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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/35016-8.txt b/35016-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a336599 --- /dev/null +++ b/35016-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6466 @@ +Project Gutenberg's A Letter to Grover Cleveland, by Lysander Spooner + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Letter to Grover Cleveland + On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes + of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, + Ignorance, and Servitude Of The People + +Author: Lysander Spooner + +Release Date: January 20, 2011 [EBook #35016] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND *** + + + + +Produced by Curtis Weyant, Ernest Schaal, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + + + A LETTER + + TO + + GROVER CLEVELAND, + + ON + + HIS FALSE INAUGURAL ADDRESS, THE USURPATIONS AND + CRIMES OF LAWMAKERS AND JUDGES, AND THE + CONSEQUENT POVERTY, IGNORANCE, AND + SERVITUDE OF THE PEOPLE. + + + BY + LYSANDER SPOONER. + + + BOSTON: + BENJ. R. TUCKER, PUBLISHER. + 1886. + + + + + The author reserves his copyright in this letter. + First pamphlet edition published in July, 1886.[1] + + [1] Under a somewhat different title, to wit, "_A Letter to + Grover Cleveland, on his False, Absurd, If-contradictory, and + Ridiculous Inaugural Address_," this letter was first published, + in instalments, "LIBERTY" (a paper published in Boston); the + instalments commencing June 20, 1885, and continuing to May 22, + 1886: notice being given, in each paper, of the reservation of + copyright. + + + + + A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND. + + SECTION I. + +_To Grover Cleveland_: + +SIR,--Your inaugural address is probably as honest, sensible, and +consistent a one as that of any president within the last fifty years, +or, perhaps, as any since the foundation of the government. If, +therefore, it is false, absurd, self-contradictory, and ridiculous, it +is not (as I think) because you are personally less honest, sensible, or +consistent than your predecessors, but because the government +itself--according to your own description of it, and according to the +practical administration of it for nearly a hundred years--is an utterly +and palpably false, absurd, and criminal one. Such praises as you bestow +upon it are, therefore, necessarily false, absurd, and ridiculous. + +Thus you describe it as "a government pledged to do equal and exact +justice to all men." + +Did you stop to think what that means? Evidently you did not; for +nearly, or quite, all the rest of your address is in direct +contradiction to it. + +Let me then remind you that justice is an immutable, natural principle; +and not anything that can be made, unmade, or altered by any human +power. + +It is also a subject of science, and is to be learned, like mathematics, +or any other science. It does not derive its authority from the +commands, will, pleasure, or discretion of any possible combination of +men, whether calling themselves a government, or by any other name. + +It is also, at all times, and in all places, the supreme law. And being +everywhere and always the supreme law, it is necessarily everywhere and +always the only law. + +Lawmakers, as they call themselves, can add nothing to it, nor take +anything from it. Therefore all their laws, as they call them,--that is, +all the laws of their own making,--have no color of authority or +obligation. It is a falsehood to call them laws; for there is nothing in +them that either creates men's duties or rights, or enlightens them as +to their duties or rights. There is consequently nothing binding or +obligatory about them. And nobody is bound to take the least notice of +them, unless it be to trample them under foot, as usurpations. If they +command men to do justice, they add nothing to men's obligation to do +it, or to any man's right to enforce it. They are therefore mere idle +wind, such as would be commands to consider the day as day, and the +night as night. If they command or license any man to do injustice, they +are criminal on their face. If they command any man to do anything which +justice does not require him to do, they are simple, naked usurpations +and tyrannies. If they forbid any man to do anything, which justice +would permit him to do, they are criminal invasions of his natural and +rightful liberty. In whatever light, therefore, they are viewed, they +are utterly destitute of everything like authority or obligation. They +are all necessarily either the impudent, fraudulent, and criminal +usurpations of tyrants, robbers, and murderers, or the senseless work of +ignorant or thoughtless men, who do not know, or certainly do not +realize, what they are doing. + +This science of justice, or natural law, is the only science that tells +us what are, and what are not, each man's natural, inherent, +inalienable, _individual_ rights, as against any and all other men. And +to say that any, or all, other men may rightfully compel him to obey any +or all such other laws as they may see fit to _make_, is to say that he +has no rights of his own, but is their subject, their property, and +their slave. + +For the reasons now given, the simple maintenance of justice, or natural +law, is plainly the one only purpose for which any coercive power--or +anything bearing the name of government--has a right to exist. + +It is intrinsically just as false, absurd, ludicrous, and ridiculous to +say that lawmakers, so-called, can invent and make any laws, _of their +own_, authoritatively fixing, or declaring, the rights of individuals, +or that shall be in any manner authoritative or obligatory upon +individuals, or that individuals may rightfully be compelled to obey, as +it would be to say that they can invent and make such mathematics, +chemistry, physiology, or other sciences, as they see fit, and +rightfully compel individuals to conform all their actions to them, +instead of conforming them to the mathematics, chemistry, physiology, or +other sciences of nature. + +Lawmakers, as they call themselves, might just as well claim the right +to abolish, by statute, the natural law of gravitation, the natural laws +of light, heat, and electricity, and all the other natural laws of +matter and mind, and institute laws of their own in the place of them, +and compel conformity to them, as to claim the right to set aside the +natural law of justice, and compel obedience to such other laws as they +may see fit to manufacture, and set up in its stead. + +Let me now ask you how you imagine that your so-called lawmakers can "do +equal and exact justice to all men," by any so-called laws of their own +making. If their laws command anything but justice, or forbid anything +but injustice, they are themselves unjust and criminal. If they simply +command justice, and forbid injustice, they add nothing to the natural +authority of justice, or to men's obligation to obey it. It is, +therefore, a simple impertinence, and sheer impudence, on their part, to +assume that _their_ commands, _as such_, are of any authority whatever. +It is also sheer impudence, on their part, to assume that their commands +are at all necessary to teach other men what is, and what is not, +justice. The science of justice is as open to be learned by all other +men, as by themselves; and it is, in general, so simple and easy to be +learned, that there is no need of, and no place for, any man, or body of +men, to teach it, declare it, or command it, on their own authority. + +For one, or another, of these reasons, therefore, each and every law, +so-called, that forty-eight different congresses have presumed to make, +within the last ninety-six years, have been utterly destitute of all +legitimate authority. That is to say, they have either been criminal, as +commanding or licensing men to do what justice forbade them to do, or as +forbidding them to do what justice would have permitted them to do; or +else they have been superfluous, as adding nothing to men's knowledge of +justice, or to their obligation to do justice, or abstain from +injustice. + +What excuse, then, have you for attempting to enforce upon the people +that great mass of superfluous or criminal laws (so-called) which +ignorant and foolish, or impudent and criminal, men have, for so many +years, been manufacturing, and promulgating, and enforcing, in violation +of justice, and of all men's natural, inherent, and inalienable rights? + + + SECTION II. + +Perhaps you will say that there is no such science as that of justice. +If you do say this, by what right, or on what reason, do you proclaim +your intention "to do equal and exact justice to all men"? If there is +no science of justice, how do you know that there is any such principle +as justice? Or how do you know what is, and what is not, justice? If +there is no science of justice,--such as the people can learn and +understand for themselves,--why do you say anything about justice _to +them?_ Or why do you promise _them_ any such thing as "equal and exact +justice," if they do not know, and are incapable of learning, what +justice is? Do you use this phrase to deceive those whom you look upon +as being so ignorant, so destitute of reason, as to be deceived by idle, +unmeaning words? If you do not, you are plainly bound to let us all know +what you do mean, by doing "equal and exact justice to all men." + +I can assure you, sir, that a very large portion of the people of this +country do not believe that the government is doing "equal and exact +justice to all men." And some persons are earnestly promulgating the +idea that the government is not attempting to do, and has no intention +of doing, anything like "equal and exact justice to all men"; that, on +the contrary, it is knowingly, deliberately, and wilfully doing an +incalculable amount of injustice; that it has always been doing this in +the past, and that it has no intention of doing anything else in the +future; that it is a mere tool in the hands of a few ambitious, +rapacious, and unprincipled men; that its purpose, in doing all this +injustice, is to keep--so far as they can without driving the people to +rebellion--all wealth, and all political power, in as few hands as +possible; and that this injustice is the direct cause of all the +widespread poverty, ignorance, and servitude among the great body of the +people. + +Now, Sir, I wish I could hope that you would do something to show that +you are not a party to any such scheme as that; something to show that +you are neither corrupt enough, nor blind enough, nor coward enough, to +be made use of for any such purpose as that; something to show that when +you profess your intention "to do equal and exact justice to all men," +you attach some real and definite meaning to your words. Until you do +that, is it not plain that the people have a right to consider you a +tyrant, and the confederate and tool of tyrants, and to get rid of you +as unceremoniously as they would of any other tyrant? + + + SECTION III. + +Sir, if any government is to be a rational, consistent, and honest +one, it must evidently be based on some fundamental, immutable, +eternal principle; such as every man may reasonably agree to, and such +as every man may rightfully be compelled to abide by, and obey. And +the whole power of the government must be limited to the maintenance +of that single principle. And that one principle is justice. There is +no other principle that any man can rightfully enforce upon others, or +ought to consent to have enforced against himself. Every man claims +the protection of this principle for himself, whether he is willing to +accord it to others, or not. Yet such is the inconsistency of human +nature, that some men--in fact, many men--who will risk their lives +for this principle, when their own liberty or property is at stake, +will violate it in the most flagrant manner, if they can thereby +obtain arbitrary power over the persons or property of others. We have +seen this fact illustrated in this country, through its whole +history--especially during the last hundred years--and in the case of +many of the most conspicuous persons. And their example and influence +have been employed to pervert the whole character of the government. +It is against such men, that all others, who desire nothing but +justice for themselves, and are willing to unite to secure it for all +others, must combine, if we are ever to have justice established for +any. + + + SECTION IV. + +It is self-evident that no number of men, by conspiring, and calling +themselves a government, can acquire any rights whatever over other men, +or other men's property, which they had not before, as individuals. And +whenever any number of men, calling themselves a government, do anything +to another man, or to his property, which they had no right to do as +individuals they thereby declare themselves trespassers, robbers, or +murderers, according to the nature of their acts. + +Men, _as individuals_, may rightfully _compel_ each other to obey this +one law of justice. And it is the only law which any man can rightfully +be compelled, _by his fellow men_, to obey. All other laws, it is +optional with each man to obey, or not, as he may choose. But this one +law of justice he may rightfully be compelled to obey; and all the force +that is reasonably necessary to compel him, may rightfully be used +against him. + +But the right of every man to do anything, and everything, _which +justice does not forbid him to do_, is a natural, inherent, inalienable +right. It is his right, as against any and all other men, whether they +be many, or few. It is a right indispensable to every man's highest +happiness; and to every man's power of judging and determining for +himself what will, and what will not, promote his happiness. Any +restriction upon the exercise of this right is a restriction upon his +rightful power of providing for, and accomplishing, his own well-being. + +Sir, these natural, inherent, inalienable, _individual_ rights are +sacred things. _They are the only human rights._ They are the only +rights by which any man can protect his own property, liberty, or life +against any one who may be disposed to take it away. Consequently they +are not things that any set of either blockheads or villains, calling +themselves a government, can rightfully take into their own hands, and +dispose of at their pleasure, as they have been accustomed to do in +this, and in nearly or quite all other countries. + + + SECTION V. + +Sir, I repeat that individual rights are the only human rights. +_Legally speaking_, there are no such things as "_public rights_," as +distinguished from individual rights. _Legally speaking_, there is no +such creature or thing as "_the public_." The term "the public" is an +utterly vague and indefinite one, applied arbitrarily and at random to a +greater or less number of individuals, each and every one of whom have +their own separate, individual rights, _and none others_. And the +protection of these separate, _individual_ rights is the one only +legitimate purpose, for which anything in the nature of a governing, or +coercive, power has a right to exist. And these separate, individual +rights all rest upon, and can be ascertained only by, the one science of +justice. + +_Legally speaking_, the term "public _rights_" is as vague and +indefinite as are the terms "public _health_," "public _good_," "public +_welfare_," and the like. It has no legal meaning, except when used to +describe the separate, private, _individual_ rights of a greater or less +number of individuals. + +In so far as the separate, private, natural rights of _individuals_ are +secured, in just so far, and no farther, are the "public rights" +secured. In so far as the separate, private, natural rights of +_individuals_ are disregarded or violated, in just so far are "public +rights" disregarded or violated. Therefore all the pretences of +so-called lawmakers, that they are protecting "public rights," by +violating private rights, are sheer and utter contradictions and frauds. +They are just as false and absurd as it would be to say that they are +protecting the public _health_, by arbitrarily poisoning and destroying +the health of single individuals. + +The pretence of the lawmakers, that they are promoting the "public +_good_," by violating individual "_rights_," is just as false and absurd +as is the pretence that they are protecting "public _rights_" by +violating "private rights." Sir, the greatest "public _good_," of which +any coercive power, calling itself a government, or by any other name, +is capable, is the protection of each and every individual in the quiet +and peaceful enjoyment and exercise of _all_ his own natural, inherent, +inalienable, _individual_ "rights." This is a "good" that comes home to +each and every individual, of whom "the public" is composed. It is also +a "good," which each and every one of these individuals, composing "the +public," can appreciate. It is a "good," for the loss of which +governments can make no compensation whatever. _It is a universal and +impartial "good,"_ of the highest importance to each and every human +being; and not any such vague, false, and criminal thing as the +lawmakers--when violating private rights--tell us they are trying to +accomplish, under the name of "the public good." It is also the only +"equal and exact justice," which you, or anybody else, are capable of +securing, or have any occasion to secure, to any human being. Let but +this "equal and exact justice" be secured "to all men," and they will +then be abundantly able to take care of themselves, and secure their own +highest "good." Or if any one should ever chance to need anything more +than this, he may safely trust to the voluntary kindness of his fellow +men to supply it. + +It is one of those things not easily accounted for, that men who would +scorn to do an injustice to a fellow man, in a private transaction,--who +would scorn to usurp any arbitrary dominion over him, or his +property,--who would be in the highest degree indignant, if charged with +any private injustice,--and who, at a moment's warning, would take their +lives in their hands, to defend their own rights, and redress their own +wrongs,--will, the moment they become members of what they call a +government, assume that they are absolved from all principles and all +obligations that were imperative upon them, as individuals; will assume +that they are invested with a right of arbitrary and irresponsible +dominion over other men, and other men's property. Yet they are doing +this continually. And all the laws they _make_ are based upon the +assumption that they have now become invested with rights that are more +than human, and that those, on whom their laws are to operate, have lost +even their human rights. They seem to be utterly blind to the fact, that +the only reason there can be for their existence as a government, is +that they may protect those very "rights," which they before +scrupulously respected, but which they now unscrupulously trample upon. + + + SECTION VI. + +But you evidently believe nothing of what I have now been saying. You +evidently believe that justice is no law at all, unless in cases where +the lawmakers may chance to prefer it to any law which they themselves +can invent. + +You evidently believe that, a certain paper, called the constitution, +which nobody ever signed, which few persons ever read, which the great +body of the people never saw, and as to the meaning of which no two +persons were ever agreed, is the supreme law of this land, anything in +the law of nature--anything in the natural, inherent, inalienable, +_individual_ rights of fifty millions of people--to the contrary not +withstanding. + +Did folly, falsehood, absurdity, assumption, or criminality ever reach a +higher point than that? + +You evidently believe that those great volumes of statutes, which the +people at large have never read, nor even seen, and never will read, nor +see, but which such men as you and your lawmakers have been +manufacturing for nearly a hundred years, to restrain them of their +liberty, and deprive them of their natural rights, were all made for +their benefit, by men wiser than they--wiser even than justice +itself--and having only their welfare at heart! + +You evidently believe that the men who made those laws were duly +authorized to make them; and that you yourself have been duly authorized +to enforce them. But in this you are utterly mistaken. You have not so +much as the honest, responsible scratch of one single pen, to justify +you in the exercise of the power you have taken upon yourself to +exercise. For example, you have no such evidence of your right to take +any man's property for the support of your government, as would be +required of you, if you were to claim pay for a single day's honest +labor. + +It was once said, in this country, that taxation without consent was +robbery. And a seven years' war was fought to maintain that principle. +But if that principle were a true one in behalf of three millions of +men, it is an equally true one in behalf of three men, or of one man. + +Who are ever taxed? Individuals only. Who have property that can be +taxed? Individuals only. Who can give their consent to be taxed? +Individuals only. Who are ever taxed without their consent? Individuals +only. Who, then, are robbed, if taxed without their consent? Individuals +only. + +If taxation without consent is robbery, the United States government has +never had, has not now, and is never likely to have, a single honest +dollar in its treasury. + +If taxation without consent is _not_ robbery, then any band of robbers +have only to declare themselves a government, and all their robberies +are legalized. + +If any man's money can be taken by a so-called government, without his +own personal consent, all his other rights are taken with it; for with +his money the government can, and will, hire soldiers to stand over him, +compel him to submit to its arbitrary will, and kill him if he resists. + +That your whole claim of a right to any man's money for the support of +your government, without his consent, is the merest farce and fraud, is +proved by the fact that you have no such evidence of your right to take +it, as would be required of you, by one of your own courts, to prove a +debt of five dollars, that might be honestly due you. + +You and your lawmakers have no such evidence of your right of dominion +over the people of this country, as would be required to prove your +right to any material property, that you might have purchased. + +When a man parts with any considerable amount of such material property +as he has a natural right to part with,--as, for example, houses, or +lands, or food, or clothing, or anything else of much value,--he usually +gives, and the purchaser usually demands, some _written_ acknowledgment, +receipt, bill of sale, or other evidence, that will prove that he +voluntarily parted with it, and that the purchaser is now the real and +true owner of it. But you hold that fifty millions of people have +voluntarily parted, not only with their natural right of dominion over +all their material property, but also with all their natural right of +dominion over their own souls and bodies; when not one of them has ever +given you a scrap of writing, or even "made his mark," to that effect. + +You have not so much as the honest signature of a single human being, +granting to you or your lawmakers any right of dominion whatever over +him or his property. + +You hold your place only by a title, which, on no just principle of law +or reason, is worth a straw. And all who are associated with you in the +government--whether they be called senators, representatives, judges, +executive officers, or what not--all hold their places, directly or +indirectly, only by the same worthless title. That title is nothing more +nor less than votes given in secret (by secret ballot), by not more than +one-fifth of the whole population. These votes were given in secret +solely because those who gave them did not dare to make themselves +personally responsible, either for their own acts, or the acts of their +agents, the lawmakers, judges, etc. + +These voters, having given their votes in secret (by secret ballot), +have put it out of your power--and out of the power of all others +associated with you in the government--to designate your principals +_individually_. That is to say, you have no legal knowledge as to who +voted for you, or who voted against you. And being unable to designate +your principals _individually_, you have no right to say that you have +any principals. And having no right to say that you have any principals, +you are bound, on every just principle of law or reason, to confess that +you are mere usurpers, making laws, and enforcing them, upon your own +authority alone. + +A secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is +nothing else than a government by conspiracy. And a government by +conspiracy is the only government we now have. + +You say that "_every voter exercises a public trust_." + +Who appointed him to that trust? Nobody. He simply usurped the power; he +never accepted the trust. And because he usurped the power, he dares +exercise it only in secret. Not one of all the ten millions of voters, +who helped to place you in power, would have dared to do so, if he had +known that he was to be held personally responsible, before any just +tribunal, for the acts of those for whom he voted. + +Inasmuch as all the votes, given for you and your lawmakers, were given +in secret, all that you and they can say, in support of your authority +as rulers, is that you venture upon your acts as lawmakers, etc., not +because you have any open, authentic, written, legitimate authority +granted you by any human being,--for you can show nothing of the +kind,--but only because, from certain reports made to you of votes given +in secret, you have reason to believe that you have at your backs a +secret association strong enough to sustain you by force, in case your +authority should be resisted. + +Is there a government on earth that rests upon a more false, absurd, or +tyrannical basis than that? + + + SECTION VII. + +But the falsehood and absurdity of your whole system of government do +not result solely from the fact that it rests wholly upon votes given in +secret, or by men who take care to avoid all personal responsibility for +their own acts, or the acts of their agents. On the contrary, if every +man, woman, and child in the United States had openly signed, sealed, +and delivered to you and your associates, a written document, purporting +to invest you with all the legislative, judicial, and executive powers +that you now exercise, they would not thereby have given you the +slightest legitimate authority. Such a contract, purporting to surrender +into your hands all their natural rights of person and property, to be +disposed of at your pleasure or discretion, would have been simply an +absurd and void contract, giving you no real authority whatever. + +It is a natural impossibility for any man to make a _binding_ contract, +by which he shall surrender to others a single one of what are commonly +called his "natural, inherent, _inalienable_ rights." + +It is a natural impossibility for any man to make a _binding_ contract, +that shall invest others with any right whatever of arbitrary, +irresponsible dominion over him. + +The right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion is the right of property; +and the right of property is the right of arbitrary, irresponsible +dominion. The two are identical. There is no difference between them. +Neither can exist without the other. If, therefore, our so-called +lawmakers really have that right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion +over us, which they claim to have, and which they habitually exercise, +it must be because they own us as property. If they own us as property, +it must be because nature made us their property; for, as no man can +sell himself as a slave, we could never make a binding contract that +should make us their property--or, what is the same thing, give them any +right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion over us. + +As a lawyer, you certainly ought to know that all this is true. + + + SECTION VIII. + +Sir, consider, for a moment, what an utterly false, absurd, ridiculous, +and criminal government we now have. + +It all rests upon the false, ridiculous, and utterly groundless +assumption, that fifty millions of people not only could voluntarily +surrender, but actually have voluntarily surrendered, all their natural +rights, as human beings, into the custody of some four hundred men, +called lawmakers, judges, etc., who are to be held utterly irresponsible +for the disposal they may make of them.[2] + + [2] The irresponsibility of the senators and representatives is + guaranteed to them in this wise: + + For any speech or debate [or vote] in either house, they + [the senators and representatives] shall not be + questioned [held to any legal responsibility] in any + other place.--_Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 6._ + + The judicial and executive officers are all equally guaranteed + against all responsibility _to the people_. They are made + responsible only to the senators and representatives, whose laws + they are to administer and execute. So long as they sanction and + execute all these laws, to the satisfaction of the lawmakers, + they are safe against all responsibility. _In no case can the + people, whose rights they are continually denying and trampling + upon, hold them to any accountability whatever._ + + Thus it will be seen that all departments of the government, + legislative, judicial, and executive, are placed entirely beyond + any responsibility _to the people_, whose agents they profess to + be, and whose rights they assume to dispose of at pleasure. + + Was a more absolute, irresponsible government than that ever + invented? + +The only right, which any individual is supposed to retain, or possess, +under the government, _is a purely fictitious one,--one that nature +never gave him,_--to wit, his right (so-called), as one of some ten +millions of male adults, to give away, by his vote, not only all his own +natural, inherent, inalienable, human rights, but also all the natural, +inherent, inalienable, human rights of forty millions of other human +beings--that is, women and children. + +To suppose that any one of all these ten millions of male adults would +voluntarily surrender a single one of all his natural, inherent, +inalienable, human rights into the hands of irresponsible men, is an +absurdity; because, first, he has no power to do so, any contract he may +make for that purpose being absurd, and necessarily void; and, secondly, +because he can have no rational motive for doing so. To suppose him to +do so, is to suppose him to be an idiot, incapable of making any +rational and obligatory contract. It is to suppose he would voluntarily +give away everything in life that was of value to himself, and get +nothing in return. To suppose that he would attempt to give away all the +natural rights _of other persons_--that is, the women and children--as +well as his own, is to suppose him to attempt to do something that he +has no right, or power, to do. It is to suppose him to be both a villain +and a fool. + +And yet this government now rests wholly upon the assumption that some +ten millions of male adults--men supposed to be _compos mentis_--have +not only attempted to do, but have actually succeeded in doing, these +absurd and impossible things. + +It cannot be said that men put all their rights into the hands of the +government, in order to have them protected; because there can be no +such thing as a man's being protected in his rights, _any longer than he +is allowed to retain them in his own possession_. The only possible way, +in which any man can be protected in his rights, _is to protect him in +his own actual possession and exercise of them_. And yet our government +is absurd enough to assume that a man can be protected in his rights, +after he has surrendered them altogether into other hands than his own. + +This is just as absurd as it would be to assume that a man had given +himself away as a slave, in order to be protected in the enjoyment of +his liberty. + +A man wants his rights protected, solely that he himself may possess and +use them, and have the full benefit of them. But if he is compelled to +give them up to somebody else,--to a government, so-called, or to any +body else,--he ceases to have any rights of his own to be protected. + +To say, as the advocates of our government do, that a man must give up +_some_ of his natural rights, to a government, in order to have the rest +of them protected--the government being all the while the sole and +irresponsible judge as to what rights he does give up, and what he +retains, and what are to be protected--is to say that he gives up all +the rights that the government chooses, _at any time_, to assume that he +has given up; and that he retains none, and is to be protected in none, +except such as the government shall, _at all times_, see fit to protect, +and to permit him to retain. This is to suppose that he has retained no +rights at all, that he can, _at any time_, claim as his own, _as against +the government_. It is to say that he has really given up every right, +and reserved none. + +For a still further reason, it is absurd to say that a man must give up +_some_ of his rights to a government, in order that government may +protect him in the rest. That reason is, that every right he gives up +diminishes his own power of self-protection, and makes it so much more +difficult for the government to protect him. And yet our government says +a man must give up _all_ his rights, in order that it may protect him. +It might just as well be said that a man must consent to be bound hand +and foot, in order to enable a government, or his friends, to protect +him against an enemy. Leave him in full possession of his limbs, and of +all his powers, and he will do more for his own protection than he +otherwise could, and will have less need of protection from a +government, or any other source. + +Finally, if a man, who is _compos mentis_, wants any outside protection +for his rights, he is perfectly competent to make his own bargain for +such as he desires; and other persons have no occasion to thrust their +protection upon him, against his will; or to insist, as they now do, +that he shall give up all, or any, of his rights to them, in +consideration of such protection, and only such protection, as they may +afterwards _choose_ to give him. + +It is especially noticeable that those persons, who are so impatient to +protect other men in their rights that they cannot wait until they are +requested to do so, have a somewhat inveterate habit of killing all who +do not voluntarily accept their protection; or do not consent to give up +to them all their rights in exchange for it. + +If A were to go to B, a merchant, and say to him, "Sir, I am a +night-watchman, and I insist upon your employing me as such in +protecting your property against burglars; and to enable me to do so +more effectually, I insist upon your letting me tie your own hands and +feet, so that you cannot interfere with me; and also upon your +delivering up to me all your keys to your store, your safe, and to all +your valuables; and that you authorize me to act solely and fully +according to my own will, pleasure, and discretion in the matter; and +I demand still further, that you shall give me an absolute guaranty +that you will not hold me to any accountability whatever for anything +I may do, or for anything that may happen to your goods while they are +under my protection; and unless you comply with this proposal, I will +now kill you on the spot,"--if A were to say all this to B, B would +naturally conclude that A himself was the most impudent and dangerous +burglar that he (B) had to fear; and that if he (B) wished to secure +his property against burglars, his best way would be to kill A in the +first place, and then take his chances against all such other burglars +as might come afterwards. + +Our government constantly acts the part that is here supposed to be +acted by A. And it is just as impudent a scoundrel as A is here +supposed to be. It insists that every man shall give up all his rights +unreservedly into its custody, and then hold it wholly irresponsible +for any disposal it may make of them. And it gives him no alternative +but death. + +If by putting a bayonet to a man's breast, and giving him his choice, to +die, or be "protected in his rights," it secures his consent to the +latter alternative, it then proclaims itself a free government,--a +government resting on consent! + +You yourself describe such a government as "the best government ever +vouchsafed to man." + +Can you tell me of one that is worse in principle? + +But perhaps you will say that ours is not so bad, in principle, as the +others, for the reason that here, once in two, four, or six years, each +male adult is permitted to have one vote in ten millions, in choosing +the public protectors. Well, if you think that that materially alters +the case, I wish you joy of your remarkable discernment. + + + SECTION IX. + +Sir, if a government is to "do equal and exact justice to all men," _it +must do simply that, and nothing more_. If it does more than that to +any,--that is, if it gives monopolies, privileges, exemptions, bounties, +or favors to any,--it can do so only by doing injustice to more or less +others. _It can give to one only what it takes from others; for it has +nothing of its own to give to any one._ The best that it can do for all, +and the only honest thing it can do for any, is simply to secure to each +and every one his own rights,--the rights that nature gave him,--his +rights of person, and his rights of property; leaving him, then, to +pursue his own interests, and secure his own welfare, by the free and +full exercise of his own powers of body and mind; so long as he +trespasses upon the equal rights of no other person. + +If he desires any favors from any body, he must, I repeat, depend upon +the voluntary kindness of such of his fellow men as may be willing to +grant them. No government can have any right to grant them; because no +government can have a right to take from one man any thing that is his, +and give it to another. + +If this be the only true idea of an honest government, it is plain that +it can have nothing to do with men's "interests," "welfare," or +"prosperity," _as distinguished from their "rights."_ Being secured in +their rights, each and all must take the sole charge of, and have the +sole responsibility for, their own "interests," "welfare," and +"prosperity." + +By simply protecting every man in his rights, a government necessarily +keeps open to every one the widest possible field, that he honestly can +have, for such industry as he may choose to follow. It also insures him +the widest possible field for obtaining such capital as he needs for his +industry, and the widest possible markets for the products of his labor. +With the possession of these rights, he must be content. + +No honest government can go into business with any individuals, be they +many, or few. It cannot furnish capital to any, nor prohibit the loaning +of capital to any. It can give to no one any special aid to competition; +nor protect any one from competition. It must adhere inflexibly to the +principle of entire freedom for all honest industry, and all honest +traffic. It can do to no one any favor, nor render to any one any +assistance, which it withholds from another. It must hold the scales +impartially between them; taking no cognizance of any man's "interests," +"welfare," or "prosperity," otherwise than by simply protecting him in +his "_rights_." + +In opposition to this view, lawmakers profess to have weighty duties +laid upon them, to promote men's "interests," "welfare," and +"prosperity," _as distinguished from their "rights."_ They seldom have +any thing to say about men's "_rights_." On the contrary, they take it +for granted that they are charged with the duty of promoting, +superintending, directing, and controlling the "business" of the +country. In the performance of this supposed duty, all ideas of +individual "_rights_" are cast aside. Not knowing any way--because +there is no way--in which they can impartially promote all men's +"interests," "welfare," and "prosperity," _otherwise than by protecting +impartially all men's rights_, they boldly proclaim that "_individual +rights must not be permitted to stand in the way of the public good, +the public welfare, and the business interests of the country_." + +Substantially all their lawmaking proceeds upon this theory; for there +is no other theory, on which they can find any justification whatever +for any lawmaking at all. So they proceed to give monopolies, +privileges, bounties, grants, loans, etc., etc., to particular persons, +or classes of persons; justifying themselves by saying that these +privileged persons will "give employment" to the unprivileged; and that +this employment, given by the privileged to the unprivileged, will +compensate the latter for the loss of their "_rights_." And they carry +on their lawmaking of this kind to the greatest extent they think is +possible, without causing rebellion and revolution, on the part of the +injured classes. + +Sir, I am sorry to see that you adopt this lawmaking theory to its +fullest extent; that although, for once only, and in a dozen words +only,--and then merely incidentally,--you describe the government as "a +government pledged to do equal and exact justice to all men," you show, +throughout the rest of your address, that you have no thought of abiding +by that principle; that you are either utterly ignorant, or utterly +regardless, of what that principle requires of you; that the government, +so far as your influence goes, is to be given up to the business of +lawmaking,--that is, to the business of abolishing justice, and +establishing injustice in its place; that you hold it to be the proper +duty and function of the government to be constantly looking after men's +"interests," "welfare," "prosperity," etc., etc., _as distinguished from +their rights_; that it must consider men's "rights" as no guide to the +promotion of their "interests"; that it must give favors to some, and +withhold the same favors from others; that in order to give these favors +to some, it must take from others their _rights_; that, in reality, it +must traffic in both men's interests and their rights; that it must keep +open shop, and sell men's interests and rights to the highest bidders; +and that this is your only plan for promoting "the general welfare," +"the common interest," etc., etc. + +That such is your idea of the constitutional duties and functions of the +government, is shown by different parts of your address: but more fully, +perhaps, by this: + + The large variety of diverse and _competing interests_ subject + to _federal control, persistently seeking recognition of their + claims_, need give us no fear that the greatest good of the + greatest number will fail to be accomplished, if, _in the + halls of national legislation_, that spirit of amity and mutual + concession shall prevail, in which the constitution had its + birth. If this involves the _surrender_ or _postponement_ of + _private interests_, and the _abandonment_ of _local + advantages_, compensation will be found in the assurance that + thus the _common interest_ is subserved, and _the general + welfare_ advanced. + +What is all this but saying that the government is not at all an +institution for "doing equal and exact justice to all men," or for the +impartial protection of all men's _rights_; but that it is its proper +business to take sides, for and against, a "large variety of diverse and +_competing interests_"; that it has this "large variety of diverse and +_competing interests_" under its arbitrary "_control_"; that it can, at +its pleasure, make such laws as will give success to some of them, and +insure the defeat of others; that these "various, diverse, and +_competing interests_" will be "_persistently seeking recognition of +their claims_ ... in _the halls of national legislation_,"--that is, +will be "persistently" clamoring for laws to be made in their favor; +that, in fact, "the halls of national legislation" are to be mere +arenas, into which the government actually invites the advocates and +representatives of all the selfish schemes of avarice and ambition that +unprincipled men can devise; that these schemes will there be free to +"_compete_" with each other in their corrupt offers for government favor +and support; and that it is to be the proper and ordinary business of +the lawmakers to listen to all these schemes; to adopt some of them, and +sustain them with all the money and power of the government; and to +"postpone," "abandon," oppose, and defeat all others; it being well +known, all the while, that the lawmakers will, _individually_, favor, or +oppose, these various schemes, according to their own irresponsible +will, pleasure, and discretion,--that is, according as they can better +serve their own personal interests and ambitions by doing the one or the +other. + +Was a more thorough scheme of national villainy ever invented? + +Sir, do you not know that in this conflict, between these "various, +diverse, and _competing interests_," all ideas of individual +"_rights_"--all ideas of "equal and exact justice to all men"--will be +cast to the winds; that the boldest, the strongest, the most fraudulent, +the most rapacious, and the most corrupt, men will have control of the +government, and make it a mere instrument for plundering the great body +of the people? + +Your idea of the real character of the government is plainly this: The +lawmakers are to assume absolute and irresponsible "_control_" of all +the financial resources, all the legislative, judicial, and executive +powers, of the government, and employ them all for the promotion of such +schemes of plunder and ambition as they may select from all those that +may be submitted to them for their approval; that they are to keep "the +halls of national legislation" wide open for the admission of all +persons having such schemes to offer; and that they are to grant +monopolies, privileges, loans, and bounties to all such of these schemes +as they can make subserve their own individual interests and ambitions, +and reject or "postpone" all others. And that there is to be no limit to +their operations of this kind, except their fear of exciting rebellion +and resistance on the part of the plundered classes. + +And you are just fool enough to tell us that such a government as this +may be relied on to "accomplish the greatest good to the greatest +number," "to subserve the common interest," and "advance the general +welfare," "if," only, "in the halls of national legislation, that spirit +of amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in which the constitution +had its birth." + +You here assume that "the general welfare" is to depend, not upon the +free and untrammelled enterprise and industry of the whole people, +acting individually, and each enjoying and exercising all his natural +rights; but wholly or principally upon the success of such particular +schemes as the government may take under its special "control." And this +means that "the general welfare" is to depend, wholly or principally, +upon such privileges, monopolies, loans, and bounties as the government +may grant to more or less of that "large variety of diverse and +competing _interests_"--that is, schemes--that may be "persistently" +pressed upon its attention. + +But as you impliedly acknowledge that the government cannot take all +these "interests" (schemes) under its "control," and bestow its favors +upon all alike, you concede that some of them must be "surrendered," +"postponed," or "abandoned"; and that, consequently, the government +cannot get on at all, unless, "in the halls of national legislation, +that spirit of amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in which the +constitution had its birth." + +This "spirit of amity and mutual concession in the halls of +legislation," you explain to mean this: a disposition, on the part of +the lawmakers respectively--whose various schemes of plunder cannot all +be accomplished, by reason of their being beyond the financial resources +of the government, or the endurance of the people--to "surrender" some +of them, "postpone" others, and "abandon" others, in order that the +general business of robbery may go on to the greatest extent possible, +and that each one of the lawmakers may succeed with as many of the +schemes he is specially intrusted with, as he can carry through by means +of such bargains, for mutual help, as he may be able to make with his +fellow lawmakers. + +Such is the plan of government, to which you say that you "consecrate" +yourself, and "engage your every faculty and effort." + +Was a more shameless avowal ever made? + +You cannot claim to be ignorant of what crimes such a government will +commit. You have had abundant opportunity to know--and if you have kept +your eyes open, you do know--what these schemes of robbery have been in +the past; and from these you can judge what they will be in the future. + +You know that under such a system, every senator and +representative--probably without an exception--will come to the congress +as the champion of the dominant scoundrelisms of his own State or +district; that he will be elected solely to serve those "interests," as +you call them; that in offering himself as a candidate, he will announce +the robbery, or robberies, to which all his efforts will be directed; +that he will call these robberies his "policy"; or if he be lost to all +decency, he will call them his "principles"; that they will always be +such as he thinks will best subserve his own interests, or ambitions; +that he will go to "the halls of national legislation" with his head +full of plans for making bargains with other lawmakers--as corrupt as +himself--for mutual help in carrying their respective schemes. + +Such has been the character of our congresses nearly, or quite, from the +beginning. It can scarcely be said that there has ever been an honest +man in one of them. A man has sometimes gained a reputation for honesty, +in his own State or district, by opposing some one or more of the +robberies that were proposed by members from other portions of the +country. But such a man has seldom, or never, deserved his reputation; +for he has, generally, if not always, been the advocate of some one or +more schemes of robbery, by which more or less of his own constituents +were to profit, and which he knew it would be indispensable that he +should advocate, in order to give him votes at home. + +If there have ever been any members, who were consistently honest +throughout,--who were really in favor of "doing equal and exact justice +to all men,"--and, of course, nothing more than that to any,--their +numbers have been few; so few as to have left no mark upon the general +legislation. They have but constituted the exceptions that proved the +rule. If you were now required to name such a lawmaker, I think you +would search our history in vain to find him. + +That this is no exaggerated description of our national lawmaking, the +following facts will prove. + +For the first seventy years of the government, one portion of the +lawmakers would be satisfied with nothing less than permission to rob +one-sixth, or one-seventh, of the whole population, not only of their +labor, but even of their right to their own persons. In 1860, this class +of lawmakers comprised all the senators and representatives from +fifteen, of the then thirty-three, States.[3] + + [3] In the Senate they stood thirty to thirty-six, in the house + ninety to one hundred and forty-seven, in the two branches + united one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty-three, + relatively to the non-slaveholding members. + + From the foundation of the government--without a single + interval, I think--the lawmakers from the slaveholding States + had been, _relatively_, as strong, or stronger, than in 1860. + +This body of lawmakers, standing always firmly together, and capable of +turning the scale for, or against, any scheme of robbery, in which +northern men were interested, but on which northern men were +divided,--such as navigation acts, tariffs, bounties, grants, war, +peace, etc.,--could purchase immunity for their own crime, by supporting +such, and so many, northern crimes--second only to their own in +atrocity--as could be mutually agreed on. + +In this way the slaveholders bargained for, and secured, protection for +slavery and the slave trade, by consenting to such navigation acts as +some of the northern States desired, and to such tariffs on +imports--such as iron, coal, wool, woollen goods, etc.,--as should +enable the home producers of similar articles to make fortunes by +robbing everybody else in the prices of their goods. + +Another class of lawmakers have been satisfied with nothing less than +such a monopoly of money, as should enable the holders of it to +suppress, as far as possible, all industry and traffic, except such as +they themselves should control; such a monopoly of money as would put +it wholly out of the power of the great body of wealth-producers to +hire the capital needed for their industries; and thus compel +them--especially the mechanical portions of them--by the alternative of +starvation--to sell their labor to the monopolists of money, for just +such prices as these latter should choose to pay. This monopoly of money +has also given, to the holders of it, a control, so nearly absolute, of +all industry--agricultural as well as mechanical--and all traffic, as +has enabled them to plunder all the producing classes in the prices of +their labor, or the products of their labor. + +Have you been blind, all these years, to the existence, or the effects, +of this monopoly of money? + +Still another class of lawmakers have demanded unequal taxation on the +various kinds of home property, that are subject to taxation; such +unequal taxation as would throw heavy burdens upon some kinds of +property, and very light burdens, or no burdens at all, upon other +kinds. + +And yet another class of lawmakers have demanded great appropriations, +or loans, of money, or grants of lands, to enterprises intended to give +great wealth to a few, at the expense of everybody else. + +These are some of the schemes of downright and outright robbery, which +you mildly describe as "the large variety of diverse and competing +interests, _subject to federal control_, persistently seeking +recognition of their claims ... in the halls of national legislation"; +and each having its champions and representatives among the lawmakers. + +You know that all, or very nearly all, the legislation of congress is +devoted to these various schemes of robbery; and that little, or no, +legislation goes through, except by means of such bargains as these +lawmakers may enter into with each other, for mutual support of their +respective robberies. And yet you have the mendacity, or the stupidity, +to tell us that so much of this legislation as does go through, may be +relied on to "accomplish the greatest good to the greatest number," to +"subserve the common interest," and "advance the general welfare." + +And when these schemes of robbery become so numerous, atrocious, and +unendurable that they can no longer be reconciled "in the halls of +national legislation," by "surrendering" some of them, "postponing" +others, and "abandoning" others, you assume--for such has been the +prevailing opinion, and you say nothing to the contrary--that it is the +right of the strongest party, or parties, to murder a half million of +men, if that be necessary,--and as we once did,--not to secure liberty +or justice to any body,--but to compel the weaker of these would-be +robbers to submit to all such robberies as the stronger ones may choose +to practise upon them. + + + SECTION X. + +Sir, your idea of the true character of our government is plainly this: +you assume that all the natural, inherent, inalienable, individual, +_human_ rights of fifty millions of people--all their individual rights +to preserve their own lives, and promote their own happiness--have been +thrown into one common heap,--into hotchpotch, as the lawyers say: and +that this hotchpotch has been given into the hands of some four hundred +champion robbers, each of whom has pledged himself to carry off as large +a portion of it as possible, to be divided among those men--well known +to himself, but who--to save themselves from all responsibility for his +acts--have secretly (by secret ballot) appointed him to be their +champion. + +Sir, if you had assumed that all the people of this country had thrown +all their wealth, all their rights, all their means of living, into +hotchpotch; and that this hotchpotch had been given over to four hundred +ferocious hounds; and that each of these hounds had been selected and +trained to bring to his masters so much of this common plunder as he, in +the general fight, or scramble, could get off with, you would scarcely +have drawn a more vivid picture of the true character of the government +of the United States, than you have done in your inaugural address. + +No wonder that you are obliged to confess that such a government can be +carried on only "amid the din of party strife"; that it will be +influenced--you should have said _directed_--by "purely partisan zeal"; +and that it will be attended by "the animosities of political strife, +the bitterness of partisan defeat, and the exultation of partisan +triumph." + +What gang of robbers, quarrelling over the division of their plunder, +could exhibit a more shameful picture than you thus acknowledge to be +shown by the government of the United States? + +Sir, nothing of all this "din," and "strife," and "animosity," and +"bitterness," is caused by any attempt, on the part of the government, +to simply "do equal and exact justice to all men,"--to simply protect +every man impartially in all his natural rights to life, liberty, and +property. It is all caused simply and solely by the government's +violation of some men's "_rights_," to promote other men's "interests." +If you do not know this, you are mentally an object of pity. + +Sir, men's "_rights_" are always harmonious. That is to say, each man's +"rights" are always consistent and harmonious with each and every other +man's "rights." But their "_interests_" as you estimate them, constantly +clash; especially such "interests" as depend on government grants of +monopolies, privileges, loans, and bounties. And these "interests," like +the interests of other gamblers, clash with a fury proportioned to the +amounts at stake. It is these clashing "_interests_" and not any +clashing "_rights_" that give rise to all the strife you have here +depicted, and to all this necessity for "that spirit of amity and mutual +concession," which you hold to be indispensable to the accomplishment of +such legislation as you say is necessary to the welfare of the country. + +Each and every man's "_rights_" being consistent and harmonious with +each and every other man's "_rights_"; and all men's rights being +immutably fixed, and easily ascertained, by a science that is open to be +learned and known by all; a government that does nothing but "equal and +exact justice to all men"--that simply gives to every man his own, and +nothing more to any--has no cause and no occasion for any "political +_parties_." What are these "political parties" but standing armies of +robbers, each trying to rob the other, and to prevent being itself +robbed by the other? A government that seeks only to "do equal and exact +justice to all men," has no cause and no occasion to enlist all the +fighting men in the nation in two hostile ranks; to keep them always in +battle array, and burning with hatred towards each other. It has no +cause and no occasion for any "political _warfare_" any "political +_hostility_" any "political _campaigns_" any "political _contests_" any +"political _fights_" any "political _defeats_" or any "political +_triumphs_." It has no cause and no occasion for any of those "political +_leaders_" so called, whose whole business is to invent new schemes of +robbery, and organize the people into opposing bands of robbers; all for +their own aggrandizement alone. It has no cause and no occasion for the +toleration, or the existence, of that vile horde of political bullies, +and swindlers, and blackguards, who enlist on one side or the other, and +fight for pay; who, year in and year out, employ their lungs and their +ink in spreading lies among ignorant people, to excite their hopes of +gain, or their fears of loss, and thus obtain their votes. In short, it +has no cause and no occasion for all this "din of party strife," for all +this "purely partisan zeal," for all "the bitterness of partisan +defeat," for all "the exultation of partisan triumph," nor, worst of +all, for any of "that spirit of amity and mutual concession [by which +you evidently mean that readiness, "in the halls of national +legislation," to sacrifice some men's "rights" to promote other men's +"interests"] in which [you say] the constitution had its birth." + +If the constitution does really, or naturally, give rise to all this +"strife," and require all this "spirit of amity and mutual +concession,"--and I do not care now to deny that it does,--so much the +worse for the constitution. And so much the worse for all those men +who, like yourself, swear to "preserve, protect, and defend it." + +And yet you have the face to make no end of professions, or pretences, +that the impelling power, the real motive, in all this robbery and +strife, is nothing else than "the service of the people," "their +interests," "the promotion of their welfare," "good government," +"government by the people," "the popular will," "the general weal," "the +achievements of our national destiny," "the benefits which our happy +form of government can bestow," "the lasting welfare of the country," +"the priceless benefits of the constitution," "the greatest good to the +greatest number," "the common interest," "the general welfare," "the +people's will," "the mission of the American people," "our civil +policy," "the genius of our institutions," "the needs of our people in +their home life," "the settlement and development of the resources of +our vast territory," "the prosperity of our republic," "the interests +and prosperity of all the people," "the safety and confidence of +business interests," "making the wage of labor sure and steady," "a +due regard to the interests of capital invested and workingmen +employed in American industries," "reform in the administration of the +government," "the application of business principles to public +affairs," "the constant and ever varying wants of an active and +enterprising population," "a firm determination to secure to all the +people of the land the full benefits of the best form of government +ever vouchsafed to man," "the blessings of our national life," etc., +etc. + +Sir, what is the use of such a deluge of unmeaning words, unless it be +to gloss over, and, if possible, hide, the true character of the acts of +the government? + +Such "generalities" as these do not even "glitter." They are only the +stale phrases of the demagogue, who wishes to appear to promise +everything, but commits himself to nothing. Or else they are the +senseless talk of a mere political parrot, who repeats words he has been +taught to utter, without knowing their meaning. At best, they are the +mere gibberish of a man destitute of all political ideas, but who +imagines that "good government," "the general welfare," "the common +interest," "the best form of government ever vouchsafed to man," etc., +etc., must be very good things, if anybody can ever find out what they +are. There is nothing definite, nothing real, nothing tangible, nothing +honest, about them. Yet they constitute your entire stock in trade. In +resorting to them--in holding them up to public gaze as comprising your +political creed--you assume that they have a meaning; that they are +matters of overruling importance; that they require the action of an +omnipotent, irresponsible, lawmaking government; that all these +"interests" must be represented, and can be secured, only "in the halls +of national legislation"; and by such political hounds as have been +selected and trained, and sent there, solely that they may bring off, to +their respective masters, as much as possible of the public plunder they +hold in their hands; that is, as much as possible of the earnings of all +the honest wealth-producers of the country. + +And when these masters count up the spoils that their hounds have thus +brought home to them, they set up a corresponding shout that "the public +prosperity," "the common interest," and "the general welfare" have been +"advanced." And the scoundrels by whom the work has been accomplished, +"in the halls of national legislation," are trumpeted to the world as +"great statesmen." And you are just stupid enough to be deceived into +the belief, or just knave enough to pretend to be deceived into the +belief, that all this is really the truth. + +One would infer from your address that you think the people of this +country incapable of doing anything for themselves, _individually_; that +they would all perish, but for the employment given them by that "large +variety of diverse and competing interests"--that is, such purely +selfish schemes--as may be "persistently seeking recognition of their +claims ... in the halls of national legislation," and secure for +themselves such monopolies and advantages as congress may see fit to +grant them. + +Instead of your recognizing the right of each and every individual to +judge of, and provide for, his own well-being, according to the dictates +of his own judgment, and by the free exercise of his own powers of body +and mind,--so long as he infringes the equal rights of no other +person,--you assume that fifty millions of people, who never saw you, +and never will see you, who know almost nothing about you, and care very +little about you, are all so weak, ignorant, and degraded as to be +humbly and beseechingly looking to you--and to a few more lawmakers (so +called) whom they never saw, and never will see, and of whom they know +almost nothing--to enlighten, direct, and "_control_" them in their +daily labors to supply their own wants, and promote their own happiness! + +You thus assume that these fifty millions of people are so debased, +mentally and morally, that they look upon you and your associate +lawmakers as their earthly gods, holding their destinies in your hands, +and anxiously studying their welfare; instead of looking upon you--as +most of you certainly ought to be looked upon--as a mere cabal of +ignorant, selfish, ambitious, rapacious, and unprincipled men, who know +very little, and care to know very little, except how you can get fame, +and power, and money, by trampling upon other men's rights, and robbing +them of the fruits of their labor. + +Assuming yourself to be the greatest of these gods, charged with the +"welfare" of fifty millions of people, you enter upon the mighty task +with all the mock solemnity, and ridiculous grandiloquence, of a man +ignorant enough to imagine that he is really performing a solemn duty, +and doing an immense public service, instead of simply making a fool of +himself. Thus you say: + + Fellow citizens: In the presence of this vast assemblage of my + countrymen, I am about to supplement and seal, by the oath + which I shall take, the manifestation of the will of a great + and free people. In the exercise of their power and right of + self-government, they have committed to one of their fellow + citizens a supreme and sacred trust, and he here consecrates + himself to their service. This impressive ceremony adds little + to the solemn sense of responsibility with which I contemplate + the duty I owe to all the people of the land. Nothing can + relieve me from anxiety lest by any act of mine their + _interests_ [not their _rights_] may suffer, and nothing is + needed to strengthen my resolution to engage every faculty and + effort in the promotion of their _welfare_. [Not in "doing + equal and exact justice to all men." After having once + described the government as one "pledged to do equal and exact + justice to all men," you drop that subject entirely, and wander + off into "interests," and "welfare," and an astonishing number + of other equally unmeaning things.] + +Sir, you would have no occasion to take all this tremendous labor and +responsibility upon yourself, if you and your lawmakers would but keep +your hands off the "_rights_" of your "countrymen." Your "countrymen" +would be perfectly competent to take care of their own "_interests_," +and provide for their own "_welfare_," if their hands were not tied, and +their powers crippled, by such fetters as men like you and your +lawmakers have fastened upon them. + +Do you know so little of your "countrymen," that you need to be told +that their own strength and skill must be their sole reliance for their +own well-being? Or that they are abundantly able, and willing, and +anxious above all other things, to supply their own "needs in their home +life," and secure their own "welfare"? Or that they would do it, not +only without jar or friction, but as their highest duty and pleasure, if +their powers were not manacled by the absurd and villainous laws you +propose to execute upon them? Are you so stupid as to imagine that +putting chains on men's hands, and fetters on their feet, and +insurmountable obstacles in their paths, is the way to supply their +"needs," and promote their "welfare"? Do you think your "countrymen" +need to be told, either by yourself, or by any such gang of ignorant or +unprincipled men as all lawmakers are, what to do, and what not to do, +to supply their own "needs in their home life"? Do they not know how to +grow their own food, make their own clothing, build their own houses, +print their own books, acquire all the knowledge, and create all the +wealth, they desire, without being domineered over, and thwarted in all +their efforts, by any set of either fools or villains, who may call +themselves their lawmakers? And do you think they will never get their +eyes open to see what blockheads, or impostors, you and your lawmakers +are? Do they not now--at least so far as you will permit them to do +it--grow their own food, build their own houses, make their own +clothing, print their own books? Do they not make all the scientific +discoveries and mechanical inventions, by which all wealth is created? +_Or are all these things done by "the government"?_ Are you an idiot, +that you can talk as you do, about what you and your lawmakers are doing +to provide for the real wants, and promote the real "welfare," of fifty +millions of people? + + + SECTION XI. + +But perhaps the most brilliant idea in your whole address, is this: + + _Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close + scrutiny of its public servants,_ and a fair and reasonable + estimate of their fidelity and usefulness. Thus is the people's + will impressed upon the whole framework of our civil policy, + municipal, State, and federal; _and this is the price of our + liberty_, and the inspiration of our faith in the republic. + +The essential parts of this declaration are these: + +"_Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of +its public servants, ... and this is the price of our liberty._" + +Who are these "public servants," that need all this watching? Evidently +they are the lawmakers, and the lawmakers only. They are not only the +_chief_ "public servants," but they are absolute masters of all the +other "public servants." These other "public servants," judicial and +executive,--the courts, the army, the navy, the collectors of taxes, +etc., etc.,--have no function whatever, except that of simple obedience +to the lawmakers. They are appointed, paid, and have their duties +prescribed to them, by the lawmakers; and are made responsible only to +the lawmakers. They are mere puppets in the hands of the lawmakers. +Clearly, then, the lawmakers are the only ones we have any occasion to +watch. + +Your declaration, therefore, amounts, practically, to this, and this +only: + +_Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of +ITS LAWMAKERS, ... and this is the price of our liberty._ + +Sir, your declaration is so far true, as that all the danger to "our +liberty" _comes solely from the lawmakers_. + +And why are the lawmakers dangerous to "our liberty"? Because it is a +natural impossibility that they can _make_ any law--that is, any law of +their own invention--that does _not_ violate "our liberty." + +_The law of justice is the one only law that does not violate "our +liberty."_ And that is not a law that was made by the lawmakers. It +existed before they were born, and will exist after they are dead. It +derives not one particle of its authority from any commands of theirs. +It is, therefore, in no sense, one of _their_ laws. Only laws of their +own invention are _their_ laws. And as it is naturally impossible that +they can invent any law of their own, that shall not conflict with the +law of justice, it is naturally impossible that they can _make_ a +law--that is, a law of their own invention--that shall _not_ violate +"our liberty." + +The law of justice is the precise measure, and the only precise measure, +of the rightful "liberty" of each and every human being. Any law--made +by lawmakers--that should give to any man more liberty than is given him +by the law of justice, would be a license to commit an injustice upon +one or more other persons. On the other hand, any law--made by +lawmakers--that should take from any human being any "liberty" that is +given him by the law of justice, would be taking from him a part of his +own rightful "liberty." + +Inasmuch, then, as every possible law, that can be made by lawmakers, +must either give to some one or more persons more "liberty" than the law +of nature--or the law of justice--gives them, and more "liberty" than is +consistent with the natural and equal "liberty" of all other persons; or +else must take from some one or more persons some portion of that +"liberty" which the law of nature--or the law of justice--gives to every +human being, it is inevitable that every law, that can be made by +lawmakers, must be a violation of the natural and rightful "liberty" of +some one or more persons. + +Therefore the very idea of a _lawmaking_ government--a government that +is to make laws of its own invention--is necessarily in direct and +inevitable conflict with "our liberty." In fact, the whole, sole, and +only real purpose of any _lawmaking_ government whatever is to take from +some one or more persons their "liberty." Consequently the only way in +which all men can preserve their "liberty," is not to have any +_lawmaking_ government at all. + +We have been told, time out of mind, that "_Eternal vigilance is +the price of liberty_." But this admonition, by reason of its +indefiniteness, has heretofore fallen dead upon the popular mind. It, in +reality, tells us nothing that we need to know, to enable us to preserve +"our liberty." It does not even tell us what "our liberty" is, or how, +or when, or through whom, it is endangered, or destroyed. + +1. It does not tell us that _individual_ liberty is the only _human_ +liberty. It does not tell us that "national liberty," "political +liberty," "republican liberty," "democratic liberty," "constitutional +liberty," "liberty under law," and all the other kinds of liberty that +men have ever invented, and with which tyrants, as well as demagogues, +have amused and cheated the ignorant, are not liberty at all, unless in +so far as they may, under certain circumstances, have chanced to +contribute something to, or given some impulse toward, _individual_ +liberty. + +2. It does not tell us that _individual_ liberty means freedom from all +compulsion to do anything whatever, except what justice requires us to +do, and freedom to do everything whatever that justice permits us to do. +It does not tell us that individual liberty means freedom from all human +restraint or coercion whatsoever, so long as we "live honestly, hurt +nobody, and give to every one his due." + +3. It does not tell us that there is any _science of liberty_; any +science, which every man may learn, and by which every man may know, +what is, and what is not, his own, and every other man's, rightful +"liberty." + +4. It does not tell us that this right of individual liberty rests upon +an immutable, natural principle, which no human power can make, unmake, +or alter; nor that all human authority, that claims to set it aside, or +modify it, is nothing but falsehood, absurdity, usurpation, tyranny, and +crime. + +5. It does not tell us that this right of individual liberty is a +_natural, inherent, inalienable right; that therefore no man can part +with it, or delegate it to another, if he would_; and that, +consequently, all the claims that have ever been made, by governments, +priests, or any other powers, that individuals have voluntarily +surrendered, or "delegated," their liberty to others, are all impostures +and frauds. + +6. It does not tell us that all human laws, so called, and all human +lawmaking,--all commands, either by one man, or any number of men, +calling themselves a government, or by any other name--requiring any +individual to do this, or forbidding him to do that--so long as he +"lives honestly, hurts no one, and gives to every one his due"--are all +false and tyrannical assumptions of a right of authority and dominion +over him; are all violations of his natural, inherent, inalienable, +rightful, individual liberty; and, as such, are to be resented and +resisted to the utmost, by every one who does not choose to be a slave. + +7. And, finally, it does not tell us that all _lawmaking_ governments +whatsoever--whether called monarchies, aristocracies, republics, +democracies, or by any other name--are all alike violations of men's +natural and rightful liberty. + +We can now see why lawmakers are the only enemies, from whom "our +liberty" has anything to fear, or whom we have any occasion to watch. +They are to be watched, because they claim the right to abolish justice, +and establish injustice in its stead; because they claim the right to +command us to do things which justice does not require us to do, and to +forbid us to do things which justice permits us to do; because they deny +our right to be, _individually, and absolutely_, our own masters and +owners, so long as we obey the one law of justice towards all other +persons; because they claim to be our masters, and that _their_ +commands, _as such_, are authoritative and binding upon us as law; and +that they may rightfully compel us to obey them. + +"Our liberty" is in danger only from the lawmakers, because it is only +through the agency of lawmakers, that anybody pretends to be able to +take away "our liberty." It is only the lawmakers that claim to be above +all responsibility for taking away "our liberty." Lawmakers are the only +ones who are impudent enough to assert for themselves the right to take +away "our liberty." They are the only ones who are impudent enough to +tell us that we have voluntarily surrendered "our liberty" into their +hands. They are the only ones who have the insolent condescension to +tell us that, in consideration of our having surrendered into their +hands "our liberty," and all our natural, inherent, inalienable rights +as human beings, they are disposed to give us, in return, "good +government," "the best form of government ever vouchsafed to man"; to +"protect" us, to provide for our "welfare," to promote our "interests," +etc., etc. + +And yet you are just blockhead enough to tell us that if "Every +citizen"--fifty millions and more of them--will but keep "a vigilant +watch and close scrutiny" upon these lawmakers, "our liberty" may be +preserved! + +Don't you think, sir, that you are really the wisest man that ever told +"a great and free people" how they could preserve "their liberty"? + +To be entirely candid, don't you think, sir, that a surer way of +preserving "our liberty" would be to have no lawmakers at all? + + + SECTION XII. + +But, in spite of all I have said, or, perhaps, can say, you will +probably persist in your idea that the world needs a great deal of +lawmaking; that mankind in general are not entitled to have any will, +choice, judgment, or conscience of their own; that, if not very wicked, +they are at least very ignorant and stupid; that they know very little +of what is for their own good, or how to promote their own "interests," +"welfare," or "prosperity"; that it is therefore necessary that they +should be put under guardianship to lawmakers; that these lawmakers, +being a very superior race of beings,--wise beyond the rest of their +species,--and entirely free from all those selfish passions which tempt +common mortals to do wrong,--must be intrusted with absolute and +irresponsible dominion over the less favored of their kind; must +prescribe to the latter, authoritatively, what they may, and may not, +do; and, in general, manage the affairs of this world according to their +discretion, free of all accountability to any human tribunals. + +And you seem to be perfectly confident that, under this absolute and +irresponsible dominion of the lawmakers, the affairs of this world will +be rightly managed; that the "interests," "welfare," and "prosperity" of +"a great and free people" will be properly attended to; that "the +greatest good of the greatest number" will be accomplished, etc., etc. + +And yet you hold that all this lawmaking, and all this subjection of the +great body of the people to the arbitrary, irresponsible dominion of the +lawmakers, will not interfere at all with "our liberty," if only "every +citizen" will but keep "a vigilant watch and close scrutiny" of the +lawmakers. + +Well, perhaps this is all so; although this subjection to the arbitrary +will of any man, or body of men, whatever, and under any pretence +whatever, seems, on the face of it, to be much more like slavery, than +it does like "liberty". + +If, therefore, you really intend to continue this system of lawmaking, +it seems indispensable that you should explain to us what you mean by +the term "our liberty." + +So far as your address gives us any light on the subject, you evidently +mean, by the term "our liberty," just such, and only such, "liberty," as +the lawmakers may see fit to allow us to have. + +You seem to have no conception of any other "liberty" whatever. + +You give us no idea of any other "liberty" that we can secure to +ourselves, even though "every citizen"--fifty millions and more of +them--shall all keep "a vigilant watch and close scrutiny" upon the +lawmakers. + +Now, inasmuch as the human race always have had all the "liberty" their +lawmakers have seen fit to permit them to have; and inasmuch as, under +your system of lawmaking, they always will have as much "liberty" as +their lawmakers shall see fit to give them; and inasmuch as you +apparently concede the right, which the lawmakers have always claimed, +of killing all those who are not content with so much "liberty" as their +lawmakers have seen fit to allow them,--it seems very plain that you +have not added anything to our stock of knowledge on the subject of "our +liberty." + +Leaving us thus, as you do, in as great darkness as we ever were, on +this all-important subject of "our liberty," I think you ought to submit +patiently to a little questioning on the part of those of us, who feel +that all this lawmaking--each and every separate particle of it--is a +violation of "our liberty." + +Will you, therefore, please tell us whether any, and, if any, how much, +of that _natural_ liberty--of that natural, inherent, inalienable, +_individual_ right to liberty--with which it has generally been supposed +that God, or Nature, has endowed every human being, will be left to us, +if the lawmakers are to continue, as you would have them do, the +exercise of their arbitrary, irresponsible dominion over us? + +Are you prepared to answer that question? + +No. You appear to have never given a thought to any such question as +that. + +I will therefore answer it for you. + +And my answer is, that from the moment it is conceded that any man, or +body of men, whatever, under any pretence whatever, have the right to +_make laws of their own invention_, and compel other men to obey them, +every vestige of man's _natural_ and rightful liberty is denied him. + +That this is so is proved by the fact that _all_ a man's _natural_ +rights stand upon one and the same basis, _viz._, that they are the gift +of God, or Nature, to him, _as an individual_, for his own uses, and for +his own happiness. If any one of these natural rights may be arbitrarily +taken from him by other men, _all_ of them may be taken from him on the +same reason. No one of these rights is any more sacred or inviolable in +its nature, than are all the others. The denial of any one of these +rights is therefore equivalent to a denial of all the others. The +violation of any one of these rights, by lawmakers, is equivalent to the +assertion of a right to violate all of them. + +Plainly, unless _all_ a man's natural rights are inviolable by +lawmakers, _none_ of them are. It is an absurdity to say that a man has +any rights _of his own_, if other men, whether calling themselves a +government, or by any other name, have the right to take them from him, +without his consent. Therefore the very idea of a lawmaking government +necessarily implies a denial of all such things as individual liberty, +or individual rights. + +From this statement it does not follow that every lawmaking government +will, in practice, take from every man _all_ his natural rights. It will +do as it pleases about it. It will take some, leaving him to enjoy +others, just as its own pleasure or discretion shall dictate at the +time. It would defeat its own ends, if it were wantonly to take away +_all_ his natural rights,--as, for example, his right to live, and to +breathe,--for then he would be dead, and the government could then get +nothing more out of him. The most tyrannical government will, therefore, +if it have any sense, leave its victims enough liberty to enable them to +provide for their own subsistence, to pay their taxes, and to render +such military or other service as the government may have need of. _But +it will do this for its own good, and not for theirs._ In allowing them +this liberty, it does not at all recognize their right to it, but only +consults its own interests. + +Now, sir, this is the real character of the government of the United +States, as it is of all other _lawmaking_ governments. There is not a +single human right, which the government of the United States recognises +as inviolable. It tramples upon any and every individual right, whenever +its own will, pleasure, or discretion shall so dictate. It takes men's +property, liberty, and lives whenever it can serve its own purposes by +doing so. + +All these things prove that the government does not exist at all for the +protection of men's _rights_; but that it absolutely denies to the +people any rights, or any liberty, whatever, except such as it shall see +fit to permit them to have for the time being. It virtually declares +that it does not itself exist at all for the good of the people, but +that the people exist solely for the use of the government. + +All these things prove that the government is not one voluntarily +established and sustained by the people, for the protection of their +natural, inherent, individual rights, but that it is merely a government +of usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who claim to own the people as their +slaves, and claim the right to dispose of them, and their property, at +their (the usurpers') pleasure or discretion. + +Now, sir, since you may be disposed to deny that such is the real +character of the government, I propose to prove it, by evidences so +numerous and conclusive that you cannot dispute them. + +My proposition, then, is, that there is not a single _natural_, human +right, that the government of the United States recognizes as +inviolable; that there is not a single _natural_, human right, that it +hesitates to trample under foot, whenever it thinks it can promote its +own interests by doing so. + +The proofs of this proposition are so numerous, that only a few of the +most important can here be enumerated. + +1. The government does not even recognize a man's natural right to his +own life. If it have need of him, for the maintenance of its power, it +takes him, against his will (conscripts him), and puts him before the +cannon's mouth, to be blown in pieces, as if he were a mere senseless +thing, having no more _rights_ than if he were a shell, a canister, or a +torpedo. It considers him simply as so much senseless war material, to +be consumed, expended, and destroyed for the maintenance of its power. +It no more recognizes his right to have anything to say in the matter, +than if he were but so much weight of powder or ball. It does not +recognize him at all as a human being, having any rights whatever of his +own, but only as an instrument, a weapon, or a machine, to be used in +killing other men. + +2. The government not only denies a man's right, as a moral human being, +to have any will, any judgment, or any conscience of his own, as to +whether he himself will be killed in battle, but it equally denies his +right to have any will, any judgment, or any conscience of his own, as a +moral human being, as to whether he shall be used as a mere weapon for +killing other men. If he refuses to kill any, or all, other men, whom it +commands him to kill, it takes his own life, as unceremoniously as if he +were but a dog. + +Is it possible to conceive of a more complete denial of all a man's +_natural_, _human_ rights, than is the denial of his right to have any +will, judgment, or conscience of his own, either as to his being killed +himself, or as to his being used as a mere weapon for killing other men? + +3. But in still another way, than by its conscriptions, the government +denies a man's right to any will, choice, judgment, or conscience of his +own, in regard either to being killed himself, or used as a weapon in +its hands for killing other people. + +If, in private life, a man enters into a perfectly voluntary agreement +to work for another, at some innocent and useful labor, for a day, a +week, a month, or a year, he cannot lawfully be compelled to fulfil that +contract; because such compulsion would be an acknowledgment of his +right to sell his own liberty. And this is what no one can do. + +This right of personal liberty is inalienable. No man can sell it, or +transfer it to another; or give to another any right of arbitrary +dominion over him. All contracts for such a purpose are absurd and void +contracts, that no man can rightfully be compelled to fulfil. + +But when a deluded or ignorant young man has once been enticed into a +contract to kill others, and to take his chances of being killed +himself, in the service of the government, for any given number of +years, the government holds that such a contract to sell his liberty, +his judgment, his conscience, and his life, is a valid and binding +contract; and that if he fails to fulfil it, he may rightfully be shot. + +All these things prove that the government recognizes no right of the +individual, to his own life, or liberty, or to the exercise of his own +will, judgment, or conscience, in regard to his killing his fellow-men, +or to being killed himself, if the government sees fit to use him as +mere war material, in maintaining its arbitrary dominion over other +human beings. + +4. The government recognizes no such thing as any _natural_ right of +property, on the part of individuals. + +This is proved by the fact that it takes, for its own uses, any and +every man's property--when it pleases, and as much of it as it +pleases--without obtaining, or even asking, his consent. + +This taking of a man's property, without his consent, is a denial of his +right of property; for the right of property is the right of supreme, +absolute, and irresponsible dominion over anything that is naturally a +subject of property,--that is, of ownership. _It is a right against all +the world._ And this right of property--this right of supreme, absolute, +and irresponsible dominion over anything that is naturally a subject of +ownership--is subject only to this qualification, _viz._, that each man +must so use his own, as not to injure another. + +If A uses his own property so as to injure the person or property of B, +his own property may rightfully be taken to any extent that is necessary +to make reparation for the wrong he has done. + +This is the only qualification to which the _natural_ right of property +is subject. + +When, therefore, a government takes a man's property, for its own +support, or for its own uses, without his consent, it practically denies +his right of property altogether; for it practically asserts that _its_ +right of dominion is superior to his. + +No man can be said to have any right of property at all, in any +thing--that is, any right of supreme, absolute, and irresponsible +dominion over any thing--of which any other men may rightfully deprive +him at their pleasure. + +Now, the government of the United States, in asserting its right to take +at pleasure the property of individuals, without their consent, +virtually denies their right of property altogether, because it asserts +that _its_ right of dominion over it, is superior to theirs. + +5. The government denies the _natural_ right of human beings to live on +this planet. This it does by denying their _natural_ right to those +things that are indispensable to the maintenance of life. It says that, +for every thing necessary to the maintenance of life, they must have a +special permit from the government; and that the government cannot be +required to grant them any other means of living than it chooses to +grant them. + +All this is shown as follows, _viz._: + +The government denies the _natural_ right of individuals to take +possession of wilderness land, and hold and cultivate it for their own +subsistence. + +It asserts that wilderness land is the property of the government; and +that individuals have no right to take possession of, or cultivate, it, +unless by special grant of the government. And if an individual attempts +to exercise this natural right, the government punishes him as a +trespasser and a criminal. + +The government has no more right to claim the ownership of wilderness +lands, than it has to claim the ownership of the sunshine, the water, or +the atmosphere. And it has no more right to punish a man for taking +possession of wilderness land, and cultivating it, without the consent +of the government, than it has to punish him for breathing the air, +drinking the water, or enjoying the sunshine, without a special grant +from the government. + +In thus asserting the government's right of property in wilderness land, +and in denying men's right to take possession of and cultivate it, +except on first obtaining a grant from the government,--which grant the +government may withhold if it pleases,--the government plainly denies +the _natural_ right of men to live on this planet, by denying their +_natural_ right to the means that are indispensable to their procuring +the food that is necessary for supporting life. + +In asserting its right of arbitrary dominion over that natural wealth +that is indispensable to the support of human life, it asserts its right +to withhold that wealth from those whose lives are dependent upon it. In +this way it denies the _natural_ right of human beings to live on the +planet. It asserts that government owns the planet, and that men have no +right to live on it, except by first getting a permit from the +government. + +This denial of men's _natural_ right to take possession of and cultivate +wilderness land is not altered at all by the fact that the government +consents to sell as much land as it thinks it expedient or profitable to +sell; nor by the fact that, in certain cases, it gives outright certain +lands to certain persons. Notwithstanding these sales and gifts, the +fact remains that the government claims the original ownership of the +lands; and thus denies the _natural_ right of individuals to take +possession of and cultivate them. In denying this _natural_ right of +individuals, it denies their _natural_ right to live on the earth; and +asserts that they have no other right to life than the government, by +its own mere will, pleasure, and discretion, may see fit to grant them. + +In thus denying man's _natural_ right to life, it of course denies every +other _natural_ right of human beings; and asserts that they have no +_natural_ right to anything; but that, for all other things, as well as +for life itself, they must depend wholly upon the good pleasure and +discretion of the government. + + + SECTION XIII. + +In still another way, the government denies men's _natural_ right to +life. And that is by denying their _natural_ right to make any of those +contracts with each other, for buying and selling, borrowing and +lending, giving and receiving, property, which are necessary, if men are +to exist in any considerable numbers on the earth. + +Even the few savages, who contrive to live, mostly or wholly, by +hunting, fishing, and gathering wild fruits, without cultivating the +earth, and almost wholly without the use of tools or machinery, are yet, +_at times_, necessitated to buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and +receive, articles of food, if no others, as their only means of +preserving their lives. But, in civilized life, where but a small +portion of men's labor is necessary for the production of food, and they +employ themselves in an almost infinite variety of industries, and in +the production of an almost infinite variety of commodities, it would be +impossible for them to live, if they were wholly prohibited from buying +and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, the products +of each other's labor. + +Yet the government of the United States--either acting separately, or +jointly with the State governments--has heretofore constantly denied, +and still constantly denies, the _natural_ right of the people, _as +individuals_, to make their own contracts, for such buying and selling, +borrowing and lending, and giving and receiving, such commodities as +they produce for each other's uses. + +I repeat that both the national and State governments have constantly +denied the _natural_ right of individuals to make their own contracts. +They have done this, sometimes by arbitrarily forbidding them to make +particular contracts, and sometimes by arbitrarily qualifying the +obligation of particular contracts, when the contracts themselves were +naturally and intrinsically as just and lawful as any others that men +ever enter into; and were, consequently, such as men have as perfect a +_natural_ right to make, as they have to make any of those contracts +which they are permitted to make. + +The laws arbitrarily prohibiting, or arbitrarily qualifying, certain +contracts, that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful, are so +numerous, and so well known, that they need not all be enumerated here. +But any and all such prohibitions, or qualifications, are a denial of +men's _natural_ right to make their own contracts. They are a denial of +men's right to make any contracts whatever, except such as the +governments shall see fit to permit them to make. + +It is the _natural_ right of any and all human beings, who are mentally +competent to make reasonable contracts, to make any and every possible +contract, that is naturally and intrinsically just and honest, for +buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, any and +all possible commodities, that are naturally vendible, loanable, and +transferable, and that any two or more individuals may, at any time, +without force or fraud, choose to buy and sell, borrow and lend, give +and receive, of and to each other. + +And it is plainly only by the untrammelled exercise of this _natural_ +right, that all the loanable capital, that is required by men's +industries, can be lent and borrowed, or that all the money can be +supplied for the purchase and sale of that almost infinite diversity and +amount of commodities, that men are capable of producing, and that are +to be transferred from the hands of the producers to those of the +consumers. + +But the government of the United States--and also the governments of the +States--utterly deny the _natural_ right of any individuals whatever to +make any contracts whatever, for buying and selling, borrowing and +lending, giving and receiving, any and all such commodities, as are +naturally vendible, loanable, and transferable, and as the producers and +consumers of such commodities may wish to buy and sell, borrow and lend, +give and receive, of and to each other. + +These governments (State and national) deny this _natural_ right of +buying and selling, etc., by arbitrarily prohibiting, or qualifying, all +such, and so many, of these contracts, as they choose to prohibit, or +qualify. + +The prohibition, or qualification, of _any one_ of these contracts--that +are intrinsically just and lawful--is a denial of all individual +_natural_ right to make any of them. For the right to make any and all +of them stands on the same grounds of _natural_ law, natural justice, +and men's natural rights. If a government has the right to prohibit, or +qualify, any one of these contracts, it has the same right to prohibit, +or qualify, all of them. Therefore the assertion, by the government, of +a right to prohibit, or qualify, any one of them, is equivalent to a +denial of all _natural_ right, on the part of individuals, to make any +of them. + +The power that has been thus usurped by governments, to arbitrarily +prohibit or qualify all contracts that are naturally and intrinsically +just and lawful, has been the great, perhaps the greatest, of all the +instrumentalities, by which, in this, as in other countries, nearly all +the wealth, accumulated by the labor of the many, has been, and is now, +transferred into the pockets of the few. + +_It is by this arbitrary power over contracts, that the monopoly of +money is sustained._ Few people have any real perception of the power, +which this monopoly gives to the holders of it, over the industry and +traffic of all other persons. And the one only purpose of the monopoly +is to enable the holders of it to rob everybody else in the prices of +their labor, and the products of their labor. + +The theory, on which the advocates of this monopoly attempt to justify +it, is simply this: _That it is not at all necessary that money should +be a bona fide equivalent of the labor or property that is to be bought +with it;_ that if the government will but specially license a small +amount of money, and prohibit all other money, the holders of the +licensed money will then be able to buy with it the labor and property +of all other persons for a half, a tenth, a hundredth, a thousandth, or +a millionth, of what such labor and property are really and truly worth. + +David A. Wells, one of the most prominent--perhaps at this time, the +most prominent--advocate of the monopoly, in this country, states the +theory thus: + + A three-cent piece, if it could be divided into a sufficient + number of pieces, with each piece capable of being handled, + would undoubtedly suffice for doing all the business of the + country in the way of facilitating exchanges, if no other + better instrumentality was available.--_New York Herald, + February 13, 1875._ + +He means here to say, that "a three-cent piece" contains _as much real, +true, and natural market value_, as it would be necessary that all the +money of the country should have, _if the government would but prohibit +all other money_; that is, if the government, by its arbitrary +legislative power, would but make all other and better money +unavailable. + +And this is the theory, on which John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, +David Ricardo, J. R. McCulloch, and John Stuart Mill, in England, and +Amasa Walker, Charles H. Carroll, Hugh McCulloch, in this country, and +all the other conspicuous advocates of the monopoly, both in this +country and in England, have attempted to justify it. They have all held +that it was not necessary that money should be a _bona fide_ equivalent +of the labor or property to be bought with it; but that, by the +prohibition of all other money, the holders of a comparatively worthless +amount of licensed money would be enabled to buy, at their own prices, +the labor and property of all other men. + +And this is the theory on which the governments of England and the +United States have always, with immaterial exceptions, acted, in +prohibiting all but such small amounts of money as they (the +governments) should specially license. _And it is the theory upon which +they act now._ And it is so manifestly a theory of pure robbery, that +scarce a word can be necessary to make it more evidently so than it now +is. + +But inasmuch as your mind seems to be filled with the wildest visions of +the excellency of this government, and to be strangely ignorant of its +wrongs; and inasmuch as this monopoly of money is, in its practical +operation, one of the greatest--possibly the greatest--of all these +wrongs, and the one that is most relied upon for robbing the great body +of the people, and keeping them in poverty and servitude, it is plainly +important that you should have your eyes opened on the subject. I +therefore submit, for your consideration, the following self-evident +propositions: + +1. That to make all traffic just and equal, it is indispensable that, in +each separate purchase and sale, the money paid should be a _bona fide_ +equivalent of the labor or property bought with it. + +Dare you, or any other man, of common sense and common honesty, dispute +the truth of that proposition? If not, let us consider that principle +established. It will then serve as one of the necessary and infallible +guides to the true settlement of all the other questions that remain to +be settled. + +2. That so long as no force or fraud is practised by either party, the +parties themselves, to each separate contract, have the sole, absolute, +and unqualified right to decide for themselves, _what money, and how +much of it_, shall be considered a _bona fide_ equivalent of the labor +or property that is to be exchanged for it. All this is necessarily +implied in the _natural_ right of men to make their own contracts, for +buying and selling their respective commodities. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +3. That any one man, who has an honest dollar, of any kind whatsoever, +has as perfect a right, as any other man can have, to offer it in the +market, in competition with any and all other dollars, in exchange for +such labor or property as may be in the market for sale. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +4. That where no fraud is practised, every person, who is mentally +competent to make reasonable contracts, must be presumed to be as +competent to judge of the value of the money that is offered in the +market, as he is to judge of the value of all the other commodities that +are bought and sold for money. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +5. That the free and open market, in which all honest money and all +honest commodities are free to be given and received in exchange for +each other, is the true, final, absolute, and only test of the true and +natural market value of all money, as of all the other commodities that +are bought and sold for money. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +6. That any prohibition, by a government, of any such kind or amount of +money--provided it be honest in itself--as the parties to contracts may +voluntarily agree to give and receive in exchange for labor or property, +is a palpable violation of their natural right to make their own +contracts, and to buy and sell their labor and property on such terms as +they may find to be necessary for the supply of their wants, or may +think most beneficial to their interests. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +7. That any government, that licenses a small amount of an article of +such universal necessity as money, and that gives the control of it into +a few hands, selected by itself, and then prohibits any and all other +money--that is intrinsically honest and valuable--palpably violates all +other men's natural right to make their own contracts, and infallibly +proves its purpose to be to enable the few holders of the licensed money +to rob all other persons in the prices of their labor and property. