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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/31875-8.txt b/31875-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..28e871b --- /dev/null +++ b/31875-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7289 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of An Introduction to the Study of Comparative +Religion, by Frank Byron Jevons + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion + +Author: Frank Byron Jevons + +Release Date: April 3, 2010 [EBook #31875] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRO TO COMPARATIVE RELIGION *** + + + + +Produced by Al Haines + + + + + + + + + + + THE HARTFORD-LAMSON LECTURES ON + THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD + + + +AN INTRODUCTION + +TO THE STUDY OF + +COMPARATIVE RELIGION + + +BY + +FRANK BYRON JEVONS + + +PRINCIPAL OF BISHOP HATFIELD'S HALL, DURHAM + UNIVERSITY, DURHAM, ENGLAND + + + + +New York + +THE MACMILLAN COMPANY + +1920 + +_All rights reserved_ + + + + +COPYRIGHT, 1908, + +By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. + + +Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1908. + + + + + Norwood Press + J. S. Cushing--Berwick & Smith Co. + Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. + + + + +{v} + +NOTE + +The Hartford-Lamson Lectures on "The Religions of the World" are +delivered at Hartford Theological Seminary in connection with the +Lamson Fund, which was established by a group of friends in honor of +the late Charles M. Lamson, D.D., sometime President of the American +Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, to assist in preparing +students for the foreign missionary field. The Lectures are designed +primarily to give to such students a good knowledge of the religious +history, beliefs, and customs of the peoples among whom they expect to +labor. As they are delivered by scholars of the first rank, who are +authorities in their respective fields, it is expected that in +published form they will prove to be of value to students generally. + + + + +{vii} + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 + IMMORTALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + MAGIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 + FETICHISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 + PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 + SACRIFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 + MORALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 + CHRISTIANITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 + APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 + BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 + INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 + + + + +{ix} + +ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS + + +INTRODUCTION + +The use of any science lies in its application to practical purposes. +For Christianity, the use of the science of religion consists in +applying it to show that Christianity is the highest manifestation of +the religious spirit. To make this use of the science of religion, we +must fully and frankly accept the facts it furnishes, and must +recognise that others are at liberty to use them for any opposite +purpose. But we must also insist that the science of religion is +limited to the establishment of facts and is excluded from passing +judgment on the religious value of those facts. The science of +religion as a historical science is concerned with the chronological +order, and not with the religious value, of its facts; and the order of +those facts does not determine their value any more in the case of +religion than in the case of literature or art. But if their value is +a question on which the science refuses to enter, it does not follow +that the question is one which does not admit of a truthful answer: +science has no monopoly of truth. The value of anything always implies +a reference to the future: to be of value a thing must be of use for +some purpose, and what is purposed is in the future. Things have +value, or have not, according as they are useful or not for our +purposes. The conviction that we can attain our purposes and ideals, +the conviction without which we should not even attempt to attain them +is faith; and it is in faith and by faith that the man of religion +proposes to {x} conquer the world. It is by faith in Christianity that +the missionary undertakes to convert men to Christianity. The +comparative value of different religions can only be ascertained by +comparison of those religions; and the missionary, of all men, ought to +know what is to be learnt from such comparison. It is sometimes +supposed (wrongly) that to admit that all religions are comparable is +to admit that all are identical; but, in truth, it is only because they +differ that it is possible to compare them. For the purpose of +comparison both the differences and the resemblances must be assumed to +exist; and even for the purposes of the science of religion there is +nothing to compel us to postulate a period in which either the +differences or the resemblances were non-existent. But though there is +nothing to compel us to assume that the lowest form in which religion +is found was necessarily the earliest to exist, it is convenient for us +to start from the lowest forms. For the practical purposes of the +missionary it is desirable where possible to discover any points of +resemblance or traits of connection between the lower form with which +his hearers are familiar and the higher form to which he proposes to +lead them. It is therefore proper for him and reasonable in itself to +look upon the long history of religion as man's search for God, and to +regard it as the function of the missionary to keep others in that +search . . . 1-33 + + +IMMORTALITY + +The belief in immortality is more prominent, though less intimately +bound up with religion, amongst uncivilised than it is amongst +civilised peoples. In early times the fancy luxuriates, unchecked, on +this as on other matters. It is late in the history of religion that +the immortality of the soul is found to be postulated alike by morality +and religion. The belief that the soul exists after death doubtless +manifested itself first in the {xi} fact that men dream of those who +have died. But, were there no desire to believe, it may be doubted +whether the belief would survive, or even originate. The belief +originates in desire, in longing for one loved and lost; and dreams are +not the cause of that desire, though they are one region in which it +manifests itself, or rather one mode of its manifestation. The desire +is for continued communion; and its gratification is found in a +spiritual communion. Such communion also is believed to unite +worshippers both with one another and with their God. Where death is +regarded as a disruption of communion between the living and the +departed, death is regarded as unnatural, as a violation of the +original design of things, which calls for explanation; and the +explanation is provided in myths which account for it by showing that +the origin of death was due to accident or mistake. At first, it is +felt that the mistake cannot be one without remedy: the deceased is +invited "to come to us again." If he does not return in his old body, +then he is believed to reappear in some new-born child. Or the +doctrine of rebirth may be satisfied by the belief that the soul is +reincarnated in animal form. This belief is specially likely to grow +up where totem ancestors are believed to manifest themselves in the +shape of some animal. Belief in such animal reincarnation has, in its +origin, however, no connection with any theory that transmigration from +a human to an animal form is a punishment. Up to this point in the +evolution of the belief in immortality, the belief in another world +than this does not show itself. Even when ancestor-worship begins to +grow up, the ancestors' field of operations is in this world, rather +than in the next. But the fact that their aid and protection can be +invoked by the community tends to elevate them to the level of the god +or gods of the community. This tendency, however, may be defeated, as +it was in Judæa, where the religious sentiment will not permit the +difference between God and man to be blurred. {xii} Where the fact +that the dead do not return establishes itself as incontrovertible, the +belief grows up that as the dead continue to exist, it is in another +world that their existence must continue. At first they are conceived +to continue to be as they are remembered to have been in this life. +Later the idea grows up that they are punished or rewarded there, +according as they have been bad or good here; according as they have or +have not in this life sought communion with the true God. This belief +thus differs entirely from the earlier belief, _e.g._ as it is found +amongst the Eskimo, that it is in this world the spirits of the +departed reappear, and that their continued existence is unaffected by +considerations of morality or religion. It is, however, not merely the +belief in the next world that may come to be sanctified by religion and +moralised. The belief in reincarnation in animal form may come to be +employed in the service of religion and morality, as it is in Buddhism. +There, however, what was originally the transmigration of souls was +transformed by Gotama into the transmigration of character; and the +very existence of the individual soul, whether before death or after, +was held to be an illusion and a deception. This tenet pushes the +doctrine of self-sacrifice, which is essential both to religion and to +morality, to an extreme which is fatal in logic to morality and +religion alike: communion between man and God--the indispensable +presupposition of both religion and morals--is impossible, if the very +existence of man is illusory. The message of the missionary will be +that by Christianity self-sacrifice is shown to be the condition of +morality, the essence of communion with God and the way to life eternal +. . . 34-69 + + +MAGIC + +A view sometime held was that magic is religion, and religion magic. +With equal reason, or want of reason, it might be held that magic was +science, and science magic. {xiii} Even if we correct the definition, +and say that to us magic appears, in one aspect, as a spurious system +of science; and, in another, as a spurious system of religion; we still +have to note that, for those who believed in it, it could not have been +a spurious system, whether of science or religion. Primitive man acts +on the assumption that he can produce like by means of like; and about +that assumption there is no "magic" of any kind. It is only when an +effect thus produced is a thing not commonly done and not generally +approved of, that it is regarded as magic; and it is magic, because not +every one knows how to do it, or not every one has the power to do it, +or not every one cares to do it. About this belief, so long as every +one entertains it, there is nothing spurious. When however it begins +to be suspected that the magician has not the power to do what he +professes, his profession tends to become fraudulent and his belief +spurious. On the other hand, a thing commonly done and generally +approved of is not regarded as magical merely because the effect +resembles the cause, and like is in this instance produced by like. +Magic is a term of evil connotation; and the practice of using like to +produce like is condemned when and because it is employed for +anti-social purposes. Such practices are resented by the society, +amongst whom and on whom they are employed; and they are offensive to +the God who looks after the interests of the community. In fine, the +object and purpose of the practice determines the attitude of the +community towards the practice: if the object is anti-social, the +practice is nefarious; and the witch, if "smelled out," is killed. The +person who is willing to undertake such nefarious proceedings comes to +be credited with a nefarious personality, that is to say, with both the +power and the will to do what ordinary, decent members of the community +could not and would not do: personal power comes to be the most +important, because the most mysterious, characteristic of the man +believed to {xiv} be a magician. If we turn to things, such as +rain-making, which are socially beneficial, we find a similar growth in +the belief that some men have extraordinary power to work wonders on +behalf of the tribe. A further stage of development is reached when +the man who uses his personal power for nefarious purposes undertakes +by means of it to control spirits: magic then tends to pass into +fetichism. Similarly, when rain and other social benefits come to be +regarded as gifts of the gods, the power of the rainmaker comes to be +regarded as a power to procure from the gods the gifts that they have +to bestow: magic is displaced by religion. The opposition of principle +between magic and religion thus makes itself manifest. It makes itself +manifest in that the one promotes social and the other anti-social +purposes: the spirit worshipped by any community as its god is a spirit +who has the interests of the community at heart, and who _ex officio_ +condemns and punishes those who by magic or otherwise work injury to +the members of the community. Finally, the decline of the belief in +magic is largely due to the discovery that it does not produce the +effects it professes to bring about. But the missionary will also +dwell on the fact that his hearers feel it to be anti-social and to be +condemned alike by their moral sentiments and their religious feeling . +. . 70-104 + + +FETICHISM + +Fetichism is regarded by some as a stage of religious development, or +as the form of religion found amongst men at the lowest stage of +development known to us. From this the conclusion is sometimes drawn +that fetichism is the source of all religion and of all religious +values; and, therefore, that (as fetichism has no value) religion +(which is an evolved form of fetichism) has no value either. This +conclusion is then believed to be proved by the science of religion. +In fact, however, students of the science of religion disclaim this +conclusion and rightly {xv} assert that the science does not undertake +to prove anything as to the truth or the value of religion. + +Much confusion prevails as to what fetichism is; and the confusion is +primarily due to Bosman. He confuses, while the science of religion +distinguishes between, animal gods and fetiches. He asserts what we +now know to be false, viz., that a fetich is an inanimate object and +nothing more; and that the native rejects, or "breaks," one of these +gods, knowing it to be a god. + +Any small object which happens to arrest the attention of a negro, when +he has a desire to gratify, may impress him as being a fetich, _i.e._ +as having power to help him to gratify his desire. Here, Höffding +says, is the simplest conceivable construction of religious ideas: here +is presented religion under the guise of desire. Let it be granted, +then, that the object attracts attention and is involuntarily +associated with the possibility of attaining the desired end. It +follows that, as in the period of animism, all objects are believed to +be animated by spirits, fetich objects are distinguished from other +objects by the fact--not that they are animated by spirits but--that it +is believed they will aid in the accomplishment of the desired end. +The picking up of a fetich object, however, is not always followed by +the desired result; and the negro then explains "that it has lost its +spirit." The spirit goes out of it, indeed, but may perchance be +induced or even compelled to return into some other object; and then +fetiches may be purposely made as well as accidentally found, and are +liable to coercion as well as open to conciliation. + +But, throughout this process, there is no religion. Religion is the +worship of the gods of a community by the community for the good of the +community. The cult of a fetich is conducted by an individual for his +private ends; and the most important function of a fetich is to work +evil against those members of the community who have incurred the +fetich owner's resentment. Thus religion {xvi} and fetich-worship are +directed to ends not merely different but antagonistic. From the very +outset religion in social fetichism is anti-social. To seek the origin +of religion in fetichism is vain. Condemned, wherever it exists, by +the religious and moral feelings of the community, fetichism cannot +have been the primitive religion of mankind. The spirits of fetichism, +according to Höffding, become eventually the gods of polytheism: such a +spirit, so long as it is a fetich, is "the god of a moment," and must +come to be permanent if it is to attain to the ranks of the +polytheistic gods. But fetiches, even when their function becomes +permanent, remain fetiches and do not become gods. They do not even +become "departmental gods," for their powers are to further a man's +desires generally. On the other hand, they have personality, even if +they have not personal names. Finally, if, as Höffding believes, the +word "god" originally meant "he who is worshipped," and gods are +worshipped by the community, then fetiches, as they are nowhere +worshipped by the community, are in no case gods. + +The function of the fetich is anti-social; of the gods, to promote the +well-being of the community. To maintain that a god is evolved out of +a fetich is to maintain that practices destructive of society have only +to be pushed far enough and they will prove the salvation of society . +. . 105-137 + + +PRAYER + +Prayer is a phenomenon in the history of religion to which the science +of religion has devoted but little attention--the reason alleged being +that it is so simple and familiar as not to demand detailed study. It +may, however, be that the phenomenon is indeed familiar yet not simple. +Simple or not, it is a matter on which different views may be held. +Thus though it may be agreed that in the lower forms of religion it is +the accomplishment of desire that is asked for, a divergence of opinion +emerges {xvii} the moment the question is put, Whose desire? that of +the individual or of the community? And instances may be cited to show +that it is not for his own personal, selfish advantage alone that the +savage always or even usually prays. It is the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned to grant: the +petition of an individual is offered and harkened to only so far as it +is not prejudicial to the interests of the community. The statement +that savage prayer is unethical may be correct in the sense that pardon +for moral sin is not sought; it is incorrect, if understood to mean +that the savage does not pray to do the things which his morality makes +it incumbent on him to do, _e.g._ to fight successfully. The desires +which the god is prayed to grant are ordinarily desires which, being +felt by each and every member of the community, are the desires of the +community, as such, and not of any one member exclusively. + +Charms, it has been suggested, in some cases are prayers that by vain +repetition have lost their religious significance and become mere +spells. And similarly it has been suggested that out of mere spells +prayer may have been evolved. But, on the hypothesis that a spell is +something in which no religion is, it is clear that out of it no +religion can come; while if prayer, _i.e._ religion, has been evolved +out of spells, then there have never been spells wholly wanting in +every religious element. Whether a given formula then is prayer or +spell may be difficult to decide, when it has some features which seem +to be magical and others which seem to be religious. The magical +element may have been original and be in process of disappearing before +the dawn of the religious spirit. Now, the formula uttered is usually +accompanied by gestures performed. If the words are uttered to explain +the gesture or rite, the explanation is offered to some one, the words +are of the nature of a prayer to some one to grant the desire which the +gesture manifests. {xviii} On the other hand, if the gestures are +performed to make the words more intelligible, then the action +performed is, again, not magical, but is intended to make the +words--the prayer--more emphatic. In neither case, then, is the +gesture or rite magical in intent. Dr. Frazer's suggestion that it +required long ages for man to discover that he could not always +succeed--even by the aid of magic--in getting what he wanted; and that +only when he made this discovery did he take to religion and prayer, is +a suggestion which cannot be maintained in view of the fact that savage +man is much more at the mercy of accidents than is civilised man. The +suggestion, in fact, tells rather against than in favour of the view +that magic preceded religion, and that spells preceded prayer. + +The Australian black fellows might have been expected to present us +with the spectacle of a people unacquainted with prayer. But in point +of fact we find amongst them both prayers to Byamee and formulæ which, +though now unintelligible even to the natives, may originally have been +prayers. And generally speaking the presumption is that races, who +distinctly admit the existence of spirits, pray to those spirits, even +though their prayers be concealed from the white man's observation. +Gods are there for the purpose of being prayed to. Prayer is the +essence of religion, as is shown by the fact that gods, when they cease +to be prayed to, are ignored rather than worshipped. Such gods--as in +Africa and elsewhere--become little more than memories, when they no +longer have a circle of worshippers to offer prayer and sacrifice to +them. + +The highest point reached in the evolution of pre-Christian prayer is +when the gods, as knowing best what is good, are petitioned simply for +things good. Our Lord's prayer is a revelation which the theory of +evolution cannot account for or explain. Nor does Höffding's "antinomy +of religious feeling" present itself to the Christian soul as an +antinomy . . . 138-174 + + +{xix} + +SACRIFICE + +Prayer and sacrifice historically go together, and logically are +indissoluble. Sacrifice, whether realised in an offering dedicated or +in a sacrificial meal, is prompted by the worshippers' desire to feel +that they are at one with the spirit worshipped. That desire manifests +itself specially on certain regularly occurring occasions (harvest, +seed time, initiation) and also in times of crisis. At harvest time +the sacrifices or offerings are thank-offerings, as is shown by the +fact that a formula of thanksgiving is employed. Primitive prayer does +not consist solely in petitions for favours to come; it includes +thanksgiving for blessings received. Such thanksgivings cannot by any +possibility be twisted into magic. + +Analogous to these thanksgivings at harvest time is the solemn eating +of first-fruits amongst the Australian black fellows. If this solemn +eating is not in Australia a survival of a sacramental meal, in which +the god and his worshippers were partakers, it must be merely a +ceremony whereby the food, which until it is eaten is taboo, is +"desacralised." But, as a matter of fact, such food is not taboo to +the tribe generally; and the object of the solemn eating cannot be to +remove the taboo and desacralise the food for the tribe. + +If the harvest rites or first-fruit ceremonials are sacrificial in +nature, then the presumption is that so, too, are the ceremonies +performed at seed time or the analogous period. + +At initiation ceremonies or mysteries, even amongst the Australian +black fellows, there is evidence to show that prayer is offered; and +generally speaking we may say that the boy initiated is admitted to the +worship of the tribal gods. + +The spring and harvest customs are closely allied to one another and +may be arranged in four groups: (1) In Mexico they plainly consist of +the worship of a god--by means of sacrifice and prayer--and of +communion. {xx} (2) In some other cases, though the god has no proper +or personal name, and no image is made of him, "the new corn," Dr. +Frazer says, "is itself eaten sacramentally, that is, as the body of +the corn spirit"; and it is by this sacramental meal that communion is +effected or maintained. (3) In the harvest customs of northern Europe, +bread and dumplings are made and eaten sacramentally, "as a substitute +for the real flesh of the divine being"; or an animal is slain and its +flesh and blood are partaken of. (4) Amongst the Australian tribes +there is a sacramental eating of the totem animal or plant. Now, these +four groups of customs may be all religious (and Dr. Frazer speaks of +them all as sacramental) or all magical; or it may be admitted that the +first three are religious, and maintained that the fourth is strictly +magical. But such a separation of the Australian group from the rest +does not commend itself as likely; further, it overlooks the fact that +it is at the period analogous to harvest time that the headman eats +solemnly and sparingly of the plant or animal, and that at harvest time +it is too late to work magic to cause the plant or animal to grow. The +probability is, then, that both the Australian group and the others are +sacrificial rites and are religious. + +Such sacrificial rites, however, though felt to be the means whereby +communion was effected and maintained between the god and his +worshippers, may come to be interpreted as the making of gifts to the +god, as the means of purchasing his favour, or as a full discharge of +their obligations. When so interpreted they will be denounced by true +religion. But though it be admitted that the sacrificial rite might be +made to bear this aspect, it does not follow, as is sometimes supposed, +that it was from the outset incapable of bearing any other. On the +contrary, it was, from the beginning, not only the rite of making +offerings to the god but, also, the rite whereby communion was +attained, whereby the society of worshippers was brought into the +presence of the god they {xxi} worshipped, even though the chief +benefits which the worshippers conceived themselves to receive were +earthly blessings. It is because the rite had from the beginning this +potentiality in it that it was possible for it to become the means +whereby, through Christ, all men might be brought to God . . . 175-210 + + +MORALITY + +The question whether morality is based on religion, or religion on +morality, is one which calls for discussion, inasmuch as it is apt to +proceed on a mistaken view of facts in the history of religion. It is +maintained that as a matter of history morality came first and religion +afterwards; and that as a matter of philosophy religion presupposes +morality. Reality, that is to say, is in the making; the spirit of man +is self-realising; being is in process of becoming rationalised and +moralised; religion in process of disappearing. + +Early religion, it is said, is unethical: it has to do with spirits, +which, as such, are not concerned with morality; with gods which are +not ethical or ideal, and are not objects of worship in our sense of +the term. + +Now, the spirits which, in the period of animism, are believed to +animate things, are not, it is true, concerned with morality; but then, +neither are they gods. To be a god a spirit must have a community of +worshippers; and it is as the protector of that community that he is +worshipped. He protects the community against any individual member +who violates the custom of the community. The custom of the community +constitutes the morality of the society. Offences against that custom +are offences against the god of the community. A god starts as an +ethical power, and as an object of worship. + +Still, it may be argued, before gods were, before religion was evolved, +morality was; and this may be shown by the origin and nature of +justice, which throughout is entirely independent of religion and +religious {xxii} considerations. On this theory, the origin of justice +is to be found in the resentment of the individual. But, first, the +individual, apart from society, is an abstraction and an impossibility: +the individual never exists apart from but always as a member of some +society. Next, justice is not the resentment of any individual, but +the sentiment of the community, expressing itself in the action not of +any individual but of the community as such. The responsibility both +for the wrong done and for righting it rests with the community. The +earliest offences against which public action is taken are said to be +witchcraft and breaches of the marriage laws. The latter are not +injuries resented by any individual: they are offences against the gods +and are punished to avert the misfortunes which otherwise would visit +the tribe. Witchcraft is especially offensive to the god of the +community. + +In almost, if not quite, the lowest stages of human development, +disease and famine are regarded as punishments which fall on the +community as a whole, because the community, in the person of one of +its members, has offended some supernatural power. In quite the lowest +stage the guilt of the offending member is also regarded as capable of +infecting the whole community; and he is, accordingly, avoided by the +whole community and tabooed. Taboo is due to the collective action, +and expresses the collective feeling of the community as a whole. It +is from such collective action and feeling that justice has been +evolved and not from individual resentment, which is still and always +was something different from justice. The offences punished by the +community have always been considered, so far as they are offences +against morality, to be offences against the gods of the community. +The fact that in course of time such offences come to be punished +always as militating against the good of society testifies merely to +the general assumption that the good of man is the will of God: men do +not believe that murder, adultery, etc., are merely offences {xxiii} +against man's laws. It is only by ignoring this patent fact that it +becomes possible to maintain that religion is built upon morality, and +that we are discovering religion to be a superfluous superstructure. + +It may be argued that the assumption that murder, adultery, etc., are +offences against God's will is a mere assumption, and that in making +the assumption we are fleeing "to the bosom of faith." The reply is +that we are content not merely to flee but to rest there . . . 211-238 + + +CHRISTIANITY + +If we are to understand the place of Christianity in the evolution of +religion, we must consider the place of religion in the evolution of +humanity; and I must explain the point of view from which I propose to +approach the three ideas of (1) evolution, (2) the evolution of +humanity, (3) the evolution of religion. + +I wish to approach the idea of evolution from the proposition that the +individual is both a means by which society attains its end, and an end +for the sake of which society exists. Utilitarianism has familiarised +us with the view that society exists for the sake of the individual and +for the purpose of realising the happiness and good of every +individual: no man is to be treated merely as a chattel, existing +solely as a means whereby his owner, or the governing class, may +benefit. But this aspect of the facts is entirely ignored by the +scientific theory of evolution: according to that theory, the +individual exists only as a factor in the process of evolution, as one +of the means by which, and not as in any sense the end for which, the +process is carried on. + +Next, this aspect of the facts is ignored not only by the scientific +theory of evolution, but also by the theory which humanitarianism holds +as to the evolution of humanity, viz. that it is a process moving +through the three stages of custom, religion, and humanitarianism. +That process is still, as it has long been in the past, far from +complete: {xxiv} the end is not yet. It is an end in which, whenever +and if ever realised on earth, we who are now living shall not live to +partake: we are--on this theory of the evolution of humanity--means, +and solely means, to an end which, when realised, we shall not partake +in. Being an end in which we cannot participate, it is not an end +which can be rationally set up for us to strive to attain. Nor will +the generation, which is ultimately to enjoy it, find much satisfaction +in reflecting that their enjoyment has been purchased at the cost of +others. To treat a minority of individuals as the end for which +humanity is evolved, and the majority as merely means, is a strange +pass for humanitarianism to come to. + +Approaching the evolution of religion from the point of view that the +individual must always be regarded both as an end and as a means, we +find that Buddhism denies the individual to be either the one or the +other, for his very existence is an illusion, and an illusion which +must be dispelled, in order that he may cease from an existence which +it is an illusion to imagine that he possesses. If, however, we turn +to other religions less highly developed than Buddhism, we find that, +in all, the existence of the individual as well as of the god of the +community is assumed; that the interests of the community are the will +of the community's god; that the interests of the community are higher +than the interests of the individual, when they appear to differ; and +that the man who prefers the interests of the community to his own is +regarded as the higher type of man. In fine, the individual, from this +point of view, acts voluntarily as the means whereby the end of society +may be realised. And, in so acting, he testifies to his conviction +that he will thereby realise his own end. + +Throughout the history of religion these two facts are implied: first, +the existence of the individual as a member of society seeking +communion with God; next, the existence of society as a means of which +the individual is {xxv} the end. Hence two consequences with regard to +evolution: first, evolution may have helped to make us, but we are +helping to make it; next, the end of evolution is not wholly outside +any one of us, but in part is realised in us. And it is just because +the end is both within us and without us that we are bound up with our +fellow-man and God. + +Whether the process of evolution is moving to any end whatever, is a +question which science declines--formally refuses--to consider. +Whether the end at which religion aims is possible or not, has in any +degree been achieved or not, is a question which the science of +religion formally declines to consider. If, however, we recognise that +the end of religion, viz. communion with God, is an end at which we +ought to aim, then the process whereby the end tends to be attained is +no longer evolution in the scientific sense. It is a process in which +progress may or may not be made. As a fact, the missionary everywhere +sees arrested development, imperfect communion with God; for the +different forms of religion realise the end of religion in different +degrees. Christianity claims to be "final," not in the chronological +sense, but in that it alone finds the true basis and the only end of +society in the love of God. The Christian theory of society again +differs from all other theories in that it not only regards the +individuals composing it as continuing to exist after death, but +teaches that the society of which the individual is truly a member, +though it manifests itself in this world, is realised in the next. + +The history of religion is the history of man's search for God. That +search depends for its success, in part, upon man's will. Christianity +cannot be stationary: the extent to which we push our missionary +outposts forward gives us the measure of our vitality. And in that +respect, as in others, the vitality of the United States is great . . . +239-265 + + +APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 _ad fin._ + + + + +{1} + +INTRODUCTION + +Of the many things that fill a visitor from the old country with +admiration, on his first visit to the United States, that which arrests +his attention most frequently, is the extent and success with which +science is applied to practical purposes. And it is beginning to dawn +upon me that in the United States it is not only pure science which is +thus practically applied,--the pure sciences of mechanics, physics, +mathematics,--but that the historic sciences also are expected to +justify themselves by their practical application; and that amongst the +historic sciences not even the science of religion is exempted from the +common lot. It also may be useful; and had better be so,--if any one +is to have any use for it. It must make itself useful to the man who +has practical need of its results and wishes to apply them--the +missionary. He it is who, for the practical purposes of the work to +which he is called, requires an applied science of religion; and +Hartford {2} Theological Seminary may, I believe, justly claim to be +the first institution in the world which has deliberately and +consciously set to work to create by the courses of lectures, of which +this series is the very humble beginning, an applied science of +religion. + +How, then, will the applied science differ from the pure science of +religion? In one way it will not differ: an applied science does not +sit in judgment upon the pure science on which it is based; it accepts +the truths which the pure science presents to all the world, and bases +itself upon them. The business of pure science is to discover facts; +that of the applied science is to use them. The business of the +science of religion is to discover all the facts necessary if we are to +understand the growth and history of religion. The business of the +applied science is, in our case, to use the discovered facts as a means +of showing that Christianity is the highest manifestation of the +religious spirit. + +In dealing with the applied science, then, we recover a liberty which +the pure science does not enjoy. The science of religion is a historic +science. Its student looks back upon the past; {3} and looks back upon +it with a single purpose, that of discovering what, as a matter of +fact, did happen, what was the order in which the events occurred. In +so looking back he may, and does, see many things which he could wish +had not occurred; but he has no power to alter them; he has no choice +but to record them; and his duty, his single duty, is to ascertain the +historic facts and to establish the historic truth. With the applied +science the case is very different. There the student sets his face to +the future, no longer to the past. The truths of pure science are the +weapons placed in his hand with which he is to conquer the world. It +is in the faith that the armour provided him by science is sure and +will not fail him that he addresses himself to his chosen work. The +implements are set in his hands. The liberty is his to employ them for +what end he will. That liberty is a consequence of the fact that the +student's object no longer is to ascertain the past, but to make the +future. + +The business of the pure science is to ascertain the facts and state +the truth. To what use the facts and truth are afterwards put, is a +question with which the pure science has nothing to do. {4} The same +facts may be put to very different uses: from the same facts very +different conclusions may be drawn. The facts which the science of +religion establishes may be used and are used for different and for +contradictory purposes. The man who is agnostic or atheist uses them +to support his atheism or agnosticism; or even, if he is so unwise, to +prove it. The man who has religion is equally at liberty to use them +in his support; and if he rarely does that, at any rate he still more +rarely commits the mistake of imagining that the science of religion +proves the truth of his particular views on the subject of religion. +Indeed, his tendency is rather in the opposite direction: he is +unreasonably uneasy and apt to have a disquieting alarm lest the +science of religion may really be a danger to religion. This alarm may +very naturally arise when he discovers that to the scientific student +one religion is as another, and the question is indifferent whether +there is any truth in any form. It is very easy to jump from these +facts to the erroneous conclusion that science of religion is wholly +incompatible with religious belief. And of course it is quite human +and perfectly intelligible that that conclusion should be proclaimed +aloud as correct {5} and inevitable by the man who, being an atheist, +fights for what he feels to be the truth. + +We must, therefore, once more insist upon the simple fact that science +of religion abstains necessarily from assuming either that religion is +true or is not true. What it does assume is what no one will deny, +viz. that religion is a fact. Religious beliefs may be right or they +may be wrong: but they exist. Therefore they can be studied, +described, classified, placed in order of development, and treated as a +branch of sociology and as one department of the evolution of the +world. And all this can be done without once asking the question +whether religious belief is true and right and good, or not. Whether +it is pronounced true or false by you or me, will not in the least +shake the fact that it has existed for thousands of years, that it has +had a history during that period, and that that history may be written. +We may have doubts whether the institution of private property is a +good thing, or whether barter and exchange are desirable proceedings. +But we shall not doubt that private property exists or that it may be +exchanged. And we shall not imagine that the science of political +economy, which deals, among other {6} things with the production and +exchange of wealth which is private property, makes any pronouncement +whatever on the question whether private property is or is not an +institution which we ought to support and believe in. The conclusions +established by the science of political economy are set forth before +the whole world; and men may use them for what purpose they will. They +may and do draw very different inferences from them, even contradictory +inferences. But if they do, it is because they use them for different +ends or contradictory purposes. And the fact that the communist or +socialist uses political economy to support his views no more proves +that socialism is the logical consequence of political economy than the +fact that the atheist uses or misuses, for his own purposes, the +conclusions of the science of religion proves his inferences to be the +logical outcome of the science. + +The science of religion deals essentially with the one fact that +religion has existed and does exist. It is from that fact that the +missionary will start; and it is with men who do not question the fact +that he will have to do. The science of religion seeks to trace the +historic growth, the evolution of religion; to establish what actually +was, not to {7} judge what ought to have been,--science knows no +"ought," in that sense or rather in that tense, the past tense. Its +work is done, its last word has been said, when it has demonstrated +what was. It is the heart which sighs to think what might have been, +and which puts on it a higher value than it does on what actually came +to pass. There is then another order in which facts may be ranged +besides the chronological order in which historically they occurred; +and that is the order of their value. It is an order in which we do +range facts, whenever we criticise them. It is the order in which we +range them, whenever we pass judgment on them. Or, rather, passing +judgment on them is placing them in the order of their value. And the +chronological order of their occurrence is quite a different thing from +the order in which we rank them when we judge them according to their +value and importance. It is, or rather it would be, quite absurd to +say, in the case of literature, or art, for instance, that the two +orders are identical. There it is obvious and universally admitted +that one period may reach a higher level than another which in point of +time is later. The classical period is followed by a post-classical +period; culmination is followed by decline. {8} Now, this difference +in point of the literary or artistic value of two periods is as real +and as fundamental as the time order or chronological relation of the +two periods. It would be patently ridiculous for any ardent maintainer +of the importance of distinguishing between good literature and bad, +good art and bad art, to say that the one period, being good, must have +been chronologically prior to the other, because, from the point of +art, it was better than that other. Every one can see that. The +chronological order, the historic order, is one thing; the order of +literary value or artistic importance is another. But if this is +granted, and every one will grant it, then it is also, and thereby, +granted that the historic order of events is not the same thing as the +order of their value, and is no guide to it. Thus far I have +illustrated these remarks by reference to literary and artistic values. +But I need hardly say that I have been thinking really all the time of +religious values. If the student of literature or of art surveys the +history of art and literature with the purpose of judging the value of +the works produced, the student of religion may and must survey the +history of religion with the same purpose. If the one student is +entitled, as he {9} justly is entitled, to say that the difference +between the literary or artistic value of two periods is as real and as +fundamental as is their difference in the order of time, then the +student of religion is claiming no exceptional or suspicious privilege +for himself. He is claiming no privilege at all; he is but exercising +the common rights of all students like himself, when he points out that +differences in religious values are just as real and just as +fundamental as the historic or chronological order itself. + +The assignment of values, then,--be it the assignment of the value of +works of art, literature, or religion,--is a proceeding which is not +only possible (as will be somewhat contemptuously admitted by those who +believe that evolution is progress, and that there is no order of value +distinct from the order of history and chronological succession); the +assignment of value is not only permissible (as may be admitted by +those who believe, or for want of thought fancy they believe, that the +historic order of events is the only order which can really exist), it +is absolutely inevitable. It is the concomitant or rather an integral +part of every act of perception. Everything that we perceive is either +dismissed from attention because it is judged at the moment to have +{10} no value, or, if it has value, attention is concentrated upon it. + +From this point of view, then, it should be clear that there is some +deficiency in such a science as the science of religion, which, by the +very conditions that determine its existence, is precluded from ever +raising the question of the value of any of the religions with which it +deals. Why does it voluntarily, deliberately, and of its own accord, +rigidly exclude the question whether religions have any value--whether +religion itself has any value? One answer there is to that question +which once would have been accepted as conclusive, viz. that the object +of science is truth. That answer delicately implies that whether +religion has any value is an enquiry to which no truthful answer can be +given. The object of science is truth; therefore science alone, with +all modesty be it said, can attain truth. Science will not ask the +question--or, when it is merciful, abstains from asking the +question--whether religion is true. So the reasonable and truthful man +must, on that point, necessarily be agnostic: whether religion is true, +he does not know. + +This train of inferences follows--so far as it is permitted illogical +inferences to follow at all--from {11} the premise that the object of +science is truth. Or, rather, it follows from that premise as we +should now understand it, viz. that the object of historic science is +historic truth. That is the object of the science of religion--to be +true to the historic facts, to discover and to state them accurately. +On the principle of the division of labour, or on the principle of +taking one thing at a time, it is obviously wise that when we are +endeavouring to discover the historic sequence of events, we should +confine ourselves to that task and not suffer ourselves to be +distracted and diverted by other and totally different considerations. +The science of religion, therefore, is justified, in the opinion of all +who are entitled to express an opinion, in steadfastly declining to +consider any other point than the historic order of the facts with +which it deals. But in so declining to go beyond its self-appointed +task of reconstituting the historic order of events and tracing the +evolution of religion, it does not, thereby, imply that it is +impossible to place them, or correctly place them, in their order of +value. To say that they have no value would be just as absurd as to +say that works of literature or art have no literary or artistic value. +To say that it is difficult to assign their value may be {12} true, but +is no argument against, it is rather a stimulus in favour of, making +the attempt. And it is just the order value, the relative value, of +forms of religion which is of absorbing interest to missionaries. It +is a valuation which is essential to what I have already designated as +the applied science of religion. Thus far in speaking of the +distinction between the historic order in which the various forms of +art, literature, and religion have occurred, and the order of value in +which the soul of every man who is sensible either to art or to +literature or to religion instinctively attempts to place them, I have +necessarily assumed the position of one who looks backward over the +past. It was impossible to compare and contrast the order value with +the historic order, save by doing so. It was necessary to point out +that the very same facts which can be arranged chronologically and in +the order of their evolution can also be--and, as a matter of fact, by +every man are--arranged more or less roughly, more or less correctly, +or incorrectly, in the order of their value. It is now necessary for +us to set our faces towards the future. I say "necessary" for the +simple reason that the idea of "value" carries with it a reference to +the future. If a thing has value, it is because we {13} judge that it +may produce some effect and serve some purpose which we foresee, or at +least surmise. If, on looking back upon past history, we pronounce +that an event had value, we do so because we see that it served, or +might have served, some end of which we approve. Its value is relative +in our eyes to some end or purpose which was relatively future to it. +The objects which we aim at, the ends after which we strive, are in the +future. Those things have value which may subserve our ends and help +us to attain our purposes. And our purposes, our ends, and objects are +in the future. There, there is hope and freedom, room to work, the +chance of remedying the errors of the past, the opportunity to make +some forward strides and to help others on. + +It is the end we aim at, the object we strive for, the ideal we set +before us, that gives value to what we do, and to what has been done by +us and others. Now our ends, our objects, and our ideals are matters +of the will, on which the will is set, and not merely matters of which +we have intellectual apprehension. They are not past events but future +possibilities. The conviction that we can attain them or attain toward +them is not, when stated as a proposition, a proposition that can be +proved, as a statement {14} referring to the past may be proved: but it +is a conviction which we hold, or a conviction which holds us, just as +strongly as any conviction that we have about any past event of +history. The whole action of mankind, every action that every man +performs, is based upon that conviction. It is the basis of all that +we do, of everything that is and has been done by us and others. And +it is Faith. In that sign alone can the world be conquered. + +When, then, the man of religion proposes by faith to conquer the world, +he is simply doing, wittingly and in full consciousness of what he is +doing, that which every man does in his every action, even though he +may not know it. To make it a sneer or a reproach that religion is a +mere matter of faith; to imagine that there is any better, or indeed +that there is any other, ground of action,--is demonstrably +unreasonable. The basis of such notions is, of course, the false idea +that the man of sense acts upon knowledge, and that the man who acts on +faith is not a sensible man. The error of such notions may be exposed +in a sentence. What knowledge have we of the future? We have none. +Absolutely none. We expect that nature will prove uniform, that causes +will produce their effects. We believe {15} the future will resemble, +to some extent, the past. But we have no knowledge of the future; and +such belief as we have about it, like all other belief,--whether it be +belief in religion or in science,--is simply faith. When, then, the +man of science consults the records of the past or the experiments of +the present for guidance as to what will or may be, he is exhibiting +his faith not in science, but in some reality, in some real being, in +which is no shadow of turning. When the practical man uses the results +of pure science for some practical end, he is taking them on faith and +uses them in the further faith that the end he aims at can be realised, +and shall by him be realised, if not in one way, then in another. The +missionary, then, who uses the results of the science of religion, who +seeks to benefit by an applied science of religion, is but following in +the footsteps of the practical man, and using business methods toward +the end he is going to realise. + +The end he is going to realise is to convert men to Christianity. The +faith in which he acts is that Christianity is the highest form which +religion can take, the final form it shall take. As works of art or +literature may be classed either according to order of history or order +of value, so the works of the {16} religious spirit may be classed, not +only in chronological order, but also in order of religious value. I +am not aware that any proof can be given to show that any given period +of art or literature is better than any other. The merits of +Shakespeare or of Homer may be pointed out; and they may, or they may +not, when pointed out, be felt. If they are felt, no proof is needed; +if they are not, no proof is possible. But they can be pointed out--by +one who feels them. And they can be contrasted with the work of other +poets in which they are less conspicuous. And the contrast may reveal +the truth in a way in which otherwise it could never have been made +plain. + +I know no other way in which the relative values of different forms of +religion can become known or be made known. You may have been tempted +to reflect, whilst I have been speaking, that, on the principle I have +laid down, there is no reason why there should not be five hundred +applied sciences, or applications of the science, of religion, instead +of one; for every one of the many forms of religion may claim to apply +the science of religion to its own ends. To that I may reply first, +that _à priori_ you would expect that every nation would set up {17} +its own literature as the highest; but, as a matter of fact, you find +Shakespeare generally placed highest amongst dramatists, Homer amongst +epic poets. You do not find the conception of literary merit varying +from nation to nation in such a way that there are as many standards of +value as there are persons to apply them. You find that there tends to +be one standard. Next, since the different forms of religion must be +compared if their relative values are to be ascertained, the method of +the applied science of religion must be the method of comparison. +Whatever the outcome that is anticipated from the employment of the +applied science, it is by the method of comparison that it must act. +And one indication of genuine faith is readiness to employ that method, +and assured confidence in the result of its employment. The +missionary's life is the best, because the most concrete example of the +practical working of the method of comparison; and the outcome of the +comparison which is made by those amongst whom and for whom he works +makes itself felt in their hearts, their lives, and sometimes in their +conversion. It is the best example, because the value of a religion to +be known must be felt. But though it is the best because it is the +{18} simplest, the most direct, and the most convincing it is not that +which addresses itself primarily to the reason, and it is not one which +is produced by the applied science of religion. It is not one which +can be produced by any science, pure or applied. The object of the +applied science of religion is to enable the missionary himself to +compare forms of religion, incidentally in order that he may know what +by faith he feels, and without faith he could not feel, viz. that +Christianity is the highest form; but still more in order that he may +teach others, and may have at his command the facts afforded by the +science of religion, wherewith to appeal, when necessary, to the reason +and intelligence as well as to the hearts and feelings of those for +whose salvation he is labouring. + +The time has happily gone by when the mere idea of comparing +Christianity with any other religion would have been rejected with +horror as treasonous and treacherous. The fact that that time has now +gone by is in itself evidence of a stronger faith in Christianity. +What, if it was not fear, at any rate presented the appearance of fear, +has been banished; and we can and do, in the greater faith that has +been vouchsafed to us, look with {19} confidence on the proposal to +compare Christianity with other religions. The truth cannot but gain +thereby, and we rest on Him who is the way and the truth. We recognise +fully and freely that comparison implies similarity, points of +resemblance, ay! and even features of identity. And of that admission +much has been made--and more than can be maintained. It has been +pressed to mean that all forms of religion, from the lowest to the +highest, are identical; that therefore there is nothing more or other +in the highest than in the lowest; and that in the lowest you see how +barbarous is religion and how unworthy of civilised man. Now, that +course of argument is open to one obvious objection which would be +fatal to it, even if it were the only objection, which it is not. That +objection is that whether we are using the method of comparison for the +purpose of estimating the relative values of different forms of +religion; or whether we are using the comparative method of science, +with the object of discovering and establishing facts, quite apart from +the value they may have for any purpose they may be put to when they +have been established; in either case, comparison is only applied, and +can only be applied to things which, {20} though they resemble one +another, also differ from one another. It is because they differ, at +first sight, that the discovery of their resemblance is important. And +it is on that aspect of the truth that the comparative method of +science dwells. Comparative philology, for instance, devotes itself to +establishing resemblances between, say, the Indo-European languages, +which for long were not suspected to bear any likeness to one another +or to have any connection with each other. Those resemblances are +examined more and more closely, are stated with more and more +precision, until they are stated as laws of comparative philology, and +recognised as laws of science to which there are no exceptions. Yet +when the resemblances have been worked out to the furthest detail, no +one imagines that Greek and Sanskrit are the same language, or that the +differences between them are negligible. It is then surprising that +any student of comparative religion should imagine that the discovery +or the recognition of points of likeness between the religions compared +will ever result in proving that the differences between them are +negligible or non-existent. Such an inference is unscientific, and it +has only to be stated to show that the student {21} of comparative +religion is but exercising a right common to all students of all +sciences, when he claims that points of difference cannot be overlooked +or thrust aside. + +If, then, the student of the science of religion directs his attention +primarily to the discovery of resemblances between religions which at +first sight bear no more resemblance to one another than Greek did to +the Celtic tongues; if the comparative method of science dwells upon +the fact that things which differ from one another may also resemble +one another, and that their resemblances may be stated in the form of +scientific laws,--there is still another aspect of the truth, and it is +that between things which resemble one another there are also +differences. And the jury of the world will ultimately demand to know +the truth and the whole truth. + +Now, to get not only at the truth, but at the whole of the truth, is +precisely the business of the applied science of religion, and is the +very object of that which, in order to distinguish it from the +comparative method of science, I have called the method of comparison. +For the purposes of fair comparison not only must the resemblances, +which the {22} comparative method of science dwells on, be taken into +account, but the differences, also, must be weighed. And it is the +business of the method of comparison, the object of the applied science +of religion, to do both things. Neither of the two can be dispensed +with; neither is more important than the other; but for the practical +purposes of the missionary it is important to begin with the +resemblances; and on grounds of logic and of theory, the resemblances +must be first established, if the importance, nay! the decisive value, +of the differences is to go home to the hearts and minds of the +missionary's hearers. The resemblances are there and are to be studied +ultimately in order to bring out the differences and make them stand +forth so plainly as to make choice between the higher form of religion +and the lower easy, simply because the difference is so manifest. Now, +the missionary's hearer could not know, much less appreciate, the +difference, the superiority of Christianity, as long as Christianity +was unknown to him. And it is equally manifest, though it has never +been officially recognised until now and by the Hartford Theological +Seminary, that neither can the missionary adequately set forth the +superiority of Christianity to {23} the lower forms of religion, unless +he knows something about them and about the points in which their +inferiority consists. Hitherto he has had to learn that for himself, +as he went on, and, as it were, by rule of thumb. But, on business +principles, economy of labour and efficiency in work will be better +secured if he is taught before he goes out, and is taught on scientific +methods. What he has to learn is the resemblances between the various +forms of religion, the differences between them, and the relative +values of those differences. + +It may perhaps be asked, Why should those differences exist? And if +the question should be put, I am inclined to say that to give the +answer is beyond the scope of the applied science of religion. The +method of comparison assumes that the differences do exist, and it +cannot begin to be employed unless and until they exist. They are and +must be taken for granted, at any rate by the applied science of +religion, and if the method of comparison is to be set to work. +Indeed, if we may take the principle of evolution to be the +differentiation of the homogeneous, we may go further and say that the +whole theory of evolution, and not merely a particular historic +science, such as the science of religion, {24} postulates +differentiation and the principle of difference, and does not explain +it,--evolution cannot start, the homogeneous cannot be other than +homogeneous, until the principle of difference and the power of +differentiation is assumed. + +That the science of religion at the end leaves untouched those +differences between religions which it recognised at the beginning, is +a point on which I insisted, as against those who unwarrantably +proclaim the science to have demonstrated that all religions alike are +barbarisms or survivals of barbarism. It is well, therefore, to bear +that fact in mind when attempts are made to explain the existence of +the differences by postulating a period when they were non-existent. +That postulate may take form in the supposition that originally the +true religion alone existed, and that the differences arose later. +That is a supposition which has been made by more than one people, and +in more ages than one. It carries with it the consequence that the +history--it would be difficult to call it the evolution and impossible +to call it the progress--of religion has been one of degradation +generally. Owing, however, to the far-reaching and deep-penetrating +influence of the theory of evolution, it has of late grown {25} +customary to assume that the movement, the course of religious history, +has been in the opposite direction; and that it has moved upwards from +the lowest forms of religion known to us, or from some form analogous +to the lowest known forms, through the higher to the highest. This +second theory, however different in its arrangement of the facts from +the Golden Age theory first alluded to, is still fundamentally in +agreement with it, inasmuch as it also assumes that the differences +exhibited later in the history of religion at first were non-existent. +Both theories assume the existence of the originally homogeneous, but +they disagree as to the nature of the differences which supervened, and +also as to the nature of the originally homogeneous. + +I wish therefore to call attention to the simple truth that the facts +at the disposal of the science of religion neither enable nor warrant +us to decide between these two views. If we were to come to a decision +on the point, we should have to travel far beyond the confines of the +science of religion, or the widest bounds of the theory of evolution, +and enquire why there should be error as well as truth--or, to put the +matter very differently, why there should be truth at all. But if we +started travelling {26} on that enquiry, we should not get back in time +for this course of lectures. Fortunately it is not necessary to take a +ticket for that journey--perhaps not possible to secure a return +ticket. We have only to recognise that the science of religion +confines itself to constating and tracing the differences, and does not +attempt to explain why they should exist; while the applied science of +religion is concerned with the practical business of bringing home the +difference between Christianity and other forms of religion to the +hearts of those whose salvation may turn on whether the missionary has +been properly equipped for his task. + +If, now, I announce that for the student of the applied science it is +advisable that he should turn his attention in the first place to the +lowest forms of religion, the announcement need not be taken to mean +that a man cannot become a student of the science of religion, whether +pure or applied, unless he assumes that the lowest is the most +primitive form. The science of religion, as it pushes its enquiries, +may possibly come across--may even already have come across--the lowest +form to which it is possible for man to descend. But whether that form +is the most primitive as well as {27} the lowest,--still more, whether +it is the most primitive because it is the lowest,--will be questions +which will not admit of being settled offhand. And in the meantime we +are not called upon to answer them in the affirmative as a _sine qua +non_ of being admitted students of the science. + +The reason for beginning with the lowest forms is--as is proper in a +practical science--a practical one. As I have already said, if the +missionary is to succeed in his work, he must know and teach the +difference and the value of the difference between Christianity and +other religions. But difference implies similarity: we cannot specify +the points of difference between two things without presupposing some +similarity between them,--at any rate sufficient similarity to make a +comparison of them profitable. Now, the similarity between the higher +forms of religion is such that there is no need to demonstrate it, in +order to justify our proceeding to dwell upon the differences. But the +similarity between the higher and the lower forms is far from being +thus obvious. Indeed, in some cases, for example in the case of some +Australian tribes, there is alleged, by some students of the science of +religion, to be such a total absence of similarity that we are entitled +or {28} compelled to recognise that however liberally, or loosely, we +relax our definition of religion, we must pronounce those tribes to be +without religion. The allegation thus made, the question thus raised, +evidently is of practical importance for the practical purposes of the +missionary. Where some resemblances exist between the higher and the +lower forms of religion, those resemblances may be made, and should be +made, the ground from which the missionary should proceed to point out +by contrast the differences, and so to set forth the higher value of +Christianity. But if no such resemblances should exist, they cannot be +made a basis for the missionary's work. Without proceeding in this +introductory lecture to discuss the question whether there are any +tribes whatever that are without religion, I may point out that +religion, in all its forms, is, in one of its aspects, a yearning and +aspiration after God, a search after Him, peradventure we may find Him. +And if it be alleged that in some cases there is no search after +Him,--that amongst civilised men, amongst our own acquaintances, there +is in some cases no search and no aspiration, and that therefore among +the more backward peoples of the earth there may also be tribes to whom +the very idea of {29} such a search is unknown,--then we must bear in +mind that a search, after any object whatever, may be dropped, may even +be totally abandoned; and yet the heart may yearn after that which it +is persuaded--or, it may be, is deluded into thinking--it can never +find. Perhaps, however, that way of putting it may be objected to, on +the ground that it is a _petitio principii_ and assumes the very fact +it is necessary to prove, viz. that the lowest tribes that are or can +be known to us have made the search and given it up, whereas the +contention is that they have never made the search. That contention, I +will remark in passing, is one which never can be proved. But to those +who consider that it is probable in itself, and that it is a necessary +stage in the evolution of belief, I would point out that every search +is made in hope--or, it may be, in fear--that search presupposes hope +and fear. Vague, of course, the hope may be; scarce conscious, if +conscious at all, of what is hoped. But without hope, until there are +some dim stirrings, however vague, search is unconceivable, and it is +in and by the process of search that the hope becomes stronger and the +object sought more definite to view. Now, inasmuch as it is doubtful +whether any tribe of {30} people is without religion, it may reasonably +be held that the vast majority, at any rate, of the peoples of the +earth have proceeded from hope to aspiration and to search; and if +there should be found a tribe which had not yet entered consciously on +the search, the reasonable conclusion would be not that it is exempted +from the laws which we see exemplified in all other peoples, but that +it is tending to obey the same laws and is starting from the same point +as they,--that hope which is the desire of all nations and has been +made manifest in the Son of Man. + +Whatever be the earliest history of that hope, whatever was its nature +and course in prehistoric times, it has been worked out in history in +many directions, under the influence of many errors, into many forms of +religion. But in them all we feel that there is the same striving, the +same yearning; and we see it with the same pity and distress as we may +observe the distorted motions of the man who, though partially +paralysed, yet strives to walk, and move to the place where he would +be. It is with these attempts to walk, in the hope of giving help to +them who need it, that we who are here to-day are concerned. We must +study them, if we are to {31} understand them and to remedy them. And +there is no understanding them, unless we recognise that in them all +there is the striving and yearning after God, which may be cruelly +distorted, but is always there. + +It so happens that there has been great readiness on the part of +students of the science of religion to recognise that belief in the +continued existence of the soul after the death of the body has +comparative universality amongst the lower races of mankind. Their +yearning after continued existence developes into hope of a future +life; and the hope, or fear, takes many forms: the continued existence +may or may not be on this earth; it may or may not take the shape of a +belief in the transmigration of souls; it sometimes does, and sometimes +does not, lead to belief in the judgment of the dead and future +punishments and rewards; it may or may not postulate the immortality of +the soul; it may shrink to comparative, if not absolute, unimportance; +or it may be dreaded and denounced by philosophy and even by religion. +But whether dreaded or delighted in, whether developed by religion or +denounced, the tendency to the belief is there--universal among mankind +and ineradicable. + +{32} + +The parallel, then, between this belief and the belief or tendency to +believe in God is close and instructive; and I shall devote my next +lecture therefore to the belief in a future life among the primitive +races of mankind. That belief manifests itself, as I shall hope to +show, from the beginning, in a yearning hope for the continued +existence of the beloved ones who have been taken from us by death, as +well as in dread of the ghosts of those who during their life were +feared. But in either case what it postulates and points to is man +living in community with man. It implies society; and there again is +parallel to religion. It is with the hopes and fears of the community +as such that religion has to do: and it is from that point of view that +I shall start when I come to deal with the subject of magic, and its +resemblance to and difference from religion. Its resemblance is not +accidental and the difference is not arbitrary: the difference is that +between social and anti-social purposes. That difference, if borne in +mind, may give us the clue to the real nature of fetichism,--a subject +which will require a lecture to itself. I shall then proceed to a +topic which has been ignored to a surprising extent by the science of +religion; that is, the subject of {33} prayer: and the light which is +to be derived thence will, I trust, give fresh illumination to the +meaning of sacrifice. The relation of religion to morality will then +fall to be considered; and my final lecture will deal with the place of +Christianity in the evolution of religion. + + + + +{34} + +IMMORTALITY + +The missionary, like any other practical man, requires to know what +science can teach him about the material on which he has to work. So +far as is possible, he should know what materials are sound and can be +used with safety in his constructive work, and what must be thrown +aside, what must be destroyed, if his work is to escape dry-rot and to +stand as a permanent edifice. He should be able to feel confidence, +for instance, not merely that magic and fetichism are the negation of +religion, but that in teaching that fact he has to support him the +evidence collected by the science of religion; and he should have that +evidence placed at his disposal for effective use, if need be. + +It may be also that amongst much unsound material he will find some +that is sound, that may be used, and that he cannot afford to cast +away. He has to work upon our common humanity, upon the humanity +common to him and his hearers. He has to remember that no man and no +community of {35} men ever is or has been or ever can be excluded from +the search after God. And his duty, his chosen duty, is to help them +in that search, and as far as may be to make the way clear for them, +and to guide their feet in the right path. He will find that they have +attempted to make paths for themselves; and it is not impossible that +he will find that some of those paths for some distance do go in the +right direction; that some of their beliefs have in them an element of +truth, or a groping after truth which, rightly understood, may be made +to lead to Christianity. It is with one of those beliefs--the belief +in immortality--that I shall deal in this lecture. + +It is a fact worthy of notice that the belief in immortality fills, I +will not say a more important, but a more prominent, place in the +hearts and hopes of uncivilised than of civilised man; and it is also a +fact worthy of notice that among primitive men the belief in +immortality is much less intimately bound up with religion than it +comes to be at a later period of evolution. The two facts are probably +not wholly without relation to one another. So long as the belief in +immortality luxuriates and grows wild, so to speak, untrained and +unrestrained by religion, it {36} developes as the fancy wills, and +lives by flattering the fancy. When, however, the relations of a +future life to morality and religion come to be realised, when the +conception of the next world comes to be moralised, then it becomes the +subject of fear as well as of hope; and the fancy loses much of the +freedom with which it tricked out the pictures that once it drew, +purely according to its own sweet liking, of a future state. On the +one hand, the guilty mind prefers not to dwell upon the day of +reckoning, so long as it can stave off the idea; and it may succeed +more or less in putting it on one side until the proximity of death +makes the idea insistent. Thus the mind more or less deliberately +dismisses the future life from attention. On the other hand, religion +itself insists persistently on the fact that you have your duty here +and now in this world to perform, and that the rest, the future +consequences, you must leave to God. Thus, once more, and this time +not from unworthy motives, attention is directed to this life rather +than to the next; and it is this point that is critical for the fate +both of the belief in immortality and of religion itself. At this +point, religion may, as in the case of Buddhism it actually has done, +formally give up and disavow {37} belief in immortality. And in that +case it sows the seed of its own destruction. Or it may recognise that +the immortality of the soul is postulated by and essential to morality +and religion alike. And in that case, even in that case alone, is +religion in a position to provide a logical basis for morality and to +place the natural desire for a future life on a firmer basis than the +untutored fancy of primitive man could find for it. + +It is then with primitive man or with the lower races that we will +begin, and with "the comparative universality of their belief in the +continued existence of the soul after the death of the body" (Tylor, +_Primitive Culture_, II, i). Now, the classical theory of this belief +is that set forth by Professor Tylor in his _Primitive Culture_. +Whence does primitive man get his idea that the soul continues to exist +after the death of the body? the answer given is, in the first place, +from the fact that man dreams. He dreams of distant scenes that he +visits in his sleep; it is clear, from the evidence of those who saw +his sleeping body, that his body certainly did not travel; therefore he +or his soul must be separable from the body and must have travelled +whilst his body lay unmoving and unmoved. But he also dreams of {38} +those who are now dead, and whose bodies he knows, it may be, to have +been incinerated. The explanation then is obvious that they, too, or +their souls, are separable from their bodies; and the fact that they +survive death and the destruction of the body is demonstrated by their +appearance in his dreams. About the reality of their appearance in his +dreams he has no more doubt than he has about the reality of what he +himself does and suffers in his dreams. If, however, the dead appeared +only in his dreams, their existence after death might seem to be +limited to the dream-time. But as a matter of fact they appear to him +in his waking moments also: ghosts are at least as familiar to the +savage as to the civilised man; and thus the evidence of his dreams, +which first suggested his belief, is confirmed by the evidence of his +senses. + +Thus the belief in the continued existence of the soul after the death +of the body is traced back to the action of dreams and waking +hallucinations. Now, it is inevitable that the inference should be +drawn that the belief in immortality has thus been tracked to its +basis. And it is inevitable that those who start with an inclination +to regard the belief as palpably absurd should welcome this exhibition +of {39} its evolution as proof conclusive that the belief could only +have originated in and can only impose upon immature minds. To that +doubtless it is a perfectly sound reply to say that the origin of a +belief is one thing and its validity quite another. The way in which +we came to hold the belief is a matter of historical investigation, and +undoubtedly may form a very fascinating enquiry. But the question +whether the belief is true is a question which has to be considered, no +matter how I got it, just as the question whether I am committing a +trespass or not in being on a piece of ground cannot be settled by any +amount of explaining how I got there. Or, to put it in another way, +the very risky path by which I have scrambled up a cliff does not make +the top any the less safe when I have got there. + +But though it is perfectly logical to insist on the distinction between +the origin and the validity of any belief, and to refuse to question or +doubt the validity of the belief in immortality merely because of the +origin ascribed to it by authorities on primitive culture,--that is no +reason why we should not examine the origin suggested for it, to see +whether it is a satisfactory origin. And that is what I propose now to +do. I wish to suggest first that belief in the appearance of {40} the +dead, whether to the dreamer or the ghost-seer, is an intellectual +belief as to what occurs as a matter of fact; and next that thereby it +is distinguished from the desire for immortality which manifests itself +with comparative universality amongst the lower races. + +Now, that the appearance of the dead, whether to the waking or the +sleeping eye, is sufficient to start the intellectual belief will be +admitted alike by those who do and those who do not hold that it is +sufficient logically to warrant the belief. But to say that it starts +the desire to see him or her whom we have lost, would be ridiculous. +On the contrary, it would be much nearer the truth to say that it is +the longing and the desire to see, once again, the loved one, that sets +the mind a-dreaming, and first gives to the heart hope. The fact that, +were there no desire for the continuance of life after the death of the +body, the belief would never have caught on--that it either would never +have arisen or would have soon ceased to exist--is shown by the simple +consideration that only where the desire for the continuance of life +after death dies down does the belief in immortality tend to wane. If +any further evidence of that is required it may be found in the +teaching of those {41} forms of philosophy and religion which endeavour +to dispense with the belief in immortality, for they all recognise and +indeed proclaim that they are based on the denial of the desire and the +will to live. If, and only if--as, and only as--the desire to live, +here and hereafter, can be suppressed, can the belief in immortality be +eradicated. The basis of the belief is the desire for continued +existence; and that is why the attempt to trace the origin of the +belief in immortality back to the belief in dreams and apparitions is +one which is not perfectly satisfactory; it leaves out of account the +desire without which the belief would not be and is not operative. + +But though it leaves out an element which is at least as important as +any element it includes, it would be an error to take no account of +what it does contribute. It would be an error of this kind if we +closed our eyes to the fact that what first arrests the attention of +man, in the lower stages of his evolution, is the survival of others +than himself. That is the belief which first manifests itself in his +heart and mind; and what first reveals it to him is the appearance of +the dead to his sleeping or his waking eye. He does not first hope or +believe that he himself will survive the death of the body and then go +{42} on to infer that therefore others also will similarly survive. On +the contrary, it is the appearance of others in his sleeping or waking +moments that first gives him the idea; and it is only later and on +reflection that it occurs to him that he also will have, or be, a ghost. + +But though we must recognise the intellectual element in the belief and +the intellectual processes which are involved in the belief, we must +also take into account the emotional element, the element of desire. +And first we should notice that the desire is not a selfish or +self-regarding desire; it is the longing for one loved and lost, of the +mother for her child, or of the child for its mother. It is desire of +that kind which gives to dreams and apparitions their emotional value, +without which they would have little significance and no spiritual +importance. That is the direction in which we must look for the reason +why, on the one hand, belief in the continuation of existence after +death seems at first to have no connection with religion, while, on the +other hand, the connection is ultimately shown by the evolution of +belief to be so intimate that neither can attain its proper development +without the other. + +Dreams are occasions on which the longing for {43} one loved and lost +manifests itself, but they are not the cause or the origin of the +affection and the longing. But dreams are not exclusively, specially, +or even usually the domain in which religion plays a part. Hence the +visions of the night, in which the memory of the departed and the +craving for reunion with them are manifested, bear no necessary +reference to religion; and it is therefore possible, and _prima facie_ +plausible, to maintain that the belief in the immortality of the soul +has its origin in a centre quite distinct from the sphere of religion, +and that it is only very slowly, if at all, that the belief in +immortality comes to be incorporated with religion. On the other hand, +the very craving for reunion or continued communion with those who are +felt not to be lost but gone before, is itself the feeling which is, +not the base, but at the base, of religion. In the lowest forms to +which religion can be reduced, or in which it manifests itself, +religion is a bond of community; it manifests itself externally in +joint acts of worship, internally in the feeling that the worshippers +are bound together by it and united with the object of their worship. +This feeling of communion is not a mere article of intellectual belief, +nor is it imposed upon the members; it is what they themselves desire. +{44} Höffding states the truth when he says that in its most +rudimentary form we encounter "religion under the guise of desire"; but +in saying so he omits the essence of the truth, that essence without +which the truth that he partially enunciates may become wholly +misleading,--he omits to say, and I think he fails to see, that the +desire which alone can claim to be considered as religious is the +desire of the community, not of the individual as such, and the desire +of the community as united in common worship. The idea of religion as +a bond of spiritual communion is implicit from the first, even though a +long process of evolution be necessary to disentangle it and set it +forth self-consciously. Now, it is precisely this spiritual communion +of which man becomes conscious in his craving after reunion or +continued communion with those who have departed this life. And it is +with the history of his attempts to harmonise this desire with what he +knows and demands of the universe otherwise, that we are here and now +concerned. + +So strong is that desire, so inconceivable is the idea that death ends +all, and divorces from us forever those we have loved and lost awhile, +that the lower races of mankind have been pretty generally driven {45} +to the conclusion that death is a mistake or due to a mistake. It is +widely held that there is no such thing as a natural death. Men do of +course die, they may be killed; but it is not an ordinance of nature +that a man must be killed; and, if he is killed, his death is not +natural. So strong is this feeling that when a man dies and his death +is not obviously a case of murder, the inference which the savage +prefers to draw is that the death is really a case of murder, but that +the murder has been worked by witchcraft or magic. Amongst the +Australian black fellows, as we are told by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, +"no such thing as natural death is realised by the native; a man who +dies has of necessity been killed by some other man or perhaps even by +a woman, and sooner or later that man or woman will be attacked;" +consequently, "in very many cases there takes place what the white man, +not seeing beneath the surface, not unnaturally describes as secret +murder; but in reality ... every case of such secret murder, when one +or more men stealthily stalk their prey with the object of killing him, +is in reality the exacting of a life for a life, the accused person +being indicated by the so-called medicine man as one who has brought +about the death of another man by magic, and whose {46} life must +therefore be forfeited" (_Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 48). + +What underlies this idea that by man alone is death brought into the +world is that death is unnatural and is no part of the original design +of things. When the fact comes to be recognised undeniably that deaths +not caused by human agency do take place, then the fact requires +explanation; and the explanation on which primitive races, quite +independently of each other, hit is that as death was no part of the +original design of things, its introduction was due to accident or +mistake. Either men were originally exempt from death, or they were +intended to be exempt. If they were intended to be exempt, then the +inference drawn is that the intention was frustrated by the +carelessness of the agent intrusted with the duty of making men +deathless. If they were originally exempt from death, then the loss of +the exemption has to be accounted for. And in either case the +explanation takes the form of a narrative which relates how the mistake +took place or what event it was that caused the loss of the exemption. +I need not quote examples of either class of narrative. What I wish to +do is to emphasise the fact that by primitive man death is felt to be +inconsistent with the {47} scheme of things. First, therefore, he +denies that it can come in the course of nature, though he admits that +it may be procured by the wicked man in the way of murder or magic. +And it is at this stage that his hope of reunion with those loved and +lost scarcely stretches beyond the prospect of their return to this +world. Evidence of this stage is found partly in tales such as those +told of the mother who returns to revisit her child, or of persons +restored to life. Stories of this latter kind come from Tasmania, +Australia, and Samoa, amongst other places, and are found amongst the +Eskimo and American Indians, as well as amongst the Fjorts (J. A. +MacCullough, _The Childhood of Fiction_, ch. IV). Even more direct +evidence of the emotion which prompts these stories is afforded by the +Ho dirge, quoted by Professor Tylor (_P. C._, II, 32, 33):-- + + "We never scolded you; never wronged you; + Come to us back! + We ever loved and cherished you; and have lived long together + Under the same roof; + Desert it not now! + The rainy nights and the cold blowing days are coming on; + Do not wander here! + Do not stand by the burnt ashes; come to us again! + You cannot find shelter under the peepul, when the rain comes down. + +{48} + + The saul will not shield you from the cold bitter wind. + Come to your home! + It is swept for you and clean; and we are there who loved you ever; + And there is rice put for you and water; + Come home, come home, come to us again!" + + +In these verses it is evident that the death of the body is recognised +as a fact. It is even more manifest that the death of the body is put +aside as weighing for naught against the absolute conviction that the +loved one still exists. But reunion is sought in this world; another +world is not yet thought of. The next world has not yet been called +into existence to redress the sorrows and the sufferings of this life. +Where the discovery of that solution has not been made, the human mind +seeks such consolation as may be found elsewhere. If the aspiration, +"come to us, come to us again," can find no other realisation, it +welcomes the reappearance of the lost one in another form. In +Australia, amongst the Euahlayi tribe, the mother who has lost her baby +or her young child may yet believe that it is restored to her and born +again in the form of another child. In West Africa, according to Miss +Kingsley, "the new babies as they arrived in the family were shown a +selection of small articles belonging to deceased members whose souls +{49} were still absent,--the thing the child caught hold of identified +him. 