantly +remain under the surface, approach great warships unseen and blow them +to pieces at will. This being the case, a nation which possessed two or +three successfully working engines of this kind could apparently wipe +out the entire British fleet. It therefore needed no argument to show +that this was a weapon which was hardly likely to prove useful to the +British navy. If the submarine could fulfil its appointed mission, it +would give the control of the sea to that nation which used it +successfully; but since Great Britain already controlled the sea, the +new type of war craft was superfluous to her. In the hands of a weak +naval power, however, which had everything to gain and nothing to lose, +it might supply the means of overthrowing the British Empire. Could one +submarine destroy another, it would present no particular menace, for +then, in order to control the sea, it would merely be necessary to build +a larger under-water fleet than that of any prospective enemy: but how +could vessels which spent all their time under the water, in the dark, +ever get a chance to come to blows? From these considerations it seemed +apparent to St. Vincent and other British experts of his time that the +best interests of the British Empire would be served, not by developing +the submarine, but by suppressing it. Fulton's biographer intimates that +the British Government offered Fulton a considerable amount of money to +take his submarine back to America and forget about it; and there is a +letter of Fulton's to Lord Granville, saying that "not for L20,000 a +year would I do what you suggest." But there seemed to be no market for +his invention, and Fulton therefore returned to America and subsequently +gave all his time to exploiting the steamboat. On the defensive powers +of the under-water vessel he also expressed the prevailing idea. +"Submarine," he said, "cannot fight submarine." + +The man who designed the type of submarine which has become the standard +in all modern navies, John P. Holland, similarly advocated it as the +only means of destroying the British navy. Holland was an American of +Irish origin; he was a member of the Fenian brotherhood, and it was his +idea that his vessel could be used to destroy the British navy, blockade +the British coast, and, as an inevitable consequence, secure freedom for +Ireland. This is the reason why his first successful boat was known as +the _Fenian Ram_, despite the fact that it was not a "ram" at all. And +the point on which Holland always insisted was that the submarine vessel +was a unique vessel in naval warfare, because there was no "answer" to +it. "There is nothing that you can send against it," he gleefully +exclaimed, "not even itself." + +Parliamentary debates in the late nineties indicated that British naval +leaders entertained this same idea. In 1900, Viscount Goschen, who was +then the First Lord of the Admiralty, dismissed the submarine as +unworthy of consideration. "The idea of submarine navigation," he said, +"is a morbid one. We need pay no attention to the submarine in naval +warfare. The submarine is the arm of weaker powers." But Mr. +Arnold-Forster, who was himself soon to become a member of the +Admiralty, took exception to these remarks. "If the First Lord," he +said, "had suggested that we should not build submarines because the +problems which control them are not yet solved, I should have hesitated +to combat his argument. But the First Lord has not said so: he has said +that the Admiralty did not care to undertake any project for submarines +because this type of boat could never be anything but the arm of the +feeble. However, if this boat is made practical, the nation which +possesses it will cease to be feeble and become in reality powerful. +More than any other nation do we have reason to fear the submarine. It +is, therefore, not wise to wait with indifference while other nations +work at the solution of this problem without trying to solve it +ourselves." "The question of the best way of meeting submarine attack," +said Viscount Goschen at another time, "is receiving much consideration. +It is in this direction that practical suggestions would be valuable. It +seems certain that the reply to this weapon must be looked for in other +directions than in building submarine boats ourselves, for it is clear +that one submarine cannot fight another." + +This prepossession dominated all professional naval minds in all +countries, until the outbreak of the Great War. Yet the war had lasted +only a few months when the idea was shown to be absurd. Practical +hostilities soon demonstrated, as already said, that not only was the +submarine able to fight another boat of the same type, but that it was +the most effective anti-submarine agency which we possessed--so +effective that the British Admiralty at once began the design of a +special type of hunting submarine having a high under-water speed. + +The fact is that the popular mind, in its attitude toward this new type +of craft, is still too much under the spell of Jules Verne. There is +still the disposition to look upon the submarine as an insidious vessel +which spends practically all of its time under the water, stealthily +slinks along, never once betraying its presence, creeps up at will to +its enemy and discharges its torpedo. Yet the description which these +pages have already given of its operations shows the falsity of this +idea. It is important that we should keep constantly in mind the fact +that the submarine is only occasionally a submarine; and that for the +greater part of its career it is a surface boat. In the long journeys +which the German U-boats made from the Heligoland Bight around Scotland +and Ireland to those great hunting grounds which lay in the Atlantic +trade routes, they travelled practically all the time on the surface of +the water. The weary weeks during which they cruised around, looking for +their victims, they also spent almost entirely on the surface. There +were virtually only two circumstances which compelled them to disappear +beneath the waves. The first of these was the occasion on which the +submarine detected a merchant ship; in this case it submerged, for the +success of its attempt to torpedo depended entirely upon its operating +unseen. The second occasion which made it necessary to submerge was when +it spied a destroyer or other dangerous patrolling craft; the submarine, +as has been said, could not fight a vessel of this type with much chance +of success. Thus the ability to submerge was merely a quality that was +utilized only in those crises when the submarine either had to escape a +vessel which was stronger than itself or planned to attack one which was +weaker. + +The time taken up by these disappearances amounted to only a fraction of +the total period consumed in a cruise. Yet the fact that the submarine +had to keep itself momentarily ready to make these disappearances is +precisely the reason why it was obliged to spend the larger part of its +time on the surface. The submarine has two sets of engines, one for +surface travel and the other for subsurface travel. An oil-engine +propels it on the top of the water, but this consumes a large amount of +air, and, for this reason, it cannot be used when travelling under the +surface. As soon as the vessel dives, therefore, it changes its motive +power to an electric motor, which makes no inroads on the oxygen needed +for sustaining the life of its crew. But the physical limitation of size +prevents the submarine from carrying large storage batteries, which is +only another way of saying that its cruising radius under the water is +extremely small, not more than fifty or sixty miles. In order to +recharge these batteries and gain motive power for subsurface travel, +the submarine has to come to the surface. Yet the simple fact that the +submarine can accomplish its destructive work only when submerged, and +that it can avoid its enemy only by diving, makes it plain that it must +always hold itself in readiness to submerge on a moment's notice and +remain under water the longest possible time. That is, its storage +batteries must always be kept at their highest efficiency; they must not +be wasted by unnecessary travelling under the water; the submarine, in +other words, must spend all its time on the surface, except those brief +periods when it is attempting to attack a merchant ship or escape an +enemy. Almost the greatest tragedy in the life of a submarine is to meet +a surface enemy, such as a destroyer, when its electric batteries are +exhausted. It cannot submerge, for it can stay submerged only when it is +in motion, unless it is in water shallow enough to permit it to rest on +the bottom. Even though it may have a little electricity, and succeed in +getting under water, it cannot stay there long, for its electric power +will soon be used up, and therefore it is soon faced with the +alternative of coming to the surface and surrendering, or of being +destroyed. The success of the submarine, indeed its very existence, +depends upon the vessel spending the largest possible part of its time +upon the surface, keeping its full supply of electric power constantly +in reserve, so that it may be able to dive at a moment's notice and to +remain under the water for the maximum period. + +This purely mechanical limitation explains why the German submarine was +not a submarine in the popularly accepted meaning of that term. Yet the +fact that this vessel remained for the greater part of its existence on +the surface was no particular disadvantage, so long as it was called +upon to contend only with surface vessels. Even with the larger part of +its decks exposed the U-boat was a comparatively small object on the +vast expanse of the sea. I have already made clear the great +disadvantage under which destroyers and other patrolling vessels +laboured in their attempts to "hunt" this type of enemy. A destroyer, +small as it is, was an immensely larger object than the under-water +boat, and the consequence was that the lookout on a submarine, +proceeding along on the surface, could detect the patrolling vessel +long before it could be observed itself. All the submarine had to do, +therefore, whenever the destroyer appeared on the horizon, was to seek +safety under water, remain there until its pursuer had passed out of +sight, and then rise again and resume its operations. Before the +adoption of the convoy system, when the Allied navies were depending +chiefly upon the patrol--that is, sending destroyers and other surface +craft out upon the high seas to hunt for the enemy--the enemy submarines +frequently operated in the same areas as the patrol vessels, and were +only occasionally inconvenienced by having to keep under the water to +conceal their presence. But let us imagine that the destroyer, in +addition to its depth charges, its torpedoes, its guns, and its ability +to ram, had still another quality. Suppose, for a moment, that, like the +submarine, it could steam submerged, put up a periscope which would +reveal everything within the radius of a wide horizon, and that, when it +had picked up an enemy submarine, it could approach rapidly under the +water, and discharge a torpedo. It is evident that such a manoeuvre as +this would have deprived the German of the only advantage which it +possessed over all other war craft--its ability to make itself unseen. + +No destroyer can accomplish any such magical feat as this: indeed, there +is only one kind of vessel that can do so, and that is another +submarine. This illustration immediately makes it clear why the Allied +submarine itself was the most destructive enemy of the German submarine. +When Robert Fulton, John P. Holland, and other authorities declared that +the under-water vessel could not fight its own kind, it is evident that +they had not themselves foreseen the ways in which their inventions were +to be used. They regarded their craft as ships that would sail the +larger part of the time under the waves, coming up only occasionally to +get their bearings and to take in a fresh supply of air. It was plain to +these pioneers that vessels which spent practically all their time +submerged could not fight each other, for the sufficient reason that +they could not see each other; a combat under these conditions would +resemble a prize-fight between two blindfolded pugilists. Neither would +such vessels fight upon the surface, for, even though they were supplied +with guns--things which did not figure in the early designs of +submarines--one boat could decline the combat simply by submerging. In +the minds of Fulton and Holland an engagement between such craft would +reduce itself to mutual attempts to ram each other under the water, and +many fanciful pictures of the early days portrayed exciting deep-sea +battles of this kind, in which submarines, looking like mighty sea +monsters, provided with huge glaring headlights, made terrific lunges at +each other. None of the inventors foresaw that, in such battles as would +actually take place, the torpedo would be used, and that the submarine +which was defeated would succumb to one of those same stealthy attacks +which it was constantly meditating against surface craft. + +Another point of the highest importance is that in a conflict of +submarine against submarine the Allied boats had one great advantage +over the German. Hans Rose and Valentiner and Moraht and other U-boat +commanders, as already explained, had to spend most of their time on the +surface in order to keep their batteries fully supplied with +electricity, in readiness for the dives that would be necessary when the +Allied destroyers approached. But the Allied submarine commander did not +have to maintain this constant readiness; the reason, it is hardly +necessary to say, is that the Allied submarine had no surface enemies, +for there were no German surface craft operating on the high seas; the +Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow was carefully attending to that very essential +detail. Occasionally, indeed, our submarines were attacked by our own +destroyers, but accidents of this kind, though uncomfortably frequent, +were not numerous enough to interfere with the operation I have in mind. +The statement seems almost like a contradiction in terms, yet it is +entirely true, that, simply because the Allied submarines did not have +to hold themselves constantly ready to submerge, they could in fact +spend a considerable part of their time under the water, for they were +not compelled to economize electric power so strictly. This gave them a +great advantage in hunting the U-boats. British and American submarines +could fully charge their batteries, drop under water and cruise around +with enough speed to maintain a horizontal position at "periscope +depth," that is, a depth just sufficient to enable them to project the +periscope above the water whenever desired. This speed was so very +slow--about one mile an hour--that it could be kept up an entire day +without exhausting the electric batteries. + +The net result was this: The German submarine necessarily sailed most of +the time on the surface with its conning-tower and deck exposed, whereas +the Allied submarine when on its hunting grounds, spent all of the +daylight hours under water, with only the periscope visible from time to +time for a few seconds. Just as the German U-boat could "spot" an Allied +destroyer at a great distance without being itself seen, so could the +periscope invariably see the German submarine on the surface long before +this tiny object came within the view of a U-boat conning-tower. Our +submarine commander could remain submerged, sweep the ocean with his +periscope until he had picked up the German enemy; then, still under +water, and almost invariably unseen, he could steal up to a position +within range, and discharge a torpedo into its fragile side. The German +submarine received that same treatment which it was itself administering +to harmless merchantmen; it was torpedoed without warning; inasmuch, +however, as it was itself a belligerent vessel, the proceeding violated +no principle of international law. + + +II + +The Allied submarines, like many other patrol craft, spent much of their +time in those restricted waters which formed the entrances to the +British Isles. Their favourite places were the English Channel, St. +George's Channel, which forms the southern entrance to the Irish Sea, +and the northern passage-way between Scotland and Ireland. At these +points, it may be remembered, the cargo ships could usually be found +sailing singly, either entirely unescorted, or escorted inadequately, +while on their way to join a convoy or to their destinations after the +dispersal of a convoy; these areas were thus almost the only places +where the German submarines had much chance of attacking single vessels. +The territory was divided into squares, each one of which was indicated +by a letter: and the section assigned to each submarine was known as +its "billet." Under ordinary circumstances, the Allied submarine spent +all its time, while patrolling, on its own particular "billet"; only in +case the pursuit of an enemy led it outside the "square" was it +permissible to leave. Allied submarines also hunted the U-boats in the +North Sea on the routes which the latter had to take in coming out or +returning through the passages in the German mine-fields of the +Heligoland Bight, or through the Skager Rack. + +As previously explained, in the daytime the Allied submarine remained +under the water, its periscope exposed for a short time every fifteen +minutes or so, sweeping the sea for a distance of many miles. As soon as +darkness set in, the boat usually emerged, began taking in new air and +recharging its batteries, the crew seizing the opportunity to stretch +their legs and catch a welcome glimpse of the external world. The simple +fact that the Allied submarines spent the larger part of their time +under water, while the German spent the larger part of their time on the +surface, gave our boats a great military advantage over the foe, but it +likewise made existence in our submarine service more arduous. Even on +the coldest winter days there could be no artificial heat, for the +precious electricity could not be spared for that purpose, and the +temperature inside the submarine was the temperature of the water in +which it sailed. The close atmosphere, heavily laden also with the smell +of oil from the engines and the odours of cooking, and the necessity of +going for days at a time without a bath or even a wash, added to the +discomfort. The stability of a submerged submarine is by no means +perfect; the vessel is constantly rolling, and a certain number of the +crew, even the experienced men, are frequently seasick. This movement +sometimes made it almost impossible to stay in a bunk and sleep for any +reasonable period; the poor seaman would perhaps doze off, but a lurch +of the vessel would send him sprawling on the deck. One could hardly +write, for it was too cold, or read, for there was little light; and +because of the motion of the vessel, it was difficult to focus one's +eyes on the page. A limited amount of smoking was permitted, but the air +was sometimes so vitiated that only the most vigorous and incessant +puffing could keep a cigarette alight. One of the most annoying things +about the submarine existence is the fact that the air condenses on the +sides as the coldness increases, so that practically everything becomes +wet; as the sailor lies in his bunk this moisture is precipitated upon +him like raindrops. This combination of discomforts usually produced, +after spending a few hours under the surface, that mental state commonly +known as "dopey." + +The usual duration of a "cruise" was eight days, and by the end of that +time many of the crew were nearly "all in," and some of them entirely +so. But the physical sufferings were the least discomfiting. Any moment +the boat was likely to hit one of the mines the Germans were always +planting. A danger which was particularly vexatious was that a British +or an American submarine was just about as likely to be attacked by +Allied surface craft as the Germans themselves. At the beginning, +recognition signals were arranged by which it was expected that an +Allied under-water craft, coming to the surface, could make its identity +known to a friendly warship; sometimes these signals succeeded, but more +frequently they failed, and the attacks which British and American +destroyers made upon their own submarines demonstrated that there was no +certainty that such signals would offer any protection. A rather grim +order directed all destroyers and other patrol craft to sink any +submarine on sight, unless there was positive information that a +friendly submarine was operating in the neighbourhood. To a large +extent, therefore, the life of our submarine sailors was the same as +that of the Germans. Our men know how it feels to have a dozen depth +charges explode around them, for not infrequently they have had to +endure this sort of thing from their own comrades. Mistakes of this +sort, even though not very numerous, were so likely to happen at any +time that whenever an Allied submarine saw an Allied destroyer at a +distance, it usually behaved just as a German would have behaved under +the same conditions: it dived precipitately to the safety of deep water. +Our men, that is, did not care to take the risk of a discussion with the +surface craft; it was more prudent to play the part of an enemy. One day +one of the American submarines, lying on the surface, saw an American +destroyer, and, cheered in their loneliness by the sight of such a +friendly vessel, waited for it to approach, making all the +identification signals carefully set down in the books. Instead of a +cordial greeting, however, about twenty rounds of projectiles began +falling about the L-boat, which as hastily as possible dropped to sixty +feet under the surface. In a few minutes depth charges began exploding +around him in profusion, the plates of the vessel shook violently, the +lights went out, and the end seemed near. Making a last effort, the +American submarine rose to the surface, sent up all the recognition +signals the officers could think of, and this time with success. The +destroyer approached, the commander shouting from the bridge: + +"Who are you?" + +"American submarine _A L-10_." + +"Good luck, old man," came a now familiar voice from the bridge. "This +is Bill." + +The commander of the destroyer and the commander of the submarine had +been room-mates at Annapolis! + +In other ways our submarine force passed through the same experiences as +the Germans. Its adventures shed the utmost light upon this campaign +against merchantmen which the Germans had depended upon to win the war. +The observer at the periscope was constantly spotting huge Allied +merchantmen making their way into port. The great ships sailed on, +entirely oblivious of the periscope and the eye of the British or +American watcher fixed upon them. + +"How easy to sink her!" the observer would say to himself. This game in +which the Germans were engaged was a dangerous one, because of Allied +anti-submarine craft; but, when it came to attacking merchant ships, it +was the easiest thing in the world. After a few weeks in a submarine, it +grew upon our men that the wonder was not that the Germans had sunk so +many merchant ships, but that they had sunk so few. Such an experience +emphasized the conviction, which was prevalent in both the British and +American navies, that the Germans were not particularly skilful at the +occupation which seemed to be so congenial to them. Indeed, there are +few things in the world that appear so absolutely helpless as a great +merchant ship when observed through the periscope of an under-water +boat. + +Whenever an Allied submarine met its enemy the contest was usually a +short one. The issue, one way or the other, was determined in a few +minutes. On rare occasions there were attempts to ram; almost +invariably, however, it was the torpedo which settled the conflict. If +our boat happened to be on the surface when it sighted the German, +which, however, was very seldom the case, the first manoeuvre was to +dive as quickly and as unostentatiously as possible. If it succeeded in +getting under before the U-boat discovered its presence, it then crept +up, guided only by the periscope, until it had reached a spot that was +within range. The combat, as was the case so frequently in this war, was +one-sided. The enemy submarine seldom knew its assailant was anywhere in +the neighbourhood; a merchant ship, from its relatively high bridge, +could sometimes see the torpedo approach and turn out of its way; but it +was almost impossible to see a wake from the low conning-tower or +periscope of a submarine, and no one except the observer had a glimpse +of the surface. The small size of the submarine was in itself a great +protection; we launched many torpedoes, but only occasionally scored a +hit. The missile would usually pass a few feet ahead or astern, or would +glide over or under the submerged hulk, perhaps a few inches only saving +it from destruction. Once an American torpedo hit its enemy squarely on +the side but failed to explode! If the torpedo once struck and +functioned, however, it was all over in a few seconds. A huge geyser of +water would leap into the air; and the submarine would sometimes rise at +the same time, or parts of it would fly in a dozen directions; then the +waters would gradually subside, leaving a mammoth oil patch, in which +two or three members of the crew might be discovered struggling in the +waves. Most of the men in the doomed vessel never knew what had struck +them. + +Thus, early one evening in May, 1918, the _E-35_, a British submarine, +was patrolling its billet in the Atlantic, about two hundred miles west +of Gibraltar. About two or three miles on the port beam a long, +low-lying object was distinguished on the surface; the appearance was +nondescript, but, to the practised eye at the periscope, it quickly took +shape as an enemy submarine. As the sea was rather rough, the _E-35_ +dived to forty feet; after a little while it ascended to twenty-six, put +up the periscope, and immediately saw, not far away, a huge enemy +submarine proceeding north at a leisurely pace, never once suspecting +that one of its own kind was on its trail. In order to get within range +and cut the German off, the Britisher dived again to forty feet, went +ahead for twenty minutes with all the speed it could muster, and again +came near enough to the surface to put up its periscope. Now it was +directly astern; still the British submarine was not near enough for a +sure shot, so again it plunged beyond periscope depth, coming up at +intervals during the next hour, each time observing with satisfaction +that it was lessening the distance between itself and its prey. When the +range had been decreased to two hundred and fifty yards, and when the +_E-35_ had succeeded in getting in such a position that it could fire +its torpedo, the missile was launched in the direction of the foe. But +this was only another of the numerous occasions when the shot missed. +Had the German submarine been a surface ship, it would have seen the +wake and probably escaped by flight; but still it sailed nonchalantly on +its way, never suspecting for a moment that a torpedo had missed its +vitals by only a few feet. Soon the _E-35_ crept still closer, and fired +two torpedoes simultaneously from its bow tubes. Both hit at the same +time. Not a glimpse of the German submarine was seen from that moment. A +terrific explosion was heard, a mountain of water rose in the air, then +in a few seconds everything was still. A small patch of oil appeared on +the surface; this gradually expanded in size until it covered a great +area; and then a few German sailors came up and started swimming toward +the British vessel. + +We Americans had seven submarines based on Berehaven, Ireland, whose +"billets" were located in the approaches to the Irish Sea. The most +spectacular achievement of any one of our boats was a curious mix-up +with a German submarine, the details of which have never been accurately +ascertained, but the practical outcome of which was indisputably the +sinking of the German boat. After a week's hard work on patrol, the _A +L-2_ was running back to her base on the surface when the lookout +sighted a periscope. The _A L-2_ at once changed her course, the torpedo +was made ready to fire, when the quiet of the summer afternoon was rent +by a terrific roar and explosion. It was quite apparent that something +exceedingly distressing had happened to the German submarine; the +American turned, and made a steep dive, in an attempt to ram the enemy, +but failed. Listening with the hydrophone, the _A L-2_ could hear now +the whirring of propellers, which indicated that the submarine was +attempting to gain surface and having difficulty in doing so, and now +and then the call letters of the German under-water signal set, which +seemed to show that the vessel was in distress and was sending appeals +for aid. According to the Admiralty records, a German submarine +operating in that area never returned to port; so it seems clear enough +that this German was lost. Commander R. C. Grady, who commanded the +American submarine division, believes that the German spotted the +American boat before it was itself seen, that it launched a torpedo, +that this torpedo made an erratic course (a not infrequent trick of a +torpedo) around our ship, returned and hit the vessel from which it +started. There are others who think that there were two German +submarines in the neighbourhood, that one fired at our boat, missed it, +and that its torpedo sped on and struck its mate. Probably the real +facts about the happening will never be explained. + +Besides the actual sinkings to their credit, the Allied submarines +accomplished strategic results of the utmost importance. We had reason +to believe that the Germans feared them almost more than any other +agency, unless it was the mine. "We got used to your depth charges," +said the commander of a captured submarine, "and did not fear them; but +we lived in constant dread of your submarines. We never knew what moment +a torpedo was going to hit us." So greatly did the Germans fear this +attack that they carefully avoided the areas in which the Allied +under-water boats were operating. We soon learned that we could keep any +section free of the Germans which we were able to patrol with our own +submarines. It also soon appeared that the German U-boats would not +fight our subsurface vessels. At first this may seem rather strange; +certainly a combat between two ships of the same kind, size, and +armament would seem to be an equal one; the disinclination of the German +to give battle under such conditions would probably strike the layman +as sheer cowardice. But in this attitude the Germans were undoubtedly +right. + +The business of their submarines was not to fight warships; it was +exclusively to destroy merchantmen. The demand made upon the U-boat +commanders was to get "tonnage! tonnage!" Germany could win the war in +only one way: that was by destroying Allied shipping to such an extent +that the Allied sea communications would be cut, and the supplies of men +and munitions and food from the United States shut off. For this +tremendous task Germany had an inadequate number of submarines and +torpedoes. Only by economizing to the utmost extent on these vessels and +these weapons could she entertain any hope of success. Had Germany +possessed an unlimited quantity of submarines and torpedoes, she might +perhaps have profitably expended some of them in warfare on British +"H-boats" and American "L-boats"; or, had there been a certainty of +"getting" an Allied submarine with each torpedo fired, it would have +been justifiable to use these weapons, small as was the supply. The fact +was, however, that the Allies expended many torpedoes for every +submarine sunk; and this was clearly a game which Germany could not +afford to play. Evidently the U-boats had orders to slip under the water +whenever an Allied submarine was seen; at least this was the almost +invariable procedure. Thus the Allied submarines compelled their German +enemies to do the one thing which worked most to their disadvantage: +that is, to keep submerged when in the same area with our submarines; +this not only prevented them from attacking merchantmen, but forced them +to consume their electric power, which, as I have already explained, +greatly diminished their efficiency as attacking ships. + +The operations of Allied submarines also greatly diminished the value of +the "cruiser" submarines which Germany began to construct in 1917. These +great subsurface vessels were introduced as an "answer" to the convoy +system. The adoption of the convoy, as I have already explained, made it +ineffective for the Germans to hunt far out at sea. Until the Allies had +put this plan into operation, the relatively small German U-boats could +go two or three hundred miles into the Atlantic and pick off almost at +will the merchant ships, which were then proceeding alone and +unescorted. But now the destroyers went out to a point two or three +hundred miles from the British coast, formed a protecting screen around +the convoy, and escorted the grouped ships into restricted waters. The +result of this was to drive the submarines into these coastal waters; +here again, however, they had their difficulties with destroyers, +subchasers, submarines, and other patrol craft. It will be recalled that +no destroyer escort was provided for the merchant convoys on their way +across the Atlantic; the Allies simply did not have the destroyers for +this purpose. The Germans could not send surface raiders to attack these +convoys in mid-ocean, first, because their surface warships could not +escape from their ports in sufficient numbers to accomplish any decisive +results, and, secondly, because Allied surface warships accompanied +every convoy to protect them against any such attack. There was only one +way in which the Germans could attack the convoys in mid-ocean. A fleet +of great ocean-going submarines, which could keep the sea for two or +three months, might conceivably destroy the whole convoy system at a +blow. The scheme was so obvious that Germany in the summer of 1917 began +building ships of this type. They were about 300 feet long, displaced +about 3,000 tons, carried fuel and supplies enough to maintain +themselves for three or four months from their base, and, besides +torpedoes, had six-inch guns that could outrange a destroyer. By the +time the armistice was signed Germany had built about twenty of these +ships. But they possessed little offensive value against merchantmen. +The Allied submarines and destroyers kept them from operating in the +submarine zone. They are so difficult to manoeuvre that not only could +they not afford to remain in the neighbourhood of our anti-submarine +craft, but they were not successful in attacking merchant vessels. They +never risked torpedoing a convoy, and rarely even a single vessel, but +captured a number by means of their superior gunfire. These huge +"cruiser submarines," which aroused such fear in the civilian mind when +the news of their existence first found its way into print, proved to be +the least harmful of any of the German types. + +The Allied submarines accomplished another result of the utmost +importance. They prevented the German U-boats from hunting in groups or +flotillas. All during 1917 and 1918 the popular mind conjured up +frightful pictures of U-boat squadrons, ten or fifteen together, lying +in wait for our merchantmen or troopships. Hardly a passenger crossed +the ocean without seeing a dozen German submarines constantly pursuing +his ship. In a speech which I made to a group of American editors who +visited England in September, 1918, I touched upon this point. "I do not +know," I told these journalists, "how many submarines you gentlemen saw +on the way over here, but if you had the usual experience, you saw a +great many. I have seen many accounts in our papers on this subject. If +you were to believe these accounts, you could only conclude that many +vessels have crossed the ocean with difficulty because submarines were +so thick that they scraped all the paint off the vessels' sides. All of +these accounts are, of course, unofficial. They get into the American +papers in various ways. It is to be regretted that they should be +published and thereby give a false impression. Some time ago I saw a +letter from one of our men who came over here on a ship bound into the +English Channel. This letter was written to his girl. He said that he +intended to take the letter on shore and slip it into a post box so that +the censor should not see it. The censor did see it and it eventually +came to me. This man was evidently intent on impressing on his girl the +dangers through which he had passed. It related that the vessel on which +he had made the voyage had met two or three submarines a day; that two +spies were found on board and hanged; and it said, 'When we arrived off +our port there were no less than eighteen submarines waiting for us. Can +you beat it?'" + +Perhaps in the early days of the war the German U-boats did hunt in +flotillas; if so, however, they were compelled to abandon the practice +as soon as the Allied submarines began to operate effectively. I have +already indicated the circumstances which reduced their submarine +operations to a lonely enterprise. In the open sea it was impossible to +tell whether a submarine was a friend or an enemy. We never knew whether +a submarine on the surface was one of our own or a German; as a result, +as already said, we gave orders to attack any under-water boat, unless +we had absolute knowledge that it was a friend. Unquestionably the +Germans had the same instructions. It would therefore be dangerous for +them to attempt to operate in groups, for they would have no way of +knowing that their supposed associate was not an Allied or an American +submarine. Possibly, even after our submarines had become exceedingly +active, the Germans may have attempted to cruise in pairs; one +explanation of the strange adventure of the _A L-2_, as said above, was +that there were two U-boats in the neighbourhood; yet the fact remains +that there is no well-established case on record in which they did so. +This circumstance that they had to operate singly was a strategic point +greatly to our advantage, especially, as I shall describe, when we began +transporting American troops. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +THE AMERICAN MINE BARRAGE IN THE NORTH SEA + + +I + +Was there no more satisfactory way of destroying submarines than by +pursuing them with destroyers, sloops, chasers, and other craft in the +open seas? It is hardly surprising that our methods impressed certain of +our critics as tedious and ill-conceived, and that a mere glance at a +small map of the North Sea suggested a far more reasonable solution of +the problem. The bases from which the German submarines found their way +to the great centres of shipping were Ostend and Zeebrugge on the +Belgian coast, Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven on the German coast, and the +harbour of Kiel in the Baltic Sea. From all these points the voyage to +the waters that lay west and south of Ireland was a long and difficult +one; in order to reach these hunting grounds the German craft had either +to pass through the Straits of Dover to the south, or through the wide +passage-way of the North Sea that stretched between the Shetland Islands +and Norway, and thence sail around the northern coast of Ireland. We +necessarily had little success in attempting to interfere with the +U-boats while they were making these lengthy open-sea voyages, but +concentrated our efforts on trying to oppose them after they had reached +the critical areas. + +[Illustration: THE NORTH SEA BARRAGE + +Just how many German submarines were sunk in attempting to get by this +barrage will never be known, for it did its work silently without any +observers. It was probably a contributory cause of the mutiny which +demoralized the German fleet in the autumn of 1918. + +Emery Walper Ltd. sc.] + +But a casual glance at the map convinced many people that our procedure +was a mistake. And most newspaper readers in those days were giving much +attention to this map. Many periodicals, published in Great Britain and +the United States, were fond of exhibiting to their readers diagrams of +the North Sea; these diagrams contained one heavy black bar drawn across +the Straits of Dover and another drawn across the northern passage from +Scotland to Norway. The accompanying printed matter informed the public +that these pictures illustrated the one effective "answer" to the +submarine. The black bars of printer's ink represented barrages of mines +and nets, which, if they were once laid between the indicated spots, +would blow to pieces any submarine which attempted to force a way +across. Not a single German U-boat could therefore succeed in getting +out of the North Sea. All the trans-Atlantic ships which contained the +food supplies and war materials so essential to Allied success would +thus be able to land on the west coast of England and France; the +submarine menace would automatically disappear and the war on the sea +would be won. Unfortunately, it was not only the pictorial artists +employed on newspapers and magazines who insisted that this was the +royal road to success. Plenty of naval men, in the United States and in +Europe, were constantly advancing the contention, and statesmen in our +own country and in Allied countries were similarly fascinated by this +programme. When I arrived in London, in April, 1917, the great plan of +confining the submarines to their bases was everywhere a lively topic of +discussion. There was not a London club in which the Admiralty was not +denounced for its stupidity in not adopting such a perfectly obvious +plan. The way to destroy a swarm of hornets--such was the favourite +simile--was to annihilate them in their nests, and not to hunt and +attack them, one by one, after they had escaped into the open. What the +situation needed was not a long and wearisome campaign, involving +unlimited new construction to offset the increasing losses of life and +shipping, and altogether too probable defeat in the end, but a swift and +terrible blow which would end the submarine menace overnight. + +The naval officers who expressed fears that, under the shipping +conditions prevailing in 1917, such a brilliant performance could not +possibly be carried out in time to avoid defeat, merely gained a +reputation for timidity and lack of resourcefulness. When the First Lord +of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, in 1915 declared that the British +fleet would "dig the Germans out of their holes like rats," his remarks +did not greatly impress naval strategists, but they certainly sounded a +note which was popular in England. One fact, not generally known at that +time, demonstrated the futility of the whole idea. Most newspaper +critics assumed that the barrage from Dover to Calais was keeping the +submarines out of the Channel. That the destroyers, aircraft, and other +patrols were safely escorting troopships and other vessels across the +Channel was a fact of which the British public was justly proud. Yet it +did not necessarily follow that the submarines could not use the Channel +as a passage-way from their German bases to their operating areas in the +focus of Allied shipping routes. The mines and nets in the Channel, of +which so much was printed in the first three years of the war, did not +offer an effective barrier to the submarines. This was due to various +reasons too complicated for description in a book of this untechnical +nature. The unusually strong tides and rough weather experienced in the +vicinity of the Straits of Dover are well known. As one British officer +expressed it at the time, "our experience in attempting to close the +Strait has involved both blood and tears"--blood because of the men who +were lost in laying the mines and nets, and tears because the arduous +work of weeks would be swept away in a storm of a single night. In +addition, at this stage of the war the British were still experimenting +with mines; they had discovered gradually that the design which they had +used up to that time--the same design which was used in the American +navy--was defective. But the process of developing new mines in wartime +had proved slow and difficult; and the demands of the army on the +munition factories had prevented the Admiralty from obtaining a +sufficient number. The work of the Dover patrols was a glorious one, as +will appear when all of the facts come to public knowledge. But in 1917 +this patrol was not preventing the U-boats from slipping through the +Channel. The Straits of Dover, at the point where this so-called barrage +was supposed to have existed, is about twenty miles wide. The +passage-way between Scotland and Norway is 250 miles wide. The water in +the Channel has an average depth of a few fathoms; in the northern +expanse of the North Sea it reaches an average depth of 600 feet. Mining +in such deep waters had never been undertaken or even considered before +by any nation. The English Channel is celebrated for its strong tides +and stormy weather, but it is not the scene of the tempestuous gales +which rage so frequently in the winter months in these northern waters. +If the British navy had not succeeded in constructing an effective mine +barrier across the English Channel, what was the likelihood that success +would crown an effort to build a much greater obstruction in the far +more difficult waters to the north? + +The one point which few understood at that time was that the mere +building of the barrage would not in itself prevent the escape of +submarines from the North Sea. Besides building such a barrage, it would +be necessary to protect it with surface vessels. Otherwise German +mine-sweepers could visit the scene, and sweep up enough of the +obstruction to make a hole through which their submarines could pass. It +is evident that, in a barrage extending 250 miles, it would not be +difficult to find some place in which to conduct such sweeping +operations; it is also clear that it would take a considerable number of +patrolling vessels to watch such an extensive barrier and to interfere +with such operations. Moreover, we could not send our mine-layers into +the North Sea without destroyer escort; that is, it would be necessary +to detach a considerable part of our forces to protect these ships while +they were laying their mines. Those responsible for anti-submarine +operations believed that in the spring and summer of 1917 it would have +been unwise to detach these anti-submarine vessels from the area in +which they were performing such indispensable service. The overwhelming +fact was that we needed all the surface craft we could assemble for the +convoy system. The destroyers which we had available for this purpose +were entirely inadequate; to have diverted any of them for other duties +would at that time have meant destruction to the Allied cause. The +object of placing the barrage so far north was to increase the enemy's +difficulty in attempting to sweep a passage through it and facilitate +its defence by our forces. The impossibility of defending a mine barrier +placed too far south was shown by experience in that area of the North +Sea which was known as the "wet triangle." By April, 1917, the British +had laid more than 30,000 mines in the Bight of Heligoland, and were +then increasing these obstructions at the rate of 3,000 mines a month. +Yet this vast explosive field did not prevent the Germans from sending +their submarines to sea. The enemy sweepers were dragging out channels +through the mine-fields almost as rapidly as the British were putting +new fields down; we could not prevent this, because protecting vessels +could not remain so near the German bases without losses from submarine +attacks. Moreover, the Germans also laid mines in the same area in order +to trap the British mine-layers; and these operations resulted in very +considerable losses on each side. These impediments made the egress of a +submarine a difficult and nerve-racking process; it sometimes required +two or three days and the assistance of a dozen or so surface vessels to +get a few submarines through the Heligoland Bight into open waters. +Several were unquestionably destroyed in the operation, yet the activity +of submarines in the Atlantic showed that these mine-fields had by no +means succeeded in proving more than a harassing measure. It was +estimated that the North Sea barrage would require about 400,000 mines, +far more than existed in the world at that time, and far more than all +our manufacturing resources could then produce within a reasonable +period. I have already made the point, and I cannot make it too +frequently, that time is often the essential element in war--and in this +case it was of vital importance. Whether a programme is a wise one or +not depends not only upon the feasibility of the plan itself, but upon +the time and the circumstances in which it is proposed. In the spring +of 1917 the situation which we were facing was that the German +submarines were destroying Allied shipping at the rate of nearly 800,000 +tons a month. The one thing which was certain was that, if this +destruction should continue for four or five months, the Allies would be +obliged to surrender unconditionally. The pressing problem was to find +methods that would check these depredations and that would check them in +time. The convoy system was the one naval plan--the point cannot be made +too emphatically--which in April and May of 1917 held forth the +certainty of immediately accomplishing this result. Other methods of +opposing the submarines were developed which magnificently supplemented +the convoy; but the convoy, at least in the spring and summer of 1917, +was the one sure method of salvation for the Allied cause. To have +started the North Sea barrage in the spring and summer of 1917 would +have meant abandoning the convoy system; and this would have been sheer +madness. + +Thus in 1917 the North Sea barrage was not an answer to the popular +proposal "to dig the Germans out of their holes like rats." We did not +have a mine which could be laid in such deep waters in sufficient +numbers to have formed any barrier at all; and even if we had possessed +one, the construction of the barrage would have demanded such an +enormous number that they could not have been manufactured in time to +finish the barrage until late in the year 1918. Presently the situation +began to change. The principal fact which made possible this great +enterprise was the invention of an entirely new type of mine. The old +mine consisted of a huge steel globe, filled with high explosive, which +could be fired only by contact. That is, it was necessary for the +surface of a ship, such as a submarine, to strike against the surface of +the mine, and in this way start the mechanism which ignited the +explosive charge. The fact that this immediate contact was essential +enormously increased the difficulty of successfully mining waters that +range in depth from 400 to 900 feet. If the mines were laid anywhere +near the surface, the submarine, merely by diving beneath them, could +avoid all danger; if they were laid any considerable depth, it could +sail with complete safety above them. Thus, if such a mine were to be +used at all, we should have had to plant several layers, one under the +other, down to a depth of about 250 feet, so that the submarine, at +whatever depth it might be sailing, would be likely to strike one of +these obstructions. This required such a large number of mines as to +render the whole project impossible. We Americans may take pride in the +fact that it was an American who invented an entirely new type of mine +and therefore solved this difficulty. In the summer of 1917 Mr. Ralph C. +Browne, an electrical engineer of Salem, Mass., offered a submarine gun +for the consideration of Commander S. P. Fullinwider, U.S.N., who was +then in charge of the mining section of the Bureau of Ordnance. As a +submarine gun this invention did not seem to offer many chances of +success, but Commander Fullinwider realized that it comprised a firing +device of excellent promise. The Bureau of Ordnance, assisted by Mr. +Browne, spent the summer and autumn experimenting with this contrivance +and perfecting it; the English mining officers who had been sent to +America to co-operate with our navy expressed great enthusiasm over it; +and some time about the beginning of August, 1917, the Bureau of +Ordnance came to the conclusion that it was a demonstrated success. The +details of Mr. Browne's invention are too intricate for description in +this place, but its main point is comprehensible enough. Its great +advantage was that it was not necessary for the submarine to strike the +mine in order to produce the desired explosion. The mine could be +located at any depth and from it a long "antenna," a thin copper cable, +reached up to within a few feet of the surface, where it was supported +in that position by a small metal buoy. Any metallic substance, such as +the hull of a submarine, simply by striking this antenna at any point, +would produce an electric current, which, instantaneously transmitted to +the mine, would cause this mine to explode. The great advantage of this +device is at once apparent. Only about one fourth the number of mines +required under the old conditions would now be necessary. The Mining +Section estimated that 100,000 mines would form a barrier that would be +extremely dangerous to submarines passing over it or through it, +whereas, under the old conditions, about 400,000 would have been +required. This implies more than a mere saving in manufacturing +resources; it meant that we should need a proportionately smaller number +of mine-laying ships, crews, officers, bases, and supplies--all those +things which are seldom considered by the amateur in warfare, but which +are as essential to its prosecution as the more spectacular details. + +I wish to emphasize the fact that, in laying such a barrage, it was not +our object to make an absolute barrier to the passage of submarines. To +have done this we should have needed such a great number of mines that +the operation would have been impossible. Nor would such an absolute +barrier have been necessary to success; a field that could be depended +upon to destroy one-fourth or one-fifth of the submarines that attempted +the passage would have represented complete success. No enemy could +stand such losses as these; and the _moral_ of no crew could have lasted +long under such conditions. + +Another circumstance which made the barrage a feasible enterprise was +that by the last of the year 1917 it was realized that the submarine had +ceased to be a decisive factor in the war. It still remained a serious +embarrassment, and every measure which could possibly thwart it should +be adopted. But the writings of German officers which have been +published since the war make it apparent that they themselves realized +early in 1918 that they would have to place their hopes of victory on +something else besides the submarine. The convoy system and the other +methods of fighting under-water craft which I have already described had +caused a great decrease in sinkings. In April of 1917 the losses were +nearly 900,000 tons; in November of the same year they were less than +300,000 tons.[7] Meanwhile, the construction of merchant shipping, +largely a result of the tremendous expansion of American shipbuilding +facilities, was increasing at a tremendous rate. A diagram of these, the +two essential factors in the submarine campaign, disclosed such a +rapidly rising curve of new shipping, and such a rapidly falling curve +of sinkings, that the time could be easily foreseen when the net amount +of Allied shipping, after the submarines had done their worst, would +show a promising increase. But, as stated above, the submarines were +still a distinct menace; they were still causing serious losses; and it +was therefore very important that we should leave no stone unturned +toward demonstrating beyond a shadow of doubt that warfare as conducted +by these craft could be entirely put down. The more successfully we +demonstrated this fact and the more energetically we prosecuted every +form of opposition, the earlier would the enemy's general _moral_ break +down and victory be assured. In war, where human lives as well as +national interests are at stake, no thought whatever can be given to +expense. It is impossible to place a value on human life. Therefore, on +November 2, 1917, the so-called "Northern Barrage" project was +officially adopted by both the American and the British Governments. +When I say that the proposed mine-field was as long as the distance from +Washington to New York, some idea of its magnitude may be obtained. +Nothing like it had ever been attempted before. The combined operations +involved a mass of detail which the lay mind can hardly comprehend. The +cost--$40,000,000--is perhaps not an astonishing figure in the +statistics of this war, but it gives some conception of the size of the +undertaking. + + +II + +During the two years preceding the war Captain Reginald R. Belknap +commanded the mine-laying squadron of the Atlantic fleet. Although his +force was small, consisting principally of two antiquated warships, the +_Baltimore_ and the _San Francisco_, Captain Belknap had performed his +duties conscientiously and ably, and his little squadron therefore gave +us an excellent foundation on which to build. Before the European War +the business of mine-laying had been unpopular in the American navy as +well as in the British; such an occupation, as Sir Eric Geddes once +said, had been regarded as something like that of "rat catching"; as +hostilities went on, however, and the mine developed great value as an +anti-submarine weapon, this branch of the service began to receive more +respectful attention. Captain Belknap's work not only provided the +nucleus out of which the great American mine force was developed, but he +was chiefly responsible for organizing this force. The "active front" of +our mine-laying squadron was found in the North Sea; but the sources of +supply lay in a dozen shipyards and several hundred manufacturing plants +in the United States. + +We began this work with practically nothing; we had to obtain ships and +transform them into mine-layers; to enlist and to train their crews; to +manufacture at least 100,000 mines; to create bases both in the United +States and Scotland; to transport all of our supplies more than 3,000 +miles of wintry sea, part of the course lying in the submarine zone; and +we had to do all this before the real business of planting could begin. +The fact that the Navy made contracts for 100,000 of these new mines +before it had had the opportunity of thoroughly testing the design under +service conditions shows the great faith of the Navy Department in this +new invention. More than 500 contractors and sub-contractors, located in +places as far west as the Mississippi River, undertook the work of +filling this huge order. Wire-rope mills, steel factories, foundries, +machine shops, electrical works, and even candy makers, engaged in this +great operation; all had their troubles with labour unions, with the +railroads, and with the weather--that was the terrible winter of +1917-18; but in a few months trainloads of mine cases--great globes of +steel--and other essential parts began to arrive at Norfolk, Virginia. +This port was the place where the mine parts were loaded on ships and +sent abroad. The plant which was ultimately constructed at this point +was able to handle 1,000 mines a day; the industry was not a popular one +in the neighbourhood, particularly after the Halifax explosion had +proved the destructive powers of the materials in which it dealt. In a +few months this establishment had handled 25,000,000 pounds of TNT. The +explosive was melted in steel kettles until it reached about the density +of hasty pudding; with the aid of automatic devices it was then poured +into the mine cases, 300 pounds to a case, and thence moved on a +mechanical conveyor to the end of the pier. Twenty-four cargo vessels, +for the most part taken from the Great Lakes, carried these cargoes to +the western coast of Scotland. Beginning in February, 1918, two or three +of these ships sailed every eight days from Norfolk, armed against +submarines and manned by naval crews. The fact that these vessels were +slow made them an easy prey for the under-water enemy; one indeed was +sunk, with the loss of forty-one men; regrettable as was this mishap, it +represented the only serious loss of the whole expedition. + +The other vital points were Newport, Rhode Island, where the six +mine-layers were assembled; and Fort William and Kyle of Lochalsh on the +western coast of Scotland, which were the disembarking points for the +ships transporting the explosives. Captain Belknap's men were very proud +of their mine-layers, and in many details they represented an +improvement over anything which had been hitherto employed in such a +service. At this point I wish to express my very great appreciation of +the loyal and devoted services rendered by Captain Belknap. An organizer +of rare ability, this officer deserves well of the nation for the +conspicuous part which he played in the development of the North Sea +Mine Barrage from start to finish. Originally, these mine-layers had +been coastwise vessels; two of them were the _Bunker Hill_ and the +_Massachusetts_, which for years had been "outside line" boats, running +from New York to Boston; all had dropped the names which had served them +in civil life and were rechristened for the most part with names which +eloquently testified to their American origin--_Canonicus_, _Shawmut_, +_Quinnebaug_, _Housatonic_, _Saranac_, _Roanoke_, _Aroostook_, and +_Canandaigua_. These changes in names were entirely suitable, for by the +time our forces had completed their alterations the ships bore few +resemblances to their former state. The cabins and saloons had been +gutted, leaving the hulls little more than empty shells; three decks for +carrying mines had been installed; on all these decks little railroad +tracks had been built on which the mines could be rolled along the lower +decks to the elevators and along the upper mine deck to the stern and +dropped into the sea. Particularly novel details, something entirely new +in mine-layers, were the elevators, the purpose of which was to bring +the mines rapidly from the lower decks to the launching track. So +rapidly did the work progress, and so well were the crews trained, that +in May, 1918, the first of these ten ships weighed anchor and started +for their destination in Scotland. Already our navy had selected as +bases the ports of Inverness and Invergordon, on Moray Firth, harbours +which were reasonably near the waters in which the mines were to be +laid. From Invergordon the Highland Railway crosses Scotland to +Lochalsh, and from Inverness the Caledonian Canal runs to Fort William. +These two transportation lines--the Highland Railway and the Caledonian +Canal--served as connecting links in our communications. If we wish a +complete picture of our operation, we must call to mind first the +hundreds of factories in all parts of our country, working day and +night, making the numerous parts of these instruments of destruction and +their attendant mechanisms; then hundreds of freight cars carrying them +to the assembling plant at Norfolk, Virginia; then another small army of +workmen at this point mixing their pasty explosive, heating it to a +boiling point, and pouring the concoction into the spherical steel +cases; then other groups of men moving the partially prepared mines to +the docks and loading them on the cargo ships; then these ships quietly +putting to sea, and, after a voyage of ten days or two weeks, as quietly +slipping into the Scottish towns of Fort William and Kyle; then trains +of freight cars and canal boats taking the cargoes across Scotland to +Inverness and Invergordon, where the mines were completed and placed in +the immense storehouses at the bases and loaded on the mine-layers as +the necessity arose. Thus, when the whole organization was once +established on a working basis, we had uninterrupted communications and +a continuous flow of mines from the American factories to the stormy +waters of the North Sea. + +The towns in which our officers and men found themselves in late May, +1918, are among the most famous in Scottish history and legend. Almost +every foot of land is associated with memories of Macbeth, Mary Queen of +Scots, Cromwell, and the Pretender. "The national anthem woke me," says +Captain Belknap, describing his first morning at his new Scottish base. +"I arose and looked out. What a glorious sight! Green slopes in all +freshness, radiant with broom and yellow gorse; the rocky shore mirrored +in the Firth, which stretched, smooth and cool, wide away to the east +and south; and, in the distance, snow-capped Ben Wyvis. Lying off the +entrance to Munlochy Bay, we had a view along the sloping shores into +the interior of Black Isle, of noted fertility. Farther out were Avoch, +a whitewashed fishing village, and the ancient town of Fortrose, with +its ruined twelfth-century cathedral. Across the Firth lay Culloden +House, where Bonnie Prince Charlie slept before the battle. Substantial, +but softened in outline by the morning haze, the Royal Burgh of +Inverness covered the banks and heights along the Ness River, gleaming +in the bright sunshine. And how peaceful everywhere! The _Canandaigua_ +and the _Sonoma_ lay near by, the _Canonicus_ farther out, but no +movement, no signal, no beat of the engine, no throbbing pumps." The +reception which the natives gave our men was as delightful as the +natural beauty of the location. For miles around the Scots turned out to +make things pleasant for their Yankee guests. The American naval forces +stationed at the mining bases in those two towns numbered about 3,000 +officers and men, and the task of providing relaxations, in the heart of +the Highlands, far removed from theatres and moving-picture houses, +would have been a serious one had it not been for the cordial +co-operation of the people. The spirit manifested during our entire stay +was evidenced on the Fourth of July, when all the shops and business +places closed in honour of American Independence Day and the whole +community for miles around joined our sailors in the celebration. The +officers spent such periods of relaxation as were permitted them on the +excellent golf links and tennis courts in the adjoining country; dances +were provided for the men, almost every evening, the Scottish lassies +showing great adaptability in learning the American steps. Amateur +theatricals, in which both the men from the warships and the Scottish +girls took part, cheered many a crew after its return from the +mine-fields. Baseball was introduced for the first time into the country +of William Wallace and Robert Burns. Great crowds gathered to witness +the matches between the several ships; the Scots quickly learned the +fine points and really developed into "fans," while the small boys of +Inverness and Invergordon were soon playing the game with as much +enthusiasm and cleverness as our own youngsters at home. In general, the +behaviour of our men was excellent and made the most favourable +impression. + +These two mine-assembly bases at Inverness and Invergordon will ever +remain a monumental tribute to the loyal and energetic devotion to duty +of Captain Orin G. Murfin, U.S. Navy, who designed and built them; +originally the bases were intended to handle 12,000 mines, but in +reality Captain Murfin successfully handled as many as 20,000 at one +time. It was here also that each secret firing device was assembled and +installed, very largely by reserve personnel. As many as 1,200 mines +were assembled in one day, which speaks very eloquently for the +foresight with which Captain Murfin planned his bases. + + +III + +But of course baseball and dancing were not the serious business in +hand; these Americans had come this long distance to do their part in +laying the mighty barrage which was to add one more serious obstacle to +the illegal German submarine campaign. Though the operation was a joint +one of the American and British navies, our part was much the larger. +The proposal was to construct this explosive impediment from the Orkney +Islands to the coast of Norway, in the vicinity of Udsire Light, a +distance of about 230 nautical miles. Of this great area about 150 +miles, extending from the Orkneys to 3 degrees east longitude, was the +American field, and the eastern section, which extended fifty nautical +miles to Norway, was taken over by the British. Since an operation of +this magnitude required the supervision of an officer of high rank, +Rear-Admiral Joseph Strauss, who had extended experience in the ordnance +field of the navy, came over in March, 1918, and took command. The +British commander was Rear-Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N. + +The mines were laid in a series of thirteen expeditions, or +"excursions," as our men somewhat cheerfully called them. The ten +mine-layers participated in each "excursion," all ten together laying +about 5,400 mines at every trip. Each trip to the field of action was +practically a duplicate of the others; a description of one will, +therefore, serve for all. After days, and sometimes after weeks of +preparation the squadron, usually on a dark and misty night, showing no +lights or signals, would weigh anchor, slip by the rocky palisades of +Moray Firth, and stealthily creep out to sea. As the ships passed +through the nets and other obstructions and reached open waters, the +speed increased, the gunners took their stations at their batteries, and +suddenly from a dark horizon came a glow of low, rapidly moving vessels; +these were the British destroyers from the Grand Fleet which had been +sent to escort the expedition and protect it from submarines. The +absolute silence of the whole proceeding was impressive; not one of the +destroyers showed a signal or a light; not one of the mine-layers gave +the slightest sign of recognition; all these details had been arranged +in advance, and everything now worked with complete precision. The +swishing of the water on the sides and the slow churning of the +propellers were the only sounds that could possibly betray the ships to +their hidden enemies. After the ships had steamed a few more miles the +dawn began to break; and now a still more inspiring sight met our men. A +squadron of battleships, with scout cruisers and destroyers, suddenly +appeared over the horizon. This fine force likewise swept on, apparently +paying not the slightest attention to our vessels. They steamed steadily +southward, and in an hour or so had entirely disappeared. The observer +would hardly have guessed that this squadron from Admiral Beatty's fleet +at Scapa Flow had anything to do with the American and British +mine-layers. Its business, however, was to establish a wall of steel and +shotted guns between these forces and the German battle fleet at Kiel. +At one time it was believed that the mine forces on the northern barrage +would prove a tempting bait to the German dreadnoughts; and that, +indeed, it might induce the enemy to risk a second general engagement on +the high seas. At any rate, a fleet of converted excursion steamers, +laying mines in the North Sea, could hardly be left exposed to the +attacks of German raiders; our men had the satisfaction of knowing that +while engaged in their engrossing if unenviable task a squadron of +British or American battleships--for Admiral Rodman's forces took their +regular turn in acting as a "screen" in these excursions--was standing a +considerable distance to the south, prepared to make things lively for +any German surface vessels which attempted to interfere with the +operation. + +Now in the open seas the ten mine-layers formed in two columns, abreast +of each other and five hundred yards apart, and started for the waters +of the barrage. Twelve destroyers surrounded them, on the lookout for +submarines, for the ships were now in the track of the U-boats bound for +their hunting ground or returning to their home ports. At a flash from +the flagship all slackened speed, and put out their paravanes--those +under-water outrigger affairs which protected the ships from mines; for +it was not at all unlikely that the Germans would place some of their +own mines in this field, for the benefit of the barrage builders. This +operation took only a few minutes; then another flash, and the squadron +again increased its speed. It steamed the distance across the North Sea +to Udsire Light, then turned west again and headed for that mathematical +spot on the ocean which was known as the "start point"--the place, that +is, where the mine-laying was to begin. In carrying out all these +manoeuvres--sighting the light on the Norwegian coast--the commander +was thinking, not only of the present, but of the future; for the time +would come, after the war had ended, when it would be necessary to +remove all these mines, and it was therefore wise to "fix" them as +accurately as possible in reference to landmarks, so as to know where to +look for them. All this time the men were at their stations, examining +the mines to see that everything was ready, testing the laying +mechanisms, and mentally rehearsing