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +Are not all these propositions so self-evident, or so easily +demonstrated, that they cannot, with any reason, be disputed? + +If you feel competent to show the falsehood of any one of them, I hope +you will attempt the task. + + + SECTION XIV. + +If, now, you wish to form some rational opinion of the extent of the +robbery practised in this country, by the holders of this monopoly of +money, you have only to look at the following facts. + +There are, in this country, I think, at least twenty-five millions of +persons, male and female, sixteen years old, and upwards, mentally and +physically capable of running machinery, producing wealth, and supplying +their own needs for an independent and comfortable subsistence. + +To make their industry most effective, and to enable them, +_individually_, to put into their own pockets as large a portion as +possible of their own earnings, they need, _on an average_, one thousand +dollars each of _money capital_. Some need one, two, three, or five +hundred dollars, others one, two, three, or five thousand. These +persons, then, need, _in the aggregate_, twenty-five thousand millions +of dollars ($25,000,000,000), of money capital. + +They need all this _money capital_ to enable them to buy the raw +materials upon which to bestow their labor, the implements and machinery +with which to labor, and their means of subsistence while producing +their goods for the market. + +Unless they can get this capital, they must all either work at a +disadvantage, or not work at all. A very large portion of them, to save +themselves from starvation, have no alternative but to sell their labor +to others, at just such prices these others choose to pay. And these +others choose to pay only such prices as are far below what the laborers +could produce, if they themselves had the necessary capital to work +with. + +But this needed capital your lawmakers arbitrarily forbid them to have; +and for no other reason than to reduce them to the condition of +servants; and subject them to all such extortions as their +employers--the holders of the privileged money--may choose to practise +upon them. + +If, now, you ask me where these twenty-five thousand millions of dollars +of money capital, which these laborers need, are to come from, I answer: + +_Theoretically_, there are, in this country, fifty thousand millions of +dollars of money capital ($50,000,000,000)--or twice as much as I have +supposed these laborers to need--NOW LYING IDLE! _And it is lying idle, +solely because the circulation of it, as money, is prohibited by the +lawmakers._ + +If you ask how this can be, I will tell you. + +_Theoretically,_ every dollar's worth of material property, that is +capable of being taken by law, and applied to the payment of the owner's +debts, is capable of being represented by a promissory note, that shall +circulate as money. + +But taking all this material property at _only half_ its actual value, +it is still capable of supplying the twenty-five thousand millions of +dollars--or one thousand dollars each--which these laborers need. + +Now, we know--because experience has taught us--that _solvent_ +promissory notes, made payable in coin on demand, are the best money +that mankind have ever had; (although probably not the best they ever +will have). + +To make a note solvent, and suitable for circulation as money, it is +only necessary that it should be made payable in coin on demand, and be +issued by a person, or persons, who are known to have in their hands +abundant material property, that can be taken by law, and applied to the +payment of the note, with all costs and damages for non-payment on +demand. + +_Theoretically,_ I repeat, all the material property in the country, +that can be taken by law, and applied to the payment of debt can be used +as banking capital; and be represented by promissory notes, made payable +in coin on demand. And, _practically_, so much of it can be used as +banking capital as may be required for supplying all the notes that can +be kept in circulation as money. + +Although these notes are made legally payable in coin on demand, it is +seldom that such payment is demanded, _if only it be publicly known that +the notes are solvent_: that is, if it be publicly known that they are +issued by persons who have so much material property, that can be taken +by law, and sold, as may be necessary to bring the coin that is needed +to pay the notes. In such cases, the notes are preferred to the coin, +because they are so much more safe and convenient for handling, +counting, and transportation, than is the coin; and also because we can +have so many times more of them. + +These notes are also a legal tender, to the banks that issue them, in +payment of the notes discounted; that is, in payment of the notes given +by the borrowers to the banks. And, in the ordinary course of things, +_all_ the notes, issued by the banks for circulation, are wanted, and +come back to the banks, in payment of the notes discounted; thus saving +all necessity for redeeming them with coin, except in rare cases. For +meeting these rare cases, the banks find it necessary to keep on hand +small amounts of coin; probably not more than one per cent. of the +amount of notes in circulation. + +As the notes discounted have usually but a short time to run,--say three +months on an average,--the bank notes issued for circulation will _all_ +come back, _on an average_, once in three months, and be redeemed by the +bankers, by being accepted in payment of the notes discounted. + +Then the bank notes will be re-issued, by discounting new notes, and +will go into circulation again; to be again brought back, at the end of +another three months, and redeemed, by being accepted in payment of the +new notes discounted. + +In this way the bank notes will be continually re-issued, and redeemed, +in the greatest amounts that can be kept in circulation long enough to +earn such an amount of interest as will make it an object for the +bankers to issue them. + +Each of these notes, issued for circulation, if known to be solvent, +will always have the same value in the market, as the same nominal +amount of coin. And this value is a just one, because the notes are in +the nature of a lien, or mortgage, upon so much property of the bankers +as is necessary to pay the notes, and as can be taken by law, and sold, +and the proceeds applied to their payment. + +There is no danger that any more of these notes will be issued than will +be wanted for buying and selling property at its true and natural market +value, relatively to coin; for as the notes are all made legally payable +in coin on demand, if they should ever fall below the value of coin in +the market, the holders of them will at once return them to the banks, +and demand coin for them; _and thus take them out of circulation_. + +The bankers, therefore, have no motive for issuing more of them than +will remain long enough in circulation, to earn so much interest as will +make it an object to issue them; the only motive for issuing them being +to draw interest on them while they are in circulation. + +The bankers readily find how many are wanted for circulation, by the +time those issued remain in circulation, before coming back for +redemption. If they come back immediately, or very quickly, after being +issued, the bankers know that they have over-issued, and that they must +therefore pay in coin--to their inconvenience and perhaps loss--notes +that would otherwise have remained in circulation long enough to earn so +much interest as would have paid for issuing them; and would then have +come back to them in payment of notes discounted, instead of coming back +on a demand for redemption in coin. + +Now, the best of all possible banking capital is real estate. It is the +best, because it is visible, immovable, and indestructible. It cannot, +like coin, be removed, concealed, or carried out of the country. And its +aggregate value, in all civilized countries, is probably a hundred times +greater than the amount of coin in circulation. It is therefore capable +of furnishing a hundred times as much money as we can have in coin. + +The owners of this real estate have the greatest inducements to use it +as banking capital, because all the banking profit, over and above +expenses, is a clear profit; inasmuch as the use of the real estate as +banking capital does not interfere at all with its use for other +purposes. + +Farmers have a double, and much more than a double, inducement to use +their lands as banking capital; because they not only get a direct +profit from the loan of their notes, but, by loaning them, they furnish +the necessary capital for the greatest variety of manufacturing +purposes. They thus induce a much larger portion of the people, than +otherwise would, to leave agriculture, and engage in mechanical +employments; and thus become purchasers, instead of producers, of +agricultural commodities. They thus get much higher prices for their +agricultural products, and also a much greater variety and amount of +manufactured commodities in exchange. + +The amount of money, capable of being furnished by this system, is so +great that every man, woman, and child, who is worthy of credit, could +get it, and do business for himself, or herself--either singly, or in +partnerships--and be under no necessity to act as a servant, or sell his +or her labor to others. All the great establishments, of every kind, now +in the hands of a few proprietors, but employing a great number of wage +laborers, would be broken up; for few, or no persons, who could hire +capital, and do business for themselves, would consent to labor for +wages for another. + +The credit furnished by this system would always be stable; for the +system is probably capable of furnishing, _at all times_, all the +credit, and all the money, that can be needed. It would also introduce a +substantially universal system of cash payments. Everybody, who could +get credit at all, would be able to get it at a bank, _in money_. With +the money, he would buy everything he needed for cash. He would also +sell everything for cash; for when everybody buys for cash, everybody +sells for cash; since buying for cash, and selling for cash, are +necessarily one and the same thing. + +We should, therefore, never have another crisis, panic, revulsion of +credit, stagnation of industry, or fall of prices; for these are all +caused by the lack of money, and the consequent necessity of buying and +selling on credit; whereby the amount of indebtedness becomes so great, +so enormous, in fact, in proportion to the amount of money extant, with +which to meet it, that the whole system of credit breaks down; to the +ruin of everybody, except the few holders of the monopoly of money, who +reap a harvest in the fall of prices, and the consequent bankruptcy of +everybody who is dependent on credit for his means of doing business. + +It would be inadmissible for me, in this letter, to occupy the space +that would be necessary, to expose all the false, absurd, and ridiculous +pretences, by which the advocates of the monopoly of money have +attempted to justify it. The only real argument they ever employed has +been that, by means of the monopoly, the few holders of it were enabled +to rob everybody else in the prices of their labor and property. + +And our governments, State and national, have hitherto acted together in +maintaining this monopoly, in flagrant violation of men's natural right +to make their own contracts, and in flagrant violation of the +self-evident truth, that, to make all traffic just and equal, it is +indispensable that the money paid should be, in all cases, a _bona fide_ +equivalent of the labor or property that is bought with it. + +The holders of this monopoly now rule and rob this nation; and the +government, in all its branches, is simply their tool. And being their +tool for this gigantic robbery, it is equally their tool for all the +lesser robberies, to which it is supposed that the people at large can +be made to submit. + + + SECTION XV. + +But although the monopoly of money is one of the most glaring violations +of men's natural right to make their own contracts, and one of the most +effective--perhaps _the_ most effective--for enabling a few men to rob +everybody else, and for keeping the great body of the people in poverty +and servitude, it is not the only one that our government practises, nor +the only one that has the same robbery in view. + +The so-called taxes or duties, which the government levies upon imports, +are a practical violation both of men's natural right of property, and +of their natural right to make their own contracts. + +A man has the same _natural_ right to traffic with another, who lives on +the opposite side of the globe, as he has to traffic with his next-door +neighbor. And any obstruction, price, or penalty, interposed by the +government, to the exercise of that right, is a practical violation of +the right itself. + +The ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. of a man's property, which is taken +from him, for the reason that he purchased it in a foreign country, must +be considered either as the price he is required to pay for the +_privilege_ of buying property in that country, or else as a penalty for +having exercised his _natural right_ of buying it in that country. +Whether it be considered as a price paid for a privilege, or a penalty +for having exercised a natural right, it is a violation both of his +natural right of property, and of his natural right to make a contract +in that country. + +In short, it is nothing but downright robbery. + +And when a man seeks to avoid this robbery, by evading the government +robbers who are lying in wait for him,--that is, the so-called revenue +officers,--whom he has as perfect a right to evade, as he has to evade +any other robbers, who may be lying in wait for him,--the seizure of his +whole property,--instead of the ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. that +would otherwise have been taken from him,--is not merely adding so much +to the robbery itself, but is adding insult to the robbery. It is +punishing a man as a criminal, for simply trying to save his property +from robbers. + +But it will be said that these taxes or duties are laid to raise revenue +for the support of the government. + +Be it so, for the sake of the argument. All taxes, levied upon a man's +property for the support of government, without his consent, are mere +robbery; a violation of his natural right of property. And when a +government takes ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. of a man's property, +for the reason that he bought it in a foreign country, such taking is as +much a violation of his natural right of property, or of his natural +right to purchase property, as is the taking of property which he has +himself produced, or which he has bought in his own village. + +A man's natural right of property, in a commodity he has bought in a +foreign country, is intrinsically as sacred and inviolable as it is in a +commodity produced at home. The foreign commodity is bought with the +commodity produced at home; and therefore stands on the same footing as +the commodity produced at home. And it is a plain violation of one's +right, for a government to make any distinction between them. + +Government assumes to exist for the impartial protection of all rights +of property. If it really exists for that purpose, it is plainly bound +to make each kind of property pay its proper proportion, and only its +proper proportion, of the cost of protecting all kinds. To levy upon a +few kinds the cost of protecting all, is a naked robbery of the holders +of those few kinds, for the benefit of the holders of all other kinds. + +But the pretence that heavy taxes are levied upon imports, solely, or +mainly, for the support of government, while light taxes, or no taxes at +all, are levied upon property at home, is an utterly false pretence. +They are levied upon the imported commodity, mainly, if not solely, for +the purpose of enabling the producers of competing home commodities to +extort from consumers a higher price than the home commodities would +bring in free and open market. And this additional price is sheer +robbery, and is known to be so. And the amount of this robbery--which +goes into the pockets of the home producers--is five, ten, twenty, or +fifty times greater than the amount that goes into the treasury, for the +support of the government, according as the amount of the home +commodities is five, ten, twenty, or fifty times greater than the amount +of the imported competing commodities. + +Thus the amounts that go to the support of the government, and also the +amounts that go into the pockets of the home producers, in the higher +prices they get for their goods, are all sheer robberies; and nothing +else. + +But it will be said that the heavy taxes are levied upon the foreign +commodity, not to put great wealth into a few pockets, but "_to protect +the home laborer against the competition of the pauper labor of other +countries_." + +This is the great argument that is relied on to justify the robbery. + +This argument must have originated with the employers of home labor, and +not with the home laborers themselves. + +The home laborers themselves could never have originated it, because +they must have seen that, so far as they were concerned, the object of +the "protection," so-called, was, _at best_, only to benefit them, by +robbing others who were as poor as themselves, and who had as good a +right as themselves to live by their labor. That is, they must have seen +that the object of the "protection" was to rob the foreign laborers, in +whole, or in part, of the pittances on which they were already +necessitated to live; and, secondly, to rob consumers at home,--in the +increased prices of the protected commodities,--when many or most of +these home consumers were also laborers as poor as themselves. + +Even if any class of laborers would have been so selfish and dishonest +as to wish to thus benefit themselves by injuring others, as poor as +themselves, they could have had no hope of carrying through such a +scheme, if they alone were to profit by it; because they could have had +no such influence with governments, as would be necessary to enable them +to carry it through, in opposition to the rights and interests of +consumers, both rich and poor, and much more numerous than themselves. + +For these reasons it is plain that the argument originated with the +employers of home labor, and not with the home laborers themselves. + +And why do the employers of home labor advocate this robbery? Certainly +not because they have such an intense compassion for their own laborers, +that they are willing to rob everybody else, rich and poor, for their +benefit. Nobody will suspect them of being influenced by any such +compassion as that. But they advocate it solely because they put into +their own pockets a very large portion certainly--probably +three-fourths, I should judge--of the increased prices their commodities +are thus made to bring in the market. The home laborers themselves +probably get not more than one-fourth of these increased prices. + +Thus the argument for "protection" is really an argument for robbing +foreign laborers--as poor as our own--of their equal and rightful +chances in our markets; and also for robbing all the home consumers of +the protected article--the poor as well as the rich--in the prices they +are made to pay for it. And all this is done at the instigation, and +principally for the benefit, of the employers of home labor, and not for +the benefit of home laborers themselves. + +Having now seen that this argument--of "protecting our home laborers +against the competition of the pauper labor of other countries"--is, of +itself, an utterly dishonest argument; that it is dishonest towards +foreign laborers and home consumers; that it must have originated with +the employers of home labor, and not with the home laborers themselves; +and that the employers of home labor, and not the home laborers +themselves, are to receive the principal profits of the robbery, let us +now see how utterly false is the argument itself. + +1. The pauper laborers (if there are any such) of other countries have +just as good a right to live by their labor, and have an equal chance in +our own markets, and in all the markets of the world, as have the pauper +laborers, or any other laborers, of our own country. + +Every human being has the same natural right to buy and sell, of and to, +any and all other people in the world, as he has to buy and sell, of and +to, the people of his own country. And none but tyrants and robbers deny +that right. And they deny it for their own benefit solely, and not for +the benefit of their laborers. + +And if a man, in our own country--either from motives of profit to +himself, or from motives of pity towards the pauper laborers of other +countries--_chooses_ to buy the products of the foreign pauper labor, +rather than the products of the laborers of his own country, he has a +perfect legal right to do so. And for any government to forbid him to do +so, or to obstruct his doing so, or to punish him for doing so, is a +violation of his natural right of purchasing property of whom he +pleases, and from such motives as he pleases. + +2. To forbid our own people to buy in the best markets, is equivalent to +forbidding them to sell the products of their own labor in the best +markets; for they can buy the products of foreign labor, only by giving +the products of their own labor in exchange. Therefore to deny our right +to buy in foreign markets, is to forbid us to sell in foreign markets. +And this is a plain violation of men's natural rights. + +If, when a producer of cotton, tobacco, grain, beef, pork, butter, +cheese, or any other commodity, in our own country, has carried it +abroad, and exchanged it for iron or woolen goods, and has brought these +latter home, the government seizes one-half of them, because they were +manufactured abroad, the robbery committed upon the owner is the same as +if the government had seized one-half of his cotton, tobacco, or other +commodity, before he exported it; because the iron or woolen goods, +which he purchased abroad with the products of his own home labor, are +as much his own property, as was the commodity with which he purchased +them. + +Therefore the tax laid upon foreign commodities, that have been bought +with the products of our home labor, is as much a robbery of the home +laborer, as the same tax would have been, if laid directly upon the +products of our home labor. It is, at best, only a robbery of one home +laborer--the producer of cotton, tobacco, grain, beef, pork, butter, or +cheese--for the benefit of another home laborer--the producer of iron or +woolen goods. + +3. But this whole argument is a false one, for the further reason that +our home laborers do not have to compete with "_the pauper labor_" of +any country on earth; since the _actual paupers_ of no country on earth +are engaged in producing commodities for export to any other country. +They produce few, or no, other commodities than those they themselves +consume; and ordinarily not even those. + +There are a great many millions of _actual paupers_ in the world. In +some of the large provinces of British India, for example, it is said +that nearly half the population are paupers. But I think that the +commodities they are producing for export to other countries than their +own, have never been heard of. + +The term, "pauper labor," is therefore a false one. And when these +robbers--the employers of home labor--talk of protecting their laborers +against the competition of "_the pauper labor_" of other countries, they +do not mean that they are protecting them against the competition of +_actual paupers_; but only against the competition of that immense body +of laborers, in all parts of the world, _who are kept constantly on the +verge of pauperism, or starvation_; who have little, or no, means of +subsistence, except such as their employers see fit to give them,--which +means are usually barely enough to keep them in a condition to labor. + +These are the only "pauper laborers," from whose competition our own +laborers are sought to be protected. They are quite as badly off as our +own laborers; and are in equal need of "protection." + +What, then, is to be done? This policy of excluding foreign commodities +from our markets, is a game that all other governments can play at, as +well as our own. And if it is the duty of our government to "protect" +our laborers against the competition of "the pauper labor," so-called, +of all other countries, it is equally the duty of every other government +to "protect" its laborers against the competition of the so-called +"pauper labor" of all other countries. So that, according to this +theory, each nation must either shut out entirely from its markets the +products of all other countries; or, at least, lay such heavy duties +upon them, as will, _in some measure_, "protect" its own laborers from +the competition of the "pauper labor" of all other countries. + +This theory, then, is that, instead of permitting all mankind to supply +each other's wants, by freely exchanging their respective products with +each other, the government of each nation should rob the people of every +other, by imposing heavy duties upon all commodities imported from them. + +The natural effect of this scheme is to pit the so-called "pauper labor" +of each country against the so-called "pauper labor" of every other +country; and all for the benefit of their employers. And as it holds +that so-called "pauper labor" is cheaper than free labor, it gives the +employers in each country a constant motive for reducing their own +laborers to the lowest condition of poverty, consistent with their +ability to labor at all. In other words, the theory is, that the smaller +the portion of the products of labor, that is given to the laborers, the +larger will be the portion that will go into the pockets of the +employers. + +Now, it is not a very honorable proceeding for any government to pit its +own so-called "pauper laborers"--or laborers that are on the verge of +pauperism--against similar laborers in all other countries: and all for +the sake of putting the principal proceeds of their labor into the +pockets of a few employers. + +To set two bodies of "pauper laborers"--or of laborers on the verge of +pauperism--to robbing each other, for the profit of their employers, is +the next thing, in point of atrocity, to setting them to killing each +other, as governments have heretofore been in the habit of doing, for +the benefit of their rulers. + +The laborers, who are paupers, or on the verge of pauperism--who are +destitute, or on the verge of destitution--comprise (with their +families) doubtless nine-tenths, probably nineteen-twentieths, of all +the people on the globe. They are not all wage laborers. Some of them +are savages, living only as savages do. Others are barbarians, living +only as barbarians do. But an immense number are mere wage laborers. +Much the larger portion of these have been reduced to the condition of +wage laborers, by the monopoly of land, which mere bands of robbers have +succeeded in securing for themselves by military power. This is the +condition of nearly all the Asiatics, and of probably one-half the +Europeans. But in those portions of Europe and the United States, where +manufactures have been most extensively introduced, and where, by +science and machinery, great wealth has been created, the laborers have +been kept in the condition of wage laborers, principally, if not wholly, +by the monopoly of money. This monopoly, established in all these +manufacturing countries, has made it impossible for the manufacturing +laborers to hire the money capital that was necessary to enable them to +do business for themselves; and has consequently compelled them to sell +their labor to the monopolists of money, for just such prices as these +latter should choose to give. + +It is, then, by the monopoly of land, and the monopoly of money, that +more than a thousand millions of the earth's inhabitants--as savages, +barbarians, and wage laborers--are kept in a state of destitution, or on +the verge of destitution. Hundreds of millions of them are receiving, +for their labor, not more than three, five, or, at most, ten cents a +day. + +In western Europe, and in the United States, where, within the last +hundred and fifty years, machinery has been introduced, and where alone +any considerable wealth is now created, the wage laborers, although they +get so small a portion of the wealth they create, are nevertheless in a +vastly better condition than are the laboring classes in other parts of +the world. + +If, now, the employers of wage labor, in this country,--who are also the +monopolists of money,--and who are ostensibly so distressed lest their +own wage laborers should suffer from the competition of the pauper labor +of other countries,--have really any of that humanity, of which they +make such profession, they have before them a much wider field for the +display of it, than they seem to desire. That is to say, they have it in +their power, not only to elevate immensely the condition of the laboring +classes in this country, but also to set an example that will be very +rapidly followed in all other countries; and the result will be the +elevation of all oppressed laborers throughout the world. This they can +do, by simply abolishing the monopoly of money. The real producers of +wealth, with few or no exceptions, will then be able to hire all the +capital they need for their industries, and will do business for +themselves. They will also be able to hire their capital at very low +rates of interest; and will then put into their own pockets all the +proceeds of their labor, except what they pay as interest on their +capital. And this amount will be too small to obstruct materially their +rise to independence and wealth. + + + SECTION XVI. + +But will the monopolists of money give up their monopoly? Certainly not +voluntarily. They will do it only upon compulsion. They will hold on to +it as long as they own and control governments as they do now. And why +will they do so? Because to give up their monopoly would be to give up +their control of those great armies of servants--the wage laborers--from +whom all their wealth is derived, and whom they can now coerce by the +alternative of starvation, to labor for them at just such prices as they +(the monopolists of money) shall choose to pay. + +Now these monopolists of money have no plans whatever for making their +"capital," as they call it--that is, their money capital--_their +privileged money capital_--profitable to themselves, _otherwise than by +using it to employ other men's labor_. And they can keep control of +other men's labor only by depriving the laborers themselves of all other +means of subsistence. And they can deprive them of all other means of +subsistence only by putting it out of their power to hire the money that +is necessary to enable them to do business for themselves. And they can +put it out of their power to hire money, only by forbidding all other +men to lend them their credit, in the shape of promissory notes, to be +circulated as money. + +If the twenty-five or fifty thousand millions of loanable +capital--promissory notes--which, _in this country_, are now lying idle, +were permitted to be loaned, these wage laborers would hire it, and do +business for themselves, instead of laboring as servants for others; and +would of course retain in their own hands all the wealth they should +create, except what they should pay as interest for their capital. + +And what is true of this country, is true of every other where +civilization exists; for wherever civilization exists, land has value, +and can be used as banking capital, and be made to furnish all the +money that is necessary to enable the producers of wealth to hire the +capital necessary for their industries, and thus relieve them from their +present servitude to the few holders of privileged money. + +Thus it is that the monopoly of money is the one great obstacle to the +liberation of the laboring classes all over the world, and to their +indefinite progress in wealth. + +But we are now to show, more definitely, what relation this monopoly of +money is made to bear to the freedom of international trade; and why it +is that the holders of this monopoly, _in this country_, demand heavy +tariffs on imports, on the lying pretence of protecting our home labor +against the competition of the so-called pauper labor of other +countries. + +The explanation of the whole matter is as follows. + +1. The holders of the monopoly of money, in each country,--more +especially in the manufacturing countries like England, the United +States, and some others,--assume that the present condition of poverty, +for the great mass of mankind, all over the world, is to be perpetuated +forever; or at least for an indefinite period. From this assumption they +infer that, if free trade between all countries is to be allowed, the +so-called pauper labor of each country is to be forever pitted against +the so-called pauper labor of every other country. Hence they infer that +it is the duty of each government--or certainly of our government--to +protect the so-called pauper labor of our own country--that is, the +class of laborers who are constantly on the verge of pauperism--against +the competition of the so-called pauper labor of all other countries, by +such duties on imports as will secure to our own laborers a monopoly of +our own home market. + +This is, on the face of it, the most plausible argument--and almost, if +not really, the only argument--by which they now attempt to sustain +their restrictions upon international trade. + +If this argument is a false one, their whole case falls to the ground. +That it is a false one, will be shown hereafter. + +2. These monopolists of money assume that pauper labor, so-called, is +the cheapest labor in the world; and that therefore each nation, in +order to compete with the pauper labor of all other nations, must itself +have "cheap labor." In fact, "cheap labor" is, with them, the great +_sine qua non_ of all national industry. To compete with "cheap labor," +say they, we must have "cheap labor." This is, with them, a self-evident +proposition. And this demand for "cheap labor" means, of course, that +the laboring classes, in this country, must be kept, as nearly as +possible, on a level with the so-called pauper labor of all other +countries. + +Thus their whole scheme of national industry is made to depend upon +"cheap labor." And to secure "cheap labor," they hold it to be +indispensable that the laborers shall be kept constantly either in +actual pauperism, or on the verge of pauperism. And, in this country, +they know of no way of keeping the laborers on the verge of pauperism, +but by retaining in their (the monopolists') own hands such a monopoly +of money as will put it out of the power of the laborers to hire money, +and do business for themselves; and thus compel them, by the alternative +of starvation, to sell their labor to the monopolists of money at such +prices as will enable them (the monopolists) to manufacture goods in +competition with the so-called pauper laborers of all other countries. + +Let it be repeated--as a vital proposition--that the whole industrial +programme of these monopolists rests upon, and implies, such a degree of +poverty, on the part of the laboring classes, as will put their labor in +direct competition with the so-called pauper labor of all other +countries. So long as they (the monopolists) can perpetuate this extreme +poverty of the laboring classes, in this country, they feel safe against +all foreign competition; for, in all other things than "cheap labor," we +have advantages equal to those of any other nation. + +Furthermore, this extreme poverty, in which the laborers are to be kept, +necessarily implies that they are to receive no larger share of the +proceeds of their own labor, than is necessary to keep them in a +condition to labor. It implies that their industry--which is really the +national industry--is not to be carried on at all for their own benefit, +but only for the benefit of their employers, the monopolists of money. +It implies that the laborers are to be mere tools and machines in the +hands of their employers; that they are to be kept simply in running +order, like other machinery; but that, beyond this, they are to have no +more rights, and no more interests, in the products of their labor, than +have the wheels, spindles, and other machinery, with which the work is +done. + +In short, this whole programme implies that the laborers--the real +producers of wealth--are not to be considered at all as human beings, +having rights and interests of their own; but only as tools and +machines, to be owned, used, and consumed in producing such wealth as +their employers--the monopolists of money--may desire for their own +subsistence and pleasure. + +What, then, is the remedy? Plainly it is to abolish the monopoly of +money. Liberate all this loanable capital--promissory notes--that is now +lying idle, and we liberate all labor, and furnish to all laborers all +the capital they need for their industries. We shall then have no +longer, all over the earth, the competition of pauper labor with pauper +labor, but only the competition of free labor with free labor. And from +this competition of free labor with free labor, no people on earth have +anything to fear, but all peoples have everything to hope. + +And why have all peoples everything to hope from the competition of free +labor with free labor? Because when every human being, who labors at +all, has, as nearly as possible, all the fruits of his labor, and all +the capital that is necessary to make his labor most effective, he has +all needed inducements to the best use of both his brains and his +muscles, his head and his hands. He applies both his head and his hands +to his work. He not only acquires, as far as possible, for his own use, +all the scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions, that are made +by others, but he himself makes scientific discoveries and mechanical +inventions. He thus multiplies indefinitely his powers of production. +And the more each one produces of his own particular commodity, the more +he can buy of every other man's products, and the more he can pay for +them. + +With freedom in money, the scientific discoveries and mechanical +inventions, made in each country, will not only be used to the utmost in +that country, but will be carried into all other countries. And these +discoveries and inventions, given by each country to every other, and +received by each country from every other, will be of infinitely more +value than all the material commodities that will be exchanged between +these countries. + +In this way each country contributes to the wealth of every other, and +the whole human race are enriched by the increased power and stimulus +given to each man's labor of body and mind. + +But it is to be kept constantly in mind, that there can be no such thing +as free labor, unless there be freedom in money; that is, unless +everybody, who can furnish money, shall be at liberty to do so. Plainly +labor cannot be free, unless the laborers are free to hire all the money +capital that is necessary for their industries. And they cannot be free +to hire all this money capital, unless all who can lend it to them, +shall be at liberty to do so. + +In short, labor cannot be free, unless each laborer is free to hire all +the capital--money capital, as well as all other capital--that he +honestly can hire; free to buy, wherever he can buy, all the raw +material he needs for his labor; and free to sell, wherever he can sell, +all the products of his labor. Therefore labor cannot be free, unless we +have freedom in money, and free trade with all mankind. + +We can now understand the situation. In the most civilized nations--such +as Western Europe and the United States--labor is utterly crippled, +robbed, and enslaved by the monopoly of money; and also, in some of +these countries, by the monopoly of land. In nearly or quite all the +other countries of the world, labor is not only robbed and enslaved, but +to a great extent paralyzed, by the monopoly of land, and by what may +properly be called the utter absence of money. There is, consequently, +in these latter countries, almost literally, no diversity of industry, +no science, no skill, no invention, no machinery, no manufactures, no +production, and no wealth; but everywhere miserable poverty, ignorance, +servitude, and wretchedness. + +In this country, and in Western Europe, where the uses of money are +known, there is no excuse to be offered for the monopoly of money. It is +maintained, in each of these countries, by a small knot of tyrants and +robbers, who have got control of the governments, and use their power +principally to maintain this monopoly; understanding, as they do, that +this one monopoly of money gives them a substantially absolute control +of all other men's property and labor. + +But not satisfied with this substantially absolute control of all other +men's property and labor, the monopolists of money, _in this +country_,--feigning great pity for their laborers, but really seeking +only to make their monopoly more profitable to themselves,--cry out for +protection against the competition of the pauper labor of all other +countries; when they alone, _and such as they_, are the direct cause of +all the pauper labor in the world. But for them, and others like them, +there would be neither poverty, ignorance, nor servitude on the face of +the earth. + +But to all that has now been said, the advocates of the monopoly of +money will say that, if all the material property of the country were +permitted to be represented by promissory notes, and these promissory +notes were permitted to be lent, bought, and sold as money, the laborers +would not be able to hire them, for the reason that they could not give +the necessary security for repayment. + +But let those who would say this, tell us why it is that, in order to +prevent men from loaning their promissory notes, for circulation as +money, it has always been necessary for governments to prohibit it, +either by penal enactments, or prohibitory taxation. These penal +enactments and prohibitory taxation are acknowledgments that, but for +them, the notes would be loaned to any extent that would be profitable +to the lenders. What this extent would be, nothing but experience of +freedom can determine. But freedom would doubtless give us ten, twenty, +most likely fifty, times as much money as we have now, if so much could +be kept in circulation. And laborers would at least have ten, twenty, or +fifty times better chances for hiring capital, than they have now. And, +furthermore, all labor and property would have ten, twenty, or fifty +times better chances of bringing their full value in the market, than +they have now. + +But in the space that is allowable in this letter, it is impossible to +say all, or nearly all, of what might be said, to show the justice, the +utility, or the necessity, for perfect freedom in the matters of money +and international trade. To pursue these topics further would exclude +other matters of great importance, as showing how the government acts +the part of robber and tyrant in all its legislation on contracts; and +that the whole purpose of all its acts is that the earnings of the many +may be put into the pockets of the few. + + + SECTION XVII. + +Although, as has already been said, the constitution is a paper that +nobody ever signed, that few persons have ever read, and that the great +body of the people never saw; and that has, consequently, no more claim +to be the supreme law of the land, or to have any authority whatever, +than has any other paper, that nobody ever signed, that few persons ever +read, and that the great body of the people never saw; and although it +purports to authorize a government, in which the lawmakers, judges, and +executive officers are all to be secured against any responsibility +whatever _to the people_, whose liberty and rights are at stake; and +although this government is kept in operation only by votes given in +secret (by secret ballot), and in a way to save the voters from all +personal responsibility for the acts of their agents--the lawmakers, +judges, etc.; and although the whole affair is so audacious a fraud and +usurpation, that no people could be expected to agree to it, or ought to +submit to it, for a moment; yet, inasmuch as the constitution declares +itself to have been ordained and established by the people of the United +States, for the maintenance of liberty and justice for themselves and +their posterity; and inasmuch as all its supporters--that is, the +voters, lawmakers, judges, etc.--profess to derive all their authority +from it; and inasmuch as all lawmakers, and all judicial and executive +officers, both national and State, swear to support it; and inasmuch as +they claim the right to kill, and are evidently determined to kill, and +esteem it the highest glory to kill, all who do not submit to its +authority; we might reasonably expect that, from motives of common +decency, if from no other, those who profess to administer it, would pay +some deference to its commands, _at least in those particular cases +where it explicitly forbids any violation of the natural rights of the +people_. + +Especially might we expect that the judiciary--whose courts claim to be +courts of justice--and who profess to be authorized and sworn to expose +and condemn all such violations of individual rights as the constitution +itself expressly forbids--would, in spite of all their official +dependence on, and responsibility to, the lawmakers, have sufficient +respect for their personal characters, and the opinions of the world, to +induce them to pay some regard to all those parts of the constitution +that expressly require any rights of the people to be held inviolable. + +If the judicial tribunals cannot be expected to do justice, even in +those cases where the constitution expressly commands them to do it, and +where they have solemnly sworn to do it, it is plain that they have sunk +to the lowest depths of servility and corruption, and can be expected to +do nothing but serve the purposes of robbers and tyrants. + +But how futile have been all expectations of justice from the judiciary, +may be seen in the conduct of the courts--and especially in that of the +so-called Supreme Court of the United States--in regard to men's natural +right to make their own contracts. + +Although the State lawmakers have, more frequently than the national +lawmakers, made laws in violation of men's natural right to make their +own contracts, yet all laws, State and national, having for their object +the destruction of that right, have always, without a single exception, +I think, received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United +States. And having been sanctioned by that court, they have been, as a +matter of course, sanctioned by all the other courts, State and +national. And this work has gone on, until, if these courts are to be +believed, nothing at all is left of men's natural right to make their +own contracts. + +That such is the truth, I now propose to prove. + +And, first, as to the State governments. + +The constitution of the United States (_Art. 1, Sec. 10_) declares that: + + No State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of + contracts. + +This provision does not designate what contracts have, and what have +not, an "obligation." But it clearly presupposes, implies, assumes, and +asserts that there are contracts that _have_ an "obligation." Any State +law, therefore, which declares that such contracts shall have _no +obligation_, is plainly in conflict with this provision of the +constitution of the United States. + +This provision, also, by implying that there _are_ contracts, that +_have_ an "obligation," _necessarily implies that men have a right to +enter into them_; for if men had no right to enter into the contracts, +the contracts themselves could have no "obligation." + +This provision, then, of the constitution of the United States, not only +implies that there are contracts that _have_ an obligation, _but it also +implies that the people have the right to enter into all such contracts, +and have the benefit of them_. And "_any_" State "_law_," conflicting +with either of these implications, is necessarily unconstitutional and +void. + +Furthermore, the language of this provision of the constitution, to wit, +"the obligation [singular] of contracts" [plural], implies _that there +is one and the same "obligation" to all "contracts" whatsoever, that +have any legal obligation at all_. And there obviously must be some one +principle, that gives validity to all contracts alike, that have any +validity. + +The law, then, of this whole country, as established by the constitution +of the United States, is, that all contracts whatsoever, in which this +one principle of validity, or "obligation," is found, shall be held +valid; and that the States shall impose no restraint whatever upon the +people's entering into all such contracts. + +All, therefore, that courts have to do, in order to determine whether +any particular contract, or class of contracts, are valid, and _whether +the people have a right to enter into them_, is simply to determine +whether the contracts themselves have, or have not, this one principle +of validity, or "obligation," which the constitution of the United +States declares shall not be impaired. + +State legislation can obviously have nothing to do with the solution of +this question. It can neither create, nor destroy, that "obligation of +contracts," which the constitution forbids it to impair. It can neither +give, nor take away, the right to enter into any contract whatever, that +has that "obligation." + +On the supposition, then, that the constitution of the United States is, +what it declares itself to be, _viz._, "the supreme law of the land, ... +anything in the constitutions or laws of the States to the contrary +notwithstanding," this provision against "any" State "law impairing the +obligation of contracts," is so explicit, and so authoritative, that the +legislatures and courts of the States have no color of authority for +violating it. And the Supreme Court of the United States has had no +color of authority or justification for suffering it to be violated. + +This provision is certainly one of the most important--perhaps the most +important--of all the provisions of the constitution of the United +States, _as protective of the natural rights of the people to make their +own contracts, or provide for their own welfare_. + +Yet it has been constantly trampled under foot, by the State +legislatures, by all manner of laws, declaring who may, and who may not, +make certain contracts; and what shall, and what shall not, be "the +obligation" of particular contracts; thus setting at defiance all ideas +of justice, of natural rights, and equal rights; conferring monopolies +and privileges upon particular individuals, and imposing the most +arbitrary and destructive restraints and penalties upon others; all with +a view of putting, as far as possible, all wealth into the hands of the +few, and imposing poverty and servitude upon the great body of the +people. + +And yet all these enormities have gone on for nearly a hundred years, +and have been sanctioned, not only by all the State courts, but also by +the Supreme Court of the United States. + +And what color of excuse have any of these courts offered for thus +upholding all these violations of justice, of men's natural rights, and +even of that constitution which they had all sworn to support? + +They have offered only this: _They have all said they did not know what +"the obligation of contracts" was_! + +Well, suppose, for the sake of the argument, that they have not known +what "the obligation of contracts" was, what, then, was their duty? +Plainly this, to neither enforce, nor annul, any contract whatever, +until they should have discovered what "the obligation of contracts" +was. + +Clearly they could have no right to either enforce, or annul, any +contract whatever, until they should have ascertained whether it had any +"obligation," and, if any, what that "obligation" was. + +If these courts really do not know--as perhaps they do not--what "the +obligation of contracts" is, they deserve nothing but contempt for their +ignorance. If they _do_ know what "the obligation of contracts" is, and +yet sanction the almost literally innumerable laws that violate it, they +deserve nothing but detestation for their villainy. + +And until they shall suspend all their judgments for either enforcing, +or annulling, contracts, or, on the other hand, shall ascertain what +"the obligation of contracts" is, and sweep away all State laws that +impair it, they will deserve both contempt for their ignorance, and +detestation for their crimes. + +Individual Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have, at +least in one instance, in 1827 (_Ogden vs. Saunders_, 12 Wheaton 213), +attempted to give a definition of "the obligation of contracts." But +there was great disagreement among them; and no one definition secured +the assent of the whole court, _or even of a majority_. Since then, so +far as I know, that court has never attempted to give a definition. And, +so far as the opinion of that court is concerned, the question is as +unsettled now, as it was sixty years ago. And the opinions of the +Supreme Courts of the States are equally unsettled with those of the +Supreme Court of the United States. The consequence is, that "the +obligation of contracts"--the principle on which the real validity, or +invalidity, of all contracts whatsoever depends--is practically unknown, +or at least unrecognized, by a single court, either of the States, or of +the United States. And, as a result, every species of absurd, corrupt, +and robber legislation goes on unrestrained, as it always has done. + +What, now, is the reason why not one of these courts has ever so far +given its attention to the subject as to have discovered what "the +obligation of contracts" is? What that principle is, I repeat, which +they have all sworn to sustain, and on which the real validity, or +invalidity, of every contract on which they ever adjudicate, depends? +Why is it that they have all gone on sanctioning and enforcing all the +nakedly iniquitous laws, by which men's natural right to make their own +contracts has been trampled under foot? + +Surely it is not because they do not know that all men have a natural +right to make their own contracts; for they know _that_, as well as they +know that all men have a natural right to live, to breathe, to move, to +speak, to hear, to see, or to do anything whatever for the support of +their lives, or the promotion of their happiness. + +Why, then, is it, that they strike down this right, without ceremony, +and without compunction, whenever they are commanded to do so by the +lawmakers? It is because, and solely because, they are so servile, +slavish, degraded, and corrupt, as to act habitually on the principle, +that justice and men's natural rights are matters of no importance, in +comparison with the commands of the impudent and tyrannical lawmakers, +on whom they are dependent for their offices and their salaries. It is +because, and solely because, they, like the judges under all other +irresponsible and tyrannical governments, are part and parcel of a +conspiracy for robbing and enslaving the great body of the people, to +gratify the luxury and pride of a few. It is because, and solely +because, they do not recognize our governments, State or national, as +institutions designed simply to maintain justice, or to protect all men +in the enjoyment of all their natural rights; but only as institutions +designed to accomplish such objects as irresponsible cabals of lawmakers +may agree upon. + +In proof of all this, I give the following. + +Previous to 1824, two cases had come up from the State courts, to the +Supreme Court of the United States, involving the question whether a +State law, _invalidating some particular contract_, came within the +constitutional prohibition of "any law impairing the obligation of +contracts." + +One of these cases was that of _Fletcher vs. Peck_, (6 _Cranch_ 87), in +the year 1810. In this case the court held simply that a grant of land, +once made by the legislature of Georgia, could not be rescinded by a +subsequent legislature. + +But no general definition of "the obligation of contracts" was given. + +Again, in the year 1819, in the case of _Dartmouth College vs. Woodward_ +(4 _Wheaton_ 518), the court held that a charter, granted to Dartmouth +College, by the king of England, before the Revolution, was a contract; +and that a law of New Hampshire, annulling, or materially altering, the +charter, without the consent of the trustees, was a "law impairing the +obligation" of _that_ contract. + +But, in this case, as in that of _Fletcher vs. Peck_, the court gave no +general definition of "the obligation of contracts." + +But in the year 1824, and again in 1827, in the case of _Ogden vs. +Saunders_ (12 _Wheaton_ 213) the question was, whether an insolvent law +of the State of New York, which discharged a debtor from a debt, +_contracted after the passage of the law_, or, as the courts would say, +"_contracted under the law_"--on his giving up his property to be +distributed among his creditors--was a "law impairing the obligation of +contracts?" + +To the correct decision of this case, it seemed indispensable that the +court should give a comprehensive, precise, and _universal_ definition +of "the obligation of contracts"; one by which it might forever after be +known what was, and what was not, that "obligation of contracts," which +the State governments were forbidden to "impair" by "_any law_" +whatever. + +The cause was heard at two terms, that of 1824, and that of 1827. + +It was argued by Webster, Wheaton, Wirt, Clay, Livingston, Ogden, Jones, +Sampson, and Haines; nine in all. Their arguments were so voluminous +that they could not be reported at length. Only summaries of them are +given. But these summaries occupy thirty-eight pages in the reports. + +The judges, at that time, were seven, _viz._, Marshall, Washington, +Johnson, Duvall, Story, Thompson, and Trimble. + +The judges gave five different opinions; occupying one hundred pages of +the reports. + +But no one definition of "the obligation of contracts" could be agreed +on; _not even by a majority_. + +Here, then, sixteen lawyers and judges--many of them among the most +eminent the country has ever had--were called upon to give their +opinions upon a question of the highest importance to all men's natural +rights, to all the interests of civilized society, and to the very +existence of civilization itself; a question, upon the answer to which +depended the real validity, or invalidity, of every contract that ever +was made, or ever will be made, between man and man. And yet, by their +disagreements, they all virtually acknowledged that they did not know +what "the obligation of contracts" was! + +But this was not all. Although they could not agree as to what "the +obligation of contracts" was, they did all agree that it could be +nothing which the State lawmakers could not prohibit and abolish, _by +laws passed before the contracts were made_. That is to say, they all +agreed that the State lawmakers had absolute power to prohibit all +contracts whatsoever, for buying and selling, borrowing and lending, +giving and receiving, property; and that, whenever they did prohibit any +particular contract, or class of contracts, _all such contracts, +thereafter made, could have no "obligation"_! + +They said this, be it noted, not of contracts that were naturally and +intrinsically criminal and void, but of contracts that were naturally +and intrinsically as just, and lawful, and useful, and necessary, as any +that men ever enter into; and that had as perfect a natural, intrinsic, +inherent "obligation," as any of those contracts, by which the traffic +of society is carried on, or by which men ever buy and sell, borrow and +lend, give and receive, property, of and to each other. + +Not one of these sixteen lawyers and judges took the ground that the +constitution, in forbidding any State to "pass any law impairing the +obligation of contracts," intended to protect, against the arbitrary +legislation of the States, the only true, real, and natural "obligation +of contracts," or the right of the people to enter into all really just, +and naturally obligatory contracts. + +Is it possible to conceive of a more shameful exhibition, or confession, +of the servility, the baseness, or the utter degradation, of both bar +and bench, than their refusal to say one word in favor of justice, +liberty, men's natural rights, or the natural, and only real, +"obligation" of their contracts? + +And yet, from that day to this--a period of sixty years, save +one--neither bar nor bench, so far as I know, have ever uttered one +syllable in vindication of men's natural right to make their own +contracts, or to have the only true, real, natural, inherent, intrinsic +"obligation" of their contracts respected by lawmakers or courts. + +Can any further proof be needed that all ideas of justice and men's +natural rights are absolutely banished from the minds of lawmakers, and +from so-called courts of justice? Or that absolute and irresponsible +lawmaking has usurped their place? + +Or can any further proof be needed, of the utter worthlessness of all +the constitutions, which these lawmakers and judges swear to support, +and profess to be governed by? + + +SECTION XVIII. + +If, now, it be asked, what is this constitutional "obligation of +contracts," which the States are forbidden to impair, the answer is, +that it is, and necessarily must be, the _natural_ obligation; or that +obligation, which contracts have, on principles of natural law, and +natural justice, as distinguished from any arbitrary or unjust +obligation, which lawmakers may assume to create, and attach to +contracts. + +This natural obligation is the only _one_ "obligation" which _all_ +obligatory contracts can be said to have. It is the only _inherent_ +"obligation," that any contract can be said to have. It is recognized +all over the world--at least as far as it is known--as the one only +_true_ obligation, that any, or all, contracts can have. And, so far as +it is known--it is held valid all over the world, except in those +exceptional cases, where arbitrary and tyrannical governments have +assumed to annul it, or substitute some other in its stead. + +The constitution assumes that this _one_ "obligation of contracts," +which it designs to protect, is the natural one, because it assumes that +it existed, _and was known_, at the time the constitution itself was +established; and certainly no _one_ "obligation," _other than the +natural one_, can be said to have been known, as applicable to all +obligatory contracts, at the time the constitution was established. +Unless, therefore, the constitution be presumed to have intended the +natural "obligation," it cannot be said to have intended any _one_ +"obligation" whatever; or, consequently, to have forbidden the violation +of any _one_ "obligation" whatever. + +It cannot be said that "the obligation," which the constitution designed +to protect was any arbitrary "obligation," that was unknown at the time +the constitution was established, but that was to be created, and made +known afterward; for then this provision of the constitution could have +had no effect, until such arbitrary "obligation" should have been +created, and made known. And as it gives us no information as to how, or +by whom, this arbitrary "obligation" was to be created, or what the +obligation itself was to be, or how it could ever be known to be the one +that was intended to be protected, the provision itself becomes a mere +nullity, having no effect to protect any "obligation" at all. + +It would be a manifest and utter absurdity to say that the constitution +intended to protect any "obligation" whatever, unless it be presumed to +have intended some particular "obligation," _that was known at the +time_; for that would be equivalent to saying that the constitution +intended to establish a law, of which no man could know the meaning. + +But this is not all. + +The right of property is a natural right. The only real right of +property, that is known to mankind, is the natural right. Men have also +a natural right to convey their natural rights of property from one +person to another. And there is no means known to mankind, by which this +_natural_ right of property can be transferred, or conveyed, by one man +to another, except by such contracts as are _naturally_ obligatory; that +is, naturally capable of conveying and binding the right of property. + +All contracts whatsoever, that are naturally capable, competent, and +sufficient to convey, transfer, and bind the natural right of property, +are naturally obligatory; and really and truly do convey, transfer, and +bind such rights of property as they purport to convey, transfer, and +bind. + +All the other modes, by which one man has ever attempted to acquire the +property of another, have been thefts, robberies, and frauds. But these, +of course, have never conveyed any real rights of property. + +To make any contract binding, obligatory, and effectual for conveying +and transferring rights of property, these three conditions only are +essential, _viz._, 1. That it be entered into by parties, who are +mentally competent to make reasonable contracts. 2. That the contract be +a purely voluntary one: that is, that it be entered into without either +force or fraud on either side. 3. That the right of property, which the +contract purports to convey, be such an one as is naturally capable of +being conveyed, or transferred, by one man to another. + +Subject to these conditions, all contracts whatsoever, for conveying +rights of property--that is, for buying and selling, borrowing and +lending, giving and receiving property--are naturally obligatory, and +bind such rights of property as they purport to convey. + +Subject to these conditions, all contracts, for the conveyance of rights +of property, are recognized as valid, all over the world, by both +civilized and savage man, except in those particular cases where +governments arbitrarily and tyrannically prohibit, alter, or invalidate +them. + +This _natural_ "obligation of contracts" must necessarily be presumed to +be the one, and the only one, which the constitution forbids to be +impaired, by any State law whatever, if we are to presume that the +constitution was intended for the maintenance of justice, or men's +natural rights. + +On the other hand, if the constitution be presumed not to protect this +_natural_ "obligation of contracts," we know not _what_ other +"obligation" it did intend to protect. It mentions no other, describes +no other, gives us no hint of any other; and nobody can give us the +least information as to what other "obligation of contracts" was +intended. + +It could not have been any "obligation" which the _State_ lawmakers +might arbitrarily create, and annex to _all_ contracts; for this is what +no lawmakers have ever attempted to do. And it would be the height of +absurdity to suppose they ever will invent any _one_ "obligation," and +attach it to _all_ contracts. They have only attempted either to annul, +or impair, the natural "obligation" of _particular_ contracts; or, _in +particular cases_, to substitute other "obligations" of their own +invention. And this is the most they will ever attempt to do. + + +SECTION XIX. + +Assuming it now to be proved that the "obligation of contracts," which +the States are forbidden to "impair," is the _natural_ "obligation"; and +that, _constitutionally speaking_, this provision secures to all the +people of the United States the right to enter into, and have the +benefit of, all contracts whatsoever, that have that _one natural_ +"obligation," let us look at some of the more important of those State +laws that have either impaired that obligation or prohibited the +exercise of that right. + +1. That law, in all the States, by which any, or all, the contracts of +persons, under twenty-one years of age, are either invalidated, or +forbidden to be entered into. + +The mental capacity of a person to make reasonable contracts, is the +only criterion, by which to determine his legal capacity to make +obligatory contracts. And his mental capacity to make reasonable +contracts is certainly not to be determined by the fact that he is, or +is not, twenty-one years of age. There would be just as much sense in +saying that it was to be determined by his height or his weight, as +there is in saying that it should be determined by his age. + +Nearly all persons, male and female, are mentally competent to make +reasonable contracts, long before they are twenty-one years of age. And +as soon as they are mentally competent to make reasonable contracts, +they have the same natural right to make them, that they ever can have. +And their contracts have the same natural "obligation" that they ever +can have. + +If a person's mental capacity to make reasonable contracts be drawn in +question, that is a question of fact, to be ascertained by the same +tribunal that is to ascertain all the other facts involved in the case. +It certainly is not to be determined by any arbitrary legislation, that +shall deprive any one of his natural right to make contracts. + +2. All the State laws, that do now forbid, or that have heretofore +forbidden married women to make any or all contracts, that they are, or +were, mentally competent to make reasonably, are violations of their +natural right to make their own contracts. + +A married woman has the same natural right to acquire and hold property, +and to make all contracts that she is mentally competent to make +reasonably, as has a married man, or any other man. And any law +invalidating her contracts, or forbidding her to enter into contracts, +on the ground of her being married, are not only absurd and outrageous +in themselves, but are also as plainly violations of that provision of +the constitution, which forbids any State to pass any law impairing the +natural obligation of contracts, as would be laws invalidating or +prohibiting similar contracts by married men. + +3. All those State laws, commonly called acts of incorporation, by which +a certain number of persons are licensed to contract debts, without +having their individual properties held liable to pay them, are laws +impairing the natural obligation of their contracts. + +On natural principles of law and reason, these persons are simply +partners; and their private properties, like those of any other +partners, should be held liable for their partnership debts. Like any +other partners, they take the profits of their business, if there be any +profits. And they are naturally bound to take all the risks of their +business, as in the case of any other business. For a law to say that, +if they make any profits, they may put them all into their own pockets, +but that, if they make a loss, they may throw it upon their creditors, +is an absurdity and an outrage. Such a law is plainly a law impairing +the natural obligation of their contracts. + +4. All State insolvent laws, so-called, that distribute a debtor's +property equally among his creditors, are laws impairing the natural +obligation of his contracts. + +If the natural obligation of contracts were known, and recognized as +law, we should have no need of insolvent or bankrupt laws. + +The only force, function, or effect of a _legal_ contract is to convey +and bind rights of property. A contract that conveys and binds no right +of property, has no _legal_ force, effect, or obligation whatever.[4] + + [4] It may have very weighty moral obligation; but it can have + no legal obligation. + +Consequently, the natural obligation of a contract of debt binds the +debtor's property, and nothing more. That is, it gives the creditor a +mortgage upon the debtor's property, and nothing more. + +A first debt is a first mortgage; a second debt is a second mortgage; a +third debt is a third mortgage; and so on indefinitely. + +The first mortgage must be paid in full, before anything is paid on the +second. The second must be paid in full, before anything is paid on the +third; and so on indefinitely. + +When the mortgaged property is exhausted, the debt is cancelled; there +is no other property that the contract binds. + +If, therefore, a debtor, at the time his debt becomes due, pays to the +extent of his ability, and has been guilty of no fraud, fault, or +neglect, during the time his debt had to run, he is thenceforth +discharged from all legal obligation. + +If this principle were acknowledged, we should have no occasion, and no +use, for insolvent or bankrupt laws. + +Of course, persons who have never asked themselves what the _natural_ +"obligation of contracts" is, will raise numerous objections to the +principle, that a legal contract binds nothing else than rights of +property. But their objections are all shallow and fallacious. + +I have not space here to go into all the arguments that may be necessary +to prove that contracts can have no _legal_ effect, except to bind +rights of property; or to show the truth of that principle in its +application to all contracts whatsoever. To do this would require a +somewhat elaborate treatise. Such a treatise I hope sometime to publish. +For the present, I only assert the principle; and assert that the +ignorance of this truth is at least one of the reasons why courts and +lawyers have never been able to agree as to what "the obligation of +contracts" was. + +In all the cases that have now been mentioned,--that is, of minors +(so-called), married women, corporations, insolvents, and in all other +like cases--the tricks, or pretences, by which the courts attempt to +uphold the validity of all laws that forbid persons to exercise their +natural right to make their own contracts, or that annul, or impair, the +_natural_ "obligation" of their contracts, are these: + +1. They say that, if a law forbids any particular contract to be made, +such contract, being then an illegal one, can have no "obligation." +Consequently, say they, the law cannot be said to impair it; because the +law cannot impair an "obligation," that has never had an existence. + +They say this of all contracts, that are arbitrarily forbidden; +although, naturally and intrinsically, they have as valid an obligation +as any others that men ever enter into, or as any that courts enforce. + +By such a naked trick as this, these courts not only strike down men's +natural right to make their own contracts, but even seek to evade that +provision of the constitution, which they are all sworn to support, and +which commands them to hold valid the _natural_ "obligation" of all +men's contracts; "anything in the constitutions or laws of the States to +the contrary notwithstanding." + +They might as well have said that, if the constitution had declared that +"no State shall pass any law impairing any man's natural right to life, +liberty, or property"--(that is, his _natural_ right to live, and do +what he will with himself and his property, so long as he infringes the +right of no other person)--this prohibition could be evaded by a State +law declaring that, from and after such a date, no person should have +any natural right to life, liberty, or property; and that, therefore, a +law arbitrarily taking from a man his life, liberty, and property, could +not be said to impair his right to them, because no law could impair a +right that did not exist. + +The answer to such an argument as this, would be, that it is a natural +truth that every man, who ever has been, or ever will be, born into the +world, _necessarily has been, and necessarily will be, born with an +inherent right to life, liberty, and property_; and that, in forbidding +this right to be impaired, _the constitution presupposes, implies, +assumes, and asserts that every man has, and will have, such a right_; +and that this _natural_ right is the very right, which the constitution +forbids any State law to impair. + +Or the courts might as well have said that, if the constitution had +declared that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of +contracts made for the purchase of food," that provision could have been +evaded by a State law forbidding any contract to be made for the +purchase of food; and then saying that such contract, being illegal, +could have no "obligation," that could be impaired. + +The answer to this argument would be that, by forbidding any State law +impairing the obligation of contracts made for the purchase of food, the +constitution presupposes, implies, assumes, and asserts that such +contracts have, and always will have, a _natural_ "obligation"; and +that this _natural_ "obligation" is the very "obligation," which the +constitution forbids any State law to impair. + +So in regard to all other contracts. The constitution presupposes, +implies, assumes, and asserts the natural truth, that certain contracts +have, _and always necessarily will have_, a _natural_ "obligation." And +this _natural_ "obligation"--which is the only real obligation that any +contract can have--is the very one that the constitution forbids any +State law to impair, in the case of any contract whatever that has such +obligation. + +And yet all the courts hold the direct opposite of this. They hold that, +if a State law forbids any contract to be made, such a contract can then +have no obligation; and that, consequently, no State law can impair an +obligation that never existed. + +But if, by forbidding a contract to be made, a State law can prevent the +contract's having any obligation, State laws, by forbidding any +contracts at all to be made, can prevent all contracts, thereafter made, +from having any obligation; and thus utterly destroy all men's natural +rights to make any obligatory contracts at all. + +2. A second pretence, by which the courts attempt to evade that +provision of the constitution, which forbids any State to "pass any law +impairing the obligation of contracts," is this: They say that the State +law, that requires, or obliges, a man to fulfil his contracts, _is +itself_ "_the obligation_," which the constitution forbids to be +impaired; and that therefore the constitution only prohibits the +impairing of any law for enforcing such contracts as shall be made under +it. + +But this pretence, it will be seen, utterly discards the idea that +contracts have any _natural_ obligation. It implies that contracts have +no obligation, except the laws that are made for enforcing them. But if +contracts have no _natural_ obligation, they have no obligation at all, +_that ought to be enforced_; and the State is a mere usurper, tyrant, +and robber, in passing any law to enforce them. + +Plainly a State cannot rightfully enforce any contracts at all, unless +they have a _natural_ obligation. + +3. A third pretence, by which the courts attempt to evade this provision +of the constitution, is this: They say that "the law is a part of the +contract" itself; and therefore cannot impair its obligation. + +By this they mean that, if a law is standing upon the statute book, +prescribing what obligation certain contracts shall, or shall not, have, +it must then be presumed that, whenever such a contract is made, the +parties intended to make it according to that law; and really to make +the law a part of their contract; _although they themselves say nothing +of the kind_. + +This pretence, that the law is a part of the contract, is a mere trick +to cheat people out of their natural right to make their own contracts; +and to compel them to make only such contracts as the lawmakers choose +to permit them to make. + +To say that it must be presumed that the parties intended to make their +contracts according to such laws as may be prescribed to them--or, what +is the same thing, to make the laws a part of their contracts--is +equivalent to saying that the parties must be presumed to have given up +all their natural right to make their own contracts; to have +acknowledged themselves imbeciles, incompetent to make reasonable +contracts, and to have authorized the lawmakers to make their contracts +for them; for if the lawmakers can make any part of a man's contract, +and presume his consent to it, they can make a whole one, and presume +his consent to it. + +If the lawmakers can make any part of men's contracts, they can make the +whole of them; and can, therefore, buy and sell, borrow and lend, give +and receive men's property of all kinds, according to their (the +lawmakers') own will, pleasure, or discretion; without the consent of +the real owners of the property, and even without their knowledge, until +it is too late. In short, they may take any man's property, and give it, +or sell it, to whom they please, and on such conditions, and at such +prices, as they please; without any regard to the rights of the owner. +They may, in fact, at their pleasure, strip any, or every, man of his +property, and bestow it upon whom they will; and then justify the act +upon the presumption that the owner consented to have his property thus +taken from him and given to others. + +This absurd, contemptible, and detestable trick has had a long lease of +life, and has been used as a cover for some of the greatest of crimes. +By means of it, the marriage contract has been perverted into a +contract, on the part of the woman, to make herself a legal non-entity, +or _non compos mentis_; to give up, to her husband, all her personal +property, and the control of all her real estate; and to part with her +natural, inherent, inalienable right, as a human being, to direct her +own labor, control her own earnings, make her own contracts, and provide +for the subsistence of herself and her children. + +There would be just as much reason in saying that the lawmakers have a +right to make the entire marriage contract; to marry any man and woman +against their will; dispose of all their personal and property rights; +declare them imbeciles, incapable of making a reasonable marriage +contract; then presume the consent of both the parties; and finally +treat them as criminals, and their children as outcasts, if they presume +to make any contract of their own. + +This same trick, of holding that the law is a part of the contract, has +been made to protect the private property of stockholders from liability +for the debts of the corporations, of which they were members; and to +protect the private property of special partners, so-called, or limited +partners, from liability for partnership debts. + +This same trick has been employed to justify insolvent and bankrupt +laws, so-called, whereby a first creditor's right to a first mortgage on +the property of his debtor, has been taken from him, and he has been +compelled to take his chances with as many subsequent creditors as the +debtor may succeed in becoming indebted to + +All these absurdities and atrocities have been practiced by the +lawmakers of the States, and sustained by the courts, under the pretence +that they (the courts) did not know what the natural "obligation of +contracts" was; or that, if they did know what it was, the constitution +of the United States imposed no restraint upon its unlimited violation +by the State lawmakers. + + +SECTION XX. + +But, not content with having always sanctioned the unlimited power of +the _State_ lawmakers to abolish all men's natural right to make their +own contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States has, within the +last twenty years, taken pains to assert that congress also has the +arbitrary power to abolish the same right. + +1. It has asserted the arbitrary power of congress to abolish all men's +right to make their own contracts, by asserting its power _to alter the +meaning of all contracts, after they are made_, so as to make them +widely, or wholly, different from what the parties had made them. + +Thus the court has said that, after a man has made a contract to pay a +certain number of dollars, at a future time,--_meaning such dollars as +were current at the time the contract was made_,--congress has power to +coin a dollar of less value than the one agreed on, and authorize the +debtor to pay his debt with a dollar of less value than the one he had +promised. + +To cover up this infamous crime, the court asserts, over and over +again,--what no one denies,--that congress has power (constitutionally +speaking) to alter, at pleasure, the value of its coins. But it then +asserts that congress has this additional, and wholly different, power, +to wit, the power to declare that this alteration in the value of the +coins _shall work a corresponding change in all existing contracts for +the payment of money_. + +In reality they say that a contract to pay money is not a contract to +pay any particular amount, or value, of such money as was known and +understood by the parties at the time the contract was made, but _only +such, and so much, as congress shall afterwards choose to call by that +name, when the debt shall become due_. + +They assert that, by simply retaining the name, while altering the +thing,--_or by simply giving an old name to a new thing_,--congress has +power to utterly abolish the contract which the parties themselves +entered into, and substitute for it any such new and different one, as +they (congress) may choose to substitute. + +Here are their own words: + + _The contract obligation ... was not a duty to pay gold or + silver, or the kind of money recognized by law at the time when + the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equal + intrinsic value in the market.... But the obligation of a + contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall + recognize as money when the payment is to be made.--Legal + Tender Cases, 12 Wallace 548._ + +This is saying that the obligation of a contract to pay money is not an +obligation to pay what both the law and the parties recognize as money, +_at the time when the contract is made_, but only such substitute as +congress shall afterwards prescribe, "_when the payment is to be made_." + +This opinion was given by a majority of the court in the year 1870. + +In another opinion the court says: + + Under the power to coin money, and to regulate its value, + congress may issue coins of same denomination [that is, bearing + the same name] as those already current by law, but of less + intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less + weight of the precious metals, _and thereby enable debtors to + discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real + value_. A contract to pay a certain sum of money, without any + stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be made, + may always be satisfied by payment of that sum [that is, that + _nominal_ amount] in any currency _which is lawful money at the + place and time at which payment is to be made_.--_Juilliard vs. + Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_, 449. + +This opinion was given by the entire court--save one, Field--at the +October term of 1883. + +Both these opinions are distinct declarations of the power of congress +to alter men's contracts, _after they are made_, by simply retaining the +name, while altering the thing, that is agreed to be paid. + +In both these cases, the court means distinctly to say that, _after the +parties to a contract have agreed upon the number of dollars to be +paid_, congress has power to reduce the value of the dollar, and +authorize all debtors to pay the less valuable dollar, instead of the +one agreed on. + +In other words, the court means to say that, after a contract has been +made for the payment of a certain number of dollars, _congress has power +to alter the meaning of the word dollar_, and thus authorize the debtor +to pay in something different from, and less valuable than, the thing he +agreed to pay. + +Well, if congress has power to alter men's contracts, _after they are +made_, by altering the meaning of the word dollar, and thus reducing the +value of the debt, it has a precisely equal power to _increase_ the +value of the dollar, and thus compel the debtor to pay _more_ than he +agreed to pay. + +Congress has evidently just as much right to _increase_ the value of the +dollar, after a contract has been made, as it has to _reduce_ its value. +It has, therefore, just as much right to cheat debtors, by compelling +them to pay _more_ than they agreed to pay, as it has to cheat +creditors, by compelling them to accept _less_ than they agreed to +accept. + +All this talk of the court is equivalent to asserting that congress has +the right to alter men's contracts at pleasure, _after they are made_, +and make them over into something, or anything, wholly different from +what the parties themselves had made them. + +And this is equivalent to denying all men's right to make their own +contracts, or to acquire any contract rights, which congress may not +_afterward_, at pleasure, alter, or abolish. + +It is equivalent to saying that the words of contracts are not to be +taken in the sense in which they are used, by the parties themselves, at +the time when the contracts are entered into, but only in such different +senses as congress may choose to put upon them at any future time. + +If this is not asserting the right of congress to abolish altogether +men's natural right to make their own contracts, what is it? + +Incredible as such audacious villainy may seem to those unsophisticated +persons, who imagine that a court of law should be a court of justice, +it is nevertheless true, that this court intended to declare the +unlimited power of congress to alter, at pleasure, the contracts of +parties, _after they have been made_, by altering the kind and amount of +money by which the contracts may be fulfilled. That they intended all +this, is proved, not only by the extracts already given from their +opinions, but also by the whole tenor of their arguments--too long to be +repeated here--and more explicitly by these quotations, _viz._: + + There is no well-founded distinction to be made between the + constitutional validity of an act of congress declaring + treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts + contracted after its passage, and that of an act making them a + legal tender for the discharge of _all_ debts, _as well those + incurred before, as those made after, its enactment_.--_Legal + Tender Cases_, 12 _Wallace_ 530 (1870). + + Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily + subject to the constitutional power of the government over the + currency, whatever that power may be, _and the obligation of + the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that + power_.--12 _Wallace_ 549. + + Contracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority + of congress, _at least so far as relates to the means of + payment_.--12 _Wallace_ 549. + +The court means here to say that "every contract for the payment of +money, simply," is necessarily made, by the parties, _subject to the +power of congress to alter it afterward_--by altering the kind and value +of the money with which it may be paid--_into anything, into which_ they +(congress) _may choose to alter it_. + +And this is equivalent to saying that all such contracts are made, by +the parties, with _the implied understanding that the contracts, as +written and signed by themselves, do not bind either of the parties to +anything_; but that they simply suggest, or initiate, some non-descript +or other, which congress may afterward convert into a binding contract, +_of such a sort, and only such a sort, as_ they (congress) _may see fit +to convert it into_. + +Every one of these judges knew that no two men, having common honesty +and common sense,--unless first deprived of all power to make their own +contracts,--would ever enter into a contract to pay money, with any +understanding that the government had any such arbitrary power as the +court here ascribes to it, to alter their contract after it should be +made. Such an absurd contract would, in reality, be no _legal_ contract +at all. It would be a mere gambling agreement, having, naturally and +really, no _legal_ "obligation" at all. + +But further. A _solvent_ contract to pay money is in reality--in law, +and in equity--_a bona fide mortgage upon the debtor's property_. And +this mortgage right is as veritable a right of property, as is any right +of property, that is conveyed by a warranty deed. And congress has no +more right to invalidate this mortgage, by a single iota, than it has to +invalidate a warranty deed of land. And these judges will sometime find +out that such is "the obligation of contracts," if they ever find out +what "the obligation of contracts" is. + +The justices of that court have had this question--what is "the +obligation of contracts"?--before them for seventy years, and more. But +they have never agreed among themselves--even by so many as a +majority--as to what it is. And this disagreement is very good evidence +that _none_ of them have known what it is; for if any one of them had +known what it is, he would doubtless have been able, long ago, to +enlighten the rest. + +Considering the vital importance of men's contracts, it would evidently +be more to the credit of these judges, if they would give their +attention to this question of "the obligation of contracts," until they +shall have solved it, than it is to be telling fifty millions of people +that they have no right to make any contracts at all, except such as +congress has power to invalidate after they shall have been made. Such +assertions as this, coming from a court that cannot even tell us what +"the obligation of contracts" is, are not entitled to any serious +consideration. On the contrary, they show us what farces and impostures +these judicial opinions--or decisions, as they call them--are. They show +that these judicial oracles, as men call them, are no better than some +of the other so-called oracles, by whom mankind have been duped. + +But these judges certainly never will find out what "the obligation of +contracts" is, until they find out that men have the natural right to +make their own contracts, and unalterably fix their "obligation"; and +that governments can have no power whatever to make, unmake, alter, or +invalidate that "obligation." + +Still further. Congress has the same power over weights and measures +that it has over coins. And the court has no more right or reason to say +that congress has power to alter existing contracts, by altering the +value of the coins, than it has to say that, after any or all men have, +for value received, entered into contracts to deliver so many bushels of +wheat or other grain, so many pounds of beef, pork, butter, cheese, +cotton, wool, or iron, so many yards of cloth, or so many feet of +lumber, congress has power, by altering these weights and measures, to +alter all these existing contracts, so as to convert them into contracts +to deliver only half as many, or to deliver twice as many, bushels, +pounds, yards, or feet, as the parties agreed upon. + +To add to the farce, as well as to the iniquity, of these judicial +opinions, it must be kept in mind, that the court says that, after A has +sold valuable property to B, and has taken in payment an honest and +sufficient mortgage on B's property, congress has the power to compel +him (A) to give up this mortgage, and to accept, in place of it, not +anything of any real value whatever, but only the promissory note of a +so-called government; and that government one which--if taxation without +consent is robbery--never had an honest dollar in its treasury, with +which to pay any of its debts, and is never likely to have one; but +relies wholly on its future robberies for its means to pay them; and can +give no guaranty, but its own interest at the time, that it will even +make the payment out of its future robberies. + +If a company of bandits were to seize a man's property for their own +uses, and give him their note, promising to pay him out of their future +robberies, the transaction would not be considered a very legitimate +one. But it would be intrinsically just as legitimate as is the one +which the Supreme Court sanctions on the part of congress. + +Banditti have not usually kept supreme courts of their own, to legalize +either their robberies, or their promises to pay for past robberies, out +of the proceeds of their future ones. Perhaps they may now take a lesson +from our Supreme Court, and establish courts of their own, that will +hereafter legalize all their contracts of this kind. + + +SECTION XXI. + +To justify its declaration, that congress has power to alter men's +contracts after they are made, the court dwells upon the fact that, at +the times when the legal-tender acts were passed, the government was in +peril of its life; and asserts that it had therefore a right to do +almost anything for its self-preservation, without much regard to its +honesty, or dishonesty, towards private persons. Thus it says: + + A civil war was then raging, which seriously threatened the + overthrow of the government, and the destruction of the + constitution itself. It demanded the equipment and support of + large armies and navies, and the employment of money to an + extent beyond the capacity of all ordinary sources of supply. + Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit + of the government, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had + become nearly exhausted. Moneyed institutions had advanced + largely of their means, and more could not be expected of them. + They had been compelled to suspend specie payments. Taxation + was inadequate to pay even the interest on the debt already + incurred, and it was impossible to await the income of + additional taxes. The necessity was immediate and pressing. The + army was unpaid. There was then due to the soldiers in the + field nearly a score of millions of dollars. The requisitions + from the War and Navy departments for supplies, exceeded fifty + millions, and the current expenditure was over one million per + day.... Foreign credit we had none. We say nothing of the + overhanging paralysis of trade, and business generally, which + threatened loss of confidence in the ability of the government + to maintain its continued existence, and therewith the complete + destruction of all remaining national credit. + + It was at such a time, and in such circumstances, that congress + was called upon to devise means to maintaining the army and + navy, for securing the large supplies of money needed, and + indeed for the preservation of the government created by the + constitution. It was at such a time, and in such and emergency, + that the legal-tender acts were passed.--12 _Wallace_ 540-1. + +In the same case Bradley said: + + Can the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn be thus taken + by the government, when the public exigency requires it, and + cannot the rich man's bonds and notes be in like manner taken + to reach the same end?--_p._ 561. + +He also said: + + It is absolutely essential to independent national existence + that government should have a firm hold on the two great + instrumentalities of the _sword_ and the _purse, and the right + to wield them without restriction, on occasions of national + peril_. In certain emergencies government must have at its + command, _not only the personal services--the bodies and + lives--of its citizens_, but the lesser, though not less + essential, power of absolute control over the resources of the + country. Its armies must be filled, and its navies manned, by + the citizens in person.--_p._ 563. + +Also he said: + + _The conscription may deprive me of liberty, and destroy my + life.... All these are fundamental political conditions on + which life, property, and money are respectively held and + enjoyed under our system of government, nay, under any system + of government._ There are times when the exigencies of the + State rightly absorb all subordinate considerations of private + interest, convenience, and feeling.--_p._ 565. + +Such an attempt as this, to justify one crime, by taking for granted the +justice of other and greater crimes, is a rather desperate mode of +reasoning, for a court of law; to say nothing of a court of justice. The +answer to it is, that no government, however good in other respects--any +more than any other good institution--has any right to live otherwise +than on purely voluntary support. It can have no right to take either +"the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn," or "the rich man's bonds +and notes," or poor men's "bodies and lives," without their consent. And +when a government resorts to such measures to save its life, we need no +further proof that its time to die has come. A good government, no more +than a bad one, has any right to live by robbery, murder, or any other +crime. + +But so think not the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. +On the contrary, they hold that, in comparison with the preservation of +the government, all the rights of the people to property, liberty, and +life are worthless things, not to be regarded. So they hold that in such +an exigency as they describe, congress had the right to commit any crime +against private persons, by which the government could be saved. And +among these lawful crimes, the court holds that congress had the right +to issue money that should serve as a license to all holders of it, to +cheat--or rather openly rob--their creditors. + +The court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve +the life of the government, congress had the right to issue such money +as would authorize all creditors to demand twice the amount of their +honest dues from all debtors. + +The court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve +the life of the government, congress had the right to sell indulgences +for all manner of crimes; for theft, robbery, rape, murder, and all +other crimes, for which indulgences would bring a price in the market. + +Can any one imagine it possible that, if the government had always done +nothing but that "equal and exact justice to all men"--which you say it +is pledged to do,--but which you must know it has never done,--it could +ever have been brought into any such peril of its life, as these judges +describe? Could it ever have been necessitated to take either "the poor +man's cattle, and horses, and corn," or "the rich man's bonds and +notes," or poor men's "bodies and lives," without their consent? Could +it ever have been necessitated to "conscript" the poor man--too poor to +pay a ransom of three hundred dollars--made thus poor by the tyranny of +the government itself--"deprive him of his liberty, and destroy his +life"? Could it ever have been necessitated to sell indulgences for +crime to either debtors, or creditors, or anybody else? To preserve "the +constitution"--a constitution, I repeat, that authorized nothing but +"equal and exact justice to all men"--could it ever have been +necessitated to send into the field millions of ignorant young men, to +cut the throats of other young men as ignorant as themselves--few of +whom, on either side, had ever read the constitution, or had any real +knowledge of its legal meaning; and not one of whom had ever signed it, +or promised to support it, or was under the least obligation to support +it? + +It is, I think, perfectly safe to say, that not one in a thousand, +probably not one in ten thousand, of these young men, who were sent out +to butcher others, and be butchered themselves, had any real knowledge +of the constitution they were professedly sent out to support; or any +reasonable knowledge of the real character and motives of the congresses +and courts that profess to administer the constitution. If they had +possessed this knowledge, how many of them would have ever gone to the +field? + +But further. Is it really true that the right of the government to +commit all these atrocities: + + _Are the fundamental political conditions on which life, + property, and money are respectively held and enjoyed under our + system of government?_ + +If such is the real character of the constitution, can any further proof +be required of the necessity that it be buried out of sight at once and +forever? The truth was that the government was in peril, _solely because +it was not fit to exist_. It, and the State governments--all but parts +of one and the same system--were rotten with tyranny and crime. And +being bound together by no honest tie, and existing for no honest +purpose, destruction was the only honest doom to which any of them were +entitled. And if we had spent the same money and blood to destroy them, +that we did to preserve them, it would have been ten thousand times more +creditable to our intelligence and character as a people. + +Clearly the court has not strengthened its case at all by this picture +of the peril in which the government was placed. It has only shown to +what desperate straits a government, founded on usurpation and fraud, +and devoted to robbery and oppression, may be brought, by the quarrels +that are liable to arise between the different factions--that is, the +different bands of robbers--of which it is composed. When such quarrels +arise, it is not to be expected that either faction--having never had +any regard to human rights, when acting in concert with the other--will +hesitate at any new crimes that may be necessary to prolong its +existence. + +Here was a government that had never had any legitimate existence. It +professedly rested all its authority on a certain paper called a +constitution; a paper, I repeat, that nobody had ever signed, that few +persons had ever read, that the great body of the people had never seen. +This government had been imposed, by a few property holders, upon a +people too poor, too scattered, and many of them too ignorant, to +resist. It had been carried on, for some seventy years, by a mere cabal +of irresponsible men, called lawmakers. In this cabal, the several local +bands of robbers--the slaveholders of the South, the iron monopolists, +the woollen monopolists, and the money monopolists, of the North--were +represented. The whole purpose of its laws was to rob and enslave the +many--both North and South--for the benefit of a few. But these robbers +and tyrants quarreled--as lesser bands of robbers have done--over the +division of their spoils. And hence the war. No such principle as +justice to anybody--black or white--was the ruling motive on either +side. + +In this war, each faction--already steeped in crime--plunged into new, +if not greater, crimes. In its desperation, it resolved to destroy men +and money, without limit, and without mercy, for the preservation of its +existence. The northern faction, having more men, money, and credit than +the southern, survived the Kilkenny fight. Neither faction cared +anything for human rights then, and neither of them has shown any regard +for human rights since. "As a war measure," the northern faction found +it necessary to put an end to the one great crime, from which the +southern faction had drawn its wealth. But all other government crimes +have been more rampant since the war, than they were before. Neither the +conquerors, nor the conquered, have yet learned that no government can +have any right to exist for any other purpose than the simple +maintenance of justice between man and man. + +And now, years after the fiendish butchery is over, and after men would +seem to have had time to come to their senses, the Supreme Court of the +United States, representing the victorious faction, comes forward with +the declaration that one of the crimes--the violation of men's private +contracts--resorted to by its faction, in the heat of conflict, as a +means of preserving its power over the other, was not only justifiable +and proper at the time, _but that it is also a legitimate and +constitutional power, to be exercised forever hereafter in time of +peace!_ + +Mark the knavery of these men. They first say that, because the +government was in peril of its life, it had a right to license great +crimes against private persons, if by so doing it could raise money for +its own preservation. Next they say that, _although the government is no +longer in peril of its life_, it may still go on forever licensing the +same crimes as it was before necessitated to license! + +They thus virtually say that the government may commit the same crimes +in time of peace, that it is necessitated to do in time of war; and, +that, consequently, it has the same right to "take the poor man's +cattle, and horses, and corn," and "the rich man's bonds and notes," and +poor men's "bodies and lives," in time of peace, _when no necessity +whatever can be alleged_, as in time of war, when the government is in +peril of its life. + +In short, they virtually say, that this government exists for itself +alone; and that all the natural rights of the people, to property, +liberty, and life, are mere baubles, to be disposed of, at its pleasure, +whether in time of peace, or in war. + + +SECTION XXII. + +As if to place beyond controversy the fact, that the court may forever +hereafter be relied on to sanction every usurpation and crime that +congress will ever dare to put into the form of a statute, without the +slightest color of authority from the constitution, necessity, utility, +justice, or reason, it has, on three separate occasions, announced its +sanction of the monopoly of money, as finally established by congress in +1866, and continued in force ever since. + +This monopoly is established by a prohibitory tax--a tax of ten per +cent.--on all notes issued for circulation as money, other than the +notes of the United States and the national banks. + +This ten per cent. is called a "tax," but is really a penalty, and is +intended as such, and as nothing else. Its whole purpose is--_not to +raise revenue_--but solely to establish a monopoly of money, by +prohibiting the issue of all notes intended for circulation as money, +except those issued, or specially licensed, by the government itself. + +This prohibition upon the issue of all notes, except those issued, or +specially licensed, by the government, is a prohibition upon all freedom +of industry and traffic. It is a prohibition upon the exercise of men's +natural right to lend and hire such money capital as all men need to +enable them to create and distribute wealth, and supply their own +wants, and provide for their own happiness. Its whole purpose is to +reduce, as far as possible, the great body of the people to the +condition of servants to a few--a condition but a single grade above +that of chattel slavery--in which their labor, and the products of their +labor, may be extorted from them at such prices only as the holders of +the monopoly may choose to give. + +This prohibitory tax--so-called--is therefore really a penalty imposed +upon the exercise of men's natural right to create and distribute +wealth, and provide for their own and each other's wants. And it is +imposed solely for the purpose of establishing a practically omnipotent +monopoly in the hands of a few. + +Calling this penalty a "tax" is one of the dirty tricks, or rather +downright lies--that of calling things by false names--to which congress +and the courts resort, to hide their usurpations and crimes from the +common eye. + +Everybody--who believes in the government--says, of course, that +congress has power to levy taxes; that it must do so to raise revenue +for the support of the government. Therefore this lying congress call +this penalty a "tax," instead of calling it by its true name, a penalty. + +It certainly is no tax, because no revenue is raised, or intended to be +raised, by it. It is not levied upon property, or persons, as such, but +only upon a certain act, or upon persons for doing a certain act; an act +that if not only perfectly innocent and lawful in itself, but that is +naturally and intrinsically useful, and even indispensable for the +prosperity and welfare of the whole people. Its whole object is simply +to deter everybody--except those specially licensed--from performing +this innocent, useful, and necessary act. And this it has succeeded in +doing for the last twenty years; to the destruction of the rights, and +the impoverishment and immeasurable injury of all the people, except the +few holders of the monopoly. + +If congress had passed an act, in this form, to wit: + + No person, nor any association of persons, incorporated or + unincorporated--_unless specially licensed by congress_--shall + issue their promissory notes for circulation as money; and a + _penalty_ of ten per cent. upon the amount of all such notes + shall be imposed upon the persons issuing them, + +the act would have been the same, in effect and intention, as is this +act, that imposes what it calls a "tax." The penalty would have been +understood by everybody as a punishment for issuing the notes; and would +have been applied to, and enforced against, those only who should have +issued them. And it is the same with this so-called tax. It will never +be collected, except for the same cause, and under the same +circumstances, as the penalty would have been. It has no more to do with +raising a revenue, than the penalty would have had. And all these lying +lawmakers and courts know it. + +But if congress had put this prohibition distinctly in the form of a +_penalty_, the usurpation would have been so barefaced--so destitute of +all color of constitutional authority--that congress dared not risk the +consequences. And possibly the court might not have dared to sanction +it; if, indeed, there be any crime or usurpation which the court dare +not sanction. So these knavish lawmakers called this penalty a "tax"; +and the court says that such a "tax" is clearly constitutional. And the +monopoly has now been established for twenty years. And substantially +all the industrial and financial troubles of that period have been the +natural consequences of the monopoly. + +If congress had laid a prohibitory tax upon all food--that is, had +imposed a penalty upon the production and sale of all food--except such +as it should have itself produced, or specially licensed; and should +have reduced the amount of food, thus produced or licensed, to one +tenth, twentieth, or fiftieth of what was really needed; the motive and +the crime would have been the same, in character, if not in degree, as +they are in this case, _viz._, to enable the few holders of the licensed +food to extort, from everybody else, by the fear of starvation, all +their (the latter's) earnings and property, in exchange for this small +quantity of privileged food. + +Such a monopoly of food would have been no clearer violation of men's +natural rights, than is the present monopoly of money. And yet this +colossal crime--like every other crime that congress chooses to +commit--is sanctioned by its servile, rotten, and stinking court. + +On what _constitutional_ grounds--that is, on what provisions found in +the constitution itself--does the court profess to give its sanction to +such a crime? + +On these three only: + +1. On the power of congress to lay and collect taxes, etc. + +2. On the power of congress to coin money. + +3. On the power of congress to borrow money. + +Out of these simple, and apparently harmless provisions, the court +manufactures an authority to grant, to a few persons, a monopoly that is +practically omnipotent over all the industry and traffic of the country; +that is fatal to all other men's natural right to lend and hire capital +for any or all their legitimate industries; and fatal absolutely to all +their natural right to buy, sell, and exchange any, or all, the products +of their labor at their true, just, and natural prices. + +Let us look at these constitutional provisions, and see how much +authority congress can really draw from them. + +1. The constitution says: + + The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, + imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts, and provide for the + common defence and general welfare of the United States_. + +This provision plainly authorizes no taxation whatever, except for the +raising of revenue to pay the debts and legitimate expenses of the +government. It no more authorizes taxation for the purpose of +establishing monopolies of any kind whatever, than it does for taking +openly and boldly all the property of the many, and giving it outright +to a few. And none but a congress of usurpers, robbers, and swindlers +would ever think of using it for that purpose. + +The court says, _in effect_, that this provision gives congress power to +establish the present monopoly of money; that the power to tax all other +money, is a power to prohibit all other money; and a power to prohibit +all other money is a power to give the present money a monopoly. + +How much is such an argument worth? Let us show by a parallel case, as +follows. + +Congress has the same power to tax all other property, that it has to +tax money. And if the power to tax money is a power to prohibit money, +then it follows that the power of congress to tax all other property +than money, is a power to prohibit all other property than money; and a +power to prohibit all other property than money, is a power to give +monopolies to all such other property as congress may not choose to +prohibit; or may choose to specially license. + +On such reasoning as this, it would follow that the power of congress to +tax money, and all other property, is a power to prohibit all money, and +all other property; and thus to establish monopolies in favor of all +such money, and all such other property, as it chooses not to prohibit; +or chooses to specially license. + +Thus, this reasoning would give congress power to establish all the +monopolies, it may choose to establish, not only in money, but in +agriculture, manufactures, and commerce; and protect these monopolies +against infringement, by imposing prohibitory taxes upon all money and +other property, except such as it should choose not to prohibit; or +should choose to specially license. + +Because the constitution says that "congress shall have power to lay and +collect taxes," etc., to raise the revenue necessary for paying the +current expenses of the government, the court say that congress have +power to levy prohibitory taxes--taxes that shall yield no revenue at +all--but shall operate only as a penalty upon all industries and +traffic, and upon the use of all the means of industry and traffic, that +shall compete with such monopolies as congress shall choose to grant. + +This is no more than an unvarnished statement of the argument, by which +the court attempts to justify a prohibitory "tax" upon money; for the +same reasoning would justify the levying of a prohibitory tax--that is, +penalty--upon the use of any and all other means of industry and +traffic, by which any other monopolies, granted by congress, might be +infringed. + +There is plainly no more connection between the "power to lay and +collect taxes," etc., for the necessary expenses of the government, and +the power to establish this monopoly of money, than there is between +such a power of taxation, and a power to punish, as a crime, any or all +industry and traffic whatsoever, except such as the government may +specially license. + +This whole cheat lies in the use of the word "tax," to describe what is +really a penalty, upon the exercise of any or all men's natural rights +of providing for their subsistence and well-being. And none but corrupt +and rotten congresses and courts would ever think of practising such a +cheat. + +2. The second provision of the constitution, relied on by the court to +justify the monopoly of money, is this: + + The congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value + thereof, and of foreign coins. + +The only important part of this provision is that which says that "the +congress shall have power to coin money, [and] regulate the value +thereof." + +That part about regulating the value of foreign coins--if any one can +tell how congress can regulate it--is of no appreciable importance to +anybody; for the coins will circulate, or not, as men may, or may not, +choose to buy and sell them as money, and at such value as they will +bear in free and open market,--that is, in competition with all other +coins, and all other money. This is their only true and natural market +value; and there is no occasion for congress to do anything in regard to +them. + +The only thing, therefore, that we need to look at, is simply the power +of congress "to coin money." + +So far as congress itself is authorized to coin money, this is simply a +power to weigh and assay metals,--gold, silver, or any other,--stamp +upon them marks indicating their weight and fineness, and then sell them +to whomsoever may choose to buy them; and let them go in the market for +whatever they may chance to bring, in competition with all other money +that may chance to be offered there. + +It is no power to impose any restrictions whatever upon any or all other +honest money, that may be offered in the market, and bought and sold in +competition with the coins weighed and assayed by the government. + +The power itself is a frivolous one, of little or no utility; for the +weighing and assaying of metals is a thing so easily done, and can be +done by so many different persons, that there is certainly no +_necessity_ for its being done at all by a government. And it would +undoubtedly have been far better if all coins--whether coined by +governments or individuals--had all been made into pieces bearing simply +the names of pounds, ounces, pennyweights, etc., and containing just the +amounts of pure metal described by those weights. The coins would then +have been regarded as only so much metal; and as having only the same +value as the same amount of metal in any other form. Men would then have +known exactly how much of certain metals they were buying, selling, and +promising to pay. And all the jugglery, cheating, and robbery that +governments have practised, and licensed individuals to practise--by +coining pieces bearing the same names, but having different amounts of +metal--would have been avoided. + +And all excuses for establishing monopolies of money, by prohibiting all +other money than the coins, would also have been avoided. + +As it is, the constitution imposes no prohibition upon the coining of +money by individuals, but only by State governments. Individuals are +left perfectly free to coin it, except that they must not +"_counterfeit_ the securities and current coin of the United States." + +For quite a number of years after the discovery of gold in +California--that is, until the establishment of a government mint +there--a large part of the gold that was taken out of the earth, was +coined by private persons and companies; and this coinage was perfectly +legal. And I do not remember to have ever heard any complaint, or +accusation, that it was not honest and reliable. + +The true and only value, which the coins have as money, is that value +which they have as metals, for uses in the arts,--that is, for plate, +watches, jewelry, and the like. This value they will retain, whether +they circulate as money, or not. At this value, they are so utterly +inadequate to serve as _bona fide_ equivalents for such other property +as is to be bought and sold for money; and, after being minted, are so +quickly taken out of circulation, and worked up into articles of +use--plate, watches, jewelry, etc.--that they are practically of almost +no importance at all as money. + +But they can be so easily and cheaply carried from one part of the world +to another, that they have substantially the same market value all over +the world. They are also, in but a small degree, liable to great or +sudden changes in value. For these reasons, they serve well as +standards--are perhaps the best standards we can have--by which to +measure the value of all other money, as well as other property. But to +give them any monopoly as money, is to deny the natural right of all men +to make their own contracts, and buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and +receive, all such money as the parties to bargains may mutually agree +upon; and also to license the few holders of the coins to rob all other +men in the prices of the latter's labor and property. + +3. The third provision of the constitution, on which the court relies to +justify the monopoly of money, is this: + + The congress shall have power to borrow money. + +Can any one see any connection between the power of congress "to borrow +money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money? + +Certainly no such connection is visible to the legal eye. But it is +distinctly visible to the political and financial eye; that is, to that +class of men, for whom governments exist, and who own congresses and +courts, and set in motion armies and navies, whenever they can promote +their own interests by doing so. + +To a government, whose usurpations and crimes have brought it to the +verge of destruction, these men say: + + Make bonds bearing six per cent. interest; sell them to us at + half their face value; then give us a monopoly of money based + upon these bonds--such a monopoly as will subject the great + body of the people to a dependence upon us for the necessaries + of life, and compel them to sell their labor and property to us + at our own prices; then, under pretence of raising revenue to + pay the interest and principal of the bonds, impose such a + tariff upon imported commodities as will enable us to get fifty + per cent. more for our own goods than they are worth; in short, + pledge to us all the power of the government to extort for us, + in the future, everything that can be extorted from the + producers of wealth, and we will lend you all the money you + need to maintain your power. + +And the government has no alternative but to comply with this infamous +proposal, or give up its infamous life. + +This is the only real connection there is between the power of congress +"to borrow money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money. It +was only by an outright sale of the rights of the whole people, for a +long series of years, that the government could raise the money +necessary to continue its villainous existence. + +Congress had just as much constitutional power "to borrow money," by the +sale of any and all the other natural rights of the people at large, as +it had "to borrow money" by the sale of the people's natural rights to +lend and hire money. + +When the Supreme Court of the United States--assuming to be an oracle, +empowered to define authoritatively the legal rights of every human +being in the country--declares that congress has a constitutional power +to prohibit the use of all that immense mass of money capital, in the +shape of promissory notes, which the real property of the country is +capable of supplying and sustaining, and which is sufficient to give to +every laboring person, man or woman, the means of independence and +wealth--when that court says that congress has power to prohibit the use +of all this money capital, and grant to a few men a monopoly of money +that shall condemn the great body of wealth-producers to hopeless +poverty, dependence, and servitude--and when the court has the audacity +to make these declarations on such nakedly false and senseless grounds +as those that have now been stated, it is clearly time for the people of +this country to inquire what constitutions and governments are good for, +and whether they (the people) have any natural right, as human beings, +to live for themselves, or only for a few conspirators, swindlers, +usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who employ lawmakers, judges, etc., to +do their villainous work upon their fellow-men. + +The court gave their sanction to the monopoly of money in these three +separate cases, _viz._: _Veazie Bank vs. Fenno_, 8 _Wallace_, 549 +(1869). _National Bank vs. United States_, 101 _U. S. Reports_, 5 _and_ +6 (1879). _Juilliard vs. Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_ 445-6 (1884). + + +Section XXIII. + +If anything could add to the disgust and detestation which the monstrous +falsifications of the constitution, already described, should excite +towards the court that resorts to them, it would be the fact that the +court, not content with falsifying to the utmost the constitution +itself, _goes outside of the constitution, to the tyrannical practices +of what it_ calls the "_sovereign_" governments of "_other civilized +nations_," to justify the same practices by our own. + +It asserts, over and over again, the idea that our government is a +"_sovereign_" government; that it has the same rights of +"_sovereignty_," as the governments of "other civilized nations"; +especially those in Europe. + +What, then, is a "sovereign" government? It is a government that is +"sovereign" over all the natural rights of the people. This is the only +"sovereignty" that any government can be said to have. Under it, the +people have no _rights_. They are simply "subjects,"--that is, slaves. +They have but one law, and one duty, _viz._, obedience, submission. They +are not recognized as having any _rights_. They can claim nothing as +their own. They can only accept what the government chooses to give +them. The government owns them and their property; and disposes of them +and their property, at its pleasure, or discretion; without regard to +any consent, or dissent, on their part. + +Such was the "sovereignty" claimed and exercised by the governments of +those, so-called, "civilized nations of Europe," that were in power in +1787, 1788, and 1789, when our constitution was framed and adopted, and +the government put in operation under it. And the court now says, +virtually, that the constitution intended to give to our government the +same "sovereignty" over the natural rights of the people, that those +governments had then. + +But how did the "civilized governments of Europe" become possessed of +such "sovereignty"? Had the people ever granted it to them? Not at all. +The governments spurned the idea that they were dependent on the will or +consent of their people for their political power. On the contrary, they +claimed to have derived it from the only source, from which such +"sovereignty" could have been derived; that is, from God Himself. + +In 1787, 1788, and 1789, all the great governments of Europe, except +England, claimed to exist by what was called "Divine Right." That is, +they claimed to have received authority from God Himself, to rule over +their people. And they taught, and a servile and corrupt priesthood +taught, that it was a religious duty of the people to obey them. And +they kept great standing armies, and hordes of pimps, spies, and +ruffians, to keep the people in subjection. + +And when, soon afterwards, the revolutionists of France dethroned the +king then existing--the Legitimist king, so-called--and asserted the +right of the people to choose their own government, these other +governments carried on a twenty years' war against her, to reëstablish +the principle of "sovereignty" by "Divine Right." And in this war, the +government of England, although not itself claiming to exist by Divine +Right,--but really existing by brute force,--furnished men and money +without limit, to reëstablish that principle in France, and to maintain +it wherever else, in Europe, it was endangered by the idea of popular +rights. + +The principle, then, of "Sovereignty by Divine Right"--sustained by +brute force--was the principle on which the governments of Europe then +rested; and most of them rest on that principle today. And now the +Supreme Court of the United States virtually says that our constitution +intended to give to our government the same "sovereignty"--the same +absolutism--the same supremacy over all the natural rights of the +people--as was claimed and exercised by those "Divine Right" governments +of Europe, a hundred years ago! + +That I may not be suspected of misrepresenting these men, I give some of +their own words as follows: + + It is not doubted that the power to establish a standard of + value, by which all other values may be measured, or, in other + words, to determine what shall be lawful money and a legal + tender, is in its nature, and of necessity, a governmental + power. _It is in all countries exercised by the + government._--_Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wallace 615._ + +The court call a power, + + To make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of _all_ + debts [private as well as public] _a power confessedly + possessed by every independent sovereignty other than the + United States_.--_Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wallace, p. 529._ + +Also, in the same case, it speaks of: + + That general power over the currency, _which has always been an + acknowledged attribute of sovereignty in every other civilized + nation than our own_.--_p. 545._ + +In this same case, by way of asserting the power of congress to do any +dishonest thing that any so-called "sovereign government" ever did, the +court say: + + Has any one, in good faith, avowed his belief that even a law + debasing the current coin, by increasing the alloy [and then + making these debased coins a legal tender in payment of debts + previously contracted], would be taking private property? It + might be impolitic, and unjust, but could its constitutionality + be doubted?--_p. 552._ + +In the same case, Bradley said: + + As a government, it [the government of the United States] was + invested with _all the attributes of sovereignty_.--_p. 555._ + +Also he said: + + Such being the character of the General Government, it seems to + be a self-evident proposition _that it is invested with all + those inherent and implied powers, which, at the time of + adopting the constitution, were generally considered to belong + to every government, as such_, and as being essential to the + exercise of its functions.--_p. 556._ + +Also he said: + + Another proposition equally clear is, _that at the time the + constitution was adopted, it was, and for a long time had + been, the practice of most, if not all, civilized governments_, + to employ the public credit as a means of anticipating the + national revenues for the purpose of enabling them to exercise + their governmental functions.--_p. 556._ + +Also he said: + + It is our duty to construe the instrument [the constitution] by + its words, _in the light of history, of the general nature of + government, and the incidents of sovereignty_.--_p. 55._ + +Also he said: + + The government simply demands that its credit shall be accepted + and received by public and private creditors during the pending + exigency. _Every government has a right to demand this, when + its existence is at stake._--_p. 560._ + +Also he said: + + These views are exhibited ... for the purpose of showing that + it [the power to make its notes a legal tender in payment of + private debts] _is one of those vital and essential powers + inhering in every national sovereignty_, and necessary to its + self-preservation.--_p. 564._ + +In still another legal tender case, the court said: + + The people of the United States, by the constitution, + established a national government, _with sovereign powers, + legislative, executive_, and judicial.--_Juilliard vs. + Greenman, 110 U. S. Reports, p. 438._ + +Also it calls the constitution: + + A constitution, establishing a form of government, declaring + fundamental principles, _and creating a national sovereignty_, + intended to endure for ages.--_p. 439._ + +Also the court speaks of the government of the United States: + + _As a sovereign government._--_p. 446._ + +Also it said: + + It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary + consequence, that congress has the power to issue the + obligations of the United States in such form, and to impress + upon them such qualities as currency, for the purchase of + merchandise and the payment of debts, _as accord with the usage + of other sovereign governments_. The power, as incident to the + power of borrowing money, and issuing bills or notes of the + government for money borrowed, of impressing upon those bills + or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the payment of + private debts, _was a power universally understood to belong to + sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing + and adoption of the constitution of the United States_. The + governments of Europe, acting through the monarch, or the + legislature, according to the distribution of powers _under + their respective constitutions_, had, and have, as _sovereign_ + a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin. This power + has been distinctly recognized in an important modern case, + ably argued and fully considered, in which the Emperor of + Austria, as King of Hungary, obtained from the English Court of + Chancery an injunction against the issue, in England, without + his license, of notes purporting to be public paper money of + Hungary.--_p. 447._ + +Also it speaks of: + + Congress, as the legislature of a _sovereign_ nation.--_p. + 449._ + +Also it said: + + The power to make the notes of the government a legal tender in + payment of private debts, _being one of the powers belonging to + sovereignty in other civilized nations_, ... we are + irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that the impressing + upon the treasury notes of the United States the quality of + being a legal tender in payment of private debts, is an + appropriate means, conducive and plainly adapted to the + execution of the undoubted powers of congress, consistent with + the letter and spirit of the constitution, etc.----_p._ 450. + +On reading these astonishing ideas about "sovereignty"--"sovereignty" +over all the natural rights of mankind--"sovereignty," as it prevailed +in Europe "at the time of the framing and adoption of the constitution +of the United States"--we are compelled to see that these judges +obtained their constitutional law, not from the constitution itself, but +from the example of the "Divine Right" governments existing in Europe a +hundred years ago. These judges seem never to have heard of the American +Revolution, or the French Revolution, or even of the English Revolutions +of the seventeenth century--revolutions fought and accomplished to +overthrow these very ideas of "sovereignty," which these judges now +proclaim, as the supreme law of this country. They seem never to have +heard of the Declaration of Independence, nor of any other declaration +of the natural rights of human beings. To their minds, "the sovereignty +of governments" is everything; human rights nothing. They apparently +cannot conceive of such a thing as a people's establishing a government +as a means of preserving their personal liberty and rights. They can +only see what fearful calamities "sovereign governments" would be liable +to, if they could not compel their "subjects"--the people--to support +them against their will, and at every cost of their property, liberty, +and lives. They are utterly blind to the fact, that it is this very +assumption of "sovereignty" over all the natural rights of men, that +brings governments into all their difficulties, and all their perils. +They do not see that it is this very assumption of "sovereignty" over +all men's natural rights, that makes it necessary for the "Divine Right" +governments of Europe to maintain not only great standing armies, but +also a vile purchased priesthood, that shall impose upon, and help to +crush, the ignorant and superstitious people. + +These judges talk of "the _constitutions_" of these "sovereign +governments" of Europe, as they existed "at the time of the framing and +adoption of the constitution of the United States." They apparently do +not know that those governments had no constitutions at all, except the +Will of God, their standing armies, and the judges, lawyers, priests, +pimps, spies, and ruffians they kept in their service. + +If these judges had lived in Russia, a hundred years ago, and had +chanced to be visited with a momentary spasm of manhood--a fact hardly +to be supposed of such creatures--and had been sentenced therefor to the +knout, a dungeon, or Siberia, would we ever afterward have seen them, as +judges of our Supreme Court, declaring that government to be the model +after which ours was formed? + +These judges will probably be surprised when I tell them that the +constitution of the United States contains no such word as "sovereign," +or "sovereignty"; that it contains no such word as "subjects"; nor any +word that implies that the government is "sovereign," or that the people +are "subjects." At most, it contains only the mistaken idea that a power +of making laws--by lawmakers chosen by the people--was consistent with, +and necessary to, the maintenance of liberty and justice for the people +themselves. This mistaken idea was, in some measure, excusable in that +day, when reason and experience had not demonstrated, to their minds, +the utter incompatibility of all lawmaking whatsoever with men's natural +rights. + +The only other provision of the constitution, that can be interpreted as +a declaration of "sovereignty" in the government, is this: + + This constitution, and the laws of the United States _which + shall be made in pursuance thereof_, and all treaties made, or + which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, + _shall be the supreme law of the land_, and the judges in every + State shall be bound thereby, _anything in the constitution or + laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding_.