'Why, he's Uncle John; see! he knows his own pipe;' or 'That's +Cousin Emma; see! she knows her market calabash;' and so on." But it +is not only amongst Australian black fellows or West African negroes +that the attempt is made to extract consolation for death from the +speculation that we die only to be reborn in this world. The theory of +rebirth is put forward by a distinguished student of Hegel--Dr. +McTaggart--in a work entitled _Some Dogmas of Religion_. It is +admitted by Dr. McTaggart to be true that we have no memory whatever of +our previous stages of existence; but he declares, "we may say that, in +spite of the loss of memory, it is the same person who lives in the +successive lives" (p. 130); and he appears to find the same consolation +as his remote forefathers did in looking forward to a future stage of +existence in which he will have no more memory of his present +existence, and no more reason to believe in it, than he now has memory +of, or reason to believe in, his preëxistence. "It is certain," he +says, "that in this life we remember no previous lives," and he accepts +the position that it is equally certain we shall have in our next life +absolutely no memory of our {50} present existence. That, of course, +distinguishes Dr. McTaggart from the West African Uncle John who, when +he is reborn, at any rate "knows his own pipe." + +The human mind, as I have said, seeks such consolation as it may find +in the doctrine of rebirth. It finds evidence of rebirth either in the +behaviour of the new-born child or in its resemblance to deceased +relations. But it also comes to the conclusion that the reincarnation +may be in animal form. Whether that conclusion is suggested by the +strangely human expression in the eyes of some animals, or whether it +is based upon the belief in the power of transformation, need not be +discussed. It is beyond doubt that transformation is believed in: the +Cherokee Indian sings a verse to the effect that he becomes a real +wolf; and "after stating that he has become a real wolf, the songster +utters a prolonged howl, and paws the ground like a wolf with his feet" +(Frazer, _Kingship_, p. 71). Indeed, identity may be attained or +manifested without any process of transformation; in Australia, amongst +the Dieri tribe, the head man of a totem consisting of a particular +sort of a seed is spoken of by his people as being the plant itself +which yields the seed (_ib._, p. 109). {51} Where such beliefs are +prevalent, the doctrine of the reincarnation of the soul in animal form +will obviously arise at the stage of evolution which we are now +discussing, that is to say when the soul is not yet supposed to depart +to another world, and must therefore manifest itself in this world in +one way or another, if not in human shape, then in animal form. In the +form of what animal the deceased will be reincarnated is a question +which will be answered in different ways. Purely fortuitous +circumstances may lead to particular animals being considered to be the +reincarnation of the deceased. Or the fact that the deceased has a +particular animal for totem may lead the survivors to expect his +reappearance in the form of that particular animal. The one fact of +importance for our present purpose is that at its origin the belief in +animal reincarnation had no necessary connection with the theory of +future punishments and rewards. At the stage of evolution in which the +belief in transmigration arose many animals were the object of genuine +respect because of the virtues of courage, etc., which were manifested +by them; or because of the position they occupied as totems. +Consequently no loss of status was involved when the soul transmigrated +from a {52} human to an animal form. No notion of punishment was +involved in the belief. + +The doctrines of reincarnation and transmigration belong to a stage in +the evolution of belief, or to a system of thought, in which the +conviction that the death of the body does not entail the destruction +of the soul is undoubted, but from which the conception, indeed the +very idea, of another world than this is excluded. That conception +begins to manifest itself where ancestor worship establishes itself; +but the manifestation is incomplete. Deceased chieftains and heroes, +who have been benefactors to the tribe, are remembered; and the good +they did is remembered also. They are themselves remembered as the +doers of good; and their spirits are naturally conceived as continuing +to be benevolent, or ready to confer benefits when properly approached. +But thus envisaged, they are seen rather in their relation to the +living than in their relation to each other. It is their assistance in +this world that is sought; their condition in the next world is of less +practical importance and therefore provokes less of speculation, in the +first instance. But when speculation is provoked, it proves ultimately +fatal to ancestor worship. + +{53} + +First, it may lead to the question of the relation of the spirits of +the deceased benefactors to the god or gods of the community. There +will be a tendency to blur the distinction between the god and his +worshippers, if any of the worshippers come to be regarded as being +after death spirits from whom aid may be invoked and to whom offerings +must be made. And if the distinction ceases after death, it is +difficult and sometimes impossible to maintain it during life; an +emperor who is to be deified after death may find his deification +beginning before his death. Belief in such deification may be accepted +by some members of the community. Others will regard it as proof that +religion is naught; and yet others will be driven to seek for a form of +religion which affords no place for such deifications, but maintains +explicitly that distinction between a god and his worshippers which is +present in the most rudimentary forms of religion. + +But though the tendency of ancestor worship is to run this course and +to pass in this way out of the evolution of religion, it may be +arrested at the very outset, if the religious spirit is, as it has been +in one case at least, strong enough to stand against it at the +beginning. Thus, amongst the Jews there {54} was a tendency to +ancestor worship, as is shown by the fact of its prohibition. But it +was stamped out; and it was stamped out so effectually that belief in +the continued existence of the soul after death ceased for long to have +any practical influence. "Generally speaking, the Hebrews regarded the +grave as the final end of all sentient and intelligent existence, 'the +land where all things are forgotten'" (Smith's _Dictionary of the +Bible_, _s.v._ Sheol). "In death," the Psalmist says to the Lord, +"there is no remembrance of thee: in Sheol who shall give thee thanks?" +"Shall they that are deceased arise and praise thee? Shall thy +loving-kindness be declared in the grave?" or "thy righteousness in the +land of forgetfulness?" Thus the Sheol of the Old Testament remains to +testify to the view taken of the state of the dead by a people amongst +whom the worship of ancestors was arrested at the outset. Amongst such +a people the dead are supposed simply to continue in the next world as +they left this: "in Sheol the kings of the nations have their thrones, +and the mighty their weapons of war," just as in Virgil the ghost of +Deiphobus still shows the ghastly wounds by which he perished (Jevons, +_History of Religion_, p. 301). + +{55} + +This continuation theory, the view that the dead continue in the next +world as they left this, means that, to the people who entertain it, +the dead are merely a memory. It is forbidden to think of them as +doing anything, as affecting the living in any way. They are conceived +as powerless to gratify the wishes of the living, or to thwart them. +Where the Lord God is a jealous God, religion cannot tolerate the idea +that any other spirit should be conceived as usurping His functions, +still less that such spirits should receive the offerings and the +prayers which are the due of Him alone. But though the dead are thus +reduced to a mere memory, the memory itself does not and cannot die. +Accordingly the dead, or rather those whose bodies are dead, continue +to live. But, as they exercise no action in, or control over, the +world of the living, their place of abode comes to be regarded as +another world, to which they are confined. Speculation, therefore, +where speculation is made, as to the case of the inhabitants of this +other world, must take the direction of enquiring as to their fate. +Where speculation is not made, the dead are conceived merely to +continue to be as they are remembered to have been in this life. But, +if there is to be room for any speculation {56} at all, there must be +assumed to be some diversity in their fate, and therefore some reason, +intelligible to man, for that diversity. That is a conclusion to which +tribes attain who have apparently gone through no period of ancestor +worship,--indeed, ancestor worship only impedes or defers the +attainment of that conclusion. The diversity of fate could only +consist in the difference between being where you would be and being +where you would not. But the reasons for that diversity may be very +different amongst different peoples. First, where religion is at its +lowest or is in its least developed form, the gods are not the cause of +the diversity nor do they seem concerned in it. Such diversity as +there is seems in its simplest form merely to be a continuance of the +social distinctions which prevail among the living: the high chieftains +rest in a calm, plenteous, sunny land in the sky; while "all Indians of +low degree go deep down under the earth to the land of Chay-her, with +its poor houses and no salmon and no deer, and blankets so small and +thin, that when the dead are buried the friends often bury blankets +with them" (Tylor, _P. C._, II, 85). Elsewhere, it is not social +distinctions, but moral, that make the difference: "the rude Tupinambas +of Brazil think {57} the souls of such as had lived virtuously, that is +to say who have well avenged themselves and eaten many of their +enemies," (_ib._) rejoin the souls of their fathers in the happy land, +while the cowards go to the other place. Thus, though the distinctions +in the next world do not seem originally to have sprung from or to have +been connected with morality, and still less with religion, they are, +or may be at a very early period, seized upon by the moral +consciousness as containing truth or implying it, when rightly +understood. Truth indeed of the highest import for morality is implied +in the distinctions thus essayed to be drawn. But before the truth +implicit could be made explicit, it was necessary that the distinctions +should be recognised to have their basis in religion. And that was +impossible where religion was at its lowest or in its least developed +form. + +From the fact that on the one hand the conception of a future life in +another world, when it arose amongst people in a low stage of religious +development, bore but little moral and no religious fruit; and on the +other, where it did yield fruit, there had been a previous period when +religion closed its eyes as far as possible to the condition of the +dead {58} in Hades or in Sheol,--we may draw the inference that the +conception of the future state formed by such people, as "the rude +Tupinambas of Brazil" had to be sterilised, so to speak,--to be +purified from associations dangerous both to morality and religion. We +may fairly say that as a matter of fact that was the consequence which +actually happened, and that both in Greece and Judæa the prospect of a +future life at one time became practically a _tabula rasa_ on which +might be written a fairer message of hope than had ever been given +before. In Greece the message was written, indeed, and was received +with hope by the thousands who joined in the celebration of the +mysteries. But the characters in which it was written faded soon. The +message was found to reveal nothing. It revealed nothing because it +demanded nothing. It demanded neither a higher life nor a higher +conception of the deity. It did not set forth a new and nobler +morality; and it accommodated itself to the existing polytheism. What +it did do was to familiarise the Hellenic world with the conviction +that there was a life hereafter, better than this life; and that the +condition of its attainment was communion with the true God, +peradventure He could be found. It was by this {59} conviction and +this expectation that the ground was prepared, wherever Hellenism +existed, for the message that was to come from Israel. + +From the beginning, or let us say in the lowest forms in which religion +manifests itself, religion is the bond in which the worshippers are +united with one another and with their God. The community which is +thus united is at first the earliest form of society, whatever that +form may have been, in which men dwell together for their common +purposes. It is the fact that its members have common purposes and +common interests which constitute them a community; and amongst the +common interests without which there could be no community is that of +common worship: knowledge of the sacra, being confined to the members +of the community, is the test by which members are known, outsiders +excluded, and the existence of the community as a community secured. +At this stage, in a large number of societies--negro, +Malayo-Polynesian, North American Indians, Eskimo, Australians--the +belief in reincarnation takes a form in which the presence of souls of +the departed is recognised as necessary to the very conception of the +community. Thus in Alaska, among the Unalits of St. Michael's {60} +Bay, a festival of the dead is observed, the equivalent of which +appears to be found amongst all the Eskimo. M. Mauss (_L'Année +Sociologique_, IX, 99) thus describes it: "It comprises two essential +parts. It begins with praying the souls of the dead graciously to +consent to reincarnate themselves for the moment in the namesake which +each deceased person has; for the custom is that in each station the +child last born always takes the name of the last person who has died. +Then these living representatives of the deceased receive presents, and +having received them the souls are dismissed from the abodes of the +living to return to the land of the dead. Thus at this festival not +only does the group regain its unity, but the rite reconstitutes the +ideal group which consists of all the generations which have succeeded +one another from the earliest times. Mythical and historic ancestors +as well as later ones thus mingle with the living, and communion +between them is conducted by means of the exchange of presents." +Amongst people other than the Eskimo, a new-born child not only takes +the name of the last member of the family or clan who has died, but is +regarded as the reincarnation of the deceased. "Thus the number of +individuals, {61} of names, of souls, of social functions in the clan +is limited; and the life of the clan consists in the death and rebirth +of individuals who are always identically the same" (_l.c._ 267). + +The line of evolution thus followed by the belief in reincarnation +results in the total separation of the belief from morality and from +religion, and results in rendering it infertile alike for morality, +religion, and progress in civilisation generally. Where the belief in +reincarnation takes the form of belief in the transmigration of the +soul into some animal form, it may be utilised for moral purposes, +provided that the people amongst whom the belief obtains have otherwise +advanced so far as to see that the punishments and rewards which are +essential to the development of morality are by no means always +realised in this life. When that conviction has established itself, +the reincarnation theory will provide machinery by which the belief in +future punishments and rewards can be conceived as operative: rebirth +in animal form, if the belief in it already exists, may be held out as +a deterrent to wrongdoing. That is, as a matter of fact, the use to +which the belief has been put by Buddhism. The form and station in +which the deceased will be {62} reborn is no longer, as amongst the +peoples just mentioned, conceived to be determined automatically, so to +speak, but is supposed to depend on the moral qualities exhibited +during life. If this view of the future life has struck deeper root +and has spread over a greater surface than the doctrine taught in the +Greek mysteries ever did, the reason may probably be found in the fact +that the Greek mysteries had no higher morality to teach than was +already recognised, whilst the moral teaching of the Buddha was far +more exalted and far more profoundly true than anything that had been +preached in India before. If a moral system by itself, on its own +merits, were capable of affording a sure foundation for religion, +Buddhism would be built upon a rock. To the spiritual community by +which man may be united to his fellow-man and to his God, morality is +essential and indispensable. But the moral life derives its value +solely from the fact that on it depends, and by means of it is +realised, that communion of man with God after which man has from the +beginning striven. If then that communion and the very possibility of +that communion is denied, the denial must prove fatal alike to religion +and to morality. Now, that is the denial which Buddhism {63} makes. +But the fact of the denial is obscured to those who believe, and to +those who would like to believe, in Buddhism, by the way in which it is +made. It is made in such a way that it appears and is believed to be +an affirmation instead of a denial. Communion with God is declared to +be the final end to which the transmigration of souls conducts. But +the communion to which it leads is so intimate that the human soul, the +individual, ceases to be. Obviously, therefore, if it ceases to be, +the communion also must cease; there is no real communion subsisting +between two spirits, the human and the divine, for two spirits do not +exist, but only one. If this way of stating the case be looked upon +with suspicion as possibly not doing justice to the teaching of +Buddhism, or as pressing unduly far the union between the human and the +divine which is the ultimate goal of the transmigration of souls, the +reply is that in truth the case against Buddhism is stronger than +appears from this mode of stating it. To say that from the Buddhist +point of view the human soul, the individual, eventually ceases to be, +is indeed an incorrect way of putting the matter. It implies that the +human soul, the individual, now is; and hereafter ceases to be. But so +far from {64} admitting that the individual now is, the Buddhist +doctrine is that the existence of the soul, now, is mere illusion, +_mâyâ_. It is therefore logical enough, and at any rate +self-consistent, to say that hereafter, when the series of +transmigrations is complete, the individual will not indeed cease to +be, for he never was, but the illusion that he existed will be +dissipated. Logically again, it follows from this that if the +existence of the individual soul is an illusion from the beginning, +then there can strictly speaking be no transmigration of souls, for +there is no soul to transmigrate. But with perfect self-consistency +Buddhism accepts this position: what is transmitted from one being to +the next in the chain of existences is not the individuality or the +soul, but the character. Professor Rhys Davids says (_Hibbert +Lectures_, pp. 91, 92): "I have no hesitation in maintaining that +Gotama did not teach the transmigration of souls. What he did teach +would be better summarized, if we wish to retain the word +transmigration, as the transmigration of character. But it would be +more accurate to drop the word transmigration altogether when speaking +of Buddhism, and to call its doctrine the doctrine of karma. Gotama +held that after the death of any being, {65} whether human or not, +there survived nothing at all but that being's 'karma,' the result, +that is, of its mental and bodily actions." "He discarded the theory +of the presence, within each human body, of a soul which could have a +separate and eternal existence. He therefore established a new +identity between the individuals in the chain of existence, which he, +like his forerunners, acknowledged, by the new assertion that that +which made two beings to be the same being was--not soul, but--karma" +(_ib._, pp. 93, 94). Thus once more it appears that there can be no +eventual communion between the human soul, at the end of its chain of +existence, and the divine, for the reason, not that the human soul +ultimately ceases to be, but that it never is or was, and therefore +neither transmigrates from one body to another, nor is eventually +absorbed in the _âtmân_. + +Logically consistent though this train of argument be, it leaves +unanswered the simple question, How can the result of my actions have +any interest for me--not hereafter, but at the present moment--if I not +only shall not exist hereafter but do not exist at the present moment? +It is not impossible for a man who believes that his existence will +absolutely {66} cease at death to take some interest in and labour for +the good of others who will come after him; but it is impossible for a +man who does not exist now to believe in anything whatever. And it is +on that fundamental absurdity that Buddhism is built: it is directed to +the conversion of those who do not exist to be converted, and it is +directed to the object of relieving from existence those who have no +existence from which to be relieved. + +Where then lies the strength of Buddhism, if as a logical structure it +is rent from top to bottom by glaring inconsistency? It lies in its +appeal to the spirit of self-sacrifice. What it denounces, from +beginning to end, is the will to live. The reason why it denounces the +will to live is that that will manifests itself exclusively in the +desires of the individual; and it is to the desires of man that all the +misery in the world are directly due. Destroy those desires by +annihilating the will to live--and in no other way can they be +destroyed--and the misery of the world will cease. The only +termination to the misery of the world which Buddhism can imagine is +the voluntary cessation of life which will ultimately ensue on the +cessation of the will to live. And the means by which that is to be +brought about is {67} the uprooting and destruction of the +self-regarding desires by means of the higher morality of +self-sacrifice. What the Buddhist overlooks is that the uprooting and +destruction of the self-regarding desires results, not in the +annihilation, but in the purification and enhanced vitality, of the +self that uproots them. The outcome of the unselfish and +self-sacrificing life is not the destruction of individuality, but its +highest realisation. Now, it is only in society and by living for +others that this unselfishness and self-sacrifice can be carried out; +man can only exist and unselfishness can only operate in society, and +society means the communion of man with his fellows. It is true that +only in society can selfishness exist; but it is recognized from the +beginning as that which is destructive of society, and it is therefore +condemned alike by the morality and the religion of the society. The +communion of man with his fellows and his God is hindered, impeded, and +blocked wholly and solely by his self-regarding desires; it is +furthered and realised solely by his unselfish desires. But his +unselfish desires involve and imply his existence--I was going to say, +just as much, I mean--far more than his selfish desires, for they +imply, and are only possible on, the assumption of {68} the existence +of his fellow-man, and of his communion with him. Nay! more, by the +testimony of Buddhism itself as well as of the religious experience of +mankind at large, the unselfish desires, the spirit of self-sacrifice, +require both for their logical and their emotional justification, still +more for their practical operation, the faith that by means of them the +will of God is carried out, and that in them man shows likest God. It +is in them and by them that the communion of man with his fellow-man +and with his God is realised. It is the faith that such communion, +though it may be interrupted, can never be entirely broken which +manifests itself in the belief in immortality. That belief may take +shape in the idea that the souls of the departed revisit this earth +temporarily in ghostly form, or more permanently as reincarnated in the +new-born members of the tribe; it may body forth another world of bliss +or woe, and if it is to subserve the purposes of morality, it must so +do; nay! more, if it is to subserve the purposes of morality, it is +into the presence of the Lord that the soul must go. But in any and +whatever shape the belief takes, the soul is conceived or implied to be +in communion with other spirits. There is no other way in which it is +{69} possible to conceive the existence of a soul; just as any particle +of matter, to be comprehended in its full reality, implies not only +every other particle of matter but the universe which comprehends them, +so the existence of any spirit logically implies not only the existence +of every other but also of Him without whom no one of them could be. + +It is in this belief in the communion of spirits wherever he may find +it--and where will he not?--that the missionary may obtain a leverage +for his work. It is a sure basis for his operations because the desire +for communion is universal; and Christianity alone, of the religions of +the world, teaches that self-sacrifice is the way to life eternal. + + + + +{70} + +MAGIC + +Of all the topics which present themselves to the student of the +science of religion for investigation and explanation there is none +which has caused more diversity of opinion, none which has produced +more confusion of thought, than magic. The fact is that the belief in +magic is condemned alike by science and religion,--by the one as +essentially irrational, and by the other as essentially irreligious. +But though it is thus condemned, it flourishes, where it does flourish, +as being science, though of a more secret kind than that usually +recognised, or as being a more potent application of the rites and +ceremonies of religion. It is indeed neither science nor religion; it +lives by mimicking one or other or both. In the natural history of +belief it owes its survival, so long as it does survive, to its +"protective colouring" and its power of mimicry. It is, always and +everywhere, an error,--whether tried by the canons of science or +religion; {71} but it lives, as error can only live, by posing and +passing itself off as truth. + +If now the only persons deceived by it were the persons who believed in +it, students of the science of religion would have been saved from much +fruitless controversy. But so subtly protective is its colouring that +some scientific enquirers have confidently and unhesitatingly +identified it with religion, and have declared that magic is religion, +and religion is magic. The tyranny of that error, however, is now +well-nigh overpast. It is erroneous, and we may suppose is seen to be +erroneous, in exactly the same way as it would be to say that science +is magic, and magic science. The truth is that magic in one aspect is +a colourable imitation of science: "in short," as Dr. Frazer says +(_Early History of the Kingship_, p. 38), "magic is a spurious system +of natural law." That is, we must note, it is a system which is +spurious in our eyes, but which, to those who believed in it, was "a +statement of the rules which determine the sequence of events +throughout the world--a set of precepts which human beings observe in +order to compare their ends" (_ib._, p. 39). + +The point, then, from which I wish to start is that {72} magic, as it +is now viewed by students of the science of religion, on the one hand +is a spurious system of natural law or science, and on the other a +spurious system of religion. + +Our next point is that magic could not be spurious for those who +believed in it: they held that they knew some things and could do +things which ordinary people did not know and could not do; and, +whether their knowledge was of the secrets of nature or of the spirit +world, it was not in their eyes spurious. + +Our third point is more difficult to explain, though it will appear not +merely obvious, but self-evident, if I succeed in explaining it. It +will facilitate the work of explanation, if you will for the moment +suppose--without considering whether the supposition is true or +not--that there was a time when no one had heard that there was such a +thing as magic. Let us further suppose that at that time man had +observed such facts as that heat produces warmth, that the young of +animals and man resemble their parents: in a word, that he had attained +more or less consciously to the idea, as a matter of observation, that +like produces like, and as a matter of practice that like may be +produced by like. Having attained to that practical idea, he will of +{73} course work it not only for all that it is worth, but for more. +That is indeed the only way he has of finding out how much it is good +for; and it is only repeated failure which will convince him that here +at length he has reached the limit, that in this particular point +things do not realise his expectations, that in this instance his +anticipation of nature has been "too previous." Until that fact has +been hammered into him, he will go on expecting and believing that in +this instance also like will produce like, when he sets it to work; and +he will be perfectly convinced that he is employing the natural and +reasonable means for attaining his end. As a matter of fact, however, +as we with our superior knowledge can see, in the first place those +means never can produce the desired effect; and next, the idea that +they can, as it withers and before it finally falls to the ground, will +change its colour and assume the hue of magic. Thus the idea that by +whistling you can produce a wind is at first as natural and as purely +rational as the idea that you can produce warmth by means of fire. +There is nothing magical in either. Both are matter-of-fact +applications of the practical maxim that like produces like. + +{74} + +That, then, is the point which I have been wishing to make, the third +of the three points from which I wish to start. There are three ways +of looking at identically the same thing, _e.g._ whistling to produce a +wind. First, we may regard it, and I suggest that it was in the +beginning regarded, as an application, having nothing to distinguish it +from any other application, of the general maxim that like produces +like. The idea that eating the flesh of deer makes a man timid, or +that if you wish to be strong and bold you should eat tiger, is, in +this stage of thought, no more magical than is the idea of drinking +water because you are dry. + +Next, the idea of whistling to produce a wind, or of sticking splinters +of bone into a man's footprints in order to injure his feet, may be an +idea not generally known, a thing not commonly done, a proceeding not +generally approved of. It is thus marked off from the commonplace +actions of drinking water to moisten your parched throat or sitting by +a fire to get warm. When it is thus marked off, it is regarded as +magic: not every one knows how to do it, or not every one has the power +to do it, or not every one cares to do it. That is the second stage, +the heyday of magic. + +{75} + +The third and final stage is that in which no educated person believes +in it, when, if a man thinks to get a wind by whistling he may whistle +for it. These three ways of looking at identically the same thing may +and do coexist. The idea of whistling for a wind is for you and me +simply a mistaken idea; but possibly at this moment there are sailors +acting upon the idea and to some of them it appears a perfectly natural +thing to do, while to others there is a flavour of the magical about +it. But though the three ways may and do coexist, it is obvious that +our way of looking at it is and must be the latest of the three, for +the simple reason that an error must exist before it can be exploded. +I say that our way of looking at it must be the latest, but in saying +so I do not mean to imply that this way of looking at it originates +only at a late stage in the history of mankind. On the contrary, it is +present in a rudimentary form from very early times; and the proof is +the fact generally recognised that magicians amongst the lowest races, +though they may believe to a certain extent in their own magical +powers, do practise a good deal of magic which they themselves know to +be fraudulent. Progress takes place when other people also, and a {76} +steadily increasing number of people, come to see that it is fraudulent. + +In the next place, just as amongst very primitive peoples we see that +some magic is known by some people, viz. the magicians themselves, to +be fraudulent, though other people believe in it; so, amongst very +primitive peoples, we find beliefs and practices existing which have +not yet come to be regarded as magical, though they are such as might +come, and do elsewhere come, to be considered pure magic. Thus, for +instance, when Cherokee Indians who suffer from rheumatism abstain from +eating the flesh of the common grey squirrel "because the squirrel eats +in a cramped position, which would clearly aggravate the pangs of the +rheumatic patient" (Frazer, _History of the Kingship_, p. 70), or when +"they will not wear the feathers of the bald-headed buzzard for fear of +themselves becoming bald" (_ib._), they are simply following the best +medical advice of their day,--they certainly do not imagine they are +practising magic, any more than you or I do when we are following the +prescriptions of our medical adviser. On the contrary, it is quite as +obvious, then, that the feathers of the bald-headed buzzard are +infectious as it is now that the clothes {77} of a fever patient are +infectious. Neither proposition, to be accepted as true, requires us +to believe in magic: either might spring up where magic had never been +heard of. And, if that is the case, it simply complicates things +unnecessarily to talk of magic in such cases. The tendency to believe +that like produces like is not a consequence of or a deduction from a +belief in magic: on the contrary, magic has its root or one of its +roots in that tendency of the human mind. But though that tendency +helps to produce magic amongst other things, magic is not the only +thing which it produces: it produces beliefs such as those of the +Cherokees just quoted, which are no more magical than the belief that +fire produces warmth, or that _causa aequat effectum_, that an effect +is, when analysed, indistinguishable from the conditions which +constitute it. + +To attempt to define magic is a risky thing; and, instead of doing so +at once, I will try to mark off proceedings which are not magical; and +I would venture to say that things which it is believed any one can do, +and felt that any one may do, are not magical in the eyes of those who +have that belief and that feeling. You may abstain from eating {78} +squirrel or wearing fine feathers because of the consequences; and +every one will think you are showing your common sense. You may hang +up the bones of animals you have killed, in order to attract more +animals of the like kind; and you are simply practising a dodge which +you think will be useful. Wives whose husbands are absent on hunting +or fighting expeditions may do or abstain from doing things which, on +the principle that like produces like, will affect their husbands' +success; and this application of the principle may be as +irrational--and as perfectly natural--as the behaviour of the beginner +at billiards whose body writhes, when he has made his stroke, in excess +of sympathy with the ball which just won't make the cannon. In both +cases the principle acted on,--deliberately in the one case, less +voluntarily in the other,--the instinctive feeling is that like +produces like, not as a matter of magic but as a matter of fact. If +the behaviour of the billiard player is due to an impulse which is in +itself natural and in his case is not magical, we may fairly take the +same view of the hunter's wife who abstains from spinning for fear the +game should turn and wind like the spindle and the hunter be unable to +hit it (Frazer, {79} p. 55). The principle in both cases is that like +produces like. Some applications of that principle are correct; some +are not. The incorrectness of the latter is not at once discovered: +the belief in their case is erroneous, but is not known to be +erroneous. And unless we are prepared to take up the position that +magic is the only form of erroneous belief which is to be found amongst +primitive men, we must endeavour to draw a line between those erroneous +beliefs which are magical and those erroneous beliefs which are not. +The line will not be a hard and fast line, because a belief which +originally had nothing magical about it may come to be regarded as +magical. Indeed, on the assumption that belief in magic is an error, +we have to enquire how men come to fall into the error. If there is no +such thing as magic, how did man come to believe that there was? My +suggestion is that the rise of the belief is not due to the +introduction of a novel practice, but to a new way of looking at an +existing practice. It is due in the first instance to the fact that +the practice is regarded with disapproval as far as its consequences +are concerned and without regard to the means employed to produce them. +Injury to a member of the community, {80} especially injury which +causes death, is viewed by the community with indignant disapproval. +Whether the death is produced by actual blows or "by drawing the figure +of a person and then stabbing it or doing it any other injury" (Frazer, +p. 41), it is visited with the condemnation of the community. And +consequently all such attempts "to injure or destroy an enemy by +injuring or destroying an effigy of him" (_ib._), whenever they are +made, whether they come off or not, are resented and disapproved by +society. On the other hand, sympathetic or hom[oe]opathic magic of +this kind, when used by the hunter or the fisherman to secure food, +meets with no condemnation. Both assassin and hunter use substantially +the same means to effect their object; but the disapproval with which +the community views the object of the assassin is extended also to the +means which he employs. In fine, the practice of using like to produce +like comes to be looked on with loathing and with dread when it is +employed for antisocial purposes. Any one can injure or destroy his +private enemy by injuring an effigy of him, just as any one can injure +or destroy his enemy by assaulting and wounding him. But though any +one may do this, it is felt {81} that no one ought to do it. Such +practices are condemned by public opinion. Further, as they are +condemned by the community, they are _ipso facto_ offensive to the god +of the community. To him only those prayers can be offered, and by him +only those practices can be approved, which are not injurious to the +community or are not felt by the community to be injurious. That is +the reason why such practices are condemned by the religious as well as +by the moral feeling of the community. And they are condemned by +religion and morality long before their futility is exposed by science +or recognised by common sense. When they are felt to be futile, there +is no call upon religion or morality especially to condemn the +practices--though the intention and the will to injure our fellow-man +remains offensive both to morality and religion. With the means +adopted for realising the will and carrying out the intention, morality +and religion have no concern. If the same or similar means can be used +for purposes consistent with the common weal, they do not, so far as +they are used for such purposes, come under the ban of either morality +or religion. Therein we have, I suggest, the reason of a certain +confusion of thought {82} in the minds of students of the science of +religion. We of the present day look at the means employed. We see +the same means employed for ends that are, and for ends that are not, +antisocial; and, inasmuch as the means are the same and are alike +irrational, we group them all together under the head of magic. The +grouping is perfectly correct, inasmuch as the proceedings grouped +together have the common attribute of being proceedings which cannot +possibly produce the effects which those who employ them believe that +they will and do produce. But this grouping becomes perfectly +misleading, if we go on to infer, as is sometimes inferred, that +primitive man adopted it. First, it is based on the fact that the +proceedings are uniformly irrational--a fact of which man is at first +wholly unaware; and which, when it begins to dawn upon him, presents +itself in the form of the further error that while some of these +proceedings are absurd, others are not. In neither case does he adopt +the modern, scientific position that all are irrational, impossible, +absurd. Next, the modern position deals only with the proceedings as +means,--declaring them all absurd,--and overlooks entirely what is to +primitive man the point of fundamental importance, viz. the object {83} +and purpose with which they are used. Yet it is the object and purpose +which determine the social value of these proceedings. For him, or in +his eyes, to class together the things which he approves of and the +things of which he disapproves would be monstrous: the means employed +in the two cases may be the same, but that is of no importance in face +of the fact that the ends aimed at in the two cases are not merely +different but contradictory. In the one case the object promotes the +common weal, or is supposed by him to promote it. In the other it is +destructive of the common weal. + +If, therefore, we wish to avoid confusion of thought, we must in +discussing magic constantly bear in mind that we group together--and +therefore are in danger of confusing--things which to the savage differ +_toto caelo_ from one another. A step towards avoiding this confusion +is taken by Dr. Frazer, when he distinguishes (_History of the +Kingship_, p. 89) between private magic and public magic. The +distinction is made still more emphatic by Dr. Haddon (_Magic and +Fetichism_, p. 20) when he speaks of "nefarious magic." The very same +means when employed against the good of the community are regarded, by +morality and religion {84} alike, as nefarious, which when employed for +the good of the community are regarded with approval. The very same +illegitimate application,--I mean logically illegitimate in our +eyes,--the very same application of the principle that like produces +like will be condemned by the public opinion of the community when it +is employed for purposes of murder and praised by public opinion when +it is employed to produce the rain which the community desires. The +distinction drawn by primitive man between the two cases is that, +though any one can use the means to do either, no one ought to do the +one which the community condemns. That is condemned as nefarious; and +because it is nefarious, the "witch" may be "smelled out" by the +"witch-doctor" and destroyed by, or with the approval of, the community. + +But though that is, I suggest, the first stage in the process by which +the belief in magic is evolved, it is by no means the whole of the +process. Indeed, it may fairly be urged that practices which any one +can perform, though no one ought to perform, may be nefarious (as +simple, straightforward murder is), but so far there is nothing magical +about them. And I am prepared to accept that view. Indeed, {85} it is +an essential part of my argument, for I seek to show that the belief in +magic had a beginning and was evolved out of something that was not a +belief in magic, though it gave rise to it. The belief that like +produces like can be entertained where magic has not so much as been +heard of. And, though it may ultimately be worked out into the +scientific position that the sum of conditions necessary to produce an +effect is indistinguishable from the effect, it may also be worked out +on other lines into a belief in magic; and the first step in that +evolution is taken when the belief that like produces like is used for +purposes pronounced by public opinion to be nefarious. + +The next step is taken when it comes to be believed not only that the +thing is nefarious but that not every one can do it. The reason why +only a certain person can do it may be that he alone knows how to do +it--or he and the person from whom he learnt it. The lore of such +persons when examined by folk-lore students is found generally to come +under one or other of the two classes known as sympathetic and mimetic +magic, or hom[oe]opathic and contagious magic. In these cases it is +obvious that the _modus operandi_ is the same as it {86} was in what I +have called the first stage in the evolution of magic and have already +described at great length. What differentiates this second stage from +the first is that whereas in the first stage these applications of the +principle that like produces like are known to every one, though not +practised by every one, in the second stage these applications are not +known to every one, but only to the dealers in magic. Some of those +applications of the principle may be applications which have descended +to the dealer and have passed out of the general memory; and others may +simply be extensions of the principle which have been invented by the +dealer or his teacher. Again, the public disapproval of nefarious arts +will tend first to segregate the followers of such arts from the rest +of the community; and next to foster the notion that the arts thus +segregated, and thereby made more or less mysterious, include not only +things which the ordinary decent member of society would not do if he +could, but also things which he could not do if he would. The mere +belief in the possibility of such arts creates an atmosphere of +suspicion in which things are believed because they are impossible. +When this stage has been reached, when he who {87} practises nefarious +arts is reported and believed to do things which ordinary decent people +could not do if they would, his personality inevitably comes to be +considered as a factor in the results that he produces; he is credited +with a power to produce them which other people, that is to say +ordinary people, do not possess. And it is that personal power which +eventually comes to be the most important, because the most mysterious, +article in his equipment. It is in virtue of that personal power that +he is commonly believed to be able to do things which are impossible +for the ordinary member of the tribe. + +Thus far I have been tracing the steps of the process by which the +worker of nefarious arts starts by employing for nefarious purposes +means which any one could use if he would, and ends by being credited +with a power peculiar to himself of working impossibilities. I now +wish to point out that a process exactly parallel is simultaneously +carried on by which arts beneficent to society are supposed to be +evolved. Rain-making may be taken as an art socially beneficial. The +_modus operandi_ of rain-making appears in all cases to be based on the +principle that like produces like; and to be in its {88} nature a +process which any one can carry out and which requires no mysterious +art to effect and no mysterious personal power to produce. At the same +time, as it is a proceeding which is beneficial to the tribe as a +whole, it is one in which the whole tribe, and no one tribesman in +particular, is interested. It must be carried out in the interest of +the tribe and by some one who in carrying it out acts for the tribe. +The natural representative of the tribe is the head-man of the tribe; +and, though any one might perform the simple actions necessary, and +could perform them just as well as the head-man, they tend to fall into +the hands of the head-man; and in any case the person who performs them +performs them as the representative of the tribe. The natural +inference comes in course of time to be drawn that he who alone +performs them is the man who alone can perform them; and when that +inference is drawn it becomes obvious that his personality, or the +power peculiar to him personally, is necessary if rain is to be made, +and that the acts and ceremonies through which he goes and through +which any one could go would not be efficacious, or not as efficacious, +without his personal agency and mysterious power. Hence the man who +works {89} wonders for his tribe or in the interests of his tribe, in +virtue of his personal power, does things which are impossible for the +ordinary member of the tribe. + +Up to this point, in tracing the evolution of magic, we have not found +it once necessary to bring in or even to refer to any belief in the +existence of spiritual beings of any kind. So far as the necessities +of the argument are concerned, the belief in magic might have +originated in the way I have described and might have developed on the +lines suggested, in a tribe which had never so much as heard of +spirits. Of course, as a matter of fact, every tribe in which the +belief in magic is found does also believe in the existence of spirits; +animism is a stage of belief lower than which or back of which science +does not profess to go. But it is only in an advanced stage of its +evolution that the belief in magic becomes involved with the belief in +spirits. Originally, eating tiger to make you bold, or eating saffron +to cure jaundice, was just as matter of fact a proceeding as drinking +water to moisten your throat or sitting by a fire to get warm; like +produces like, and beyond that obvious fact it was not necessary to +go--there was no more need to imagine that the action of the saffron +was due to a spirit than to imagine {90} that it was a water spirit +which slakes your thirst. The fact seems to be that animism is a +savage philosophy which is competent to explain everything when called +upon, but that the savage does not spend every moment of his waking +life in invoking it: until there is some need to fall back upon it, he +goes on treating inanimate things as things which he can utilise for +his own purposes without reference to spirits. That is the attitude +also of the man who in virtue of his lore or his personal power can +produce effects which the ordinary man cannot or will not: he performs +his ceremony and the effect follows--or will follow--because he knows +how to do it or has mysterious personal power to produce the effect. +But he consults no spirits--at any rate in the first instance. +Eventually he may do so; and then magic enters on a further stage in +its evolution. (See Appendix.) + +If the man who has the lore or the personal power, and who uses it for +nefarious purposes, proposes to employ it on obtaining the same control +over spirits as he has over things, his magic reaches a stage of +evolution in which it is difficult and practically unnecessary to +distinguish it from the stage of fetichism in which the owner of a +fetich {91} applies coercion to make the fetich spirit do what he +wishes. With fetichism I deal in another lecture. If, on the other +hand, the man who has the lore or the personal power and uses it for +social or "communal" purposes (Haddon, p. 41) comes to believe that, +for the effects which he has hitherto sought to produce by means of his +superior knowledge or superior power, it is necessary to invoke the aid +of spirits, he will naturally address himself to the spirit or god who +is worshipped by the community because he has at heart the general +interests of the community; or it may be that the spirit who produces +such a benefit for the community at large, as rain for example, will +take his place among the gods of the community as the rain-god, in +virtue of the benefit which he confers upon the community generally. +In either case, the attitude of the priest or person who approaches him +on behalf of the community will be that which befits a supplicant +invoking a favour from a power that has shown favour in the past to the +community. And it will not surprise us if we find that the ceremonies +which were used for the purpose of rain-making, before rain was +recognised as the gift of the gods, continue for a time to be practised +as the proper rites with {92} which to approach the god of the +community or the rain-god in particular. Such survivals are then in +danger of being misinterpreted by students of the science of religion, +for they may be regarded as evidence that religion was evolved out of +magic, when in truth they show that religion tends to drive out magic. +Thus Dr. Frazer, in his _Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship_ +(pp. 73-75), describes the practice of the New Caledonians who, to +promote the growth of taro, "bury in the field certain stones +resembling taros, praying to their ancestors at the same time," and he +goes on to say: "In these practices of the New Caledonians the magical +efficacy of the stones appears to be deemed insufficient of itself to +accomplish the end in view; it has to be reinforced by the spirits of +the dead, whose help is sought by prayer and sacrifice. Thus in New +Caledonia sorcery is blent with the worship of the dead; in other +words, magic is combined with religion. If the stones ceased to be +employed, and the prayers and sacrifices to the ancestors remained, the +transition from magic to religion would be complete." Thus it seems to +be suggested in these words of Dr. Frazer's that religion may be +evolved out of magic. If that is what is suggested, {93} then there is +little doubt that the suggestion is not borne out by the instance +given. Let us concede for the moment what some of us would be inclined +to doubt, viz. that prayers and sacrifice offered to a human being, +alive or dead, is religion; and let us enquire whether this form of +religion is evolved out of magic. The magic here is quite clear: +stones resembling taros are buried in the taro field to promote the +growth of taros. That is an application of the principle that like +produces like which might be employed by men who had never heard of +ancestor worship or of any kind of religion, and who had never uttered +prayers or offered sacrifices of any kind. Next, the religious +element, according to Dr. Frazer, is also quite clear: it consists in +offering sacrifices to the dead with the prayer or the words, "Here are +your offerings, in order that the crop of yams may be good." Now, it +is not suggested, even by Dr. Frazer, that this religious element is a +form of magic or is in any way developed out of or evolved from magic. +On the contrary, if this element is religious--indeed, whether it be +really religious or not--it is obviously entirely distinct and +different from sympathetic or hom[oe]opathic magic. The mere fact that +the magical {94} rite of burying in the taro fields stones which +resemble taros has to be supplemented by rites which are, on Dr. +Frazer's own showing, non-magical, shows that the primitive belief in +this application of the principle that like produces like was already +dying out, and was in process of becoming a mere survival. Suppose +that it died out entirely and the rite of burying stones became an +unintelligible survival, or was dropped altogether, and suppose that +the prayers and sacrifices remained in possession of the field, which +would be the more correct way of stating the facts, to say that the +magic had died out and its place had been taken by something totally +different, viz. religion; or that what was magic had become religion, +that magic and religion are but two manifestations, two stages, in the +evolution of the same principle? The latter statement was formally +rejected by Dr. Frazer in the second edition of his _Golden Bough_, +when he declared that he had come to recognise "a fundamental +distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and +religion" (Preface, xvi). His words, therefore, justify us in assuming +that when he speaks, in his _Lectures on the Early History of the +Kingship_, of the "transition from magic to religion," he cannot {95} +mean that magic becomes religion, or that religion is evolved out of +magic, for the "distinction and even opposition of principle" between +the two is "fundamental." He can, therefore, only mean that magic is +followed and may be driven out by something which is fundamentally +opposed to it, viz. religion. + +What then is the fundamental opposition between magic and religion? and +is it such as to require us to believe with Dr. Frazer that magic +preceded religion, and that of two opposite ideas the mind can conceive +the one without conceiving--and rejecting--the other? + +The fundamental opposition between magic and religion I take to be that +religion is supposed to promote the interests of the community, and +that magic, so far forth as it is nefarious, is condemned by the moral +and by the religious feeling of the community. It is the ends for +which nefarious magic is used that are condemned, and not the means. +The means may be and, as we see, are silly and futile; and, for +intellectual progress, their silliness and futility must be recognised +by the intellect. But, it is only when they are used for purposes +inimical to the public good that they are {96} condemned by religion +and morality as nefarious. If therefore we talk of a fundamental +opposition between magic and religion, we must understand that the +fundamental opposition is that between nefarious magic and religion; +neither religion nor morality condemns the desire to increase the food +supply or to promote any other interest of the community. Whether a +man uses skill that he has acquired, or personal power, or force of +will, matters not, provided he uses it for the general good. The +question whether, as a cold matter of fact, the means he uses are +efficacious is not one which moral fervour or religious ardour is +competent by itself to settle: the cool atmosphere and dry light of +reason have rather that function to perform; and they have to perform +it in the case both of means that are used for the general good and of +those used against it. + +I take it therefore that what religion is fundamentally opposed to is +magic--or anything else--that is used for nefarious purposes. + +The question then arises whether we have any reason to believe that +magic used for nefarious purposes must have existed before religion. +Now by nefarious purposes I mean purposes inconsistent with or +destructive of the common good. {97} There can be no such purposes, +however, unless and until there is a community, however small, having +common interests and a common good. As soon as there exists such a +community, there will be a distinction between actions which promote +and actions which are destructive of the common good. The one class +will be approved, the other disapproved, of by public opinion. Magic +will be approved and disapproved of according as it is or is not used +in a way inconsistent with the public good. If there is a spirit or a +god who is worshipped by the community because he is believed to be +concerned with the good of the community, then he will disapprove of +nefarious proceedings whether magical or not. But Dr. Frazer's +position I take to be that no such spirit or god can come to be +believed in, unless there has been previously a belief in magic. Now, +that argument either is or is not based on the assumption that magic +and religion are but two manifestations, two stages, in the evolution +of the same principle. If that is the basis, then what manifested +itself at first as magic subsequently manifests itself as religion; and +"the transition from magic to religion" implies the priority of magic +to religion. But, as we have seen, Dr. Frazer {98} formally +postulates, not an identity, but an "opposition of principle" between +the two. We must therefore reject the assumption of an identity of +principle; and accept the "opposition of principle." But if so, then +there must be two principles which are opposed to one another, religion +and magic; and we might urge that line of argument consistently enough +to show that there can be no magic save where there is religion to be +opposed to it. + +Now, there is an opposition of principle between magic used for +nefarious purposes and religion; and the opposition is that the one +promotes social and the other anti-social purposes. Nefarious +purposes, whether worked by magic or by other means, are condemned by +religion and are nefarious especially because offensive to the god who +has the interests of the community at heart. That from the moment +society existed anti-social tendencies also manifested themselves will +not be doubted; and neither need we doubt that the principle that like +produces like was employed from the beginning for social as well as for +anti-social purposes. The question is whether, in the stage of +animism, the earliest and the lowest stage which science recognises in +the evolution of man, there is ever found a society {99} of human +beings which has not appropriated some one or more of the spirits by +which all things, on the animistic principle, are worked, to the +purposes of the community. No such society has yet been proved to +exist; still less has any _à priori_ proof been produced to show that +such a society must have existed. The presumption indeed is rather the +other way. Children go through a period of helpless infancy longer +than the young of any other creatures; and could not reach the age of +self-help, if the family did not hold together for some years at least. +But where there is a family there is a society, even if it be confined +to members of the family. There also, therefore, there are social and +anti-social tendencies and purposes; and, in the animistic stage, the +spirits, by which man conceives himself to be surrounded, are either +hostile or not hostile to the society, and are accordingly either +worshipped or not worshipped by it. Doubtless, even in those early +times, the father and the husband conceived himself to be the whole +family; and if that view had its unamiable side--and it still has--it +also on occasion had the inestimable advantage of sinking self, of +self-sacrifice, in defence of the family. + +{100} + +Thus far I have been concerned to show how, starting from a principle +such as that like produces like, about which there is nothing magical +in the eyes either of those who believe in magic or of those who have +left the belief behind, man might evolve the conception of magic as +being the lore or the personal power which enables a man to do what +ordinary people cannot do. A few words are necessary as to the decline +of the belief. The first is that the belief is rotten before it is +ripe. Those applications of the principle that like produces like +which are magical are generally precisely those which are false. The +fact that they are false has not prevented them from surviving in +countless numbers to the present day. But some suspicion of their +falsity in some cases does arise; and the person who has the most +frequent opportunities of discovering their falsity, the person on +whose notice the discovery of their falsity is thrust most pointedly, +is the person who deals habitually and professionally in magic. Hence, +though it is his profession to work wonders, he takes care as far as +may be not to attempt impossibilities. Thus Dr. Haddon (_l.c._, p. 62) +found that the men of Murray Island, Torres Straits, who made a "big +wind" by magic, only made it in the {101} season of the southeast trade +wind. "On my asking," he says, "whether the ceremony was done in the +north monsoon, my informant said emphatically, 'Can't do it in +northwest.' That is, the charm is performed only at that season of the +year when the required result is possible--indeed when it is of normal +occurrence. In this, as in other cases, I found that the impossible +was never attempted. A rain charm would not be made when there was no +expectation of rain coming, or a southeast wind be raised during the +wrong season." The instance thus given to us by Dr. Haddon shows how +the belief in magic begins to give way before the scientific +observation of fact. The collapse of magic becomes complete when every +one sees that the southeast trade wind blows at its appointed time, +whether the magic rites are performed or not. In fine, what kills +magic regarded as a means for producing effects is the discovery that +it is superfluous, when for instance the desired wind or rain is +coming, and futile when it is not. And whereas morality and religion +only condemn the end aimed at by magic, and only condemn it when it is +anti-social, science slowly shows that magic as a means to any end is +superfluous and silly. + +{102} + +Science, however, shows this but slowly; and if we wish to understand +how it is that the belief in the magician's power has survived for +thousands of years down to the present moment amongst numerous peoples, +we must remember that his equipment and apparatus are not limited to +purely nonsensical notions. On the contrary, in his stock of +knowledge, carefully handed down, are many truths and facts not +generally known; and they are the most efficacious articles of his +stock in trade. Dr. Frazer may not go farther than his argument +requires, but he certainly goes farther than the facts will support +him, when he says (_l.c._, p. 83) "for it must always be remembered +that every single profession and claim put forward by the magician as +such is false; not one of them can be maintained without deception, +conscious or unconscious." + +If now, in conclusion, we look once more at the subject of magic and +look at it from the practical point of view of the missionary, we shall +see that there are several conclusions which may be of use to him. In +the first place, his attitude to magic will be hostile, and in his +hostility to it he will find the best starting-point for his campaign +against it to be in the fact that everywhere magic is felt, to a +greater {103} or less extent, to be anti-social, and is condemned both +by the moral sentiments and the religious feeling of the community. It +is felt to be essentially wicked; and in warring against it the +missionary will be championing the cause of those who know it to be +wrong but who simply dare not defy it. The fact that defiance is not +ventured on is essential to the continuance of the tyranny; and what is +necessary, if it is to be defied, is an actual concrete example of the +fact that when defied it is futile. + +Next, where magic is practised for social purposes, where it mimics +science or religion and survives in virtue of its power of "protective +colouring," it is in fact superfluous and silly; and where the natives +themselves are beginning to recognise that the magic which is supposed, +for instance, to raise the southeast trade wind won't act at the wrong +season, it should not be difficult to get them to see that it is +unnecessary at the right season. The natural process which tends thus +to get rid of magic may be accelerated by the sensible missionary; and +some knowledge of science will be found in this, as in other matters, +an indispensable part of his training. + +Finally, the missionary may rest assured in the conviction that his +flank will not be turned by the {104} science of religion. The idea +that religion was preceded by and evolved out of magic may have been +entertained by some students of the science of religion in the past, +and may not yet have been thrown off by all. But it holds no place now +in the science of religion. To derive either science or religion from +the magic which exists only by mimicking one or the other is just as +absurd as to imagine that the insect which imitates the colour of the +leaf whereon it lives precedes and creates the tree which is to support +it. + + + + +{105} + +FETICHISM + +The line of action taken by the missionary at work will, like that of +any other practical man, be conditioned, not only by the object which +he wishes to attain, but also by the nature of the material on which +and with which he has to work. He requires therefore all the +information which the science of religion can place at his disposal +about the beliefs and practices of those amongst whom his work is cast; +and, if he is to make practical use of that information, he must know +not only that certain beliefs and practices do as a matter of fact +obtain, he must know also what is their value for his special +purpose--what, if any, are the points about them which have religious +value, and can be utilized by him; and what are those points about them +which are obstructive to his purpose, and how best they may be removed +and counteracted. To supply him with this information, to give him +this estimate of values, to guide him as to the attitude he should +assume and the way in which he may utilise or must {106} attack native +practices and beliefs, is the object with which the applied science of +religion, when it has been constituted by the action of Hartford +Theological Seminary, will address itself. + +Now, it may seem from the practical point of view of the missionary +that with regard to fetichism there can be no question as to what its +value is or as to what his attitude should be towards it. But, even if +we should ultimately find that fetichism is obstructive to religion, we +shall still want to know what hints we can extract from the science of +religion as to the best way of cutting at the roots of fetichism; and +therefore it will be necessary to consider what exactly fetichism is. +And, as a matter of fact, there is a tendency manifesting itself +amongst students of the science of religion to say, as Dr. Haddon says +(_Magic and Fetichism_, p. 91), that "fetichism is a stage of religious +development"; and amongst writers on the philosophy of religion to take +fetichism and treat it, provisionally at any rate, if not as the +primitive religion of mankind, then as that form of religion which "we +find amongst men at the lowest stage of development known to us" +(Höffding, _Philosophy of Religion_, E. T., §§ 45, 46). If, then, +fetichism is the primitive religion of {107} mankind or a stage of +religious development, "a basis from which many other modes of +religious thought have been developed" (Haddon, p. 91), it will have a +value which the missionary must recognise. And in any case he must +know what value, if any, it has. + +Now, if we are, I will not say to do justice to the view that fetichism +is the primitive religion of mankind or a stage from which other modes +of religious thought have been developed, but if we are simply to +understand it, we must clearly distinguish it from the view--somewhat +paradoxical to say the least--that fetichism has no religious value, +and yet is the source of all religious values. The inference which may +legitimately be drawn from this second view is that all forms of +religious thought, having been evolved from this primitive religion of +mankind, have precisely the same value as it has; they do but make +explicit what it really was; the history of religion does but write +large and set out at length what was contained in it from the first; in +fetichism we see what from the first religion was, and what at the last +religion is. On this view, the source from which all religious values +spring is fetichism; fetichism has no value of any kind, and therefore +the {108} evolved forms of fetichism which we call forms of religion +have no value either of any kind. Thus, science--the science of +religion--is supposed to demonstrate by scientific methods the real +nature and the essential character of all religion. + +Now, the error in this reasoning proceeds partly on a false conception +of the object and method of science--a false conception which is slowly +but surely disappearing. The object of all science, whether it be +physical science or other, whether it be historic science or other, is +to establish facts. The object of the historic science of religion is +to record the facts of the history of religion in such a way that the +accuracy of the record as a record will be disputed by no one qualified +to judge the fact. For that purpose, it abstains deliberately and +consistently from asking or considering the religious value of any of +the facts with which it deals. It has not to consider, and does not +consider, what would have been, still less what ought to have been, the +course of history, but simply what it was. In this it is following +merely the dictates of common sense; before we can profitably express +an opinion on any occurrence, we must know what exactly it was that +occurred; and to learn what occurred we must {109} divest our minds of +preconceptions. It is the business of the science of religion to set +aside preconceptions as to whether religion has or has not any value; +and if it does set them aside, that is to say so far as it is +scientific, it will end as it began without touching on the question of +the value of religion. In fine, it is, and would I think now be +generally admitted to be, a misconception of the function of the +science of religion to imagine that it does, or can, prove anything as +to the truth of religion, one way or the other. + +There is, however, another error in the reasoning which is directed to +show that in fetichism we see what religion was and essentially is. +That error consists not only in a false conception of what religion +is,--the man who has himself no religion may be excused if he fails to +understand fully what it is,--it is based on a misunderstanding of what +fetichism is. And so confusion is doubly confounded. The source of +that misunderstanding is to be found in Bosman (Pinkerton, _Voyages and +Travels_, London, 1814, XVI, 493), who says: "I once asked a negro with +whom I could talk very freely ... how they celebrated their divine +worship, and what number of gods they had; he, laughing, answered that +I had {110} puzzled him; and assured me that nobody in the whole +country could give me an exact account of it. 