their duties. At about four o'clock +an important signal came from the flagship: + +"Have everything ready, for the squadron will reach 'start point' in an +hour and mine-laying will begin." + +Up to this time the ships were sailing in two columns; when they came +within seven miles of "start point," another signal was broken out; the +ships all wheeled like a company of soldiers, each turning sharply to +the right, so that in a few minutes, instead of two columns, we had +eight ships in line abreast, with the remaining two, also in line +abreast, sailing ahead of them. This splendid array, keeping perfect +position, approached the starting point like a line of racehorses +passing under the wire. Not a ship was off this line by so much as a +quarter length; the whole atmosphere was one of eagerness; the officers +all had their eyes fixed upon the stern of the flagship, for the glimpse +of the red flag which would be the signal to begin. Suddenly the flag +was hauled down, indicating: + +"First mine over." + +If you had been following one of these ships, you would probably have +been surprised at the apparent simplicity of the task. The vessel was +going at its full speed; at intervals of a few seconds a huge black +object, about five feet high, would be observed gliding toward the +stern; at this point it would pause for a second or two, as though +suspended in air; it would then give a mighty lurch, fall head first +into the water, sending up a great splash, and then sink beneath the +waves. By the time the disturbance was over the ship would have advanced +a considerable distance; then, in a few seconds, another black object +would roll toward the stern, make a similar plunge, and disappear. You +might have followed the same ship for two or three hours, watching these +mines fall overboard at intervals of about fifteen seconds. There were +four planters, each of which could and did on several trips lay about +860 mines in three hours and thirty-five minutes, in a single line about +forty-four miles long. These were the _Canandaigua_, the _Canonicus_, +the _Housatonic_, and the _Roanoke_. Occasionally the monotony of this +procedure would be enlivened by a terrible explosion, a great geyser of +water rising where a mine had only recently disappeared; this meant that +the "egg," as the sailors called it, had gone off spontaneously, without +the assistance of any external contact; such accidents were part of the +game, the records showing that about 4 per cent. of all the mines +indulged in such initial premature explosions. For the most part, +however, nothing happened to disturb the steady mechanical routine. The +mines went over with such regularity that, to an observer, the whole +proceeding seemed hardly the work of human agency. Yet every detail had +been arranged months before in the United States; the mines fell into +the sea in accordance with a time-table which had been prepared in +Newport before the vessels started for Scotland. Every man on the ship +had a particular duty to perform and each performed it in the way in +which he had been schooled under the direction of Captain Belknap. + +The spherical mine case, which contains the explosive charge and the +mechanism for igniting it, is only a part of the contrivance. While at +rest on board the ship this case stands upon a box-like affair, about +two feet square, known as the anchor; this anchor sinks to the bottom +after launching and it contains an elaborate arrangement for maintaining +the mine at any desired depth beneath the surface. The bottom of the +"anchor" has four wheels, on which it runs along the little railroad +track on the launching deck to the jumping-off place at the stern. All +along these railroad tracks the mines were stationed one back of +another; as one went overboard, they would all advance a peg, a mine +coming up from below on an elevator to fill up the vacant space at the +end of the procession. It took a crew of hard-working, begrimed, and +sweaty men to keep these mines moving and going over the stern at the +regularly appointed intervals. After three or four hours had been spent +in this way and the ships had started back to their base, the decks +would sometimes be covered with the sleeping figures of these exhausted +men. It would be impossible to speak too appreciatively of the spirit +they displayed; in the whole summer there was not a single mishap of any +importance. The men all felt that they were engaged in a task which had +never been accomplished before, and their exhilaration increased with +almost every mine that was laid. "Nails in the coffin of the Kaiser," +the men called these grim instruments of vengeance. + + +IV + +I have described one of these thirteen summer excursions, and the +description given could be applied to all the rest. Once or twice the +periscope of a submarine was sighted--without any disastrous +results--but in the main this business of mine-laying was uneventful. +Just what was accomplished the chart makes clear. In the summer and +autumn months of 1918 the American forces laid 56,571 mines and the +British 13,546. The operation was to have been a continuous one; had the +war gone on for two years we should probably have laid several hundred +thousand; Admiral Strauss's forces kept at the thing steadily up to the +time of the armistice; they had become so expert and the barrage was +producing such excellent results that we had plans nearly completed for +building another at the Strait of Otranto, which would have completely +closed the Adriatic Sea. Besides this undertaking the American +mine-layer _Baltimore_ laid a mine-field in the North Irish Channel, the +narrow waters which separate Scotland and Ireland; two German submarines +which soon afterward attempted this passage were blown to pieces, and +after this the mine-field was given a wide berth. + +Just what the North Sea barrage accomplished, in the actual destruction +of submarines, will never be definitely known. We have information that +four certainly were destroyed, and in all probability six and possibly +eight; yet these results doubtless measure only a small part of the +German losses. In the majority of cases the Germans had little or no +evidence of sunken submarines. The destroyers, subchasers, and other +patrol boats were usually able to obtain some evidences of injury +inflicted; they could often see their quarry, or the disturbances which +it made on the surface; they could pursue and attack it, and the +resultant oil patches, wreckage, and German prisoners--and sometimes the +recovered submarine itself or its location on the bottom--would tell the +story either of damage or destruction. But the disconcerting thing about +the North Sea barrage, from the viewpoint of the Germans, was that it +could do its work so secretly that no one, friend or enemy, would +necessarily know a thing about it. A German submarine simply left its +home port; attempting to cross the barrage, perhaps at night, it would +strike one of these mines, or its antenna; an explosion would crumple it +up like so much paper; with its crew it would sink to the bottom; and +not a soul, perhaps not even the crew itself, would ever know what had +happened to it. It would in truth be a case of "sinking without a +trace"--though an entirely legitimate one under the rules of warfare. +The German records disclosed anywhere from forty to fifty submarines +sunk which did not appear in the records of the Allies; how these were +destroyed not a soul knows, or ever will know. They simply left their +German ports and were never heard of again. That many of them fell +victims to mines, and some of them to the mines of our barrage, is an +entirely justifiable assumption. That probably even a larger number of +U-boats were injured is also true. A German submarine captain, after the +surrender at Scapa Flow, said that he personally knew of three +submarines, including his own, which had been so badly injured at the +barrage that they had been compelled to limp back to their German ports. + +The results other than the sinking of submarines were exceedingly +important in bringing the war to an end. It was the failure of the +submarine campaign which defeated the German hopes and forced their +surrender; and in this defeat the barrage was an important element. +That submarines frequently crossed it is true; there was no expectation, +when the enterprise was started, that it would absolutely shut the +U-boats in the North Sea; but its influence in breaking down the German +_moral_ must have been great. To understand this, just place yourself +for a moment in the position of a submarine crew. The width of this +barrage ranged from fifteen to thirty-five miles; it took from one to +three hours for a submarine to cross this area on the surface and from +two to six hours under the surface. Not every square foot, it is true, +had been mined; there were certain gaps caused by the spontaneous +explosions to which I have referred; but nobody knew where these +openings were, or where a single mine was located. The officers and +crews knew only that at any moment an explosion might send them to +eternity. A strain of this sort is serious enough if it lasts only a few +minutes; imagine being kept in this state of mind anywhere from one to +six hours! Submarine prisoners constantly told us how they dreaded the +mines; going through such a field, I suppose, was about the most +disagreeable experience in this nerve-racking service. Our North Sea +barrage began to show results almost immediately after our first +planting. The German officers evidently kept informed of our progress +and had a general idea of the territory which had been covered. For a +considerable time a passage-way, sixty miles wide, was kept open for the +Grand Fleet just east of the Orkney Islands; the result was that the +submarines, which had hitherto usually skirted the Norwegian coast, now +changed their route, and attempted to slip through the western +passage-way--a course that enabled them to avoid the mine-field. When +the entire distance from the Orkneys to Norway had been mined, however, +it became impossible to "run around the end." The Germans were now +obliged to sail boldly into this explosive field, taking their chances +of hitting a mine. Stories of this barrage were circulated all over +Germany; sailors who had been in contact with it related their +experiences to their fellows; and the result was extremely demoralizing +to the German submarine flotilla. The North Sea barrage was probably a +contributory cause of the mutiny which demoralized the German fleet in +the autumn of 1918. + +I think I am therefore justified in saying that this enterprise was a +strong factor in overcoming the submarine menace, though the success of +the convoy system had already brought the end in sight, and had thus +made it practicable to assign, without danger of defeat, the tonnage +necessary to lay the barrage and maintain and augment it as long as +might be necessary. The Germans saw the barrage not only as it was in +the autumn of 1918, but as it would be a few months or a year hence. We +had started a steady stream of mines from hundreds of factories in the +United States to our Scottish bases; these establishments were +constantly increasing production, and there was practically no limit to +their possible output. We had developed a mine-laying organization which +was admittedly better than any that had been hitherto known; and this +branch of the service we could now enlarge indefinitely. In time we +could have planted this area so densely with explosives that it would +have been madness for any submarines even to attempt a passage. To be +sure, the Pentland Firth, between the Orkneys and Scotland, was always +open, and could not be mined on account of its swift tides, but besides +being a dangerous passage at best it was constantly patrolled to make it +still more dangerous. + +The loyal devotion to duty and the skilful seamanship which our officers +displayed in this great enterprise were not only thoroughly in keeping +with the highest traditions of the navy, but really established new +standards to guide and inspire those who will follow us. These gallant +officers who actually laid the mines are entitled to the nation's +gratitude, and I take great pleasure in commending the work of Captain +H. V. Butler, commanding the flagship _San Francisco_; Captain J. Harvey +Tomb, commanding the _Aroostook_; Captain A. W. Marshall, commanding the +_Baltimore_; Commander W. H. Reynolds, commanding the _Canandaigua_; +Captain T. L. Johnson, commanding the _Canonicus_; Captain J. W. +Greenslade, commanding the _Housatonic_; Commander D. Pratt Mannix, +commanding the _Quinnebaug_; Captain C. D. Stearns, commanding the +_Roanoke_; Captain Sinclair Gannon, commanding the _Saranac_; and +Captain W. T. Cluverius, commanding the _Shawmut_. + +This splendid squadron, of which the flagship was the _San Francisco_, +was organized by Captain R. R. Belknap and, by order of the Secretary +of the Navy, was placed under his direct command; and he was therefore +responsible for all preparations, tactics, general instructions, special +instructions for each mine-laying "excursion," the intricate navigation +required, and in fact all arrangements necessary for the successful +planting of the mines in their assigned positions. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[7] Complete statistics of shipping losses, new ship construction for +1917 and 1918, will be found in Appendices VIII and IX. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +GERMAN SUBMARINES VISIT THE AMERICAN COAST + + +It was in the summer of 1918 that the Germans made their only attempt at +what might be called an offensive against their American enemies. +Between the beginning of May and the end of October, 1918, five German +submarines crossed the Atlantic and torpedoed a few ships on our coast. +That submarines could make this long journey had long been known. +Singularly enough, however, the impression still prevails in this +country that the German U-boats were the first to accomplish the feat. +In the early autumn of 1916 the _U-53_--commanded by that submarine +officer, Hans Rose, who has been previously mentioned in these +pages--crossed the Atlantic, dropped in for a call at Newport, R.I., +and, on the way back, sank a few merchant vessels off Nantucket. A few +months previous the so-called merchant submarine _Deutschland_ had made +its trip to Newport News. The Teutonic press, and even some +Germanophiles in this country, hailed these achievements as marking a +glorious page in the record of the German navy. Doubtless the real +purpose was to show the American people how easily these destructive +vessels could cross the Atlantic; and to impress upon their minds the +fate which awaited them in case they maintained their rights against the +Prussian bully. As a matter of fact, it had been proved, long before the +_Deutschland_ or the _U-53_ had made their voyages, that submarines +could cross the Atlantic. In 1915, not one but ten submarines had gone +from North America to Europe under their own power. Admiral Sir John +Fisher tells about this expedition in his recently published memoirs. In +1914, the British Admiralty had contracted for submarines with Charles M. +Schwab, president of the Bethlehem Steel Company. As international +law prohibited the construction of war vessels by a nation in wartime +for the use of a belligerent with which it was at peace, the parts of +ten submarines were sent to Canada, where they were put together. These +submarines then crossed the Atlantic under their own power, and were +sent from British ports to the Dardanelles, where they succeeded in +driving Turkish and German shipping out of the Sea of Marmora. Thus a +crossing of the Atlantic by American-built submarines manned by British +crews had been accomplished before the Germans made their voyages. It +was therefore not necessary for the two German submarines to cross the +Atlantic to prove that the thing could be done; but the Germans +doubtless believed that this demonstration of their ability to operate +on the American coast would serve as a warning to the American people. + +We were never at all deceived as to what would be the purpose of such a +visit after our entrance into the war. In the early part of 1917 the +Allies believed that a few German U-boats might assail our coast, and I +so informed the Navy Department at Washington. My cables and letters of +1917 explained fully the reasons why Germany might indulge in such a +gesture. Strategically, as these despatches make clear, such attacks +would have no great military value. To have sent a sufficient number of +submarines to do any considerable damage on the American coast would +have been a great mistake. Germany's one chance of winning the war with +the submarine weapon was to destroy shipping to such an extent that the +communications of the Allies with the outside world, and especially with +the United States, would be cut. The only places where the submarine +warfare could be conducted with some chance of success were the ocean +passage routes which lead to European ports, especially in that area +south and south-west of Ireland in which were focussed the trade routes +for ships sailing from all parts of the world and destined for British +and French ports. With the number of submarines available, the Germans +could keep enough of their U-boats at work in these areas to destroy a +large number of merchant ships. Germany thus needed to concentrate all +of her available submarines at these points; she had an inadequate +number for her purpose; to send any considerable force three thousand +miles across the Atlantic would simply weaken her efforts in the real +scene of warfare and would make her submarine campaign a failure. The +cruises of submarines on the American coast would have been very much +longer and would have been a much more serious strain on the submarines +than were the shorter cruises in the inshore waters of Europe. As has +already been explained, the submarine did not differ from other craft in +its need for constant repairs and careful upkeep, except that perhaps it +was a more delicate instrument of warfare than any other naval craft, +and that it would require longer and more frequent periods of overhaul. +Any operations carried out three thousand miles from their bases, where +alone supplies, spare parts, and repair facilities were available, would +have soon reduced the submarine campaign to comparative uselessness; +each voyage would have resulted in sinking a relatively small amount of +shipping; a great number of submarines would be out of commission at all +times for repairs, or would be lost through accidents. The Germans had +no submarine bases in American waters and could establish none. +Possibly, as the newspaper writer has pointed out, they might have +seized a deserted island off the coast of Maine or in the Caribbean, and +cached there a reservoir of fuel and food; unless, however, they could +also have created at these places adequate facilities for repairing +submarines or supplying them with torpedoes and ammunition, such a place +would not have served the purpose of a base at all. Comparatively few of +the German submarines could have made the cruise to the American coast +and operated successfully there so far away from their bases for any +considerable time. In the time spent in such an enterprise, the same +submarine could make three or four trips in the waters about the British +Isles, or off the coast of France, and could sink four or five times the +tonnage which could be destroyed in the cruise on the Atlantic coast. In +the eastern Atlantic, the submarine could seek its victims in an area +comprising a comparatively few square miles, at points where shipping +was so dense that a submarine had only to take a station and lie in +wait, and be certain, within a short time, of encountering valuable +ships which it could attack successfully with its torpedoes. If the +U-boats should be sent to America, on the other hand, they would have to +patrol up and down three thousand miles of coast, looking for victims; +and even when they found them the ships that they could sink would +usually be those engaged in the coastwise traffic, which were of +infinitely less military importance than the transports which were +carrying food, munitions, and supplies to the Allies and which were +being sunk in the eastern Atlantic. + +Anything resembling an attack in force on American harbours was +therefore improbable. Yet it seemed likely from the first that the +Germans would send an occasional submarine into our waters, as a measure +of propaganda rather than for the direct military result that would be +achieved. American destroyers and other vessels were essential to the +success of the whole anti-submarine campaign of the Allies. The sooner +they could all be sent into the critical European waters the sooner the +German campaign of terrorism would end. If these destroyers, or any +considerable part of them, could be kept indefinitely in American +waters, the Germans might win the war. Any manoeuvre which would have +as its result the keeping of these American vessels, so indispensable to +the Allies, out of the field of active warfare, would thus be more than +justified and, indeed, would indicate the highest wisdom on the part of +the German navy. The Napoleonic principle of dividing your enemy's +forces is just as valuable in naval as in land warfare. For many years +Admiral Mahan had been instructing American naval officers that the +first rule in warfare is not to divide your fighting forces, but always +to keep them together, so as to bring the whole weight at a given moment +against your adversary. Two of the fundamental principles of the science +of warfare, on land and sea alike, are contained in the maxims: Keep +your own forces concentrated, and always endeavour to divide those of +the enemy. Undoubtedly, the best method which Germany could use to keep +our destroyers in our own waters would be to make the American people +believe that their lives and property were in danger; they might +accomplish this by sending a submarine to attack our shipping off New +York and Boston and other Atlantic seaports, and possibly even to +bombard our harbours. The Germans doubtless believed that they might +create such alarm and arouse such public clamour in the United States +that our destroyers and other anti-submarine craft would be kept over +here by the Navy Department, in response to the popular agitation to +protect our own coast. This is the reason why American headquarters in +London, and the Allied admiralties, expected such a visitation. The +Germans obviously endeavoured to create the impression that such an +attack was likely to occur at any time. This was part of their war +propaganda. The press was full of reports that such attacks were about +to be made. German agents were continually circulating these reports. + +Of course it was clear from the first, to the heads of the Allied navies +and to all naval authorities who were informed about the actual +conditions, that these attacks by German submarines on the American +coast would be in the nature of raids for moral effect only. It was also +quite clear from the first, as I pointed out in my despatches to the +Navy Department, that the best place to defend our coast was in the +critical submarine areas in the European Atlantic, through which the +submarines had to pass in setting out for our coast, and in which alone +they could have any hope of succeeding in the military object of the +undersea campaign. It was not necessary to keep our destroyers in +American waters, patrolling the vast expanse of our three thousand miles +of coastline, in a futile effort to find and destroy such enemy +submarines as might operate on the American coast. So long as these +attacks were only sporadic--and carried out by the type of submarine +which used its guns almost exclusively in sinking ships, and which +selected for its victims unarmed and unprotected ships--destroyers and +other anti-submarine craft would be of no possible use on the Atlantic +coast. The submarine could see these craft from a much greater distance +than it could itself be seen by them; and by diving and sailing +submerged it could easily avoid them and sink its victims without ever +being sighted or attacked by our own patrols, however numerous they +might have been. Even in the narrow waters of the English Channel, up to +the very end of the war, submarines were successfully attacking small +merchant craft by gunfire, although the density of patrol craft in this +area was naturally a thousand times greater than we could ever have +provided for the vast expanse of our own coast. Consequently, so long as +the submarine attacks on the American coast were only sporadic, it was +absolutely futile to maintain patrol craft in those waters, as this +could not provide any adequate defence against such scattered +demonstrations. If, on the other hand, the Germans had ever decided to +commit the military mistake of concentrating a considerable number of +submarines off our Atlantic ports, we could always have countered such +a step by sending back from the war zone an adequate number of craft to +protect convoys in and out of the Atlantic ports, in the same manner +that convoys were protected in the submarine danger zone in European +waters. This is a fact which even many naval men did not seem to grasp. +Yet I have already explained that we knew practically where every German +submarine was at any given time. We knew whenever one left a German +port; and we kept track of it day by day until it returned home. No +U-boat ever made a voyage across the Atlantic without our knowledge. The +submarine was a slow traveller, and required a minimum of thirty days +for such a trip; normally, the time would be much longer, for a +submarine on such a long voyage had to economize oil fuel for the return +trip and therefore seldom cruised at more than five knots an hour. Our +destroyers and anti-submarine craft, on the other hand, could easily +cross the Atlantic in ten days and refuel in their home ports. It is +therefore apparent that a flotilla of destroyers stationed in European +waters could protect the American coast from submarines almost as +successfully as if it were stationed at Hampton Roads or Newport. Such a +flotilla would be of no use at these American stations unless there were +submarines attacking shipping off the coast; but as soon as the Germans +started for America--a fact of which we could always be informed, and of +which, as I shall explain, we always were informed--we could send our +destroyers in advance of them. These agile vessels would reach home +waters about three weeks before the submarines arrived; they would thus +have plenty of time to refit and to welcome the uninvited guests. From +any conceivable point of view, therefore, there was no excuse for +keeping destroyers on the American side of the Atlantic for "home +defence." Moreover, the fact that we could keep this close track of +submarines in itself formed a great protection against them. I have +already explained how we routed convoys entering European waters in such +ways that they could sail around the U-boat and thus escape contact. I +think that this simple procedure saved more shipping than any other +method. In the same way we could keep these vessels sailing from +American ports outside of the area in which the submarines were known to +be operating in our own waters. + +Yet the enemy sent no submarines to our coast in 1917; why they did not +do so may seem difficult to understand, for that was just the period +when a campaign of this kind might have served their purpose. During +this time, however, we had repeated indications that the Germans did not +take the American entrance into the war very seriously; moreover, +looking forward to conditions after the peace, they perhaps hoped that +they might soon be able once again to establish friendly relations. In +1917 they therefore refrained from any acts which might arouse popular +hatred against them. We had more than one indication of this attitude. +Early in the summer of 1917 we obtained from one of the captured German +submarines a set of the orders issued to it by the German Admiralty +Staff. Among these was one dated May 8, 1917, in which the submarine +commanders were informed that Germany had not declared war upon the +United States, and that, until further instructions were received, the +submarines were to continue to look upon America and American shipping +as neutral. The submarine commanders were especially warned against +attacking or committing any overt act against such American war vessels +as might be encountered in European waters. The orders explained that no +official confirmation had been received by the German Government of the +news which had been published in the press that America had declared +war, and that, therefore, the Germans, officially, were ignoring our +belligerence. From their own standpoint such a policy of endeavouring +not to offend America, even after she became an enemy, may have seemed +politically wise; from a military point of view, their failure to +attempt the submarine demonstration off our coast in 1917 was a great +mistake; for when they finally started warfare on our coast, the United +States was deeply involved in hostilities, and had already begun the +transportation of the great army which produced such decisive results on +the Western Front. The time had passed, as experience soon showed, when +any demonstration on our coast would disturb the calm of the American +people or affect their will to victory. + +In late April, 1918, I learned through secret-service channels that one +of the large submarines of the _Deutschland_ class had left its German +base on the 19th of April for a long cruise. On the 1st of May, 1918, I +therefore cabled to the Department that there were indications that this +submarine was bound for our own coast. A few days afterward I received +more specific information, through the interception of radio despatches +between Germany and the submarine; and therefore I cabled the +Department, this time informing them that the submarine was the _U-151_, +that it was now well on its way across the Atlantic, and that it could +be expected to begin operations off the American coast any time after +May 20th. I gave a complete description of the vessel, the probable +nature of her cruise, and her essential military characteristics. She +carried a supply of mines, and I therefore invited the attention of the +Department to the fact that the favourite areas for laying mines were +those places where the ships stopped to pick up pilots. Since at +Delaware Bay pilots for large ships were taken on just south of the Five +Fathom Bank Light, I suggested that it was not unlikely that the _U-151_ +would attempt to lay mines in that vicinity. Now the fact is that we +knew that the _U-151_ intended to lay mines at this very place. We had +obtained this piece of information from the radio which we had +intercepted; as there was a possibility that our own cable might fall +into German hands, we did not care to give the news in the precise form +in which we had received it, as we did not intend that they should know +that we had means of keeping so accurately informed. As had been +predicted, the _U-151_ proceeded directly to the vicinity of this Five +Fathom Bank off Delaware Bay, laid her mines, and then, cruising +northward up the coast, began her demonstration on the 25th of May by +sinking two small wooden schooners. These had no radio apparatus, and it +was not until June 2nd that the Navy Department and the country received +the news that the first submarine was operating. On June 29th I informed +Washington that another U-boat was then coming down the west coast of +Ireland, bound for the United States, and that it would arrive some time +after July 15th. Complete reports of this vessel were sent from day to +day, as it made its slow progress across the ocean. On July 6th I cabled +that still another U-boat had started for our coast; and the progress of +this adventurer, with all details as to its character and probable area +of operations, were also forwarded regularly. From the end of May until +October there was nearly always one submarine operating off our coast. +The largest number active at any one time was in August, when for a week +or ten days three were more or less active in attacking coastwise +vessels. These three operated all the way from Cape Hatteras to +Newfoundland, attempting by these tactics to create the impression that +dozens of hostile U-boats were preying upon our commerce and threatening +our shores. These submarines, however, attacked almost exclusively +sailing vessels and small coastwise steamers, rarely, if ever, using +torpedoes. A number of mines were laid at different points off our +ports, on what the Germans believed to be the traffic routes; but the +information which we had concerning them made it possible to counter +successfully their efforts and, from a military point of view, the whole +of the submarine operations off our coast can be dismissed as one of the +minor incidents of the war, as the Secretary of the Navy described it in +his Annual Report. The five submarines sunk in all approximately 110,000 +tons of shipping, but the vessels were, for the most part, small and of +no great military importance. The only real victory was the destruction +of the cruiser _San Diego_, which was sunk by a mine which had been laid +by the _U-156_ off Fire Island. + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +FIGHTING SUBMARINES FROM THE AIR + + +The Allied navies were harrowing the submarines not only under the water +and on the surface, but from the air. In the anti-submarine campaign the +several forms of aircraft--airplane, seaplane, dirigible, and kite +balloon--developed great offensive power. Nor did the fact that our +fighters in the heavens made few direct attacks which were successful +diminish the importance of their work. The records of the British +Admiralty attribute the destruction of five submarines to the British +air service; the French Admiralty gives the American forces credit for +destroying one on the French coast. These achievements, compared with +the tremendous efforts involved in equipping air stations, may at first +look like an inconsiderable return; yet the fact remains that aircraft +were an important element in defeating the German campaign against +merchant shipping. + +Like the subchaser and the submarine, the seaplane operated most +successfully in coastal waters. I have already indicated that one +advantage of the convoy system was that it forced the U-boats to seek +their victims closer to the shore. In our several forms of aircraft we +had still another method of interfering with their operation in such +quarters. In order to use these agencies effectively we constructed +aircraft stations in large numbers along the coast of France and the +British Isles, assigned a certain stretch of coastline to each one of +these stations, and kept the indicated area constantly patrolled. The +advantages which were possessed by a fleet of aircraft operating at a +considerable height above the water are at once apparent. The great +speed of seaplanes in itself transformed them into formidable foes. The +submarine on the surface could make a maximum of only 16 knots an hour, +whereas an airplane made anywhere from 60 to 100; it therefore had +little difficulty, once it had sighted the under-water boat, in catching +up with it and starting hostilities. Its great speed also made it +possible for an airplane or dirigible to patrol a much greater area of +water than a surface or a subsurface vessel. An observer located several +hundred feet in the heavens could see the submarine much more easily +than could his comrades on other craft. If the water were clear he could +at once detect it, even though it were submerged; in any event, merely +lifting a man in the air greatly extended his horizon, and made it +possible for him to pick up hostile vessels at a much greater distance. +Moreover, the airplane had that same advantage upon which I have laid +such emphasis in describing the anti-submarine powers of the submarine +itself: that is, it was almost invisible to its under-water foe. If the +U-boat were lying on the surface, a seaplane or a dirigible was readily +seen; but if it were submerged entirely, or even sailing at periscope +depth, the most conspicuous enemy in the heavens was invisible. After +our submarines and our aircraft had settled down to their business of +extermination, existence for those Germans who were operating in coastal +waters became extremely hazardous and nerve-racking; their chief anxiety +was no longer the depth bomb of a destroyer; they lived every moment in +the face of hidden terrors; they never knew when a torpedo would explode +into their vitals, or when an unseen bomb, dropped from the heavens, +would fall upon their fragile decks. + +I have said that the destructive achievements of aircraft figure only +moderately in the statistics of the war; this was because the greater +part of their most valuable work was done in co-operation with war +vessels. Aircraft in the Navy performed a service not unlike that which +it performed in the Army. We are all familiar with the picture of +airplanes sailing over the field of battle, obtaining information which +was wirelessed back to their own forces, "spotting" artillery positions, +and giving ranges. The seaplanes and dirigibles of the Allied navies +performed a similar service on the ocean. To a considerable extent they +became the "eyes" of the destroyers and other surface craft, just as the +airplanes on the land became the "eyes" of the army. As part of their +equipment all the dirigibles had wireless telegraph and wireless +telephone; as soon as a submarine was "spotted," the news was +immediately flashed broadcast, and every offensive warship which was +anywhere in the neighbourhood, as well as the airplane itself, started +for the indicated scene. There are several cases in which the sinking of +submarines by destroyers was attributed to information wirelessed in +this fashion by American aircraft; and since the air service of the +British navy was many times greater than our own, there are many more +such "indirect sinkings" credited to the British effort. + +The following citation, which I submitted to the Navy Department in +recommending Lieutenant John J. Schieffelin for the Distinguished +Service Medal, illustrates this co-operation between air and surface +craft: + + This officer performed many hazardous reconnaissance flights, and + on July 9th, 1918, he attacked an enemy submarine with bombs and + then directed the British destroyers to the spot, which were + successful in seriously damaging the submarine. Again, on July + 19th, 1918, Lieutenant Schieffelin dropped bombs on another enemy + submarine, and then signalled trawlers to the spot, which delivered + a determined attack against the submarine, which attack was + considered highly successful and the submarine seriously damaged, + if not destroyed. This officer was at all times an example of + courageous loyalty. + +Besides scouting and "spotting" and bombing, the aerial hunters of the +submarine developed great value in escorting convoys. A few dirigibles, +located on the flanks of a convoy, protected them almost as effectively +as the destroyers themselves; and even a single airship not infrequently +brought a group of merchantmen and troopships safely into port. +Sometimes the airships operated in this way as auxiliaries to +destroyers, while sometimes they operated alone. In applying this +mechanism of protection to merchant convoys, we were simply adopting the +method which Great Britain had been using for three years in the narrow +passages of the English Channel. Much has been said of the skill with +which the British navy transported about 20,000,000 souls back and forth +between England and France in four years; and in this great movement +seaplanes, dirigibles, and other forms of aircraft played an important +part. In the same way this scheme of protection was found valuable with +the coastal convoys, particularly with the convoys which sailed from one +French port to another, and from British ports to places in Ireland, +Holland, or Scandinavia. I have described the dangers in which these +ships were involved owing to the fact that the groups were obliged to +break up after entering the Channel and the Irish Sea, and thus to +proceed singly to their destinations. Aircraft improved this situation +to a considerable extent, for they could often go to sea, pick up the +ships, and bring them safely home. The circumstance that our seaplanes, +perched high in the air, could see the submarine long before they had +reached torpedoing distance, and could, if necessary, signal to a +destroyer for assistance, made them exceedingly valuable for this kind +of work. + +Early in 1918, at the request of the British Government, we took over a +large seaplane base which had been established by the British at +Killingholme, England, a little sea-coast town at the mouth of the +Humber River. According to the original plan we intended to co-operate +from this point with the British in a joint expedition against enemy +naval bases, employing for this purpose especially constructed towing +lighters, upon which seaplanes were to be towed by destroyers to within +a short flying distance of their objectives. Although this project was +never carried out, Killingholme, because of its geographical location, +became a very important base for seaplanes used in escorting mercantile +convoys to and from Scandinavian ports, patrolling mine-fields while on +the lookout for enemy submarines and making those all-important +reconnaissance flights over the North Sea which were intended to give +advanced warning of any activity of the German High Seas Fleet. These +flights lasted usually from six to eight hours; the record was made by +Ensigns S. C. Kennedy and C. H. Weatherhead, U.S.N., who flew for nine +hours continuously on convoy escort duty. For a routine patrol, this +compares very favourably indeed with the flight of the now famous +trans-Atlantic _NC-4_. + +I can no better describe the splendid work of these enthusiastic and +courageous young Americans than by quoting a few extracts from a report +which was submitted to me by Ensign K. B. Keyes, of a reconnaissance +flight in which he took part, while attached temporarily to a British +seaplane station under post-graduate instruction. The picture given by +Ensign Keyes is typical of the flights which our boys were constantly +making: + + On June 4, 1918, we received orders to carry out a reconnaissance + and hostile aircraft patrol over the North Sea and along the coast + of Holland. It was a perfect day for such work, for the visibility + was extremely good, with a light wind of fifteen knots and clouds + at the high altitude of about eight or ten thousand feet. + + Our three machines from Felixstowe rose from the water at twelve + o'clock, circled into patrol formation, and proceeded north-east by + north along the coast to Yarmouth. Here we were joined by two more + planes, but not without some trouble and slight delay because of a + broken petrol pipe which was subsequently repaired in the air. We + again circled into formation, Capt. Leckie, D.S.O., of Yarmouth, + taking his position as leader of the squadron. + + At one o'clock the squadron proceeded east, our machine, being in + the first division, flew at 1,500 feet and at about half a mile in + the rear of Capt. Leckie's machine, but keeping him on our + starboard quarter. + + We sighted nothing at all until about half-past two, when the Haaks + Light Vessel slowly rose on the horizon, but near this mark and + considerably more to the south we discovered a large fleet of Dutch + fishing smacks. This fleet consisted of more than a hundred smacks. + + Ten minutes later we sighted the Dutch coast, where we changed our + course more to the north-east. We followed the sandy beaches of the + islands of Texel and Vlieland until we came to Terschelling. In + following the coast of Vlieland we were close enough to distinguish + houses on the inside of the island and even to make out breakers + rolling up on the sandy beach. + + At Terschelling we proceeded west in accordance with our orders, + but soon had to turn back because of Capt. Leckie's machine which + had fallen out of formation and come to the water. This machine + landed at three fifteen and we continued to circle around it, + finding that the trouble was with a badly broken petrol pipe, until + about fifteen minutes later, when we sighted five German planes + steering west, a direction which would soon bring them upon us. + + At this time Capt. Barker had the wheel, Lt. Galvayne was seated + beside him, but if we met the opposing forces he was to kneel on + the seat with his eyes above the cowl, where he could see all the + enemy planes and direct the pilot in which direction to proceed. I + was in the front cockpit with one gun and four hundred rounds of + ammunition. In the stern cockpit the engineer and wireless ratings + were to handle three guns. + + We at once took battle formation and went forward to meet the + enemy, but here we were considerably surprised to find that when we + were nearly within range they had turned and were running away from + us. At once we gave chase, but soon found that they were much too + fast for us. Our machine had broken out of the formation and, with + nose down, had crept slightly ahead of Capt. Leckie, and we being + the nearest machine to the enemy, I had the satisfaction of trying + out my gun for a number of rounds. It was quite impossible to tell + whether I had registered any hits or not. + + Our purpose in chasing these planes was to keep them away from the + machine on the water which, if we had not been there, would have + been shot to pieces. Finding that it was useless to follow them, as + they could easily keep out of our range, we turned back and very + shortly we were again circling around our machine on the water. + + It was not long before the enemy again came very close, so we gave + chase the second time. This time, instead of five machines as + before, there were only four, and one small scout could be seen + flying in the direction of Borkum. + + It was the fourth time that we went off in pursuit of the enemy + that we suddenly discovered that a large number of hostile planes + were proceeding towards us, not in the air with the other four + planes but very close to the water. There were ten planes in this + first group, but they were joined a few minutes later by five more. + + We swung into battle formation and steered for the middle of the + group. When we were nearly within range four planes on the port + side and five planes on the starboard side rose to our level of + fifteen hundred feet. Two planes passed directly beneath us firing + upward. Firing was incessant from the beginning and the air seemed + blue with tracer smoke. I gave most of my time to the four planes + on our port side, because they were exactly on the same level with + us and seemed to be within good range, that is about two hundred + yards. When we had passed each other I looked around and noticed + that Lt. Galvayne was in a stooping position, with head and one arm + on his seat, the other arm hanging down as if reaching for + something. I had seen him in this position earlier in the day so + thought nothing of it. All this I had seen in the fraction of a + second, for I had to continue firing. A few minutes later I turned + around again and found with a shock that Lt. Galvayne was in the + same position. It was then that the first inkling of the truth + dawned upon me. By bending lower I discovered that his head was + lying in a pool of blood. + + From this time on I have no clear idea of just what our + manoeuvring was, but evidently we put up a running fight steering + east, then circled until suddenly I found our machine had been cut + off from the formation and we were surrounded by seven enemy + seaplanes. + + This time we were steering west or more to the south-west. We + carried on a running fight for ten miles or so until we drove the + seven planes off. During the last few minutes of the fight our + engine had been popping altogether too frequently and soon the + engineer came forward to tell us that the port engine petrol pipe + had broken. + + By this time I had laid out Lt. Galvayne in the wireless cockpit, + cleaned up the second pilot's seat, and taken it myself. + + The engagement had lasted about half an hour, and the closest range + was one hundred yards while the average range was two hundred. The + boat with Ensign Eaton in it landed between the Islands of Texel + and Vlieland, while the other boat, which had not taken any part in + the fight, was last seen two miles off Vlieland and still taxiing + in toward the beach. + + We descended to the water at five forty-five, ten miles north-west + of Vlieland. During the ten minutes we were on the water I loosened + Lt. Galvayne's clothing, made his position somewhat easier, and + felt for his heart which at that time I was quite sure was beating + feebly. + + When we rose from the water and ascended to fifteen hundred feet, + we sighted two planes which later proved to be the two Yarmouth + boats. We picked them up, swung into formation, and laid our course + for Yarmouth. + + At ten minutes to seven we sighted land and twenty minutes after we + were resting on the water in front of Yarmouth slipway. + + We at once summoned medical aid but found that nothing could be + done. The shot had gone through his head, striking the mouth and + coming out behind his ear, tearing a gash of about two inches in + diameter. + + The boat had been more or less riddled, a number of shots tearing + up the top between the front cockpit and the beginning of the cowl. + + The total duration of the flight was seven hours and ten minutes. + +American naval aviation had a romantic beginning; indeed, the +development of our air service from almost nothing to a force which, in +European waters, comprised 2,500 officers and 22,000 men, is one of the +great accomplishments of the war. It was very largely the outcome of +civilian enterprise and civilian public spirit. In describing our +subchasers I have already paid tribute to the splendid qualities of +reserve officers; and our indebtedness to this type of citizen was +equally great in the aviation service. I can pay no further tribute to +American youth than to say that the great aircraft force which was +ultimately assembled in Europe had its beginnings in a small group of +undergraduates at Yale University. In recommending Mr. Trubee Davison +for a Distinguished Service Medal, the commander of our aviation forces +wrote: "This officer was responsible for the organization of the first +Yale aviation unit of twenty-nine aviators who were later enrolled in +the Naval Reserve Flying Corps.... This group of aviators formed the +nucleus of the first Naval Reserve Flying Corps, and, in fact, may be +considered as the nucleus from which the United States Aviation Forces, +Foreign Service, later grew." This group of college boys acted entirely +on their own initiative. While the United States was still at peace, +encouraged only by their own parents and a few friends, they took up the +study of aviation. It was their conviction that the United States would +certainly get into the war, and they selected this branch as the one in +which they could render greatest service to their country. These young +men worked all through the summer of 1916 at Port Washington, Long +Island, learning how to fly: at this time they were an entirely +unofficial body, paying their own expenses. Ultimately the unit +comprised about twenty men; they kept constantly at work, even after +college opened in the fall of 1916, and when war broke out they were +prepared--for they had actually learned to fly. When the submarine +scares disturbed the Atlantic seaboard in the early months of the war +these Yale undergraduates were sent by the department scouting over Long +Island Sound and other places looking for the imaginary Germans. In +February, 1917, Secretary Daniels recognized their work by making +Davison a member of the Committee on Aeronautics; in March practically +every member of the unit was enrolled in the aviation service; and their +names appear among the first one hundred aviators enrolled in the +Navy--a list that ultimately included several thousand. So proficient +had these undergraduates become that they were used as a nucleus to +train our aircraft forces; they were impressed as instructors at +Buffalo, Bayshore, Hampton Roads, the Massachusetts Institute of +Technology, Key West and Moorhead City. They began to go abroad in the +summer of 1917, and they were employed as instructors in schools in +France and England. These young men not only rendered great material +service, but they manifested an enthusiasm, an earnestness, and a +tireless vigilance which exerted a wonderful influence in strengthening +the _moral_ of the whole aviation department. "I knew that whenever we +had a member of the Yale unit," says Lieutenant-Commander Edwards, who +was aide for aviation at the London headquarters in the latter part of +the war, "everything was all right. Whenever the French and English +asked us to send a couple of our crack men to reinforce a squadron, I +would say, 'Let's get some of the Yale gang.' We never made a mistake +when we did this." + +There were many men in the regular navy to whom the nation is likewise +indebted. Captain T. T. Craven served with very marked distinction as +aide for aviation on the staff of Admiral Wilson, and afterward, after +the armistice was signed, as the senior member of the Board which had +been appointed to settle all claims with the French Government. +Lieutenant (now Commander) Kenneth Whiting was another officer who +rendered great service in aviation. Commander Whiting arrived in St. +Nazaire, France, on the 5th of June, 1917, in command of the first +aeronautic detachment, which consisted of 7 officers and 122 men. + +Such were the modest beginnings of American aviation in France. In a +short time Commander Whiting was assigned to the command of the large +station which was taken over at Killingholme, England, and in October, +1917, Captain Hutch I. Cone came from the United States to take charge +of the great aviation programme which had now been planned. Captain Cone +had for many years enjoyed the reputation of being one of the Navy's +most efficient administrators; while still a lieutenant-commander, he +had held for a considerable time the rank of rear-admiral, as chief of +the Bureau of Steam Engineering; and in 1917 he was commanding naval +officer of the Panama Canal, a position which required organizing +ability of the highest order. It was at my request that he was ordered +abroad to organize our European air forces. Captain Cone now came to +Paris and plunged into the work of organizing naval aviation with all +his usual vigour. + +It subsequently became apparent, however, that London would be a better +place for his work than Paris, and Captain Cone therefore took up his +headquarters in Grosvenor Gardens. Under his administration naval +aviation foreign service grew to the proportions I have indicated and +included in France six seaplane stations, three dirigible stations, two +kite balloon stations, one school of aerial gunnery, one assembly and +repair base, and the United States Naval Northern Bombing Group. In the +British Isles there were established four seaplane stations and one kite +balloon station in Ireland; one seaplane station and one assembly and +repair base in England; and in Italy we occupied, at the request of the +Italian Government, two seaplane stations at Pescara and Porto Corsini +on the Adriatic. From these stations we bombed to good effect Austrian +naval bases in that area. To Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Callan, +U.S.N.R.F., is due much of the credit for the cordial relations which +existed between the Italians and ourselves, as well as for the efficient +conduct of our aviation forces in Italy under his command. + +Probably the most completely equipped aviation centre which we +constructed was that at Pauillac, France, under the command of Captain +F. T. Evans, U.S.N.; here we built accommodation for 20,000 men; we had +here what would have eventually been a great airplane factory; had the +war continued six months longer, we would have been turning out planes +in this place on a scale almost large enough to supply our needs. The +far-sighted judgment and the really extraordinary professional ability +of civil engineers D. G. Copeland and A. W. K. Billings made such work +possible, but only, I might add, with the hearty co-operation of +Lieutenant-Commander Benjamin Briscoe and his small band of loyal and +devoted co-workers. Another great adventure was the establishment of our +Northern Bombing Group, under the command of Captain David C. Hanrahan, +U.S.N.; here we had 112 planes, 305 officers, and more than 2,000 +enlisted personnel, who devoted all of their attention to bombing German +submarine bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. This enterprise was a joint one +with the marines under the command of Major A. A. Cunningham, an +experienced pilot and an able administrator, who performed all of his +various duties not only to my entire satisfaction but in a manner which +reflected the greatest credit to himself as well as to the Marine Corps +of which he was a worthy representative. Due to the fact that the +rapidity of our construction work had exceeded that with which airplanes +were being built at home, we entered into an agreement with the Italian +Government whereby we obtained a number of Caproni planes in exchange +for raw materials. Several of these large bombing airplanes were +successfully flown over the Alps to the fields of Flanders, under the +direction of Lieutenant-Commander E. O. MacDonnell, who deserves the +greatest credit for the energetic and resourceful manner in which he +executed this difficult task. + +In September, 1918, Captain Cone's duties took him to Ireland; the ship +on which he sailed, the _Leinster_, was torpedoed in the Irish Sea; +Captain Cone was picked up unconscious in the water, and, when taken to +the hospital, it was discovered that both his legs were broken. It was +therefore necessary to appoint another officer in his stead, and I +selected Lieutenant W. A. Edwards, who had served with credit on the +destroyer _Cushing_, and who, for some time, had been second in command +to Captain Cone in the aviation section. It was almost unprecedented to +put at the head of such an important branch a young lieutenant who had +only been out of the naval academy for a few years; ordinarily the +duties would have required a man of Admiral's rank. Lieutenant Edwards, +however, was not only extremely capable, but he had the gift of getting +along splendidly with our Allies, particularly the British, with whom +our intercourse was necessarily extensive, and with whom he was very +popular. He remained in charge of the department for the rest of the +war, winning golden opinions from his superiors and his subordinates, +and the Distinguished Service Order from King George. + +The armistice was signed before our aviation work had got completely +into running order. Yet its accomplishments were highly creditable; and +had the war lasted a little longer they would have reached great +proportions. Of the thirty-nine direct attacks made on submarines, ten +were, in varying degrees, "successful." Perhaps the most amazing hit +made by any seaplane in the war was that scored by Ensign Paul F. Ives; +he dropped a bomb upon a submarine, striking it directly on its deck; +the result was partly tragical, partly ludicrous, for the bomb proved to +be a "dud" and did not explode! In commenting upon this and another +creditable attack, the British Admiralty wrote as follows: + + I beg to enclose for your information reports of attacks made on + two enemy submarines on the 25th March by Pilot Ensign J. F. + McNamara, U.S.N., and Pilot Ensign P. F. Ives, U.S.N. + + The Admiralty are of opinion that the submarine attacked by Pilot + Ensign McNamara was damaged and that the attack of Pilot Ensign + Ives might also have been successful had not his bombs failed to + explode, which was due to no fault of his own. + + I should add that Wing Commander, Portsmouth Group has expressed + his appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the United + States Pilots. + +At the cessation of hostilities we had a total of more than 500 planes +of various descriptions actually in commission, a large number of which +were in actual operation over the North Sea, the Irish Sea, the Bay of +Biscay, and the Adriatic; our bombing planes were making frequent +flights over enemy submarine bases, and 2,500 officers and 22,000 +enlisted men were making raids, doing patrols, bombing submarines, +bombing enemy bases, taking photographs, making reconnaissance over +enemy waters, and engaging enemy aircraft. There can be no doubt but +that this great force was a factor in persuading the enemy to +acknowledge defeat when he did. A few simple comparisons will +illustrate the gigantic task which confronted us and the difficulties +which were successfully overcome in the establishment of our naval +aviation force on foreign service. If all the buildings constructed and +used for barracks for officers and men were joined end to end, they +would stretch for a distance of twelve miles. The total cubic contents +of all structures erected and used could be represented by a box 245 ft. +wide, 300 ft. long, and 1,500 ft. high. In such a box more than ten +Woolworth buildings could be easily placed. Twenty-nine telephone +exchanges were installed, and in addition connections were made to +existing long-distance lines in England and France, and approximately +800 miles of long-distance lines were constructed in Ireland, so that +every station could be communicated with from London headquarters. The +lumber used for construction work would provide a board-walk one foot +wide, extending from New York City to the Isle of Malta--a distance of +more than 4,000 miles. + +When we consider the fact that during the war naval aviation abroad grew +in personnel to be more than one-half the size of the entire pre-war +American navy, it is not at all astonishing that all of those regular +officers who had been trained in this service were employed almost +exclusively in an administrative capacity, which naturally excluded them +from taking part in the more exciting work of bombing submarines and +fighting aircraft. To their credit be it said that they chafed +considerably under this enforced restraint, but they were so few in +number that we had to employ them not in command of seaplanes, but of +air stations where they rendered the most valuable service. + +For the reserves I entertain the very highest regard and even personal +affection. Collectively they were magnificent and they reflected the +greatest credit upon the country they served so gallantly and with such +brilliant success. I know of no finer individual exploit in the war than +that of Ensign C. H. Hammon who, while attached to our Air Station at +Porto Corsini, took part in a bombing raid on Pola, in which he engaged +two enemy airplanes and as a result had his plane hit in several places. +During this engagement a colleague, Ensign G. H. Ludlow, was shot down. +Ensign Hammon went to his rescue, landed his boat on the water just +outside of Pola harbour, picked up the stricken aviator, and flew back +to Porto Corsini, a distance of seventy-five miles. A heavy sea made it +highly probable that his frail boat, already damaged by his combat with +the enemy, would collapse and that he would be drowned or captured and +made a prisoner of war. For this act of courageous devotion to duty I +recommended Ensign Hammon for the Congressional Medal of Honour. + +The mention of this officer calls to my mind the exploits of +Lieutenant-Commander A. L. Gates, who was the second of only three +officers attached to the Naval Forces in Europe whom I recommended for +the Congressional Medal of Honour. The citation in the case of Gates +reads as follows and needs no elaboration to prove the calibre of the +man: "This officer commanded the U.S. Naval Air Station, Dunkirk, +France, with very marked efficiency and under almost constant shell and +bomb fire from the enemy. Alone and unescorted he rescued the crew of a +British airplane wrecked in the sea off Ostend, for which he was awarded +the Distinguished Flying Cross by the British Government. This act of +bravery was actually over and above the duties required of this officer +and in itself demonstrates the highest type of courage. +Lieutenant-Commander Gates took part in a number of flights over the +enemy lines and was shot down in combat and taken prisoner by the enemy. +He made several heroic and determined attempts to escape. During all of +his service this officer was a magnificent example of courage, modesty, +and energetic devotion to duty. He at all times upheld the very highest +traditions of the Naval Service." + +Volumes could well be written about the work of these splendid young +Americans--of how Ensign Stephen Potter shot down in flames an enemy +seaplane from a position over Heligoland Bight; unfortunately he made +the supreme sacrifice only a month later when he in turn was shot down +in flames and fell to his resting-place in the North Sea; and of De +Cernea and Wilcox and Ludlow. Theirs was the spirit which dominated the +entire Force and which made it possible to accomplish what seemed at +times to be almost the impossible. It was the superior "will to victory" +which proved to be invincible. + + + + +CHAPTER XII + +THE NAVY FIGHTING ON THE LAND + + +Besides transporting American troops, the Navy, in one detail of its +work, actually participated in warfare on the Western Front. Though this +feature of our effort has nothing to do with the main subject, the +defeat of the submarine, yet any account of the American navy in the war +which overlooks the achievements of our naval batteries on land would +certainly be incomplete. The use of naval guns in war operations was not +unprecedented; the British used such guns in the Boer War, particularly +at Ladysmith and Spion Kop; and there were occasions in which such +armament rendered excellent service in the Boxer Rebellion. All through +the Great War, British, French, and Germans frequently reinforced their +army artillery with naval batteries. But, compared with the American +naval guns which under the command of Rear-Admiral Charles P. Plunkett +performed such telling deeds against the retreating Germans in the final +phases of the conflict, all previous equipment of naval guns on shore +had been less efficient in one highly important respect. + +For the larger part of the war, the Germans had had a great gun +stationed in Belgium bombarding Dunkirk. The original purpose in sending +American naval batteries to France was to silence this gun. The proposal +was made in November, 1917; but, rapidly as the preparations progressed, +the situation had entirely changed before our five fourteen-inch guns +were ready to leave for France. In the spring of 1918 the Germans began +the great drive which nearly took them to the Channel ports; and under +the conditions which prevailed in that area it was impossible to send +our guns to the Belgian coast. Meanwhile, the enemy had stationed a gun, +having a range of nearly seventy-five miles, in the forest of Compiegne; +the shells from this weapon, constantly falling upon Paris, were having +a more demoralizing effect upon the French populace than was officially +admitted. The demand for the silencing of this gun came from all sides; +and it was a happy coincidence that, at just about the time when this +new peril appeared, the American naval guns were nearly ready to be +transported to France. Encouraged by the success of this long-range gun +on Paris, the Germans were preparing long-range bombardments on several +sections of the front. They had taken huge guns from the new +battle-cruiser _Hindenburg_ and mounted them at convenient points for +bombarding Dunkirk, Chalons-sur-Marne, and Nancy. In all, the Allied +intelligence departments reported that sixteen guns of great calibre had +left Kiel in May, 1918, and that they would soon be trained upon +important objectives in France. For this reason it was welcome news to +the Allies, who were deficient in this type of artillery, that five +naval fourteen-inch guns, with mountings and ammunition and supply +trains, were ready to embark for the European field. The Navy received +an urgent request from General Pershing that these guns should be landed +at St. Nazaire; it was to be their main mission to destroy the "Big +Bertha" which was raining shells on Paris, and to attack specific +points, especially railroad communications and the bridges across the +Rhine. + +The initiative in the design of these mobile railway batteries was taken +by the Bureau of Ordnance of the Navy Department, under Rear-Admiral +Ralph Earle, and the details of the design were worked out by the +officers of that bureau and Admiral Plunkett. The actual construction of +the great gun mounts on the cars from which the guns were to be fired, +and of the specially designed cars of the supply trains for each gun, +was an engineering feat which reflects great credit upon the Baldwin +Locomotive Works and particularly upon its president, Mr. Samuel M. +Vauclain, who undertook the task with the greatest enthusiasm. The +reason why our naval guns represented a greater achievement than +anything of a similar nature accomplished by the Germans was that they +were mobile. Careful observations taken of the bombardment of Dunkirk +revealed the fact that the gun with which it was being done was steadily +losing range. This indicated that the weapon was not a movable one, but +that it was firmly implanted in a fixed position. The seventy-five mile +gun which was bombarding Paris was similarly emplaced. The answering +weapon which our ordnance department now proposed to build was to have +the ability to travel from place to place--to go to any position to +which the railroad system of France could take it. To do this it would +be necessary to build a mounting on a railroad car and to supply cars +which could carry the crews, their sleeping quarters, their food and +ammunition; to construct, indeed, a whole train for each separate gun. +This equipment must be built in the United States, shipped over three +thousand miles of ocean, landed at a French port, assembled there, and +started on French railroads to the several destinations at the front. +The Baldwin Locomotive Works accepted the contract for constructing +these mountings and attendant cars; it began work February 13, 1918; two +months afterward the first mount had been finished and the gun was being +proved at Sandy Hook, New Jersey; and by July all five guns had arrived +at St. Nazaire and were being prepared to be sent forward to the scene +of hostilities. The rapidity with which this work was completed +furnished an illustration of American manufacturing genius at its best. +Meanwhile, Admiral Plunkett had collected and trained his crews; it +speaks well for the _moral_ of the Navy that, when news of this great +operation was first noised about, more than 20,000 officers and men +volunteered for the service. + +At first the French, great as was their admiration for these guns and +the astonishingly accurate marksmanship which they had displayed on +their trials, believed that their railroad beds and their bridges could +not sustain such a weight; the French engineers, indeed, declined at the +beginning to approve our request for the use of their rails. The +constant rain of German shells on Paris, however, modified this +attitude; the situation was so urgent that such assistance as these +American guns promised was welcome. One August morning, therefore, the +first train started for Helles Mouchy, the point from which it was +expected to silence the "Big Bertha." The progress of this train through +France was a triumphant march. Our own confidence in the French road bed +and bridges was not much greater than that of the French themselves; the +train therefore went along slowly, climbed the grades at a snail's pace, +and took the curves with the utmost caution. As they crossed certain of +the bridges, the crews held their breath and sat tight, expecting almost +every moment to crash through. All along the route the French populace +greeted the great battery train with one long cheer, and at the towns +and villages the girls decorated the long muzzle of the gun with +flowers. But there were other spectators than the French. Expertly as +this unusual train had been camouflaged, the German airplane observers +had detected its approach. As it neared the objective the shells that +had been falling on Paris ceased; before the Americans could get to +work, the Germans had removed their mighty weapon, leaving nothing but +an emplacement as a target for our shells. Though our men were therefore +deprived of the privilege of destroying this famous long-range gun, it +is apparent that their arrival saved Paris from further bombardment, for +nothing was heard of the gun for the rest of the war. + +The guns proved exceedingly effective in attacking German railroad +centres, bridges, and other essential positions; and as they could be +fired from any point of the railroad tracks behind the Western Front, +and as they could be shifted from one position to another, with all +their personnel and equipment, as fast as the locomotives could haul +them, it was apparent that the more guns of this design that could be +supplied the better. These qualities were at once recognized by the +Army, which called upon the Navy for assistance in building a large +number of railway batteries; and if the war had continued these great +guns would soon have been thundering all along the Western Front. + +From the time the naval guns were mounted until the armistice Admiral +Plunkett's men were busy on several points of the Allied lines. In this +time the five naval guns fired 782 shells at distances ranging from 18 +to 23 miles. They played great havoc in the railroad yards at Laon, +destroying large stretches of track that were indispensable to the +Germans, and in general making this place practically useless as a +railroad centre. Probably the greatest service which they rendered to +the cause of the Allies was in the region north of Verdun. In late +October three naval batteries were brought up to Charny and Thierville +and began bombarding the railroad which ran through Montmedy, Longuyon, +and Conflans. This was the most important line of communication on the +Western Front; it was the road over which the German army in the east +was supplied, and there was practically no other line by which the great +German armies engaging the Americans could escape. From October 23rd to +the hour when the armistice was signed our fourteen-inch guns were +raining shells upon this road. So successful was this bombardment that +the German traffic was stopped, not only while the firing was taking +place, but for several hours each day after it had ceased. What this +meant to the success of the Allied armies the world now knows. The +result is perfectly summed up in General Pershing's report: + +"Our large calibre guns," he says, "had advanced and were skilfully +brought into position to fire upon the important lines at Montmedy, +Longuyon, and Conflans; the strategical goal which was our highest hope +was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line of communications and +nothing but surrender or an armistice could save his army from complete +disaster." + +These guns were, of course, only one of many contributing factors, but +that the Navy had its part in this great achievement is another example +of the success with which our two services co-operated with each other +throughout the war--a co-operation which, for efficient and harmonious +devotion to a common cause, has seldom, if ever, been equalled. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +TRANSPORTING TWO MILLION AMERICAN SOLDIERS TO FRANCE + + +I + +In March, 1918, it became apparent that the German submarine campaign +had failed. The prospect that confronted the Allied forces at that time, +when compared with the conditions which had faced them in April, 1917, +forms one of the most impressive contrasts in history. In the first part +of the earlier year the cause of the Allied Powers, and consequently the +cause of liberty throughout the world, had reached the point almost of +desperation. On both land and sea the Germans seemed to hold the future +in their hands. In Europe the armies of the Central Powers were +everywhere in the ascendant. The French and British were holding their +own in France, and in the Somme campaign they had apparently inflicted +great damage upon the German forces, yet the disintegration of the +Russian army, the unmistakable signs of which had already appeared, was +bringing nearer the day when they would have to meet the undivided +strength of their enemy. At the time in question, Rumania, Serbia, and +Montenegro were conquered countries, and Italy seemed unable to make any +progress against the Austrians. Bulgaria and Turkey had become +practically German provinces, and the dream of a great Germanic eastern +empire was rapidly approaching realization. So strong was Germany in a +military sense, so little did she apprehend that the United States could +ever assemble her resources and her men in time to make them a decisive +element in the struggle, that the German war lords, in their effort to +bring the European conflict to a quick conclusion, did not hesitate to +take the step which was destined to make our country their enemy. +Probably no nation ever adopted a war measure with more confidence in +its success. The results which the German submarines could accomplish +seemed at that time to be simply a matter of mathematical calculation. +The Germans estimated that they could sink at least 1,000,000 tons a +month, completely cut off Great Britain's supplies of food and war +materials, and thus end the war by October or November of 1917. Even +though the United States should declare war, what could an unprepared +nation like our own accomplish in such a brief period? Millions of +troops we might indeed raise, but we could not train them in three or +four months, and, even though we could perform such a miracle, it was +ridiculous to suppose that we could transport them to Europe through the +submarine danger zone. I have already shown that the Germans were not +alone in thus predicting the course of events. In the month of April, +1917, I had found the Allied officials just about as distressed as the +Germans were jubilant. Already the latter, in sinking merchant ships, +had had successes which almost equalled their own predictions; no +adequate means of defence against the submarine had been devised; and +the chiefs of the British navy made no attempts to disguise their +apprehension for the future. + +Such was the atmosphere of gloom which prevailed in Allied councils in +April, 1917; yet one year later the naval situation had completely +changed. The reasons for that change have been set forth in the +preceding pages. In that brief twelve months the relative position of +the submarine had undergone a marked transformation. Instead of being +usually the pursuer it was now often the pursued. Instead of sailing +jauntily upon the high seas, sinking helpless merchantmen almost at +will, it was half-heartedly lying in wait along the coasts, seeking its +victims in the vessels of dispersed convoys. If it attempted to push out +to sea, and attack a convoy, escorting destroyers were likely to deliver +one of their dangerous attacks; if it sought the shallower coastal +waters, a fleet of yachts, sloops, and subchasers was constantly ready +to assail it with dozens of depth charges. An attempt to pass through +the Straits of Dover meant almost inevitable destruction by mines; an +attempt to escape into the ocean by the northern passage involved the +momentary dread of a similar end or the hazard of navigating the +difficult Pentland Firth. In most of the narrow passages Allied +submarines lay constantly in wait with their torpedoes; a great fleet of +airplanes and dirigibles was always circling above ready to rain a +shower of bombs upon the under-water foe. Already the ocean floor about +the British Isles held not far from 200 sunken submarines, with most of +their crews, amounting to at least 4,000 men, whose deaths involved +perhaps the most hideous tragedies of the war. Bad as was this +situation, it was nothing compared with what it would become a few +months or a year later. American and British shipyards were turning out +anti-submarine craft with great rapidity; the industries of America, +with their enormous output of steel, had been enlisted in the +anti-submarine campaign. The American and British shipbuilding +facilities were neutralizing the German campaign in two ways: they were +not only constructing war vessels on a scale which would soon drive all +the German submarines from the sea, but they were building merchant +tonnage so rapidly that, in March, 1918, more new tonnage was launched +than was being destroyed. Thus by this time the Teutonic hopes of ending +the war by the submarine had utterly collapsed; if the Germans were to +win the war at all, or even to obtain a peace which would not be +disastrous, some other programme must be adopted and adopted quickly. + +Disheartened by their failure at sea, the enemy therefore turned their +eyes once more toward the land. The destruction of Russian military +power had given the German armies a great numerical superiority over +those of the Allies. There seemed little likelihood that the French or +the British, after three years of frightfully gruelling war, could add +materially to their forces. Thus, with the grouping of the Powers, such +as existed in 1917, the Germans had a tremendous advantage on their +side, for Russia, which German statesmen for fifty years had feared as a +source of inexhaustible man-supply to her enemies, had disappeared as a +military power. But a new element in the situation now counterbalanced +this temporary gain; that was the daily increasing importance of the +United States in the war. The Germans, who in 1917 had despised us as an +enemy, immediate or prospective, now despised us no longer. The army +which they declared could never be raised and trained was actually being +raised and trained by the millions. The nation which their publicists +had denounced as lacking cohesion and public spirit had adopted +conscription simultaneously with their declaration of war, and the +people whom the Germans had affected to regard as devoted only to the +pursuit of gain and pleasure had manifested a unity of purpose which +they had never before displayed, and had offered their lives, their +labours, and their wealth without limit to the cause of the Allies. Up +to March, 1918, only a comparatively small part of this American army +had reached Europe, but the Germans had already tested its fighting +quality and had learned to respect it. Yet all these manifestations +would not have disturbed the Germanic calculations except for one +depressing fact. Even a nation of 100,000,000 brave and energetic +people, fully trained and equipped for war, is not a formidable foe so +long as an impassable watery gulf of three thousand miles separates them +from the field of battle. + +For the greater part of 1917 the German people believed that their +submarines could bar the progress of the American armies. By March, +1918, they had awakened from this delusion. Not only was an American +army millions strong in process of formation, but the alarming truth now +dawned upon the Germans that it could be transported to Europe. The +great industries of America could provide munitions and food to supply +any number of soldiers indefinitely, and these, too, could be brought to +the Western Front. Outwardly, the German chiefs might still affect to +despise this new foe, but in their hearts they knew that it spelt their +doom. They were not now dealing with a corrupt Czardom and hordes of +ignorant and passionless Slavs, who could be eliminated by propaganda +and sedition; they were dealing with millions of intelligent and +energetic freemen, all animated by a mighty and almost religious +purpose. Yet the situation, desperate as it seemed, held forth one more +hope. If the German armies, which still greatly outnumbered the French +and British, could strike and win a decisive victory before the +Americans could arrive, then they might still force a satisfactory +peace. "It is a race between Ludendorff and Wilson" is the terse and +accurate way in which Lloyd George summed up the situation. The great +blow fell on March 21, 1918; the British and the French met it with +heroism, but it was quite evident that they were fighting against +terrible odds. At this time the American army in France numbered about +300,000 men; it now became the business of the American navy, assisted +by the British, to transport the American troops who could increase +these forces sufficiently to turn the balance in the Allies' favour. + +The supreme hour, to which all the anti-submarine labours of the +preceding year were merely preliminary, had now arrived. Since the close +of the war there has been much discussion of the part which the American +navy played in bringing it to a successful end. Even during the war +there was some criticism on this point. There were two more or less +definite opinions in the public mind upon this question. One was that +the main business of our war vessels was to convoy the American soldiers +to France; the other emphasized the anti-submarine warfare as its most +important duty. Anyone would suppose, from the detached way in which +these two subjects have been discussed, that the anti-submarine warfare +and the successful transportation of troops were separate matters. An +impression apparently prevails that, at the beginning of the war, the +American navy could have quietly decided whether it would devote its +energies to making warfare on the submarine or to convoying American +armies; yet the absurdity of such a conception must be apparent to +anyone who has read the foregoing pages. The several operations in which +the Allied navies engaged were all part of a comprehensive programme; +they were all interdependent. According to my idea, the business of the +American navy was to join its forces whole-heartedly with those of the +Allies in the effort _to win the war_. Anything which helped to +accomplish this great purpose became automatically our duty. Germany was +basing her chances of success upon the submarine; our business was +therefore to assist in defeating the submarine. The cause of the Allies +was our cause; our cause was the cause of the Allies; anything which +benefited the Allies benefited the United States; and anything which +benefited the United States benefited the Allies. Neither we nor France +nor England were conducting a separate campaign; we were separate units +of an harmonious whole. At the beginning the one pressing duty was to +put an end to the sinking of merchantmen, not because these merchantmen +were for the larger part British, but because the failure to do so would +have meant the elimination of Great Britain from the war, with results +which would have meant defeat for the other Allies. Let us imagine, for +a moment, what the sequence of events would have been had the submarine +campaign against merchant shipping succeeded; in that case Britain and +France would have been compelled to surrender unconditionally and the +United States would therefore have been forced to fight the Central +Empires alone. Germany's terms of peace would have included the +surrender of all the Allied fleets; this would eventually have left the +United States navy to fight the German navy reinforced by the ships of +Great Britain, Austria, France, and Italy. In such a contest we should +have been outnumbered about three or four to one. I have such confidence +in the power and purpose of America as to believe that, even in a +single-handed conflict with Germany, we should have won in the end; but +it is evident that the problem would have been quite a different one +from that of fighting in co-operation with the Allies against the +Germanic foe. + +Simply as a matter of self-interest and strategy it was certainly wisdom +to throw the last ounce of our strength into the scale of the Allied +navies; and it was therefore inevitable that we should first of all use +our anti-submarine craft to protect all shipping sailing to Europe and +to clear the sea of submarines. In doing this we were protecting the +food supply not only of Great Britain, but of France and our other +Allies, for most of the materials which we sent to our European friends +were transported first to England and thence were shipped across the +Channel. Moreover, our twelve months' campaign against the submarine was +an invaluable preliminary to transporting the troops. Does any sane +person believe that we could have put two million Americans into France +had the German submarines maintained until the spring and summer of 1918 +the striking power which had been theirs in the spring of 1917? Merely +to state the question is to answer it. In that same twelve months we had +gained much experience which was exceedingly valuable when we began +transporting troops in great numbers. The most efficacious protection to +merchant shipping, the convoy, was similarly the greatest safeguard to +our military transports. Those methods which had been so successfully +used in shipping food, munitions, and materials were now used in +shipping soldiers. The section of the great headquarters which we had +developed in London for routing convoys was used for routing +transports, and the American naval officer, Captain Byron A. Long, who +had demonstrated such great ability in this respect, was likewise the +master mind in directing the course of the American soldiers to France. + +In other ways we had laid the foundations for this, the greatest troop +movement in history. In the preceding twelve months we had increased the +oil tankage at Brest more than fourfold, sent over repair ships, and +augmented its repair facilities. This port and all of our naval +activities in France were under the command first of Rear-Admiral Wm. B. +Fletcher, and later Rear-Admiral Henry B. Wilson. It was a matter of +regret that we could not earlier have made Brest the main naval base for +the American naval forces in France, for it was in some respects +strategically better located for that purpose than was any other port in +Europe. Even for escorting certain merchant convoys into the Channel +Brest would have provided a better base than either Plymouth or +Queenstown. A glance at the map explains why. To send destroyers from +Queenstown to pick up convoys and escort them into the Channel or to +French ports and thence return to their base involved a long triangular +trip; to send such destroyers from Brest to escort these involved a +smaller amount of steaming and a direct east and west voyage. Similarly, +Queenstown was a much better location for destroyers sent to meet +convoys bound for ports in the Irish Sea over the northern "trunk line." +But unfortunately it was utterly impossible to use the great natural +advantages of Brest in the early days of war; the mere fact that this +French harbour possessed most inadequate tankage facilities put it out +of the question, and it was also very deficient in docks, repair +facilities, and other indispensable features of a naval base. At this +time Brest was hardly more than able to provide for the requirements of +the French, and it would have embarrassed our French allies greatly had +we attempted to establish a large American force there, before we had +supplied the essential oil fuel and repair facilities. The ships which +we did send in the first part of the war were mostly yachts, of the +"dollar-a-year" variety, which their owners had generously given to the +national service; their crews were largely of that type of young +business man and college undergraduate to whose skill and devotion I +have already paid tribute. This little flotilla acquitted itself +splendidly up and down the coast of France. Meanwhile, we were +constructing fuel-oil tanks; and as soon as these were ready and repair +ships were available, we began building up a large force at Brest--a +force which was ultimately larger than the one we maintained at +Queenstown; at the height of the troop movements it comprised about 36 +destroyers, 12 yachts, 3 tenders, and several mine-sweepers and tugs. +The fine work which this detachment accomplished in escorting troop and +supply convoys is sufficient evidence of the skill acquired by the +destroyers and other vessels in carrying out their duties in this +peculiar warfare. + +Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, a great organization had +been created under the able direction of Rear-Admiral Albert Gleaves for +maintaining and administering the fleet of transports and their ocean +escorts. Also, as soon as war was declared the work was begun of +converting into transports those German merchant ships which had been +interned in American ports. The successful completion of this work was, +in itself, a great triumph for the American navy. Of the vessels which +the Germans had left in our hands, seventeen at New York, Boston, +Norfolk, and Philadelphia, seemed to be adapted for transport purposes, +but the Germans had not intended that we should make any such use of +them. The condition of these ships, after their German custodians had +left, was something indescribable; they reflected great discredit upon +German seamanship, for it would have been impossible for any people +which really loved ships to permit them to deteriorate as had these +vessels and to become such cesspools of filth. For three years the +Germans had evidently made no attempt to clean them; the sanitary +conditions were so bad that our workmen could not sleep on board, but +had to have sleeping quarters near the docks; they spent weeks +scrubbing, scraping, and disinfecting, in a finally successful effort to +make the ships suitable habitations for human beings. Not only had the +Germans permitted such liners as the _Vaterland_ and the _Kronprinzessin +Cecilie_ to go neglected, but, on their departure, they had attempted to +injure them in all conceivable ways. The cylinders had been broken, +engines had been smashed, vital parts of the machinery had been removed +and thrown into the sea, ground glass had been placed in the oil cups, +gunpowder had been placed in the coal--evidently in the hope of causing +explosions when the vessels were at sea--and other damage of a more +subtle nature had been done, it evidently being the expectation that the +ships would break down when on the ocean and beyond the possibility of +repair. Although our navy yards had no copies of the plans of these +vessels or their machinery--the Germans having destroyed them all--and +although the missing parts were of peculiarly German design, they +succeeded, in an incredibly short time, in making them even better and +speedier vessels than they had ever been before. + +The national sense of humour did not fail the transport service when it +came to rechristening these ships; the _Princess Irene_ became the +_Pocahontas_, the _Rhein_ the _Susquehanna_; and there was also an +ironic justice in the fact that the _Vaterland_, which had been built by +the Germans partly for the purpose of transporting troops in war, +actually fulfilled this mission, though not quite in the way which the +Germans had anticipated. Meanwhile, both the American and the British +mercantile marines were supplementing this German tonnage. The first +troops which we sent to France, in June, 1917, were transported in ships +of the United Fruit Company; and when the German blow was struck, in +March, 1918, both the United States and Great Britain began collecting +from all parts of the world vessels which could be used as troop +transports. We called in all available vessels from the Atlantic and +Pacific coasts and the Great Lakes; England stripped her trade routes to +South America, Australia, and the East, and France and Italy also made +their contributions. Of all the American troops sent to France from the +beginning of the war, the United States provided transports for 46.25 +per cent., Great Britain for 51.25, the remainder being provided by +France and Italy. Of those sent between March, 1918, and the armistice, +American vessels carried 42.15 per cent., British 55.40 per cent.[8] + +Yet there was one element in the safe transportation of troops which was +even more fundamental than those which I have named. The basis of all +our naval operations was the dreadnoughts and the battle-cruisers of the +Grand Fleet. It was this aggregation, as I have already indicated, +which made possible the operation of all the surface ships that +destroyed the effectiveness of the submarines. Had the Grand Fleet +suddenly disappeared beneath the waves, all these offensive craft would +have been driven from the seas, the Allies' sea lines of communication +would have been cut, and the war would have ended in Germany's favour. +From the time the transportation of troops began the United States had a +squadron of five dreadnought battleships constantly with the Grand +Fleet. The following vessels performed this important duty: the _New +York_, Captain C. F. Hughes, afterward Captain E. L. Beach; the +_Wyoming_, Captain H. A. Wiley, afterward Captain H. H. Christy; the +_Florida_, Captain Thomas Washington, afterward Captain M. M. Taylor; +the _Delaware_, Captain A. H. Scales; the _Arkansas_, Captain W. H. G. +Bullard, afterward Captain L. R. de Steiguer; and the _Texas_, Captain +Victor Blue. These vessels gave this great force an unquestioned +preponderance, and made it practically certain that Germany would not +attempt another general sea battle. Under Rear-Admiral Hugh Rodman, the +American squadron performed excellent service and made the most +favourable impression upon the chiefs of the Allied navies. Under the +general policy of co-operation established throughout our European naval +forces these vessels were quickly made a part of the Grand Fleet in so +far as concerned their military operations. This was, of course, wholly +essential to efficiency--a point the layman does not always +understand--so essential, in fact, that it may be said that, if the +Grand Fleet had gone into battle the day after our vessels joined, the +latter might have decreased rather than increased the fighting +efficiency of the whole; for, though our people and the British spoke +the same language, the languages of the ships, that is, their methods of +communication by signals, were wholly different. It was therefore our +duty to stow our signal flags and books down below, and learn the +British signal language. This they did so well that four days after +their arrival they went out and manoeuvred successfully with the Grand +Fleet. In the same way they adopted the British systems of tactics and +fire control, and in every other way conformed to the established +practices of the British. Too great praise cannot be given the officers +and men of our squadron, not only for their efficiency and the +cordiality of their co-operation, but for the patience with which they +bore the almost continuous restriction to their ships, and the long +vigil without the opportunity of a contact with the enemy forces. Just +how well our ships succeeded in this essential co-operation was +expressed by Admiral Sir David Beatty in the farewell speech which he +made to them upon the day of their departure for home. He said in part: + + "I want, first of all, to thank you, Admiral Rodman, the captains, + officers, and ships' companies of the magnificent squadron, for the + wonderful co-operation and the loyalty you have given to me and to + my admirals; and the assistance that you have given us in every + duty you had to undertake. The support which you have shown is that + of true comradeship; and in time of stress, that is worth a very + great deal. + + "You will return to your own shores; and I hope in the sunshine, + which Admiral Rodman tells me always shines there, you won't forget + your 'comrades of the mist' and your pleasant associations of the + North Sea.... + + "I thank you again and again for the great part the Sixth Battle + Squadron played in bringing about the greatest naval victory in + history. I hope you will give this message to your comrades: 'Come + back soon. Good-bye and good luck!'" + +But these were not the only large battleships which the United States +had sent to European waters. Despite all the precautions which I have +described, there was still one danger which constantly confronted +American troop transports. By June and July, 1918, our troops were +crossing the Atlantic in enormous numbers, about 300,000 a month, and +were accomplishing most decisive results upon the battlefield. A +successful attack upon a convoy, involving the sinking of one or more +transports, would have had no important effect upon the war, but it +would probably have improved German _moral_ and possibly have injured +that of the Americans. There was practically only one way in which such +an attack could be made; one or more German battle-cruisers might slip +out to sea and assail one of our troop convoys. In order to prepare for +such a possibility, the Department sent three of our most powerful +dreadnoughts to Berehaven, Ireland--the _Nevada_, Captain A. T. Long, +afterward Captain W. C. Cole; the _Oklahoma_, Captain M. L. Bristol, +afterward Captain C. B. McVay; and the _Utah_, Captain F. B. Bassett, +the whole division under the command of Rear-Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers. +This port is located in Bantry Bay, on the extreme southwestern coast. +For several months our dreadnoughts lay here, momentarily awaiting the +news that a German raider had escaped, ready to start to sea and give +battle. But the expected did not happen. The fact that this powerful +squadron was ready for the emergency is perhaps the reason why the +Germans never attempted the adventure. + + +II + +A reference to the map which accompanies this chapter will help the +reader to understand why our transports were able to carry American +troops to France so successfully that not a single ingoing ship was ever +struck by a torpedo. This diagram makes it evident that there were two +areas of the Atlantic through which American shipping could reach its +European destination. The line of division was about the forty-ninth +parallel of latitude, the French city of Brest representing its most +familiar landmark. From this point extending southward, as far as the +forty-fifth parallel, which corresponds to the location of the city of +Bordeaux, is a great stretch of ocean, about 200 miles wide. It includes +the larger part of the Bay of Biscay, which forms that huge indentation +with which our school geographies have made us Americans so familiar, +and which has always enjoyed a particular fame for its storms, the +dangers of its coast, and the sturdy and independent character of the +people on its shores. The other distinct area to which the map calls +attention extends northerly from the forty-ninth parallel to the +fifty-second; it comprises the English Channel, and includes both the +French channel ports, the British ports, the southern coast of Ireland, +and the entrance to the Irish Sea. The width of this second section is +very nearly the same as that of the one to the south, or about 200 +miles. + +[Illustration: THE OPTION OFFERED TO THE GERMAN SUBMARINES + +This diagram explains why the American navy succeeded in transporting +more than 2,000,000 American soldiers to France without loss because of +submarines. The Atlantic was divided into two broad areas--shown by the +shaded parts of the diagram. Through the northern area were sent +practically all the merchant ships with supplies of food and materials +for Europe. The southern area, extending roughly from the forty-fifth to +the forty-ninth parallel, was used almost exclusively for troopships. +The Germans could keep only eight or ten U-boats at the same time in the +eastern Atlantic; they thus were forced to choose whether they should +devote these boats to attacking mercantile or troop convoys. The text +explains why, under these circumstances, they were compelled to use +nearly all their forces against merchant ships and leave troop +transports practically alone. + +Emery Walker Ltd. sc] + +Up to the present moment this narrative has been concerned chiefly with +the northernmost of these two great sea pathways. Through this one to +the north passed practically all the merchant shipping which was +destined for the Allies. Consequently, as I have described, it was the +great hunting ground of the German submarines. I have thus far had +little to say of the Bay of Biscay section because, until 1918, there +was comparatively little activity in that part of the ocean. For every +ship which sailed through this bay I suppose that there were at least +100 which came through the Irish Sea and the English Channel. In my +first report to the Department I described the principal scene of +submarine activity as the area of the Atlantic reaching from the French +island of Ushant--which lies just westward of Brest--to the tip of +Scotland, and that remained the chief scene of hostilities to the end. +Along much of the coastline south of Brest the waters were so shallow +that the submarines could operate only with difficulty; it was a long +distance from the German bases; the shipping consisted largely of +coastal convoys; much of this was the coal trade from England; it is +therefore not surprising that the Germans contented themselves with now +and then planting mines off the most important harbours. Since our enemy +was able to maintain only eight or ten U-boats in the Atlantic at one +time it would have been sheer waste of energy to have stationed them off +the western coast of France. They would have put in their time to little +purpose, and meanwhile the ships and cargoes which they were above all +ambitious to destroy would have been safely finding their way into +British ports. + +The fact that we had these two separate areas and that these areas were +so different in character was what made it possible to send our +2,000,000 soldiers to France without losing a single man. From March, +1918, to the conclusion of the war, the American and British navies were +engaged in two distinct transportation operations. The shipment of food +and munitions continued in 1918 as in 1917, and on an even larger scale. +With the passing of time the mechanism of these mercantile convoys +increased in efficiency, and by March, 1918, the management of this +great transportation system had become almost automatic. Shipping from +America came into British ports, it will be remembered, in two great +"trunk lines," one of which ran through the English Channel and the +other up the Irish Sea. But when the time came to bring over the +American troops, we naturally selected the area to the south, both +because it was necessary to send the troops to France and because we had +here a great expanse of ocean which was relatively free of submarines. +Our earliest troop shipments disembarked at St. Nazaire; later, when the +great trans-Atlantic liners, both German and British, were pressed into +service, we landed many tens of thousands at Brest; and all the largest +French ports from Brest to Bordeaux took a share. A smaller number we +sent to England, from which country they were transported across the +Channel into France; when the demands became pressing, indeed, hardly a +ship of any kind was sent to Europe without its quota of American +soldiers; but, on the whole, the business of transportation in 1918 +followed simple and well-defined lines. We sent mercantile convoys in +what I may call the northern "lane" and troop convoys in the southern +"lane." We kept both lines of traffic for the most part distinct; and +this simple procedure offered to our German enemies a pretty problem. + +For, I must repeat, the German navy could maintain in the open Atlantic +an average of only about eight or ten of her efficient U-boats at one +time. The German Admiralty thus had to answer this difficult question: +Shall we use these submarines to attack mercantile convoys or to attack +troop convoys? The submarine flotilla which was actively engaged was so +small that it was absurd to think of sending half into each lane; the +Germans must send most of their submarines against cargo ships or most +of them against troopships. Which should it be? If it were decided to +concentrate on mercantile vessels then the American armies, which the +German chiefs had declared to their people could never get to the +Western Front, would reach France and furnish General Foch the reserves +with which he might crush the German armies before winter. If, on the +other hand, the Germans should decide to concentrate on troopships, then +the food and supplies which were essential to the Allied cause would +flow at an even greater rate into Great Britain and thence to the +European nations. Whether it were more important, in a military sense, +to cut the Allies' commercial lines of communication or to sink troop +transports is an interesting question. It is almost impossible for the +Anglo-Saxon mind to consider this as a purely military matter, apart +from the human factors involved. The sinking of a great transport, with +4,000 or 5,000 American boys on board, would have been a dreadful +calamity and would have struck horror to the American people; it was +something which the Navy was determined to prevent, and which we did +prevent. Considered as a strictly military question, however--and that +was the only consideration which influenced the Germans--it is hard to +see how the loss of one transport, or even the loss of several, would +have materially affected the course of the war. In judging the purely +military results of such a tragedy, we must remember that the Allied +armies were losing from 3,000 to 5,000 men a day; thus the sinking of an +American transport once a week would not have particularly affected the +course of the war. The