--_Art._ VI. + +This provision I interpret to mean simply that the constitution, laws, +and treaties of the United States, shall be "the supreme law of the +land"--_not anything in the natural rights of the people to liberty and +justice, to the contrary notwithstanding_--but only that they shall be +"the supreme law of the land," "_anything in the constitution or laws of +any State to the contrary notwithstanding_,"--that is, whenever the two +may chance to conflict with each other. + +If this is its true interpretation, the provision contains no +declaration of "sovereignty" over the natural rights of the people. + +Justice is "the supreme law" of this, and all other lands; anything in +the constitutions or laws of any nation to the contrary notwithstanding. +And if the constitution of the United States intended to assert the +contrary, it was simply an audacious lie--a lie as foolish as it was +audacious--that should have covered with infamy every man who helped to +frame the constitution, or afterward sanctioned it, or that should ever +attempt to administer it. + +Inasmuch as the constitution declares itself to have been "ordained and +established" by + + We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more + perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, + provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, + and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our + posterity, + +everybody who attempts to administer it, is bound to give it such an +interpretation, and only such an interpretation, as is consistent +with, and promotive of, those objects, if its language will admit of +such an interpretation. + +To suppose that "the people of the United States" intended to declare +that the constitution and laws of the United States should be "the +supreme law of the land," _anything in their own natural rights, or in +the natural rights of the rest of mankind, to the contrary +notwithstanding_, would be to suppose that they intended, not only to +authorize every injustice, and arouse universal violence, among +themselves, but that they intended also to avow themselves the open +enemies of the rights of all the rest of mankind. Certainly no such +folly, madness, or criminality as this can be attributed to them by any +rational man--always excepting the justices of the Supreme Court of the +United States, the lawmakers, and the believers in the "Divine Right" of +the cunning and the strong, to establish governments that shall deceive, +plunder, enslave, and murder the ignorant and the weak. + +Many men, still living, can well remember how, some fifty years ago, +those famous champions of "sovereignty," of arbitrary power, Webster and +Calhoun, debated the question, whether, in this country, "sovereignty" +resided in the general or State governments. But they never settled the +question, for the very good reason that no such thing as "sovereignty" +resided in either. + +And the question was never settled, until it was settled at the cost of +a million of lives, and some ten thousand millions of money. And then it +was settled only as the same question had so often been settled before, +to wit, that "the heaviest battalions" are "sovereign" over the lighter. + +The only real "sovereignty," or right of "sovereignty," in this or any +other country, is that right of sovereignty which each and every human +being has over his or her own person and property, so long as he or she +obeys the one law of justice towards the person and property of every +other human being. This is the only _natural_ right of sovereignty, that +was ever known among men. All other so-called rights of sovereignty are +simply the usurpations of impostors, conspirators, robbers, tyrants, and +murderers. + +It is not strange that we are in such high favor with the tyrants of +Europe, when our Supreme Court tells them that our government, although +a little different in form, stands on the same essential basis as theirs +of a hundred years ago; that it is as absolute and irresponsible as +theirs were then; that it will spend more money, and shed more blood, to +maintain its power, than they have ever been able to do; that the people +have no more rights here than there; and that the government is doing +all it can to keep the producing classes as poor here as they are +there. + + +SECTION XXIV. + +John Marshall has the reputation of having been the greatest jurist the +country has ever had. And he unquestionably would have been a great +jurist, if the two fundamental propositions, on which all his legal, +political, and constitutional ideas were based, had been true. + +These propositions were, first, that government has all power; and, +secondly, that the people have no rights. + +These two propositions were, with him, cardinal principles, from which, +I think, he never departed. + +For these reasons he was the oracle of all the rapacious classes, in +whose interest the government was administered. And from them he got all +his fame. + +I think his record does not furnish a single instance, in which he ever +vindicated men's natural rights, in opposition to the arbitrary +legislation of congress. + +He was chief justice thirty-four years: from 1801 to 1835. In all that +time, so far as I have known, he never declared a single act of congress +unconstitutional; and probably never would have done so, if he had lived +to this time. + +And, so far as I know, he never declared a single State law +unconstitutional, on account of its injustice, or its violation of men's +natural rights; but only on account of its conflict with the +constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. + +He was considered very profound on questions of "sovereignty." In fact, +he never said much in regard to anything else. He held that, in this +country, "sovereignty" was divided: that the national government was +"sovereign" over certain things; and that the State governments were +"sovereign" over all other things. He had apparently never heard of any +natural, individual, human rights, that had never been delegated to +either the general or State governments. + +As a practical matter, he seemed to hold that the general government had +"sovereignty" enough to destroy as many of the natural rights of the +people as it should please to destroy; and that the State governments +had "sovereignty" enough to destroy what should be left, if there should +be any such. He evidently considered that, to the national government, +had been delegated the part of the lion, with the right to devour as +much of his prey as his appetite should crave; and that the State +governments were jackals, with power to devour what the lion should +leave. + +In his efforts to establish the absolutism of our governments, he made +himself an adept in the use of all those false definitions, and false +assumptions, to which courts are driven, who hold that constitutions and +statute books are supreme over all natural principles of justice, and +over all the natural rights of mankind. + +Here is his definition of law. He professes to have borrowed it from +some one,--he does not say whom,--but he accepts it as his own. + + Law has been defined by a writer, whose definitions especially + have been the theme of _almost_ universal panegyric, "_To be a + rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a + State._" In our system, the legislature of a State is the + supreme power, in all cases where its action is not restrained + by the constitution of the United States.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, + 12 Wheaton 347._ + +This definition is an utterly false one. It denies all the natural +rights of the people; and is resorted to only by usurpers and tyrants, +to justify their crimes. + +The true definition of law is, that it is a fixed, immutable, natural +principle; and not anything that man ever made, or can make, unmake, or +alter. Thus we speak of the laws of matter, and the laws of mind; of the +law of gravitation, the laws of light, heat, and electricity, the laws +of chemistry, geology, botany; of physiological laws, of astronomical +and atmospherical laws, etc., etc. + +All these are natural laws, that man never made, nor can ever unmake, or +alter. + +The law of justice is just as supreme and universal in the moral world, +as these others are in the mental or physical world; and is as +unalterable as are these by any human power. And it is just as false and +absurd to talk of anybody's having the power to abolish the law of +justice, and set up their own will in its stead, as it would be to talk +of their having the power to abolish the law of gravitation, or any of +the other natural laws of the universe, and set up their own will in the +place of them. + +Yet Marshall holds that this natural law of justice is no law at all, in +comparison with some "rule of civil conduct prescribed by [what he +calls] the supreme power in a State." + +And he gives this miserable definition, which he picked up +somewhere--out of the legal filth in which he wallowed--as his +sufficient authority for striking down all the natural obligation of +men's contracts, and all men's natural rights to make their own +contracts; and for upholding the State governments in prohibiting all +such contracts as they, in their avarice and tyranny, may choose to +prohibit. He does it too, directly in the face of that very +constitution, which he professes to uphold, and which declares that "No +State shall pass any law impairing the [natural] obligation of +contracts." + +By the same rule, or on the same definition of law, he would strike down +any and all the other natural rights of mankind. + +That such a definition of law should suit the purposes of men like +Marshall, who believe that governments should have all power, and men no +rights, accounts for the fact that, in this country, men have had no +"_rights_"--but only such permits as lawmakers have seen fit to allow +them--since the State and United States governments were +established,--or at least for the last eighty years. + +Marshall also said: + + The right [of government] to regulate contracts, to prescribe + the rules by which they may be evidenced, _to prohibit such as + may be deemed mischievous, is unquestionable_, and has been + universally exercised.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 347._ + +He here asserts that "the supreme power in a State"--that is, the +legislature of a State--has "the _right_" to "_deem_ it _mischievous_" +to allow men to exercise their natural right to make their own +contracts! Contracts that have a natural obligation! And that, if a +State legislature thinks it "mischievous" to allow men to make contracts +that are naturally obligatory, "_its right to prohibit them is +unquestionable_." + +Is not this equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and +the people no rights? + +On the same principle, and under the same definition of law, the +lawmakers of a State may, of course, hold it "mischievous" to allow men +to exercise any of their other natural rights, as well as their right to +make their own contracts; and may therefore prohibit the exercise of +any, or all, of them. + +And this is equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and +the people no rights. + +If a government can forbid the free exercise of a single one of man's +natural rights, it may, for the same reason, forbid the exercise of any +and all of them; and thus establish, practically and absolutely, +Marshall's principle, that the government has all power, and the people +no rights. + +_In the same case, of Ogden vs. Saunders, Marshall's principle was +agreed to by all the other justices, and all the lawyers!_ + +Thus Thompson, one of the justices, said: + + Would it not be within the legitimate powers of a State + legislature to declare _prospectively_ that no one should be + made responsible, upon contracts entered into before arriving + at the age of _twenty-five_ years? This, I presume, cannot be + doubted.--_p. 300._ + +On the same principle, he might say that a State legislature may declare +that no person, under fifty, or seventy, or a hundred, years of age, +shall exercise his natural right of making any contract that is +naturally obligatory. + +In the same case, Trimble, another of the justices, said: + + If the positive law [that is, the statute law] of the State + declares the contract shall have no obligation, _it can have no + obligation, whatever may be the principles of natural law in + regard to such a contract. This doctrine has been held and + maintained by all States and nations. The power of controlling, + modifying, and even taking away, all obligation from such + contracts as, independently of positive enactions to the + contrary, would have been obligatory, has been exercised by all + independent sovereigns._--_p. 320._ + +Yes; and why has this power been exercised by "all States and nations," +and "all independent sovereigns"? Solely because these governments have +all--or at least so many of them as Trimble had in his mind--been +despotic and tyrannical; and have claimed for themselves all power, and +denied to the people all rights. + +Thus it seems that Trimble, like all the rest of them, got his +constitutional law, not from any natural principles of justice, not from +man's natural rights, not from the constitution of the United States, +nor even from any constitution affirming men's natural rights, but from +"the doctrine [that] has been held and maintained by all [those] States +and nations," and "all [those] independent sovereigns," who have usurped +all power, and denied all the natural rights of mankind. + +Marshall gives another of his false definitions, when, speaking for the +whole court, in regard to the power of congress "to regulate commerce +with foreign nations, and among the several States," he asserts the +right of congress to an arbitrary, absolute dominion over all men's +natural rights to carry on such commerce. Thus he says: + + What is this power? It is the power to regulate: _that is, to + prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This + power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in + itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges + no limitations, other than are prescribed by the constitution._ + These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the + questions which arise in this case, or which have been + discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the + sovereignty of congress, though limited to specific objects, is + plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with + foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in + congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, + having in its constitution the same restrictions on the + exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the + United States. _The wisdom and the discretion of congress, + their identity with the people, and the influence which their + constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many + other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the + sole restraints on which they_ [the people] _have relied, to + secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which + the people must often rely_ SOLELY, _in all representative + governments_.--_Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 196._ + +This is a general declaration of absolutism over all "commerce with +foreign nations and among the several States," with certain exceptions +mentioned in the constitution; such as that "all duties, imposts, and +excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," and "no tax or +duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State," and "no +preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to +the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound +to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in +another." + +According to this opinion of the court, congress has--subject to the +exceptions referred to--absolute, irresponsible dominion over "all +commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States"; and all +men's natural rights to trade with each other, among the several States, +and all over the world, are prostrate under the feet of a contemptible, +detestable, and irresponsible cabal of lawmakers; and the people have no +protection or redress for any tyranny or robbery that may be practised +upon them, except _"the wisdom and the discretion of congress, their +identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents +possess at elections"!_ + +It will be noticed that the court say that _"all the other powers, +vested in congress, are complete in themselves, and may be exercised to +their utmost extent, and acknowledge no limitations, other than those +prescribed by the constitution."_ + +They say that among "all the other [practically unlimited] powers, +vested in congress," is the power "of declaring war"; and, of course, +of carrying on war; that congress has power to carry on war, for any +reason, to any extent, and against any people, it pleases. + +Thus they say, virtually, that _the natural rights of mankind_ impose no +_constitutional_ restraints whatever upon congress, in the exercise of +their lawmaking powers. + +Is not this asserting that governments have all power, and the people no +rights? + +But what is to be particularly noticed, is the fact that Marshall gives +to congress all this practically unlimited power over all "commerce with +foreign nations, and among the several States," _solely on the strength +of a false definition of the verb "to regulate_." He says that "the +power to regulate commerce" is the power "_to prescribe the rule by +which commerce is to be governed_." + + This definition is an utterly false, absurd, and atrocious one. + It would give congress power arbitrarily to control, obstruct, + impede, derange, prohibit, and destroy commerce. + + The verb "to regulate" does not, as Marshall asserts, imply the + exercise of any arbitrary control whatever over the thing + regulated; nor any power "to prescribe [arbitrarily] the rule, + by which" the thing regulated "is to be governed." On the + contrary, it comes from the Latin word, _regula_, a rule; _and + implies the pre-existence of a rule, to which the thing + regulated is made to conform_. + + To regulate one's diet, for example, is not, on the one hand, + to starve one's self to emaciation, nor, on the other, to gorge + one's self with all sorts of indigestible and hurtful + substances, in disregard of the natural laws of health. But it + supposes the pre-existence of the _natural laws of health_, to + which the diet is made to conform. + + A clock is not "regulated," when it is made to go, to stop, to + go forwards, to go backwards, to go fast, to go slow, at the + mere will or caprice of the person who may have it in hand. It + is "regulated" only when it is made to conform to, to mark + truly, the diurnal revolutions of the earth. These revolutions + of the earth constitute the pre-existing rule, by which alone a + clock can be regulated. + + A mariner's compass is not "regulated," when the needle is made + to move this way and that, at the will of an operator, without + reference to the north pole. But it is regulated when it is + freed from all disturbing influences, and suffered to point + constantly to the north, as it is its nature to do. + + A locomotive is not "regulated," when it is made to go, to + stop, to go forwards, to go backwards, to go fast, to go slow, + at the mere will and caprice of the engineer, and without + regard to economy, utility, or safety. But it is regulated, + when its motions are made to conform to a pre-existing rule, + that is made up of economy, utility, and safety combined. What + this rule is, in the case of a locomotive, may not be known + with such scientific precision, as is the rule in the case of a + clock, or a mariner's compass; but it may be approximated with + sufficient accuracy for practical purposes. + + The pre-existing rule, by which alone commerce can be + "regulated," is a matter of science; and is already known, so + far as the natural principle of justice, in relation to + contracts, is known. The natural right of all men to make all + contracts whatsoever, that are naturally and intrinsically just + and lawful, furnishes the pre-existing rule, by which _alone_ + commerce can be regulated. And it is the only rule, to which + congress have any constitutional power to make commerce + conform. + + When all commerce, that is intrinsically just and lawful, is + secured and protected, and all commerce that is intrinsically + unjust and unlawful, is prohibited, then commerce is regulated, + and not before.[5] + + [5] The above extracts are from a pamphlet published by + me in 1864, entitled "_Considerations for Bankers_," + etc., pp. 55, 56, 57. + +This false definition of the verb "_to regulate_" has been used, time +out of mind, by knavish lawmakers and their courts, to hide their +violations of men's natural right to do their own businesses in all such +ways--that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful--as they may +choose to do them in. These lawmakers and courts dare not always deny, +utterly and plainly, men's right to do their own businesses in their own +ways; but they will assume "_to regulate_" them; and in pretending +simply "to regulate" them, they contrive "to regulate" men out of all +their natural rights to do their own businesses in their own ways. + +How much have we all heard (we who are old enough), within the last +fifty years, of the power of congress, or of the States, "_to regulate +the currency_." And "to regulate the currency" has always meant to fix +the kind, _and limit the amount_, of currency, that men may be permitted +to buy and sell, lend and borrow, give and receive, in their dealings +with each other. It has also meant to say _who shall have the control of +the licensed money_; instead of making it mean the suppression only of +false and dishonest money, and then leaving all men free to exercise +their natural right of buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving +and receiving, all such, and so much, honest and true money, or +currency, as the parties to any or all contracts may mutually agree +upon. + +Marshall's false _assumptions_ are numerous and tyrannical. They all +have the same end in view as his false definitions; that is, to +establish the principle that governments have all power, and the people +no rights. They are so numerous that it would be tedious, if not +impossible, to describe them all separately. Many, or most, of them are +embraced in the following, _viz._: + +1. The assumption that, by a certain paper, called the constitution of +the United States--a paper (I repeat and reiterate) which nobody ever +signed, which but few persons ever read, and which the great body of the +people never saw--and also by some forty subsidiary papers, called State +constitutions, which also nobody ever signed, which but few persons ever +read, and which the great body of the people never saw--all making a +perfect system of the merest nothingness--the assumption, I say, that, +by these papers, the people have all consented to the abolition of +justice itself, the highest moral law of the Universe; and that all +their own natural, inherent, inalienable rights to the benefits of that +law, shall be annulled; and that they themselves, and everything that is +theirs, shall be given over into the irresponsible custody of some forty +little cabals of blockheads and villains called lawmakers--blockheads, +who imagine themselves wiser than justice itself, and villains, who care +nothing for either wisdom or justice, but only for the gratification of +their own avarice and ambitions; and that these cabals shall be invested +with the right to dispose of the property, liberty, and lives of all the +rest of the people, at their pleasure or discretion; or, as Marshall +says, "their wisdom and discretion!" + +If such an assumption as that does not embrace nearly, or quite, all the +other false assumptions that usurpers and tyrants can ever need, to +justify themselves in robbing, enslaving, and murdering all the rest of +mankind, it is less comprehensive than it appears to me to be. + +2. In the following paragraph may be found another batch of Marshall's +false assumptions. + + The right to contract is the attribute of a free agent, and he + may rightfully coerce performance from another free agent, who + violates his faith. Contracts have consequently an intrinsic + obligation. _[But] When men come into society, they can no + longer exercise this original natural right of coercion. It + would be incompatible with general peace, and is therefore + surrendered._ Society prohibits the use of private individual + coercion, _and gives in its place a more safe and more certain + remedy_. But the right to contract is not surrendered with the + right to coerce performance.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton + 350._ + +In this extract, taken in connection with the rest of his opinion in the +same case, Marshall convicts himself of the grossest falsehood. He +acknowledges that men have a natural right to make their own contracts; +that their contracts have an "intrinsic obligation"; and that they have +an "original and natural right" to coerce performance of them. And yet +he assumes, and virtually asserts, that men _voluntarily "come into +society_," and "_surrender_" to "society" their natural right to coerce +the fulfilment of their contracts. He assumes, and virtually asserts, +that they do this, _upon the ground, and for the reason, that "society +gives in its place a more safe and more certain remedy_"; that is, "a +more safe and more certain" enforcement of all men's contracts that have +"an intrinsic obligation." + +In thus saying that "men come into society," and "surrender" to society, +their "original and natural right" of coercing the fulfilment of +contracts, and that "_society gives in its place a more safe and certain +remedy_," he virtually says, and means to say, that, _in consideration +of such "surrender" of their "original and natural right of coercion," +"society" pledges itself to them that it will give them this "more safe +and more certain remedy_"; that is, that it will more safely and more +certainly enforce their contracts than they can do it themselves. + +And yet, in the same opinion--only two and three pages preceding this +extract--he declares emphatically that "the right" of government--or of +what he calls "society"--"_to prohibit such contracts as may be deemed +mischievous_, is _unquestionable_."--_p. 347._ + +And as an illustration of the exercise of this right of "society" to +prohibit such contracts "as may be deemed mischievous," he cites the +usury laws, thus: + + The acts against usury declare the contract to be void in the + beginning. They deny that the instrument ever became a + contract. They deny it all original obligation; and cannot + impair that which never came into existence.--_p. 348._ + +All this is as much as to say that, when a man has voluntarily "come +into society," and has "surrendered" to society "his original and +natural right of coercing" the fulfilment of his contracts, and when he +has done this in the confidence that society will fulfil its pledge to +"give him a more safe and more certain coercion" than he was capable of +himself, "society" may then turn around to him, and say: + + We acknowledge that you have a natural right to make your own + contracts. We acknowledge that your contracts have "an + intrinsic obligation." We acknowledge that you had "an original + and natural right" to coerce the fulfilment of them. We + acknowledge that it was solely in consideration of our pledge + to you, that we would give you a more safe and more certain + coercion than you were capable of yourself, that you + "surrendered" to us your right to coerce a fulfilment of them. + And we acknowledge that, _according to our pledge_, you have + now a right to require of us that we coerce a fulfilment of + them. But after you had "surrendered" to us your own right of + coercion, we took a different view of the pledge we had given + you; and concluded that it would be "mischievous" to allow you + to make such contracts. We therefore "prohibited" your making + them. And having prohibited the making of them, we cannot now + admit that they have any "obligation." We must therefore + decline to enforce the fulfilment of them. And we warn you + that, if you attempt to enforce them, by virtue of your own + "original and natural right of coercion," we shall be obliged + to consider your act a breach of "the general peace," and + punish you accordingly. We are sorry that you have lost your + property, but "society" must judge as to what contracts are, + and what are not, "mischievous." We can therefore give you no + redress. Nor can we suffer you to enforce your own rights, or + redress your own wrongs. + +Such is Marshall's theory of the way in which "society" got possession +of all men's "original and natural right" to make their own contracts, +and enforce the fulfilment of them; and of the way in which "society" +now justifies itself in prohibiting all contracts, though "intrinsically +obligatory," which it may choose to consider "mischievous." And he +asserts that, in this way, "society" has acquired "_an unquestionable +right_" to cheat men out of all their "original and natural right" to +make their own contracts, and enforce the fulfilment of them. + +A man's "original and natural right" to make all contracts that are +"intrinsically obligatory," and to coerce the fulfilment of them, is one +of the most valuable and indispensable of all human possessions. But +Marshall assumes that a man may "surrender" this right to "society," +under a pledge from "society," that it will secure to him "a more safe +and certain" fulfilment of his contracts, than he is capable of himself; +and that "society," having thus obtained from him this "surrender," may +then turn around to him, and not only refuse to fulfil its pledge to +him, but may also prohibit his own exercise of his own "original and +natural right," which he has "surrendered" to "society!" + +This is as much as to say that, if A can but induce B to intrust his +(B's) property with him (A), for safekeeping, under a pledge that he +(A) will keep it more safely and certainly than B can do it himself, _A +thereby acquires an "unquestionable right" to keep the property forever, +and let B whistle for it!_ + +This is the kind of assumption on which Marshall based all his ideas of +the constitutional law of this country; that _constitutional_ law, which +he was so famous for expounding. It is the kind of assumption, by which +he expounded the people out of all their "original and natural rights." + +He had just as much right to assume, and practically did assume, that +the people had voluntarily "come into society," and had voluntarily +"surrendered" to their governments _all their other natural rights_, as +well as their "original and natural right" to make and enforce their own +contracts. + +He virtually said to all the people of this country: + + You have voluntarily "come into society," and have voluntarily + "surrendered" to your governments all your natural rights, of + every name and nature whatsoever, _for safe keeping;_ and now + that these governments have, _by your own consent_, got + possession of all your natural rights, they have an + "_unquestionable right_" to withhold them from you forever. + +If it were not melancholy to see mankind thus cheated, robbed, enslaved, +and murdered, on the authority of such naked impostures as these, it +would be, to the last degree, ludicrous, to see a man like +Marshall--reputed to be one of the first intellects the country has ever +had--solemnly expounding the "constitutional powers," as he called them, +by which the general and State governments were authorized to rob the +people of all their natural rights as human beings. + +And yet this same Marshall has done more than any other one +man--certainly more than any other man within the last eighty-five +years--to make our governments, State and national, what they are. He +has, for more than sixty years, been esteemed an oracle, not only by his +associates and successors on the bench of the Supreme Court of the +United States, but by all the other judges, State and national, by all +the ignorant, as well as knavish, lawmakers in the country, and by all +the sixty to a hundred thousand lawyers, upon whom the people have been, +and are, obliged to depend for the security of their rights. + +This system of false definitions, false assumptions, and fraud and +usurpation generally, runs through all the operations of our +governments, State and national. There is nothing genuine, nothing real, +nothing true, nothing honest, to be found in any of them. They all +proceed upon the principle, that governments have all power, and the +people no rights. + + +SECTION XXV. + +But perhaps the most absolute proof that our national lawmakers and +judges are as regardless of all constitutional, as they are of all +natural, law, and that their statutes and decisions are as destitute of +all constitutional, as they are of all natural, authority, is to be +found in the fact that these lawmakers and judges have trampled upon, +and utterly ignored, certain amendments to the constitution, which had +been adopted, and (constitutionally speaking) become authoritative, as +early as 1791; only two years after the government went into operation. + +If these amendments had been obeyed, they would have compelled all +congresses and courts to understand that, if the government had any +constitutional powers at all, they were simply powers to protect men's +natural rights, and not to destroy any of them. + +These amendments have actually forbidden any lawmaking whatever in +violation of men's natural rights. And this is equivalent to a +prohibition of any lawmaking at all. And if lawmakers and courts had +been as desirous of preserving men's natural rights, as they have been +of violating them, they would long ago have found out that, since these +amendments, the constitution authorized no lawmaking at all. + +These amendments were ten in number. They were recommended by the first +congress, at its first session, in 1789; two-thirds of both houses +concurring. And in 1791, they had been ratified by all the States: and +from that time they imposed the restrictions mentioned upon all the +powers of congress. + +These amendments were proposed, by the first congress, for the reason +that, although the constitution, as originally framed, had been adopted, +its adoption had been procured only with great difficulty, and in spite +of great objections. _These objections were that, as originally framed +and adopted, the constitution contained no adequate security for the +private rights of the people._ + +These objections were admitted, by very many, if not all, the friends of +the constitution themselves, to be very weighty; and such as ought to be +immediately removed by amendments. And it was only because these friends +of the constitution pledged themselves to use their influence to secure +these amendments, that the adoption of the constitution itself was +secured. And it was in fulfilment of these pledges, and to remove these +objections, that the amendments were proposed and adopted. + +The first eight amendments specified particularly various prohibitions +upon the power of congress; such, for example, as those securing to the +people the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech and the +press, the right to keep and bear arms, etc., etc. Then followed the +ninth amendment, in these words: + + The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights, + [retained by the people] shall not be construed to deny or + disparage others retained by the people. + +Here is an authoritative declaration, that "the people" have "_other +rights_" than those specially "enumerated in the constitution"; and that +these "_other rights_" were "_retained by the people_"; that is, _that +congress should have no power to infringe them_. + +What, then, were these "other rights," that had not been "enumerated"; +but which were nevertheless "retained by the people"? + +Plainly they were men's natural "rights"; for these are the only +"rights" that "the people" ever had, or, consequently, that they could +"retain." + +And as no attempt is made to enumerate _all_ these "other rights," or +any considerable number of them, and as it would be obviously impossible +to enumerate all, or any considerable number, of them; and as no +exceptions are made of any of them, the necessary, the legal, the +inevitable inference is, that they were _all_ "retained"; and that +congress should have no power to violate any of them. + +Now, if congress and the courts had attempted to obey this amendment, as +they were constitutionally bound to do, they would soon have found that +they had really no lawmaking power whatever left to them; because they +would have found that they could make no law at all, _of their own +invention_, that would _not_ violate men's natural rights. + +All men's natural rights are co-extensive with natural law, the law of +justice; or justice as a science. This law is the exact measure, and the +only measure, of any and every man's natural rights. No one of these +natural rights can be taken from any man, without doing him an +injustice; and no more than these rights can be given to any one, unless +by taking from the natural rights of one or more others. + +In short, every man's natural rights are, first, the right to do, with +himself and his property, everything that he pleases to do, and that +justice towards others does not forbid him to do; and, secondly, to be +free from all compulsion, by others, to do anything whatever, except +what justice to others requires him to do. + +Such, then, has been the constitutional law of this country since 1791; +admitting, for the sake of the argument--what I do not really admit to +be a fact--that the constitution, so called, has ever been a law at all. + +This amendment, from the remarkable circumstances under which it was +proposed and adopted, must have made an impression upon the minds of all +the public men of the time; although they may not have fully +comprehended, and doubtless did not fully comprehend, its sweeping +effects upon all the supposed powers of the government. + +But whatever impression it may have made upon the public men of that +time, its authority and power were wholly lost upon their successors; +and probably, for at least eighty years, it has never been heard of, +either in congress or the courts. + +John Marshall was perfectly familiar with all the circumstances, under +which this, and the other nine amendments, were proposed and adopted. He +was thirty-two years old (lacking seven days) when the constitution, as +originally framed, was published (September 17, 1787); and he was a +member of the Virginia convention that ratified it. He knew perfectly +the objections that were raised to it, in that convention, on the ground +of its inadequate guaranty of men's natural rights. He knew with what +force these objections were urged by some of the ablest members of the +convention. And he knew that, to obviate these objections, the +convention, as a body, without a dissenting voice, so far as appears, +recommended that very stringent amendments, for securing men's natural +rights, be made to the constitution. And he knew further, that, but for +these amendments being recommended, the constitution would not have been +adopted by the convention.[6] + + [6] For the amendments recommended by the Virginia convention, + see "Elliot's Debates," Vol. 3, pp. 657 to 663. For the debates + upon these amendments, see pages 444 to 452, and 460 to 462, and + 466 to 471, and 579 to 652. + +The amendments proposed were too numerous to be repeated here, although +they would be very instructive, as showing how jealous the people were, +lest their natural rights should be invaded by laws made by congress. +And that the convention might do everything in its power to secure the +adoption of these amendments, it resolved as follows: + + And the convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of + this commonwealth, enjoin it upon their representatives in + congress to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable + and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the foregoing + alterations and provisions, in the manner provided by the 5th + article of the said Constitution; and, in all congressional + laws to be passed in the meantime, to conform to the spirit of + these amendments, as far as the said Constitution will + admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 3, p. 661._ + +In seven other State conventions, to wit, in those of Massachusetts, New +Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, and South +Carolina, the inadequate security for men's natural rights, and the +necessity for amendments, were admitted, and insisted upon, in very +similar terms to those in Virginia. + +In Massachusetts, the convention proposed nine amendments to the +constitution; and resolved as follows: + + And the convention do, in the name and in the behalf of the + people of this commonwealth, enjoin it upon their + representatives in Congress, at all times, until the + alterations and provisions aforesaid have been considered, + agreeably to the 5th article of the said Constitution, to exert + all their influence, and use all reasonable and legal methods, + to obtain a ratification of the said alterations and + provisions, in such manner as is provided in the said + article.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 2, p. 178._ + +The New Hampshire convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed +twelve amendments, and added: + + And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of + this State, enjoin it upon their representatives in congress, + at all times, until the alterations and provisions aforesaid + have been considered agreeably to the fifth article of the said + Constitution, to exert all their influence, and use all + reasonable and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the + said alterations and provisions, in such manner as is provided + in the article.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 326._ + +The Rhode Island convention, in ratifying the constitution, put forth a +declaration of rights, in eighteen articles, and also proposed +twenty-one amendments to the constitution; and prescribed as follows: + + And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of + the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, enjoin it + upon their senators and representative or representatives, + which may be elected to represent this State in congress, to + exert all their influence, and use all reasonable means, to + obtain a ratification of the following amendments to the said + Constitution, in the manner prescribed therein; and in all laws + to be passed by the congress in the mean time, to conform to + the spirit of the said amendments, as far as the Constitution + will admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 335._ + +The New York convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed a +great many amendments, and added: + + And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of + the State of New York, enjoin it upon their representatives in + congress, to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable + means, to obtain a ratification of the following amendments to + the said Constitution, in the manner prescribed therein; and in + all laws to be passed by the congress, in the mean time, to + conform to the spirit of the said amendments as far as the + Constitution will admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 329._ + +The New York convention also addressed a "CIRCULAR LETTER" to the +governors of all the other States, the first two paragraphs of which are +as follows: + + THE CIRCULAR LETTER, + + _From the Convention of the State of New York to the Governors + of the several States in the Union._ + + POUGHKEEPSIE, JULY 28, 1788. + + Sir, We, the members of the Convention of this State, have + deliberately and maturely considered the Constitution proposed + for the United States. Several articles in it appear so + exceptionable to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest + confidence of obtaining a revision of them by a general + convention, and an invincible reluctance to separating from our + sister States, could have prevailed upon a sufficient number to + ratify it, without stipulating for previous amendments. We all + unite in opinion, that such a revision will be necessary to + recommend it to the approbation and support of a numerous body + of our constituents. + + We observe that amendments have been proposed, and are + anxiously desired, by several of the States, as well as by + this; and we think it of great importance that effectual + measures be immediately taken for calling a convention, to meet + at a period not far remote; for we are convinced that the + apprehensions and discontents, which those articles occasion, + cannot be removed or allayed, unless an act to provide for it + be among the first that shall be passed by the new + congress.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 2, p. 413._ + +In the Maryland convention, numerous amendments were proposed, and +thirteen were agreed to; "most of them by a unanimous vote, and all by a +great majority." Fifteen others were proposed, but there was so much +disagreement in regard to them, that none at all were formally +recommended to congress. But, says Elliot: + + All the members, who voted for the ratification [of the + constitution], declared that they would engage themselves, + under every tie of honor, to support the amendments they had + agreed to, both in their public and private characters, until + they should become a part of the general government.--_Elliot's + Debates, Vol. 2, pp. 550, 552-3._ + +The first North Carolina convention refused to ratify the constitution, +and + + _Resolved_, That a declaration of rights, asserting and + securing from encroachments the great principles of civil and + religious liberty, and the inalienable rights of the people, + together with amendments to the most ambiguous and + exceptionable parts of the said constitution of government, + ought to be laid before congress, and the convention of States + that shall or may be called for the purpose of amending the + said Constitution, for their consideration, previous to the + ratification of the Constitution aforesaid, on the part of the + State of North Carolina.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 332._ + +The South Carolina convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed +certain amendments, and + + _Resolved_, That it be a standing instruction to all such + delegates as may hereafter be elected to represent this State + in the General Government, to exert their utmost abilities and + influence to effect an alteration of the Constitution, + conformably to the foregoing resolutions.--_Elliot's Debates, + Vol. 1. p. 325._ + +In the Pennsylvania convention, numerous objections were made to the +constitution, but it does not appear that the convention, as a +convention, recommended any specific amendments. But a strong movement, +outside of the convention, was afterwards made in favor of such +amendments. ("Elliot's Debates," Vol. 2, p. 542.) + +Of the debates in the Connecticut convention, Elliot gives only what he +calls "_A Fragment_." + +Of the debates in the conventions of New Jersey, Delaware, and Georgia, +Elliot gives no accounts at all. + +I therefore cannot state the grounds, on which the adoption of the +constitution was opposed. They were doubtless very similar to those in +the other States. This is rendered morally certain by the fact, that the +amendments, soon afterwards proposed by congress, were immediately +ratified by all the States. Also by the further fact, that these States, +by reason of the smallness of their representation in the popular branch +of congress, would naturally be even more jealous of their rights, than +the people of the larger States. + +It is especially worthy of notice that, in some, if not in all, the +conventions that ratified the constitution, although the ratification +was accompanied by such urgent recommendations of amendments, and by an +almost absolute assurance that they would be made, it was nevertheless +secured only by very small majorities. + +Thus in Virginia, the vote was only 89 ayes to 79 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 3, +p. 654.) + +In Massachusetts, the ratification was secured only by a vote of 187 +yeas to 168 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 2, p. 181.) + +In New York, the vote was only 30 yeas to 27 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 2, p. +413.) + +In New Hampshire and Rhode Island, neither the yeas nor nays are given. +(Elliot, Vol. 1, pp. 327-335.) + +In Connecticut, the yeas were 128; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1. p. +321-2.) + +In New Jersey, the yeas were 38; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. +321.) + +In Pennsylvania, the yeas were 46; _the nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. +1, p. 320.) + +In Delaware, the yeas were 30; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. +319.) + +In Maryland, the vote was 57 yeas; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. +325.) + +In North Carolina, neither the yeas nor nays are given. (Elliot, Vol. 1, +p. 333.) + +In South Carolina, neither the yeas nor nays are given. (Elliot, Vol. 1, +p. 325.) + +In Georgia, the yeas were 26; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. +324.) + +We can thus see by what meagre votes the constitution was adopted. We +can also see that, but for the prospect that important amendments would +be made, specially for securing the natural rights of the people, the +constitution would have been spurned with contempt, as it deserved to +be. + +And yet now, owing to the usurpations of lawmakers and courts, the +original constitution--with the worst possible construction put upon +it--has been carried into effect; and the amendments have been simply +cast into the waste baskets. + +Marshall was thirty-six years old, when these amendments became a part +of the constitution in 1791. Ten years after, in 1801, he became Chief +Justice. It then became his sworn constitutional duty to scrutinize +severely every act of congress, and to condemn, as unconstitutional, all +that should violate any of these natural rights. Yet he appears never to +have thought of the matter afterwards. Or, rather, this ninth amendment, +the most important of all, seems to have been so utterly antagonistic to +all his ideas of government, that he chose to ignore it altogether, and, +as far as he could, to bury it out of sight. + +Instead of recognizing it as an absolute guaranty of all the natural +rights of the people, he chose to assume--for it was all a mere +assumption, a mere making a constitution out of his own head, to suit +himself--that the people had all voluntarily "come into society," and +had voluntarily "surrendered" to "society" all their natural rights, of +every name and nature--trusting that they would be secured; and that +now, "society," having thus got possession of all these natural rights +of the people, had the "unquestionable right" to dispose of them, at the +pleasure--or, as he would say, according to the "wisdom and +discretion"--of a few contemptible, detestable, and irresponsible +lawmakers, whom the constitution (thus amended) had forbidden to dispose +of any one of them. + +If, now, Marshall did not see, in this amendment, any legal force or +authority, what becomes of his reputation as a constitutional lawyer? If +he did see this force and authority, but chose to trample them under his +feet, he was a perjured tyrant and traitor. + +What, also, are we to think of all the judges,--forty in all,--his +associates and successors, who, for eighty years, have been telling the +people that the government has all power, and the people no rights? Have +they all been mere blockheads, who never read this amendment, or knew +nothing of its meaning? Or have they, too, been perjured tyrants and +traitors? + +What, too, becomes of those great constitutional lawyers, as we have +called them, who have been supposed to have won such immortal honors, as +"expounders of the constitution," but who seem never to have discovered +in it any security for men's natural rights? Is their apparent +ignorance, on this point, to be accounted for by the fact, that that +portion of the people, who, by authority of the government, are +systematically robbed of all their earnings, beyond a bare subsistence, +are not able to pay such fees as are the robbers who are authorized to +plunder them? + +If any one will now look back to the records of congress and the courts, +for the last eighty years, I do not think he will find a single mention +of this amendment. And why has this been so? Solely because the +amendment--if its authority had been recognized--would have stood as an +insuperable barrier against all the ambition and rapacity--all the +arbitrary power, all the plunder, and all the tyranny--which the +ambitious and rapacious classes have determined to accomplish through +the agency of the government. + +The fact that these classes have been so successful in perverting the +constitution (thus amended) from an instrument avowedly securing all +men's natural rights, into an authority for utterly destroying them, is +a sufficient proof that no lawmaking power can be safely intrusted to +any body, for any purpose whatever. + +And that this perversion of the constitution should have been sanctioned +by all the judicial tribunals of the country, is also a proof, not only +of the servility, audacity, and villainy of the judges, but also of the +utter rottenness of our judicial system. It is a sufficient proof that +judges, who are dependent upon lawmakers for their offices and salaries, +and are responsible to them by impeachment, cannot be relied on to put +the least restraint upon the acts of their masters, the lawmakers. + +Such, then, would have been the effect of the ninth amendment, if it had +been permitted to have its legitimate authority. + + +SECTION XXVI. + +The tenth amendment is in these words: + + The powers not delegated to the United States by the + constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved + to the States respectively, _or to the people_. + +This amendment, equally with the ninth, secures to "the people" all +their natural rights. And why? + +Because, in truth, no powers at all, neither legislative, judicial, nor +executive, had been "delegated to the United States by the +constitution." + +But it will be said that the amendment itself implies that certain +lawmaking "powers" had been "delegated to the United States by the +constitution." + +No. It only implies that those who adopted the amendment _believed_ that +such lawmaking "powers" had been "delegated to the United States by the +constitution." + +But in this belief, they were entirely mistaken. And why? + +1. Because it is a natural impossibility that any lawmaking "powers" +whatever can be delegated by any one man, or any number of men, to any +other man, or any number of other men. + +Men's natural rights are all inherent and inalienable; and therefore +cannot be parted with, or delegated, by one person to another. And all +contracts whatsoever, for such a purpose, are necessarily absurd and +void contracts. + +For example. I cannot delegate to another man any right to _make_ +laws--that is, laws of his own invention--and compel me to obey them. + +Such a contract, on my part, would be a contract to part with my natural +liberty; to give myself, or sell myself, to him as a slave. Such a +contract would be an absurd and void contract, utterly destitute of all +legal or moral obligation. + +2. I cannot delegate to another any right to make laws--that is, laws of +his own invention--and compel a third person to obey them. + +For example. I cannot delegate to A any right to make laws--that is, +laws of his own invention--and compel Z to obey them. + +I cannot delegate any such right to A, because I have no such right +myself; and I cannot delegate to another what I do not myself possess. + +For these reasons no lawmaking powers ever could be--and therefore no +lawmaking powers ever were--"delegated to the United States by the +constitution"; no matter what the people of that day--any or all of +them--may have attempted to do, or may have believed they had power to +do, in the way of delegating such powers. + +But not only were no lawmaking powers "delegated to the United States by +the constitution," but neither were any _judicial_ powers so delegated. +And why? Because it is a natural impossibility that one man can delegate +his judicial powers to another. + +Every man has, by nature, certain judicial powers, or rights. That is to +say, he has, by nature, the right to judge of, and enforce his own +rights, and judge of, and redress his own wrongs. But, in so doing, he +must act only in accordance with his own judgment and conscience, _and +subject to his own personal responsibility, if, through either ignorance +or design, he commits any error injurious to another_. + +Now, inasmuch as no man can delegate, or impart, his own judgment or +conscience to another, it is naturally impossible that he can delegate +to another his judicial rights or powers. + +So, too, every man has, by nature, a right to judge of, and enforce, the +rights, and judge of, and redress the wrongs, of any and all other men. +This right is included in his natural right to maintain justice between +man and man, and to protect the injured party against the wrongdoer. +But, in doing this, he must act only in accordance with his own judgment +and conscience, and subject to his own personal responsibility for any +error he may commit, either through ignorance or design. + +But, inasmuch as, in this case, as in the preceding one, he can neither +delegate nor impart his own judgment or conscience to another, he cannot +delegate his judicial power or right to another. + +But not only were no lawmaking or judicial powers "delegated to the +United States by the constitution," neither were any executive powers so +delegated. And why? Because, in a case of justice or injustice, it is +naturally impossible that any one man can delegate his executive right +or power to another. + +Every man has, by nature, the right to maintain justice for himself, and +for all other persons, by the use of so much force as may be reasonably +necessary for that purpose. But he can use the force only in accordance +with his own judgment and conscience, and on his own personal +responsibility, if, through ignorance or design, he commits any wrong to +another. + +But inasmuch as he cannot delegate, or impart, his own judgment or +conscience to another, he cannot delegate his executive power or right +to another. + +_The result is, that, in all judicial and executive proceedings, for the +maintenance of justice, every man must act only in accordance with his +own judgment and conscience, and on his own personal responsibility for +any wrong he may commit; whether such wrong be committed through either +ignorance or design._ + +The effect of this principle of personal responsibility, in all judicial +and executive proceedings, would be--or at least ought to be--that no +one would give any judicial opinions, or do any executive acts, except +such as his own judgment and conscience should approve, _and such as he +would be willing to be held personally responsible for_. + +No one could justify, or excuse, his wrong act, by saying that a power, +or authority, to do it had been delegated to him, by any other men, +however numerous. + +For the reasons that have now been given, neither any legislative, +judicial, nor executive powers ever were, or ever could have been, +"delegated to the United States by the constitution"; no matter how +honestly or innocently the people of that day may have believed, or +attempted, the contrary. + +And what is true, in this matter, in regard to the national government, +is, for the same reasons, equally true in regard to all the State +governments. + +But this principle of personal responsibility, each for his own judicial +or executive acts, does not stand in the way of men's associating, at +pleasure, for the maintenance of justice; and selecting such persons as +they think most suitable, for judicial and executive duties; and +_requesting_ them to perform those duties; and then paying them for +their labor. But the persons, thus selected, must still perform their +duties according to their own judgments and consciences alone, and +subject to their own personal responsibility for any errors of either +ignorance or design. + +To make it safe and proper for persons to perform judicial duties, +subject to their personal responsibility for any errors of either +ignorance or design, two things would seem to be important, if not +indispensable, _viz._: + +1. That, as far as is reasonably practicable, all judicial proceedings +should be in writing; that is, that all testimony, and all judicial +opinions, even to quite minute details, should be in writing, and be +preserved; so that judges may always have it in their power to show +fully what their acts, and their reasons for their acts, have been; and +also that anybody, and everybody, interested, may forever after have the +means of knowing fully the reasons on which everything has been done; +and that any errors, ever afterwards discovered, may be corrected. + +2. That all judicial tribunals should consist of so many judges--within +any reasonable number--as either party may desire; or as may be +necessary to prevent any wrong doing, by any one or more of the judges, +either through ignorance or design. + +Such tribunals, consisting of judges, numerous enough, and perfectly +competent to settle justly probably ninety-nine one-hundredths of all +the controversies that arise among men, could be obtained in every +village. They could give their immediate attention to every case; and +thus avoid most of the delay, and most of the expense, now attendant on +judicial proceedings. + +To make these tribunals satisfactory to all reasonable and honest +persons, it is important, and probably indispensable, that all judicial +proceedings should be had, _in the first instance_, at the expense of +the association, or associations, to which the parties to the suit +belong. + +An association for the maintenance of justice should be a purely +voluntary one; and should be formed upon the same principle as a mutual +fire or marine insurance company; that is, each member should pay his +just proportion of the expense necessary for protecting all. + +A single individual could not reasonably be expected to delay, or +forego, the exercise of his natural right to enforce his own rights, and +redress his own wrongs, except upon the condition that there is an +association that will do it promptly, and without expense to him. But +having paid his proper proportion of the expense necessary for the +protection of all, he has then a right to demand prompt and complete +protection for himself. + +Inasmuch as it cannot be known which party is in the wrong, until the +trial has been had, the expense of both parties must, _in the first +instance_, be paid by the association, or associations, to which they +belong. But after the trial has been had, and it has been ascertained +which party was in the wrong, and (if such should be the case) so +clearly in the wrong as to have had no justification for putting the +association to the expense of a trial, he then may properly be compelled +to pay the cost of all the proceedings. + +If the parties to a suit should belong to different associations, it +would be right that the judges should be taken from both associations; +or from a third association, with which neither party was connected. + +If, with all these safeguards against injustice and expense, a party, +accused of a wrong, should refuse to appear for trial, he might +rightfully be proceeded against, in his absence, if the evidence +produced against him should be sufficient to justify it. + +It is probably not necessary to go into any further details here, to +show how easy and natural a thing it would be, to form as many voluntary +and mutually protective judicial associations, as might be either +necessary or convenient, in order to bring justice home to every man's +door; and to give to every honest and dishonest man, all reasonable +assurance that he should have justice, and nothing else, done for him, +or to him. + + +SECTION XXVII. + +Of course we can have no courts of justice, under such systems of +lawmaking, and supreme court decisions, as now prevail. + +We have a population of fifty to sixty millions; _and not a single court +of justice, State or national!_ + +But we have everywhere courts of injustice--open and avowed +injustice--claiming sole jurisdiction of all cases affecting men's +rights of both person and property; and having at their beck brute force +enough to compel absolute submission to their decrees, whether just or +unjust. + +Can a more decisive or infallible condemnation of our governments be +conceived of, than the absence of all courts of justice, and the +absolute power of their courts of injustice? + +Yes, they lie under still another condemnation, to wit, that their +courts are not only courts of injustice, but they are also secret +tribunals; adjudicating all causes according to the secret instructions +of their masters, the lawmakers, and their authorized interpreters, +their supreme courts. + +I say _secret tribunals_, and _secret instructions_, because, to the +great body of the people, whose rights are at stake, they are secret to +all practical intents and purposes. They are secret, because their +reasons for their decrees are to be found only in great volumes of +statutes and supreme court reports, which the mass of the people have +neither money to buy, nor time to read; and would not understand, if +they were to read them. + +These statutes and reports are so far out of reach of the people at +large, that the only knowledge a man can ordinarily get of them, when he +is summoned before one of the tribunals appointed to execute them, is +to be obtained by employing an expert--or so-called lawyer--to enlighten +him. + +This expert in injustice is one who buys these great volumes of statutes +and reports, and spends his life in studying them, and trying to keep +himself informed of their contents. But even he can give a client very +little information in regard to them; for the statutes and decisions are +so voluminous, and are so constantly being made and unmade, and are so +destitute of all conformity to those natural principles of justice which +men readily and intuitively comprehend; and are moreover capable of so +many different interpretations, that he is usually in as great +doubt--perhaps in even greater doubt--than his client, as to what will +be the result of a suit. + +The most he can usually say to his client, is this: + + Every civil suit must finally be given to one of two persons, + the plaintiff or defendant. Whether, therefore, your cause is a + just, or an unjust, one, you have at least one chance in two, + of gaining it. But no matter how just your cause may be, you + need have no hope that the tribunal that tries it, will be + governed by any such consideration, if the statute book, or the + past decisions of the supreme court, are against you. So, also, + no matter how unjust your cause may be, you may nevertheless + expect to gain it, if the statutes and past decisions are in + your favor. If, therefore, you have money to spend in such a + lottery as this, I will do my best to gain your cause for you, + whether it be a just, or an unjust, one. + +If the charge is a criminal one, this expert says to his client: + + You must either be found guilty, or acquitted. Whether, + therefore, you are really innocent or guilty, you have at least + one chance in two, of an acquittal. But no matter how innocent + you may be of any real crime, you need have no hope of an + acquittal, if the statute book, or the past decisions of the + supreme court, are against you. If, on the other hand, you have + committed a real wrong to another, there may be many laws on + the statute book, many precedents, and technicalities, and + whimsicalities, through which you may hope to escape. But your + reputation, your liberty, or perhaps your life, is at stake. To + save these you can afford to risk your money, even though the + result is so uncertain. Therefore you had best give me your + money, and I will do my best to save you, whether you are + innocent or guilty. + +But for the great body of the people,--those who have no money that they +can afford to risk in a lawsuit,--no matter what may be their rights in +either a civil or criminal suit,--their cases are hopeless. They may +have been taxed, directly and indirectly, to their last dollars, for the +support of the government; they may even have been compelled to risk +their lives, and to lose their limbs, in its defence; yet when they want +its protection,--that protection for which their taxes and military +services were professedly extorted from them,--they are coolly told that +the government offers no justice, nor even any chance or semblance of +justice, except to those who have more money than they. + +But the point now to be specially noticed is, that in the case of either +the civil or criminal suit, the client, whether rich or poor, is nearly +or quite as much in the dark as to his fate, and as to the grounds on +which his fate will be determined, as though he were to be tried by an +English Star Chamber court, or one of the secret tribunals of Russia, or +even the Spanish Inquisition. + +Thus in the supreme exigencies of a man's life, whether in civil or +criminal cases, where his property, his reputation, his liberty, or his +life is at stake, he is really to be tried by what is, _to him_, at +least, _a secret tribunal_; a tribunal that is governed by what are, _to +him_, _the secret instructions_ of lawmakers, and supreme courts; +neither of whom care anything for his rights of property in a civil +suit, or for his guilt or innocence in a criminal one; but only for +their own authority as lawmakers and judges. + +The bystanders, at these trials, look on amazed, but powerless to defend +the right, or prevent the wrong. Human nature has no rights, in the +presence of these infernal tribunals. + +Is it any wonder that all men live in constant terror of such a +government as that? Is it any wonder that so many give up all attempts +to preserve their natural rights of person and property, in opposition +to tribunals, to whom justice and injustice are indifferent, and whose +ways are, to common minds, hidden mysteries, and impenetrable secrets. + +But even this is not all. The mode of trial, if not as infamous as the +trial itself, is at least so utterly false and absurd, as to add a new +element of uncertainty to the result of all judicial proceedings. + +A trial in one of these courts of injustice is a trial by battle, +almost, if not quite, as really as was a trial by battle, five hundred +or a thousand years ago. + +Now, as then, the adverse parties choose their champions, to fight their +battles for them. + +These champions, trained to such contests, and armed, not only with all +the weapons their own skill, cunning, and power can supply, but also +with all the iniquitous laws, precedents, and technicalities that +lawmakers and supreme courts can give them, for defeating justice, +and accomplishing injustice, can--if not always, yet none but +themselves know how often--offer their clients such chances of +victory--independently of the justice of their causes--as to induce the +dishonest to go into court to evade justice, or accomplish injustice, +not less often perhaps than the honest go there in the hope to get +justice, or avoid injustice. + +We have now, I think, some sixty thousand of these champions, who make +it the business of their lives to equip themselves for these conflicts, +and sell their services for a price. + +Is there any one of these men, who studies justice as a science, and +regards that alone in all his professional exertions? If there are any +such, why do we so seldom, or never, hear of them? Why have they not +told us, hundreds of years ago, what are men's natural rights of person +and property? And why have they not told us how false, absurd, and +tyrannical are all these lawmaking governments? Why have they not told +us what impostors and tyrants all these so-called lawmakers, judges, +etc., etc., are? Why are so many of them so ambitious to become +lawmakers and judges themselves? + +Is it too much to hope for mankind, that they may sometime have courts +of justice, instead of such courts of injustice as these? + +If we ever should have courts of justice, it is easy to see what will +become of statute books, supreme courts, trial by battle, and all the +other machinery of fraud and tyranny, by which the world is now ruled. + +If the people of this country knew what crimes are constantly committed +by these courts of injustice, they would squelch them, without mercy, as +unceremoniously as they would squelch so many gangs of bandits or +pirates. In fact, bandits and pirates are highly respectable and +honorable villains, compared with the judges of these courts of +injustice. Bandits and pirates do not--like these judges--attempt to +cheat us out of our common sense, in order to cheat us out of our +property, liberty, or life. They do not profess to be anything but such +villains as they really are. They do not claim to have received any +"Divine" authority for robbing, enslaving, or murdering us at their +pleasure. They do not claim immunity for their crimes, upon the ground +that they are duly authorized agents of any such invisible, intangible, +irresponsible, unimaginable thing as "society," or "the State." They do +not insult us by telling us that they are only exercising that authority +to rob, enslave, and murder us, which we ourselves have delegated to +them. They do not claim that they are robbing, enslaving, and murdering +us, solely to secure our happiness and prosperity, and not from any +selfish motives of their own. They do not claim a wisdom so superior to +that of the producers of wealth, as to know, better than they, how their +wealth should be disposed of. They do not tell us that we are the freest +and happiest people on earth, inasmuch as each of our male adults is +allowed one voice in ten millions in the choice of the men, who are to +rob, enslave, and murder us. They do not tell us that all liberty and +order would be destroyed, that society itself would go to pieces, and +man go back to barbarism, if it were not for the care, and supervision, +and protection, they lavish upon us. They do not tell us of the +almshouses, hospitals, schools, churches, etc., which, out of the purest +charity and benevolence, they maintain for our benefit, out of the money +they take from us. They do not carry their heads high, above all other +men, and demand our reverence and admiration, as statesmen, patriots, +and benefactors. They do not claim that we have voluntarily "come into +their society," and "surrendered" to them all our natural rights of +person and property; nor all our "original and natural right" of +defending our own rights, and redressing our own wrongs. They do not +tell us that they have established infallible supreme courts, to whom +they refer all questions as to the legality of their acts, and that they +do nothing that is not sanctioned by these courts. They do not attempt +to deceive us, or mislead us, or reconcile us to their doings, by any +such pretences, impostures, or insults as these. _There is not a single +John Marshall among them._ On the contrary, they acknowledge themselves +robbers, murderers, and villains, pure and simple. When they have once +taken our money, they have the decency to get out of our sight as soon +as possible; they do not persist in following us, and robbing us, again +and again, so long as we produce anything that they can take from us. In +short, they acknowledge themselves _hostes humani generis: enemies of +the human race_. They acknowledge it to be our unquestioned right and +duty to kill them, if we can; that they expect nothing else, than that +we will kill them, if we can; and that we are only fools and cowards, if +we do not kill them, by any and every means in our power. They neither +ask, nor expect, any mercy, if they should ever fall into the hands of +honest men. + +For all these reasons, they are not only modest and sensible, but really +frank, honest, and honorable villains, contrasted with these courts of +injustice, and the lawmakers by whom these courts are established. + +Such, Mr. Cleveland, is the real character of the government, of which +you are the nominal head. Such are, and have been, its lawmakers. Such +are, and have been, its judges. Such have been its executives. Such is +its present executive. Have you anything to say for any of them? + + Yours frankly, LYSANDER SPOONER. + + BOSTON, MAY 15, 1886. + + + THE END. + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: + +Text in italics was enclosed with underscores (_italics_). + +Text in small caps was replaced with ALL CAPS (SMALL CAPS). + +On page 22, there was the use of double quotation marks within double +quotation marks. That usage was not changed. + +On page 43, "at bank" was replaced "at a bank". + +On page 60, "_viz._, 1," was replaced with "_viz._, 1.". + +On page 105, "viz." was italized. + +On page 65, a period as added after "indebted to". + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Letter to Grover Cleveland, by Lysander Spooner + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND *** + +***** This file should be named 35016-8.txt or 35016-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/5/0/1/35016/ + +Produced by Curtis Weyant, Ernest Schaal, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Letter to Grover Cleveland + On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes + of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, + Ignorance, and Servitude Of The People + +Author: Lysander Spooner + +Release Date: January 20, 2011 [EBook #35016] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND *** + + + + +Produced by Curtis Weyant, Ernest Schaal, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p class="h1">A LETTER</p> + +<p class="h4sm">to</p> + +<p class="h2">GROVER CLEVELAND,</p> + +<p class="h4sm">on</p> + +<p class="h4sm">His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and<br /> +Crimes of Lawmakers and Judges, and The<br /> +Consequent Poverty, Ignorance, and<br /> +Servitude of the People.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p class="h4sm">by</p> + +<p class="h2">LYSANDER SPOONER.</p> + +<hr /> + +<p class="cnobmargin">BOSTON:</p> + +<p class="cnomargins">BENJ. R. TUCKER, PUBLISHER.</p> + +<p class="cnotmargin">1886.</p> + +<hr class="hr2"/> + +<p class="cnobmargin">The author reserves his copyright in this letter.</p> + +<p class="cnotmargin">First pamphlet edition published in July, 1886.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Under a somewhat different title, to wit, "<i>A Letter to Grover Cleveland, on his False, Absurd, +If-contradictory, and Ridiculous Inaugural Address</i>," this letter was first published, in instalments, +"<span class="smcap">Liberty</span>" (a paper published in Boston); the instalments commencing June 20, 1885, and continuing +to May 22, 1886: notice being given, in each paper, of the reservation of copyright.</p></div> +</div> + +<hr class="hr2"/> + +<h1>A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND.</h1> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Section I.</h2> + +<p class="indent"><i>To Grover Cleveland</i>:</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="smcap">Sir</span>,—Your inaugural address is probably as honest, sensible, and consistent a +one as that of any president within the last fifty years, or, perhaps, as any since the +foundation of the government. If, therefore, it is false, absurd, self-contradictory, +and ridiculous, it is not (as I think) because you are personally less honest, sensible, +or consistent than your predecessors, but because the government itself—according +to your own description of it, and according to the practical administration of it for +nearly a hundred years—is an utterly and palpably false, absurd, and criminal one. +Such praises as you bestow upon it are, therefore, necessarily false, absurd, and +ridiculous.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus you describe it as "a government pledged to do equal and exact justice to +all men."</p> + +<p class="indent">Did you stop to think what that means? Evidently you did not; for nearly, or +quite, all the rest of your address is in direct contradiction to it.</p> + +<p class="indent">Let me then remind you that justice is an immutable, natural principle; and not +anything that can be made, unmade, or altered by any human power.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is also a subject of science, and is to be learned, like mathematics, or any other +science. It does not derive its authority from the commands, will, pleasure, or +discretion of any possible combination of men, whether calling themselves a government, +or by any other name.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is also, at all times, and in all places, the supreme law. And being everywhere +and always the supreme law, it is necessarily everywhere and always the only law.</p> + +<p class="indent">Lawmakers, as they call themselves, can add nothing to it, nor take anything +from it. Therefore all their laws, as they call them,—that is, all the laws of their +own making,—have no color of authority or obligation. It is a falsehood to call +them laws; for there is nothing in them that either creates men's duties or rights, +or enlightens them as to their duties or rights. There is consequently nothing +binding or obligatory about them. And nobody is bound to take the least notice +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 4]</span> +of them, unless it be to trample them under foot, as usurpations. If they command +men to do justice, they add nothing to men's obligation to do it, or to any man's +right to enforce it. They are therefore mere idle wind, such as would be commands +to consider the day as day, and the night as night. If they command or license +any man to do injustice, they are criminal on their face. If they command any +man to do anything which justice does not require him to do, they are simple, naked +usurpations and tyrannies. If they forbid any man to do anything, which justice +would permit him to do, they are criminal invasions of his natural and rightful liberty. +In whatever light, therefore, they are viewed, they are utterly destitute of +everything like authority or obligation. They are all necessarily either the impudent, +fraudulent, and criminal usurpations of tyrants, robbers, and murderers, or +the senseless work of ignorant or thoughtless men, who do not know, or certainly +do not realize, what they are doing.</p> + +<p class="indent">This science of justice, or natural law, is the only science that tells us what are, +and what are not, each man's natural, inherent, inalienable, <i>individual</i> rights, as +against any and all other men. And to say that any, or all, other men may rightfully +compel him to obey any or all such other laws as they may see fit to <i>make</i>, is +to say that he has no rights of his own, but is their subject, their property, and +their slave.</p> + +<p class="indent">For the reasons now given, the simple maintenance of justice, or natural law, is +plainly the one only purpose for which any coercive power—or anything bearing +the name of government—has a right to exist.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is intrinsically just as false, absurd, ludicrous, and ridiculous to say that lawmakers, +so-called, can invent and make any laws, <i>of their own</i>, authoritatively fixing, +or declaring, the rights of individuals, or that shall be in any manner authoritative +or obligatory upon individuals, or that individuals may rightfully be compelled to +obey, as it would be to say that they can invent and make such mathematics, chemistry, +physiology, or other sciences, as they see fit, and rightfully compel individuals +to conform all their actions to them, instead of conforming them to the mathematics, +chemistry, physiology, or other sciences of nature.</p> + +<p class="indent">Lawmakers, as they call themselves, might just as well claim the right to abolish, +by statute, the natural law of gravitation, the natural laws of light, heat, and electricity, +and all the other natural laws of matter and mind, and institute laws of +their own in the place of them, and compel conformity to them, as to claim the +right to set aside the natural law of justice, and compel obedience to such other +laws as they may see fit to manufacture, and set up in its stead.</p> + +<p class="indent">Let me now ask you how you imagine that your so-called lawmakers can "do +equal and exact justice to all men," by any so-called laws of their own making. If +their laws command anything but justice, or forbid anything but injustice, they +are themselves unjust and criminal. If they simply command justice, and forbid +injustice, they add nothing to the natural authority of justice, or to men's obligation +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 5]</span> +to obey it. It is, therefore, a simple impertinence, and sheer impudence, on +their part, to assume that <i>their</i> commands, <i>as such</i>, are of any authority whatever. +It is also sheer impudence, on their part, to assume that their commands are at all +necessary to teach other men what is, and what is not, justice. The science of justice +is as open to be learned by all other men, as by themselves; and it is, in general, +so simple and easy to be learned, that there is no need of, and no place for, any +man, or body of men, to teach it, declare it, or command it, on their own authority.</p> + +<p class="indent">For one, or another, of these reasons, therefore, each and every law, so-called, +that forty-eight different congresses have presumed to make, within the last ninety-six +years, have been utterly destitute of all legitimate authority. That is to say, +they have either been criminal, as commanding or licensing men to do what justice +forbade them to do, or as forbidding them to do what justice would have permitted +them to do; or else they have been superfluous, as adding nothing to men's knowledge +of justice, or to their obligation to do justice, or abstain from injustice.</p> + +<p class="indent">What excuse, then, have you for attempting to enforce upon the people that great +mass of superfluous or criminal laws (so-called) which ignorant and foolish, or impudent +and criminal, men have, for so many years, been manufacturing, and promulgating, +and enforcing, in violation of justice, and of all men's natural, inherent, +and inalienable rights?</p> + +<h2>Section II.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Perhaps you will say that there is no such science as that of justice. If you do +say this, by what right, or on what reason, do you proclaim your intention "to do +equal and exact justice to all men"? If there is no science of justice, how do you +know that there is any such principle as justice? Or how do you know what is, +and what is not, justice? If there is no science of justice,—such as the people can +learn and understand for themselves,—why do you say anything about justice <i>to +them?</i> Or why do you promise <i>them</i> any such thing as "equal and exact justice," if +they do not know, and are incapable of learning, what justice is? Do you use this +phrase to deceive those whom you look upon as being so ignorant, so destitute of +reason, as to be deceived by idle, unmeaning words? If you do not, you are plainly +bound to let us all know what you do mean, by doing "equal and exact justice to +all men."</p> + +<p class="indent">I can assure you, sir, that a very large portion of the people of this country do +not believe that the government is doing "equal and exact justice to all men." +And some persons are earnestly promulgating the idea that the government is not +attempting to do, and has no intention of doing, anything like "equal and exact +justice to all men"; that, on the contrary, it is knowingly, deliberately, and wilfully +doing an incalculable amount of injustice; that it has always been doing this +in the past, and that it has no intention of doing anything else in the future; that +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 6]</span> +it is a mere tool in the hands of a few ambitious, rapacious, and unprincipled +men; that its purpose, in doing all this injustice, is to keep—so far as they can +without driving the people to rebellion—all wealth, and all political power, in as +few hands as possible; and that this injustice is the direct cause of all the widespread +poverty, ignorance, and servitude among the great body of the people.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, Sir, I wish I could hope that you would do something to show that you are +not a party to any such scheme as that; something to show that you are neither +corrupt enough, nor blind enough, nor coward enough, to be made use of for any +such purpose as that; something to show that when you profess your intention +"to do equal and exact justice to all men," you attach some real and definite +meaning to your words. Until you do that, is it not plain that the people have a +right to consider you a tyrant, and the confederate and tool of tyrants, and to get +rid of you as unceremoniously as they would of any other tyrant?</p> + +<h2>Section III.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Sir, if any government is to be a rational, consistent, and honest one, it must +evidently be based on some fundamental, immutable, eternal principle; such as +every man may reasonably agree to, and such as every man may rightfully be +compelled to abide by, and obey. And the whole power of the government must +be limited to the maintenance of that single principle. And that one principle is +justice. There is no other principle that any man can rightfully enforce upon +others, or ought to consent to have enforced against himself. Every man claims +the protection of this principle for himself, whether he is willing to accord it to +others, or not. Yet such is the inconsistency of human nature, that some men—in +fact, many men—who will risk their lives for this principle, when their own +liberty or property is at stake, will violate it in the most flagrant manner, if they +can thereby obtain arbitrary power over the persons or property of others. We +have seen this fact illustrated in this country, through its whole history—especially +during the last hundred years—and in the case of many of the most conspicuous +persons. And their example and influence have been employed to +pervert the whole character of the government. It is against such men, that all +others, who desire nothing but justice for themselves, and are willing to unite to +secure it for all others, must combine, if we are ever to have justice established +for any.</p> + +<h2>Section IV.</h2> + +<p class="indent">It is self-evident that no number of men, by conspiring, and calling themselves +a government, can acquire any rights whatever over other men, or other men's +property, which they had not before, as individuals. And whenever any number +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 7]</span> +of men, calling themselves a government, do anything to another man, or to his +property, which they had no right to do as individuals they thereby declare themselves +trespassers, robbers, or murderers, according to the nature of their acts.</p> + +<p class="indent">Men, <i>as individuals</i>, may rightfully <i>compel</i> each other to obey this one law of justice. +And it is the only law which any man can rightfully be compelled, <i>by his +fellow men</i>, to obey. All other laws, it is optional with each man to obey, or not, +as he may choose. But this one law of justice he may rightfully be compelled to +obey; and all the force that is reasonably necessary to compel him, may rightfully +be used against him.</p> + +<p class="indent">But the right of every man to do anything, and everything, <i>which justice does not +forbid him to do</i>, is a natural, inherent, inalienable right. It is his right, as against +any and all other men, whether they be many, or few. It is a right indispensable +to every man's highest happiness; and to every man's power of judging and determining +for himself what will, and what will not, promote his happiness. Any +restriction upon the exercise of this right is a restriction upon his rightful power +of providing for, and accomplishing, his own well-being.</p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, these natural, inherent, inalienable, <i>individual</i> rights are sacred things. +<i>They are the only human rights.</i> They are the only rights by which any man can +protect his own property, liberty, or life against any one who may be disposed to +take it away. Consequently they are not things that any set of either blockheads +or villains, calling themselves a government, can rightfully take into their own +hands, and dispose of at their pleasure, as they have been accustomed to do in +this, and in nearly or quite all other countries.</p> + +<h2>Section V.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Sir, I repeat that individual rights are the only human rights. <i>Legally speaking</i>, +there are no such things as "<i>public rights</i>," as distinguished from individual rights. +<i>Legally speaking</i>, there is no such creature or thing as "<i>the public</i>." The term "the +public" is an utterly vague and indefinite one, applied arbitrarily and at random +to a greater or less number of individuals, each and every one of whom have their +own separate, individual rights, <i>and none others</i>. And the protection of these +separate, <i>individual</i> rights is the one only legitimate purpose, for which anything +in the nature of a governing, or coercive, power has a right to exist. And these +separate, individual rights all rest upon, and can be ascertained only by, the one +science of justice.</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>Legally speaking</i>, the term "public <i>rights</i>" is as vague and indefinite as are the +terms "public <i>health</i>," "public <i>good</i>," "public <i>welfare</i>," and the like. It has no +legal meaning, except when used to describe the separate, private, <i>individual</i> rights +of a greater or less number of individuals.</p> + +<p class="indent">In so far as the separate, private, natural rights of <i>individuals</i> are secured, in +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 8]</span> +just so far, and no farther, are the "public rights" secured. In so far as the separate, +private, natural rights of <i>individuals</i> are disregarded or violated, in just so far +are "public rights" disregarded or violated. Therefore all the pretences of so-called +lawmakers, that they are protecting "public rights," by violating private +rights, are sheer and utter contradictions and frauds. They are just as false and +absurd as it would be to say that they are protecting the public <i>health</i>, by arbitrarily +poisoning and destroying the health of single individuals.</p> + +<p class="indent">The pretence of the lawmakers, that they are promoting the "public <i>good</i>," +by violating individual "<i>rights</i>," is just as false and absurd as is the pretence that +they are protecting "public <i>rights</i>" by violating "private rights." Sir, the greatest +"public <i>good</i>," of which any coercive power, calling itself a government, or by +any other name, is capable, is the protection of each and every individual in the +quiet and peaceful enjoyment and exercise of <i>all</i> his own natural, inherent, inalienable, +<i>individual</i> "rights." This is a "good" that comes home to each and every +individual, of whom "the public" is composed. It is also a "good," which each +and every one of these individuals, composing "the public," can appreciate. It is +a "good," for the loss of which governments can make no compensation whatever. +<i>It is a universal and impartial "good,"</i> of the highest importance to each and every +human being; and not any such vague, false, and criminal thing as the lawmakers—when +violating private rights—tell us they are trying to accomplish, under the +name of "the public good." It is also the only "equal and exact justice," which +you, or anybody else, are capable of securing, or have any occasion to secure, to +any human being. Let but this "equal and exact justice" be secured "to all +men," and they will then be abundantly able to take care of themselves, and secure +their own highest "good." Or if any one should ever chance to need anything +more than this, he may safely trust to the voluntary kindness of his fellow +men to supply it.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is one of those things not easily accounted for, that men who would scorn +to do an injustice to a fellow man, in a private transaction,—who would scorn to +usurp any arbitrary dominion over him, or his property,—who would be in the +highest degree indignant, if charged with any private injustice,—and who, at a +moment's warning, would take their lives in their hands, to defend their own rights, +and redress their own wrongs,—will, the moment they become members of what +they call a government, assume that they are absolved from all principles and all +obligations that were imperative upon them, as individuals; will assume that they +are invested with a right of arbitrary and irresponsible dominion over other men, +and other men's property. Yet they are doing this continually. And all the laws +they <i>make</i> are based upon the assumption that they have now become invested +with rights that are more than human, and that those, on whom their laws are to +operate, have lost even their human rights. They seem to be utterly blind to the +fact, that the only reason there can be for their existence as a government, is that +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 9]</span> +they may protect those very "rights," which they before scrupulously respected, +but which they now unscrupulously trample upon.</p> + +<h2>Section VI.</h2> + +<p class="indent">But you evidently believe nothing of what I have now been saying. You evidently +believe that justice is no law at all, unless in cases where the lawmakers +may chance to prefer it to any law which they themselves can invent.</p> + +<p class="indent">You evidently believe that, a certain paper, called the constitution, which nobody +ever signed, which few persons ever read, which the great body of the people +never saw, and as to the meaning of which no two persons were ever agreed, is +the supreme law of this land, anything in the law of nature—anything in the +natural, inherent, inalienable, <i>individual</i> rights of fifty millions of people—to the +contrary not withstanding.</p> + +<p class="indent">Did folly, falsehood, absurdity, assumption, or criminality ever reach a higher +point than that?</p> + +<p class="indent">You evidently believe that those great volumes of statutes, which the people at +large have never read, nor even seen, and never will read, nor see, but which such +men as you and your lawmakers have been manufacturing for nearly a hundred +years, to restrain them of their liberty, and deprive them of their natural rights, +were all made for their benefit, by men wiser than they—wiser even than justice +itself—and having only their welfare at heart!</p> + +<p class="indent">You evidently believe that the men who made those laws were duly authorized +to make them; and that you yourself have been duly authorized to enforce them. +But in this you are utterly mistaken. You have not so much as the honest, +responsible scratch of one single pen, to justify you in the exercise of the power +you have taken upon yourself to exercise. For example, you have no such evidence +of your right to take any man's property for the support of your government, +as would be required of you, if you were to claim pay for a single day's +honest labor.</p> + +<p class="indent">It was once said, in this country, that taxation without consent was robbery. +And a seven years' war was fought to maintain that principle. But if that principle +were a true one in behalf of three millions of men, it is an equally true one +in behalf of three men, or of one man.</p> + +<p class="indent">Who are ever taxed? Individuals only. Who have property that can be taxed? +Individuals only. Who can give their consent to be taxed? Individuals only. +Who are ever taxed without their consent? Individuals only. Who, then, are +robbed, if taxed without their consent? Individuals only.</p> + +<p class="indent">If taxation without consent is robbery, the United States government has never +had, has not now, and is never likely to have, a single honest dollar in its treasury.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 10]</span> +If taxation without consent is <i>not</i> robbery, then any band of robbers have only +to declare themselves a government, and all their robberies are legalized.</p> + +<p class="indent">If any man's money can be taken by a so-called government, without his own +personal consent, all his other rights are taken with it; for with his money the +government can, and will, hire soldiers to stand over him, compel him to submit +to its arbitrary will, and kill him if he resists.</p> + +<p class="indent">That your whole claim of a right to any man's money for the support of your +government, without his consent, is the merest farce and fraud, is proved by the +fact that you have no such evidence of your right to take it, as would be required +of you, by one of your own courts, to prove a debt of five dollars, that might be +honestly due you.</p> + +<p class="indent">You and your lawmakers have no such evidence of your right of dominion over +the people of this country, as would be required to prove your right to any material +property, that you might have purchased.</p> + +<p class="indent">When a man parts with any considerable amount of such material property as +he has a natural right to part with,—as, for example, houses, or lands, or food, or +clothing, or anything else of much value,—he usually gives, and the purchaser +usually demands, some <i>written</i> acknowledgment, receipt, bill of sale, or other evidence, +that will prove that he voluntarily parted with it, and that the purchaser is +now the real and true owner of it. But you hold that fifty millions of people have +voluntarily parted, not only with their natural right of dominion over all their material +property, but also with all their natural right of dominion over their own +souls and bodies; when not one of them has ever given you a scrap of writing, or +even "made his mark," to that effect.</p> + +<p class="indent">You have not so much as the honest signature of a single human being, granting +to you or your lawmakers any right of dominion whatever over him or his +property.</p> + +<p class="indent">You hold your place only by a title, which, on no just principle of law or reason, +is worth a straw. And all who are associated with you in the government—whether +they be called senators, representatives, judges, executive officers, or what +not—all hold their places, directly or indirectly, only by the same worthless title. +That title is nothing more nor less than votes given in secret (by secret ballot), +by not more than one-fifth of the whole population. These votes were given in +secret solely because those who gave them did not dare to make themselves personally +responsible, either for their own acts, or the acts of their agents, the lawmakers, +judges, etc.</p> + +<p class="indent">These voters, having given their votes in secret (by secret ballot), have put it +out of your power—and out of the power of all others associated with you in the +government—to designate your principals <i>individually</i>. That is to say, you have +no legal knowledge as to who voted for you, or who voted against you. And being +unable to designate your principals <i>individually</i>, you have no right to say that you +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 11]</span> +have any principals. And having no right to say that you have any principals, +you are bound, on every just principle of law or reason, to confess that you are +mere usurpers, making laws, and enforcing them, upon your own authority alone.</p> + +<p class="indent">A secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is nothing +else than a government by conspiracy. And a government by conspiracy is the +only government we now have.</p> + +<p class="indent">You say that "<i>every voter exercises a public trust</i>."</p> + +<p class="indent">Who appointed him to that trust? Nobody. He simply usurped the power; +he never accepted the trust. And because he usurped the power, he dares exercise +it only in secret. Not one of all the ten millions of voters, who helped to place +you in power, would have dared to do so, if he had known that he was to be held +personally responsible, before any just tribunal, for the acts of those for whom he +voted.</p> + +<p class="indent">Inasmuch as all the votes, given for you and your lawmakers, were given in secret, +all that you and they can say, in support of your authority as rulers, is that +you venture upon your acts as lawmakers, etc., not because you have any open, +authentic, written, legitimate authority granted you by any human being,—for +you can show nothing of the kind,—but only because, from certain reports made +to you of votes given in secret, you have reason to believe that you have at your +backs a secret association strong enough to sustain you by force, in case your +authority should be resisted.</p> + +<p class="indent">Is there a government on earth that rests upon a more false, absurd, or tyrannical +basis than that?</p> + +<h2>Section VII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">But the falsehood and absurdity of your whole system of government do not +result solely from the fact that it rests wholly upon votes given in secret, or by +men who take care to avoid all personal responsibility for their own acts, or the +acts of their agents. On the contrary, if every man, woman, and child in the +United States had openly signed, sealed, and delivered to you and your associates, +a written document, purporting to invest you with all the legislative, judicial, and +executive powers that you now exercise, they would not thereby have given you +the slightest legitimate authority. Such a contract, purporting to surrender into +your hands all their natural rights of person and property, to be disposed of at +your pleasure or discretion, would have been simply an absurd and void contract, +giving you no real authority whatever.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is a natural impossibility for any man to make a <i>binding</i> contract, by which +he shall surrender to others a single one of what are commonly called his "natural, +inherent, <i>inalienable</i> rights."</p> + +<p class="indent">It is a natural impossibility for any man to make a <i>binding</i> contract, that shall +invest others with any right whatever of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion over him.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 12]</span> +The right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion is the right of property; and the +right of property is the right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion. The two are +identical. There is no difference between them. Neither can exist without the +other. If, therefore, our so-called lawmakers really have that right of arbitrary, +irresponsible dominion over us, which they claim to have, and which they habitually +exercise, it must be because they own us as property. If they own us as property, +it must be because nature made us their property; for, as no man can sell +himself as a slave, we could never make a binding contract that should make us +their property—or, what is the same thing, give them any right of arbitrary, irresponsible +dominion over us.</p> + +<p class="indent">As a lawyer, you certainly ought to know that all this is true.</p> + +<h2>Section VIII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Sir, consider, for a moment, what an utterly false, absurd, ridiculous, and criminal +government we now have.</p> + +<p class="indent">It all rests upon the false, ridiculous, and utterly groundless assumption, that +fifty millions of people not only could voluntarily surrender, but actually have +voluntarily surrendered, all their natural rights, as human beings, into the custody +of some four hundred men, called lawmakers, judges, etc., who are to be held +utterly irresponsible for the disposal they may make of them.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> The irresponsibility of the senators and representatives is guaranteed to them in this wise: +</p> + +<blockquote><p>For any speech or debate [or vote] in either house, they [the senators and representatives] shall not +be questioned [held to any legal responsibility] in any other place.—<i>Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 6.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p> +The judicial and executive officers are all equally guaranteed against all responsibility <i>to the people</i>. +They are made responsible only to the senators and representatives, whose laws they are to administer +and execute. So long as they sanction and execute all these laws, to the satisfaction of the lawmakers, +they are safe against all responsibility. <i>In no case can the people, whose rights they are continually +denying and trampling upon, hold them to any accountability whatever.</i> +</p> +<p> +Thus it will be seen that all departments of the government, legislative, judicial, and executive, are +placed entirely beyond any responsibility <i>to the people</i>, whose agents they profess to be, and whose +rights they assume to dispose of at pleasure. +</p> +<p> +Was a more absolute, irresponsible government than that ever invented?</p></div> +</div> + +<p class="indent">The only right, which any individual is supposed to retain, or possess, under the +government, <i>is a purely fictitious one,—one that nature never gave him,</i>—to wit, his +right (so-called), as one of some ten millions of male adults, to give away, by his +vote, not only all his own natural, inherent, inalienable, human rights, but also +all the natural, inherent, inalienable, human rights of forty millions of other +human beings—that is, women and children.</p> + +<p class="indent">To suppose that any one of all these ten millions of male adults would voluntarily +surrender a single one of all his natural, inherent, inalienable, human rights +into the hands of irresponsible men, is an absurdity; because, first, he has no +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 13]</span> +power to do so, any contract he may make for that purpose being absurd, and +necessarily void; and, secondly, because he can have no rational motive for doing +so. To suppose him to do so, is to suppose him to be an idiot, incapable of making +any rational and obligatory contract. It is to suppose he would voluntarily give +away everything in life that was of value to himself, and get nothing in return. +To suppose that he would attempt to give away all the natural rights <i>of other persons</i>—that +is, the women and children—as well as his own, is to suppose him to +attempt to do something that he has no right, or power, to do. It is to suppose +him to be both a villain and a fool.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet this government now rests wholly upon the assumption that some ten +millions of male adults—men supposed to be <i>compos mentis</i>—have not only attempted +to do, but have actually succeeded in doing, these absurd and impossible +things.</p> + +<p class="indent">It cannot be said that men put all their rights into the hands of the government, +in order to have them protected; because there can be no such thing as a man's being +protected in his rights, <i>any longer than he is allowed to retain them in his own possession</i>. +The only possible way, in which any man can be protected in his rights, +<i>is to protect him in his own actual possession and exercise of them</i>. And yet our government +is absurd enough to assume that a man can be protected in his rights, after +he has surrendered them altogether into other hands than his own.</p> + +<p class="indent">This is just as absurd as it would be to assume that a man had given himself +away as a slave, in order to be protected in the enjoyment of his liberty.</p> + +<p class="indent">A man wants his rights protected, solely that he himself may possess and use +them, and have the full benefit of them. But if he is compelled to give them up to +somebody else,—to a government, so-called, or to any body else,—he ceases to have +any rights of his own to be protected.</p> + +<p class="indent">To say, as the advocates of our government do, that a man must give up <i>some</i> of +his natural rights, to a government, in order to have the rest of them protected—the +government being all the while the sole and irresponsible judge as to what rights +he does give up, and what he retains, and what are to be protected—is to say that +he gives up all the rights that the government chooses, <i>at any time</i>, to assume that +he has given up; and that he retains none, and is to be protected in none, except +such as the government shall, <i>at all times</i>, see fit to protect, and to permit him to +retain. This is to suppose that he has retained no rights at all, that he can, <i>at any +time</i>, claim as his own, <i>as against the government</i>. It is to say that he has really +given up every right, and reserved none.</p> + +<p class="indent">For a still further reason, it is absurd to say that a man must give up <i>some</i> of his +rights to a government, in order that government may protect him in the rest. +That reason is, that every right he gives up diminishes his own power of self-protection, +and makes it so much more difficult for the government to protect him. +And yet our government says a man must give up <i>all</i> his rights, in order that it +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 14]</span> +may protect him. It might just as well be said that a man must consent to be +bound hand and foot, in order to enable a government, or his friends, to protect +him against an enemy. Leave him in full possession of his limbs, and of all his +powers, and he will do more for his own protection than he otherwise could, and +will have less need of protection from a government, or any other source.</p> + +<p class="indent">Finally, if a man, who is <i>compos mentis</i>, wants any outside protection for his rights, +he is perfectly competent to make his own bargain for such as he desires; and other +persons have no occasion to thrust their protection upon him, against his will; or +to insist, as they now do, that he shall give up all, or any, of his rights to them, in +consideration of such protection, and only such protection, as they may afterwards +<i>choose</i> to give him.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is especially noticeable that those persons, who are so impatient to protect other +men in their rights that they cannot wait until they are requested to do so, have a +somewhat inveterate habit of killing all who do not voluntarily accept their protection; +or do not consent to give up to them all their rights in exchange for it.</p> + +<p class="indent">If A were to go to B, a merchant, and say to him, "Sir, I am a night-watchman, +and I insist upon your employing me as such in protecting your property against +burglars; and to enable me to do so more effectually, I insist upon your letting me +tie your own hands and feet, so that you cannot interfere with me; and also upon +your delivering up to me all your keys to your store, your safe, and to all your valuables; +and that you authorize me to act solely and fully according to my own will, +pleasure, and discretion in the matter; and I demand still further, that you shall +give me an absolute guaranty that you will not hold me to any accountability whatever +for anything I may do, or for anything that may happen to your goods while +they are under my protection; and unless you comply with this proposal, I will now +kill you on the spot,"—if A were to say all this to B, B would naturally conclude +that A himself was the most impudent and dangerous burglar that he (B) had to +fear; and that if he (B) wished to secure his property against burglars, his best way +would be to kill A in the first place, and then take his chances against all such +other burglars as might come afterwards.</p> + +<p class="indent">Our government constantly acts the part that is here supposed to be acted by A. +And it is just as impudent a scoundrel as A is here supposed to be. It insists +that every man shall give up all his rights unreservedly into its custody, and then +hold it wholly irresponsible for any disposal it may make of them. And it gives +him no alternative but death.</p> + +<p class="indent">If by putting a bayonet to a man's breast, and giving him his choice, to die, or +be "protected in his rights," it secures his consent to the latter alternative, it then +proclaims itself a free government,—a government resting on consent!</p> + +<p class="indent">You yourself describe such a government as "the best government ever vouchsafed +to man."</p> + +<p class="indent">Can you tell me of one that is worse in principle?</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 15]</span> +But perhaps you will say that ours is not so bad, in principle, as the others, for +the reason that here, once in two, four, or six years, each male adult is permitted to +have one vote in ten millions, in choosing the public protectors. Well, if you think +that that materially alters the case, I wish you joy of your remarkable discernment.</p> + +<h2>Section IX.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Sir, if a government is to "do equal and exact justice to all men," <i>it must do +simply that, and nothing more</i>. If it does more than that to any,—that is, if it gives +monopolies, privileges, exemptions, bounties, or favors to any,—it can do so only +by doing injustice to more or less others. <i>It can give to one only what it takes from +others; for it has nothing of its own to give to any one.</i> The best that it can do for all, +and the only honest thing it can do for any, is simply to secure to each and every +one his own rights,—the rights that nature gave him,—his rights of person, and +his rights of property; leaving him, then, to pursue his own interests, and secure his +own welfare, by the free and full exercise of his own powers of body and mind; so +long as he trespasses upon the equal rights of no other person.</p> + +<p class="indent">If he desires any favors from any body, he must, I repeat, depend upon the voluntary +kindness of such of his fellow men as may be willing to grant them. No +government can have any right to grant them; because no government can have a +right to take from one man any thing that is his, and give it to another.</p> + +<p class="indent">If this be the only true idea of an honest government, it is plain that it can have +nothing to do with men's "interests," "welfare," or "prosperity," <i>as distinguished +from their "rights."</i> Being secured in their rights, each and all must take the sole +charge of, and have the sole responsibility for, their own "interests," "welfare," +and "prosperity."</p> + +<p class="indent">By simply protecting every man in his rights, a government necessarily keeps +open to every one the widest possible field, that he honestly can have, for such industry +as he may choose to follow. It also insures him the widest possible field +for obtaining such capital as he needs for his industry, and the widest possible +markets for the products of his labor. With the possession of these rights, he +must be content.</p> + +<p class="indent">No honest government can go into business with any individuals, be they many, +or few. It cannot furnish capital to any, nor prohibit the loaning of capital to any. +It can give to no one any special aid to competition; nor protect any one from +competition. It must adhere inflexibly to the principle of entire freedom for all +honest industry, and all honest traffic. It can do to no one any favor, nor render +to any one any assistance, which it withholds from another. It must hold the +scales impartially between them; taking no cognizance of any man's "interests," +"welfare," or "prosperity," otherwise than by simply protecting him in his "<i>rights</i>."</p> + +<p class="indent">In opposition to this view, lawmakers profess to have weighty duties laid upon +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 16]</span> +them, to promote men's "interests," "welfare," and "prosperity," <i>as distinguished +from their "rights."</i> They seldom have any thing to say about men's "<i>rights</i>." On +the contrary, they take it for granted that they are charged with the duty of promoting, +superintending, directing, and controlling the "business" of the country. +In the performance of this supposed duty, all ideas of individual "<i>rights</i>" are cast +aside. Not knowing any way—because there is no way—in which they can impartially +promote all men's "interests," "welfare," and "prosperity," <i>otherwise than +by protecting impartially all men's rights</i>, they boldly proclaim that "<i>individual rights +must not be permitted to stand in the way of the public good, the public welfare, and the +business interests of the country</i>."</p> + +<p class="indent">Substantially all their lawmaking proceeds upon this theory; for there is no +other theory, on which they can find any justification whatever for any lawmaking +at all. So they proceed to give monopolies, privileges, bounties, grants, loans, etc., +etc., to particular persons, or classes of persons; justifying themselves by saying +that these privileged persons will "give employment" to the unprivileged; and that +this employment, given by the privileged to the unprivileged, will compensate the +latter for the loss of their "<i>rights</i>." And they carry on their lawmaking of this +kind to the greatest extent they think is possible, without causing rebellion and +revolution, on the part of the injured classes.</p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, I am sorry to see that you adopt this lawmaking theory to its fullest extent; +that although, for once only, and in a dozen words only,—and then merely +incidentally,—you describe the government as "a government pledged to do equal +and exact justice to all men," you show, throughout the rest of your address, that +you have no thought of abiding by that principle; that you are either utterly ignorant, +or utterly regardless, of what that principle requires of you; that the government, +so far as your influence goes, is to be given up to the business of lawmaking,—that +is, to the business of abolishing justice, and establishing injustice in its +place; that you hold it to be the proper duty and function of the government to be +constantly looking after men's "interests," "welfare," "prosperity," etc., etc., <i>as +distinguished from their rights</i>; that it must consider men's "rights" as no guide to +the promotion of their "interests"; that it must give favors to some, and withhold +the same favors from others; that in order to give these favors to some, it must +take from others their <i>rights</i>; that, in reality, it must traffic in both men's interests +and their rights; that it must keep open shop, and sell men's interests and rights +to the highest bidders; and that this is your only plan for promoting "the general +welfare," "the common interest," etc., etc.</p> + +<p class="indent">That such is your idea of the constitutional duties and functions of the government, +is shown by different parts of your address: but more fully, perhaps, by this:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The large variety of diverse and <i>competing interests</i> subject to <i>federal control, persistently +seeking recognition of their claims</i>, need give us no fear that the greatest good of the greatest +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 17]</span> +number will fail to be accomplished, if, <i>in the halls of national legislation</i>, that spirit of +amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in which the constitution had its birth. If this +involves the <i>surrender</i> or <i>postponement</i> of <i>private interests</i>, and the <i>abandonment</i> of <i>local +advantages</i>, compensation will be found in the assurance that thus the <i>common interest</i> is +subserved, and <i>the general welfare</i> advanced.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">What is all this but saying that the government is not at all an institution for +"doing equal and exact justice to all men," or for the impartial protection of all +men's <i>rights</i>; but that it is its proper business to take sides, for and against, a +"large variety of diverse and <i>competing interests</i>"; that it has this "large variety of +diverse and <i>competing interests</i>" under its arbitrary "<i>control</i>"; that it can, at its +pleasure, make such laws as will give success to some of them, and insure the defeat +of others; that these "various, diverse, and <i>competing interests</i>" will be "<i>persistently +seeking recognition of their claims</i> ... in <i>the halls of national legislation</i>,"—that +is, will be "persistently" clamoring for laws to be made in their favor; that, +in fact, "the halls of national legislation" are to be mere arenas, into which the +government actually invites the advocates and representatives of all the selfish +schemes of avarice and ambition that unprincipled men can devise; that these +schemes will there be free to "<i>compete</i>" with each other in their corrupt offers for +government favor and support; and that it is to be the proper and ordinary business +of the lawmakers to listen to all these schemes; to adopt some of them, and +sustain them with all the money and power of the government; and to "postpone," +"abandon," oppose, and defeat all others; it being well known, all the while, that +the lawmakers will, <i>individually</i>, favor, or oppose, these various schemes, according +to their own irresponsible will, pleasure, and discretion,—that is, according as they +can better serve their own personal interests and ambitions by doing the one or +the other.</p> + +<p class="indent">Was a more thorough scheme of national villainy ever invented?</p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, do you not know that in this conflict, between these "various, diverse, and +<i>competing interests</i>," all ideas of individual "<i>rights</i>"—all ideas of "equal and exact +justice to all men"—will be cast to the winds; that the boldest, the strongest, the +most fraudulent, the most rapacious, and the most corrupt, men will have control +of the government, and make it a mere instrument for plundering the great body +of the people?</p> + +<p class="indent">Your idea of the real character of the government is plainly this: The lawmakers +are to assume absolute and irresponsible "<i>control</i>" of all the financial resources, +all the legislative, judicial, and executive powers, of the government, and +employ them all for the promotion of such schemes of plunder and ambition as +they may select from all those that may be submitted to them for their approval; +that they are to keep "the halls of national legislation" wide open for the admission +of all persons having such schemes to offer; and that they are to grant monopolies, +privileges, loans, and bounties to all such of these schemes as they can make +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 18]</span> +subserve their own individual interests and ambitions, and reject or "postpone" +all others. And that there is to be no limit to their operations of this kind, except +their fear of exciting rebellion and resistance on the part of the plundered classes.</p> + +<p class="indent">And you are just fool enough to tell us that such a government as this may be +relied on to "accomplish the greatest good to the greatest number," "to subserve +the common interest," and "advance the general welfare," "if," only, "in the halls +of national legislation, that spirit of amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in +which the constitution had its birth."</p> + +<p class="indent">You here assume that "the general welfare" is to depend, not upon the free +and untrammelled enterprise and industry of the whole people, acting individually, +and each enjoying and exercising all his natural rights; but wholly or principally +upon the success of such particular schemes as the government may take under its +special "control." And this means that "the general welfare" is to depend, wholly +or principally, upon such privileges, monopolies, loans, and bounties as the government +may grant to more or less of that "large variety of diverse and competing +<i>interests</i>"—that is, schemes—that may be "persistently" pressed upon its attention.</p> + +<p class="indent">But as you impliedly acknowledge that the government cannot take all these +"interests" (schemes) under its "control," and bestow its favors upon all alike, you +concede that some of them must be "surrendered," "postponed," or "abandoned"; +and that, consequently, the government cannot get on at all, unless, "in the halls +of national legislation, that spirit of amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in +which the constitution had its birth."</p> + +<p class="indent">This "spirit of amity and mutual concession in the halls of legislation," you explain +to mean this: a disposition, on the part of the lawmakers respectively—whose +various schemes of plunder cannot all be accomplished, by reason of their +being beyond the financial resources of the government, or the endurance of the +people—to "surrender" some of them, "postpone" others, and "abandon" others, +in order that the general business of robbery may go on to the greatest extent possible, +and that each one of the lawmakers may succeed with as many of the +schemes he is specially intrusted with, as he can carry through by means of such +bargains, for mutual help, as he may be able to make with his fellow lawmakers.