'For, as for my own +part, I have a very large number of gods, and doubt not but that others +have as many. For any of us being resolved to undertake anything of +importance, we first of all search out a god to prosper our designed +undertaking; and going out of doors with the design, take the first +creature that presents itself to our eyes, whether dog, cat, or the +most contemptible creature in the world for our god; or, perhaps, +instead of that, any inanimate that falls in our way, whether a stone, +a piece of wood, or anything else of the same nature. This new-chosen +god is immediately presented with an offering, which is accompanied by +a solemn vow, that if it pleaseth him to prosper our undertakings, for +the future we will always worship and esteem him as a god. If our +design prove successful, we have discovered a new and assisting god, +which is daily presented with a fresh offering; but if the contrary +happen, the new god is rejected as a useless tool, and consequently +returns to his primitive estate. We make and break our gods daily, and +consequently are the masters and inventors of what we sacrifice to.'" +Now, all this was said by the {111} negro, as Bosman himself observed, +to "ridicule his own country gods." And it is not surprising that it +should have been, or should be, accepted as a trustworthy description +of the earliest form of religion by those who in the highest form can +find no more than this negro found in fetichism when he wished to +ridicule it. + +Let us hold over for the moment the question whether fetichism is or is +not a form of religion; and let us enquire how far the account given by +Bosman's negro accords with the facts. First, though there is no doubt +that animals are worshipped as gods, and though there is no doubt that +the guardian spirits of individuals are chosen, or are supposed to +manifest themselves, for example, amongst the North American Indians, +in animal form, and that "the first creature that presents itself" to +the man seeking the manifestation of his guardian spirit may be taken +to be his god, even though it be "the most contemptible creature in the +world "; still students of the science of religion are fairly satisfied +that such gods or guardian spirits are not to be confused with +fetiches. A fetich is an inanimate or lifeless object, even if it is +the feather, claw, bone, eyeball, or any other part of an animal or +even of a man. It is as {112} Bosman's negro said, "any inanimate that +falls in our way." When he goes on to say that it "is immediately +presented with an offering," and, so long as its owner believes in it, +"is daily presented with a fresh offering," he is stating a fact that +is beyond dispute, and which is fully recognised by all students. A +typical instance is given by Professor Tylor (_Primitive Culture_, II, +158) of the owner of a stone which had been taken as a fetich: "He was +once going out on important business, but crossing the threshold he +trod on this stone and hurt himself. Ha! ha! thought he, art thou +there? So he took the stone, and it helped him through his undertaking +for days." When Bosman's negro further goes on to state that if the +fetich is discovered by its owner not to prosper his undertakings, as +he expected it to do, "it is rejected as a useless tool," he makes a +statement which is admitted to be true and which, in its truth, may be +understood to mean that when the owner finds that the object is not a +fetich, he casts it aside as being nothing but the "inanimate" which it +is. Bosman's negro, however, says not that the inanimate but that "the +new god is rejected as a useless tool." That we must take as being but +a carelessness of expression; the evidence of Colonel {113} Ellis, an +observer whose competence is undoubted, is: "Every native with whom I +have conversed on the subject has laughed at the possibility of it +being supposed that he could worship or offer sacrifice to some such +object as a stone, which of itself would be perfectly obvious to his +senses was a stone only and nothing more" (_The Tshi-speaking Peoples_, +p. 192). From these words it follows that the object worshipped as a +fetich is a stone (or whatever it is) and something more, and that the +object "rejected as a useless tool" is a stone (or whatever it is) and +nothing more. When, then, Bosman's negro goes on to say, "we make and +break our gods daily," he is not describing accurately the processes as +they are conceived by those who perform them. The fetich worshipper +believes that the object which arrests his attention has already the +powers which he ascribes to it; and it is in consequence of that belief +that he takes it as his fetich. And it is only when he is convinced +that it is not a fetich that he rejects it as a useless tool. But what +Bosman's negro suggests, and apparently intended to suggest, is that +the fetich worshipper makes, say, a stone his god, knowing that it is a +stone and nothing more; and that he breaks his fetich believing it to +be a god. {114} Thus the worshipper knows that the object is no god +when he is worshipping it; but believes it to be a god when he rejects +it as a useless tool. Now that is, consciously or unconsciously, +deliberately or not, a misrepresentation of fetichism; and it is +precisely on that misconception of what fetichism is that they base +themselves who identify religion with fetichism, and then argue that, +as fetichism has no value, religious or reasonable, neither has +religion itself. + +Returning now to the question what fetichism is--a question which must +be answered before we can enquire what religious value it possesses, +and whether it can be of any use for the practical purposes of the +missionary in his work--we have now seen that a fetich is not merely an +"inanimate," but something more; and that an object to become regarded +as a fetich must attract the attention of the man who is to adopt it, +and must attract the attention of the man when he has business on hand, +that is to say when he has some end in view which he desires to attain, +or generally when he is in a state of expectancy. The process of +choice is one of "natural selection." Professor Höffding sees in it +"the simplest conceivable construction of religious ideas. The choice +is entirely elementary {115} and involuntary, as elementary and +involuntary as the exclamation which is the simplest form of a judgment +of worth. The object chosen must be something or other which is +closely bound up with whatever engrosses the mind. It perhaps awakens +memories of earlier events in which it was present or coöperative, or +else it presents a certain--perhaps a very distant--similarity to +objects which helped in previous times of need. Or it may be merely +the first object which presents itself in a moment of strained +expectation. It attracts attention, and is therefore involuntarily +associated with what is about to happen, with the possibility of +attaining the desired end" (_Philosophy of Religion_, E. T., p. 139). +And then Professor Höffding goes on to say, "In such phenomena as these +we encounter religion under the guise of desire." Now, without denying +that there are such things as religious desires--and holding as we do +that religion is the search after God and the yearning of the human +heart after Him, "the desire of all nations," we shall have no +temptation to deny that there are such things as religious desires--yet +we must for the moment reserve our decision on the question whether it +is in such phenomena {116} as these that we encounter religious +desires, and we must bear in mind that there are desires which are not +religious, and that we want to know whether it is in the phenomena of +fetichism that we encounter religious desires. + +That in the phenomena of fetichism we encounter desires other than +religious is beyond dispute: the use of a fetich is, as Dr. Nassau +says, "to aid the possessor in the accomplishment of some specific +wish" (_Fetichism in West Africa_, p. 82); that is, of any specific +wish. Now, a fetich is, as we have seen, an inanimate object and +something more. What more? In actual truth, nothing more than the +fact that it is "involuntarily associated with what is about to happen, +with the possibility of attaining the desired end." But to the +possessor the something more, it may be said, is the fact that it is +not merely an "inanimate" but also a spirit, or the habitation of a +spiritual being. When, however, we reflect that fetichism goes back to +the animistic stage of human thought, in which all the things that we +term inanimate are believed to be animated by spirits, it is obvious +that we require some differentia to mark off those things (animated by +spirits) which are fetiches from those things (animated by spirits) +{117} which are not. And the differentia is, of course, that fetiches +are spirits, or objects animated by spirits, which will aid the +possessor in the accomplishment of some specific wish, and are thought +to be willing so to aid, owing to the fact that by an involuntary +association of ideas they become connected in the worshipper's mind +with the possibility of attaining the end he has in view at the moment. +To recognise fetichism, then, in its simplest if not in its most +primitive form, all we need postulate is animism--the belief that all +things are animated by spirits--and the process of very natural +selection which has already been described. At this stage in the +history of fetichism it is especially difficult to judge whether the +fetich is the spirit or the object animated by the spirit. As Dr. +Haddon says (p. 83), "Just as the human body and soul form one +individual, so the material object and its occupying spirit or power +form one individual, more vague, perhaps, but still with many +attributes distinctively human. It possesses personality and will ... +it possesses most of the human passions,--anger, revenge, also +generosity and gratitude; it is within reach of influence and may be +benevolent, hence to be deprecated and placated, and its aid enlisted." + +{118} + +A more advanced stage in the history of fetichism is that which is +reached by reflection on the fact that a fetich not unfrequently ceases +to prosper the undertakings of its possessor in the way he expected it +to do. On the principles of animism, everything that is--whether +animate, or inanimate according to our notions--is made up of spirit, +or soul, and body. In the case of man, when he dies, the spirit leaves +the body. When, therefore, a fetich ceases to act, the explanation by +analogy is that the spirit has left the body, the inanimate, with which +it was originally associated; and when that is the case, then, as we +learn from Miss Kingsley (_Travels in West Africa_, pp. 304-305), "the +little thing you kept the spirit in is no more use now, and only fit to +sell to a white man as 'a big curio.'" The fact that, in native +belief, what we call an inanimate thing may lose its soul and become +really dead is shown by Miss Kingsley in a passage quoted by Dr. +Haddon: "Everything that he," the native, "knows by means of his senses +he regards as a twofold entity--part spirit, part not spirit, or, as we +should say, matter; the connection of a certain spirit with a certain +mass of matter, he holds, is not permanent. He will point out to you a +lightning-struck tree, and tell {119} you its spirit has been broken; +he will tell you when the cooking-pot has been broken, that it has lost +its spirit" (_Folk-Lore_, VIII, 141). We might safely infer then that +as any object may lose its spirit, so too may an object which has been +chosen as a fetich; even if we had not, as we have, direct testimony to +the belief. + +Next, when it is believed that an object may lose its spirit and become +dead indeed, there is room and opportunity for the belief to grow that +its spirit may pass into some other object: that there may be a +transmigration of spirits. And when this belief arises, a fresh stage +in the history of fetichism is evolved. And the fresh stage is evolved +in accordance with the law that governs the whole evolution of +fetichism. That law is that a fetich is an object believed to aid its +possessor in attaining the end he desires. In the earliest stage of +its history anything which happens to arrest a man's attention when he +is in a state of expectancy "is involuntarily associated with what is +about to happen," and so becomes a fetich. In the most developed stage +of fetichism, men are not content to wait until they stumble across a +fetich, and when they do so to say, "Ha! ha! art thou there?" Their +mental attitude becomes {120} interrogative: "Ha! ha! where art thou?" +They no longer wait to stumble across a fetich, they proceed to make +one; and for that procedure a belief in the transmigration of spirits +is essential. An object, a habitation for the spirit, is prepared; and +he is invited, conjúred, or cónjured, into it. If he is conjúred into +it, the attitude of the man who invites him is submissive; if cónjured, +the mental attitude of the performer is one of superiority. Colonel +Ellis throughout all his careful enquiries found that "so great is the +fear of giving possible offence to any superhuman agent" that (in the +region of his observation) we may well believe that even the makers of +fetiches did not assume to command the spirits. But elsewhere, in +other regions, it is impossible to doubt but that the owners of +fetiches not only conjúre the spirits into the objects, but also apply +coercion to them when they fail to aid their possessor in the +accomplishment of his wishes. That, I take it, is the ultimate stage +in the evolution, the fine flower, of fetichism. And it is not +religion, it has no value as religion, or rather its value is +anti-religious. Even if we were to accept as a definition of religion +that it is the conciliation of beings conceived to be superior, we +should be compelled by {121} the definition to say that fetichism in +its eventual outcome is not religion, for the attitude of the owner +towards his fetich is then one of superiority, and his method is, when +conciliation fails, to apply coercion. + +But it may perhaps be argued that fetichism, except in what I have +termed its ultimate evolution, is religion and has religious value; or, +to put it otherwise, that what I have represented as the eventual +outcome is really a perversion or the decline of fetichism. Then, in +the fetichism which is or represents the primitive religion of mankind +we meet, according to Professor Höffding, "religion under the guise of +desire." Now, not all desires are religious; and the question, which +is purely a question of fact, arises whether the desires which +fetichism subserves are religious. And in using the word "religious" I +will not here place any extravagant meaning on the word; I will take it +in the meaning which would be understood by the community in which the +owner of a fetich dwells himself. In the tribes described by Colonel +Ellis, for instance, there are worshipped personal gods having proper +names; and the worship is served by duly appointed priests; and the +worshippers consist of a body of {122} persons whose welfare the god +has at heart. Such are some of the salient features of what all +students of the science of religion would include under the head of the +religion of those tribes. Now amongst those same tribes the fetich, or +_suhman_, as it is termed by them, is found; and there are several +features which make a fetich quite distinguishable from any of the gods +which are worshipped there. Thus, the fetich has no body of +worshippers: it is the private property, of its owner, who alone makes +offerings to it. Its _raison d'être_, its special and only function, +is to subserve the private wishes of its owner. In so far as he makes +offerings to it he may be called its priest; but he is not, as in the +case of the priests of the gods who are worshipped there, the +representative of the community or congregation, for a fetich has no +plurality of worshippers; and none of the priests of the gods will have +anything to do with it. Next, "though offerings are made to the +_suhman_ by its owner, they are made in private" (Jevons, _History of +Religion_, p. 165)--there is no public worship--and "public opinion +does not approve of them." The interests and the desires which the +fetich exists to promote are not those of the community: they are +antisocial, for, as Colonel Ellis {123} tells us, "one of the special +attributes of a _suhman_ is to procure the death of any person whom its +worshipper may wish to have removed"--indeed "the most important +function of the _suhman_ appears to be to work evil against those who +have injured or offended its worshipper." + +Thus, a very clear distinction exists between the worship of a fetich +and the worship of the gods. It is not merely that the fetich is +invoked occasionally in aid of antisocial desires: nothing can prevent +the worshipper of a god, if the worshipper be bad enough, from praying +for that which he ought not to pray for. It is that the gods of the +community are there to sanction and further all desires which are for +the good of the community, and that the fetich is there to further +desires which are not for the good of the community,--hence it is that +"public opinion does not approve of them." At another stage of +religious evolution, it becomes apparent and is openly pronounced that +neither does the god of the community approve of them; and then +fetichism, like the sin of witchcraft, is stamped out more or less. +But amongst the tribes who have only reached the point of religious +progress attained by the natives of West Africa, public opinion has +{124} only gone so far as to express disapproval, not to declare war. + +If, then, we are to hold to the view of Professor Höffding and of Dr. +Haddon, that fetichism is in its essence, or was at the beginning, +religious in its nature, though it may be perverted into something +non-religious or anti-religious, we must at any rate admit that it has +become non-religious not only in the case of those fetichists who +assume an attitude of superiority and command to their fetiches, but +also in the earlier stage of evolution when the fetichist preserves an +attitude of submission and conciliation towards his fetich, but assumes +the attitude only for the purpose of realising desires which are +anti-social and recognised to be anti-religious. + +But, if we take--as I think we must take--that line of argument, the +conclusion to which it will bring us is fairly clear and is not far +off. The differentia or rather that differentia which +characteristically marks off the fetich from the god is the nature of +the desires which each exists to promote; the function which each +exists to fulfil, the end which is there for each to subserve. But the +ends are different. Not only are they different, they are +antagonistic. And the process of evolution does {125} but bring out +the antagonism, it does not create it. It was there from the +beginning. From the moment there was society, there were desires which +could only be realised at the cost and to the loss of society, as well +as desires in the realisation of which the good of society was +realised. The assistance of powers other than human might be sought; +and the nature of the power which was sought was determined by the end +or purpose for which its aid was employed or invoked--if for the good +of society, it was approved by society; if not, not. Its function, the +end it subserved, determined its value for society--determined whether +public opinion should approve or disapprove of it, whether it was a god +of the community or the fetich of an individual. Society can only +exist where there is a certain community of purpose among its members; +and can only continue to exist where anti-social tendencies are to some +extent suppressed or checked by force of public opinion. + +Fetichism, then, in its tendency and in its purpose, in the function +which it performs and the end at which it aims is not only +distinguishable from religion, it is antagonistic to it, from the +earliest period of its history to the latest. Religion is social, an +{126} affair of the community; fetichism is anti-social, condemned by +the community. Public opinion, expressing the moral sentiments of the +community as well as its religious feeling, pronounces both moral and +religious disapproval of the man who uses a _suhman_ for its special +purpose of causing death--committing murder. Fetichism is offensive to +the morality as well as to the religion even of the native. To seek +the origin of religion in fetichism is as vain as to seek the origin of +morality in the selfish and self-seeking tendencies of man. There is +no need to enquire whether fetichism is historically prior to religion, +or whether religion is historically prior to fetichism. Man, as long +as he has lived in societies, must have had desires which were +incompatible with the welfare of the community as well as desires which +promoted its welfare. The powers which are supposed to care whether +the community fares well are the gods of the community; and their +worship is the religion of the community. The powers which have no +such care are not gods, nor is their worship--if coercion or cajolery +can be called worship--religion. The essence of fetichism on its +external side is that the owner of the fetich alone has access {127} to +it, alone can pray to it, alone can offer sacrifices to it. It is +therefore in its inward essence directly destructive of the unity of +interests and purposes that society demands and religion promotes. +Perhaps it would be going too far to say that the practice of making +prayers and offerings to a fetich is borrowed from religious worship: +they are the natural and instinctive method of approaching any power +which is capable of granting or refusing what we desire. It is the +quarter to which they are addressed, and the end for which they are +employed, that makes the difference between them. It is the fact that +in the one case they are, and in the other are not, addressed to the +quarter to which they ought to be addressed, and employed for the end +for which they ought to be employed, that makes the difference in +religious value between them. + +If we bear in mind the simple fact that fetichism is condemned by the +religious and moral feelings of the communities in which it exists, we +shall not fall into the mistake of regarding fetichism either as the +primitive religion of mankind or as a stage of religious development or +as "a basis from which many other modes of religious thought have been +developed." + +{128} + +Professor Höffding, holding that fetichism is the primitive religion, +out of which polytheism was developed, adopts Usener's theory as to the +mode of its evolution. "The fetich," Professor Höffding says (p. 140), +"is only the provisional and momentary dwelling-place of a spirit. As +Hermann Usener has strikingly called it, it is 'the god of a moment.'" +But though Professor Höffding adopts this definition of a fetich, it is +obvious that the course of his argument requires us to understand it as +subject to a certain limitation. His argument in effect is that +fetichism is not polytheism, but something different, something out of +which polytheism was evolved. And the difference is that polytheism +means a plurality of gods, whereas fetichism knows no gods, but only +spirits. Inasmuch then as, on the theory--whether it is held by +Höffding or by anybody else--that the spirits of fetichism become the +gods of polytheism, there must be differences between the spirits of +the one and the gods of the other, let us enquire what the differences +are supposed to be. + +First, there is the statement that a fetich is the "god of a moment," +by which must be meant that the spirits which, so long as they are +momentary and {129} temporary, are fetiches, must come to be permanent +if they are to attain to the rank of gods. + +But on this point Dr. Haddon differs. He is quite clear that a fetich +may be worshipped permanently without ceasing to be a fetich. And it +is indeed abundantly clear that an object only ceases to be worshipped +when its owner is convinced that it is not really a fetich; as long as +he is satisfied that it is a fetich, he continues its cult--and he +continues it because it is his personal property, because he, and not +the rest of the community, has access to it. + +Next, Höffding argues that it is from these momentary fetiches that +special or specialised deities--"departmental gods," as Mr. Andrew Lang +has termed them--arise. And these "specialised divinities constitute +an advance on gods of the moment" (p. 142). Now, what is implied in +this argument, what is postulated but not expressed, is that a fetich +has only one particular thing which it can do. A departmental god can +only do one particular sort of thing, has one specialised function. A +departmental god is but a fetich advanced one stage in the hierarchy of +divine beings. Therefore the function of the fetich in the first +instance was specialised {130} and limited. But there it is that the +_à priori_ argument comes into collision with the actual facts. A +fetich, when it presents itself to a man, assists him in the particular +business on which he is at the moment engaged. But it only continues +to act as a fetich, provided that it assists him afterwards and in +other matters also. The desires of the owner are not limited, and +consequently neither are his expectations; the business of the fetich +is to procure him general prosperity (Haddon, p. 83). As far as +fetiches are concerned, it is simply reversing the facts to suppose +that it is because one fetich can only do one thing, that many fetiches +are picked up. Many objects are picked up on the chance of their +proving fetiches, because if the object turns out really to be a fetich +it will bring its owner good luck and prosperity generally--there is no +knowing what it may do. But it is only to its owner that it brings +prosperity--not to other people, not to the community, for the +community is debarred access to it. + +The next difference between fetichism and polytheism, according to +Höffding, is that the gods of polytheism have developed that +personality which is not indeed absolutely wanting in the spirits of +fetichism but can hardly be said to be properly {131} there. "The +transition," he says, "from momentary and special gods to gods which +can properly be called personal is one of the most important +transitions in the history of religion. It denotes the transition from +animism to polytheism" (p. 145). And one of the outward signs that the +transition has been effected is, as Usener points out with special +emphasis, "that only at a certain stage of evolution, _i.e._, on the +appearance of polytheism, do the gods acquire proper names" (_ib._ 147). + +Now, this argument, I suggest, seeks to make, or to make much of, a +difference between fetichism and polytheism which scarcely exists, and +so far as it does exist is not the real difference between them. It +seeks to minimise, if not to deny, the personality of the fetich, in +order to exalt that of the gods of polytheism. And then this +difference in degree of personality, this transition from the one +degree to the other, is exhibited as "one of the most important +transitions in the history of religion." The question therefore is +first whether the difference is so great, and next whether it is the +real difference between fetichism and religion in the polytheistic +stage. + +The difference in point of personality between the spirits of fetichism +and the gods of polytheism is not {132} absolute. The fetich, +according to Dr. Haddon, "_possesses personality_ and will, it has also +many human characters. It possesses most of the human passions, anger, +revenge, also generosity and gratitude; it is within reach of influence +and may be benevolent, is hence to be deprecated and placated, and its +aid to be enlisted" (p. 83); "the fetich is worshipped, prayed to, +sacrificed to, and talked with" (p. 89). + +But, perhaps it may be said that, though the fetich does "possess +personality," it is only when it has acquired sufficient personality to +enjoy a proper name that it becomes a god, or fetichism passes into +polytheism. To this the reply is that polytheism does not wait thus +deferentially on the evolution of proper names. There was a period in +the evolution of the human race when men neither had proper names of +their own nor knew their fellows by proper names; and yet they doubted +not their personality. The simple fact is that he who is to receive a +name--whether he be a human being or a spiritual being--must be there +in order to be named. When he is there he may receive a name which has +lost all meaning, as proper names at the present day have generally +done; or one which has a meaning. {133} A mother may address her child +as "John" or as "boy," but, whichever form of address she uses, she has +no doubt that the child has a personality. The fact that a fetich has +not acquired a proper name is not a proof that it has acquired no +personality; if it can, as Dr. Haddon says it can, be "petted or +ill-treated with regard to its past or future behaviour" (p. 90), its +personality is undeniable. If it can be "worshipped, prayed to, +sacrificed to, talked with," it is as personal as any deity in a +pantheon. If it has no proper name, neither at one time had men +themselves. And Höffding himself seems disinclined to follow Usener on +this point: "no important period," he says (p. 147), "in the history of +religion can begin with an empty word. The word can neither be the +beginning nor exist at the beginning." Finally Höffding, to enforce +the conclusion that polytheism is evolved from fetichism, says: "The +influence exerted by worship on the life of religious ideas can find no +more striking exemplification than in the word 'god' itself: when we +study those etymologies of this word which, from the philological point +of view, appear most likely to be correct, we find the word really +means 'he to whom sacrifice is made,' or 'he who is worshipped'" (p. +148). {134} Professor Wilhelm Thomsen considers the first explanation +the more probable: "In that case there would be a relationship between +the root of the word '_gott_' and '_giessen_' (to pour), as also +between the Greek _chéein_, whose root _chu_ = the Sanskrit _hu_, from +which comes _huta_, which means 'sacrificed,' as well as 'he to whom +sacrifices are made'" (p. 396). Now, if "god" means either "he to whom +sacrifice is made" or "he who is worshipped," we have only to enquire +by whom the sacrifice is made or the worship paid, according to +Professor Höffding, in order to see the value of this philological +argument. A leading difference between a fetich and a god is that +sacrifice is made and worship paid to the fetich by its owner, to the +god by the community. Now this philological derivation of "god" throws +no light whatever on the question by whom the "god" is worshipped; but +the content of the passage which I have quoted shows that Professor +Höffding himself here understands the worship of a god to be the +worship paid by the community. If that is so, and if the function or a +function of the being worshipped is to grant the desires of his +worshippers, then the function of the being worshipped by the community +is to grant the desires of the community. {135} And if that is the +distinguishing mark or a distinguishing mark of a god, then the worship +of a god differs _toto caelo_ from the worship paid to a fetich, whose +distinguishing mark is that it is subservient to the anti-social wishes +of its owner, and is not worshipped by the community. And it is just +as impossible to maintain that a god is evolved out of a fetich as it +would be to argue--indeed it is arguing--that practices destructive of +society or social welfare have only to be pushed far enough and they +will prove the salvation of society. + +If in the animistic stage, when everything that is is worked by +spirits, it is possible and desirable for the individual to gain his +individual ends by the coöperation of some spirit, it is equally +possible and more desirable for the community to gain the aid of a +spirit which will further the ends for the sake of which the community +exists. But those ends are not transient or momentary, neither +therefore can the spirit who promotes them be a "momentary" god. And +if we accept Höffding's description of the simplest and earliest +manifestation of the religious spirit as being belief "in a power which +cares whether he [man] has or has not experiences which he values," we +must be careful to make it clear that the {136} power worshipped by a +community is worshipped because he is believed to care that the +community should have the experiences which the community values. +Having made that stipulation, we may accept Höffding's further +statement (p. 147) that "even the momentary and special gods implied +the existence of a personifying tendency and faculty"; for, although +from our point of view a momentary god is a self-contradictory notion, +we are quite willing to agree that this tendency to personification may +be taken as primary and primitive: religion from the beginning has been +the search after a power essentially personal. But that way of +conceiving spiritual powers is not in itself distinctive of or confined +to religion: it is an intellectual conception; it is the essence of +animism, and animism is not religion. To say that an emotional element +also must be present is true; but neither will that serve to mark off +fetichism from religion. Fetichism also is emotional in tone: it is in +hope that the savage picks up the thing that may prove to have the +fetich power; and it is with fear that he recognises his neighbour's +_suhman_. A god is not merely a power conceived of intellectually and +felt emotionally to be a personal power from whom things may {137} be +hoped or feared; he must indeed be a personal power and be regarded +with hope and fear, but it is by a community that he must be so +regarded. And the community, in turning to such a power, worships him +with sacrifice: a god is indeed he to whom sacrifice is made and +worship paid by the community, with whose interests and whose +morality--with whose good, in a word, he is from the beginning +identified. "In the absence of experience of good as one of the +realities of life, no one," Höffding says, "would ever have believed in +the goodness of the gods"; and, we may add, it is as interested in and +caring for the good of the community that the god of the community is +worshipped. It is in the conviction that he does so care, that +religious feeling is rooted; or, as Höffding puts it (p. 162), it is +rooted in "the need to collect and concentrate ourselves, to resign +ourselves, to feel ourselves supported and carried by a power raised +above all struggle and opposition and beyond all change." There we +have, implicit from the beginning, that communion with god, or striving +thereafter, which is essential to worship. It is faith. It is rest. +It is the heart's desire. And it is not fetichism, nor is fetichism it. + + + + +{138} + +PRAYER + +The physician, if he is to do his work, must know both a healthy and a +diseased body, or organ, when he sees it. He must know the difference +between the two and the symptoms both of health and disease. Otherwise +he is in danger of trying to cure an organ which is healthy already--in +which case his remedies will simply aggravate the disease. That is +obviously true of the physician who seeks to heal the body, and it is +equally, if not so obviously, true of the physician who seeks to +minister to a mind, or a soul, diseased. Now, the missionary will find +that the heathen, to whom he is to minister, have the habit of prayer; +and the question arises, What is to be his attitude towards it? He +cannot take up the position that prayer is in itself a habit to be +condemned; he is not there to eradicate the habit, or to uproot the +tendency. Neither is he there to create the habit; it already exists, +and the wise missionary will acknowledge its existence with +thankfulness. His business is not to teach his flock to {139} pray, +but how to pray, that is to say, for what and to whom. But even if he +thus wisely recognises that prayer is a habit not to be created, but to +be trained by him, it is still possible for him to assume rashly that +it is simply impossible for a heathen ever to pray for anything that is +right, and therefore, that it is a missionary's duty first to insist +that everything for which a savage or barbarian prays must be condemned +as essentially irreligious and wicked. In that case, what will such a +missionary, if sent to the Khonds of Orissa, say, when he finds them +praying thus: "We are ignorant of what it is good to ask for. You know +what is good for us. Give it to us!"? Can he possibly say to his +flock, "All your prayers, all the things that you pray for now, are +wicked; and your only hope of salvation lies in ceasing to pray for +them"? If not, then he must recognise the fact that it is possible for +the heathen to pray, and to pray for some things that it is right to +pray for. And he must not only recognise the fact, but he must utilise +it. Nay! more, he must not only recognise the fact if it chances to +force itself upon him, he must go out of his way with the deliberate +purpose of finding out what things are prayed for. He will then find +himself in {140} more intimate contact with the soul of the man than he +can ever attain to in any other way; and he may then find that there +are other things for which petitions are put up which could not be +prayed for save by a man who had a defective or erroneous conception of +Him who alone can answer prayer. + +But it is a blundering, unbusinesslike way of managing things if the +missionary has to go out to his work unprepared in this essential +matter, and has to find out these things for himself--and perhaps not +find them out at all. The applied science of religion should equip him +in this respect; it should be able to take the facts and truths +established by the science of religion and apply them to the purposes +of the missionary. But it is a striking example of the youth and +immaturity of the science of religion that no attempt has yet been made +by it to collect the facts, much less to coördinate and state them +scientifically. If a thing is clear, when we come to think of it, in +the history of religion, it is that the gods are there to be prayed to: +man worships them because it is on their knees that all things lie. It +is from them that man hopes all things; it is in prayer that man +expresses his hopes and desires. It is from his prayers that we should +be able to find out {141} what the gods really are to whom man prays. +What is said about them in mythology--or even in theology--is the +product of reflection, and is in many cases demonstrably different from +what is given in consciousness at the moment when man is striving after +communion with the Highest. Yet it is from mythology, or from the +still more reflective and deliberative expression of ritual, of rites +and ceremonies, that the science of religion has sought to infer the +nature of the gods man worships. The whole apparatus of religion, +rites and ceremonies, sacrifice and altars, nature-worship and +polytheism, has been investigated; the one thing overlooked has been +the one thing for the sake of which all the others exist, the prayer in +which man's soul rises, or seeks to rise, to God. + +The reason given by Professor Tylor (_Primitive Culture_, II, 364) for +this is not that the subject is unimportant, but that it is so simple; +"so simple and familiar," he says, "is the nature of prayer that its +study does not demand that detail of fact and argument which must be +given to rites in comparison practically insignificant." Now, it is +indeed the case that things which are familiar may appear to be simple; +but it is also the case that sometimes things {142} are considered +simple merely because they are familiar, and not because they are +simple. The fact that they are not so simple as every one has assumed +comes to be suspected when it is discovered that people take slightly +different views of them. Such slightly different views may be detected +in this case. + +Professor Höffding holds that, in the lowest form in which religion +manifests itself, "religion appears under the guise of desire," thus +ranging himself on the side of an opinion mentioned by Professor Tylor +(_op. cit._, II, 464) that, as regards the religion of the lower +culture, in prayer "the accomplishment of desire is asked for, but +desire is as yet limited to personal advantage." Now, starting from +this position that prayer is the expression of desire, we have only to +ask, whose desire? that of the individual or that of the community? and +we shall see that under the simple and familiar phrase of "the +accomplishment of desire" there lurks a difference of view which may +possibly widen out into a very wide difference of opinion. If we +appeal to the facts, we may take as an instance a prayer uttered "in +loud uncouth voice of plaintive, piteous tone" by one of the Osages to +Wohkonda, {143} the Master of Life: "Wohkonda, pity me, I am very poor; +give me what I need; give me success against mine enemies, that I may +avenge the death of my friends. May I be able to take scalps, to take +horses!" etc. (Tylor, II, 365). So on the Gold Coast a negro in the +morning will pray, "Heaven! grant that I may have something to eat this +day" (_ib._, 368), not "give us this day our daily bread"; or, raising +his eyes to heaven, he will thus address the god of heaven: "God, give +me to-day rice and yams, gold and agries, give me slaves, riches and +health, and that I may be brisk and swift!" (_ib._). On the other +hand, John Tanner (_Narrative_, p. 46) relates that when Algonquin +Indians were setting out in a fleet of frail bark canoes across Lake +Superior, the chief addressed a prayer to the Great Spirit: "You have +made this lake; and you have made us, your children; you can now cause +that the water shall remain smooth while we pass over in safety." The +chief, it will be observed, did not expressly call the Great Spirit +"our Father," but he did speak of himself and his men as "your +children." If we cross over to Africa, again, we find the Masai women +praying thus; and be it observed that though the first person singular +is used, {144} it is used by the chorus of women, and is plural in +effect:-- + + I + + "My God, to thee alone I pray + That offspring may to me be given. + Thee only I invoke each day, + O morning star in highest heaven. + God of the thunder and the rain, + Give ear unto my suppliant strain. + Lord of the powers of the air, + To thee I raise my daily prayer. + + II + + "My God, to thee alone I pray, + Whose savour is as passing sweet + As only choicest herbs display, + Thy blessing daily I entreat. + Thou hearest when I pray to thee, + And listenest in thy clemency. + Lord of the powers of the air, + To thee I raise my daily prayer." + --HOLLIS, _The Masai_, p. 346. + + +When Professor Tylor says that by the savage "the accomplishment of +desire is asked for, but desire is as yet limited to personal +advantage," we must be careful not to infer that the only advantage a +savage is capable of praying for is his own selfish advantage. +Professor Tylor himself quotes (II, {145} 366) the following prayer +from the war-song of a Delaware:-- + + "O Great Spirit there above, + Have pity on my children + And my wife! + Prevent that they shall mourn for me! + Let me succeed in this undertaking, + That I may slay my enemy + And bring home the tokens of victory + To my dear family and my friends + That we may rejoice together.... + Have pity on me and protect my life, + And I will bring thee an offering." + +Nor is it exclusively for their own personal advantage that the Masai +women are concerned when they pray for the safe return of their sons +from the wars:-- + + "O thou who gavest, thou to whom we pray + For offspring, take not now thy gift away. + O morning star, that shinest from afar, + Bring back our sons in safety from the war." + --HOLLIS, p. 351. + +Nor is it in a purely selfish spirit that the Masai women pray that +their warriors may have the advantage over all their enemies:-- + + I + + "O God of battles, break + The power of the foe. + +{146} + + Their cattle may we take, + Their mightiest lay low. + + II + + "Sing, O ye maidens fair, + For triumph o'er the foe. + This is the time for prayer + Success our arms may know. + + III + + "Morning and evening stars + That in the heavens glow, + Break, as in other wars, + The power of the foe. + + IV + + "O dweller, where on high + Flushes at dawn the snow, + O Cloud God, break, we cry, + The power of the foe." + --_Ib._, p. 352. + +Again, the rain that is prayed for by the Manganja of Lake Nyassa is an +advantage indeed, but one enjoyed by the community and prayed for by +the community. They made offerings to the Supreme Deity that he might +give them rain, and "the priestess dropped the meal handful by handful +on the ground, each time calling in a high-pitched voice, {147} 'Hear +thou, O God, and send rain!' and the assembled people responded, +clapping their hands softly and intoning (they always intone their +prayers), 'Hear thou, O God'" (Tylor, p. 368). + +The appeal then to facts shows that it is with the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned, and that it is by +a representative of the community that those desires are offered up in +prayer, and that the community may join in. The appeal to facts shows, +also, that an individual may put up individual petitions, as when a +Yebu will pray: "God in heaven protect me from sickness and death. God +give me happiness and wisdom." But we may safely infer that the only +prayers that the god of the community is expected to harken to are +prayers that are consistent with the interests and welfare of the +community. + +From that point of view we must refuse to give more than a guarded +assent to the "opinion that prayer appeared in the religion of the +lower culture, but that in this its earlier stage it was unethical" +(Tylor, 364). Prayer obviously does appear in the religion of the +lower culture, but to say that it there is unethical is to make a +statement which requires defining. The statement means what {148} +Professor Tylor expresses later on in the words: "It scarcely appears +as though any savage prayer, authentically native in its origin, were +ever directed to obtain moral goodness or to ask pardon for moral sin" +(p. 373). But it might be misunderstood to mean that among savages it +was customary or possible to pray for things recognised by the savage +himself as wrong, and condemned by the community at large. In the +first place, however, the god of the community simply as being the god +of the community would not tolerate such prayers. Next, the range and +extent of savage morality is less extensive than it is--or at any rate +than it ought to be--in our day; and though we must recognise and at +the right time insist upon the difference, that ought not to make us +close our eyes to the fact that the savage does pray to do the things +which savage morality holds it incumbent on him to do, for instance to +fight bravely for the good of his wife, his children, and his tribe, to +carry out the duty of avenging murder. And if he prays for wealth he +also prays for wisdom; if he prays that his god may deliver him from +sickness, that shows he is human rather than that he is a low type of +humanity. + +It would seem, then, that though in religions of low {149} culture we +meet religion under the guise of desire, we also find that religion +makes a distinction between desires; there are desires which may be +expressed to the god of the community, and desires which may not. +Further, though it is in the heart of a person and an individual that +desire must originate, it does not follow that prayer originates in +individual desire. To say so, we must assume that the same desire +cannot possibly originate simultaneously in different persons. But +that is a patently erroneous assumption: in time of war, the desire for +victory will spring up simultaneously in the hearts of all the tribe; +in time of drought, the prayer for rain will ascend from the hearts of +all the people; at the time of the sowing of seed a prayer for "the +kindly fruits of the earth" may be uttered by every member of the +community. Now it is precisely these desires, which being desires must +originate in individual souls, yet being desires of every individual in +the community are the desires of the community, that are the desires +which take the form of prayer offered by the community or its +representative to the god of the community. Anti-social desires cannot +be expressed by the community or sanctioned by religion. Prayer is the +essential {150} expression of true socialism; and the spirit which +prompts it is and has always been the moving spirit of social progress. + +Professor Tylor, noticing the "extreme development of mechanical +religion, the prayer-mill of the Tibetan Buddhists," suggests that it +"may perhaps lead us to form an opinion of large application in the +study of religion and superstition; namely, that the theory of prayers +may explain the origin of charms. Charm-formulæ," he says, "are in +very many cases actual prayers, and as such are intelligible. Where +they are mere verbal forms, producing their effect on nature and man by +some unexplained process, may not they or the types they have been +modelled on have been originally prayers, since dwindled into mystic +sentences?" (_P. C._ II, 372-373). Now, if this suggestion of +Professor Tylor's be correct, it will follow that as charms and spells +are degraded survivals of prayer, so magic generally--of which charms +and spells are but one department--is a degradation of religion. That +in many cases charms and spells are survivals of prayer--formulæ from +which all spirit of religion has entirely evaporated--all students of +the science of religion would now admit. That prayers may {151} +stiffen into traditional formulæ, and then become vain repetitions +which may actually be unintelligible to those who utter them, and so be +conceived to have a force which is purely magical and a "nature +practically assimilated more or less to that of charms" (_l.c._), is a +fact which cannot be denied. But when once the truth has been admitted +that prayers may pass into spells, the possibility is suggested that it +is out of spells that prayer has originated. Mercury raised to a high +temperature becomes red precipitate; and red precipitate exposed to a +still greater heat becomes mercury again. Spells may be the origin of +prayers, if prayers show a tendency to relapse into spells. That +possibility fits in either with the theory that magic preceded religion +or still more exactly with the theory that religion simply is magic +raised, so to speak, to a higher moral temperature. We have therefore +to consider the possibility that the process of evolution has been from +spell to prayer (R. R. Marett, _Folk-Lore_ XV, 2, pp. 132-166); and let +us begin the consideration by observing that the reverse passage--from +prayer to spell--is only possible on the condition that religion +evaporates entirely in the process. The prayer does not become a charm +until the {152} religion has disappeared entirely from it: a charm +therefore is that in which no religion is, and out of which +consequently no religion can be extracted. If then, _per impossibile_, +it could be demonstrated that there was a period in the history of +mankind, when charms and magic existed, and religion was utterly +unknown; if it be argued that the spirit of religion, when at length it +breathed upon mankind, transformed spells into prayers--still all that +would then be maintained is that spoken formulæ which were spells were +followed by other formulæ which are the very opposite of spells. Must +we not, however, go one step further and admit that one and the same +form of words may be prayer and religion when breathed in one spirit, +and vain repetition and mere magic when uttered in another? Let us +admit that the difference between prayer and spell lies in the +difference of the spirit inspiring them; and then we shall see that the +difference is essential, fundamental, as little to be ignored as it is +impossible to bridge. + +The formula used by the person employing it to express his desire may +or may not in itself suffice to show whether it is religious in intent +and value. Thus in West Africa the women of Framin dance {153} and +sing, "Our husbands have gone to Ashantee land; may they sweep their +enemies off the face of the earth" (Frazer, _Golden Bough_,^2 I, 34). +We may compare the song sung in time of war by the Masai women: "O God, +to whom I pray for offspring, may our children return hither" (Hollis, +p. 351); and there seems no reason why, since the Masai song is +religious, the Framin song may not be regarded as religious also. But +we have to remember that both prayers and spells have a setting of +their own: the desires which they express manifest themselves not only +in what is said but in what is done; and, when we enquire what the +Framin women do whilst they sing the words quoted above, we find that +they dance with brushes in their hands. The brushes are quite as +essential as the words. It is therefore suggested that the whole +ceremony is magical, that the sweeping is sympathetic magic and the +song is a spell. The words explain what the action is intended to +effect, just as in New Caledonia when a man has kindled a smoky fire +and has performed certain acts, he "invokes his ancestors and says, +'Sun! I do this that you may be burning hot, and eat up all the clouds +in the sky'" (Frazer, _ib._, 116). Again, amongst the Masai in time of +{154} drought a charm called ol-kora is thrown into a fire; the old men +encircle the fire and sing:-- + + "God of the rain-cloud, slake our thirst, + We know thy far-extending powers, + As herdsmen lead their kine to drink, + Refresh us with thy cooling showers." + --HOLLIS, p. 348. + +If the ol-kora which is thrown into the fire makes it rise in clouds of +smoke, resembling the rain-clouds which are desired, then here too the +ceremony taken as a whole presents the appearance of a magical rite +accompanied by a spoken spell. It is true that in this case the +ceremony is reënforced by an appeal to a god, just as in the New +Caledonian case it is reënforced by an appeal to ancestor worship. But +this may be explained as showing that here we have magic and charms +being gradually superseded by religion and prayer; the old formula and +the old rite are in process of being suffused by a new spirit, the +spirit of religion, which is the very negation and ultimately the +destruction of the old spirit of magic. Before accepting this +interpretation, however, which is intended to show the priority of +magic to religion, we may notice that it is not the only interpretation +of which the facts are susceptible. It is {155} based on the +assumption that the words uttered are intended as an explanation of the +meaning of the acts performed. If that assumption is correct, then the +performer of the ceremony is explaining its meaning and intention to +somebody. To whom? In the case of the New Caledonian ceremony, to the +ancestral spirits; in the case of the Masai old men, to the god. Thus, +the religious aspect of the ceremony appears after all to be an +essential part of the ceremony, and not a new element in an old rite. +And, then, we may consistently argue that the Framin women who sing, +"Our husbands have gone to Ashantee land; may they sweep their enemies +off the face of the earth," are either still conscious that they are +addressing a prayer to their native god; or that, if they are no longer +conscious of the fact, they once were, and what was originally prayer +has become by vain repetition a mere spell. All this is on the +assumption that in these ceremonies, the words are intended to explain +the meaning of the acts performed, and therefore to explain it to +somebody, peradventure he will understand and grant the performer of +the ceremony his heart's desire. But, as the consequences of the +assumption do not favour the theory that prayer must be {156} preceded +by spell, let us discard the assumption that the words explain the +meaning of the acts performed. Let us consider the possibility that +perhaps the actions which are gone through are meant to explain the +words and make them more forcible. It is undeniable that in moments of +emotion we express ourselves by gesture and the play of our features as +well as by our words; indeed, in reading a play we are apt to miss the +full meaning of the words simply because they are not assisted and +interpreted by the actor's gestures and features. If we take up this +position, that the things done are explanatory of the words uttered and +reënforce them, then the sweeping which is acted by the Framin women +again is not magical; it simply emphasises the words, "may they sweep +their enemies off the face of the earth," and shows to the power +appealed to what it is that is desired. The smoke sent up by the New +Caledonian ancestor worshipper or the Masai old men is a way of +indicating the clouds which they wish to attract or avert respectively. +An equally clear case comes from the Kei Islands: "When the warriors +have departed, the women return indoors and bring out certain baskets +containing fruits and stones. These fruits and stones they anoint and +place on a board, {157} murmuring as they do so, 'O lord sun, moon, let +the bullets rebound from our husbands, brothers, betrothed, and other +relations, just as raindrops rebound from these objects which are +smeared with oil'" (Frazer, _op. cit._, p. 33). It is, I think, +perfectly reasonable to regard the act performed as explanatory of the +words uttered and of the thing desired; the women themselves explain to +their lords, the sun and moon,--with the precision natural to women +when explaining what they want,--exactly how they want the bullets to +bounce off, just like raindrops. Dr. Frazer, however, from whom I have +quoted this illustration, not having perhaps considered the possibility +that the acts performed may be explanatory of the words, is compelled +to explain the action as magical: "in this custom the ceremony of +anointing stones in order that the bullets may recoil from the men like +raindrops from the stones is a piece of pure sympathetic or imitative +magic." He is therefore compelled to suggest that the prayer to the +sun is a prayer that he will give effect to the charm, and is perhaps a +later addition. But independently of the possibility that the actions +performed are explanatory of the words, or rather that words and +actions both are intended to make clear to the sun precisely {158} what +the petition is, what tells against Dr. Frazer's suggestion is that the +women want the bullets to bounce off, and it is the power of the god to +which they appeal and on which they rely for the fulfilment of their +prayer. + +There is, however, a further consideration which we should perhaps take +into account. Man, when he has a desire which he wishes to +realise,--and the whole of our life is spent in trying to realise what +we wish,--takes all the steps which experience shows to be necessary or +reason suggests; and, when he has done everything that he can do, he +may still feel that nothing is certain in this life, and the thing may +not come off. Under those circumstances he may, and often does, pray +that success may attend his efforts. Now Dr. Frazer, in the second +edition of his _Golden Bough_, wishing to show that the period of +religion was preceded by a non-religious period in the history of +mankind, suggests that at first man had no idea that his attempts to +realise his desires could fail, and that it was his "tardy recognition" +of the fact that led him to religion. This tardy recognition, he says, +probably "proceeded very slowly, and required long ages for its more or +less perfect accomplishment. For the recognition of man's +powerlessness to influence the course of {159} nature on a grand scale +must have been gradual" (I, 78). I would suggest, however, that it +cannot have taken "long ages" for savage man to discover that his +wishes and his plans did not always come off. It is, I think, going +too far to imagine that for long ages man had no idea that his attempts +to realise his desires could fail. If religion arises, as Dr. Frazer +suggests, when man recognises his own weakness and his own +powerlessness, often, to effect what he most desires, then man in his +most primitive and most helpless condition must have been most ready to +recognise that there were powers other than himself, and to desire, +that is to pray for, their assistance. Doubtless it would be at the +greater crises, times of pestilence, drought, famine and war, that his +prayers would be most insistent; but it is in the period of savagery +that famine is most frequent and drought most to be feared. Against +them he takes all the measures known to him, all the practical steps +which natural science, as understood by him, can suggest. Now his +theory and practice include many things which, though they are in later +days regarded as uncanny and magical, are to him the ordinary natural +means of producing the effects which he desires. But when he has taken +all {160} the steps which practical reason suggests, and experience of +the past approves, savage man, harassed by the dread of approaching +drought or famine, may still breathe out the Manganja prayer, "Hear +thou, O God, and send rain." When, however, he does so, it is, I +suggest, doubly erroneous to infer that this prayer takes the place of +a spell or that apart from the prayer the acts performed are, and +originally were, magical. These acts may be based on the principle +that like produces like and may be performed as the ordinary, natural +means for producing the effect, which have nothing magical about them. +And they are accompanied by a prayer which is not a mere explanation or +statement of the purpose with which the acts are performed, but is the +expression of the heart's desire. + +No _à priori_ proofs of any cogency, therefore, have been adduced by +Dr. Frazer, and none therefore are likely to be produced by any one +else, to show that there was ever a period in the history of man when +prayers and religion were unknown to him. The question remains whether +any actual instances are known to the science of religion. +Unfortunately, as I pointed out at the beginning of this lecture, so +neglected by the science of religion has been the subject of prayer +that even now we are scarcely {161} able to go beyond the statement +made more than a quarter of a century ago by Professor Tylor that, "at +low levels of civilisation there are many races who distinctly admit +the existence of spirits, but are not certainly known to pray to them +even in thought" (_P. C._ II, 364). Professor Tylor's statement is +properly guarded: there are races not certainly known to pray. The +possibility that they may yet be discovered to make prayers is not +excluded. + +Now, if we turn to one of the lowest levels of culture, that of the +Australian black fellows, we shall find that there is much doubt +amongst students whether the "aborigines have consciously any form of +religion whatever" (Howitt, _Native Tribes of S. E. Australia_), and in +southeast Australia Mr. Howitt thinks it cannot be alleged that they +have, though their beliefs are such that they might easily have +developed into an actual religion (p. 507). Now one of the tribes of +southeast Australia is that of the Dieri. With them rain is very +important, for periods of drought are frequent; and "rain-making +ceremonies are considered of much consequence" (p. 394). The +ceremonies are symbolic: there is "blood to symbolise the rain" and two +large stones "representing gathering {162} clouds presaging rain," just +as the New Caledonian sends up clouds of smoke to symbolise +rain-clouds, and the Masai, we have conjectured, throw ol-kora into the +fire for the same purpose. But the New Caledonian not only performs +the actions prescribed for the rite, he also invokes the spirits of his +ancestors; and the Masai not only go through the proper dance, but call +upon the god of the rain-cloud. The Dieri, however, ought to be +content with their symbolic or sympathetic magic and not offer up any +prayer. But, being unaware of this fact, they do pray: they call "upon +the rain-making _Mura-muras_ to give them power to make a heavy +rainfall, crying out in loud voices the impoverished state of the +country, and the half-starved condition of the tribe, in consequence of +the difficulty in procuring food in sufficient quantity to preserve +life" (p. 394). The _Mura-muras_ seem to be ancestral spirits, like +those invoked by the New Caledonian. If we turn to the Euahlayi tribe +of northwestern New South Wales, we find that at the Boorah rites a +prayer is offered to Byamee, "asking him to let the blacks live long, +for they have been faithful to his charge as shown by the observance of +the Boorah ceremony" (L. Parker, _The Euahlayi {163} Tribe_, p. 79). +That is the prayer of the community to Byamee, and is in conformity +with what we have noted before, viz. that it is with the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned. Another prayer, +the nature of which is not stated by Mrs. Parker, by whom the +information is given us, is put up at funerals, presumably to Byamee by +the community or its representative. Mrs. Parker adds: "Though we say +that actually these people have but two attempts at prayers, one at the +grave and one at the inner Boorah ring, I think perhaps we are wrong. +When a man invokes aid on the eve of battle, or in his hour of danger +and need; when a woman croons over her baby an incantation to keep him +honest and true, and that he shall be spared in danger,--surely these +croonings are of the nature of prayers born of the same elementary +frame of mind as our more elaborate litanies." As an instance of the +croonings Mrs. Parker gives the mother's song over her baby as soon as +it begins to crawl:--- + + "Kind be, + Do not steal, + Do not touch what to another belongs, + Leave all such alone, + Kind be." + +{164} + +These instances may suffice to show that it would not have been safe to +infer, a year or two ago, from the fact that the Australians were not +known to pray, that therefore prayer was unknown to them. Indeed, we +may safely go farther and surmise that other instances besides those +noted really exist, though they have not been observed or if observed +have not been understood. Among the northern tribes of central +Australia rites are performed to secure food, just as they are +performed by the Dieri to avert drought. The Dieri rites are +accompanied by a prayer, as we have seen. The Kaitish rites to promote +the growth of grass are accompanied by the singing of words, which +"have no meaning known to the natives of the present day" (Spencer and +Gillen, _Northern Tribes_, p. 292). Amongst the Mara tribe the +rain-making rite consists simply in "singing" the water, drinking it +and spitting it out in all directions. In the Anula tribe "dugongs are +a favourite article of food," and if the natives desire to bring them +out from the rocks, they "can do so by 'singing' and throwing sticks at +the rocks" (_ib._, pp. 313, 314). It is reasonable to suppose that in +all these cases the "singing" is now merely a charm. But if we +remember that prayers, when {165} their meaning is forgotten, pass by +vain repetitions into mere charms, we may also reasonably suppose that +these Australian charms are degraded prayers; and we shall be confirmed +in this supposition to some extent by the fact that in the Kaitish +tribes the words sung "have no meaning known to the natives of the +present day." If the meaning has evaporated, the religion may have +evaporated with it. That the rites, of which the "singing" is an +essential part, have now become magical and are used and understood to +be practised purely to promote the supply of dugongs and other articles +of food, may be freely admitted; but it is unsafe to infer that the +purpose with which the rites continue to be practised is the whole of +the purpose with which they were originally performed. If the meaning +of the "singing" has passed entirely away, the meaning of the rites may +have suffered a change. At the present day the rite is understood to +increase the supply of dugongs or other articles of food. But it may +have been used originally for other purposes. Presumably rites of a +similar kind, certainly of some kind, are practised by the Australians +who have for their totem the blow-fly, the water-beetle, or the evening +star. But they do not {166} eat flies or beetles. Their original +purpose in choosing the evening star cannot have been to increase its +number. Nor can that have been the object of choosing the mosquito for +a totem. But if the object of the rites is not to increase the number +of mosquitoes, flies, and beetles, it need not in the first instance +have been the object with which the rites were celebrated in the case +of other totems. + +Let us now return to Professor Tylor's statement that "at low levels of +civilisation there are many races who distinctly admit the existence of +spirits, but are not certainly known to pray to them even in thought." +The number of those races who are not known to pray is being reduced, +as we have seen. And I think we may go even farther than that and say +that where the existence of spirits is not merely believed in, but is +utilised for the purpose of establishing permanent relations between a +community and a spirit, we may safely infer that the community offers +prayer to the spirit, even though the fact may have escaped the notice +of travellers. The reason why we may infer it is that at the lower +levels of civilisation we meet with religion, in Höffding's words, "in +the guise of desire." We may put the same truth in other words and say +that religion is {167} from the beginning practical. Such prayers as +are known to us to be put up by the lowest races are always practical: +they may be definite petitions for definite goods such as harvest or +rain or victory in time of war; or they may be general petitions such +as that of the Khonds: "We are ignorant of what it is good for us to +ask for. You know what is good for us. Give it us." But in any case +what the god of a community is there for is to promote the good of the +community. It is because the savage has petitions to put up that he +believes there are powers who can grant his petitions. Prayer is the +very root of religion. When the savage has taken every measure he +knows of to produce the result he desires, he then goes on to pray for +the rainfall he desires, crying out in a loud voice "the impoverished +state of the country and the half-starved condition of the tribe." It +is true that it is in moments of stress particularly, if not solely, +that the savage turns to his god--and the same may be said of many of +us--but it is with confidence and hope that he turns to him. If he had +no confidence and no hope, he would offer no prayers. But he has hope, +he has faith; and every time he prays his heart says, if his words do +not, "in Thee, Lord, do we put our trust." + +{168} + +That prayer is the essence, the very breath, of religion, without which +it dies, is shown by the fact that amongst the very lowest races of +mankind we find frequent traditions of the existence of a high god or +supreme being, the creator of the world and the father of mankind. The +numerous traces of this dying tradition have been collected by the +untiring energy and the unrivalled knowledge of Mr. Andrew Lang in his +book, _The Making of Religion_. In West Africa Dr. Nassau (_Fetichism +in West Africa_, pp. 36 ff.) "hundreds of times" (p. 37) has found that +"they know of a Being superior to themselves, of whom they themselves," +he says, "inform me that he is the Maker and the Father." What is +characteristic of the belief of the savages in this god is that, in Dr. +Nassau's words, "it is an accepted belief, but it does not often +influence their life. 'God is not in all their thought.' In practice +they give Him no worship." The belief is in fact a dying tradition; +and it is dying because prayer is not offered to this remote and +traditional god. I say that the belief is a dying tradition, and I say +so because its elements, which are all found present and active where a +community believes in, prays to, and worships the god of the community, +{169} are found partially, but only partially, present where the belief +survives but as a tradition. Thus, for instance, where the belief is +fully operative, the god of the community sanctions the morality of the +community; but sometimes where the belief has become merely +traditional, this traditional god is supposed to take no interest in +the community and exercises no ethical influence over the community. +Thus, in West Africa, Nyankupon is "ignored rather than worshipped." +In the Andaman Islands, on the other hand, where the god Puluga is +still angered by sin or wrong-doing, he is pitiful to those in pain or +distress and "sometimes deigns to afford relief" (Lang p. 212 quoting +_Man_, _J. A._ I., XII, 158). Again, where the belief in the god of +the community is fully operative, the occasions on which the prayers of +the community are offered are also the occasions on which sacrifice is +made. Where sacrifice and prayers are not offered, the belief may +still for a time survive, at it does among the Fuegians. They make no +sacrifice and, as far as is known, offer no prayers; but to kill a man +brings down the wrath of their god, the big man in the woods: "Rain +come down, snow come down, hail come down, wind blow, blow, very much +blow. {170} Very bad to kill man. Big man in woods no like it, he +very angry" (Lang, p. 188, quoting Fitzroy, II, 180). But when +sacrifice and prayer cease, the ultimate outcome is that which is found +amongst the West African natives, who, as Dr. Nassau tells us (p. 38), +say with regard to Anzam, whom they admit to be their Creator and +Father, "Why should we care for him? He does not help nor harm us. It +is the spirits who can harm us whom we fear and worship, and for whom +we care." Who the spirits are Dr. Nassau does not say, but they must +be either the other gods of the place or the fetich spirits. And the +reason why Anzam is no longer believed to help or harm the natives is +obviously that, from some cause or other, there is now no longer any +established form of worship of him. The community of which he was +originally the god may have broken up, or more probably may have been +broken up, with the result that the congregation which met to offer +prayer and sacrifice to Anzam was scattered; and the memory of him +alone survives. Nothing would be more natural, then, than that the +natives, when asked by Dr. Nassau, "Why do you not worship him?" (p. +38), should invent a reason, viz. that it is no use worshipping {171} +him now--the truth being that the form of worship has perished for +reasons now no longer present to the natives' mind. In any case, when +prayers cease to be offered--whether because the community is broken up +or because some new quarter is discovered to which prayers can be +offered with greater hope of success--when prayers, for any reason, do +cease to be offered to a god, the worship of him begins to cease also, +for the breath of life has departed from it. + +In this lecture, as my subject is primitive religion, I have made no +attempt to trace the history of prayer farther than the highest point +which it reaches in the lower levels of religion. That is the point +reached by the Khond prayer: "We are ignorant of what it is good to ask +for. You know what is good for us. Give it us." That is also the +highest point reached by the most religious mind amongst the ancient +Greeks: Socrates prayed the gods simply for things good, because the +gods knew best what is good (Xen., _Mem._, I, iii, 2). The general +impression left on one's mind by the prayers offered in this stage of +religious development is that man is here and the gods are--there. But +"there" is such a long way off. And yet, far off as it is, man {172} +never came to think it was so far off that the gods could not hear. +The possibility of man's entering into some sort of communication with +them was always present. Nay! more, a community of interests between +him and them was postulated: the gods were to promote the interests of +the community, and man was to serve the gods. On occasions when +sacrifice was made and prayer was offered, the worshippers entered into +the presence of God, and communion with Him was sought; but stress was +laid rather on the sacrifice offered than on the prayers sent up. The +communion at which animal sacrifice aimed may have been gross at times, +and at others mystic; but it was the sacrifice rather than the prayer +which accompanied it that was regarded as essential to the communion +desired, as the means of bridging the gap between man here and the gods +there. If, however, the gap was to be bridged, a new revelation was +necessary, one revealing the real nature of the sacrifice required by +God, and of the communion desired by man. And that revelation is made +in Our Lord's Prayer. With the most earnest and unfeigned desire to +use the theory of evolution as a means of ordering the facts of the +history of religion and of enabling {173} us--so far as it can enable +us--to understand them, one is bound to notice as a fact that the +theory of evolution is unable to account for or explain the revelation, +made in Our Lord's Prayer, of the spirit which is both human and +divine. It is the beam of light which, when turned on the darkness of +the past, enables us to see whither man with his prayers and his +sacrifices had been blindly striving, the place where he fain would be. +It is the surest beacon the missionary can hold out to those who are +still in darkness and who show by the fact that they pray--if only for +rain, for harvest, and victory over all their enemies--that they are +battling with the darkness and that they have not turned entirely away +from the light of His countenance who is never at any time far from any +one of us. Their heart within them is ready to bear witness. Religion +is present in them, if only under "the guise of desire"; but it is "the +desire of all nations" for which they yearn. + +There are, Höffding says, "two tendencies in the nature of religious +feeling: on the one hand there is the need to collect and concentrate +ourselves, to resign ourselves, to feel ourselves supported and carried +by a power raised above all {174} struggle and opposition and beyond +all change. But within the religious consciousness another need makes +itself felt, the need of feeling that in the midst of the struggle we +have a fellow-struggler at our side, a fellow-struggler who knows from +his own experience what it is to suffer and meet resistance" (_The +Philosophy of Religion_, § 54). Between these two tendencies Höffding +discovers an opposition or contradiction, an "antinomy of religious +feeling." But it is precisely because Christianity alone of all +religions recognises both needs that it transcends the antinomy. The +antinomy is indeed purely intellectual. Höffding himself says, "only +when recollection, collation, and comparison are possible do we +discover the opposition or the contradiction between the two +tendencies." And in saying that, inasmuch as recollection, collation, +and comparison are intellectual processes, he admits that the antinomy +is intellectual. That it is not an antinomy of religious feeling is +shown by the fact that the two needs exist, that is to say, are both +felt. To say _à priori_ that both cannot be satisfied is useless in +face of the fact that those who feel them find that Christianity +satisfies them. + + + + +{175} + +SACRIFICE + +In my last lecture I called attention to the fact that the subject of +prayer has been strangely neglected by the science of religion. +Religion, in whatever form it manifests itself, is essentially +practical; man desires to enter into communication or into communion +with his god, and in so doing he has a practical purpose in view. That +purpose may be to secure a material blessing of a particular kind, such +as victory in war or the enjoyment of the fruits of the earth in their +due season, or the purpose may be to offer thanks for a harvest and to +pray for a continuance of prosperity generally. Or the purpose of +prayer may be to ask for deliverance from material evils, such as +famine or plague. Or it may be to ask for deliverance from moral evils +and for power to do God's will. In a word, if man had no prayer to +make, the most powerful, if not the only, motive inciting him to seek +communion would be wanting. Now, to some of us it may seem _à priori_ +that there is no reason why the communion thus sought in {176} prayer +should require any external rite to sanction or condition it. If that +is our _à priori_ view, we shall be the more surprised to find that in +actual fact an external rite has always been felt to be essential; and +that rite has always been and still is sacrifice, in one or other of +its forms. Or, to put the same fact in another way, public worship has +been from the beginning the condition without which private worship +could not begin and without which private worship cannot continue. To +any form of religion, whatever it be, it is essential, if it is to be +religion, that there shall be a community of worshippers and a god +worshipped. The bond which unites the worshippers with one another and +with their god is religion. From the beginning the public worship in +which the worshippers have united has expressed itself in rites--rites +of sacrifice--and in the prayers of the community. To the end, the +prayers offered are prayers to "Our Father"; and if the worshipper is +spatially separated from, he is spiritually united to, his +fellow-worshippers even in private prayer. + +We may then recognise that prayer logically and ultimately implies +sacrifice in one or other of its senses; and that sacrifice as a rite +is meaningless and impossible without prayer. But if we recognise +{177} that sacrifice wherever it occurs implies prayer, then the fact +that the observers of savage or barbarous rites have described the +ritual acts of sacrifice, but have not observed or have neglected to +report the prayers implied, will not lead us into the error of +imagining that sacrifice is a rite which can exist--that it can have a +religious existence--without prayer. We may attend to either, the +sacrifice or to the prayer, as we may attend either to the concavity or +the convexity of a curve, but we may not deny the existence and +presence of the one because our attention happens to be concentrated on +the other. The relation in primitive religion of the one to the other +we may express by saying that prayer states the motive with which the +sacrifice is made, and that sacrifice is essential to the prayer, which +would not be efficacious without the sacrifice. The reason why a +community can address the god which it worships is that the god is felt +to be identified in some way with the community and to have its +interests in his charge and care. And the rite of sacrifice is felt to +make the identification more real. Prayer, again, is possible only to +the god to whom the community is known; with whom it is identified, +more or less; and with whom, when his help is required, the {178} +community seeks to identify itself more effectually. The means of that +identification without which the prayers of the community would be +ineffectual is sacrifice. The earliest form of sacrifice may probably +be taken to be the sacrifice of an animal, followed by a sacrificial +meal. Later, when the god has a stated place in which he is believed +to manifest himself,--tree or temple,--then the identification may be +effected by attaching offerings to the tree or temple. But in either +case what is sought by the offering dedicated or the meal of sacrifice +is in a word "incorporation." The worshippers desire to feel that they +are at one with the spirit whom they worship. And the desire to +experience this sense of union is particularly strong when plague or +famine makes it evident that some estrangement has taken place between +the god and the community which is normally in his care and under his +protection. The sacrifices and prayers that are offered in such a case +obviously do not open up communication for the first time between the +god and his tribe: they revive and reënforce a communion which is felt +to exist already, even though temporal misfortunes, such as drought or +famine, testify that it has been allowed by the tribe to become less +close than it ought to be, or that {179} it has been strained by +transgressions on the part of individual members of the community. But +it is not only in times of public distress that the community +approaches its god with sacrifice and prayer. It so happens that the +prayers offered for victory in war or for rain or for deliverance from +famine are instances of prayer of so marked a character that they have +forced themselves on the notice of travellers in all parts of the +world, from the Eskimo to the Australian black fellows or the negroes +of Africa. And it was to this class of prayers that I called your +attention principally in the last lecture. But they are, when we come +to think of it, essentially occasional prayers, prayers that are +offered at the great crises of tribal life, when the very existence of +the tribe is at stake. Such crises, however, by their very nature are +not regular or normal; and it would be an error to suppose that it is +only on these occasions that prayers are made by savage or barbarous +peoples. If we wish to discover the earliest form of regularly +recurring public worship, we must look for some regularly recurring +occasion for it. One such regularly recurring occasion is harvest +time, another is seed time, another is the annual ceremonial at which +the boys who {180} attain in the course of the year to the age of +manhood are initiated into the secrets or "mysteries" of the tribe. +These are the chief and perhaps the only regularly recurring occasions +of public worship as distinguished from the irregular crises of war, +pestilence, drought, and famine which affect the community as a whole, +and from the irregular occasions when the individual member of the +community prays for offspring or for delivery from sickness or for +success in the private undertaking in which he happens to be engaged. + +Of the regularly recurring occasions of public worship I will select, +to begin with, the rites which are associated with harvest time. And I +will do so partly because the science of religion provides us with very +definite particulars both as to the sacrifices and as to the prayers +which are usually made on these occasions; and partly because the +prayers that are made are of a special kind and throw a fresh light on +the nature of the communion that the tribe seeks to effect by means of +the sacrificial offering. + +At Saa, in the Solomon Islands, yams are offered, and the person +offering them cries in a loud voice, "This is yours to eat" (Frazer, +_G. B._^2, II, 465). In {181} the Society Islands the formula is, +"Here, Tari, I have brought you something to eat" (_ib._, 469). In +Indo-China, the invitation is the same: "Taste, O goddess, these +first-fruits which have just been reaped" (_ib._, 325). There are no +actually expressed words of thanks in these instances; but we may +safely conjecture that the offerings are thank-offerings and that the +feeling with which the offerings are made is one of gratitude and +thankfulness. Thus in Ceram we are told that first-fruits are offered +"as a token of gratitude" (_ib._, 463). On the Niger the Onitsha +formula is explicit: "I thank God for being permitted to eat the new +yam" (_ib._, 325). At Tjumba in the East Indies, "vessels filled with +rice are presented as a thank-offering to the gods" (_ib._, 462). The +people of Nias on these occasions offer thanks for the blessings +bestowed on them (_ib._, 463). By a very natural transition of thought +and feeling, thankfulness for past favours leads to prayer for the +continuance of favour in the future. Thus in Tana, in the New +Hebrides, the formula is: "Compassionate father! here is some food for +you; eat it; be kind to us on account of it" (_ib._, 464); while the +Basutos say: "Thank you, gods; give us bread to-morrow also" (_ib._, +459); and in Tonga the prayers {182} made at the offering of +first-fruits implore the protection of the gods, and beseech them for +welfare generally, though in especial for the fruits of the earth +(_ib._, 466). + +The prayers of primitive man which I quoted in my last lecture were in +the nature of petitions or requests, as was natural and indeed +inevitable in view of the fact that they were preferred on occasions +when the tribe was in exceptional distress and required the aid of the +gods on whose protection the community relied. But the prayers which I +have just quoted are not in their essence petitions or requests, even +though in some cases they tend to become so. They are essentially +prayers of thanksgiving and the offerings made are thank-offerings. +Thus our conception of primitive prayer must be extended to include +both mental attitudes--that of thankfulness for past or present +blessings as well as the hope of blessings yet to come. And inasmuch +as sacrifice is the concomitant of prayer, we must recognise that +sacrificial offerings also serve as the expression of both mental +attitudes. And we must note that in the regularly recurring form of +public or tribal worship with which we are now dealing the dominant +feeling to which expression is given is {183} that of thankfulness. +The tribe seeks for communion with its god for the purpose of +expressing its thanks. Even the savage who simply says, "Here, Tari, I +have brought you something to eat," or, still more curtly, "This is +yours to eat," is expressing thanks, albeit in savage fashion. And the +means which the savage adopts for securing that communion which he +seeks to renew regularly with the tribal god is a sacrificial meal, of +which the god and his worshippers partake. Throughout the whole +ceremony, whether we regard the spoken words or the acts performed, +there is no suggestion of magic and no possibility of twisting the +ceremony into a piece of magic intended to produce some desired result +or to exercise any constraint over the powers to which the ceremony is +addressed. The mental attitude is that of thankfulness. + +Now, it is, I venture to suggest, impossible to dissociate from the +first-fruits ceremonials which I have described the ceremonies observed +by Australian black fellows on similar occasions. And it is also +impossible to overlook the differences between the ceremony in +Australia and the ceremony elsewhere. In Australia, as elsewhere, when +the time of year arrives at which the food becomes fit for eating, +{184} a ceremony has to be performed before custom permits the food to +be eaten freely. In Australia, as elsewhere, a ceremonial eating, a +sacramental meal, has to take place. But whereas elsewhere the god of +the community is expressly invited to partake of the sacramental meal, +even though he be not mentioned by name and though the invitation take +the curt form of "This is yours to eat," in Australia no words whatever +are spoken; the person who performs the ceremony performs it indeed +with every indication of reverential feeling, he eats solemnly and +sparingly, that is to say formally and because the eating is a matter +of ritual, but no reference is made by him so far as we know, to any +god. How then are we to explain the absence of any such reference? +There seems to me to be only one explanation which is reasonably +possible. It is that in the Australian ceremony, which would be +perfectly intelligible and perfectly in line with the ceremony as it +occurs everywhere else, the reference to the god who is or was invited +to partake of the first-fruits has in the process of time and, we must +add, in the course of religious decay, gradually dropped out. The +invitation may never have been more ample than the curt form, "This is +yours to eat." Even in the {185} absence of any verbal invitation +whatever, a gesture may long have sufficed to indicate what was in the +mind and was implied by the act of the savage performing the ceremony. +Words may not have been felt necessary to explain what every person +present at the ceremony knew to be the purpose of the rite. But in the +absence of any verbal formula whatever the purpose and meaning of the +rite would be apt to pass out of mind, to evaporate, even though custom +maintained, as it does in Australia to this day maintain, the punctual +and punctilious performance of the outward ceremony. I suggest, +therefore, that in Australia, as elsewhere, the solemn eating of the +first-fruits has been a sacramental meal of which both the god and his +worshippers were partakers. The alternative is to my mind much less +probable: it is to use the Australian ceremony as it now exists to +explain the origin of the ceremony as we find it elsewhere. In +Australia it is not now apparently associated with the worship of any +god; therefore it may be argued in other countries also it was not +originally part of the worship of any god either. If, then, it was not +an act of public worship originally, how are we to understand it? The +suggestion is that the fruits of the earth or the animals which become +the food of {186} man are, until they become fit for eating, regarded +as sacred or taboo, and therefore may not be eaten. That suggestion +derives some support from the fact that in Australia anything that is +eaten may be a totem and being a totem is taboo. But if it is thus +sacred, then in order to be eaten it must be "desacralised," the taboo +must be taken off. And it is suggested that that precisely is what is +effected by the ceremonial eating of the totem by the headman of the +totem clan: the totem is desacralised by the mere fact that it is +formally and ceremonially eaten by the headman, after which it may be +consumed by others as an ordinary article of food. But this +explanation of the first-fruits ceremony is based upon an assumption +which is contrary to the facts of the case as it occurs in Australia. +It assumes that the plant or the animal until desacralised is taboo to +all members of the tribe, and that none of them can eat it until it has +been desacralised by the ceremonial eating. But the assumption is +false; the plant or animal is sacred and taboo only to members of the +clan whose totem it is. It is not sacred to the vast majority of the +tribe, for they have totems of their own; to them it is not sacred or +taboo, they may kill it--and they do--without breaking any taboo. The +ceremonial {187} eating of the first-fruits raises no taboo as far as +the tribe generally is concerned, for the plant or animal is not taboo +to them. As far as the tribe generally is concerned, no process of +desacralisation takes place and none is effected by the ceremonial +eating. It is the particular totem group alone which is affected by +the ceremony; and the inference which it seems to me preferable to draw +is that the ceremonial eating of the first-fruits is, or rather has +been, in Australia what it is elsewhere, viz. an instance of prayer and +sacrifice in which the worshippers of a god are brought into +periodic--in this case annual--communion with their god. The +difference between the Australian case and others seems to be that in +the other cases the god who partakes of the first-fruits is the god of +the whole community, while in Australia he is the god of the particular +totem group and is analogous to the family gods who are worshipped +elsewhere, even where there is a tribal or national god to be +worshipped as well. + +We are then inclined, for these and other reasons, to explain the +ceremonial eating of the totem plant or animal in Australia by the +analogy of the ceremonial eating of first-fruits elsewhere, and to +regard the ceremony as being in all cases an act of worship, {188} in +which at harvest time the worshippers of a god seek communion with him +by means of sacrifice and prayers of thanksgiving. But if we take this +view of the sacrifice and prayers offered at harvest time, we shall be +inclined to regard the rites which are performed at seed time, or the +period analogous to it, as being also possibly, in part, of a religious +character. In the case of agricultural peoples it is beyond doubt that +some of the ceremonies are religious in character: where the food plant +is itself regarded as a deity or the mode in which a deity is +manifested, not only may there be at harvest time a sacramental meal in +which, as amongst the Aztecs, the deity is formally "communicated" to +his worshippers, but at seed time sacrifice and prayer may be made to +the deity. Such a religious ceremony, whatever be the degree of +civilisation or semicivilisation which has been reached by those who +observe the ceremony, does not of course take the place of the +agricultural operations which are necessary if the fruits are to be +produced in due season. And the combination of the religious rites and +the agricultural operations does not convert the agricultural +operations into magical operations, or prove that the religious rites +are merely pieces of magic {189} intended to constrain the superior +power of the deity concerned. Indeed, if among the operations +performed at seed time we find some that from the