destruction of merchant shipping in large +quantities, however, represented the one way in which the Germans could +win. There were at least a hundred merchant ships to every one of our +troopships; if a considerable number of the former could be sunk, +Germany would have scored a decisive advantage. From the declaration of +submarine warfare, the objective of the German Admiralty had been for +"tonnage"; by March, 1918, as already said, the chances of destroying +sufficient tonnage to win had become extremely slight; yet it still +represented the one logical mission of the submarine. + +The two alternatives, however, that of attacking mercantile convoys or +troop convoys, hardly existed in fact. Let us suppose for a moment that +the Germans had changed their programme, had taken their group of +operating submarines from the northern trade routes, and had stationed +them to the south, in the track of the troop transports. What would the +results have been? "Lane," though a convenient word for descriptive +purposes, is hardly an accurate one; for this ocean passage-way was +really about 200 miles wide. Imagine eight or ten submarines, stretched +across that expanse and hunting for troopships. At this rate the Germans +would have had about one submarine for every twenty miles. Instead of +finding themselves sailing amid a swarm of surface ships, as they were +when they were stationed in the busy trade routes of the Irish Sea or +the English Channel, the submarines would have found themselves drifting +on a great waste of waters. Our troop convoys averaged not more than +three a week even in the busiest period; in all probability the +submarines would therefore have hung around for a month without catching +a glimpse of one. Even if by some chance the patient vigil should +finally have been rewarded, it is extremely unlikely that the submarine +would ever have found a favourable opportunity to attack. We must keep +in mind that the convoy room at the Admiralty knew, within certain +limits, the location of submarines from day to day; any time one was +located in the track of a troop convoy, therefore, a wireless to the +convoy would have conveyed this information and directed it to reach the +coast of France by another route. + +At the beginning the speediest vessels only were used for transporting +troops. Ships which made less than twelve knots an hour were not deemed +safe for such precious cargoes; when the need for troops became more +and more pressing and when our transport service had demonstrated great +skill in the work, a few slower vessels were used; but the great +majority of our troop transports were those which made twelve knots or +more. Now one of the greatest protections which a ship possesses against +submarine attack is unquestionably high speed. A submarine makes only +eight knots when submerged--and it must submerge immediately if its +attack is to be successful. It must be within at least a mile of its +quarry when it discharges its torpedo; and most successful attacks were +made within three hundred yards. Now take a pencil and a piece of paper +and figure out what must be the location of a submarine, having a speed +of eight knots, when it sights a convoy, which makes twelve knots and +more, if it hopes to approach near enough to launch a torpedo. A little +diagramming will prove that the U-boat must be almost directly in line +of its hoped-for victim if it is to score a hit. But even though the god +of Chance should favour the enemy in this way, the likelihood of sinking +its prey would still be very remote. Like all convoys, the troopships +began zigzagging as soon as they entered the danger zone; and this in +itself made it almost impossible for a submarine to get its bearings and +take good aim. I believe that these circumstances in themselves--the +comparative scarcity of troop transports, the width of the "lane" in +which they travelled, the high speed which they maintained, and their +constant zigzagging, would have defeated most of the attempts which the +Germans could have made to torpedo them. Though I think that most of +them would have reached their destinations unharmed without any other +protection, still this risk, small as it was, could not be taken; and we +therefore gave them one other protection greater than any of those which +I have yet mentioned--the destroyer escort. A convoy of four or five +large troopships would be surrounded by as many as ten or a dozen +destroyers. Very properly, since they were carrying human cargoes, we +gave them an escort at least three times as large per vessel as that +given to large mercantile convoys of twenty or more vessels; and this +fact made them very uninviting baits for the most venturesome U-boat +commanders. + +When the engineers build a Brooklyn bridge they introduce an element +which they call the factor of safety. It is their usual procedure to +estimate the greatest weight which their structure may be called upon to +bear under any conceivable circumstances and then they make it strong +enough to stand a number of times that weight. This additional strength +is the "factor of safety"; it is never called into use, of course, but +the consciousness that it exists gives the public a sense of security +which it could obtain in no other way. We adopted a similar policy in +transporting these millions of American boys to Europe. We also had a +large margin of safety. We did not depend upon one precaution to assure +the lives of our soldiers; we heaped one precautionary measure on +another. From the embarking of the troops at New York or at Hampton +Roads to the disembarkation at Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, +or at one of their other destinations, not the minutest safeguard was +omitted. We necessarily thus somewhat diminished the protection of some +of the mercantile convoys--and properly so. This was done whenever the +arrival of a troop convoy conflicted with the arrival of a merchant +convoy. Also, until they reached the submarine zone, they were attended +by a cruiser or a battleship whose business it was to protect them +against a German raider which might possibly have made its escape into +the ocean; the work performed by these ocean escorts, practically all of +which were American, was for the most part unobtrusive and +unspectacular, but it constitutes a particularly fine example of +efficiency and seamanlike devotion. At Berehaven, Ireland, as described +above, we had stationed three powerful American dreadnoughts, +momentarily prepared to rush to the scene in case one of the great +German battle-cruisers succeeded in breaking into the open sea. Even the +most minute precautions were taken by the transports. + +The soldiers and crews were not permitted to throw anything overboard +which might betray the course of a convoy; the cook's refuse was dropped +at a particular time and in a way that would furnish no clue to a +lurking submarine; even a tin can, if thrown into the sea, was first +pierced with holes to make sure that it would sink. Anyone who struck a +match at night in the danger zone committed a punishable offence. It is +thus apparent why the Germans never "landed" a single one of our +transports. The records show only three or four cases in which even +attempts were made to do this; and those few efforts were feeble and +ineffectual. Of course, the boys all had exciting experiences with +phantom submarines; indeed I don't suppose that there is a single one of +our more than 2,000,000 troops who has not entertained his friends and +relatives with accounts of torpedo streaks and schools of U-boats. + +But the Germans made no concerted campaign against our transports; +fundamental conditions, already described, rendered such an offensive +hopeless; and the skill with which our transport service was organized +and conducted likewise dissuaded them. I have always believed that the +German Admiralty ordered their U-boat captains to let the American +transports alone; or at least not to attack except under very favourable +circumstances, and this belief is rather confirmed by a passage in +General Ludendorff's memoirs. "From our previous experience of the +submarine war," General Ludendorff writes, "I expected strong forces of +Americans to come, but the rapidity with which they actually did arrive +proved surprising. General von Cramon, the German military +representative at the Austro-Hungarian Headquarters, often called me up +and asked me to insist on the sinking of American troopships; public +opinion in Austria-Hungary demanded it. Admiral von Holtzendorff could +only reply that everything was being done to reduce enemy tonnage and to +sink troopships. It was not possible to direct the submarines against +troopships exclusively. They could approach the coasts of Europe +anywhere between the north of England and Gibraltar, a front of some +fourteen hundred nautical miles. It was impossible effectively to close +this area by means of submarines. One could have concentrated them only +on certain routes; but whether the troopships would choose the same +routes at the same time was the question. As soon as the enemy heard of +submarines anywhere he could always send the ships new orders by +wireless and unload at another port. It was, therefore, not certain that +by this method we should meet with a sufficient number of troopships. +The destruction of the enemy's freight tonnage would then have been +undertaken only spasmodically, and would have been set back in an +undesirable manner; and in that way the submarine war would have become +diverted from its original object. The submarine war against commerce +was therefore continued with all the vigour possible." + +Apparently it became the policy of the German Admiralty, as I have +said, to concentrate their U-boats on merchant shipping and leave the +American troopships practically alone--at least those bound to Europe. +Unfortunately, however, at no time did we have enough destroyers to +provide escorts for all of these transports as fast as they were +unloaded and ready to return to America, but as time in the "turn +around" was the all-important consideration in getting the troops over, +the transports were sent back through the submarine zone under the +escort of armed yachts, and occasionally not escorted at all. Under +these conditions the transports could be attacked with much less risk, +as was shown by the fact that five were torpedoed, though of these +happily only three were sunk. + + +III + +The position of the German naval chiefs, as is shown by the quotation +from General Ludendorff's book, was an extremely unhappy one. They had +blatantly promised the German people that their submarines would prevent +the transportation of American troops to Europe. At first they had +ridiculed the idea that undisciplined, unmilitary America could ever +organize an army; after we adopted conscription and began to train our +young men by the millions, they just as vehemently proclaimed that this +army could never be landed in Europe. In this opinion the German +military chieftains were not alone. No such army movement had ever +before been attempted. The discouraging forecast made by a brilliant +British naval authority in July, 1917, reflected the ideas of too many +military people on both sides of the ocean. "I am distressed," he said, +"at the fact that it appears to me to be impossible to provide enough +shipping to bring the American army over in hundreds of thousands to +France, and, after they are brought over, to supply the enormous amount +of shipping which will be required to keep them full up with munitions, +food, and equipment." + +It is thus not surprising that the German people accepted as gospel the +promises of their Admiralty; therefore their anger was unbounded when +American troops began to arrive. The German newspapers began to ask the +most embarrassing questions. What had become of their submarines? Had +the German people not been promised that their U-boats would sink any +American troopships that attempted to cross the ocean? As the shipments +increased, and as the effect of these vigorous fresh young troops began +to be manifest upon the Western Front, the outcries in Germany waxed +even more fierce and abusive. Von Capelle and other German naval chiefs +made rambling speeches in the Reichstag, once more promising their +people that the submarines would certainly win the war--speeches that +were followed by ever-increasing arrivals of American soldiers in +France. The success of our transports led directly to the fall of Von +Capelle as Minister of Marine; his successor, Admiral von Mann, who was +evidently driven to desperation by the popular outburst, decided to make +one frantic attempt to attack our men. The new minister, of course, knew +that he could accomplish no definite results; but the sinking of even +one transport with several thousand troops on board would have had a +tremendous effect upon German _moral_. When the great British liner +_Justicia_ was torpedoed, the German Admiralty officially announced that +it was the _Leviathan_, filled with American soldiers; and the +jubilation which followed in the German press, and the subsequent +dejection when it was learned that this was a practically empty +transport, sailing westward, showed that an actual achievement of this +kind would have raised their drooping spirits. Admiral von Mann, +therefore, took several submarines away from the trade routes and sent +them into the transport zone. But they did not succeed even in attacking +a single east-bound troopship. The only result accomplished was the one +which, from what I have already said, would have been expected; the +removal of the submarines from the commercial lane caused a great fall +in the sinking of merchant ships. In August, 1918, these sinkings +amounted to 280,000 tons; in September and October, when this futile +drive was made at American transports, the sinkings fell to 190,000 and +110,000 tons. + +Too much praise cannot be given to the commanders of our troop convoys +and the commanding officers of the troop transports, as well as the +commanders of the cruisers and battleships that escorted them from +America to the western edge of the submarine zone. The success of their +valuable services is evidence of a high degree not only of nautical +skill, judgment, and experience, but of the admirable seamanship +displayed under the very unusual conditions of steaming without lights +while continuously manoeuvring in close formation. Moreover, their +cordial co-operation with the escorts sent to meet them was everything +that could be desired. In this invaluable service these commanding +officers had the loyal and enthusiastic support of the admirable petty +officers and men whose initiative, energy, and devotion throughout the +war enabled us to accomplish results which were not only beyond our +expectations but which demonstrated that they are second to none in the +world in the qualities which make for success in war on the sea. + +On the whole, the safeguarding of American soldiers on the ocean was an +achievement of the American navy. Great Britain provided a slightly +larger amount of tonnage for this purpose than the United States; but +about 82 per cent. of the escorting was done by our own forces. The +cruiser escorts across the ocean to France were almost entirely +American; and the destroyer escorts through the danger zone were +likewise nearly all our own work. And in performing this great feat the +American navy fulfilled its ultimate duty in the war. The transportation +of these American troops brought the great struggle to an end. On the +battlefield they acquitted themselves in a way that aroused the +admiration of their brothers in the naval service. When we were reading, +day by day, the story of their achievements, when we saw the German +battle lines draw nearer and nearer to the Rhine, and, finally, when the +German Government raised its hands in abject surrender, the eighteen +months' warfare against the German submarines, in which the American +navy had been privileged to play its part, appeared in its true +light--as one of the greatest victories against the organized forces of +evil in all history. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[8] These figures are taken from the Annual Report of the Secretary of +the Navy for 1919, page 207. + + +THE END + + + + +APPENDIX I + +OFFICIAL AUTHORIZATION TO PUBLISH "THE VICTORY AT SEA" + + +U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND + +14 June 1919. + + From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S. Navy. + + To: The Secretary of the Navy. + + Subject: Requests Permission to Publish a Book on the Activities of + the U.S. Navy during The Great War. + + Reference (a): Paragraph 1534 of the Articles for the Government of + the Navy of the United States. + +1. In accordance with the provisions of reference (a) I request +authority to publish in my name a book descriptive of the activities of +the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters during The Great War. + +2. My object in preparing this book is to familiarize the American +people with the great work accomplished by the Navy during the war. It +will be a popular presentation written in a nontechnical style, +illustrated with photographs taken in Europe and various diagrams +indicating the nature of our activities. + +[s] WM. S. SIMS. + +9 July 1919. +APPROVED. +[s] Josephus Daniels. + + +HWS-MEF + +2nd Indorsement. +OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, +Washington, D.C. + +11 July 1919. + + From: Director of Naval Intelligence. + + To: President Naval War College. + + 1. Forwarded. + +[s] A. P. NIBLACK. + + +THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WASHINGTON + +June 26, 1919. + +MY DEAR ADMIRAL: + +I am sending you in the regular official course my approval of your +plan to print and publish a book relative to the operations of the naval +forces under your command during the great war. I am happy that you are +going to undertake this, because I am sure it will be of great value to +the Navy and of interest to the world. + +With sentiments of esteem and high regard, + +Sincerely yours, +[s] JOSEPHUS DANIELS. + +P.S. + +Of course any facilities or assistance that the Navy Department can +render you will be at your disposal. + +Rear-Admiral W. S. Sims, U.S.N., +President Naval War College, +Newport, Rhode Island. + + +_Extract from Navy Regulations, 1913, Article 1534_ + +"(2) No person belonging to the Navy or employed under the Navy +Department shall publish or cause or permit to be published, directly or +indirectly, or communicate by interviews, private letters, or otherwise, +except as required by his official duties, any information in regard to +the foreign policy of the United States, or concerning the acts or +measures of any department of the Government or of any officer acting +thereunder, or any comments or criticisms thereon; or the text of any +official instructions, reports, or letters upon any subject whatever, or +furnish copies thereof to any person, without the express permission of +the Navy Department. + +"(4) Nothing in this article shall be construed as prohibiting officers +from forwarding to the department, through official channels, +well-considered comment and suggestions with a view to promoting the +efficiency of the service and the public interests; on the contrary, +such suggestions are invited, but they should be in regard to things or +methods and not a criticism of persons, and should in all cases be +accompanied by a well-digested plan for improvement. Such suggestions, +if approved by the department, will be entered on the officer's record +and he will be duly notified to that effect." + + + + +APPENDIX II + +FIRST CABLE MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON + + +To: Secretary of the Navy. + +Sent April 14, 1917. +Through: State Department. + +File No. 25-9-2. + +The situation is as follows: + +The submarine issue is very much more serious than the people realize in +America. The recent success of operations and the rapidity of +construction constitute the real crisis of the war. The _moral_ of the +enemy submarines is not broken, only about fifty-four are known to have +been captured or sunk and no voluntary surrenders have been recorded. +The reports of our press are greatly in error. Recent reports circulated +concerning surrenders are simply to depreciate enemy _moral_ and results +are [not] very satisfactory. + +Supplies and communications of forces all fronts, including the +Russians, are threatened and control of the sea actually imperilled. + +German submarines are constantly extending their operations into the +Atlantic, increasing areas and the difficulty of patrolling. Russian +situation critical. Baltic fleet mutiny, eighty-five admirals, captains, +and commanders murdered, and in some armies there is insubordination. + +The amount of British, neutral and Allied shipping lost in February was +536,000 tons, in March, 517,000 tons, and in the first ten days of April +205,000 tons. With short nights and better weather these losses are +increasing. + +The British forces could not effectively prevent the escape of some +raiders during the long nights, but the chances are better now. + +The Allies were notified that hospital ships will continue to be sunk, +this in order to draw destroyers away from operations against submarines +to convoy hospital ships; in this way causing a large demand for large +convoy forces in all areas not before necessary, and also partially +immobilizing the main fleet. + +On account of the immense theatre and the length and number of lines of +communication, and the material deterioration resulting from three +years' continuous operation in distant fields with inadequate base +facilities, the strength of the naval forces is dangerously strained. +This applies to all of the sea forces outside of the Grand Fleet. The +enemy has six large and sixty-four small submarine mine-layers; the +latter carry eighteen mines and the former thirty-four, also torpedoes +and guns. All classes submarines for actual commission completed at a +rate approaching three per week. To accelerate and insure defeat of the +submarine campaign immediate active co-operation absolutely necessary. + +The issue is and must inevitably be decided at the focus of all lines of +communications in the Eastern Atlantic, therefore I very urgently +recommend the following immediate naval co-operation. + +Maximum number of destroyers to be sent, accompanied by small +anti-submarine craft; the former to patrol designated high seas area +westward to Ireland, based on Queenstown, with an advance base at Bantry +Bay, latter to be an inshore patrol for destroyers: small craft should +be of light draft with as high speed as possible but low speed also +useful. Also repair ships and staff for base. Oil and docks are +available but I advise sending continuous supply of fuel. German main +fleet must be contained, demanding maximum conservation of the British +main fleet. South of Scotland no base is so far available for this +force. + +At present our battleships can serve no useful purpose in this area, +except that two divisions of dreadnoughts might be based on Brest for +moral effect against anticipated raids by heavy enemy ships in the +channel out of reach of the British main fleet. + +The chief other and urgent practical co-operation is merchant tonnage +and a continuous augmentation of anti-submarine craft to reinforce our +advanced forces. There is a serious shortage of the latter craft. For +towing the present large amount of sailing tonnage through dangerous +areas sea-going tugs would be of great use. + +The co-operation outlined above should be expedited with the utmost +despatch in order to break the enemy submarine _moral_ and accelerate +the accomplishment of the chief American objective. + +It is very likely the enemy will make submarine mine-laying raids on our +coast or in the Caribbean to divert attention and to keep our forces +from the critical areas in the Eastern Atlantic through effect upon +public opinion. The difficulty of maintaining submarine bases and the +focussing of shipping on this side will restrict such operations to +minor importance, although they should be effectively opposed, +principally by keeping the Channel swept on soundings. Enemy submarine +mines have been anchored as deep as ninety fathoms but majority at not +more than fifty fathoms. Mines do not rise from the bottom to set depth +until from twenty-four to forty-eight hours after they have been laid. + +So far all experience shows that submarines never lay mines out of sight +of landmarks or lights on account of danger to themselves if location is +not known. Maximum augmentation merchant tonnage and anti-submarine work +where most effective constitute the paramount immediate necessity. + +Mr. Hoover informs that there is only sufficient grain supply in this +country for three weeks. This does not include the supply in retail +stores. In a few days Mr. Hoover will sail for the United States. + +SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX III + +FIRST DETAILED REPORT ON THE ALLIED NAVAL SITUATION + + +LONDON, ENGLAND. +April 19, 1917. + + From: Rear-Admiral Wm. S. Sims, U.S.N. + + To: Secretary of the Navy. + + Subject: Confirmation and elaboration of recent cablegrams + concerning War situation and recommendations for U.S. Naval + co-operation. + +1. _Reception_: + +My reception in this country has been exceptionally cordial and +significant of the seriousness of present situation and the importance +to be attached to the United States' entry into the war. + +I was met at Liverpool by Rear-Admiral Hope, R.N., a member of Admiral +Jellicoe's staff, and the Admiral of the Port, the former having been +sent by the Admiralty to escort me to London. A special train was +provided which made a record run, and within a few hours after arrival +in London I was received by the First Sea Lord and his principal +assistants in a special conference. + +2. _Conferences_: + +More or less hesitancy was noted at first in presenting a full statement +of the true situation, particularly (as it developed later) on account +of its seriousness, combined with a natural reluctance against appearing +to seek assistance, and a hesitancy in taking chances of allowing +information indirectly to reach the enemy, and thereby improve enemy +_moral_. + +I therefore positively took the position that I must be considered a +part of the Admiralty organization, and that it was essential to safe +and efficient co-operation that I be trusted with a full knowledge of +the exact situation. + +They finally consented, only after reference to the Imperial War +Council, to my exposing the true state of affairs both as regards the +military situation and rate of destruction of merchant shipping. + +I have had daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, both at his office +and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty +and access to all Government Officials. I have freely consulted with +such officials as the following: + +Prime Minister. + +First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson). + +Ministers of Munitions, Shipping, Trade, and other Cabinet officials. + +First Sea Lord, and his assistants. + +Chief of Naval Staff. + +Directors (corresponding to our Chiefs of Bureaus) of Intelligence, +Anti-submarine operations, Torpedoes, Mines, Mining, etc. + +3. _General Statement of the Situation_: + +Since the last declaration of the enemy Government, which from +intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine campaign against +merchant shipping of all Nations has resolved itself into the real issue +of the war and, stated briefly, the Allied Governments have not been +able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation presented. + +4. As stated in my first despatch, the communications and supplies to +all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the +"Command of the Sea" is actually at stake. + +5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine +menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as +probably those of the Department also, had been largely based upon Press +reports and reports of our Attaches and other professional Americans who +have been abroad during the War. All of this information has been either +rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form that it would +be of minimum assistance to enemy _moral_. + +6. The necessity for secrecy, which the British Government has +experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London, and even in the +Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have been remarkable and +unexpected leakages of information throughout the war. Certain neutral +legations of smaller countries are now under strong suspicion. + +7. The extent to which the submarine campaign is being waged is in +itself excellent evidence of the importance attached to it by the enemy, +and of the degree to which they counted, and still are counting, upon +it. + +The Intelligence Department has reliable information (as reliable as can +be) that the enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in +_two_ months through shortage of supplies. + +8. With improved weather and the shorter nights now coming on we may +expect even more enemy submarine success. + +9. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet was yesterday in conference +in the Admiralty as to what greater extent destroyers and auxiliaries of +the Fleet may be utilized without endangering its power in the remote +possibility of another fleet engagement. + +The consensus of opinion seems to be that the latter will not occur, but +there is not complete unanimity in this belief, and of course, in any +case, the possibility must be adequately and continuously provided +against. + +_General discussion of situation_: + +10. I delayed [four days] forwarding my first report of the situation +with a view of obtaining the maximum information consistent with the +importance of the time element. I was also somewhat deterred by a +natural reluctance to alter so radically my preconceived views and +opinions as to the situation. + +11. The evidence is conclusive that, regardless of any enemy diversions +such as raids on our coasts or elsewhere, the critical area in which the +war's decision will be made is in the eastern Atlantic at the focus of +all lines of communications. + +The known number of enemy submarines and their rate of construction, +allowing liberal factors for errors of information, renders it +inevitable that the main submarine effort must continue to be +concentrated in the above critical area. + +12. Even in this critical area, it is manifest that the field is +relatively large for the maximum number of submarines which the enemy +can maintain in it. For example, with the present Admiralty policy +(explained below) they are forced to cover all the possible trade routes +of approach between the north of Scotland and Ushant. + +13. From consideration of the above and all other essential information +available, it is apparent that the enemy could not disperse his main +submarine campaign into other quarters of the Globe without diminishing +results in this and all areas to a degree which would mean failure to +accomplish the Mission of the submarine campaign, which can be nothing +else than a final decision of the war. + +14. Considerable criticism has been, and still is, concentrated upon the +Admiralty for not taking more effective steps and for failing to produce +more substantial and visible results. One of the principal demands is +for convoys of merchant shipping, and more definite and real protection +within the war zone. + +The answer, which manifestly is not publicly known, is simply that the +necessary vessels are not available, and further that those which are +available are suffering from the effects of three years of arduous +service. + +15. It is insistently asked (was asked by myself) why shipping is not +directed to and concentrated at various rendezvous and from these +convoyed through the dangerous areas. The answer is the same--the area +is too large; the necessary vessels are not available. + +16. However, I am now consulting with the Director of Shipping as to the +practicability and advisability of attempting some approach to such a +plan in case the United States is able to put in operation sufficient +tonnage to warrant it. + +17. After trying various methods of controlling shipping, the Admiralty +now believes the best policy to be one of dispersion. They use about six +relatively large avenues or arcs of approach to the United Kingdom and +Channel, changing their limits or area periodically if necessity +demands. + +Generally speaking, one is to the north of Scotland, another to the +north of Ireland, and three or four others covering the Irish Sea and +Channel. Individual ships coming into any of these areas of approach are +instructed, generally before sailing, to cross the twentieth meridian at +certain and different latitudes and thence steer certain courses to +port. + +At times in the past they have found one of these avenues of approach +free of submarines under such conditions as to lead them to concentrate +shipping therein, but invariably the enemy has become aware of the +course pursued. + +18. The great difficulty in any method of shipping control is +communication with the shipping itself and full co-operation by the +merchant personnel. The moment a ship is captured the code either +becomes dangerous or useless. The merchant code is being continually +changed, and at all times it cannot be counted upon for more than a +fortnight. The immense difficulty of changing the code and keeping +shipping all over the world in touch with changes is apparent. + +19. Continual trouble is experienced with some merchant Captains taking +the law into their own hands and exhibiting contempt, or at least +indifference, for Admiralty instructions. The American Liner _New York_ +upon which I took passage furnishes a typical example. She was +instructed to make Fastnet Light at daylight but she passed it about +nine P.M., thus passing in daylight through the most dangerous +area. + +20. The Admiralty has had frequent conferences with Merchant masters and +sought their advice. Their most unanimous demand is "Give us a gun and +let us look out for ourselves." They are also insistent that it is +impracticable for merchant vessels to proceed in formation, at least in +any considerable numbers, due principally to difficulty in controlling +their speed and to the inexperience of their subordinate officers. With +this view I do not personally agree but believe that with a little +experience merchant vessels could safely and sufficiently well steam in +open formations. + +21. The best protection against the submarine menace for all classes of +ships, merchant as well as Naval, is SPEED and ZIGZAGGING, not more than +fifteen minutes on a course. Upon this point no one disagrees, but on +the contrary there is absolutely unanimity of opinion. + +22. In the absence of adequate patrol craft, _particularly destroyers_, +and until the enemy submarine _moral_ is broken, there is but one sure +method of meeting the submarine issue upon which there is also complete +unanimity--increased number of merchant bottoms, preferably small. + +"More Ships! More Ships! More Ships!" is heard on every hand. + +23. It is also significant that until very recently the Admiralty have +been unable completely to convince some members of the Cabinet that the +submarine issue is the deciding factor in the War. The civilian mind, +here as at home, is loath to believe in unseen dangers, particularly +until the pinch is felt in real physical ways. + +24. The Prime Minister only two days ago expressed to me the opinion +that it ought to be possible to find physical means of absolutely +sealing up all escape for submarines from their own ports. The fact that +all such methods (nets, mines, obstructions, etc.) inherently involve +the added necessity of continuous protection and maintenance by our own +Naval forces is seldom understood and appreciated. I finally convinced +the Prime Minister of the fallacy of such propositions by describing the +situations into which we would be led: namely, that in order to maintain +our obstructions we would have to match the forces the enemy brought +against them, until finally the majority if not all of our forces would +be forced into dangerous areas where they would be subject to continual +torpedo and other attack, in fact in a position most favourable to the +enemy. + +25. Entirely outside of the fact that the enemy does, and always can, +force exits, and thereby nullify the close blockade, the weather is a +serious added difficulty. The heaviest anchors obtainable have been used +for nets, mines, and obstructions, only to have the arduous work of +weeks swept away in a few hours of heavy weather. Moorings will not +hold. They chafe through. In this respect we could be of great +assistance, i.e. in supply of moorings and buoys. + +26. The Channel is not now, and never has been, completely sealed +against submarine egress, let alone the vaster areas of escape to the +north. Submarines have gone under mine-fields, and have succeeded in +unknown ways in evading and cutting through nets and obstructions. + +27. In addition to submarines, heavy forces are free to raid, and in +fact escape through, the Channel at any time when the enemy decides that +the necessity or return will justify the risk. Hence the suggestion that +two divisions of our fast Dreadnoughts might be based upon Brest, +primarily for the resulting moral effect against such possible raids. + +I was told yesterday by an important Admiralty official that while he +thought the chances of raids in, or escape through, the Channel by heavy +enemy forces out of reach of the Grand Fleet (North of Scotland) were +very remote, nevertheless the possibility existed and was principally +thwarted on moral grounds, that is, the uncertainty in his mind of the +opposition which would be encountered. He agreed with others, including +the First Sea Lord, that the addition of some of our heavy forces to +those maintained in southern Channel approaches by the French and +British would undoubtedly entirely preclude the possibility of such +raids. + +28. _Submarine Losses_: + +It has been found necessary to accept _no_ reports of submarine losses +as authentic and certain unless survivors are captured or the submarine +itself is definitely located by dragging. No dependence even is placed +upon evidence of oil on the surface after a submarine has been attacked +and forced down, as there is reason to believe that when an enemy +submarine dives to escape gunfire she is fitted to expel oil for the +particular purpose of conveying the impression that she has been sunk +and thereby avoid further pursuit. It has been shown that the amount of +damage a submarine can stand is surprising and much more than was +anticipated before the experience of the war. Upon a recent occasion a +British submarine was mistaken for an enemy and though struck by several +shells, dived and escaped to port. + +The submarine losses which are certain since outbreak of war are as +given in attached cablegram. + +It is estimated that between thirty and forty submarines operate at a +time in the waters surrounding the British Islands and French Coast. At +least one is now known to be on White Sea trade lanes. + +29. _Best anti-submarine weapons_: + +One of the most efficient weapons now used by all destroyers and patrol +craft against submarines is the so-called "Depth Charge," sample and +drawings of which have been forwarded by our Naval Attache. These are +merely explosive charges designed to explode at a certain depth, +formerly eighty feet, now about one hundred feet. They are dropped +overboard where a submarine that has submerged is assumed to be and are +counted upon to badly shake up and demoralize if they do not actually +cause serious damage. + +Howitzers and Bomb-throwers of large calibre are under construction, +designed to throw similar depth charges to distances of about 2,000 +yards. Details will be forwarded. + +30. _Torpedo Protection_: + +This subject may be summed up by the statement of the Captain of a +British Dreadnought who said in effect that after a year's experience he +did not fear being sunk by a torpedo. Unless struck by several the worst +to be anticipated is damage to shafts or rudder, thus necessitating +towing. Cruisers have often been struck and been able to reach port. +Vital water-tight doors are kept continuously closed at sea. + +Destroyer officers have been heard to express the curious opinion that +the enemy ships were more or less unsinkable. This is probably to be +explained by the fact that they carry very few supplies; that they have +their storage spaces compartmented or filled with wood or other +water-excluding material; and that when in port, they quarter their +crews in barracks, and when leaving for a cruise carry the minimum +amount of berthing and supply facilities. These points, however, are not +positively known. + +On the contrary, all vessels of the British Fleet must be kept fully +supplied and fuelled at all times for extended cruising. This is +particularly true of Battle-cruisers and Cruisers. + +31. All officers of rank and actual experience consulted are convinced +that the enemy have no unusual methods of protection, or in fact any +"surprises" in ordnance or other fighting equipment. + +32. All are agreed that the best protection against torpedoes is SPEED +and ZIGZAGGING. + +33. It is a common experience of the Naval as well as Merchant service +that torpedo wakes are reported where none exist. Many reports are +received of torpedoes barely missing ships. This was true in the Jutland +Battle. The Captain on one Battleship said that he received numerous +reports of torpedoes passing just ahead and just astern, nearly all of +which he had reason to believe did not exist. + +Streaks of suds, slicks, etc., are very deceiving and are easily +mistaken for torpedo wakes, particularly when the danger of torpedoes is +present. This accounts for many reports by passengers on liners and +other merchant craft of seeing many torpedoes just miss their mark. + +34. _Submarine versus Submarine_: + +There has always been opposition to using submarines against submarines, +principally on the grounds that the possibilities of their +accomplishments would not be sufficiently great to justify the risk +involved of mistaken identity and resulting damage to friends. + +The Director of Anti-Submarine Warfare believes, however, that such +operations promise well, and the experiment is now being tried with as +many submarines as can be spared from the Grand Fleet. Some enemy +submarines have been destroyed by this method, usually torpedoed. One +valuable feature of this method lies in the fact that as long as our +submarines are not so used, the enemy submarine is always perfectly safe +in assuming that all submarines sighted are friends. If this certainty +is removed the enemy will be forced to keep down more, and to take much +greater precautions against detection. This is an advantage of no small +account. + +In addition to the possible offensive work that may be accomplished by +our submarines on such duty, the plan furnishes us with more reliable +information as to the limitations and capabilities of enemy vessels +under the actual conditions existing in the areas in which they operate. +Without this knowledge based on actual experience too much is left to +conjecture which is liable to lead to a great deal of misdirected +effort. + +(Signed) WM. S. SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX IV + +THE QUESTION OF ARMING MERCHANT SHIPS + + + To: Secretary of the Navy. + + Through Admiralty. From Queenstown. + + Sent: June 28, 1917. + + Admiralty for Secretary Navy Washington, providing it meets + Admiralty's full approval. + + From Admiral Sims. + +Referring to Department's opinion, reported in last two cables, to the +effect that adequate armament and trained crews constitute one of the +most effective defensive anti-submarine measures, I again submit with +all possible stress the following based on extended [Allied] war +experience. The measures demanded, if enemy defeat in time is to be +assured, are not defensive but offensive defensive. The merchantman's +inherent weakness is lack of speed and protection. Guns are no defence +against torpedo attack without warning, which is necessarily the enemy +method of attack against armed ships. In this area alone during the last +six weeks thirty armed ships were sunk by torpedoes without submarine +being seen, although three of these were escorted each by a single +destroyer. The result would of course have been the same no matter how +many guns these ships carried or what their calibre. Three mystery +ships, heavily manned by expert naval crews with much previous +experience with submarine attack, have recently been torpedoed without +warning. Another case within the month of mystery ship engaging +submarine with gunfire at six thousand yards but submarine submerged and +approached unseen and torpedoed ship at close range. The ineffectiveness +of heaviest batteries against submarine attack is conclusively shown by +Admiralty's practice always sending destroyers to escort their +men-of-war. The comparative immunity of the relatively small number +American ships, especially liners, is believed here to be due to the +enemy's hopes that the pacifist movement will succeed. Cases are on +record of submarines making successful gun attacks from advantageous sun +position against armed ships without ship being able to see submarine. +I submit that if submarine campaign is to be defeated it must be by +offensive measures. The enemy submarine mission must be destruction of +shipping and avoidance of anti-submarine craft. Enemy submarines are now +using for their final approach an auxiliary periscope less than two +inches in diameter. This information just acquired. All of the +experience in this submarine campaign to date demonstrates that it would +be a seriously dangerous misapprehension to base our action on the +assumption that any armament on merchantmen is any protection against +submarines which are willing to use their torpedoes. The British have +now definitely decided the adoption, to the maximum practicable extent, +convoys from sixteen to twenty ships. This is an offensive measure +against submarines, as the latter will be subject to the attack of our +anti-submarine craft whenever they come within torpedoing distance of +convoyed merchantmen. Moreover it permits of concentrated attack by our +forces and obliges the enemy to disperse his forces to cover the various +routes of approach. + +Concerning Department's reference to a scheme for protection of merchant +shipping which will not interfere with present escort duties, I submit +that the time element alone prevents utilization of any new +anti-submarine invention. The campaign may easily be lost before any +such schemes can come into effective operation. The enemy is certainly +counting on maximum effort being exerted before long nights and bad +weather of autumn, that is, in next three months. Heaviest effort may be +anticipated in July and August. I again submit that protection of our +coastlines and of Allied shipping must necessarily be carried out in +field of enemy activity if it is to be effective. The mission of the +Allies must be to force submarines to give battle. Hence no operations +in home waters should take precedence over, or be allowed to diminish, +the maximum effort we can exert in area in which enemy is operating, and +must continue to operate in order to succeed. + +SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX V + +THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONVOY SYSTEM + + + LONDON, + June 29, 1917. + + From: Commander U.S. Naval Forces operating in European Waters. + + To: Secretary of the Navy (Operations). + + Subject: General report concerning military situation. + +1. I feel that there is little to add to my recent cable despatches +which, in view of the importance of the time element, have been made +full and detailed. + +2. To sum up my despatches briefly, I would repeat that I consider that +the military situation is very grave indeed on account of the success of +the enemy submarine campaign. + +If the shipping losses continue as they have during the past four +months, it is submitted that the Allies will be forced to dire straits +indeed, if they will not actually be forced into an unsatisfactory +peace. + +The present rate of destruction is very much greater than the rate of +building, and the shortage of tonnage is already so great that the +efficiency of the naval forces is already reduced by lack of oil. Orders +have just been given to use three-fifths speed, except in cases of +emergency. This simply means that the enemy is winning the war. + +3. My reasons for being so insistent in my cable despatches have been +because of my conviction that measures of co-operation which we may take +will be inefficient if they are not put into operation immediately, that +is, within a month. + +There is every reason to believe that the maximum enemy submarine effort +will occur between now and the first of November, reaching its height +probably during the latter part of July, if not earlier. + +4. There is certainly no sovereign solution for the submarine menace +except through well-established methods of warfare based upon +fundamental military principles. + +5. It is submitted that the cardinal military principle of +concentration of effort is at present being pursued by the enemy and +not by the Allies. + +6. We are dispersing our forces while the enemy is concentrating his. +The enemy's submarine mission is and must continue to be the destruction +of merchant shipping. The limitations of submarines and the distances +over which they must operate prevent them from attacking our naval +forces, that is, anti-submarine craft. They cannot afford to engage +anti-submarine craft with guns; they must use torpedoes. If they should +do so to any considerable extent their limited supply would greatly +reduce their period of operation away from base, and the number of +merchantmen they could destroy. Their object is to avoid contact with +anti-submarine craft. This they can almost always do, as the submarine +can see the surface craft at many times the distance the surface craft +can see a periscope, particularly one less than two inches in diameter. + +Moreover, the submarine greatly fears the anti-submarine craft because +of the great danger of the depth charges. Our tactics should therefore +be such as to force the submarine to incur this danger in order to get +within range of merchantmen. + +7. It therefore seems to go without question that the only course for us +to pursue is to revert to the ancient practice of convoy. This will be +purely an offensive measure, because if we concentrate our shipping into +convoys and protect it with our naval forces we will thereby force the +enemy, in order to carry out his mission, to encounter naval forces +which are not embarrassed with valuable cargoes, and which are a great +danger to the submarine. At present our naval forces are wearing down +their personnel and material in an attempted combination of escorting +single ships, when they can be picked up, and also of attempting to seek +and offensively engage an enemy whose object is to avoid such +encounters. With the convoy system the conditions will be reversed. +Although the enemy may easily know when our convoys sail, he can never +know the course they will pursue or the route of approach to their +destinations. Our escorting forces will thus be able to work on a +deliberate prearranged plan, preserving their oil supplies and energy, +while the enemy will be forced to disperse his forces and seek us. In a +word, the handicap we now labour under will be shifted to the enemy; we +will have adopted the essential principal of concentration while the +enemy will lose it. + +8. The most careful and thorough study of the convoy system made by the +British Admiralty shows clearly that while we may have some losses under +this system, owing to lack of adequate number of anti-submarine craft, +they nevertheless will not be critical as they are at present. + +9. I again submit that if the Allied campaign is to be viewed as a +whole, there is no necessity for any high sea protection on our own +coast. The submarine as a type of war vessel possesses no unusual +characteristics different from those of other naval craft, with the +single exception of its ability to submerge for a limited time. The +difficulty of maintaining distant bases is the same for the submarine as +it is for other craft. As long as we maintain control of the sea as far +as surface craft are concerned, there can be no fear of the enemy +establishing submarine bases in the Western Hemisphere. + +10. To take an extreme illustration, if the enemy could be led or forced +into diverting part of his submarine effort to the United States coast, +or to any other area distant from the critical area surrounding the +coast of France and the United Kingdom, the anti-submarine campaign +would at once be won. The enemy labours under severe difficulties in +carrying out his campaign, even in this restricted area, owing to the +material limitations and the distances they must operate from their +bases, through extremely dangerous localities. The extent of the United +States coastline and the distances between its principal commercial +ports preclude the possibility of any submarine effort in that part of +the world except limited operations of diversion designed to affect +public opinion, and thereby hold our forces from the vital field of +action. + +11. The difficulties confronting the convoy system are, of course, +considerable. They are primarily involved in the widely dispersed ports +of origin of merchant shipping; the difficulty of communication by +cable; the time involved by communications by mail; and the difficulties +of obtaining a co-operation and co-ordination between Allied +Governments. + +As reported by cable despatch, the British Government has definitely +reached the decision to put the convoy system into operation as far as +its ability goes. Convoys from Hampton Roads, Canada, Mediterranean, and +Scandinavian countries are already in operation. Convoys from New York +will be put in operation as soon as ships are available. The British +navy is already strained beyond its capacity, and I therefore urgently +recommend that we co-operate, at least to the extent of handling convoys +from New York. + +12. The dangers to convoys from high sea raiders is remote, but, of +course, must be provided against, and hence the necessity for escorting +cruisers or reserve battleships. The necessity is even greater, however, +for anti-submarine craft in the submarine war zone. + +13. As stated in my despatches, the arming of merchantmen is not a +solution of the submarine menace, it serves the single purpose of +forcing the submarine to use torpedoes instead of guns and bombs. The +facts that men-of-war cannot proceed safely at sea without escort, and +that in the Queenstown avenue of approach alone in the past six weeks +there have been thirty armed merchantmen sunk, without having seen the +submarine at all before the attack, seem to be conclusive evidence. A +great mass of other evidence and war experience could be collected in +support of the above. + +14. The week ending June 19th has been one of great submarine activity. +Evidence indicates that fifteen to nineteen of the largest and latest +submarines have been operating, of which ten to thirteen were operating +in the critical area to the west and south-west of the British Isles. +The above numbers are exclusive of the smaller and earlier type of +submarines, and submarines carrying mines alone. Two submarines are +working to the westward of the Straits of Gibraltar. A feature of the +week was the sinking of ships as far west as nineteen degrees. Three +merchant ship convoys are en route from Hampton Roads, the last one, +consisting of eighteen ships, having sailed on the 19th of June. One +hundred and sixteen moored mines have been swept up during the week. + +Twenty-two reports of encounters with enemy submarines in waters +surrounding the United Kingdom have been reported during the week--three +by destroyers, two by cruisers, two by mystery ships, one by French +gunboat, three by submarines, nine by auxiliary patrol vessels, one by +seaplane, and one by merchant vessel. + +There is attached copy of report of operations by anti-submarine craft +based on Queenstown. + +(Signed) WM. S. SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX VI + +THE NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY + + + From: Secretary of Navy. + + To: Vice-Admiral Sims, U.S.S. _Melville_. + + Received: July 10, 1917. + +The following letter from the Secretary to the Secretary of State is +quoted for your information and guidance as an index of the policy of +the Department in relation to the co-operation of our naval forces with +those of our Allies. Quote: After careful consideration of the present +naval situation taken in connection with possible future situations +which might arise, the Department is preparing to announce as its +policy, in so far as it relates to the Allies. First, the most hearty +co-operation with the Allies to meet the present submarine situation in +European or other waters compatible with an adequate defence of our own +home waters. Second, the most hearty co-operation with the Allies to +meet any future situation arising during the present war period. Third, +the realization that while a successful termination of the present war +must always be the first Allied aim, and will probably result in +diminished tension throughout the world, the future position of the +United States must in no way be jeopardized by any disintegration of our +main fighting fleet. Fourth, the conception that the present main +military role of the United States naval force lies in its safeguarding +the line of communications of the Allies. In pursuing this aim there +will be generally speaking two classes of vessels engaged: minor craft +and major craft, and two roles of action, first, offensive and, second, +defensive. Fifth, in pursuing the role set forth in paragraph four, the +Department cannot too strongly insist on its opinion that the offensive +must always be the dominant note in any general plans of strategy +prepared. But as the primary role in all offensive preparations must +perforce belong to the Allied powers, the Navy Department announces as +its policy that in general it is willing to accept any joint plan of +action of the Allies deemed necessary to meet immediate need. Sixth, +pursuant to the above general policy, the Navy Department announces as +its general plan of action the following: One, its willingness to send +its minor fighting forces, composed of destroyers, cruisers, submarine +chasers, auxiliaries in any number not incompatible with home needs, and +to any field of action deemed expedient by the joint Allied Admiralties +which would not involve a violation of our present state policy. Two, +its unwillingness as a matter of policy to separate any division from +the main fleet for service abroad, although it is willing to send the +entire battleship fleet abroad to act as a united but co-operating unit +when, after joint consultations of all Admiralties concerned, the +emergency is deemed to warrant it and the extra tension imposed upon the +line of communications due to the increase of fighting ships in European +waters will stand the strain imposed upon it. Three, its willingness to +discuss more fully plans for joint operations. End of Quote 11009. + +(Sd) JOSEPHUS DANIELS. + + + + +APPENDIX VII + +COMMENTS UPON NAVY DEPARTMENT'S POLICY + + + Office Vice-Admiral, Commanding + U.S. Destroyer Forces + European Waters. + LONDON, + July 16, 1917. + + From: Vice-Admiral Sims. + + To: Secretary of the Navy. + + Subject: Concerning Policy of U.S. Naval co-operation in war, and + allied subjects. + +1. The Department's cablegram of July 10, 1917, quoting a letter which +had been addressed to the Secretary of State concerning naval policy in +relation to the present war, was received on July 10th. + +In view of the nature of certain parts of the policy set forth therein, +I wish to indicate the general policy which has heretofore governed my +recommendation. + +2. I have assumed that our mission was to promote the maximum +co-operation with the Allies in defeating a common enemy. + +All of my despatches and recommendations have been based on the firm +conviction that the above mission could and would be accomplished, and +that hence such questions as the possibility of post war situations, or +of all or part of the Allies being defeated and America being left +alone, were not given consideration--in fact, I cannot see how we could +enter into this war whole-heartedly if such considerations were allowed +to diminish in any way the chances of Allied success. + +3. The first course open to us which naturally occurs to mind is that we +should look upon our service as part of the combined Allied service, of +which the British Grand Fleet is the main body, and all other Allied +naval forces disposed throughout the world, as necessary branches +thereof. + +This conception views our battleship fleet as a support or reserve of +the Allied main body (the British Grand Fleet) and would lead to +utilizing our other forces to fill in weak spots and to strengthen +Allied lines, both offensively and defensively, wherever necessary. + +Such a course might be considered as a disintegration of our fleet, and +it is only natural, therefore, that hesitation and caution should be +felt in its adoption. + +4. I have felt, however, that it was possible to accomplish our mission +without in any way involving the so-called disintegration of our fleet +as a whole. + +In the first instance I have assumed that our aim would be to project, +or prepare to project, our maximum force against the enemy offensively. + +5. An estimate of the situation shows clearly that the enemy is +depending for success upon breaking down the Allies' lines of +communications by virtue of the submarine campaign. + +A necessary part of such a plan is to divert strength from the main +fleet and from anti-submarine operations by such means as coastal raids, +threats of landing operations, air raids, and attacks on hospital ships, +which last necessitates destroyer escort for such vessels. + +The submarine campaign itself, while it is of necessity concentrated +primarily on the most vital lines of communications, is nevertheless +carried out in such a manner as to lead the Allies to disperse, and not +concentrate, their inadequate anti-submarine Forces. + +The Allies are, of course, forced to contemplate at all times, and hence +provide against, the possibility of another main fleet action. + +6. A study of the submarine situation, the number of submarines +available to the enemy, and the necessary lines of the Allies' +communications, for both Army and Navy as well as civil needs, shows +clearly that the enemy must direct his main effort in certain restricted +areas. + +These areas, as has repeatedly been reported, are included approximately +in a circle drawn from about Ushant to the north of Scotland. The most +effective field for enemy activity is, of course, close into the Irish +Sea and Channel approaches, where all lines must focus. + +But, as stated above, the enemy also attacks occasionally well out to +sea and in other dispersed areas with a view of scattering the limited +anti-submarine forces available. + +It therefore seems manifest that the war not only is, but must remain, +in European waters, in so far as success or failure is concerned. + +7. Speaking generally, but disregarding for the moment the question of +logistics, our course of action, in order to throw our main strength +against the enemy, would be to move all our forces, including the +battleship fleet, into the war area. + +8. In view of the nature of the present sea warfare as effected by the +submarine, such a movement by the battleships would necessitate a large +force of light craft--much larger than our peace establishment provided. +In addition to all destroyers, adequate protection of the fleet would +require all other available light craft in the service, or which could +be commandeered and put into service--that is, submarines, armed tugs, +trawlers, yachts, torpedo boats, revenue cutters, mine-layers and +mine-sweepers, and in fact any type of small craft which could be used +as protective or offensive screens. + +9. In view of the shipping situation, as affected by the submarine +campaign, it has been impossible to date to see in what way our +battleships could be supplied in case they were sent into the war area. +This refers particularly to oil-burning vessels. It would therefore seem +unwise to recommend such a movement until we could see clearly far +enough ahead to ensure the safety of the lines of communication which +such a force would require. + +10. It is to be observed, however, that even in case the decision were +made to move the battleships into the war area, it would unavoidably be +greatly delayed both in getting together the necessary screening forces +and also in getting such craft across the Atlantic. + +In the meantime, and while awaiting a decision as to the movements of +the battleship fleet, the submarine campaign has become so intensive, +and the available anti-submarine craft have been so inadequate to meet +it, that the necessity for increasing the anti-submarine forces in the +war area to the maximum possible extent has become imperative. + +11. As long, therefore, as the enemy fleet is contained by the stronger +British fleet in a position of readiness, it would not seem a +disintegration of our fleet to advance into the war area all the light +craft of every description which would necessarily have to accompany the +fleet in case it should be needed in this area. + +Such movements of the light craft would not in any way separate them +strategically from the battleships, as they would be operating between +the enemy and our own main body and based in a position to fall back as +the main body approached, or to meet it at an appointed place. This +advance of light forces, strategically, would mean no delay whatever to +our heavy forces, should the time come for their entry into the active +war zone. + +12. Another very important consideration is the fact that, pending the +movement of the battleships themselves, all of the light forces would be +gaining valuable war experience and would be the better prepared for +operations of any nature in the future, either in connection with the +fleet itself or independently. + +It is also considered that it would not constitute a disintegration of +our fleet to advance into the war zone, in co-operation with the British +Grand Fleet or for other duty, certain units of our battleship fleet. +These would merely constitute units advanced for purpose of enemy +defeat, and which would always be in a position to fall back on the main +part of our Fleet, or to join it as it approached the war zone. + +It is for this reason that I recommended, on July 7, 1917, that all +coal-burning dreadnoughts be kept in readiness for distant service in +case their juncture with the Grand Fleet might be deemed advisable in +connection with unexpected enemy developments. + +It would, of course, be preferable to advance the entire fleet providing +adequate lines of communications could be established to ensure their +efficient operation. At the present time there is a sufficient coal +supply in England to supply our coal-burning dreadnoughts, but the oil +would be a very difficult problem as it must be brought in through the +submarine zone. + +When notified that the _Chester_, _Birmingham_, and _Salem_ were +available for duty in the war area, I recommended, after consultation +with the Admiralty, that they join the British Light Cruiser Squadrons +in the North Sea, where there is always a constant demand for more +ships, especially to oppose enemy raiding and other operations aimed at +dispersing the Allied sea forces. + +In view of the Department's reference to the Gibraltar situation, and +also in consideration of the sea-keeping qualities of the seven gunboats +of the _Sacramento_ class, it was recommended that they be based on +Gibraltar for duty in assisting to escort convoys clear of the Straits, +and particularly as this would release some British destroyers which are +urgently needed in critical areas to the northward. + +13. The Department's policy, as contained in its letter to the Secretary +of State, refers in the first statement to an adequate defence of our +own home waters. It would seem to be sound reasoning that the most +effective defence which can be afforded to our home waters is an +offensive campaign against the enemy which threatens those waters. Or in +other words, that the place for protection of home waters is the place +in which protection is necessary--that is, where the enemy is operating +and must continue to operate in force. + +As has been stated in numerous despatches, it is considered that home +waters are threatened solely in the submarine zone--in fact are being +attacked solely in that zone, and must continue to be attacked therein +if the enemy is to succeed against us as well as against the European +Entente. + +The number of available enemy submarines is not unlimited, and the +difficulties of obtaining and maintaining bases are fully as difficult +for submarine as for surface craft. + +The difficulties experienced by enemy submarines en route and in +operating as far from their bases as they now do are prodigious. + +Operations on our coast without a base are impracticable, except by very +limited numbers for brief periods, purely as diversions. + +In view of our distance from enemy home bases, the extent of our +coastline, and the distances between our principal ports, it is a safe +assumption that if we could induce the enemy to shift the submarine war +area to our coasts his defeat would be assured, and his present success +would be diminished more than in proportion to the number of submarines +he diverted from the more accessible area where commerce necessarily +focuses. + +14. The Department's policy refers to willingness to extend hearty +co-operation to the Allies, and to discuss plans for joint operations, +and also to its readiness to consider any plans which may be submitted +by the joint Allied Admiralties. + +15. I submit that it is impossible to carry out this co-operation, to +discuss plans with the various Admiralties, except in one way--and that +is, to establish what might be termed an advance headquarters in the war +zone composed of Department representatives upon whose recommendations +the Department can depend. + +I refer to exactly the same procedure as is now carried out in the +army--that is, the General Headquarters in the field being the advance +headquarters of the War Department at home, and the advance headquarters +must of necessity be left a certain area of discretion and freedom of +action as concerns the details of the measures necessitated by the +military situations as they arise. + +16. The time element is one of the most vital of all elements which +enter into military warfare, and hence delays in communications by +written reports, together with the necessity for secrecy, render it very +difficult to discuss plans at long range. The enemy secret service has +proved itself to be of extraordinary efficiency. + +Moreover, I believe it to be very unsafe to depend upon discussion of +military plans by cable, as well as by letter. The necessary inadequacy +of written or cable communications needs no discussion. The +opportunities for misunderstandings are great. It is difficult to be +sure that one has expressed clearly one's meaning in writing, and hence +phrases in a letter are very liable to misinterpretation. They cannot +explain themselves. + +17. One of the greatest military difficulties of this war, and perhaps +of all Allied wars, has been the difficulty of co-ordination and +co-operation in military effort. I am aware of a great mass of +information in this connection which it is practically impossible to +impart except by personal discussion. + +It is unquestionable that efficiency would be greatly improved if _any +one_ of the Allies--Italy, France, England, or the United States--were +selected to direct all operations, the others merely keeping the one +selected fully informed of their resources available, and submitting to +complete control and direction in regard to the utilization of these +resources. + +18. If the above considerations are granted, it then becomes necessary +to decide as to the best location in which to establish such advanced +headquarters, or what might be called an advance branch war council at +the front--that is, an advanced branch upon whose advice and decisions +the War Council itself largely depends. + +I fully realize the pressure and the influences which must have been +brought to bear upon the Department from all of the Allies, and from +various and perhaps conflicting sources. + +I also realize that my position here in England renders me open to +suspicion that I may be unduly influenced by the British viewpoint of +the war. It should be unnecessary to state that I have done everything +within my ability to maintain a broad viewpoint with the above stated +mission constantly in mind. + +19. From the _naval_ point of view it would seem evident that London is +the best and most central location in the war area for what I have +termed above the Advance Branch of