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such is the plan of government, to which you say that you "consecrate" yourself, +and "engage your every faculty and effort."</p> + +<p class="indent">Was a more shameless avowal ever made?</p> + +<p class="indent">You cannot claim to be ignorant of what crimes such a government will commit. +You have had abundant opportunity to know—and if you have kept your eyes +open, you do know—what these schemes of robbery have been in the past; and +from these you can judge what they will be in the future.</p> + +<p class="indent">You know that under such a system, every senator and representative—probably +without an exception—will come to the congress as the champion of the dominant +scoundrelisms of his own State or district; that he will be elected solely to serve +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 19]</span> +those "interests," as you call them; that in offering himself as a candidate, he will +announce the robbery, or robberies, to which all his efforts will be directed; that +he will call these robberies his "policy"; or if he be lost to all decency, he will call +them his "principles"; that they will always be such as he thinks will best subserve +his own interests, or ambitions; that he will go to "the halls of national legislation" +with his head full of plans for making bargains with other lawmakers—as +corrupt as himself—for mutual help in carrying their respective schemes.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such has been the character of our congresses nearly, or quite, from the beginning. +It can scarcely be said that there has ever been an honest man in one of +them. A man has sometimes gained a reputation for honesty, in his own State or +district, by opposing some one or more of the robberies that were proposed by +members from other portions of the country. But such a man has seldom, or +never, deserved his reputation; for he has, generally, if not always, been the advocate +of some one or more schemes of robbery, by which more or less of his own +constituents were to profit, and which he knew it would be indispensable that he +should advocate, in order to give him votes at home.</p> + +<p class="indent">If there have ever been any members, who were consistently honest throughout,—who +were really in favor of "doing equal and exact justice to all men,"—and, +of course, nothing more than that to any,—their numbers have been few; so few +as to have left no mark upon the general legislation. They have but constituted +the exceptions that proved the rule. If you were now required to name such a +lawmaker, I think you would search our history in vain to find him.</p> + +<p class="indent">That this is no exaggerated description of our national lawmaking, the following +facts will prove.</p> + +<p class="indent">For the first seventy years of the government, one portion of the lawmakers +would be satisfied with nothing less than permission to rob one-sixth, or one-seventh, +of the whole population, not only of their labor, but even of their right to +their own persons. In 1860, this class of lawmakers comprised all the senators and +representatives from fifteen, of the then thirty-three, States.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> In the Senate they stood thirty to thirty-six, in the house ninety to one hundred and forty-seven, in +the two branches united one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty-three, relatively to the +non-slaveholding members.</p> + +<p> +From the foundation of the government—without a single interval, I think—the lawmakers from +the slaveholding States had been, <i>relatively</i>, as strong, or stronger, than in 1860.</p></div> +</div> + +<p class="indent">This body of lawmakers, standing always firmly together, and capable of turning +the scale for, or against, any scheme of robbery, in which northern men were +interested, but on which northern men were divided,—such as navigation acts, +tariffs, bounties, grants, war, peace, etc.,—could purchase immunity for their own +crime, by supporting such, and so many, northern crimes—second only to their +own in atrocity—as could be mutually agreed on.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 20]</span> +In this way the slaveholders bargained for, and secured, protection for slavery +and the slave trade, by consenting to such navigation acts as some of the northern +States desired, and to such tariffs on imports—such as iron, coal, wool, woollen +goods, etc.,—as should enable the home producers of similar articles to make fortunes +by robbing everybody else in the prices of their goods.</p> + +<p class="indent">Another class of lawmakers have been satisfied with nothing less than such a +monopoly of money, as should enable the holders of it to suppress, as far as possible, +all industry and traffic, except such as they themselves should control; such a +monopoly of money as would put it wholly out of the power of the great body of +wealth-producers to hire the capital needed for their industries; and thus compel +them—especially the mechanical portions of them—by the alternative of starvation—to +sell their labor to the monopolists of money, for just such prices as these +latter should choose to pay. This monopoly of money has also given, to the holders +of it, a control, so nearly absolute, of all industry—agricultural as well as mechanical—and +all traffic, as has enabled them to plunder all the producing classes +in the prices of their labor, or the products of their labor.</p> + +<p class="indent">Have you been blind, all these years, to the existence, or the effects, of this monopoly +of money?</p> + +<p class="indent">Still another class of lawmakers have demanded unequal taxation on the various +kinds of home property, that are subject to taxation; such unequal taxation as +would throw heavy burdens upon some kinds of property, and very light burdens, +or no burdens at all, upon other kinds.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet another class of lawmakers have demanded great appropriations, or +loans, of money, or grants of lands, to enterprises intended to give great wealth to +a few, at the expense of everybody else.</p> + +<p class="indent">These are some of the schemes of downright and outright robbery, which you +mildly describe as "the large variety of diverse and competing interests, <i>subject +to federal control</i>, persistently seeking recognition of their claims ... in the +halls of national legislation"; and each having its champions and representatives +among the lawmakers.</p> + +<p class="indent">You know that all, or very nearly all, the legislation of congress is devoted to +these various schemes of robbery; and that little, or no, legislation goes through, +except by means of such bargains as these lawmakers may enter into with each +other, for mutual support of their respective robberies. And yet you have the +mendacity, or the stupidity, to tell us that so much of this legislation as does go +through, may be relied on to "accomplish the greatest good to the greatest number," +to "subserve the common interest," and "advance the general welfare."</p> + +<p class="indent">And when these schemes of robbery become so numerous, atrocious, and unendurable +that they can no longer be reconciled "in the halls of national legislation," +by "surrendering" some of them, "postponing" others, and "abandoning" others, +you assume—for such has been the prevailing opinion, and you say nothing to +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 21]</span> +the contrary—that it is the right of the strongest party, or parties, to murder a +half million of men, if that be necessary,—and as we once did,—not to secure +liberty or justice to any body,—but to compel the weaker of these would-be robbers +to submit to all such robberies as the stronger ones may choose to practise +upon them.</p> + +<h2>Section X.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Sir, your idea of the true character of our government is plainly this: you assume +that all the natural, inherent, inalienable, individual, <i>human</i> rights of fifty +millions of people—all their individual rights to preserve their own lives, and +promote their own happiness—have been thrown into one common heap,—into +hotchpotch, as the lawyers say: and that this hotchpotch has been given into the +hands of some four hundred champion robbers, each of whom has pledged himself +to carry off as large a portion of it as possible, to be divided among those men—well +known to himself, but who—to save themselves from all responsibility for +his acts—have secretly (by secret ballot) appointed him to be their champion.</p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, if you had assumed that all the people of this country had thrown all their +wealth, all their rights, all their means of living, into hotchpotch; and that this +hotchpotch had been given over to four hundred ferocious hounds; and that each +of these hounds had been selected and trained to bring to his masters so much of +this common plunder as he, in the general fight, or scramble, could get off with, +you would scarcely have drawn a more vivid picture of the true character of the +government of the United States, than you have done in your inaugural address.</p> + +<p class="indent">No wonder that you are obliged to confess that such a government can be carried +on only "amid the din of party strife"; that it will be influenced—you +should have said <i>directed</i>—by "purely partisan zeal"; and that it will be attended +by "the animosities of political strife, the bitterness of partisan defeat, and the +exultation of partisan triumph."</p> + +<p class="indent">What gang of robbers, quarrelling over the division of their plunder, could +exhibit a more shameful picture than you thus acknowledge to be shown by the +government of the United States?</p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, nothing of all this "din," and "strife," and "animosity," and "bitterness," +is caused by any attempt, on the part of the government, to simply "do equal and +exact justice to all men,"—to simply protect every man impartially in all his +natural rights to life, liberty, and property. It is all caused simply and solely by +the government's violation of some men's "<i>rights</i>," to promote other men's "interests." +If you do not know this, you are mentally an object of pity.</p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, men's "<i>rights</i>" are always harmonious. That is to say, each man's "rights" +are always consistent and harmonious with each and every other man's "rights." +But their "<i>interests</i>" as you estimate them, constantly clash; especially such +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 22]</span> +"interests" as depend on government grants of monopolies, privileges, loans, and +bounties. And these "interests," like the interests of other gamblers, clash with +a fury proportioned to the amounts at stake. It is these clashing "<i>interests</i>" and +not any clashing "<i>rights</i>" that give rise to all the strife you have here depicted, +and to all this necessity for "that spirit of amity and mutual concession," which +you hold to be indispensable to the accomplishment of such legislation as you say +is necessary to the welfare of the country.</p> + +<p class="indent">Each and every man's "<i>rights</i>" being consistent and harmonious with each and +every other man's "<i>rights</i>"; and all men's rights being immutably fixed, and easily +ascertained, by a science that is open to be learned and known by all; a government +that does nothing but "equal and exact justice to all men"—that simply +gives to every man his own, and nothing more to any—has no cause and no occasion +for any "political <i>parties</i>." What are these "political parties" but standing +armies of robbers, each trying to rob the other, and to prevent being itself robbed +by the other? A government that seeks only to "do equal and exact justice to all +men," has no cause and no occasion to enlist all the fighting men in the nation in +two hostile ranks; to keep them always in battle array, and burning with hatred +towards each other. It has no cause and no occasion for any "political <i>warfare</i>" +any "political <i>hostility</i>" any "political <i>campaigns</i>" any "political <i>contests</i>" any +"political <i>fights</i>" any "political <i>defeats</i>" or any "political <i>triumphs</i>." It has no +cause and no occasion for any of those "political <i>leaders</i>" so called, whose whole +business is to invent new schemes of robbery, and organize the people into opposing +bands of robbers; all for their own aggrandizement alone. It has no cause +and no occasion for the toleration, or the existence, of that vile horde of political +bullies, and swindlers, and blackguards, who enlist on one side or the other, and +fight for pay; who, year in and year out, employ their lungs and their ink in +spreading lies among ignorant people, to excite their hopes of gain, or their fears +of loss, and thus obtain their votes. In short, it has no cause and no occasion for +all this "din of party strife," for all this "purely partisan zeal," for all "the bitterness +of partisan defeat," for all "the exultation of partisan triumph," nor, worst +of all, for any of "that spirit of amity and mutual concession [by which you evidently +mean that readiness, "in the halls of national legislation," to sacrifice some +men's "rights" to promote other men's "interests"] in which [you say] the constitution +had its birth."</p> + +<p class="indent">If the constitution does really, or naturally, give rise to all this "strife," and +require all this "spirit of amity and mutual concession,"—and I do not care now +to deny that it does,—so much the worse for the constitution. And so much the +worse for all those men who, like yourself, swear to "preserve, protect, and +defend it."</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet you have the face to make no end of professions, or pretences, that the +impelling power, the real motive, in all this robbery and strife, is nothing else +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 23]</span> +than "the service of the people," "their interests," "the promotion of their welfare," +"good government," "government by the people," "the popular will," "the +general weal," "the achievements of our national destiny," "the benefits which +our happy form of government can bestow," "the lasting welfare of the country," +"the priceless benefits of the constitution," "the greatest good to the greatest +number," "the common interest," "the general welfare," "the people's will," "the +mission of the American people," "our civil policy," "the genius of our institutions," +"the needs of our people in their home life," "the settlement and development +of the resources of our vast territory," "the prosperity of our republic," "the +interests and prosperity of all the people," "the safety and confidence of business +interests," "making the wage of labor sure and steady," "a due regard to the interests +of capital invested and workingmen employed in American industries," +"reform in the administration of the government," "the application of business +principles to public affairs," "the constant and ever varying wants of an active +and enterprising population," "a firm determination to secure to all the people of +the land the full benefits of the best form of government ever vouchsafed to man," +"the blessings of our national life," etc., etc.</p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, what is the use of such a deluge of unmeaning words, unless it be to gloss +over, and, if possible, hide, the true character of the acts of the government?</p> + +<p class="indent">Such "generalities" as these do not even "glitter." They are only the stale +phrases of the demagogue, who wishes to appear to promise everything, but commits +himself to nothing. Or else they are the senseless talk of a mere political parrot, +who repeats words he has been taught to utter, without knowing their meaning. At +best, they are the mere gibberish of a man destitute of all political ideas, but who +imagines that "good government," "the general welfare," "the common interest," +"the best form of government ever vouchsafed to man," etc., etc., must be very +good things, if anybody can ever find out what they are. There is nothing definite, +nothing real, nothing tangible, nothing honest, about them. Yet they constitute +your entire stock in trade. In resorting to them—in holding them up to public +gaze as comprising your political creed—you assume that they have a meaning; +that they are matters of overruling importance; that they require the action of an +omnipotent, irresponsible, lawmaking government; that all these "interests" must +be represented, and can be secured, only "in the halls of national legislation"; and +by such political hounds as have been selected and trained, and sent there, solely +that they may bring off, to their respective masters, as much as possible of the public +plunder they hold in their hands; that is, as much as possible of the earnings +of all the honest wealth-producers of the country.</p> + +<p class="indent">And when these masters count up the spoils that their hounds have thus brought +home to them, they set up a corresponding shout that "the public prosperity," "the +common interest," and "the general welfare" have been "advanced." And the +scoundrels by whom the work has been accomplished, "in the halls of national +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 24]</span> +legislation," are trumpeted to the world as "great statesmen." And you are just +stupid enough to be deceived into the belief, or just knave enough to pretend to +be deceived into the belief, that all this is really the truth.</p> + +<p class="indent">One would infer from your address that you think the people of this country incapable +of doing anything for themselves, <i>individually</i>; that they would all perish, +but for the employment given them by that "large variety of diverse and competing +interests"—that is, such purely selfish schemes—as may be "persistently seeking +recognition of their claims ... in the halls of national legislation," and +secure for themselves such monopolies and advantages as congress may see fit to +grant them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Instead of your recognizing the right of each and every individual to judge of, +and provide for, his own well-being, according to the dictates of his own judgment, +and by the free exercise of his own powers of body and mind,—so long as he infringes +the equal rights of no other person,—you assume that fifty millions of people, +who never saw you, and never will see you, who know almost nothing about +you, and care very little about you, are all so weak, ignorant, and degraded as to +be humbly and beseechingly looking to you—and to a few more lawmakers (so +called) whom they never saw, and never will see, and of whom they know almost +nothing—to enlighten, direct, and "<i>control</i>" them in their daily labors to supply +their own wants, and promote their own happiness!</p> + +<p class="indent">You thus assume that these fifty millions of people are so debased, mentally and +morally, that they look upon you and your associate lawmakers as their earthly +gods, holding their destinies in your hands, and anxiously studying their welfare; +instead of looking upon you—as most of you certainly ought to be looked upon—as +a mere cabal of ignorant, selfish, ambitious, rapacious, and unprincipled men, +who know very little, and care to know very little, except how you can get fame, +and power, and money, by trampling upon other men's rights, and robbing them +of the fruits of their labor.</p> + +<p class="indent">Assuming yourself to be the greatest of these gods, charged with the "welfare" +of fifty millions of people, you enter upon the mighty task with all the mock solemnity, +and ridiculous grandiloquence, of a man ignorant enough to imagine that he +is really performing a solemn duty, and doing an immense public service, instead +of simply making a fool of himself. Thus you say:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Fellow citizens: In the presence of this vast assemblage of my countrymen, I am about to +supplement and seal, by the oath which I shall take, the manifestation of the will of a great +and free people. In the exercise of their power and right of self-government, they have committed +to one of their fellow citizens a supreme and sacred trust, and he here consecrates +himself to their service. This impressive ceremony adds little to the solemn sense of responsibility +with which I contemplate the duty I owe to all the people of the land. Nothing can +relieve me from anxiety lest by any act of mine their <i>interests</i> [not their <i>rights</i>] may suffer, +and nothing is needed to strengthen my resolution to engage every faculty and effort in the +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 25]</span> +promotion of their <i>welfare</i>. [Not in "doing equal and exact justice to all men." After +having once described the government as one "pledged to do equal and exact justice to all +men," you drop that subject entirely, and wander off into "interests," and "welfare," and +an astonishing number of other equally unmeaning things.]</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Sir, you would have no occasion to take all this tremendous labor and responsibility +upon yourself, if you and your lawmakers would but keep your hands off the +"<i>rights</i>" of your "countrymen." Your "countrymen" would be perfectly competent +to take care of their own "<i>interests</i>," and provide for their own "<i>welfare</i>," if +their hands were not tied, and their powers crippled, by such fetters as men like +you and your lawmakers have fastened upon them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Do you know so little of your "countrymen," that you need to be told that their +own strength and skill must be their sole reliance for their own well-being? Or +that they are abundantly able, and willing, and anxious above all other things, to +supply their own "needs in their home life," and secure their own "welfare"? Or +that they would do it, not only without jar or friction, but as their highest duty and +pleasure, if their powers were not manacled by the absurd and villainous laws you +propose to execute upon them? Are you so stupid as to imagine that putting +chains on men's hands, and fetters on their feet, and insurmountable obstacles in +their paths, is the way to supply their "needs," and promote their "welfare"? Do +you think your "countrymen" need to be told, either by yourself, or by any such +gang of ignorant or unprincipled men as all lawmakers are, what to do, and what +not to do, to supply their own "needs in their home life"? Do they not know how +to grow their own food, make their own clothing, build their own houses, print +their own books, acquire all the knowledge, and create all the wealth, they desire, +without being domineered over, and thwarted in all their efforts, by any set of +either fools or villains, who may call themselves their lawmakers? And do you +think they will never get their eyes open to see what blockheads, or impostors, you +and your lawmakers are? Do they not now—at least so far as you will permit +them to do it—grow their own food, build their own houses, make their own +clothing, print their own books? Do they not make all the scientific discoveries +and mechanical inventions, by which all wealth is created? <i>Or are all these things +done by "the government"?</i> Are you an idiot, that you can talk as you do, about +what you and your lawmakers are doing to provide for the real wants, and promote +the real "welfare," of fifty millions of people?</p> + +<h2>Section XI.</h2> + +<p class="indent">But perhaps the most brilliant idea in your whole address, is this:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent"><i>Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of its public servants,</i> +and a fair and reasonable estimate of their fidelity and usefulness. Thus is the people's will +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 26]</span> +impressed upon the whole framework of our civil policy, municipal, State, and federal; <i>and +this is the price of our liberty</i>, and the inspiration of our faith in the republic.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The essential parts of this declaration are these:</p> + +<p class="indent">"<i>Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of its public servants, ... and +this is the price of our liberty.</i>"</p> + +<p class="indent">Who are these "public servants," that need all this watching? Evidently they +are the lawmakers, and the lawmakers only. They are not only the <i>chief</i> "public +servants," but they are absolute masters of all the other "public servants." These +other "public servants," judicial and executive,—the courts, the army, the navy, +the collectors of taxes, etc., etc.,—have no function whatever, except that of simple +obedience to the lawmakers. They are appointed, paid, and have their duties +prescribed to them, by the lawmakers; and are made responsible only to the lawmakers. +They are mere puppets in the hands of the lawmakers. Clearly, then, +the lawmakers are the only ones we have any occasion to watch.</p> + +<p class="indent">Your declaration, therefore, amounts, practically, to this, and this only:</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of ITS LAWMAKERS, ... and +this is the price of our liberty.</i></p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, your declaration is so far true, as that all the danger to "our liberty" <i>comes +solely from the lawmakers</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">And why are the lawmakers dangerous to "our liberty"? Because it is a natural +impossibility that they can <i>make</i> any law—that is, any law of their own +invention—that does <i>not</i> violate "our liberty."</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>The law of justice is the one only law that does not violate "our liberty."</i> And that +is not a law that was made by the lawmakers. It existed before they were born, +and will exist after they are dead. It derives not one particle of its authority +from any commands of theirs. It is, therefore, in no sense, one of <i>their</i> laws. Only +laws of their own invention are <i>their</i> laws. And as it is naturally impossible that +they can invent any law of their own, that shall not conflict with the law of +justice, it is naturally impossible that they can <i>make</i> a law—that is, a law of their +own invention—that shall <i>not</i> violate "our liberty."</p> + +<p class="indent">The law of justice is the precise measure, and the only precise measure, of the +rightful "liberty" of each and every human being. Any law—made by lawmakers—that +should give to any man more liberty than is given him by the law +of justice, would be a license to commit an injustice upon one or more other persons. +On the other hand, any law—made by lawmakers—that should take from +any human being any "liberty" that is given him by the law of justice, would be +taking from him a part of his own rightful "liberty."</p> + +<p class="indent">Inasmuch, then, as every possible law, that can be made by lawmakers, must +either give to some one or more persons more "liberty" than the law of nature—or +the law of justice—gives them, and more "liberty" than is consistent with the +natural and equal "liberty" of all other persons; or else must take from some one +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 27]</span> +or more persons some portion of that "liberty" which the law of nature—or the +law of justice—gives to every human being, it is inevitable that every law, that +can be made by lawmakers, must be a violation of the natural and rightful "liberty" +of some one or more persons.</p> + +<p class="indent">Therefore the very idea of a <i>lawmaking</i> government—a government that is to +make laws of its own invention—is necessarily in direct and inevitable conflict +with "our liberty." In fact, the whole, sole, and only real purpose of any <i>lawmaking</i> +government whatever is to take from some one or more persons their "liberty." +Consequently the only way in which all men can preserve their "liberty," is not to +have any <i>lawmaking</i> government at all.</p> + +<p class="indent">We have been told, time out of mind, that "<i>Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty</i>." +But this admonition, by reason of its indefiniteness, has heretofore fallen +dead upon the popular mind. It, in reality, tells us nothing that we need to know, +to enable us to preserve "our liberty." It does not even tell us what "our liberty" +is, or how, or when, or through whom, it is endangered, or destroyed.</p> + +<p class="indent">1. It does not tell us that <i>individual</i> liberty is the only <i>human</i> liberty. It does +not tell us that "national liberty," "political liberty," "republican liberty," +"democratic liberty," "constitutional liberty," "liberty under law," and all the +other kinds of liberty that men have ever invented, and with which tyrants, as +well as demagogues, have amused and cheated the ignorant, are not liberty at all, +unless in so far as they may, under certain circumstances, have chanced to contribute +something to, or given some impulse toward, <i>individual</i> liberty.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. It does not tell us that <i>individual</i> liberty means freedom from all compulsion +to do anything whatever, except what justice requires us to do, and freedom to do +everything whatever that justice permits us to do. It does not tell us that individual +liberty means freedom from all human restraint or coercion whatsoever, so +long as we "live honestly, hurt nobody, and give to every one his due."</p> + +<p class="indent">3. It does not tell us that there is any <i>science of liberty</i>; any science, which +every man may learn, and by which every man may know, what is, and what is +not, his own, and every other man's, rightful "liberty."</p> + +<p class="indent">4. It does not tell us that this right of individual liberty rests upon an immutable, +natural principle, which no human power can make, unmake, or alter; nor +that all human authority, that claims to set it aside, or modify it, is nothing but +falsehood, absurdity, usurpation, tyranny, and crime.</p> + +<p class="indent">5. It does not tell us that this right of individual liberty is a <i>natural, inherent, +inalienable right; that therefore no man can part with it, or delegate it to another, if he +would</i>; and that, consequently, all the claims that have ever been made, by governments, +priests, or any other powers, that individuals have voluntarily surrendered, +or "delegated," their liberty to others, are all impostures and frauds.</p> + +<p class="indent">6. It does not tell us that all human laws, so called, and all human lawmaking,—all +commands, either by one man, or any number of men, calling themselves a +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 28]</span> +government, or by any other name—requiring any individual to do this, or forbidding +him to do that—so long as he "lives honestly, hurts no one, and gives to +every one his due"—are all false and tyrannical assumptions of a right of authority +and dominion over him; are all violations of his natural, inherent, inalienable, +rightful, individual liberty; and, as such, are to be resented and resisted to the +utmost, by every one who does not choose to be a slave.</p> + +<p class="indent">7. And, finally, it does not tell us that all <i>lawmaking</i> governments whatsoever—whether +called monarchies, aristocracies, republics, democracies, or by any other +name—are all alike violations of men's natural and rightful liberty.</p> + +<p class="indent">We can now see why lawmakers are the only enemies, from whom "our liberty" +has anything to fear, or whom we have any occasion to watch. They are to be +watched, because they claim the right to abolish justice, and establish injustice in +its stead; because they claim the right to command us to do things which justice +does not require us to do, and to forbid us to do things which justice permits us to +do; because they deny our right to be, <i>individually, and absolutely</i>, our own masters +and owners, so long as we obey the one law of justice towards all other persons; +because they claim to be our masters, and that <i>their</i> commands, <i>as such</i>, are authoritative +and binding upon us as law; and that they may rightfully compel us +to obey them.</p> + +<p class="indent">"Our liberty" is in danger only from the lawmakers, because it is only through +the agency of lawmakers, that anybody pretends to be able to take away "our +liberty." It is only the lawmakers that claim to be above all responsibility for +taking away "our liberty." Lawmakers are the only ones who are impudent +enough to assert for themselves the right to take away "our liberty." They are +the only ones who are impudent enough to tell us that we have voluntarily surrendered +"our liberty" into their hands. They are the only ones who have the insolent +condescension to tell us that, in consideration of our having surrendered into +their hands "our liberty," and all our natural, inherent, inalienable rights as human +beings, they are disposed to give us, in return, "good government," "the best +form of government ever vouchsafed to man"; to "protect" us, to provide for our +"welfare," to promote our "interests," etc., etc.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet you are just blockhead enough to tell us that if "Every citizen"—fifty +millions and more of them—will but keep "a vigilant watch and close scrutiny" +upon these lawmakers, "our liberty" may be preserved!</p> + +<p class="indent">Don't you think, sir, that you are really the wisest man that ever told "a great +and free people" how they could preserve "their liberty"?</p> + +<p class="indent">To be entirely candid, don't you think, sir, that a surer way of preserving "our +liberty" would be to have no lawmakers at all? +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 29]</span></p> + +<h2>Section XII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">But, in spite of all I have said, or, perhaps, can say, you will probably persist in +your idea that the world needs a great deal of lawmaking; that mankind in general +are not entitled to have any will, choice, judgment, or conscience of their own; +that, if not very wicked, they are at least very ignorant and stupid; that they know +very little of what is for their own good, or how to promote their own "interests," +"welfare," or "prosperity"; that it is therefore necessary that they should be put +under guardianship to lawmakers; that these lawmakers, being a very superior race +of beings,—wise beyond the rest of their species,—and entirely free from all those +selfish passions which tempt common mortals to do wrong,—must be intrusted +with absolute and irresponsible dominion over the less favored of their kind; must +prescribe to the latter, authoritatively, what they may, and may not, do; and, in +general, manage the affairs of this world according to their discretion, free of all +accountability to any human tribunals.</p> + +<p class="indent">And you seem to be perfectly confident that, under this absolute and irresponsible +dominion of the lawmakers, the affairs of this world will be rightly managed; +that the "interests," "welfare," and "prosperity" of "a great and free people" will +be properly attended to; that "the greatest good of the greatest number" will be +accomplished, etc., etc.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet you hold that all this lawmaking, and all this subjection of the great +body of the people to the arbitrary, irresponsible dominion of the lawmakers, will +not interfere at all with "our liberty," if only "every citizen" will but keep "a vigilant +watch and close scrutiny" of the lawmakers.</p> + +<p class="indent">Well, perhaps this is all so; although this subjection to the arbitrary will of any +man, or body of men, whatever, and under any pretence whatever, seems, on the +face of it, to be much more like slavery, than it does like "liberty".</p> + +<p class="indent">If, therefore, you really intend to continue this system of lawmaking, it seems +indispensable that you should explain to us what you mean by the term "our +liberty."</p> + +<p class="indent">So far as your address gives us any light on the subject, you evidently mean, by +the term "our liberty," just such, and only such, "liberty," as the lawmakers may +see fit to allow us to have.</p> + +<p class="indent">You seem to have no conception of any other "liberty" whatever.</p> + +<p class="indent">You give us no idea of any other "liberty" that we can secure to ourselves, even +though "every citizen"—fifty millions and more of them—shall all keep "a vigilant +watch and close scrutiny" upon the lawmakers.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, inasmuch as the human race always have had all the "liberty" their lawmakers +have seen fit to permit them to have; and inasmuch as, under your system +of lawmaking, they always will have as much "liberty" as their lawmakers shall +see fit to give them; and inasmuch as you apparently concede the right, which the +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 30]</span> +lawmakers have always claimed, of killing all those who are not content with so +much "liberty" as their lawmakers have seen fit to allow them,—it seems very +plain that you have not added anything to our stock of knowledge on the subject +of "our liberty."</p> + +<p class="indent">Leaving us thus, as you do, in as great darkness as we ever were, on this all-important +subject of "our liberty," I think you ought to submit patiently to a +little questioning on the part of those of us, who feel that all this lawmaking—each +and every separate particle of it—is a violation of "our liberty."</p> + +<p class="indent">Will you, therefore, please tell us whether any, and, if any, how much, of that +<i>natural</i> liberty—of that natural, inherent, inalienable, <i>individual</i> right to liberty—with +which it has generally been supposed that God, or Nature, has endowed every +human being, will be left to us, if the lawmakers are to continue, as you would +have them do, the exercise of their arbitrary, irresponsible dominion over us?</p> + +<p class="indent">Are you prepared to answer that question?</p> + +<p class="indent">No. You appear to have never given a thought to any such question as that.</p> + +<p class="indent">I will therefore answer it for you.</p> + +<p class="indent">And my answer is, that from the moment it is conceded that any man, or body +of men, whatever, under any pretence whatever, have the right to <i>make laws of their +own invention</i>, and compel other men to obey them, every vestige of man's <i>natural</i> +and rightful liberty is denied him.</p> + +<p class="indent">That this is so is proved by the fact that <i>all</i> a man's <i>natural</i> rights stand upon +one and the same basis, <i>viz.</i>, that they are the gift of God, or Nature, to him, <i>as an +individual</i>, for his own uses, and for his own happiness. If any one of these natural +rights may be arbitrarily taken from him by other men, <i>all</i> of them may be taken +from him on the same reason. No one of these rights is any more sacred or inviolable +in its nature, than are all the others. The denial of any one of these rights +is therefore equivalent to a denial of all the others. The violation of any one of +these rights, by lawmakers, is equivalent to the assertion of a right to violate all +of them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Plainly, unless <i>all</i> a man's natural rights are inviolable by lawmakers, <i>none</i> of +them are. It is an absurdity to say that a man has any rights <i>of his own</i>, if other +men, whether calling themselves a government, or by any other name, have the +right to take them from him, without his consent. Therefore the very idea of a +lawmaking government necessarily implies a denial of all such things as individual +liberty, or individual rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">From this statement it does not follow that every lawmaking government will, +in practice, take from every man <i>all</i> his natural rights. It will do as it pleases +about it. It will take some, leaving him to enjoy others, just as its own pleasure +or discretion shall dictate at the time. It would defeat its own ends, if it were +wantonly to take away <i>all</i> his natural rights,—as, for example, his right to live, +and to breathe,—for then he would be dead, and the government could then get +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 31]</span> +nothing more out of him. The most tyrannical government will, therefore, if it +have any sense, leave its victims enough liberty to enable them to provide for their +own subsistence, to pay their taxes, and to render such military or other service as +the government may have need of. <i>But it will do this for its own good, and not for +theirs.</i> In allowing them this liberty, it does not at all recognize their right to it, +but only consults its own interests.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, sir, this is the real character of the government of the United States, as it +is of all other <i>lawmaking</i> governments. There is not a single human right, which +the government of the United States recognises as inviolable. It tramples upon +any and every individual right, whenever its own will, pleasure, or discretion shall +so dictate. It takes men's property, liberty, and lives whenever it can serve its +own purposes by doing so.</p> + +<p class="indent">All these things prove that the government does not exist at all for the protection +of men's <i>rights</i>; but that it absolutely denies to the people any rights, or any +liberty, whatever, except such as it shall see fit to permit them to have for the time +being. It virtually declares that it does not itself exist at all for the good of the +people, but that the people exist solely for the use of the government.</p> + +<p class="indent">All these things prove that the government is not one voluntarily established +and sustained by the people, for the protection of their natural, inherent, individual +rights, but that it is merely a government of usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who +claim to own the people as their slaves, and claim the right to dispose of them, and +their property, at their (the usurpers') pleasure or discretion.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, sir, since you may be disposed to deny that such is the real character of +the government, I propose to prove it, by evidences so numerous and conclusive +that you cannot dispute them.</p> + +<p class="indent">My proposition, then, is, that there is not a single <i>natural</i>, human right, that the +government of the United States recognizes as inviolable; that there is not a single +<i>natural</i>, human right, that it hesitates to trample under foot, whenever it thinks it +can promote its own interests by doing so.</p> + +<p class="indent">The proofs of this proposition are so numerous, that only a few of the most important +can here be enumerated.</p> + +<p class="indent">1. The government does not even recognize a man's natural right to his own +life. If it have need of him, for the maintenance of its power, it takes him, against +his will (conscripts him), and puts him before the cannon's mouth, to be blown in +pieces, as if he were a mere senseless thing, having no more <i>rights</i> than if he were +a shell, a canister, or a torpedo. It considers him simply as so much senseless +war material, to be consumed, expended, and destroyed for the maintenance of its +power. It no more recognizes his right to have anything to say in the matter, than +if he were but so much weight of powder or ball. It does not recognize him at all +as a human being, having any rights whatever of his own, but only as an instrument, +a weapon, or a machine, to be used in killing other men.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 32]</span> +2. The government not only denies a man's right, as a moral human being, to +have any will, any judgment, or any conscience of his own, as to whether he himself +will be killed in battle, but it equally denies his right to have any will, any +judgment, or any conscience of his own, as a moral human being, as to whether he +shall be used as a mere weapon for killing other men. If he refuses to kill any, or +all, other men, whom it commands him to kill, it takes his own life, as unceremoniously +as if he were but a dog.</p> + +<p class="indent">Is it possible to conceive of a more complete denial of all a man's <i>natural</i>, <i>human</i> +rights, than is the denial of his right to have any will, judgment, or conscience of +his own, either as to his being killed himself, or as to his being used as a mere +weapon for killing other men?</p> + +<p class="indent">3. But in still another way, than by its conscriptions, the government denies a +man's right to any will, choice, judgment, or conscience of his own, in regard either +to being killed himself, or used as a weapon in its hands for killing other people.</p> + +<p class="indent">If, in private life, a man enters into a perfectly voluntary agreement to work for +another, at some innocent and useful labor, for a day, a week, a month, or a year, +he cannot lawfully be compelled to fulfil that contract; because such compulsion +would be an acknowledgment of his right to sell his own liberty. And this is +what no one can do.</p> + +<p class="indent">This right of personal liberty is inalienable. No man can sell it, or transfer it +to another; or give to another any right of arbitrary dominion over him. All contracts +for such a purpose are absurd and void contracts, that no man can rightfully +be compelled to fulfil.</p> + +<p class="indent">But when a deluded or ignorant young man has once been enticed into a contract +to kill others, and to take his chances of being killed himself, in the service +of the government, for any given number of years, the government holds that such +a contract to sell his liberty, his judgment, his conscience, and his life, is a valid +and binding contract; and that if he fails to fulfil it, he may rightfully be shot.</p> + +<p class="indent">All these things prove that the government recognizes no right of the individual, +to his own life, or liberty, or to the exercise of his own will, judgment, or conscience, +in regard to his killing his fellow-men, or to being killed himself, if the government +sees fit to use him as mere war material, in maintaining its arbitrary dominion +over other human beings.</p> + +<p class="indent">4. The government recognizes no such thing as any <i>natural</i> right of property, +on the part of individuals.</p> + +<p class="indent">This is proved by the fact that it takes, for its own uses, any and every man's +property—when it pleases, and as much of it as it pleases—without obtaining, or +even asking, his consent.</p> + +<p class="indent">This taking of a man's property, without his consent, is a denial of his right of +property; for the right of property is the right of supreme, absolute, and irresponsible +dominion over anything that is naturally a subject of property,—that is, of +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 33]</span> +ownership. <i>It is a right against all the world.</i> And this right of property—this +right of supreme, absolute, and irresponsible dominion over anything that is naturally +a subject of ownership—is subject only to this qualification, <i>viz.</i>, that each +man must so use his own, as not to injure another.</p> + +<p class="indent">If A uses his own property so as to injure the person or property of B, his own +property may rightfully be taken to any extent that is necessary to make reparation +for the wrong he has done.</p> + +<p class="indent">This is the only qualification to which the <i>natural</i> right of property is subject.</p> + +<p class="indent">When, therefore, a government takes a man's property, for its own support, or +for its own uses, without his consent, it practically denies his right of property altogether; +for it practically asserts that <i>its</i> right of dominion is superior to his.</p> + +<p class="indent">No man can be said to have any right of property at all, in any thing—that is, +any right of supreme, absolute, and irresponsible dominion over any thing—of +which any other men may rightfully deprive him at their pleasure.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, the government of the United States, in asserting its right to take at pleasure +the property of individuals, without their consent, virtually denies their right of +property altogether, because it asserts that <i>its</i> right of dominion over it, is superior +to theirs.</p> + +<p class="indent">5. The government denies the <i>natural</i> right of human beings to live on this +planet. This it does by denying their <i>natural</i> right to those things that are indispensable +to the maintenance of life. It says that, for every thing necessary to the +maintenance of life, they must have a special permit from the government; and +that the government cannot be required to grant them any other means of living +than it chooses to grant them.</p> + +<p class="indent">All this is shown as follows, <i>viz.</i>:</p> + +<p class="indent">The government denies the <i>natural</i> right of individuals to take possession of +wilderness land, and hold and cultivate it for their own subsistence.</p> + +<p class="indent">It asserts that wilderness land is the property of the government; and that individuals +have no right to take possession of, or cultivate, it, unless by special grant +of the government. And if an individual attempts to exercise this natural right, +the government punishes him as a trespasser and a criminal.</p> + +<p class="indent">The government has no more right to claim the ownership of wilderness lands, +than it has to claim the ownership of the sunshine, the water, or the atmosphere. +And it has no more right to punish a man for taking possession of wilderness land, +and cultivating it, without the consent of the government, than it has to punish +him for breathing the air, drinking the water, or enjoying the sunshine, without a +special grant from the government.</p> + +<p class="indent">In thus asserting the government's right of property in wilderness land, and in +denying men's right to take possession of and cultivate it, except on first obtaining +a grant from the government,—which grant the government may withhold if it +pleases,—the government plainly denies the <i>natural</i> right of men to live on this +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 34]</span> +planet, by denying their <i>natural</i> right to the means that are indispensable to their +procuring the food that is necessary for supporting life.</p> + +<p class="indent">In asserting its right of arbitrary dominion over that natural wealth that is indispensable +to the support of human life, it asserts its right to withhold that wealth +from those whose lives are dependent upon it. In this way it denies the <i>natural</i> +right of human beings to live on the planet. It asserts that government owns the +planet, and that men have no right to live on it, except by first getting a permit +from the government.</p> + +<p class="indent">This denial of men's <i>natural</i> right to take possession of and cultivate wilderness +land is not altered at all by the fact that the government consents to sell as much +land as it thinks it expedient or profitable to sell; nor by the fact that, in certain +cases, it gives outright certain lands to certain persons. Notwithstanding these +sales and gifts, the fact remains that the government claims the original ownership +of the lands; and thus denies the <i>natural</i> right of individuals to take possession of +and cultivate them. In denying this <i>natural</i> right of individuals, it denies their +<i>natural</i> right to live on the earth; and asserts that they have no other right to life +than the government, by its own mere will, pleasure, and discretion, may see fit to +grant them.</p> + +<p class="indent">In thus denying man's <i>natural</i> right to life, it of course denies every other <i>natural</i> +right of human beings; and asserts that they have no <i>natural</i> right to anything; +but that, for all other things, as well as for life itself, they must depend wholly +upon the good pleasure and discretion of the government.</p> + +<h2>Section XIII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">In still another way, the government denies men's <i>natural</i> right to life. And +that is by denying their <i>natural</i> right to make any of those contracts with each +other, for buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, property, +which are necessary, if men are to exist in any considerable numbers on the +earth.</p> + +<p class="indent">Even the few savages, who contrive to live, mostly or wholly, by hunting, fishing, +and gathering wild fruits, without cultivating the earth, and almost wholly +without the use of tools or machinery, are yet, <i>at times</i>, necessitated to buy and +sell, borrow and lend, give and receive, articles of food, if no others, as their only +means of preserving their lives. But, in civilized life, where but a small portion +of men's labor is necessary for the production of food, and they employ themselves +in an almost infinite variety of industries, and in the production of an almost infinite +variety of commodities, it would be impossible for them to live, if they were +wholly prohibited from buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and +receiving, the products of each other's labor.</p> + +<p class="indent">Yet the government of the United States—either acting separately, or jointly +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 35]</span> +with the State governments—has heretofore constantly denied, and still constantly +denies, the <i>natural</i> right of the people, <i>as individuals</i>, to make their own +contracts, for such buying and selling, borrowing and lending, and giving and +receiving, such commodities as they produce for each other's uses.</p> + +<p class="indent">I repeat that both the national and State governments have constantly denied +the <i>natural</i> right of individuals to make their own contracts. They have done +this, sometimes by arbitrarily forbidding them to make particular contracts, and +sometimes by arbitrarily qualifying the obligation of particular contracts, when +the contracts themselves were naturally and intrinsically as just and lawful as any +others that men ever enter into; and were, consequently, such as men have as perfect +a <i>natural</i> right to make, as they have to make any of those contracts which they +are permitted to make.</p> + +<p class="indent">The laws arbitrarily prohibiting, or arbitrarily qualifying, certain contracts, +that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful, are so numerous, and so well +known, that they need not all be enumerated here. But any and all such prohibitions, +or qualifications, are a denial of men's <i>natural</i> right to make their own +contracts. They are a denial of men's right to make any contracts whatever, except +such as the governments shall see fit to permit them to make.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is the <i>natural</i> right of any and all human beings, who are mentally competent +to make reasonable contracts, to make any and every possible contract, that +is naturally and intrinsically just and honest, for buying and selling, borrowing +and lending, giving and receiving, any and all possible commodities, that are naturally +vendible, loanable, and transferable, and that any two or more individuals +may, at any time, without force or fraud, choose to buy and sell, borrow and lend, +give and receive, of and to each other.</p> + +<p class="indent">And it is plainly only by the untrammelled exercise of this <i>natural</i> right, that +all the loanable capital, that is required by men's industries, can be lent and borrowed, +or that all the money can be supplied for the purchase and sale of that +almost infinite diversity and amount of commodities, that men are capable of producing, +and that are to be transferred from the hands of the producers to those of +the consumers.</p> + +<p class="indent">But the government of the United States—and also the governments of the +States—utterly deny the <i>natural</i> right of any individuals whatever to make any +contracts whatever, for buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and +receiving, any and all such commodities, as are naturally vendible, loanable, and +transferable, and as the producers and consumers of such commodities may wish +to buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and receive, of and to each other.</p> + +<p class="indent">These governments (State and national) deny this <i>natural</i> right of buying and +selling, etc., by arbitrarily prohibiting, or qualifying, all such, and so many, of +these contracts, as they choose to prohibit, or qualify.</p> + +<p class="indent">The prohibition, or qualification, of <i>any one</i> of these contracts—that are intrinsically +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 36]</span> +just and lawful—is a denial of all individual <i>natural</i> right to make any of +them. For the right to make any and all of them stands on the same grounds of +<i>natural</i> law, natural justice, and men's natural rights. If a government has the +right to prohibit, or qualify, any one of these contracts, it has the same right to +prohibit, or qualify, all of them. Therefore the assertion, by the government, of +a right to prohibit, or qualify, any one of them, is equivalent to a denial of all +<i>natural</i> right, on the part of individuals, to make any of them.</p> + +<p class="indent">The power that has been thus usurped by governments, to arbitrarily prohibit +or qualify all contracts that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful, has +been the great, perhaps the greatest, of all the instrumentalities, by which, in this, +as in other countries, nearly all the wealth, accumulated by the labor of the many, +has been, and is now, transferred into the pockets of the few.</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>It is by this arbitrary power over contracts, that the monopoly of money is sustained.</i> +Few people have any real perception of the power, which this monopoly gives to +the holders of it, over the industry and traffic of all other persons. And the one +only purpose of the monopoly is to enable the holders of it to rob everybody else +in the prices of their labor, and the products of their labor.</p> + +<p class="indent">The theory, on which the advocates of this monopoly attempt to justify it, is +simply this: <i>That it is not at all necessary that money should be a bona fide equivalent +of the labor or property that is to be bought with it;</i> that if the government will but +specially license a small amount of money, and prohibit all other money, the holders +of the licensed money will then be able to buy with it the labor and property +of all other persons for a half, a tenth, a hundredth, a thousandth, or a millionth, +of what such labor and property are really and truly worth.</p> + +<p class="indent">David A. Wells, one of the most prominent—perhaps at this time, the most +prominent—advocate of the monopoly, in this country, states the theory thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">A three-cent piece, if it could be divided into a sufficient number of pieces, with each piece +capable of being handled, would undoubtedly suffice for doing all the business of the country +in the way of facilitating exchanges, if no other better instrumentality was available.—<i>New +York Herald, February 13, 1875.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">He means here to say, that "a three-cent piece" contains <i>as much real, true, and +natural market value</i>, as it would be necessary that all the money of the country +should have, <i>if the government would but prohibit all other money</i>; that is, if the government, +by its arbitrary legislative power, would but make all other and better +money unavailable.</p> + +<p class="indent">And this is the theory, on which John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, David +Ricardo, J. R. McCulloch, and John Stuart Mill, in England, and Amasa Walker, +Charles H. Carroll, Hugh McCulloch, in this country, and all the other conspicuous +advocates of the monopoly, both in this country and in England, have attempted +to justify it. They have all held that it was not necessary that money should be +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 37]</span> +a <i>bona fide</i> equivalent of the labor or property to be bought with it; but that, by +the prohibition of all other money, the holders of a comparatively worthless amount +of licensed money would be enabled to buy, at their own prices, the labor and property +of all other men.</p> + +<p class="indent">And this is the theory on which the governments of England and the United +States have always, with immaterial exceptions, acted, in prohibiting all but such +small amounts of money as they (the governments) should specially license. <i>And +it is the theory upon which they act now.</i> And it is so manifestly a theory of pure +robbery, that scarce a word can be necessary to make it more evidently so than it +now is.</p> + +<p class="indent">But inasmuch as your mind seems to be filled with the wildest visions of the +excellency of this government, and to be strangely ignorant of its wrongs; and +inasmuch as this monopoly of money is, in its practical operation, one of the +greatest—possibly the greatest—of all these wrongs, and the one that is most relied +upon for robbing the great body of the people, and keeping them in poverty +and servitude, it is plainly important that you should have your eyes opened on +the subject. I therefore submit, for your consideration, the following self-evident +propositions:</p> + +<p class="indent">1. That to make all traffic just and equal, it is indispensable that, in each separate +purchase and sale, the money paid should be a <i>bona fide</i> equivalent of the +labor or property bought with it.</p> + +<p class="indent">Dare you, or any other man, of common sense and common honesty, dispute the +truth of that proposition? If not, let us consider that principle established. It +will then serve as one of the necessary and infallible guides to the true settlement +of all the other questions that remain to be settled.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. That so long as no force or fraud is practised by either party, the parties +themselves, to each separate contract, have the sole, absolute, and unqualified right +to decide for themselves, <i>what money, and how much of it</i>, shall be considered a <i>bona +fide</i> equivalent of the labor or property that is to be exchanged for it. All this is +necessarily implied in the <i>natural</i> right of men to make their own contracts, for +buying and selling their respective commodities.</p> + +<p class="indent">Will you dispute the truth of that proposition?</p> + +<p class="indent">3. That any one man, who has an honest dollar, of any kind whatsoever, has as +perfect a right, as any other man can have, to offer it in the market, in competition +with any and all other dollars, in exchange for such labor or property as may +be in the market for sale.</p> + +<p class="indent">Will you dispute the truth of that proposition?</p> + +<p class="indent">4. That where no fraud is practised, every person, who is mentally competent +to make reasonable contracts, must be presumed to be as competent to judge of +the value of the money that is offered in the market, as he is to judge of the value +of all the other commodities that are bought and sold for money.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 38]</span> +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition?</p> + +<p class="indent">5. That the free and open market, in which all honest money and all honest +commodities are free to be given and received in exchange for each other, is the +true, final, absolute, and only test of the true and natural market value of all +money, as of all the other commodities that are bought and sold for money.</p> + +<p class="indent">Will you dispute the truth of that proposition?</p> + +<p class="indent">6. That any prohibition, by a government, of any such kind or amount of +money—provided it be honest in itself—as the parties to contracts may voluntarily +agree to give and receive in exchange for labor or property, is a palpable violation +of their natural right to make their own contracts, and to buy and sell their +labor and property on such terms as they may find to be necessary for the supply +of their wants, or may think most beneficial to their interests.</p> + +<p class="indent">Will you dispute the truth of that proposition?</p> + +<p class="indent">7. That any government, that licenses a small amount of an article of such +universal necessity as money, and that gives the control of it into a few hands, +selected by itself, and then prohibits any and all other money—that is intrinsically +honest and valuable—palpably violates all other men's natural right to make +their own contracts, and infallibly proves its purpose to be to enable the few holders +of the licensed money to rob all other persons in the prices of their labor and +property.</p> + +<p class="indent">Will you dispute the truth of that proposition?</p> + +<p class="indent">Are not all these propositions so self-evident, or so easily demonstrated, that +they cannot, with any reason, be disputed?</p> + +<p class="indent">If you feel competent to show the falsehood of any one of them, I hope you +will attempt the task.</p> + +<h2>Section XIV.</h2> + +<p class="indent">If, now, you wish to form some rational opinion of the extent of the robbery +practised in this country, by the holders of this monopoly of money, you have only +to look at the following facts.</p> + +<p class="indent">There are, in this country, I think, at least twenty-five millions of persons, male +and female, sixteen years old, and upwards, mentally and physically capable of +running machinery, producing wealth, and supplying their own needs for an independent +and comfortable subsistence.</p> + +<p class="indent">To make their industry most effective, and to enable them, <i>individually</i>, to put +into their own pockets as large a portion as possible of their own earnings, they need, +<i>on an average</i>, one thousand dollars each of <i>money capital</i>. Some need one, two, +three, or five hundred dollars, others one, two, three, or five thousand. These +persons, then, need, <i>in the aggregate</i>, twenty-five thousand millions of dollars ($25,000,000,000), +of money capital.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 39]</span> +They need all this <i>money capital</i> to enable them to buy the raw materials upon +which to bestow their labor, the implements and machinery with which to labor, +and their means of subsistence while producing their goods for the market.</p> + +<p class="indent">Unless they can get this capital, they must all either work at a disadvantage, or +not work at all. A very large portion of them, to save themselves from starvation, +have no alternative but to sell their labor to others, at just such prices these +others choose to pay. And these others choose to pay only such prices as are far +below what the laborers could produce, if they themselves had the necessary capital +to work with.</p> + +<p class="indent">But this needed capital your lawmakers arbitrarily forbid them to have; and +for no other reason than to reduce them to the condition of servants; and subject +them to all such extortions as their employers—the holders of the privileged +money—may choose to practise upon them.</p> + +<p class="indent">If, now, you ask me where these twenty-five thousand millions of dollars of +money capital, which these laborers need, are to come from, I answer:</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>Theoretically</i>, there are, in this country, fifty thousand millions of dollars of +money capital ($50,000,000,000)—or twice as much as I have supposed these laborers +to need—<span class="smcap">NOW LYING IDLE</span>! <i>And it is lying idle, solely because the circulation of +it, as money, is prohibited by the lawmakers.</i></p> + +<p class="indent">If you ask how this can be, I will tell you.</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>Theoretically,</i> every dollar's worth of material property, that is capable of being +taken by law, and applied to the payment of the owner's debts, is capable of being +represented by a promissory note, that shall circulate as money.</p> + +<p class="indent">But taking all this material property at <i>only half</i> its actual value, it is still capable +of supplying the twenty-five thousand millions of dollars—or one thousand dollars +each—which these laborers need.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, we know—because experience has taught us—that <i>solvent</i> promissory +notes, made payable in coin on demand, are the best money that mankind have +ever had; (although probably not the best they ever will have).</p> + +<p class="indent">To make a note solvent, and suitable for circulation as money, it is only necessary +that it should be made payable in coin on demand, and be issued by a person, +or persons, who are known to have in their hands abundant material property, +that can be taken by law, and applied to the payment of the note, with all costs +and damages for non-payment on demand.</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>Theoretically,</i> I repeat, all the material property in the country, that can be taken +by law, and applied to the payment of debt can be used as banking capital; and +be represented by promissory notes, made payable in coin on demand. And, <i>practically</i>, +so much of it can be used as banking capital as may be required for supplying +all the notes that can be kept in circulation as money.</p> + +<p class="indent">Although these notes are made legally payable in coin on demand, it is seldom +that such payment is demanded, <i>if only it be publicly known that the notes are solvent</i>: +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 40]</span> +that is, if it be publicly known that they are issued by persons who have so much +material property, that can be taken by law, and sold, as may be necessary to bring +the coin that is needed to pay the notes. In such cases, the notes are preferred to +the coin, because they are so much more safe and convenient for handling, counting, +and transportation, than is the coin; and also because we can have so many +times more of them.</p> + +<p class="indent">These notes are also a legal tender, to the banks that issue them, in payment of +the notes discounted; that is, in payment of the notes given by the borrowers +to the banks. And, in the ordinary course of things, <i>all</i> the notes, issued by the +banks for circulation, are wanted, and come back to the banks, in payment of the +notes discounted; thus saving all necessity for redeeming them with coin, except +in rare cases. For meeting these rare cases, the banks find it necessary to keep on +hand small amounts of coin; probably not more than one per cent. of the amount +of notes in circulation.</p> + +<p class="indent">As the notes discounted have usually but a short time to run,—say three months +on an average,—the bank notes issued for circulation will <i>all</i> come back, <i>on an +average</i>, once in three months, and be redeemed by the bankers, by being accepted +in payment of the notes discounted.</p> + +<p class="indent">Then the bank notes will be re-issued, by discounting new notes, and will go +into circulation again; to be again brought back, at the end of another three +months, and redeemed, by being accepted in payment of the new notes discounted.</p> + +<p class="indent">In this way the bank notes will be continually re-issued, and redeemed, in the +greatest amounts that can be kept in circulation long enough to earn such an +amount of interest as will make it an object for the bankers to issue them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Each of these notes, issued for circulation, if known to be solvent, will always +have the same value in the market, as the same nominal amount of coin. And +this value is a just one, because the notes are in the nature of a lien, or mortgage, +upon so much property of the bankers as is necessary to pay the notes, and as can +be taken by law, and sold, and the proceeds applied to their payment.</p> + +<p class="indent">There is no danger that any more of these notes will be issued than will be +wanted for buying and selling property at its true and natural market value, relatively +to coin; for as the notes are all made legally payable in coin on demand, if +they should ever fall below the value of coin in the market, the holders of them +will at once return them to the banks, and demand coin for them; <i>and thus take +them out of circulation</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">The bankers, therefore, have no motive for issuing more of them than will remain +long enough in circulation, to earn so much interest as will make it an object +to issue them; the only motive for issuing them being to draw interest on them +while they are in circulation.</p> + +<p class="indent">The bankers readily find how many are wanted for circulation, by the time +those issued remain in circulation, before coming back for redemption. If they +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 41]</span> +come back immediately, or very quickly, after being issued, the bankers know that +they have over-issued, and that they must therefore pay in coin—to their inconvenience +and perhaps loss—notes that would otherwise have remained in circulation +long enough to earn so much interest as would have paid for issuing them; +and would then have come back to them in payment of notes discounted, instead +of coming back on a demand for redemption in coin.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, the best of all possible banking capital is real estate. It is the best, because +it is visible, immovable, and indestructible. It cannot, like coin, be removed, +concealed, or carried out of the country. And its aggregate value, in all +civilized countries, is probably a hundred times greater than the amount of coin in +circulation. It is therefore capable of furnishing a hundred times as much money +as we can have in coin.</p> + +<p class="indent">The owners of this real estate have the greatest inducements to use it as banking +capital, because all the banking profit, over and above expenses, is a clear profit; +inasmuch as the use of the real estate as banking capital does not interfere at all +with its use for other purposes.</p> + +<p class="indent">Farmers have a double, and much more than a double, inducement to use their +lands as banking capital; because they not only get a direct profit from the loan +of their notes, but, by loaning them, they furnish the necessary capital for the +greatest variety of manufacturing purposes. They thus induce a much larger portion +of the people, than otherwise would, to leave agriculture, and engage in mechanical +employments; and thus become purchasers, instead of producers, of +agricultural commodities. They thus get much higher prices for their agricultural +products, and also a much greater variety and amount of manufactured commodities +in exchange.</p> + +<p class="indent">The amount of money, capable of being furnished by this system, is so great that +every man, woman, and child, who is worthy of credit, could get it, and do business +for himself, or herself—either singly, or in partnerships—and be under no +necessity to act as a servant, or sell his or her labor to others. All the great establishments, +of every kind, now in the hands of a few proprietors, but employing +a great number of wage laborers, would be broken up; for few, or no persons, +who could hire capital, and do business for themselves, would consent to labor for +wages for another.</p> + +<p class="indent">The credit furnished by this system would always be stable; for the system is +probably capable of furnishing, <i>at all times</i>, all the credit, and all the money, that +can be needed. It would also introduce a substantially universal system of cash +payments. Everybody, who could get credit at all, would be able to get it at a +bank, <i>in money</i>. With the money, he would buy everything he needed for cash. +He would also sell everything for cash; for when everybody buys for cash, everybody +sells for cash; since buying for cash, and selling for cash, are necessarily one +and the same thing.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 42]</span> +We should, therefore, never have another crisis, panic, revulsion of credit, stagnation +of industry, or fall of prices; for these are all caused by the lack of money, +and the consequent necessity of buying and selling on credit; whereby the amount +of indebtedness becomes so great, so enormous, in fact, in proportion to the amount +of money extant, with which to meet it, that the whole system of credit breaks +down; to the ruin of everybody, except the few holders of the monopoly of money, +who reap a harvest in the fall of prices, and the consequent bankruptcy of everybody +who is dependent on credit for his means of doing business.</p> + +<p class="indent">It would be inadmissible for me, in this letter, to occupy the space that would +be necessary, to expose all the false, absurd, and ridiculous pretences, by which the +advocates of the monopoly of money have attempted to justify it. The only real +argument they ever employed has been that, by means of the monopoly, the few +holders of it were enabled to rob everybody else in the prices of their labor and +property.</p> + +<p class="indent">And our governments, State and national, have hitherto acted together in maintaining +this monopoly, in flagrant violation of men's natural right to make their +own contracts, and in flagrant violation of the self-evident truth, that, to make all +traffic just and equal, it is indispensable that the money paid should be, in all +cases, a <i>bona fide</i> equivalent of the labor or property that is bought with it.</p> + +<p class="indent">The holders of this monopoly now rule and rob this nation; and the government, +in all its branches, is simply their tool. And being their tool for this gigantic +robbery, it is equally their tool for all the lesser robberies, to which it is supposed +that the people at large can be made to submit.</p> + +<h2>Section XV.</h2> + +<p class="indent">But although the monopoly of money is one of the most glaring violations of +men's natural right to make their own contracts, and one of the most effective—perhaps +<i>the</i> most effective—for enabling a few men to rob everybody else, and +for keeping the great body of the people in poverty and servitude, it is not the +only one that our government practises, nor the only one that has the same robbery +in view.</p> + +<p class="indent">The so-called taxes or duties, which the government levies upon imports, are a +practical violation both of men's natural right of property, and of their natural +right to make their own contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">A man has the same <i>natural</i> right to traffic with another, who lives on the opposite +side of the globe, as he has to traffic with his next-door neighbor. And any +obstruction, price, or penalty, interposed by the government, to the exercise of +that right, is a practical violation of the right itself.</p> + +<p class="indent">The ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. of a man's property, which is taken from him, +for the reason that he purchased it in a foreign country, must be considered either +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 43]</span> +as the price he is required to pay for the <i>privilege</i> of buying property in that country, +or else as a penalty for having exercised his <i>natural right</i> of buying it in that +country. Whether it be considered as a price paid for a privilege, or a penalty for +having exercised a natural right, it is a violation both of his natural right of property, +and of his natural right to make a contract in that country.</p> + +<p class="indent">In short, it is nothing but downright robbery.</p> + +<p class="indent">And when a man seeks to avoid this robbery, by evading the government robbers +who are lying in wait for him,—that is, the so-called revenue officers,—whom he has +as perfect a right to evade, as he has to evade any other robbers, who may be lying +in wait for him,—the seizure of his whole property,—instead of the ten, twenty, +or fifty per cent. that would otherwise have been taken from him,—is not merely +adding so much to the robbery itself, but is adding insult to the robbery. It is +punishing a man as a criminal, for simply trying to save his property from +robbers.</p> + +<p class="indent">But it will be said that these taxes or duties are laid to raise revenue for the +support of the government.</p> + +<p class="indent">Be it so, for the sake of the argument. All taxes, levied upon a man's property +for the support of government, without his consent, are mere robbery; a violation +of his natural right of property. And when a government takes ten, twenty, or +fifty per cent. of a man's property, for the reason that he bought it in a foreign +country, such taking is as much a violation of his natural right of property, or of +his natural right to purchase property, as is the taking of property which he has +himself produced, or which he has bought in his own village.</p> + +<p class="indent">A man's natural right of property, in a commodity he has bought in a foreign +country, is intrinsically as sacred and inviolable as it is in a commodity produced +at home. The foreign commodity is bought with the commodity produced at +home; and therefore stands on the same footing as the commodity produced at +home. And it is a plain violation of one's right, for a government to make any +distinction between them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Government assumes to exist for the impartial protection of all rights of property. +If it really exists for that purpose, it is plainly bound to make each kind +of property pay its proper proportion, and only its proper proportion, of the cost +of protecting all kinds. To levy upon a few kinds the cost of protecting all, is a +naked robbery of the holders of those few kinds, for the benefit of the holders of all +other kinds.</p> + +<p class="indent">But the pretence that heavy taxes are levied upon imports, solely, or mainly, for +the support of government, while light taxes, or no taxes at all, are levied upon +property at home, is an utterly false pretence. They are levied upon the imported +commodity, mainly, if not solely, for the purpose of enabling the producers of +competing home commodities to extort from consumers a higher price than the +home commodities would bring in free and open market. And this additional +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 44]</span> +price is sheer robbery, and is known to be so. And the amount of this robbery—which +goes into the pockets of the home producers—is five, ten, twenty, or fifty +times greater than the amount that goes into the treasury, for the support of the +government, according as the amount of the home commodities is five, ten, twenty, +or fifty times greater than the amount of the imported competing commodities.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus the amounts that go to the support of the government, and also the +amounts that go into the pockets of the home producers, in the higher prices they +get for their goods, are all sheer robberies; and nothing else.</p> + +<p class="indent">But it will be said that the heavy taxes are levied upon the foreign commodity, +not to put great wealth into a few pockets, but "<i>to protect the home laborer against +the competition of the pauper labor of other countries</i>."</p> + +<p class="indent">This is the great argument that is relied on to justify the robbery.</p> + +<p class="indent">This argument must have originated with the employers of home labor, and not +with the home laborers themselves.</p> + +<p class="indent">The home laborers themselves could never have originated it, because they must +have seen that, so far as they were concerned, the object of the "protection," so-called, +was, <i>at best</i>, only to benefit them, by robbing others who were as poor as +themselves, and who had as good a right as themselves to live by their labor. That +is, they must have seen that the object of the "protection" was to rob the foreign +laborers, in whole, or in part, of the pittances on which they were already necessitated +to live; and, secondly, to rob consumers at home,—in the increased prices +of the protected commodities,—when many or most of these home consumers +were also laborers as poor as themselves.</p> + +<p class="indent">Even if any class of laborers would have been so selfish and dishonest as to wish +to thus benefit themselves by injuring others, as poor as themselves, they could +have had no hope of carrying through such a scheme, if they alone were to profit +by it; because they could have had no such influence with governments, as would +be necessary to enable them to carry it through, in opposition to the rights +and interests of consumers, both rich and poor, and much more numerous than +themselves.</p> + +<p class="indent">For these reasons it is plain that the argument originated with the employers of +home labor, and not with the home laborers themselves.</p> + +<p class="indent">And why do the employers of home labor advocate this robbery? Certainly not +because they have such an intense compassion for their own laborers, that they are +willing to rob everybody else, rich and poor, for their benefit. Nobody will suspect +them of being influenced by any such compassion as that. But they advocate +it solely because they put into their own pockets a very large portion certainly—probably +three-fourths, I should judge—of the increased prices their commodities +are thus made to bring in the market. The home laborers themselves probably +get not more than one-fourth of these increased prices.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus the argument for "protection" is really an argument for robbing foreign +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 45]</span> +laborers—as poor as our own—of their equal and rightful chances in our markets; +and also for robbing all the home consumers of the protected article—the +poor as well as the rich—in the prices they are made to pay for it. And all this is +done at the instigation, and principally for the benefit, of the employers of home +labor, and not for the benefit of home laborers themselves.</p> + +<p class="indent">Having now seen that this argument—of "protecting our home laborers against +the competition of the pauper labor of other countries"—is, of itself, an utterly dishonest +argument; that it is dishonest towards foreign laborers and home consumers; +that it must have originated with the employers of home labor, and not with +the home laborers themselves; and that the employers of home labor, and not the +home laborers themselves, are to receive the principal profits of the robbery, let us +now see how utterly false is the argument itself.</p> + +<p class="indent">1. The pauper laborers (if there are any such) of other countries have just as +good a right to live by their labor, and have an equal chance in our own markets, +and in all the markets of the world, as have the pauper laborers, or any other laborers, +of our own country.</p> + +<p class="indent">Every human being has the same natural right to buy and sell, of and to, any +and all other people in the world, as he has to buy and sell, of and to, the people +of his own country. And none but tyrants and robbers deny that right. And they +deny it for their own benefit solely, and not for the benefit of their laborers.</p> + +<p class="indent">And if a man, in our own country—either from motives of profit to himself, or +from motives of pity towards the pauper laborers of other countries—<i>chooses</i> to +buy the products of the foreign pauper labor, rather than the products of the laborers +of his own country, he has a perfect legal right to do so. And for any government +to forbid him to do so, or to obstruct his doing so, or to punish him for +doing so, is a violation of his natural right of purchasing property of whom he +pleases, and from such motives as he pleases.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. To forbid our own people to buy in the best markets, is equivalent to forbidding +them to sell the products of their own labor in the best markets; for they +can buy the products of foreign labor, only by giving the products of their own labor +in exchange. Therefore to deny our right to buy in foreign markets, is to forbid +us to sell in foreign markets. And this is a plain violation of men's natural +rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">If, when a producer of cotton, tobacco, grain, beef, pork, butter, cheese, or any +other commodity, in our own country, has carried it abroad, and exchanged it for +iron or woolen goods, and has brought these latter home, the government seizes +one-half of them, because they were manufactured abroad, the robbery committed +upon the owner is the same as if the government had seized one-half of his cotton, +tobacco, or other commodity, before he exported it; because the iron or woolen +goods, which he purchased abroad with the products of his own home labor, are as +much his own property, as was the commodity with which he purchased them.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 46]</span> +Therefore the tax laid upon foreign commodities, that have been bought with +the products of our home labor, is as much a robbery of the home laborer, as the +same tax would have been, if laid directly upon the products of our home labor. +It is, at best, only a robbery of one home laborer—the producer of cotton, tobacco, +grain, beef, pork, butter, or cheese—for the benefit of another home laborer—the +producer of iron or woolen goods.</p> + +<p class="indent">3. But this whole argument is a false one, for the further reason that our home +laborers do not have to compete with "<i>the pauper labor</i>" of any country on earth; +since the <i>actual paupers</i> of no country on earth are engaged in producing commodities +for export to any other country. They produce few, or no, other commodities +than those they themselves consume; and ordinarily not even those.</p> + +<p class="indent">There are a great many millions of <i>actual paupers</i> in the world. In some of the +large provinces of British India, for example, it is said that nearly half the population +are paupers. But I think that the commodities they are producing for export +to other countries than their own, have never been heard of.</p> + +<p class="indent">The term, "pauper labor," is therefore a false one. And when these robbers—the +employers of home labor—talk of protecting their laborers against the competition +of "<i>the pauper labor</i>" of other countries, they do not mean that they are +protecting them against the competition of <i>actual paupers</i>; but only against the +competition of that immense body of laborers, in all parts of the world, <i>who are +kept constantly on the verge of pauperism, or starvation</i>; who have little, or no, means +of subsistence, except such as their employers see fit to give them,—which means +are usually barely enough to keep them in a condition to labor.</p> + +<p class="indent">These are the only "pauper laborers," from whose competition our own laborers +are sought to be protected. They are quite as badly off as our own laborers; and +are in equal need of "protection."</p> + +<p class="indent">What, then, is to be done? This policy of excluding foreign commodities from +our markets, is a game that all other governments can play at, as well as our own. +And if it is the duty of our government to "protect" our laborers against the competition +of "the pauper labor," so-called, of all other countries, it is equally the +duty of every other government to "protect" its laborers against the competition +of the so-called "pauper labor" of all other countries. So that, according to this +theory, each nation must either shut out entirely from its markets the products of +all other countries; or, at least, lay such heavy duties upon them, as will, <i>in some +measure</i>, "protect" its own laborers from the competition of the "pauper labor" of +all other countries.</p> + +<p class="indent">This theory, then, is that, instead of permitting all mankind to supply each +other's wants, by freely exchanging their respective products with each other, the +government of each nation should rob the people of every other, by imposing heavy +duties upon all commodities imported from them.</p> + +<p class="indent">The natural effect of this scheme is to pit the so-called "pauper labor" of each +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 47]</span> +country against the so-called "pauper labor" of every other country; and all for +the benefit of their employers. And as it holds that so-called "pauper labor" is +cheaper than free labor, it gives the employers in each country a constant motive +for reducing their own laborers to the lowest condition of poverty, consistent with +their ability to labor at all. In other words, the theory is, that the smaller the +portion of the products of labor, that is given to the laborers, the larger will be the +portion that will go into the pockets of the employers.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, it is not a very honorable proceeding for any government to pit its own so-called +"pauper laborers"—or laborers that are on the verge of pauperism—against +similar laborers in all other countries: and all for the sake of putting the principal +proceeds of their labor into the pockets of a few employers.</p> + +<p class="indent">To set two bodies of "pauper laborers"—or of laborers on the verge of pauperism—to +robbing each other, for the profit of their employers, is the next thing, in +point of atrocity, to setting them to killing each other, as governments have heretofore +been in the habit of doing, for the benefit of their rulers.</p> + +<p class="indent">The laborers, who are paupers, or on the verge of pauperism—who are destitute, +or on the verge of destitution—comprise (with their families) doubtless nine-tenths, +probably nineteen-twentieths, of all the people on the globe. They are not all wage +laborers. Some of them are savages, living only as savages do. Others are barbarians, +living only as barbarians do. But an immense number are mere wage laborers. +Much the larger portion of these have been reduced to the condition of wage +laborers, by the monopoly of land, which mere bands of robbers have succeeded in +securing for themselves by military power. This is the condition of nearly all the +Asiatics, and of probably one-half the Europeans. But in those portions of Europe +and the United States, where manufactures have been most extensively introduced, +and where, by science and machinery, great wealth has been created, the laborers +have been kept in the condition of wage laborers, principally, if not wholly, by the +monopoly of money. This monopoly, established in all these manufacturing countries, +has made it impossible for the manufacturing laborers to hire the money +capital that was necessary to enable them to do business for themselves; and has +consequently compelled them to sell their labor to the monopolists of money, for +just such prices as these latter should choose to give.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is, then, by the monopoly of land, and the monopoly of money, that more than +a thousand millions of the earth's inhabitants—as savages, barbarians, and wage +laborers—are kept in a state of destitution, or on the verge of destitution. Hundreds +of millions of them are receiving, for their labor, not more than three, five, +or, at most, ten cents a day.</p> + +<p class="indent">In western Europe, and in the United States, where, within the last hundred +and fifty years, machinery has been introduced, and where alone any considerable +wealth is now created, the wage laborers, although they get so small a portion of +the wealth they create, are nevertheless in a vastly better condition than are the +laboring classes in other parts of the world.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 48]</span> +If, now, the employers of wage labor, in this country,—who are also the monopolists +of money,—and who are ostensibly so distressed lest their own wage laborers +should suffer from the competition of the pauper labor of other countries,—have +really any of that humanity, of which they make such profession, they have before +them a much wider field for the display of it, than they seem to desire. That is +to say, they have it in their power, not only to elevate immensely the condition of +the laboring classes in this country, but also to set an example that will be very +rapidly followed in all other countries; and the result will be the elevation of all +oppressed laborers throughout the world. This they can do, by simply abolishing +the monopoly of money. The real producers of wealth, with few or no exceptions, +will then be able to hire all the capital they need for their industries, and will do +business for themselves. They will also be able to hire their capital at very low +rates of interest; and will then put into their own pockets all the proceeds of their +labor, except what they pay as interest on their capital. And this amount will be +too small to obstruct materially their rise to independence and wealth.</p> + +<h2>Section XVI.</h2> + +<p class="indent">But will the monopolists of money give up their monopoly? Certainly not voluntarily. +They will do it only upon compulsion. They will hold on to it as long +as they own and control governments as they do now. And why will they do so? +Because to give up their monopoly would be to give up their control of those great +armies of servants—the wage laborers—from whom all their wealth is derived, +and whom they can now coerce by the alternative of starvation, to labor for them +at just such prices as they (the monopolists of money) shall choose to pay.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now these monopolists of money have no plans whatever for making their "capital," +as they call it—that is, their money capital—<i>their privileged money capital</i>—profitable +to themselves, <i>otherwise than by using it to employ other men's labor</i>. And +they can keep control of other men's labor only by depriving the laborers themselves +of all other means of subsistence. And they can deprive them of all other +means of subsistence only by putting it out of their power to hire the money that +is necessary to enable them to do business for themselves. And they can put it +out of their power to hire money, only by forbidding all other men to lend them +their credit, in the shape of promissory notes, to be circulated as money.</p> + +<p class="indent">If the twenty-five or fifty thousand millions of loanable capital—promissory +notes—which, <i>in this country</i>, are now lying idle, were permitted to be loaned, +these wage laborers would hire it, and do business for themselves, instead of laboring +as servants for others; and would of course retain in their own hands all the +wealth they should create, except what they should pay as interest for their capital.</p> + +<p class="indent">And what is true of this country, is true of every other where civilization exists; +for wherever civilization exists, land has value, and can be used as banking capital, +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 49]</span> +and be made to furnish all the money that is necessary to enable the producers +of wealth to hire the capital necessary for their industries, and thus relieve them +from their present servitude to the few holders of privileged money.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus it is that the monopoly of money is the one great obstacle to the liberation +of the laboring classes all over the world, and to their indefinite progress in +wealth.</p> + +<p class="indent">But we are now to show, more definitely, what relation this monopoly of money +is made to bear to the freedom of international trade; and why it is that the holders +of this monopoly, <i>in this country</i>, demand heavy tariffs on imports, on the lying +pretence of protecting our home labor against the competition of the so-called pauper +labor of other countries.</p> + +<p class="indent">The explanation of the whole matter is as follows.</p> + +<p class="indent">1. The holders of the monopoly of money, in each country,—more especially +in the manufacturing countries like England, the United States, and some others,—assume +that the present condition of poverty, for the great mass of mankind, +all over the world, is to be perpetuated forever; or at least for an indefinite period. +From this assumption they infer that, if free trade between all countries is to be +allowed, the so-called pauper labor of each country is to be forever pitted against +the so-called pauper labor of every other country. Hence they infer that it is the +duty of each government—or certainly of our government—to protect the so-called +pauper labor of our own country—that is, the class of laborers who are constantly on +the verge of pauperism—against the competition of the so-called pauper labor of +all other countries, by such duties on imports as will secure to our own laborers a +monopoly of our own home market.</p> + +<p class="indent">This is, on the face of it, the most plausible argument—and almost, if not really, +the only argument—by which they now attempt to sustain their restrictions upon +international trade.</p> + +<p class="indent">If this argument is a false one, their whole case falls to the ground. That it is a +false one, will be shown hereafter.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. These monopolists of money assume that pauper labor, so-called, is the cheapest +labor in the world; and that therefore each nation, in order to compete with +the pauper labor of all other nations, must itself have "cheap labor." In fact, +"cheap labor" is, with them, the great <i>sine qua non</i> of all national industry. To +compete with "cheap labor," say they, we must have "cheap labor." This is, with +them, a self-evident proposition. And this demand for "cheap labor" means, of +course, that the laboring classes, in this country, must be kept, as nearly as possible, +on a level with the so-called pauper labor of all other countries.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus their whole scheme of national industry is made to depend upon "cheap +labor." And to secure "cheap labor," they hold it to be indispensable that the laborers +shall be kept constantly either in actual pauperism, or on the verge of pauperism. +And, in this country, they know of no way of keeping the laborers on the +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 50]</span> +verge of pauperism, but by retaining in their (the monopolists') own hands such a +monopoly of money as will put it out of the power of the laborers to hire money, +and do business for themselves; and thus compel them, by the alternative of starvation, +to sell their labor to the monopolists of money at such prices as will enable +them (the monopolists) to manufacture goods in competition with the so-called +pauper laborers of all other countries.</p> + +<p class="indent">Let it be repeated—as a vital proposition—that the whole industrial programme +of these monopolists rests upon, and implies, such a degree of poverty, on +the part of the laboring classes, as will put their labor in direct competition with +the so-called pauper labor of all other countries. So long as they (the monopolists) +can perpetuate this extreme poverty of the laboring classes, in this country, they +feel safe against all foreign competition; for, in all other things than "cheap labor," +we have advantages equal to those of any other nation.</p> + +<p class="indent">Furthermore, this extreme poverty, in which the laborers are to be kept, necessarily +implies that they are to receive no larger share of the proceeds of their own +labor, than is necessary to keep them in a condition to labor. It implies that +their industry—which is really the national industry—is not to be carried on at +all for their own benefit, but only for the benefit of their employers, the monopolists +of money. It implies that the laborers are to be mere tools and machines in +the hands of their employers; that they are to be kept simply in running order, +like other machinery; but that, beyond this, they are to have no more rights, and +no more interests, in the products of their labor, than have the wheels, spindles, +and other machinery, with which the work is done.</p> + +<p class="indent">In short, this whole programme implies that the laborers—the real producers of +wealth—are not to be considered at all as human beings, having rights and interests +of their own; but only as tools and machines, to be owned, used, and consumed +in producing such wealth as their employers—the monopolists of money—may +desire for their own subsistence and pleasure.</p> + +<p class="indent">What, then, is the remedy? Plainly it is to abolish the monopoly of money. +Liberate all this loanable capital—promissory notes—that is now lying idle, and +we liberate all labor, and furnish to all laborers all the capital they need for their +industries. We shall then have no longer, all over the earth, the competition of +pauper labor with pauper labor, but only the competition of free labor with free +labor. And from this competition of free labor with free labor, no people on earth +have anything to fear, but all peoples have everything to hope.</p> + +<p class="indent">And why have all peoples everything to hope from the competition of free labor +with free labor? Because when every human being, who labors at all, has, as nearly +as possible, all the fruits of his labor, and all the capital that is necessary to make +his labor most effective, he has all needed inducements to the best use of both his +brains and his muscles, his head and his hands. He applies both his head and his +hands to his work. He not only acquires, as far as possible, for his own use, all the +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 51]</span> +scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions, that are made by others, but he +himself makes scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions. He thus multiplies +indefinitely his powers of production. And the more each one produces of +his own particular commodity, the more he can buy of every other man's products, +and the more he can pay for them.</p> + +<p class="indent">With freedom in money, the scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions, +made in each country, will not only be used to the utmost in that country, but will +be carried into all other countries. And these discoveries and inventions, given +by each country to every other, and received by each country from every other, +will be of infinitely more value than all the material commodities that will be exchanged +between these countries.</p> + +<p class="indent">In this way each country contributes to the wealth of every other, and the whole +human race are enriched by the increased power and stimulus given to each man's +labor of body and mind.</p> + +<p class="indent">But it is to be kept constantly in mind, that there can be no such thing as free +labor, unless there be freedom in money; that is, unless everybody, who can furnish +money, shall be at liberty to do so. Plainly labor cannot be free, unless the +laborers are free to hire all the money capital that is necessary for their industries. +And they cannot be free to hire all this money capital, unless all who can lend it +to them, shall be at liberty to do so.</p> + +<p class="indent">In short, labor cannot be free, unless each laborer is free to hire all the capital—money +capital, as well as all other capital—that he honestly can hire; free to +buy, wherever he can buy, all the raw material he needs for his labor; and free to +sell, wherever he can sell, all the products of his labor. Therefore labor cannot be +free, unless we have freedom in money, and free trade with all mankind.</p> + +<p class="indent">We can now understand the situation. In the most civilized nations—such as +Western Europe and the United States—labor is utterly crippled, robbed, and enslaved +by the monopoly of money; and also, in some of these countries, by the +monopoly of land. In nearly or quite all the other countries of the world, labor is +not only robbed and enslaved, but to a great extent paralyzed, by the monopoly of +land, and by what may properly be called the utter absence of money. There is, consequently, +in these latter countries, almost literally, no diversity of industry, no science, +no skill, no invention, no machinery, no manufactures, no production, and no +wealth; but everywhere miserable poverty, ignorance, servitude, and wretchedness.</p> + +<p class="indent">In this country, and in Western Europe, where the uses of money are known, +there is no excuse to be offered for the monopoly of money. It is maintained, in +each of these countries, by a small knot of tyrants and robbers, who have got control +of the governments, and use their power principally to maintain this monopoly; +understanding, as they do, that this one monopoly of money gives them a substantially +absolute control of all other men's property and labor.</p> + +<p class="indent"> +But not satisfied with this substantially absolute control of all other men's property +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 52]</span>and labor, the monopolists of money, <i>in this country</i>,—feigning great pity for +their laborers, but really seeking only to make their monopoly more profitable to +themselves,—cry out for protection against the competition of the pauper labor of +all other countries; when they alone, <i>and such as they</i>, are the direct cause of all the +pauper labor in the world. But for them, and others like them, there would be +neither poverty, ignorance, nor servitude on the face of the earth.</p> + +<p class="indent">But to all that has now been said, the advocates of the monopoly of money will +say that, if all the material property of the country were permitted to be represented +by promissory notes, and these promissory notes were permitted to be lent, +bought, and sold as money, the laborers would not be able to hire them, for the +reason that they could not give the necessary security for repayment.</p> + +<p class="indent">But let those who would say this, tell us why it is that, in order to prevent men +from loaning their promissory notes, for circulation as money, it has always been +necessary for governments to prohibit it, either by penal enactments, or prohibitory +taxation. These penal enactments and prohibitory taxation are acknowledgments +that, but for them, the notes would be loaned to any extent that would be profitable +to the lenders. What this extent would be, nothing but experience of freedom +can determine. But freedom would doubtless give us ten, twenty, most likely fifty, +times as much money as we have now, if so much could be kept in circulation. +And laborers would at least have ten, twenty, or fifty times better chances for hiring +capital, than they have now. And, furthermore, all labor and property would +have ten, twenty, or fifty times better chances of bringing their full value in the +market, than they have now.</p> + +<p class="indent">But in the space that is allowable in this letter, it is impossible to say all, or +nearly all, of what might be said, to show the justice, the utility, or the necessity, +for perfect freedom in the matters of money and international trade. To pursue +these topics further would exclude other matters of great importance, as showing +how the government acts the part of robber and tyrant in all its legislation on contracts; +and that the whole purpose of all its acts is that the earnings of the many +may be put into the pockets of the few.</p> + +<h2>Section XVII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Although, as has already been said, the constitution is a paper that nobody ever +signed, that few persons have ever read, and that the great body of the people +never saw; and that has, consequently, no more claim to be the supreme law of the +land, or to have any authority whatever, than has any other paper, that nobody +ever signed, that few persons ever read, and that the great body of the people +never saw; and although it purports to authorize a government, in which the lawmakers, +judges, and executive officers are all to be secured against any responsibility +whatever <i>to the people</i>, whose liberty and rights are at stake; and although +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 53]</span> +this government is kept in operation only by votes given in secret (by secret ballot), +and in a way to save the voters from all personal responsibility for the acts +of their agents—the lawmakers, judges, etc.; and although the whole affair is so +audacious a fraud and usurpation, that no people could be expected to agree to it, +or ought to submit to it, for a moment; yet, inasmuch as the constitution declares +itself to have been ordained and established by the people of the United States, +for the maintenance of liberty and justice for themselves and their posterity; and +inasmuch as all its supporters—that is, the voters, lawmakers, judges, etc.—profess +to derive all their authority from it; and inasmuch as all lawmakers, and all +judicial and executive officers, both national and State, swear to support it; and +inasmuch as they claim the right to kill, and are evidently determined to kill, and +esteem it the highest glory to kill, all who do not submit to its authority; we +might reasonably expect that, from motives of common decency, if from no other, +those who profess to administer it, would pay some deference to its commands, <i>at +least in those particular cases where it explicitly forbids any violation of the natural +rights of the people</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">Especially might we expect that the judiciary—whose courts claim to be courts +of justice—and who profess to be authorized and sworn to expose and condemn +all such violations of individual rights as the constitution itself expressly forbids—would, +in spite of all their official dependence on, and responsibility to, the lawmakers, +have sufficient respect for their personal characters, and the opinions of +the world, to induce them to pay some regard to all those parts of the constitution +that expressly require any rights of the people to be held inviolable.</p> + +<p class="indent">If the judicial tribunals cannot be expected to do justice, even in those cases +where the constitution expressly commands them to do it, and where they have +solemnly sworn to do it, it is plain that they have sunk to the lowest depths of +servility and corruption, and can be expected to do nothing but serve the purposes +of robbers and tyrants.</p> + +<p class="indent">But how futile have been all expectations of justice from the judiciary, may be +seen in the conduct of the courts—and especially in that of the so-called Supreme +Court of the United States—in regard to men's natural right to make their own +contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">Although the State lawmakers have, more frequently than the national lawmakers, +made laws in violation of men's natural right to make their own contracts, +yet all laws, State and national, having for their object the destruction of +that right, have always, without a single exception, I think, received the sanction +of the Supreme Court of the United States. And having been sanctioned by that +court, they have been, as a matter of course, sanctioned by all the other courts, +State and national. And this work has gone on, until, if these courts are to be believed, +nothing at all is left of men's natural right to make their own contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">That such is the truth, I now propose to prove.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 54]</span> +And, first, as to the State governments.</p> + +<p class="indent">The constitution of the United States (<i>Art. 1, Sec. 10</i>) declares that:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">No State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">This provision does not designate what contracts have, and what have not, an +"obligation." But it clearly presupposes, implies, assumes, and asserts that there +are contracts that <i>have</i> an "obligation." Any State law, therefore, which declares +that such contracts shall have <i>no obligation</i>, is plainly in conflict with this provision +of the constitution of the United States.</p> + +<p class="indent">This provision, also, by implying that there <i>are</i> contracts, that <i>have</i> an "obligation," +<i>necessarily implies that men have a right to enter into them</i>; for if men had no +right to enter into the contracts, the contracts themselves could have no "obligation."</p> + +<p class="indent">This provision, then, of the constitution of the United States, not only implies +that there are contracts that <i>have</i> an obligation, <i>but it also implies that the people +have the right to enter into all such contracts, and have the benefit of them</i>. And "<i>any</i>" +State "<i>law</i>," conflicting with either of these implications, is necessarily unconstitutional +and void.</p> + +<p class="indent">Furthermore, the language of this provision of the constitution, to wit, "the obligation +[singular] of contracts" [plural], implies <i>that there is one and the same "obligation" +to all "contracts" whatsoever, that have any legal obligation at all</i>. And +there obviously must be some one principle, that gives validity to all contracts +alike, that have any validity.</p> + +<p class="indent">The law, then, of this whole country, as established by the constitution of the +United States, is, that all contracts whatsoever, in which this one principle of validity, +or "obligation," is found, shall be held valid; and that the States shall impose +no restraint whatever upon the people's entering into all such contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">All, therefore, that courts have to do, in order to determine whether any particular +contract, or class of contracts, are valid, and <i>whether the people have a right to +enter into them</i>, is simply to determine whether the contracts themselves have, or +have not, this one principle of validity, or "obligation," which the constitution of +the United States declares shall not be impaired.</p> + +<p class="indent">State legislation can obviously have nothing to do with the solution of this question. +It can neither create, nor destroy, that "obligation of contracts," which the +constitution forbids it to impair. It can neither give, nor take away, the right to +enter into any contract whatever, that has that "obligation."</p> + +<p class="indent">On the supposition, then, that the constitution of the United States is, what it +declares itself to be, <i>viz.</i>, "the supreme law of the land, ... anything in the constitutions +or laws of the States to the contrary notwithstanding," this provision +against "any" State "law impairing the obligation of contracts," is so explicit, and +so authoritative, that the legislatures and courts of the States have no color of authority +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 55]</span> +for violating it. And the Supreme Court of the United States has had no +color of authority or justification for suffering it to be violated.</p> + +<p class="indent">This provision is certainly one of the most important—perhaps the most important—of +all the provisions of the constitution of the United States, <i>as protective of +the natural rights of the people to make their own contracts, or provide for their own +welfare</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">Yet it has been constantly trampled under foot, by the State legislatures, by all +manner of laws, declaring who may, and who may not, make certain contracts; +and what shall, and what shall not, be "the obligation" of particular contracts; +thus setting at defiance all ideas of justice, of natural rights, and equal rights; conferring +monopolies and privileges upon particular individuals, and imposing the +most arbitrary and destructive restraints and penalties upon others; all with a +view of putting, as far as possible, all wealth into the hands of the few, and imposing +poverty and servitude upon the great body of the people.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet all these enormities have gone on for nearly a hundred years, and have +been sanctioned, not only by all the State courts, but also by the Supreme Court of +the United States.</p> + +<p class="indent">And what color of excuse have any of these courts offered for thus upholding all +these violations of justice, of men's natural rights, and even of that constitution +which they had all sworn to support?</p> + +<p class="indent">They have offered only this: <i>They have all said they did not know what "the obligation +of contracts" was</i>!</p> + +<p class="indent">Well, suppose, for the sake of the argument, that they have not known what +"the obligation of contracts" was, what, then, was their duty? Plainly this, to +neither enforce, nor annul, any contract whatever, until they should have discovered +what "the obligation of contracts" was.</p> + +<p class="indent">Clearly they could have no right to either enforce, or annul, any contract whatever, +until they should have ascertained whether it had any "obligation," and, if +any, what that "obligation" was.</p> + +<p class="indent">If these courts really do not know—as perhaps they do not—what "the obligation +of contracts" is, they deserve nothing but contempt for their ignorance. If +they <i>do</i> know what "the obligation of contracts" is, and yet sanction the almost +literally innumerable laws that violate it, they deserve nothing but detestation +for their villainy.</p> + +<p class="indent">And until they shall suspend all their judgments for either enforcing, or annulling, +contracts, or, on the other hand, shall ascertain what "the obligation of contracts" +is, and sweep away all State laws that impair it, they will deserve both +contempt for their ignorance, and detestation for their crimes.</p> + +<p class="indent">Individual Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have, at least in +one instance, in 1827 (<i>Ogden vs. Saunders</i>, 12 Wheaton 213), attempted to give a +definition of "the obligation of contracts." But there was great disagreement +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 56]</span> +among them; and no one definition secured the assent of the whole court, <i>or even of +a majority</i>. Since then, so far as I know, that court has never attempted to give a +definition. And, so far as the opinion of that court is concerned, the question is +as unsettled now, as it was sixty years ago. And the opinions of the Supreme +Courts of the States are equally unsettled with those of the Supreme Court of the +United States. The consequence is, that "the obligation of contracts"—the principle +on which the real validity, or invalidity, of all contracts whatsoever depends—is +practically unknown, or at least unrecognized, by a single court, either of the +States, or of the United States. And, as a result, every species of absurd, corrupt, +and robber legislation goes on unrestrained, as it always has done.</p> + +<p class="indent">What, now, is the reason why not one of these courts has ever so far given its +attention to the subject as to have discovered what "the obligation of contracts" +is? What that principle is, I repeat, which they have all sworn to sustain, and on +which the real validity, or invalidity, of every contract on which they ever adjudicate, +depends? Why is it that they have all gone on sanctioning and enforcing +all the nakedly iniquitous laws, by which men's natural right to make their own +contracts has been trampled under foot?</p> + +<p class="indent">Surely it is not because they do not know that all men have a natural right to +make their own contracts; for they know <i>that</i>, as well as they know that all men +have a natural right to live, to breathe, to move, to speak, to hear, to see, or +to do anything whatever for the support of their lives, or the promotion of their +happiness.</p> + +<p class="indent">Why, then, is it, that they strike down this right, without ceremony, and without +compunction, whenever they are commanded to do so by the lawmakers? It +is because, and solely because, they are so servile, slavish, degraded, and corrupt, +as to act habitually on the principle, that justice and men's natural rights are matters +of no importance, in comparison with the commands of the impudent and tyrannical +lawmakers, on whom they are dependent for their offices and their +salaries. It is because, and solely because, they, like the judges under all other +irresponsible and tyrannical governments, are part and parcel of a conspiracy for +robbing and enslaving the great body of the people, to gratify the luxury and +pride of a few. It is because, and solely because, they do not recognize our governments, +State or national, as institutions designed simply to maintain justice, +or to protect all men in the enjoyment of all their natural rights; but only as institutions +designed to accomplish such objects as irresponsible cabals of lawmakers +may agree upon.</p> + +<p class="indent">In proof of all this, I give the following.</p> + +<p class="indent">Previous to 1824, two cases had come up from the State courts, to the Supreme +Court of the United States, involving the question whether a State law, <i>invalidating +some particular contract</i>, came within the constitutional prohibition of "any +law impairing the obligation of contracts."</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 57]</span> +One of these cases was that of <i>Fletcher vs. Peck</i>, (6 <i>Cranch</i> 87), in the year 1810. +In this case the court held simply that a grant of land, once made by the legislature +of Georgia, could not be rescinded by a subsequent legislature.