point of view of +modern science are perfectly ineffectual, as vain as eating tiger to +make you bold, we shall be justified in regarding them as pieces of +primitive science, eventually discarded indeed in the progress of +advancing knowledge, but originally practised (on the principle that +like produces like) as the natural means of producing the effect +desired. If we so regard them, we shall escape the error of +considering them to be magical; and we shall have no difficulty in +distinguishing them from the religious rites which may be combined with +them. Further, where harvest time is marked by the offering of +sacrifice and prayers of thanksgiving, we may not unreasonably take it +that the religious rites observed at seed time or the period analogous +to it are in the nature of sacrifice and prayers addressed to the +appropriate deity to beseech him to favour the growth of the plant or +animal in question. In a word, the practice of giving thanks to a god +at harvest time for the harvest creates a reasonable presumption that +prayer is offered to him at seed time; and if thanks are given at a +period analogous to {190} harvest time by a people like the Australian +black fellows, who have no domesticated plants or animals, prayers of +the nature of petitions may be offered by them at the period analogous +to seed time. + +The deity to whom prayers are offered at the one period and +thanksgiving is made at the other may be, as in the case of the Aztec +Xilonen, or the Hindoo Maize-mother, the spirit of the plant envisaged +as a deity; or may be, not a "departmental" deity of this kind, but a +supreme deity having power over all things. But when we turn from the +regularly recurring acts of public worship connected with seed time and +harvest to the regularly recurring ceremonies at which the boys of a +tribe are initiated into the duties and rights of manhood, it is +obvious that the deity concerned in them, even if we assume (as is by +no means necessary) that he was originally "departmental" and at first +connected merely with the growth of a plant or animal, must be regarded +at the initiation ceremonies as a god having in his care all the +interests of that tribe of which the boys to be initiated are about to +become full members. Unmistakable traces of such a deity are found +amongst the Australian black fellows in the "father of all," "the +all-father" described by Mr. Howitt. The {191} worship of the +"all-father" is indeed now of a fragmentary kind; but it fortunately +happens that in the case of one tribe, the Euahlayi, we have evidence, +rescued by Mrs. Langloh Parker, to show that prayer is offered to +Byamee; the Euahlayi pray to him for long life, because they have kept +his law. The nature of Byamee's law may safely be inferred from the +fact that at this festival, both amongst the Euahlayi and other +Australians, the boys who are being initiated are taught the moral laws +or the customary morality of the tribe. But though prayers are still +offered by the Euahlayi and may have at one time been offered by all +the Australian tribes, there is no evidence at present to show that the +prayer is accompanied by a sacrifice, as is customary amongst tribes +whose worship has not disintegrated so much as is the case amongst the +Australians. + +The ceremonies by which boys are admitted to the status of manhood are, +probably amongst all the peoples of the earth who observe them, of a +religious character, for the simple reason that the community to which +the boy is admitted when he attains the age of manhood is a community, +united together by religious bonds as a community worshipping the same +god or gods; and it is to the {192} worship and the service of these +gods that he is admitted. But the ceremonies themselves vary too much +to allow of our drawing from them any valuable or important conclusion +as to the nature and import of sacrifice as a religious institution. +On the other hand, the ceremonies observed at harvest time, or the +analogous period, have, wherever they occur, such marked similarity +among themselves, and the institution of prayer and sacrifice is such a +prominent feature in them, that the evidence they afford must be +decisive for us in attempting to form a theory of sacrifice. Nor can +we dissociate the ceremonies observed in spring from the harvest +ceremonies; as Dr. Frazer remarks (_G. B._, II, 190), "Plainly these +spring and harvest customs are based on the same ancient modes of +thought and form parts of the same primitive heathendom." What, then, +are these "ancient modes of thought" and what the primitive customs +based upon them? We may, I think, classify them in four groups. If we +are to take first those instances in which the "ancient mode of +thought" is most clearly expressed--whether because they are the most +fully developed or because they retain the ancient mode most faithfully +and with the least disintegration--we must {193} turn to ancient Mexico +and Peru. In Mexico a paste idol or dough image of the god was made; +the priest hurled a dart into its breast; and this was called the +killing of the god, "so that his body might be eaten." The dough image +was broken and the pieces were given in the manner of a communion to +the people, "who received it with such tears, fear, and reverence, as +it was an admirable thing," says Father Acosta, "saying that they did +eat the flesh and bones of God." Or, again, an image of the goddess +Chicomecoatl was made of dough and exhibited by the priest, saying, +"This is your god." All kinds of maize, beans, etc., were offered to +it and then were eaten in the temple "in a general scramble, take who +could." In Peru ears of maize were dressed in rich garments and +worshipped as the Mother of the Maize; or little loaves of maize +mingled with the blood of sheep were made; the priest gave to each of +the people a morsel of these loaves, "and all did receive and eat these +pieces," and prayed that the god "would show them favour, granting them +children and happy years and abundance and all that they required." In +this, the first group of instances, it is plain beyond all possibility +of gainsaying that the spring and harvest customs consist {194} of the +worship of a god, of sacrifice and prayers to him, and of a communion +which bound the worshippers to one another and to him. + +Our second group of instances consists of cases in which the corn or +dough or paste is not indeed made into the form or image of a god, but, +as Dr. Frazer says (_G. B._ II, 318), "the new corn is itself eaten +sacramentally, that is, as the body of the corn spirit." The spirit +thus worshipped may not yet have acquired a proper name; the only +designation used may have been such a one as the Hindoo Bhogaldai, +meaning simply Cotton-mother. Indeed, even amongst the Peruvians, the +goddess had not yet acquired a proper name, but was known only as the +Mother of the Maize. But precisely because the stage illustrated in +our second group of instances is not so highly developed as in Mexico +or Peru it is much more widely spread. It is found in the East Indian +island of Euro, amongst the Alfoors of Minahassa, in the Celebes, in +the Neilgherry Hills of South India, in the Hindoo Koosh, in +Indo-China, on the Niger, amongst the Zulus and the Pondos, and amongst +the Creek, Seminole, and Natchez Indians (_ib._ 321-342). In this, the +second group of instances, then, though the god {195} may have no +special, proper, name, and though no image of him is made out of the +dough or paste, still "the new corn is itself eaten sacramentally, that +is as the body of the corn spirit"; by means of the sacramental eating, +of sacrifice and prayer, communion between the god and his worshippers +is renewed and maintained. + +The third group of instances consists of the harvest customs of +northern Europe--the harvest supper and the rites of the Corn-mother or +the Corn-maiden or the Kern Baby. It can scarcely be contended that +these rites and customs, so far as they survive at the present day, +retain, if they ever had, any religious value; they are performed as a +matter of tradition and custom and not because any one knows why they +are performed. But that they originally had a meaning--even though now +it has evaporated--cannot be doubted. Nor can it be doubted that the +meaning, if it is to be recovered, must be recovered by means of the +comparative method. And, if the comparative method is to be applied, +the Corn-mother of northern Europe cannot be dissociated from the +Maize-mother of ancient Peru. But if we go thus far, then we must, +with Dr. Frazer (_ib._ 288), recognise "clearly the {196} sacramental +character of the harvest-supper," in which, "as a substitute for the +real flesh of the divine being, bread and dumplings are made and eaten +sacramentally." Thus, once more, harvest customs testify in northern +Europe, as elsewhere, to the fact that there was once a stated, annual, +period at which communion between the god and his worshipper was sought +by prayer and sacrifice. + +The North-European harvest customs are further interesting and +important because, if they are clearly connected on the one hand with +the groups of instances already given, they are also connected on the +other with the group to which we have yet to call attention. Thus far +the wheat or maize, if not eaten in the form of little loaves or cakes, +has been made into a dough image, or else the ears of maize have been +dressed in rich garments to indicate that they represent the Mother of +the Maize; and in Europe also both forms of symbolism are found. But +in northern Europe, the corn spirit is also believed to be manifested, +Dr. Frazer says, in "the animal which is present in the corn and is +caught or killed in the last sheaf." The animal may be a wolf, dog, +cock, hare, cat, goat, bull, cow, horse, or pig. "The animal is slain +and its flesh and blood are partaken {197} of by the harvesters," and, +Dr. Frazer says, "these customs bring out clearly the sacramental +character of the harvest supper." Now, this manifestation of the corn +spirit in animal form is not confined to Europe; it occurs for instance +in Guinea and in all the provinces and districts of China. And it is +important as forming a link between the agricultural and the +pre-agricultural periods; in Dr. Frazer's words, "hunting and pastoral +tribes, as well as agricultural peoples, have been in the habit of +killing their gods" (_ib._ 366). In the pastoral period, as well as in +agricultural times, the god who is worshipped by the tribe and with +whom the tribe seeks communion by means of prayer and sacrifice, may +manifest himself in animal form, and "the animal is slain and its flesh +and blood are partaken of." + +We now come to the fourth and the last of our groups of instances. It +consists of the rites observed by Australian tribes. Amongst these +tribes too there is what Dr. Frazer terms "a sacramental eating" of the +totem plant or animal. Thus Central Australian black men of the +kangaroo totem eat a little kangaroo flesh, as a sacrament (Spencer and +Gillen, p. 204 ff.). Now, it is impossible, I think, to {198} +dissociate the Australian rite, to separate this fourth group, from the +three groups already described. In Australia, as in the other cases, +the customs are observed in spring and harvest time, and in harvest +time, in Australia as well as elsewhere, there is a solemn and sparing +eating of the plant or animal; and, in Dr. Frazer's words, "plainly +these spring and harvest customs are based on the same ancient modes of +thought, and form part of the same primitive heathendom." What, then, +is this ancient and primitive mode of thought? In all the cases except +the Australian, the thought manifestly implied and expressed is that by +the solemn eating of the plant or the animal, or the dough image or +paste idol, or the little loaves, the community enters into communion +with its god, or renews communion with him. On this occasion the +Peruvians prayed for children, happy years and abundance. On this +occasion, even among the Australians, the Euahlayi tribe pray for long +life, because they have kept Byamee's law. It would not, therefore, be +unreasonable to interpret the Australian custom by the same ancient +mode of thought which explains the custom wherever else--and that is +all over the world--it is found. But perhaps, if we can find some +other interpretation {199} of the Australian custom, we should do +better to reverse the process and explain the spring and harvest +customs which are found elsewhere by means of, and in accordance with, +the Australian custom. Now another interpretation of the Australian +custom has been put forward by Dr. Frazer. He treats the Australian +ceremony as being a piece of pure magic, the purpose of which is to +promote the growth and increase of the plants and animals which provide +the black fellows with food. But if we start from this point of view, +we must go further and say that amongst other peoples than the +Australian the killing of the representative animal of the spirit of +vegetation is, in Dr. Frazer's words, "a magical rite intended to +assure the revival of nature in spring." And if that is the nature of +the rite which appears in northern Europe as the harvest supper, it +will also be the nature of the rite as it appears both in our second +group of instances, where the corn is eaten "as the body of the +corn-spirit," and in the first group, where the dough image or paste +idol was eaten in Mexico as the flesh and bones of the god. That this +line of thought runs through Dr. Frazer's _Golden Bough_, in its second +edition, is indicated by the fact that the rite is spoken of throughout +as a {200} sacrament. That the Mexican rite as described in our first +group is sacramental, is clear. Of the rites which form our second +group of instances, Dr. Frazer says that the corn-spirit, or god, "is +killed in the person of his representative and eaten sacramentally," +and that "the new corn is itself eaten sacramentally; that is, as the +body of the corn-spirit" (p. 318). Of the North European rites, again, +he says, "the animal is slain and its flesh and blood are partaken of +by the harvesters"--"these customs bring out clearly the sacramental +character of the harvest supper"--"as a substitute for the real flesh +of the divine being, bread or dumplings are made in his image and eaten +sacramentally." Finally, even when speaking of the Australians as men +who have no gods to worship, and with whom the rite is pure and +unadulterated magic, he yet describes the rite as a sacrament. + +Now if, on the one hand, from its beginning amongst the Australians to +the form which it finally took amongst the Mexicans the rite is, as Dr. +Frazer systematically calls it, a sacrament; and if, on the other, it +is, in Dr. Frazer's words, "a magical rite intended to assure the +revival of nature in spring," then the conclusion which the reader +cannot help {201} drawing is that a sacrament, or this sacrament at +least, is in its origin, and in its nature throughout, a piece of +magic. Religion is but magic written in different characters; and for +those who can interpret them it spells the same thing. But though this +is the conclusion to which Dr. Frazer's argument leads, and to which in +the first edition of his _Golden Bough_ it clearly seemed to point; in +the preface to the second edition he formally disavows it. He +recognises that religion does not spring from magic, but is +fundamentally opposed to it. A sacrament, therefore, we may infer, +cannot be a piece of magic. The Australian sacrament, therefore, as +Dr. Frazer calls it, cannot, we should be inclined to say, be a piece +of magic. But Dr. Frazer still holds that the Australian rite or +sacrament is pure magic--religious it cannot be, for in Dr. Frazer's +view the Australians know no religion and have no gods. + +Now if the rite as it occurs in Australia is pure magic, and if +religion is not a variety of magic but fundamentally different from it, +then the rite which, as it occurs everywhere else, is religious, cannot +be derived from, or a variety of, the Australian piece of magic; and +the spring and harvest customs which are found in Australia cannot be +"based on the {202} same ancient modes of thought or form part of the +same primitive heathendom" as the sacramental rites which are found +everywhere else in the world. The solemn annual eating of the totem +plant or animal in Australia must have a totally different basis from +that on which the sacrament and communion stands in every other part of +the globe: in Australia it is based on magic, elsewhere on that which +is, according to Dr. Frazer, fundamentally different and opposed to +magic, viz. religion. Before, however, we commit ourselves to this +conclusion, we may be allowed to ask, What is it that compels us thus +to sever the Australian from the other forms of the rite? The reply +would seem to be that, whereas the other forms are admittedly +religious, the Australian is "a magical rite intended to assure the +revival of nature in spring." Now, if that were really the nature of +the Australian rite, we might have to accept the conclusion to which we +hesitate to commit ourselves. But, as a matter of fact, the Australian +rite is not intended to assure the revival of nature in spring, and has +nothing magical about it. It is perfectly true that in spring in +Australia certain proceedings are performed which are based upon the +principle that like produces like; and {203} that these proceedings +are, by students of the science of religion, termed--perhaps +incorrectly--magical. But these spring customs are quite different +from the harvest customs; and it is the harvest customs which +constitute the link between the rite in Australia and the rite in the +rest of the world. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the +Australian harvest rite is magical, or is even based on the principle +that like produces like. And the answer is that it is plainly not. +The harvest rite in Australia consists, as we know it now, simply in +the fact that at the appointed time a little of the totem plant or +animal is solemnly and sparingly eaten by the headman of the totem. +The solemnity with which the rite is performed is unmistakable, and may +well be termed religious. And no attempt even, so far as I am aware, +has been made to show that this solemn eating is regarded as magic by +the performers of the rite, or how it can be so regarded by students of +the science of religion. Until the attempt is made and made +successfully, we are more than justified in refusing to regard the rite +as magical; we are bound to refuse to regard it as such. But if the +rite is not magical--and _à fortiori_ if it is, as Dr. Frazer terms it, +sacramental--then it is {204} religious; and the ancient mode of +thought, forming part of primitive heathendom, which is at the base of +the rite, is the conviction that manifests itself wherever the rite +continues to live, viz. that by prayer and sacrifice the worshippers in +any community are brought into communion with the god they worship. +The rite is, in truth, what Dr. Frazer terms it as it occurs in +Australia--a sacrament. But not even in Australia is a sacrament a +piece of magic. + +In the animistic stage of the evolution of humanity, the only causes +man can conceive of are animated things; and, in the presence of any +occurrence sufficiently striking to arrest his attention, the questions +which present themselves to his mind are, Who did this thing, and why? +Occurrences which arrest the attention of the community are occurrences +which affect the community; and in a low stage of evolution, when the +most pressing of all practical questions is how to live, the +occurrences which most effectually arrest attention are those which +affect the food supply of the community. If, then, the food supply +fails, the occurrence is due to some of the personal, or +quasi-personal, powers by whom the community is surrounded; and the +reason why such power so acted is found in the wrath which {205} must +have actuated him. The situation is abnormal, for famine is abnormal; +and it indicates anger and wrath on the part of the power who brought +it about. But it also implies that when things go on in the normal +way,--when the relations between the spirit and the community are +normal,--the attitude of the spirit to the community is peaceable and +friendly. Not only, however, does the community desire to renew +peaceable and friendly relations, where pestilence or famine show that +they have been disturbed: the community also desires to benefit by them +when they are in their normal condition. The spirits that can disturb +the normal conditions by sending pestilence or famine can also assist +the community in undertakings, the success of which is indispensable if +the community is to maintain its existence; for instance, those +undertakings on which the food supply of the community depends. Hence +the petitions which are put up at seed time, or, in the +pre-agricultural period, at seasons analogous to seed time. Hence, +also, the rites at harvest time or the analogous season, rites which +are instituted and developed for the purpose of maintaining friendly +relation and communion between the community, and the spirit whose +favour {206} is sought and whose anger is dreaded by the community. +Such sacrificial rites may indeed be interpreted as the making of gifts +to the gods; and they do, as a matter of fact, often come so to be +regarded by those who perform them. From this undeniable fact the +inference may then be drawn, and by many students of the science of +religion it is inferred, that from the beginning there was in such +sacrificial rites no other intention than to bribe the god or to +purchase his favour and the good things he had to give. But the +inference, which, when properly limited, has some truth in it, becomes +misleading when put forward as being the whole truth. Unless there +were some truth in it, the rite of sacrifice could never have developed +into the form which was denounced by the Hebrew prophets and +mercilessly exposed by Plato. But had that been the whole truth, the +rite would have been incapable of discharging the really religious +function which it has in its history fulfilled. That function has been +to place and maintain the society which practises it in communion with +its god. Doubtless in the earliest stages of the history of the rite, +the communion thus felt to be established was prized and was mainly +sought for the external blessings which were believed {207} to follow +from it, or, as a means to avert the public disasters which a breach of +communion entailed. Doubtless it was only by degrees, and by slow +degrees, that the communion thus established came to be regarded as +being in itself the end which the rite of sacrifice was truly intended +to attain. But the communion of the worshippers with their god was not +a purpose originally foreign to the rite, and which, when introduced, +transformed the rite from what it at first was into something radically +different. On the contrary, it was present, even though not prominent +or predominant, from the beginning; and the rite, as a religious +institution, followed different lines of evolution, according as the +one aspect or the other was developed. Where the aspect under which +the sacrificial rite was regarded was that the offering was a gift made +to the deity in order to secure some specified temporal advantage, the +religious value of the rite diminished to the vanishing point in the +eyes both of those who, like Plato, could see the intrinsic absurdity +of pretending to make gifts to Him from whom alone all good things +come, and of those who felt that the sacrificial rite so conceived did +not afford the spiritual communion for which they yearned. Where even +the {208} sacrificial rite was regarded as a means whereby communion +between the worshipper and his god was attained or maintained, the +emphasis might be thrown on the rite and its due performance rather +than on the spiritual communion of which it was the condition. That is +to say, with the growth of formalism attention was concentrated on the +ritual and correspondingly withdrawn from the prayer which, from the +beginning, had been of the essence of the rite. By the rite of +sacrifice the community had always been brought into the presence of +the god it worshipped; and, in the prayers then offered on behalf of +the society, the society had been brought into communion with its god. +From that communion it was possible to fall away, even though the +performance of the rite was maintained. The very object of that +communion might be misinterpreted and mistaken to be a means merely to +temporal blessings for the community, or even to personal advantages +for the individual. Or the punctilious performance of each and every +detail of the rite might tend to become an end in itself and displace +the spiritual communion, the attainment of which had been from the +beginning the highest, even if not the only or the most prominent, +{209} end which the rite might subserve. The difference between the +possibilities which the rite might have realised and the actual +purposes for which it had come to be used before the birth of Christ is +a difference patent to the most casual observer of the facts. The +dissatisfaction felt alike by Plato and the Hebrew prophets with the +rite as it had come to be practised may be regarded, if we choose so to +regard it, as the necessary consequence of pre-existing facts, and as +necessarily entailing the rejection or the reconstitution of the rite. +As a matter of history, the rite was reconstituted and not rejected; +and as reconstituted it became the central fact of the Christian +religion. It became the means whereby, through Christ, all men might +be brought to God. We may say, if we will, that a new meaning was put +into the rite, or that its true meaning was now made manifest. The +facts themselves clearly indicate that from the beginning the rite was +the means whereby a society sought or might seek communion with its +god. They also indicate that the rite of animal sacrifice came to be +found insufficient as a means. It was through our Lord that mankind +learned what sacrifice was needed--learned to "offer and present unto +thee, O Lord, ourselves, our {210} souls and bodies, to be a +reasonable, holy and lively sacrifice unto thee." That is the +sacrifice Christ showed us the example of; that is the example which +the missionary devotes himself to follow and to teach. + + + + +{211} + +MORALITY + +In this lecture I propose to consider the question whether morality is +based on religion or religion on morality. It is a question which may +be approached from the point of view either of philosophy or of +history. Quite recently it has been treated from the former point of +view by Professor Höffding in _The Philosophy of Religion_ (translated +into English, 1906); and from the point of view of the history of +morality by Mr. Hobhouse in his _Morals in Evolution_ (1906). It may, +of course, also be quite properly approached from the point of view of +the history of religion; and from whatever standpoint it is treated, +the question is one of importance for the missionary, both because of +its intrinsic interest for the philosophy of religion, and because its +discussion is apt to proceed on a mistaken view of facts in the history +of religion. About those facts and their meaning, the missionary, who +is to be properly equipped for his work, should be in no doubt: a right +view and a proper estimate of the facts are essential both for {212} +his practical work and for the theoretical justification of his +position. + +One answer to the question before us is that morality is the basal +fact--the bottom fact: if we regard the question historically, we shall +find that morality came first and religion afterwards; and, even if +that were not so, we should find that as a matter of logic and +philosophy religion presupposes morality--religion may, for a time, be +the lever that moves the world, but it would be powerless if it had not +a fulcrum, and that fulcrum is morality. So long and so far as +religion operates beneficially on the world, it does so simply because +it supports and reënforces morality. But the time is not far distant, +and may even now be come, when morality no longer requires any support +from religion--and then religion becomes useless, nay! an encumbrance +which must either fall off or be lopped off. If, therefore, morality +can stand by itself, and all along has not merely stood by itself, but +has really upheld religion, in what is morality rooted? The answer is +that morality has its roots, not in the command that thou shalt love +the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all thy soul, but in human +solidarity, in humanity regarded as a spiritual whole. To {213} this +conclusion, it is said, the history of recent philosophy has steadily +been moving. If the movement had taken place in only one school of +philosophic thought, it might have been a movement running into a +side-track. But it is the direction taken by schools so different in +their presuppositions and their methods as that of Hegel and that of +Comte; and it is the undesigned coincidence of their tendency, which at +first could never have been surmised, that carries with it a conviction +of its correctness. Human solidarity, humanity regarded as a spiritual +whole, may be called, as Hegel calls it, self-conscious spirit; or you +may call it, as Comte calls it, the Mind of Humanity--it is but the +collective wisdom "of a common humanity with a common aim"; and, that +being so, morality is rooted, not in the will and the love of a +beneficent and omnipotent Providence, but in the self-realising spirit +in man setting up its "common aim" at morality. The very conception of +a beneficent and omnipotent God--having now done its work as an aid to +morality--must now be put aside, because it stands in the way of our +recognising what is the real spiritual whole, besides which there is +none other spirit, viz. the self-realising spirit in man. That spirit +is only realising; it is not yet {214} realised. It is in process of +realisation; and the conception of it, as in process of realisation, +enables it to be brought into harmony, or rather reveals its inner +harmony, with the notion of evolution. There is nothing outside +evolution, no being to whom evolution is presented as a spectacle or by +whom, as a process, it is directed. "Being itself," as Höffding says +(_Problems of Philosophy_, p. 136), "is to be conceived as in process +of becoming, of evolution." The spirit in man, as we have just said, +is the real spiritual whole, and it is self-realising; it is evolving +and progressing both morally and rationally. In Höffding's words +"Being itself becomes more rational than before" (_ib._, p. 137). +"Being itself is not ready-made but still incomplete, and rather to be +conceived as a continual becoming, like the individual personality and +like knowledge" (_ib._, p. 120). We may say, then, that being is +becoming rationalised and moralised as and because the spirit in man +realises itself. For a time the process of moralisation and +self-realisation was worked by and through the conception of a +beneficent and omnipotent god. That conception was, it would seem, a +hypothesis, valuable as long it was a working hypothesis, but to be +cast aside now that humanitarianism is found {215} more adequate to the +facts and more in harmony with the consistent application of the theory +of evolution. We have, then, to consider whether it is adequate to the +facts, whether, when we regard the facts of the history of religion, we +do find that morality comes first and religion later. + +"What," Mr. Hobhouse enquires in his _Morals in Evolution_ (II, 74), +"What is the ethical character of early religion?" and his reply is +that "in the first stage we find that spirits, as such, are not +concerned with morality." That was also the answer which had +previously been given by Professor Höffding, who says in his +_Philosophy of Religion_: "in the lowest forms of it ... religion +cannot be said to have any ethical significance" (p. 323). Originally, +the gods were "purely natural forces which could be defied or evaded," +though eventually they "became ethical powers whom men neither could +nor wished to defy" (p. 324). This first stage of early religion seems +on the terms of the hypothesis to be supposed to be found in the period +of animism and fetichism; and "the primitive conception of spirit" is, +Mr. Hobhouse says (II, 16), of something "feeling and thinking like a +rather stupid man, and open like him to supplication, exhortation, or +intimidation." If {216} that is so, then Professor Höffding may be +justified in saying that in the lowest forms of religion "the gods +appear as powers on which man is dependent, but not as patterns of +conduct or administrators of an ethical world order" (p. 324). Now, in +the period termed animistic because inanimate things are supposed to be +animated and actuated by spirits, it may be that many or most of such +spirits are supposed to feel and think like a rather stupid man, and +therefore to be capable of being cajoled, deluded, intimidated, and +castigated by the human being who desires to make use of them. But it +is not all such spirits that are worshipped then. Indeed, it is +impossible, Mr. Hobhouse says (II, 15), that any such spirit could be +"an object of worship in our sense of the term." Worship implies the +superiority of the object worshipped to the person worshipping. But, +though not an object of worship in our sense of the term, the spirit +that could be deluded, intimidated, and castigated was, according to +Mr. Hobhouse, "the object of a religious cult" on the part of the man +who believed that he could and did intimidate and castigate the spirit. +Probably, however, most students of the science of religion would agree +that a cult which included or {217} allowed intimidation and +castigation of the object of the cult was as little entitled to be +termed religious as it is to be called worship. In the period of +animism, then, either there was no religious cult, no worship in our +sense of the term; or, if there was religion, then the spirit +worshipped was worshipped as a being higher than man. Whether man has +at any time been without religion is a question on which there is here +no need to enter. The allegation we are now considering is that +whenever religion does appear, then in its first and earliest stage it +is not concerned with morality; and the ground for that allegation is +that the spirits of the animistic period have nothing to do with +morality or conduct. Now, it may be that these spirits which animate +inanimate things are not concerned with morality; but then neither are +they worshipped, nor is the relation between them and man religious. +Religion implies a god; and a spirit to be a god must have worshippers, +a community of worshippers--whether that community be a nation, a +tribe, or a family. Further, it is as the protector of the interests +of that community--however small--that the god is worshipped by the +community. The indispensable condition of religion is the existence of +a community; {218} and from the beginning man must have lived in some +sort of community,--whether a family or a horde,--for the period of +helpless infancy is so long in the case of human beings that without +some sort of permanent community the race could not be perpetuated. +The indispensable condition of religion, therefore, has always existed +from the time when man was man. Further, whatever the form of +community in which man originally dwelt, it was only in the community +and by means of the community that the individual could exist--that is +to say, if the interest of any one individual conflicted or was +supposed to conflict with the interests of the community, then the +interests of the community must prevail, if the community was to exist. +Here, then, from the beginning we have the second condition +indispensable for the existence of religion, viz. the possibility that +the conduct of some member of the community might not be the conduct +required by the interests or supposed interests of the community, and +prescribed by the custom of the community. In the case of such +divergence of interests and conduct, the being worshipped by the +community was necessarily, as being the god of the community, and +receiving the worship of the community, on the side {219} of the +community and against the member who violated the custom of the +community. But, at this period in the history of humanity, the +morality of the community was the custom of the community; and the god +of the community from the first necessarily upheld the custom, that is, +the morality of the community. Spirits "as such," that is to say, +spirits which animated inanimate things but which were not the +protectors of any human community, were, for the very reason that they +were not the gods of any community, "not concerned with morality." +Spirits, however, which were the protectors of a community necessarily +upheld the customs and therefore the morality of the community; they +were not "without ethical significance." It was an essential part of +the very conception of such spirits--of spirits standing in this +relation to the community--that they were "ethical powers." Höffding's +dictum that "the gods appear as powers on which man is dependent, but +not as patterns of conduct or administrators of an ethical world order" +(p. 323), overlooks the fact that in the earliest times not only are +gods powers on which man is dependent, but powers which enforce the +conduct required by the custom of the community and sanction the +ethical order as {220} far as it has then been revealed. The fact that +"the worship of the family, of the clan, or of the nation is shared in +by all," not merely "helps to nourish a feeling of solidarity which may +acquire ethical significance," as Höffding says (p. 325), it creates a +solidarity which otherwise would not exist. If there were no worship +shared in by all, there would be no religious solidarity; and, judging +from the very general, if not universal, occurrence of religion in the +lowest races as well as the highest, we may conjecture that without +religious solidarity a tribe found it hard or impossible to survive in +the struggle for existence. That religious solidarity however is not, +as Höffding suggests, something which may eventually "acquire ethical +significance"; it is in its essence and from the beginning the worship +of a god who punishes the community for the ethical transgression of +its members, because they are not merely violations of the custom of +the community, but offences against him. When Höffding says (p. 328) +"religious faith ... assumes an independent human ethic, which has, as +a matter of fact, developed historically under the practical influence +of the ethical feeling of man," he seems to overlook the fact that as a +matter of history human {221} ethics have always been based--rightly or +wrongly--on religious faith, that moral transgressions have always been +regarded as not merely wrongs done to a man's neighbour, but also as +offences against the god or gods of the community, that the person +suffering from foul wrong for which he can get no human redress has +always appealed from man to God, and that the remorse of the wrong-doer +who has evaded human punishment has always taken shape in the fear of +what God may yet do. + +Those who desire to prove that at the present day morality can exist +apart from religion, and that in the future it will do so, finding its +basis in humanitarianism and not in religion, are moved to show that as +a matter of historic fact religion and morality have been things apart. +We have examined the assertion that religion in its lowest forms is not +concerned with morality; and we have attempted to show that the god of +a community, or the spirit worshipped by a community, is necessarily a +being conceived as concerned with the interests of the community and as +hostile to those who violate the customs--which is to transgress the +morality--of the community. But even if this be admitted, it may still +be said that it does not in the least disprove the assertion that {222} +morality existed before religion did. The theory we are examining +freely admits that religion is supposed, in certain stages of the +history of humanity, to reënforce morality and to be necessary in the +interest of morals, though eventually it is found that morality needs +no such support; and not only needs now no such support but never did +need it; and the fact that it did not need it is shown by demonstrating +the existence of morality before religion existed. If, then, it be +admitted that religion from the moment it first appeared reënforced +morality, and did not pass through a non-moral period first, still +morality may have existed before religion was evolved, and must have so +existed if morality and religion are things essentially apart. What +evidence then is there on the point? We find Mr. Hobhouse saying (I, +80) that "at almost, if not quite, the lowest stages" of human +development there are "certain actions which are resented as involving +the community as a whole in misfortune and danger. These include, +besides actual treason, conduct which brings upon the people the wrath +of God, or of certain spirits, or which violates some mighty and +mysterious taboo. The actions most frequently regarded in this light +are certain breaches of the marriage law and witchcraft." {223} These +offences, we are told (_ib._, 82), endanger the community itself, and +the punishment is "prompted by the sense of a danger to the whole +community." Here, then, from the beginning we find that offences +against the common good are punished, not simply as such, but as +misconduct bringing on the community, and not merely on the offender, +the wrath of gods or spirits. In other words--Mr. Hobhouse's words, p. +119--"in the evolution of public justice, we find that at the outset +the community interferes mainly on what we may call supernatural +grounds only with actions which are regarded as endangering its own +existence." We may then fairly say that if the community inflicts +punishments mainly on supernatural grounds from the time when the +evolution of public justice first begins, then morality from its very +beginning was reënforced--indeed prompted--by religion. The morality +was indeed only the custom of the community; but violation of the +custom was from the beginning regarded as a religious offence and was +punished on supernatural grounds. + +The view that morality and religion are essentially distinct, that +morality not only can stand alone, without support from religion, but +has in reality always stood without such support--however much {224} +the fact has been obscured by religious prepossessions--this view +receives striking confirmation from the current and generally accepted +theory of the origin and nature of justice. That theory traces the +origin of justice back to the feeling of resentment experienced by the +individual against the particular cause of his pain (Westermarck, +_Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_, I, 22). Resentment leads +to retaliation and takes the form of revenge. Vengeance, at first +executed by the person injured (or by his kin, if he be killed), comes +eventually, if slowly, to be taken out of the hands of the person +injured or his avengers, and to be exercised by the State in the +interests of the community and in furtherance, not of revenge, but of +justice and the good of society. Thus not only the origin of justice, +but the whole course of its growth and development, is entirely +independent of religion and religious considerations. Throughout, the +individual and society are the only parties involved; the gods do not +appear--or, if they do appear, they are intrusive and superfluous. If +this be the true view of the history and nature of justice, it may--and +probably must--be the truth about the whole of morality and not only +about justice. We have but {225} to follow Dr. Westermarck (_ib._, p. +21) in grouping the moral emotions under the two heads of emotions of +approval and emotions of disapproval, we have but to note with him that +both groups belong to the class of retributive emotions, and we see +that the origin and history of justice are typical of the origin and +history of morals: morality in general, just as much as justice in +particular, both originates independently of religion and +developes--where moral progress is made--independently of religion. + +Let us now proceed to examine this view of the relation of religion and +morality and to consider whether their absolute independence of each +other is historic fact. It traces back justice to the feeling of +resentment experienced by the individual; but if the individual ever +existed by himself and apart from society, there could neither then be +justice nor anything analogous to justice, for justice implies, not +merely a plurality of individuals, but a society; it is a social +virtue. The individual existing by himself and apart from society is +not a historic fact but an impossible abstraction--a conception +essentially false because it expresses something which neither exists +nor has existed nor could possibly {226} exist. The origin of +justice--or of any virtue--cannot be found in the impossible and +self-contradictory conception of the individual existing apart from +society; it cannot be found in a mere plurality of such individuals: it +can only be found in a society--whether that society have the +organisation of a family, a tribe, or a nation. Justice in particular +and morality in general, like religion, imply the existence of a +society; neither is a merely individual affair. Justice is, as Mr. +Hobhouse states, "public action taken for the sake of public safety" +(I, 83): it is, from the outset of its history, public action; and back +of that we cannot go, for the individual did not, as a matter of +history, exist before society, and could not so have existed. + +In the next place, justice is not the resentment of any individual, it +is the sentiment of the community expressing itself in public action, +taken not for the sake of any individual, but for the sake of public +safety. Its object from the beginning is not the gratification of +individual resentment, but the safety and welfare of the community +which takes common action. Proof of this, if proof were needed, would +be found in the fact that the existence of the individual, as such, is +not recognised. Not only does {227} the community which has suffered +in the wrong done to any of its members take action as a community; it +proceeds, not against the individual who has inflicted the wrong, but +against the community to which he belongs. "The wrong done," is, as +Mr. Hobhouse says (I, 91), "the act of the family or clan and may be +avenged on any member of that family or clan." There is collective +responsibility for the wrong done, just as there is collective +responsibility for righting it. + +If, now, we enquire, What are the earliest offences against which +public action is taken? and why? we may remember that Mr. Hobhouse has +stated them to be witchcraft and breaches of the marriage law; and that +the punishment of those offences corresponds, as he has said, "roughly +to our own administration of justice" (I, 81). Now, in the case of +breaches of the marriage laws--mating with a cousin on the mother's +side instead of with a cousin on the father's side, marrying into a +forbidden class--it is obvious that there is no individual who has +suffered injury and that there is no individual to experience +resentment. It is the community that suffers or is expected to suffer; +and it expects to suffer, because it, in the person of one of its {228} +members, has offended. Collectively it is responsible for the misdeeds +of its members. Whom, then, has it offended? To whom is it +responsible? Who will visit it with punishment, unless it makes haste +to set itself right? The answer given by a certain tribe of the Sea +Dyaks makes the matter clear: they, Mr. St. John tells us in his _Life +in the Forests of the Far East_ (I, 63, quoted by Westermarck, I, 49), +"are of opinion that an unmarried girl proving with child must be +offensive to the superior powers, who, instead of always chastising the +individual, punish the tribe by misfortunes happening to its members. +They therefore on the discovery of the pregnancy fine the lovers, and +sacrifice a pig to propitiate offended heaven, and to avert that +sickness or those misfortunes that might otherwise follow." That is, +of course, only one instance. But we may safely say that the marriage +law is generally ascribed to the ordinance of the gods, even in the +lowest tribes, and that breaches of it are offences against heaven. It +is unnecessary to prove, it need only be mentioned, that witchcraft is +conspicuously offensive to the religious sentiment, and is punished as +an offence against the god or gods. When, then, we consider the origin +and nature of justice, not from {229} an abstract and _à priori_ point +of view, but in the light of historic fact, so far from finding that it +originates and operates in complete independence of religion, we +discover that from the beginning the offences with which the justice of +the primitive community deals are offences, not against the community, +but against heaven. "In the evolution of public justice," as Mr. +Hobhouse says, "at the outset the community interferes mainly on what +we may call supernatural grounds." From the beginning misdeeds are +punished, not merely as wrongs done to society, but as wrong done to +the gods and as wrong-doing for which the community collectively is +responsible to the gods. Justice from the beginning is not individual +resentment, but "public action taken for the public safety." It is +not, as Mr. Hobhouse calls it, "revenge guided and limited by custom." +It is the customary action of the community taken to avert divine +vengeance. The action taken assumes in extreme cases the form of the +death penalty; but its usual form of action is that of taboo. + +If the origin of justice is to be sought in something that is not +justice, if justice in particular and morality in general are to be +treated as having been evolved out of something which was in a way +different {230} from them and yet in a way must have contained them, +inasmuch as they came forth from it, we shall do well to look for that +something, not in the unhistorical, unreal abstraction of an imaginary +individual, apart from society, but in society itself when it is as yet +not clearly conscious of the justice and morality at work within it. +Such a stage in the development of society is, I think, to be discerned. + +We have seen that, "at almost, if not quite, the lowest stages" of +human development, there is something which, according to Mr. Hobhouse, +corresponds "roughly to our own administration of justice" (I, 81). +But this rough justice implies conscious, deliberate action on the part +of the community. It implies that the community as such makes some +sort of enquiry into what can be the cause of the misfortunes which are +befalling it; and that, having found out the person responsible, it +deliberately takes the steps it deems necessary for putting itself +right with the supernatural power that has sent the sickness or famine. +Now, such conscious, purposive, deliberate action may and probably does +take place at almost the lowest stage of development of society; but +not, we may surmise, at quite the lowest. What eventually is done +{231} consciously and deliberately is probably done in the first place +much more summarily and automatically. And--in quite the lowest stage +of social development--it is by means of the action of taboo that +summary and automatic punishment for breaches of the custom of the +community is inflicted. Its action is automatic and immediate: merely +to come in contact with the forbidden thing is to become tabooed +yourself; and so great is the horror and dread of such contact, even if +made unwittingly, that it is capable of causing, when discovered, +death. Like the justice, however, of which it is the forerunner, it +does not result always in death, nor does it produce that effect in +most cases. But what it does do is to make the offender himself taboo +and as infectious as the thing that rendered him taboo. Here, too, the +action of taboo, in excommunicating the offender, anticipates, or +rather foreshadows, the action of justice when it excludes the guilty +person from the community and makes of him an outlaw. Again, in the +rough justice found at almost, though not quite, the lowest stages, the +earliest offences of which official notice, so to speak, is taken, are +offences for which the punishment--disease or famine, etc.--falls on +the community as a whole, because the {232} community, in the person of +one of its members, has offended as a whole against heaven. In the +earlier stage of feeling, also, which survives where taboo prevails, it +is the community as a whole which may be infected, and which must +suffer if the offender is allowed to spread the infection; it is the +community, as a whole, which is concerned to thrust out the guilty +person--every one shuns him because he is taboo. Thus, in this the +earliest stage, the offender against the custom of the community is +outlawed just as effectively as in later stages of social development. +But no formal sentence is pronounced; no meeting of the men or the +elders of the community is held to try the offender; no reason is given +or sought why the offence should thus be punished. The operation of +taboo is like that of the laws of nature: the man who eats poisonous +food dies with no reason given. A reason may eventually be found by +science, and is eventually discovered, though the process of discovery +is slow, and many mistakes are made, and many false reasons are given +before the true reason is found. So, too, the true reason for the +prohibition of many of the things, which the community feels to be +forbidden and pronounced to be taboo, is found, with the progress of +society--when it does {233} progress, which is not always--to be that +they are immoral and irreligious, though here, too, many mistakes are +made before true morality and true religion are found. But at the +outset no reason is given: the things are simply offensive to the +community and are tabooed as such. We, looking back at that stage in +the evolution of society, can see that amongst the things thus +offensive and tabooed are some which, in later stages, are equally +offensive, but are now forbidden for a reason that can be formulated +and given, viz. that they are offences against the law of morality and +the law of God. That reason, at the outset of society, may scarcely +have been consciously present to the mind of man: progress, in part at +least, has consisted in the discovery of the reasons of things. But +that man did from the beginning avoid some of the things which are +forbidden by morality and religion, and that those things were taboo to +him, is beyond the possibility of doubt. Nor can it be doubted that in +the prohibition and punishment of them there was inchoate justice and +inchoate religion. Such prohibition was due to the collective action +and expressed the collective feeling of the community as a whole. And +it is from such social action and feeling that {234} justice, I +suggest, has been evolved--not from the feeling of resentment +experienced by the individual as an individual. Personal resentment +and personal revenge may have stimulated justice to action. But, by +the hypothesis we have been examining, they were not justice. Neither +have they been transformed into justice: they still exist as something +distinct from justice and capable of perverting it. + +The form which justice takes in the period which is almost, but not +quite, the lowest stage of human evolution is the sense of the +collective responsibility of the community for all its actions, that is +to say, for the acts of all its members. And that responsibility in +its earliest shape is felt to be a responsibility to heaven, to the +supernatural powers that send disease and famine upon the community. +In those days no man sins to himself alone, just as, in still earlier +days, no man could break a taboo without becoming a source of danger to +the whole community. The wrong-doer has offended against the +supernatural powers and has brought down calamity upon the community. +He is therefore punished, directly as an offender against the god of +the community, and indirectly for having involved the {235} community +in suffering. In Dr. Westermarck's words (I, 194), there is "genuine +indignation against the offender, both because he rebels against God, +and because he thereby exposes the whole community to supernatural +dangers." But though society for many long centuries continues to +punish rebellion against God, still in the long run it ceases, or tends +to cease, doing so. Its reason for so ceasing is interpreted +differently by different schools of thought. On the one hand, it is +said in derision, let the gods punish offences against the gods--the +implication being that there are no such offences to punish, because +there is no god. On the other hand, it is said, "I will repay, saith +the Lord"--the implication being that man may not assume to be the +minister of divine vengeance. If, then, we bear in mind that the fact +may be interpreted in either of these different ways, we shall not fall +into the fallacy of imagining that the mere existence of the fact +suffices to prove either interpretation to be true. Yet this fallacy +plays its part in lending fictitious support to the doctrine that +morality is in no wise dependent upon religion. The offences now +punished by law, it is argued, are no longer punished as offences +against religion, but solely as offences {236} against the good of the +community. To this argument the reply is that men believe the good of +the community to be the will of God, and do not believe murder, theft, +adultery, etc., to be merely offences against man's laws. Overlooking +this fact, which is fatal to the doctrine that morality is in no wise +dependent on religion, the argument we are discussing proceeds to +maintain that the basis for the enforcement of morality by the law is +recognised by every one who knows anything of the philosophy of law to +be what is good for the community and its members: fraud and violence +are punished as such, and not because they are offences against this or +that religion. The fact that the law no longer punishes them as +offences against God suffices to show that it is only as offences +against humanity that there is any sense, or ever was any sense, in +punishing them. Religion may have reënforced morality very usefully at +one time, by making out that moral misdeeds were offences against God, +but such arguments are not now required. The good and the well-being +of humanity is in itself sufficient argument. Humanitarianism is +taking the place of religion, and by so doing is demonstrating that +morality is, as it always has been, {237} independent of religion; and +that in truth religion has built upon it, not it upon religion. As +Höffding puts it (p. 328): "Religious faith ... assumes an independent +human ethic developed historically under the practical influence of the +ethical feeling of man." That is to say, morality is in Höffding's +view independent of religion, and prior to religion, both as a matter +of logic and of history. As a matter of history--of the history of +religion--this seems to me, for the reasons already given, to be +contrary to the facts as they are known. The real reason for +maintaining that morality is and must be--and must have +been--independent of religion, seems to me to be a philosophical +reason. I may give it in Höffding's own words: "What other aims and +qualities," he asks (p. 324), "could man attribute to his gods or +conceive as divine, but those which he has learnt from his own +experience to recognise as the highest?" The answer expected to the +question plainly is not merely that it is from experience that man +learns, but that man has no experience of God from which he could +learn. The answer given by Mr. Hobhouse, in the concluding words of +his _Morals in Evolution_ is that "the collective wisdom" of man "is +all that we directly know of the Divine." {238} Here, too, no direct +access to God is allowed to be possible to man. It is from his +experience of other men--perhaps even of himself and his own +doings--that man learns all he knows of God: but he has himself no +experience of God. Obviously, then, from this humanitarian point of +view, what a man goes through in his religious moments is not +experience, and we are mistaken if we imagine that it was experience; +it is only a misinterpretation of experience. It is on the supposition +that we are mistaken, on the assumption that we make a +misinterpretation, that the argument is built to prove that morality is +and must be independent of religion. Argument to show, or proof to +demonstrate, that we had not the experience, or, that we mistook +something else for it, is, of course, not forthcoming. But if we hold +fast to our conviction, we are told that we are fleeing "to the bosom +of faith." + +Until some better argument is produced, we may be well content not +merely to flee but to rest there. + + + + +{239} + +CHRISTIANITY + +The subject dealt with in this lecture will be the place of +Christianity in the evolution of religion; and I shall approach it by +considering the place of religion in the evolution of humanity. It +will be therefore advisable, indeed necessary, for me to consider what +is meant by evolution; and I wish to begin by explaining the point of +view from which I propose to approach the three ideas of evolution, of +the evolution of humanity and the evolution of religion. + +The individual exists, and can only exist, in society. Society cannot +exist without individuals as members thereof; and the individual cannot +exist save in society. From this it follows that from one point of +view the individual may be regarded as a means--a means by which +society attains its end or purpose: every one of us has his place or +function in society; and society thrives according as each member +performs his function and discharges his duty. From another point of +view {240} the individual may be regarded as an end. If man is a +social animal, if men live in society, it is because so alone can a man +do what is best for himself: it is by means of society that he realises +his end. It is then from this proposition, viz. that the individual is +both a means and an end, that I wish to approach the idea of evolution. + +I will begin by calling attention to the fact that that proposition is +true both statically, that is to say, is true of the individual's +position in a community, and is also true dynamically, that is to say, +is true of his place in the process of evolution. On the former point, +that the proposition is true statically, of the position of the +individual in the community, I need say but little. In moral +philosophy it is the utilitarian school which has particularly insisted +upon this truth. That school has steadily argued that, in the +distribution of happiness or of the good, every man is to count as one, +and nobody to count as more than one--that is to say, in the community +the individual is to be regarded as the end. The object to be aimed at +is not happiness in general and no one's happiness in particular, but +the happiness of each and every individual. It is the individual and +his happiness which is the {241} end, for the sake of which society +exists and to which it is the means; otherwise the individual might +derive no benefit from society. But if the truth that the individual +is an end as well as a means is recognised by moral philosophy, that +truth has also played at least an equally important part in political +philosophy. It is the very breath of the cry for liberty, equality, +and fraternity,--a cry wrung out from the heart of man by the system of +oppression which denied that the ordinary citizen had a right to be +anything but a means for procuring enjoyment to the members of the +ruling class. The truth that any one man--whatever his place in +society, whatever the colour of his skin--has as much right as any +other to be treated as an end and that no man was merely a means to the +enjoyment or happiness or well-being of another, was the charter for +the emancipation of slaves. It is still the magna charta for the +freedom of every member of the human race. No man is or can be a +chattel--a thing existing for no other purpose than to subserve the +interests of its owner and to be a means to his ends. But though from +the truth that the individual is in himself an end as well as a means, +it follows that all men have the right to {242} freedom, it does not +follow as a logical inference that all men are equal as means--as means +to the material happiness or to the moral improvement of society. + +I need not further dwell upon the fact that statically as regards the +relations of men to one another in society at any moment, the truth is +fully recognised that the individual is not merely a means to the +happiness or well-being of others, but is also in himself an end. But +when we consider the proposition dynamically, when we wish to find out +the part it has played as one of the forces at work in evolution, we +find that its truth has been far from fully recognised--partly perhaps +because utilitarianism dates from a time when evolution, or the bearing +of it, was not understood. But the truth is at least of as great +importance dynamically as it is statically. And on one side, its truth +and the importance of its truth has been fully developed: that the +individual is a means to an end beyond him; and that, dynamically, he +has been and is a factor in evolution, and as a factor merely a means +and nothing else--all this has been worked out fully, if not to excess. +The other side of the truth, the fact that the individual is always an +end, has, however, {243} been as much neglected by the scientific +evolutionist as it was by the slave-driver: he has been liable to +regard men as chattels, as instruments by which the work of evolution +is carried on. The work has got to be done (by men amongst other +animals and things), things have to be evolved, evolution must go on. +But, why? and for whom? with what purpose and for whose benefit? with +what end? are questions which science leaves to be answered by those +people who are foolish enough to ask them. Science is concerned simply +with the individual as a means, as one of the means, whereby evolution +is carried on; and doubtless science is justified--if only on the +principle of the division of labour--in confining itself to the +department of enquiry which it takes in hand and in refusing to travel +beyond it. Any theory of man, therefore, or of the evolution of +humanity, which professes to base itself strictly on scientific fact +and to exclude other considerations as unscientific and therefore as +unsafe material to build on, will naturally, and perhaps necessarily, +be dominated by the notion that the individual exists as a factor in +evolution, as one of the means by which, and not as in any sense the +end for which, evolution is carried on. + +{244} + +Such seems to be the case with the theory of humanitarianism. It bases +itself upon science, upon experience, and rules out communion with God +as not being a scientific fact or a fact of experience at all. Based +upon science, it is a theory which seeks amongst other things to assign +to religion its place in the evolution of humanity. According to the +theory, the day of religion is over, its part played out, its function +in the evolution of humanity discharged. According to this theory, +three stages may be discerned in the evolution of humanity when we +regard man as a moral being, as an ethical consciousness. Those three +stages may be characterised first as custom, next religion, and finally +humanitarianism. + +By the theory, in the first stage--that of custom--the spirits to whom +cult is paid are vindictive. In the second stage--that of +religion--man, having attained to a higher morality, credits his gods +with that higher morality. In the third stage--that of +humanitarianism--he finds that the gods are but lay figures on which +the robes of righteousness have been displayed that man alone can +wear--when he is perfect. He is not yet perfect. If he were, the +evolution of humanity {245} would be attained--whereas at present it is +as yet in process. The end of evolution is not yet attained: it is to +establish, in some future generation, a perfect humanity. For that end +we must work; to it we may know that, as a matter of scientific +evolution, we are working. On it, we may be satisfied, man will not +enter in our generation. + +Now this theory of the evolution of humanity, and of the place religion +takes in that evolution, is in essential harmony with the scientific +treatment of the evolution theory, inasmuch as it treats of the +individual solely as an instrument to something other than himself, as +a means of producing a state of humanity to which he will not belong. +But if the assumption that the individual is always a means and never +an end in himself be false, then a theory of the evolution of man (as +an ethical consciousness) which is based on that wrong assumption will +itself be wrong. If each individual is an end, as valuable and as +important as any other individual; if each counts for one and not less +than any one other,--then his end and his good cannot lie in the +perfection of some future generation. In that case, his end would be +one that _ex hypothesi_ he could never enjoy, a rest into which he +could never enter; {246} and consequently it would be an irrational +end, and could not serve as a basis for a rationalist theory of ethics. +Man's object (to be a rational object) must have reference to a society +of which he may be a member. The realisation of his object, therefore, +cannot be referred to a stage of society yet to come, on earth, after +he is dead,--a society of which he, whether dead or annihilated, could +not be a member. If, then, the individual's object is to be a rational +object, as the humanitarian or rationalist assumes, then that end must +be one in which he can share; and therefore cannot be in this world. +Nor can that end be attained by doing man's will--for man's will may be +evil, and regress as well as progress is a fact in the evolution of +humanity; its attainment, therefore, must be effected by doing God's +will. + +The truth that the individual is an end as well as a means is, I +suggest, valuable in considering the dynamics as well as the statics of +society. At least, it saves one from the self-complacency of imagining +that one's ancestors existed with no other end and for no higher +purpose than to produce--me; and if the golden days anticipated by the +theory of humanitarianism ever arrive, it is to be supposed that the +{247} men of that time will find it just as intolerable and revolting +as we do now, to believe that past generations toiled and suffered for +no other reason, for no other end, and to no other purpose than that +their successors should enter into the fruits of their labour. In a +word, the theory that in the evolution of man as an ethical +consciousness, as a moral being, religion is to be superseded by +humanitarianism, is only possible so long as we deny or ignore the fact +that the individual is an end and not merely a means. We will +therefore now go on to consider the evolution of religion from the +point of view that the individual is in himself an end as well as a +means. If, of the world religions, we take that which is the greatest, +as measured by the number of its adherents, viz. Buddhism, we shall see +that, tried by this test, it is at once found wanting. The object at +which Buddhism proclaims that man should aim is not the development, +the perfection, and the realisation of the individual to the fullest +extent: it is, on the contrary, the utter and complete effacement of +the individual, so that he is not merely absorbed, but absolutely wiped +out, in _nirvana_. In the _atman_, with which it is the duty of man to +seek to identify himself, the individuality of man does not survive: +{248} it simply ceases to be. Now this obliteration of his existence +may seem to a man in a certain mood desirable; and that mood may be +cultivated, as indeed Buddhism seeks to cultivate it, systematically. +But here it is that the inner inconsistency, the self-contradictoriness +of Buddhism, becomes patent. The individual, to do anything, must +exist. If he is to desire nothing save to cease to exist, he must +exist to do that. But the teaching of Buddhism is that this world and +this life is illusion--and further, that the existence of the +individual self is precisely the most mischievous illusion, that +illusion above all others from which it is incumbent on us to free +ourselves. We are here for no other end than to free ourselves from +that illusion. Thus, then, by the teaching of Buddhism there is an +end, it may be said, for the individual to aim at. Yes! but by the +same teaching there is no individual to aim at it--individual existence +is the most pernicious of all illusions. And further, by the teaching, +the final end and object of religion is to get rid of an individual +existence, which does not exist to be got rid of, and which it is an +illusion to believe in. In fine, Buddhism denies that the individual +is either an end or a means, for it denies {249} the existence of the +individual, and contradicts itself in that denial. The individual is +not an end--the happiness or immortality, the continued existence, of +the individual is not to be aimed at. Neither is he a means, for his +very existence is an illusion, and as such is an obstacle or impediment +which has to be removed, in order that he who is not may cease to do +what he has never begun to do, viz. to exist. + +In Buddhism we have a developed religion--a religion which has been +developed by a system of philosophy, but scarcely, as religion, +improved by it. If, now, we turn to other religions less highly +developed, even if we turn to religions the development of which has +been early arrested, which have never got beyond the stage of infantile +development, we shall find that all proceed on the assumption that +communion between man and God is possible and does occur. In all, the +existence of the individual as well as of the god is assumed, even +though time and development may be required to realise, even +inadequately, what is contained in the assumption. In all, and from +the beginning, religion has been a social fact: the god has been the +god of the community; and, as such, has {250} represented the interests +of the community. Those interests have been regarded not merely as +other, but as higher, than the interests of the individual, when the +two have been at variance, for the simple reason (when the time came +for a reason to be sought and given) that the interests of the +community were the will of the community's god. Hence at all times the +man who has postponed his own interests to those under the sanction of +the god and the community--the man who has respected and upheld the +custom of the community--has been regarded as the higher type of man, +as the better man from the religious as well as from the moral point of +view; while the man who has sacrificed the higher interests to the +lower, has been punished--whether by the automatic action of taboo, or +the deliberate sentence of outlawry--as one who, by breaking custom, +has offended against the god and so brought suffering on the community. + +Now, if the interests, whether of the individual or the community, are +regarded as purely earthly, the divergence between them must be utter +and irreconcileable; and to expect the individual to forego his own +interests must be eventually discovered to be, as it fundamentally is, +unreasonable. {251} If, on the other hand, for the individual to +forego them is (as, in a cool moment, we all recognise it to be) +reasonable, then the interests under the sanction of the god and the +community--the higher interests--cannot be other than, they must be +identical with, the real interests of the individual. It is only in +and through society that the individual can attain his highest +interests, and only by doing the will of the god that he can so attain +them. Doubtless--despite of logic and feeling--in all communities all +individuals in a greater or less degree have deliberately preferred the +lower to the higher, and in so doing have been actuated neither by love +of God nor by love of their fellow-man. But, in so doing, they have at +all times, in the latest as well as the earliest stages of society, +been felt to be breaching the very basis of social solidarity, the +maintenance of which is the will of the God worshipped by society. + +From that point of view the individual is regarded as a means. But he +is also in himself an end, intrinsically as valuable as any other +member of the community, and therefore an end which society exists to +further and promote. It is impossible, therefore, that the end, viewed +as that which society {252} as well as the individual aims at, and +which society must realise, as far as it can realise it, through the +individual, should be one which can only be attained by some future +state of society in which he does not exist. "The kingdom of Heaven is +within you" and not something to which you cannot attain. God is not +far from us at any time. That truth was implicit at all stages in the +evolution of religion--consciously recognised, perhaps more, perhaps +less, but whether more or less consciously recognised, it was there. +That is the conviction implied in the fact that man everywhere seeks +God. If he seeks Him in plants, in animals, in stocks or stones, that +only shows that man has tried in many wrong directions--not that there +is not a right direction. It is the general law of evolution: of a +thousand seeds thrown out, perhaps one alone falls into good soil. But +the failure of the 999 avails nothing against the fact that the one +bears fruit abundantly. What sanctifies the failures is that they were +attempts. We indeed may, if we are so selfish and blind, regard the +attempts as made in order that we might succeed. Certainly we profit +by the work of our ancestors,--or rather we may profit, if we will. +But our savage ancestors were themselves ends, and {253} not merely +means to our benefit. It is monstrous to imagine that our salvation is +bought at the cost of their condemnation. No man can do more than turn +to such light as there may be to guide him. "To him that hath, shall +be given," it is true--but every man at every time had something; never +was there one to whom nothing was given. To us at this day, in this +dispensation, much has been given. But ten talents as well as one may +be wrapped up: one as well as ten may be put to profit. It is +monstrous to say that one could not be, cannot have been, used +properly. It was for not using the one talent he had that the +unfaithful servant was condemned--not for not having ten to use. + +Throughout the history of religion, then, two facts have been implied, +which, if implicit at the beginning, have been rendered explicit in the +course of its history or evolution. They are, first, the existence of +the individual as a member of society, in communion or seeking +communion with God; and, next, that while the individual is a means to +social ends, society is also a means of which the individual is the +end. Neither end--neither that of society nor that of the +individual--can be forwarded at {254} the cost of the other; the +realisation of each is to be attained only by the realisation of the +other. Two consequences then follow with regard to evolution: first, +it depends on us; evolution may have helped to make us, but we are +helping to make it. Next, the end of evolution is not wholly outside +any one of us, but in part is realised in us, or may be, if we so will. +That is to say, the true end may be realised by every one of us; for +each of us, as being himself an end, is an object of care to God--and +not merely those who are to live on earth at the final stage of +evolution. If the end is outside us, it is in love of neighbour; if +beyond us, it is in God's love. It is just because the end is (or may +be) both within us and without us that we are bound up with our +fellow-man and God. It is precisely because we are individuals that we +are not the be-all and the end-all--that the end is without us. And it +is because we are members of a community, that the end is not wholly +outside us. + +In his _Problems of Philosophy_ (p. 163) Höffding says: "The test of +the perfection of a human society is: to what degree is every person so +placed and treated that he is not only a mere means, but also always at +the same time an end?" and he points {255} out that "this is Kant's +famous dictum, with another motive than that given to it by him." But +if it is reasonable to apply this test to society, regarded from the +point of view of statics, it is also reasonable to apply it to society +regarded dynamically. If it is the proper test for ascertaining what +degree of perfection society at any given moment has attained, it is +also the proper test for ascertaining what advance, if any, towards +perfection has been made by society between any two periods of its +growth, any two stages in its evolution. But the moment we admit the +possibility of applying a test to the process of evolution and of +discovering to what end the process is moving, we are abandoning +science and the scientific theory of evolution. Science formally +refuses to consider whether there be any end to which the process of +evolution is working: "end" is a category which science declines to +apply to its subject-matter. In the interests of knowledge it declines +to be influenced by any consideration of what the end aimed at by +evolution may be, or whether there be any end aimed at at all. It +simply notes what does take place, what is, what has been, and to some +extent what may be, the sequence of events--not their object or +purpose. And the {256} science of religion, being a science, restricts +itself in the same way. As therefore science declines to use the +category, "end," progress is an idea impossible for science--for +progress is movement towards an end, the realisation of a purpose and +object. And science declines to consider whether progress is so much +as possible. But, so far as the subject-matter of the science of +religion is concerned, it is positive (that is to say, it is mere fact +of observation) that in religion an end is aimed at, for man everywhere +seeks God and communion with Him. What the science of religion +declines to do is to pronounce or even to consider whether that end is +possible or not, whether it is in any degree achieved or not, whether +progress is made or not. + +But if we do not, as science does, merely constate the fact that in +religion an end is aimed at, viz. that communion with God which issues +in doing His will from love of Him and therefore of our fellow-man; if +we recognise that end as the end that ought to be aimed at,--then our +attitude towards the whole process of evolution is changed: it is now a +process with an end--and that end the same for the individual and for +society. But at the same time it is no longer a process determined by +mechanical {257} causes worked by the iron hand of necessity--and +therefore it is no longer evolution in the scientific sense; it is no +longer evolution as understood by science. It is now a process in +which there may or may not be progress made; and in which, therefore, +it is necessary to have a test of progress--a test which is to be found +in the fact that the individual is not merely a means, but an end. +Whether progress is made depends in part on whether there is the will +in man to move towards the end proposed; and that will is not uniformly +exercised, as is shown by the fact that deterioration as well as +advance takes place--regress occurs as well as progress; whole nations, +and those not small ones, may be arrested in their religious +development. If we look with the eye of the missionary over the globe, +everywhere we see arrested development, imperfect communion with God. +It may be that in such cases of imperfect communion there is an +unconscious or hardly conscious recognition that the form of religion +there and then prevalent does not suffice to afford the communion +desired. Or, worse still, and much more general, there is the belief +that such communion as does exist is all that can exist--that advance +and improvement are impossible. From {258} this state it has been the +work of the religious spirit to wake us, to reveal to us God's will, to +make us understand that it is within us, and that it may, if we will, +work within us. It is as such a revelation of the will of God and the +love of God, and as the manifestation of the personality of God, that +our Lord appeared on earth. + +That appearance as a historic fact must take its place in the order of +historic events, and must stand in relation to what preceded and to +what followed and is yet to follow. In relation to what preceded, +Christianity claims "to be the fulfilment of all that is true in +previous religion" (Illingworth, _Personality: Human and Divine_, p. +75). The making of that claim assumes that there was some truth in +previous religion, that so far as previous forms were religious, they +were true--a fact that must constantly be borne in mind by the +missionary. The truth and the good inherent in all forms of religion +is that, in all, man seeks after God. The finality of Christianity +lies in the fact that it reveals the God for whom man seeks. What was +true in other religions was the belief in the possibility of communion +with God, and the belief that only as a member of a society could the +individual man attain {259} to that communion. What is offered by +Christianity is a means of grace whereby that communion may be attained +and a society in which the individual may attain it. Christianity +offers a means whereby the end aimed at by all religions may be +realised. Its finality, therefore, does not consist in its +chronological relation to other religions. It is not final because, or +in the sense that, it supervened in the order of time upon previous +religions, or that it fulfilled only their truth. Other religions +have, as a matter of chronology, followed it, and yet others may follow +it hereafter. But their chronological order is irrelevant to the +question: Which of them best realises the end at which religion, in all +its forms, aims? And it is the answer to that question which must +determine the finality of any form of religion. No one would consider +the fact that Mahommedanism dates some centuries after Christ any proof +of its superiority to Christianity. And the lapse of time, however +much greater, would constitute no greater proof. + +That different forms of religion do realise the end of religion in +different degrees is a point on which there is general agreement. +Monotheism is pronounced higher than polytheism, ethical religions +{260} higher than non-ethical. What differentiates Christianity from +other ethical religions and from other forms of monotheism, is that in +them religion appears as ancillary to morality, and imposes penalties +and rewards with a view to enforce or encourage morality. In them, at +their highest, the love of man is for his fellow-man, and usually for +himself. Christianity alone makes love of God to be the true basis and +the only end of society, both that whereby personality exists and the +end in which it seeks its realisation. Therein the Christian theory of +society differs from all others. Not merely does it hold that man +cannot make himself better without making society better, that +development of personality cannot be effected without a corresponding +development of society. But it holds that such moral development and +improvement of the individual and of society can find no rational basis +and has no rational end, save in the love of God. + +In another way the Christian theory of society differs from all others. +Like all others it holds that the unifying bond of every society is +found in worship. Unlike others it recognises that the individual is +restricted by existing society, even where that society is based upon a +common worship. The {261} adequate realisation of the potentialities +of the individual postulates the realisation of a perfect society, just +as a perfect society is possible only provided that the potentialities +of the individual are realised to the full. Such perfection, to which +both society and the individual are means, is neither attained nor +possible on earth, even where communion with God is recognised to be +both the true end of society and the individual, and the only means by +which that end can be attained. Still less is such perfection a +possible end, if morality is set above religion, and the love of man be +substituted for the love of God. In that case the life of the +individual upon earth is pronounced to be the only life of which he is, +or can be, conscious; and the end to which he is a means is the good of +humanity as a whole. Now human society, from the beginning of its +evolution to its end, may be regarded as a whole, just as the society +existing at any given moment of its evolution may be regarded as a +whole. But if we are to consider human society from the former point +of view and to see in it, so regarded, the end to which the individual +is a means, then it is clear that, until perfection is attained in some +remote and very improbable future, the individual members of the {262} +human race will have laboured and not earned their reward, will have +worked for an end which they have not attained, and for an end which +when, if ever, it is attained, society as a whole will not enjoy. Such +an end is an irrational and impossible object of pursuit. Perfection, +if it is to be attained by the individual or by society, is not to be +attained on earth, nor in man's communion with man. Religion from its +outset has been the quest of man for God. It has been the quest of +man, whether regarded as an individual or as a member of society. But +if that quest is to be realised, it is not to be realised either by +society or the individual, regarded as having a mere earthly existence. +A new conception of the real nature of both is requisite. Not only +must the individual be regarded as continuing to exist after death, but +the society of which he is truly a member must be regarded as one +which, if it manifests or begins to manifest itself on this earth, +requires for its realisation--that is, for perfect communion with +God--the postulate that though it manifests itself in this world, it is +realised in the next. This new conception of the real nature of +society and the individual, involving belief in the communion of the +saints, and in the kingdom of Heaven as that {263} which may be in each +individual, and therefore must extend beyond each and include all +whether in this world or the next--this conception is one which +Christianity alone, of all religions, offers to the world. + +Religion is the quest of man for God. Man everywhere has been in +search of God, peradventure he might find Him; and the history of +religion is the history of his search. But the moment we regard the +history--the evolution--of religion as a search, we abandon the +mechanical idea of evolution: the cause at work is not material or +mechanical, but final. The cause is no longer a necessary cause which +can only have one result and which, when it operates, must produce that +result. Progress is no longer something which must take place, which +is the inevitable result of antecedent causes. It is something which +may or may not take place and which cannot take place unless effort is +made. In a word, it is dependent in part upon man's will--without the +action of which neither search can be made nor progress in the search. +But though in part dependent upon man's will, progress can only be made +so far as man's will is to do God's will. And that is not always, and +has not been always, {264} man's will. Hence evolution has not always +been progress. Nor is it so now. There have been lapses in +civilisation, dark ages, periods when man's love for man has waned +_pari passu_ with the waning of his love for God. Such lapses there +may be yet again. The fall of man may be greater, in the spiritual +sense, than it ever yet has been, for man's will is free. But God's +love is great, and our faith is in it. If Christianity should cease to +grow where it now grows, and cease to spread where it as yet is not, +there would be the greater fall. And on us would rest some, at least, +of the responsibility. Christianity cannot be stationary: if it +stands, let it beware; it is in danger of falling. Between religions, +as well as other organisations, there is a struggle for existence. In +that struggle we have to fight--for a religion to decline to fight is +for that religion to die. The missionary is not engaged in a work of +supererogation, something with which we at home have no concern. We +speak of him as in the forefront of the battle. We do not usually or +constantly realise that it is our battle he is fighting--that his +defeat, if he were defeated, would be the beginning of the end for us; +that on his success our fate depends. The metaphor of the missionary +as an {265} outpost sounds rather picturesque when heard in a +sermon,--or did so sound the first time it was used, I suppose,--but it +is not a mere picture; it is the barest truth. The extent to which we +push our outposts forward is the measure of our vitality, of how much +we have in us to do for the world. Six out of seven of Christendom's +missionaries come from the United States of America. Until I heard +that from the pulpit of Durham Cathedral, I had rather a horror of big +things and a certain apprehension about going to a land where bigness, +rather than the golden mean, seemed to be taken as the standard of +merit. But from that sermon I learnt something, viz. not only that +there are big things to be done in the world, but that America does +them, and that America does more of them than she talks about. + + + + +{267} + +APPENDIX + +Since the chapter on Magic was written, the publication of Wilhelm +Wundt's _Völkerpsychologie_, Vol. II, Part II, has led me to believe +that I ought to have laid more stress on the power of the magician, +which I mention on pages 74, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, and less on the +savage's recognition of the principle that like produces like. In the +stage of human evolution known as Animism, every event which calls for +explanation is explained as the doing of some person or conscious +agent. When a savage falls ill, his sickness is regarded as the work +of some ill-disposed person, whose power cannot be doubted--for it is +manifest in the sickness it has caused--and whose power is as +mysterious as it is indubitable. That power is what a savage means by +magic; and the persons believed to possess it are magicians. It is the +business of the sick savage's friends to find out who is causing his +sickness. Their suspicion may fall on any one whose appearance or +behaviour is suspicious or mysterious; and the person {268} suspected +comes to be regarded as a witch or magician, from the very fact that he +is suspected. Such persons have the power of witchcraft or magic, +because they are believed to have the power: _possunt quia posse +videntur_. Not only are they believed to possess the power; they come +to believe, themselves, that they possess it. They believe that, +possessing it, they have but to exercise it. The Australian magician +has but to "point" his stick, and, in the belief both of himself and of +every one concerned, the victim will fall. All over the world the +witch has but to stab the image she has drawn or made, and the person +portrayed will feel the wound. In this proceeding, the image is like +the person, and the blow delivered is like the blow which the victim is +to feel. It is open to us, therefore, to say that, in this typical +case of "imitative" or "mimetic" magic, like is believed to produce +like. And on pages 75-77, and elsewhere, above, I have taken that +position. But I would now add two qualifications. The first is, as +already intimated, that, though stabbing an effigy is like stabbing the +victim, it is only a magician or witch that has the power thus to +inflict wounds, sickness, or death: the services of the magician or +witch are employed for no other reason than that {269} the ordinary +person has not the power, even by the aid of the rite, to cause the +effect. The second qualification is that, whereas we distinguish +between the categories of likeness and identity, the savage makes but +little distinction. To us it is evident that stabbing the image is +only like stabbing the victim; but to the believer in magic, stabbing +the image is the same thing as stabbing the victim; and in his belief, +as the waxen image melts, so the victim withers away. + +It would, therefore, be more precise and more correct to say (page 74, +above) that eating tiger to make you bold points rather to a confusion, +in the savage's mind, of the categories of likeness and identity, than +to a conscious recognition of the principle that like produces like: as +you eat tiger's flesh, so you become bold with the tiger's boldness. +The spirit of the tiger enters you. But no magic is necessary to +enable you to make the meal: any one can eat tiger. The belief that so +the tiger's spirit will enter you is a piece of Animism; but it is not +therefore a piece of magic. + + + + +{271} + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + +ABT, A. Die Apologie des Apuleius von Madaura und die antike Zauberei. +Giessen. 