our Naval War Council. + +The British navy, on account of its size alone, is bearing the brunt of +the naval war, and hence all naval information concerning the war +therefore reaches and centres in London. + +It will be quite possible for all of our advanced headquarters staff, or +parts or divisions thereof, to visit Paris and other Allied Admiralties +at any time. + +I wish to make it quite clear that up to date it has been wholly +impossible for me, with one military Aide, to perform all of the +functions of such an advanced branch of the Department. + +As stated in my despatches, it has been evident for some time that I +have been approaching a state in which it would be physically impossible +to handle the work without an increase of staff. + +The present state of affairs is such that it is quite within range of +possibility for serious errors to occur which may involve disaster to +our ships, due to the physical impossibility of handling the +administrative and other work with the thoroughness which is essential +to safety. + +20. I consider that a very minimum staff which would be required is +approximately as follows. More officers could be well employed with +resulting increase of efficiency: + + (1) One Chief of Staff, who should be free to carry on a +continuous estimate of the situation, based upon all necessary +information. He would be given the freedom of the Operations Department +of the British and French Admiralties. + + (2) An officer, preferably of the rank of commander, for duties in + connection with shipping and convoy to handle all the numerous + communications in relation to the movements of American shipping, + particularly military shipping, and also other shipping carrying + American troops. + + (3) An officer, at least a lieutenant-commander, for duties in + connection with Anti-Submarine Division operations in order to + insure perfect co-operation in that field of work between our + service and other Allied Services. + + (4) An officer of all-round ability and discretion for duties in + connection with general military intelligence. He should be in + constant touch with the Secret Service Departments of the + Admiralties to insure that all military intelligence, which in any + way affects the Navy Department or our Forces, is properly and + promptly acted upon. + + (5) At least two lieutenants or lieutenant-commanders of the line + in my own office in connection with general administrative + questions in addition to the one now available. The necessity for + these additional officers is imperative. + + (6) One communication officer to take general charge of codes and + communications both with the Department at home, the Allied + Admiralties, and with the various bases of our Forces in the war + area. (At present Queenstown, Brest, Bordeaux, St. Nazaire, London, + and Paris.) + + (7) A paymaster to have complete charge of all financial matters + connected with our naval organization abroad. This officer should + be in addition to Paymaster Tobey, who is performing necessary and + invaluable service on my staff in connection with all logistic + questions. + +(Signed) WM. S. SIMS. + + + + +APPENDIX VIII + +MONTHLY LOSSES SINCE FEBRUARY, 1917, FROM ENEMY ACTION + + +During the twenty-one months of unrestricted submarine warfare from +February, 1917, to October, 1918, inclusive, 3,843 merchant vessels +(British fishing vessels included) of a total gross tonnage of 8,478,947 +have been sunk by enemy action, a monthly average of 183 vessels +totalling 403,760 gross tons. The October tonnage losses show a decrease +from this average of 291,333 gross tons, or 72 per cent. + +The following gives the tonnage losses by months from February, 1917, to +October, 1918, inclusive: + +=========+===========+==============+==========+==========+========= + | British | Other Allied | Neutral | British | +Period. | Merchant | Merchant | Merchant | Fishing | Total. + | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | +---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- + 1917 | | | | | +February | 313,486 | 84,820 | 135,090 | 3,478 | 536,334 +March | 353,478 | 81,151 | 165,225 | 3,586 | 603,440 +April | 545,282 | 134,448 | 189,373 | 5,920 | 875,023 +May | 352,289 | 102,960 | 137,957 | 1,448 | 594,654 +June | 417,925 | 126,171 | 139,229 | 1,342 | 684,667 +July | 364,858 | 111,683 | 70,370 | 2,736 | 549,647 +August | 329,810 | 128,489 | 53,018 | 242 | 511,559 +September| 196,212 | 119,086 | 29,941 | 245 | 345,484 +October | 276,132 | 127,932 | 54,432 | 227 | 458,723 +November | 173,560 | 87,646 | 31,476 | 87 | 292,769 +December | 253,087 | 86,981 | 54,047 | 413 | 394,528 +---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- + +=========+===========+==============+==========+==========+========= + | British | Other Allied | Neutral | British | +Period. | Merchant | Merchant | Merchant | Fishing | Total. + | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | Vessels. | +---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- +1918 | | | | | +January | 179,973 | 87,078 | 35,037 | 375 | 302,463 +February | 226,896 | 54,904 | 36,374 | 686 | 318,860 +March | 199,458 | 94,321 | 51,035 | 293 | 345,107 +April | 215,453 | 50,879 | 11,361 | 241 | 277,934 +May | 192,436 | 80,826 | 20,757 | 504 | 294,523 +June | 162,990 | 51,173 | 38,474 | 639 | 253,276 +July | 165,449 | 70,900 | 23,552 | 555 | 260,456 +August | 145,721 | 91,209 | 41,946 | 1,455 | 280,331 +September| 136,864 | 39,343 | 10,393 | 142 | 186,742 +October | 57,607 | 41,308 | 13,512 | -- | 112,427 +---------+-----------+--------------+----------+----------+--------- + + + + +APPENDIX IX + +TONNAGE CONSTRUCTED BY ALLIED AND NEUTRAL NATIONS SINCE AUGUST, 1914 + + +Construction of merchant shipping is shown in the following table, which +gives tonnage completed since the beginning of the war for the United +Kingdom, United States, and for other Allied and Neutral Nations. + +================+===========+============+============+============ + | United | United |Other Allied| + Period. | Kingdom. | States. |and Neutral.|World Total. + |Gross tons.|Gross tons. |Gross tons. |Gross tons. +----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ +1914 | 675,610 | 120,000[1]| 217,310 | 1,012,920 +1915 | 650,919 | 225,122 | 325,959 | 1,202,000 +1916 | 541,552 | 325,413 | 821,036 | 1,688,000 +1917 | 1,163,474 |1,034,296 | 505,585 | 2,703,355 +----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ +1918 1st quarter| 320,280 | 328,541 | 220,496 | 869,317 + 2nd quarter| 442,966 | 559,939 | 240,369 | 1,243,274 + 3rd quarter| 411,395 | 834,250 | 232,127 | 1,477,772 +October | 136,100 | 357,532[1]| 50,000 | 543,632 +----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ +1918 (10 months)| 1,310,741 |2,080,262 | 742,992 | 4,133,995 +----------------+-----------+------------+------------+------------ +[1: Estimated.] + + + + +INDEX + + +_Aboukir_, _Hogue_ and _Cressy_ torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174 + +_Achates_, with convoy, 122 + +_Active_, flagship of Vice-Adm. Bayly, 58 + +Adams, Ensign Ashley D., in charge of subchaser units, 191 + +Aircraft against submarines, 275 + +_Alcock_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163 + +Allied Naval Council, value of, 218 + +Amberger, Kapitaen-Leutnant Gustav, of _U-58_, captured, 131; + comment on treatment, 134 + +American forces in European waters, 204 + +Anti-submarine craft, use of, 26 + +Anti-submarine devices, search for, 8 + +_Arkansas_, on duty with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Arming of merchant vessels, 25 + +_Aroostook_, mine-layer, 254, 264 + +_Aubrietia_, mystery ship, heading convoy, 118; + sights submarine, 121 + +_Audacious_, sunk by mine, 174 + +Aviation, naval, development of, 282; + extent at time of armistice, 286 + + +Babcock, Commr. J. V., sails with Adm. Sims as aide, 2; + at London headquarters, 205, 212, 214 + +_Badger_ in bombardment of Durazzo, 200 + +Bagley, Lt.-Commr. D. W., highly commended, 139 + +Baillargeon, J. C, volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Baldwin Locomotive Works, constructors of the U.S. mobile railway + batteries, 290 + +Balfour, Arthur James, discussion of submarine situation with, 9; + with Commission to the United States, 9; + advises Washington of critical submarine situation, 39 + +_Baltimore_, converted as mine-layer, 252, 261, 264 + +_Basilisk_, assisted by yacht _Lydonia_, sinks submarine, 136 + +Bassett, Capt. F. B., commanding the _Utah_, 305 + +Bastedo, Lt.-Commr. Paul H., in bombardment of Durazzo, 199, 201 + +Bayly, Vice-Adm. Lewis, letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, 45; + welcome to Americans at Queenstown, 46; + instructs Americans as to duties, 49; + characteristics, 52; + meets _Fanning_ and congratulates officers and men on capture of + submarine crew, 133; + message commending American forces at Queenstown, 140; + introduces Capt. G. Campbell of the "mystery ship," 142; + has difficulty in identifying one such ship, 151 + +Beach, Capt. E. L., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Beatty, Adm. Sir David, attitude toward torpedo flags, 217; + farewell speech to American Squadron, 304 + +Belknap, Capt. Reginald R., commanding mine-laying squadron, 252, 260, 264 + +_Benham_, highly commended, 139 + +Berrien, Commr. Frank D., commanding destroyer division, 129; + highly commended, 139 + +"Big Bertha," American naval guns sent to destroy, 290 + +Billings, A. W. K., great work in connection with air service, 285 + +_Birmingham_, at Gibraltar, 134 + +Blakely, Lt.-Commr. C. A., highly commended, 139 + +Blakeslee, Lt.-Commr. E. G., at London headquarters, 212 + +Blue, Capt. Victor, with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Boyd, Capt. David F., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Brest, as destroyer base, 134, 300 + +Brindisi, rendezvous for attack on Durazzo, 200 + +Briscoe, Lt.-Commr. Benjamin, work on air service stations, 285 + +Bristol, Capt. M. L., commanding the _Oklahoma_, 305 + +British Admiralty, commends work of U.S. aviation pilots, 286 + +British Fleet, not in control of the seas, 16; + at Scapa Flow, 28 + +_Broke_, sinks two German destroyers, 61 + +Browne, Ralph C, new type of submarine mine, 250 + +Bruges, submarine base, 19 + +Bullard, Capt. W. H. G., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Bumstead, Prof. H. A., at London headquarters, 213 + +_Bunker Hill_, converted as mine-layer, 254 + +Bushnell, David, inventor of submarine, 225 + +Butler, Capt. H. V., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + + +Callan, Lt.-Commr. J. L., in charge of U.S. air forces in Italy, 284 + +Campbell, Capt. Gordon, at Queenstown, 58; + exploits with mystery ships, 142; + with "mystery ship" _Pargust_, 147; + technique of operation, 148; + heroism on _Dunraven_, 157; + letter from Adm. Sims on _Dunraven_ exploit, 164 + +_Canandaigua_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264 + +_Canonicus_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264 + +Carpender, Lt. A. S., in command of _Fanning_, when submarine crew was + captured, 132; + receives D.S.O., 134 + +Carson, Sir Edward, discussion of submarine, 9; + of convoy system, 95 + +Cecil, Lord Robert, on submarine situation with, 9 + +_Centurion_, in China, commanded by Jellicoe, 43 + +_Christabel_, encounter with submarine, 127 + +_Christopher_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163 + +Christy, Capt. H. H., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Churchill, Rt. Hon. W., "digging the rats out of their holes," 246 + +Clinton-Baker, Rear-Adm., in command of British mine-laying operations, + 257 + +Cluverius, Capt. W. T., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +Cole, Capt. W. C., commanding the Nevada, 305 + +College boys and subchasers, 168 + +Commerce raiders, guarding against, 94, 112 + +Cone, Capt. Hutch I., at London headquarters, 212, 214; + organizer American air forces, 284; + severely injured on torpedoed _Leinster_, 285 + +Conner, Francis G., jumps overboard from _Fanning_ to save drowning + German from crew of submarine, 132 + +Convoy of shipping to Scandinavia, 22 + +Convoy system, ancient use of, 86; + merchant captains hostile to, 88, 93; + Gibraltar experiment, 96; + merchant captains won over, 96; + the headquarters and staff, 103; + details of operation, 103, 108; + routing of the convoys, 110, 116; + actual convoys described, 117; + success of system, 136; + relative parts taken by Great Britain and the United States, 138; + most important agency in winning the war, 141 + +_Conyngham_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; + with convoy, 122, 124; + destroys submarine, 125 + +Copeland, D. G., great work in connection with air service, 285 + +Corfu, subchaser base established at, 182; + detachment performing excellent service, 194 + +Cork, American destroyer officers make state visit to, 48; + sailors not permitted to visit, 71 + +Cotten, Capt. Lyman A., with subchasers, arrives at Plymouth, 177; + work in training subchaser crews, 178; + commanding subchaser squadrons, 182 + +Craven, Capt. T. T., great service in aviation, 283 + +Crenshaw, Capt. Arthur, good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +_Cressy_, _Aboukir_ and _Hogue_ torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174 + +Cronan, Capt. William P., work in training subchaser crews, 178 + +_Cumberland_, escorting convoy, 119, 123 + +Cunningham, Major A. A., commanding Marine Corps aviation in Northern + Bombing Group, 285 + +_Cushing_, at Queenstown, 139; + deceived by "mystery ship," 147 + + +_Danae_, attempt to torpedo, 128 + +Daniels, Secretary of War, instructs Adm. Sims to sail for England, 1 + +_Dartmouth_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +_Davis_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Davison, Trubee, organizer Yale aviation unit, recommended for + Distinguished Service Medal, 282 + +De Bon, Vice-Adm., Chief of French Naval Staff, 221 + +De Steiguer, Capt. L. R., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +_Decatur_, at Gibraltar, 135 + +Defrees, Capt. Joseph H., work on listening devices, 178 + +_Delaware_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + +Depth charge, origin of, 78; + effects of on submarines, 79 + +Destroyers, scarcity of in British navy, 28; + a new type of war vessel, their history, 75; + size and armament, 76; + high efficiency, 76; + how submarines are attacked, 82; + use of in convoying merchant vessels, 95 + +Destroyers, American, arrive in Queenstown, 40; + copy of sailing orders, 43; + compared with British, 48; + why placed under British Admiral at Queenstown, 61; + number of at Queenstown, 63; + enthusiasm of British public on arrival, 63; + "the return of the _Mayflower_," 64; + in action, 99; + duties of, 101 + +_Deutschland_, "merchant" submarine, visits Newport News, 266 + +Di Revel, Vice-Adm., Italian Member Allied Naval Council, 222 + +Dortch, Lt.-Commr. I. F., highly commended, 139 + +_Drayton_, highly commended, 139 + +Duff, Vice-Adm. Sir Alexander L., in charge of convoy system, 103 + +_Duncan_, American destroyer, at Queenstown, 57 + +Dunlap, Col. R. H., at London headquarters, 215 + +_Dunraven_, mystery ship, heroism of captain and crew, 157; + given Victoria Cross, 163, 164 + +Durazzo, bombardment of, 199 + + +Earle, Rear-Adm., in charge of design of mobile railway batteries for + Western Front, 290 + +Edwards, Lt.-Commr. W. A., at London headquarters, 212, 214; + commands Yale aviation unit, 283; + succeeds Capt. Cone in charge of aviation section, 285 + +Evans, Capt. E. R. G. R., British liaison officer with American + destroyers, 44; + exploit as commander of destroyer _Broke_, 61 + +Evans, Capt. F. T., in command of U.S. aviation centre at Pauillac, + France, 284 + + +Fairfield, Commr. Arthur P., with first American destroyer contingent, 42; + highly commended, 139 + +_Fanning_, captures crew of submarine, 129 + +Farquhar, Lt.-Commr., highly commended, 139 + +_Fenian Ram_, Holland's submarine, 227 + +Fighting submarines from the air, 275 + +Fisher, Adm. Sir John, in charge of department for investigating + anti-submarine devices, 8; + tells of American-built submarines, first to cross Atlantic, 266 + +Fletcher, Rear-Adm. Wm. B., commanding Brest naval base, 300 + +_Florida_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + +Foster, Arnold-, on building of submarines, 228 + +Fullinwider, Commr. S. P., efforts in perfection of new submarine mine, + 250 + +Fulton, Robert, efforts in developing the submarine, 226 + +Funakoshi, Rear-Adm., Japanese member Allied Naval Council, 222 + +Furer, Commr. Julius A., work in development of subchasers, 175 + + +Gannon, Capt. Sinclair, with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +Gates, Lt.-Commr. A. L., exploits at Dunkirk, 288 + +Geddes, Sir Eric, First Lord of the Admiralty, 219 + +George, King, meeting with, 9; + popular with American sailors, 67 + +George, Lloyd, optimistic regarding submarine situation, 10; + on convoy system, 95 + +German interned ships converted into transports, 301 + +Gibraltar, co-operation of American navy with British in operations at, + 134 + +Gillmor, R. E., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Gleaves, Rear-Adm. Albert, organization for transport fleet, 301 + +Glinder, Franz, drowned when crew surrendered to _Fanning_, 134; + buried with honours of war, 134 + +Good, P. F., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Goschen, Viscount, deemed submarine useless, 227 + +Graham, Capt. S. V., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Grand Fleet, British, protected by destroyers, 73; + immune from torpedo attack, 85 + +Greenslade, Capt. J. W., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + + +Hammon, Ensign C. H., exploit at Pola, 287 + +Hanrahan, Commr. David C., highly commended, 139; + commanding American mystery ship _Santee_, 166; + in command of Northern Bombing Group, 285 + +Harwell, Elxer, jumps overboard from _Fanning_ to save drowning German + from crew of submarine, 134 + +Helfferich, Dr. Karl, on effectiveness of the submarine, 14 + +Henry, Lt. Walter S., on _Fanning_, 130 + +Hepburn, Capt. Arthur J., work in training subchaser crews, 178; + commanding squadron of subchasers, reaches Queenstown, 203 + +_Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, torpedoed by _U-29_, 84, 174 + +Holland, John P., designer of the modern submarine, 227 + +Hope, Rear-Adm., receives Adm. Sims on arrival, 2 + +Hospital ships, torpedoing of, 29 + +_Housatonic_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264 + +Howard, Lt.-Commr. D. L., highly commended, 139 + +Hughes, Capt. C. F., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + + +Inventions, anti-submarine, search for, 8 + +Inverness and Invergordon, mine-assembly bases at, 256 + +Ives, Ensign Paul F., drops a "dud" on deck of submarine, 286 + + +_Jacob Jones_, torpedoed by _U-53_, 107; + highly commended, 139 + +Jacoby, Ensign Maclair, at bombardment of Durazzo, 201 + +Jellicoe, Adm., character and abilities, 5; + statement of tonnage lost to submarines, 6; + in conference with, 8; + wounded in Boxer Rebellion, 43; + letter of welcome to Commr. Taussig, 44; + difficulty in having convoy system adopted, 89, 95; + presides over Allied Naval Council, 219 + +Jessop, Capt. E. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Johnson, Commr. Alfred W., with first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Johnson, Capt. T. L., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +_Justicia_, torpedoing of, 114; + torpedoing announced as that of _Leviathan_ by German Admiralty, 314 + + +Kelly, Commodore, in bombardment of Durazzo, 198; + congratulates subchasers in this action, 203 + +Kennedy, Ensign S. C., record seaplane flight, 278 + +Keyes, Ensign K. B., extracts from seaplane flight report, 278 + +Keys, Adm. Sir Roger, reconstructs submarine barrage, 20 + +Killingholme, England, U.S. air station at, 278, 284 + +Kittredge, T. B., volunteers service at London headquarters, 206 + +Knox, Capt. D. W., at London headquarters, 215 + +_Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, converted into transport, 301 + + +Lacaze, Adm., French Minister of Marine, 221 + +Leigh, Capt. Richard H., experiments with listening devices, 172; + sent to Italy to construct subchaser base, 182; + at London headquarters, 212, 214 + +Libbey, Commr. Miles A., work in perfection of listening devices, 178 + +Listening devices, development of, 171; + especially advantageous on subchaser, 178; + method of operation on subchasers, 184; + of great value in the Otranto barrage, 196; + tube climbed by submarine survivor, 197 + +Little, Col. L. McC., at London headquarters, 215 + +London headquarters, 204, 210; + different departments of, 212; + work of the Planning Section, 215 + +Long, Capt. A. T., commanding the _Nevada_, 305 + +Long, Capt. Byron A., at headquarters of convoy system, 103; + at London headquarters, 212, 214; + routing American troops to France, 300 + +Loomis, Coxswain David D., lookout on _Fanning_ when submarine crew was + captured, 129 + +Lord Mayor of Cork, welcomes Americans at Queenstown, 45 + +_Lowestoft_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +_Luckenback_, shelled by submarine, 123 + +Ludlow, Ensign G. H., wounded, rescued from water, 287 + +_Lydonia_, assists in sinking submarine, 136 + +Lyons, Lt.-Commr. D., highly commended, 139 + + +MacDonnell, Lt.-Commr. E. O., in charge of flying Caproni bombers from + Italy to Flanders, 285 + +MacDougall, Capt. W. D., at London headquarters, 204 + +McBride, Capt. L. B., at London headquarters, 212, 214 + +McCalla, Capt., meets Adm. Jellicoe in China, 44 + +McCormick, E. H., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +McCullough, Commr. Richard P., recommended for decoration, 136 + +_McDougal_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; + highly commended, 139 + +McDowell, Commr. Clyde S., work on listening devices, 178 + +McGrann, Commr. W. H., at London headquarters, 212 + +McNamee, Capt. L., at London headquarters, 215 + +McVay, Capt. C. B., commanding the _Oklahoma_, 305 + +Magruder, Rear-Adm. T. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Mannix, Commr. D. Pratt, with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +Marshall, Capt. A. W., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +_Mary Rose_, welcomes American destroyers at Queenstown, 41 + +_Massachusetts_, converted as mine-layer, 254 + +_Melville_, "Mother Ship" of the destroyers at Queenstown, 58, 62 + +Millard, H., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Milner, Lord, on convoy system, 95 + +Mine barrage, at first not effective against submarines, 20, 24 + +Mine barrage in North Sea, American, 245; + immensity of, 252; + how laid, 257 + +Mine laying by German submarines, 51, 273, 274 + +Mines, Americans perfect new type, 250; + immense organization of supply and transport, 252 + +_Moewe_, commerce raider, 95 + +Murfin, Capt. Orin G., designer and builder of mine-assembly bases in + Scotland, 256 + +Mystery ships, greatly aid in combating the submarine, 103; + accompanying convoy, 118; + method of operating, 118; + operations of, 142; + technique, 148; + difficulty of identifying, 151; + number in operation, 152; + heroic fight of the _Dunraven_, 157; + exploit of _Prize_, 165; + American ship _Santee_, 166; + _Stockforce_ destroys submarine, 183 + + +_Nautilus_, submarine of Robert Fulton, 226 + +Naval guns, German, bombarding Dunkirk and Paris, 290 + +Naval guns, U.S., used on the Western Front, 289 + +Nelson, Capt. C. P., good work in convoying subchasers, 178; + commanding subchaser squadrons at Corfu, 194; + in bombardment of Durazzo, 199, 200 + +_Neptune_ attacked by _U-29_, 84, 85 + +_Nevada_, guarding transports, 304 + +_New York_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + +Niblack, Rear-Adm. Albert P., commanding forces at Gibraltar, 134; + asks that subchasers be sent to Gibraltar, 195 + +_Nicholson_, in submarine chase, 123; + on convoy duty, 129; + assists _Fanning_ in capture of submarine and crew, 130; + highly commended, 139 + +_Noma_, goes to relief of sinking mystery ship _Dunraven_, 163 + +Northern Bombing Group, established, 284, 285 + + +_O'Brien_, highly commended, 163 + +Oil, scarcity of, for Great Britain's fleet, 34 + +_Oklahoma_, guarding transports, 305 + +_Orama_, torpedoed, 125 + +Ostend, bombing of submarine base at, 285 + +Otranto barrage, the, 181, 195 + + +Page, Ambassador Walter Hines, asks that high naval representative be + sent to England, 1; + states that England faces defeat by submarines, 8; + on critical submarine situation, 38; + advised of submarine peril, 52; + a tower of strength, 207 + +_Pargust_, "mystery ship," destroys submarine, 147 + +_Parker_, in hunt for submarine, 119; + highly commended, 139; + supporting ship for subchasers at Plymouth, 182; + seriously damages the _U-53_, 189 + +Pauillac, France, U.S. aviation centre at, 284 + +_Pennsylvania_, transmits mobilization orders to destroyer division, 42 + +Pershing, Gen., request for naval guns at St. Nazaire, 290; + report of their skilful use, 293 + +Pescara, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, 284 + +_Pisa_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +Pitt, William, early opinion of the submarine, 226 + +Planning Section at London headquarters, 215 + +Pleadwell, Capt. F. L., at London headquarters, 212 + +Plunkett, Adm. Charles P., commanding naval guns on Western Front, 289; + aids in designing mobile railway batteries, 290 + +Plymouth, subchaser base at, 182 + +_Pocahontas_, converted from German liner to transport, 302 + +_Porter_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Porto Corsini, Italy, U.S. seaplane station at, 284 + +Poteet, Lt.-Commr. Fred H., with first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Potter, Ensign Stephen, fight with enemy seaplane, 288 + +Powell, Lt.-Commr. Halsey, of destroyer _Parker_, 119; + highly commended, 139 + +_Princess Irene_, converted into transport, 302 + +Pringle, Capt. J. R. P., at Queenstown, 58; + commended by Adm. Bayly, 139 + +_Prize_, mystery ship, damages submarine and captures captain and two of + crew, 165 + + +Q-ships, _see_ Mystery ships + +Queenstown, a destroyer base, 32; + arrival of first American destroyers, 40; + officially welcomes the Americans, 45 + +_Quinnebaug_, mine-layer, 254, 264 + + +_Rene_, in westbound convoy, 129 + +Reynolds, Commr. W. H., with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +_Rhein_, converted into transport, 302 + +Richardson, R. M. D., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +_Roanoke_, mine-layer, 254, 260, 264 + +Roberts, Lady, requests Adm. Sims to call, 66 + +Robison, Rear-Adm. S. S., work on listening devices, 178 + +Rodgers, Rear-Adm. Thomas S., commanding Dreadnought division in Bantry + Bay, 305 + +Rodman, Adm. Hugh, commanding American squadron with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Rose, Hans, humane commander of the _U-53_, 106; + Allied forces ambitious to capture, 189; + not on _U-53_ when depth charged, 190; + visits Newport, and sinks merchantmen off Nantucket, 266 + +Royal Family, interested in American sailors, 67 + + +_Sacramento_, at Gibraltar, 134 + +_San Diego_, sunk by mine off Fire Island, 274 + +_San Francisco_, converted as mine-layer, 252, 264 + +_San Giorgio_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +_San Marco_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +Sanders, Lt. William, commanding mystery ship _Prize_, 165; + awarded Victoria Cross, 165 + +_Santa Maria_, compared in size to modern destroyer, 76 + +_Santee_, U.S. mystery ship, 150, 166 + +_Saranac_, mine-layer, 254, 264 + +Scales, Capt. A. H., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Schieffelin, Lt. John J., recommended for Distinguished Service Medal, 277 + +Schofield, Capt. Frank H., work on listening devices, 178; + at London headquarters, 215 + +Schuyler, Commr. G. L., at London headquarters, 212 + +Schwab, Charles M., fabricates submarines for the Allies, 266 + +Seaplane base at Killingholme, England, taken over by U.S., 278 + +Seaplane stations of U.S. forces in Europe, 284 + +Sexton, Capt. W. R., at London headquarters, 212 + +_Shawmut_, mine-layer, 254, 264 + +Sims, Adm., ordered to England, 1; + notifies Washington that war is being lost, 33; + of the oil scarcity, 34; + favours using U.S. naval forces in conjunction with Allies, 35; + first report of critical submarine situation, 37; + extent of duties in European waters, 62; + significance of the Guildhall speech, 65; + reception accorded by British people, 66; + meets Lady Roberts, 66; + first foreign naval officer to command British forces in war, 68; + works for adoption of convoy system, 93, 95; + congratulates officers and men of _Fanning_ on capture of submarine + and crew, 134; + has difficulty in identifying a "mystery ship," 151; + letter to Capt. Campbell on _Dunraven_ exploit, 164; + warns Navy Department of German submarines visiting U.S. coast, 267 + +Sinn Fein, controversy with American sailors, 69; in league with Germany, + 72 + +Smith, Capt. S. F., at London headquarters, 212 + +Sparrow, Capt. H. G., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Stark, Commr. Harold R., brings small destroyers from Manila to + Gibraltar, 135; + at London headquarters, 212 + +Stearns, Capt. C. D., with mine-laying squadron. 264 + +_Sterrett_, highly commended, 139 + +Stevens, L. S., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +_Stockforce_, mystery ship, destroys submarine, 183 + +Stockton, G. B., volunteers services at London headquarters, 206 + +Strauss, Rear-Adm. Joseph, in command of U.S. mine-laying operations, 257 + +Subchasers, number built and bases used, 168; + mobilized at New London, Conn., 173; + great numbers ordered by Great Britain and France, 174, 179; + hardships of the new crews, 176; + trip from New London to Corfu, 195; + an influence in the breakdown of Austria, 196; + in attack on Durazzo, 198; + congratulated on exploits of Durazzo by British Commodore and Italian + Naval General Staff, 203 + +Submarine against submarine, 224; + method of attack, 233 + +Submarine sinkings, gravity of, concealed by British, 2, 6; + losses of shipping, 51, 141 + +Submarines, American built, first to cross Atlantic, 267 + really submersible surface ships, 229; + how operated, 229; + an American invention, 225 + +Submarines, American, their part in the war, 224; + attacked by destroyers through error, 236; + the base at Berehaven, 238; + witnesses U-boat destroy itself, 239 + +Submarines, British, the _H_-, _E_-, and _K_-boats, 224; + destroy a U-boat, 238 + +Submarines, enemy, winning the war, 4, 7; + number of, destroyed, 7; + officers exaggerate sinkings, 13; + difficulty of blockading the United States, 17; + cruising period dependent upon supply of torpedoes, 19; + mines and nets not effective against, 19; + number operating simultaneously, 20, 21, 31; + erroneous impression as to numbers operating, 20; + every movement charted by Allies, 21, 271, 273; + three different types of, 22; + plans to pen in the bases, 23; + playing hide and seek with destroyers, 33; + on American coast, 36, 266; + amount of shipping destroyed, 51; + how attacked by destroyer, 82; + method of attack on battleships, 84; + operating on American coast impracticable, 91; + individual locations and movements plotted each day, 104; + destroyed by depth charges, 126, 128, 130, 136; + decoying by "mystery ship," 142, 183; + not taken seriously until after Weddingen's exploit, 174; + concentrated in enclosed waters, 180; + the Otranto barrage, 181; + sinkings prevented by subchasers, 183; + how located by listening devices, 184; + _U-53_ seriously damaged by destroyer _Parker_, 189; + suicide of entire crew of a depth charged submarine, 193; + two submarines sunk by subchasers in bombardment of Durazzo, 202; + Germans have difficulty in reaching home after Austrian surrender, 203; + number destroyed by Allies and how, 224; + U-boat destroys itself, 239; + the cruiser submarines, 240; + their various bases, 244; + effectiveness of American North Sea mine barrage, 245; + lay mines on American coast, 273, 274; + aircraft an important factor against, 275; + number sunk about British Isles, 296; + forced to choose between transports and merchantmen, 306 + +_Surveyor_, yacht, assists in sinking submarine, 136 + +_Surveyor_, merchantmen torpedoed while being convoyed, 136 + +_Susquehanna_, converted from German liner to transport, 302 + +Swasey, A. Loring, services in designing of subchasers, 175 + + +Taussig, Commr. Joseph K., in charge of first American destroyer + contingent, 42; + copy of sailing orders, 42; + previous record, 43; + welcoming letters from Admirals Jellicoe and Bayly, 44, 45; + reports to Vice-Adm. Bayly at Queenstown, 46; + highly commended, 139 + +Taylor, Capt. M. M., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +_Texas_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + +Thompson, Commr. Edgar, at London headquarters, 212 + +Thomson, Commr. T. A., at London headquarters, 212 + +Tobey, Capt. E. C., at London headquarters, 212, 214 + +Tomb, Capt. J. Harvey, with mine-laying squadron, 264 + +Tompkins, Capt. John T., work in organization of subchaser fleet, 178 + +Torpedo, track or wake made by, 81; + effective range of, 83; + duration of submarine's voyage dependent on number carried, 19; + supply limited, 26; + cost of, 77 + +Torpedo-boat, invention of, 76 + +Tozer, Capt. C. M., good work in convoying subchasers, 178 + +Transporting armies to France, 294; + nationality of ships and percentage carried, 302 + +_Turtle_, first submarine, 225 + +Twining, Capt. N. C., at London headquarters, 212, 213 + + +_U-29_, torpedoes _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, and is later sunk by + _Dreadnought_, 84, 85 + +_U-53_, operates off American coast, 106; + torpedoes the _Jacob Jones_, 107; + seriously damaged by depth charges, 188; + surrendered after armistice, 190; + after visiting Newport, R.I., sinks several merchantmen, 266 + +_U-58_ depth charged and crew captured by _Fanning_ and _Nicholson_, 131 + +_U-151_, lays mines off American coast, 273 + +_U-156_, lays mines off American coast, 274 + +_UC-56_, practically destroyed by depth charge from _Christabel_, 128 + +_Utah_, guarding transports, 305 + + +_Vaterland_, converted into transport, 301 + +Vauclain, Samuel M., great help in turning out mobile railway batteries, + 290 + +_Venetia_, assists in sinking submarine, 136; + seriously damages another, 136 + +Voysey, Miss, niece of Vice-Adm. Bayly, and charming hostess, 59 + + +_Wadsworth_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42; + highly commended, 139 + +_Wainwright_, in first American destroyer contingent, 42 + +Washington, Capt. Thomas, with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Weatherhead, Ensign C. H., makes record seaplane flight, 278 + +Weddingen, Commr. Otto, torpedoes _Hogue_, _Cressy_ and _Aboukir_, and + is in turn sunk by battleship _Dreadnought_, 84, 174 + +_Welshman_, narrow escape from being torpedoed, 130, 133 + +_Weymouth_, in attack on Durazzo, 199 + +_Wheeling_, depth charges submarine, 136 + +White, Sir William, on the submarine, 225 + +Whiting, Commr. Kenneth, great service in aviation, 283 + +Wiley, Capt. H. A., with the Grand Fleet, 303 + +Wilhelm, Kaiser, on effectiveness of the submarine, 13 + +_Wilkes_, on submarine hunt with _Parker_, 189 + +Williams, Lt.-Commr. Roger, at Queenstown, 57 + +Wilson, Rear-Adm. Henry B., commander of forces at _Gibraltar_, 134; + at Brest, 134; + commanding Brest naval base, 300 + +Wireless telegraphy, of the submarines and destroyers, 100; + messages reveal locations of submarines, 105 + +Wortman, Lieut.-Commr. Ward K., with first American destroyer contingent, + 42 + +_Wyoming_, on duty with Grand Fleet, 303 + + +Y-guns, or howitzers, for hurling depth charges, 79 + +Yachts, good service on French coast, 301 + +Yale aviation unit, organization of, 282; + renders great service, 283 + +Yarnell, Capt. H. E., at London headquarters, 215 + + +Zeebrugge, bombing of submarine base at, 285 + +Zigzagging, efficacious protection against submarines, 87, 120 + +Zogbaum, Lt.-Commr. Rufus F., with first American destroyer contingent, + 42 + + + + +-----------------------------------------------+ + | Transcriber's Note: | + | | + | Inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the | + | original document have been preserved. | + | | + | Typographical errors corrected in the text: | + | | + | Page 136 Carthagena changed to Cartagena | + | Page 151 out changed to our | + | Page 194 saltest changed to saltiest | + | Page 227 if changed to it | + | Page 264 wift changed to swift | + | Page 271 frm changed to from | + | Page 278 Ensign changed to Ensigns | + | Page 348 de Steigner changed to de Steiguer | + +-----------------------------------------------+ + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Victory At Sea, by +William Sowden Sims and Burton J. 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