</p> + +<p class="indent">But no general definition of "the obligation of contracts" was given.</p> + +<p class="indent">Again, in the year 1819, in the case of <i>Dartmouth College vs. Woodward</i> (4 +<i>Wheaton</i> 518), the court held that a charter, granted to Dartmouth College, by +the king of England, before the Revolution, was a contract; and that a law of New +Hampshire, annulling, or materially altering, the charter, without the consent of +the trustees, was a "law impairing the obligation" of <i>that</i> contract.</p> + +<p class="indent">But, in this case, as in that of <i>Fletcher vs. Peck</i>, the court gave no general definition +of "the obligation of contracts."</p> + +<p class="indent">But in the year 1824, and again in 1827, in the case of <i>Ogden vs. Saunders</i> (12 +<i>Wheaton</i> 213) the question was, whether an insolvent law of the State of New +York, which discharged a debtor from a debt, <i>contracted after the passage of the +law</i>, or, as the courts would say, "<i>contracted under the law</i>"—on his giving up +his property to be distributed among his creditors—was a "law impairing the +obligation of contracts?"</p> + +<p class="indent">To the correct decision of this case, it seemed indispensable that the court +should give a comprehensive, precise, and <i>universal</i> definition of "the obligation of +contracts"; one by which it might forever after be known what was, and what was +not, that "obligation of contracts," which the State governments were forbidden +to "impair" by "<i>any law</i>" whatever.</p> + +<p class="indent">The cause was heard at two terms, that of 1824, and that of 1827.</p> + +<p class="indent">It was argued by Webster, Wheaton, Wirt, Clay, Livingston, Ogden, Jones, +Sampson, and Haines; nine in all. Their arguments were so voluminous that +they could not be reported at length. Only summaries of them are given. But +these summaries occupy thirty-eight pages in the reports.</p> + +<p class="indent">The judges, at that time, were seven, <i>viz.</i>, Marshall, Washington, Johnson, Duvall, +Story, Thompson, and Trimble.</p> + +<p class="indent">The judges gave five different opinions; occupying one hundred pages of the +reports.</p> + +<p class="indent">But no one definition of "the obligation of contracts" could be agreed on; <i>not +even by a majority</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">Here, then, sixteen lawyers and judges—many of them among the most eminent +the country has ever had—were called upon to give their opinions upon a +question of the highest importance to all men's natural rights, to all the interests +of civilized society, and to the very existence of civilization itself; a question, +upon the answer to which depended the real validity, or invalidity, of every contract +that ever was made, or ever will be made, between man and man. And yet, +by their disagreements, they all virtually acknowledged that they did not know +what "the obligation of contracts" was!</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 58]</span> +But this was not all. Although they could not agree as to what "the obligation +of contracts" was, they did all agree that it could be nothing which the State +lawmakers could not prohibit and abolish, <i>by laws passed before the contracts were +made</i>. That is to say, they all agreed that the State lawmakers had absolute +power to prohibit all contracts whatsoever, for buying and selling, borrowing and +lending, giving and receiving, property; and that, whenever they did prohibit any +particular contract, or class of contracts, <i>all such contracts, thereafter made, could +have no "obligation"</i>!</p> + +<p class="indent">They said this, be it noted, not of contracts that were naturally and intrinsically +criminal and void, but of contracts that were naturally and intrinsically as just, +and lawful, and useful, and necessary, as any that men ever enter into; and that had +as perfect a natural, intrinsic, inherent "obligation," as any of those contracts, by +which the traffic of society is carried on, or by which men ever buy and sell, borrow +and lend, give and receive, property, of and to each other.</p> + +<p class="indent">Not one of these sixteen lawyers and judges took the ground that the constitution, +in forbidding any State to "pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts," +intended to protect, against the arbitrary legislation of the States, the only true, +real, and natural "obligation of contracts," or the right of the people to enter into +all really just, and naturally obligatory contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">Is it possible to conceive of a more shameful exhibition, or confession, of the +servility, the baseness, or the utter degradation, of both bar and bench, than their +refusal to say one word in favor of justice, liberty, men's natural rights, or the +natural, and only real, "obligation" of their contracts?</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet, from that day to this—a period of sixty years, save one—neither bar +nor bench, so far as I know, have ever uttered one syllable in vindication of men's +natural right to make their own contracts, or to have the only true, real, natural, +inherent, intrinsic "obligation" of their contracts respected by lawmakers or +courts.</p> + +<p class="indent">Can any further proof be needed that all ideas of justice and men's natural +rights are absolutely banished from the minds of lawmakers, and from so-called +courts of justice? Or that absolute and irresponsible lawmaking has usurped their +place?</p> + +<p class="indent">Or can any further proof be needed, of the utter worthlessness of all the constitutions, +which these lawmakers and judges swear to support, and profess to be +governed by?</p> + +<h2>Section XVIII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">If, now, it be asked, what is this constitutional "obligation of contracts," which +the States are forbidden to impair, the answer is, that it is, and necessarily must +be, the <i>natural</i> obligation; or that obligation, which contracts have, on principles +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 59]</span> +of natural law, and natural justice, as distinguished from any arbitrary or unjust +obligation, which lawmakers may assume to create, and attach to contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">This natural obligation is the only <i>one</i> "obligation" which <i>all</i> obligatory contracts +can be said to have. It is the only <i>inherent</i> "obligation," that any contract +can be said to have. It is recognized all over the world—at least as far as it is +known—as the one only <i>true</i> obligation, that any, or all, contracts can have. And, +so far as it is known—it is held valid all over the world, except in those exceptional +cases, where arbitrary and tyrannical governments have assumed to annul +it, or substitute some other in its stead.</p> + +<p class="indent">The constitution assumes that this <i>one</i> "obligation of contracts," which it designs +to protect, is the natural one, because it assumes that it existed, <i>and was +known</i>, at the time the constitution itself was established; and certainly no <i>one</i> +"obligation," <i>other than the natural one</i>, can be said to have been known, as applicable +to all obligatory contracts, at the time the constitution was established. +Unless, therefore, the constitution be presumed to have intended the natural "obligation," +it cannot be said to have intended any <i>one</i> "obligation" whatever; or, +consequently, to have forbidden the violation of any <i>one</i> "obligation" whatever.</p> + +<p class="indent">It cannot be said that "the obligation," which the constitution designed to protect +was any arbitrary "obligation," that was unknown at the time the constitution +was established, but that was to be created, and made known afterward; for +then this provision of the constitution could have had no effect, until such arbitrary +"obligation" should have been created, and made known. And as it gives +us no information as to how, or by whom, this arbitrary "obligation" was to be +created, or what the obligation itself was to be, or how it could ever be known to +be the one that was intended to be protected, the provision itself becomes a mere +nullity, having no effect to protect any "obligation" at all.</p> + +<p class="indent">It would be a manifest and utter absurdity to say that the constitution intended +to protect any "obligation" whatever, unless it be presumed to have intended some +particular "obligation," <i>that was known at the time</i>; for that would be equivalent to +saying that the constitution intended to establish a law, of which no man could +know the meaning.</p> + +<p class="indent">But this is not all.</p> + +<p class="indent">The right of property is a natural right. The only real right of property, that +is known to mankind, is the natural right. Men have also a natural right to convey +their natural rights of property from one person to another. And there is no +means known to mankind, by which this <i>natural</i> right of property can be transferred, +or conveyed, by one man to another, except by such contracts as are <i>naturally</i> +obligatory; that is, naturally capable of conveying and binding the right of +property.</p> + +<p class="indent">All contracts whatsoever, that are naturally capable, competent, and sufficient to +convey, transfer, and bind the natural right of property, are naturally obligatory; +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 60]</span> +and really and truly do convey, transfer, and bind such rights of property as they +purport to convey, transfer, and bind.</p> + +<p class="indent">All the other modes, by which one man has ever attempted to acquire the property +of another, have been thefts, robberies, and frauds. But these, of course, have +never conveyed any real rights of property.</p> + +<p class="indent">To make any contract binding, obligatory, and effectual for conveying and +transferring rights of property, these three conditions only are essential, <i>viz.</i>, 1. +That it be entered into by parties, who are mentally competent to make reasonable +contracts. 2. That the contract be a purely voluntary one: that is, that it be +entered into without either force or fraud on either side. 3. That the right of +property, which the contract purports to convey, be such an one as is naturally capable +of being conveyed, or transferred, by one man to another.</p> + +<p class="indent">Subject to these conditions, all contracts whatsoever, for conveying rights of +property—that is, for buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving +property—are naturally obligatory, and bind such rights of property as +they purport to convey.</p> + +<p class="indent">Subject to these conditions, all contracts, for the conveyance of rights of property, +are recognized as valid, all over the world, by both civilized and savage +man, except in those particular cases where governments arbitrarily and tyrannically +prohibit, alter, or invalidate them.</p> + +<p class="indent">This <i>natural</i> "obligation of contracts" must necessarily be presumed to be the +one, and the only one, which the constitution forbids to be impaired, by any State +law whatever, if we are to presume that the constitution was intended for the +maintenance of justice, or men's natural rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">On the other hand, if the constitution be presumed not to protect this <i>natural</i> +"obligation of contracts," we know not <i>what</i> other "obligation" it did intend to +protect. It mentions no other, describes no other, gives us no hint of any other; +and nobody can give us the least information as to what other "obligation of contracts" +was intended.</p> + +<p class="indent">It could not have been any "obligation" which the <i>State</i> lawmakers might arbitrarily +create, and annex to <i>all</i> contracts; for this is what no lawmakers have ever +attempted to do. And it would be the height of absurdity to suppose they ever +will invent any <i>one</i> "obligation," and attach it to <i>all</i> contracts. They have only +attempted either to annul, or impair, the natural "obligation" of <i>particular</i> contracts; +or, <i>in particular cases</i>, to substitute other "obligations" of their own invention. +And this is the most they will ever attempt to do.</p> + +<h2>Section XIX.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Assuming it now to be proved that the "obligation of contracts," which the States +are forbidden to "impair," is the <i>natural</i> "obligation"; and that, <i>constitutionally +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 61]</span> +speaking</i>, this provision secures to all the people of the United States the right to +enter into, and have the benefit of, all contracts whatsoever, that have that <i>one natural</i> +"obligation," let us look at some of the more important of those State laws +that have either impaired that obligation or prohibited the exercise of that right.</p> + +<p class="indent">1. That law, in all the States, by which any, or all, the contracts of persons, +under twenty-one years of age, are either invalidated, or forbidden to be entered +into.</p> + +<p class="indent">The mental capacity of a person to make reasonable contracts, is the only criterion, +by which to determine his legal capacity to make obligatory contracts. And +his mental capacity to make reasonable contracts is certainly not to be determined +by the fact that he is, or is not, twenty-one years of age. There would be just as +much sense in saying that it was to be determined by his height or his weight, as +there is in saying that it should be determined by his age.</p> + +<p class="indent">Nearly all persons, male and female, are mentally competent to make reasonable +contracts, long before they are twenty-one years of age. And as soon as they are +mentally competent to make reasonable contracts, they have the same natural right +to make them, that they ever can have. And their contracts have the same natural +"obligation" that they ever can have.</p> + +<p class="indent">If a person's mental capacity to make reasonable contracts be drawn in question, +that is a question of fact, to be ascertained by the same tribunal that is to +ascertain all the other facts involved in the case. It certainly is not to be determined +by any arbitrary legislation, that shall deprive any one of his natural right +to make contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. All the State laws, that do now forbid, or that have heretofore forbidden +married women to make any or all contracts, that they are, or were, mentally competent +to make reasonably, are violations of their natural right to make their own +contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">A married woman has the same natural right to acquire and hold property, and +to make all contracts that she is mentally competent to make reasonably, as has +a married man, or any other man. And any law invalidating her contracts, or +forbidding her to enter into contracts, on the ground of her being married, are +not only absurd and outrageous in themselves, but are also as plainly violations of +that provision of the constitution, which forbids any State to pass any law impairing +the natural obligation of contracts, as would be laws invalidating or prohibiting +similar contracts by married men.</p> + +<p class="indent">3. All those State laws, commonly called acts of incorporation, by which a certain +number of persons are licensed to contract debts, without having their individual +properties held liable to pay them, are laws impairing the natural obligation +of their contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">On natural principles of law and reason, these persons are simply partners; and +their private properties, like those of any other partners, should be held liable for +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 62]</span> +their partnership debts. Like any other partners, they take the profits of their +business, if there be any profits. And they are naturally bound to take all the +risks of their business, as in the case of any other business. For a law to say that, +if they make any profits, they may put them all into their own pockets, but that, if +they make a loss, they may throw it upon their creditors, is an absurdity and an +outrage. Such a law is plainly a law impairing the natural obligation of their +contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">4. All State insolvent laws, so-called, that distribute a debtor's property equally +among his creditors, are laws impairing the natural obligation of his contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">If the natural obligation of contracts were known, and recognized as law, we +should have no need of insolvent or bankrupt laws.</p> + +<p class="indent">The only force, function, or effect of a <i>legal</i> contract is to convey and bind rights +of property. A contract that conveys and binds no right of property, has no <i>legal</i> +force, effect, or obligation whatever.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> It may have very weighty moral obligation; but it can have no legal obligation.</p></div> +</div> + +<p class="indent">Consequently, the natural obligation of a contract of debt binds the debtor's +property, and nothing more. That is, it gives the creditor a mortgage upon the +debtor's property, and nothing more.</p> + +<p class="indent">A first debt is a first mortgage; a second debt is a second mortgage; a third debt +is a third mortgage; and so on indefinitely.</p> + +<p class="indent">The first mortgage must be paid in full, before anything is paid on the second. +The second must be paid in full, before anything is paid on the third; and so on +indefinitely.</p> + +<p class="indent">When the mortgaged property is exhausted, the debt is cancelled; there is no +other property that the contract binds.</p> + +<p class="indent">If, therefore, a debtor, at the time his debt becomes due, pays to the extent of +his ability, and has been guilty of no fraud, fault, or neglect, during the time his +debt had to run, he is thenceforth discharged from all legal obligation.</p> + +<p class="indent">If this principle were acknowledged, we should have no occasion, and no use, +for insolvent or bankrupt laws.</p> + +<p class="indent">Of course, persons who have never asked themselves what the <i>natural</i> "obligation +of contracts" is, will raise numerous objections to the principle, that a legal contract +binds nothing else than rights of property. But their objections are all shallow +and fallacious.</p> + +<p class="indent">I have not space here to go into all the arguments that may be necessary to +prove that contracts can have no <i>legal</i> effect, except to bind rights of property; or +to show the truth of that principle in its application to all contracts whatsoever. +To do this would require a somewhat elaborate treatise. Such a treatise I hope +sometime to publish. For the present, I only assert the principle; and assert that +the ignorance of this truth is at least one of the reasons why courts and lawyers +have never been able to agree as to what "the obligation of contracts" was.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 63]</span> +In all the cases that have now been mentioned,—that is, of minors (so-called), +married women, corporations, insolvents, and in all other like cases—the tricks, or +pretences, by which the courts attempt to uphold the validity of all laws that forbid +persons to exercise their natural right to make their own contracts, or that annul, +or impair, the <i>natural</i> "obligation" of their contracts, are these:</p> + +<p class="indent">1. They say that, if a law forbids any particular contract to be made, such contract, +being then an illegal one, can have no "obligation." Consequently, say +they, the law cannot be said to impair it; because the law cannot impair an "obligation," +that has never had an existence.</p> + +<p class="indent">They say this of all contracts, that are arbitrarily forbidden; although, naturally +and intrinsically, they have as valid an obligation as any others that men +ever enter into, or as any that courts enforce.</p> + +<p class="indent">By such a naked trick as this, these courts not only strike down men's natural +right to make their own contracts, but even seek to evade that provision of the +constitution, which they are all sworn to support, and which commands them to +hold valid the <i>natural</i> "obligation" of all men's contracts; "anything in the constitutions +or laws of the States to the contrary notwithstanding."</p> + +<p class="indent">They might as well have said that, if the constitution had declared that "no +State shall pass any law impairing any man's natural right to life, liberty, or property"— +(that is, his <i>natural</i> right to live, and do what he will with himself and +his property, so long as he infringes the right of no other person)—this prohibition +could be evaded by a State law declaring that, from and after such a date, no +person should have any natural right to life, liberty, or property; and that, therefore, +a law arbitrarily taking from a man his life, liberty, and property, could not +be said to impair his right to them, because no law could impair a right that did +not exist.</p> + +<p class="indent">The answer to such an argument as this, would be, that it is a natural truth +that every man, who ever has been, or ever will be, born into the world, <i>necessarily +has been, and necessarily will be, born with an inherent right to life, liberty, and property</i>; +and that, in forbidding this right to be impaired, <i>the constitution presupposes, +implies, assumes, and asserts that every man has, and will have, such a right</i>; and that +this <i>natural</i> right is the very right, which the constitution forbids any State law +to impair.</p> + +<p class="indent">Or the courts might as well have said that, if the constitution had declared that +"no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts made for the +purchase of food," that provision could have been evaded by a State law forbidding +any contract to be made for the purchase of food; and then saying that such +contract, being illegal, could have no "obligation," that could be impaired.</p> + +<p class="indent">The answer to this argument would be that, by forbidding any State law impairing +the obligation of contracts made for the purchase of food, the constitution +presupposes, implies, assumes, and asserts that such contracts have, and always +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 64]</span> +will have, a <i>natural</i> "obligation"; and that this <i>natural</i> "obligation" is the very +"obligation," which the constitution forbids any State law to impair.</p> + +<p class="indent">So in regard to all other contracts. The constitution presupposes, implies, assumes, +and asserts the natural truth, that certain contracts have, <i>and always necessarily +will have</i>, a <i>natural</i> "obligation." And this <i>natural</i> "obligation"—which is +the only real obligation that any contract can have—is the very one that the constitution +forbids any State law to impair, in the case of any contract whatever +that has such obligation.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet all the courts hold the direct opposite of this. They hold that, if a +State law forbids any contract to be made, such a contract can then have no obligation; +and that, consequently, no State law can impair an obligation that never +existed.</p> + +<p class="indent">But if, by forbidding a contract to be made, a State law can prevent the contract's +having any obligation, State laws, by forbidding any contracts at all to be +made, can prevent all contracts, thereafter made, from having any obligation; and +thus utterly destroy all men's natural rights to make any obligatory contracts +at all.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. A second pretence, by which the courts attempt to evade that provision of +the constitution, which forbids any State to "pass any law impairing the obligation +of contracts," is this: They say that the State law, that requires, or obliges, +a man to fulfil his contracts, <i>is itself</i> "<i>the obligation</i>," which the constitution forbids +to be impaired; and that therefore the constitution only prohibits the impairing +of any law for enforcing such contracts as shall be made under it.</p> + +<p class="indent">But this pretence, it will be seen, utterly discards the idea that contracts have +any <i>natural</i> obligation. It implies that contracts have no obligation, except the +laws that are made for enforcing them. But if contracts have no <i>natural</i> obligation, +they have no obligation at all, <i>that ought to be enforced</i>; and the State is a +mere usurper, tyrant, and robber, in passing any law to enforce them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Plainly a State cannot rightfully enforce any contracts at all, unless they have +a <i>natural</i> obligation.</p> + +<p class="indent">3. A third pretence, by which the courts attempt to evade this provision of the +constitution, is this: They say that "the law is a part of the contract" itself; and +therefore cannot impair its obligation.</p> + +<p class="indent">By this they mean that, if a law is standing upon the statute book, prescribing +what obligation certain contracts shall, or shall not, have, it must then be presumed +that, whenever such a contract is made, the parties intended to make it according +to that law; and really to make the law a part of their contract; <i>although +they themselves say nothing of the kind</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">This pretence, that the law is a part of the contract, is a mere trick to cheat +people out of their natural right to make their own contracts; and to compel them +to make only such contracts as the lawmakers choose to permit them to make.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 65]</span> +To say that it must be presumed that the parties intended to make their contracts +according to such laws as may be prescribed to them—or, what is the same +thing, to make the laws a part of their contracts—is equivalent to saying that the +parties must be presumed to have given up all their natural right to make their +own contracts; to have acknowledged themselves imbeciles, incompetent to make +reasonable contracts, and to have authorized the lawmakers to make their contracts +for them; for if the lawmakers can make any part of a man's contract, and +presume his consent to it, they can make a whole one, and presume his consent +to it.</p> + +<p class="indent">If the lawmakers can make any part of men's contracts, they can make the +whole of them; and can, therefore, buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and receive +men's property of all kinds, according to their (the lawmakers') own will, pleasure, +or discretion; without the consent of the real owners of the property, and +even without their knowledge, until it is too late. In short, they may take any +man's property, and give it, or sell it, to whom they please, and on such conditions, +and at such prices, as they please; without any regard to the rights of the owner. +They may, in fact, at their pleasure, strip any, or every, man of his property, and +bestow it upon whom they will; and then justify the act upon the presumption +that the owner consented to have his property thus taken from him and given to +others.</p> + +<p class="indent">This absurd, contemptible, and detestable trick has had a long lease of life, and +has been used as a cover for some of the greatest of crimes. By means of it, the +marriage contract has been perverted into a contract, on the part of the woman, to +make herself a legal non-entity, or <i>non compos mentis</i>; to give up, to her husband, +all her personal property, and the control of all her real estate; and to part with +her natural, inherent, inalienable right, as a human being, to direct her own labor, +control her own earnings, make her own contracts, and provide for the subsistence +of herself and her children.</p> + +<p class="indent">There would be just as much reason in saying that the lawmakers have a right +to make the entire marriage contract; to marry any man and woman against +their will; dispose of all their personal and property rights; declare them imbeciles, +incapable of making a reasonable marriage contract; then presume the consent +of both the parties; and finally treat them as criminals, and their children as +outcasts, if they presume to make any contract of their own.</p> + +<p class="indent">This same trick, of holding that the law is a part of the contract, has been made +to protect the private property of stockholders from liability for the debts of the +corporations, of which they were members; and to protect the private property of +special partners, so-called, or limited partners, from liability for partnership debts.</p> + +<p class="indent">This same trick has been employed to justify insolvent and bankrupt laws, so-called, +whereby a first creditor's right to a first mortgage on the property of his +debtor, has been taken from him, and he has been compelled to take his chances with +as many subsequent creditors as the debtor may succeed in becoming indebted to.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 66]</span> +All these absurdities and atrocities have been practiced by the lawmakers of the +States, and sustained by the courts, under the pretence that they (the courts) did +not know what the natural "obligation of contracts" was; or that, if they did +know what it was, the constitution of the United States imposed no restraint upon +its unlimited violation by the State lawmakers.</p> + +<h2>Section XX.</h2> + +<p class="indent">But, not content with having always sanctioned the unlimited power of the <i>State</i> +lawmakers to abolish all men's natural right to make their own contracts, the Supreme +Court of the United States has, within the last twenty years, taken pains to +assert that congress also has the arbitrary power to abolish the same right.</p> + +<p class="indent">1. It has asserted the arbitrary power of congress to abolish all men's right to +make their own contracts, by asserting its power <i>to alter the meaning of all contracts, +after they are made</i>, so as to make them widely, or wholly, different from what the +parties had made them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus the court has said that, after a man has made a contract to pay a certain +number of dollars, at a future time,—<i>meaning such dollars as were current at the +time the contract was made</i>,—congress has power to coin a dollar of less value than +the one agreed on, and authorize the debtor to pay his debt with a dollar of less +value than the one he had promised.</p> + +<p class="indent">To cover up this infamous crime, the court asserts, over and over again,—what +no one denies,—that congress has power (constitutionally speaking) to alter, at +pleasure, the value of its coins. But it then asserts that congress has this additional, +and wholly different, power, to wit, the power to declare that this alteration +in the value of the coins <i>shall work a corresponding change in all existing contracts +for the payment of money</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">In reality they say that a contract to pay money is not a contract to pay any +particular amount, or value, of such money as was known and understood by the +parties at the time the contract was made, but <i>only such, and so much, as congress +shall afterwards choose to call by that name, when the debt shall become due</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">They assert that, by simply retaining the name, while altering the thing,—<i>or by +simply giving an old name to a new thing</i>,—congress has power to utterly abolish +the contract which the parties themselves entered into, and substitute for it any +such new and different one, as they (congress) may choose to substitute.</p> + +<p class="indent">Here are their own words:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent"><i>The contract obligation ... was not a duty to pay gold or silver, or the kind of money +recognized by law at the time when the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money +of equal intrinsic value in the market.... But the obligation of a contract to pay +money is to pay that which the law shall recognize as money when the payment is to be +made.—Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wallace 548.</i></p></blockquote><p class="indent"></p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 67]</span> +This is saying that the obligation of a contract to pay money is not an obligation +to pay what both the law and the parties recognize as money, <i>at the time when +the contract is made</i>, but only such substitute as congress shall afterwards prescribe, +"<i>when the payment is to be made</i>."</p> + +<p class="indent">This opinion was given by a majority of the court in the year 1870.</p> + +<p class="indent">In another opinion the court says:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Under the power to coin money, and to regulate its value, congress may issue coins of +same denomination [that is, bearing the same name] as those already current by law, but +of less intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less weight of the precious +metals, <i>and thereby enable debtors to discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less +real value</i>. A contract to pay a certain sum of money, without any stipulation as to the kind +of money in which it shall be made, may always be satisfied by payment of that sum [that +is, that <i>nominal</i> amount] in any currency <i>which is lawful money at the place and time at +which payment is to be made</i>.—<i>Juilliard vs. Greenman</i>, 110 <i>U. S. Reports</i>, 449.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">This opinion was given by the entire court—save one, Field—at the October +term of 1883.</p> + +<p class="indent">Both these opinions are distinct declarations of the power of congress to alter +men's contracts, <i>after they are made</i>, by simply retaining the name, while altering +the thing, that is agreed to be paid.</p> + +<p class="indent">In both these cases, the court means distinctly to say that, <i>after the parties to a +contract have agreed upon the number of dollars to be paid</i>, congress has power to reduce +the value of the dollar, and authorize all debtors to pay the less valuable dollar, +instead of the one agreed on.</p> + +<p class="indent">In other words, the court means to say that, after a contract has been made for +the payment of a certain number of dollars, <i>congress has power to alter the meaning +of the word dollar</i>, and thus authorize the debtor to pay in something different +from, and less valuable than, the thing he agreed to pay.</p> + +<p class="indent">Well, if congress has power to alter men's contracts, <i>after they are made</i>, by altering +the meaning of the word dollar, and thus reducing the value of the debt, it +has a precisely equal power to <i>increase</i> the value of the dollar, and thus compel the +debtor to pay <i>more</i> than he agreed to pay.</p> + +<p class="indent">Congress has evidently just as much right to <i>increase</i> the value of the dollar, +after a contract has been made, as it has to <i>reduce</i> its value. It has, therefore, +just as much right to cheat debtors, by compelling them to pay <i>more</i> than they +agreed to pay, as it has to cheat creditors, by compelling them to accept <i>less</i> than +they agreed to accept.</p> + +<p class="indent">All this talk of the court is equivalent to asserting that congress has the right +to alter men's contracts at pleasure, <i>after they are made</i>, and make them over into +something, or anything, wholly different from what the parties themselves had +made them.</p> + +<p class="indent">And this is equivalent to denying all men's right to make their own contracts, +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 68]</span> +or to acquire any contract rights, which congress may not <i>afterward</i>, at pleasure, +alter, or abolish.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is equivalent to saying that the words of contracts are not to be taken in the +sense in which they are used, by the parties themselves, at the time when the contracts +are entered into, but only in such different senses as congress may choose to +put upon them at any future time.</p> + +<p class="indent">If this is not asserting the right of congress to abolish altogether men's natural +right to make their own contracts, what is it?</p> + +<p class="indent">Incredible as such audacious villainy may seem to those unsophisticated persons, +who imagine that a court of law should be a court of justice, it is nevertheless +true, that this court intended to declare the unlimited power of congress to alter, +at pleasure, the contracts of parties, <i>after they have been made</i>, by altering the kind +and amount of money by which the contracts may be fulfilled. That they intended +all this, is proved, not only by the extracts already given from their opinions, +but also by the whole tenor of their arguments—too long to be repeated +here—and more explicitly by these quotations, <i>viz.</i>:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">There is no well-founded distinction to be made between the constitutional validity of an +act of congress declaring treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts contracted +after its passage, and that of an act making them a legal tender for the discharge of <i>all</i> +debts, <i>as well those incurred before, as those made after, its enactment</i>.—<i>Legal Tender +Cases</i>, 12 <i>Wallace</i> 530 (1870).</p> + +<p class="indent">Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional +power of the government over the currency, whatever that power may be, <i>and the +obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that power</i>.—12 <i>Wallace</i> +549.</p> + +<p class="indent">Contracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority of congress, <i>at least so +far as relates to the means of payment</i>.—12 <i>Wallace</i> 549.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The court means here to say that "every contract for the payment of money, +simply," is necessarily made, by the parties, <i>subject to the power of congress to alter +it afterward</i>—by altering the kind and value of the money with which it may be +paid—<i>into anything, into which</i> they (congress) <i>may choose to alter it</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">And this is equivalent to saying that all such contracts are made, by the parties, +with <i>the implied understanding that the contracts, as written and signed by themselves, do +not bind either of the parties to anything</i>; but that they simply suggest, or initiate, +some non-descript or other, which congress may afterward convert into a binding +contract, <i>of such a sort, and only such a sort, as</i> they (congress) <i>may see fit to convert +it into</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">Every one of these judges knew that no two men, having common honesty and +common sense,—unless first deprived of all power to make their own contracts,—would +ever enter into a contract to pay money, with any understanding that the +government had any such arbitrary power as the court here ascribes to it, to alter +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 69]</span> +their contract after it should be made. Such an absurd contract would, in reality, +be no <i>legal</i> contract at all. It would be a mere gambling agreement, having, +naturally and really, no <i>legal</i> "obligation" at all.</p> + +<p class="indent">But further. A <i>solvent</i> contract to pay money is in reality—in law, and in +equity—<i>a bona fide mortgage upon the debtor's property</i>. And this mortgage right +is as veritable a right of property, as is any right of property, that is conveyed by +a warranty deed. And congress has no more right to invalidate this mortgage, +by a single iota, than it has to invalidate a warranty deed of land. And these +judges will sometime find out that such is "the obligation of contracts," if they +ever find out what "the obligation of contracts" is.</p> + +<p class="indent">The justices of that court have had this question—what is "the obligation of +contracts"?—before them for seventy years, and more. But they have never +agreed among themselves—even by so many as a majority—as to what it is. +And this disagreement is very good evidence that <i>none</i> of them have known what +it is; for if any one of them had known what it is, he would doubtless have been +able, long ago, to enlighten the rest.</p> + +<p class="indent">Considering the vital importance of men's contracts, it would evidently be more +to the credit of these judges, if they would give their attention to this question of +"the obligation of contracts," until they shall have solved it, than it is to be telling +fifty millions of people that they have no right to make any contracts at all, except +such as congress has power to invalidate after they shall have been made. +Such assertions as this, coming from a court that cannot even tell us what "the +obligation of contracts" is, are not entitled to any serious consideration. On the +contrary, they show us what farces and impostures these judicial opinions—or decisions, +as they call them—are. They show that these judicial oracles, as men +call them, are no better than some of the other so-called oracles, by whom mankind +have been duped.</p> + +<p class="indent">But these judges certainly never will find out what "the obligation of contracts" +is, until they find out that men have the natural right to make their own contracts, +and unalterably fix their "obligation"; and that governments can have no power +whatever to make, unmake, alter, or invalidate that "obligation."</p> + +<p class="indent">Still further. Congress has the same power over weights and measures that it +has over coins. And the court has no more right or reason to say that congress +has power to alter existing contracts, by altering the value of the coins, than it +has to say that, after any or all men have, for value received, entered into contracts +to deliver so many bushels of wheat or other grain, so many pounds of beef, pork, +butter, cheese, cotton, wool, or iron, so many yards of cloth, or so many feet of +lumber, congress has power, by altering these weights and measures, to alter all +these existing contracts, so as to convert them into contracts to deliver only half +as many, or to deliver twice as many, bushels, pounds, yards, or feet, as the parties +agreed upon.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 70]</span> +To add to the farce, as well as to the iniquity, of these judicial opinions, it must +be kept in mind, that the court says that, after A has sold valuable property to B, +and has taken in payment an honest and sufficient mortgage on B's property, congress +has the power to compel him (A) to give up this mortgage, and to accept, in +place of it, not anything of any real value whatever, but only the promissory note +of a so-called government; and that government one which—if taxation without +consent is robbery—never had an honest dollar in its treasury, with which to pay +any of its debts, and is never likely to have one; but relies wholly on its future +robberies for its means to pay them; and can give no guaranty, but its own interest +at the time, that it will even make the payment out of its future robberies.</p> + +<p class="indent">If a company of bandits were to seize a man's property for their own uses, and +give him their note, promising to pay him out of their future robberies, the transaction +would not be considered a very legitimate one. But it would be intrinsically +just as legitimate as is the one which the Supreme Court sanctions on the +part of congress.</p> + +<p class="indent">Banditti have not usually kept supreme courts of their own, to legalize either +their robberies, or their promises to pay for past robberies, out of the proceeds of +their future ones. Perhaps they may now take a lesson from our Supreme Court, +and establish courts of their own, that will hereafter legalize all their contracts of +this kind.</p> + +<h2>Section XXI.</h2> + +<p class="indent">To justify its declaration, that congress has power to alter men's contracts after +they are made, the court dwells upon the fact that, at the times when the legal-tender +acts were passed, the government was in peril of its life; and asserts that +it had therefore a right to do almost anything for its self-preservation, without +much regard to its honesty, or dishonesty, towards private persons. Thus it says:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">A civil war was then raging, which seriously threatened the overthrow of the government, +and the destruction of the constitution itself. It demanded the equipment and support of +large armies and navies, and the employment of money to an extent beyond the capacity of +all ordinary sources of supply. Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the +credit of the government, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had become nearly exhausted. +Moneyed institutions had advanced largely of their means, and more could not be expected +of them. They had been compelled to suspend specie payments. Taxation was inadequate +to pay even the interest on the debt already incurred, and it was impossible to await the income +of additional taxes. The necessity was immediate and pressing. The army was unpaid. +There was then due to the soldiers in the field nearly a score of millions of dollars. +The requisitions from the War and Navy departments for supplies, exceeded fifty millions, +and the current expenditure was over one million per day.... Foreign credit we had +none. We say nothing of the overhanging paralysis of trade, and business generally, which +threatened loss of confidence in the ability of the government to maintain its continued existence, +and therewith the complete destruction of all remaining national credit.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 71]</span> +It was at such a time, and in such circumstances, that congress was called upon to devise +means to maintaining the army and navy, for securing the large supplies of money needed, +and indeed for the preservation of the government created by the constitution. It was at +such a time, and in such and emergency, that the legal-tender acts were passed.—12 <i>Wallace</i> +540-1.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">In the same case Bradley said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Can the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn be thus taken by the government, when +the public exigency requires it, and cannot the rich man's bonds and notes be in like manner +taken to reach the same end?—<i>p.</i> 561.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">He also said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">It is absolutely essential to independent national existence that government should have +a firm hold on the two great instrumentalities of the <i>sword</i> and the <i>purse, and the right to +wield them without restriction, on occasions of national peril</i>. In certain emergencies government +must have at its command, <i>not only the personal services—the bodies and lives—of +its citizens</i>, but the lesser, though not less essential, power of absolute control over the +resources of the country. Its armies must be filled, and its navies manned, by the citizens +in person.—<i>p.</i> 563.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent"><i>The conscription may deprive me of liberty, and destroy my life.... All these are +fundamental political conditions on which life, property, and money are respectively held +and enjoyed under our system of government, nay, under any system of government.</i> There +are times when the exigencies of the State rightly absorb all subordinate considerations of +private interest, convenience, and feeling.—<i>p.</i> 565.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Such an attempt as this, to justify one crime, by taking for granted the justice +of other and greater crimes, is a rather desperate mode of reasoning, for a court of +law; to say nothing of a court of justice. The answer to it is, that no government, +however good in other respects—any more than any other good institution—has +any right to live otherwise than on purely voluntary support. It can have no right +to take either "the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn," or "the rich man's +bonds and notes," or poor men's "bodies and lives," without their consent. And +when a government resorts to such measures to save its life, we need no further +proof that its time to die has come. A good government, no more than a bad one, +has any right to live by robbery, murder, or any other crime.</p> + +<p class="indent">But so think not the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. On +the contrary, they hold that, in comparison with the preservation of the government, +all the rights of the people to property, liberty, and life are worthless things, +not to be regarded. So they hold that in such an exigency as they describe, congress +had the right to commit any crime against private persons, by which the +government could be saved. And among these lawful crimes, the court holds that +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 72]</span> +congress had the right to issue money that should serve as a license to all holders +of it, to cheat—or rather openly rob—their creditors.</p> + +<p class="indent">The court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve the life +of the government, congress had the right to issue such money as would authorize +all creditors to demand twice the amount of their honest dues from all debtors.</p> + +<p class="indent">The court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve the life +of the government, congress had the right to sell indulgences for all manner of +crimes; for theft, robbery, rape, murder, and all other crimes, for which indulgences +would bring a price in the market.</p> + +<p class="indent">Can any one imagine it possible that, if the government had always done +nothing but that "equal and exact justice to all men"—which you say it is +pledged to do,—but which you must know it has never done,—it could ever have +been brought into any such peril of its life, as these judges describe? Could it +ever have been necessitated to take either "the poor man's cattle, and horses, and +corn," or "the rich man's bonds and notes," or poor men's "bodies and lives," without +their consent? Could it ever have been necessitated to "conscript" the poor +man—too poor to pay a ransom of three hundred dollars—made thus poor by the +tyranny of the government itself—"deprive him of his liberty, and destroy his +life"? Could it ever have been necessitated to sell indulgences for crime to either +debtors, or creditors, or anybody else? To preserve "the constitution"—a constitution, +I repeat, that authorized nothing but "equal and exact justice to all men"—could +it ever have been necessitated to send into the field millions of ignorant +young men, to cut the throats of other young men as ignorant as themselves—few +of whom, on either side, had ever read the constitution, or had any real knowledge +of its legal meaning; and not one of whom had ever signed it, or promised to support +it, or was under the least obligation to support it?</p> + +<p class="indent">It is, I think, perfectly safe to say, that not one in a thousand, probably not one +in ten thousand, of these young men, who were sent out to butcher others, and be +butchered themselves, had any real knowledge of the constitution they were professedly +sent out to support; or any reasonable knowledge of the real character +and motives of the congresses and courts that profess to administer the constitution. +If they had possessed this knowledge, how many of them would have ever +gone to the field?</p> + +<p class="indent">But further. Is it really true that the right of the government to commit all +these atrocities:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent"><i>Are the fundamental political conditions on which life, property, and money are respectively +held and enjoyed under our system of government?</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">If such is the real character of the constitution, can any further proof be required +of the necessity that it be buried out of sight at once and forever? +The truth was that the government was in peril, <i>solely because it was not fit to exist</i>. +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 73]</span> +It, and the State governments—all but parts of one and the same system—were +rotten with tyranny and crime. And being bound together by no honest tie, +and existing for no honest purpose, destruction was the only honest doom to which +any of them were entitled. And if we had spent the same money and blood to +destroy them, that we did to preserve them, it would have been ten thousand times +more creditable to our intelligence and character as a people.</p> + +<p class="indent">Clearly the court has not strengthened its case at all by this picture of the peril +in which the government was placed. It has only shown to what desperate straits +a government, founded on usurpation and fraud, and devoted to robbery and oppression, +may be brought, by the quarrels that are liable to arise between the different +factions—that is, the different bands of robbers—of which it is composed. +When such quarrels arise, it is not to be expected that either faction—having +never had any regard to human rights, when acting in concert with the other—will +hesitate at any new crimes that may be necessary to prolong its existence.</p> + +<p class="indent">Here was a government that had never had any legitimate existence. It professedly +rested all its authority on a certain paper called a constitution; a paper, +I repeat, that nobody had ever signed, that few persons had ever read, that the +great body of the people had never seen. This government had been imposed, by +a few property holders, upon a people too poor, too scattered, and many of them +too ignorant, to resist. It had been carried on, for some seventy years, by a mere +cabal of irresponsible men, called lawmakers. In this cabal, the several local +bands of robbers—the slaveholders of the South, the iron monopolists, the woollen +monopolists, and the money monopolists, of the North—were represented. The +whole purpose of its laws was to rob and enslave the many—both North and South—for +the benefit of a few. But these robbers and tyrants quarreled—as lesser +bands of robbers have done—over the division of their spoils. And hence the +war. No such principle as justice to anybody—black or white—was the ruling +motive on either side.</p> + +<p class="indent">In this war, each faction—already steeped in crime—plunged into new, if not +greater, crimes. In its desperation, it resolved to destroy men and money, without +limit, and without mercy, for the preservation of its existence. The northern faction, +having more men, money, and credit than the southern, survived the Kilkenny +fight. Neither faction cared anything for human rights then, and neither +of them has shown any regard for human rights since. "As a war measure," the +northern faction found it necessary to put an end to the one great crime, from +which the southern faction had drawn its wealth. But all other government crimes +have been more rampant since the war, than they were before. Neither the conquerors, +nor the conquered, have yet learned that no government can have any +right to exist for any other purpose than the simple maintenance of justice between +man and man.</p> + +<p class="indent">And now, years after the fiendish butchery is over, and after men would seem +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 74]</span> +to have had time to come to their senses, the Supreme Court of the United States, +representing the victorious faction, comes forward with the declaration that one of +the crimes—the violation of men's private contracts—resorted to by its faction, +in the heat of conflict, as a means of preserving its power over the other, was not +only justifiable and proper at the time, <i>but that it is also a legitimate and constitutional +power, to be exercised forever hereafter in time of peace</i>!</p> + +<p class="indent">Mark the knavery of these men. They first say that, because the government +was in peril of its life, it had a right to license great crimes against private persons, +if by so doing it could raise money for its own preservation. Next they say that, +<i>although the government is no longer in peril of its life</i>, it may still go on forever licensing +the same crimes as it was before necessitated to license!</p> + +<p class="indent">They thus virtually say that the government may commit the same crimes in +time of peace, that it is necessitated to do in time of war; and, that, consequently, +it has the same right to "take the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn," and +"the rich man's bonds and notes," and poor men's "bodies and lives," in time of +peace, <i>when no necessity whatever can be alleged</i>, as in time of war, when the government +is in peril of its life.</p> + +<p class="indent">In short, they virtually say, that this government exists for itself alone; and +that all the natural rights of the people, to property, liberty, and life, are mere +baubles, to be disposed of, at its pleasure, whether in time of peace, or in war.</p> + +<h2>Section XXII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">As if to place beyond controversy the fact, that the court may forever hereafter +be relied on to sanction every usurpation and crime that congress will ever dare to +put into the form of a statute, without the slightest color of authority from the +constitution, necessity, utility, justice, or reason, it has, on three separate occasions, +announced its sanction of the monopoly of money, as finally established +by congress in 1866, and continued in force ever since.</p> + +<p class="indent">This monopoly is established by a prohibitory tax—a tax of ten per cent.—on +all notes issued for circulation as money, other than the notes of the United States +and the national banks.</p> + +<p class="indent">This ten per cent. is called a "tax," but is really a penalty, and is intended as +such, and as nothing else. Its whole purpose is—<i>not to raise revenue</i>—but solely +to establish a monopoly of money, by prohibiting the issue of all notes intended +for circulation as money, except those issued, or specially licensed, by the government +itself.</p> + +<p class="indent">This prohibition upon the issue of all notes, except those issued, or specially +licensed, by the government, is a prohibition upon all freedom of industry and +traffic. It is a prohibition upon the exercise of men's natural right to lend and +hire such money capital as all men need to enable them to create and distribute +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 75]</span> +wealth, and supply their own wants, and provide for their own happiness. Its +whole purpose is to reduce, as far as possible, the great body of the people to the +condition of servants to a few—a condition but a single grade above that of chattel +slavery—in which their labor, and the products of their labor, may be extorted +from them at such prices only as the holders of the monopoly may choose to give.</p> + +<p class="indent">This prohibitory tax—so-called—is therefore really a penalty imposed upon the +exercise of men's natural right to create and distribute wealth, and provide for +their own and each other's wants. And it is imposed solely for the purpose of +establishing a practically omnipotent monopoly in the hands of a few.</p> + +<p class="indent">Calling this penalty a "tax" is one of the dirty tricks, or rather downright lies—that +of calling things by false names—to which congress and the courts resort, +to hide their usurpations and crimes from the common eye.</p> + +<p class="indent">Everybody—who believes in the government—says, of course, that congress +has power to levy taxes; that it must do so to raise revenue for the support of the +government. Therefore this lying congress call this penalty a "tax," instead of +calling it by its true name, a penalty.</p> + +<p class="indent">It certainly is no tax, because no revenue is raised, or intended to be raised, by +it. It is not levied upon property, or persons, as such, but only upon a certain +act, or upon persons for doing a certain act; an act that if not only perfectly innocent +and lawful in itself, but that is naturally and intrinsically useful, and even +indispensable for the prosperity and welfare of the whole people. Its whole object +is simply to deter everybody—except those specially licensed—from performing +this innocent, useful, and necessary act. And this it has succeeded in doing for +the last twenty years; to the destruction of the rights, and the impoverishment +and immeasurable injury of all the people, except the few holders of the monopoly.</p> + +<p class="indent">If congress had passed an act, in this form, to wit:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">No person, nor any association of persons, incorporated or unincorporated—<i>unless specially +licensed by congress</i>—shall issue their promissory notes for circulation as money; +and a <i>penalty</i> of ten per cent. upon the amount of all such notes shall be imposed upon the +persons issuing them,</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">the act would have been the same, in effect and intention, as is this act, that +imposes what it calls a "tax." The penalty would have been understood by everybody +as a punishment for issuing the notes; and would have been applied to, and +enforced against, those only who should have issued them. And it is the same +with this so-called tax. It will never be collected, except for the same cause, and +under the same circumstances, as the penalty would have been. It has no more to +do with raising a revenue, than the penalty would have had. And all these lying +lawmakers and courts know it.</p> + +<p class="indent">But if congress had put this prohibition distinctly in the form of a <i>penalty</i>, the +usurpation would have been so barefaced—so destitute of all color of constitutional +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 76]</span> +authority—that congress dared not risk the consequences. And possibly +the court might not have dared to sanction it; if, indeed, there be any crime or +usurpation which the court dare not sanction. So these knavish lawmakers called +this penalty a "tax"; and the court says that such a "tax" is clearly constitutional. +And the monopoly has now been established for twenty years. And substantially +all the industrial and financial troubles of that period have been the +natural consequences of the monopoly.</p> + +<p class="indent">If congress had laid a prohibitory tax upon all food—that is, had imposed a +penalty upon the production and sale of all food—except such as it should have +itself produced, or specially licensed; and should have reduced the amount of food, +thus produced or licensed, to one tenth, twentieth, or fiftieth of what was really +needed; the motive and the crime would have been the same, in character, if not +in degree, as they are in this case, <i>viz.</i>, to enable the few holders of the licensed +food to extort, from everybody else, by the fear of starvation, all their (the latter's) +earnings and property, in exchange for this small quantity of privileged food.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such a monopoly of food would have been no clearer violation of men's natural +rights, than is the present monopoly of money. And yet this colossal crime—like +every other crime that congress chooses to commit—is sanctioned by its servile, +rotten, and stinking court.</p> + +<p class="indent">On what <i>constitutional</i> grounds—that is, on what provisions found in the constitution +itself—does the court profess to give its sanction to such a crime?</p> + +<p class="indent">On these three only:</p> + +<p class="indent">1. On the power of congress to lay and collect taxes, etc.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. On the power of congress to coin money.</p> + +<p class="indent">3. On the power of congress to borrow money.</p> + +<p class="indent">Out of these simple, and apparently harmless provisions, the court manufactures +an authority to grant, to a few persons, a monopoly that is practically omnipotent +over all the industry and traffic of the country; that is fatal to all other men's natural +right to lend and hire capital for any or all their legitimate industries; and +fatal absolutely to all their natural right to buy, sell, and exchange any, or all, the +products of their labor at their true, just, and natural prices.</p> + +<p class="indent">Let us look at these constitutional provisions, and see how much authority congress +can really draw from them.</p> + +<p class="indent">1. The constitution says:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, <i>to pay +the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States</i>.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">This provision plainly authorizes no taxation whatever, except for the raising +of revenue to pay the debts and legitimate expenses of the government. It no +more authorizes taxation for the purpose of establishing monopolies of any kind +whatever, than it does for taking openly and boldly all the property of the many, +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 77]</span> +and giving it outright to a few. And none but a congress of usurpers, robbers, +and swindlers would ever think of using it for that purpose.</p> + +<p class="indent">The court says, <i>in effect</i>, that this provision gives congress power to establish the +present monopoly of money; that the power to tax all other money, is a power to +prohibit all other money; and a power to prohibit all other money is a power to +give the present money a monopoly.</p> + +<p class="indent">How much is such an argument worth? Let us show by a parallel case, as follows.</p> + +<p class="indent">Congress has the same power to tax all other property, that it has to tax money. +And if the power to tax money is a power to prohibit money, then it follows that +the power of congress to tax all other property than money, is a power to prohibit +all other property than money; and a power to prohibit all other property than +money, is a power to give monopolies to all such other property as congress may +not choose to prohibit; or may choose to specially license.</p> + +<p class="indent">On such reasoning as this, it would follow that the power of congress to tax +money, and all other property, is a power to prohibit all money, and all other property; +and thus to establish monopolies in favor of all such money, and all such +other property, as it chooses not to prohibit; or chooses to specially license.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus, this reasoning would give congress power to establish all the monopolies, +it may choose to establish, not only in money, but in agriculture, manufactures, +and commerce; and protect these monopolies against infringement, by imposing +prohibitory taxes upon all money and other property, except such as it should +choose not to prohibit; or should choose to specially license.</p> + +<p class="indent">Because the constitution says that "congress shall have power to lay and collect +taxes," etc., to raise the revenue necessary for paying the current expenses of the +government, the court say that congress have power to levy prohibitory taxes—taxes +that shall yield no revenue at all—but shall operate only as a penalty upon +all industries and traffic, and upon the use of all the means of industry and traffic, +that shall compete with such monopolies as congress shall choose to grant.</p> + +<p class="indent">This is no more than an unvarnished statement of the argument, by which the +court attempts to justify a prohibitory "tax" upon money; for the same reasoning +would justify the levying of a prohibitory tax—that is, penalty—upon the use of +any and all other means of industry and traffic, by which any other monopolies, +granted by congress, might be infringed.</p> + +<p class="indent">There is plainly no more connection between the "power to lay and collect taxes," +etc., for the necessary expenses of the government, and the power to establish this +monopoly of money, than there is between such a power of taxation, and a power +to punish, as a crime, any or all industry and traffic whatsoever, except such as the +government may specially license.</p> + +<p class="indent">This whole cheat lies in the use of the word "tax," to describe what is really a +penalty, upon the exercise of any or all men's natural rights of providing for their +subsistence and well-being. And none but corrupt and rotten congresses and +courts would ever think of practising such a cheat.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 78]</span> +2. The second provision of the constitution, relied on by the court to justify +the monopoly of money, is this:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign +coins.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The only important part of this provision is that which says that "the congress +shall have power to coin money, [and] regulate the value thereof."</p> + +<p class="indent">That part about regulating the value of foreign coins—if any one can tell how +congress can regulate it—is of no appreciable importance to anybody; for the +coins will circulate, or not, as men may, or may not, choose to buy and sell them +as money, and at such value as they will bear in free and open market,—that is, +in competition with all other coins, and all other money. This is their only true +and natural market value; and there is no occasion for congress to do anything in +regard to them.</p> + +<p class="indent">The only thing, therefore, that we need to look at, is simply the power of congress +"to coin money."</p> + +<p class="indent">So far as congress itself is authorized to coin money, this is simply a power to +weigh and assay metals,—gold, silver, or any other,—stamp upon them marks indicating +their weight and fineness, and then sell them to whomsoever may choose +to buy them; and let them go in the market for whatever they may chance to bring, +in competition with all other money that may chance to be offered there.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is no power to impose any restrictions whatever upon any or all other honest +money, that may be offered in the market, and bought and sold in competition +with the coins weighed and assayed by the government.</p> + +<p class="indent">The power itself is a frivolous one, of little or no utility; for the weighing and +assaying of metals is a thing so easily done, and can be done by so many different +persons, that there is certainly no <i>necessity</i> for its being done at all by a government. +And it would undoubtedly have been far better if all coins—whether coined by +governments or individuals—had all been made into pieces bearing simply the +names of pounds, ounces, pennyweights, etc., and containing just the amounts of +pure metal described by those weights. The coins would then have been regarded +as only so much metal; and as having only the same value as the same amount of +metal in any other form. Men would then have known exactly how much of certain +metals they were buying, selling, and promising to pay. And all the jugglery, +cheating, and robbery that governments have practised, and licensed individuals +to practise—by coining pieces bearing the same names, but having different +amounts of metal—would have been avoided.</p> + +<p class="indent">And all excuses for establishing monopolies of money, by prohibiting all other +money than the coins, would also have been avoided.</p> + +<p class="indent">As it is, the constitution imposes no prohibition upon the coining of money by +individuals, but only by State governments. Individuals are left perfectly free to +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 79]</span> +coin it, except that they must not "<i>counterfeit</i> the securities and current coin of the +United States."</p> + +<p class="indent">For quite a number of years after the discovery of gold in California—that is, +until the establishment of a government mint there—a large part of the gold that +was taken out of the earth, was coined by private persons and companies; and this +coinage was perfectly legal. And I do not remember to have ever heard any complaint, +or accusation, that it was not honest and reliable.</p> + +<p class="indent">The true and only value, which the coins have as money, is that value which +they have as metals, for uses in the arts,—that is, for plate, watches, jewelry, and +the like. This value they will retain, whether they circulate as money, or not. At +this value, they are so utterly inadequate to serve as <i>bona fide</i> equivalents for such +other property as is to be bought and sold for money; and, after being minted, +are so quickly taken out of circulation, and worked up into articles of use—plate, +watches, jewelry, etc.—that they are practically of almost no importance at +all as money.</p> + +<p class="indent">But they can be so easily and cheaply carried from one part of the world to +another, that they have substantially the same market value all over the world. +They are also, in but a small degree, liable to great or sudden changes in value. +For these reasons, they serve well as standards—are perhaps the best standards +we can have—by which to measure the value of all other money, as well as other +property. But to give them any monopoly as money, is to deny the natural right +of all men to make their own contracts, and buy and sell, borrow and lend, give +and receive, all such money as the parties to bargains may mutually agree upon; +and also to license the few holders of the coins to rob all other men in the prices +of the latter's labor and property.</p> + +<p class="indent">3. The third provision of the constitution, on which the court relies to justify +the monopoly of money, is this:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The congress shall have power to borrow money.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Can any one see any connection between the power of congress "to borrow +money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money?</p> + +<p class="indent">Certainly no such connection is visible to the legal eye. But it is distinctly visible +to the political and financial eye; that is, to that class of men, for whom governments +exist, and who own congresses and courts, and set in motion armies and +navies, whenever they can promote their own interests by doing so.</p> + +<p class="indent">To a government, whose usurpations and crimes have brought it to the verge of +destruction, these men say:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Make bonds bearing six per cent. interest; sell them to us at half their face value; then +give us a monopoly of money based upon these bonds—such a monopoly as will subject the +great body of the people to a dependence upon us for the necessaries of life, and compel +them to sell their labor and property to us at our own prices; then, under pretence of raising +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 80]</span> +revenue to pay the interest and principal of the bonds, impose such a tariff upon imported +commodities as will enable us to get fifty per cent. more for our own goods than they +are worth; in short, pledge to us all the power of the government to extort for us, in the future, +everything that can be extorted from the producers of wealth, and we will lend you +all the money you need to maintain your power.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">And the government has no alternative but to comply with this infamous proposal, +or give up its infamous life.</p> + +<p class="indent">This is the only real connection there is between the power of congress "to borrow +money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money. It was only by an +outright sale of the rights of the whole people, for a long series of years, that the +government could raise the money necessary to continue its villainous existence.</p> + +<p class="indent">Congress had just as much constitutional power "to borrow money," by the sale +of any and all the other natural rights of the people at large, as it had "to borrow +money" by the sale of the people's natural rights to lend and hire money.</p> + +<p class="indent">When the Supreme Court of the United States—assuming to be an oracle, empowered +to define authoritatively the legal rights of every human being in the +country—declares that congress has a constitutional power to prohibit the use of +all that immense mass of money capital, in the shape of promissory notes, which +the real property of the country is capable of supplying and sustaining, and which +is sufficient to give to every laboring person, man or woman, the means of independence +and wealth—when that court says that congress has power to prohibit +the use of all this money capital, and grant to a few men a monopoly of money +that shall condemn the great body of wealth-producers to hopeless poverty, dependence, +and servitude—and when the court has the audacity to make these +declarations on such nakedly false and senseless grounds as those that have now +been stated, it is clearly time for the people of this country to inquire what constitutions +and governments are good for, and whether they (the people) have any +natural right, as human beings, to live for themselves, or only for a few conspirators, +swindlers, usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who employ lawmakers, judges, etc., +to do their villainous work upon their fellow-men.</p> + +<p class="indent">The court gave their sanction to the monopoly of money in these three separate +cases, <i>viz.</i>: <i>Veazie Bank vs. Fenno</i>, 8 <i>Wallace</i>, 549 (1869). <i>National Bank vs. United +States</i>, 101 <i>U. S. Reports</i>, 5 <i>and</i> 6 (1879). <i>Juilliard vs. Greenman</i>, 110 <i>U. S. Reports</i> +445-6 (1884).</p> + +<h2>Section XXIII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">If anything could add to the disgust and detestation which the monstrous falsifications +of the constitution, already described, should excite towards the court +that resorts to them, it would be the fact that the court, not content with falsifying +to the utmost the constitution itself, <i>goes outside of the constitution, to the tyrannical +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 81]</span> +practices of what it</i> calls the "<i>sovereign</i>" governments of "<i>other civilized nations</i>," +to justify the same practices by our own.</p> + +<p class="indent">It asserts, over and over again, the idea that our government is a "<i>sovereign</i>" +government; that it has the same rights of "<i>sovereignty</i>," as the governments of +"other civilized nations"; especially those in Europe.</p> + +<p class="indent">What, then, is a "sovereign" government? It is a government that is "sovereign" +over all the natural rights of the people. This is the only "sovereignty" +that any government can be said to have. Under it, the people have no <i>rights</i>. +They are simply "subjects,"—that is, slaves. They have but one law, and one +duty, <i>viz.</i>, obedience, submission. They are not recognized as having any <i>rights</i>. +They can claim nothing as their own. They can only accept what the government +chooses to give them. The government owns them and their property; and disposes +of them and their property, at its pleasure, or discretion; without regard to +any consent, or dissent, on their part.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such was the "sovereignty" claimed and exercised by the governments of those, +so-called, "civilized nations of Europe," that were in power in 1787, 1788, and 1789, +when our constitution was framed and adopted, and the government put in operation +under it. And the court now says, virtually, that the constitution intended +to give to our government the same "sovereignty" over the natural rights of the +people, that those governments had then.</p> + +<p class="indent">But how did the "civilized governments of Europe" become possessed of such +"sovereignty"? Had the people ever granted it to them? Not at all. The governments +spurned the idea that they were dependent on the will or consent of their +people for their political power. On the contrary, they claimed to have derived it +from the only source, from which such "sovereignty" could have been derived; +that is, from God Himself.</p> + +<p class="indent">In 1787, 1788, and 1789, all the great governments of Europe, except England, +claimed to exist by what was called "Divine Right." That is, they claimed to +have received authority from God Himself, to rule over their people. And they +taught, and a servile and corrupt priesthood taught, that it was a religious duty of +the people to obey them. And they kept great standing armies, and hordes of +pimps, spies, and ruffians, to keep the people in subjection.</p> + +<p class="indent">And when, soon afterwards, the revolutionists of France dethroned the king +then existing—the Legitimist king, so-called—and asserted the right of the people +to choose their own government, these other governments carried on a twenty +years' war against her, to reëstablish the principle of "sovereignty" by "Divine +Right." And in this war, the government of England, although not itself claiming +to exist by Divine Right,—but really existing by brute force,—furnished +men and money without limit, to reëstablish that principle in France, and to +maintain it wherever else, in Europe, it was endangered by the idea of popular +rights.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 82]</span> +The principle, then, of "Sovereignty by Divine Right"—sustained by brute +force—was the principle on which the governments of Europe then rested; and +most of them rest on that principle today. And now the Supreme Court of the +United States virtually says that our constitution intended to give to our government +the same "sovereignty"—the same absolutism—the same supremacy over +all the natural rights of the people—as was claimed and exercised by those "Divine +Right" governments of Europe, a hundred years ago!</p> + +<p class="indent">That I may not be suspected of misrepresenting these men, I give some of their +own words as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">It is not doubted that the power to establish a standard of value, by which all other values +may be measured, or, in other words, to determine what shall be lawful money and a legal +tender, is in its nature, and of necessity, a governmental power. <i>It is in all countries exercised +by the government.</i>—<i>Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wallace 615.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The court call a power,</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">To make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of <i>all</i> debts [private as well as +public] <i>a power confessedly possessed by every independent sovereignty other than the United +States</i>.—<i>Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wallace, p. 529.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also, in the same case, it speaks of:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">That general power over the currency, <i>which has always been an acknowledged attribute +of sovereignty in every other civilized nation than our own</i>.—<i>p. 545.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">In this same case, by way of asserting the power of congress to do any dishonest +thing that any so-called "sovereign government" ever did, the court say:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Has any one, in good faith, avowed his belief that even a law debasing the current coin, +by increasing the alloy [and then making these debased coins a legal tender in payment of +debts previously contracted], would be taking private property? It might be impolitic, and +unjust, but could its constitutionality be doubted?—<i>p. 552.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">In the same case, Bradley said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">As a government, it [the government of the United States] was invested with <i>all the attributes +of sovereignty</i>.—<i>p. 555.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Such being the character of the General Government, it seems to be a self-evident proposition +<i>that it is invested with all those inherent and implied powers, which, at the time of +adopting the constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government, as such</i>, +and as being essential to the exercise of its functions.—<i>p. 556.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also he said:</p> + +<p class="indent"> +</p><blockquote><p class="indent">Another proposition equally clear is, <i>that at the time the constitution was adopted, it was,</i> +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 83]</span> +<i>and for a long time had been, the practice of most, if not all, civilized governments</i>, to employ +the public credit as a means of anticipating the national revenues for the purpose of +enabling them to exercise their governmental functions.—<i>p. 556.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">It is our duty to construe the instrument [the constitution] by its words, <i>in the light of +history, of the general nature of government, and the incidents of sovereignty</i>.—<i>p. 55.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The government simply demands that its credit shall be accepted and received by public +and private creditors during the pending exigency. <i>Every government has a right to demand +this, when its existence is at stake.</i>—<i>p. 560.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also he said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">These views are exhibited ... for the purpose of showing that it [the power to make +its notes a legal tender in payment of private debts] <i>is one of those vital and essential powers +inhering in every national sovereignty</i>, and necessary to its self-preservation.—<i>p. 564.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">In still another legal tender case, the court said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The people of the United States, by the constitution, established a national government, +<i>with sovereign powers, legislative, executive</i>, and judicial.—<i>Juilliard vs. Greenman, 110 +U. S. Reports, p. 438.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also it calls the constitution:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">A constitution, establishing a form of government, declaring fundamental principles, <i>and +creating a national sovereignty</i>, intended to endure for ages.—<i>p. 439.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also the court speaks of the government of the United States:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent"><i>As a sovereign government.</i>—<i>p. 446.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also it said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary consequence, that congress has the +power to issue the obligations of the United States in such form, and to impress upon them +such qualities as currency, for the purchase of merchandise and the payment of debts, <i>as +accord with the usage of other sovereign governments</i>. The power, as incident to the power +of borrowing money, and issuing bills or notes of the government for money borrowed, of +impressing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the payment of +private debts, <i>was a power universally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and +America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the constitution of the United States</i>. +The governments of Europe, acting through the monarch, or the legislature, according to +the distribution of powers <i>under their respective constitutions</i>, had, and have, as <i>sovereign</i> +a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin. This power has been distinctly recognized +in an important modern case, ably argued and fully considered, in which the Emperor +of Austria, as King of Hungary, obtained from the English Court of Chancery an injunction +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 84]</span> +against the issue, in England, without his license, of notes purporting to be public paper +money of Hungary.—<i>p. 447.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also it speaks of:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Congress, as the legislature of a <i>sovereign</i> nation.—<i>p. 449.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Also it said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The power to make the notes of the government a legal tender in payment of private +debts, <i>being one of the powers belonging to sovereignty in other civilized nations</i>, ... we +are irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that the impressing upon the treasury notes of +the United States the quality of being a legal tender in payment of private debts, is an appropriate +means, conducive and plainly adapted to the execution of the undoubted powers +of congress, consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, etc.——<i>p.</i> 450.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">On reading these astonishing ideas about "sovereignty"—"sovereignty" over +all the natural rights of mankind—"sovereignty," as it prevailed in Europe "at the +time of the framing and adoption of the constitution of the United States"—we +are compelled to see that these judges obtained their constitutional law, not from +the constitution itself, but from the example of the "Divine Right" governments +existing in Europe a hundred years ago. These judges seem never to have heard +of the American Revolution, or the French Revolution, or even of the English +Revolutions of the seventeenth century—revolutions fought and accomplished to +overthrow these very ideas of "sovereignty," which these judges now proclaim, as +the supreme law of this country. They seem never to have heard of the Declaration +of Independence, nor of any other declaration of the natural rights of human +beings. To their minds, "the sovereignty of governments" is everything; human +rights nothing. They apparently cannot conceive of such a thing as a people's +establishing a government as a means of preserving their personal liberty and +rights. They can only see what fearful calamities "sovereign governments" +would be liable to, if they could not compel their "subjects"—the people—to +support them against their will, and at every cost of their property, liberty, and +lives. They are utterly blind to the fact, that it is this very assumption of "sovereignty" +over all the natural rights of men, that brings governments into all their +difficulties, and all their perils. They do not see that it is this very assumption of +"sovereignty" over all men's natural rights, that makes it necessary for the "Divine +Right" governments of Europe to maintain not only great standing armies, +but also a vile purchased priesthood, that shall impose upon, and help to crush, the +ignorant and superstitious people.</p> + +<p class="indent">These judges talk of "the <i>constitutions</i>" of these "sovereign governments" of +Europe, as they existed "at the time of the framing and adoption of the constitution +of the United States." They apparently do not know that those governments +had no constitutions at all, except the Will of God, their standing armies, and the +judges, lawyers, priests, pimps, spies, and ruffians they kept in their service.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 85]</span> +If these judges had lived in Russia, a hundred years ago, and had chanced to +be visited with a momentary spasm of manhood—a fact hardly to be supposed of +such creatures—and had been sentenced therefor to the knout, a dungeon, or +Siberia, would we ever afterward have seen them, as judges of our Supreme Court, +declaring that government to be the model after which ours was formed?</p> + +<p class="indent">These judges will probably be surprised when I tell them that the constitution +of the United States contains no such word as "sovereign," or "sovereignty"; +that it contains no such word as "subjects"; nor any word that implies that the +government is "sovereign," or that the people are "subjects." At most, it contains +only the mistaken idea that a power of making laws—by lawmakers chosen +by the people—was consistent with, and necessary to, the maintenance of liberty +and justice for the people themselves. This mistaken idea was, in some measure, +excusable in that day, when reason and experience had not demonstrated, to their +minds, the utter incompatibility of all lawmaking whatsoever with men's natural +rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">The only other provision of the constitution, that can be interpreted as a declaration +of "sovereignty" in the government, is this:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">This constitution, and the laws of the United States <i>which shall be made in pursuance +thereof</i>, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United +States, <i>shall be the supreme law of the land</i>, and the judges in every State shall be bound +thereby, <i>anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding</i>.—<i>Art.</i> +VI.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">This provision I interpret to mean simply that the constitution, laws, and treaties +of the United States, shall be "the supreme law of the land"—<i>not anything +in the natural rights of the people to liberty and justice, to the contrary notwithstanding</i>—but +only that they shall be "the supreme law of the land," "<i>anything in +the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding</i>,"—that is, whenever +the two may chance to conflict with each other.</p> + +<p class="indent">If this is its true interpretation, the provision contains no declaration of "sovereignty" +over the natural rights of the people.</p> + +<p class="indent">Justice is "the supreme law" of this, and all other lands; anything in the constitutions +or laws of any nation to the contrary notwithstanding. And if the constitution +of the United States intended to assert the contrary, it was simply an +audacious lie—a lie as foolish as it was audacious—that should have covered +with infamy every man who helped to frame the constitution, or afterward sanctioned +it, or that should ever attempt to administer it.</p> + +<p class="indent">Inasmuch as the constitution declares itself to have been "ordained and established" +by</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, +insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general +welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent"> +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 86]</span> +everybody who attempts to administer it, is bound to give it such an interpretation, +and only such an interpretation, as is consistent with, and promotive of, +those objects, if its language will admit of such an interpretation.</p> + +<p class="indent">To suppose that "the people of the United States" intended to declare that the +constitution and laws of the United States should be "the supreme law of the +land," <i>anything in their own natural rights, or in the natural rights of the rest of mankind, +to the contrary notwithstanding</i>, would be to suppose that they intended, not +only to authorize every injustice, and arouse universal violence, among themselves, +but that they intended also to avow themselves the open enemies of the rights of +all the rest of mankind. Certainly no such folly, madness, or criminality as this +can be attributed to them by any rational man—always excepting the justices of +the Supreme Court of the United States, the lawmakers, and the believers in the +"Divine Right" of the cunning and the strong, to establish governments that shall +deceive, plunder, enslave, and murder the ignorant and the weak.</p> + +<p class="indent">Many men, still living, can well remember how, some fifty years ago, those famous +champions of "sovereignty," of arbitrary power, Webster and Calhoun, debated +the question, whether, in this country, "sovereignty" resided in the general +or State governments. But they never settled the question, for the very good reason +that no such thing as "sovereignty" resided in either.</p> + +<p class="indent">And the question was never settled, until it was settled at the cost of a million +of lives, and some ten thousand millions of money. And then it was settled only +as the same question had so often been settled before, to wit, that "the heaviest +battalions" are "sovereign" over the lighter.</p> + +<p class="indent">The only real "sovereignty," or right of "sovereignty," in this or any other +country, is that right of sovereignty which each and every human being has over +his or her own person and property, so long as he or she obeys the one law of justice +towards the person and property of every other human being. This is the +only <i>natural</i> right of sovereignty, that was ever known among men. All other so-called +rights of sovereignty are simply the usurpations of impostors, conspirators, +robbers, tyrants, and murderers.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is not strange that we are in such high favor with the tyrants of Europe, +when our Supreme Court tells them that our government, although a little different +in form, stands on the same essential basis as theirs of a hundred years ago; +that it is as absolute and irresponsible as theirs were then; that it will spend +more money, and shed more blood, to maintain its power, than they have ever +been able to do; that the people have no more rights here than there; and that +the government is doing all it can to keep the producing classes as poor here as +they are there. +</p> + +<p><span class="pagenum">[Pg 87]</span></p> + +<h2>Section XXIV.</h2> + +<p class="indent">John Marshall has the reputation of having been the greatest jurist the country +has ever had. And he unquestionably would have been a great jurist, if the two +fundamental propositions, on which all his legal, political, and constitutional ideas +were based, had been true.</p> + +<p class="indent">These propositions were, first, that government has all power; and, secondly, +that the people have no rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">These two propositions were, with him, cardinal principles, from which, I think, +he never departed.</p> + +<p class="indent">For these reasons he was the oracle of all the rapacious classes, in whose interest +the government was administered. And from them he got all his fame.</p> + +<p class="indent">I think his record does not furnish a single instance, in which he ever vindicated +men's natural rights, in opposition to the arbitrary legislation of congress.</p> + +<p class="indent">He was chief justice thirty-four years: from 1801 to 1835. In all that time, so +far as I have known, he never declared a single act of congress unconstitutional; +and probably never would have done so, if he had lived to this time.</p> + +<p class="indent">And, so far as I know, he never declared a single State law unconstitutional, on +account of its injustice, or its violation of men's natural rights; but only on account +of its conflict with the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.</p> + +<p class="indent">He was considered very profound on questions of "sovereignty." In fact, he +never said much in regard to anything else. He held that, in this country, "sovereignty" +was divided: that the national government was "sovereign" over certain +things; and that the State governments were "sovereign" over all other things. +He had apparently never heard of any natural, individual, human rights, that had +never been delegated to either the general or State governments.</p> + +<p class="indent">As a practical matter, he seemed to hold that the general government had "sovereignty" +enough to destroy as many of the natural rights of the people as it should +please to destroy; and that the State governments had "sovereignty" enough to +destroy what should be left, if there should be any such. He evidently considered +that, to the national government, had been delegated the part of the lion, with the +right to devour as much of his prey as his appetite should crave; and that the State +governments were jackals, with power to devour what the lion should leave.</p> + +<p class="indent">In his efforts to establish the absolutism of our governments, he made himself +an adept in the use of all those false definitions, and false assumptions, to which +courts are driven, who hold that constitutions and statute books are supreme over +all natural principles of justice, and over all the natural rights of mankind.</p> + +<p class="indent">Here is his definition of law. He professes to have borrowed it from some one,—he +does not say whom,—but he accepts it as his own.</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Law has been defined by a writer, whose definitions especially have been the theme of +<i>almost</i> universal panegyric, "<i>To be a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 88]</span> +in a State.</i>" In our system, the legislature of a State is the supreme power, in all cases +where its action is not restrained by the constitution of the United States.—<i>Ogden vs. +Saunders, 12 Wheaton 347.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">This definition is an utterly false one. It denies all the natural rights of the +people; and is resorted to only by usurpers and tyrants, to justify their crimes.</p> + +<p class="indent">The true definition of law is, that it is a fixed, immutable, natural principle; and +not anything that man ever made, or can make, unmake, or alter. Thus we speak +of the laws of matter, and the laws of mind; of the law of gravitation, the laws of +light, heat, and electricity, the laws of chemistry, geology, botany; of physiological +laws, of astronomical and atmospherical laws, etc., etc.</p> + +<p class="indent">All these are natural laws, that man never made, nor can ever unmake, or alter.</p> + +<p class="indent">The law of justice is just as supreme and universal in the moral world, as these +others are in the mental or physical world; and is as unalterable as are these by +any human power. And it is just as false and absurd to talk of anybody's having +the power to abolish the law of justice, and set up their own will in its stead, as it +would be to talk of their having the power to abolish the law of gravitation, or any +of the other natural laws of the universe, and set up their own will in the place of +them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Yet Marshall holds that this natural law of justice is no law at all, in comparison +with some "rule of civil conduct prescribed by [what he calls] the supreme +power in a State."</p> + +<p class="indent">And he gives this miserable definition, which he picked up somewhere—out of +the legal filth in which he wallowed—as his sufficient authority for striking down +all the natural obligation of men's contracts, and all men's natural rights to make +their own contracts; and for upholding the State governments in prohibiting all +such contracts as they, in their avarice and tyranny, may choose to prohibit. He +does it too, directly in the face of that very constitution, which he professes to uphold, +and which declares that "No State shall pass any law impairing the [natural] +obligation of contracts."</p> + +<p class="indent">By the same rule, or on the same definition of law, he would strike down any +and all the other natural rights of mankind.</p> + +<p class="indent">That such a definition of law should suit the purposes of men like Marshall, who +believe that governments should have all power, and men no rights, accounts for +the fact that, in this country, men have had no "<i>rights</i>"—but only such permits +as lawmakers have seen fit to allow them—since the State and United States governments +were established,—or at least for the last eighty years.</p> + +<p class="indent">Marshall also said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The right [of government] to regulate contracts, to prescribe the rules by which they may +be evidenced, <i>to prohibit such as may be deemed mischievous, is unquestionable</i>, and has +been universally exercised.—<i>Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 347.</i></p></blockquote><p class="indent"></p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 89]</span> +He here asserts that "the supreme power in a State"—that is, the legislature of +a State—has "the <i>right</i>" to "<i>deem</i> it <i>mischievous</i>" to allow men to exercise their +natural right to make their own contracts! Contracts that have a natural obligation! +And that, if a State legislature thinks it "mischievous" to allow men to make +contracts that are naturally obligatory, "<i>its right to prohibit them is unquestionable</i>."</p> + +<p class="indent">Is not this equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and the people +no rights?</p> + +<p class="indent">On the same principle, and under the same definition of law, the lawmakers of +a State may, of course, hold it "mischievous" to allow men to exercise any of their +other natural rights, as well as their right to make their own contracts; and may +therefore prohibit the exercise of any, or all, of them.</p> + +<p class="indent">And this is equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and the people +no rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">If a government can forbid the free exercise of a single one of man's natural +rights, it may, for the same reason, forbid the exercise of any and all of them; and +thus establish, practically and absolutely, Marshall's principle, that the government +has all power, and the people no rights.</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>In the same case, of Ogden vs. Saunders, Marshall's principle was agreed to by all +the other justices, and all the lawyers!</i></p> + +<p class="indent">Thus Thompson, one of the justices, said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Would it not be within the legitimate powers of a State legislature to declare <i>prospectively</i> +that no one should be made responsible, upon contracts entered into before arriving at the +age of <i>twenty-five</i> years? This, I presume, cannot be doubted.—<i>p. 300.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">On the same principle, he might say that a State legislature may declare that no +person, under fifty, or seventy, or a hundred, years of age, shall exercise his natural +right of making any contract that is naturally obligatory.</p> + +<p class="indent">In the same case, Trimble, another of the justices, said:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">If the positive law [that is, the statute law] of the State declares the contract shall have +no obligation, <i>it can have no obligation, whatever may be the principles of natural law in +regard to such a contract</i>. <i>This doctrine has been held and maintained by all States and +nations. The power of controlling, modifying, and even taking away, all obligation from +such contracts as, independently of positive enactions to the contrary, would have been obligatory, +has been exercised by all independent sovereigns.</i>—<i>p. 320.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Yes; and why has this power been exercised by "all States and nations," and +"all independent sovereigns"? Solely because these governments have all—or at +least so many of them as Trimble had in his mind—been despotic and tyrannical; +and have claimed for themselves all power, and denied to the people all rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus it seems that Trimble, like all the rest of them, got his constitutional law, +not from any natural principles of justice, not from man's natural rights, not from +the constitution of the United States, nor even from any constitution affirming +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 90]</span> +men's natural rights, but from "the doctrine [that] has been held and maintained +by all [those] States and nations," and "all [those] independent sovereigns," who +have usurped all power, and denied all the natural rights of mankind.</p> + +<p class="indent">Marshall gives another of his false definitions, when, speaking for the whole +court, in regard to the power of congress "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, +and among the several States," he asserts the right of congress to an arbitrary, +absolute dominion over all men's natural rights to carry on such commerce. +Thus he says:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">What is this power? It is the power to regulate: <i>that is, to prescribe the rule by which +commerce is to be governed</i>. <i>This power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in +itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are +prescribed by the constitution.</i> These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the +questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always +been understood, the sovereignty of congress, though limited to specific objects, is plenary +as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the several +States, is vested in congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, having in +its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution +of the United States. <i>The wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity with +the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in +many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which +they</i> [the people] <i>have relied, to secure them from its abuse</i>. <i>They are the restraints on +which the people must often rely</i> <span class="smcap">SOLELY</span>, <i>in all representative governments</i>.—<i>Gibbons vs. +Ogden, 9 Wheaton 196.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">This is a general declaration of absolutism over all "commerce with foreign nations +and among the several States," with certain exceptions mentioned in the constitution; +such as that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout +the United States," and "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any +State," and "no preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, +to the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to, or +from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another."</p> + +<p class="indent">According to this opinion of the court, congress has—subject to the exceptions +referred to—absolute, irresponsible dominion over "all commerce with foreign nations, +and among the several States"; and all men's natural rights to trade with +each other, among the several States, and all over the world, are prostrate under +the feet of a contemptible, detestable, and irresponsible cabal of lawmakers; and +the people have no protection or redress for any tyranny or robbery that may be +practised upon them, except "<i>the wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity +with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections"!</i></p> + +<p class="indent">It will be noticed that the court say that "<i>all the other powers, vested in congress, +are complete in themselves, and may be exercised to their utmost extent, and acknowledge +no limitations, other than those prescribed by the constitution</i>."</p> + +<p class="indent">They say that among "all the other [practically unlimited] powers, vested in +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 91]</span> +congress," is the power "of declaring war"; and, of course, of carrying on war; +that congress has power to carry on war, for any reason, to any extent, and against +any people, it pleases.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus they say, virtually, that <i>the natural rights of mankind</i> impose no <i>constitutional</i> +restraints whatever upon congress, in the exercise of their lawmaking powers.</p> + +<p class="indent">Is not this asserting that governments have all power, and the people no rights?</p> + +<p class="indent">But what is to be particularly noticed, is the fact that Marshall gives to congress +all this practically unlimited power over all "commerce with foreign nations, and +among the several States," <i>solely on the strength of a false definition of the verb "to +regulate</i>." He says that "the power to regulate commerce" is the power "<i>to prescribe +the rule by which commerce is to be governed</i>."</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">This definition is an utterly false, absurd, and atrocious one. It would give congress power +arbitrarily to control, obstruct, impede, derange, prohibit, and destroy commerce.</p> + +<p class="indent">The verb "to regulate" does not, as Marshall asserts, imply the exercise of any arbitrary +control whatever over the thing regulated; nor any power "to prescribe [arbitrarily] the +rule, by which" the thing regulated "is to be governed." On the contrary, it comes from +the Latin word, <i>regula</i>, a rule; <i>and implies the pre-existence of a rule, to which the thing +regulated is made to conform</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">To regulate one's diet, for example, is not, on the one hand, to starve one's self to emaciation, +nor, on the other, to gorge one's self with all sorts of indigestible and hurtful substances, +in disregard of the natural laws of health. But it supposes the pre-existence of the <i>natural +laws of health</i>, to which the diet is made to conform.</p> + +<p class="indent">A clock is not "regulated," when it is made to go, to stop, to go forwards, to go backwards, +to go fast, to go slow, at the mere will or caprice of the person who may have it in hand. It +is "regulated" only when it is made to conform to, to mark truly, the diurnal revolutions of +the earth. These revolutions of the earth constitute the pre-existing rule, by which alone a +clock can be regulated.</p> + +<p class="indent">A mariner's compass is not "regulated," when the needle is made to move this way and +that, at the will of an operator, without reference to the north pole. But it is regulated +when it is freed from all disturbing influences, and suffered to point constantly to the north, +as it is its nature to do.</p> + +<p class="indent">A locomotive is not "regulated," when it is made to go, to stop, to go forwards, to go +backwards, to go fast, to go slow, at the mere will and caprice of the engineer, and without +regard to economy, utility, or safety. But it is regulated, when its motions are made to +conform to a pre-existing rule, that is made up of economy, utility, and safety combined. +What this rule is, in the case of a locomotive, may not be known with such scientific precision, +as is the rule in the case of a clock, or a mariner's compass; but it may be approximated +with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes.</p> + +<p class="indent">The pre-existing rule, by which alone commerce can be "regulated," is a matter of science; +and is already known, so far as the natural principle of justice, in relation to contracts, +is known. The natural right of all men to make all contracts whatsoever, that are +naturally and intrinsically just and lawful, furnishes the pre-existing rule, by which <i>alone</i> +commerce can be regulated. And it is the only rule, to which congress have any constitutional +power to make commerce conform.</p> + +<p class="indent">When all commerce, that is intrinsically just and lawful, is secured and protected, and all +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 92]</span> +commerce that is intrinsically unjust and unlawful, is prohibited, then commerce is regulated, +and not before.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a></p></blockquote> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The above extracts are from a pamphlet published by me in 1864, entitled "<i>Considerations for +Bankers</i>," etc., pp. 55, 56, 57.</p></div> +</div> + +<p class="indent">This false definition of the verb "<i>to regulate</i>" has been used, time out of mind, +by knavish lawmakers and their courts, to hide their violations of men's natural +right to do their own businesses in all such ways—that are naturally and intrinsically +just and lawful—as they may choose to do them in. These lawmakers and +courts dare not always deny, utterly and plainly, men's right to do their own businesses +in their own ways; but they will assume "<i>to regulate</i>" them; and in pretending +simply "to regulate" them, they contrive "to regulate" men out of all +their natural rights to do their own businesses in their own ways.</p> + +<p class="indent">How much have we all heard (we who are old enough), within the last fifty +years, of the power of congress, or of the States, "<i>to regulate the currency</i>." And +"to regulate the currency" has always meant to fix the kind, <i>and limit the amount</i>, +of currency, that men may be permitted to buy and sell, lend and borrow, give +and receive, in their dealings with each other. It has also meant to say <i>who shall +have the control of the licensed money</i>; instead of making it mean the suppression +only of false and dishonest money, and then leaving all men free to exercise their +natural right of buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, +all such, and so much, honest and true money, or currency, as the parties to any +or all contracts may mutually agree upon.</p> + +<p class="indent">Marshall's false <i>assumptions</i> are numerous and tyrannical. They all have the +same end in view as his false definitions; that is, to establish the principle that +governments have all power, and the people no rights. They are so numerous +that it would be tedious, if not impossible, to describe them all separately. Many, +or most, of them are embraced in the following, <i>viz.</i>:</p> + +<p class="indent">1. The assumption that, by a certain paper, called the constitution of the +United States—a paper (I repeat and reiterate) which nobody ever signed, which +but few persons ever read, and which the great body of the people never saw—and +also by some forty subsidiary papers, called State constitutions, which also +nobody ever signed, which but few persons ever read, and which the great body of +the people never saw—all making a perfect system of the merest nothingness—the +assumption, I say, that, by these papers, the people have all consented to the +abolition of justice itself, the highest moral law of the Universe; and that all their +own natural, inherent, inalienable rights to the benefits of that law, shall be annulled; +and that they themselves, and everything that is theirs, shall be given +over into the irresponsible custody of some forty little cabals of blockheads and +villains called lawmakers—blockheads, who imagine themselves wiser than justice +itself, and villains, who care nothing for either wisdom or justice, but only for the +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 93]</span> +gratification of their own avarice and ambitions; and that these cabals shall be invested +with the right to dispose of the property, liberty, and lives of all the rest of +the people, at their pleasure or discretion; or, as Marshall says, "their wisdom +and discretion!"</p> + +<p class="indent">If such an assumption as that does not embrace nearly, or quite, all the other +false assumptions that usurpers and tyrants can ever need, to justify themselves in +robbing, enslaving, and murdering all the rest of mankind, it is less comprehensive +than it appears to me to be.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. In the following paragraph may be found another batch of Marshall's false +assumptions.</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The right to contract is the attribute of a free agent, and he may rightfully coerce performance +from another free agent, who violates his faith. Contracts have consequently an +intrinsic obligation. <i>[But] When men come into society, they can no longer exercise this +original natural right of coercion. It would be incompatible with general peace, and is +therefore surrendered.</i> Society prohibits the use of private individual coercion, <i>and gives +in its place a more safe and more certain remedy</i>. But the right to contract is not surrendered +with the right to coerce performance.—<i>Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 350.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">In this extract, taken in connection with the rest of his opinion in the same +case, Marshall convicts himself of the grossest falsehood. He acknowledges that +men have a natural right to make their own contracts; that their contracts have +an "intrinsic obligation"; and that they have an "original and natural right" to +coerce performance of them. And yet he assumes, and virtually asserts, that men +<i>voluntarily "come into society</i>," and "<i>surrender</i>" to "society" their natural right to +coerce the fulfilment of their contracts. He assumes, and virtually asserts, that +they do this, <i>upon the ground, and for the reason, that "society gives in its place a +more safe and more certain remedy</i>"; that is, "a more safe and more certain" enforcement +of all men's contracts that have "an intrinsic obligation."</p> + +<p class="indent">In thus saying that "men come into society," and "surrender" to society, their +"original and natural right" of coercing the fulfilment of contracts, and that +"<i>society gives in its place a more safe and certain remedy</i>," he virtually says, and +means to say, that, <i>in consideration of such "surrender" of their "original and natural +right of coercion," "society" pledges itself to them that it will give them this "more +safe and more certain remedy</i>"; that is, that it will more safely and more certainly +enforce their contracts than they can do it themselves.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet, in the same opinion—only two and three pages preceding this extract—he +declares emphatically that "the right" of government—or of what he calls +"society"—"<i>to prohibit such contracts as may be deemed mischievous</i>, is <i>unquestionable</i>."—<i>p. +347.</i></p> + +<p class="indent">And as an illustration of the exercise of this right of "society" to prohibit such +contracts "as may be deemed mischievous," he cites the usury laws, thus:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The acts against usury declare the contract to be void in the beginning. They deny that +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 94]</span> +the instrument ever became a contract. They deny it all original obligation; and cannot +impair that which never came into existence.—<i>p. 348.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">All this is as much as to say that, when a man has voluntarily "come into society," +and has "surrendered" to society "his original and natural right of coercing" +the fulfilment of his contracts, and when he has done this in the confidence +that society will fulfil its pledge to "give him a more safe and more certain coercion" +than he was capable of himself, "society" may then turn around to him, +and say:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">We acknowledge that you have a natural right to make your own contracts. We acknowledge +that your contracts have "an intrinsic obligation." We acknowledge that you had +"an original and natural right" to coerce the fulfilment of them. We acknowledge that it +was solely in consideration of our pledge to you, that we would give you a more safe and +more certain coercion than you were capable of yourself, that you "surrendered" to us +your right to coerce a fulfilment of them. And we acknowledge that, <i>according to our +pledge</i>, you have now a right to require of us that we coerce a fulfilment of them. But after +you had "surrendered" to us your own right of coercion, we took a different view of the +pledge we had given you; and concluded that it would be "mischievous" to allow you to +make such contracts. We therefore "prohibited" your making them. And having prohibited +the making of them, we cannot now admit that they have any "obligation." We +must therefore decline to enforce the fulfilment of them. And we warn you that, if you attempt +to enforce them, by virtue of your own "original and natural right of coercion," we +shall be obliged to consider your act a breach of "the general peace," and punish you accordingly. +We are sorry that you have lost your property, but "society" must judge as to +what contracts are, and what are not, "mischievous." We can therefore give you no redress. +Nor can we suffer you to enforce your own rights, or redress your own wrongs.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Such is Marshall's theory of the way in which "society" got possession of all +men's "original and natural right" to make their own contracts, and enforce the +fulfilment of them; and of the way in which "society" now justifies itself in prohibiting +all contracts, though "intrinsically obligatory," which it may choose to +consider "mischievous." And he asserts that, in this way, "society" has acquired +"<i>an unquestionable right</i>" to cheat men out of all their "original and natural right" +to make their own contracts, and enforce the fulfilment of them.</p> + +<p class="indent">A man's "original and natural right" to make all contracts that are "intrinsically +obligatory," and to coerce the fulfilment of them, is one of the most valuable +and indispensable of all human possessions. But Marshall assumes that a man +may "surrender" this right to "society," under a pledge from "society," that it +will secure to him "a more safe and certain" fulfilment of his contracts, than he +is capable of himself; and that "society," having thus obtained from him this +"surrender," may then turn around to him, and not only refuse to fulfil its pledge +to him, but may also prohibit his own exercise of his own "original and natural +right," which he has "surrendered" to "society!"