1908. + +ALVIELLA, G. Origin and Growth of the Conception of God. London. +1892. + +BASTIAN, A. Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde. Berlin. 1888. + +BOUSSET, W. What is Religion? (E. T.). London. 1907. + +DAVIES, T. W. Magic, Divination, and Demonology. Leipzig. 1898. + +ELLIS, A. B. The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast. London. +1890. The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast. London. 1887. +The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast. London. 1894. + +FAHZ, L. De poetarum Romanorum doctrina magica. Giessen. 1904. + +FARNELL, L. R. The Place of the Sonder-Götter in Greek Polytheism, in +Anthropological Essays. Oxford. 1907. + +FRAZER, J. G. Adonis, Attis, Osiris. London. 1905. The Golden +Bough. London. 1900. Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship. +London. 1905. + +GRANGER, F. The Worship of the Romans. London. 1895. + +HADDON, H. C. Magic and Fetishism. London. 1906. + +HARRISON, J. E. Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. +Cambridge. 1903. + +HARTLAND, E. S. The Legend of Perseus. London. 1895. + +HOBHOUSE, L. T. Morals in Evolution. London. 1906. + +HÖFFDING, H. Philosophy of Religion (E. T.). London. 1906. + +{272} + +HOLLIS. The Masai. Oxford. 1905. + +HOWITT, A. W. The Native Tribes of South East Australia. London. +1904. + +HUBERT, H. Magia. In Daremberg Saglio's Dictionnaire des Antiquités. +Paris. 1904. + +HUBERT, H. & MAUSS, M. Théorie générale de la magie. L'Année +Sociologique. Paris. 1904. La Nature et la fonction du sacrifice. +L'Année Sociologique. Paris. 1899. + +HUVELIN, P. Magie et droit individual. L'Année Sociologique. Paris. +1907. + +ILLINGWORTH, J. R. Personality: Human and Divine. London. 1894. + +JEVONS, F. B. The Definition of Magic. Sociological Review for April, +1908. London. The Evolution of the Religious Consciousness. In +Pan-Anglican Papers. London. 1908. Introduction to the History of +Religion. London. 1896. Magic. In Proceedings of the International +Congress for the History of Religions. 1908. + +LANG, A. Custom and Myth. London. 1893. Magic and Religion. +London. 1901. The Making of Religion. London. 1898. Modern +Mythology. London. 1897. Myth, Ritual, and Religion. London. 1887. + +LENORMANT, F. Chaldean Magic (E. T.). London. 1877. + +MACCULLOUGH, J. A. Comparative Theology. London. 1902. + +MARETT, R. R. Is Taboo a Negative Magic? In Anthropological Essays. +Oxford. 1907. + +MAUSS, M. Des Sociétés Eskimos. L'Année Sociologique. Paris. 1906. + +MÜLLER, J. G. Geschichte der amerikanischen Urreligionen. Basel. +1855. + +NASSAU, R. H. Fetichism in West Africa. London. 1904. + +{273} + +PARKER, K. L. The Euahlayi Tribe. London. 1905. + +PAYNE, E. J. History of the New World called America. Oxford. 1892. + +REINACH, S. Cultes, Mythes, et Religions. Paris. 1905. Reports of +the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits. Cambridge +(England). 1908. + +RHYS DAVIDS, T. W. Origin and Growth of Religion. London. 1891. + +RUHL, L. De Mortuorum indicio. Giessen. 1903. + +SCHMIDT, H. Veteres Philosophi quomodo indicaverint de precibus. +Giessen. 1907. + +SCHRADER, O. Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumer. Strassburg. +1901. + +SKEAT, W. W. Malay Magic. London. 1900. + +SMITH, W. R. Religion of the Semites. London. 1894. + +SPENCE, L. The Mythologies of Ancient Mexico and Peru. London. 1907. + +SPENCER & GILLEN. The Native Tribes of Central Australia. London. +1899. The Northern Tribes of Central Australia. London. 1904. + +TYLOR, E. B. Primitive Culture. London. 1873. + +WAITZ, T. Anthropologie der Naturvölker. Leipzig. 1864. + +WEBSTER, H. Primitive Secret Societies. London. 1908. + +WESTERMARCK, E. The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. +London. 1906. + +WUNDT, W. Völkerpsychologie. Leipzig. 1904-1907. + + + + +{275} + +INDEX + + +Acosta, Father, 193. + +Agnostic, 4, 6. + +Agries, 143. + +Alfoors, 194. + +Algonquins, 143. + +All-father, 190. + +Ancestors, 162. + +Ancestor worship, 52, 53; may be arrested by religion, 53, 54, 55. + +Andaman Islands, 169. + +Animal sacrifice, 209; animal meal, 178. + +Animals, worshipped, 111. + +Animism, 204, 215, 216, 217; and magic, 89, 90, 98; and fetichism, 116, +117, 118; polytheism, 131; not religion, 136. + +Anticipation, of nature, 73. + +Antinomy, the, of religious feeling, 174. + +Anzam, 170. + +Applied science of religion, 2 ff.; looks to the future, 3; is used by +the missionary as a practical man, 15, 16; its object, 18, 21. + +Ashantee Land, 153, 155. + +Atheist, 4, 6. + +Atman, 247. + +At-one-ment, 178. + +Attention, 9, 10. + +Australia, 183 ff. + +Australian tribes, religion of, 27, 28. + +Aztecs, 188, 190. + + +Basutos, 181. + +Becoming, 214. + +Being, is in process of evolution, 214; still incomplete, 214. + +Belief, and desire, 39, 40; in immortality and God, 31, 32; erroneous, +and magic, 79; in magic, 85; religious, 137. + +Bhogaldai, 194. + +Billiards, 78. + +Blood, and rain, 161. + +Bones, of animals, hung up, 78. + +Boorah, 162 ff. + +Bosman, 109 ff., 112, 113. + +Bread, prayer for daily, 181. + +Buddhism, 247 ff.; and immortality, 36, 37, 61, 62, 63; its fundamental +illogicality, 66; its strength, 66. + +Buro, 194. + +Buzzard, 76. + +Byamee, 162 ff., 191, 198. + + +Cause, and conditions, 77, 85. + +Celebes, 194. + +Ceram, 181. + +Ceremonies, for rain, 161. + +Chain of existence, 65. + +Charms, and prayers, 150, 115, 152. + +Chattels, 241, 243. + +Cherokee Indian, 50, 76, 77. + +Chicomecoatl, 193. + +Childhood, 98. + +China, 194, 197. + +Christianity, 239 ff., 258, 259, 260; the highest form of religion, 15, +18, 22, 23; and other forms of religion, 26, 27, 28, 35; alone teaches +self-sacrifice as the way to life eternal, 69; and sacrifice, 209. + +Clouds, 153; of smoke and rain, 161, 162. + +Communal purposes, and magic, 91. + +Communion, 175; not so much an intellectual belief as an object of +desire, 43, 44; of man with God the basis of morality, 62; logically +incompatible with Buddhism, 63; involves personal existence, 67; with +God, 137; sought in prayer, 172; and sacrifice, 172; in Mexico, 193; +maintained by sacramental eating, 195; annually, 196; renewed, 198; the +true end of sacrifice, 207, 208; between man and God, 249; imperfect, +257. + +Community, 254; and magic, 81, 97; and its God, 91. + +Community, the, and fetiches, 122; and its gods, 135; and prayer, 146, +147, 148, 166; and the individual, 218, 239. + +Comparative method, 20, 21. + +Comparative Philology, 20. + +Comparison, method of, 17; implies similarity in the religions +compared, 19; and implies difference also, 20; contrasted with +comparative method, 21; deals with differences, 22. + +Comte, 213. + +Conciliation, and coercion, of spirits, 121. + +Congregations, 170. + +Contagious magic, 85. + +Continuation theory, 55, 56. + +Corn, eaten sacramentally, 194, 195. + +Corn-maiden, 195. + +Corn-mother, 195. + +Corn-spirit, 196, 199, 200. + +Cotton-mother, 194. + +Creator, 170. + +Creek Indians, 194. + +Custom, 244; protected by the god of the community, 219. + + +Dances, 162; and prayer, 153. + +Dead, the, 38; return, 47; spirits of the, 92. + +Death, a mistake according to the primitive view, 44, 45; or else due +to magic, 45, 46, 80. + +Deer, 74. + +Degradation of religion, 24. + +Deification, 53. + +Deiphobus, 54. + +Delaware prayer, 145. + +Departmental deities, 190. + +Desacralisation, 186. + +Desire for immortality, is the origin of the belief in immortality, 40, +41; is not a selfish desire, 42; the root of all evils, 66; religious, +115, 116, 121; and prayer, 142, 149; and the worship of the gods, 135; +and religion, 158, 166; of the community, 163. + +Desire of all nations, 115, 173. + +Dieri, 50, 161, 164. + +Difference, implies similarity, 27. + +Differences, to be taken into account by method of comparison, 22; +their value, 23, 24; postulated by science, 24. + +Differentiation of the homogeneous, 23, 24, 25. + +Domesticated plants and animals, 190. + +Dreams, and the soul, 37; their emotional value, 42. + +Drought, 164. + +Dugongs, 164, 165. + +Dynamics, of society, 246, 255. + + +East Indies, 181. + +Eating of the god, 193. + +Eating tiger, 74, 89. + +Ellis, Colonel, 113, 120, 121, 122. + +Emotional element, in fetichism and religion, 136. + +End, the, gives value to what we do, 13; and is a matter of will, 13; +of society, 251, 253; a category unknown to science, 255. + +Ends, anti-social, 81. + +Error, 25. + +Euahlayi, 48, 162, 191, 198. + +Evolution, 214; of religion, 6, 239, 247, 253; and progress, 9, 12, 24, +264; theory of, 23; and the history of religion, 172, 173; of humanity, +239, 244, 246; law of, 252; end of, 254, 256. + + +Faith, 137, 238; the conviction that we can attain our ends, 14; shared +by the religious man with all practical men, 14, 15; exhibited in +adopting method of comparison in religion, 17; in Christianity, 18; +banishes fear of comparisons, 18, 19; in the communion of man with God +manifests itself in the desire for immortality, 68. + +Family, and society, 98. + +Famine, 205. + +Father, 98. + +Feeling, religious, 137; moral and religious, 81. + +Fetich, defined, 111, 112; offerings made to it, 112; not merely an +"inanimate," 113, 116; but a spirit, 116, 117; possesses personality +and will, 117; aids in the accomplishment of desire, 117, 119; may be +made, 120; is feared, 120; has no religious value, 120, 121; distinct +from a god, 122; subservient to its owner, 122; has no plurality of +worshippers, 122; its principal object to work evil, 123; serves its +owner only, 127; permanence of its worship, 129; has no specialised +function, 129, 130; is prayed to and talked with, 132; worshipped by an +individual, 134; and not by the community, 135, 170. + +Fetichism, 105 ff., 215; as the lowest form of religion, 106, 107; as +the source of religious values, 107, 108; and magic, 90; and religion, +114, 120, 136; the law of its evolution, 119, 120; condemned by public +opinion, 122, 123; offensive to the morality of the native, 126; and at +variance with his religion, 126, 127; not the basis of religion, 127; +and polytheism, 128, 131, 132, 133; and fear, 136. + +Finality of Christianity, 258, 259. + +First-fruit ceremonials, 183, 184; and the gods, 185, 187; an act of +worship, 187, 188. + +First-fruits, 181. + +Flesh of the divine being, 196. + +Fly-totem, 165, 166. + +Folk-lore, 85. + +Food supply, 205. + +Footprints, 74. + +Forms of religion, 19. + +Framin women, 152, 153, 155, 156. + +Frazer, J. G., 50, 76, 78, 79, 83, 92, 94, 102, 153, 157, 158, 160, +180, 192, 194-200, 202, 205. + +Fuegians, 169. + +Funerals, and prayer, 163. + +Future, knowledge of the, 14, 15. + +Future life, its relation to morality and religion, 36, 37, 57. + +Future punishments, and rewards, 51, 61. + +Future world, 52 ff. + + +Ghosts, 38, 42. + +Gift-theory of sacrifice, 206. + +God, worshipped by community, 91, 98; a supreme being, 168; etymology +of the word, 133, 134; a personal power, 136, 137; correlative to a +community, 137. + +Gods and worshippers, 53; and fetichism, 110; made and broken, 110; +personal, 121; "departmental," 129; their personality, 130, 131; and +the good of the community, 123; and fetiches, 124; are the powers that +care for the welfare of the community, 126, 172; and spirits, 128; "of +a moment," 128, 136; their proper names, 131; worshipped by a +community, 134; and the desires of their worshippers, 134; not evolved +from fetiches, 135; promote the community's good, 135, 137, 167; and +prayer, 140, 147, 148; and morality, 169; of a community identified +with the community, 177; as ethical powers, 215; punish transgression, +220. + +Gold Coast, prayer, 143. + +Golden Age, 25. + +Good, the, 140; and the gods, 137. + +Gotama, 64. + +_Gott_, and _giessen_, 134. + +Grace, 259. + +Gratitude, 181. + +Great Spirit, the, 143. + +Guardian spirits, 111. + +Guinea, 197. + + +Haddon, Dr., 83, 91, 100, 101, 106, 107, 117, 118, 124, 129, 130, 132, +133. + +Hades, 58. + +Hallucinations, 38. + +Happiness, 240. + +Hartford Theological Seminary, 1, 22, 106. + +Harvest, prayers and sacrifice, 180 ff. + +Harvest communion, 188, 189. + +Harvest customs, 192, 198, 203. + +Harvest supper, 195 ff., 200; its sacramental character, 197. + +Health, and disease, 138. + +Heaven, kingdom of, 252, 262. + +Hebrew prophets, 207, 209. + +Hebrews, 54. + +Hegel, 213. + +Hindoo Koosh, 194. + +Historic science, has the historic order for its object, 11; but does +not therefore deny that its facts may have value other than truth +value, 11. + +History, of art and literature, 8; of religion, 253, 263. + +Ho dirge, 47. + +Hobhouse, L. T., 211, 214-216, 222, 223, 226-229, 230, 237. + +Höffding, H., 44, 166, 173, 254; on fetichism, 106, 114, 115, 121, 124, +128-130, 133-137; on antinomy of religious feeling, 174; and morality, +211, 214-216, 219, 220, 237. + +Hollis, Mr., 143 ff. + +Homer, 16, 17. + +Hom[oe]opathic magic, 80, 85, 93. + +Homogeneous, the, 23, 24. + +Howitt, Mr., 190. + +_Hu, huta_, 134, + +Humanitarianism, 214, 215, 236, 244, 246, 247; and morality, 221. + +Humanity, 213; its evolution, 244. + +Husband, 98. + + +Ideals, a matter of the will, 13. + +Idols, 193. + +Illingworth, J. R., 258. + +Illusion, 64, 248. + +Images, of dough, 193, 196. + +Imitative magic, 157. + +Immortality, 34 ff. + +Incorporation, 178. + +Individual, and the community, 218, 239; cannot exist save in society, +225; both a means and an end for society, 240 ff., 246, 247; existence +of, 248; interests of, 250, 251; end of, 253. + +Individuality, not destroyed but strengthened by uprooting selfish +desires, 67. + +Indo-China, 181, 194. + +Indo-European languages, 20. + +Infancy, helpless, 98. + +Initiation ceremonies, 190, 191; admit to the worship of the gods, 192; +important for theory of sacrifice, 192. + +Interests, of the community, 250; and the individual, 250. + +Intoning, of prayer, 147. + +Israel, 59. + + +Jaundice, 89. + +Jews, 53, 54. + +Judgments, of value, 115. + +Justice, public, 223, 224 ff. + + +Kaitish rites, 164, 165. + +Kangaroo totem, 197. + +Kant, 255. + +Karma, 64, 65. + +Kei Islands, 156. + +Kern Baby, 195. + +Khonds of Orissa, and prayer, 139, 167, 171. + +Killing of the god, 197. + +Kingsley, Miss, 48, 49, 116. + + +Lake Nyassa, 146. + +Lake Superior, 143. + +Lang, Andrew, 129, 168, 169, 170. + +_L'Année Sociologique_, 60. + +Like produces like, 72, 73, 74, 76, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 89, 98, 100, +160, 189. + +Litanies, 163. + +Love of neighbours, 254. + + +MacCullough, J. A., 47. + +McTaggart, Dr., 49, 50. + +Magic, 32, 70 ff.; and murder, 45, 47; a colourable imitation of +science, 71; a spurious system, 71, 72; fraudulent, 75, 76; origin of +belief in, 79; regarded with disapproval, 79; sympathetic or +hom[oe]opathic, 80; offensive to the god of the community, 81; not +prior to religion, 97; condemned when inconsistent with the public +good, 97; and anti-social purposes, 98; decline of, 100; and the +impossible, 101; private and public, 83; nefarious, 83; beneficent, 87, +88; does not imply spirits, 89; and religion, 92 ff.; fundamentally +different, 95, 158, 160; mimics science and religion, 103; and the +degradation of religion, 150, 151, 152; and prayer, 153, 154; priority +of, to religion, 154, 157; and sacramental eating, 199-204. _See_ +Appendix. + +Magician, his personality, 87. + +Mahommedanism, 259. + +Maize-mother, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196. + +Maker, the, 168. + +Manganja, 146, 160. + +Mara tribe, 164. + +Marett, R. R., 151. + +Marriage law, 222, 227. + +Masai, and prayer, 143, 144, 145, 153-156, 162. + +Master of Life, 143. + +Mauss, M., 60. + +Mâyâ, 64. + +Medical advice, 76. + +Mexico, 193, 194, 199, 200. + +Mimetic magic, 85. + +Minahassa, 194. + +Mind of Humanity, 213. + +Missionary, 6, 140, 210, 211, 257, 265; interested in the value rather +than the chronological order of religions, 12; being practical, uses +applied science, 15; and method of comparison, 17; and notes +resemblances, 22; requires scientific knowledge of the material he has +to work on, 34; may use as a lever the belief in man's communion with +spirits, 69; and magic, 102, 103, 104; and fetichism, 105; and heathen +prayer, 138, 173. + +Momentary gods, 128, 136. + +Morality, 81, 83, 84, 95, 211 ff., 260, 261; and communion with God, +62; and the mysteries, 191; and prayer, 148. + +Moral transgression, and sin, 221. + +Mosquito-totem, 166. + +Mura-muras, 162. + +Mysteries, the Greek, 58, 62; and prayer, 180. + + +Names, and gods, 121. + +Names, of gods, 121, 131, 132; of men, 132; and personality, 133. + +Nassau, Dr., 116, 168, 170. + +Natchez Indians, 194. + +Natural law, 72. + +Nature, uniformity of, 14, 15. + +Nefarious magic, 83-87, 95. + +Neilgherry Hills, 194. + +New Caledonia, 92, 153, 154, 155, 156, 162. + +New Hebrides, 181. + +New South Wales, 162. + +Nias, 181. + +Niger, 181. + +Nirvana, 247. + +North American Indians, 111. + +Nyankupon, 169. + + +Offerings, 178; and their object, 180; made to fetiches, 112, 122. + +Old Testament, 54. + +Ol-kora, 154, 162. + +Onitsha, 181. + +Order of value, 7; distinct from chronological order, 7, 9, 15, 16; +historic, 8. + +Origin, and validity, 38, 39. + +Osages, 143. + + +Parker, Mrs. L., 162 ff., 191. + +Perception, 9. + +Personality, of magician, 87; of gods and fetiches, 130, 131, 132; of +God, 258; and proper names, 133. + +Personification, 136. + +Peru, 193, 194, 198. + +Pestilence, 205. + +Pinkerton, 109. + +Plato, 206, 207, 209. + +Political economy, 5, 6. + +Political philosophy, 241. + +Polytheism and fetichism, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133. + +Pondos, 194. + +Power, personal, 87, 88, 100. + +Prayer, 92, 93, 94, 138 ff.; among the heathen, 138; to fetiches, 127; +and desire, 142; and personal advantage, 144; and the community, 146; +of individuals, 147; unethical, 148, 149; and magic, 154; and spells, +155, 157, 160; and famine, 158; for rain, 160; the expression of the +heart's desire, 160; never unknown to man, 160, 161; in exceptional +distress, 182; of thanksgiving, 182; occasional and recurring, 179 ff.; +and communion, 180; its purpose, 175; and external rites, 176; implies +sacrifice, 176; not always reported by observers, 177; and sacrifice go +together, 169; no worship without, 170; of Socrates, 171; and +sacrifice, 172; Our Lord's, 172, 173; practical, 167; the root of +religion, 167, 168; and its objects, 163; a mother's prayer, 163; +"singing," 164; and charms, 150, 165; at seed time, 205. + +Prayer-mill, 150. + +Priests, 91, 193; and gods, 121; and fetiches, 122. + +Primitive man, believes in immortality, 37. + +Private property, 5, 6. + +Progress, 9, 246, 256, 257, 263; and evolution, 24. + +Protective colouring, 70, 103. + +Psalmist, 54. + +Puluga, 169. + +Pure science of religion, is a historic science, 2; its facts may be +used for different and contradictory purposes, 4. + + +Rain, prayed for, 146, 160, 161. + +Rain-clouds, 154, 156, 161, 162. + +Rain-god, 91, 92. + +Rain-making, 84, 87, 88, 91, 161, 164. + +Rebirth, 48, 49, 50. + +Regress, 246, 257. + +Reincarnation, 59; in animal form, 50, 51, 52; in new-born children, +48-50; in namesakes, 50; its relation to morality and religion, 61. + +Religion, is a fact, 5; never unknown to man, 160, 161; essentially +practical, 160, 175; its evolution, 239; as a survival of barbarism, +24; lowest forms to be studied first, 26, 27; is a yearning after and +search for God, 28, 115, 136; a bond of community from the first, 43, +59, 176; implies gods and their worship, 121, 122, 177, 217; implies +rites and prayers, 176; "under the guise of desire," 44, 115, 149, 158, +166, 173; but it is the desire of the community, 44; and morality, 37, +81, 83, 84, 211, 215; and animism, 136; and fetichism, 106-109, 115, +131, 132, 136; and magic, 70, 71, 72, 92-95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 150, 151, +152, 154; mechanical, 150; applied science of, 105; and its value, 109. + +Religious values, 9, 16. + +Resemblances, not more important than differences, for the method of +comparison, 22; their value, 23, 24. + +Resentment and justice, 224. + +Responsibility, collective, 227, 228, 234. + +Revelation, 172, 255; and evolution, 173. + +Revenge and justice, 229. + +Rheumatism, 76. + +Rhys Davids, 64. + + +Saa, 180. + +Sacrament, in Central Australia, 197, 200. + +Sacramental meals, 183 ff., 197, 199, 200, 201, 203. + +Sacrifice, 92, 93, 94, 175 ff.; to fetiches, 113; and worship, 137, +177; and prayer, 172, 177; and the gift theory, 206; and communion, +207, 208; its ultimate form, 209, 210; and the etymology of "god," 133 +ff., 137. + +Saffron, 89. + +Science, has truth, not assignment of value, for its object, 10, 11, +108; and history, 108; does not deal with ends, 255; and evolution, +257; and magic, 70, 71, 72, 101; of the savage, 159, 189. + +Science of religion, 256; pure and applied, 2 ff.; supposed to be +incompatible with religious belief, 4; really has nothing to do with +the truth or value of religion, 5, 10; and prayer, 140, 141; and the +missionary, 105. + +Sea Dyaks, 228. + +Search for God, the, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 252, 258, 262. + +Seed time, 188, 205. + +Self-realising spirit, 213, 214. + +Seminole Indians, 194. + +Shakespeare, 16, 17. + +Sheol, 54, 58. + +Similarity, between higher and lower forms of religion, 27; the basis +for the missionary's work, 28. + +"Singing," 164, 165. + +Slavery, 241, 243. + +"Smelling out," 84. + +Social purpose, and magic, 91. + +Society, a means, 253; as an end, 261; perfection of, 254, 261; and the +family, 98. + +Society Islands, 181. + +Solidarity, 212, 213, 251; religious, 220. + +Solomon Islands, 180. + +Soul, the, 37; separable from the body, 37; its continued existence, 38. + +Spells, and prayers, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 160, 164. + +Spencer and Gillen, 45, 46, 164, 197. + +Spinning, 78, 79. + +Spirits, 162, 170; not essential to magic, 89, 90, 91; and fetiches, +118, 119; of fetichism and gods of polytheism, 128; guardian, 111; +"momentary," and gods, 135; and prayer, 166; and morality, 215, 217, +219; not worshipped, 216. + +Spring customs, 192, 198, 203. + +Squirrel, 76, 78. + +State, the, and justice, 224. + +St. John, Mr., 228. + +Stones, 92, 93, 94. + +Struggle for existence, 264. + +_Suhman_, 122, 123, 126, 136. + +Sun, 153, 157. + +Superstition, 150. + +Sympathetic magic, 80, 85, 93, 153, 157, 162. + + +Taboo, 186 ff., 222, 229, 231-234, 250. + +Talents, 253. + +Tana, 181. + +Tanner, John, 143. + +Tari, 181, 183. + +Taro, 92, 93, 94. + +Temples, 178. + +Test, of perfection in society, 255. + +Thanks, do not need words, 181, 185. + +Thank-offerings, 181. + +Thomsen, Professor, 134. + +Tibetan Buddhists, 150. + +Tiger, 74, 89. + +Tjumba, 181. + +Tonga, 181. + +Totems, 51, 165, 166, 197, 203; eating of, 186. + +Trade wind, 101. + +Transmigration, 51, 61, 119, 120; of character, 64. + +Truth, 25; and value, 10. + +Tupinambas, 56, 58. + +Tylor, Professor, 37, 47, 56, 112, 141-144, 147, 148, 150, 161, 166. + + +Unalits, 59, 60. + +Uncle John, knows his own pipe, 49, 50. + +Uniformity of nature, 14; matter of faith, not of knowledge, 15. + +Unselfishness, developes and does not weaken individuality, 67. + +Usener, Professor, 128, 131, 133. + +Utilitarianism, 240, 242. + + +Value, 7; literary and artistic, 8, 9; religious, 8, 9, 10, 107, 108, +109; carries a reference to the future, 12; relative to a purpose or +end, 13, 15; of literature and art, felt, not proved, 16, 17; of +fetichism, 114, 115, 120; of fetichism and religion for society, 125; +religious, and fetichism, 127. + +Virgil, 54. + + +West Africa, 152, 153. + +Westermarck, E., 224, 225, 228, 235. + +Whistling, to produce a wind, 73, 74, 75. + +Will, the, 13. + +Will to injure, 81. + +Will to live, the, 41; involves the desire for immortality, 41; +denounced by Buddhism, 66. + +Wind, 100, 101. + +Wisdom, collective, of man, 237. + +Witch, and witch-doctor, 84. + +Witchcraft, 222, 227. + +Wives, of hunters and warriors, 78. + +Wohkonda, 143. + +Worship, 121, 122, 177, 180, 260; and the etymology of "god," 133 ff., +137; of gods and of fetiches, 123, 134, 135; of the community, given to +the powers that protect it, 126; may break up, 170. + + +Xenophon, 171. + +Xilonen, 190. + + +Yams, 93, 143, 180, 181. + +Yebu, 147. + + +Zulus, 194. + + + + +Printed in the United States of America. + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Introduction to the Study of +Comparative Religion, by Frank Byron Jevons + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRO TO COMPARATIVE RELIGION *** + +***** This file should be named 31875-8.txt or 31875-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/1/8/7/31875/ + +Produced by Al Haines + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion + +Author: Frank Byron Jevons + +Release Date: April 3, 2010 [EBook #31875] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRO TO COMPARATIVE RELIGION *** + + + + +Produced by Al Haines + + + + + +</pre> + + +<BR><BR> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +THE HARTFORD-LAMSON LECTURES ON<BR> +THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD<BR> +</H4> + +<BR><BR> + +<H1 ALIGN="center"> +AN INTRODUCTION +</H1> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +TO THE STUDY OF +</H4> + +<H1 ALIGN="center"> +COMPARATIVE RELIGION +</H1> + +<BR> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +BY +</H4> + +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +FRANK BYRON JEVONS +</H2> + +<BR> + +<H5 ALIGN="center"> +PRINCIPAL OF BISHOP HATFIELD'S HALL, DURHAM +UNIVERSITY, DURHAM, ENGLAND<BR> +</H5> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +New York +<BR> +THE MACMILLAN COMPANY +<BR> +1920 +</H3> + +<H5 ALIGN="center"> +<I>All rights reserved</I> +</H5> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<H5 ALIGN="center"> +COPYRIGHT, 1908, +<BR> +By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. +<BR><BR> +Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1908. +</H5> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<H5 ALIGN="center"> +Norwood Press<BR> +J. S. Cushing—Berwick & Smith Co.<BR> +Norwood, Mass., U.S.A.<BR> +</H5> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pv"></A>v}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +NOTE +</H3> + +<P> +The Hartford-Lamson Lectures on "The Religions of the World" are +delivered at Hartford Theological Seminary in connection with the +Lamson Fund, which was established by a group of friends in honor of +the late Charles M. Lamson, D.D., sometime President of the American +Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, to assist in preparing +students for the foreign missionary field. The Lectures are designed +primarily to give to such students a good knowledge of the religious +history, beliefs, and customs of the peoples among whom they expect to +labor. As they are delivered by scholars of the first rank, who are +authorities in their respective fields, it is expected that in +published form they will prove to be of value to students generally. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pvii"></A>vii}</SPAN> + +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +CONTENTS +</H2> + +<TABLE ALIGN="center" WIDTH="60%"> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="80%"> </TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top" WIDTH="20%">PAGE</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#intro">INTRODUCTION </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">1</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#immortality">IMMORTALITY </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">34</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#magic">MAGIC </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">70</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#fetichism">FETICHISM </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">105</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#prayer">PRAYER </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">138</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#sacrifice">SACRIFICE </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">175</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#morality">MORALITY </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">211</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#christianity">CHRISTIANITY </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">239 +</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#appendix">APPENDIX </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">267</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#biblio">BIBLIOGRAPHY </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">271</TD> +</TR> + +<TR> +<TD ALIGN="left" VALIGN="top"> +<A HREF="#index">INDEX </A> +</TD> +<TD ALIGN="right" VALIGN="top">275</TD> +</TR> + +</TABLE> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pix"></A>ix}</SPAN> + +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS +</H2> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +INTRODUCTION +</H3> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +The use of any science lies in its application to practical purposes. +For Christianity, the use of the science of religion consists in +applying it to show that Christianity is the highest manifestation of +the religious spirit. To make this use of the science of religion, we +must fully and frankly accept the facts it furnishes, and must +recognise that others are at liberty to use them for any opposite +purpose. But we must also insist that the science of religion is +limited to the establishment of facts and is excluded from passing +judgment on the religious value of those facts. The science of +religion as a historical science is concerned with the chronological +order, and not with the religious value, of its facts; and the order of +those facts does not determine their value any more in the case of +religion than in the case of literature or art. But if their value is +a question on which the science refuses to enter, it does not follow +that the question is one which does not admit of a truthful answer: +science has no monopoly of truth. The value of anything always implies +a reference to the future: to be of value a thing must be of use for +some purpose, and what is purposed is in the future. Things have +value, or have not, according as they are useful or not for our +purposes. The conviction that we can attain our purposes and ideals, +the conviction without which we should not even attempt to attain them +is faith; and it is in faith and by faith that the man of religion +proposes to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Px"></A>x}</SPAN> +conquer the world. It is by faith in Christianity that +the missionary undertakes to convert men to Christianity. The +comparative value of different religions can only be ascertained by +comparison of those religions; and the missionary, of all men, ought to +know what is to be learnt from such comparison. It is sometimes +supposed (wrongly) that to admit that all religions are comparable is +to admit that all are identical; but, in truth, it is only because they +differ that it is possible to compare them. For the purpose of +comparison both the differences and the resemblances must be assumed to +exist; and even for the purposes of the science of religion there is +nothing to compel us to postulate a period in which either the +differences or the resemblances were non-existent. But though there is +nothing to compel us to assume that the lowest form in which religion +is found was necessarily the earliest to exist, it is convenient for us +to start from the lowest forms. For the practical purposes of the +missionary it is desirable where possible to discover any points of +resemblance or traits of connection between the lower form with which +his hearers are familiar and the higher form to which he proposes to +lead them. It is therefore proper for him and reasonable in itself to +look upon the long history of religion as man's search for God, and to +regard it as the function of the missionary to keep others in that +search . . . 1-33 +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +IMMORTALITY +</H3> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +The belief in immortality is more prominent, though less intimately +bound up with religion, amongst uncivilised than it is amongst +civilised peoples. In early times the fancy luxuriates, unchecked, on +this as on other matters. It is late in the history of religion that +the immortality of the soul is found to be postulated alike by morality +and religion. The belief that the soul exists after death doubtless +manifested itself first in the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxi"></A>xi}</SPAN> +fact that men dream of those who +have died. But, were there no desire to believe, it may be doubted +whether the belief would survive, or even originate. The belief +originates in desire, in longing for one loved and lost; and dreams are +not the cause of that desire, though they are one region in which it +manifests itself, or rather one mode of its manifestation. The desire +is for continued communion; and its gratification is found in a +spiritual communion. Such communion also is believed to unite +worshippers both with one another and with their God. Where death is +regarded as a disruption of communion between the living and the +departed, death is regarded as unnatural, as a violation of the +original design of things, which calls for explanation; and the +explanation is provided in myths which account for it by showing that +the origin of death was due to accident or mistake. At first, it is +felt that the mistake cannot be one without remedy: the deceased is +invited "to come to us again." If he does not return in his old body, +then he is believed to reappear in some new-born child. Or the +doctrine of rebirth may be satisfied by the belief that the soul is +reincarnated in animal form. This belief is specially likely to grow +up where totem ancestors are believed to manifest themselves in the +shape of some animal. Belief in such animal reincarnation has, in its +origin, however, no connection with any theory that transmigration from +a human to an animal form is a punishment. Up to this point in the +evolution of the belief in immortality, the belief in another world +than this does not show itself. Even when ancestor-worship begins to +grow up, the ancestors' field of operations is in this world, rather +than in the next. But the fact that their aid and protection can be +invoked by the community tends to elevate them to the level of the god +or gods of the community. This tendency, however, may be defeated, as +it was in Judæa, where the religious sentiment will not permit the +difference between God and man to be blurred. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxii"></A>xii}</SPAN> +Where the fact +that the dead do not return establishes itself as incontrovertible, the +belief grows up that as the dead continue to exist, it is in another +world that their existence must continue. At first they are conceived +to continue to be as they are remembered to have been in this life. +Later the idea grows up that they are punished or rewarded there, +according as they have been bad or good here; according as they have or +have not in this life sought communion with the true God. This belief +thus differs entirely from the earlier belief, <I>e.g.</I> as it is found +amongst the Eskimo, that it is in this world the spirits of the +departed reappear, and that their continued existence is unaffected by +considerations of morality or religion. It is, however, not merely the +belief in the next world that may come to be sanctified by religion and +moralised. The belief in reincarnation in animal form may come to be +employed in the service of religion and morality, as it is in Buddhism. +There, however, what was originally the transmigration of souls was +transformed by Gotama into the transmigration of character; and the +very existence of the individual soul, whether before death or after, +was held to be an illusion and a deception. This tenet pushes the +doctrine of self-sacrifice, which is essential both to religion and to +morality, to an extreme which is fatal in logic to morality and +religion alike: communion between man and God—the indispensable +presupposition of both religion and morals—is impossible, if the very +existence of man is illusory. The message of the missionary will be +that by Christianity self-sacrifice is shown to be the condition of +morality, the essence of communion with God and the way to life eternal . . . 34-69 +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +MAGIC +</H3> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +A view sometime held was that magic is religion, and religion magic. +With equal reason, or want of reason, it might be held that magic was +science, and science magic. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxiii"></A>xiii}</SPAN> +Even if we correct the definition, +and say that to us magic appears, in one aspect, as a spurious system +of science; and, in another, as a spurious system of religion; we still +have to note that, for those who believed in it, it could not have been +a spurious system, whether of science or religion. Primitive man acts +on the assumption that he can produce like by means of like; and about +that assumption there is no "magic" of any kind. It is only when an +effect thus produced is a thing not commonly done and not generally +approved of, that it is regarded as magic; and it is magic, because not +every one knows how to do it, or not every one has the power to do it, +or not every one cares to do it. About this belief, so long as every +one entertains it, there is nothing spurious. When however it begins +to be suspected that the magician has not the power to do what he +professes, his profession tends to become fraudulent and his belief +spurious. On the other hand, a thing commonly done and generally +approved of is not regarded as magical merely because the effect +resembles the cause, and like is in this instance produced by like. +Magic is a term of evil connotation; and the practice of using like to +produce like is condemned when and because it is employed for +anti-social purposes. Such practices are resented by the society, +amongst whom and on whom they are employed; and they are offensive to +the God who looks after the interests of the community. In fine, the +object and purpose of the practice determines the attitude of the +community towards the practice: if the object is anti-social, the +practice is nefarious; and the witch, if "smelled out," is killed. The +person who is willing to undertake such nefarious proceedings comes to +be credited with a nefarious personality, that is to say, with both the +power and the will to do what ordinary, decent members of the community +could not and would not do: personal power comes to be the most +important, because the most mysterious, characteristic of the man +believed to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxiv"></A>xiv}</SPAN> +be a magician. If we turn to things, such as +rain-making, which are socially beneficial, we find a similar growth in +the belief that some men have extraordinary power to work wonders on +behalf of the tribe. A further stage of development is reached when +the man who uses his personal power for nefarious purposes undertakes +by means of it to control spirits: magic then tends to pass into +fetichism. Similarly, when rain and other social benefits come to be +regarded as gifts of the gods, the power of the rainmaker comes to be +regarded as a power to procure from the gods the gifts that they have +to bestow: magic is displaced by religion. The opposition of principle +between magic and religion thus makes itself manifest. It makes itself +manifest in that the one promotes social and the other anti-social +purposes: the spirit worshipped by any community as its god is a spirit +who has the interests of the community at heart, and who <I>ex officio</I> +condemns and punishes those who by magic or otherwise work injury to +the members of the community. Finally, the decline of the belief in +magic is largely due to the discovery that it does not produce the +effects it professes to bring about. But the missionary will also +dwell on the fact that his hearers feel it to be anti-social and to be +condemned alike by their moral sentiments and their religious feeling . . . 70-104 +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +FETICHISM +</H3> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Fetichism is regarded by some as a stage of religious development, or +as the form of religion found amongst men at the lowest stage of +development known to us. From this the conclusion is sometimes drawn +that fetichism is the source of all religion and of all religious +values; and, therefore, that (as fetichism has no value) religion +(which is an evolved form of fetichism) has no value either. This +conclusion is then believed to be proved by the science of religion. +In fact, however, students of the science of religion disclaim this +conclusion and rightly +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxv"></A>xv}</SPAN> +assert that the science does not undertake +to prove anything as to the truth or the value of religion. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Much confusion prevails as to what fetichism is; and the confusion is +primarily due to Bosman. He confuses, while the science of religion +distinguishes between, animal gods and fetiches. He asserts what we +now know to be false, viz., that a fetich is an inanimate object and +nothing more; and that the native rejects, or "breaks," one of these +gods, knowing it to be a god. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Any small object which happens to arrest the attention of a negro, when +he has a desire to gratify, may impress him as being a fetich, <I>i.e.</I> +as having power to help him to gratify his desire. Here, Höffding +says, is the simplest conceivable construction of religious ideas: here +is presented religion under the guise of desire. Let it be granted, +then, that the object attracts attention and is involuntarily +associated with the possibility of attaining the desired end. It +follows that, as in the period of animism, all objects are believed to +be animated by spirits, fetich objects are distinguished from other +objects by the fact—not that they are animated by spirits but—that it +is believed they will aid in the accomplishment of the desired end. +The picking up of a fetich object, however, is not always followed by +the desired result; and the negro then explains "that it has lost its +spirit." The spirit goes out of it, indeed, but may perchance be +induced or even compelled to return into some other object; and then +fetiches may be purposely made as well as accidentally found, and are +liable to coercion as well as open to conciliation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +But, throughout this process, there is no religion. Religion is the +worship of the gods of a community by the community for the good of the +community. The cult of a fetich is conducted by an individual for his +private ends; and the most important function of a fetich is to work +evil against those members of the community who have incurred the +fetich owner's resentment. Thus religion +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxvi"></A>xvi}</SPAN> +and fetich-worship are +directed to ends not merely different but antagonistic. From the very +outset religion in social fetichism is anti-social. To seek the origin +of religion in fetichism is vain. Condemned, wherever it exists, by +the religious and moral feelings of the community, fetichism cannot +have been the primitive religion of mankind. The spirits of fetichism, +according to Höffding, become eventually the gods of polytheism: such a +spirit, so long as it is a fetich, is "the god of a moment," and must +come to be permanent if it is to attain to the ranks of the +polytheistic gods. But fetiches, even when their function becomes +permanent, remain fetiches and do not become gods. They do not even +become "departmental gods," for their powers are to further a man's +desires generally. On the other hand, they have personality, even if +they have not personal names. Finally, if, as Höffding believes, the +word "god" originally meant "he who is worshipped," and gods are +worshipped by the community, then fetiches, as they are nowhere +worshipped by the community, are in no case gods. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +The function of the fetich is anti-social; of the gods, to promote the +well-being of the community. To maintain that a god is evolved out of +a fetich is to maintain that practices destructive of society have only +to be pushed far enough and they will prove the salvation of society . . . 105-137 +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PRAYER +</H3> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Prayer is a phenomenon in the history of religion to which the science +of religion has devoted but little attention—the reason alleged being +that it is so simple and familiar as not to demand detailed study. It +may, however, be that the phenomenon is indeed familiar yet not simple. +Simple or not, it is a matter on which different views may be held. +Thus though it may be agreed that in the lower forms of religion it is +the accomplishment of desire that is asked for, a divergence of opinion +emerges +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxvii"></A>xvii}</SPAN> +the moment the question is put, Whose desire? that of +the individual or of the community? And instances may be cited to show +that it is not for his own personal, selfish advantage alone that the +savage always or even usually prays. It is the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned to grant: the +petition of an individual is offered and harkened to only so far as it +is not prejudicial to the interests of the community. The statement +that savage prayer is unethical may be correct in the sense that pardon +for moral sin is not sought; it is incorrect, if understood to mean +that the savage does not pray to do the things which his morality makes +it incumbent on him to do, <I>e.g.</I> to fight successfully. The desires +which the god is prayed to grant are ordinarily desires which, being +felt by each and every member of the community, are the desires of the +community, as such, and not of any one member exclusively. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Charms, it has been suggested, in some cases are prayers that by vain +repetition have lost their religious significance and become mere +spells. And similarly it has been suggested that out of mere spells +prayer may have been evolved. But, on the hypothesis that a spell is +something in which no religion is, it is clear that out of it no +religion can come; while if prayer, <I>i.e.</I> religion, has been evolved +out of spells, then there have never been spells wholly wanting in +every religious element. Whether a given formula then is prayer or +spell may be difficult to decide, when it has some features which seem +to be magical and others which seem to be religious. The magical +element may have been original and be in process of disappearing before +the dawn of the religious spirit. Now, the formula uttered is usually +accompanied by gestures performed. If the words are uttered to explain +the gesture or rite, the explanation is offered to some one, the words +are of the nature of a prayer to some one to grant the desire which the +gesture manifests. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxviii"></A>xviii}</SPAN> +On the other hand, if the gestures are +performed to make the words more intelligible, then the action +performed is, again, not magical, but is intended to make the +words—the prayer—more emphatic. In neither case, then, is the +gesture or rite magical in intent. Dr. Frazer's suggestion that it +required long ages for man to discover that he could not always +succeed—even by the aid of magic—in getting what he wanted; and that +only when he made this discovery did he take to religion and prayer, is +a suggestion which cannot be maintained in view of the fact that savage +man is much more at the mercy of accidents than is civilised man. The +suggestion, in fact, tells rather against than in favour of the view +that magic preceded religion, and that spells preceded prayer. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +The Australian black fellows might have been expected to present us +with the spectacle of a people unacquainted with prayer. But in point +of fact we find amongst them both prayers to Byamee and formulæ which, +though now unintelligible even to the natives, may originally have been +prayers. And generally speaking the presumption is that races, who +distinctly admit the existence of spirits, pray to those spirits, even +though their prayers be concealed from the white man's observation. +Gods are there for the purpose of being prayed to. Prayer is the +essence of religion, as is shown by the fact that gods, when they cease +to be prayed to, are ignored rather than worshipped. Such gods—as in +Africa and elsewhere—become little more than memories, when they no +longer have a circle of worshippers to offer prayer and sacrifice to +them. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +The highest point reached in the evolution of pre-Christian prayer is +when the gods, as knowing best what is good, are petitioned simply for +things good. Our Lord's prayer is a revelation which the theory of +evolution cannot account for or explain. Nor does Höffding's "antinomy +of religious feeling" present itself to the Christian soul as an +antinomy . . . 138-174 +</P> + +<BR> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxix"></A>xix}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +SACRIFICE +</H3> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Prayer and sacrifice historically go together, and logically are +indissoluble. Sacrifice, whether realised in an offering dedicated or +in a sacrificial meal, is prompted by the worshippers' desire to feel +that they are at one with the spirit worshipped. That desire manifests +itself specially on certain regularly occurring occasions (harvest, +seed time, initiation) and also in times of crisis. At harvest time +the sacrifices or offerings are thank-offerings, as is shown by the +fact that a formula of thanksgiving is employed. Primitive prayer does +not consist solely in petitions for favours to come; it includes +thanksgiving for blessings received. Such thanksgivings cannot by any +possibility be twisted into magic. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Analogous to these thanksgivings at harvest time is the solemn eating +of first-fruits amongst the Australian black fellows. If this solemn +eating is not in Australia a survival of a sacramental meal, in which +the god and his worshippers were partakers, it must be merely a +ceremony whereby the food, which until it is eaten is taboo, is +"desacralised." But, as a matter of fact, such food is not taboo to +the tribe generally; and the object of the solemn eating cannot be to +remove the taboo and desacralise the food for the tribe. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +If the harvest rites or first-fruit ceremonials are sacrificial in +nature, then the presumption is that so, too, are the ceremonies +performed at seed time or the analogous period. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +At initiation ceremonies or mysteries, even amongst the Australian +black fellows, there is evidence to show that prayer is offered; and +generally speaking we may say that the boy initiated is admitted to the +worship of the tribal gods. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +The spring and harvest customs are closely allied to one another and +may be arranged in four groups: (1) In Mexico they plainly consist of +the worship of a god—by means of sacrifice and prayer—and of +communion. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxx"></A>xx}</SPAN> +(2) In some other cases, though the god has no proper +or personal name, and no image is made of him, "the new corn," Dr. +Frazer says, "is itself eaten sacramentally, that is, as the body of +the corn spirit"; and it is by this sacramental meal that communion is +effected or maintained. (3) In the harvest customs of northern Europe, +bread and dumplings are made and eaten sacramentally, "as a substitute +for the real flesh of the divine being"; or an animal is slain and its +flesh and blood are partaken of. (4) Amongst the Australian tribes +there is a sacramental eating of the totem animal or plant. Now, these +four groups of customs may be all religious (and Dr. Frazer speaks of +them all as sacramental) or all magical; or it may be admitted that the +first three are religious, and maintained that the fourth is strictly +magical. But such a separation of the Australian group from the rest +does not commend itself as likely; further, it overlooks the fact that +it is at the period analogous to harvest time that the headman eats +solemnly and sparingly of the plant or animal, and that at harvest time +it is too late to work magic to cause the plant or animal to grow. The +probability is, then, that both the Australian group and the others are +sacrificial rites and are religious. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Such sacrificial rites, however, though felt to be the means whereby +communion was effected and maintained between the god and his +worshippers, may come to be interpreted as the making of gifts to the +god, as the means of purchasing his favour, or as a full discharge of +their obligations. When so interpreted they will be denounced by true +religion. But though it be admitted that the sacrificial rite might be +made to bear this aspect, it does not follow, as is sometimes supposed, +that it was from the outset incapable of bearing any other. On the +contrary, it was, from the beginning, not only the rite of making +offerings to the god but, also, the rite whereby communion was +attained, whereby the society of worshippers was brought into the +presence of the god they +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxxi"></A>xxi}</SPAN> +worshipped, even though the chief +benefits which the worshippers conceived themselves to receive were +earthly blessings. It is because the rite had from the beginning this +potentiality in it that it was possible for it to become the means +whereby, through Christ, all men might be brought to God . . . 175-210 +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +MORALITY +</H3> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +The question whether morality is based on religion, or religion on +morality, is one which calls for discussion, inasmuch as it is apt to +proceed on a mistaken view of facts in the history of religion. It is +maintained that as a matter of history morality came first and religion +afterwards; and that as a matter of philosophy religion presupposes +morality. Reality, that is to say, is in the making; the spirit of man +is self-realising; being is in process of becoming rationalised and +moralised; religion in process of disappearing. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Early religion, it is said, is unethical: it has to do with spirits, +which, as such, are not concerned with morality; with gods which are +not ethical or ideal, and are not objects of worship in our sense of +the term. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Now, the spirits which, in the period of animism, are believed to +animate things, are not, it is true, concerned with morality; but then, +neither are they gods. To be a god a spirit must have a community of +worshippers; and it is as the protector of that community that he is +worshipped. He protects the community against any individual member +who violates the custom of the community. The custom of the community +constitutes the morality of the society. Offences against that custom +are offences against the god of the community. A god starts as an +ethical power, and as an object of worship. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Still, it may be argued, before gods were, before religion was evolved, +morality was; and this may be shown by the origin and nature of +justice, which throughout is entirely independent of religion and +religious +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxxii"></A>xxii}</SPAN> +considerations. On this theory, the origin of justice +is to be found in the resentment of the individual. But, first, the +individual, apart from society, is an abstraction and an impossibility: +the individual never exists apart from but always as a member of some +society. Next, justice is not the resentment of any individual, but +the sentiment of the community, expressing itself in the action not of +any individual but of the community as such. The responsibility both +for the wrong done and for righting it rests with the community. The +earliest offences against which public action is taken are said to be +witchcraft and breaches of the marriage laws. The latter are not +injuries resented by any individual: they are offences against the gods +and are punished to avert the misfortunes which otherwise would visit +the tribe. Witchcraft is especially offensive to the god of the +community. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +In almost, if not quite, the lowest stages of human development, +disease and famine are regarded as punishments which fall on the +community as a whole, because the community, in the person of one of +its members, has offended some supernatural power. In quite the lowest +stage the guilt of the offending member is also regarded as capable of +infecting the whole community; and he is, accordingly, avoided by the +whole community and tabooed. Taboo is due to the collective action, +and expresses the collective feeling of the community as a whole. It +is from such collective action and feeling that justice has been +evolved and not from individual resentment, which is still and always +was something different from justice. The offences punished by the +community have always been considered, so far as they are offences +against morality, to be offences against the gods of the community. +The fact that in course of time such offences come to be punished +always as militating against the good of society testifies merely to +the general assumption that the good of man is the will of God: men do +not believe that murder, adultery, etc., are merely offences +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxxiii"></A>xxiii}</SPAN> +against man's laws. It is only by ignoring this patent fact that it +becomes possible to maintain that religion is built upon morality, and +that we are discovering religion to be a superfluous superstructure. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +It may be argued that the assumption that murder, adultery, etc., are +offences against God's will is a mere assumption, and that in making +the assumption we are fleeing "to the bosom of faith." The reply is +that we are content not merely to flee but to rest there . . . 211-238 +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +CHRISTIANITY +</H3> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +If we are to understand the place of Christianity in the evolution of +religion, we must consider the place of religion in the evolution of +humanity; and I must explain the point of view from which I propose to +approach the three ideas of (1) evolution, (2) the evolution of +humanity, (3) the evolution of religion. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +I wish to approach the idea of evolution from the proposition that the +individual is both a means by which society attains its end, and an end +for the sake of which society exists. Utilitarianism has familiarised +us with the view that society exists for the sake of the individual and +for the purpose of realising the happiness and good of every +individual: no man is to be treated merely as a chattel, existing +solely as a means whereby his owner, or the governing class, may +benefit. But this aspect of the facts is entirely ignored by the +scientific theory of evolution: according to that theory, the +individual exists only as a factor in the process of evolution, as one +of the means by which, and not as in any sense the end for which, the +process is carried on. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Next, this aspect of the facts is ignored not only by the scientific +theory of evolution, but also by the theory which humanitarianism holds +as to the evolution of humanity, viz. that it is a process moving +through the three stages of custom, religion, and humanitarianism. +That process is still, as it has long been in the past, far from +complete: +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxxiv"></A>xxiv}</SPAN> +the end is not yet. It is an end in which, whenever +and if ever realised on earth, we who are now living shall not live to +partake: we are—on this theory of the evolution of humanity—means, +and solely means, to an end which, when realised, we shall not partake +in. Being an end in which we cannot participate, it is not an end +which can be rationally set up for us to strive to attain. Nor will +the generation, which is ultimately to enjoy it, find much satisfaction +in reflecting that their enjoyment has been purchased at the cost of +others. To treat a minority of individuals as the end for which +humanity is evolved, and the majority as merely means, is a strange +pass for humanitarianism to come to. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Approaching the evolution of religion from the point of view that the +individual must always be regarded both as an end and as a means, we +find that Buddhism denies the individual to be either the one or the +other, for his very existence is an illusion, and an illusion which +must be dispelled, in order that he may cease from an existence which +it is an illusion to imagine that he possesses. If, however, we turn +to other religions less highly developed than Buddhism, we find that, +in all, the existence of the individual as well as of the god of the +community is assumed; that the interests of the community are the will +of the community's god; that the interests of the community are higher +than the interests of the individual, when they appear to differ; and +that the man who prefers the interests of the community to his own is +regarded as the higher type of man. In fine, the individual, from this +point of view, acts voluntarily as the means whereby the end of society +may be realised. And, in so acting, he testifies to his conviction +that he will thereby realise his own end. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Throughout the history of religion these two facts are implied: first, +the existence of the individual as a member of society seeking +communion with God; next, the existence of society as a means of which +the individual is +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="Pxxv"></A>xxv}</SPAN> +the end. Hence two consequences with regard to +evolution: first, evolution may have helped to make us, but we are +helping to make it; next, the end of evolution is not wholly outside +any one of us, but in part is realised in us. And it is just because +the end is both within us and without us that we are bound up with our +fellow-man and God. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +Whether the process of evolution is moving to any end whatever, is a +question which science declines—formally refuses—to consider. +Whether the end at which religion aims is possible or not, has in any +degree been achieved or not, is a question which the science of +religion formally declines to consider. If, however, we recognise that +the end of religion, viz. communion with God, is an end at which we +ought to aim, then the process whereby the end tends to be attained is +no longer evolution in the scientific sense. It is a process in which +progress may or may not be made. As a fact, the missionary everywhere +sees arrested development, imperfect communion with God; for the +different forms of religion realise the end of religion in different +degrees. Christianity claims to be "final," not in the chronological +sense, but in that it alone finds the true basis and the only end of +society in the love of God. The Christian theory of society again +differs from all other theories in that it not only regards the +individuals composing it as continuing to exist after death, but +teaches that the society of which the individual is truly a member, +though it manifests itself in this world, is realised in the next. +</P> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +The history of religion is the history of man's search for God. That +search depends for its success, in part, upon man's will. Christianity +cannot be stationary: the extent to which we push our missionary +outposts forward gives us the measure of our vitality. And in that +respect, as in others, the vitality of the United States is great . . . 239-265 +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="contents"> +APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 <I>ad fin.</I> +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="intro"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P1"></A>1}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +INTRODUCTION +</H3> + +<P> +Of the many things that fill a visitor from the old country with +admiration, on his first visit to the United States, that which arrests +his attention most frequently, is the extent and success with which +science is applied to practical purposes. And it is beginning to dawn +upon me that in the United States it is not only pure science which is +thus practically applied,—the pure sciences of mechanics, physics, +mathematics,—but that the historic sciences also are expected to +justify themselves by their practical application; and that amongst the +historic sciences not even the science of religion is exempted from the +common lot. It also may be useful; and had better be so,—if any one +is to have any use for it. It must make itself useful to the man who +has practical need of its results and wishes to apply them—the +missionary. He it is who, for the practical purposes of the work to +which he is called, requires an applied science of religion; and +Hartford +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P2"></A>2}</SPAN> +Theological Seminary may, I believe, justly claim to be +the first institution in the world which has deliberately and +consciously set to work to create by the courses of lectures, of which +this series is the very humble beginning, an applied science of +religion. +</P> + +<P> +How, then, will the applied science differ from the pure science of +religion? In one way it will not differ: an applied science does not +sit in judgment upon the pure science on which it is based; it accepts +the truths which the pure science presents to all the world, and bases +itself upon them. The business of pure science is to discover facts; +that of the applied science is to use them. The business of the +science of religion is to discover all the facts necessary if we are to +understand the growth and history of religion. The business of the +applied science is, in our case, to use the discovered facts as a means +of showing that Christianity is the highest manifestation of the +religious spirit. +</P> + +<P> +In dealing with the applied science, then, we recover a liberty which +the pure science does not enjoy. The science of religion is a historic +science. Its student looks back upon the past; +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P3"></A>3}</SPAN> +and looks back upon +it with a single purpose, that of discovering what, as a matter of +fact, did happen, what was the order in which the events occurred. In +so looking back he may, and does, see many things which he could wish +had not occurred; but he has no power to alter them; he has no choice +but to record them; and his duty, his single duty, is to ascertain the +historic facts and to establish the historic truth. With the applied +science the case is very different. There the student sets his face to +the future, no longer to the past. The truths of pure science are the +weapons placed in his hand with which he is to conquer the world. It +is in the faith that the armour provided him by science is sure and +will not fail him that he addresses himself to his chosen work. The +implements are set in his hands. The liberty is his to employ them for +what end he will. That liberty is a consequence of the fact that the +student's object no longer is to ascertain the past, but to make the +future. +</P> + +<P> +The business of the pure science is to ascertain the facts and state +the truth. To what use the facts and truth are afterwards put, is a +question with which the pure science has nothing to do. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P4"></A>4}</SPAN> +The same +facts may be put to very different uses: from the same facts very +different conclusions may be drawn. The facts which the science of +religion establishes may be used and are used for different and for +contradictory purposes. The man who is agnostic or atheist uses them +to support his atheism or agnosticism; or even, if he is so unwise, to +prove it. The man who has religion is equally at liberty to use them +in his support; and if he rarely does that, at any rate he still more +rarely commits the mistake of imagining that the science of religion +proves the truth of his particular views on the subject of religion. +Indeed, his tendency is rather in the opposite direction: he is +unreasonably uneasy and apt to have a disquieting alarm lest the +science of religion may really be a danger to religion. This alarm may +very naturally arise when he discovers that to the scientific student +one religion is as another, and the question is indifferent whether +there is any truth in any form. It is very easy to jump from these +facts to the erroneous conclusion that science of religion is wholly +incompatible with religious belief. And of course it is quite human +and perfectly intelligible that that conclusion should be proclaimed +aloud as correct +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P5"></A>5}</SPAN> +and inevitable by the man who, being an atheist, +fights for what he feels to be the truth. +</P> + +<P> +We must, therefore, once more insist upon the simple fact that science +of religion abstains necessarily from assuming either that religion is +true or is not true. What it does assume is what no one will deny, +viz. that religion is a fact. Religious beliefs may be right or they +may be wrong: but they exist. Therefore they can be studied, +described, classified, placed in order of development, and treated as a +branch of sociology and as one department of the evolution of the +world. And all this can be done without once asking the question +whether religious belief is true and right and good, or not. Whether +it is pronounced true or false by you or me, will not in the least +shake the fact that it has existed for thousands of years, that it has +had a history during that period, and that that history may be written. +We may have doubts whether the institution of private property is a +good thing, or whether barter and exchange are desirable proceedings. +But we shall not doubt that private property exists or that it may be +exchanged. And we shall not imagine that the science of political +economy, which deals, among other +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P6"></A>6}</SPAN> +things with the production and +exchange of wealth which is private property, makes any pronouncement +whatever on the question whether private property is or is not an +institution which we ought to support and believe in. The conclusions +established by the science of political economy are set forth before +the whole world; and men may use them for what purpose they will. They +may and do draw very different inferences from them, even contradictory +inferences. But if they do, it is because they use them for different +ends or contradictory purposes. And the fact that the communist or +socialist uses political economy to support his views no more proves +that socialism is the logical consequence of political economy than the +fact that the atheist uses or misuses, for his own purposes, the +conclusions of the science of religion proves his inferences to be the +logical outcome of the science. +</P> + +<P> +The science of religion deals essentially with the one fact that +religion has existed and does exist. It is from that fact that the +missionary will start; and it is with men who do not question the fact +that he will have to do. The science of religion seeks to trace the +historic growth, the evolution of religion; to establish what actually +was, not to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P7"></A>7}</SPAN> +judge what ought to have been,—science knows no +"ought," in that sense or rather in that tense, the past tense. Its +work is done, its last word has been said, when it has demonstrated +what was. It is the heart which sighs to think what might have been, +and which puts on it a higher value than it does on what actually came +to pass. There is then another order in which facts may be ranged +besides the chronological order in which historically they occurred; +and that is the order of their value. It is an order in which we do +range facts, whenever we criticise them. It is the order in which we +range them, whenever we pass judgment on them. Or, rather, passing +judgment on them is placing them in the order of their value. And the +chronological order of their occurrence is quite a different thing from +the order in which we rank them when we judge them according to their +value and importance. It is, or rather it would be, quite absurd to +say, in the case of literature, or art, for instance, that the two +orders are identical. There it is obvious and universally admitted +that one period may reach a higher level than another which in point of +time is later. The classical period is followed by a post-classical +period; culmination is followed by decline. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P8"></A>8}</SPAN> +Now, this difference +in point of the literary or artistic value of two periods is as real +and as fundamental as the time order or chronological relation of the +two periods. It would be patently ridiculous for any ardent maintainer +of the importance of distinguishing between good literature and bad, +good art and bad art, to say that the one period, being good, must have +been chronologically prior to the other, because, from the point of +art, it was better than that other. Every one can see that. The +chronological order, the historic order, is one thing; the order of +literary value or artistic importance is another. But if this is +granted, and every one will grant it, then it is also, and thereby, +granted that the historic order of events is not the same thing as the +order of their value, and is no guide to it. Thus far I have +illustrated these remarks by reference to literary and artistic values. +But I need hardly say that I have been thinking really all the time of +religious values. If the student of literature or of art surveys the +history of art and literature with the purpose of judging the value of +the works produced, the student of religion may and must survey the +history of religion with the same purpose. If the one student is +entitled, as he +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P9"></A>9}</SPAN> +justly is entitled, to say that the difference +between the literary or artistic value of two periods is as real and as +fundamental as is their difference in the order of time, then the +student of religion is claiming no exceptional or suspicious privilege +for himself. He is claiming no privilege at all; he is but exercising +the common rights of all students like himself, when he points out that +differences in religious values are just as real and just as +fundamental as the historic or chronological order itself. +</P> + +<P> +The assignment of values, then,—be it the assignment of the value of +works of art, literature, or religion,—is a proceeding which is not +only possible (as will be somewhat contemptuously admitted by those who +believe that evolution is progress, and that there is no order of value +distinct from the order of history and chronological succession); the +assignment of value is not only permissible (as may be admitted by +those who believe, or for want of thought fancy they believe, that the +historic order of events is the only order which can really exist), it +is absolutely inevitable. It is the concomitant or rather an integral +part of every act of perception. Everything that we perceive is either +dismissed from attention because it is judged at the moment to have +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P10"></A>10}</SPAN> +no value, or, if it has value, attention is concentrated upon it. +</P> + +<P> +From this point of view, then, it should be clear that there is some +deficiency in such a science as the science of religion, which, by the +very conditions that determine its existence, is precluded from ever +raising the question of the value of any of the religions with which it +deals. Why does it voluntarily, deliberately, and of its own accord, +rigidly exclude the question whether religions have any value—whether +religion itself has any value? One answer there is to that question +which once would have been accepted as conclusive, viz. that the object +of science is truth. That answer delicately implies that whether +religion has any value is an enquiry to which no truthful answer can be +given. The object of science is truth; therefore science alone, with +all modesty be it said, can attain truth. Science will not ask the +question—or, when it is merciful, abstains from asking the +question—whether religion is true. So the reasonable and truthful man +must, on that point, necessarily be agnostic: whether religion is true, +he does not know. +</P> + +<P> +This train of inferences follows—so far as it is permitted illogical +inferences to follow at all—from +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P11"></A>11}</SPAN> +the premise that the object of +science is truth. Or, rather, it follows from that premise as we +should now understand it, viz. that the object of historic science is +historic truth. That is the object of the science of religion—to be +true to the historic facts, to discover and to state them accurately. +On the principle of the division of labour, or on the principle of +taking one thing at a time, it is obviously wise that when we are +endeavouring to discover the historic sequence of events, we should +confine ourselves to that task and not suffer ourselves to be +distracted and diverted by other and totally different considerations. +The science of religion, therefore, is justified, in the opinion of all +who are entitled to express an opinion, in steadfastly declining to +consider any other point than the historic order of the facts with +which it deals. But in so declining to go beyond its self-appointed +task of reconstituting the historic order of events and tracing the +evolution of religion, it does not, thereby, imply that it is +impossible to place them, or correctly place them, in their order of +value. To say that they have no value would be just as absurd as to +say that works of literature or art have no literary or artistic value. +To say that it is difficult to assign their value may be +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P12"></A>12}</SPAN> +true, but +is no argument against, it is rather a stimulus in favour of, making +the attempt. And it is just the order value, the relative value, of +forms of religion which is of absorbing interest to missionaries. It +is a valuation which is essential to what I have already designated as +the applied science of religion. Thus far in speaking of the +distinction between the historic order in which the various forms of +art, literature, and religion have occurred, and the order of value in +which the soul of every man who is sensible either to art or to +literature or to religion instinctively attempts to place them, I have +necessarily assumed the position of one who looks backward over the +past. It was impossible to compare and contrast the order value with +the historic order, save by doing so. It was necessary to point out +that the very same facts which can be arranged chronologically and in +the order of their evolution can also be—and, as a matter of fact, by +every man are—arranged more or less roughly, more or less correctly, +or incorrectly, in the order of their value. It is now necessary for +us to set our faces towards the future. I say "necessary" for the +simple reason that the idea of "value" carries with it a reference to +the future. If a thing has value, it is because we +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P13"></A>13}</SPAN> +judge that it +may produce some effect and serve some purpose which we foresee, or at +least surmise. If, on looking back upon past history, we pronounce +that an event had value, we do so because we see that it served, or +might have served, some end of which we approve. Its value is relative +in our eyes to some end or purpose which was relatively future to it. +The objects which we aim at, the ends after which we strive, are in the +future. Those things have value which may subserve our ends and help +us to attain our purposes. And our purposes, our ends, and objects are +in the future. There, there is hope and freedom, room to work, the +chance of remedying the errors of the past, the opportunity to make +some forward strides and to help others on. +</P> + +<P> +It is the end we aim at, the object we strive for, the ideal we set +before us, that gives value to what we do, and to what has been done by +us and others. Now our ends, our objects, and our ideals are matters +of the will, on which the will is set, and not merely matters of which +we have intellectual apprehension. They are not past events but future +possibilities. The conviction that we can attain them or attain toward +them is not, when stated as a proposition, a proposition that can be +proved, as a statement +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P14"></A>14}</SPAN> +referring to the past may be proved: but it +is a conviction which we hold, or a conviction which holds us, just as +strongly as any conviction that we have about any past event of +history. The whole action of mankind, every action that every man +performs, is based upon that conviction. It is the basis of all that +we do, of everything that is and has been done by us and others. And +it is Faith. In that sign alone can the world be conquered. +</P> + +<P> +When, then, the man of religion proposes by faith to conquer the world, +he is simply doing, wittingly and in full consciousness of what he is +doing, that which every man does in his every action, even though he +may not know it. To make it a sneer or a reproach that religion is a +mere matter of faith; to imagine that there is any better, or indeed +that there is any other, ground of action,—is demonstrably +unreasonable. The basis of such notions is, of course, the false idea +that the man of sense acts upon knowledge, and that the man who acts on +faith is not a sensible man. The error of such notions may be exposed +in a sentence. What knowledge have we of the future? We have none. +Absolutely none. We expect that nature will prove uniform, that causes +will produce their effects. We believe +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P15"></A>15}</SPAN> +the future will resemble, +to some extent, the past. But we have no knowledge of the future; and +such belief as we have about it, like all other belief,—whether it be +belief in religion or in science,—is simply faith. When, then, the +man of science consults the records of the past or the experiments of +the present for guidance as to what will or may be, he is exhibiting +his faith not in science, but in some reality, in some real being, in +which is no shadow of turning. When the practical man uses the results +of pure science for some practical end, he is taking them on faith and +uses them in the further faith that the end he aims at can be realised, +and shall by him be realised, if not in one way, then in another. The +missionary, then, who uses the results of the science of religion, who +seeks to benefit by an applied science of religion, is but following in +the footsteps of the practical man, and using business methods toward +the end he is going to realise. +</P> + +<P> +The end he is going to realise is to convert men to Christianity. The +faith in which he acts is that Christianity is the highest form which +religion can take, the final form it shall take. As works of art or +literature may be classed either according to order of history or order +of value, so the works of the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P16"></A>16}</SPAN> +religious spirit may be classed, not +only in chronological order, but also in order of religious value. I +am not aware that any proof can be given to show that any given period +of art or literature is better than any other. The merits of +Shakespeare or of Homer may be pointed out; and they may, or they may +not, when pointed out, be felt. If they are felt, no proof is needed; +if they are not, no proof is possible. But they can be pointed out—by +one who feels them. And they can be contrasted with the work of other +poets in which they are less conspicuous. And the contrast may reveal +the truth in a way in which otherwise it could never have been made +plain. +</P> + +<P> +I know no other way in which the relative values of different forms of +religion can become known or be made known. You may have been tempted +to reflect, whilst I have been speaking, that, on the principle I have +laid down, there is no reason why there should not be five hundred +applied sciences, or applications of the science, of religion, instead +of one; for every one of the many forms of religion may claim to apply +the science of religion to its own ends. To that I may reply first, +that <I>à priori</I> you would expect that every nation would set up +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P17"></A>17}</SPAN> +its own literature as the highest; but, as a matter of fact, you find +Shakespeare generally placed highest amongst dramatists, Homer amongst +epic poets. You do not find the conception of literary merit varying +from nation to nation in such a way that there are as many standards of +value as there are persons to apply them. You find that there tends to +be one standard. Next, since the different forms of religion must be +compared if their relative values are to be ascertained, the method of +the applied science of religion must be the method of comparison. +Whatever the outcome that is anticipated from the employment of the +applied science, it is by the method of comparison that it must act. +And one indication of genuine faith is readiness to employ that method, +and assured confidence in the result of its employment. The +missionary's life is the best, because the most concrete example of the +practical working of the method of comparison; and the outcome of the +comparison which is made by those amongst whom and for whom he works +makes itself felt in their hearts, their lives, and sometimes in their +conversion. It is the best example, because the value of a religion to +be known must be felt. But though it is the best because it is the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P18"></A>18}</SPAN> +simplest, the most direct, and the most convincing it is not that +which addresses itself primarily to the reason, and it is not one which +is produced by the applied science of religion. It is not one which +can be produced by any science, pure or applied. The object of the +applied science of religion is to enable the missionary himself to +compare forms of religion, incidentally in order that he may know what +by faith he feels, and without faith he could not feel, viz. that +Christianity is the highest form; but still more in order that he may +teach others, and may have at his command the facts afforded by the +science of religion, wherewith to appeal, when necessary, to the reason +and intelligence as well as to the hearts and feelings of those for +whose salvation he is labouring. +</P> + +<P> +The time has happily gone by when the mere idea of comparing +Christianity with any other religion would have been rejected with +horror as treasonous and treacherous. The fact that that time has now +gone by is in itself evidence of a stronger faith in Christianity. +What, if it was not fear, at any rate presented the appearance of fear, +has been banished; and we can and do, in the greater faith that has +been vouchsafed to us, look with +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P19"></A>19}</SPAN> +confidence on the proposal to +compare Christianity with other religions. The truth cannot but gain +thereby, and we rest on Him who is the way and the truth. We recognise +fully and freely that comparison implies similarity, points of +resemblance, ay! and even features of identity. And of that admission +much has been made—and more than can be maintained. It has been +pressed to mean that all forms of religion, from the lowest to the +highest, are identical; that therefore there is nothing more or other +in the highest than in the lowest; and that in the lowest you see how +barbarous is religion and how unworthy of civilised man. Now, that +course of argument is open to one obvious objection which would be +fatal to it, even if it were the only objection, which it is not. That +objection is that whether we are using the method of comparison for the +purpose of estimating the relative values of different forms of +religion; or whether we are using the comparative method of science, +with the object of discovering and establishing facts, quite apart from +the value they may have for any purpose they may be put to when they +have been established; in either case, comparison is only applied, and +can only be applied to things which, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P20"></A>20}</SPAN> +though they resemble one +another, also differ from one another. It is because they differ, at +first sight, that the discovery of their resemblance is important. And +it is on that aspect of the truth that the comparative method of +science dwells. Comparative philology, for instance, devotes itself to +establishing resemblances between, say, the Indo-European languages, +which for long were not suspected to bear any likeness to one another +or to have any connection with each other. Those resemblances are +examined more and more closely, are stated with more and more +precision, until they are stated as laws of comparative philology, and +recognised as laws of science to which there are no exceptions. Yet +when the resemblances have been worked out to the furthest detail, no +one imagines that Greek and Sanskrit are the same language, or that the +differences between them are negligible. It is then surprising that +any student of comparative religion should imagine that the discovery +or the recognition of points of likeness between the religions compared +will ever result in proving that the differences between them are +negligible or non-existent. Such an inference is unscientific, and it +has only to be stated to show that the student +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P21"></A>21}</SPAN> +of comparative +religion is but exercising a right common to all students of all +sciences, when he claims that points of difference cannot be overlooked +or thrust aside. +</P> + +<P> +If, then, the student of the science of religion directs his attention +primarily to the discovery of resemblances between religions which at +first sight bear no more resemblance to one another than Greek did to +the Celtic tongues; if the comparative method of science dwells upon +the fact that things which differ from one another may also resemble +one another, and that their resemblances may be stated in the form of +scientific laws,—there is still another aspect of the truth, and it is +that between things which resemble one another there are also +differences. And the jury of the world will ultimately demand to know +the truth and the whole truth. +</P> + +<P> +Now, to get not only at the truth, but at the whole of the truth, is +precisely the business of the applied science of religion, and is the +very object of that which, in order to distinguish it from the +comparative method of science, I have called the method of comparison. +For the purposes of fair comparison not only must the resemblances, +which the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P22"></A>22}</SPAN> +comparative method of science dwells on, be taken into +account, but the differences, also, must be weighed. And it is the +business of the method of comparison, the object of the applied science +of religion, to do both things. Neither of the two can be dispensed +with; neither is more important than the other; but for the practical +purposes of the missionary it is important to begin with the +resemblances; and on grounds of logic and of theory, the resemblances +must be first established, if the importance, nay! the decisive value, +of the differences is to go home to the hearts and minds of the +missionary's hearers. The resemblances are there and are to be studied +ultimately in order to bring out the differences and make them stand +forth so plainly as to make choice between the higher form of religion +and the lower easy, simply because the difference is so manifest. Now, +the missionary's hearer could not know, much less appreciate, the +difference, the superiority of Christianity, as long as Christianity +was unknown to him. And it is equally manifest, though it has never +been officially recognised until now and by the Hartford Theological +Seminary, that neither can the missionary adequately set forth the +superiority of Christianity to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P23"></A>23}</SPAN> +the lower forms of religion, unless +he knows something about them and about the points in which their +inferiority consists. Hitherto he has had to learn that for himself, +as he went on, and, as it were, by rule of thumb. But, on business +principles, economy of labour and efficiency in work will be better +secured if he is taught before he goes out, and is taught on scientific +methods. What he has to learn is the resemblances between the various +forms of religion, the differences between them, and the relative +values of those differences. +</P> + +<P> +It may perhaps be asked, Why should those differences exist? And if +the question should be put, I am inclined to say that to give the +answer is beyond the scope of the applied science of religion. The +method of comparison assumes that the differences do exist, and it +cannot begin to be employed unless and until they exist. They are and +must be taken for granted, at any rate by the applied science of +religion, and if the method of comparison is to be set to work. +Indeed, if we may take the principle of evolution to be the +differentiation of the homogeneous, we may go further and say that the +whole theory of evolution, and not merely a particular historic +science, such as the science of religion, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P24"></A>24}</SPAN> +postulates +differentiation and the principle of difference, and does not explain +it,—evolution cannot start, the homogeneous cannot be other than +homogeneous, until the principle of difference and the power of +differentiation is assumed. +</P> + +<P> +That the science of religion at the end leaves untouched those +differences between religions which it recognised at the beginning, is +a point on which I insisted, as against those who unwarrantably +proclaim the science to have demonstrated that all religions alike are +barbarisms or survivals of barbarism. It is well, therefore, to bear +that fact in mind when attempts are made to explain the existence of +the differences by postulating a period when they were non-existent. +That postulate may take form in the supposition that originally the +true religion alone existed, and that the differences arose later. +That is a supposition which has been made by more than one people, and +in more ages than one. It carries with it the consequence that the +history—it would be difficult to call it the evolution and impossible +to call it the progress—of religion has been one of degradation +generally. Owing, however, to the far-reaching and deep-penetrating +influence of the theory of evolution, it has of late grown +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P25"></A>25}</SPAN> +customary to assume that the movement, the course of religious history, +has been in the opposite direction; and that it has moved upwards from +the lowest forms of religion known to us, or from some form analogous +to the lowest known forms, through the higher to the highest. This +second theory, however different in its arrangement of the facts from +the Golden Age theory first alluded to, is still fundamentally in +agreement with it, inasmuch as it also assumes that the differences +exhibited later in the history of religion at first were non-existent. +Both theories assume the existence of the originally homogeneous, but +they disagree as to the nature of the differences which supervened, and +also as to the nature of the originally homogeneous. +</P> + +<P> +I wish therefore to call attention to the simple truth that the facts +at the disposal of the science of religion neither enable nor warrant +us to decide between these two views. If we were to come to a decision +on the point, we should have to travel far beyond the confines of the +science of religion, or the widest bounds of the theory of evolution, +and enquire why there should be error as well as truth—or, to put the +matter very differently, why there should be truth at all. But if we +started travelling +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P26"></A>26}</SPAN> +on that enquiry, we should not get back in time +for this course of lectures. Fortunately it is not necessary to take a +ticket for that journey—perhaps not possible to secure a return +ticket. We have only to recognise that the science of religion +confines itself to constating and tracing the differences, and does not +attempt to explain why they should exist; while the applied science of +religion is concerned with the practical business of bringing home the +difference between Christianity and other forms of religion to the +hearts of those whose salvation may turn on whether the missionary has +been properly equipped for his task. +</P> + +<P> +If, now, I announce that for the student of the applied science it is +advisable that he should turn his attention in the first place to the +lowest forms of religion, the announcement need not be taken to mean +that a man cannot become a student of the science of religion, whether +pure or applied, unless he assumes that the lowest is the most +primitive form. The science of religion, as it pushes its enquiries, +may possibly come across—may even already have come across—the lowest +form to which it is possible for man to descend. But whether that form +is the most primitive as well as +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P27"></A>27}</SPAN> +the lowest,—still more, whether +it is the most primitive because it is the lowest,—will be questions +which will not admit of being settled offhand. And in the meantime we +are not called upon to answer them in the affirmative as a <I>sine qua +non</I> of being admitted students of the science. +</P> + +<P> +The reason for beginning with the lowest forms is—as is proper in a +practical science—a practical one. As I have already said, if the +missionary is to succeed in his work, he must know and teach the +difference and the value of the difference between Christianity and +other religions. But difference implies similarity: we cannot specify +the points of difference between two things without presupposing some +similarity between them,—at any rate sufficient similarity to make a +comparison of them profitable. Now, the similarity between the higher +forms of religion is such that there is no need to demonstrate it, in +order to justify our proceeding to dwell upon the differences. But the +similarity between the higher and the lower forms is far from being +thus obvious. Indeed, in some cases, for example in the case of some +Australian tribes, there is alleged, by some students of the science of +religion, to be such a total absence of similarity that we are entitled +or +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P28"></A>28}</SPAN> +compelled to recognise that however liberally, or loosely, we +relax our definition of religion, we must pronounce those tribes to be +without religion. The allegation thus made, the question thus raised, +evidently is of practical importance for the practical purposes of the +missionary. Where some resemblances exist between the higher and the +lower forms of religion, those resemblances may be made, and should be +made, the ground from which the missionary should proceed to point out +by contrast the differences, and so to set forth the higher value of +Christianity. But if no such resemblances should exist, they cannot be +made a basis for the missionary's work. Without proceeding in this +introductory lecture to discuss the question whether there are any +tribes whatever that are without religion, I may point out that +religion, in all its forms, is, in one of its aspects, a yearning and +aspiration after God, a search after Him, peradventure we may find Him. +And if it be alleged that in some cases there is no search after +Him,—that amongst civilised men, amongst our own acquaintances, there +is in some cases no search and no aspiration, and that therefore among +the more backward peoples of the earth there may also be tribes to whom +the very idea of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P29"></A>29}</SPAN> +such a search is unknown,—then we must bear in +mind that a search, after any object whatever, may be dropped, may even +be totally abandoned; and yet the heart may yearn after that which it +is persuaded—or, it may be, is deluded into thinking—it can never +find. Perhaps, however, that way of putting it may be objected to, on +the ground that it is a <I>petitio principii</I> and assumes the very fact +it is necessary to prove, viz. that the lowest tribes that are or can +be known to us have made the search and given it up, whereas the +contention is that they have never made the search. That contention, I +will remark in passing, is one which never can be proved. But to those +who consider that it is probable in itself, and that it is a necessary +stage in the evolution of belief, I would point out that every search +is made in hope—or, it may be, in fear—that search presupposes hope +and fear. Vague, of course, the hope may be; scarce conscious, if +conscious at all, of what is hoped. But without hope, until there are +some dim stirrings, however vague, search is unconceivable, and it is +in and by the process of search that the hope becomes stronger and the +object sought more definite to view. Now, inasmuch as it is doubtful +whether any tribe of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P30"></A>30}</SPAN> +people is without religion, it may reasonably +be held that the vast majority, at any rate, of the peoples of the +earth have proceeded from hope to aspiration and to search; and if +there should be found a tribe which had not yet entered consciously on +the search, the reasonable conclusion would be not that it is exempted +from the laws which we see exemplified in all other peoples, but that +it is tending to obey the same laws and is starting from the same point +as they,—that hope which is the desire of all nations and has been +made manifest in the Son of Man. +</P> + +<P> +Whatever be the earliest history of that hope, whatever was its nature +and course in prehistoric times, it has been worked out in history in +many directions, under the influence of many errors, into many forms of +religion. But in them all we feel that there is the same striving, the +same yearning; and we see it with the same pity and distress as we may +observe the distorted motions of the man who, though partially +paralysed, yet strives to walk, and move to the place where he would +be. It is with these attempts to walk, in the hope of giving help to +them who need it, that we who are here to-day are concerned. We must +study them, if we are to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P31"></A>31}</SPAN> +understand them and to remedy them. And +there is no understanding them, unless we recognise that in them all +there is the striving and yearning after God, which may be cruelly +distorted, but is always there. +</P> + +<P> +It so happens that there has been great readiness on the part of +students of the science of religion to recognise that belief in the +continued existence of the soul after the death of the body has +comparative universality amongst the lower races of mankind. Their +yearning after continued existence developes into hope of a future +life; and the hope, or fear, takes many forms: the continued existence +may or may not be on this earth; it may or may not take the shape of a +belief in the transmigration of souls; it sometimes does, and sometimes +does not, lead to belief in the judgment of the dead and future +punishments and rewards; it may or may not postulate the immortality of +the soul; it may shrink to comparative, if not absolute, unimportance; +or it may be dreaded and denounced by philosophy and even by religion. +But whether dreaded or delighted in, whether developed by religion or +denounced, the tendency to the belief is there—universal among mankind +and ineradicable. +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P32"></A>32}</SPAN> + +<P> +The parallel, then, between this belief and the belief or tendency to +believe in God is close and instructive; and I shall devote my next +lecture therefore to the belief in a future life among the primitive +races of mankind. That belief manifests itself, as I shall hope to +show, from the beginning, in a yearning hope for the continued +existence of the beloved ones who have been taken from us by death, as +well as in dread of the ghosts of those who during their life were +feared. But in either case what it postulates and points to is man +living in community with man. It implies society; and there again is +parallel to religion. It is with the hopes and fears of the community +as such that religion has to do: and it is from that point of view that +I shall start when I come to deal with the subject of magic, and its +resemblance to and difference from religion. Its resemblance is not +accidental and the difference is not arbitrary: the difference is that +between social and anti-social purposes. That difference, if borne in +mind, may give us the clue to the real nature of fetichism,—a subject +which will require a lecture to itself. I shall then proceed to a +topic which has been ignored to a surprising extent by the science of +religion; that is, the subject of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P33"></A>33}</SPAN> +prayer: and the light which is +to be derived thence will, I trust, give fresh illumination to the +meaning of sacrifice. The relation of religion to morality will then +fall to be considered; and my final lecture will deal with the place of +Christianity in the evolution of religion. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="immortality"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P34"></A>34}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +IMMORTALITY +</H3> + +<P> +The missionary, like any other practical man, requires to know what +science can teach him about the material on which he has to work. So +far as is possible, he should know what materials are sound and can be +used with safety in his constructive work, and what must be thrown +aside, what must be destroyed, if his work is to escape dry-rot and to +stand as a permanent edifice. He should be able to feel confidence, +for instance, not merely that magic and fetichism are the negation of +religion, but that in teaching that fact he has to support him the +evidence collected by the science of religion; and he should have that +evidence placed at his disposal for effective use, if need be. +</P> + +<P> +It may be also that amongst much unsound material he will find some +that is sound, that may be used, and that he cannot afford to cast +away. He has to work upon our common humanity, upon the humanity +common to him and his hearers. He has to remember that no man and no +community of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P35"></A>35}</SPAN> +men ever is or has been or ever can be excluded from +the search after God. And his duty, his chosen duty, is to help them +in that search, and as far as may be to make the way clear for them, +and to guide their feet in the right path. He will find that they have +attempted to make paths for themselves; and it is not impossible that +he will find that some of those paths for some distance do go in the +right direction; that some of their beliefs have in them an element of +truth, or a groping after truth which, rightly understood, may be made +to lead to Christianity. It is with one of those beliefs—the belief +in immortality—that I shall deal in this lecture. +</P> + +<P> +It is a fact worthy of notice that the belief in immortality fills, I +will not say a more important, but a more prominent, place in the +hearts and hopes of uncivilised than of civilised man; and it is also a +fact worthy of notice that among primitive men the belief in +immortality is much less intimately bound up with religion than it +comes to be at a later period of evolution. The two facts are probably +not wholly without relation to one another. So long as the belief in +immortality luxuriates and grows wild, so to speak, untrained and +unrestrained by religion, it +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P36"></A>36}</SPAN> +developes as the fancy wills, and +lives by flattering the fancy. When, however, the relations of a +future life to morality and religion come to be realised, when the +conception of the next world comes to be moralised, then it becomes the +subject of fear as well as of hope; and the fancy loses much of the +freedom with which it tricked out the pictures that once it drew, +purely according to its own sweet liking, of a future state. On the +one hand, the guilty mind prefers not to dwell upon the day of +reckoning, so long as it can stave off the idea; and it may succeed +more or less in putting it on one side until the proximity of death +makes the idea insistent. Thus the mind more or less deliberately +dismisses the future life from attention. On the other hand, religion +itself insists persistently on the fact that you have your duty here +and now in this world to perform, and that the rest, the future +consequences, you must leave to God. Thus, once more, and this time +not from unworthy motives, attention is directed to this life rather +than to the next; and it is this point that is critical for the fate +both of the belief in immortality and of religion itself. At this +point, religion may, as in the case of Buddhism it actually has done, +formally give up and disavow +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P37"></A>37}</SPAN> +belief in immortality. And in that +case it sows the seed of its own destruction. Or it may recognise that +the immortality of the soul is postulated by and essential to morality +and religion alike. And in that case, even in that case alone, is +religion in a position to provide a logical basis for morality and to +place the natural desire for a future life on a firmer basis than the +untutored fancy of primitive man could find for it. +</P> + +<P> +It is then with primitive man or with the lower races that we will +begin, and with "the comparative universality of their belief in the +continued existence of the soul after the death of the body" (Tylor, +<I>Primitive Culture</I>, II, i). Now, the classical theory of this belief +is that set forth by Professor Tylor in his <I>Primitive Culture</I>. +Whence does primitive man get his idea that the soul continues to exist +after the death of the body? the answer given is, in the first place, +from the fact that man dreams. He dreams of distant scenes that he +visits in his sleep; it is clear, from the evidence of those who saw +his sleeping body, that his body certainly did not travel; therefore he +or his soul must be separable from the body and must have travelled +whilst his body lay unmoving and unmoved. But he also dreams of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P38"></A>38}</SPAN> +those who are now dead, and whose bodies he knows, it may be, to have +been incinerated. The explanation then is obvious that they, too, or +their souls, are separable from their bodies; and the fact that they +survive death and the destruction of the body is demonstrated by their +appearance in his dreams. About the reality of their appearance in his +dreams he has no more doubt than he has about the reality of what he +himself does and suffers in his dreams. If, however, the dead appeared +only in his dreams, their existence after death might seem to be +limited to the dream-time. But as a matter of fact they appear to him +in his waking moments also: ghosts are at least as familiar to the +savage as to the civilised man; and thus the evidence of his dreams, +which first suggested his belief, is confirmed by the evidence of his +senses. +</P> + +<P> +Thus the belief in the continued existence of the soul after the death +of the body is traced back to the action of dreams and waking +hallucinations. Now, it is inevitable that the inference should be +drawn that the belief in immortality has thus been tracked to its +basis. And it is inevitable that those who start with an inclination +to regard the belief as palpably absurd should welcome this exhibition +of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P39"></A>39}</SPAN> +its evolution as proof conclusive that the belief could only +have originated in and can only impose upon immature minds. To that +doubtless it is a perfectly sound reply to say that the origin of a +belief is one thing and its validity quite another. The way in which +we came to hold the belief is a matter of historical investigation, and +undoubtedly may form a very fascinating enquiry. But the question +whether the belief is true is a question which has to be considered, no +matter how I got it, just as the question whether I am committing a +trespass or not in being on a piece of ground cannot be settled by any +amount of explaining how I got there. Or, to put it in another way, +the very risky path by which I have scrambled up a cliff does not make +the top any the less safe when I have got there. +</P> + +<P> +But though it is perfectly logical to insist on the distinction between +the origin and the validity of any belief, and to refuse to question or +doubt the validity of the belief in immortality merely because of the +origin ascribed to it by authorities on primitive culture,—that is no +reason why we should not examine the origin suggested for it, to see +whether it is a satisfactory origin. And that is what I propose now to +do. I wish to suggest first that belief in the appearance of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P40"></A>40}</SPAN> +the +dead, whether to the dreamer or the ghost-seer, is an intellectual +belief as to what occurs as a matter of fact; and next that thereby it +is distinguished from the desire for immortality which manifests itself +with comparative universality amongst the lower races. +</P> + +<P> +Now, that the appearance of the dead, whether to the waking or the +sleeping eye, is sufficient to start the intellectual belief will be +admitted alike by those who do and those who do not hold that it is +sufficient logically to warrant the belief. But to say that it starts +the desire to see him or her whom we have lost, would be ridiculous. +On the contrary, it would be much nearer the truth to say that it is +the longing and the desire to see, once again, the loved one, that sets +the mind a-dreaming, and first gives to the heart hope. The fact that, +were there no desire for the continuance of life after the death of the +body, the belief would never have caught on—that it either would never +have arisen or would have soon ceased to exist—is shown by the simple +consideration that only where the desire for the continuance of life +after death dies down does the belief in immortality tend to wane. If +any further evidence of that is required it may be found in the +teaching of those +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P41"></A>41}</SPAN> +forms of philosophy and religion which endeavour +to dispense with the belief in immortality, for they all recognise and +indeed proclaim that they are based on the denial of the desire and the +will to live. If, and only if—as, and only as—the desire to live, +here and hereafter, can be suppressed, can the belief in immortality be +eradicated. The basis of the belief is the desire for continued +existence; and that is why the attempt to trace the origin of the +belief in immortality back to the belief in dreams and apparitions is +one which is not perfectly satisfactory; it leaves out of account the +desire without which the belief would not be and is not operative. +</P> + +<P> +But though it leaves out an element which is at least as important as +any element it includes, it would be an error to take no account of +what it does contribute. It would be an error of this kind if we +closed our eyes to the fact that what first arrests the attention of +man, in the lower stages of his evolution, is the survival of others +than himself. That is the belief which first manifests itself in his +heart and mind; and what first reveals it to him is the appearance of +the dead to his sleeping or his waking eye. He does not first hope or +believe that he himself will survive the death of the body and then go +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P42"></A>42}</SPAN> +on to infer that therefore others also will similarly survive. On +the contrary, it is the appearance of others in his sleeping or waking +moments that first gives him the idea; and it is only later and on +reflection that it occurs to him that he also will have, or be, a ghost. +</P> + +<P> +But though we must recognise the intellectual element in the belief and +the intellectual processes which are involved in the belief, we must +also take into account the emotional element, the element of desire. +And first we should notice that the desire is not a selfish or +self-regarding desire; it is the longing for one loved and lost, of the +mother for her child, or of the child for its mother. It is desire of +that kind which gives to dreams and apparitions their emotional value, +without which they would have little significance and no spiritual +importance. That is the direction in which we must look for the reason +why, on the one hand, belief in the continuation of existence after +death seems at first to have no connection with religion, while, on the +other hand, the connection is ultimately shown by the evolution of +belief to be so intimate that neither can attain its proper development +without the other. +</P> + +<P> +Dreams are occasions on which the longing for +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P43"></A>43}</SPAN> +one loved and lost +manifests itself, but they are not the cause or the origin of the +affection and the longing. But dreams are not exclusively, specially, +or even usually the domain in which religion plays a part. Hence the +visions of the night, in which the memory of the departed and the +craving for reunion with them are manifested, bear no necessary +reference to religion; and it is therefore possible, and <I>prima facie</I> +plausible, to maintain that the belief in the immortality of the soul +has its origin in a centre quite distinct from the sphere of religion, +and that it is only very slowly, if at all, that the belief in +immortality comes to be incorporated with religion. On the other hand, +the very craving for reunion or continued communion with those who are +felt not to be lost but gone before, is itself the feeling which is, +not the base, but at the base, of religion. In the lowest forms to +which religion can be reduced, or in which it manifests itself, +religion is a bond of community; it manifests itself externally in +joint acts of worship, internally in the feeling that the worshippers +are bound together by it and united with the object of their worship. +This feeling of communion is not a mere article of intellectual belief, +nor is it imposed upon the members; it is what they themselves desire. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P44"></A>44}</SPAN> +Höffding states the truth when he says that in its most +rudimentary form we encounter "religion under the guise of desire"; but +in saying so he omits the essence of the truth, that essence without +which the truth that he partially enunciates may become wholly +misleading,—he omits to say, and I think he fails to see, that the +desire which alone can claim to be considered as religious is the +desire of the community, not of the individual as such, and the desire +of the community as united in common worship. The idea of religion as +a bond of spiritual communion is implicit from the first, even though a +long process of evolution be necessary to disentangle it and set it +forth self-consciously. Now, it is precisely this spiritual communion +of which man becomes conscious in his craving after reunion or +continued communion with those who have departed this life. And it is +with the history of his attempts to harmonise this desire with what he +knows and demands of the universe otherwise, that we are here and now +concerned. +</P> + +<P> +So strong is that desire, so inconceivable is the idea that death ends +all, and divorces from us forever those we have loved and lost awhile, +that the lower races of mankind have been pretty generally driven +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P45"></A>45}</SPAN> +to the conclusion that death is a mistake or due to a mistake. It is +widely held that there is no such thing as a natural death. Men do of +course die, they may be killed; but it is not an ordinance of nature +that a man must be killed; and, if he is killed, his death is not +natural. So strong is this feeling that when a man dies and his death +is not obviously a case of murder, the inference which the savage +prefers to draw is that the death is really a case of murder, but that +the murder has been worked by witchcraft or magic. Amongst the +Australian black fellows, as we are told by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, +"no such thing as natural death is realised by the native; a man who +dies has of necessity been killed by some other man or perhaps even by +a woman, and sooner or later that man or woman will be attacked;" +consequently, "in very many cases there takes place what the white man, +not seeing beneath the surface, not unnaturally describes as secret +murder; but in reality ... every case of such secret murder, when one +or more men stealthily stalk their prey with the object of killing him, +is in reality the exacting of a life for a life, the accused person +being indicated by the so-called medicine man as one who has brought +about the death of another man by magic, and whose +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P46"></A>46}</SPAN> +life must +therefore be forfeited" (<I>Native Tribes of Central Australia</I>, p. 48). +</P> + +<P> +What underlies this idea that by man alone is death brought into the +world is that death is unnatural and is no part of the original design +of things. When the fact comes to be recognised undeniably that deaths +not caused by human agency do take place, then the fact requires +explanation; and the explanation on which primitive races, quite +independently of each other, hit is that as death was no part of the +original design of things, its introduction was due to accident or +mistake. Either men were originally exempt from death, or they were +intended to be exempt. If they were intended to be exempt, then the +inference drawn is that the intention was frustrated by the +carelessness of the agent intrusted with the duty of making men +deathless. If they were originally exempt from death, then the loss of +the exemption has to be accounted for. And in either case the +explanation takes the form of a narrative which relates how the mistake +took place or what event it was that caused the loss of the exemption. +I need not quote examples of either class of narrative. What I wish to +do is to emphasise the fact that by primitive man death is felt to be +inconsistent with the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P47"></A>47}</SPAN> +scheme of things. First, therefore, he +denies that it can come in the course of nature, though he admits that +it may be procured by the wicked man in the way of murder or magic. +And it is at this stage that his hope of reunion with those loved and +lost scarcely stretches beyond the prospect of their return to this +world. Evidence of this stage is found partly in tales such as those +told of the mother who returns to revisit her child, or of persons +restored to life. Stories of this latter kind come from Tasmania, +Australia, and Samoa, amongst other places, and are found amongst the +Eskimo and American Indians, as well as amongst the Fjorts (J. A. +MacCullough, <I>The Childhood of Fiction</I>, ch. IV). Even more direct +evidence of the emotion which prompts these stories is afforded by the +Ho dirge, quoted by Professor Tylor (<I>P. C.</I>, II, 32, 33):— +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 1em">"We never scolded you; never wronged you;</SPAN><BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">Come to us back!</SPAN><BR> +We ever loved and cherished you; and have lived long together<BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">Under the same roof;</SPAN><BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">Desert it not now!</SPAN><BR> +The rainy nights and the cold blowing days are coming on;<BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">Do not wander here!</SPAN><BR> +Do not stand by the burnt ashes; come to us again!<BR> +You cannot find shelter under the peepul, when the rain comes down.<BR> +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P48"></A>48}</SPAN> +The saul will not shield you from the cold bitter wind.<BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">Come to your home!</SPAN><BR> +It is swept for you and clean; and we are there who loved you ever;<BR> +And there is rice put for you and water;<BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">Come home, come home, come to us again!"</SPAN><BR> +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +In these verses it is evident that the death of the body is recognised +as a fact. It is even more manifest that the death of the body is put +aside as weighing for naught against the absolute conviction that the +loved one still exists. But reunion is sought in this world; another +world is not yet thought of. The next world has not yet been called +into existence to redress the sorrows and the sufferings of this life. +Where the discovery of that solution has not been made, the human mind +seeks such consolation as may be found elsewhere. If the aspiration, +"come to us, come to us again," can find no other realisation, it +welcomes the reappearance of the lost one in another form. In +Australia, amongst the Euahlayi tribe, the mother who has lost her baby +or her young child may yet believe that it is restored to her and born +again in the form of another child. In West Africa, according to Miss +Kingsley, "the new babies as they arrived in the family were shown a +selection of small articles belonging to deceased members whose souls +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P49"></A>49}</SPAN> +were still absent,—the thing the child caught hold of identified +him. 'Why, he's Uncle John; see! he knows his own pipe;' or 'That's +Cousin Emma; see! she knows her market calabash;' and so on." But it +is not only amongst Australian black fellows or West African negroes +that the attempt is made to extract consolation for death from the +speculation that we die only to be reborn in this world. The theory of +rebirth is put forward by a distinguished student of Hegel—Dr. +McTaggart—in a work entitled <I>Some Dogmas of Religion</I>. It is +admitted by Dr. McTaggart to be true that we have no memory whatever of +our previous stages of existence; but he declares, "we may say that, in +spite of the loss of memory, it is the same person who lives in the +successive lives" (p. 130); and he appears to find the same consolation +as his remote forefathers did in looking forward to a future stage of +existence in which he will have no more memory of his present +existence, and no more reason to believe in it, than he now has memory +of, or reason to believe in, his preëxistence. "It is certain," he +says, "that in this life we remember no previous lives," and he accepts +the position that it is equally certain we shall have in our next life +absolutely no memory of our +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P50"></A>50}</SPAN> +present existence. That, of course, +distinguishes Dr. McTaggart from the West African Uncle John who, when +he is reborn, at any rate "knows his own pipe." +</P> + +<P> +The human mind, as I have said, seeks such consolation as it may find +in the doctrine of rebirth. It finds evidence of rebirth either in the +behaviour of the new-born child or in its resemblance to deceased +relations. But it also comes to the conclusion that the reincarnation +may be in animal form. Whether that conclusion is suggested by the +strangely human expression in the eyes of some animals, or whether it +is based upon the belief in the power of transformation, need not be +discussed. It is beyond doubt that transformation is believed in: the +Cherokee Indian sings a verse to the effect that he becomes a real +wolf; and "after stating that he has become a real wolf, the songster +utters a prolonged howl, and paws the ground like a wolf with his feet" +(Frazer, <I>Kingship</I>, p. 71). Indeed, identity may be attained or +manifested without any process of transformation; in Australia, amongst +the Dieri tribe, the head man of a totem consisting of a particular +sort of a seed is spoken of by his people as being the plant itself +which yields the seed (<I>ib.</I>, p. 109). +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P51"></A>51}</SPAN> +Where such beliefs are +prevalent, the doctrine of the reincarnation of the soul in animal form +will obviously arise at the stage of evolution which we are now +discussing, that is to say when the soul is not yet supposed to depart +to another world, and must therefore manifest itself in this world in +one way or another, if not in human shape, then in animal form. In the +form of what animal the deceased will be reincarnated is a question +which will be answered in different ways. Purely fortuitous +circumstances may lead to particular animals being considered to be the +reincarnation of the deceased. Or the fact that the deceased has a +particular animal for totem may lead the survivors to expect his +reappearance in the form of that particular animal. The one fact of +importance for our present purpose is that at its origin the belief in +animal reincarnation had no necessary connection with the theory of +future punishments and rewards. At the stage of evolution in which the +belief in transmigration arose many animals were the object of genuine +respect because of the virtues of courage, etc., which were manifested +by them; or because of the position they occupied as totems. +Consequently no loss of status was involved when the soul transmigrated +from a +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P52"></A>52}</SPAN> +human to an animal form. No notion of punishment was +involved in the belief. +</P> + +<P> +The doctrines of reincarnation and transmigration belong to a stage in +the evolution of belief, or to a system of thought, in which the +conviction that the death of the body does not entail the destruction +of the soul is undoubted, but from which the conception, indeed the +very idea, of another world than this is excluded. That conception +begins to manifest itself where ancestor worship establishes itself; +but the manifestation is incomplete. Deceased chieftains and heroes, +who have been benefactors to the tribe, are remembered; and the good +they did is remembered also. They are themselves remembered as the +doers of good; and their spirits are naturally conceived as continuing +to be benevolent, or ready to confer benefits when properly approached. +But thus envisaged, they are seen rather in their relation to the +living than in their relation to each other. It is their assistance in +this world that is sought; their condition in the next world is of less +practical importance and therefore provokes less of speculation, in the +first instance. But when speculation is provoked, it proves ultimately +fatal to ancestor worship. +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P53"></A>53}</SPAN> + +<P> +First, it may lead to the question of the relation of the spirits of +the deceased benefactors to the god or gods of the community. There +will be a tendency to blur the distinction between the god and his +worshippers, if any of the worshippers come to be regarded as being +after death spirits from whom aid may be invoked and to whom offerings +must be made. And if the distinction ceases after death, it is +difficult and sometimes impossible to maintain it during life; an +emperor who is to be deified after death may find his deification +beginning before his death. Belief in such deification may be accepted +by some members of the community. Others will regard it as proof that +religion is naught; and yet others will be driven to seek for a form of +religion which affords no place for such deifications, but maintains +explicitly that distinction between a god and his worshippers which is +present in the most rudimentary forms of religion. +</P> + +<P> +But though the tendency of ancestor worship is to run this course and +to pass in this way out of the evolution of religion, it may be +arrested at the very outset, if the religious spirit is, as it has been +in one case at least, strong enough to stand against it at the +beginning. Thus, amongst the Jews there +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P54"></A>54}</SPAN> +was a tendency to +ancestor worship, as is shown by the fact of its prohibition. But it +was stamped out; and it was stamped out so effectually that belief in +the continued existence of the soul after death ceased for long to have +any practical influence. "Generally speaking, the Hebrews regarded the +grave as the final end of all sentient and intelligent existence, 'the +land where all things are forgotten'" (Smith's <I>Dictionary of the +Bible</I>, <I>s.v.</I> Sheol). "In death," the Psalmist says to the Lord, +"there is no remembrance of thee: in Sheol who shall give thee thanks?" +"Shall they that are deceased arise and praise thee? Shall thy +loving-kindness be declared in the grave?" or "thy righteousness in the +land of forgetfulness?" Thus the Sheol of the Old Testament remains to +testify to the view taken of the state of the dead by a people amongst +whom the worship of ancestors was arrested at the outset. Amongst such +a people the dead are supposed simply to continue in the next world as +they left this: "in Sheol the kings of the nations have their thrones, +and the mighty their weapons of war," just as in Virgil the ghost of +Deiphobus still shows the ghastly wounds by which he perished (Jevons, +<I>History of Religion</I>, p. 301). +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P55"></A>55}</SPAN> + +<P> +This continuation theory, the view that the dead continue in the next +world as they left this, means that, to the people who entertain it, +the dead are merely a memory. It is forbidden to think of them as +doing anything, as affecting the living in any way. They are conceived +as powerless to gratify the wishes of the living, or to thwart them. +Where the Lord God is a jealous God, religion cannot tolerate the idea +that any other spirit should be conceived as usurping His functions, +still less that such spirits should receive the offerings and the +prayers which are the due of Him alone. But though the dead are thus +reduced to a mere memory, the memory itself does not and cannot die. +Accordingly the dead, or rather those whose bodies are dead, continue +to live. But, as they exercise no action in, or control over, the +world of the living, their place of abode comes to be regarded as +another world, to which they are confined. Speculation, therefore, +where speculation is made, as to the case of the inhabitants of this +other world, must take the direction of enquiring as to their fate. +Where speculation is not made, the dead are conceived merely to +continue to be as they are remembered to have been in this life. But, +if there is to be room for any speculation +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P56"></A>56}</SPAN> +at all, there must be +assumed to be some diversity in their fate, and therefore some reason, +intelligible to man, for that diversity. That is a conclusion to which +tribes attain who have apparently gone through no period of ancestor +worship,—indeed, ancestor worship only impedes or defers the +attainment of that conclusion. The diversity of fate could only +consist in the difference between being where you would be and being +where you would not. But the reasons for that diversity may be very +different amongst different peoples. First, where religion is at its +lowest or is in its least developed form, the gods are not the cause of +the diversity nor do they seem concerned in it. Such diversity as +there is seems in its simplest form merely to be a continuance of the +social distinctions which prevail among the living: the high chieftains +rest in a calm, plenteous, sunny land in the sky; while "all Indians of +low degree go deep down under the earth to the land of Chay-her, with +its poor houses and no salmon and no deer, and blankets so small and +thin, that when the dead are buried the friends often bury blankets +with them" (Tylor, <I>P. C.</I>, II, 85). Elsewhere, it is not social +distinctions, but moral, that make the difference: "the rude Tupinambas +of Brazil think +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P57"></A>57}</SPAN> +the souls of such as had lived virtuously, that is +to say who have well avenged themselves and eaten many of their +enemies," (<I>ib.</I>) rejoin the souls of their fathers in the happy land, +while the cowards go to the other place. Thus, though the distinctions +in the next world do not seem originally to have sprung from or to have +been connected with morality, and still less with religion, they are, +or may be at a very early period, seized upon by the moral +consciousness as containing truth or implying it, when rightly +understood. Truth indeed of the highest import for morality is implied +in the distinctions thus essayed to be drawn. But before the truth +implicit could be made explicit, it was necessary that the distinctions +should be recognised to have their basis in religion. And that was +impossible where religion was at its lowest or in its least developed +form. +</P> + +<P> +From the fact that on the one hand the conception of a future life in +another world, when it arose amongst people in a low stage of religious +development, bore but little moral and no religious fruit; and on the +other, where it did yield fruit, there had been a previous period when +religion closed its eyes as far as possible to the condition of the +dead +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P58"></A>58}</SPAN> +in Hades or in Sheol,—we may draw the inference that the +conception of the future state formed by such people, as "the rude +Tupinambas of Brazil" had to be sterilised, so to speak,—to be +purified from associations dangerous both to morality and religion. We +may fairly say that as a matter of fact that was the consequence which +actually happened, and that both in Greece and Judæa the prospect of a +future life at one time became practically a <I>tabula rasa</I> on which +might be written a fairer message of hope than had ever been given +before. In Greece the message was written, indeed, and was received +with hope by the thousands who joined in the celebration of the +mysteries. But the characters in which it was written faded soon. The +message was found to reveal nothing. It revealed nothing because it +demanded nothing. It demanded neither a higher life nor a higher +conception of the deity. It did not set forth a new and nobler +morality; and it accommodated itself to the existing polytheism. What +it did do was to familiarise the Hellenic world with the conviction +that there was a life hereafter, better than this life; and that the +condition of its attainment was communion with the true God, +peradventure He could be found. It was by this +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P59"></A>59}</SPAN> +conviction and +this expectation that the ground was prepared, wherever Hellenism +existed, for the message that was to come from Israel. +</P> + +<P> +From the beginning, or let us say in the lowest forms in which religion +manifests itself, religion is the bond in which the worshippers are +united with one another and with their God. The community which is +thus united is at first the earliest form of society, whatever that +form may have been, in which men dwell together for their common +purposes. It is the fact that its members have common purposes and +common interests which constitute them a community; and amongst the +common interests without which there could be no community is that of +common worship: knowledge of the sacra, being confined to the members +of the community, is the test by which members are known, outsiders +excluded, and the existence of the community as a community secured. +At this stage, in a large number of societies—negro, +Malayo-Polynesian, North American Indians, Eskimo, Australians—the +belief in reincarnation takes a form in which the presence of souls of +the departed is recognised as necessary to the very conception of the +community. Thus in Alaska, among the Unalits of St. Michael's +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P60"></A>60}</SPAN> +Bay, a festival of the dead is observed, the equivalent of which +appears to be found amongst all the Eskimo. M. Mauss (<I>L'Année +Sociologique</I>, IX, 99) thus describes it: "It comprises two essential +parts. It begins with praying the souls of the dead graciously to +consent to reincarnate themselves for the moment in the namesake which +each deceased person has; for the custom is that in each station the +child last born always takes the name of the last person who has died. +Then these living representatives of the deceased receive presents, and +having received them the souls are dismissed from the abodes of the +living to return to the land of the dead. Thus at this festival not +only does the group regain its unity, but the rite reconstitutes the +ideal group which consists of all the generations which have succeeded +one another from the earliest times. Mythical and historic ancestors +as well as later ones thus mingle with the living, and communion +between them is conducted by means of the exchange of presents." +Amongst people other than the Eskimo, a new-born child not only takes +the name of the last member of the family or clan who has died, but is +regarded as the reincarnation of the deceased. "Thus the number of +individuals, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P61"></A>61}</SPAN> +of names, of souls, of social functions in the clan +is limited; and the life of the clan consists in the death and rebirth +of individuals who are always identically the same" (<I>l.c.</I> 267). +</P> + +<P> +The line of evolution thus followed by the belief in reincarnation +results in the total separation of the belief from morality and from +religion, and results in rendering it infertile alike for morality, +religion, and progress in civilisation generally. Where the belief in +reincarnation takes the form of belief in the transmigration of the +soul into some animal form, it may be utilised for moral purposes, +provided that the people amongst whom the belief obtains have otherwise +advanced so far as to see that the punishments and rewards which are +essential to the development of morality are by no means always +realised in this life. When that conviction has established itself, +the reincarnation theory will provide machinery by which the belief in +future punishments and rewards can be conceived as operative: rebirth +in animal form, if the belief in it already exists, may be held out as +a deterrent to wrongdoing. That is, as a matter of fact, the use to +which the belief has been put by Buddhism. The form and station in +which the deceased will be +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P62"></A>62}</SPAN> +reborn is no longer, as amongst the +peoples just mentioned, conceived to be determined automatically, so to +speak, but is supposed to depend on the moral qualities exhibited +during life. If this view of the future life has struck deeper root +and has spread over a greater surface than the doctrine taught in the +Greek mysteries ever did, the reason may probably be found in the fact +that the Greek mysteries had no higher morality to teach than was +already recognised, whilst the moral teaching of the Buddha was far +more exalted and far more profoundly true than anything that had been +preached in India before. If a moral system by itself, on its own +merits, were capable of affording a sure foundation for religion, +Buddhism would be built upon a rock. To the spiritual community by +which man may be united to his fellow-man and to his God, morality is +essential and indispensable. But the moral life derives its value +solely from the fact that on it depends, and by means of it is +realised, that communion of man with God after which man has from the +beginning striven. If then that communion and the very possibility of +that communion is denied, the denial must prove fatal alike to religion +and to morality. Now, that is the denial which Buddhism +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P63"></A>63}</SPAN> +makes. +But the fact of the denial is obscured to those who believe, and to +those who would like to believe, in Buddhism, by the way in which it is +made. It is made in such a way that it appears and is believed to be +an affirmation instead of a denial. Communion with God is declared to +be the final end to which the transmigration of souls conducts. But +the communion to which it leads is so intimate that the human soul, the +individual, ceases to be. Obviously, therefore, if it ceases to be, +the communion also must cease; there is no real communion subsisting +between two spirits, the human and the divine, for two spirits do not +exist, but only one. If this way of stating the case be looked upon +with suspicion as possibly not doing justice to the teaching of +Buddhism, or as pressing unduly far the union between the human and the +divine which is the ultimate goal of the transmigration of souls, the +reply is that in truth the case against Buddhism is stronger than +appears from this mode of stating it. To say that from the Buddhist +point of view the human soul, the individual, eventually ceases to be, +is indeed an incorrect way of putting the matter. It implies that the +human soul, the individual, now is; and hereafter ceases to be. But so +far from +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P64"></A>64}</SPAN> +admitting that the individual now is, the Buddhist +doctrine is that the existence of the soul, now, is mere illusion, +<I>mâyâ</I>. It is therefore logical enough, and at any rate +self-consistent, to say that hereafter, when the series of +transmigrations is complete, the individual will not indeed cease to +be, for he never was, but the illusion that he existed will be +dissipated. Logically again, it follows from this that if the +existence of the individual soul is an illusion from the beginning, +then there can strictly speaking be no transmigration of souls, for +there is no soul to transmigrate. But with perfect self-consistency +Buddhism accepts this position: what is transmitted from one being to +the next in the chain of existences is not the individuality or the +soul, but the character. Professor Rhys Davids says (<I>Hibbert +Lectures</I>, pp. 91, 92): "I have no hesitation in maintaining that +Gotama did not teach the transmigration of souls. What he did teach +would be better summarized, if we wish to retain the word +transmigration, as the transmigration of character. But it would be +more accurate to drop the word transmigration altogether when speaking +of Buddhism, and to call its doctrine the doctrine of karma. Gotama +held that after the death of any being, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P65"></A>65}</SPAN> +whether human or not, +there survived nothing at all but that being's 'karma,' the result, +that is, of its mental and bodily actions." "He discarded the theory +of the presence, within each human body, of a soul which could have a +separate and eternal existence. He therefore established a new +identity between the individuals in the chain of existence, which he, +like his forerunners, acknowledged, by the new assertion that that +which made two beings to be the same being was—not soul, but—karma" +(<I>ib.</I>, pp. 93, 94). Thus once more it appears that there can be no +eventual communion between the human soul, at the end of its chain of +existence, and the divine, for the reason, not that the human soul +ultimately ceases to be, but that it never is or was, and therefore +neither transmigrates from one body to another, nor is eventually +absorbed in the <I>âtmân</I>. +</P> + +<P> +Logically consistent though this train of argument be, it leaves +unanswered the simple question, How can the result of my actions have +any interest for me—not hereafter, but at the present moment—if I not +only shall not exist hereafter but do not exist at the present moment? +It is not impossible for a man who believes that his existence will +absolutely +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P66"></A>66}</SPAN> +cease at death to take some interest in and labour for +the good of others who will come after him; but it is impossible for a +man who does not exist now to believe in anything whatever. And it is +on that fundamental absurdity that Buddhism is built: it is directed to +the conversion of those who do not exist to be converted, and it is +directed to the object of relieving from existence those who have no +existence from which to be relieved. +</P> + +<P> +Where then lies the strength of Buddhism, if as a logical structure it +is rent from top to bottom by glaring inconsistency? It lies in its +appeal to the spirit of self-sacrifice. What it denounces, from +beginning to end, is the will to live. The reason why it denounces the +will to live is that that will manifests itself exclusively in the +desires of the individual; and it is to the desires of man that all the +misery in the world are directly due. Destroy those desires by +annihilating the will to live—and in no other way can they be +destroyed—and the misery of the world will cease. The only +termination to the misery of the world which Buddhism can imagine is +the voluntary cessation of life which will ultimately ensue on the +cessation of the will to live. And the means by which that is to be +brought about is +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P67"></A>67}</SPAN> +the uprooting and destruction of the +self-regarding desires by means of the higher morality of +self-sacrifice. What the Buddhist overlooks is that the uprooting and +destruction of the self-regarding desires results, not in the +annihilation, but in the purification and enhanced vitality, of the +self that uproots them. The outcome of the unselfish and +self-sacrificing life is not the destruction of individuality, but its +highest realisation. Now, it is only in society and by living for +others that this unselfishness and self-sacrifice can be carried out; +man can only exist and unselfishness can only operate in society, and +society means the communion of man with his fellows. It is true that +only in society can selfishness exist; but it is recognized from the +beginning as that which is destructive of society, and it is therefore +condemned alike by the morality and the religion of the society. The +communion of man with his fellows and his God is hindered, impeded, and +blocked wholly and solely by his self-regarding desires; it is +furthered and realised solely by his unselfish desires. But his +unselfish desires involve and imply his existence—I was going to say, +just as much, I mean—far more than his selfish desires, for they +imply, and are only possible on, the assumption of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P68"></A>68}</SPAN> +the existence +of his fellow-man, and of his communion with him. Nay! more, by the +testimony of Buddhism itself as well as of the religious experience of +mankind at large, the unselfish desires, the spirit of self-sacrifice, +require both for their logical and their emotional justification, still +more for their practical operation, the faith that by means of them the +will of God is carried out, and that in them man shows likest God. It +is in them and by them that the communion of man with his fellow-man +and with his God is realised. It is the faith that such communion, +though it may be interrupted, can never be entirely broken which +manifests itself in the belief in immortality. That belief may take +shape in the idea that the souls of the departed revisit this earth +temporarily in ghostly form, or more permanently as reincarnated in the +new-born members of the tribe; it may body forth another world of bliss +or woe, and if it is to subserve the purposes of morality, it must so +do; nay! more, if it is to subserve the purposes of morality, it is +into the presence of the Lord that the soul must go. But in any and +whatever shape the belief takes, the soul is conceived or implied to be +in communion with other spirits. There is no other way in which it is +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P69"></A>69}</SPAN> +possible to conceive the existence of a soul; just as any particle +of matter, to be comprehended in its full reality, implies not only +every other particle of matter but the universe which comprehends them, +so the existence of any spirit logically implies not only the existence +of every other but also of Him without whom no one of them could be. +</P> + +<P> +It is in this belief in the communion of spirits wherever he may find +it—and where will he not?—that the missionary may obtain a leverage +for his work. It is a sure basis for his operations because the desire +for communion is universal; and Christianity alone, of the religions of +the world, teaches that self-sacrifice is the way to life eternal. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="magic"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P70"></A>70}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +MAGIC +</H3> + +<P> +Of all the topics which present themselves to the student of the +science of religion for investigation and explanation there is none +which has caused more diversity of opinion, none which has produced +more confusion of thought, than magic. The fact is that the belief in +magic is condemned alike by science and religion,—by the one as +essentially irrational, and by the other as essentially irreligious. +But though it is thus condemned, it flourishes, where it does flourish, +as being science, though of a more secret kind than that usually +recognised, or as being a more potent application of the rites and +ceremonies of religion. It is indeed neither science nor religion; it +lives by mimicking one or other or both. In the natural history of +belief it owes its survival, so long as it does survive, to its +"protective colouring" and its power of mimicry. It is, always and +everywhere, an error,—whether tried by the canons of science or +religion; +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P71"></A>71}</SPAN> +but it lives, as error can only live, by posing and +passing itself off as truth. +</P> + +<P> +If now the only persons deceived by it were the persons who believed in +it, students of the science of religion would have been saved from much +fruitless controversy. But so subtly protective is its colouring that +some scientific enquirers have confidently and unhesitatingly +identified it with religion, and have declared that magic is religion, +and religion is magic. The tyranny of that error, however, is now +well-nigh overpast. It is erroneous, and we may suppose is seen to be +erroneous, in exactly the same way as it would be to say that science +is magic, and magic science. The truth is that magic in one aspect is +a colourable imitation of science: "in short," as Dr. Frazer says +(<I>Early History of the Kingship</I>, p. 38), "magic is a spurious system +of natural law." That is, we must note, it is a system which is +spurious in our eyes, but which, to those who believed in it, was "a +statement of the rules which determine the sequence of events +throughout the world—a set of precepts which human beings observe in +order to compare their ends" (<I>ib.</I>, p. 39). +</P> + +<P> +The point, then, from which I wish to start is that +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P72"></A>72}</SPAN> +magic, as it +is now viewed by students of the science of religion, on the one hand +is a spurious system of natural law or science, and on the other a +spurious system of religion. +</P> + +<P> +Our next point is that magic could not be spurious for those who +believed in it: they held that they knew some things and could do +things which ordinary people did not know and could not do; and, +whether their knowledge was of the secrets of nature or of the spirit +world, it was not in their eyes spurious. +</P> + +<P> +Our third point is more difficult to explain, though it will appear not +merely obvious, but self-evident, if I succeed in explaining it. It +will facilitate the work of explanation, if you will for the moment +suppose—without considering whether the supposition is true or +not—that there was a time when no one had heard that there was such a +thing as magic. Let us further suppose that at that time man had +observed such facts as that heat produces warmth, that the young of +animals and man resemble their parents: in a word, that he had attained +more or less consciously to the idea, as a matter of observation, that +like produces like, and as a matter of practice that like may be +produced by like. Having attained to that practical idea, he will of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P73"></A>73}</SPAN> +course work it not only for all that it is worth, but for more. +That is indeed the only way he has of finding out how much it is good +for; and it is only repeated failure which will convince him that here +at length he has reached the limit, that in this particular point +things do not realise his expectations, that in this instance his +anticipation of nature has been "too previous." Until that fact has +been hammered into him, he will go on expecting and believing that in +this instance also like will produce like, when he sets it to work; and +he will be perfectly convinced that he is employing the natural and +reasonable means for attaining his end. As a matter of fact, however, +as we with our superior knowledge can see, in the first place those +means never can produce the desired effect; and next, the idea that +they can, as it withers and before it finally falls to the ground, will +change its colour and assume the hue of magic. Thus the idea that by +whistling you can produce a wind is at first as natural and as purely +rational as the idea that you can produce warmth by means of fire. +There is nothing magical in either. Both are matter-of-fact +applications of the practical maxim that like produces like. +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P74"></A>74}</SPAN> + +<P> +That, then, is the point which I have been wishing to make, the third +of the three points from which I wish to start. There are three ways +of looking at identically the same thing, <I>e.g.</I> whistling to produce a +wind. First, we may regard it, and I suggest that it was in the +beginning regarded, as an application, having nothing to distinguish it +from any other application, of the general maxim that like produces +like. The idea that eating the flesh of deer makes a man timid, or +that if you wish to be strong and bold you should eat tiger, is, in +this stage of thought, no more magical than is the idea of drinking +water because you are dry. +</P> + +<P> +Next, the idea of whistling to produce a wind, or of sticking splinters +of bone into a man's footprints in order to injure his feet, may be an +idea not generally known, a thing not commonly done, a proceeding not +generally approved of. It is thus marked off from the commonplace +actions of drinking water to moisten your parched throat or sitting by +a fire to get warm. When it is thus marked off, it is regarded as +magic: not every one knows how to do it, or not every one has the power +to do it, or not every one cares to do it. That is the second stage, +the heyday of magic. +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P75"></A>75}</SPAN> + +<P> +The third and final stage is that in which no educated person believes +in it, when, if a man thinks to get a wind by whistling he may whistle +for it. These three ways of looking at identically the same thing may +and do coexist. The idea of whistling for a wind is for you and me +simply a mistaken idea; but possibly at this moment there are sailors +acting upon the idea and to some of them it appears a perfectly natural +thing to do, while to others there is a flavour of the magical about +it. But though the three ways may and do coexist, it is obvious that +our way of looking at it is and must be the latest of the three, for +the simple reason that an error must exist before it can be exploded. +I say that our way of looking at it must be the latest, but in saying +so I do not mean to imply that this way of looking at it originates +only at a late stage in the history of mankind. On the contrary, it is +present in a rudimentary form from very early times; and the proof is +the fact generally recognised that magicians amongst the lowest races, +though they may believe to a certain extent in their own magical +powers, do practise a good deal of magic which they themselves know to +be fraudulent. Progress takes place when other people also, and a +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P76"></A>76}</SPAN> +steadily increasing number of people, come to see that it is fraudulent. +</P> + +<P> +In the next place, just as amongst very primitive peoples we see that +some magic is known by some people, viz. the magicians themselves, to +be fraudulent, though other people believe in it; so, amongst very +primitive peoples, we find beliefs and practices existing which have +not yet come to be regarded as magical, though they are such as might +come, and do elsewhere come, to be considered pure magic. Thus, for +instance, when Cherokee Indians who suffer from rheumatism abstain from +eating the flesh of the common grey squirrel "because the squirrel eats +in a cramped position, which would clearly aggravate the pangs of the +rheumatic patient" (Frazer, <I>History of the Kingship</I>, p. 70), or when +"they will not wear the feathers of the bald-headed buzzard for fear of +themselves becoming bald" (<I>ib.</I>), they are simply following the best +medical advice of their day,—they certainly do not imagine they are +practising magic, any more than you or I do when we are following the +prescriptions of our medical adviser. On the contrary, it is quite as +obvious, then, that the feathers of the bald-headed buzzard are +infectious as it is now that the clothes +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P77"></A>77}</SPAN> +of a fever patient are +infectious. Neither proposition, to be accepted as true, requires us +to believe in magic: either might spring up where magic had never been +heard of. And, if that is the case, it simply complicates things +unnecessarily to talk of magic in such cases. The tendency to believe +that like produces like is not a consequence of or a deduction from a +belief in magic: on the contrary, magic has its root or one of its +roots in that tendency of the human mind. But though that tendency +helps to produce magic amongst other things, magic is not the only +thing which it produces: it produces beliefs such as those of the +Cherokees just quoted, which are no more magical than the belief that +fire produces warmth, or that <I>causa aequat effectum</I>, that an effect +is, when analysed, indistinguishable from the conditions which +constitute it. +</P> + +<P> +To attempt to define magic is a risky thing; and, instead of doing so +at once, I will try to mark off proceedings which are not magical; and +I would venture to say that things which it is believed any one can do, +and felt that any one may do, are not magical in the eyes of those who +have that belief and that feeling. You may abstain from eating +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P78"></A>78}</SPAN> +squirrel or wearing fine feathers because of the consequences; and +every one will think you are showing your common sense. You may hang +up the bones of animals you have killed, in order to attract more +animals of the like kind; and you are simply practising a dodge which +you think will be useful. Wives whose husbands are absent on hunting +or fighting expeditions may do or abstain from doing things which, on +the principle that like produces like, will affect their husbands' +success; and this application of the principle may be as +irrational—and as perfectly natural—as the behaviour of the beginner +at billiards whose body writhes, when he has made his stroke, in excess +of sympathy with the ball which just won't make the cannon. In both +cases the principle acted on,—deliberately in the one case, less +voluntarily in the other,—the instinctive feeling is that like +produces like, not as a matter of magic but as a matter of fact. If +the behaviour of the billiard player is due to an impulse which is in +itself natural and in his case is not magical, we may fairly take the +same view of the hunter's wife who abstains from spinning for fear the +game should turn and wind like the spindle and the hunter be unable to +hit it (Frazer, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P79"></A>79}</SPAN> +p. 55). The principle in both cases is that like +produces like. Some applications of that principle are correct; some +are not. The incorrectness of the latter is not at once discovered: +the belief in their case is erroneous, but is not known to be +erroneous. And unless we are prepared to take up the position that +magic is the only form of erroneous belief which is to be found amongst +primitive men, we must endeavour to draw a line between those erroneous +beliefs which are magical and those erroneous beliefs which are not. +The line will not be a hard and fast line, because a belief which +originally had nothing magical about it may come to be regarded as +magical. Indeed, on the assumption that belief in magic is an error, +we have to enquire how men come to fall into the error. If there is no +such thing as magic, how did man come to believe that there was? My +suggestion is that the rise of the belief is not due to the +introduction of a novel practice, but to a new way of looking at an +existing practice. It is due in the first instance to the fact that +the practice is regarded with disapproval as far as its consequences +are concerned and without regard to the means employed to produce them. +Injury to a member of the community, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P80"></A>80}</SPAN> +especially injury which +causes death, is viewed by the community with indignant disapproval. +Whether the death is produced by actual blows or "by drawing the figure +of a person and then stabbing it or doing it any other injury" (Frazer, +p. 41), it is visited with the condemnation of the community. And +consequently all such attempts "to injure or destroy an enemy by +injuring or destroying an effigy of him" (<I>ib.