</p> + +<p class="indent">This is as much as to say that, if A can but induce B to intrust his (B's) property +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 95]</span> +with him (A), for safekeeping, under a pledge that he (A) will keep it more +safely and certainly than B can do it himself, <i>A thereby acquires an "unquestionable +right" to keep the property forever, and let B whistle for it!</i></p> + +<p class="indent">This is the kind of assumption on which Marshall based all his ideas of the constitutional +law of this country; that <i>constitutional</i> law, which he was so famous for +expounding. It is the kind of assumption, by which he expounded the people out +of all their "original and natural rights."</p> + +<p class="indent">He had just as much right to assume, and practically did assume, that the people +had voluntarily "come into society," and had voluntarily "surrendered" to +their governments <i>all their other natural rights</i>, as well as their "original and natural +right" to make and enforce their own contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">He virtually said to all the people of this country:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">You have voluntarily "come into society," and have voluntarily "surrendered" to your +governments all your natural rights, of every name and nature whatsoever, <i>for safe keeping;</i> +and now that these governments have, <i>by your own consent</i>, got possession of all your +natural rights, they have an "<i>unquestionable right</i>" to withhold them from you forever.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">If it were not melancholy to see mankind thus cheated, robbed, enslaved, and +murdered, on the authority of such naked impostures as these, it would be, to the +last degree, ludicrous, to see a man like Marshall—reputed to be one of the first +intellects the country has ever had—solemnly expounding the "constitutional +powers," as he called them, by which the general and State governments were authorized +to rob the people of all their natural rights as human beings.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet this same Marshall has done more than any other one man—certainly +more than any other man within the last eighty-five years—to make our governments, +State and national, what they are. He has, for more than sixty years, been +esteemed an oracle, not only by his associates and successors on the bench of the +Supreme Court of the United States, but by all the other judges, State and national, +by all the ignorant, as well as knavish, lawmakers in the country, and by all the +sixty to a hundred thousand lawyers, upon whom the people have been, and are, +obliged to depend for the security of their rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">This system of false definitions, false assumptions, and fraud and usurpation +generally, runs through all the operations of our governments, State and national. +There is nothing genuine, nothing real, nothing true, nothing honest, to be found +in any of them. They all proceed upon the principle, that governments have all +power, and the people no rights.</p> + +<h2>Section XXV.</h2> + +<p class="indent">But perhaps the most absolute proof that our national lawmakers and judges +are as regardless of all constitutional, as they are of all natural, law, and that their +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 96]</span> +statutes and decisions are as destitute of all constitutional, as they are of all natural, +authority, is to be found in the fact that these lawmakers and judges have +trampled upon, and utterly ignored, certain amendments to the constitution, which +had been adopted, and (constitutionally speaking) become authoritative, as early +as 1791; only two years after the government went into operation.</p> + +<p class="indent">If these amendments had been obeyed, they would have compelled all congresses +and courts to understand that, if the government had any constitutional powers at +all, they were simply powers to protect men's natural rights, and not to destroy any +of them.</p> + +<p class="indent">These amendments have actually forbidden any lawmaking whatever in violation +of men's natural rights. And this is equivalent to a prohibition of any lawmaking +at all. And if lawmakers and courts had been as desirous of preserving +men's natural rights, as they have been of violating them, they would long ago +have found out that, since these amendments, the constitution authorized no lawmaking +at all.</p> + +<p class="indent">These amendments were ten in number. They were recommended by the first +congress, at its first session, in 1789; two-thirds of both houses concurring. And +in 1791, they had been ratified by all the States: and from that time they imposed +the restrictions mentioned upon all the powers of congress.</p> + +<p class="indent">These amendments were proposed, by the first congress, for the reason that, +although the constitution, as originally framed, had been adopted, its adoption +had been procured only with great difficulty, and in spite of great objections. <i>These +objections were that, as originally framed and adopted, the constitution contained no adequate +security for the private rights of the people.</i></p> + +<p class="indent">These objections were admitted, by very many, if not all, the friends of the constitution +themselves, to be very weighty; and such as ought to be immediately removed +by amendments. And it was only because these friends of the constitution +pledged themselves to use their influence to secure these amendments, that the +adoption of the constitution itself was secured. And it was in fulfilment of these +pledges, and to remove these objections, that the amendments were proposed and +adopted.</p> + +<p class="indent">The first eight amendments specified particularly various prohibitions upon the +power of congress; such, for example, as those securing to the people the free exercise +of religion, the freedom of speech and the press, the right to keep and bear +arms, etc., etc. Then followed the ninth amendment, in these words:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights, [retained by the people] shall not +be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">Here is an authoritative declaration, that "the people" have "<i>other rights</i>" than +those specially "enumerated in the constitution"; and that these "<i>other rights</i>" +were "<i>retained by the people</i>"; that is, <i>that congress should have no power to infringe +them</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 97]</span> +What, then, were these "other rights," that had not been "enumerated"; but +which were nevertheless "retained by the people"?</p> + +<p class="indent">Plainly they were men's natural "rights"; for these are the only "rights" that +"the people" ever had, or, consequently, that they could "retain."</p> + +<p class="indent">And as no attempt is made to enumerate <i>all</i> these "other rights," or any considerable +number of them, and as it would be obviously impossible to enumerate all, +or any considerable number, of them; and as no exceptions are made of any of +them, the necessary, the legal, the inevitable inference is, that they were <i>all</i> "retained"; +and that congress should have no power to violate any of them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, if congress and the courts had attempted to obey this amendment, as they +were constitutionally bound to do, they would soon have found that they had really +no lawmaking power whatever left to them; because they would have found that +they could make no law at all, <i>of their own invention</i>, that would <i>not</i> violate men's +natural rights.</p> + +<p class="indent">All men's natural rights are co-extensive with natural law, the law of justice; or +justice as a science. This law is the exact measure, and the only measure, of any +and every man's natural rights. No one of these natural rights can be taken from +any man, without doing him an injustice; and no more than these rights can be +given to any one, unless by taking from the natural rights of one or more others.</p> + +<p class="indent">In short, every man's natural rights are, first, the right to do, with himself and +his property, everything that he pleases to do, and that justice towards others does +not forbid him to do; and, secondly, to be free from all compulsion, by others, to +do anything whatever, except what justice to others requires him to do.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such, then, has been the constitutional law of this country since 1791; admitting, +for the sake of the argument—what I do not really admit to be a fact—that +the constitution, so called, has ever been a law at all.</p> + +<p class="indent">This amendment, from the remarkable circumstances under which it was proposed +and adopted, must have made an impression upon the minds of all the public +men of the time; although they may not have fully comprehended, and doubtless +did not fully comprehend, its sweeping effects upon all the supposed powers of the +government.</p> + +<p class="indent">But whatever impression it may have made upon the public men of that time, +its authority and power were wholly lost upon their successors; and probably, for +at least eighty years, it has never been heard of, either in congress or the courts.</p> + +<p class="indent">John Marshall was perfectly familiar with all the circumstances, under which +this, and the other nine amendments, were proposed and adopted. He was thirty-two +years old (lacking seven days) when the constitution, as originally framed, was +published (September 17, 1787); and he was a member of the Virginia convention +that ratified it. He knew perfectly the objections that were raised to it, in that +convention, on the ground of its inadequate guaranty of men's natural rights. He +knew with what force these objections were urged by some of the ablest members +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 98]</span> +of the convention. And he knew that, to obviate these objections, the convention, +as a body, without a dissenting voice, so far as appears, recommended that very +stringent amendments, for securing men's natural rights, be made to the constitution. +And he knew further, that, but for these amendments being recommended, +the constitution would not have been adopted by the convention.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> + +<div class="footnotes"> +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> For the amendments recommended by the Virginia convention, see "Elliot's Debates," Vol. 3, pp. +657 to 663. For the debates upon these amendments, see pages 444 to 452, and 460 to 462, and 466 to 471, +and 579 to 652.</p></div> +</div> + +<p class="indent">The amendments proposed were too numerous to be repeated here, although they +would be very instructive, as showing how jealous the people were, lest their natural +rights should be invaded by laws made by congress. And that the convention +might do everything in its power to secure the adoption of these amendments, it +resolved as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">And the convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of this commonwealth, enjoin +it upon their representatives in congress to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable +and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the foregoing alterations and provisions, in the +manner provided by the 5th article of the said Constitution; and, in all congressional laws +to be passed in the meantime, to conform to the spirit of these amendments, as far as the +said Constitution will admit.—<i>Elliot's Debates, Vol. 3, p. 661.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">In seven other State conventions, to wit, in those of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, +Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, and South Carolina, the +inadequate security for men's natural rights, and the necessity for amendments, +were admitted, and insisted upon, in very similar terms to those in Virginia.</p> + +<p class="indent">In Massachusetts, the convention proposed nine amendments to the constitution; +and resolved as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">And the convention do, in the name and in the behalf of the people of this commonwealth, +enjoin it upon their representatives in Congress, at all times, until the alterations and provisions +aforesaid have been considered, agreeably to the 5th article of the said Constitution, +to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable and legal methods, to obtain a ratification +of the said alterations and provisions, in such manner as is provided in the said article.—<i>Elliot's +Debates, Vol. 2, p. 178.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The New Hampshire convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed twelve +amendments, and added:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of this State, enjoin it upon +their representatives in congress, at all times, until the alterations and provisions aforesaid +have been considered agreeably to the fifth article of the said Constitution, to exert all their +influence, and use all reasonable and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the said alterations +and provisions, in such manner as is provided in the article.—<i>Elliot's Debates, Vol. +1, p. 326.</i></p></blockquote><p class="indent"></p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 99]</span> +The Rhode Island convention, in ratifying the constitution, put forth a declaration +of rights, in eighteen articles, and also proposed twenty-one amendments to +the constitution; and prescribed as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of the State of Rhode Island +and Providence Plantations, enjoin it upon their senators and representative or representatives, +which may be elected to represent this State in congress, to exert all their influence, +and use all reasonable means, to obtain a ratification of the following amendments to +the said Constitution, in the manner prescribed therein; and in all laws to be passed by the +congress in the mean time, to conform to the spirit of the said amendments, as far as the +Constitution will admit.—<i>Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 335.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The New York convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed a great many +amendments, and added:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of the State of New York, +enjoin it upon their representatives in congress, to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable +means, to obtain a ratification of the following amendments to the said Constitution, +in the manner prescribed therein; and in all laws to be passed by the congress, in the mean +time, to conform to the spirit of the said amendments as far as the Constitution will admit.—<i>Elliot's +Debates, Vol. 1, p. 329.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The New York convention also addressed a "<span class="smcap">Circular Letter</span>" to the governors +of all the other States, the first two paragraphs of which are as follows:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="center"><span class="smcap">The Circular Letter</span>,</p> + +<p class="center"><i>From the Convention of the State of New York to the Governors of the several States in the +Union.</i></p> + +<p class="right"> +<span class="smcap">Poughkeepsie, July 28, 1788.</span> +</p> + +<p class="indent">Sir, We, the members of the Convention of this State, have deliberately and maturely considered +the Constitution proposed for the United States. Several articles in it appear so exceptionable +to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest confidence of obtaining a revision +of them by a general convention, and an invincible reluctance to separating from our sister +States, could have prevailed upon a sufficient number to ratify it, without stipulating for +previous amendments. We all unite in opinion, that such a revision will be necessary to +recommend it to the approbation and support of a numerous body of our constituents.</p> + +<p class="indent">We observe that amendments have been proposed, and are anxiously desired, by several +of the States, as well as by this; and we think it of great importance that effectual measures +be immediately taken for calling a convention, to meet at a period not far remote; for we +are convinced that the apprehensions and discontents, which those articles occasion, cannot +be removed or allayed, unless an act to provide for it be among the first that shall be passed +by the new congress.—<i>Elliot's Debates, Vol. 2, p. 413.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">In the Maryland convention, numerous amendments were proposed, and thirteen +were agreed to; "most of them by a unanimous vote, and all by a great majority." +Fifteen others were proposed, but there was so much disagreement in regard to +them, that none at all were formally recommended to congress. But, says Elliot: +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 100]</span></p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">All the members, who voted for the ratification [of the constitution], declared that they +would engage themselves, under every tie of honor, to support the amendments they had +agreed to, both in their public and private characters, until they should become a part of the +general government.—<i>Elliot's Debates, Vol. 2, pp. 550, 552-3.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The first North Carolina convention refused to ratify the constitution, and</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent"><i>Resolved</i>, That a declaration of rights, asserting and securing from encroachments the +great principles of civil and religious liberty, and the inalienable rights of the people, together +with amendments to the most ambiguous and exceptionable parts of the said constitution +of government, ought to be laid before congress, and the convention of States that +shall or may be called for the purpose of amending the said Constitution, for their consideration, +previous to the ratification of the Constitution aforesaid, on the part of the State of +North Carolina.—<i>Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 332.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">The South Carolina convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed certain +amendments, and</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent"><i>Resolved</i>, That it be a standing instruction to all such delegates as may hereafter be +elected to represent this State in the General Government, to exert their utmost abilities +and influence to effect an alteration of the Constitution, conformably to the foregoing resolutions.—<i>Elliot's +Debates, Vol. 1. p. 325.</i></p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">In the Pennsylvania convention, numerous objections were made to the constitution, +but it does not appear that the convention, as a convention, recommended +any specific amendments. But a strong movement, outside of the convention, was +afterwards made in favor of such amendments. ("Elliot's Debates," Vol. 2, p. 542.)</p> + +<p class="indent">Of the debates in the Connecticut convention, Elliot gives only what he calls +"<i>A Fragment</i>."</p> + +<p class="indent">Of the debates in the conventions of New Jersey, Delaware, and Georgia, Elliot +gives no accounts at all.</p> + +<p class="indent">I therefore cannot state the grounds, on which the adoption of the constitution +was opposed. They were doubtless very similar to those in the other States. This +is rendered morally certain by the fact, that the amendments, soon afterwards proposed +by congress, were immediately ratified by all the States. Also by the further +fact, that these States, by reason of the smallness of their representation in +the popular branch of congress, would naturally be even more jealous of their +rights, than the people of the larger States.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is especially worthy of notice that, in some, if not in all, the conventions that +ratified the constitution, although the ratification was accompanied by such urgent +recommendations of amendments, and by an almost absolute assurance that they +would be made, it was nevertheless secured only by very small majorities.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus in Virginia, the vote was only 89 ayes to 79 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 3, p. 654.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In Massachusetts, the ratification was secured only by a vote of 187 yeas to 168 +nays. (Elliot, Vol. 2, p. 181.)</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 101]</span> +In New York, the vote was only 30 yeas to 27 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 2, p. 413.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In New Hampshire and Rhode Island, neither the yeas nor nays are given. +(Elliot, Vol. 1, pp. 327-335.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In Connecticut, the yeas were 128; <i>nays not given</i>. (Elliot, Vol. 1. p. 321-2.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In New Jersey, the yeas were 38; <i>nays not given</i>. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. 321.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In Pennsylvania, the yeas were 46; <i>the nays not given</i>. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. 320.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In Delaware, the yeas were 30; <i>nays not given</i>. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. 319.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In Maryland, the vote was 57 yeas; <i>nays not given</i>. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. 325.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In North Carolina, neither the yeas nor nays are given. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. 333.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In South Carolina, neither the yeas nor nays are given. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. 325.)</p> + +<p class="indent">In Georgia, the yeas were 26; <i>nays not given</i>. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. 324.)</p> + +<p class="indent">We can thus see by what meagre votes the constitution was adopted. We can +also see that, but for the prospect that important amendments would be made, +specially for securing the natural rights of the people, the constitution would have +been spurned with contempt, as it deserved to be.</p> + +<p class="indent">And yet now, owing to the usurpations of lawmakers and courts, the original +constitution—with the worst possible construction put upon it—has been carried +into effect; and the amendments have been simply cast into the waste baskets.</p> + +<p class="indent">Marshall was thirty-six years old, when these amendments became a part of the +constitution in 1791. Ten years after, in 1801, he became Chief Justice. It then +became his sworn constitutional duty to scrutinize severely every act of congress, +and to condemn, as unconstitutional, all that should violate any of these natural +rights. Yet he appears never to have thought of the matter afterwards. Or, +rather, this ninth amendment, the most important of all, seems to have been so +utterly antagonistic to all his ideas of government, that he chose to ignore it altogether, +and, as far as he could, to bury it out of sight.</p> + +<p class="indent">Instead of recognizing it as an absolute guaranty of all the natural rights of the +people, he chose to assume—for it was all a mere assumption, a mere making a +constitution out of his own head, to suit himself—that the people had all voluntarily +"come into society," and had voluntarily "surrendered" to "society" all +their natural rights, of every name and nature—trusting that they would be secured; +and that now, "society," having thus got possession of all these natural +rights of the people, had the "unquestionable right" to dispose of them, at the +pleasure—or, as he would say, according to the "wisdom and discretion"—of a +few contemptible, detestable, and irresponsible lawmakers, whom the constitution +(thus amended) had forbidden to dispose of any one of them.</p> + +<p class="indent">If, now, Marshall did not see, in this amendment, any legal force or authority, +what becomes of his reputation as a constitutional lawyer? If he did see this +force and authority, but chose to trample them under his feet, he was a perjured +tyrant and traitor.</p> + +<p class="indent">What, also, are we to think of all the judges,—forty in all,—his associates and +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 102]</span> +successors, who, for eighty years, have been telling the people that the government +has all power, and the people no rights? Have they all been mere blockheads, +who never read this amendment, or knew nothing of its meaning? Or have they, +too, been perjured tyrants and traitors?</p> + +<p class="indent">What, too, becomes of those great constitutional lawyers, as we have called +them, who have been supposed to have won such immortal honors, as "expounders +of the constitution," but who seem never to have discovered in it any security +for men's natural rights? Is their apparent ignorance, on this point, to be accounted +for by the fact, that that portion of the people, who, by authority of the government, +are systematically robbed of all their earnings, beyond a bare subsistence, +are not able to pay such fees as are the robbers who are authorized to plunder +them?</p> + +<p class="indent">If any one will now look back to the records of congress and the courts, for the +last eighty years, I do not think he will find a single mention of this amendment. +And why has this been so? Solely because the amendment—if its authority had +been recognized—would have stood as an insuperable barrier against all the ambition +and rapacity—all the arbitrary power, all the plunder, and all the tyranny—which +the ambitious and rapacious classes have determined to accomplish +through the agency of the government.</p> + +<p class="indent">The fact that these classes have been so successful in perverting the constitution +(thus amended) from an instrument avowedly securing all men's natural +rights, into an authority for utterly destroying them, is a sufficient proof that no +lawmaking power can be safely intrusted to any body, for any purpose whatever.</p> + +<p class="indent">And that this perversion of the constitution should have been sanctioned by all +the judicial tribunals of the country, is also a proof, not only of the servility, audacity, +and villainy of the judges, but also of the utter rottenness of our judicial +system. It is a sufficient proof that judges, who are dependent upon lawmakers +for their offices and salaries, and are responsible to them by impeachment, cannot +be relied on to put the least restraint upon the acts of their masters, the lawmakers.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such, then, would have been the effect of the ninth amendment, if it had been +permitted to have its legitimate authority.</p> + +<h2>Section XXVI.</h2> + +<p class="indent">The tenth amendment is in these words:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to +the States, are reserved to the States respectively, <i>or to the people</i>.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">This amendment, equally with the ninth, secures to "the people" all their natural +rights. And why?</p> + +<p class="indent">Because, in truth, no powers at all, neither legislative, judicial, nor executive, +had been "delegated to the United States by the constitution."</p> + +<p class="indent"><span class="pagenum">[Pg 103]</span> +But it will be said that the amendment itself implies that certain lawmaking +"powers" had been "delegated to the United States by the constitution."</p> + +<p class="indent">No. It only implies that those who adopted the amendment <i>believed</i> that such +lawmaking "powers" had been "delegated to the United States by the constitution."</p> + +<p class="indent">But in this belief, they were entirely mistaken. And why?</p> + +<p class="indent">1. Because it is a natural impossibility that any lawmaking "powers" whatever +can be delegated by any one man, or any number of men, to any other man, +or any number of other men.</p> + +<p class="indent">Men's natural rights are all inherent and inalienable; and therefore cannot be +parted with, or delegated, by one person to another. And all contracts whatsoever, +for such a purpose, are necessarily absurd and void contracts.</p> + +<p class="indent">For example. I cannot delegate to another man any right to <i>make</i> laws—that +is, laws of his own invention—and compel me to obey them.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such a contract, on my part, would be a contract to part with my natural liberty; +to give myself, or sell myself, to him as a slave. Such a contract would be +an absurd and void contract, utterly destitute of all legal or moral obligation.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. I cannot delegate to another any right to make laws—that is, laws of his +own invention—and compel a third person to obey them.</p> + +<p class="indent">For example. I cannot delegate to A any right to make laws—that is, laws of +his own invention—and compel Z to obey them.</p> + +<p class="indent">I cannot delegate any such right to A, because I have no such right myself; +and I cannot delegate to another what I do not myself possess.</p> + +<p class="indent">For these reasons no lawmaking powers ever could be—and therefore no lawmaking +powers ever were—"delegated to the United States by the constitution"; +no matter what the people of that day—any or all of them—may have attempted +to do, or may have believed they had power to do, in the way of delegating such +powers.</p> + +<p class="indent">But not only were no lawmaking powers "delegated to the United States by the +constitution," but neither were any <i>judicial</i> powers so delegated. And why? Because +it is a natural impossibility that one man can delegate his judicial powers +to another.</p> + +<p class="indent">Every man has, by nature, certain judicial powers, or rights. That is to say, he +has, by nature, the right to judge of, and enforce his own rights, and judge of, and +redress his own wrongs. But, in so doing, he must act only in accordance with +his own judgment and conscience, <i>and subject to his own personal responsibility, if, +through either ignorance or design, he commits any error injurious to another</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, inasmuch as no man can delegate, or impart, his own judgment or conscience +to another, it is naturally impossible that he can delegate to another his +judicial rights or powers.</p> + +<p class="indent">So, too, every man has, by nature, a right to judge of, and enforce, the rights, +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 104]</span> +and judge of, and redress the wrongs, of any and all other men. This right is included +in his natural right to maintain justice between man and man, and to protect +the injured party against the wrongdoer. But, in doing this, he must act +only in accordance with his own judgment and conscience, and subject to his own +personal responsibility for any error he may commit, either through ignorance or +design.</p> + +<p class="indent">But, inasmuch as, in this case, as in the preceding one, he can neither delegate +nor impart his own judgment or conscience to another, he cannot delegate his +judicial power or right to another.</p> + +<p class="indent">But not only were no lawmaking or judicial powers "delegated to the United +States by the constitution," neither were any executive powers so delegated. And +why? Because, in a case of justice or injustice, it is naturally impossible that any +one man can delegate his executive right or power to another.</p> + +<p class="indent">Every man has, by nature, the right to maintain justice for himself, and for all +other persons, by the use of so much force as may be reasonably necessary for that +purpose. But he can use the force only in accordance with his own judgment and +conscience, and on his own personal responsibility, if, through ignorance or design, +he commits any wrong to another.</p> + +<p class="indent">But inasmuch as he cannot delegate, or impart, his own judgment or conscience +to another, he cannot delegate his executive power or right to another.</p> + +<p class="indent"><i>The result is, that, in all judicial and executive proceedings, for the maintenance of +justice, every man must act only in accordance with his own judgment and conscience, +and on his own personal responsibility for any wrong he may commit; whether such wrong +be committed through either ignorance or design.</i></p> + +<p class="indent">The effect of this principle of personal responsibility, in all judicial and executive +proceedings, would be—or at least ought to be—that no one would give any +judicial opinions, or do any executive acts, except such as his own judgment and +conscience should approve, <i>and such as he would be willing to be held personally responsible +for</i>.</p> + +<p class="indent">No one could justify, or excuse, his wrong act, by saying that a power, or authority, +to do it had been delegated to him, by any other men, however numerous.</p> + +<p class="indent">For the reasons that have now been given, neither any legislative, judicial, nor +executive powers ever were, or ever could have been, "delegated to the United States +by the constitution"; no matter how honestly or innocently the people of that day +may have believed, or attempted, the contrary.</p> + +<p class="indent">And what is true, in this matter, in regard to the national government, is, for +the same reasons, equally true in regard to all the State governments.</p> + +<p class="indent">But this principle of personal responsibility, each for his own judicial or executive +acts, does not stand in the way of men's associating, at pleasure, for the maintenance +of justice; and selecting such persons as they think most suitable, for +judicial and executive duties; and <i>requesting</i> them to perform those duties; and +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 105]</span> +then paying them for their labor. But the persons, thus selected, must still perform +their duties according to their own judgments and consciences alone, and +subject to their own personal responsibility for any errors of either ignorance or +design.</p> + +<p class="indent">To make it safe and proper for persons to perform judicial duties, subject to +their personal responsibility for any errors of either ignorance or design, two things +would seem to be important, if not indispensable, <i>viz.</i>:</p> + +<p class="indent">1. That, as far as is reasonably practicable, all judicial proceedings should be +in writing; that is, that all testimony, and all judicial opinions, even to quite minute +details, should be in writing, and be preserved; so that judges may always +have it in their power to show fully what their acts, and their reasons for their +acts, have been; and also that anybody, and everybody, interested, may forever +after have the means of knowing fully the reasons on which everything has been +done; and that any errors, ever afterwards discovered, may be corrected.</p> + +<p class="indent">2. That all judicial tribunals should consist of so many judges—within any +reasonable number—as either party may desire; or as may be necessary to prevent +any wrong doing, by any one or more of the judges, either through ignorance +or design.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such tribunals, consisting of judges, numerous enough, and perfectly competent +to settle justly probably ninety-nine one-hundredths of all the controversies that +arise among men, could be obtained in every village. They could give their immediate +attention to every case; and thus avoid most of the delay, and most of the +expense, now attendant on judicial proceedings.</p> + +<p class="indent">To make these tribunals satisfactory to all reasonable and honest persons, it is +important, and probably indispensable, that all judicial proceedings should be had, +<i>in the first instance</i>, at the expense of the association, or associations, to which the +parties to the suit belong.</p> + +<p class="indent">An association for the maintenance of justice should be a purely voluntary one; +and should be formed upon the same principle as a mutual fire or marine insurance +company; that is, each member should pay his just proportion of the expense necessary +for protecting all.</p> + +<p class="indent">A single individual could not reasonably be expected to delay, or forego, the exercise +of his natural right to enforce his own rights, and redress his own wrongs, +except upon the condition that there is an association that will do it promptly, and +without expense to him. But having paid his proper proportion of the expense +necessary for the protection of all, he has then a right to demand prompt and complete +protection for himself.</p> + +<p class="indent">Inasmuch as it cannot be known which party is in the wrong, until the trial has +been had, the expense of both parties must, <i>in the first instance</i>, be paid by the association, +or associations, to which they belong. But after the trial has been had, +and it has been ascertained which party was in the wrong, and (if such should be +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 106]</span> +the case) so clearly in the wrong as to have had no justification for putting the association +to the expense of a trial, he then may properly be compelled to pay the +cost of all the proceedings.</p> + +<p class="indent">If the parties to a suit should belong to different associations, it would be right +that the judges should be taken from both associations; or from a third association, +with which neither party was connected.</p> + +<p class="indent">If, with all these safeguards against injustice and expense, a party, accused of a +wrong, should refuse to appear for trial, he might rightfully be proceeded against, +in his absence, if the evidence produced against him should be sufficient to justify it.</p> + +<p class="indent">It is probably not necessary to go into any further details here, to show how easy +and natural a thing it would be, to form as many voluntary and mutually protective +judicial associations, as might be either necessary or convenient, in order to +bring justice home to every man's door; and to give to every honest and dishonest +man, all reasonable assurance that he should have justice, and nothing else, done +for him, or to him.</p> + +<h2>Section XXVII.</h2> + +<p class="indent">Of course we can have no courts of justice, under such systems of lawmaking, +and supreme court decisions, as now prevail.</p> + +<p class="indent">We have a population of fifty to sixty millions; <i>and not a single court of justice, +State or national!</i></p> + +<p class="indent">But we have everywhere courts of injustice—open and avowed injustice—claiming +sole jurisdiction of all cases affecting men's rights of both person and +property; and having at their beck brute force enough to compel absolute submission +to their decrees, whether just or unjust.</p> + +<p class="indent">Can a more decisive or infallible condemnation of our governments be conceived +of, than the absence of all courts of justice, and the absolute power of their courts +of injustice?</p> + +<p class="indent">Yes, they lie under still another condemnation, to wit, that their courts are not +only courts of injustice, but they are also secret tribunals; adjudicating all causes +according to the secret instructions of their masters, the lawmakers, and their authorized +interpreters, their supreme courts.</p> + +<p class="indent">I say <i>secret tribunals</i>, and <i>secret instructions</i>, because, to the great body of the people, +whose rights are at stake, they are secret to all practical intents and purposes. +They are secret, because their reasons for their decrees are to be found only in +great volumes of statutes and supreme court reports, which the mass of the people +have neither money to buy, nor time to read; and would not understand, if they +were to read them.</p> + +<p class="indent">These statutes and reports are so far out of reach of the people at large, that the +only knowledge a man can ordinarily get of them, when he is summoned before +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 107]</span> +one of the tribunals appointed to execute them, is to be obtained by employing an +expert—or so-called lawyer—to enlighten him.</p> + +<p class="indent">This expert in injustice is one who buys these great volumes of statutes and reports, +and spends his life in studying them, and trying to keep himself informed +of their contents. But even he can give a client very little information in regard +to them; for the statutes and decisions are so voluminous, and are so constantly +being made and unmade, and are so destitute of all conformity to those natural +principles of justice which men readily and intuitively comprehend; and are moreover +capable of so many different interpretations, that he is usually in as great +doubt—perhaps in even greater doubt—than his client, as to what will be the result +of a suit.</p> + +<p class="indent">The most he can usually say to his client, is this:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">Every civil suit must finally be given to one of two persons, the plaintiff or defendant. +Whether, therefore, your cause is a just, or an unjust, one, you have at least one chance in +two, of gaining it. But no matter how just your cause may be, you need have no hope that +the tribunal that tries it, will be governed by any such consideration, if the statute book, or +the past decisions of the supreme court, are against you. So, also, no matter how unjust +your cause may be, you may nevertheless expect to gain it, if the statutes and past decisions +are in your favor. If, therefore, you have money to spend in such a lottery as this, I will +do my best to gain your cause for you, whether it be a just, or an unjust, one.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">If the charge is a criminal one, this expert says to his client:</p> + +<blockquote><p class="indent">You must either be found guilty, or acquitted. Whether, therefore, you are really innocent +or guilty, you have at least one chance in two, of an acquittal. But no matter how innocent +you may be of any real crime, you need have no hope of an acquittal, if the statute +book, or the past decisions of the supreme court, are against you. If, on the other hand, +you have committed a real wrong to another, there may be many laws on the statute book, +many precedents, and technicalities, and whimsicalities, through which you may hope to +escape. But your reputation, your liberty, or perhaps your life, is at stake. To save these +you can afford to risk your money, even though the result is so uncertain. Therefore you +had best give me your money, and I will do my best to save you, whether you are innocent +or guilty.</p></blockquote> + +<p class="indent">But for the great body of the people,—those who have no money that they can +afford to risk in a lawsuit,—no matter what may be their rights in either a civil +or criminal suit,—their cases are hopeless. They may have been taxed, directly +and indirectly, to their last dollars, for the support of the government; they may +even have been compelled to risk their lives, and to lose their limbs, in its defence; +yet when they want its protection,—that protection for which their taxes and +military services were professedly extorted from them,—they are coolly told that +the government offers no justice, nor even any chance or semblance of justice, except +to those who have more money than they.</p> + +<p class="indent">But the point now to be specially noticed is, that in the case of either the civil +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 108]</span> +or criminal suit, the client, whether rich or poor, is nearly or quite as much in the +dark as to his fate, and as to the grounds on which his fate will be determined, as +though he were to be tried by an English Star Chamber court, or one of the secret +tribunals of Russia, or even the Spanish Inquisition.</p> + +<p class="indent">Thus in the supreme exigencies of a man's life, whether in civil or criminal +cases, where his property, his reputation, his liberty, or his life is at stake, he is +really to be tried by what is, <i>to him</i>, at least, <i>a secret tribunal</i>; a tribunal that is +governed by what are, <i>to him</i>, <i>the secret instructions</i> of lawmakers, and supreme +courts; neither of whom care anything for his rights of property in a civil suit, or +for his guilt or innocence in a criminal one; but only for their own authority as +lawmakers and judges.</p> + +<p class="indent">The bystanders, at these trials, look on amazed, but powerless to defend the +right, or prevent the wrong. Human nature has no rights, in the presence of +these infernal tribunals.</p> + +<p class="indent">Is it any wonder that all men live in constant terror of such a government as +that? Is it any wonder that so many give up all attempts to preserve their natural +rights of person and property, in opposition to tribunals, to whom justice and +injustice are indifferent, and whose ways are, to common minds, hidden mysteries, +and impenetrable secrets.</p> + +<p class="indent">But even this is not all. The mode of trial, if not as infamous as the trial itself, +is at least so utterly false and absurd, as to add a new element of uncertainty to +the result of all judicial proceedings.</p> + +<p class="indent">A trial in one of these courts of injustice is a trial by battle, almost, if not quite, +as really as was a trial by battle, five hundred or a thousand years ago.</p> + +<p class="indent">Now, as then, the adverse parties choose their champions, to fight their battles +for them.</p> + +<p class="indent">These champions, trained to such contests, and armed, not only with all the +weapons their own skill, cunning, and power can supply, but also with all the iniquitous +laws, precedents, and technicalities that lawmakers and supreme courts +can give them, for defeating justice, and accomplishing injustice, can—if not always, +yet none but themselves know how often—offer their clients such chances +of victory—independently of the justice of their causes—as to induce the dishonest +to go into court to evade justice, or accomplish injustice, not less often perhaps +than the honest go there in the hope to get justice, or avoid injustice.</p> + +<p class="indent">We have now, I think, some sixty thousand of these champions, who make it +the business of their lives to equip themselves for these conflicts, and sell their +services for a price.</p> + +<p class="indent">Is there any one of these men, who studies justice as a science, and regards that +alone in all his professional exertions? If there are any such, why do we so seldom, +or never, hear of them? Why have they not told us, hundreds of years ago, +what are men's natural rights of person and property? And why have they not +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 109]</span> +told us how false, absurd, and tyrannical are all these lawmaking governments? +Why have they not told us what impostors and tyrants all these so-called lawmakers, +judges, etc., etc., are? Why are so many of them so ambitious to become +lawmakers and judges themselves?</p> + +<p class="indent">Is it too much to hope for mankind, that they may sometime have courts of +justice, instead of such courts of injustice as these?</p> + +<p class="indent">If we ever should have courts of justice, it is easy to see what will become of +statute books, supreme courts, trial by battle, and all the other machinery of fraud +and tyranny, by which the world is now ruled.</p> + +<p class="indent">If the people of this country knew what crimes are constantly committed by +these courts of injustice, they would squelch them, without mercy, as unceremoniously +as they would squelch so many gangs of bandits or pirates. In fact, bandits +and pirates are highly respectable and honorable villains, compared with the +judges of these courts of injustice. Bandits and pirates do not—like these judges—attempt +to cheat us out of our common sense, in order to cheat us out of our +property, liberty, or life. They do not profess to be anything but such villains as +they really are. They do not claim to have received any "Divine" authority for +robbing, enslaving, or murdering us at their pleasure. They do not claim immunity +for their crimes, upon the ground that they are duly authorized agents of any +such invisible, intangible, irresponsible, unimaginable thing as "society," or "the +State." They do not insult us by telling us that they are only exercising that authority +to rob, enslave, and murder us, which we ourselves have delegated to them. +They do not claim that they are robbing, enslaving, and murdering us, solely to +secure our happiness and prosperity, and not from any selfish motives of their +own. They do not claim a wisdom so superior to that of the producers of wealth, +as to know, better than they, how their wealth should be disposed of. They do +not tell us that we are the freest and happiest people on earth, inasmuch as each +of our male adults is allowed one voice in ten millions in the choice of the men, +who are to rob, enslave, and murder us. They do not tell us that all liberty +and order would be destroyed, that society itself would go to pieces, and man go +back to barbarism, if it were not for the care, and supervision, and protection, they +lavish upon us. They do not tell us of the almshouses, hospitals, schools, churches, +etc., which, out of the purest charity and benevolence, they maintain for our benefit, +out of the money they take from us. They do not carry their heads high, above +all other men, and demand our reverence and admiration, as statesmen, patriots, +and benefactors. They do not claim that we have voluntarily "come into their +society," and "surrendered" to them all our natural rights of person and property; +nor all our "original and natural right" of defending our own rights, and redressing +our own wrongs. They do not tell us that they have established infallible supreme +courts, to whom they refer all questions as to the legality of their acts, and +that they do nothing that is not sanctioned by these courts. They do not attempt +<span class="pagenum">[Pg 110]</span> +to deceive us, or mislead us, or reconcile us to their doings, by any such pretences, +impostures, or insults as these. <i>There is not a single John Marshall among them.</i> +On the contrary, they acknowledge themselves robbers, murderers, and villains, +pure and simple. When they have once taken our money, they have the decency +to get out of our sight as soon as possible; they do not persist in following us, +and robbing us, again and again, so long as we produce anything that they can +take from us. In short, they acknowledge themselves <i>hostes humani generis: enemies +of the human race</i>. They acknowledge it to be our unquestioned right and +duty to kill them, if we can; that they expect nothing else, than that we will kill +them, if we can; and that we are only fools and cowards, if we do not kill them, +by any and every means in our power. They neither ask, nor expect, any mercy, +if they should ever fall into the hands of honest men.</p> + +<p class="indent">For all these reasons, they are not only modest and sensible, but really frank, +honest, and honorable villains, contrasted with these courts of injustice, and the +lawmakers by whom these courts are established.</p> + +<p class="indent">Such, Mr. Cleveland, is the real character of the government, of which you are +the nominal head. Such are, and have been, its lawmakers. Such are, and have +been, its judges. Such have been its executives. Such is its present executive. +Have you anything to say for any of them?</p> + +<p class="margin-left8"> +Yours frankly, <span class="ralign">LYSANDER SPOONER.</span></p> + +<p class="margin-left"> +<span class="smcap">Boston, May 15, 1886.</span> +</p> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">The End.</span> +</p> + +<hr class="hr2"/> + +<div class="tnote"> +<h2>Transcriber's Notes:</h2> + +<hr /> + +<p class="indent">On page 22, there was the use of double quotation marks within double +quotation marks. That usage was not changed.</p> + +<p class="indent">On page 43, "at bank" was replaced "at a bank".</p> + +<p class="indent">On page 60, "<i>viz.</i>, 1," was replaced with "<i>viz.</i>, 1.".</p> + +<p class="indent">On page 65, a period as added after "indebted to".</p> + +<p class="indent">On page 105, "viz." was italized.</p> +</div> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Letter to Grover Cleveland, by Lysander Spooner + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND *** + +***** This file should be named 35016-h.htm or 35016-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/5/0/1/35016/ + +Produced by Curtis Weyant, Ernest Schaal, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: A Letter to Grover Cleveland + On His False Inaugural Address, The Usurpations and Crimes + of Lawmakers and Judges, and the Consequent Poverty, + Ignorance, and Servitude Of The People + +Author: Lysander Spooner + +Release Date: January 20, 2011 [EBook #35016] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND *** + + + + +Produced by Curtis Weyant, Ernest Schaal, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + + + + + + + + + A LETTER + + TO + + GROVER CLEVELAND, + + ON + + HIS FALSE INAUGURAL ADDRESS, THE USURPATIONS AND + CRIMES OF LAWMAKERS AND JUDGES, AND THE + CONSEQUENT POVERTY, IGNORANCE, AND + SERVITUDE OF THE PEOPLE. + + + BY + LYSANDER SPOONER. + + + BOSTON: + BENJ. R. TUCKER, PUBLISHER. + 1886. + + + + + The author reserves his copyright in this letter. + First pamphlet edition published in July, 1886.[1] + + [1] Under a somewhat different title, to wit, "_A Letter to + Grover Cleveland, on his False, Absurd, If-contradictory, and + Ridiculous Inaugural Address_," this letter was first published, + in instalments, "LIBERTY" (a paper published in Boston); the + instalments commencing June 20, 1885, and continuing to May 22, + 1886: notice being given, in each paper, of the reservation of + copyright. + + + + + A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND. + + SECTION I. + +_To Grover Cleveland_: + +SIR,--Your inaugural address is probably as honest, sensible, and +consistent a one as that of any president within the last fifty years, +or, perhaps, as any since the foundation of the government. If, +therefore, it is false, absurd, self-contradictory, and ridiculous, it +is not (as I think) because you are personally less honest, sensible, or +consistent than your predecessors, but because the government +itself--according to your own description of it, and according to the +practical administration of it for nearly a hundred years--is an utterly +and palpably false, absurd, and criminal one. Such praises as you bestow +upon it are, therefore, necessarily false, absurd, and ridiculous. + +Thus you describe it as "a government pledged to do equal and exact +justice to all men." + +Did you stop to think what that means? Evidently you did not; for +nearly, or quite, all the rest of your address is in direct +contradiction to it. + +Let me then remind you that justice is an immutable, natural principle; +and not anything that can be made, unmade, or altered by any human +power. + +It is also a subject of science, and is to be learned, like mathematics, +or any other science. It does not derive its authority from the +commands, will, pleasure, or discretion of any possible combination of +men, whether calling themselves a government, or by any other name. + +It is also, at all times, and in all places, the supreme law. And being +everywhere and always the supreme law, it is necessarily everywhere and +always the only law. + +Lawmakers, as they call themselves, can add nothing to it, nor take +anything from it. Therefore all their laws, as they call them,--that is, +all the laws of their own making,--have no color of authority or +obligation. It is a falsehood to call them laws; for there is nothing in +them that either creates men's duties or rights, or enlightens them as +to their duties or rights. There is consequently nothing binding or +obligatory about them. And nobody is bound to take the least notice of +them, unless it be to trample them under foot, as usurpations. If they +command men to do justice, they add nothing to men's obligation to do +it, or to any man's right to enforce it. They are therefore mere idle +wind, such as would be commands to consider the day as day, and the +night as night. If they command or license any man to do injustice, they +are criminal on their face. If they command any man to do anything which +justice does not require him to do, they are simple, naked usurpations +and tyrannies. If they forbid any man to do anything, which justice +would permit him to do, they are criminal invasions of his natural and +rightful liberty. In whatever light, therefore, they are viewed, they +are utterly destitute of everything like authority or obligation. They +are all necessarily either the impudent, fraudulent, and criminal +usurpations of tyrants, robbers, and murderers, or the senseless work of +ignorant or thoughtless men, who do not know, or certainly do not +realize, what they are doing. + +This science of justice, or natural law, is the only science that tells +us what are, and what are not, each man's natural, inherent, +inalienable, _individual_ rights, as against any and all other men. And +to say that any, or all, other men may rightfully compel him to obey any +or all such other laws as they may see fit to _make_, is to say that he +has no rights of his own, but is their subject, their property, and +their slave. + +For the reasons now given, the simple maintenance of justice, or natural +law, is plainly the one only purpose for which any coercive power--or +anything bearing the name of government--has a right to exist. + +It is intrinsically just as false, absurd, ludicrous, and ridiculous to +say that lawmakers, so-called, can invent and make any laws, _of their +own_, authoritatively fixing, or declaring, the rights of individuals, +or that shall be in any manner authoritative or obligatory upon +individuals, or that individuals may rightfully be compelled to obey, as +it would be to say that they can invent and make such mathematics, +chemistry, physiology, or other sciences, as they see fit, and +rightfully compel individuals to conform all their actions to them, +instead of conforming them to the mathematics, chemistry, physiology, or +other sciences of nature. + +Lawmakers, as they call themselves, might just as well claim the right +to abolish, by statute, the natural law of gravitation, the natural laws +of light, heat, and electricity, and all the other natural laws of +matter and mind, and institute laws of their own in the place of them, +and compel conformity to them, as to claim the right to set aside the +natural law of justice, and compel obedience to such other laws as they +may see fit to manufacture, and set up in its stead. + +Let me now ask you how you imagine that your so-called lawmakers can "do +equal and exact justice to all men," by any so-called laws of their own +making. If their laws command anything but justice, or forbid anything +but injustice, they are themselves unjust and criminal. If they simply +command justice, and forbid injustice, they add nothing to the natural +authority of justice, or to men's obligation to obey it. It is, +therefore, a simple impertinence, and sheer impudence, on their part, to +assume that _their_ commands, _as such_, are of any authority whatever. +It is also sheer impudence, on their part, to assume that their commands +are at all necessary to teach other men what is, and what is not, +justice. The science of justice is as open to be learned by all other +men, as by themselves; and it is, in general, so simple and easy to be +learned, that there is no need of, and no place for, any man, or body of +men, to teach it, declare it, or command it, on their own authority. + +For one, or another, of these reasons, therefore, each and every law, +so-called, that forty-eight different congresses have presumed to make, +within the last ninety-six years, have been utterly destitute of all +legitimate authority. That is to say, they have either been criminal, as +commanding or licensing men to do what justice forbade them to do, or as +forbidding them to do what justice would have permitted them to do; or +else they have been superfluous, as adding nothing to men's knowledge of +justice, or to their obligation to do justice, or abstain from +injustice. + +What excuse, then, have you for attempting to enforce upon the people +that great mass of superfluous or criminal laws (so-called) which +ignorant and foolish, or impudent and criminal, men have, for so many +years, been manufacturing, and promulgating, and enforcing, in violation +of justice, and of all men's natural, inherent, and inalienable rights? + + + SECTION II. + +Perhaps you will say that there is no such science as that of justice. +If you do say this, by what right, or on what reason, do you proclaim +your intention "to do equal and exact justice to all men"? If there is +no science of justice, how do you know that there is any such principle +as justice? Or how do you know what is, and what is not, justice? If +there is no science of justice,--such as the people can learn and +understand for themselves,--why do you say anything about justice _to +them?_ Or why do you promise _them_ any such thing as "equal and exact +justice," if they do not know, and are incapable of learning, what +justice is? Do you use this phrase to deceive those whom you look upon +as being so ignorant, so destitute of reason, as to be deceived by idle, +unmeaning words? If you do not, you are plainly bound to let us all know +what you do mean, by doing "equal and exact justice to all men." + +I can assure you, sir, that a very large portion of the people of this +country do not believe that the government is doing "equal and exact +justice to all men." And some persons are earnestly promulgating the +idea that the government is not attempting to do, and has no intention +of doing, anything like "equal and exact justice to all men"; that, on +the contrary, it is knowingly, deliberately, and wilfully doing an +incalculable amount of injustice; that it has always been doing this in +the past, and that it has no intention of doing anything else in the +future; that it is a mere tool in the hands of a few ambitious, +rapacious, and unprincipled men; that its purpose, in doing all this +injustice, is to keep--so far as they can without driving the people to +rebellion--all wealth, and all political power, in as few hands as +possible; and that this injustice is the direct cause of all the +widespread poverty, ignorance, and servitude among the great body of the +people. + +Now, Sir, I wish I could hope that you would do something to show that +you are not a party to any such scheme as that; something to show that +you are neither corrupt enough, nor blind enough, nor coward enough, to +be made use of for any such purpose as that; something to show that when +you profess your intention "to do equal and exact justice to all men," +you attach some real and definite meaning to your words. Until you do +that, is it not plain that the people have a right to consider you a +tyrant, and the confederate and tool of tyrants, and to get rid of you +as unceremoniously as they would of any other tyrant? + + + SECTION III. + +Sir, if any government is to be a rational, consistent, and honest +one, it must evidently be based on some fundamental, immutable, +eternal principle; such as every man may reasonably agree to, and such +as every man may rightfully be compelled to abide by, and obey. And +the whole power of the government must be limited to the maintenance +of that single principle. And that one principle is justice. There is +no other principle that any man can rightfully enforce upon others, or +ought to consent to have enforced against himself. Every man claims +the protection of this principle for himself, whether he is willing to +accord it to others, or not. Yet such is the inconsistency of human +nature, that some men--in fact, many men--who will risk their lives +for this principle, when their own liberty or property is at stake, +will violate it in the most flagrant manner, if they can thereby +obtain arbitrary power over the persons or property of others. We have +seen this fact illustrated in this country, through its whole +history--especially during the last hundred years--and in the case of +many of the most conspicuous persons. And their example and influence +have been employed to pervert the whole character of the government. +It is against such men, that all others, who desire nothing but +justice for themselves, and are willing to unite to secure it for all +others, must combine, if we are ever to have justice established for +any. + + + SECTION IV. + +It is self-evident that no number of men, by conspiring, and calling +themselves a government, can acquire any rights whatever over other men, +or other men's property, which they had not before, as individuals. And +whenever any number of men, calling themselves a government, do anything +to another man, or to his property, which they had no right to do as +individuals they thereby declare themselves trespassers, robbers, or +murderers, according to the nature of their acts. + +Men, _as individuals_, may rightfully _compel_ each other to obey this +one law of justice. And it is the only law which any man can rightfully +be compelled, _by his fellow men_, to obey. All other laws, it is +optional with each man to obey, or not, as he may choose. But this one +law of justice he may rightfully be compelled to obey; and all the force +that is reasonably necessary to compel him, may rightfully be used +against him. + +But the right of every man to do anything, and everything, _which +justice does not forbid him to do_, is a natural, inherent, inalienable +right. It is his right, as against any and all other men, whether they +be many, or few. It is a right indispensable to every man's highest +happiness; and to every man's power of judging and determining for +himself what will, and what will not, promote his happiness. Any +restriction upon the exercise of this right is a restriction upon his +rightful power of providing for, and accomplishing, his own well-being. + +Sir, these natural, inherent, inalienable, _individual_ rights are +sacred things. _They are the only human rights._ They are the only +rights by which any man can protect his own property, liberty, or life +against any one who may be disposed to take it away. Consequently they +are not things that any set of either blockheads or villains, calling +themselves a government, can rightfully take into their own hands, and +dispose of at their pleasure, as they have been accustomed to do in +this, and in nearly or quite all other countries. + + + SECTION V. + +Sir, I repeat that individual rights are the only human rights. +_Legally speaking_, there are no such things as "_public rights_," as +distinguished from individual rights. _Legally speaking_, there is no +such creature or thing as "_the public_." The term "the public" is an +utterly vague and indefinite one, applied arbitrarily and at random to a +greater or less number of individuals, each and every one of whom have +their own separate, individual rights, _and none others_. And the +protection of these separate, _individual_ rights is the one only +legitimate purpose, for which anything in the nature of a governing, or +coercive, power has a right to exist. And these separate, individual +rights all rest upon, and can be ascertained only by, the one science of +justice. + +_Legally speaking_, the term "public _rights_" is as vague and +indefinite as are the terms "public _health_," "public _good_," "public +_welfare_," and the like. It has no legal meaning, except when used to +describe the separate, private, _individual_ rights of a greater or less +number of individuals. + +In so far as the separate, private, natural rights of _individuals_ are +secured, in just so far, and no farther, are the "public rights" +secured. In so far as the separate, private, natural rights of +_individuals_ are disregarded or violated, in just so far are "public +rights" disregarded or violated. Therefore all the pretences of +so-called lawmakers, that they are protecting "public rights," by +violating private rights, are sheer and utter contradictions and frauds. +They are just as false and absurd as it would be to say that they are +protecting the public _health_, by arbitrarily poisoning and destroying +the health of single individuals. + +The pretence of the lawmakers, that they are promoting the "public +_good_," by violating individual "_rights_," is just as false and absurd +as is the pretence that they are protecting "public _rights_" by +violating "private rights." Sir, the greatest "public _good_," of which +any coercive power, calling itself a government, or by any other name, +is capable, is the protection of each and every individual in the quiet +and peaceful enjoyment and exercise of _all_ his own natural, inherent, +inalienable, _individual_ "rights." This is a "good" that comes home to +each and every individual, of whom "the public" is composed. It is also +a "good," which each and every one of these individuals, composing "the +public," can appreciate. It is a "good," for the loss of which +governments can make no compensation whatever. _It is a universal and +impartial "good,"_ of the highest importance to each and every human +being; and not any such vague, false, and criminal thing as the +lawmakers--when violating private rights--tell us they are trying to +accomplish, under the name of "the public good." It is also the only +"equal and exact justice," which you, or anybody else, are capable of +securing, or have any occasion to secure, to any human being. Let but +this "equal and exact justice" be secured "to all men," and they will +then be abundantly able to take care of themselves, and secure their own +highest "good." Or if any one should ever chance to need anything more +than this, he may safely trust to the voluntary kindness of his fellow +men to supply it. + +It is one of those things not easily accounted for, that men who would +scorn to do an injustice to a fellow man, in a private transaction,--who +would scorn to usurp any arbitrary dominion over him, or his +property,--who would be in the highest degree indignant, if charged with +any private injustice,--and who, at a moment's warning, would take their +lives in their hands, to defend their own rights, and redress their own +wrongs,--will, the moment they become members of what they call a +government, assume that they are absolved from all principles and all +obligations that were imperative upon them, as individuals; will assume +that they are invested with a right of arbitrary and irresponsible +dominion over other men, and other men's property. Yet they are doing +this continually. And all the laws they _make_ are based upon the +assumption that they have now become invested with rights that are more +than human, and that those, on whom their laws are to operate, have lost +even their human rights. They seem to be utterly blind to the fact, that +the only reason there can be for their existence as a government, is +that they may protect those very "rights," which they before +scrupulously respected, but which they now unscrupulously trample upon. + + + SECTION VI. + +But you evidently believe nothing of what I have now been saying. You +evidently believe that justice is no law at all, unless in cases where +the lawmakers may chance to prefer it to any law which they themselves +can invent. + +You evidently believe that, a certain paper, called the constitution, +which nobody ever signed, which few persons ever read, which the great +body of the people never saw, and as to the meaning of which no two +persons were ever agreed, is the supreme law of this land, anything in +the law of nature--anything in the natural, inherent, inalienable, +_individual_ rights of fifty millions of people--to the contrary not +withstanding. + +Did folly, falsehood, absurdity, assumption, or criminality ever reach a +higher point than that? + +You evidently believe that those great volumes of statutes, which the +people at large have never read, nor even seen, and never will read, nor +see, but which such men as you and your lawmakers have been +manufacturing for nearly a hundred years, to restrain them of their +liberty, and deprive them of their natural rights, were all made for +their benefit, by men wiser than they--wiser even than justice +itself--and having only their welfare at heart! + +You evidently believe that the men who made those laws were duly +authorized to make them; and that you yourself have been duly authorized +to enforce them. But in this you are utterly mistaken. You have not so +much as the honest, responsible scratch of one single pen, to justify +you in the exercise of the power you have taken upon yourself to +exercise. For example, you have no such evidence of your right to take +any man's property for the support of your government, as would be +required of you, if you were to claim pay for a single day's honest +labor. + +It was once said, in this country, that taxation without consent was +robbery. And a seven years' war was fought to maintain that principle. +But if that principle were a true one in behalf of three millions of +men, it is an equally true one in behalf of three men, or of one man. + +Who are ever taxed? Individuals only. Who have property that can be +taxed? Individuals only. Who can give their consent to be taxed? +Individuals only. Who are ever taxed without their consent? Individuals +only. Who, then, are robbed, if taxed without their consent? Individuals +only. + +If taxation without consent is robbery, the United States government has +never had, has not now, and is never likely to have, a single honest +dollar in its treasury. + +If taxation without consent is _not_ robbery, then any band of robbers +have only to declare themselves a government, and all their robberies +are legalized. + +If any man's money can be taken by a so-called government, without his +own personal consent, all his other rights are taken with it; for with +his money the government can, and will, hire soldiers to stand over him, +compel him to submit to its arbitrary will, and kill him if he resists. + +That your whole claim of a right to any man's money for the support of +your government, without his consent, is the merest farce and fraud, is +proved by the fact that you have no such evidence of your right to take +it, as would be required of you, by one of your own courts, to prove a +debt of five dollars, that might be honestly due you. + +You and your lawmakers have no such evidence of your right of dominion +over the people of this country, as would be required to prove your +right to any material property, that you might have purchased. + +When a man parts with any considerable amount of such material property +as he has a natural right to part with,--as, for example, houses, or +lands, or food, or clothing, or anything else of much value,--he usually +gives, and the purchaser usually demands, some _written_ acknowledgment, +receipt, bill of sale, or other evidence, that will prove that he +voluntarily parted with it, and that the purchaser is now the real and +true owner of it. But you hold that fifty millions of people have +voluntarily parted, not only with their natural right of dominion over +all their material property, but also with all their natural right of +dominion over their own souls and bodies; when not one of them has ever +given you a scrap of writing, or even "made his mark," to that effect. + +You have not so much as the honest signature of a single human being, +granting to you or your lawmakers any right of dominion whatever over +him or his property. + +You hold your place only by a title, which, on no just principle of law +or reason, is worth a straw. And all who are associated with you in the +government--whether they be called senators, representatives, judges, +executive officers, or what not--all hold their places, directly or +indirectly, only by the same worthless title. That title is nothing more +nor less than votes given in secret (by secret ballot), by not more than +one-fifth of the whole population. These votes were given in secret +solely because those who gave them did not dare to make themselves +personally responsible, either for their own acts, or the acts of their +agents, the lawmakers, judges, etc. + +These voters, having given their votes in secret (by secret ballot), +have put it out of your power--and out of the power of all others +associated with you in the government--to designate your principals +_individually_. That is to say, you have no legal knowledge as to who +voted for you, or who voted against you. And being unable to designate +your principals _individually_, you have no right to say that you have +any principals. And having no right to say that you have any principals, +you are bound, on every just principle of law or reason, to confess that +you are mere usurpers, making laws, and enforcing them, upon your own +authority alone. + +A secret ballot makes a secret government; and a secret government is +nothing else than a government by conspiracy. And a government by +conspiracy is the only government we now have. + +You say that "_every voter exercises a public trust_." + +Who appointed him to that trust? Nobody. He simply usurped the power; he +never accepted the trust. And because he usurped the power, he dares +exercise it only in secret. Not one of all the ten millions of voters, +who helped to place you in power, would have dared to do so, if he had +known that he was to be held personally responsible, before any just +tribunal, for the acts of those for whom he voted. + +Inasmuch as all the votes, given for you and your lawmakers, were given +in secret, all that you and they can say, in support of your authority +as rulers, is that you venture upon your acts as lawmakers, etc., not +because you have any open, authentic, written, legitimate authority +granted you by any human being,--for you can show nothing of the +kind,--but only because, from certain reports made to you of votes given +in secret, you have reason to believe that you have at your backs a +secret association strong enough to sustain you by force, in case your +authority should be resisted. + +Is there a government on earth that rests upon a more false, absurd, or +tyrannical basis than that? + + + SECTION VII. + +But the falsehood and absurdity of your whole system of government do +not result solely from the fact that it rests wholly upon votes given in +secret, or by men who take care to avoid all personal responsibility for +their own acts, or the acts of their agents. On the contrary, if every +man, woman, and child in the United States had openly signed, sealed, +and delivered to you and your associates, a written document, purporting +to invest you with all the legislative, judicial, and executive powers +that you now exercise, they would not thereby have given you the +slightest legitimate authority. Such a contract, purporting to surrender +into your hands all their natural rights of person and property, to be +disposed of at your pleasure or discretion, would have been simply an +absurd and void contract, giving you no real authority whatever. + +It is a natural impossibility for any man to make a _binding_ contract, +by which he shall surrender to others a single one of what are commonly +called his "natural, inherent, _inalienable_ rights." + +It is a natural impossibility for any man to make a _binding_ contract, +that shall invest others with any right whatever of arbitrary, +irresponsible dominion over him. + +The right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion is the right of property; +and the right of property is the right of arbitrary, irresponsible +dominion. The two are identical. There is no difference between them. +Neither can exist without the other. If, therefore, our so-called +lawmakers really have that right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion +over us, which they claim to have, and which they habitually exercise, +it must be because they own us as property. If they own us as property, +it must be because nature made us their property; for, as no man can +sell himself as a slave, we could never make a binding contract that +should make us their property--or, what is the same thing, give them any +right of arbitrary, irresponsible dominion over us. + +As a lawyer, you certainly ought to know that all this is true. + + + SECTION VIII. + +Sir, consider, for a moment, what an utterly false, absurd, ridiculous, +and criminal government we now have. + +It all rests upon the false, ridiculous, and utterly groundless +assumption, that fifty millions of people not only could voluntarily +surrender, but actually have voluntarily surrendered, all their natural +rights, as human beings, into the custody of some four hundred men, +called lawmakers, judges, etc., who are to be held utterly irresponsible +for the disposal they may make of them.[2] + + [2] The irresponsibility of the senators and representatives is + guaranteed to them in this wise: + + For any speech or debate [or vote] in either house, they + [the senators and representatives] shall not be + questioned [held to any legal responsibility] in any + other place.--_Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 6._ + + The judicial and executive officers are all equally guaranteed + against all responsibility _to the people_. They are made + responsible only to the senators and representatives, whose laws + they are to administer and execute. So long as they sanction and + execute all these laws, to the satisfaction of the lawmakers, + they are safe against all responsibility. _In no case can the + people, whose rights they are continually denying and trampling + upon, hold them to any accountability whatever._ + + Thus it will be seen that all departments of the government, + legislative, judicial, and executive, are placed entirely beyond + any responsibility _to the people_, whose agents they profess to + be, and whose rights they assume to dispose of at pleasure. + + Was a more absolute, irresponsible government than that ever + invented? + +The only right, which any individual is supposed to retain, or possess, +under the government, _is a purely fictitious one,--one that nature +never gave him,_--to wit, his right (so-called), as one of some ten +millions of male adults, to give away, by his vote, not only all his own +natural, inherent, inalienable, human rights, but also all the natural, +inherent, inalienable, human rights of forty millions of other human +beings--that is, women and children. + +To suppose that any one of all these ten millions of male adults would +voluntarily surrender a single one of all his natural, inherent, +inalienable, human rights into the hands of irresponsible men, is an +absurdity; because, first, he has no power to do so, any contract he may +make for that purpose being absurd, and necessarily void; and, secondly, +because he can have no rational motive for doing so. To suppose him to +do so, is to suppose him to be an idiot, incapable of making any +rational and obligatory contract. It is to suppose he would voluntarily +give away everything in life that was of value to himself, and get +nothing in return. To suppose that he would attempt to give away all the +natural rights _of other persons_--that is, the women and children--as +well as his own, is to suppose him to attempt to do something that he +has no right, or power, to do. It is to suppose him to be both a villain +and a fool. + +And yet this government now rests wholly upon the assumption that some +ten millions of male adults--men supposed to be _compos mentis_--have +not only attempted to do, but have actually succeeded in doing, these +absurd and impossible things. + +It cannot be said that men put all their rights into the hands of the +government, in order to have them protected; because there can be no +such thing as a man's being protected in his rights, _any longer than he +is allowed to retain them in his own possession_. The only possible way, +in which any man can be protected in his rights, _is to protect him in +his own actual possession and exercise of them_. And yet our government +is absurd enough to assume that a man can be protected in his rights, +after he has surrendered them altogether into other hands than his own. + +This is just as absurd as it would be to assume that a man had given +himself away as a slave, in order to be protected in the enjoyment of +his liberty. + +A man wants his rights protected, solely that he himself may possess and +use them, and have the full benefit of them. But if he is compelled to +give them up to somebody else,--to a government, so-called, or to any +body else,--he ceases to have any rights of his own to be protected. + +To say, as the advocates of our government do, that a man must give up +_some_ of his natural rights, to a government, in order to have the rest +of them protected--the government being all the while the sole and +irresponsible judge as to what rights he does give up, and what he +retains, and what are to be protected--is to say that he gives up all +the rights that the government chooses, _at any time_, to assume that he +has given up; and that he retains none, and is to be protected in none, +except such as the government shall, _at all times_, see fit to protect, +and to permit him to retain. This is to suppose that he has retained no +rights at all, that he can, _at any time_, claim as his own, _as against +the government_. It is to say that he has really given up every right, +and reserved none. + +For a still further reason, it is absurd to say that a man must give up +_some_ of his rights to a government, in order that government may +protect him in the rest. That reason is, that every right he gives up +diminishes his own power of self-protection, and makes it so much more +difficult for the government to protect him. And yet our government says +a man must give up _all_ his rights, in order that it may protect him. +It might just as well be said that a man must consent to be bound hand +and foot, in order to enable a government, or his friends, to protect +him against an enemy. Leave him in full possession of his limbs, and of +all his powers, and he will do more for his own protection than he +otherwise could, and will have less need of protection from a +government, or any other source. + +Finally, if a man, who is _compos mentis_, wants any outside protection +for his rights, he is perfectly competent to make his own bargain for +such as he desires; and other persons have no occasion to thrust their +protection upon him, against his will; or to insist, as they now do, +that he shall give up all, or any, of his rights to them, in +consideration of such protection, and only such protection, as they may +afterwards _choose_ to give him. + +It is especially noticeable that those persons, who are so impatient to +protect other men in their rights that they cannot wait until they are +requested to do so, have a somewhat inveterate habit of killing all who +do not voluntarily accept their protection; or do not consent to give up +to them all their rights in exchange for it. + +If A were to go to B, a merchant, and say to him, "Sir, I am a +night-watchman, and I insist upon your employing me as such in +protecting your property against burglars; and to enable me to do so +more effectually, I insist upon your letting me tie your own hands and +feet, so that you cannot interfere with me; and also upon your +delivering up to me all your keys to your store, your safe, and to all +your valuables; and that you authorize me to act solely and fully +according to my own will, pleasure, and discretion in the matter; and +I demand still further, that you shall give me an absolute guaranty +that you will not hold me to any accountability whatever for anything +I may do, or for anything that may happen to your goods while they are +under my protection; and unless you comply with this proposal, I will +now kill you on the spot,"--if A were to say all this to B, B would +naturally conclude that A himself was the most impudent and dangerous +burglar that he (B) had to fear; and that if he (B) wished to secure +his property against burglars, his best way would be to kill A in the +first place, and then take his chances against all such other burglars +as might come afterwards. + +Our government constantly acts the part that is here supposed to be +acted by A. And it is just as impudent a scoundrel as A is here +supposed to be. It insists that every man shall give up all his rights +unreservedly into its custody, and then hold it wholly irresponsible +for any disposal it may make of them. And it gives him no alternative +but death. + +If by putting a bayonet to a man's breast, and giving him his choice, to +die, or be "protected in his rights," it secures his consent to the +latter alternative, it then proclaims itself a free government,--a +government resting on consent! + +You yourself describe such a government as "the best government ever +vouchsafed to man." + +Can you tell me of one that is worse in principle? + +But perhaps you will say that ours is not so bad, in principle, as the +others, for the reason that here, once in two, four, or six years, each +male adult is permitted to have one vote in ten millions, in choosing +the public protectors. Well, if you think that that materially alters +the case, I wish you joy of your remarkable discernment. + + + SECTION IX. + +Sir, if a government is to "do equal and exact justice to all men," _it +must do simply that, and nothing more_. If it does more than that to +any,--that is, if it gives monopolies, privileges, exemptions, bounties, +or favors to any,--it can do so only by doing injustice to more or less +others. _It can give to one only what it takes from others; for it has +nothing of its own to give to any one._ The best that it can do for all, +and the only honest thing it can do for any, is simply to secure to each +and every one his own rights,--the rights that nature gave him,--his +rights of person, and his rights of property; leaving him, then, to +pursue his own interests, and secure his own welfare, by the free and +full exercise of his own powers of body and mind; so long as he +trespasses upon the equal rights of no other person. + +If he desires any favors from any body, he must, I repeat, depend upon +the voluntary kindness of such of his fellow men as may be willing to +grant them. No government can have any right to grant them; because no +government can have a right to take from one man any thing that is his, +and give it to another. + +If this be the only true idea of an honest government, it is plain that +it can have nothing to do with men's "interests," "welfare," or +"prosperity," _as distinguished from their "rights."_ Being secured in +their rights, each and all must take the sole charge of, and have the +sole responsibility for, their own "interests," "welfare," and +"prosperity." + +By simply protecting every man in his rights, a government necessarily +keeps open to every one the widest possible field, that he honestly can +have, for such industry as he may choose to follow. It also insures him +the widest possible field for obtaining such capital as he needs for his +industry, and the widest possible markets for the products of his labor. +With the possession of these rights, he must be content. + +No honest government can go into business with any individuals, be they +many, or few. It cannot furnish capital to any, nor prohibit the loaning +of capital to any. It can give to no one any special aid to competition; +nor protect any one from competition. It must adhere inflexibly to the +principle of entire freedom for all honest industry, and all honest +traffic. It can do to no one any favor, nor render to any one any +assistance, which it withholds from another. It must hold the scales +impartially between them; taking no cognizance of any man's "interests," +"welfare," or "prosperity," otherwise than by simply protecting him in +his "_rights_." + +In opposition to this view, lawmakers profess to have weighty duties +laid upon them, to promote men's "interests," "welfare," and +"prosperity," _as distinguished from their "rights."_ They seldom have +any thing to say about men's "_rights_." On the contrary, they take it +for granted that they are charged with the duty of promoting, +superintending, directing, and controlling the "business" of the +country. In the performance of this supposed duty, all ideas of +individual "_rights_" are cast aside. Not knowing any way--because +there is no way--in which they can impartially promote all men's +"interests," "welfare," and "prosperity," _otherwise than by protecting +impartially all men's rights_, they boldly proclaim that "_individual +rights must not be permitted to stand in the way of the public good, +the public welfare, and the business interests of the country_." + +Substantially all their lawmaking proceeds upon this theory; for there +is no other theory, on which they can find any justification whatever +for any lawmaking at all. So they proceed to give monopolies, +privileges, bounties, grants, loans, etc., etc., to particular persons, +or classes of persons; justifying themselves by saying that these +privileged persons will "give employment" to the unprivileged; and that +this employment, given by the privileged to the unprivileged, will +compensate the latter for the loss of their "_rights_." And they carry +on their lawmaking of this kind to the greatest extent they think is +possible, without causing rebellion and revolution, on the part of the +injured classes. + +Sir, I am sorry to see that you adopt this lawmaking theory to its +fullest extent; that although, for once only, and in a dozen words +only,--and then merely incidentally,--you describe the government as "a +government pledged to do equal and exact justice to all men," you show, +throughout the rest of your address, that you have no thought of abiding +by that principle; that you are either utterly ignorant, or utterly +regardless, of what that principle requires of you; that the government, +so far as your influence goes, is to be given up to the business of +lawmaking,--that is, to the business of abolishing justice, and +establishing injustice in its place; that you hold it to be the proper +duty and function of the government to be constantly looking after men's +"interests," "welfare," "prosperity," etc., etc., _as distinguished from +their rights_; that it must consider men's "rights" as no guide to the +promotion of their "interests"; that it must give favors to some, and +withhold the same favors from others; that in order to give these favors +to some, it must take from others their _rights_; that, in reality, it +must traffic in both men's interests and their rights; that it must keep +open shop, and sell men's interests and rights to the highest bidders; +and that this is your only plan for promoting "the general welfare," +"the common interest," etc., etc. + +That such is your idea of the constitutional duties and functions of the +government, is shown by different parts of your address: but more fully, +perhaps, by this: + + The large variety of diverse and _competing interests_ subject + to _federal control, persistently seeking recognition of their + claims_, need give us no fear that the greatest good of the + greatest number will fail to be accomplished, if, _in the + halls of national legislation_, that spirit of amity and mutual + concession shall prevail, in which the constitution had its + birth. If this involves the _surrender_ or _postponement_ of + _private interests_, and the _abandonment_ of _local + advantages_, compensation will be found in the assurance that + thus the _common interest_ is subserved, and _the general + welfare_ advanced. + +What is all this but saying that the government is not at all an +institution for "doing equal and exact justice to all men," or for the +impartial protection of all men's _rights_; but that it is its proper +business to take sides, for and against, a "large variety of diverse and +_competing interests_"; that it has this "large variety of diverse and +_competing interests_" under its arbitrary "_control_"; that it can, at +its pleasure, make such laws as will give success to some of them, and +insure the defeat of others; that these "various, diverse, and +_competing interests_" will be "_persistently seeking recognition of +their claims_ ... in _the halls of national legislation_,"--that is, +will be "persistently" clamoring for laws to be made in their favor; +that, in fact, "the halls of national legislation" are to be mere +arenas, into which the government actually invites the advocates and +representatives of all the selfish schemes of avarice and ambition that +unprincipled men can devise; that these schemes will there be free to +"_compete_" with each other in their corrupt offers for government favor +and support; and that it is to be the proper and ordinary business of +the lawmakers to listen to all these schemes; to adopt some of them, and +sustain them with all the money and power of the government; and to +"postpone," "abandon," oppose, and defeat all others; it being well +known, all the while, that the lawmakers will, _individually_, favor, or +oppose, these various schemes, according to their own irresponsible +will, pleasure, and discretion,--that is, according as they can better +serve their own personal interests and ambitions by doing the one or the +other. + +Was a more thorough scheme of national villainy ever invented? + +Sir, do you not know that in this conflict, between these "various, +diverse, and _competing interests_," all ideas of individual +"_rights_"--all ideas of "equal and exact justice to all men"--will be +cast to the winds; that the boldest, the strongest, the most fraudulent, +the most rapacious, and the most corrupt, men will have control of the +government, and make it a mere instrument for plundering the great body +of the people? + +Your idea of the real character of the government is plainly this: The +lawmakers are to assume absolute and irresponsible "_control_" of all +the financial resources, all the legislative, judicial, and executive +powers, of the government, and employ them all for the promotion of such +schemes of plunder and ambition as they may select from all those that +may be submitted to them for their approval; that they are to keep "the +halls of national legislation" wide open for the admission of all +persons having such schemes to offer; and that they are to grant +monopolies, privileges, loans, and bounties to all such of these schemes +as they can make subserve their own individual interests and ambitions, +and reject or "postpone" all others. And that there is to be no limit to +their operations of this kind, except their fear of exciting rebellion +and resistance on the part of the plundered classes. + +And you are just fool enough to tell us that such a government as this +may be relied on to "accomplish the greatest good to the greatest +number," "to subserve the common interest," and "advance the general +welfare," "if," only, "in the halls of national legislation, that spirit +of amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in which the constitution +had its birth." + +You here assume that "the general welfare" is to depend, not upon the +free and untrammelled enterprise and industry of the whole people, +acting individually, and each enjoying and exercising all his natural +rights; but wholly or principally upon the success of such particular +schemes as the government may take under its special "control." And this +means that "the general welfare" is to depend, wholly or principally, +upon such privileges, monopolies, loans, and bounties as the government +may grant to more or less of that "large variety of diverse and +competing _interests_"--that is, schemes--that may be "persistently" +pressed upon its attention. + +But as you impliedly acknowledge that the government cannot take all +these "interests" (schemes) under its "control," and bestow its favors +upon all alike, you concede that some of them must be "surrendered," +"postponed," or "abandoned"; and that, consequently, the government +cannot get on at all, unless, "in the halls of national legislation, +that spirit of amity and mutual concession shall prevail, in which the +constitution had its birth." + +This "spirit of amity and mutual concession in the halls of +legislation," you explain to mean this: a disposition, on the part of +the lawmakers respectively--whose various schemes of plunder cannot all +be accomplished, by reason of their being beyond the financial resources +of the government, or the endurance of the people--to "surrender" some +of them, "postpone" others, and "abandon" others, in order that the +general business of robbery may go on to the greatest extent possible, +and that each one of the lawmakers may succeed with as many of the +schemes he is specially intrusted with, as he can carry through by means +of such bargains, for mutual help, as he may be able to make with his +fellow lawmakers. + +Such is the plan of government, to which you say that you "consecrate" +yourself, and "engage your every faculty and effort." + +Was a more shameless avowal ever made? + +You cannot claim to be ignorant of what crimes such a government will +commit. You have had abundant opportunity to know--and if you have kept +your eyes open, you do know--what these schemes of robbery have been in +the past; and from these you can judge what they will be in the future. + +You know that under such a system, every senator and +representative--probably without an exception--will come to the congress +as the champion of the dominant scoundrelisms of his own State or +district; that he will be elected solely to serve those "interests," as +you call them; that in offering himself as a candidate, he will announce +the robbery, or robberies, to which all his efforts will be directed; +that he will call these robberies his "policy"; or if he be lost to all +decency, he will call them his "principles"; that they will always be +such as he thinks will best subserve his own interests, or ambitions; +that he will go to "the halls of national legislation" with his head +full of plans for making bargains with other lawmakers--as corrupt as +himself--for mutual help in carrying their respective schemes. + +Such has been the character of our congresses nearly, or quite, from the +beginning. It can scarcely be said that there has ever been an honest +man in one of them. A man has sometimes gained a reputation for honesty, +in his own State or district, by opposing some one or more of the +robberies that were proposed by members from other portions of the +country. But such a man has seldom, or never, deserved his reputation; +for he has, generally, if not always, been the advocate of some one or +more schemes of robbery, by which more or less of his own constituents +were to profit, and which he knew it would be indispensable that he +should advocate, in order to give him votes at home. + +If there have ever been any members, who were consistently honest +throughout,--who were really in favor of "doing equal and exact justice +to all men,"--and, of course, nothing more than that to any,--their +numbers have been few; so few as to have left no mark upon the general +legislation. They have but constituted the exceptions that proved the +rule. If you were now required to name such a lawmaker, I think you +would search our history in vain to find him. + +That this is no exaggerated description of our national lawmaking, the +following facts will prove. + +For the first seventy years of the government, one portion of the +lawmakers would be satisfied with nothing less than permission to rob +one-sixth, or one-seventh, of the whole population, not only of their +labor, but even of their right to their own persons. In 1860, this class +of lawmakers comprised all the senators and representatives from +fifteen, of the then thirty-three, States.[3] + + [3] In the Senate they stood thirty to thirty-six, in the house + ninety to one hundred and forty-seven, in the two branches + united one hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty-three, + relatively to the non-slaveholding members. + + From the foundation of the government--without a single + interval, I think--the lawmakers from the slaveholding States + had been, _relatively_, as strong, or stronger, than in 1860. + +This body of lawmakers, standing always firmly together, and capable of +turning the scale for, or against, any scheme of robbery, in which +northern men were interested, but on which northern men were +divided,--such as navigation acts, tariffs, bounties, grants, war, +peace, etc.,--could purchase immunity for their own crime, by supporting +such, and so many, northern crimes--second only to their own in +atrocity--as could be mutually agreed on. + +In this way the slaveholders bargained for, and secured, protection for +slavery and the slave trade, by consenting to such navigation acts as +some of the northern States desired, and to such tariffs on +imports--such as iron, coal, wool, woollen goods, etc.,--as should +enable the home producers of similar articles to make fortunes by +robbing everybody else in the prices of their goods. + +Another class of lawmakers have been satisfied with nothing less than +such a monopoly of money, as should enable the holders of it to +suppress, as far as possible, all industry and traffic, except such as +they themselves should control; such a monopoly of money as would put +it wholly out of the power of the great body of wealth-producers to +hire the capital needed for their industries; and thus compel +them--especially the mechanical portions of them--by the alternative of +starvation--to sell their labor to the monopolists of money, for just +such prices as these latter should choose to pay. This monopoly of money +has also given, to the holders of it, a control, so nearly absolute, of +all industry--agricultural as well as mechanical--and all traffic, as +has enabled them to plunder all the producing classes in the prices of +their labor, or the products of their labor. + +Have you been blind, all these years, to the existence, or the effects, +of this monopoly of money? + +Still another class of lawmakers have demanded unequal taxation on the +various kinds of home property, that are subject to taxation; such +unequal taxation as would throw heavy burdens upon some kinds of +property, and very light burdens, or no burdens at all, upon other +kinds. + +And yet another class of lawmakers have demanded great appropriations, +or loans, of money, or grants of lands, to enterprises intended to give +great wealth to a few, at the expense of everybody else. + +These are some of the schemes of downright and outright robbery, which +you mildly describe as "the large variety of diverse and competing +interests, _subject to federal control_, persistently seeking +recognition of their claims ... in the halls of national legislation"; +and each having its champions and representatives among the lawmakers. + +You know that all, or very nearly all, the legislation of congress is +devoted to these various schemes of robbery; and that little, or no, +legislation goes through, except by means of such bargains as these +lawmakers may enter into with each other, for mutual support of their +respective robberies. And yet you have the mendacity, or the stupidity, +to tell us that so much of this legislation as does go through, may be +relied on to "accomplish the greatest good to the greatest number," to +"subserve the common interest," and "advance the general welfare." + +And when these schemes of robbery become so numerous, atrocious, and +unendurable that they can no longer be reconciled "in the halls of +national legislation," by "surrendering" some of them, "postponing" +others, and "abandoning" others, you assume--for such has been the +prevailing opinion, and you say nothing to the contrary--that it is the +right of the strongest party, or parties, to murder a half million of +men, if that be necessary,--and as we once did,--not to secure liberty +or justice to any body,--but to compel the weaker of these would-be +robbers to submit to all such robberies as the stronger ones may choose +to practise upon them. + + + SECTION X. + +Sir, your idea of the true character of our government is plainly this: +you assume that all the natural, inherent, inalienable, individual, +_human_ rights of fifty millions of people--all their individual rights +to preserve their own lives, and promote their own happiness--have been +thrown into one common heap,--into hotchpotch, as the lawyers say: and +that this hotchpotch has been given into the hands of some four hundred +champion robbers, each of whom has pledged himself to carry off as large +a portion of it as possible, to be divided among those men--well known +to himself, but who--to save themselves from all responsibility for his +acts--have secretly (by secret ballot) appointed him to be their +champion. + +Sir, if you had assumed that all the people of this country had thrown +all their wealth, all their rights, all their means of living, into +hotchpotch; and that this hotchpotch had been given over to four hundred +ferocious hounds; and that each of these hounds had been selected and +trained to bring to his masters so much of this common plunder as he, in +the general fight, or scramble, could get off with, you would scarcely +have drawn a more vivid picture of the true character of the government +of the United States, than you have done in your inaugural address. + +No wonder that you are obliged to confess that such a government can be +carried on only "amid the din of party strife"; that it will be +influenced--you should have said _directed_--by "purely partisan zeal"; +and that it will be attended by "the animosities of political strife, +the bitterness of partisan defeat, and the exultation of partisan +triumph." + +What gang of robbers, quarrelling over the division of their plunder, +could exhibit a more shameful picture than you thus acknowledge to be +shown by the government of the United States? + +Sir, nothing of all this "din," and "strife," and "animosity," and +"bitterness," is caused by any attempt, on the part of the government, +to simply "do equal and exact justice to all men,"--to simply protect +every man impartially in all his natural rights to life, liberty, and +property. It is all caused simply and solely by the government's +violation of some men's "_rights_," to promote other men's "interests." +If you do not know this, you are mentally an object of pity. + +Sir, men's "_rights_" are always harmonious. That is to say, each man's +"rights" are always consistent and harmonious with each and every other +man's "rights." But their "_interests_" as you estimate them, constantly +clash; especially such "interests" as depend on government grants of +monopolies, privileges, loans, and bounties. And these "interests," like +the interests of other gamblers, clash with a fury proportioned to the +amounts at stake. It is these clashing "_interests_" and not any +clashing "_rights_" that give rise to all the strife you have here +depicted, and to all this necessity for "that spirit of amity and mutual +concession," which you hold to be indispensable to the accomplishment of +such legislation as you say is necessary to the welfare of the country. + +Each and every man's "_rights_" being consistent and harmonious with +each and every other man's "_rights_"; and all men's rights being +immutably fixed, and easily ascertained, by a science that is open to be +learned and known by all; a government that does nothing but "equal and +exact justice to all men"--that simply gives to every man his own, and +nothing more to any--has no cause and no occasion for any "political +_parties_." What are these "political parties" but standing armies of +robbers, each trying to rob the other, and to prevent being itself +robbed by the other? A government that seeks only to "do equal and exact +justice to all men," has no cause and no occasion to enlist all the +fighting men in the nation in two hostile ranks; to keep them always in +battle array, and burning with hatred towards each other. It has no +cause and no occasion for any "political _warfare_" any "political +_hostility_" any "political _campaigns_" any "political _contests_" any +"political _fights_" any "political _defeats_" or any "political +_triumphs_." It has no cause and no occasion for any of those "political +_leaders_" so called, whose whole business is to invent new schemes of +robbery, and organize the people into opposing bands of robbers; all for +their own aggrandizement alone. It has no cause and no occasion for the +toleration, or the existence, of that vile horde of political bullies, +and swindlers, and blackguards, who enlist on one side or the other, and +fight for pay; who, year in and year out, employ their lungs and their +ink in spreading lies among ignorant people, to excite their hopes of +gain, or their fears of loss, and thus obtain their votes. In short, it +has no cause and no occasion for all this "din of party strife," for all +this "purely partisan zeal," for all "the bitterness of partisan +defeat," for all "the exultation of partisan triumph," nor, worst of +all, for any of "that spirit of amity and mutual concession [by which +you evidently mean that readiness, "in the halls of national +legislation," to sacrifice some men's "rights" to promote other men's +"interests"] in which [you say] the constitution had its birth." + +If the constitution does really, or naturally, give rise to all this +"strife," and require all this "spirit of amity and mutual +concession,"--and I do not care now to deny that it does,--so much the +worse for the constitution. And so much the worse for all those men +who, like yourself, swear to "preserve, protect, and defend it." + +And yet you have the face to make no end of professions, or pretences, +that the impelling power, the real motive, in all this robbery and +strife, is nothing else than "the service of the people," "their +interests," "the promotion of their welfare," "good government," +"government by the people," "the popular will," "the general weal," "the +achievements of our national destiny," "the benefits which our happy +form of government can bestow," "the lasting welfare of the country," +"the priceless benefits of the constitution," "the greatest good to the +greatest number," "the common interest," "the general welfare," "the +people's will," "the mission of the American people," "our civil +policy," "the genius of our institutions," "the needs of our people in +their home life," "the settlement and development of the resources of +our vast territory," "the prosperity of our republic," "the interests +and prosperity of all the people," "the safety and confidence of +business interests," "making the wage of labor sure and steady," "a +due regard to the interests of capital invested and workingmen +employed in American industries," "reform in the administration of the +government," "the application of business principles to public +affairs," "the constant and ever varying wants of an active and +enterprising population," "a firm determination to secure to all the +people of the land the full benefits of the best form of government +ever vouchsafed to man," "the blessings of our national life," etc., +etc. + +Sir, what is the use of such a deluge of unmeaning words, unless it be +to gloss over, and, if possible, hide, the true character of the acts of +the government? + +Such "generalities" as these do not even "glitter." They are only the +stale phrases of the demagogue, who wishes to appear to promise +everything, but commits himself to nothing. Or else they are the +senseless talk of a mere political parrot, who repeats words he has been +taught to utter, without knowing their meaning. At best, they are the +mere gibberish of a man destitute of all political ideas, but who +imagines that "good government," "the general welfare," "the common +interest," "the best form of government ever vouchsafed to man," etc., +etc., must be very good things, if anybody can ever find out what they +are. There is nothing definite, nothing real, nothing tangible, nothing +honest, about them. Yet they constitute your entire stock in trade. In +resorting to them--in holding them up to public gaze as comprising your +political creed--you assume that they have a meaning; that they are +matters of overruling importance; that they require the action of an +omnipotent, irresponsible, lawmaking government; that all these +"interests" must be represented, and can be secured, only "in the halls +of national legislation"; and by such political hounds as have been +selected and trained, and sent there, solely that they may bring off, to +their respective masters, as much as possible of the public plunder they +hold in their hands; that is, as much as possible of the earnings of all +the honest wealth-producers of the country. + +And when these masters count up the spoils that their hounds have thus +brought home to them, they set up a corresponding shout that "the public +prosperity," "the common interest," and "the general welfare" have been +"advanced." And the scoundrels by whom the work has been accomplished, +"in the halls of national legislation," are trumpeted to the world as +"great statesmen." And you are just stupid enough to be deceived into +the belief, or just knave enough to pretend to be deceived into the +belief, that all this is really the truth. + +One would infer from your address that you think the people of this +country incapable of doing anything for themselves, _individually_; that +they would all perish, but for the employment given them by that "large +variety of diverse and competing interests"--that is, such purely +selfish schemes--as may be "persistently seeking recognition of their +claims ... in the halls of national legislation," and secure for +themselves such monopolies and advantages as congress may see fit to +grant them. + +Instead of your recognizing the right of each and every individual to +judge of, and provide for, his own well-being, according to the dictates +of his own judgment, and by the free exercise of his own powers of body +and mind,--so long as he infringes the equal rights of no other +person,--you assume that fifty millions of people, who never saw you, +and never will see you, who know almost nothing about you, and care very +little about you, are all so weak, ignorant, and degraded as to be +humbly and beseechingly looking to you--and to a few more lawmakers (so +called) whom they never saw, and never will see, and of whom they know +almost nothing--to enlighten, direct, and "_control_" them in their +daily labors to supply their own wants, and promote their own happiness! + +You thus assume that these fifty millions of people are so debased, +mentally and morally, that they look upon you and your associate +lawmakers as their earthly gods, holding their destinies in your hands, +and anxiously studying their welfare; instead of looking upon you--as +most of you certainly ought to be looked upon--as a mere cabal of +ignorant, selfish, ambitious, rapacious, and unprincipled men, who know +very little, and care to know very little, except how you can get fame, +and power, and money, by trampling upon other men's rights, and robbing +them of the fruits of their labor. + +Assuming yourself to be the greatest of these gods, charged with the +"welfare" of fifty millions of people, you enter upon the mighty task +with all the mock solemnity, and ridiculous grandiloquence, of a man +ignorant enough to imagine that he is really performing a solemn duty, +and doing an immense public service, instead of simply making a fool of +himself. Thus you say: + + Fellow citizens: In the presence of this vast assemblage of my + countrymen, I am about to supplement and seal, by the oath + which I shall take, the manifestation of the will of a great + and free people. In the exercise of their power and right of + self-government, they have committed to one of their fellow + citizens a supreme and sacred trust, and he here consecrates + himself to their service. This impressive ceremony adds little + to the solemn sense of responsibility with which I contemplate + the duty I owe to all the people of the land. Nothing can + relieve me from anxiety lest by any act of mine their + _interests_ [not their _rights_] may suffer, and nothing is + needed to strengthen my resolution to engage every faculty and + effort in the promotion of their _welfare_. [Not in "doing + equal and exact justice to all men." After having once + described the government as one "pledged to do equal and exact + justice to all men," you drop that subject entirely, and wander + off into "interests," and "welfare," and an astonishing number + of other equally unmeaning things.] + +Sir, you would have no occasion to take all this tremendous labor and +responsibility upon yourself, if you and your lawmakers would but keep +your hands off the "_rights_" of your "countrymen." Your "countrymen" +would be perfectly competent to take care of their own "_interests_," +and provide for their own "_welfare_," if their hands were not tied, and +their powers crippled, by such fetters as men like you and your +lawmakers have fastened upon them. + +Do you know so little of your "countrymen," that you need to be told +that their own strength and skill must be their sole reliance for their +own well-being? Or that they are abundantly able, and willing, and +anxious above all other things, to supply their own "needs in their home +life," and secure their own "welfare"? Or that they would do it, not +only without jar or friction, but as their highest duty and pleasure, if +their powers were not manacled by the absurd and villainous laws you +propose to execute upon them? Are you so stupid as to imagine that +putting chains on men's hands, and fetters on their feet, and +insurmountable obstacles in their paths, is the way to supply their +"needs," and promote their "welfare"? Do you think your "countrymen" +need to be told, either by yourself, or by any such gang of ignorant or +unprincipled men as all lawmakers are, what to do, and what not to do, +to supply their own "needs in their home life"? Do they not know how to +grow their own food, make their own clothing, build their own houses, +print their own books, acquire all the knowledge, and create all the +wealth, they desire, without being domineered over, and thwarted in all +their efforts, by any set of either fools or villains, who may call +themselves their lawmakers? And do you think they will never get their +eyes open to see what blockheads, or impostors, you and your lawmakers +are? Do they not now--at least so far as you will permit them to do +it--grow their own food, build their own houses, make their own +clothing, print their own books? Do they not make all the scientific +discoveries and mechanical inventions, by which all wealth is created? +_Or are all these things done by "the government"?_ Are you an idiot, +that you can talk as you do, about what you and your lawmakers are doing +to provide for the real wants, and promote the real "welfare," of fifty +millions of people? + + + SECTION XI. + +But perhaps the most brilliant idea in your whole address, is this: + + _Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close + scrutiny of its public servants,_ and a fair and reasonable + estimate of their fidelity and usefulness. Thus is the people's + will impressed upon the whole framework of our civil policy, + municipal, State, and federal; _and this is the price of our + liberty_, and the inspiration of our faith in the republic. + +The essential parts of this declaration are these: + +"_Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of +its public servants, ... and this is the price of our liberty._" + +Who are these "public servants," that need all this watching? Evidently +they are the lawmakers, and the lawmakers only. They are not only the +_chief_ "public servants," but they are absolute masters of all the +other "public servants." These other "public servants," judicial and +executive,--the courts, the army, the navy, the collectors of taxes, +etc., etc.,--have no function whatever, except that of simple obedience +to the lawmakers. They are appointed, paid, and have their duties +prescribed to them, by the lawmakers; and are made responsible only to +the lawmakers. They are mere puppets in the hands of the lawmakers. +Clearly, then, the lawmakers are the only ones we have any occasion to +watch. + +Your declaration, therefore, amounts, practically, to this, and this +only: + +_Every citizen owes the country a vigilant watch and close scrutiny of +ITS LAWMAKERS, ... and this is the price of our liberty._ + +Sir, your declaration is so far true, as that all the danger to "our +liberty" _comes solely from the lawmakers_. + +And why are the lawmakers dangerous to "our liberty"? Because it is a +natural impossibility that they can _make_ any law--that is, any law of +their own invention--that does _not_ violate "our liberty." + +_The law of justice is the one only law that does not violate "our +liberty."_ And that is not a law that was made by the lawmakers. It +existed before they were born, and will exist after they are dead. It +derives not one particle of its authority from any commands of theirs. +It is, therefore, in no sense, one of _their_ laws. Only laws of their +own invention are _their_ laws. And as it is naturally impossible that +they can invent any law of their own, that shall not conflict with the +law of justice, it is naturally impossible that they can _make_ a +law--that is, a law of their own invention--that shall _not_ violate +"our liberty." + +The law of justice is the precise measure, and the only precise measure, +of the rightful "liberty" of each and every human being. Any law--made +by lawmakers--that should give to any man more liberty than is given him +by the law of justice, would be a license to commit an injustice upon +one or more other persons. On the other hand, any law--made by +lawmakers--that should take from any human being any "liberty" that is +given him by the law of justice, would be taking from him a part of his +own rightful "liberty." + +Inasmuch, then, as every possible law, that can be made by lawmakers, +must either give to some one or more persons more "liberty" than the law +of nature--or the law of justice--gives them, and more "liberty" than is +consistent with the natural and equal "liberty" of all other persons; or +else must take from some one or more persons some portion of that +"liberty" which the law of nature--or the law of justice--gives to every +human being, it is inevitable that every law, that can be made by +lawmakers, must be a violation of the natural and rightful "liberty" of +some one or more persons. + +Therefore the very idea of a _lawmaking_ government--a government that +is to make laws of its own invention--is necessarily in direct and +inevitable conflict with "our liberty." In fact, the whole, sole, and +only real purpose of any _lawmaking_ government whatever is to take from +some one or more persons their "liberty." Consequently the only way in +which all men can preserve their "liberty," is not to have any +_lawmaking_ government at all. + +We have been told, time out of mind, that "_Eternal vigilance is +the price of liberty_." But this admonition, by reason of its +indefiniteness, has heretofore fallen dead upon the popular mind. It, in +reality, tells us nothing that we need to know, to enable us to preserve +"our liberty." It does not even tell us what "our liberty" is, or how, +or when, or through whom, it is endangered, or destroyed. + +1. It does not tell us that _individual_ liberty is the only _human_ +liberty. It does not tell us that "national liberty," "political +liberty," "republican liberty," "democratic liberty," "constitutional +liberty," "liberty under law," and all the other kinds of liberty that +men have ever invented, and with which tyrants, as well as demagogues, +have amused and cheated the ignorant, are not liberty at all, unless in +so far as they may, under certain circumstances, have chanced to +contribute something to, or given some impulse toward, _individual_ +liberty. + +2. It does not tell us that _individual_ liberty means freedom from all +compulsion to do anything whatever, except what justice requires us to +do, and freedom to do everything whatever that justice permits us to do. +It does not tell us that individual liberty means freedom from all human +restraint or coercion whatsoever, so long as we "live honestly, hurt +nobody, and give to every one his due." + +3. It does not tell us that there is any _science of liberty_; any +science, which every man may learn, and by which every man may know, +what is, and what is not, his own, and every other man's, rightful +"liberty." + +4. It does not tell us that this right of individual liberty rests upon +an immutable, natural principle, which no human power can make, unmake, +or alter; nor that all human authority, that claims to set it aside, or +modify it, is nothing but falsehood, absurdity, usurpation, tyranny, and +crime. + +5. It does not tell us that this right of individual liberty is a +_natural, inherent, inalienable right; that therefore no man can part +with it, or delegate it to another, if he would_; and that, +consequently, all the claims that have ever been made, by governments, +priests, or any other powers, that individuals have voluntarily +surrendered, or "delegated," their liberty to others, are all impostures +and frauds. + +6. It does not tell us that all human laws, so called, and all human +lawmaking,--all commands, either by one man, or any number of men, +calling themselves a government, or by any other name--requiring any +individual to do this, or forbidding him to do that--so long as he +"lives honestly, hurts no one, and gives to every one his due"--are all +false and tyrannical assumptions of a right of authority and dominion +over him; are all violations of his natural, inherent, inalienable, +rightful, individual liberty; and, as such, are to be resented and +resisted to the utmost, by every one who does not choose to be a slave. + +7. And, finally, it does not tell us that all _lawmaking_ governments +whatsoever--whether called monarchies, aristocracies, republics, +democracies, or by any other name--are all alike violations of men's +natural and rightful liberty. + +We can now see why lawmakers are the only enemies, from whom "our +liberty" has anything to fear, or whom we have any occasion to watch. +They are to be watched, because they claim the right to abolish justice, +and establish injustice in its stead; because they claim the right to +command us to do things which justice does not require us to do, and to +forbid us to do things which justice permits us to do; because they deny +our right to be, _individually, and absolutely_, our own masters and +owners, so long as we obey the one law of justice towards all other +persons; because they claim to be our masters, and that _their_ +commands, _as such_, are authoritative and binding upon us as law; and +that they may rightfully compel us to obey them. + +"Our liberty" is in danger only from the lawmakers, because it is only +through the agency of lawmakers, that anybody pretends to be able to +take away "our liberty." It is only the lawmakers that claim to be above +all responsibility for taking away "our liberty." Lawmakers are the only +ones who are impudent enough to assert for themselves the right to take +away "our liberty." They are the only ones who are impudent enough to +tell us that we have voluntarily surrendered "our liberty" into their +hands. They are the only ones who have the insolent condescension to +tell us that, in consideration of our having surrendered into their +hands "our liberty," and all our natural, inherent, inalienable rights +as human beings, they are disposed to give us, in return, "good +government," "the best form of government ever vouchsafed to man"; to +"protect" us, to provide for our "welfare," to promote our "interests," +etc., etc. + +And yet you are just blockhead enough to tell us that if "Every +citizen"--fifty millions and more of them--will but keep "a vigilant +watch and close scrutiny" upon these lawmakers, "our liberty" may be +preserved! + +Don't you think, sir, that you are really the wisest man that ever told +"a great and free people" how they could preserve "their liberty"? + +To be entirely candid, don't you think, sir, that a surer way of +preserving "our liberty" would be to have no lawmakers at all? + + + SECTION XII. + +But, in spite of all I have said, or, perhaps, can say, you will +probably persist in your idea that the world needs a great deal of +lawmaking; that mankind in general are not entitled to have any will, +choice, judgment, or conscience of their own; that, if not very wicked, +they are at least very ignorant and stupid; that they know very little +of what is for their own good, or how to promote their own "interests," +"welfare," or "prosperity"; that it is therefore necessary that they +should be put under guardianship to lawmakers; that these lawmakers, +being a very superior race of beings,--wise beyond the rest of their +species,--and entirely free from all those selfish passions which tempt +common mortals to do wrong,--must be intrusted with absolute and +irresponsible dominion over the less favored of their kind; must +prescribe to the latter, authoritatively, what they may, and may not, +do; and, in general, manage the affairs of this world according to their +discretion, free of all accountability to any human tribunals. + +And you seem to be perfectly confident that, under this absolute and +irresponsible dominion of the lawmakers, the affairs of this world will +be rightly managed; that the "interests," "welfare," and "prosperity" of +"a great and free people" will be properly attended to; that "the +greatest good of the greatest number" will be accomplished, etc., etc. + +And yet you hold that all this lawmaking, and all this subjection of the +great body of the people to the arbitrary, irresponsible dominion of the +lawmakers, will not interfere at all with "our liberty," if only "every +citizen" will but keep "a vigilant watch and close scrutiny" of the +lawmakers. + +Well, perhaps this is all so; although this subjection to the arbitrary +will of any man, or body of men, whatever, and under any pretence +whatever, seems, on the face of it, to be much more like slavery, than +it does like "liberty". + +If, therefore, you really intend to continue this system of lawmaking, +it seems indispensable that you should explain to us what you mean by +the term "our liberty." + +So far as your address gives us any light on the subject, you evidently +mean, by the term "our liberty," just such, and only such, "liberty," as +the lawmakers may see fit to allow us to have. + +You seem to have no conception of any other "liberty" whatever. + +You give us no idea of any other "liberty" that we can secure to +ourselves, even though "every citizen"--fifty millions and more of +them--shall all keep "a vigilant watch and close scrutiny" upon the +lawmakers. + +Now, inasmuch as the human race always have had all the "liberty" their +lawmakers have seen fit to permit them to have; and inasmuch as, under +your system of lawmaking, they always will have as much "liberty" as +their lawmakers shall see fit to give them; and inasmuch as you +apparently concede the right, which the lawmakers have always claimed, +of killing all those who are not content with so much "liberty" as their +lawmakers have seen fit to allow them,--it seems very plain that you +have not added anything to our stock of knowledge on the subject of "our +liberty." + +Leaving us thus, as you do, in as great darkness as we ever were, on +this all-important subject of "our liberty," I think you ought to submit +patiently to a little questioning on the part of those of us, who feel +that all this lawmaking--each and every separate particle of it--is a +violation of "our liberty." + +Will you, therefore, please tell us whether any, and, if any, how much, +of that _natural_ liberty--of that natural, inherent, inalienable, +_individual_ right to liberty--with which it has generally been supposed +that God, or Nature, has endowed every human being, will be left to us, +if the lawmakers are to continue, as you would have them do, the +exercise of their arbitrary, irresponsible dominion over us? + +Are you prepared to answer that question? + +No. You appear to have never given a thought to any such question as +that. + +I will therefore answer it for you. + +And my answer is, that from the moment it is conceded that any man, or +body of men, whatever, under any pretence whatever, have the right to +_make laws of their own invention_, and compel other men to obey them, +every vestige of man's _natural_ and rightful liberty is denied him. + +That this is so is proved by the fact that _all_ a man's _natural_ +rights stand upon one and the same basis, _viz._, that they are the gift +of God, or Nature, to him, _as an individual_, for his own uses, and for +his own happiness. If any one of these natural rights may be arbitrarily +taken from him by other men, _all_ of them may be taken from him on the +same reason. No one of these rights is any more sacred or inviolable in +its nature, than are all the others. The denial of any one of these +rights is therefore equivalent to a denial of all the others. The +violation of any one of these rights, by lawmakers, is equivalent to the +assertion of a right to violate all of them. + +Plainly, unless _all_ a man's natural rights are inviolable by +lawmakers, _none_ of them are. It is an absurdity to say that a man has +any rights _of his own_, if other men, whether calling themselves a +government, or by any other name, have the right to take them from him, +without his consent. Therefore the very idea of a lawmaking government +necessarily implies a denial of all such things as individual liberty, +or individual rights. + +From this statement it does not follow that every lawmaking government +will, in practice, take from every man _all_ his natural rights. It will +do as it pleases about it. It will take some, leaving him to enjoy +others, just as its own pleasure or discretion shall dictate at the +time. It would defeat its own ends, if it were wantonly to take away +_all_ his natural rights,--as, for example, his right to live, and to +breathe,--for then he would be dead, and the government could then get +nothing more out of him. The most tyrannical government will, therefore, +if it have any sense, leave its victims enough liberty to enable them to +provide for their own subsistence, to pay their taxes, and to render +such military or other service as the government may have need of. _But +it will do this for its own good, and not for theirs._ In allowing them +this liberty, it does not at all recognize their right to it, but only +consults its own interests. + +Now, sir, this is the real character of the government of the United +States, as it is of all other _lawmaking_ governments. There is not a +single human right, which the government of the United States recognises +as inviolable. It tramples upon any and every individual right, whenever +its own will, pleasure, or discretion shall so dictate. It takes men's +property, liberty, and lives whenever it can serve its own purposes by +doing so. + +All these things prove that the government does not exist at all for the +protection of men's _rights_; but that it absolutely denies to the +people any rights, or any liberty, whatever, except such as it shall see +fit to permit them to have for the time being. It virtually declares +that it does not itself exist at all for the good of the people, but +that the people exist solely for the use of the government. + +All these things prove that the government is not one voluntarily +established and sustained by the people, for the protection of their +natural, inherent, individual rights, but that it is merely a government +of usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who claim to own the people as their +slaves, and claim the right to dispose of them, and their property, at +their (the usurpers') pleasure or discretion. + +Now, sir, since you may be disposed to deny that such is the real +character of the government, I propose to prove it, by evidences so +numerous and conclusive that you cannot dispute them. + +My proposition, then, is, that there is not a single _natural_, human +right, that the government of the United States recognizes as +inviolable; that there is not a single _natural_, human right, that it +hesitates to trample under foot, whenever it thinks it can promote its +own interests by doing so. + +The proofs of this proposition are so numerous, that only a few of the +most important can here be enumerated. + +1. The government does not even recognize a man's natural right to his +own life. If it have need of him, for the maintenance of its power, it +takes him, against his will (conscripts him), and puts him before the +cannon's mouth, to be blown in pieces, as if he were a mere senseless +thing, having no more _rights_ than if he were a shell, a canister, or a +torpedo. It considers him simply as so much senseless war material, to +be consumed, expended, and destroyed for the maintenance of its power. +It no more recognizes his right to have anything to say in the matter, +than if he were but so much weight of powder or ball. It does not +recognize him at all as a human being, having any rights whatever of his +own, but only as an instrument, a weapon, or a machine, to be used in +killing other men. + +2. The government not only denies a man's right, as a moral human being, +to have any will, any judgment, or any conscience of his own, as to +whether he himself will be killed in battle, but it equally denies his +right to have any will, any judgment, or any conscience of his own, as a +moral human being, as to whether he shall be used as a mere weapon for +killing other men. If he refuses to kill any, or all, other men, whom it +commands him to kill, it takes his own life, as unceremoniously as if he +were but a dog. + +Is it possible to conceive of a more complete denial of all a man's +_natural_, _human_ rights, than is the denial of his right to have any +will, judgment, or conscience of his own, either as to his being killed +himself, or as to his being used as a mere weapon for killing other men? + +3. But in still another way, than by its conscriptions, the government +denies a man's right to any will, choice, judgment, or conscience of his +own, in regard either to being killed himself, or used as a weapon in +its hands for killing other people. + +If, in private life, a man enters into a perfectly voluntary agreement +to work for another, at some innocent and useful labor, for a day, a +week, a month, or a year, he cannot lawfully be compelled to fulfil that +contract; because such compulsion would be an acknowledgment of his +right to sell his own liberty. And this is what no one can do. + +This right of personal liberty is inalienable. No man can sell it, or +transfer it to another; or give to another any right of arbitrary +dominion over him. All contracts for such a purpose are absurd and void +contracts, that no man can rightfully be compelled to fulfil. + +But when a deluded or ignorant young man has once been enticed into a +contract to kill others, and to take his chances of being killed +himself, in the service of the government, for any given number of +years, the government holds that such a contract to sell his liberty, +his judgment, his conscience, and his life, is a valid and binding +contract; and that if he fails to fulfil it, he may rightfully be shot. + +All these things prove that the government recognizes no right of the +individual, to his own life, or liberty, or to the exercise of his own +will, judgment, or conscience, in regard to his killing his fellow-men, +or to being killed himself, if the government sees fit to use him as +mere war material, in maintaining its arbitrary dominion over other +human beings. + +4. The government recognizes no such thing as any _natural_ right of +property, on the part of individuals. + +This is proved by the fact that it takes, for its own uses, any and +every man's property--when it pleases, and as much of it as it +pleases--without obtaining, or even asking, his consent. + +This taking of a man's property, without his consent, is a denial of his +right of property; for the right of property is the right of supreme, +absolute, and irresponsible dominion over anything that is naturally a +subject of property,--that is, of ownership. _It is a right against all +the world._ And this right of property--this right of supreme, absolute, +and irresponsible dominion over anything that is naturally a subject of +ownership--is subject only to this qualification, _viz._, that each man +must so use his own, as not to injure another. + +If A uses his own property so as to injure the person or property of B, +his own property may rightfully be taken to any extent that is necessary +to make reparation for the wrong he has done. + +This is the only qualification to which the _natural_ right of property +is subject. + +When, therefore, a government takes a man's property, for its own +support, or for its own uses, without his consent, it practically denies +his right of property altogether; for it practically asserts that _its_ +right of dominion is superior to his. + +No man can be said to have any right of property at all, in any +thing--that is, any right of supreme, absolute, and irresponsible +dominion over any thing--of which any other men may rightfully deprive +him at their pleasure. + +Now, the government of the United States, in asserting its right to take +at pleasure the property of individuals, without their consent, +virtually denies their right of property altogether, because it asserts +that _its_ right of dominion over it, is superior to theirs. + +5. The government denies the _natural_ right of human beings to live on +this planet. This it does by denying their _natural_ right to those +things that are indispensable to the maintenance of life. It says that, +for every thing necessary to the maintenance of life, they must have a +special permit from the government; and that the government cannot be +required to grant them any other means of living than it chooses to +grant them. + +All this is shown as follows, _viz._: + +The government denies the _natural_ right of individuals to take +possession of wilderness land, and hold and cultivate it for their own +subsistence. + +It asserts that wilderness land is the property of the government; and +that individuals have no right to take possession of, or cultivate, it, +unless by special grant of the government. And if an individual attempts +to exercise this natural right, the government punishes him as a +trespasser and a criminal. + +The government has no more right to claim the ownership of wilderness +lands, than it has to claim the ownership of the sunshine, the water, or +the atmosphere. And it has no more right to punish a man for taking +possession of wilderness land, and cultivating it, without the consent +of the government, than it has to punish him for breathing the air, +drinking the water, or enjoying the sunshine, without a special grant +from the government. + +In thus asserting the government's right of property in wilderness land, +and in denying men's right to take possession of and cultivate it, +except on first obtaining a grant from the government,--which grant the +government may withhold if it pleases,--the government plainly denies +the _natural_ right of men to live on this planet, by denying their +_natural_ right to the means that are indispensable to their procuring +the food that is necessary for supporting life. + +In asserting its right of arbitrary dominion over that natural wealth +that is indispensable to the support of human life, it asserts its right +to withhold that wealth from those whose lives are dependent upon it. In +this way it denies the _natural_ right of human beings to live on the +planet. It asserts that government owns the planet, and that men have no +right to live on it, except by first getting a permit from the +government. + +This denial of men's _natural_ right to take possession of and cultivate +wilderness land is not altered at all by the fact that the government +consents to sell as much land as it thinks it expedient or profitable to +sell; nor by the fact that, in certain cases, it gives outright certain +lands to certain persons. Notwithstanding these sales and gifts, the +fact remains that the government claims the original ownership of the +lands; and thus denies the _natural_ right of individuals to take +possession of and cultivate them. In denying this _natural_ right of +individuals, it denies their _natural_ right to live on the earth; and +asserts that they have no other right to life than the government, by +its own mere will, pleasure, and discretion, may see fit to grant them. + +In thus denying man's _natural_ right to life, it of course denies every +other _natural_ right of human beings; and asserts that they have no +_natural_ right to anything; but that, for all other things, as well as +for life itself, they must depend wholly upon the good pleasure and +discretion of the government. + + + SECTION XIII. + +In still another way, the government denies men's _natural_ right to +life. And that is by denying their _natural_ right to make any of those +contracts with each other, for buying and selling, borrowing and +lending, giving and receiving, property, which are necessary, if men are +to exist in any considerable numbers on the earth. + +Even the few savages, who contrive to live, mostly or wholly, by +hunting, fishing, and gathering wild fruits, without cultivating the +earth, and almost wholly without the use of tools or machinery, are yet, +_at times_, necessitated to buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and +receive, articles of food, if no others, as their only means of +preserving their lives. But, in civilized life, where but a small +portion of men's labor is necessary for the production of food, and they +employ themselves in an almost infinite variety of industries, and in +the production of an almost infinite variety of commodities, it would be +impossible for them to live, if they were wholly prohibited from buying +and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, the products +of each other's labor. + +Yet the government of the United States--either acting separately, or +jointly with the State governments--has heretofore constantly denied, +and still constantly denies, the _natural_ right of the people, _as +individuals_, to make their own contracts, for such buying and selling, +borrowing and lending, and giving and receiving, such commodities as +they produce for each other's uses. + +I repeat that both the national and State governments have constantly +denied the _natural_ right of individuals to make their own contracts. +They have done this, sometimes by arbitrarily forbidding them to make +particular contracts, and sometimes by arbitrarily qualifying the +obligation of particular contracts, when the contracts themselves were +naturally and intrinsically as just and lawful as any others that men +ever enter into; and were, consequently, such as men have as perfect a +_natural_ right to make, as they have to make any of those contracts +which they are permitted to make. + +The laws arbitrarily prohibiting, or arbitrarily qualifying, certain +contracts, that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful, are so +numerous, and so well known, that they need not all be enumerated here. +But any and all such prohibitions, or qualifications, are a denial of +men's _natural_ right to make their own contracts. They are a denial of +men's right to make any contracts whatever, except such as the +governments shall see fit to permit them to make. + +It is the _natural_ right of any and all human beings, who are mentally +competent to make reasonable contracts, to make any and every possible +contract, that is naturally and intrinsically just and honest, for +buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving and receiving, any and +all possible commodities, that are naturally vendible, loanable, and +transferable, and that any two or more individuals may, at any time, +without force or fraud, choose to buy and sell, borrow and lend, give +and receive, of and to each other. + +And it is plainly only by the untrammelled exercise of this _natural_ +right, that all the loanable capital, that is required by men's +industries, can be lent and borrowed, or that all the money can be +supplied for the purchase and sale of that almost infinite diversity and +amount of commodities, that men are capable of producing, and that are +to be transferred from the hands of the producers to those of the +consumers. + +But the government of the United States--and also the governments of the +States--utterly deny the _natural_ right of any individuals whatever to +make any contracts whatever, for buying and selling, borrowing and +lending, giving and receiving, any and all such commodities, as are +naturally vendible, loanable, and transferable, and as the producers and +consumers of such commodities may wish to buy and sell, borrow and lend, +give and receive, of and to each other. + +These governments (State and national) deny this _natural_ right of +buying and selling, etc., by arbitrarily prohibiting, or qualifying, all +such, and so many, of these contracts, as they choose to prohibit, or +qualify. + +The prohibition, or qualification, of _any one_ of these contracts--that +are intrinsically just and lawful--is a denial of all individual +_natural_ right to make any of them. For the right to make any and all +of them stands on the same grounds of _natural_ law, natural justice, +and men's natural rights. If a government has the right to prohibit, or +qualify, any one of these contracts, it has the same right to prohibit, +or qualify, all of them. Therefore the assertion, by the government, of +a right to prohibit, or qualify, any one of them, is equivalent to a +denial of all _natural_ right, on the part of individuals, to make any +of them. + +The power that has been thus usurped by governments, to arbitrarily +prohibit or qualify all contracts that are naturally and intrinsically +just and lawful, has been the great, perhaps the greatest, of all the +instrumentalities, by which, in this, as in other countries, nearly all +the wealth, accumulated by the labor of the many, has been, and is now, +transferred into the pockets of the few. + +_It is by this arbitrary power over contracts, that the monopoly of +money is sustained._ Few people have any real perception of the power, +which this monopoly gives to the holders of it, over the industry and +traffic of all other persons. And the one only purpose of the monopoly +is to enable the holders of it to rob everybody else in the prices of +their labor, and the products of their labor. + +The theory, on which the advocates of this monopoly attempt to justify +it, is simply this: _That it is not at all necessary that money should +be a bona fide equivalent of the labor or property that is to be bought +with it;_ that if the government will but specially license a small +amount of money, and prohibit all other money, the holders of the +licensed money will then be able to buy with it the labor and property +of all other persons for a half, a tenth, a hundredth, a thousandth, or +a millionth, of what such labor and property are really and truly worth. + +David A. Wells, one of the most prominent--perhaps at this time, the +most prominent--advocate of the monopoly, in this country, states the +theory thus: + + A three-cent piece, if it could be divided into a sufficient + number of pieces, with each piece capable of being handled, + would undoubtedly suffice for doing all the business of the + country in the way of facilitating exchanges, if no other + better instrumentality was available.--_New York Herald, + February 13, 1875._ + +He means here to say, that "a three-cent piece" contains _as much real, +true, and natural market value_, as it would be necessary that all the +money of the country should have, _if the government would but prohibit +all other money_; that is, if the government, by its arbitrary +legislative power, would but make all other and better money +unavailable. + +And this is the theory, on which John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, +David Ricardo, J. R. McCulloch, and John Stuart Mill, in England, and +Amasa Walker, Charles H. Carroll, Hugh McCulloch, in this country, and +all the other conspicuous advocates of the monopoly, both in this +country and in England, have attempted to justify it. They have all held +that it was not necessary that money should be a _bona fide_ equivalent +of the labor or property to be bought with it; but that, by the +prohibition of all other money, the holders of a comparatively worthless +amount of licensed money would be enabled to buy, at their own prices, +the labor and property of all other men. + +And this is the theory on which the governments of England and the +United States have always, with immaterial exceptions, acted, in +prohibiting all but such small amounts of money as they (the +governments) should specially license. _And it is the theory upon which +they act now._ And it is so manifestly a theory of pure robbery, that +scarce a word can be necessary to make it more evidently so than it now +is. + +But inasmuch as your mind seems to be filled with the wildest visions of +the excellency of this government, and to be strangely ignorant of its +wrongs; and inasmuch as this monopoly of money is, in its practical +operation, one of the greatest--possibly the greatest--of all these +wrongs, and the one that is most relied upon for robbing the great body +of the people, and keeping them in poverty and servitude, it is plainly +important that you should have your eyes opened on the subject. I +therefore submit, for your consideration, the following self-evident +propositions: + +1. That to make all traffic just and equal, it is indispensable that, in +each separate purchase and sale, the money paid should be a _bona fide_ +equivalent of the labor or property bought with it. + +Dare you, or any other man, of common sense and common honesty, dispute +the truth of that proposition? If not, let us consider that principle +established. It will then serve as one of the necessary and infallible +guides to the true settlement of all the other questions that remain to +be settled. + +2. That so long as no force or fraud is practised by either party, the +parties themselves, to each separate contract, have the sole, absolute, +and unqualified right to decide for themselves, _what money, and how +much of it_, shall be considered a _bona fide_ equivalent of the labor +or property that is to be exchanged for it. All this is necessarily +implied in the _natural_ right of men to make their own contracts, for +buying and selling their respective commodities. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +3. That any one man, who has an honest dollar, of any kind whatsoever, +has as perfect a right, as any other man can have, to offer it in the +market, in competition with any and all other dollars, in exchange for +such labor or property as may be in the market for sale. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +4. That where no fraud is practised, every person, who is mentally +competent to make reasonable contracts, must be presumed to be as +competent to judge of the value of the money that is offered in the +market, as he is to judge of the value of all the other commodities that +are bought and sold for money. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +5. That the free and open market, in which all honest money and all +honest commodities are free to be given and received in exchange for +each other, is the true, final, absolute, and only test of the true and +natural market value of all money, as of all the other commodities that +are bought and sold for money. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +6. That any prohibition, by a government, of any such kind or amount of +money--provided it be honest in itself--as the parties to contracts may +voluntarily agree to give and receive in exchange for labor or property, +is a palpable violation of their natural right to make their own +contracts, and to buy and sell their labor and property on such terms as +they may find to be necessary for the supply of their wants, or may +think most beneficial to their interests. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +7. That any government, that licenses a small amount of an article of +such universal necessity as money, and that gives the control of it into +a few hands, selected by itself, and then prohibits any and all other +money--that is intrinsically honest and valuable--palpably violates all +other men's natural right to make their own contracts, and infallibly +proves its purpose to be to enable the few holders of the licensed money +to rob all other persons in the prices of their labor and property. + +Will you dispute the truth of that proposition? + +Are not all these propositions so self-evident, or so easily +demonstrated, that they cannot, with any reason, be disputed? + +If you feel competent to show the falsehood of any one of them, I hope +you will attempt the task. + + + SECTION XIV. + +If, now, you wish to form some rational opinion of the extent of the +robbery practised in this country, by the holders of this monopoly of +money, you have only to look at the following facts. + +There are, in this country, I think, at least twenty-five millions of +persons, male and female, sixteen years old, and upwards, mentally and +physically capable of running machinery, producing wealth, and supplying +their own needs for an independent and comfortable subsistence. + +To make their industry most effective, and to enable them, +_individually_, to put into their own pockets as large a portion as +possible of their own earnings, they need, _on an average_, one thousand +dollars each of _money capital_. Some need one, two, three, or five +hundred dollars, others one, two, three, or five thousand. These +persons, then, need, _in the aggregate_, twenty-five thousand millions +of dollars ($25,000,000,000), of money capital. + +They need all this _money capital_ to enable them to buy the raw +materials upon which to bestow their labor, the implements and machinery +with which to labor, and their means of subsistence while producing +their goods for the market. + +Unless they can get this capital, they must all either work at a +disadvantage, or not work at all. A very large portion of them, to save +themselves from starvation, have no alternative but to sell their labor +to others, at just such prices these others choose to pay. And these +others choose to pay only such prices as are far below what the laborers +could produce, if they themselves had the necessary capital to work +with. + +But this needed capital your lawmakers arbitrarily forbid them to have; +and for no other reason than to reduce them to the condition of +servants; and subject them to all such extortions as their +employers--the holders of the privileged money--may choose to practise +upon them. + +If, now, you ask me where these twenty-five thousand millions of dollars +of money capital, which these laborers need, are to come from, I answer: + +_Theoretically_, there are, in this country, fifty thousand millions of +dollars of money capital ($50,000,000,000)--or twice as much as I have +supposed these laborers to need--NOW LYING IDLE! _And it is lying idle, +solely because the circulation of it, as money, is prohibited by the +lawmakers._ + +If you ask how this can be, I will tell you. + +_Theoretically,_ every dollar's worth of material property, that is +capable of being taken by law, and applied to the payment of the owner's +debts, is capable of being represented by a promissory note, that shall +circulate as money. + +But taking all this material property at _only half_ its actual value, +it is still capable of supplying the twenty-five thousand millions of +dollars--or one thousand dollars each--which these laborers need. + +Now, we know--because experience has taught us--that _solvent_ +promissory notes, made payable in coin on demand, are the best money +that mankind have ever had; (although probably not the best they ever +will have). + +To make a note solvent, and suitable for circulation as money, it is +only necessary that it should be made payable in coin on demand, and be +issued by a person, or persons, who are known to have in their hands +abundant material property, that can be taken by law, and applied to the +payment of the note, with all costs and damages for non-payment on +demand. + +_Theoretically,_ I repeat, all the material property in the country, +that can be taken by law, and applied to the payment of debt can be used +as banking capital; and be represented by promissory notes, made payable +in coin on demand. And, _practically_, so much of it can be used as +banking capital as may be required for supplying all the notes that can +be kept in circulation as money. + +Although these notes are made legally payable in coin on demand, it is +seldom that such payment is demanded, _if only it be publicly known that +the notes are solvent_: that is, if it be publicly known that they are +issued by persons who have so much material property, that can be taken +by law, and sold, as may be necessary to bring the coin that is needed +to pay the notes. In such cases, the notes are preferred to the coin, +because they are so much more safe and convenient for handling, +counting, and transportation, than is the coin; and also because we can +have so many times more of them. + +These notes are also a legal tender, to the banks that issue them, in +payment of the notes discounted; that is, in payment of the notes given +by the borrowers to the banks. And, in the ordinary course of things, +_all_ the notes, issued by the banks for circulation, are wanted, and +come back to the banks, in payment of the notes discounted; thus saving +all necessity for redeeming them with coin, except in rare cases. For +meeting these rare cases, the banks find it necessary to keep on hand +small amounts of coin; probably not more than one per cent. of the +amount of notes in circulation. + +As the notes discounted have usually but a short time to run,--say three +months on an average,--the bank notes issued for circulation will _all_ +come back, _on an average_, once in three months, and be redeemed by the +bankers, by being accepted in payment of the notes discounted. + +Then the bank notes will be re-issued, by discounting new notes, and +will go into circulation again; to be again brought back, at the end of +another three months, and redeemed, by being accepted in payment of the +new notes discounted. + +In this way the bank notes will be continually re-issued, and redeemed, +in the greatest amounts that can be kept in circulation long enough to +earn such an amount of interest as will make it an object for the +bankers to issue them. + +Each of these notes, issued for circulation, if known to be solvent, +will always have the same value in the market, as the same nominal +amount of coin. And this value is a just one, because the notes are in +the nature of a lien, or mortgage, upon so much property of the bankers +as is necessary to pay the notes, and as can be taken by law, and sold, +and the proceeds applied to their payment. + +There is no danger that any more of these notes will be issued than will +be wanted for buying and selling property at its true and natural market +value, relatively to coin; for as the notes are all made legally payable +in coin on demand, if they should ever fall below the value of coin in +the market, the holders of them will at once return them to the banks, +and demand coin for them; _and thus take them out of circulation_. + +The bankers, therefore, have no motive for issuing more of them than +will remain long enough in circulation, to earn so much interest as will +make it an object to issue them; the only motive for issuing them being +to draw interest on them while they are in circulation. + +The bankers readily find how many are wanted for circulation, by the +time those issued remain in circulation, before coming back for +redemption. If they come back immediately, or very quickly, after being +issued, the bankers know that they have over-issued, and that they must +therefore pay in coin--to their inconvenience and perhaps loss--notes +that would otherwise have remained in circulation long enough to earn so +much interest as would have paid for issuing them; and would then have +come back to them in payment of notes discounted, instead of coming back +on a demand for redemption in coin. + +Now, the best of all possible banking capital is real estate. It is the +best, because it is visible, immovable, and indestructible. It cannot, +like coin, be removed, concealed, or carried out of the country. And its +aggregate value, in all civilized countries, is probably a hundred times +greater than the amount of coin in circulation. It is therefore capable +of furnishing a hundred times as much money as we can have in coin. + +The owners of this real estate have the greatest inducements to use it +as banking capital, because all the banking profit, over and above +expenses, is a clear profit; inasmuch as the use of the real estate as +banking capital does not interfere at all with its use for other +purposes. + +Farmers have a double, and much more than a double, inducement to use +their lands as banking capital; because they not only get a direct +profit from the loan of their notes, but, by loaning them, they furnish +the necessary capital for the greatest variety of manufacturing +purposes. They thus induce a much larger portion of the people, than +otherwise would, to leave agriculture, and engage in mechanical +employments; and thus become purchasers, instead of producers, of +agricultural commodities. They thus get much higher prices for their +agricultural products, and also a much greater variety and amount of +manufactured commodities in exchange. + +The amount of money, capable of being furnished by this system, is so +great that every man, woman, and child, who is worthy of credit, could +get it, and do business for himself, or herself--either singly, or in +partnerships--and be under no necessity to act as a servant, or sell his +or her labor to others. All the great establishments, of every kind, now +in the hands of a few proprietors, but employing a great number of wage +laborers, would be broken up; for few, or no persons, who could hire +capital, and do business for themselves, would consent to labor for +wages for another. + +The credit furnished by this system would always be stable; for the +system is probably capable of furnishing, _at all times_, all the +credit, and all the money, that can be needed. It would also introduce a +substantially universal system of cash payments. Everybody, who could +get credit at all, would be able to get it at a bank, _in money_. With +the money, he would buy everything he needed for cash. He would also +sell everything for cash; for when everybody buys for cash, everybody +sells for cash; since buying for cash, and selling for cash, are +necessarily one and the same thing. + +We should, therefore, never have another crisis, panic, revulsion of +credit, stagnation of industry, or fall of prices; for these are all +caused by the lack of money, and the consequent necessity of buying and +selling on credit; whereby the amount of indebtedness becomes so great, +so enormous, in fact, in proportion to the amount of money extant, with +which to meet it, that the whole system of credit breaks down; to the +ruin of everybody, except the few holders of the monopoly of money, who +reap a harvest in the fall of prices, and the consequent bankruptcy of +everybody who is dependent on credit for his means of doing business. + +It would be inadmissible for me, in this letter, to occupy the space +that would be necessary, to expose all the false, absurd, and ridiculous +pretences, by which the advocates of the monopoly of money have +attempted to justify it. The only real argument they ever employed has +been that, by means of the monopoly, the few holders of it were enabled +to rob everybody else in the prices of their labor and property. + +And our governments, State and national, have hitherto acted together in +maintaining this monopoly, in flagrant violation of men's natural right +to make their own contracts, and in flagrant violation of the +self-evident truth, that, to make all traffic just and equal, it is +indispensable that the money paid should be, in all cases, a _bona fide_ +equivalent of the labor or property that is bought with it. + +The holders of this monopoly now rule and rob this nation; and the +government, in all its branches, is simply their tool. And being their +tool for this gigantic robbery, it is equally their tool for all the +lesser robberies, to which it is supposed that the people at large can +be made to submit. + + + SECTION XV. + +But although the monopoly of money is one of the most glaring violations +of men's natural right to make their own contracts, and one of the most +effective--perhaps _the_ most effective--for enabling a few men to rob +everybody else, and for keeping the great body of the people in poverty +and servitude, it is not the only one that our government practises, nor +the only one that has the same robbery in view. + +The so-called taxes or duties, which the government levies upon imports, +are a practical violation both of men's natural right of property, and +of their natural right to make their own contracts. + +A man has the same _natural_ right to traffic with another, who lives on +the opposite side of the globe, as he has to traffic with his next-door +neighbor. And any obstruction, price, or penalty, interposed by the +government, to the exercise of that right, is a practical violation of +the right itself. + +The ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. of a man's property, which is taken +from him, for the reason that he purchased it in a foreign country, must +be considered either as the price he is required to pay for the +_privilege_ of buying property in that country, or else as a penalty for +having exercised his _natural right_ of buying it in that country. +Whether it be considered as a price paid for a privilege, or a penalty +for having exercised a natural right, it is a violation both of his +natural right of property, and of his natural right to make a contract +in that country. + +In short, it is nothing but downright robbery. + +And when a man seeks to avoid this robbery, by evading the government +robbers who are lying in wait for him,--that is, the so-called revenue +officers,--whom he has as perfect a right to evade, as he has to evade +any other robbers, who may be lying in wait for him,--the seizure of his +whole property,--instead of the ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. that +would otherwise have been taken from him,--is not merely adding so much +to the robbery itself, but is adding insult to the robbery. It is +punishing a man as a criminal, for simply trying to save his property +from robbers. + +But it will be said that these taxes or duties are laid to raise revenue +for the support of the government. + +Be it so, for the sake of the argument. All taxes, levied upon a man's +property for the support of government, without his consent, are mere +robbery; a violation of his natural right of property. And when a +government takes ten, twenty, or fifty per cent. of a man's property, +for the reason that he bought it in a foreign country, such taking is as +much a violation of his natural right of property, or of his natural +right to purchase property, as is the taking of property which he has +himself produced, or which he has bought in his own village. + +A man's natural right of property, in a commodity he has bought in a +foreign country, is intrinsically as sacred and inviolable as it is in a +commodity produced at home. The foreign commodity is bought with the +commodity produced at home; and therefore stands on the same footing as +the commodity produced at home. And it is a plain violation of one's +right, for a government to make any distinction between them. + +Government assumes to exist for the impartial protection of all rights +of property. If it really exists for that purpose, it is plainly bound +to make each kind of property pay its proper proportion, and only its +proper proportion, of the cost of protecting all kinds. To levy upon a +few kinds the cost of protecting all, is a naked robbery of the holders +of those few kinds, for the benefit of the holders of all other kinds. + +But the pretence that heavy taxes are levied upon imports, solely, or +mainly, for the support of government, while light taxes, or no taxes at +all, are levied upon property at home, is an utterly false pretence. +They are levied upon the imported commodity, mainly, if not solely, for +the purpose of enabling the producers of competing home commodities to +extort from consumers a higher price than the home commodities would +bring in free and open market. And this additional price is sheer +robbery, and is known to be so. And the amount of this robbery--which +goes into the pockets of the home producers--is five, ten, twenty, or +fifty times greater than the amount that goes into the treasury, for the +support of the government, according as the amount of the home +commodities is five, ten, twenty, or fifty times greater than the amount +of the imported competing commodities. + +Thus the amounts that go to the support of the government, and also the +amounts that go into the pockets of the home producers, in the higher +prices they get for their goods, are all sheer robberies; and nothing +else. + +But it will be said that the heavy taxes are levied upon the foreign +commodity, not to put great wealth into a few pockets, but "_to protect +the home laborer against the competition of the pauper labor of other +countries_." + +This is the great argument that is relied on to justify the robbery. + +This argument must have originated with the employers of home labor, and +not with the home laborers themselves. + +The home laborers themselves could never have originated it, because +they must have seen that, so far as they were concerned, the object of +the "protection," so-called, was, _at best_, only to benefit them, by +robbing others who were as poor as themselves, and who had as good a +right as themselves to live by their labor. That is, they must have seen +that the object of the "protection" was to rob the foreign laborers, in +whole, or in part, of the pittances on which they were already +necessitated to live; and, secondly, to rob consumers at home,--in the +increased prices of the protected commodities,--when many or most of +these home consumers were also laborers as poor as themselves. + +Even if any class of laborers would have been so selfish and dishonest +as to wish to thus benefit themselves by injuring others, as poor as +themselves, they could have had no hope of carrying through such a +scheme, if they alone were to profit by it; because they could have had +no such influence with governments, as would be necessary to enable them +to carry it through, in opposition to the rights and interests of +consumers, both rich and poor, and much more numerous than themselves. + +For these reasons it is plain that the argument originated with the +employers of home labor, and not with the home laborers themselves. + +And why do the employers of home labor advocate this robbery? Certainly +not because they have such an intense compassion for their own laborers, +that they are willing to rob everybody else, rich and poor, for their +benefit. Nobody will suspect them of being influenced by any such +compassion as that. But they advocate it solely because they put into +their own pockets a very large portion certainly--probably +three-fourths, I should judge--of the increased prices their commodities +are thus made to bring in the market. The home laborers themselves +probably get not more than one-fourth of these increased prices. + +Thus the argument for "protection" is really an argument for robbing +foreign laborers--as poor as our own--of their equal and rightful +chances in our markets; and also for robbing all the home consumers of +the protected article--the poor as well as the rich--in the prices they +are made to pay for it. And all this is done at the instigation, and +principally for the benefit, of the employers of home labor, and not for +the benefit of home laborers themselves. + +Having now seen that this argument--of "protecting our home laborers +against the competition of the pauper labor of other countries"--is, of +itself, an utterly dishonest argument; that it is dishonest towards +foreign laborers and home consumers; that it must have originated with +the employers of home labor, and not with the home laborers themselves; +and that the employers of home labor, and not the home laborers +themselves, are to receive the principal profits of the robbery, let us +now see how utterly false is the argument itself. + +1. The pauper laborers (if there are any such) of other countries have +just as good a right to live by their labor, and have an equal chance in +our own markets, and in all the markets of the world, as have the pauper +laborers, or any other laborers, of our own country. + +Every human being has the same natural right to buy and sell, of and to, +any and all other people in the world, as he has to buy and sell, of and +to, the people of his own country. And none but tyrants and robbers deny +that right. And they deny it for their own benefit solely, and not for +the benefit of their laborers. + +And if a man, in our own country--either from motives of profit to +himself, or from motives of pity towards the pauper laborers of other +countries--_chooses_ to buy the products of the foreign pauper labor, +rather than the products of the laborers of his own country, he has a +perfect legal right to do so. And for any government to forbid him to do +so, or to obstruct his doing so, or to punish him for doing so, is a +violation of his natural right of purchasing property of whom he +pleases, and from such motives as he pleases. + +2. To forbid our own people to buy in the best markets, is equivalent to +forbidding them to sell the products of their own labor in the best +markets; for they can buy the products of foreign labor, only by giving +the products of their own labor in exchange. Therefore to deny our right +to buy in foreign markets, is to forbid us to sell in foreign markets. +And this is a plain violation of men's natural rights. + +If, when a producer of cotton, tobacco, grain, beef, pork, butter, +cheese, or any other commodity, in our own country, has carried it +abroad, and exchanged it for iron or woolen goods, and has brought these +latter home, the government seizes one-half of them, because they were +manufactured abroad, the robbery committed upon the owner is the same as +if the government had seized one-half of his cotton, tobacco, or other +commodity, before he exported it; because the iron or woolen goods, +which he purchased abroad with the products of his own home labor, are +as much his own property, as was the commodity with which he purchased +them. + +Therefore the tax laid upon foreign commodities, that have been bought +with the products of our home labor, is as much a robbery of the home +laborer, as the same tax would have been, if laid directly upon the +products of our home labor. It is, at best, only a robbery of one home +laborer--the producer of cotton, tobacco, grain, beef, pork, butter, or +cheese--for the benefit of another home laborer--the producer of iron or +woolen goods. + +3. But this whole argument is a false one, for the further reason that +our home laborers do not have to compete with "_the pauper labor_" of +any country on earth; since the _actual paupers_ of no country on earth +are engaged in producing commodities for export to any other country. +They produce few, or no, other commodities than those they themselves +consume; and ordinarily not even those. + +There are a great many millions of _actual paupers_ in the world. In +some of the large provinces of British India, for example, it is said +that nearly half the population are paupers. But I think that the +commodities they are producing for export to other countries than their +own, have never been heard of. + +The term, "pauper labor," is therefore a false one. And when these +robbers--the employers of home labor--talk of protecting their laborers +against the competition of "_the pauper labor_" of other countries, they +do not mean that they are protecting them against the competition of +_actual paupers_; but only against the competition of that immense body +of laborers, in all parts of the world, _who are kept constantly on the +verge of pauperism, or starvation_; who have little, or no, means of +subsistence, except such as their employers see fit to give them,--which +means are usually barely enough to keep them in a condition to labor. + +These are the only "pauper laborers," from whose competition our own +laborers are sought to be protected. They are quite as badly off as our +own laborers; and are in equal need of "protection." + +What, then, is to be done? This policy of excluding foreign commodities +from our markets, is a game that all other governments can play at, as +well as our own. And if it is the duty of our government to "protect" +our laborers against the competition of "the pauper labor," so-called, +of all other countries, it is equally the duty of every other government +to "protect" its laborers against the competition of the so-called +"pauper labor" of all other countries. So that, according to this +theory, each nation must either shut out entirely from its markets the +products of all other countries; or, at least, lay such heavy duties +upon them, as will, _in some measure_, "protect" its own laborers from +the competition of the "pauper labor" of all other countries. + +This theory, then, is that, instead of permitting all mankind to supply +each other's wants, by freely exchanging their respective products with +each other, the government of each nation should rob the people of every +other, by imposing heavy duties upon all commodities imported from them. + +The natural effect of this scheme is to pit the so-called "pauper labor" +of each country against the so-called "pauper labor" of every other +country; and all for the benefit of their employers. And as it holds +that so-called "pauper labor" is cheaper than free labor, it gives the +employers in each country a constant motive for reducing their own +laborers to the lowest condition of poverty, consistent with their +ability to labor at all. In other words, the theory is, that the smaller +the portion of the products of labor, that is given to the laborers, the +larger will be the portion that will go into the pockets of the +employers. + +Now, it is not a very honorable proceeding for any government to pit its +own so-called "pauper laborers"--or laborers that are on the verge of +pauperism--against similar laborers in all other countries: and all for +the sake of putting the principal proceeds of their labor into the +pockets of a few employers. + +To set two bodies of "pauper laborers"--or of laborers on the verge of +pauperism--to robbing each other, for the profit of their employers, is +the next thing, in point of atrocity, to setting them to killing each +other, as governments have heretofore been in the habit of doing, for +the benefit of their rulers. + +The laborers, who are paupers, or on the verge of pauperism--who are +destitute, or on the verge of destitution--comprise (with their +families) doubtless nine-tenths, probably nineteen-twentieths, of all +the people on the globe. They are not all wage laborers. Some of them +are savages, living only as savages do. Others are barbarians, living +only as barbarians do. But an immense number are mere wage laborers. +Much the larger portion of these have been reduced to the condition of +wage laborers, by the monopoly of land, which mere bands of robbers have +succeeded in securing for themselves by military power. This is the +condition of nearly all the Asiatics, and of probably one-half the +Europeans. But in those portions of Europe and the United States, where +manufactures have been most extensively introduced, and where, by +science and machinery, great wealth has been created, the laborers have +been kept in the condition of wage laborers, principally, if not wholly, +by the monopoly of money. This monopoly, established in all these +manufacturing countries, has made it impossible for the manufacturing +laborers to hire the money capital that was necessary to enable them to +do business for themselves; and has consequently compelled them to sell +their labor to the monopolists of money, for just such prices as these +latter should choose to give. + +It is, then, by the monopoly of land, and the monopoly of money, that +more than a thousand millions of the earth's inhabitants--as savages, +barbarians, and wage laborers--are kept in a state of destitution, or on +the verge of destitution. Hundreds of millions of them are receiving, +for their labor, not more than three, five, or, at most, ten cents a +day. + +In western Europe, and in the United States, where, within the last +hundred and fifty years, machinery has been introduced, and where alone +any considerable wealth is now created, the wage laborers, although they +get so small a portion of the wealth they create, are nevertheless in a +vastly better condition than are the laboring classes in other parts of +the world. + +If, now, the employers of wage labor, in this country,--who are also the +monopolists of money,--and who are ostensibly so distressed lest their +own wage laborers should suffer from the competition of the pauper labor +of other countries,--have really any of that humanity, of which they +make such profession, they have before them a much wider field for the +display of it, than they seem to desire. That is to say, they have it in +their power, not only to elevate immensely the condition of the laboring +classes in this country, but also to set an example that will be very +rapidly followed in all other countries; and the result will be the +elevation of all oppressed laborers throughout the world. This they can +do, by simply abolishing the monopoly of money. The real producers of +wealth, with few or no exceptions, will then be able to hire all the +capital they need for their industries, and will do business for +themselves. They will also be able to hire their capital at very low +rates of interest; and will then put into their own pockets all the +proceeds of their labor, except what they pay as interest on their +capital. And this amount will be too small to obstruct materially their +rise to independence and wealth. + + + SECTION XVI. + +But will the monopolists of money give up their monopoly? Certainly not +voluntarily. They will do it only upon compulsion. They will hold on to +it as long as they own and control governments as they do now. And why +will they do so? Because to give up their monopoly would be to give up +their control of those great armies of servants--the wage laborers--from +whom all their wealth is derived, and whom they can now coerce by the +alternative of starvation, to labor for them at just such prices as they +(the monopolists of money) shall choose to pay. + +Now these monopolists of money have no plans whatever for making their +"capital," as they call it--that is, their money capital--_their +privileged money capital_--profitable to themselves, _otherwise than by +using it to employ other men's labor_. And they can keep control of +other men's labor only by depriving the laborers themselves of all other +means of subsistence. And they can deprive them of all other means of +subsistence only by putting it out of their power to hire the money that +is necessary to enable them to do business for themselves. And they can +put it out of their power to hire money, only by forbidding all other +men to lend them their credit, in the shape of promissory notes, to be +circulated as money. + +If the twenty-five or fifty thousand millions of loanable +capital--promissory notes--which, _in this country_, are now lying idle, +were permitted to be loaned, these wage laborers would hire it, and do +business for themselves, instead of laboring as servants for others; and +would of course retain in their own hands all the wealth they should +create, except what they should pay as interest for their capital. + +And what is true of this country, is true of every other where +civilization exists; for wherever civilization exists, land has value, +and can be used as banking capital, and be made to furnish all the +money that is necessary to enable the producers of wealth to hire the +capital necessary for their industries, and thus relieve them from their +present servitude to the few holders of privileged money. + +Thus it is that the monopoly of money is the one great obstacle to the +liberation of the laboring classes all over the world, and to their +indefinite progress in wealth. + +But we are now to show, more definitely, what relation this monopoly of +money is made to bear to the freedom of international trade; and why it +is that the holders of this monopoly, _in this country_, demand heavy +tariffs on imports, on the lying pretence of protecting our home labor +against the competition of the so-called pauper labor of other +countries. + +The explanation of the whole matter is as follows. + +1. The holders of the monopoly of money, in each country,--more +especially in the manufacturing countries like England, the United +States, and some others,--assume that the present condition of poverty, +for the great mass of mankind, all over the world, is to be perpetuated +forever; or at least for an indefinite period. From this assumption they +infer that, if free trade between all countries is to be allowed, the +so-called pauper labor of each country is to be forever pitted against +the so-called pauper labor of every other country. Hence they infer that +it is the duty of each government--or certainly of our government--to +protect the so-called pauper labor of our own country--that is, the +class of laborers who are constantly on the verge of pauperism--against +the competition of the so-called pauper labor of all other countries, by +such duties on imports as will secure to our own laborers a monopoly of +our own home market. + +This is, on the face of it, the most plausible argument--and almost, if +not really, the only argument--by which they now attempt to sustain +their restrictions upon international trade. + +If this argument is a false one, their whole case falls to the ground. +That it is a false one, will be shown hereafter. + +2. These monopolists of money assume that pauper labor, so-called, is +the cheapest labor in the world; and that therefore each nation, in +order to compete with the pauper labor of all other nations, must itself +have "cheap labor." In fact, "cheap labor" is, with them, the great +_sine qua non_ of all national industry. To compete with "cheap labor," +say they, we must have "cheap labor." This is, with them, a self-evident +proposition. And this demand for "cheap labor" means, of course, that +the laboring classes, in this country, must be kept, as nearly as +possible, on a level with the so-called pauper labor of all other +countries. + +Thus their whole scheme of national industry is made to depend upon +"cheap labor." And to secure "cheap labor," they hold it to be +indispensable that the laborers shall be kept constantly either in +actual pauperism, or on the verge of pauperism. And, in this country, +they know of no way of keeping the laborers on the verge of pauperism, +but by retaining in their (the monopolists') own hands such a monopoly +of money as will put it out of the power of the laborers to hire money, +and do business for themselves; and thus compel them, by the alternative +of starvation, to sell their labor to the monopolists of money at such +prices as will enable them (the monopolists) to manufacture goods in +competition with the so-called pauper laborers of all other countries. + +Let it be repeated--as a vital proposition--that the whole industrial +programme of these monopolists rests upon, and implies, such a degree of +poverty, on the part of the laboring classes, as will put their labor in +direct competition with the so-called pauper labor of all other +countries. So long as they (the monopolists) can perpetuate this extreme +poverty of the laboring classes, in this country, they feel safe against +all foreign competition; for, in all other things than "cheap labor," we +have advantages equal to those of any other nation. + +Furthermore, this extreme poverty, in which the laborers are to be kept, +necessarily implies that they are to receive no larger share of the +proceeds of their own labor, than is necessary to keep them in a +condition to labor. It implies that their industry--which is really the +national industry--is not to be carried on at all for their own benefit, +but only for the benefit of their employers, the monopolists of money. +It implies that the laborers are to be mere tools and machines in the +hands of their employers; that they are to be kept simply in running +order, like other machinery; but that, beyond this, they are to have no +more rights, and no more interests, in the products of their labor, than +have the wheels, spindles, and other machinery, with which the work is +done. + +In short, this whole programme implies that the laborers--the real +producers of wealth--are not to be considered at all as human beings, +having rights and interests of their own; but only as tools and +machines, to be owned, used, and consumed in producing such wealth as +their employers--the monopolists of money--may desire for their own +subsistence and pleasure. + +What, then, is the remedy? Plainly it is to abolish the monopoly of +money. Liberate all this loanable capital--promissory notes--that is now +lying idle, and we liberate all labor, and furnish to all laborers all +the capital they need for their industries. We shall then have no +longer, all over the earth, the competition of pauper labor with pauper +labor, but only the competition of free labor with free labor. And from +this competition of free labor with free labor, no people on earth have +anything to fear, but all peoples have everything to hope. + +And why have all peoples everything to hope from the competition of free +labor with free labor? Because when every human being, who labors at +all, has, as nearly as possible, all the fruits of his labor, and all +the capital that is necessary to make his labor most effective, he has +all needed inducements to the best use of both his brains and his +muscles, his head and his hands. He applies both his head and his hands +to his work. He not only acquires, as far as possible, for his own use, +all the scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions, that are made +by others, but he himself makes scientific discoveries and mechanical +inventions. He thus multiplies indefinitely his powers of production. +And the more each one produces of his own particular commodity, the more +he can buy of every other man's products, and the more he can pay for +them. + +With freedom in money, the scientific discoveries and mechanical +inventions, made in each country, will not only be used to the utmost in +that country, but will be carried into all other countries. And these +discoveries and inventions, given by each country to every other, and +received by each country from every other, will be of infinitely more +value than all the material commodities that will be exchanged between +these countries. + +In this way each country contributes to the wealth of every other, and +the whole human race are enriched by the increased power and stimulus +given to each man's labor of body and mind. + +But it is to be kept constantly in mind, that there can be no such thing +as free labor, unless there be freedom in money; that is, unless +everybody, who can furnish money, shall be at liberty to do so. Plainly +labor cannot be free, unless the laborers are free to hire all the money +capital that is necessary for their industries. And they cannot be free +to hire all this money capital, unless all who can lend it to them, +shall be at liberty to do so. + +In short, labor cannot be free, unless each laborer is free to hire all +the capital--money capital, as well as all other capital--that he +honestly can hire; free to buy, wherever he can buy, all the raw +material he needs for his labor; and free to sell, wherever he can sell, +all the products of his labor. Therefore labor cannot be free, unless we +have freedom in money, and free trade with all mankind. + +We can now understand the situation. In the most civilized nations--such +as Western Europe and the United States--labor is utterly crippled, +robbed, and enslaved by the monopoly of money; and also, in some of +these countries, by the monopoly of land. In nearly or quite all the +other countries of the world, labor is not only robbed and enslaved, but +to a great extent paralyzed, by the monopoly of land, and by what may +properly be called the utter absence of money. There is, consequently, +in these latter countries, almost literally, no diversity of industry, +no science, no skill, no invention, no machinery, no manufactures, no +production, and no wealth; but everywhere miserable poverty, ignorance, +servitude, and wretchedness. + +In this country, and in Western Europe, where the uses of money are +known, there is no excuse to be offered for the monopoly of money. It is +maintained, in each of these countries, by a small knot of tyrants and +robbers, who have got control of the governments, and use their power +principally to maintain this monopoly; understanding, as they do, that +this one monopoly of money gives them a substantially absolute control +of all other men's property and labor. + +But not satisfied with this substantially absolute control of all other +men's property and labor, the monopolists of money, _in this +country_,--feigning great pity for their laborers, but really seeking +only to make their monopoly more profitable to themselves,--cry out for +protection against the competition of the pauper labor of all other +countries; when they alone, _and such as they_, are the direct cause of +all the pauper labor in the world. But for them, and others like them, +there would be neither poverty, ignorance, nor servitude on the face of +the earth. + +But to all that has now been said, the advocates of the monopoly of +money will say that, if all the material property of the country were +permitted to be represented by promissory notes, and these promissory +notes were permitted to be lent, bought, and sold as money, the laborers +would not be able to hire them, for the reason that they could not give +the necessary security for repayment. + +But let those who would say this, tell us why it is that, in order to +prevent men from loaning their promissory notes, for circulation as +money, it has always been necessary for governments to prohibit it, +either by penal enactments, or prohibitory taxation. These penal +enactments and prohibitory taxation are acknowledgments that, but for +them, the notes would be loaned to any extent that would be profitable +to the lenders. What this extent would be, nothing but experience of +freedom can determine. But freedom would doubtless give us ten, twenty, +most likely fifty, times as much money as we have now, if so much could +be kept in circulation. And laborers would at least have ten, twenty, or +fifty times better chances for hiring capital, than they have now. And, +furthermore, all labor and property would have ten, twenty, or fifty +times better chances of bringing their full value in the market, than +they have now. + +But in the space that is allowable in this letter, it is impossible to +say all, or nearly all, of what might be said, to show the justice, the +utility, or the necessity, for perfect freedom in the matters of money +and international trade. To pursue these topics further would exclude +other matters of great importance, as showing how the government acts +the part of robber and tyrant in all its legislation on contracts; and +that the whole purpose of all its acts is that the earnings of the many +may be put into the pockets of the few. + + + SECTION XVII. + +Although, as has already been said, the constitution is a paper that +nobody ever signed, that few persons have ever read, and that the great +body of the people never saw; and that has, consequently, no more claim +to be the supreme law of the land, or to have any authority whatever, +than has any other paper, that nobody ever signed, that few persons ever +read, and that the great body of the people never saw; and although it +purports to authorize a government, in which the lawmakers, judges, and +executive officers are all to be secured against any responsibility +whatever _to the people_, whose liberty and rights are at stake; and +although this government is kept in operation only by votes given in +secret (by secret ballot), and in a way to save the voters from all +personal responsibility for the acts of their agents--the lawmakers, +judges, etc.; and although the whole affair is so audacious a fraud and +usurpation, that no people could be expected to agree to it, or ought to +submit to it, for a moment; yet, inasmuch as the constitution declares +itself to have been ordained and established by the people of the United +States, for the maintenance of liberty and justice for themselves and +their posterity; and inasmuch as all its supporters--that is, the +voters, lawmakers, judges, etc.--profess to derive all their authority +from it; and inasmuch as all lawmakers, and all judicial and executive +officers, both national and State, swear to support it; and inasmuch as +they claim the right to kill, and are evidently determined to kill, and +esteem it the highest glory to kill, all who do not submit to its +authority; we might reasonably expect that, from motives of common +decency, if from no other, those who profess to administer it, would pay +some deference to its commands, _at least in those particular cases +where it explicitly forbids any violation of the natural rights of the +people_. + +Especially might we expect that the judiciary--whose courts claim to be +courts of justice--and who profess to be authorized and sworn to expose +and condemn all such violations of individual rights as the constitution +itself expressly forbids--would, in spite of all their official +dependence on, and responsibility to, the lawmakers, have sufficient +respect for their personal characters, and the opinions of the world, to +induce them to pay some regard to all those parts of the constitution +that expressly require any rights of the people to be held inviolable. + +If the judicial tribunals cannot be expected to do justice, even in +those cases where the constitution expressly commands them to do it, and +where they have solemnly sworn to do it, it is plain that they have sunk +to the lowest depths of servility and corruption, and can be expected to +do nothing but serve the purposes of robbers and tyrants. + +But how futile have been all expectations of justice from the judiciary, +may be seen in the conduct of the courts--and especially in that of the +so-called Supreme Court of the United States--in regard to men's natural +right to make their own contracts. + +Although the State lawmakers have, more frequently than the national +lawmakers, made laws in violation of men's natural right to make their +own contracts, yet all laws, State and national, having for their object +the destruction of that right, have always, without a single exception, +I think, received the sanction of the Supreme Court of the United +States. And having been sanctioned by that court, they have been, as a +matter of course, sanctioned by all the other courts, State and +national. And this work has gone on, until, if these courts are to be +believed, nothing at all is left of men's natural right to make their +own contracts. + +That such is the truth, I now propose to prove. + +And, first, as to the State governments. + +The constitution of the United States (_Art. 1, Sec. 10_) declares that: + + No State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of + contracts. + +This provision does not designate what contracts have, and what have +not, an "obligation." But it clearly presupposes, implies, assumes, and +asserts that there are contracts that _have_ an "obligation." Any State +law, therefore, which declares that such contracts shall have _no +obligation_, is plainly in conflict with this provision of the +constitution of the United States. + +This provision, also, by implying that there _are_ contracts, that +_have_ an "obligation," _necessarily implies that men have a right to +enter into them_; for if men had no right to enter into the contracts, +the contracts themselves could have no "obligation." + +This provision, then, of the constitution of the United States, not only +implies that there are contracts that _have_ an obligation, _but it also +implies that the people have the right to enter into all such contracts, +and have the benefit of them_. And "_any_" State "_law_," conflicting +with either of these implications, is necessarily unconstitutional and +void. + +Furthermore, the language of this provision of the constitution, to wit, +"the obligation [singular] of contracts" [plural], implies _that there +is one and the same "obligation" to all "contracts" whatsoever, that +have any legal obligation at all_. And there obviously must be some one +principle, that gives validity to all contracts alike, that have any +validity. + +The law, then, of this whole country, as established by the constitution +of the United States, is, that all contracts whatsoever, in which this +one principle of validity, or "obligation," is found, shall be held +valid; and that the States shall impose no restraint whatever upon the +people's entering into all such contracts. + +All, therefore, that courts have to do, in order to determine whether +any particular contract, or class of contracts, are valid, and _whether +the people have a right to enter into them_, is simply to determine +whether the contracts themselves have, or have not, this one principle +of validity, or "obligation," which the constitution of the United +States declares shall not be impaired. + +State legislation can obviously have nothing to do with the solution of +this question. It can neither create, nor destroy, that "obligation of +contracts," which the constitution forbids it to impair. It can neither +give, nor take away, the right to enter into any contract whatever, that +has that "obligation." + +On the supposition, then, that the constitution of the United States is, +what it declares itself to be, _viz._, "the supreme law of the land, ... +anything in the constitutions or laws of the States to the contrary +notwithstanding," this provision against "any" State "law impairing the +obligation of contracts," is so explicit, and so authoritative, that the +legislatures and courts of the States have no color of authority for +violating it. And the Supreme Court of the United States has had no +color of authority or justification for suffering it to be violated. + +This provision is certainly one of the most important--perhaps the most +important--of all the provisions of the constitution of the United +States, _as protective of the natural rights of the people to make their +own contracts, or provide for their own welfare_. + +Yet it has been constantly trampled under foot, by the State +legislatures, by all manner of laws, declaring who may, and who may not, +make certain contracts; and what shall, and what shall not, be "the +obligation" of particular contracts; thus setting at defiance all ideas +of justice, of natural rights, and equal rights; conferring monopolies +and privileges upon particular individuals, and imposing the most +arbitrary and destructive restraints and penalties upon others; all with +a view of putting, as far as possible, all wealth into the hands of the +few, and imposing poverty and servitude upon the great body of the +people. + +And yet all these enormities have gone on for nearly a hundred years, +and have been sanctioned, not only by all the State courts, but also by +the Supreme Court of the United States. + +And what color of excuse have any of these courts offered for thus +upholding all these violations of justice, of men's natural rights, and +even of that constitution which they had all sworn to support? + +They have offered only this: _They have all said they did not know what +"the obligation of contracts" was_! + +Well, suppose, for the sake of the argument, that they have not known +what "the obligation of contracts" was, what, then, was their duty? +Plainly this, to neither enforce, nor annul, any contract whatever, +until they should have discovered what "the obligation of contracts" +was. + +Clearly they could have no right to either enforce, or annul, any +contract whatever, until they should have ascertained whether it had any +"obligation," and, if any, what that "obligation" was. + +If these courts really do not know--as perhaps they do not--what "the +obligation of contracts" is, they deserve nothing but contempt for their +ignorance. If they _do_ know what "the obligation of contracts" is, and +yet sanction the almost literally innumerable laws that violate it, they +deserve nothing but detestation for their villainy. + +And until they shall suspend all their judgments for either enforcing, +or annulling, contracts, or, on the other hand, shall ascertain what +"the obligation of contracts" is, and sweep away all State laws that +impair it, they will deserve both contempt for their ignorance, and +detestation for their crimes. + +Individual Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States have, at +least in one instance, in 1827 (_Ogden vs. Saunders_, 12 Wheaton 213), +attempted to give a definition of "the obligation of contracts." But +there was great disagreement among them; and no one definition secured +the assent of the whole court, _or even of a majority_. Since then, so +far as I know, that court has never attempted to give a definition. And, +so far as the opinion of that court is concerned, the question is as +unsettled now, as it was sixty years ago. And the opinions of the +Supreme Courts of the States are equally unsettled with those of the +Supreme Court of the United States. The consequence is, that "the +obligation of contracts"--the principle on which the real validity, or +invalidity, of all contracts whatsoever depends--is practically unknown, +or at least unrecognized, by a single court, either of the States, or of +the United States. And, as a result, every species of absurd, corrupt, +and robber legislation goes on unrestrained, as it always has done. + +What, now, is the reason why not one of these courts has ever so far +given its attention to the subject as to have discovered what "the +obligation of contracts" is? What that principle is, I repeat, which +they have all sworn to sustain, and on which the real validity, or +invalidity, of every contract on which they ever adjudicate, depends? +Why is it that they have all gone on sanctioning and enforcing all the +nakedly iniquitous laws, by which men's natural right to make their own +contracts has been trampled under foot? + +Surely it is not because they do not know that all men have a natural +right to make their own contracts; for they know _that_, as well as they +know that all men have a natural right to live, to breathe, to move, to +speak, to hear, to see, or to do anything whatever for the support of +their lives, or the promotion of their happiness. + +Why, then, is it, that they strike down this right, without ceremony, +and without compunction, whenever they are commanded to do so by the +lawmakers? It is because, and solely because, they are so servile, +slavish, degraded, and corrupt, as to act habitually on the principle, +that justice and men's natural rights are matters of no importance, in +comparison with the commands of the impudent and tyrannical lawmakers, +on whom they are dependent for their offices and their salaries. It is +because, and solely because, they, like the judges under all other +irresponsible and tyrannical governments, are part and parcel of a +conspiracy for robbing and enslaving the great body of the people, to +gratify the luxury and pride of a few. It is because, and solely +because, they do not recognize our governments, State or national, as +institutions designed simply to maintain justice, or to protect all men +in the enjoyment of all their natural rights; but only as institutions +designed to accomplish such objects as irresponsible cabals of lawmakers +may agree upon. + +In proof of all this, I give the following. + +Previous to 1824, two cases had come up from the State courts, to the +Supreme Court of the United States, involving the question whether a +State law, _invalidating some particular contract_, came within the +constitutional prohibition of "any law impairing the obligation of +contracts." + +One of these cases was that of _Fletcher vs. Peck_, (6 _Cranch_ 87), in +the year 1810. In this case the court held simply that a grant of land, +once made by the legislature of Georgia, could not be rescinded by a +subsequent legislature. + +But no general definition of "the obligation of contracts" was given. + +Again, in the year 1819, in the case of _Dartmouth College vs. Woodward_ +(4 _Wheaton_ 518), the court held that a charter, granted to Dartmouth +College, by the king of England, before the Revolution, was a contract; +and that a law of New Hampshire, annulling, or materially altering, the +charter, without the consent of the trustees, was a "law impairing the +obligation" of _that_ contract. + +But, in this case, as in that of _Fletcher vs. Peck_, the court gave no +general definition of "the obligation of contracts." + +But in the year 1824, and again in 1827, in the case of _Ogden vs. +Saunders_ (12 _Wheaton_ 213) the question was, whether an insolvent law +of the State of New York, which discharged a debtor from a debt, +_contracted after the passage of the law_, or, as the courts would say, +"_contracted under the law_"--on his giving up his property to be +distributed among his creditors--was a "law impairing the obligation of +contracts?" + +To the correct decision of this case, it seemed indispensable that the +court should give a comprehensive, precise, and _universal_ definition +of "the obligation of contracts"; one by which it might forever after be +known what was, and what was not, that "obligation of contracts," which +the State governments were forbidden to "impair" by "_any law_" +whatever. + +The cause was heard at two terms, that of 1824, and that of 1827. + +It was argued by Webster, Wheaton, Wirt, Clay, Livingston, Ogden, Jones, +Sampson, and Haines; nine in all. Their arguments were so voluminous +that they could not be reported at length. Only summaries of them are +given. But these summaries occupy thirty-eight pages in the reports. + +The judges, at that time, were seven, _viz._, Marshall, Washington, +Johnson, Duvall, Story, Thompson, and Trimble. + +The judges gave five different opinions; occupying one hundred pages of +the reports. + +But no one definition of "the obligation of contracts" could be agreed +on; _not even by a majority_. + +Here, then, sixteen lawyers and judges--many of them among the most +eminent the country has ever had--were called upon to give their +opinions upon a question of the highest importance to all men's natural +rights, to all the interests of civilized society, and to the very +existence of civilization itself; a question, upon the answer to which +depended the real validity, or invalidity, of every contract that ever +was made, or ever will be made, between man and man. And yet, by their +disagreements, they all virtually acknowledged that they did not know +what "the obligation of contracts" was! + +But this was not all. Although they could not agree as to what "the +obligation of contracts" was, they did all agree that it could be +nothing which the State lawmakers could not prohibit and abolish, _by +laws passed before the contracts were made_. That is to say, they all +agreed that the State lawmakers had absolute power to prohibit all +contracts whatsoever, for buying and selling, borrowing and lending, +giving and receiving, property; and that, whenever they did prohibit any +particular contract, or class of contracts, _all such contracts, +thereafter made, could have no "obligation"_! + +They said this, be it noted, not of contracts that were naturally and +intrinsically criminal and void, but of contracts that were naturally +and intrinsically as just, and lawful, and useful, and necessary, as any +that men ever enter into; and that had as perfect a natural, intrinsic, +inherent "obligation," as any of those contracts, by which the traffic +of society is carried on, or by which men ever buy and sell, borrow and +lend, give and receive, property, of and to each other. + +Not one of these sixteen lawyers and judges took the ground that the +constitution, in forbidding any State to "pass any law impairing the +obligation of contracts," intended to protect, against the arbitrary +legislation of the States, the only true, real, and natural "obligation +of contracts," or the right of the people to enter into all really just, +and naturally obligatory contracts. + +Is it possible to conceive of a more shameful exhibition, or confession, +of the servility, the baseness, or the utter degradation, of both bar +and bench, than their refusal to say one word in favor of justice, +liberty, men's natural rights, or the natural, and only real, +"obligation" of their contracts? + +And yet, from that day to this--a period of sixty years, save +one--neither bar nor bench, so far as I know, have ever uttered one +syllable in vindication of men's natural right to make their own +contracts, or to have the only true, real, natural, inherent, intrinsic +"obligation" of their contracts respected by lawmakers or courts. + +Can any further proof be needed that all ideas of justice and men's +natural rights are absolutely banished from the minds of lawmakers, and +from so-called courts of justice? Or that absolute and irresponsible +lawmaking has usurped their place? + +Or can any further proof be needed, of the utter worthlessness of all +the constitutions, which these lawmakers and judges swear to support, +and profess to be governed by? + + +SECTION XVIII. + +If, now, it be asked, what is this constitutional "obligation of +contracts," which the States are forbidden to impair, the answer is, +that it is, and necessarily must be, the _natural_ obligation; or that +obligation, which contracts have, on principles of natural law, and +natural justice, as distinguished from any arbitrary or unjust +obligation, which lawmakers may assume to create, and attach to +contracts. + +This natural obligation is the only _one_ "obligation" which _all_ +obligatory contracts can be said to have. It is the only _inherent_ +"obligation," that any contract can be said to have. It is recognized +all over the world--at least as far as it is known--as the one only +_true_ obligation, that any, or all, contracts can have. And, so far as +it is known--it is held valid all over the world, except in those +exceptional cases, where arbitrary and tyrannical governments have +assumed to annul it, or substitute some other in its stead. + +The constitution assumes that this _one_ "obligation of contracts," +which it designs to protect, is the natural one, because it assumes that +it existed, _and was known_, at the time the constitution itself was +established; and certainly no _one_ "obligation," _other than the +natural one_, can be said to have been known, as applicable to all +obligatory contracts, at the time the constitution was established. +Unless, therefore, the constitution be presumed to have intended the +natural "obligation," it cannot be said to have intended any _one_ +"obligation" whatever; or, consequently, to have forbidden the violation +of any _one_ "obligation" whatever. + +It cannot be said that "the obligation," which the constitution designed +to protect was any arbitrary "obligation," that was unknown at the time +the constitution was established, but that was to be created, and made +known afterward; for then this provision of the constitution could have +had no effect, until such arbitrary "obligation" should have been +created, and made known. And as it gives us no information as to how, or +by whom, this arbitrary "obligation" was to be created, or what the +obligation itself was to be, or how it could ever be known to be the one +that was intended to be protected, the provision itself becomes a mere +nullity, having no effect to protect any "obligation" at all. + +It would be a manifest and utter absurdity to say that the constitution +intended to protect any "obligation" whatever, unless it be presumed to +have intended some particular "obligation," _that was known at the +time_; for that would be equivalent to saying that the constitution +intended to establish a law, of which no man could know the meaning. + +But this is not all. + +The right of property is a natural right. The only real right of +property, that is known to mankind, is the natural right. Men have also +a natural right to convey their natural rights of property from one +person to another. And there is no means known to mankind, by which this +_natural_ right of property can be transferred, or conveyed, by one man +to another, except by such contracts as are _naturally_ obligatory; that +is, naturally capable of conveying and binding the right of property. + +All contracts whatsoever, that are naturally capable, competent, and +sufficient to convey, transfer, and bind the natural right of property, +are naturally obligatory; and really and truly do convey, transfer, and +bind such rights of property as they purport to convey, transfer, and +bind. + +All the other modes, by which one man has ever attempted to acquire the +property of another, have been thefts, robberies, and frauds. But these, +of course, have never conveyed any real rights of property. + +To make any contract binding, obligatory, and effectual for conveying +and transferring rights of property, these three conditions only are +essential, _viz._, 1. That it be entered into by parties, who are +mentally competent to make reasonable contracts. 2. That the contract be +a purely voluntary one: that is, that it be entered into without either +force or fraud on either side. 3. That the right of property, which the +contract purports to convey, be such an one as is naturally capable of +being conveyed, or transferred, by one man to another. + +Subject to these conditions, all contracts whatsoever, for conveying +rights of property--that is, for buying and selling, borrowing and +lending, giving and receiving property--are naturally obligatory, and +bind such rights of property as they purport to convey. + +Subject to these conditions, all contracts, for the conveyance of rights +of property, are recognized as valid, all over the world, by both +civilized and savage man, except in those particular cases where +governments arbitrarily and tyrannically prohibit, alter, or invalidate +them. + +This _natural_ "obligation of contracts" must necessarily be presumed to +be the one, and the only one, which the constitution forbids to be +impaired, by any State law whatever, if we are to presume that the +constitution was intended for the maintenance of justice, or men's +natural rights. + +On the other hand, if the constitution be presumed not to protect this +_natural_ "obligation of contracts," we know not _what_ other +"obligation" it did intend to protect. It mentions no other, describes +no other, gives us no hint of any other; and nobody can give us the +least information as to what other "obligation of contracts" was +intended. + +It could not have been any "obligation" which the _State_ lawmakers +might arbitrarily create, and annex to _all_ contracts; for this is what +no lawmakers have ever attempted to do. And it would be the height of +absurdity to suppose they ever will invent any _one_ "obligation," and +attach it to _all_ contracts. They have only attempted either to annul, +or impair, the natural "obligation" of _particular_ contracts; or, _in +particular cases_, to substitute other "obligations" of their own +invention. And this is the most they will ever attempt to do. + + +SECTION XIX. + +Assuming it now to be proved that the "obligation of contracts," which +the States are forbidden to "impair," is the _natural_ "obligation"; and +that, _constitutionally speaking_, this provision secures to all the +people of the United States the right to enter into, and have the +benefit of, all contracts whatsoever, that have that _one natural_ +"obligation," let us look at some of the more important of those State +laws that have either impaired that obligation or prohibited the +exercise of that right. + +1. That law, in all the States, by which any, or all, the contracts of +persons, under twenty-one years of age, are either invalidated, or +forbidden to be entered into. + +The mental capacity of a person to make reasonable contracts, is the +only criterion, by which to determine his legal capacity to make +obligatory contracts. And his mental capacity to make reasonable +contracts is certainly not to be determined by the fact that he is, or +is not, twenty-one years of age. There would be just as much sense in +saying that it was to be determined by his height or his weight, as +there is in saying that it should be determined by his age. + +Nearly all persons, male and female, are mentally competent to make +reasonable contracts, long before they are twenty-one years of age. And +as soon as they are mentally competent to make reasonable contracts, +they have the same natural right to make them, that they ever can have. +And their contracts have the same natural "obligation" that they ever +can have. + +If a person's mental capacity to make reasonable contracts be drawn in +question, that is a question of fact, to be ascertained by the same +tribunal that is to ascertain all the other facts involved in the case. +It certainly is not to be determined by any arbitrary legislation, that +shall deprive any one of his natural right to make contracts. + +2. All the State laws, that do now forbid, or that have heretofore +forbidden married women to make any or all contracts, that they are, or +were, mentally competent to make reasonably, are violations of their +natural right to make their own contracts. + +A married woman has the same natural right to acquire and hold property, +and to make all contracts that she is mentally competent to make +reasonably, as has a married man, or any other man. And any law +invalidating her contracts, or forbidding her to enter into contracts, +on the ground of her being married, are not only absurd and outrageous +in themselves, but are also as plainly violations of that provision of +the constitution, which forbids any State to pass any law impairing the +natural obligation of contracts, as would be laws invalidating or +prohibiting similar contracts by married men. + +3. All those State laws, commonly called acts of incorporation, by which +a certain number of persons are licensed to contract debts, without +having their individual properties held liable to pay them, are laws +impairing the natural obligation of their contracts. + +On natural principles of law and reason, these persons are simply +partners; and their private properties, like those of any other +partners, should be held liable for their partnership debts. Like any +other partners, they take the profits of their business, if there be any +profits. And they are naturally bound to take all the risks of their +business, as in the case of any other business. For a law to say that, +if they make any profits, they may put them all into their own pockets, +but that, if they make a loss, they may throw it upon their creditors, +is an absurdity and an outrage. Such a law is plainly a law impairing +the natural obligation of their contracts. + +4. All State insolvent laws, so-called, that distribute a debtor's +property equally among his creditors, are laws impairing the natural +obligation of his contracts. + +If the natural obligation of contracts were known, and recognized as +law, we should have no need of insolvent or bankrupt laws. + +The only force, function, or effect of a _legal_ contract is to convey +and bind rights of property. A contract that conveys and binds no right +of property, has no _legal_ force, effect, or obligation whatever.[4] + + [4] It may have very weighty moral obligation; but it can have + no legal obligation. + +Consequently, the natural obligation of a contract of debt binds the +debtor's property, and nothing more. That is, it gives the creditor a +mortgage upon the debtor's property, and nothing more. + +A first debt is a first mortgage; a second debt is a second mortgage; a +third debt is a third mortgage; and so on indefinitely. + +The first mortgage must be paid in full, before anything is paid on the +second. The second must be paid in full, before anything is paid on the +third; and so on indefinitely. + +When the mortgaged property is exhausted, the debt is cancelled; there +is no other property that the contract binds. + +If, therefore, a debtor, at the time his debt becomes due, pays to the +extent of his ability, and has been guilty of no fraud, fault, or +neglect, during the time his debt had to run, he is thenceforth +discharged from all legal obligation. + +If this principle were acknowledged, we should have no occasion, and no +use, for insolvent or bankrupt laws. + +Of course, persons who have never asked themselves what the _natural_ +"obligation of contracts" is, will raise numerous objections to the +principle, that a legal contract binds nothing else than rights of +property. But their objections are all shallow and fallacious. + +I have not space here to go into all the arguments that may be necessary +to prove that contracts can have no _legal_ effect, except to bind +rights of property; or to show the truth of that principle in its +application to all contracts whatsoever. To do this would require a +somewhat elaborate treatise. Such a treatise I hope sometime to publish. +For the present, I only assert the principle; and assert that the +ignorance of this truth is at least one of the reasons why courts and +lawyers have never been able to agree as to what "the obligation of +contracts" was. + +In all the cases that have now been mentioned,--that is, of minors +(so-called), married women, corporations, insolvents, and in all other +like cases--the tricks, or pretences, by which the courts attempt to +uphold the validity of all laws that forbid persons to exercise their +natural right to make their own contracts, or that annul, or impair, the +_natural_ "obligation" of their contracts, are these: + +1. They say that, if a law forbids any particular contract to be made, +such contract, being then an illegal one, can have no "obligation." +Consequently, say they, the law cannot be said to impair it; because the +law cannot impair an "obligation," that has never had an existence. + +They say this of all contracts, that are arbitrarily forbidden; +although, naturally and intrinsically, they have as valid an obligation +as any others that men ever enter into, or as any that courts enforce. + +By such a naked trick as this, these courts not only strike down men's +natural right to make their own contracts, but even seek to evade that +provision of the constitution, which they are all sworn to support, and +which commands them to hold valid the _natural_ "obligation" of all +men's contracts; "anything in the constitutions or laws of the States to +the contrary notwithstanding." + +They might as well have said that, if the constitution had declared that +"no State shall pass any law impairing any man's natural right to life, +liberty, or property"--(that is, his _natural_ right to live, and do +what he will with himself and his property, so long as he infringes the +right of no other person)--this prohibition could be evaded by a State +law declaring that, from and after such a date, no person should have +any natural right to life, liberty, or property; and that, therefore, a +law arbitrarily taking from a man his life, liberty, and property, could +not be said to impair his right to them, because no law could impair a +right that did not exist. + +The answer to such an argument as this, would be, that it is a natural +truth that every man, who ever has been, or ever will be, born into the +world, _necessarily has been, and necessarily will be, born with an +inherent right to life, liberty, and property_; and that, in forbidding +this right to be impaired, _the constitution presupposes, implies, +assumes, and asserts that every man has, and will have, such a right_; +and that this _natural_ right is the very right, which the constitution +forbids any State law to impair. + +Or the courts might as well have said that, if the constitution had +declared that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of +contracts made for the purchase of food," that provision could have been +evaded by a State law forbidding any contract to be made for the +purchase of food; and then saying that such contract, being illegal, +could have no "obligation," that could be impaired. + +The answer to this argument would be that, by forbidding any State law +impairing the obligation of contracts made for the purchase of food, the +constitution presupposes, implies, assumes, and asserts that such +contracts have, and always will have, a _natural_ "obligation"; and +that this _natural_ "obligation" is the very "obligation," which the +constitution forbids any State law to impair. + +So in regard to all other contracts. The constitution presupposes, +implies, assumes, and asserts the natural truth, that certain contracts +have, _and always necessarily will have_, a _natural_ "obligation." And +this _natural_ "obligation"--which is the only real obligation that any +contract can have--is the very one that the constitution forbids any +State law to impair, in the case of any contract whatever that has such +obligation. + +And yet all the courts hold the direct opposite of this. They hold that, +if a State law forbids any contract to be made, such a contract can then +have no obligation; and that, consequently, no State law can impair an +obligation that never existed. + +But if, by forbidding a contract to be made, a State law can prevent the +contract's having any obligation, State laws, by forbidding any +contracts at all to be made, can prevent all contracts, thereafter made, +from having any obligation; and thus utterly destroy all men's natural +rights to make any obligatory contracts at all. + +2. A second pretence, by which the courts attempt to evade that +provision of the constitution, which forbids any State to "pass any law +impairing the obligation of contracts," is this: They say that the State +law, that requires, or obliges, a man to fulfil his contracts, _is +itself_ "_the obligation_," which the constitution forbids to be +impaired; and that therefore the constitution only prohibits the +impairing of any law for enforcing such contracts as shall be made under +it. + +But this pretence, it will be seen, utterly discards the idea that +contracts have any _natural_ obligation. It implies that contracts have +no obligation, except the laws that are made for enforcing them. But if +contracts have no _natural_ obligation, they have no obligation at all, +_that ought to be enforced_; and the State is a mere usurper, tyrant, +and robber, in passing any law to enforce them. + +Plainly a State cannot rightfully enforce any contracts at all, unless +they have a _natural_ obligation. + +3. A third pretence, by which the courts attempt to evade this provision +of the constitution, is this: They say that "the law is a part of the +contract" itself; and therefore cannot impair its obligation. + +By this they mean that, if a law is standing upon the statute book, +prescribing what obligation certain contracts shall, or shall not, have, +it must then be presumed that, whenever such a contract is made, the +parties intended to make it according to that law; and really to make +the law a part of their contract; _although they themselves say nothing +of the kind_. + +This pretence, that the law is a part of the contract, is a mere trick +to cheat people out of their natural right to make their own contracts; +and to compel them to make only such contracts as the lawmakers choose +to permit them to make. + +To say that it must be presumed that the parties intended to make their +contracts according to such laws as may be prescribed to them--or, what +is the same thing, to make the laws a part of their contracts--is +equivalent to saying that the parties must be presumed to have given up +all their natural right to make their own contracts; to have +acknowledged themselves imbeciles, incompetent to make reasonable +contracts, and to have authorized the lawmakers to make their contracts +for them; for if the lawmakers can make any part of a man's contract, +and presume his consent to it, they can make a whole one, and presume +his consent to it. + +If the lawmakers can make any part of men's contracts, they can make the +whole of them; and can, therefore, buy and sell, borrow and lend, give +and receive men's property of all kinds, according to their (the +lawmakers') own will, pleasure, or discretion; without the consent of +the real owners of the property, and even without their knowledge, until +it is too late. In short, they may take any man's property, and give it, +or sell it, to whom they please, and on such conditions, and at such +prices, as they please; without any regard to the rights of the owner. +They may, in fact, at their pleasure, strip any, or every, man of his +property, and bestow it upon whom they will; and then justify the act +upon the presumption that the owner consented to have his property thus +taken from him and given to others. + +This absurd, contemptible, and detestable trick has had a long lease of +life, and has been used as a cover for some of the greatest of crimes. +By means of it, the marriage contract has been perverted into a +contract, on the part of the woman, to make herself a legal non-entity, +or _non compos mentis_; to give up, to her husband, all her personal +property, and the control of all her real estate; and to part with her +natural, inherent, inalienable right, as a human being, to direct her +own labor, control her own earnings, make her own contracts, and provide +for the subsistence of herself and her children. + +There would be just as much reason in saying that the lawmakers have a +right to make the entire marriage contract; to marry any man and woman +against their will; dispose of all their personal and property rights; +declare them imbeciles, incapable of making a reasonable marriage +contract; then presume the consent of both the parties; and finally +treat them as criminals, and their children as outcasts, if they presume +to make any contract of their own. + +This same trick, of holding that the law is a part of the contract, has +been made to protect the private property of stockholders from liability +for the debts of the corporations, of which they were members; and to +protect the private property of special partners, so-called, or limited +partners, from liability for partnership debts. + +This same trick has been employed to justify insolvent and bankrupt +laws, so-called, whereby a first creditor's right to a first mortgage on +the property of his debtor, has been taken from him, and he has been +compelled to take his chances with as many subsequent creditors as the +debtor may succeed in becoming indebted to + +All these absurdities and atrocities have been practiced by the +lawmakers of the States, and sustained by the courts, under the pretence +that they (the courts) did not know what the natural "obligation of +contracts" was; or that, if they did know what it was, the constitution +of the United States imposed no restraint upon its unlimited violation +by the State lawmakers. + + +SECTION XX. + +But, not content with having always sanctioned the unlimited power of +the _State_ lawmakers to abolish all men's natural right to make their +own contracts, the Supreme Court of the United States has, within the +last twenty years, taken pains to assert that congress also has the +arbitrary power to abolish the same right. + +1. It has asserted the arbitrary power of congress to abolish all men's +right to make their own contracts, by asserting its power _to alter the +meaning of all contracts, after they are made_, so as to make them +widely, or wholly, different from what the parties had made them. + +Thus the court has said that, after a man has made a contract to pay a +certain number of dollars, at a future time,--_meaning such dollars as +were current at the time the contract was made_,--congress has power to +coin a dollar of less value than the one agreed on, and authorize the +debtor to pay his debt with a dollar of less value than the one he had +promised. + +To cover up this infamous crime, the court asserts, over and over +again,--what no one denies,--that congress has power (constitutionally +speaking) to alter, at pleasure, the value of its coins. But it then +asserts that congress has this additional, and wholly different, power, +to wit, the power to declare that this alteration in the value of the +coins _shall work a corresponding change in all existing contracts for +the payment of money_. + +In reality they say that a contract to pay money is not a contract to +pay any particular amount, or value, of such money as was known and +understood by the parties at the time the contract was made, but _only +such, and so much, as congress shall afterwards choose to call by that +name, when the debt shall become due_. + +They assert that, by simply retaining the name, while altering the +thing,--_or by simply giving an old name to a new thing_,--congress has +power to utterly abolish the contract which the parties themselves +entered into, and substitute for it any such new and different one, as +they (congress) may choose to substitute. + +Here are their own words: + + _The contract obligation ... was not a duty to pay gold or + silver, or the kind of money recognized by law at the time when + the contract was made, nor was it a duty to pay money of equal + intrinsic value in the market.... But the obligation of a + contract to pay money is to pay that which the law shall + recognize as money when the payment is to be made.--Legal + Tender Cases, 12 Wallace 548._ + +This is saying that the obligation of a contract to pay money is not an +obligation to pay what both the law and the parties recognize as money, +_at the time when the contract is made_, but only such substitute as +congress shall afterwards prescribe, "_when the payment is to be made_." + +This opinion was given by a majority of the court in the year 1870. + +In another opinion the court says: + + Under the power to coin money, and to regulate its value, + congress may issue coins of same denomination [that is, bearing + the same name] as those already current by law, but of less + intrinsic value than those, by reason of containing a less + weight of the precious metals, _and thereby enable debtors to + discharge their debts by the payment of coins of the less real + value_. A contract to pay a certain sum of money, without any + stipulation as to the kind of money in which it shall be made, + may always be satisfied by payment of that sum [that is, that + _nominal_ amount] in any currency _which is lawful money at the + place and time at which payment is to be made_.--_Juilliard vs. + Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_, 449. + +This opinion was given by the entire court--save one, Field--at the +October term of 1883. + +Both these opinions are distinct declarations of the power of congress +to alter men's contracts, _after they are made_, by simply retaining the +name, while altering the thing, that is agreed to be paid. + +In both these cases, the court means distinctly to say that, _after the +parties to a contract have agreed upon the number of dollars to be +paid_, congress has power to reduce the value of the dollar, and +authorize all debtors to pay the less valuable dollar, instead of the +one agreed on. + +In other words, the court means to say that, after a contract has been +made for the payment of a certain number of dollars, _congress has power +to alter the meaning of the word dollar_, and thus authorize the debtor +to pay in something different from, and less valuable than, the thing he +agreed to pay. + +Well, if congress has power to alter men's contracts, _after they are +made_, by altering the meaning of the word dollar, and thus reducing the +value of the debt, it has a precisely equal power to _increase_ the +value of the dollar, and thus compel the debtor to pay _more_ than he +agreed to pay. + +Congress has evidently just as much right to _increase_ the value of the +dollar, after a contract has been made, as it has to _reduce_ its value. +It has, therefore, just as much right to cheat debtors, by compelling +them to pay _more_ than they agreed to pay, as it has to cheat +creditors, by compelling them to accept _less_ than they agreed to +accept. + +All this talk of the court is equivalent to asserting that congress has +the right to alter men's contracts at pleasure, _after they are made_, +and make them over into something, or anything, wholly different from +what the parties themselves had made them. + +And this is equivalent to denying all men's right to make their own +contracts, or to acquire any contract rights, which congress may not +_afterward_, at pleasure, alter, or abolish. + +It is equivalent to saying that the words of contracts are not to be +taken in the sense in which they are used, by the parties themselves, at +the time when the contracts are entered into, but only in such different +senses as congress may choose to put upon them at any future time. + +If this is not asserting the right of congress to abolish altogether +men's natural right to make their own contracts, what is it? + +Incredible as such audacious villainy may seem to those unsophisticated +persons, who imagine that a court of law should be a court of justice, +it is nevertheless true, that this court intended to declare the +unlimited power of congress to alter, at pleasure, the contracts of +parties, _after they have been made_, by altering the kind and amount of +money by which the contracts may be fulfilled. That they intended all +this, is proved, not only by the extracts already given from their +opinions, but also by the whole tenor of their arguments--too long to be +repeated here--and more explicitly by these quotations, _viz._: + + There is no well-founded distinction to be made between the + constitutional validity of an act of congress declaring + treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of debts + contracted after its passage, and that of an act making them a + legal tender for the discharge of _all_ debts, _as well those + incurred before, as those made after, its enactment_.--_Legal + Tender Cases_, 12 _Wallace_ 530 (1870). + + Every contract for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily + subject to the constitutional power of the government over the + currency, whatever that power may be, _and the obligation of + the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that + power_.--12 _Wallace_ 549. + + Contracts for the payment of money are subject to the authority + of congress, _at least so far as relates to the means of + payment_.--12 _Wallace_ 549. + +The court means here to say that "every contract for the payment of +money, simply," is necessarily made, by the parties, _subject to the +power of congress to alter it afterward_--by altering the kind and value +of the money with which it may be paid--_into anything, into which_ they +(congress) _may choose to alter it_. + +And this is equivalent to saying that all such contracts are made, by +the parties, with _the implied understanding that the contracts, as +written and signed by themselves, do not bind either of the parties to +anything_; but that they simply suggest, or initiate, some non-descript +or other, which congress may afterward convert into a binding contract, +_of such a sort, and only such a sort, as_ they (congress) _may see fit +to convert it into_. + +Every one of these judges knew that no two men, having common honesty +and common sense,--unless first deprived of all power to make their own +contracts,--would ever enter into a contract to pay money, with any +understanding that the government had any such arbitrary power as the +court here ascribes to it, to alter their contract after it should be +made. Such an absurd contract would, in reality, be no _legal_ contract +at all. It would be a mere gambling agreement, having, naturally and +really, no _legal_ "obligation" at all. + +But further. A _solvent_ contract to pay money is in reality--in law, +and in equity--_a bona fide mortgage upon the debtor's property_. And +this mortgage right is as veritable a right of property, as is any right +of property, that is conveyed by a warranty deed. And congress has no +more right to invalidate this mortgage, by a single iota, than it has to +invalidate a warranty deed of land. And these judges will sometime find +out that such is "the obligation of contracts," if they ever find out +what "the obligation of contracts" is. + +The justices of that court have had this question--what is "the +obligation of contracts"?