</I>), whenever they are +made, whether they come off or not, are resented and disapproved by +society. On the other hand, sympathetic or homœopathic magic of +this kind, when used by the hunter or the fisherman to secure food, +meets with no condemnation. Both assassin and hunter use substantially +the same means to effect their object; but the disapproval with which +the community views the object of the assassin is extended also to the +means which he employs. In fine, the practice of using like to produce +like comes to be looked on with loathing and with dread when it is +employed for antisocial purposes. Any one can injure or destroy his +private enemy by injuring an effigy of him, just as any one can injure +or destroy his enemy by assaulting and wounding him. But though any +one may do this, it is felt +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P81"></A>81}</SPAN> +that no one ought to do it. Such +practices are condemned by public opinion. Further, as they are +condemned by the community, they are <I>ipso facto</I> offensive to the god +of the community. To him only those prayers can be offered, and by him +only those practices can be approved, which are not injurious to the +community or are not felt by the community to be injurious. That is +the reason why such practices are condemned by the religious as well as +by the moral feeling of the community. And they are condemned by +religion and morality long before their futility is exposed by science +or recognised by common sense. When they are felt to be futile, there +is no call upon religion or morality especially to condemn the +practices—though the intention and the will to injure our fellow-man +remains offensive both to morality and religion. With the means +adopted for realising the will and carrying out the intention, morality +and religion have no concern. If the same or similar means can be used +for purposes consistent with the common weal, they do not, so far as +they are used for such purposes, come under the ban of either morality +or religion. Therein we have, I suggest, the reason of a certain +confusion of thought +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P82"></A>82}</SPAN> +in the minds of students of the science of +religion. We of the present day look at the means employed. We see +the same means employed for ends that are, and for ends that are not, +antisocial; and, inasmuch as the means are the same and are alike +irrational, we group them all together under the head of magic. The +grouping is perfectly correct, inasmuch as the proceedings grouped +together have the common attribute of being proceedings which cannot +possibly produce the effects which those who employ them believe that +they will and do produce. But this grouping becomes perfectly +misleading, if we go on to infer, as is sometimes inferred, that +primitive man adopted it. First, it is based on the fact that the +proceedings are uniformly irrational—a fact of which man is at first +wholly unaware; and which, when it begins to dawn upon him, presents +itself in the form of the further error that while some of these +proceedings are absurd, others are not. In neither case does he adopt +the modern, scientific position that all are irrational, impossible, +absurd. Next, the modern position deals only with the proceedings as +means,—declaring them all absurd,—and overlooks entirely what is to +primitive man the point of fundamental importance, viz. the object +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P83"></A>83}</SPAN> +and purpose with which they are used. Yet it is the object and purpose +which determine the social value of these proceedings. For him, or in +his eyes, to class together the things which he approves of and the +things of which he disapproves would be monstrous: the means employed +in the two cases may be the same, but that is of no importance in face +of the fact that the ends aimed at in the two cases are not merely +different but contradictory. In the one case the object promotes the +common weal, or is supposed by him to promote it. In the other it is +destructive of the common weal. +</P> + +<P> +If, therefore, we wish to avoid confusion of thought, we must in +discussing magic constantly bear in mind that we group together—and +therefore are in danger of confusing—things which to the savage differ +<I>toto caelo</I> from one another. A step towards avoiding this confusion +is taken by Dr. Frazer, when he distinguishes (<I>History of the +Kingship</I>, p. 89) between private magic and public magic. The +distinction is made still more emphatic by Dr. Haddon (<I>Magic and +Fetichism</I>, p. 20) when he speaks of "nefarious magic." The very same +means when employed against the good of the community are regarded, by +morality and religion +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P84"></A>84}</SPAN> +alike, as nefarious, which when employed for +the good of the community are regarded with approval. The very same +illegitimate application,—I mean logically illegitimate in our +eyes,—the very same application of the principle that like produces +like will be condemned by the public opinion of the community when it +is employed for purposes of murder and praised by public opinion when +it is employed to produce the rain which the community desires. The +distinction drawn by primitive man between the two cases is that, +though any one can use the means to do either, no one ought to do the +one which the community condemns. That is condemned as nefarious; and +because it is nefarious, the "witch" may be "smelled out" by the +"witch-doctor" and destroyed by, or with the approval of, the community. +</P> + +<P> +But though that is, I suggest, the first stage in the process by which +the belief in magic is evolved, it is by no means the whole of the +process. Indeed, it may fairly be urged that practices which any one +can perform, though no one ought to perform, may be nefarious (as +simple, straightforward murder is), but so far there is nothing magical +about them. And I am prepared to accept that view. Indeed, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P85"></A>85}</SPAN> +it is +an essential part of my argument, for I seek to show that the belief in +magic had a beginning and was evolved out of something that was not a +belief in magic, though it gave rise to it. The belief that like +produces like can be entertained where magic has not so much as been +heard of. And, though it may ultimately be worked out into the +scientific position that the sum of conditions necessary to produce an +effect is indistinguishable from the effect, it may also be worked out +on other lines into a belief in magic; and the first step in that +evolution is taken when the belief that like produces like is used for +purposes pronounced by public opinion to be nefarious. +</P> + +<P> +The next step is taken when it comes to be believed not only that the +thing is nefarious but that not every one can do it. The reason why +only a certain person can do it may be that he alone knows how to do +it—or he and the person from whom he learnt it. The lore of such +persons when examined by folk-lore students is found generally to come +under one or other of the two classes known as sympathetic and mimetic +magic, or homœopathic and contagious magic. In these cases it is +obvious that the <I>modus operandi</I> is the same as it +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P86"></A>86}</SPAN> +was in what I +have called the first stage in the evolution of magic and have already +described at great length. What differentiates this second stage from +the first is that whereas in the first stage these applications of the +principle that like produces like are known to every one, though not +practised by every one, in the second stage these applications are not +known to every one, but only to the dealers in magic. Some of those +applications of the principle may be applications which have descended +to the dealer and have passed out of the general memory; and others may +simply be extensions of the principle which have been invented by the +dealer or his teacher. Again, the public disapproval of nefarious arts +will tend first to segregate the followers of such arts from the rest +of the community; and next to foster the notion that the arts thus +segregated, and thereby made more or less mysterious, include not only +things which the ordinary decent member of society would not do if he +could, but also things which he could not do if he would. The mere +belief in the possibility of such arts creates an atmosphere of +suspicion in which things are believed because they are impossible. +When this stage has been reached, when he who +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P87"></A>87}</SPAN> +practises nefarious +arts is reported and believed to do things which ordinary decent people +could not do if they would, his personality inevitably comes to be +considered as a factor in the results that he produces; he is credited +with a power to produce them which other people, that is to say +ordinary people, do not possess. And it is that personal power which +eventually comes to be the most important, because the most mysterious, +article in his equipment. It is in virtue of that personal power that +he is commonly believed to be able to do things which are impossible +for the ordinary member of the tribe. +</P> + +<P> +Thus far I have been tracing the steps of the process by which the +worker of nefarious arts starts by employing for nefarious purposes +means which any one could use if he would, and ends by being credited +with a power peculiar to himself of working impossibilities. I now +wish to point out that a process exactly parallel is simultaneously +carried on by which arts beneficent to society are supposed to be +evolved. Rain-making may be taken as an art socially beneficial. The +<I>modus operandi</I> of rain-making appears in all cases to be based on the +principle that like produces like; and to be in its +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P88"></A>88}</SPAN> +nature a +process which any one can carry out and which requires no mysterious +art to effect and no mysterious personal power to produce. At the same +time, as it is a proceeding which is beneficial to the tribe as a +whole, it is one in which the whole tribe, and no one tribesman in +particular, is interested. It must be carried out in the interest of +the tribe and by some one who in carrying it out acts for the tribe. +The natural representative of the tribe is the head-man of the tribe; +and, though any one might perform the simple actions necessary, and +could perform them just as well as the head-man, they tend to fall into +the hands of the head-man; and in any case the person who performs them +performs them as the representative of the tribe. The natural +inference comes in course of time to be drawn that he who alone +performs them is the man who alone can perform them; and when that +inference is drawn it becomes obvious that his personality, or the +power peculiar to him personally, is necessary if rain is to be made, +and that the acts and ceremonies through which he goes and through +which any one could go would not be efficacious, or not as efficacious, +without his personal agency and mysterious power. Hence the man who +works +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P89"></A>89}</SPAN> +wonders for his tribe or in the interests of his tribe, in +virtue of his personal power, does things which are impossible for the +ordinary member of the tribe. +</P> + +<P> +Up to this point, in tracing the evolution of magic, we have not found +it once necessary to bring in or even to refer to any belief in the +existence of spiritual beings of any kind. So far as the necessities +of the argument are concerned, the belief in magic might have +originated in the way I have described and might have developed on the +lines suggested, in a tribe which had never so much as heard of +spirits. Of course, as a matter of fact, every tribe in which the +belief in magic is found does also believe in the existence of spirits; +animism is a stage of belief lower than which or back of which science +does not profess to go. But it is only in an advanced stage of its +evolution that the belief in magic becomes involved with the belief in +spirits. Originally, eating tiger to make you bold, or eating saffron +to cure jaundice, was just as matter of fact a proceeding as drinking +water to moisten your throat or sitting by a fire to get warm; like +produces like, and beyond that obvious fact it was not necessary to +go—there was no more need to imagine that the action of the saffron +was due to a spirit than to imagine +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P90"></A>90}</SPAN> +that it was a water spirit +which slakes your thirst. The fact seems to be that animism is a +savage philosophy which is competent to explain everything when called +upon, but that the savage does not spend every moment of his waking +life in invoking it: until there is some need to fall back upon it, he +goes on treating inanimate things as things which he can utilise for +his own purposes without reference to spirits. That is the attitude +also of the man who in virtue of his lore or his personal power can +produce effects which the ordinary man cannot or will not: he performs +his ceremony and the effect follows—or will follow—because he knows +how to do it or has mysterious personal power to produce the effect. +But he consults no spirits—at any rate in the first instance. +Eventually he may do so; and then magic enters on a further stage in +its evolution. (See Appendix.) +</P> + +<P> +If the man who has the lore or the personal power, and who uses it for +nefarious purposes, proposes to employ it on obtaining the same control +over spirits as he has over things, his magic reaches a stage of +evolution in which it is difficult and practically unnecessary to +distinguish it from the stage of fetichism in which the owner of a +fetich +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P91"></A>91}</SPAN> +applies coercion to make the fetich spirit do what he +wishes. With fetichism I deal in another lecture. If, on the other +hand, the man who has the lore or the personal power and uses it for +social or "communal" purposes (Haddon, p. 41) comes to believe that, +for the effects which he has hitherto sought to produce by means of his +superior knowledge or superior power, it is necessary to invoke the aid +of spirits, he will naturally address himself to the spirit or god who +is worshipped by the community because he has at heart the general +interests of the community; or it may be that the spirit who produces +such a benefit for the community at large, as rain for example, will +take his place among the gods of the community as the rain-god, in +virtue of the benefit which he confers upon the community generally. +In either case, the attitude of the priest or person who approaches him +on behalf of the community will be that which befits a supplicant +invoking a favour from a power that has shown favour in the past to the +community. And it will not surprise us if we find that the ceremonies +which were used for the purpose of rain-making, before rain was +recognised as the gift of the gods, continue for a time to be practised +as the proper rites with +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P92"></A>92}</SPAN> +which to approach the god of the +community or the rain-god in particular. Such survivals are then in +danger of being misinterpreted by students of the science of religion, +for they may be regarded as evidence that religion was evolved out of +magic, when in truth they show that religion tends to drive out magic. +Thus Dr. Frazer, in his <I>Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship</I> +(pp. 73-75), describes the practice of the New Caledonians who, to +promote the growth of taro, "bury in the field certain stones +resembling taros, praying to their ancestors at the same time," and he +goes on to say: "In these practices of the New Caledonians the magical +efficacy of the stones appears to be deemed insufficient of itself to +accomplish the end in view; it has to be reinforced by the spirits of +the dead, whose help is sought by prayer and sacrifice. Thus in New +Caledonia sorcery is blent with the worship of the dead; in other +words, magic is combined with religion. If the stones ceased to be +employed, and the prayers and sacrifices to the ancestors remained, the +transition from magic to religion would be complete." Thus it seems to +be suggested in these words of Dr. Frazer's that religion may be +evolved out of magic. If that is what is suggested, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P93"></A>93}</SPAN> +then there is +little doubt that the suggestion is not borne out by the instance +given. Let us concede for the moment what some of us would be inclined +to doubt, viz. that prayers and sacrifice offered to a human being, +alive or dead, is religion; and let us enquire whether this form of +religion is evolved out of magic. The magic here is quite clear: +stones resembling taros are buried in the taro field to promote the +growth of taros. That is an application of the principle that like +produces like which might be employed by men who had never heard of +ancestor worship or of any kind of religion, and who had never uttered +prayers or offered sacrifices of any kind. Next, the religious +element, according to Dr. Frazer, is also quite clear: it consists in +offering sacrifices to the dead with the prayer or the words, "Here are +your offerings, in order that the crop of yams may be good." Now, it +is not suggested, even by Dr. Frazer, that this religious element is a +form of magic or is in any way developed out of or evolved from magic. +On the contrary, if this element is religious—indeed, whether it be +really religious or not—it is obviously entirely distinct and +different from sympathetic or homœopathic magic. The mere fact that +the magical +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P94"></A>94}</SPAN> +rite of burying in the taro fields stones which +resemble taros has to be supplemented by rites which are, on Dr. +Frazer's own showing, non-magical, shows that the primitive belief in +this application of the principle that like produces like was already +dying out, and was in process of becoming a mere survival. Suppose +that it died out entirely and the rite of burying stones became an +unintelligible survival, or was dropped altogether, and suppose that +the prayers and sacrifices remained in possession of the field, which +would be the more correct way of stating the facts, to say that the +magic had died out and its place had been taken by something totally +different, viz. religion; or that what was magic had become religion, +that magic and religion are but two manifestations, two stages, in the +evolution of the same principle? The latter statement was formally +rejected by Dr. Frazer in the second edition of his <I>Golden Bough</I>, +when he declared that he had come to recognise "a fundamental +distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and +religion" (Preface, xvi). His words, therefore, justify us in assuming +that when he speaks, in his <I>Lectures on the Early History of the +Kingship</I>, of the "transition from magic to religion," he cannot +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P95"></A>95}</SPAN> +mean that magic becomes religion, or that religion is evolved out of +magic, for the "distinction and even opposition of principle" between +the two is "fundamental." He can, therefore, only mean that magic is +followed and may be driven out by something which is fundamentally +opposed to it, viz. religion. +</P> + +<P> +What then is the fundamental opposition between magic and religion? and +is it such as to require us to believe with Dr. Frazer that magic +preceded religion, and that of two opposite ideas the mind can conceive +the one without conceiving—and rejecting—the other? +</P> + +<P> +The fundamental opposition between magic and religion I take to be that +religion is supposed to promote the interests of the community, and +that magic, so far forth as it is nefarious, is condemned by the moral +and by the religious feeling of the community. It is the ends for +which nefarious magic is used that are condemned, and not the means. +The means may be and, as we see, are silly and futile; and, for +intellectual progress, their silliness and futility must be recognised +by the intellect. But, it is only when they are used for purposes +inimical to the public good that they are +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P96"></A>96}</SPAN> +condemned by religion +and morality as nefarious. If therefore we talk of a fundamental +opposition between magic and religion, we must understand that the +fundamental opposition is that between nefarious magic and religion; +neither religion nor morality condemns the desire to increase the food +supply or to promote any other interest of the community. Whether a +man uses skill that he has acquired, or personal power, or force of +will, matters not, provided he uses it for the general good. The +question whether, as a cold matter of fact, the means he uses are +efficacious is not one which moral fervour or religious ardour is +competent by itself to settle: the cool atmosphere and dry light of +reason have rather that function to perform; and they have to perform +it in the case both of means that are used for the general good and of +those used against it. +</P> + +<P> +I take it therefore that what religion is fundamentally opposed to is +magic—or anything else—that is used for nefarious purposes. +</P> + +<P> +The question then arises whether we have any reason to believe that +magic used for nefarious purposes must have existed before religion. +Now by nefarious purposes I mean purposes inconsistent with or +destructive of the common good. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P97"></A>97}</SPAN> +There can be no such purposes, +however, unless and until there is a community, however small, having +common interests and a common good. As soon as there exists such a +community, there will be a distinction between actions which promote +and actions which are destructive of the common good. The one class +will be approved, the other disapproved, of by public opinion. Magic +will be approved and disapproved of according as it is or is not used +in a way inconsistent with the public good. If there is a spirit or a +god who is worshipped by the community because he is believed to be +concerned with the good of the community, then he will disapprove of +nefarious proceedings whether magical or not. But Dr. Frazer's +position I take to be that no such spirit or god can come to be +believed in, unless there has been previously a belief in magic. Now, +that argument either is or is not based on the assumption that magic +and religion are but two manifestations, two stages, in the evolution +of the same principle. If that is the basis, then what manifested +itself at first as magic subsequently manifests itself as religion; and +"the transition from magic to religion" implies the priority of magic +to religion. But, as we have seen, Dr. Frazer +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P98"></A>98}</SPAN> +formally +postulates, not an identity, but an "opposition of principle" between +the two. We must therefore reject the assumption of an identity of +principle; and accept the "opposition of principle." But if so, then +there must be two principles which are opposed to one another, religion +and magic; and we might urge that line of argument consistently enough +to show that there can be no magic save where there is religion to be +opposed to it. +</P> + +<P> +Now, there is an opposition of principle between magic used for +nefarious purposes and religion; and the opposition is that the one +promotes social and the other anti-social purposes. Nefarious +purposes, whether worked by magic or by other means, are condemned by +religion and are nefarious especially because offensive to the god who +has the interests of the community at heart. That from the moment +society existed anti-social tendencies also manifested themselves will +not be doubted; and neither need we doubt that the principle that like +produces like was employed from the beginning for social as well as for +anti-social purposes. The question is whether, in the stage of +animism, the earliest and the lowest stage which science recognises in +the evolution of man, there is ever found a society +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P99"></A>99}</SPAN> +of human +beings which has not appropriated some one or more of the spirits by +which all things, on the animistic principle, are worked, to the +purposes of the community. No such society has yet been proved to +exist; still less has any <I>à priori</I> proof been produced to show that +such a society must have existed. The presumption indeed is rather the +other way. Children go through a period of helpless infancy longer +than the young of any other creatures; and could not reach the age of +self-help, if the family did not hold together for some years at least. +But where there is a family there is a society, even if it be confined +to members of the family. There also, therefore, there are social and +anti-social tendencies and purposes; and, in the animistic stage, the +spirits, by which man conceives himself to be surrounded, are either +hostile or not hostile to the society, and are accordingly either +worshipped or not worshipped by it. Doubtless, even in those early +times, the father and the husband conceived himself to be the whole +family; and if that view had its unamiable side—and it still has—it +also on occasion had the inestimable advantage of sinking self, of +self-sacrifice, in defence of the family. +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P100"></A>100}</SPAN> + +<P> +Thus far I have been concerned to show how, starting from a principle +such as that like produces like, about which there is nothing magical +in the eyes either of those who believe in magic or of those who have +left the belief behind, man might evolve the conception of magic as +being the lore or the personal power which enables a man to do what +ordinary people cannot do. A few words are necessary as to the decline +of the belief. The first is that the belief is rotten before it is +ripe. Those applications of the principle that like produces like +which are magical are generally precisely those which are false. The +fact that they are false has not prevented them from surviving in +countless numbers to the present day. But some suspicion of their +falsity in some cases does arise; and the person who has the most +frequent opportunities of discovering their falsity, the person on +whose notice the discovery of their falsity is thrust most pointedly, +is the person who deals habitually and professionally in magic. Hence, +though it is his profession to work wonders, he takes care as far as +may be not to attempt impossibilities. Thus Dr. Haddon (<I>l.c.</I>, p. 62) +found that the men of Murray Island, Torres Straits, who made a "big +wind" by magic, only made it in the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P101"></A>101}</SPAN> +season of the southeast trade +wind. "On my asking," he says, "whether the ceremony was done in the +north monsoon, my informant said emphatically, 'Can't do it in +northwest.' That is, the charm is performed only at that season of the +year when the required result is possible—indeed when it is of normal +occurrence. In this, as in other cases, I found that the impossible +was never attempted. A rain charm would not be made when there was no +expectation of rain coming, or a southeast wind be raised during the +wrong season." The instance thus given to us by Dr. Haddon shows how +the belief in magic begins to give way before the scientific +observation of fact. The collapse of magic becomes complete when every +one sees that the southeast trade wind blows at its appointed time, +whether the magic rites are performed or not. In fine, what kills +magic regarded as a means for producing effects is the discovery that +it is superfluous, when for instance the desired wind or rain is +coming, and futile when it is not. And whereas morality and religion +only condemn the end aimed at by magic, and only condemn it when it is +anti-social, science slowly shows that magic as a means to any end is +superfluous and silly. +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P102"></A>102}</SPAN> + +<P> +Science, however, shows this but slowly; and if we wish to understand +how it is that the belief in the magician's power has survived for +thousands of years down to the present moment amongst numerous peoples, +we must remember that his equipment and apparatus are not limited to +purely nonsensical notions. On the contrary, in his stock of +knowledge, carefully handed down, are many truths and facts not +generally known; and they are the most efficacious articles of his +stock in trade. Dr. Frazer may not go farther than his argument +requires, but he certainly goes farther than the facts will support +him, when he says (<I>l.c.</I>, p. 83) "for it must always be remembered +that every single profession and claim put forward by the magician as +such is false; not one of them can be maintained without deception, +conscious or unconscious." +</P> + +<P> +If now, in conclusion, we look once more at the subject of magic and +look at it from the practical point of view of the missionary, we shall +see that there are several conclusions which may be of use to him. In +the first place, his attitude to magic will be hostile, and in his +hostility to it he will find the best starting-point for his campaign +against it to be in the fact that everywhere magic is felt, to a +greater +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P103"></A>103}</SPAN> +or less extent, to be anti-social, and is condemned both +by the moral sentiments and the religious feeling of the community. It +is felt to be essentially wicked; and in warring against it the +missionary will be championing the cause of those who know it to be +wrong but who simply dare not defy it. The fact that defiance is not +ventured on is essential to the continuance of the tyranny; and what is +necessary, if it is to be defied, is an actual concrete example of the +fact that when defied it is futile. +</P> + +<P> +Next, where magic is practised for social purposes, where it mimics +science or religion and survives in virtue of its power of "protective +colouring," it is in fact superfluous and silly; and where the natives +themselves are beginning to recognise that the magic which is supposed, +for instance, to raise the southeast trade wind won't act at the wrong +season, it should not be difficult to get them to see that it is +unnecessary at the right season. The natural process which tends thus +to get rid of magic may be accelerated by the sensible missionary; and +some knowledge of science will be found in this, as in other matters, +an indispensable part of his training. +</P> + +<P> +Finally, the missionary may rest assured in the conviction that his +flank will not be turned by the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P104"></A>104}</SPAN> +science of religion. The idea +that religion was preceded by and evolved out of magic may have been +entertained by some students of the science of religion in the past, +and may not yet have been thrown off by all. But it holds no place now +in the science of religion. To derive either science or religion from +the magic which exists only by mimicking one or the other is just as +absurd as to imagine that the insect which imitates the colour of the +leaf whereon it lives precedes and creates the tree which is to support +it. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="fetichism"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P105"></A>105}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +FETICHISM +</H3> + +<P> +The line of action taken by the missionary at work will, like that of +any other practical man, be conditioned, not only by the object which +he wishes to attain, but also by the nature of the material on which +and with which he has to work. He requires therefore all the +information which the science of religion can place at his disposal +about the beliefs and practices of those amongst whom his work is cast; +and, if he is to make practical use of that information, he must know +not only that certain beliefs and practices do as a matter of fact +obtain, he must know also what is their value for his special +purpose—what, if any, are the points about them which have religious +value, and can be utilized by him; and what are those points about them +which are obstructive to his purpose, and how best they may be removed +and counteracted. To supply him with this information, to give him +this estimate of values, to guide him as to the attitude he should +assume and the way in which he may utilise or must +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P106"></A>106}</SPAN> +attack native +practices and beliefs, is the object with which the applied science of +religion, when it has been constituted by the action of Hartford +Theological Seminary, will address itself. +</P> + +<P> +Now, it may seem from the practical point of view of the missionary +that with regard to fetichism there can be no question as to what its +value is or as to what his attitude should be towards it. But, even if +we should ultimately find that fetichism is obstructive to religion, we +shall still want to know what hints we can extract from the science of +religion as to the best way of cutting at the roots of fetichism; and +therefore it will be necessary to consider what exactly fetichism is. +And, as a matter of fact, there is a tendency manifesting itself +amongst students of the science of religion to say, as Dr. Haddon says +(<I>Magic and Fetichism</I>, p. 91), that "fetichism is a stage of religious +development"; and amongst writers on the philosophy of religion to take +fetichism and treat it, provisionally at any rate, if not as the +primitive religion of mankind, then as that form of religion which "we +find amongst men at the lowest stage of development known to us" +(Höffding, <I>Philosophy of Religion</I>, E. T., §§ 45, 46). If, then, +fetichism is the primitive religion of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P107"></A>107}</SPAN> +mankind or a stage of +religious development, "a basis from which many other modes of +religious thought have been developed" (Haddon, p. 91), it will have a +value which the missionary must recognise. And in any case he must +know what value, if any, it has. +</P> + +<P> +Now, if we are, I will not say to do justice to the view that fetichism +is the primitive religion of mankind or a stage from which other modes +of religious thought have been developed, but if we are simply to +understand it, we must clearly distinguish it from the view—somewhat +paradoxical to say the least—that fetichism has no religious value, +and yet is the source of all religious values. The inference which may +legitimately be drawn from this second view is that all forms of +religious thought, having been evolved from this primitive religion of +mankind, have precisely the same value as it has; they do but make +explicit what it really was; the history of religion does but write +large and set out at length what was contained in it from the first; in +fetichism we see what from the first religion was, and what at the last +religion is. On this view, the source from which all religious values +spring is fetichism; fetichism has no value of any kind, and therefore +the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P108"></A>108}</SPAN> +evolved forms of fetichism which we call forms of religion +have no value either of any kind. Thus, science—the science of +religion—is supposed to demonstrate by scientific methods the real +nature and the essential character of all religion. +</P> + +<P> +Now, the error in this reasoning proceeds partly on a false conception +of the object and method of science—a false conception which is slowly +but surely disappearing. The object of all science, whether it be +physical science or other, whether it be historic science or other, is +to establish facts. The object of the historic science of religion is +to record the facts of the history of religion in such a way that the +accuracy of the record as a record will be disputed by no one qualified +to judge the fact. For that purpose, it abstains deliberately and +consistently from asking or considering the religious value of any of +the facts with which it deals. It has not to consider, and does not +consider, what would have been, still less what ought to have been, the +course of history, but simply what it was. In this it is following +merely the dictates of common sense; before we can profitably express +an opinion on any occurrence, we must know what exactly it was that +occurred; and to learn what occurred we must +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P109"></A>109}</SPAN> +divest our minds of +preconceptions. It is the business of the science of religion to set +aside preconceptions as to whether religion has or has not any value; +and if it does set them aside, that is to say so far as it is +scientific, it will end as it began without touching on the question of +the value of religion. In fine, it is, and would I think now be +generally admitted to be, a misconception of the function of the +science of religion to imagine that it does, or can, prove anything as +to the truth of religion, one way or the other. +</P> + +<P> +There is, however, another error in the reasoning which is directed to +show that in fetichism we see what religion was and essentially is. +That error consists not only in a false conception of what religion +is,—the man who has himself no religion may be excused if he fails to +understand fully what it is,—it is based on a misunderstanding of what +fetichism is. And so confusion is doubly confounded. The source of +that misunderstanding is to be found in Bosman (Pinkerton, <I>Voyages and +Travels</I>, London, 1814, XVI, 493), who says: "I once asked a negro with +whom I could talk very freely ... how they celebrated their divine +worship, and what number of gods they had; he, laughing, answered that +I had +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P110"></A>110}</SPAN> +puzzled him; and assured me that nobody in the whole +country could give me an exact account of it. 'For, as for my own +part, I have a very large number of gods, and doubt not but that others +have as many. For any of us being resolved to undertake anything of +importance, we first of all search out a god to prosper our designed +undertaking; and going out of doors with the design, take the first +creature that presents itself to our eyes, whether dog, cat, or the +most contemptible creature in the world for our god; or, perhaps, +instead of that, any inanimate that falls in our way, whether a stone, +a piece of wood, or anything else of the same nature. This new-chosen +god is immediately presented with an offering, which is accompanied by +a solemn vow, that if it pleaseth him to prosper our undertakings, for +the future we will always worship and esteem him as a god. If our +design prove successful, we have discovered a new and assisting god, +which is daily presented with a fresh offering; but if the contrary +happen, the new god is rejected as a useless tool, and consequently +returns to his primitive estate. We make and break our gods daily, and +consequently are the masters and inventors of what we sacrifice to.'" +Now, all this was said by the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P111"></A>111}</SPAN> +negro, as Bosman himself observed, +to "ridicule his own country gods." And it is not surprising that it +should have been, or should be, accepted as a trustworthy description +of the earliest form of religion by those who in the highest form can +find no more than this negro found in fetichism when he wished to +ridicule it. +</P> + +<P> +Let us hold over for the moment the question whether fetichism is or is +not a form of religion; and let us enquire how far the account given by +Bosman's negro accords with the facts. First, though there is no doubt +that animals are worshipped as gods, and though there is no doubt that +the guardian spirits of individuals are chosen, or are supposed to +manifest themselves, for example, amongst the North American Indians, +in animal form, and that "the first creature that presents itself" to +the man seeking the manifestation of his guardian spirit may be taken +to be his god, even though it be "the most contemptible creature in the +world "; still students of the science of religion are fairly satisfied +that such gods or guardian spirits are not to be confused with +fetiches. A fetich is an inanimate or lifeless object, even if it is +the feather, claw, bone, eyeball, or any other part of an animal or +even of a man. It is as +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P112"></A>112}</SPAN> +Bosman's negro said, "any inanimate that +falls in our way." When he goes on to say that it "is immediately +presented with an offering," and, so long as its owner believes in it, +"is daily presented with a fresh offering," he is stating a fact that +is beyond dispute, and which is fully recognised by all students. A +typical instance is given by Professor Tylor (<I>Primitive Culture</I>, II, +158) of the owner of a stone which had been taken as a fetich: "He was +once going out on important business, but crossing the threshold he +trod on this stone and hurt himself. Ha! ha! thought he, art thou +there? So he took the stone, and it helped him through his undertaking +for days." When Bosman's negro further goes on to state that if the +fetich is discovered by its owner not to prosper his undertakings, as +he expected it to do, "it is rejected as a useless tool," he makes a +statement which is admitted to be true and which, in its truth, may be +understood to mean that when the owner finds that the object is not a +fetich, he casts it aside as being nothing but the "inanimate" which it +is. Bosman's negro, however, says not that the inanimate but that "the +new god is rejected as a useless tool." That we must take as being but +a carelessness of expression; the evidence of Colonel +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P113"></A>113}</SPAN> +Ellis, an +observer whose competence is undoubted, is: "Every native with whom I +have conversed on the subject has laughed at the possibility of it +being supposed that he could worship or offer sacrifice to some such +object as a stone, which of itself would be perfectly obvious to his +senses was a stone only and nothing more" (<I>The Tshi-speaking Peoples</I>, +p. 192). From these words it follows that the object worshipped as a +fetich is a stone (or whatever it is) and something more, and that the +object "rejected as a useless tool" is a stone (or whatever it is) and +nothing more. When, then, Bosman's negro goes on to say, "we make and +break our gods daily," he is not describing accurately the processes as +they are conceived by those who perform them. The fetich worshipper +believes that the object which arrests his attention has already the +powers which he ascribes to it; and it is in consequence of that belief +that he takes it as his fetich. And it is only when he is convinced +that it is not a fetich that he rejects it as a useless tool. But what +Bosman's negro suggests, and apparently intended to suggest, is that +the fetich worshipper makes, say, a stone his god, knowing that it is a +stone and nothing more; and that he breaks his fetich believing it to +be a god. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P114"></A>114}</SPAN> +Thus the worshipper knows that the object is no god +when he is worshipping it; but believes it to be a god when he rejects +it as a useless tool. Now that is, consciously or unconsciously, +deliberately or not, a misrepresentation of fetichism; and it is +precisely on that misconception of what fetichism is that they base +themselves who identify religion with fetichism, and then argue that, +as fetichism has no value, religious or reasonable, neither has +religion itself. +</P> + +<P> +Returning now to the question what fetichism is—a question which must +be answered before we can enquire what religious value it possesses, +and whether it can be of any use for the practical purposes of the +missionary in his work—we have now seen that a fetich is not merely an +"inanimate," but something more; and that an object to become regarded +as a fetich must attract the attention of the man who is to adopt it, +and must attract the attention of the man when he has business on hand, +that is to say when he has some end in view which he desires to attain, +or generally when he is in a state of expectancy. The process of +choice is one of "natural selection." Professor Höffding sees in it +"the simplest conceivable construction of religious ideas. The choice +is entirely elementary +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P115"></A>115}</SPAN> +and involuntary, as elementary and +involuntary as the exclamation which is the simplest form of a judgment +of worth. The object chosen must be something or other which is +closely bound up with whatever engrosses the mind. It perhaps awakens +memories of earlier events in which it was present or coöperative, or +else it presents a certain—perhaps a very distant—similarity to +objects which helped in previous times of need. Or it may be merely +the first object which presents itself in a moment of strained +expectation. It attracts attention, and is therefore involuntarily +associated with what is about to happen, with the possibility of +attaining the desired end" (<I>Philosophy of Religion</I>, E. T., p. 139). +And then Professor Höffding goes on to say, "In such phenomena as these +we encounter religion under the guise of desire." Now, without denying +that there are such things as religious desires—and holding as we do +that religion is the search after God and the yearning of the human +heart after Him, "the desire of all nations," we shall have no +temptation to deny that there are such things as religious desires—yet +we must for the moment reserve our decision on the question whether it +is in such phenomena +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P116"></A>116}</SPAN> +as these that we encounter religious +desires, and we must bear in mind that there are desires which are not +religious, and that we want to know whether it is in the phenomena of +fetichism that we encounter religious desires. +</P> + +<P> +That in the phenomena of fetichism we encounter desires other than +religious is beyond dispute: the use of a fetich is, as Dr. Nassau +says, "to aid the possessor in the accomplishment of some specific +wish" (<I>Fetichism in West Africa</I>, p. 82); that is, of any specific +wish. Now, a fetich is, as we have seen, an inanimate object and +something more. What more? In actual truth, nothing more than the +fact that it is "involuntarily associated with what is about to happen, +with the possibility of attaining the desired end." But to the +possessor the something more, it may be said, is the fact that it is +not merely an "inanimate" but also a spirit, or the habitation of a +spiritual being. When, however, we reflect that fetichism goes back to +the animistic stage of human thought, in which all the things that we +term inanimate are believed to be animated by spirits, it is obvious +that we require some differentia to mark off those things (animated by +spirits) which are fetiches from those things (animated by spirits) +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P117"></A>117}</SPAN> +which are not. And the differentia is, of course, that fetiches +are spirits, or objects animated by spirits, which will aid the +possessor in the accomplishment of some specific wish, and are thought +to be willing so to aid, owing to the fact that by an involuntary +association of ideas they become connected in the worshipper's mind +with the possibility of attaining the end he has in view at the moment. +To recognise fetichism, then, in its simplest if not in its most +primitive form, all we need postulate is animism—the belief that all +things are animated by spirits—and the process of very natural +selection which has already been described. At this stage in the +history of fetichism it is especially difficult to judge whether the +fetich is the spirit or the object animated by the spirit. As Dr. +Haddon says (p. 83), "Just as the human body and soul form one +individual, so the material object and its occupying spirit or power +form one individual, more vague, perhaps, but still with many +attributes distinctively human. It possesses personality and will ... +it possesses most of the human passions,—anger, revenge, also +generosity and gratitude; it is within reach of influence and may be +benevolent, hence to be deprecated and placated, and its aid enlisted." +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P118"></A>118}</SPAN> + +<P> +A more advanced stage in the history of fetichism is that which is +reached by reflection on the fact that a fetich not unfrequently ceases +to prosper the undertakings of its possessor in the way he expected it +to do. On the principles of animism, everything that is—whether +animate, or inanimate according to our notions—is made up of spirit, +or soul, and body. In the case of man, when he dies, the spirit leaves +the body. When, therefore, a fetich ceases to act, the explanation by +analogy is that the spirit has left the body, the inanimate, with which +it was originally associated; and when that is the case, then, as we +learn from Miss Kingsley (<I>Travels in West Africa</I>, pp. 304-305), "the +little thing you kept the spirit in is no more use now, and only fit to +sell to a white man as 'a big curio.'" The fact that, in native +belief, what we call an inanimate thing may lose its soul and become +really dead is shown by Miss Kingsley in a passage quoted by Dr. +Haddon: "Everything that he," the native, "knows by means of his senses +he regards as a twofold entity—part spirit, part not spirit, or, as we +should say, matter; the connection of a certain spirit with a certain +mass of matter, he holds, is not permanent. He will point out to you a +lightning-struck tree, and tell +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P119"></A>119}</SPAN> +you its spirit has been broken; +he will tell you when the cooking-pot has been broken, that it has lost +its spirit" (<I>Folk-Lore</I>, VIII, 141). We might safely infer then that +as any object may lose its spirit, so too may an object which has been +chosen as a fetich; even if we had not, as we have, direct testimony to +the belief. +</P> + +<P> +Next, when it is believed that an object may lose its spirit and become +dead indeed, there is room and opportunity for the belief to grow that +its spirit may pass into some other object: that there may be a +transmigration of spirits. And when this belief arises, a fresh stage +in the history of fetichism is evolved. And the fresh stage is evolved +in accordance with the law that governs the whole evolution of +fetichism. That law is that a fetich is an object believed to aid its +possessor in attaining the end he desires. In the earliest stage of +its history anything which happens to arrest a man's attention when he +is in a state of expectancy "is involuntarily associated with what is +about to happen," and so becomes a fetich. In the most developed stage +of fetichism, men are not content to wait until they stumble across a +fetich, and when they do so to say, "Ha! ha! art thou there?" Their +mental attitude becomes +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P120"></A>120}</SPAN> +interrogative: "Ha! ha! where art thou?" +They no longer wait to stumble across a fetich, they proceed to make +one; and for that procedure a belief in the transmigration of spirits +is essential. An object, a habitation for the spirit, is prepared; and +he is invited, conjúred, or cónjured, into it. If he is conjúred into +it, the attitude of the man who invites him is submissive; if cónjured, +the mental attitude of the performer is one of superiority. Colonel +Ellis throughout all his careful enquiries found that "so great is the +fear of giving possible offence to any superhuman agent" that (in the +region of his observation) we may well believe that even the makers of +fetiches did not assume to command the spirits. But elsewhere, in +other regions, it is impossible to doubt but that the owners of +fetiches not only conjúre the spirits into the objects, but also apply +coercion to them when they fail to aid their possessor in the +accomplishment of his wishes. That, I take it, is the ultimate stage +in the evolution, the fine flower, of fetichism. And it is not +religion, it has no value as religion, or rather its value is +anti-religious. Even if we were to accept as a definition of religion +that it is the conciliation of beings conceived to be superior, we +should be compelled by +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P121"></A>121}</SPAN> +the definition to say that fetichism in +its eventual outcome is not religion, for the attitude of the owner +towards his fetich is then one of superiority, and his method is, when +conciliation fails, to apply coercion. +</P> + +<P> +But it may perhaps be argued that fetichism, except in what I have +termed its ultimate evolution, is religion and has religious value; or, +to put it otherwise, that what I have represented as the eventual +outcome is really a perversion or the decline of fetichism. Then, in +the fetichism which is or represents the primitive religion of mankind +we meet, according to Professor Höffding, "religion under the guise of +desire." Now, not all desires are religious; and the question, which +is purely a question of fact, arises whether the desires which +fetichism subserves are religious. And in using the word "religious" I +will not here place any extravagant meaning on the word; I will take it +in the meaning which would be understood by the community in which the +owner of a fetich dwells himself. In the tribes described by Colonel +Ellis, for instance, there are worshipped personal gods having proper +names; and the worship is served by duly appointed priests; and the +worshippers consist of a body of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P122"></A>122}</SPAN> +persons whose welfare the god +has at heart. Such are some of the salient features of what all +students of the science of religion would include under the head of the +religion of those tribes. Now amongst those same tribes the fetich, or +<I>suhman</I>, as it is termed by them, is found; and there are several +features which make a fetich quite distinguishable from any of the gods +which are worshipped there. Thus, the fetich has no body of +worshippers: it is the private property, of its owner, who alone makes +offerings to it. Its <I>raison d'être</I>, its special and only function, +is to subserve the private wishes of its owner. In so far as he makes +offerings to it he may be called its priest; but he is not, as in the +case of the priests of the gods who are worshipped there, the +representative of the community or congregation, for a fetich has no +plurality of worshippers; and none of the priests of the gods will have +anything to do with it. Next, "though offerings are made to the +<I>suhman</I> by its owner, they are made in private" (Jevons, <I>History of +Religion</I>, p. 165)—there is no public worship—and "public opinion +does not approve of them." The interests and the desires which the +fetich exists to promote are not those of the community: they are +antisocial, for, as Colonel Ellis +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P123"></A>123}</SPAN> +tells us, "one of the special +attributes of a <I>suhman</I> is to procure the death of any person whom its +worshipper may wish to have removed"—indeed "the most important +function of the <I>suhman</I> appears to be to work evil against those who +have injured or offended its worshipper." +</P> + +<P> +Thus, a very clear distinction exists between the worship of a fetich +and the worship of the gods. It is not merely that the fetich is +invoked occasionally in aid of antisocial desires: nothing can prevent +the worshipper of a god, if the worshipper be bad enough, from praying +for that which he ought not to pray for. It is that the gods of the +community are there to sanction and further all desires which are for +the good of the community, and that the fetich is there to further +desires which are not for the good of the community,—hence it is that +"public opinion does not approve of them." At another stage of +religious evolution, it becomes apparent and is openly pronounced that +neither does the god of the community approve of them; and then +fetichism, like the sin of witchcraft, is stamped out more or less. +But amongst the tribes who have only reached the point of religious +progress attained by the natives of West Africa, public opinion has +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P124"></A>124}</SPAN> +only gone so far as to express disapproval, not to declare war. +</P> + +<P> +If, then, we are to hold to the view of Professor Höffding and of Dr. +Haddon, that fetichism is in its essence, or was at the beginning, +religious in its nature, though it may be perverted into something +non-religious or anti-religious, we must at any rate admit that it has +become non-religious not only in the case of those fetichists who +assume an attitude of superiority and command to their fetiches, but +also in the earlier stage of evolution when the fetichist preserves an +attitude of submission and conciliation towards his fetich, but assumes +the attitude only for the purpose of realising desires which are +anti-social and recognised to be anti-religious. +</P> + +<P> +But, if we take—as I think we must take—that line of argument, the +conclusion to which it will bring us is fairly clear and is not far +off. The differentia or rather that differentia which +characteristically marks off the fetich from the god is the nature of +the desires which each exists to promote; the function which each +exists to fulfil, the end which is there for each to subserve. But the +ends are different. Not only are they different, they are +antagonistic. And the process of evolution does +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P125"></A>125}</SPAN> +but bring out +the antagonism, it does not create it. It was there from the +beginning. From the moment there was society, there were desires which +could only be realised at the cost and to the loss of society, as well +as desires in the realisation of which the good of society was +realised. The assistance of powers other than human might be sought; +and the nature of the power which was sought was determined by the end +or purpose for which its aid was employed or invoked—if for the good +of society, it was approved by society; if not, not. Its function, the +end it subserved, determined its value for society—determined whether +public opinion should approve or disapprove of it, whether it was a god +of the community or the fetich of an individual. Society can only +exist where there is a certain community of purpose among its members; +and can only continue to exist where anti-social tendencies are to some +extent suppressed or checked by force of public opinion. +</P> + +<P> +Fetichism, then, in its tendency and in its purpose, in the function +which it performs and the end at which it aims is not only +distinguishable from religion, it is antagonistic to it, from the +earliest period of its history to the latest. Religion is social, an +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P126"></A>126}</SPAN> +affair of the community; fetichism is anti-social, condemned by +the community. Public opinion, expressing the moral sentiments of the +community as well as its religious feeling, pronounces both moral and +religious disapproval of the man who uses a <I>suhman</I> for its special +purpose of causing death—committing murder. Fetichism is offensive to +the morality as well as to the religion even of the native. To seek +the origin of religion in fetichism is as vain as to seek the origin of +morality in the selfish and self-seeking tendencies of man. There is +no need to enquire whether fetichism is historically prior to religion, +or whether religion is historically prior to fetichism. Man, as long +as he has lived in societies, must have had desires which were +incompatible with the welfare of the community as well as desires which +promoted its welfare. The powers which are supposed to care whether +the community fares well are the gods of the community; and their +worship is the religion of the community. The powers which have no +such care are not gods, nor is their worship—if coercion or cajolery +can be called worship—religion. The essence of fetichism on its +external side is that the owner of the fetich alone has access +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P127"></A>127}</SPAN> +to +it, alone can pray to it, alone can offer sacrifices to it. It is +therefore in its inward essence directly destructive of the unity of +interests and purposes that society demands and religion promotes. +Perhaps it would be going too far to say that the practice of making +prayers and offerings to a fetich is borrowed from religious worship: +they are the natural and instinctive method of approaching any power +which is capable of granting or refusing what we desire. It is the +quarter to which they are addressed, and the end for which they are +employed, that makes the difference between them. It is the fact that +in the one case they are, and in the other are not, addressed to the +quarter to which they ought to be addressed, and employed for the end +for which they ought to be employed, that makes the difference in +religious value between them. +</P> + +<P> +If we bear in mind the simple fact that fetichism is condemned by the +religious and moral feelings of the communities in which it exists, we +shall not fall into the mistake of regarding fetichism either as the +primitive religion of mankind or as a stage of religious development or +as "a basis from which many other modes of religious thought have been +developed." +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P128"></A>128}</SPAN> + +<P> +Professor Höffding, holding that fetichism is the primitive religion, +out of which polytheism was developed, adopts Usener's theory as to the +mode of its evolution. "The fetich," Professor Höffding says (p. 140), +"is only the provisional and momentary dwelling-place of a spirit. As +Hermann Usener has strikingly called it, it is 'the god of a moment.'" +But though Professor Höffding adopts this definition of a fetich, it is +obvious that the course of his argument requires us to understand it as +subject to a certain limitation. His argument in effect is that +fetichism is not polytheism, but something different, something out of +which polytheism was evolved. And the difference is that polytheism +means a plurality of gods, whereas fetichism knows no gods, but only +spirits. Inasmuch then as, on the theory—whether it is held by +Höffding or by anybody else—that the spirits of fetichism become the +gods of polytheism, there must be differences between the spirits of +the one and the gods of the other, let us enquire what the differences +are supposed to be. +</P> + +<P> +First, there is the statement that a fetich is the "god of a moment," +by which must be meant that the spirits which, so long as they are +momentary and +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P129"></A>129}</SPAN> +temporary, are fetiches, must come to be permanent +if they are to attain to the rank of gods. +</P> + +<P> +But on this point Dr. Haddon differs. He is quite clear that a fetich +may be worshipped permanently without ceasing to be a fetich. And it +is indeed abundantly clear that an object only ceases to be worshipped +when its owner is convinced that it is not really a fetich; as long as +he is satisfied that it is a fetich, he continues its cult—and he +continues it because it is his personal property, because he, and not +the rest of the community, has access to it. +</P> + +<P> +Next, Höffding argues that it is from these momentary fetiches that +special or specialised deities—"departmental gods," as Mr. Andrew Lang +has termed them—arise. And these "specialised divinities constitute +an advance on gods of the moment" (p. 142). Now, what is implied in +this argument, what is postulated but not expressed, is that a fetich +has only one particular thing which it can do. A departmental god can +only do one particular sort of thing, has one specialised function. A +departmental god is but a fetich advanced one stage in the hierarchy of +divine beings. Therefore the function of the fetich in the first +instance was specialised +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P130"></A>130}</SPAN> +and limited. But there it is that the +<I>à priori</I> argument comes into collision with the actual facts. A +fetich, when it presents itself to a man, assists him in the particular +business on which he is at the moment engaged. But it only continues +to act as a fetich, provided that it assists him afterwards and in +other matters also. The desires of the owner are not limited, and +consequently neither are his expectations; the business of the fetich +is to procure him general prosperity (Haddon, p. 83). As far as +fetiches are concerned, it is simply reversing the facts to suppose +that it is because one fetich can only do one thing, that many fetiches +are picked up. Many objects are picked up on the chance of their +proving fetiches, because if the object turns out really to be a fetich +it will bring its owner good luck and prosperity generally—there is no +knowing what it may do. But it is only to its owner that it brings +prosperity—not to other people, not to the community, for the +community is debarred access to it. +</P> + +<P> +The next difference between fetichism and polytheism, according to +Höffding, is that the gods of polytheism have developed that +personality which is not indeed absolutely wanting in the spirits of +fetichism but can hardly be said to be properly +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P131"></A>131}</SPAN> +there. "The +transition," he says, "from momentary and special gods to gods which +can properly be called personal is one of the most important +transitions in the history of religion. It denotes the transition from +animism to polytheism" (p. 145). And one of the outward signs that the +transition has been effected is, as Usener points out with special +emphasis, "that only at a certain stage of evolution, <I>i.e.</I>, on the +appearance of polytheism, do the gods acquire proper names" (<I>ib.</I> 147). +</P> + +<P> +Now, this argument, I suggest, seeks to make, or to make much of, a +difference between fetichism and polytheism which scarcely exists, and +so far as it does exist is not the real difference between them. It +seeks to minimise, if not to deny, the personality of the fetich, in +order to exalt that of the gods of polytheism. And then this +difference in degree of personality, this transition from the one +degree to the other, is exhibited as "one of the most important +transitions in the history of religion." The question therefore is +first whether the difference is so great, and next whether it is the +real difference between fetichism and religion in the polytheistic +stage. +</P> + +<P> +The difference in point of personality between the spirits of fetichism +and the gods of polytheism is not +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P132"></A>132}</SPAN> +absolute. The fetich, +according to Dr. Haddon, "<I>possesses personality</I> and will, it has also +many human characters. It possesses most of the human passions, anger, +revenge, also generosity and gratitude; it is within reach of influence +and may be benevolent, is hence to be deprecated and placated, and its +aid to be enlisted" (p. 83); "the fetich is worshipped, prayed to, +sacrificed to, and talked with" (p. 89). +</P> + +<P> +But, perhaps it may be said that, though the fetich does "possess +personality," it is only when it has acquired sufficient personality to +enjoy a proper name that it becomes a god, or fetichism passes into +polytheism. To this the reply is that polytheism does not wait thus +deferentially on the evolution of proper names. There was a period in +the evolution of the human race when men neither had proper names of +their own nor knew their fellows by proper names; and yet they doubted +not their personality. The simple fact is that he who is to receive a +name—whether he be a human being or a spiritual being—must be there +in order to be named. When he is there he may receive a name which has +lost all meaning, as proper names at the present day have generally +done; or one which has a meaning. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P133"></A>133}</SPAN> +A mother may address her child +as "John" or as "boy," but, whichever form of address she uses, she has +no doubt that the child has a personality. The fact that a fetich has +not acquired a proper name is not a proof that it has acquired no +personality; if it can, as Dr. Haddon says it can, be "petted or +ill-treated with regard to its past or future behaviour" (p. 90), its +personality is undeniable. If it can be "worshipped, prayed to, +sacrificed to, talked with," it is as personal as any deity in a +pantheon. If it has no proper name, neither at one time had men +themselves. And Höffding himself seems disinclined to follow Usener on +this point: "no important period," he says (p. 147), "in the history of +religion can begin with an empty word. The word can neither be the +beginning nor exist at the beginning." Finally Höffding, to enforce +the conclusion that polytheism is evolved from fetichism, says: "The +influence exerted by worship on the life of religious ideas can find no +more striking exemplification than in the word 'god' itself: when we +study those etymologies of this word which, from the philological point +of view, appear most likely to be correct, we find the word really +means 'he to whom sacrifice is made,' or 'he who is worshipped'" (p. +148). +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P134"></A>134}</SPAN> +Professor Wilhelm Thomsen considers the first explanation +the more probable: "In that case there would be a relationship between +the root of the word '<I>gott</I>' and '<I>giessen</I>' (to pour), as also +between the Greek <I>chéein</I>, whose root <I>chu</I> = the Sanskrit <I>hu</I>, from +which comes <I>huta</I>, which means 'sacrificed,' as well as 'he to whom +sacrifices are made'" (p. 396). Now, if "god" means either "he to whom +sacrifice is made" or "he who is worshipped," we have only to enquire +by whom the sacrifice is made or the worship paid, according to +Professor Höffding, in order to see the value of this philological +argument. A leading difference between a fetich and a god is that +sacrifice is made and worship paid to the fetich by its owner, to the +god by the community. Now this philological derivation of "god" throws +no light whatever on the question by whom the "god" is worshipped; but +the content of the passage which I have quoted shows that Professor +Höffding himself here understands the worship of a god to be the +worship paid by the community. If that is so, and if the function or a +function of the being worshipped is to grant the desires of his +worshippers, then the function of the being worshipped by the community +is to grant the desires of the community. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P135"></A>135}</SPAN> +And if that is the +distinguishing mark or a distinguishing mark of a god, then the worship +of a god differs <I>toto caelo</I> from the worship paid to a fetich, whose +distinguishing mark is that it is subservient to the anti-social wishes +of its owner, and is not worshipped by the community. And it is just +as impossible to maintain that a god is evolved out of a fetich as it +would be to argue—indeed it is arguing—that practices destructive of +society or social welfare have only to be pushed far enough and they +will prove the salvation of society. +</P> + +<P> +If in the animistic stage, when everything that is is worked by +spirits, it is possible and desirable for the individual to gain his +individual ends by the coöperation of some spirit, it is equally +possible and more desirable for the community to gain the aid of a +spirit which will further the ends for the sake of which the community +exists. But those ends are not transient or momentary, neither +therefore can the spirit who promotes them be a "momentary" god. And +if we accept Höffding's description of the simplest and earliest +manifestation of the religious spirit as being belief "in a power which +cares whether he [man] has or has not experiences which he values," we +must be careful to make it clear that the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P136"></A>136}</SPAN> +power worshipped by a +community is worshipped because he is believed to care that the +community should have the experiences which the community values. +Having made that stipulation, we may accept Höffding's further +statement (p. 147) that "even the momentary and special gods implied +the existence of a personifying tendency and faculty"; for, although +from our point of view a momentary god is a self-contradictory notion, +we are quite willing to agree that this tendency to personification may +be taken as primary and primitive: religion from the beginning has been +the search after a power essentially personal. But that way of +conceiving spiritual powers is not in itself distinctive of or confined +to religion: it is an intellectual conception; it is the essence of +animism, and animism is not religion. To say that an emotional element +also must be present is true; but neither will that serve to mark off +fetichism from religion. Fetichism also is emotional in tone: it is in +hope that the savage picks up the thing that may prove to have the +fetich power; and it is with fear that he recognises his neighbour's +<I>suhman</I>. A god is not merely a power conceived of intellectually and +felt emotionally to be a personal power from whom things may +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P137"></A>137}</SPAN> +be +hoped or feared; he must indeed be a personal power and be regarded +with hope and fear, but it is by a community that he must be so +regarded. And the community, in turning to such a power, worships him +with sacrifice: a god is indeed he to whom sacrifice is made and +worship paid by the community, with whose interests and whose +morality—with whose good, in a word, he is from the beginning +identified. "In the absence of experience of good as one of the +realities of life, no one," Höffding says, "would ever have believed in +the goodness of the gods"; and, we may add, it is as interested in and +caring for the good of the community that the god of the community is +worshipped. It is in the conviction that he does so care, that +religious feeling is rooted; or, as Höffding puts it (p. 162), it is +rooted in "the need to collect and concentrate ourselves, to resign +ourselves, to feel ourselves supported and carried by a power raised +above all struggle and opposition and beyond all change." There we +have, implicit from the beginning, that communion with god, or striving +thereafter, which is essential to worship. It is faith. It is rest. +It is the heart's desire. And it is not fetichism, nor is fetichism it. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="prayer"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P138"></A>138}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +PRAYER +</H3> + +<P> +The physician, if he is to do his work, must know both a healthy and a +diseased body, or organ, when he sees it. He must know the difference +between the two and the symptoms both of health and disease. Otherwise +he is in danger of trying to cure an organ which is healthy already—in +which case his remedies will simply aggravate the disease. That is +obviously true of the physician who seeks to heal the body, and it is +equally, if not so obviously, true of the physician who seeks to +minister to a mind, or a soul, diseased. Now, the missionary will find +that the heathen, to whom he is to minister, have the habit of prayer; +and the question arises, What is to be his attitude towards it? He +cannot take up the position that prayer is in itself a habit to be +condemned; he is not there to eradicate the habit, or to uproot the +tendency. Neither is he there to create the habit; it already exists, +and the wise missionary will acknowledge its existence with +thankfulness. His business is not to teach his flock to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P139"></A>139}</SPAN> +pray, +but how to pray, that is to say, for what and to whom. But even if he +thus wisely recognises that prayer is a habit not to be created, but to +be trained by him, it is still possible for him to assume rashly that +it is simply impossible for a heathen ever to pray for anything that is +right, and therefore, that it is a missionary's duty first to insist +that everything for which a savage or barbarian prays must be condemned +as essentially irreligious and wicked. In that case, what will such a +missionary, if sent to the Khonds of Orissa, say, when he finds them +praying thus: "We are ignorant of what it is good to ask for. You know +what is good for us. Give it to us!"? Can he possibly say to his +flock, "All your prayers, all the things that you pray for now, are +wicked; and your only hope of salvation lies in ceasing to pray for +them"? If not, then he must recognise the fact that it is possible for +the heathen to pray, and to pray for some things that it is right to +pray for. And he must not only recognise the fact, but he must utilise +it. Nay! more, he must not only recognise the fact if it chances to +force itself upon him, he must go out of his way with the deliberate +purpose of finding out what things are prayed for. He will then find +himself in +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P140"></A>140}</SPAN> +more intimate contact with the soul of the man than he +can ever attain to in any other way; and he may then find that there +are other things for which petitions are put up which could not be +prayed for save by a man who had a defective or erroneous conception of +Him who alone can answer prayer. +</P> + +<P> +But it is a blundering, unbusinesslike way of managing things if the +missionary has to go out to his work unprepared in this essential +matter, and has to find out these things for himself—and perhaps not +find them out at all. The applied science of religion should equip him +in this respect; it should be able to take the facts and truths +established by the science of religion and apply them to the purposes +of the missionary. But it is a striking example of the youth and +immaturity of the science of religion that no attempt has yet been made +by it to collect the facts, much less to coördinate and state them +scientifically. If a thing is clear, when we come to think of it, in +the history of religion, it is that the gods are there to be prayed to: +man worships them because it is on their knees that all things lie. It +is from them that man hopes all things; it is in prayer that man +expresses his hopes and desires. It is from his prayers that we should +be able to find out +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P141"></A>141}</SPAN> +what the gods really are to whom man prays. +What is said about them in mythology—or even in theology—is the +product of reflection, and is in many cases demonstrably different from +what is given in consciousness at the moment when man is striving after +communion with the Highest. Yet it is from mythology, or from the +still more reflective and deliberative expression of ritual, of rites +and ceremonies, that the science of religion has sought to infer the +nature of the gods man worships. The whole apparatus of religion, +rites and ceremonies, sacrifice and altars, nature-worship and +polytheism, has been investigated; the one thing overlooked has been +the one thing for the sake of which all the others exist, the prayer in +which man's soul rises, or seeks to rise, to God. +</P> + +<P> +The reason given by Professor Tylor (<I>Primitive Culture</I>, II, 364) for +this is not that the subject is unimportant, but that it is so simple; +"so simple and familiar," he says, "is the nature of prayer that its +study does not demand that detail of fact and argument which must be +given to rites in comparison practically insignificant." Now, it is +indeed the case that things which are familiar may appear to be simple; +but it is also the case that sometimes things +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P142"></A>142}</SPAN> +are considered +simple merely because they are familiar, and not because they are +simple. The fact that they are not so simple as every one has assumed +comes to be suspected when it is discovered that people take slightly +different views of them. Such slightly different views may be detected +in this case. +</P> + +<P> +Professor Höffding holds that, in the lowest form in which religion +manifests itself, "religion appears under the guise of desire," thus +ranging himself on the side of an opinion mentioned by Professor Tylor +(<I>op. cit.</I>, II, 464) that, as regards the religion of the lower +culture, in prayer "the accomplishment of desire is asked for, but +desire is as yet limited to personal advantage." Now, starting from +this position that prayer is the expression of desire, we have only to +ask, whose desire? that of the individual or that of the community? and +we shall see that under the simple and familiar phrase of "the +accomplishment of desire" there lurks a difference of view which may +possibly widen out into a very wide difference of opinion. If we +appeal to the facts, we may take as an instance a prayer uttered "in +loud uncouth voice of plaintive, piteous tone" by one of the Osages to +Wohkonda, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P143"></A>143}</SPAN> +the Master of Life: "Wohkonda, pity me, I am very poor; +give me what I need; give me success against mine enemies, that I may +avenge the death of my friends. May I be able to take scalps, to take +horses!" etc. (Tylor, II, 365). So on the Gold Coast a negro in the +morning will pray, "Heaven! grant that I may have something to eat this +day" (<I>ib.</I>, 368), not "give us this day our daily bread"; or, raising +his eyes to heaven, he will thus address the god of heaven: "God, give +me to-day rice and yams, gold and agries, give me slaves, riches and +health, and that I may be brisk and swift!" (<I>ib.</I>). On the other +hand, John Tanner (<I>Narrative</I>, p. 46) relates that when Algonquin +Indians were setting out in a fleet of frail bark canoes across Lake +Superior, the chief addressed a prayer to the Great Spirit: "You have +made this lake; and you have made us, your children; you can now cause +that the water shall remain smooth while we pass over in safety." The +chief, it will be observed, did not expressly call the Great Spirit +"our Father," but he did speak of himself and his men as "your +children." If we cross over to Africa, again, we find the Masai women +praying thus; and be it observed that though the first person singular +is used, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P144"></A>144}</SPAN> +it is used by the chorus of women, and is plural in +effect:— +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +I<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"My God, to thee alone I pray<BR> +That offspring may to me be given.<BR> +Thee only I invoke each day,<BR> +O morning star in highest heaven.<BR> +God of the thunder and the rain,<BR> +Give ear unto my suppliant strain.<BR> +Lord of the powers of the air,<BR> +To thee I raise my daily prayer.<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +II<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"My God, to thee alone I pray,<BR> +Whose savour is as passing sweet<BR> +As only choicest herbs display,<BR> +Thy blessing daily I entreat.<BR> +Thou hearest when I pray to thee,<BR> +And listenest in thy clemency.<BR> +Lord of the powers of the air,<BR> +To thee I raise my daily prayer."<BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">—HOLLIS, <I>The Masai</I>, p. 346.</SPAN><BR> +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +When Professor Tylor says that by the savage "the accomplishment of +desire is asked for, but desire is as yet limited to personal +advantage," we must be careful not to infer that the only advantage a +savage is capable of praying for is his own selfish advantage. +Professor Tylor himself quotes (II, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P145"></A>145}</SPAN> +366) the following prayer +from the war-song of a Delaware:— +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"O Great Spirit there above,<BR> +Have pity on my children<BR> +And my wife!<BR> +Prevent that they shall mourn for me!<BR> +Let me succeed in this undertaking,<BR> +That I may slay my enemy<BR> +And bring home the tokens of victory<BR> +To my dear family and my friends<BR> +That we may rejoice together....<BR> +Have pity on me and protect my life,<BR> +And I will bring thee an offering."<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Nor is it exclusively for their own personal advantage that the Masai +women are concerned when they pray for the safe return of their sons +from the wars:— +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"O thou who gavest, thou to whom we pray<BR> +For offspring, take not now thy gift away.<BR> +O morning star, that shinest from afar,<BR> +Bring back our sons in safety from the war."<BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">—HOLLIS, p. 351.</SPAN><BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Nor is it in a purely selfish spirit that the Masai women pray that +their warriors may have the advantage over all their enemies:— +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +I<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"O God of battles, break<BR> +The power of the foe.<BR> +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P146"></A>146}</SPAN> +Their cattle may we take,<BR> +Their mightiest lay low.<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +II<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"Sing, O ye maidens fair,<BR> +For triumph o'er the foe.<BR> +This is the time for prayer<BR> +Success our arms may know.<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +III<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"Morning and evening stars<BR> +That in the heavens glow,<BR> +Break, as in other wars,<BR> +The power of the foe.<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +IV<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"O dweller, where on high<BR> +Flushes at dawn the snow,<BR> +O Cloud God, break, we cry,<BR> +The power of the foe."<BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">—<I>Ib.</I>, p. 352.