--before them for seventy years, and more. But +they have never agreed among themselves--even by so many as a +majority--as to what it is. And this disagreement is very good evidence +that _none_ of them have known what it is; for if any one of them had +known what it is, he would doubtless have been able, long ago, to +enlighten the rest. + +Considering the vital importance of men's contracts, it would evidently +be more to the credit of these judges, if they would give their +attention to this question of "the obligation of contracts," until they +shall have solved it, than it is to be telling fifty millions of people +that they have no right to make any contracts at all, except such as +congress has power to invalidate after they shall have been made. Such +assertions as this, coming from a court that cannot even tell us what +"the obligation of contracts" is, are not entitled to any serious +consideration. On the contrary, they show us what farces and impostures +these judicial opinions--or decisions, as they call them--are. They show +that these judicial oracles, as men call them, are no better than some +of the other so-called oracles, by whom mankind have been duped. + +But these judges certainly never will find out what "the obligation of +contracts" is, until they find out that men have the natural right to +make their own contracts, and unalterably fix their "obligation"; and +that governments can have no power whatever to make, unmake, alter, or +invalidate that "obligation." + +Still further. Congress has the same power over weights and measures +that it has over coins. And the court has no more right or reason to say +that congress has power to alter existing contracts, by altering the +value of the coins, than it has to say that, after any or all men have, +for value received, entered into contracts to deliver so many bushels of +wheat or other grain, so many pounds of beef, pork, butter, cheese, +cotton, wool, or iron, so many yards of cloth, or so many feet of +lumber, congress has power, by altering these weights and measures, to +alter all these existing contracts, so as to convert them into contracts +to deliver only half as many, or to deliver twice as many, bushels, +pounds, yards, or feet, as the parties agreed upon. + +To add to the farce, as well as to the iniquity, of these judicial +opinions, it must be kept in mind, that the court says that, after A has +sold valuable property to B, and has taken in payment an honest and +sufficient mortgage on B's property, congress has the power to compel +him (A) to give up this mortgage, and to accept, in place of it, not +anything of any real value whatever, but only the promissory note of a +so-called government; and that government one which--if taxation without +consent is robbery--never had an honest dollar in its treasury, with +which to pay any of its debts, and is never likely to have one; but +relies wholly on its future robberies for its means to pay them; and can +give no guaranty, but its own interest at the time, that it will even +make the payment out of its future robberies. + +If a company of bandits were to seize a man's property for their own +uses, and give him their note, promising to pay him out of their future +robberies, the transaction would not be considered a very legitimate +one. But it would be intrinsically just as legitimate as is the one +which the Supreme Court sanctions on the part of congress. + +Banditti have not usually kept supreme courts of their own, to legalize +either their robberies, or their promises to pay for past robberies, out +of the proceeds of their future ones. Perhaps they may now take a lesson +from our Supreme Court, and establish courts of their own, that will +hereafter legalize all their contracts of this kind. + + +SECTION XXI. + +To justify its declaration, that congress has power to alter men's +contracts after they are made, the court dwells upon the fact that, at +the times when the legal-tender acts were passed, the government was in +peril of its life; and asserts that it had therefore a right to do +almost anything for its self-preservation, without much regard to its +honesty, or dishonesty, towards private persons. Thus it says: + + A civil war was then raging, which seriously threatened the + overthrow of the government, and the destruction of the + constitution itself. It demanded the equipment and support of + large armies and navies, and the employment of money to an + extent beyond the capacity of all ordinary sources of supply. + Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit + of the government, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had + become nearly exhausted. Moneyed institutions had advanced + largely of their means, and more could not be expected of them. + They had been compelled to suspend specie payments. Taxation + was inadequate to pay even the interest on the debt already + incurred, and it was impossible to await the income of + additional taxes. The necessity was immediate and pressing. The + army was unpaid. There was then due to the soldiers in the + field nearly a score of millions of dollars. The requisitions + from the War and Navy departments for supplies, exceeded fifty + millions, and the current expenditure was over one million per + day.... Foreign credit we had none. We say nothing of the + overhanging paralysis of trade, and business generally, which + threatened loss of confidence in the ability of the government + to maintain its continued existence, and therewith the complete + destruction of all remaining national credit. + + It was at such a time, and in such circumstances, that congress + was called upon to devise means to maintaining the army and + navy, for securing the large supplies of money needed, and + indeed for the preservation of the government created by the + constitution. It was at such a time, and in such and emergency, + that the legal-tender acts were passed.--12 _Wallace_ 540-1. + +In the same case Bradley said: + + Can the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn be thus taken + by the government, when the public exigency requires it, and + cannot the rich man's bonds and notes be in like manner taken + to reach the same end?--_p._ 561. + +He also said: + + It is absolutely essential to independent national existence + that government should have a firm hold on the two great + instrumentalities of the _sword_ and the _purse, and the right + to wield them without restriction, on occasions of national + peril_. In certain emergencies government must have at its + command, _not only the personal services--the bodies and + lives--of its citizens_, but the lesser, though not less + essential, power of absolute control over the resources of the + country. Its armies must be filled, and its navies manned, by + the citizens in person.--_p._ 563. + +Also he said: + + _The conscription may deprive me of liberty, and destroy my + life.... All these are fundamental political conditions on + which life, property, and money are respectively held and + enjoyed under our system of government, nay, under any system + of government._ There are times when the exigencies of the + State rightly absorb all subordinate considerations of private + interest, convenience, and feeling.--_p._ 565. + +Such an attempt as this, to justify one crime, by taking for granted the +justice of other and greater crimes, is a rather desperate mode of +reasoning, for a court of law; to say nothing of a court of justice. The +answer to it is, that no government, however good in other respects--any +more than any other good institution--has any right to live otherwise +than on purely voluntary support. It can have no right to take either +"the poor man's cattle, and horses, and corn," or "the rich man's bonds +and notes," or poor men's "bodies and lives," without their consent. And +when a government resorts to such measures to save its life, we need no +further proof that its time to die has come. A good government, no more +than a bad one, has any right to live by robbery, murder, or any other +crime. + +But so think not the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. +On the contrary, they hold that, in comparison with the preservation of +the government, all the rights of the people to property, liberty, and +life are worthless things, not to be regarded. So they hold that in such +an exigency as they describe, congress had the right to commit any crime +against private persons, by which the government could be saved. And +among these lawful crimes, the court holds that congress had the right +to issue money that should serve as a license to all holders of it, to +cheat--or rather openly rob--their creditors. + +The court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve +the life of the government, congress had the right to issue such money +as would authorize all creditors to demand twice the amount of their +honest dues from all debtors. + +The court might, with just as much reason, have said that, to preserve +the life of the government, congress had the right to sell indulgences +for all manner of crimes; for theft, robbery, rape, murder, and all +other crimes, for which indulgences would bring a price in the market. + +Can any one imagine it possible that, if the government had always done +nothing but that "equal and exact justice to all men"--which you say it +is pledged to do,--but which you must know it has never done,--it could +ever have been brought into any such peril of its life, as these judges +describe? Could it ever have been necessitated to take either "the poor +man's cattle, and horses, and corn," or "the rich man's bonds and +notes," or poor men's "bodies and lives," without their consent? Could +it ever have been necessitated to "conscript" the poor man--too poor to +pay a ransom of three hundred dollars--made thus poor by the tyranny of +the government itself--"deprive him of his liberty, and destroy his +life"? Could it ever have been necessitated to sell indulgences for +crime to either debtors, or creditors, or anybody else? To preserve "the +constitution"--a constitution, I repeat, that authorized nothing but +"equal and exact justice to all men"--could it ever have been +necessitated to send into the field millions of ignorant young men, to +cut the throats of other young men as ignorant as themselves--few of +whom, on either side, had ever read the constitution, or had any real +knowledge of its legal meaning; and not one of whom had ever signed it, +or promised to support it, or was under the least obligation to support +it? + +It is, I think, perfectly safe to say, that not one in a thousand, +probably not one in ten thousand, of these young men, who were sent out +to butcher others, and be butchered themselves, had any real knowledge +of the constitution they were professedly sent out to support; or any +reasonable knowledge of the real character and motives of the congresses +and courts that profess to administer the constitution. If they had +possessed this knowledge, how many of them would have ever gone to the +field? + +But further. Is it really true that the right of the government to +commit all these atrocities: + + _Are the fundamental political conditions on which life, + property, and money are respectively held and enjoyed under our + system of government?_ + +If such is the real character of the constitution, can any further proof +be required of the necessity that it be buried out of sight at once and +forever? The truth was that the government was in peril, _solely because +it was not fit to exist_. It, and the State governments--all but parts +of one and the same system--were rotten with tyranny and crime. And +being bound together by no honest tie, and existing for no honest +purpose, destruction was the only honest doom to which any of them were +entitled. And if we had spent the same money and blood to destroy them, +that we did to preserve them, it would have been ten thousand times more +creditable to our intelligence and character as a people. + +Clearly the court has not strengthened its case at all by this picture +of the peril in which the government was placed. It has only shown to +what desperate straits a government, founded on usurpation and fraud, +and devoted to robbery and oppression, may be brought, by the quarrels +that are liable to arise between the different factions--that is, the +different bands of robbers--of which it is composed. When such quarrels +arise, it is not to be expected that either faction--having never had +any regard to human rights, when acting in concert with the other--will +hesitate at any new crimes that may be necessary to prolong its +existence. + +Here was a government that had never had any legitimate existence. It +professedly rested all its authority on a certain paper called a +constitution; a paper, I repeat, that nobody had ever signed, that few +persons had ever read, that the great body of the people had never seen. +This government had been imposed, by a few property holders, upon a +people too poor, too scattered, and many of them too ignorant, to +resist. It had been carried on, for some seventy years, by a mere cabal +of irresponsible men, called lawmakers. In this cabal, the several local +bands of robbers--the slaveholders of the South, the iron monopolists, +the woollen monopolists, and the money monopolists, of the North--were +represented. The whole purpose of its laws was to rob and enslave the +many--both North and South--for the benefit of a few. But these robbers +and tyrants quarreled--as lesser bands of robbers have done--over the +division of their spoils. And hence the war. No such principle as +justice to anybody--black or white--was the ruling motive on either +side. + +In this war, each faction--already steeped in crime--plunged into new, +if not greater, crimes. In its desperation, it resolved to destroy men +and money, without limit, and without mercy, for the preservation of its +existence. The northern faction, having more men, money, and credit than +the southern, survived the Kilkenny fight. Neither faction cared +anything for human rights then, and neither of them has shown any regard +for human rights since. "As a war measure," the northern faction found +it necessary to put an end to the one great crime, from which the +southern faction had drawn its wealth. But all other government crimes +have been more rampant since the war, than they were before. Neither the +conquerors, nor the conquered, have yet learned that no government can +have any right to exist for any other purpose than the simple +maintenance of justice between man and man. + +And now, years after the fiendish butchery is over, and after men would +seem to have had time to come to their senses, the Supreme Court of the +United States, representing the victorious faction, comes forward with +the declaration that one of the crimes--the violation of men's private +contracts--resorted to by its faction, in the heat of conflict, as a +means of preserving its power over the other, was not only justifiable +and proper at the time, _but that it is also a legitimate and +constitutional power, to be exercised forever hereafter in time of +peace!_ + +Mark the knavery of these men. They first say that, because the +government was in peril of its life, it had a right to license great +crimes against private persons, if by so doing it could raise money for +its own preservation. Next they say that, _although the government is no +longer in peril of its life_, it may still go on forever licensing the +same crimes as it was before necessitated to license! + +They thus virtually say that the government may commit the same crimes +in time of peace, that it is necessitated to do in time of war; and, +that, consequently, it has the same right to "take the poor man's +cattle, and horses, and corn," and "the rich man's bonds and notes," and +poor men's "bodies and lives," in time of peace, _when no necessity +whatever can be alleged_, as in time of war, when the government is in +peril of its life. + +In short, they virtually say, that this government exists for itself +alone; and that all the natural rights of the people, to property, +liberty, and life, are mere baubles, to be disposed of, at its pleasure, +whether in time of peace, or in war. + + +SECTION XXII. + +As if to place beyond controversy the fact, that the court may forever +hereafter be relied on to sanction every usurpation and crime that +congress will ever dare to put into the form of a statute, without the +slightest color of authority from the constitution, necessity, utility, +justice, or reason, it has, on three separate occasions, announced its +sanction of the monopoly of money, as finally established by congress in +1866, and continued in force ever since. + +This monopoly is established by a prohibitory tax--a tax of ten per +cent.--on all notes issued for circulation as money, other than the +notes of the United States and the national banks. + +This ten per cent. is called a "tax," but is really a penalty, and is +intended as such, and as nothing else. Its whole purpose is--_not to +raise revenue_--but solely to establish a monopoly of money, by +prohibiting the issue of all notes intended for circulation as money, +except those issued, or specially licensed, by the government itself. + +This prohibition upon the issue of all notes, except those issued, or +specially licensed, by the government, is a prohibition upon all freedom +of industry and traffic. It is a prohibition upon the exercise of men's +natural right to lend and hire such money capital as all men need to +enable them to create and distribute wealth, and supply their own +wants, and provide for their own happiness. Its whole purpose is to +reduce, as far as possible, the great body of the people to the +condition of servants to a few--a condition but a single grade above +that of chattel slavery--in which their labor, and the products of their +labor, may be extorted from them at such prices only as the holders of +the monopoly may choose to give. + +This prohibitory tax--so-called--is therefore really a penalty imposed +upon the exercise of men's natural right to create and distribute +wealth, and provide for their own and each other's wants. And it is +imposed solely for the purpose of establishing a practically omnipotent +monopoly in the hands of a few. + +Calling this penalty a "tax" is one of the dirty tricks, or rather +downright lies--that of calling things by false names--to which congress +and the courts resort, to hide their usurpations and crimes from the +common eye. + +Everybody--who believes in the government--says, of course, that +congress has power to levy taxes; that it must do so to raise revenue +for the support of the government. Therefore this lying congress call +this penalty a "tax," instead of calling it by its true name, a penalty. + +It certainly is no tax, because no revenue is raised, or intended to be +raised, by it. It is not levied upon property, or persons, as such, but +only upon a certain act, or upon persons for doing a certain act; an act +that if not only perfectly innocent and lawful in itself, but that is +naturally and intrinsically useful, and even indispensable for the +prosperity and welfare of the whole people. Its whole object is simply +to deter everybody--except those specially licensed--from performing +this innocent, useful, and necessary act. And this it has succeeded in +doing for the last twenty years; to the destruction of the rights, and +the impoverishment and immeasurable injury of all the people, except the +few holders of the monopoly. + +If congress had passed an act, in this form, to wit: + + No person, nor any association of persons, incorporated or + unincorporated--_unless specially licensed by congress_--shall + issue their promissory notes for circulation as money; and a + _penalty_ of ten per cent. upon the amount of all such notes + shall be imposed upon the persons issuing them, + +the act would have been the same, in effect and intention, as is this +act, that imposes what it calls a "tax." The penalty would have been +understood by everybody as a punishment for issuing the notes; and would +have been applied to, and enforced against, those only who should have +issued them. And it is the same with this so-called tax. It will never +be collected, except for the same cause, and under the same +circumstances, as the penalty would have been. It has no more to do with +raising a revenue, than the penalty would have had. And all these lying +lawmakers and courts know it. + +But if congress had put this prohibition distinctly in the form of a +_penalty_, the usurpation would have been so barefaced--so destitute of +all color of constitutional authority--that congress dared not risk the +consequences. And possibly the court might not have dared to sanction +it; if, indeed, there be any crime or usurpation which the court dare +not sanction. So these knavish lawmakers called this penalty a "tax"; +and the court says that such a "tax" is clearly constitutional. And the +monopoly has now been established for twenty years. And substantially +all the industrial and financial troubles of that period have been the +natural consequences of the monopoly. + +If congress had laid a prohibitory tax upon all food--that is, had +imposed a penalty upon the production and sale of all food--except such +as it should have itself produced, or specially licensed; and should +have reduced the amount of food, thus produced or licensed, to one +tenth, twentieth, or fiftieth of what was really needed; the motive and +the crime would have been the same, in character, if not in degree, as +they are in this case, _viz._, to enable the few holders of the licensed +food to extort, from everybody else, by the fear of starvation, all +their (the latter's) earnings and property, in exchange for this small +quantity of privileged food. + +Such a monopoly of food would have been no clearer violation of men's +natural rights, than is the present monopoly of money. And yet this +colossal crime--like every other crime that congress chooses to +commit--is sanctioned by its servile, rotten, and stinking court. + +On what _constitutional_ grounds--that is, on what provisions found in +the constitution itself--does the court profess to give its sanction to +such a crime? + +On these three only: + +1. On the power of congress to lay and collect taxes, etc. + +2. On the power of congress to coin money. + +3. On the power of congress to borrow money. + +Out of these simple, and apparently harmless provisions, the court +manufactures an authority to grant, to a few persons, a monopoly that is +practically omnipotent over all the industry and traffic of the country; +that is fatal to all other men's natural right to lend and hire capital +for any or all their legitimate industries; and fatal absolutely to all +their natural right to buy, sell, and exchange any, or all, the products +of their labor at their true, just, and natural prices. + +Let us look at these constitutional provisions, and see how much +authority congress can really draw from them. + +1. The constitution says: + + The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, + imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts, and provide for the + common defence and general welfare of the United States_. + +This provision plainly authorizes no taxation whatever, except for the +raising of revenue to pay the debts and legitimate expenses of the +government. It no more authorizes taxation for the purpose of +establishing monopolies of any kind whatever, than it does for taking +openly and boldly all the property of the many, and giving it outright +to a few. And none but a congress of usurpers, robbers, and swindlers +would ever think of using it for that purpose. + +The court says, _in effect_, that this provision gives congress power to +establish the present monopoly of money; that the power to tax all other +money, is a power to prohibit all other money; and a power to prohibit +all other money is a power to give the present money a monopoly. + +How much is such an argument worth? Let us show by a parallel case, as +follows. + +Congress has the same power to tax all other property, that it has to +tax money. And if the power to tax money is a power to prohibit money, +then it follows that the power of congress to tax all other property +than money, is a power to prohibit all other property than money; and a +power to prohibit all other property than money, is a power to give +monopolies to all such other property as congress may not choose to +prohibit; or may choose to specially license. + +On such reasoning as this, it would follow that the power of congress to +tax money, and all other property, is a power to prohibit all money, and +all other property; and thus to establish monopolies in favor of all +such money, and all such other property, as it chooses not to prohibit; +or chooses to specially license. + +Thus, this reasoning would give congress power to establish all the +monopolies, it may choose to establish, not only in money, but in +agriculture, manufactures, and commerce; and protect these monopolies +against infringement, by imposing prohibitory taxes upon all money and +other property, except such as it should choose not to prohibit; or +should choose to specially license. + +Because the constitution says that "congress shall have power to lay and +collect taxes," etc., to raise the revenue necessary for paying the +current expenses of the government, the court say that congress have +power to levy prohibitory taxes--taxes that shall yield no revenue at +all--but shall operate only as a penalty upon all industries and +traffic, and upon the use of all the means of industry and traffic, that +shall compete with such monopolies as congress shall choose to grant. + +This is no more than an unvarnished statement of the argument, by which +the court attempts to justify a prohibitory "tax" upon money; for the +same reasoning would justify the levying of a prohibitory tax--that is, +penalty--upon the use of any and all other means of industry and +traffic, by which any other monopolies, granted by congress, might be +infringed. + +There is plainly no more connection between the "power to lay and +collect taxes," etc., for the necessary expenses of the government, and +the power to establish this monopoly of money, than there is between +such a power of taxation, and a power to punish, as a crime, any or all +industry and traffic whatsoever, except such as the government may +specially license. + +This whole cheat lies in the use of the word "tax," to describe what is +really a penalty, upon the exercise of any or all men's natural rights +of providing for their subsistence and well-being. And none but corrupt +and rotten congresses and courts would ever think of practising such a +cheat. + +2. The second provision of the constitution, relied on by the court to +justify the monopoly of money, is this: + + The congress shall have power to coin money, regulate the value + thereof, and of foreign coins. + +The only important part of this provision is that which says that "the +congress shall have power to coin money, [and] regulate the value +thereof." + +That part about regulating the value of foreign coins--if any one can +tell how congress can regulate it--is of no appreciable importance to +anybody; for the coins will circulate, or not, as men may, or may not, +choose to buy and sell them as money, and at such value as they will +bear in free and open market,--that is, in competition with all other +coins, and all other money. This is their only true and natural market +value; and there is no occasion for congress to do anything in regard to +them. + +The only thing, therefore, that we need to look at, is simply the power +of congress "to coin money." + +So far as congress itself is authorized to coin money, this is simply a +power to weigh and assay metals,--gold, silver, or any other,--stamp +upon them marks indicating their weight and fineness, and then sell them +to whomsoever may choose to buy them; and let them go in the market for +whatever they may chance to bring, in competition with all other money +that may chance to be offered there. + +It is no power to impose any restrictions whatever upon any or all other +honest money, that may be offered in the market, and bought and sold in +competition with the coins weighed and assayed by the government. + +The power itself is a frivolous one, of little or no utility; for the +weighing and assaying of metals is a thing so easily done, and can be +done by so many different persons, that there is certainly no +_necessity_ for its being done at all by a government. And it would +undoubtedly have been far better if all coins--whether coined by +governments or individuals--had all been made into pieces bearing simply +the names of pounds, ounces, pennyweights, etc., and containing just the +amounts of pure metal described by those weights. The coins would then +have been regarded as only so much metal; and as having only the same +value as the same amount of metal in any other form. Men would then have +known exactly how much of certain metals they were buying, selling, and +promising to pay. And all the jugglery, cheating, and robbery that +governments have practised, and licensed individuals to practise--by +coining pieces bearing the same names, but having different amounts of +metal--would have been avoided. + +And all excuses for establishing monopolies of money, by prohibiting all +other money than the coins, would also have been avoided. + +As it is, the constitution imposes no prohibition upon the coining of +money by individuals, but only by State governments. Individuals are +left perfectly free to coin it, except that they must not +"_counterfeit_ the securities and current coin of the United States." + +For quite a number of years after the discovery of gold in +California--that is, until the establishment of a government mint +there--a large part of the gold that was taken out of the earth, was +coined by private persons and companies; and this coinage was perfectly +legal. And I do not remember to have ever heard any complaint, or +accusation, that it was not honest and reliable. + +The true and only value, which the coins have as money, is that value +which they have as metals, for uses in the arts,--that is, for plate, +watches, jewelry, and the like. This value they will retain, whether +they circulate as money, or not. At this value, they are so utterly +inadequate to serve as _bona fide_ equivalents for such other property +as is to be bought and sold for money; and, after being minted, are so +quickly taken out of circulation, and worked up into articles of +use--plate, watches, jewelry, etc.--that they are practically of almost +no importance at all as money. + +But they can be so easily and cheaply carried from one part of the world +to another, that they have substantially the same market value all over +the world. They are also, in but a small degree, liable to great or +sudden changes in value. For these reasons, they serve well as +standards--are perhaps the best standards we can have--by which to +measure the value of all other money, as well as other property. But to +give them any monopoly as money, is to deny the natural right of all men +to make their own contracts, and buy and sell, borrow and lend, give and +receive, all such money as the parties to bargains may mutually agree +upon; and also to license the few holders of the coins to rob all other +men in the prices of the latter's labor and property. + +3. The third provision of the constitution, on which the court relies to +justify the monopoly of money, is this: + + The congress shall have power to borrow money. + +Can any one see any connection between the power of congress "to borrow +money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money? + +Certainly no such connection is visible to the legal eye. But it is +distinctly visible to the political and financial eye; that is, to that +class of men, for whom governments exist, and who own congresses and +courts, and set in motion armies and navies, whenever they can promote +their own interests by doing so. + +To a government, whose usurpations and crimes have brought it to the +verge of destruction, these men say: + + Make bonds bearing six per cent. interest; sell them to us at + half their face value; then give us a monopoly of money based + upon these bonds--such a monopoly as will subject the great + body of the people to a dependence upon us for the necessaries + of life, and compel them to sell their labor and property to us + at our own prices; then, under pretence of raising revenue to + pay the interest and principal of the bonds, impose such a + tariff upon imported commodities as will enable us to get fifty + per cent. more for our own goods than they are worth; in short, + pledge to us all the power of the government to extort for us, + in the future, everything that can be extorted from the + producers of wealth, and we will lend you all the money you + need to maintain your power. + +And the government has no alternative but to comply with this infamous +proposal, or give up its infamous life. + +This is the only real connection there is between the power of congress +"to borrow money," and its power to establish a monopoly of money. It +was only by an outright sale of the rights of the whole people, for a +long series of years, that the government could raise the money +necessary to continue its villainous existence. + +Congress had just as much constitutional power "to borrow money," by the +sale of any and all the other natural rights of the people at large, as +it had "to borrow money" by the sale of the people's natural rights to +lend and hire money. + +When the Supreme Court of the United States--assuming to be an oracle, +empowered to define authoritatively the legal rights of every human +being in the country--declares that congress has a constitutional power +to prohibit the use of all that immense mass of money capital, in the +shape of promissory notes, which the real property of the country is +capable of supplying and sustaining, and which is sufficient to give to +every laboring person, man or woman, the means of independence and +wealth--when that court says that congress has power to prohibit the use +of all this money capital, and grant to a few men a monopoly of money +that shall condemn the great body of wealth-producers to hopeless +poverty, dependence, and servitude--and when the court has the audacity +to make these declarations on such nakedly false and senseless grounds +as those that have now been stated, it is clearly time for the people of +this country to inquire what constitutions and governments are good for, +and whether they (the people) have any natural right, as human beings, +to live for themselves, or only for a few conspirators, swindlers, +usurpers, robbers, and tyrants, who employ lawmakers, judges, etc., to +do their villainous work upon their fellow-men. + +The court gave their sanction to the monopoly of money in these three +separate cases, _viz._: _Veazie Bank vs. Fenno_, 8 _Wallace_, 549 +(1869). _National Bank vs. United States_, 101 _U. S. Reports_, 5 _and_ +6 (1879). _Juilliard vs. Greenman_, 110 _U. S. Reports_ 445-6 (1884). + + +Section XXIII. + +If anything could add to the disgust and detestation which the monstrous +falsifications of the constitution, already described, should excite +towards the court that resorts to them, it would be the fact that the +court, not content with falsifying to the utmost the constitution +itself, _goes outside of the constitution, to the tyrannical practices +of what it_ calls the "_sovereign_" governments of "_other civilized +nations_," to justify the same practices by our own. + +It asserts, over and over again, the idea that our government is a +"_sovereign_" government; that it has the same rights of +"_sovereignty_," as the governments of "other civilized nations"; +especially those in Europe. + +What, then, is a "sovereign" government? It is a government that is +"sovereign" over all the natural rights of the people. This is the only +"sovereignty" that any government can be said to have. Under it, the +people have no _rights_. They are simply "subjects,"--that is, slaves. +They have but one law, and one duty, _viz._, obedience, submission. They +are not recognized as having any _rights_. They can claim nothing as +their own. They can only accept what the government chooses to give +them. The government owns them and their property; and disposes of them +and their property, at its pleasure, or discretion; without regard to +any consent, or dissent, on their part. + +Such was the "sovereignty" claimed and exercised by the governments of +those, so-called, "civilized nations of Europe," that were in power in +1787, 1788, and 1789, when our constitution was framed and adopted, and +the government put in operation under it. And the court now says, +virtually, that the constitution intended to give to our government the +same "sovereignty" over the natural rights of the people, that those +governments had then. + +But how did the "civilized governments of Europe" become possessed of +such "sovereignty"? Had the people ever granted it to them? Not at all. +The governments spurned the idea that they were dependent on the will or +consent of their people for their political power. On the contrary, they +claimed to have derived it from the only source, from which such +"sovereignty" could have been derived; that is, from God Himself. + +In 1787, 1788, and 1789, all the great governments of Europe, except +England, claimed to exist by what was called "Divine Right." That is, +they claimed to have received authority from God Himself, to rule over +their people. And they taught, and a servile and corrupt priesthood +taught, that it was a religious duty of the people to obey them. And +they kept great standing armies, and hordes of pimps, spies, and +ruffians, to keep the people in subjection. + +And when, soon afterwards, the revolutionists of France dethroned the +king then existing--the Legitimist king, so-called--and asserted the +right of the people to choose their own government, these other +governments carried on a twenty years' war against her, to reestablish +the principle of "sovereignty" by "Divine Right." And in this war, the +government of England, although not itself claiming to exist by Divine +Right,--but really existing by brute force,--furnished men and money +without limit, to reestablish that principle in France, and to maintain +it wherever else, in Europe, it was endangered by the idea of popular +rights. + +The principle, then, of "Sovereignty by Divine Right"--sustained by +brute force--was the principle on which the governments of Europe then +rested; and most of them rest on that principle today. And now the +Supreme Court of the United States virtually says that our constitution +intended to give to our government the same "sovereignty"--the same +absolutism--the same supremacy over all the natural rights of the +people--as was claimed and exercised by those "Divine Right" governments +of Europe, a hundred years ago! + +That I may not be suspected of misrepresenting these men, I give some of +their own words as follows: + + It is not doubted that the power to establish a standard of + value, by which all other values may be measured, or, in other + words, to determine what shall be lawful money and a legal + tender, is in its nature, and of necessity, a governmental + power. _It is in all countries exercised by the + government._--_Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wallace 615._ + +The court call a power, + + To make treasury notes a legal tender for the payment of _all_ + debts [private as well as public] _a power confessedly + possessed by every independent sovereignty other than the + United States_.--_Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wallace, p. 529._ + +Also, in the same case, it speaks of: + + That general power over the currency, _which has always been an + acknowledged attribute of sovereignty in every other civilized + nation than our own_.--_p. 545._ + +In this same case, by way of asserting the power of congress to do any +dishonest thing that any so-called "sovereign government" ever did, the +court say: + + Has any one, in good faith, avowed his belief that even a law + debasing the current coin, by increasing the alloy [and then + making these debased coins a legal tender in payment of debts + previously contracted], would be taking private property? It + might be impolitic, and unjust, but could its constitutionality + be doubted?--_p. 552._ + +In the same case, Bradley said: + + As a government, it [the government of the United States] was + invested with _all the attributes of sovereignty_.--_p. 555._ + +Also he said: + + Such being the character of the General Government, it seems to + be a self-evident proposition _that it is invested with all + those inherent and implied powers, which, at the time of + adopting the constitution, were generally considered to belong + to every government, as such_, and as being essential to the + exercise of its functions.--_p. 556._ + +Also he said: + + Another proposition equally clear is, _that at the time the + constitution was adopted, it was, and for a long time had + been, the practice of most, if not all, civilized governments_, + to employ the public credit as a means of anticipating the + national revenues for the purpose of enabling them to exercise + their governmental functions.--_p. 556._ + +Also he said: + + It is our duty to construe the instrument [the constitution] by + its words, _in the light of history, of the general nature of + government, and the incidents of sovereignty_.--_p. 55._ + +Also he said: + + The government simply demands that its credit shall be accepted + and received by public and private creditors during the pending + exigency. _Every government has a right to demand this, when + its existence is at stake._--_p. 560._ + +Also he said: + + These views are exhibited ... for the purpose of showing that + it [the power to make its notes a legal tender in payment of + private debts] _is one of those vital and essential powers + inhering in every national sovereignty_, and necessary to its + self-preservation.--_p. 564._ + +In still another legal tender case, the court said: + + The people of the United States, by the constitution, + established a national government, _with sovereign powers, + legislative, executive_, and judicial.--_Juilliard vs. + Greenman, 110 U. S. Reports, p. 438._ + +Also it calls the constitution: + + A constitution, establishing a form of government, declaring + fundamental principles, _and creating a national sovereignty_, + intended to endure for ages.--_p. 439._ + +Also the court speaks of the government of the United States: + + _As a sovereign government._--_p. 446._ + +Also it said: + + It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary + consequence, that congress has the power to issue the + obligations of the United States in such form, and to impress + upon them such qualities as currency, for the purchase of + merchandise and the payment of debts, _as accord with the usage + of other sovereign governments_. The power, as incident to the + power of borrowing money, and issuing bills or notes of the + government for money borrowed, of impressing upon those bills + or notes the quality of being a legal tender for the payment of + private debts, _was a power universally understood to belong to + sovereignty, in Europe and America, at the time of the framing + and adoption of the constitution of the United States_. The + governments of Europe, acting through the monarch, or the + legislature, according to the distribution of powers _under + their respective constitutions_, had, and have, as _sovereign_ + a power of issuing paper money as of stamping coin. This power + has been distinctly recognized in an important modern case, + ably argued and fully considered, in which the Emperor of + Austria, as King of Hungary, obtained from the English Court of + Chancery an injunction against the issue, in England, without + his license, of notes purporting to be public paper money of + Hungary.--_p. 447._ + +Also it speaks of: + + Congress, as the legislature of a _sovereign_ nation.--_p. + 449._ + +Also it said: + + The power to make the notes of the government a legal tender in + payment of private debts, _being one of the powers belonging to + sovereignty in other civilized nations_, ... we are + irresistibly impelled to the conclusion that the impressing + upon the treasury notes of the United States the quality of + being a legal tender in payment of private debts, is an + appropriate means, conducive and plainly adapted to the + execution of the undoubted powers of congress, consistent with + the letter and spirit of the constitution, etc.----_p._ 450. + +On reading these astonishing ideas about "sovereignty"--"sovereignty" +over all the natural rights of mankind--"sovereignty," as it prevailed +in Europe "at the time of the framing and adoption of the constitution +of the United States"--we are compelled to see that these judges +obtained their constitutional law, not from the constitution itself, but +from the example of the "Divine Right" governments existing in Europe a +hundred years ago. These judges seem never to have heard of the American +Revolution, or the French Revolution, or even of the English Revolutions +of the seventeenth century--revolutions fought and accomplished to +overthrow these very ideas of "sovereignty," which these judges now +proclaim, as the supreme law of this country. They seem never to have +heard of the Declaration of Independence, nor of any other declaration +of the natural rights of human beings. To their minds, "the sovereignty +of governments" is everything; human rights nothing. They apparently +cannot conceive of such a thing as a people's establishing a government +as a means of preserving their personal liberty and rights. They can +only see what fearful calamities "sovereign governments" would be liable +to, if they could not compel their "subjects"--the people--to support +them against their will, and at every cost of their property, liberty, +and lives. They are utterly blind to the fact, that it is this very +assumption of "sovereignty" over all the natural rights of men, that +brings governments into all their difficulties, and all their perils. +They do not see that it is this very assumption of "sovereignty" over +all men's natural rights, that makes it necessary for the "Divine Right" +governments of Europe to maintain not only great standing armies, but +also a vile purchased priesthood, that shall impose upon, and help to +crush, the ignorant and superstitious people. + +These judges talk of "the _constitutions_" of these "sovereign +governments" of Europe, as they existed "at the time of the framing and +adoption of the constitution of the United States." They apparently do +not know that those governments had no constitutions at all, except the +Will of God, their standing armies, and the judges, lawyers, priests, +pimps, spies, and ruffians they kept in their service. + +If these judges had lived in Russia, a hundred years ago, and had +chanced to be visited with a momentary spasm of manhood--a fact hardly +to be supposed of such creatures--and had been sentenced therefor to the +knout, a dungeon, or Siberia, would we ever afterward have seen them, as +judges of our Supreme Court, declaring that government to be the model +after which ours was formed? + +These judges will probably be surprised when I tell them that the +constitution of the United States contains no such word as "sovereign," +or "sovereignty"; that it contains no such word as "subjects"; nor any +word that implies that the government is "sovereign," or that the people +are "subjects." At most, it contains only the mistaken idea that a power +of making laws--by lawmakers chosen by the people--was consistent with, +and necessary to, the maintenance of liberty and justice for the people +themselves. This mistaken idea was, in some measure, excusable in that +day, when reason and experience had not demonstrated, to their minds, +the utter incompatibility of all lawmaking whatsoever with men's natural +rights. + +The only other provision of the constitution, that can be interpreted as +a declaration of "sovereignty" in the government, is this: + + This constitution, and the laws of the United States _which + shall be made in pursuance thereof_, and all treaties made, or + which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, + _shall be the supreme law of the land_, and the judges in every + State shall be bound thereby, _anything in the constitution or + laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding_.--_Art._ VI. + +This provision I interpret to mean simply that the constitution, laws, +and treaties of the United States, shall be "the supreme law of the +land"--_not anything in the natural rights of the people to liberty and +justice, to the contrary notwithstanding_--but only that they shall be +"the supreme law of the land," "_anything in the constitution or laws of +any State to the contrary notwithstanding_,"--that is, whenever the two +may chance to conflict with each other. + +If this is its true interpretation, the provision contains no +declaration of "sovereignty" over the natural rights of the people. + +Justice is "the supreme law" of this, and all other lands; anything in +the constitutions or laws of any nation to the contrary notwithstanding. +And if the constitution of the United States intended to assert the +contrary, it was simply an audacious lie--a lie as foolish as it was +audacious--that should have covered with infamy every man who helped to +frame the constitution, or afterward sanctioned it, or that should ever +attempt to administer it. + +Inasmuch as the constitution declares itself to have been "ordained and +established" by + + We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more + perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, + provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, + and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our + posterity, + +everybody who attempts to administer it, is bound to give it such an +interpretation, and only such an interpretation, as is consistent +with, and promotive of, those objects, if its language will admit of +such an interpretation. + +To suppose that "the people of the United States" intended to declare +that the constitution and laws of the United States should be "the +supreme law of the land," _anything in their own natural rights, or in +the natural rights of the rest of mankind, to the contrary +notwithstanding_, would be to suppose that they intended, not only to +authorize every injustice, and arouse universal violence, among +themselves, but that they intended also to avow themselves the open +enemies of the rights of all the rest of mankind. Certainly no such +folly, madness, or criminality as this can be attributed to them by any +rational man--always excepting the justices of the Supreme Court of the +United States, the lawmakers, and the believers in the "Divine Right" of +the cunning and the strong, to establish governments that shall deceive, +plunder, enslave, and murder the ignorant and the weak. + +Many men, still living, can well remember how, some fifty years ago, +those famous champions of "sovereignty," of arbitrary power, Webster and +Calhoun, debated the question, whether, in this country, "sovereignty" +resided in the general or State governments. But they never settled the +question, for the very good reason that no such thing as "sovereignty" +resided in either. + +And the question was never settled, until it was settled at the cost of +a million of lives, and some ten thousand millions of money. And then it +was settled only as the same question had so often been settled before, +to wit, that "the heaviest battalions" are "sovereign" over the lighter. + +The only real "sovereignty," or right of "sovereignty," in this or any +other country, is that right of sovereignty which each and every human +being has over his or her own person and property, so long as he or she +obeys the one law of justice towards the person and property of every +other human being. This is the only _natural_ right of sovereignty, that +was ever known among men. All other so-called rights of sovereignty are +simply the usurpations of impostors, conspirators, robbers, tyrants, and +murderers. + +It is not strange that we are in such high favor with the tyrants of +Europe, when our Supreme Court tells them that our government, although +a little different in form, stands on the same essential basis as theirs +of a hundred years ago; that it is as absolute and irresponsible as +theirs were then; that it will spend more money, and shed more blood, to +maintain its power, than they have ever been able to do; that the people +have no more rights here than there; and that the government is doing +all it can to keep the producing classes as poor here as they are +there. + + +SECTION XXIV. + +John Marshall has the reputation of having been the greatest jurist the +country has ever had. And he unquestionably would have been a great +jurist, if the two fundamental propositions, on which all his legal, +political, and constitutional ideas were based, had been true. + +These propositions were, first, that government has all power; and, +secondly, that the people have no rights. + +These two propositions were, with him, cardinal principles, from which, +I think, he never departed. + +For these reasons he was the oracle of all the rapacious classes, in +whose interest the government was administered. And from them he got all +his fame. + +I think his record does not furnish a single instance, in which he ever +vindicated men's natural rights, in opposition to the arbitrary +legislation of congress. + +He was chief justice thirty-four years: from 1801 to 1835. In all that +time, so far as I have known, he never declared a single act of congress +unconstitutional; and probably never would have done so, if he had lived +to this time. + +And, so far as I know, he never declared a single State law +unconstitutional, on account of its injustice, or its violation of men's +natural rights; but only on account of its conflict with the +constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. + +He was considered very profound on questions of "sovereignty." In fact, +he never said much in regard to anything else. He held that, in this +country, "sovereignty" was divided: that the national government was +"sovereign" over certain things; and that the State governments were +"sovereign" over all other things. He had apparently never heard of any +natural, individual, human rights, that had never been delegated to +either the general or State governments. + +As a practical matter, he seemed to hold that the general government had +"sovereignty" enough to destroy as many of the natural rights of the +people as it should please to destroy; and that the State governments +had "sovereignty" enough to destroy what should be left, if there should +be any such. He evidently considered that, to the national government, +had been delegated the part of the lion, with the right to devour as +much of his prey as his appetite should crave; and that the State +governments were jackals, with power to devour what the lion should +leave. + +In his efforts to establish the absolutism of our governments, he made +himself an adept in the use of all those false definitions, and false +assumptions, to which courts are driven, who hold that constitutions and +statute books are supreme over all natural principles of justice, and +over all the natural rights of mankind. + +Here is his definition of law. He professes to have borrowed it from +some one,--he does not say whom,--but he accepts it as his own. + + Law has been defined by a writer, whose definitions especially + have been the theme of _almost_ universal panegyric, "_To be a + rule of civil conduct prescribed by the supreme power in a + State._" In our system, the legislature of a State is the + supreme power, in all cases where its action is not restrained + by the constitution of the United States.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, + 12 Wheaton 347._ + +This definition is an utterly false one. It denies all the natural +rights of the people; and is resorted to only by usurpers and tyrants, +to justify their crimes. + +The true definition of law is, that it is a fixed, immutable, natural +principle; and not anything that man ever made, or can make, unmake, or +alter. Thus we speak of the laws of matter, and the laws of mind; of the +law of gravitation, the laws of light, heat, and electricity, the laws +of chemistry, geology, botany; of physiological laws, of astronomical +and atmospherical laws, etc., etc. + +All these are natural laws, that man never made, nor can ever unmake, or +alter. + +The law of justice is just as supreme and universal in the moral world, +as these others are in the mental or physical world; and is as +unalterable as are these by any human power. And it is just as false and +absurd to talk of anybody's having the power to abolish the law of +justice, and set up their own will in its stead, as it would be to talk +of their having the power to abolish the law of gravitation, or any of +the other natural laws of the universe, and set up their own will in the +place of them. + +Yet Marshall holds that this natural law of justice is no law at all, in +comparison with some "rule of civil conduct prescribed by [what he +calls] the supreme power in a State." + +And he gives this miserable definition, which he picked up +somewhere--out of the legal filth in which he wallowed--as his +sufficient authority for striking down all the natural obligation of +men's contracts, and all men's natural rights to make their own +contracts; and for upholding the State governments in prohibiting all +such contracts as they, in their avarice and tyranny, may choose to +prohibit. He does it too, directly in the face of that very +constitution, which he professes to uphold, and which declares that "No +State shall pass any law impairing the [natural] obligation of +contracts." + +By the same rule, or on the same definition of law, he would strike down +any and all the other natural rights of mankind. + +That such a definition of law should suit the purposes of men like +Marshall, who believe that governments should have all power, and men no +rights, accounts for the fact that, in this country, men have had no +"_rights_"--but only such permits as lawmakers have seen fit to allow +them--since the State and United States governments were +established,--or at least for the last eighty years. + +Marshall also said: + + The right [of government] to regulate contracts, to prescribe + the rules by which they may be evidenced, _to prohibit such as + may be deemed mischievous, is unquestionable_, and has been + universally exercised.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton 347._ + +He here asserts that "the supreme power in a State"--that is, the +legislature of a State--has "the _right_" to "_deem_ it _mischievous_" +to allow men to exercise their natural right to make their own +contracts! Contracts that have a natural obligation! And that, if a +State legislature thinks it "mischievous" to allow men to make contracts +that are naturally obligatory, "_its right to prohibit them is +unquestionable_." + +Is not this equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and +the people no rights? + +On the same principle, and under the same definition of law, the +lawmakers of a State may, of course, hold it "mischievous" to allow men +to exercise any of their other natural rights, as well as their right to +make their own contracts; and may therefore prohibit the exercise of +any, or all, of them. + +And this is equivalent to saying that governments have all power, and +the people no rights. + +If a government can forbid the free exercise of a single one of man's +natural rights, it may, for the same reason, forbid the exercise of any +and all of them; and thus establish, practically and absolutely, +Marshall's principle, that the government has all power, and the people +no rights. + +_In the same case, of Ogden vs. Saunders, Marshall's principle was +agreed to by all the other justices, and all the lawyers!_ + +Thus Thompson, one of the justices, said: + + Would it not be within the legitimate powers of a State + legislature to declare _prospectively_ that no one should be + made responsible, upon contracts entered into before arriving + at the age of _twenty-five_ years? This, I presume, cannot be + doubted.--_p. 300._ + +On the same principle, he might say that a State legislature may declare +that no person, under fifty, or seventy, or a hundred, years of age, +shall exercise his natural right of making any contract that is +naturally obligatory. + +In the same case, Trimble, another of the justices, said: + + If the positive law [that is, the statute law] of the State + declares the contract shall have no obligation, _it can have no + obligation, whatever may be the principles of natural law in + regard to such a contract. This doctrine has been held and + maintained by all States and nations. The power of controlling, + modifying, and even taking away, all obligation from such + contracts as, independently of positive enactions to the + contrary, would have been obligatory, has been exercised by all + independent sovereigns._--_p. 320._ + +Yes; and why has this power been exercised by "all States and nations," +and "all independent sovereigns"? Solely because these governments have +all--or at least so many of them as Trimble had in his mind--been +despotic and tyrannical; and have claimed for themselves all power, and +denied to the people all rights. + +Thus it seems that Trimble, like all the rest of them, got his +constitutional law, not from any natural principles of justice, not from +man's natural rights, not from the constitution of the United States, +nor even from any constitution affirming men's natural rights, but from +"the doctrine [that] has been held and maintained by all [those] States +and nations," and "all [those] independent sovereigns," who have usurped +all power, and denied all the natural rights of mankind. + +Marshall gives another of his false definitions, when, speaking for the +whole court, in regard to the power of congress "to regulate commerce +with foreign nations, and among the several States," he asserts the +right of congress to an arbitrary, absolute dominion over all men's +natural rights to carry on such commerce. Thus he says: + + What is this power? It is the power to regulate: _that is, to + prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This + power, like all others vested in congress, is complete in + itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges + no limitations, other than are prescribed by the constitution._ + These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect the + questions which arise in this case, or which have been + discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the + sovereignty of congress, though limited to specific objects, is + plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with + foreign nations, and among the several States, is vested in + congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government, + having in its constitution the same restrictions on the + exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the + United States. _The wisdom and the discretion of congress, + their identity with the people, and the influence which their + constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many + other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the + sole restraints on which they_ [the people] _have relied, to + secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which + the people must often rely_ SOLELY, _in all representative + governments_.--_Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheaton 196._ + +This is a general declaration of absolutism over all "commerce with +foreign nations and among the several States," with certain exceptions +mentioned in the constitution; such as that "all duties, imposts, and +excises shall be uniform throughout the United States," and "no tax or +duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State," and "no +preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to +the ports of one State over those of another; nor shall vessels bound +to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in +another." + +According to this opinion of the court, congress has--subject to the +exceptions referred to--absolute, irresponsible dominion over "all +commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States"; and all +men's natural rights to trade with each other, among the several States, +and all over the world, are prostrate under the feet of a contemptible, +detestable, and irresponsible cabal of lawmakers; and the people have no +protection or redress for any tyranny or robbery that may be practised +upon them, except _"the wisdom and the discretion of congress, their +identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents +possess at elections"!_ + +It will be noticed that the court say that _"all the other powers, +vested in congress, are complete in themselves, and may be exercised to +their utmost extent, and acknowledge no limitations, other than those +prescribed by the constitution."_ + +They say that among "all the other [practically unlimited] powers, +vested in congress," is the power "of declaring war"; and, of course, +of carrying on war; that congress has power to carry on war, for any +reason, to any extent, and against any people, it pleases. + +Thus they say, virtually, that _the natural rights of mankind_ impose no +_constitutional_ restraints whatever upon congress, in the exercise of +their lawmaking powers. + +Is not this asserting that governments have all power, and the people no +rights? + +But what is to be particularly noticed, is the fact that Marshall gives +to congress all this practically unlimited power over all "commerce with +foreign nations, and among the several States," _solely on the strength +of a false definition of the verb "to regulate_." He says that "the +power to regulate commerce" is the power "_to prescribe the rule by +which commerce is to be governed_." + + This definition is an utterly false, absurd, and atrocious one. + It would give congress power arbitrarily to control, obstruct, + impede, derange, prohibit, and destroy commerce. + + The verb "to regulate" does not, as Marshall asserts, imply the + exercise of any arbitrary control whatever over the thing + regulated; nor any power "to prescribe [arbitrarily] the rule, + by which" the thing regulated "is to be governed." On the + contrary, it comes from the Latin word, _regula_, a rule; _and + implies the pre-existence of a rule, to which the thing + regulated is made to conform_. + + To regulate one's diet, for example, is not, on the one hand, + to starve one's self to emaciation, nor, on the other, to gorge + one's self with all sorts of indigestible and hurtful + substances, in disregard of the natural laws of health. But it + supposes the pre-existence of the _natural laws of health_, to + which the diet is made to conform. + + A clock is not "regulated," when it is made to go, to stop, to + go forwards, to go backwards, to go fast, to go slow, at the + mere will or caprice of the person who may have it in hand. It + is "regulated" only when it is made to conform to, to mark + truly, the diurnal revolutions of the earth. These revolutions + of the earth constitute the pre-existing rule, by which alone a + clock can be regulated. + + A mariner's compass is not "regulated," when the needle is made + to move this way and that, at the will of an operator, without + reference to the north pole. But it is regulated when it is + freed from all disturbing influences, and suffered to point + constantly to the north, as it is its nature to do. + + A locomotive is not "regulated," when it is made to go, to + stop, to go forwards, to go backwards, to go fast, to go slow, + at the mere will and caprice of the engineer, and without + regard to economy, utility, or safety. But it is regulated, + when its motions are made to conform to a pre-existing rule, + that is made up of economy, utility, and safety combined. What + this rule is, in the case of a locomotive, may not be known + with such scientific precision, as is the rule in the case of a + clock, or a mariner's compass; but it may be approximated with + sufficient accuracy for practical purposes. + + The pre-existing rule, by which alone commerce can be + "regulated," is a matter of science; and is already known, so + far as the natural principle of justice, in relation to + contracts, is known. The natural right of all men to make all + contracts whatsoever, that are naturally and intrinsically just + and lawful, furnishes the pre-existing rule, by which _alone_ + commerce can be regulated. And it is the only rule, to which + congress have any constitutional power to make commerce + conform. + + When all commerce, that is intrinsically just and lawful, is + secured and protected, and all commerce that is intrinsically + unjust and unlawful, is prohibited, then commerce is regulated, + and not before.[5] + + [5] The above extracts are from a pamphlet published by + me in 1864, entitled "_Considerations for Bankers_," + etc., pp. 55, 56, 57. + +This false definition of the verb "_to regulate_" has been used, time +out of mind, by knavish lawmakers and their courts, to hide their +violations of men's natural right to do their own businesses in all such +ways--that are naturally and intrinsically just and lawful--as they may +choose to do them in. These lawmakers and courts dare not always deny, +utterly and plainly, men's right to do their own businesses in their own +ways; but they will assume "_to regulate_" them; and in pretending +simply "to regulate" them, they contrive "to regulate" men out of all +their natural rights to do their own businesses in their own ways. + +How much have we all heard (we who are old enough), within the last +fifty years, of the power of congress, or of the States, "_to regulate +the currency_." And "to regulate the currency" has always meant to fix +the kind, _and limit the amount_, of currency, that men may be permitted +to buy and sell, lend and borrow, give and receive, in their dealings +with each other. It has also meant to say _who shall have the control of +the licensed money_; instead of making it mean the suppression only of +false and dishonest money, and then leaving all men free to exercise +their natural right of buying and selling, borrowing and lending, giving +and receiving, all such, and so much, honest and true money, or +currency, as the parties to any or all contracts may mutually agree +upon. + +Marshall's false _assumptions_ are numerous and tyrannical. They all +have the same end in view as his false definitions; that is, to +establish the principle that governments have all power, and the people +no rights. They are so numerous that it would be tedious, if not +impossible, to describe them all separately. Many, or most, of them are +embraced in the following, _viz._: + +1. The assumption that, by a certain paper, called the constitution of +the United States--a paper (I repeat and reiterate) which nobody ever +signed, which but few persons ever read, and which the great body of the +people never saw--and also by some forty subsidiary papers, called State +constitutions, which also nobody ever signed, which but few persons ever +read, and which the great body of the people never saw--all making a +perfect system of the merest nothingness--the assumption, I say, that, +by these papers, the people have all consented to the abolition of +justice itself, the highest moral law of the Universe; and that all +their own natural, inherent, inalienable rights to the benefits of that +law, shall be annulled; and that they themselves, and everything that is +theirs, shall be given over into the irresponsible custody of some forty +little cabals of blockheads and villains called lawmakers--blockheads, +who imagine themselves wiser than justice itself, and villains, who care +nothing for either wisdom or justice, but only for the gratification of +their own avarice and ambitions; and that these cabals shall be invested +with the right to dispose of the property, liberty, and lives of all the +rest of the people, at their pleasure or discretion; or, as Marshall +says, "their wisdom and discretion!" + +If such an assumption as that does not embrace nearly, or quite, all the +other false assumptions that usurpers and tyrants can ever need, to +justify themselves in robbing, enslaving, and murdering all the rest of +mankind, it is less comprehensive than it appears to me to be. + +2. In the following paragraph may be found another batch of Marshall's +false assumptions. + + The right to contract is the attribute of a free agent, and he + may rightfully coerce performance from another free agent, who + violates his faith. Contracts have consequently an intrinsic + obligation. _[But] When men come into society, they can no + longer exercise this original natural right of coercion. It + would be incompatible with general peace, and is therefore + surrendered._ Society prohibits the use of private individual + coercion, _and gives in its place a more safe and more certain + remedy_. But the right to contract is not surrendered with the + right to coerce performance.--_Ogden vs. Saunders, 12 Wheaton + 350._ + +In this extract, taken in connection with the rest of his opinion in the +same case, Marshall convicts himself of the grossest falsehood. He +acknowledges that men have a natural right to make their own contracts; +that their contracts have an "intrinsic obligation"; and that they have +an "original and natural right" to coerce performance of them. And yet +he assumes, and virtually asserts, that men _voluntarily "come into +society_," and "_surrender_" to "society" their natural right to coerce +the fulfilment of their contracts. He assumes, and virtually asserts, +that they do this, _upon the ground, and for the reason, that "society +gives in its place a more safe and more certain remedy_"; that is, "a +more safe and more certain" enforcement of all men's contracts that have +"an intrinsic obligation." + +In thus saying that "men come into society," and "surrender" to society, +their "original and natural right" of coercing the fulfilment of +contracts, and that "_society gives in its place a more safe and certain +remedy_," he virtually says, and means to say, that, _in consideration +of such "surrender" of their "original and natural right of coercion," +"society" pledges itself to them that it will give them this "more safe +and more certain remedy_"; that is, that it will more safely and more +certainly enforce their contracts than they can do it themselves. + +And yet, in the same opinion--only two and three pages preceding this +extract--he declares emphatically that "the right" of government--or of +what he calls "society"--"_to prohibit such contracts as may be deemed +mischievous_, is _unquestionable_."--_p. 347._ + +And as an illustration of the exercise of this right of "society" to +prohibit such contracts "as may be deemed mischievous," he cites the +usury laws, thus: + + The acts against usury declare the contract to be void in the + beginning. They deny that the instrument ever became a + contract. They deny it all original obligation; and cannot + impair that which never came into existence.--_p. 348._ + +All this is as much as to say that, when a man has voluntarily "come +into society," and has "surrendered" to society "his original and +natural right of coercing" the fulfilment of his contracts, and when he +has done this in the confidence that society will fulfil its pledge to +"give him a more safe and more certain coercion" than he was capable of +himself, "society" may then turn around to him, and say: + + We acknowledge that you have a natural right to make your own + contracts. We acknowledge that your contracts have "an + intrinsic obligation." We acknowledge that you had "an original + and natural right" to coerce the fulfilment of them. We + acknowledge that it was solely in consideration of our pledge + to you, that we would give you a more safe and more certain + coercion than you were capable of yourself, that you + "surrendered" to us your right to coerce a fulfilment of them. + And we acknowledge that, _according to our pledge_, you have + now a right to require of us that we coerce a fulfilment of + them. But after you had "surrendered" to us your own right of + coercion, we took a different view of the pledge we had given + you; and concluded that it would be "mischievous" to allow you + to make such contracts. We therefore "prohibited" your making + them. And having prohibited the making of them, we cannot now + admit that they have any "obligation." We must therefore + decline to enforce the fulfilment of them. And we warn you + that, if you attempt to enforce them, by virtue of your own + "original and natural right of coercion," we shall be obliged + to consider your act a breach of "the general peace," and + punish you accordingly. We are sorry that you have lost your + property, but "society" must judge as to what contracts are, + and what are not, "mischievous." We can therefore give you no + redress. Nor can we suffer you to enforce your own rights, or + redress your own wrongs. + +Such is Marshall's theory of the way in which "society" got possession +of all men's "original and natural right" to make their own contracts, +and enforce the fulfilment of them; and of the way in which "society" +now justifies itself in prohibiting all contracts, though "intrinsically +obligatory," which it may choose to consider "mischievous." And he +asserts that, in this way, "society" has acquired "_an unquestionable +right_" to cheat men out of all their "original and natural right" to +make their own contracts, and enforce the fulfilment of them. + +A man's "original and natural right" to make all contracts that are +"intrinsically obligatory," and to coerce the fulfilment of them, is one +of the most valuable and indispensable of all human possessions. But +Marshall assumes that a man may "surrender" this right to "society," +under a pledge from "society," that it will secure to him "a more safe +and certain" fulfilment of his contracts, than he is capable of himself; +and that "society," having thus obtained from him this "surrender," may +then turn around to him, and not only refuse to fulfil its pledge to +him, but may also prohibit his own exercise of his own "original and +natural right," which he has "surrendered" to "society!" + +This is as much as to say that, if A can but induce B to intrust his +(B's) property with him (A), for safekeeping, under a pledge that he +(A) will keep it more safely and certainly than B can do it himself, _A +thereby acquires an "unquestionable right" to keep the property forever, +and let B whistle for it!_ + +This is the kind of assumption on which Marshall based all his ideas of +the constitutional law of this country; that _constitutional_ law, which +he was so famous for expounding. It is the kind of assumption, by which +he expounded the people out of all their "original and natural rights." + +He had just as much right to assume, and practically did assume, that +the people had voluntarily "come into society," and had voluntarily +"surrendered" to their governments _all their other natural rights_, as +well as their "original and natural right" to make and enforce their own +contracts. + +He virtually said to all the people of this country: + + You have voluntarily "come into society," and have voluntarily + "surrendered" to your governments all your natural rights, of + every name and nature whatsoever, _for safe keeping;_ and now + that these governments have, _by your own consent_, got + possession of all your natural rights, they have an + "_unquestionable right_" to withhold them from you forever. + +If it were not melancholy to see mankind thus cheated, robbed, enslaved, +and murdered, on the authority of such naked impostures as these, it +would be, to the last degree, ludicrous, to see a man like +Marshall--reputed to be one of the first intellects the country has ever +had--solemnly expounding the "constitutional powers," as he called them, +by which the general and State governments were authorized to rob the +people of all their natural rights as human beings. + +And yet this same Marshall has done more than any other one +man--certainly more than any other man within the last eighty-five +years--to make our governments, State and national, what they are. He +has, for more than sixty years, been esteemed an oracle, not only by his +associates and successors on the bench of the Supreme Court of the +United States, but by all the other judges, State and national, by all +the ignorant, as well as knavish, lawmakers in the country, and by all +the sixty to a hundred thousand lawyers, upon whom the people have been, +and are, obliged to depend for the security of their rights. + +This system of false definitions, false assumptions, and fraud and +usurpation generally, runs through all the operations of our +governments, State and national. There is nothing genuine, nothing real, +nothing true, nothing honest, to be found in any of them. They all +proceed upon the principle, that governments have all power, and the +people no rights. + + +SECTION XXV. + +But perhaps the most absolute proof that our national lawmakers and +judges are as regardless of all constitutional, as they are of all +natural, law, and that their statutes and decisions are as destitute of +all constitutional, as they are of all natural, authority, is to be +found in the fact that these lawmakers and judges have trampled upon, +and utterly ignored, certain amendments to the constitution, which had +been adopted, and (constitutionally speaking) become authoritative, as +early as 1791; only two years after the government went into operation. + +If these amendments had been obeyed, they would have compelled all +congresses and courts to understand that, if the government had any +constitutional powers at all, they were simply powers to protect men's +natural rights, and not to destroy any of them. + +These amendments have actually forbidden any lawmaking whatever in +violation of men's natural rights. And this is equivalent to a +prohibition of any lawmaking at all. And if lawmakers and courts had +been as desirous of preserving men's natural rights, as they have been +of violating them, they would long ago have found out that, since these +amendments, the constitution authorized no lawmaking at all. + +These amendments were ten in number. They were recommended by the first +congress, at its first session, in 1789; two-thirds of both houses +concurring. And in 1791, they had been ratified by all the States: and +from that time they imposed the restrictions mentioned upon all the +powers of congress. + +These amendments were proposed, by the first congress, for the reason +that, although the constitution, as originally framed, had been adopted, +its adoption had been procured only with great difficulty, and in spite +of great objections. _These objections were that, as originally framed +and adopted, the constitution contained no adequate security for the +private rights of the people._ + +These objections were admitted, by very many, if not all, the friends of +the constitution themselves, to be very weighty; and such as ought to be +immediately removed by amendments. And it was only because these friends +of the constitution pledged themselves to use their influence to secure +these amendments, that the adoption of the constitution itself was +secured. And it was in fulfilment of these pledges, and to remove these +objections, that the amendments were proposed and adopted. + +The first eight amendments specified particularly various prohibitions +upon the power of congress; such, for example, as those securing to the +people the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech and the +press, the right to keep and bear arms, etc., etc. Then followed the +ninth amendment, in these words: + + The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights, + [retained by the people] shall not be construed to deny or + disparage others retained by the people. + +Here is an authoritative declaration, that "the people" have "_other +rights_" than those specially "enumerated in the constitution"; and that +these "_other rights_" were "_retained by the people_"; that is, _that +congress should have no power to infringe them_. + +What, then, were these "other rights," that had not been "enumerated"; +but which were nevertheless "retained by the people"? + +Plainly they were men's natural "rights"; for these are the only +"rights" that "the people" ever had, or, consequently, that they could +"retain." + +And as no attempt is made to enumerate _all_ these "other rights," or +any considerable number of them, and as it would be obviously impossible +to enumerate all, or any considerable number, of them; and as no +exceptions are made of any of them, the necessary, the legal, the +inevitable inference is, that they were _all_ "retained"; and that +congress should have no power to violate any of them. + +Now, if congress and the courts had attempted to obey this amendment, as +they were constitutionally bound to do, they would soon have found that +they had really no lawmaking power whatever left to them; because they +would have found that they could make no law at all, _of their own +invention_, that would _not_ violate men's natural rights. + +All men's natural rights are co-extensive with natural law, the law of +justice; or justice as a science. This law is the exact measure, and the +only measure, of any and every man's natural rights. No one of these +natural rights can be taken from any man, without doing him an +injustice; and no more than these rights can be given to any one, unless +by taking from the natural rights of one or more others. + +In short, every man's natural rights are, first, the right to do, with +himself and his property, everything that he pleases to do, and that +justice towards others does not forbid him to do; and, secondly, to be +free from all compulsion, by others, to do anything whatever, except +what justice to others requires him to do. + +Such, then, has been the constitutional law of this country since 1791; +admitting, for the sake of the argument--what I do not really admit to +be a fact--that the constitution, so called, has ever been a law at all. + +This amendment, from the remarkable circumstances under which it was +proposed and adopted, must have made an impression upon the minds of all +the public men of the time; although they may not have fully +comprehended, and doubtless did not fully comprehend, its sweeping +effects upon all the supposed powers of the government. + +But whatever impression it may have made upon the public men of that +time, its authority and power were wholly lost upon their successors; +and probably, for at least eighty years, it has never been heard of, +either in congress or the courts. + +John Marshall was perfectly familiar with all the circumstances, under +which this, and the other nine amendments, were proposed and adopted. He +was thirty-two years old (lacking seven days) when the constitution, as +originally framed, was published (September 17, 1787); and he was a +member of the Virginia convention that ratified it. He knew perfectly +the objections that were raised to it, in that convention, on the ground +of its inadequate guaranty of men's natural rights. He knew with what +force these objections were urged by some of the ablest members of the +convention. And he knew that, to obviate these objections, the +convention, as a body, without a dissenting voice, so far as appears, +recommended that very stringent amendments, for securing men's natural +rights, be made to the constitution. And he knew further, that, but for +these amendments being recommended, the constitution would not have been +adopted by the convention.[6] + + [6] For the amendments recommended by the Virginia convention, + see "Elliot's Debates," Vol. 3, pp. 657 to 663. For the debates + upon these amendments, see pages 444 to 452, and 460 to 462, and + 466 to 471, and 579 to 652. + +The amendments proposed were too numerous to be repeated here, although +they would be very instructive, as showing how jealous the people were, +lest their natural rights should be invaded by laws made by congress. +And that the convention might do everything in its power to secure the +adoption of these amendments, it resolved as follows: + + And the convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of + this commonwealth, enjoin it upon their representatives in + congress to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable + and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the foregoing + alterations and provisions, in the manner provided by the 5th + article of the said Constitution; and, in all congressional + laws to be passed in the meantime, to conform to the spirit of + these amendments, as far as the said Constitution will + admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 3, p. 661._ + +In seven other State conventions, to wit, in those of Massachusetts, New +Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, Maryland, North Carolina, and South +Carolina, the inadequate security for men's natural rights, and the +necessity for amendments, were admitted, and insisted upon, in very +similar terms to those in Virginia. + +In Massachusetts, the convention proposed nine amendments to the +constitution; and resolved as follows: + + And the convention do, in the name and in the behalf of the + people of this commonwealth, enjoin it upon their + representatives in Congress, at all times, until the + alterations and provisions aforesaid have been considered, + agreeably to the 5th article of the said Constitution, to exert + all their influence, and use all reasonable and legal methods, + to obtain a ratification of the said alterations and + provisions, in such manner as is provided in the said + article.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 2, p. 178._ + +The New Hampshire convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed +twelve amendments, and added: + + And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of + this State, enjoin it upon their representatives in congress, + at all times, until the alterations and provisions aforesaid + have been considered agreeably to the fifth article of the said + Constitution, to exert all their influence, and use all + reasonable and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the + said alterations and provisions, in such manner as is provided + in the article.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 326._ + +The Rhode Island convention, in ratifying the constitution, put forth a +declaration of rights, in eighteen articles, and also proposed +twenty-one amendments to the constitution; and prescribed as follows: + + And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of + the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, enjoin it + upon their senators and representative or representatives, + which may be elected to represent this State in congress, to + exert all their influence, and use all reasonable means, to + obtain a ratification of the following amendments to the said + Constitution, in the manner prescribed therein; and in all laws + to be passed by the congress in the mean time, to conform to + the spirit of the said amendments, as far as the Constitution + will admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 335._ + +The New York convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed a +great many amendments, and added: + + And the Convention do, in the name and behalf of the people of + the State of New York, enjoin it upon their representatives in + congress, to exert all their influence, and use all reasonable + means, to obtain a ratification of the following amendments to + the said Constitution, in the manner prescribed therein; and in + all laws to be passed by the congress, in the mean time, to + conform to the spirit of the said amendments as far as the + Constitution will admit.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 329._ + +The New York convention also addressed a "CIRCULAR LETTER" to the +governors of all the other States, the first two paragraphs of which are +as follows: + + THE CIRCULAR LETTER, + + _From the Convention of the State of New York to the Governors + of the several States in the Union._ + + POUGHKEEPSIE, JULY 28, 1788. + + Sir, We, the members of the Convention of this State, have + deliberately and maturely considered the Constitution proposed + for the United States. Several articles in it appear so + exceptionable to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest + confidence of obtaining a revision of them by a general + convention, and an invincible reluctance to separating from our + sister States, could have prevailed upon a sufficient number to + ratify it, without stipulating for previous amendments. We all + unite in opinion, that such a revision will be necessary to + recommend it to the approbation and support of a numerous body + of our constituents. + + We observe that amendments have been proposed, and are + anxiously desired, by several of the States, as well as by + this; and we think it of great importance that effectual + measures be immediately taken for calling a convention, to meet + at a period not far remote; for we are convinced that the + apprehensions and discontents, which those articles occasion, + cannot be removed or allayed, unless an act to provide for it + be among the first that shall be passed by the new + congress.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 2, p. 413._ + +In the Maryland convention, numerous amendments were proposed, and +thirteen were agreed to; "most of them by a unanimous vote, and all by a +great majority." Fifteen others were proposed, but there was so much +disagreement in regard to them, that none at all were formally +recommended to congress. But, says Elliot: + + All the members, who voted for the ratification [of the + constitution], declared that they would engage themselves, + under every tie of honor, to support the amendments they had + agreed to, both in their public and private characters, until + they should become a part of the general government.--_Elliot's + Debates, Vol. 2, pp. 550, 552-3._ + +The first North Carolina convention refused to ratify the constitution, +and + + _Resolved_, That a declaration of rights, asserting and + securing from encroachments the great principles of civil and + religious liberty, and the inalienable rights of the people, + together with amendments to the most ambiguous and + exceptionable parts of the said constitution of government, + ought to be laid before congress, and the convention of States + that shall or may be called for the purpose of amending the + said Constitution, for their consideration, previous to the + ratification of the Constitution aforesaid, on the part of the + State of North Carolina.--_Elliot's Debates, Vol. 1, p. 332._ + +The South Carolina convention, that ratified the constitution, proposed +certain amendments, and + + _Resolved_, That it be a standing instruction to all such + delegates as may hereafter be elected to represent this State + in the General Government, to exert their utmost abilities and + influence to effect an alteration of the Constitution, + conformably to the foregoing resolutions.--_Elliot's Debates, + Vol. 1. p. 325._ + +In the Pennsylvania convention, numerous objections were made to the +constitution, but it does not appear that the convention, as a +convention, recommended any specific amendments. But a strong movement, +outside of the convention, was afterwards made in favor of such +amendments. ("Elliot's Debates," Vol. 2, p. 542.) + +Of the debates in the Connecticut convention, Elliot gives only what he +calls "_A Fragment_." + +Of the debates in the conventions of New Jersey, Delaware, and Georgia, +Elliot gives no accounts at all. + +I therefore cannot state the grounds, on which the adoption of the +constitution was opposed. They were doubtless very similar to those in +the other States. This is rendered morally certain by the fact, that the +amendments, soon afterwards proposed by congress, were immediately +ratified by all the States. Also by the further fact, that these States, +by reason of the smallness of their representation in the popular branch +of congress, would naturally be even more jealous of their rights, than +the people of the larger States. + +It is especially worthy of notice that, in some, if not in all, the +conventions that ratified the constitution, although the ratification +was accompanied by such urgent recommendations of amendments, and by an +almost absolute assurance that they would be made, it was nevertheless +secured only by very small majorities. + +Thus in Virginia, the vote was only 89 ayes to 79 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 3, +p. 654.) + +In Massachusetts, the ratification was secured only by a vote of 187 +yeas to 168 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 2, p. 181.) + +In New York, the vote was only 30 yeas to 27 nays. (Elliot, Vol. 2, p. +413.) + +In New Hampshire and Rhode Island, neither the yeas nor nays are given. +(Elliot, Vol. 1, pp. 327-335.) + +In Connecticut, the yeas were 128; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1. p. +321-2.) + +In New Jersey, the yeas were 38; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. +321.) + +In Pennsylvania, the yeas were 46; _the nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. +1, p. 320.) + +In Delaware, the yeas were 30; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. +319.) + +In Maryland, the vote was 57 yeas; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. +325.) + +In North Carolina, neither the yeas nor nays are given. (Elliot, Vol. 1, +p. 333.) + +In South Carolina, neither the yeas nor nays are given. (Elliot, Vol. 1, +p. 325.) + +In Georgia, the yeas were 26; _nays not given_. (Elliot, Vol. 1, p. +324.) + +We can thus see by what meagre votes the constitution was adopted. We +can also see that, but for the prospect that important amendments would +be made, specially for securing the natural rights of the people, the +constitution would have been spurned with contempt, as it deserved to +be. + +And yet now, owing to the usurpations of lawmakers and courts, the +original constitution--with the worst possible construction put upon +it--has been carried into effect; and the amendments have been simply +cast into the waste baskets. + +Marshall was thirty-six years old, when these amendments became a part +of the constitution in 1791. Ten years after, in 1801, he became Chief +Justice. It then became his sworn constitutional duty to scrutinize +severely every act of congress, and to condemn, as unconstitutional, all +that should violate any of these natural rights. Yet he appears never to +have thought of the matter afterwards. Or, rather, this ninth amendment, +the most important of all, seems to have been so utterly antagonistic to +all his ideas of government, that he chose to ignore it altogether, and, +as far as he could, to bury it out of sight. + +Instead of recognizing it as an absolute guaranty of all the natural +rights of the people, he chose to assume--for it was all a mere +assumption, a mere making a constitution out of his own head, to suit +himself--that the people had all voluntarily "come into society," and +had voluntarily "surrendered" to "society" all their natural rights, of +every name and nature--trusting that they would be secured; and that +now, "society," having thus got possession of all these natural rights +of the people, had the "unquestionable right" to dispose of them, at the +pleasure--or, as he would say, according to the "wisdom and +discretion"--of a few contemptible, detestable, and irresponsible +lawmakers, whom the constitution (thus amended) had forbidden to dispose +of any one of them. + +If, now, Marshall did not see, in this amendment, any legal force or +authority, what becomes of his reputation as a constitutional lawyer? If +he did see this force and authority, but chose to trample them under his +feet, he was a perjured tyrant and traitor. + +What, also, are we to think of all the judges,--forty in all,--his +associates and successors, who, for eighty years, have been telling the +people that the government has all power, and the people no rights? Have +they all been mere blockheads, who never read this amendment, or knew +nothing of its meaning? Or have they, too, been perjured tyrants and +traitors? + +What, too, becomes of those great constitutional lawyers, as we have +called them, who have been supposed to have won such immortal honors, as +"expounders of the constitution," but who seem never to have discovered +in it any security for men's natural rights? Is their apparent +ignorance, on this point, to be accounted for by the fact, that that +portion of the people, who, by authority of the government, are +systematically robbed of all their earnings, beyond a bare subsistence, +are not able to pay such fees as are the robbers who are authorized to +plunder them? + +If any one will now look back to the records of congress and the courts, +for the last eighty years, I do not think he will find a single mention +of this amendment. And why has this been so? Solely because the +amendment--if its authority had been recognized--would have stood as an +insuperable barrier against all the ambition and rapacity--all the +arbitrary power, all the plunder, and all the tyranny--which the +ambitious and rapacious classes have determined to accomplish through +the agency of the government. + +The fact that these classes have been so successful in perverting the +constitution (thus amended) from an instrument avowedly securing all +men's natural rights, into an authority for utterly destroying them, is +a sufficient proof that no lawmaking power can be safely intrusted to +any body, for any purpose whatever. + +And that this perversion of the constitution should have been sanctioned +by all the judicial tribunals of the country, is also a proof, not only +of the servility, audacity, and villainy of the judges, but also of the +utter rottenness of our judicial system. It is a sufficient proof that +judges, who are dependent upon lawmakers for their offices and salaries, +and are responsible to them by impeachment, cannot be relied on to put +the least restraint upon the acts of their masters, the lawmakers. + +Such, then, would have been the effect of the ninth amendment, if it had +been permitted to have its legitimate authority. + + +SECTION XXVI. + +The tenth amendment is in these words: + + The powers not delegated to the United States by the + constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved + to the States respectively, _or to the people_. + +This amendment, equally with the ninth, secures to "the people" all +their natural rights. And why? + +Because, in truth, no powers at all, neither legislative, judicial, nor +executive, had been "delegated to the United States by the +constitution." + +But it will be said that the amendment itself implies that certain +lawmaking "powers" had been "delegated to the United States by the +constitution." + +No. It only implies that those who adopted the amendment _believed_ that +such lawmaking "powers" had been "delegated to the United States by the +constitution." + +But in this belief, they were entirely mistaken. And why? + +1. Because it is a natural impossibility that any lawmaking "powers" +whatever can be delegated by any one man, or any number of men, to any +other man, or any number of other men. + +Men's natural rights are all inherent and inalienable; and therefore +cannot be parted with, or delegated, by one person to another. And all +contracts whatsoever, for such a purpose, are necessarily absurd and +void contracts. + +For example. I cannot delegate to another man any right to _make_ +laws--that is, laws of his own invention--and compel me to obey them. + +Such a contract, on my part, would be a contract to part with my natural +liberty; to give myself, or sell myself, to him as a slave. Such a +contract would be an absurd and void contract, utterly destitute of all +legal or moral obligation. + +2. I cannot delegate to another any right to make laws--that is, laws of +his own invention--and compel a third person to obey them. + +For example. I cannot delegate to A any right to make laws--that is, +laws of his own invention--and compel Z to obey them. + +I cannot delegate any such right to A, because I have no such right +myself; and I cannot delegate to another what I do not myself possess. + +For these reasons no lawmaking powers ever could be--and therefore no +lawmaking powers ever were--"delegated to the United States by the +constitution"; no matter what the people of that day--any or all of +them--may have attempted to do, or may have believed they had power to +do, in the way of delegating such powers. + +But not only were no lawmaking powers "delegated to the United States by +the constitution," but neither were any _judicial_ powers so delegated. +And why? Because it is a natural impossibility that one man can delegate +his judicial powers to another. + +Every man has, by nature, certain judicial powers, or rights. That is to +say, he has, by nature, the right to judge of, and enforce his own +rights, and judge of, and redress his own wrongs. But, in so doing, he +must act only in accordance with his own judgment and conscience, _and +subject to his own personal responsibility, if, through either ignorance +or design, he commits any error injurious to another_. + +Now, inasmuch as no man can delegate, or impart, his own judgment or +conscience to another, it is naturally impossible that he can delegate +to another his judicial rights or powers. + +So, too, every man has, by nature, a right to judge of, and enforce, the +rights, and judge of, and redress the wrongs, of any and all other men. +This right is included in his natural right to maintain justice between +man and man, and to protect the injured party against the wrongdoer. +But, in doing this, he must act only in accordance with his own judgment +and conscience, and subject to his own personal responsibility for any +error he may commit, either through ignorance or design. + +But, inasmuch as, in this case, as in the preceding one, he can neither +delegate nor impart his own judgment or conscience to another, he cannot +delegate his judicial power or right to another. + +But not only were no lawmaking or judicial powers "delegated to the +United States by the constitution," neither were any executive powers so +delegated. And why? Because, in a case of justice or injustice, it is +naturally impossible that any one man can delegate his executive right +or power to another. + +Every man has, by nature, the right to maintain justice for himself, and +for all other persons, by the use of so much force as may be reasonably +necessary for that purpose. But he can use the force only in accordance +with his own judgment and conscience, and on his own personal +responsibility, if, through ignorance or design, he commits any wrong to +another. + +But inasmuch as he cannot delegate, or impart, his own judgment or +conscience to another, he cannot delegate his executive power or right +to another. + +_The result is, that, in all judicial and executive proceedings, for the +maintenance of justice, every man must act only in accordance with his +own judgment and conscience, and on his own personal responsibility for +any wrong he may commit; whether such wrong be committed through either +ignorance or design._ + +The effect of this principle of personal responsibility, in all judicial +and executive proceedings, would be--or at least ought to be--that no +one would give any judicial opinions, or do any executive acts, except +such as his own judgment and conscience should approve, _and such as he +would be willing to be held personally responsible for_. + +No one could justify, or excuse, his wrong act, by saying that a power, +or authority, to do it had been delegated to him, by any other men, +however numerous. + +For the reasons that have now been given, neither any legislative, +judicial, nor executive powers ever were, or ever could have been, +"delegated to the United States by the constitution"; no matter how +honestly or innocently the people of that day may have believed, or +attempted, the contrary. + +And what is true, in this matter, in regard to the national government, +is, for the same reasons, equally true in regard to all the State +governments. + +But this principle of personal responsibility, each for his own judicial +or executive acts, does not stand in the way of men's associating, at +pleasure, for the maintenance of justice; and selecting such persons as +they think most suitable, for judicial and executive duties; and +_requesting_ them to perform those duties; and then paying them for +their labor. But the persons, thus selected, must still perform their +duties according to their own judgments and consciences alone, and +subject to their own personal responsibility for any errors of either +ignorance or design. + +To make it safe and proper for persons to perform judicial duties, +subject to their personal responsibility for any errors of either +ignorance or design, two things would seem to be important, if not +indispensable, _viz._: + +1. That, as far as is reasonably practicable, all judicial proceedings +should be in writing; that is, that all testimony, and all judicial +opinions, even to quite minute details, should be in writing, and be +preserved; so that judges may always have it in their power to show +fully what their acts, and their reasons for their acts, have been; and +also that anybody, and everybody, interested, may forever after have the +means of knowing fully the reasons on which everything has been done; +and that any errors, ever afterwards discovered, may be corrected. + +2. That all judicial tribunals should consist of so many judges--within +any reasonable number--as either party may desire; or as may be +necessary to prevent any wrong doing, by any one or more of the judges, +either through ignorance or design. + +Such tribunals, consisting of judges, numerous enough, and perfectly +competent to settle justly probably ninety-nine one-hundredths of all +the controversies that arise among men, could be obtained in every +village. They could give their immediate attention to every case; and +thus avoid most of the delay, and most of the expense, now attendant on +judicial proceedings. + +To make these tribunals satisfactory to all reasonable and honest +persons, it is important, and probably indispensable, that all judicial +proceedings should be had, _in the first instance_, at the expense of +the association, or associations, to which the parties to the suit +belong. + +An association for the maintenance of justice should be a purely +voluntary one; and should be formed upon the same principle as a mutual +fire or marine insurance company; that is, each member should pay his +just proportion of the expense necessary for protecting all. + +A single individual could not reasonably be expected to delay, or +forego, the exercise of his natural right to enforce his own rights, and +redress his own wrongs, except upon the condition that there is an +association that will do it promptly, and without expense to him. But +having paid his proper proportion of the expense necessary for the +protection of all, he has then a right to demand prompt and complete +protection for himself. + +Inasmuch as it cannot be known which party is in the wrong, until the +trial has been had, the expense of both parties must, _in the first +instance_, be paid by the association, or associations, to which they +belong. But after the trial has been had, and it has been ascertained +which party was in the wrong, and (if such should be the case) so +clearly in the wrong as to have had no justification for putting the +association to the expense of a trial, he then may properly be compelled +to pay the cost of all the proceedings. + +If the parties to a suit should belong to different associations, it +would be right that the judges should be taken from both associations; +or from a third association, with which neither party was connected. + +If, with all these safeguards against injustice and expense, a party, +accused of a wrong, should refuse to appear for trial, he might +rightfully be proceeded against, in his absence, if the evidence +produced against him should be sufficient to justify it. + +It is probably not necessary to go into any further details here, to +show how easy and natural a thing it would be, to form as many voluntary +and mutually protective judicial associations, as might be either +necessary or convenient, in order to bring justice home to every man's +door; and to give to every honest and dishonest man, all reasonable +assurance that he should have justice, and nothing else, done for him, +or to him. + + +SECTION XXVII. + +Of course we can have no courts of justice, under such systems of +lawmaking, and supreme court decisions, as now prevail. + +We have a population of fifty to sixty millions; _and not a single court +of justice, State or national!_ + +But we have everywhere courts of injustice--open and avowed +injustice--claiming sole jurisdiction of all cases affecting men's +rights of both person and property; and having at their beck brute force +enough to compel absolute submission to their decrees, whether just or +unjust. + +Can a more decisive or infallible condemnation of our governments be +conceived of, than the absence of all courts of justice, and the +absolute power of their courts of injustice? + +Yes, they lie under still another condemnation, to wit, that their +courts are not only courts of injustice, but they are also secret +tribunals; adjudicating all causes according to the secret instructions +of their masters, the lawmakers, and their authorized interpreters, +their supreme courts. + +I say _secret tribunals_, and _secret instructions_, because, to the +great body of the people, whose rights are at stake, they are secret to +all practical intents and purposes. They are secret, because their +reasons for their decrees are to be found only in great volumes of +statutes and supreme court reports, which the mass of the people have +neither money to buy, nor time to read; and would not understand, if +they were to read them. + +These statutes and reports are so far out of reach of the people at +large, that the only knowledge a man can ordinarily get of them, when he +is summoned before one of the tribunals appointed to execute them, is +to be obtained by employing an expert--or so-called lawyer--to enlighten +him. + +This expert in injustice is one who buys these great volumes of statutes +and reports, and spends his life in studying them, and trying to keep +himself informed of their contents. But even he can give a client very +little information in regard to them; for the statutes and decisions are +so voluminous, and are so constantly being made and unmade, and are so +destitute of all conformity to those natural principles of justice which +men readily and intuitively comprehend; and are moreover capable of so +many different interpretations, that he is usually in as great +doubt--perhaps in even greater doubt--than his client, as to what will +be the result of a suit. + +The most he can usually say to his client, is this: + + Every civil suit must finally be given to one of two persons, + the plaintiff or defendant. Whether, therefore, your cause is a + just, or an unjust, one, you have at least one chance in two, + of gaining it. But no matter how just your cause may be, you + need have no hope that the tribunal that tries it, will be + governed by any such consideration, if the statute book, or the + past decisions of the supreme court, are against you. So, also, + no matter how unjust your cause may be, you may nevertheless + expect to gain it, if the statutes and past decisions are in + your favor. If, therefore, you have money to spend in such a + lottery as this, I will do my best to gain your cause for you, + whether it be a just, or an unjust, one. + +If the charge is a criminal one, this expert says to his client: + + You must either be found guilty, or acquitted. Whether, + therefore, you are really innocent or guilty, you have at least + one chance in two, of an acquittal. But no matter how innocent + you may be of any real crime, you need have no hope of an + acquittal, if the statute book, or the past decisions of the + supreme court, are against you. If, on the other hand, you have + committed a real wrong to another, there may be many laws on + the statute book, many precedents, and technicalities, and + whimsicalities, through which you may hope to escape. But your + reputation, your liberty, or perhaps your life, is at stake. To + save these you can afford to risk your money, even though the + result is so uncertain. Therefore you had best give me your + money, and I will do my best to save you, whether you are + innocent or guilty. + +But for the great body of the people,--those who have no money that they +can afford to risk in a lawsuit,--no matter what may be their rights in +either a civil or criminal suit,--their cases are hopeless. They may +have been taxed, directly and indirectly, to their last dollars, for the +support of the government; they may even have been compelled to risk +their lives, and to lose their limbs, in its defence; yet when they want +its protection,--that protection for which their taxes and military +services were professedly extorted from them,--they are coolly told that +the government offers no justice, nor even any chance or semblance of +justice, except to those who have more money than they. + +But the point now to be specially noticed is, that in the case of either +the civil or criminal suit, the client, whether rich or poor, is nearly +or quite as much in the dark as to his fate, and as to the grounds on +which his fate will be determined, as though he were to be tried by an +English Star Chamber court, or one of the secret tribunals of Russia, or +even the Spanish Inquisition. + +Thus in the supreme exigencies of a man's life, whether in civil or +criminal cases, where his property, his reputation, his liberty, or his +life is at stake, he is really to be tried by what is, _to him_, at +least, _a secret tribunal_; a tribunal that is governed by what are, _to +him_, _the secret instructions_ of lawmakers, and supreme courts; +neither of whom care anything for his rights of property in a civil +suit, or for his guilt or innocence in a criminal one; but only for +their own authority as lawmakers and judges. + +The bystanders, at these trials, look on amazed, but powerless to defend +the right, or prevent the wrong. Human nature has no rights, in the +presence of these infernal tribunals. + +Is it any wonder that all men live in constant terror of such a +government as that? Is it any wonder that so many give up all attempts +to preserve their natural rights of person and property, in opposition +to tribunals, to whom justice and injustice are indifferent, and whose +ways are, to common minds, hidden mysteries, and impenetrable secrets. + +But even this is not all. The mode of trial, if not as infamous as the +trial itself, is at least so utterly false and absurd, as to add a new +element of uncertainty to the result of all judicial proceedings. + +A trial in one of these courts of injustice is a trial by battle, +almost, if not quite, as really as was a trial by battle, five hundred +or a thousand years ago. + +Now, as then, the adverse parties choose their champions, to fight their +battles for them. + +These champions, trained to such contests, and armed, not only with all +the weapons their own skill, cunning, and power can supply, but also +with all the iniquitous laws, precedents, and technicalities that +lawmakers and supreme courts can give them, for defeating justice, +and accomplishing injustice, can--if not always, yet none but +themselves know how often--offer their clients such chances of +victory--independently of the justice of their causes--as to induce the +dishonest to go into court to evade justice, or accomplish injustice, +not less often perhaps than the honest go there in the hope to get +justice, or avoid injustice. + +We have now, I think, some sixty thousand of these champions, who make +it the business of their lives to equip themselves for these conflicts, +and sell their services for a price. + +Is there any one of these men, who studies justice as a science, and +regards that alone in all his professional exertions? If there are any +such, why do we so seldom, or never, hear of them? Why have they not +told us, hundreds of years ago, what are men's natural rights of person +and property? And why have they not told us how false, absurd, and +tyrannical are all these lawmaking governments? Why have they not told +us what impostors and tyrants all these so-called lawmakers, judges, +etc., etc., are? Why are so many of them so ambitious to become +lawmakers and judges themselves? + +Is it too much to hope for mankind, that they may sometime have courts +of justice, instead of such courts of injustice as these? + +If we ever should have courts of justice, it is easy to see what will +become of statute books, supreme courts, trial by battle, and all the +other machinery of fraud and tyranny, by which the world is now ruled. + +If the people of this country knew what crimes are constantly committed +by these courts of injustice, they would squelch them, without mercy, as +unceremoniously as they would squelch so many gangs of bandits or +pirates. In fact, bandits and pirates are highly respectable and +honorable villains, compared with the judges of these courts of +injustice. Bandits and pirates do not--like these judges--attempt to +cheat us out of our common sense, in order to cheat us out of our +property, liberty, or life. They do not profess to be anything but such +villains as they really are. They do not claim to have received any +"Divine" authority for robbing, enslaving, or murdering us at their +pleasure. They do not claim immunity for their crimes, upon the ground +that they are duly authorized agents of any such invisible, intangible, +irresponsible, unimaginable thing as "society," or "the State." They do +not insult us by telling us that they are only exercising that authority +to rob, enslave, and murder us, which we ourselves have delegated to +them. They do not claim that they are robbing, enslaving, and murdering +us, solely to secure our happiness and prosperity, and not from any +selfish motives of their own. They do not claim a wisdom so superior to +that of the producers of wealth, as to know, better than they, how their +wealth should be disposed of. They do not tell us that we are the freest +and happiest people on earth, inasmuch as each of our male adults is +allowed one voice in ten millions in the choice of the men, who are to +rob, enslave, and murder us. They do not tell us that all liberty and +order would be destroyed, that society itself would go to pieces, and +man go back to barbarism, if it were not for the care, and supervision, +and protection, they lavish upon us. They do not tell us of the +almshouses, hospitals, schools, churches, etc., which, out of the purest +charity and benevolence, they maintain for our benefit, out of the money +they take from us. They do not carry their heads high, above all other +men, and demand our reverence and admiration, as statesmen, patriots, +and benefactors. They do not claim that we have voluntarily "come into +their society," and "surrendered" to them all our natural rights of +person and property; nor all our "original and natural right" of +defending our own rights, and redressing our own wrongs. They do not +tell us that they have established infallible supreme courts, to whom +they refer all questions as to the legality of their acts, and that they +do nothing that is not sanctioned by these courts. They do not attempt +to deceive us, or mislead us, or reconcile us to their doings, by any +such pretences, impostures, or insults as these. _There is not a single +John Marshall among them._ On the contrary, they acknowledge themselves +robbers, murderers, and villains, pure and simple. When they have once +taken our money, they have the decency to get out of our sight as soon +as possible; they do not persist in following us, and robbing us, again +and again, so long as we produce anything that they can take from us. In +short, they acknowledge themselves _hostes humani generis: enemies of +the human race_. They acknowledge it to be our unquestioned right and +duty to kill them, if we can; that they expect nothing else, than that +we will kill them, if we can; and that we are only fools and cowards, if +we do not kill them, by any and every means in our power. They neither +ask, nor expect, any mercy, if they should ever fall into the hands of +honest men. + +For all these reasons, they are not only modest and sensible, but really +frank, honest, and honorable villains, contrasted with these courts of +injustice, and the lawmakers by whom these courts are established. + +Such, Mr. Cleveland, is the real character of the government, of which +you are the nominal head. Such are, and have been, its lawmakers. Such +are, and have been, its judges. Such have been its executives. Such is +its present executive. Have you anything to say for any of them? + + Yours frankly, LYSANDER SPOONER. + + BOSTON, MAY 15, 1886. + + + THE END. + + + + +Transcriber's Notes: + +Text in italics was enclosed with underscores (_italics_). + +Text in small caps was replaced with ALL CAPS (SMALL CAPS). + +On page 22, there was the use of double quotation marks within double +quotation marks. That usage was not changed. + +On page 43, "at bank" was replaced "at a bank". + +On page 60, "_viz._, 1," was replaced with "_viz._, 1.". + +On page 105, "viz." was italized. + +On page 65, a period as added after "indebted to". + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's A Letter to Grover Cleveland, by Lysander Spooner + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A LETTER TO GROVER CLEVELAND *** + +***** This file should be named 35016.txt or 35016.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/3/5/0/1/35016/ + +Produced by Curtis Weyant, Ernest Schaal, and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive) + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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