</SPAN><BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Again, the rain that is prayed for by the Manganja of Lake Nyassa is an +advantage indeed, but one enjoyed by the community and prayed for by +the community. They made offerings to the Supreme Deity that he might +give them rain, and "the priestess dropped the meal handful by handful +on the ground, each time calling in a high-pitched voice, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P147"></A>147}</SPAN> +'Hear +thou, O God, and send rain!' and the assembled people responded, +clapping their hands softly and intoning (they always intone their +prayers), 'Hear thou, O God'" (Tylor, p. 368). +</P> + +<P> +The appeal then to facts shows that it is with the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned, and that it is by +a representative of the community that those desires are offered up in +prayer, and that the community may join in. The appeal to facts shows, +also, that an individual may put up individual petitions, as when a +Yebu will pray: "God in heaven protect me from sickness and death. God +give me happiness and wisdom." But we may safely infer that the only +prayers that the god of the community is expected to harken to are +prayers that are consistent with the interests and welfare of the +community. +</P> + +<P> +From that point of view we must refuse to give more than a guarded +assent to the "opinion that prayer appeared in the religion of the +lower culture, but that in this its earlier stage it was unethical" +(Tylor, 364). Prayer obviously does appear in the religion of the +lower culture, but to say that it there is unethical is to make a +statement which requires defining. The statement means what +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P148"></A>148}</SPAN> +Professor Tylor expresses later on in the words: "It scarcely appears +as though any savage prayer, authentically native in its origin, were +ever directed to obtain moral goodness or to ask pardon for moral sin" +(p. 373). But it might be misunderstood to mean that among savages it +was customary or possible to pray for things recognised by the savage +himself as wrong, and condemned by the community at large. In the +first place, however, the god of the community simply as being the god +of the community would not tolerate such prayers. Next, the range and +extent of savage morality is less extensive than it is—or at any rate +than it ought to be—in our day; and though we must recognise and at +the right time insist upon the difference, that ought not to make us +close our eyes to the fact that the savage does pray to do the things +which savage morality holds it incumbent on him to do, for instance to +fight bravely for the good of his wife, his children, and his tribe, to +carry out the duty of avenging murder. And if he prays for wealth he +also prays for wisdom; if he prays that his god may deliver him from +sickness, that shows he is human rather than that he is a low type of +humanity. +</P> + +<P> +It would seem, then, that though in religions of low +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P149"></A>149}</SPAN> +culture we +meet religion under the guise of desire, we also find that religion +makes a distinction between desires; there are desires which may be +expressed to the god of the community, and desires which may not. +Further, though it is in the heart of a person and an individual that +desire must originate, it does not follow that prayer originates in +individual desire. To say so, we must assume that the same desire +cannot possibly originate simultaneously in different persons. But +that is a patently erroneous assumption: in time of war, the desire for +victory will spring up simultaneously in the hearts of all the tribe; +in time of drought, the prayer for rain will ascend from the hearts of +all the people; at the time of the sowing of seed a prayer for "the +kindly fruits of the earth" may be uttered by every member of the +community. Now it is precisely these desires, which being desires must +originate in individual souls, yet being desires of every individual in +the community are the desires of the community, that are the desires +which take the form of prayer offered by the community or its +representative to the god of the community. Anti-social desires cannot +be expressed by the community or sanctioned by religion. Prayer is the +essential +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P150"></A>150}</SPAN> +expression of true socialism; and the spirit which +prompts it is and has always been the moving spirit of social progress. +</P> + +<P> +Professor Tylor, noticing the "extreme development of mechanical +religion, the prayer-mill of the Tibetan Buddhists," suggests that it +"may perhaps lead us to form an opinion of large application in the +study of religion and superstition; namely, that the theory of prayers +may explain the origin of charms. Charm-formulæ," he says, "are in +very many cases actual prayers, and as such are intelligible. Where +they are mere verbal forms, producing their effect on nature and man by +some unexplained process, may not they or the types they have been +modelled on have been originally prayers, since dwindled into mystic +sentences?" (<I>P. C.</I> II, 372-373). Now, if this suggestion of +Professor Tylor's be correct, it will follow that as charms and spells +are degraded survivals of prayer, so magic generally—of which charms +and spells are but one department—is a degradation of religion. That +in many cases charms and spells are survivals of prayer—formulæ from +which all spirit of religion has entirely evaporated—all students of +the science of religion would now admit. That prayers may +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P151"></A>151}</SPAN> +stiffen into traditional formulæ, and then become vain repetitions +which may actually be unintelligible to those who utter them, and so be +conceived to have a force which is purely magical and a "nature +practically assimilated more or less to that of charms" (<I>l.c.</I>), is a +fact which cannot be denied. But when once the truth has been admitted +that prayers may pass into spells, the possibility is suggested that it +is out of spells that prayer has originated. Mercury raised to a high +temperature becomes red precipitate; and red precipitate exposed to a +still greater heat becomes mercury again. Spells may be the origin of +prayers, if prayers show a tendency to relapse into spells. That +possibility fits in either with the theory that magic preceded religion +or still more exactly with the theory that religion simply is magic +raised, so to speak, to a higher moral temperature. We have therefore +to consider the possibility that the process of evolution has been from +spell to prayer (R. R. Marett, <I>Folk-Lore</I> XV, 2, pp. 132-166); and let +us begin the consideration by observing that the reverse passage—from +prayer to spell—is only possible on the condition that religion +evaporates entirely in the process. The prayer does not become a charm +until the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P152"></A>152}</SPAN> +religion has disappeared entirely from it: a charm +therefore is that in which no religion is, and out of which +consequently no religion can be extracted. If then, <I>per impossibile</I>, +it could be demonstrated that there was a period in the history of +mankind, when charms and magic existed, and religion was utterly +unknown; if it be argued that the spirit of religion, when at length it +breathed upon mankind, transformed spells into prayers—still all that +would then be maintained is that spoken formulæ which were spells were +followed by other formulæ which are the very opposite of spells. Must +we not, however, go one step further and admit that one and the same +form of words may be prayer and religion when breathed in one spirit, +and vain repetition and mere magic when uttered in another? Let us +admit that the difference between prayer and spell lies in the +difference of the spirit inspiring them; and then we shall see that the +difference is essential, fundamental, as little to be ignored as it is +impossible to bridge. +</P> + +<P> +The formula used by the person employing it to express his desire may +or may not in itself suffice to show whether it is religious in intent +and value. Thus in West Africa the women of Framin dance +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P153"></A>153}</SPAN> +and +sing, "Our husbands have gone to Ashantee land; may they sweep their +enemies off the face of the earth" (Frazer, <I>Golden Bough</I>,^2 I, 34). +We may compare the song sung in time of war by the Masai women: "O God, +to whom I pray for offspring, may our children return hither" (Hollis, +p. 351); and there seems no reason why, since the Masai song is +religious, the Framin song may not be regarded as religious also. But +we have to remember that both prayers and spells have a setting of +their own: the desires which they express manifest themselves not only +in what is said but in what is done; and, when we enquire what the +Framin women do whilst they sing the words quoted above, we find that +they dance with brushes in their hands. The brushes are quite as +essential as the words. It is therefore suggested that the whole +ceremony is magical, that the sweeping is sympathetic magic and the +song is a spell. The words explain what the action is intended to +effect, just as in New Caledonia when a man has kindled a smoky fire +and has performed certain acts, he "invokes his ancestors and says, +'Sun! I do this that you may be burning hot, and eat up all the clouds +in the sky'" (Frazer, <I>ib.</I>, 116). Again, amongst the Masai in time of + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P154"></A>154}</SPAN> +drought a charm called ol-kora is thrown into a fire; the old men +encircle the fire and sing:— +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"God of the rain-cloud, slake our thirst,<BR> +We know thy far-extending powers,<BR> +As herdsmen lead their kine to drink,<BR> +Refresh us with thy cooling showers."<BR> +<SPAN STYLE="margin-left: 3em">—HOLLIS, p. 348.</SPAN><BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +If the ol-kora which is thrown into the fire makes it rise in clouds of +smoke, resembling the rain-clouds which are desired, then here too the +ceremony taken as a whole presents the appearance of a magical rite +accompanied by a spoken spell. It is true that in this case the +ceremony is reënforced by an appeal to a god, just as in the New +Caledonian case it is reënforced by an appeal to ancestor worship. But +this may be explained as showing that here we have magic and charms +being gradually superseded by religion and prayer; the old formula and +the old rite are in process of being suffused by a new spirit, the +spirit of religion, which is the very negation and ultimately the +destruction of the old spirit of magic. Before accepting this +interpretation, however, which is intended to show the priority of +magic to religion, we may notice that it is not the only interpretation +of which the facts are susceptible. It is +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P155"></A>155}</SPAN> +based on the +assumption that the words uttered are intended as an explanation of the +meaning of the acts performed. If that assumption is correct, then the +performer of the ceremony is explaining its meaning and intention to +somebody. To whom? In the case of the New Caledonian ceremony, to the +ancestral spirits; in the case of the Masai old men, to the god. Thus, +the religious aspect of the ceremony appears after all to be an +essential part of the ceremony, and not a new element in an old rite. +And, then, we may consistently argue that the Framin women who sing, +"Our husbands have gone to Ashantee land; may they sweep their enemies +off the face of the earth," are either still conscious that they are +addressing a prayer to their native god; or that, if they are no longer +conscious of the fact, they once were, and what was originally prayer +has become by vain repetition a mere spell. All this is on the +assumption that in these ceremonies, the words are intended to explain +the meaning of the acts performed, and therefore to explain it to +somebody, peradventure he will understand and grant the performer of +the ceremony his heart's desire. But, as the consequences of the +assumption do not favour the theory that prayer must be +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P156"></A>156}</SPAN> +preceded +by spell, let us discard the assumption that the words explain the +meaning of the acts performed. Let us consider the possibility that +perhaps the actions which are gone through are meant to explain the +words and make them more forcible. It is undeniable that in moments of +emotion we express ourselves by gesture and the play of our features as +well as by our words; indeed, in reading a play we are apt to miss the +full meaning of the words simply because they are not assisted and +interpreted by the actor's gestures and features. If we take up this +position, that the things done are explanatory of the words uttered and +reënforce them, then the sweeping which is acted by the Framin women +again is not magical; it simply emphasises the words, "may they sweep +their enemies off the face of the earth," and shows to the power +appealed to what it is that is desired. The smoke sent up by the New +Caledonian ancestor worshipper or the Masai old men is a way of +indicating the clouds which they wish to attract or avert respectively. +An equally clear case comes from the Kei Islands: "When the warriors +have departed, the women return indoors and bring out certain baskets +containing fruits and stones. These fruits and stones they anoint and +place on a board, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P157"></A>157}</SPAN> +murmuring as they do so, 'O lord sun, moon, let +the bullets rebound from our husbands, brothers, betrothed, and other +relations, just as raindrops rebound from these objects which are +smeared with oil'" (Frazer, <I>op. cit.</I>, p. 33). It is, I think, +perfectly reasonable to regard the act performed as explanatory of the +words uttered and of the thing desired; the women themselves explain to +their lords, the sun and moon,—with the precision natural to women +when explaining what they want,—exactly how they want the bullets to +bounce off, just like raindrops. Dr. Frazer, however, from whom I have +quoted this illustration, not having perhaps considered the possibility +that the acts performed may be explanatory of the words, is compelled +to explain the action as magical: "in this custom the ceremony of +anointing stones in order that the bullets may recoil from the men like +raindrops from the stones is a piece of pure sympathetic or imitative +magic." He is therefore compelled to suggest that the prayer to the +sun is a prayer that he will give effect to the charm, and is perhaps a +later addition. But independently of the possibility that the actions +performed are explanatory of the words, or rather that words and +actions both are intended to make clear to the sun precisely +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P158"></A>158}</SPAN> +what +the petition is, what tells against Dr. Frazer's suggestion is that the +women want the bullets to bounce off, and it is the power of the god to +which they appeal and on which they rely for the fulfilment of their +prayer. +</P> + +<P> +There is, however, a further consideration which we should perhaps take +into account. Man, when he has a desire which he wishes to +realise,—and the whole of our life is spent in trying to realise what +we wish,—takes all the steps which experience shows to be necessary or +reason suggests; and, when he has done everything that he can do, he +may still feel that nothing is certain in this life, and the thing may +not come off. Under those circumstances he may, and often does, pray +that success may attend his efforts. Now Dr. Frazer, in the second +edition of his <I>Golden Bough</I>, wishing to show that the period of +religion was preceded by a non-religious period in the history of +mankind, suggests that at first man had no idea that his attempts to +realise his desires could fail, and that it was his "tardy recognition" +of the fact that led him to religion. This tardy recognition, he says, +probably "proceeded very slowly, and required long ages for its more or +less perfect accomplishment. For the recognition of man's +powerlessness to influence the course of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P159"></A>159}</SPAN> +nature on a grand scale +must have been gradual" (I, 78). I would suggest, however, that it +cannot have taken "long ages" for savage man to discover that his +wishes and his plans did not always come off. It is, I think, going +too far to imagine that for long ages man had no idea that his attempts +to realise his desires could fail. If religion arises, as Dr. Frazer +suggests, when man recognises his own weakness and his own +powerlessness, often, to effect what he most desires, then man in his +most primitive and most helpless condition must have been most ready to +recognise that there were powers other than himself, and to desire, +that is to pray for, their assistance. Doubtless it would be at the +greater crises, times of pestilence, drought, famine and war, that his +prayers would be most insistent; but it is in the period of savagery +that famine is most frequent and drought most to be feared. Against +them he takes all the measures known to him, all the practical steps +which natural science, as understood by him, can suggest. Now his +theory and practice include many things which, though they are in later +days regarded as uncanny and magical, are to him the ordinary natural +means of producing the effects which he desires. But when he has taken +all +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P160"></A>160}</SPAN> +the steps which practical reason suggests, and experience of +the past approves, savage man, harassed by the dread of approaching +drought or famine, may still breathe out the Manganja prayer, "Hear +thou, O God, and send rain." When, however, he does so, it is, I +suggest, doubly erroneous to infer that this prayer takes the place of +a spell or that apart from the prayer the acts performed are, and +originally were, magical. These acts may be based on the principle +that like produces like and may be performed as the ordinary, natural +means for producing the effect, which have nothing magical about them. +And they are accompanied by a prayer which is not a mere explanation or +statement of the purpose with which the acts are performed, but is the +expression of the heart's desire. +</P> + +<P> +No <I>à priori</I> proofs of any cogency, therefore, have been adduced by +Dr. Frazer, and none therefore are likely to be produced by any one +else, to show that there was ever a period in the history of man when +prayers and religion were unknown to him. The question remains whether +any actual instances are known to the science of religion. +Unfortunately, as I pointed out at the beginning of this lecture, so +neglected by the science of religion has been the subject of prayer +that even now we are scarcely +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P161"></A>161}</SPAN> +able to go beyond the statement +made more than a quarter of a century ago by Professor Tylor that, "at +low levels of civilisation there are many races who distinctly admit +the existence of spirits, but are not certainly known to pray to them +even in thought" (<I>P. C.</I> II, 364). Professor Tylor's statement is +properly guarded: there are races not certainly known to pray. The +possibility that they may yet be discovered to make prayers is not +excluded. +</P> + +<P> +Now, if we turn to one of the lowest levels of culture, that of the +Australian black fellows, we shall find that there is much doubt +amongst students whether the "aborigines have consciously any form of +religion whatever" (Howitt, <I>Native Tribes of S. E. Australia</I>), and in +southeast Australia Mr. Howitt thinks it cannot be alleged that they +have, though their beliefs are such that they might easily have +developed into an actual religion (p. 507). Now one of the tribes of +southeast Australia is that of the Dieri. With them rain is very +important, for periods of drought are frequent; and "rain-making +ceremonies are considered of much consequence" (p. 394). The +ceremonies are symbolic: there is "blood to symbolise the rain" and two +large stones "representing gathering +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P162"></A>162}</SPAN> +clouds presaging rain," just +as the New Caledonian sends up clouds of smoke to symbolise +rain-clouds, and the Masai, we have conjectured, throw ol-kora into the +fire for the same purpose. But the New Caledonian not only performs +the actions prescribed for the rite, he also invokes the spirits of his +ancestors; and the Masai not only go through the proper dance, but call +upon the god of the rain-cloud. The Dieri, however, ought to be +content with their symbolic or sympathetic magic and not offer up any +prayer. But, being unaware of this fact, they do pray: they call "upon +the rain-making <I>Mura-muras</I> to give them power to make a heavy +rainfall, crying out in loud voices the impoverished state of the +country, and the half-starved condition of the tribe, in consequence of +the difficulty in procuring food in sufficient quantity to preserve +life" (p. 394). The <I>Mura-muras</I> seem to be ancestral spirits, like +those invoked by the New Caledonian. If we turn to the Euahlayi tribe +of northwestern New South Wales, we find that at the Boorah rites a +prayer is offered to Byamee, "asking him to let the blacks live long, +for they have been faithful to his charge as shown by the observance of +the Boorah ceremony" (L. Parker, <I>The Euahlayi +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P163"></A>163}</SPAN> +Tribe</I>, p. 79). +That is the prayer of the community to Byamee, and is in conformity +with what we have noted before, viz. that it is with the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned. Another prayer, +the nature of which is not stated by Mrs. Parker, by whom the +information is given us, is put up at funerals, presumably to Byamee by +the community or its representative. Mrs. Parker adds: "Though we say +that actually these people have but two attempts at prayers, one at the +grave and one at the inner Boorah ring, I think perhaps we are wrong. +When a man invokes aid on the eve of battle, or in his hour of danger +and need; when a woman croons over her baby an incantation to keep him +honest and true, and that he shall be spared in danger,—surely these +croonings are of the nature of prayers born of the same elementary +frame of mind as our more elaborate litanies." As an instance of the +croonings Mrs. Parker gives the mother's song over her baby as soon as +it begins to crawl:—- +</P> + +<P CLASS="poem"> +"Kind be,<BR> +Do not steal,<BR> +Do not touch what to another belongs,<BR> +Leave all such alone,<BR> +Kind be."<BR> +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P164"></A>164}</SPAN> + +<P> +These instances may suffice to show that it would not have been safe to +infer, a year or two ago, from the fact that the Australians were not +known to pray, that therefore prayer was unknown to them. Indeed, we +may safely go farther and surmise that other instances besides those +noted really exist, though they have not been observed or if observed +have not been understood. Among the northern tribes of central +Australia rites are performed to secure food, just as they are +performed by the Dieri to avert drought. The Dieri rites are +accompanied by a prayer, as we have seen. The Kaitish rites to promote +the growth of grass are accompanied by the singing of words, which +"have no meaning known to the natives of the present day" (Spencer and +Gillen, <I>Northern Tribes</I>, p. 292). Amongst the Mara tribe the +rain-making rite consists simply in "singing" the water, drinking it +and spitting it out in all directions. In the Anula tribe "dugongs are +a favourite article of food," and if the natives desire to bring them +out from the rocks, they "can do so by 'singing' and throwing sticks at +the rocks" (<I>ib.</I>, pp. 313, 314). It is reasonable to suppose that in +all these cases the "singing" is now merely a charm. But if we +remember that prayers, when +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P165"></A>165}</SPAN> +their meaning is forgotten, pass by +vain repetitions into mere charms, we may also reasonably suppose that +these Australian charms are degraded prayers; and we shall be confirmed +in this supposition to some extent by the fact that in the Kaitish +tribes the words sung "have no meaning known to the natives of the +present day." If the meaning has evaporated, the religion may have +evaporated with it. That the rites, of which the "singing" is an +essential part, have now become magical and are used and understood to +be practised purely to promote the supply of dugongs and other articles +of food, may be freely admitted; but it is unsafe to infer that the +purpose with which the rites continue to be practised is the whole of +the purpose with which they were originally performed. If the meaning +of the "singing" has passed entirely away, the meaning of the rites may +have suffered a change. At the present day the rite is understood to +increase the supply of dugongs or other articles of food. But it may +have been used originally for other purposes. Presumably rites of a +similar kind, certainly of some kind, are practised by the Australians +who have for their totem the blow-fly, the water-beetle, or the evening +star. But they do not +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P166"></A>166}</SPAN> +eat flies or beetles. Their original +purpose in choosing the evening star cannot have been to increase its +number. Nor can that have been the object of choosing the mosquito for +a totem. But if the object of the rites is not to increase the number +of mosquitoes, flies, and beetles, it need not in the first instance +have been the object with which the rites were celebrated in the case +of other totems. +</P> + +<P> +Let us now return to Professor Tylor's statement that "at low levels of +civilisation there are many races who distinctly admit the existence of +spirits, but are not certainly known to pray to them even in thought." +The number of those races who are not known to pray is being reduced, +as we have seen. And I think we may go even farther than that and say +that where the existence of spirits is not merely believed in, but is +utilised for the purpose of establishing permanent relations between a +community and a spirit, we may safely infer that the community offers +prayer to the spirit, even though the fact may have escaped the notice +of travellers. The reason why we may infer it is that at the lower +levels of civilisation we meet with religion, in Höffding's words, "in +the guise of desire." We may put the same truth in other words and say +that religion is +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P167"></A>167}</SPAN> +from the beginning practical. Such prayers as +are known to us to be put up by the lowest races are always practical: +they may be definite petitions for definite goods such as harvest or +rain or victory in time of war; or they may be general petitions such +as that of the Khonds: "We are ignorant of what it is good for us to +ask for. You know what is good for us. Give it us." But in any case +what the god of a community is there for is to promote the good of the +community. It is because the savage has petitions to put up that he +believes there are powers who can grant his petitions. Prayer is the +very root of religion. When the savage has taken every measure he +knows of to produce the result he desires, he then goes on to pray for +the rainfall he desires, crying out in a loud voice "the impoverished +state of the country and the half-starved condition of the tribe." It +is true that it is in moments of stress particularly, if not solely, +that the savage turns to his god—and the same may be said of many of +us—but it is with confidence and hope that he turns to him. If he had +no confidence and no hope, he would offer no prayers. But he has hope, +he has faith; and every time he prays his heart says, if his words do +not, "in Thee, Lord, do we put our trust." +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P168"></A>168}</SPAN> + +<P> +That prayer is the essence, the very breath, of religion, without which +it dies, is shown by the fact that amongst the very lowest races of +mankind we find frequent traditions of the existence of a high god or +supreme being, the creator of the world and the father of mankind. The +numerous traces of this dying tradition have been collected by the +untiring energy and the unrivalled knowledge of Mr. Andrew Lang in his +book, <I>The Making of Religion</I>. In West Africa Dr. Nassau (<I>Fetichism +in West Africa</I>, pp. 36 ff.) "hundreds of times" (p. 37) has found that +"they know of a Being superior to themselves, of whom they themselves," +he says, "inform me that he is the Maker and the Father." What is +characteristic of the belief of the savages in this god is that, in Dr. +Nassau's words, "it is an accepted belief, but it does not often +influence their life. 'God is not in all their thought.' In practice +they give Him no worship." The belief is in fact a dying tradition; +and it is dying because prayer is not offered to this remote and +traditional god. I say that the belief is a dying tradition, and I say +so because its elements, which are all found present and active where a +community believes in, prays to, and worships the god of the community, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P169"></A>169}</SPAN> +are found partially, but only partially, present where the belief +survives but as a tradition. Thus, for instance, where the belief is +fully operative, the god of the community sanctions the morality of the +community; but sometimes where the belief has become merely +traditional, this traditional god is supposed to take no interest in +the community and exercises no ethical influence over the community. +Thus, in West Africa, Nyankupon is "ignored rather than worshipped." +In the Andaman Islands, on the other hand, where the god Puluga is +still angered by sin or wrong-doing, he is pitiful to those in pain or +distress and "sometimes deigns to afford relief" (Lang p. 212 quoting +<I>Man</I>, <I>J. A.</I> I., XII, 158). Again, where the belief in the god of +the community is fully operative, the occasions on which the prayers of +the community are offered are also the occasions on which sacrifice is +made. Where sacrifice and prayers are not offered, the belief may +still for a time survive, at it does among the Fuegians. They make no +sacrifice and, as far as is known, offer no prayers; but to kill a man +brings down the wrath of their god, the big man in the woods: "Rain +come down, snow come down, hail come down, wind blow, blow, very much +blow. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P170"></A>170}</SPAN> +Very bad to kill man. Big man in woods no like it, he +very angry" (Lang, p. 188, quoting Fitzroy, II, 180). But when +sacrifice and prayer cease, the ultimate outcome is that which is found +amongst the West African natives, who, as Dr. Nassau tells us (p. 38), +say with regard to Anzam, whom they admit to be their Creator and +Father, "Why should we care for him? He does not help nor harm us. It +is the spirits who can harm us whom we fear and worship, and for whom +we care." Who the spirits are Dr. Nassau does not say, but they must +be either the other gods of the place or the fetich spirits. And the +reason why Anzam is no longer believed to help or harm the natives is +obviously that, from some cause or other, there is now no longer any +established form of worship of him. The community of which he was +originally the god may have broken up, or more probably may have been +broken up, with the result that the congregation which met to offer +prayer and sacrifice to Anzam was scattered; and the memory of him +alone survives. Nothing would be more natural, then, than that the +natives, when asked by Dr. Nassau, "Why do you not worship him?" (p. +38), should invent a reason, viz. that it is no use worshipping +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P171"></A>171}</SPAN> +him now—the truth being that the form of worship has perished for +reasons now no longer present to the natives' mind. In any case, when +prayers cease to be offered—whether because the community is broken up +or because some new quarter is discovered to which prayers can be +offered with greater hope of success—when prayers, for any reason, do +cease to be offered to a god, the worship of him begins to cease also, +for the breath of life has departed from it. +</P> + +<P> +In this lecture, as my subject is primitive religion, I have made no +attempt to trace the history of prayer farther than the highest point +which it reaches in the lower levels of religion. That is the point +reached by the Khond prayer: "We are ignorant of what it is good to ask +for. You know what is good for us. Give it us." That is also the +highest point reached by the most religious mind amongst the ancient +Greeks: Socrates prayed the gods simply for things good, because the +gods knew best what is good (Xen., <I>Mem.</I>, I, iii, 2). The general +impression left on one's mind by the prayers offered in this stage of +religious development is that man is here and the gods are—there. But +"there" is such a long way off. And yet, far off as it is, man +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P172"></A>172}</SPAN> +never came to think it was so far off that the gods could not hear. +The possibility of man's entering into some sort of communication with +them was always present. Nay! more, a community of interests between +him and them was postulated: the gods were to promote the interests of +the community, and man was to serve the gods. On occasions when +sacrifice was made and prayer was offered, the worshippers entered into +the presence of God, and communion with Him was sought; but stress was +laid rather on the sacrifice offered than on the prayers sent up. The +communion at which animal sacrifice aimed may have been gross at times, +and at others mystic; but it was the sacrifice rather than the prayer +which accompanied it that was regarded as essential to the communion +desired, as the means of bridging the gap between man here and the gods +there. If, however, the gap was to be bridged, a new revelation was +necessary, one revealing the real nature of the sacrifice required by +God, and of the communion desired by man. And that revelation is made +in Our Lord's Prayer. With the most earnest and unfeigned desire to +use the theory of evolution as a means of ordering the facts of the +history of religion and of enabling +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P173"></A>173}</SPAN> +us—so far as it can enable +us—to understand them, one is bound to notice as a fact that the +theory of evolution is unable to account for or explain the revelation, +made in Our Lord's Prayer, of the spirit which is both human and +divine. It is the beam of light which, when turned on the darkness of +the past, enables us to see whither man with his prayers and his +sacrifices had been blindly striving, the place where he fain would be. +It is the surest beacon the missionary can hold out to those who are +still in darkness and who show by the fact that they pray—if only for +rain, for harvest, and victory over all their enemies—that they are +battling with the darkness and that they have not turned entirely away +from the light of His countenance who is never at any time far from any +one of us. Their heart within them is ready to bear witness. Religion +is present in them, if only under "the guise of desire"; but it is "the +desire of all nations" for which they yearn. +</P> + +<P> +There are, Höffding says, "two tendencies in the nature of religious +feeling: on the one hand there is the need to collect and concentrate +ourselves, to resign ourselves, to feel ourselves supported and carried +by a power raised above all +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P174"></A>174}</SPAN> +struggle and opposition and beyond +all change. But within the religious consciousness another need makes +itself felt, the need of feeling that in the midst of the struggle we +have a fellow-struggler at our side, a fellow-struggler who knows from +his own experience what it is to suffer and meet resistance" (<I>The +Philosophy of Religion</I>, § 54). Between these two tendencies Höffding +discovers an opposition or contradiction, an "antinomy of religious +feeling." But it is precisely because Christianity alone of all +religions recognises both needs that it transcends the antinomy. The +antinomy is indeed purely intellectual. Höffding himself says, "only +when recollection, collation, and comparison are possible do we +discover the opposition or the contradiction between the two +tendencies." And in saying that, inasmuch as recollection, collation, +and comparison are intellectual processes, he admits that the antinomy +is intellectual. That it is not an antinomy of religious feeling is +shown by the fact that the two needs exist, that is to say, are both +felt. To say <I>à priori</I> that both cannot be satisfied is useless in +face of the fact that those who feel them find that Christianity +satisfies them. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="sacrifice"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P175"></A>175}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +SACRIFICE +</H3> + +<P> +In my last lecture I called attention to the fact that the subject of +prayer has been strangely neglected by the science of religion. +Religion, in whatever form it manifests itself, is essentially +practical; man desires to enter into communication or into communion +with his god, and in so doing he has a practical purpose in view. That +purpose may be to secure a material blessing of a particular kind, such +as victory in war or the enjoyment of the fruits of the earth in their +due season, or the purpose may be to offer thanks for a harvest and to +pray for a continuance of prosperity generally. Or the purpose of +prayer may be to ask for deliverance from material evils, such as +famine or plague. Or it may be to ask for deliverance from moral evils +and for power to do God's will. In a word, if man had no prayer to +make, the most powerful, if not the only, motive inciting him to seek +communion would be wanting. Now, to some of us it may seem <I>à priori</I> +that there is no reason why the communion thus sought in +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P176"></A>176}</SPAN> +prayer +should require any external rite to sanction or condition it. If that +is our <I>à priori</I> view, we shall be the more surprised to find that in +actual fact an external rite has always been felt to be essential; and +that rite has always been and still is sacrifice, in one or other of +its forms. Or, to put the same fact in another way, public worship has +been from the beginning the condition without which private worship +could not begin and without which private worship cannot continue. To +any form of religion, whatever it be, it is essential, if it is to be +religion, that there shall be a community of worshippers and a god +worshipped. The bond which unites the worshippers with one another and +with their god is religion. From the beginning the public worship in +which the worshippers have united has expressed itself in rites—rites +of sacrifice—and in the prayers of the community. To the end, the +prayers offered are prayers to "Our Father"; and if the worshipper is +spatially separated from, he is spiritually united to, his +fellow-worshippers even in private prayer. +</P> + +<P> +We may then recognise that prayer logically and ultimately implies +sacrifice in one or other of its senses; and that sacrifice as a rite +is meaningless and impossible without prayer. But if we recognise +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P177"></A>177}</SPAN> +that sacrifice wherever it occurs implies prayer, then the fact +that the observers of savage or barbarous rites have described the +ritual acts of sacrifice, but have not observed or have neglected to +report the prayers implied, will not lead us into the error of +imagining that sacrifice is a rite which can exist—that it can have a +religious existence—without prayer. We may attend to either, the +sacrifice or to the prayer, as we may attend either to the concavity or +the convexity of a curve, but we may not deny the existence and +presence of the one because our attention happens to be concentrated on +the other. The relation in primitive religion of the one to the other +we may express by saying that prayer states the motive with which the +sacrifice is made, and that sacrifice is essential to the prayer, which +would not be efficacious without the sacrifice. The reason why a +community can address the god which it worships is that the god is felt +to be identified in some way with the community and to have its +interests in his charge and care. And the rite of sacrifice is felt to +make the identification more real. Prayer, again, is possible only to +the god to whom the community is known; with whom it is identified, +more or less; and with whom, when his help is required, the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P178"></A>178}</SPAN> +community seeks to identify itself more effectually. The means of that +identification without which the prayers of the community would be +ineffectual is sacrifice. The earliest form of sacrifice may probably +be taken to be the sacrifice of an animal, followed by a sacrificial +meal. Later, when the god has a stated place in which he is believed +to manifest himself,—tree or temple,—then the identification may be +effected by attaching offerings to the tree or temple. But in either +case what is sought by the offering dedicated or the meal of sacrifice +is in a word "incorporation." The worshippers desire to feel that they +are at one with the spirit whom they worship. And the desire to +experience this sense of union is particularly strong when plague or +famine makes it evident that some estrangement has taken place between +the god and the community which is normally in his care and under his +protection. The sacrifices and prayers that are offered in such a case +obviously do not open up communication for the first time between the +god and his tribe: they revive and reënforce a communion which is felt +to exist already, even though temporal misfortunes, such as drought or +famine, testify that it has been allowed by the tribe to become less +close than it ought to be, or that +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P179"></A>179}</SPAN> +it has been strained by +transgressions on the part of individual members of the community. But +it is not only in times of public distress that the community +approaches its god with sacrifice and prayer. It so happens that the +prayers offered for victory in war or for rain or for deliverance from +famine are instances of prayer of so marked a character that they have +forced themselves on the notice of travellers in all parts of the +world, from the Eskimo to the Australian black fellows or the negroes +of Africa. And it was to this class of prayers that I called your +attention principally in the last lecture. But they are, when we come +to think of it, essentially occasional prayers, prayers that are +offered at the great crises of tribal life, when the very existence of +the tribe is at stake. Such crises, however, by their very nature are +not regular or normal; and it would be an error to suppose that it is +only on these occasions that prayers are made by savage or barbarous +peoples. If we wish to discover the earliest form of regularly +recurring public worship, we must look for some regularly recurring +occasion for it. One such regularly recurring occasion is harvest +time, another is seed time, another is the annual ceremonial at which +the boys who +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P180"></A>180}</SPAN> +attain in the course of the year to the age of +manhood are initiated into the secrets or "mysteries" of the tribe. +These are the chief and perhaps the only regularly recurring occasions +of public worship as distinguished from the irregular crises of war, +pestilence, drought, and famine which affect the community as a whole, +and from the irregular occasions when the individual member of the +community prays for offspring or for delivery from sickness or for +success in the private undertaking in which he happens to be engaged. +</P> + +<P> +Of the regularly recurring occasions of public worship I will select, +to begin with, the rites which are associated with harvest time. And I +will do so partly because the science of religion provides us with very +definite particulars both as to the sacrifices and as to the prayers +which are usually made on these occasions; and partly because the +prayers that are made are of a special kind and throw a fresh light on +the nature of the communion that the tribe seeks to effect by means of +the sacrificial offering. +</P> + +<P> +At Saa, in the Solomon Islands, yams are offered, and the person +offering them cries in a loud voice, "This is yours to eat" (Frazer, +<I>G. B.</I>^2, II, 465). In +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P181"></A>181}</SPAN> +the Society Islands the formula is, +"Here, Tari, I have brought you something to eat" (<I>ib.</I>, 469). In +Indo-China, the invitation is the same: "Taste, O goddess, these +first-fruits which have just been reaped" (<I>ib.</I>, 325). There are no +actually expressed words of thanks in these instances; but we may +safely conjecture that the offerings are thank-offerings and that the +feeling with which the offerings are made is one of gratitude and +thankfulness. Thus in Ceram we are told that first-fruits are offered +"as a token of gratitude" (<I>ib.</I>, 463). On the Niger the Onitsha +formula is explicit: "I thank God for being permitted to eat the new +yam" (<I>ib.</I>, 325). At Tjumba in the East Indies, "vessels filled with +rice are presented as a thank-offering to the gods" (<I>ib.</I>, 462). The +people of Nias on these occasions offer thanks for the blessings +bestowed on them (<I>ib.</I>, 463). By a very natural transition of thought +and feeling, thankfulness for past favours leads to prayer for the +continuance of favour in the future. Thus in Tana, in the New +Hebrides, the formula is: "Compassionate father! here is some food for +you; eat it; be kind to us on account of it" (<I>ib.</I>, 464); while the +Basutos say: "Thank you, gods; give us bread to-morrow also" (<I>ib.</I>, +459); and in Tonga the prayers +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P182"></A>182}</SPAN> +made at the offering of +first-fruits implore the protection of the gods, and beseech them for +welfare generally, though in especial for the fruits of the earth +(<I>ib.</I>, 466). +</P> + +<P> +The prayers of primitive man which I quoted in my last lecture were in +the nature of petitions or requests, as was natural and indeed +inevitable in view of the fact that they were preferred on occasions +when the tribe was in exceptional distress and required the aid of the +gods on whose protection the community relied. But the prayers which I +have just quoted are not in their essence petitions or requests, even +though in some cases they tend to become so. They are essentially +prayers of thanksgiving and the offerings made are thank-offerings. +Thus our conception of primitive prayer must be extended to include +both mental attitudes—that of thankfulness for past or present +blessings as well as the hope of blessings yet to come. And inasmuch +as sacrifice is the concomitant of prayer, we must recognise that +sacrificial offerings also serve as the expression of both mental +attitudes. And we must note that in the regularly recurring form of +public or tribal worship with which we are now dealing the dominant +feeling to which expression is given is +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P183"></A>183}</SPAN> +that of thankfulness. +The tribe seeks for communion with its god for the purpose of +expressing its thanks. Even the savage who simply says, "Here, Tari, I +have brought you something to eat," or, still more curtly, "This is +yours to eat," is expressing thanks, albeit in savage fashion. And the +means which the savage adopts for securing that communion which he +seeks to renew regularly with the tribal god is a sacrificial meal, of +which the god and his worshippers partake. Throughout the whole +ceremony, whether we regard the spoken words or the acts performed, +there is no suggestion of magic and no possibility of twisting the +ceremony into a piece of magic intended to produce some desired result +or to exercise any constraint over the powers to which the ceremony is +addressed. The mental attitude is that of thankfulness. +</P> + +<P> +Now, it is, I venture to suggest, impossible to dissociate from the +first-fruits ceremonials which I have described the ceremonies observed +by Australian black fellows on similar occasions. And it is also +impossible to overlook the differences between the ceremony in +Australia and the ceremony elsewhere. In Australia, as elsewhere, when +the time of year arrives at which the food becomes fit for eating, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P184"></A>184}</SPAN> +a ceremony has to be performed before custom permits the food to +be eaten freely. In Australia, as elsewhere, a ceremonial eating, a +sacramental meal, has to take place. But whereas elsewhere the god of +the community is expressly invited to partake of the sacramental meal, +even though he be not mentioned by name and though the invitation take +the curt form of "This is yours to eat," in Australia no words whatever +are spoken; the person who performs the ceremony performs it indeed +with every indication of reverential feeling, he eats solemnly and +sparingly, that is to say formally and because the eating is a matter +of ritual, but no reference is made by him so far as we know, to any +god. How then are we to explain the absence of any such reference? +There seems to me to be only one explanation which is reasonably +possible. It is that in the Australian ceremony, which would be +perfectly intelligible and perfectly in line with the ceremony as it +occurs everywhere else, the reference to the god who is or was invited +to partake of the first-fruits has in the process of time and, we must +add, in the course of religious decay, gradually dropped out. The +invitation may never have been more ample than the curt form, "This is +yours to eat." Even in the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P185"></A>185}</SPAN> +absence of any verbal invitation +whatever, a gesture may long have sufficed to indicate what was in the +mind and was implied by the act of the savage performing the ceremony. +Words may not have been felt necessary to explain what every person +present at the ceremony knew to be the purpose of the rite. But in the +absence of any verbal formula whatever the purpose and meaning of the +rite would be apt to pass out of mind, to evaporate, even though custom +maintained, as it does in Australia to this day maintain, the punctual +and punctilious performance of the outward ceremony. I suggest, +therefore, that in Australia, as elsewhere, the solemn eating of the +first-fruits has been a sacramental meal of which both the god and his +worshippers were partakers. The alternative is to my mind much less +probable: it is to use the Australian ceremony as it now exists to +explain the origin of the ceremony as we find it elsewhere. In +Australia it is not now apparently associated with the worship of any +god; therefore it may be argued in other countries also it was not +originally part of the worship of any god either. If, then, it was not +an act of public worship originally, how are we to understand it? The +suggestion is that the fruits of the earth or the animals which become +the food of +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P186"></A>186}</SPAN> +man are, until they become fit for eating, regarded +as sacred or taboo, and therefore may not be eaten. That suggestion +derives some support from the fact that in Australia anything that is +eaten may be a totem and being a totem is taboo. But if it is thus +sacred, then in order to be eaten it must be "desacralised," the taboo +must be taken off. And it is suggested that that precisely is what is +effected by the ceremonial eating of the totem by the headman of the +totem clan: the totem is desacralised by the mere fact that it is +formally and ceremonially eaten by the headman, after which it may be +consumed by others as an ordinary article of food. But this +explanation of the first-fruits ceremony is based upon an assumption +which is contrary to the facts of the case as it occurs in Australia. +It assumes that the plant or the animal until desacralised is taboo to +all members of the tribe, and that none of them can eat it until it has +been desacralised by the ceremonial eating. But the assumption is +false; the plant or animal is sacred and taboo only to members of the +clan whose totem it is. It is not sacred to the vast majority of the +tribe, for they have totems of their own; to them it is not sacred or +taboo, they may kill it—and they do—without breaking any taboo. The +ceremonial +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P187"></A>187}</SPAN> +eating of the first-fruits raises no taboo as far as +the tribe generally is concerned, for the plant or animal is not taboo +to them. As far as the tribe generally is concerned, no process of +desacralisation takes place and none is effected by the ceremonial +eating. It is the particular totem group alone which is affected by +the ceremony; and the inference which it seems to me preferable to draw +is that the ceremonial eating of the first-fruits is, or rather has +been, in Australia what it is elsewhere, viz. an instance of prayer and +sacrifice in which the worshippers of a god are brought into +periodic—in this case annual—communion with their god. The +difference between the Australian case and others seems to be that in +the other cases the god who partakes of the first-fruits is the god of +the whole community, while in Australia he is the god of the particular +totem group and is analogous to the family gods who are worshipped +elsewhere, even where there is a tribal or national god to be +worshipped as well. +</P> + +<P> +We are then inclined, for these and other reasons, to explain the +ceremonial eating of the totem plant or animal in Australia by the +analogy of the ceremonial eating of first-fruits elsewhere, and to +regard the ceremony as being in all cases an act of worship, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P188"></A>188}</SPAN> +in +which at harvest time the worshippers of a god seek communion with him +by means of sacrifice and prayers of thanksgiving. But if we take this +view of the sacrifice and prayers offered at harvest time, we shall be +inclined to regard the rites which are performed at seed time, or the +period analogous to it, as being also possibly, in part, of a religious +character. In the case of agricultural peoples it is beyond doubt that +some of the ceremonies are religious in character: where the food plant +is itself regarded as a deity or the mode in which a deity is +manifested, not only may there be at harvest time a sacramental meal in +which, as amongst the Aztecs, the deity is formally "communicated" to +his worshippers, but at seed time sacrifice and prayer may be made to +the deity. Such a religious ceremony, whatever be the degree of +civilisation or semicivilisation which has been reached by those who +observe the ceremony, does not of course take the place of the +agricultural operations which are necessary if the fruits are to be +produced in due season. And the combination of the religious rites and +the agricultural operations does not convert the agricultural +operations into magical operations, or prove that the religious rites +are merely pieces of magic +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P189"></A>189}</SPAN> +intended to constrain the superior +power of the deity concerned. Indeed, if among the operations +performed at seed time we find some that from the point of view of +modern science are perfectly ineffectual, as vain as eating tiger to +make you bold, we shall be justified in regarding them as pieces of +primitive science, eventually discarded indeed in the progress of +advancing knowledge, but originally practised (on the principle that +like produces like) as the natural means of producing the effect +desired. If we so regard them, we shall escape the error of +considering them to be magical; and we shall have no difficulty in +distinguishing them from the religious rites which may be combined with +them. Further, where harvest time is marked by the offering of +sacrifice and prayers of thanksgiving, we may not unreasonably take it +that the religious rites observed at seed time or the period analogous +to it are in the nature of sacrifice and prayers addressed to the +appropriate deity to beseech him to favour the growth of the plant or +animal in question. In a word, the practice of giving thanks to a god +at harvest time for the harvest creates a reasonable presumption that +prayer is offered to him at seed time; and if thanks are given at a +period analogous to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P190"></A>190}</SPAN> +harvest time by a people like the Australian +black fellows, who have no domesticated plants or animals, prayers of +the nature of petitions may be offered by them at the period analogous +to seed time. +</P> + +<P> +The deity to whom prayers are offered at the one period and +thanksgiving is made at the other may be, as in the case of the Aztec +Xilonen, or the Hindoo Maize-mother, the spirit of the plant envisaged +as a deity; or may be, not a "departmental" deity of this kind, but a +supreme deity having power over all things. But when we turn from the +regularly recurring acts of public worship connected with seed time and +harvest to the regularly recurring ceremonies at which the boys of a +tribe are initiated into the duties and rights of manhood, it is +obvious that the deity concerned in them, even if we assume (as is by +no means necessary) that he was originally "departmental" and at first +connected merely with the growth of a plant or animal, must be regarded +at the initiation ceremonies as a god having in his care all the +interests of that tribe of which the boys to be initiated are about to +become full members. Unmistakable traces of such a deity are found +amongst the Australian black fellows in the "father of all," "the +all-father" described by Mr. Howitt. The +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P191"></A>191}</SPAN> +worship of the +"all-father" is indeed now of a fragmentary kind; but it fortunately +happens that in the case of one tribe, the Euahlayi, we have evidence, +rescued by Mrs. Langloh Parker, to show that prayer is offered to +Byamee; the Euahlayi pray to him for long life, because they have kept +his law. The nature of Byamee's law may safely be inferred from the +fact that at this festival, both amongst the Euahlayi and other +Australians, the boys who are being initiated are taught the moral laws +or the customary morality of the tribe. But though prayers are still +offered by the Euahlayi and may have at one time been offered by all +the Australian tribes, there is no evidence at present to show that the +prayer is accompanied by a sacrifice, as is customary amongst tribes +whose worship has not disintegrated so much as is the case amongst the +Australians. +</P> + +<P> +The ceremonies by which boys are admitted to the status of manhood are, +probably amongst all the peoples of the earth who observe them, of a +religious character, for the simple reason that the community to which +the boy is admitted when he attains the age of manhood is a community, +united together by religious bonds as a community worshipping the same +god or gods; and it is to the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P192"></A>192}</SPAN> +worship and the service of these +gods that he is admitted. But the ceremonies themselves vary too much +to allow of our drawing from them any valuable or important conclusion +as to the nature and import of sacrifice as a religious institution. +On the other hand, the ceremonies observed at harvest time, or the +analogous period, have, wherever they occur, such marked similarity +among themselves, and the institution of prayer and sacrifice is such a +prominent feature in them, that the evidence they afford must be +decisive for us in attempting to form a theory of sacrifice. Nor can +we dissociate the ceremonies observed in spring from the harvest +ceremonies; as Dr. Frazer remarks (<I>G. B.</I>, II, 190), "Plainly these +spring and harvest customs are based on the same ancient modes of +thought and form parts of the same primitive heathendom." What, then, +are these "ancient modes of thought" and what the primitive customs +based upon them? We may, I think, classify them in four groups. If we +are to take first those instances in which the "ancient mode of +thought" is most clearly expressed—whether because they are the most +fully developed or because they retain the ancient mode most faithfully +and with the least disintegration—we must +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P193"></A>193}</SPAN> +turn to ancient Mexico +and Peru. In Mexico a paste idol or dough image of the god was made; +the priest hurled a dart into its breast; and this was called the +killing of the god, "so that his body might be eaten." The dough image +was broken and the pieces were given in the manner of a communion to +the people, "who received it with such tears, fear, and reverence, as +it was an admirable thing," says Father Acosta, "saying that they did +eat the flesh and bones of God." Or, again, an image of the goddess +Chicomecoatl was made of dough and exhibited by the priest, saying, +"This is your god." All kinds of maize, beans, etc., were offered to +it and then were eaten in the temple "in a general scramble, take who +could." In Peru ears of maize were dressed in rich garments and +worshipped as the Mother of the Maize; or little loaves of maize +mingled with the blood of sheep were made; the priest gave to each of +the people a morsel of these loaves, "and all did receive and eat these +pieces," and prayed that the god "would show them favour, granting them +children and happy years and abundance and all that they required." In +this, the first group of instances, it is plain beyond all possibility +of gainsaying that the spring and harvest customs consist +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P194"></A>194}</SPAN> +of the +worship of a god, of sacrifice and prayers to him, and of a communion +which bound the worshippers to one another and to him. +</P> + +<P> +Our second group of instances consists of cases in which the corn or +dough or paste is not indeed made into the form or image of a god, but, +as Dr. Frazer says (<I>G. B.</I> II, 318), "the new corn is itself eaten +sacramentally, that is, as the body of the corn spirit." The spirit +thus worshipped may not yet have acquired a proper name; the only +designation used may have been such a one as the Hindoo Bhogaldai, +meaning simply Cotton-mother. Indeed, even amongst the Peruvians, the +goddess had not yet acquired a proper name, but was known only as the +Mother of the Maize. But precisely because the stage illustrated in +our second group of instances is not so highly developed as in Mexico +or Peru it is much more widely spread. It is found in the East Indian +island of Euro, amongst the Alfoors of Minahassa, in the Celebes, in +the Neilgherry Hills of South India, in the Hindoo Koosh, in +Indo-China, on the Niger, amongst the Zulus and the Pondos, and amongst +the Creek, Seminole, and Natchez Indians (<I>ib.</I> 321-342). In this, the +second group of instances, then, though the god +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P195"></A>195}</SPAN> +may have no +special, proper, name, and though no image of him is made out of the +dough or paste, still "the new corn is itself eaten sacramentally, that +is as the body of the corn spirit"; by means of the sacramental eating, +of sacrifice and prayer, communion between the god and his worshippers +is renewed and maintained. +</P> + +<P> +The third group of instances consists of the harvest customs of +northern Europe—the harvest supper and the rites of the Corn-mother or +the Corn-maiden or the Kern Baby. It can scarcely be contended that +these rites and customs, so far as they survive at the present day, +retain, if they ever had, any religious value; they are performed as a +matter of tradition and custom and not because any one knows why they +are performed. But that they originally had a meaning—even though now +it has evaporated—cannot be doubted. Nor can it be doubted that the +meaning, if it is to be recovered, must be recovered by means of the +comparative method. And, if the comparative method is to be applied, +the Corn-mother of northern Europe cannot be dissociated from the +Maize-mother of ancient Peru. But if we go thus far, then we must, +with Dr. Frazer (<I>ib.</I> 288), recognise "clearly the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P196"></A>196}</SPAN> +sacramental +character of the harvest-supper," in which, "as a substitute for the +real flesh of the divine being, bread and dumplings are made and eaten +sacramentally." Thus, once more, harvest customs testify in northern +Europe, as elsewhere, to the fact that there was once a stated, annual, +period at which communion between the god and his worshipper was sought +by prayer and sacrifice. +</P> + +<P> +The North-European harvest customs are further interesting and +important because, if they are clearly connected on the one hand with +the groups of instances already given, they are also connected on the +other with the group to which we have yet to call attention. Thus far +the wheat or maize, if not eaten in the form of little loaves or cakes, +has been made into a dough image, or else the ears of maize have been +dressed in rich garments to indicate that they represent the Mother of +the Maize; and in Europe also both forms of symbolism are found. But +in northern Europe, the corn spirit is also believed to be manifested, +Dr. Frazer says, in "the animal which is present in the corn and is +caught or killed in the last sheaf." The animal may be a wolf, dog, +cock, hare, cat, goat, bull, cow, horse, or pig. "The animal is slain +and its flesh and blood are partaken +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P197"></A>197}</SPAN> +of by the harvesters," and, +Dr. Frazer says, "these customs bring out clearly the sacramental +character of the harvest supper." Now, this manifestation of the corn +spirit in animal form is not confined to Europe; it occurs for instance +in Guinea and in all the provinces and districts of China. And it is +important as forming a link between the agricultural and the +pre-agricultural periods; in Dr. Frazer's words, "hunting and pastoral +tribes, as well as agricultural peoples, have been in the habit of +killing their gods" (<I>ib.</I> 366). In the pastoral period, as well as in +agricultural times, the god who is worshipped by the tribe and with +whom the tribe seeks communion by means of prayer and sacrifice, may +manifest himself in animal form, and "the animal is slain and its flesh +and blood are partaken of." +</P> + +<P> +We now come to the fourth and the last of our groups of instances. It +consists of the rites observed by Australian tribes. Amongst these +tribes too there is what Dr. Frazer terms "a sacramental eating" of the +totem plant or animal. Thus Central Australian black men of the +kangaroo totem eat a little kangaroo flesh, as a sacrament (Spencer and +Gillen, p. 204 ff.). Now, it is impossible, I think, to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P198"></A>198}</SPAN> +dissociate the Australian rite, to separate this fourth group, from the +three groups already described. In Australia, as in the other cases, +the customs are observed in spring and harvest time, and in harvest +time, in Australia as well as elsewhere, there is a solemn and sparing +eating of the plant or animal; and, in Dr. Frazer's words, "plainly +these spring and harvest customs are based on the same ancient modes of +thought, and form part of the same primitive heathendom." What, then, +is this ancient and primitive mode of thought? In all the cases except +the Australian, the thought manifestly implied and expressed is that by +the solemn eating of the plant or the animal, or the dough image or +paste idol, or the little loaves, the community enters into communion +with its god, or renews communion with him. On this occasion the +Peruvians prayed for children, happy years and abundance. On this +occasion, even among the Australians, the Euahlayi tribe pray for long +life, because they have kept Byamee's law. It would not, therefore, be +unreasonable to interpret the Australian custom by the same ancient +mode of thought which explains the custom wherever else—and that is +all over the world—it is found. But perhaps, if we can find some +other interpretation +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P199"></A>199}</SPAN> +of the Australian custom, we should do +better to reverse the process and explain the spring and harvest +customs which are found elsewhere by means of, and in accordance with, +the Australian custom. Now another interpretation of the Australian +custom has been put forward by Dr. Frazer. He treats the Australian +ceremony as being a piece of pure magic, the purpose of which is to +promote the growth and increase of the plants and animals which provide +the black fellows with food. But if we start from this point of view, +we must go further and say that amongst other peoples than the +Australian the killing of the representative animal of the spirit of +vegetation is, in Dr. Frazer's words, "a magical rite intended to +assure the revival of nature in spring." And if that is the nature of +the rite which appears in northern Europe as the harvest supper, it +will also be the nature of the rite as it appears both in our second +group of instances, where the corn is eaten "as the body of the +corn-spirit," and in the first group, where the dough image or paste +idol was eaten in Mexico as the flesh and bones of the god. That this +line of thought runs through Dr. Frazer's <I>Golden Bough</I>, in its second +edition, is indicated by the fact that the rite is spoken of throughout +as a +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P200"></A>200}</SPAN> +sacrament. That the Mexican rite as described in our first +group is sacramental, is clear. Of the rites which form our second +group of instances, Dr. Frazer says that the corn-spirit, or god, "is +killed in the person of his representative and eaten sacramentally," +and that "the new corn is itself eaten sacramentally; that is, as the +body of the corn-spirit" (p. 318). Of the North European rites, again, +he says, "the animal is slain and its flesh and blood are partaken of +by the harvesters"—"these customs bring out clearly the sacramental +character of the harvest supper"—"as a substitute for the real flesh +of the divine being, bread or dumplings are made in his image and eaten +sacramentally." Finally, even when speaking of the Australians as men +who have no gods to worship, and with whom the rite is pure and +unadulterated magic, he yet describes the rite as a sacrament. +</P> + +<P> +Now if, on the one hand, from its beginning amongst the Australians to +the form which it finally took amongst the Mexicans the rite is, as Dr. +Frazer systematically calls it, a sacrament; and if, on the other, it +is, in Dr. Frazer's words, "a magical rite intended to assure the +revival of nature in spring," then the conclusion which the reader +cannot help +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P201"></A>201}</SPAN> +drawing is that a sacrament, or this sacrament at +least, is in its origin, and in its nature throughout, a piece of +magic. Religion is but magic written in different characters; and for +those who can interpret them it spells the same thing. But though this +is the conclusion to which Dr. Frazer's argument leads, and to which in +the first edition of his <I>Golden Bough</I> it clearly seemed to point; in +the preface to the second edition he formally disavows it. He +recognises that religion does not spring from magic, but is +fundamentally opposed to it. A sacrament, therefore, we may infer, +cannot be a piece of magic. The Australian sacrament, therefore, as +Dr. Frazer calls it, cannot, we should be inclined to say, be a piece +of magic. But Dr. Frazer still holds that the Australian rite or +sacrament is pure magic—religious it cannot be, for in Dr. Frazer's +view the Australians know no religion and have no gods. +</P> + +<P> +Now if the rite as it occurs in Australia is pure magic, and if +religion is not a variety of magic but fundamentally different from it, +then the rite which, as it occurs everywhere else, is religious, cannot +be derived from, or a variety of, the Australian piece of magic; and +the spring and harvest customs which are found in Australia cannot be +"based on the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P202"></A>202}</SPAN> +same ancient modes of thought or form part of the +same primitive heathendom" as the sacramental rites which are found +everywhere else in the world. The solemn annual eating of the totem +plant or animal in Australia must have a totally different basis from +that on which the sacrament and communion stands in every other part of +the globe: in Australia it is based on magic, elsewhere on that which +is, according to Dr. Frazer, fundamentally different and opposed to +magic, viz. religion. Before, however, we commit ourselves to this +conclusion, we may be allowed to ask, What is it that compels us thus +to sever the Australian from the other forms of the rite? The reply +would seem to be that, whereas the other forms are admittedly +religious, the Australian is "a magical rite intended to assure the +revival of nature in spring." Now, if that were really the nature of +the Australian rite, we might have to accept the conclusion to which we +hesitate to commit ourselves. But, as a matter of fact, the Australian +rite is not intended to assure the revival of nature in spring, and has +nothing magical about it. It is perfectly true that in spring in +Australia certain proceedings are performed which are based upon the +principle that like produces like; and +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P203"></A>203}</SPAN> +that these proceedings +are, by students of the science of religion, termed—perhaps +incorrectly—magical. But these spring customs are quite different +from the harvest customs; and it is the harvest customs which +constitute the link between the rite in Australia and the rite in the +rest of the world. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the +Australian harvest rite is magical, or is even based on the principle +that like produces like. And the answer is that it is plainly not. +The harvest rite in Australia consists, as we know it now, simply in +the fact that at the appointed time a little of the totem plant or +animal is solemnly and sparingly eaten by the headman of the totem. +The solemnity with which the rite is performed is unmistakable, and may +well be termed religious. And no attempt even, so far as I am aware, +has been made to show that this solemn eating is regarded as magic by +the performers of the rite, or how it can be so regarded by students of +the science of religion. Until the attempt is made and made +successfully, we are more than justified in refusing to regard the rite +as magical; we are bound to refuse to regard it as such. But if the +rite is not magical—and <I>à fortiori</I> if it is, as Dr. Frazer terms it, +sacramental—then it is +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P204"></A>204}</SPAN> +religious; and the ancient mode of +thought, forming part of primitive heathendom, which is at the base of +the rite, is the conviction that manifests itself wherever the rite +continues to live, viz. that by prayer and sacrifice the worshippers in +any community are brought into communion with the god they worship. +The rite is, in truth, what Dr. Frazer terms it as it occurs in +Australia—a sacrament. But not even in Australia is a sacrament a +piece of magic. +</P> + +<P> +In the animistic stage of the evolution of humanity, the only causes +man can conceive of are animated things; and, in the presence of any +occurrence sufficiently striking to arrest his attention, the questions +which present themselves to his mind are, Who did this thing, and why? +Occurrences which arrest the attention of the community are occurrences +which affect the community; and in a low stage of evolution, when the +most pressing of all practical questions is how to live, the +occurrences which most effectually arrest attention are those which +affect the food supply of the community. If, then, the food supply +fails, the occurrence is due to some of the personal, or +quasi-personal, powers by whom the community is surrounded; and the +reason why such power so acted is found in the wrath which +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P205"></A>205}</SPAN> +must +have actuated him. The situation is abnormal, for famine is abnormal; +and it indicates anger and wrath on the part of the power who brought +it about. But it also implies that when things go on in the normal +way,—when the relations between the spirit and the community are +normal,—the attitude of the spirit to the community is peaceable and +friendly. Not only, however, does the community desire to renew +peaceable and friendly relations, where pestilence or famine show that +they have been disturbed: the community also desires to benefit by them +when they are in their normal condition. The spirits that can disturb +the normal conditions by sending pestilence or famine can also assist +the community in undertakings, the success of which is indispensable if +the community is to maintain its existence; for instance, those +undertakings on which the food supply of the community depends. Hence +the petitions which are put up at seed time, or, in the +pre-agricultural period, at seasons analogous to seed time. Hence, +also, the rites at harvest time or the analogous season, rites which +are instituted and developed for the purpose of maintaining friendly +relation and communion between the community, and the spirit whose +favour +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P206"></A>206}</SPAN> +is sought and whose anger is dreaded by the community. +Such sacrificial rites may indeed be interpreted as the making of gifts +to the gods; and they do, as a matter of fact, often come so to be +regarded by those who perform them. From this undeniable fact the +inference may then be drawn, and by many students of the science of +religion it is inferred, that from the beginning there was in such +sacrificial rites no other intention than to bribe the god or to +purchase his favour and the good things he had to give. But the +inference, which, when properly limited, has some truth in it, becomes +misleading when put forward as being the whole truth. Unless there +were some truth in it, the rite of sacrifice could never have developed +into the form which was denounced by the Hebrew prophets and +mercilessly exposed by Plato. But had that been the whole truth, the +rite would have been incapable of discharging the really religious +function which it has in its history fulfilled. That function has been +to place and maintain the society which practises it in communion with +its god. Doubtless in the earliest stages of the history of the rite, +the communion thus felt to be established was prized and was mainly +sought for the external blessings which were believed +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P207"></A>207}</SPAN> +to follow +from it, or, as a means to avert the public disasters which a breach of +communion entailed. Doubtless it was only by degrees, and by slow +degrees, that the communion thus established came to be regarded as +being in itself the end which the rite of sacrifice was truly intended +to attain. But the communion of the worshippers with their god was not +a purpose originally foreign to the rite, and which, when introduced, +transformed the rite from what it at first was into something radically +different. On the contrary, it was present, even though not prominent +or predominant, from the beginning; and the rite, as a religious +institution, followed different lines of evolution, according as the +one aspect or the other was developed. Where the aspect under which +the sacrificial rite was regarded was that the offering was a gift made +to the deity in order to secure some specified temporal advantage, the +religious value of the rite diminished to the vanishing point in the +eyes both of those who, like Plato, could see the intrinsic absurdity +of pretending to make gifts to Him from whom alone all good things +come, and of those who felt that the sacrificial rite so conceived did +not afford the spiritual communion for which they yearned. Where even +the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P208"></A>208}</SPAN> +sacrificial rite was regarded as a means whereby communion +between the worshipper and his god was attained or maintained, the +emphasis might be thrown on the rite and its due performance rather +than on the spiritual communion of which it was the condition. That is +to say, with the growth of formalism attention was concentrated on the +ritual and correspondingly withdrawn from the prayer which, from the +beginning, had been of the essence of the rite. By the rite of +sacrifice the community had always been brought into the presence of +the god it worshipped; and, in the prayers then offered on behalf of +the society, the society had been brought into communion with its god. +From that communion it was possible to fall away, even though the +performance of the rite was maintained. The very object of that +communion might be misinterpreted and mistaken to be a means merely to +temporal blessings for the community, or even to personal advantages +for the individual. Or the punctilious performance of each and every +detail of the rite might tend to become an end in itself and displace +the spiritual communion, the attainment of which had been from the +beginning the highest, even if not the only or the most prominent, + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P209"></A>209}</SPAN> +end which the rite might subserve. The difference between the +possibilities which the rite might have realised and the actual +purposes for which it had come to be used before the birth of Christ is +a difference patent to the most casual observer of the facts. The +dissatisfaction felt alike by Plato and the Hebrew prophets with the +rite as it had come to be practised may be regarded, if we choose so to +regard it, as the necessary consequence of pre-existing facts, and as +necessarily entailing the rejection or the reconstitution of the rite. +As a matter of history, the rite was reconstituted and not rejected; +and as reconstituted it became the central fact of the Christian +religion. It became the means whereby, through Christ, all men might +be brought to God. We may say, if we will, that a new meaning was put +into the rite, or that its true meaning was now made manifest. The +facts themselves clearly indicate that from the beginning the rite was +the means whereby a society sought or might seek communion with its +god. They also indicate that the rite of animal sacrifice came to be +found insufficient as a means. It was through our Lord that mankind +learned what sacrifice was needed—learned to "offer and present unto +thee, O Lord, ourselves, our +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P210"></A>210}</SPAN> +souls and bodies, to be a +reasonable, holy and lively sacrifice unto thee." That is the +sacrifice Christ showed us the example of; that is the example which +the missionary devotes himself to follow and to teach. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="morality"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P211"></A>211}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +MORALITY +</H3> + +<P> +In this lecture I propose to consider the question whether morality is +based on religion or religion on morality. It is a question which may +be approached from the point of view either of philosophy or of +history. Quite recently it has been treated from the former point of +view by Professor Höffding in <I>The Philosophy of Religion</I> (translated +into English, 1906); and from the point of view of the history of +morality by Mr. Hobhouse in his <I>Morals in Evolution</I> (1906). It may, +of course, also be quite properly approached from the point of view of +the history of religion; and from whatever standpoint it is treated, +the question is one of importance for the missionary, both because of +its intrinsic interest for the philosophy of religion, and because its +discussion is apt to proceed on a mistaken view of facts in the history +of religion. About those facts and their meaning, the missionary, who +is to be properly equipped for his work, should be in no doubt: a right +view and a proper estimate of the facts are essential both for +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P212"></A>212}</SPAN> +his practical work and for the theoretical justification of his +position. +</P> + +<P> +One answer to the question before us is that morality is the basal +fact—the bottom fact: if we regard the question historically, we shall +find that morality came first and religion afterwards; and, even if +that were not so, we should find that as a matter of logic and +philosophy religion presupposes morality—religion may, for a time, be +the lever that moves the world, but it would be powerless if it had not +a fulcrum, and that fulcrum is morality. So long and so far as +religion operates beneficially on the world, it does so simply because +it supports and reënforces morality. But the time is not far distant, +and may even now be come, when morality no longer requires any support +from religion—and then religion becomes useless, nay! an encumbrance +which must either fall off or be lopped off. If, therefore, morality +can stand by itself, and all along has not merely stood by itself, but +has really upheld religion, in what is morality rooted? The answer is +that morality has its roots, not in the command that thou shalt love +the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all thy soul, but in human +solidarity, in humanity regarded as a spiritual whole. To +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P213"></A>213}</SPAN> +this +conclusion, it is said, the history of recent philosophy has steadily +been moving. If the movement had taken place in only one school of +philosophic thought, it might have been a movement running into a +side-track. But it is the direction taken by schools so different in +their presuppositions and their methods as that of Hegel and that of +Comte; and it is the undesigned coincidence of their tendency, which at +first could never have been surmised, that carries with it a conviction +of its correctness. Human solidarity, humanity regarded as a spiritual +whole, may be called, as Hegel calls it, self-conscious spirit; or you +may call it, as Comte calls it, the Mind of Humanity—it is but the +collective wisdom "of a common humanity with a common aim"; and, that +being so, morality is rooted, not in the will and the love of a +beneficent and omnipotent Providence, but in the self-realising spirit +in man setting up its "common aim" at morality. The very conception of +a beneficent and omnipotent God—having now done its work as an aid to +morality—must now be put aside, because it stands in the way of our +recognising what is the real spiritual whole, besides which there is +none other spirit, viz. the self-realising spirit in man. That spirit +is only realising; it is not yet +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P214"></A>214}</SPAN> +realised. It is in process of +realisation; and the conception of it, as in process of realisation, +enables it to be brought into harmony, or rather reveals its inner +harmony, with the notion of evolution. There is nothing outside +evolution, no being to whom evolution is presented as a spectacle or by +whom, as a process, it is directed. "Being itself," as Höffding says +(<I>Problems of Philosophy</I>, p. 136), "is to be conceived as in process +of becoming, of evolution." The spirit in man, as we have just said, +is the real spiritual whole, and it is self-realising; it is evolving +and progressing both morally and rationally. In Höffding's words +"Being itself becomes more rational than before" (<I>ib.</I>, p. 137). +"Being itself is not ready-made but still incomplete, and rather to be +conceived as a continual becoming, like the individual personality and +like knowledge" (<I>ib.</I>, p. 120). We may say, then, that being is +becoming rationalised and moralised as and because the spirit in man +realises itself. For a time the process of moralisation and +self-realisation was worked by and through the conception of a +beneficent and omnipotent god. That conception was, it would seem, a +hypothesis, valuable as long it was a working hypothesis, but to be +cast aside now that humanitarianism is found +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P215"></A>215}</SPAN> +more adequate to the +facts and more in harmony with the consistent application of the theory +of evolution. We have, then, to consider whether it is adequate to the +facts, whether, when we regard the facts of the history of religion, we +do find that morality comes first and religion later. +</P> + +<P> +"What," Mr. Hobhouse enquires in his <I>Morals in Evolution</I> (II, 74), +"What is the ethical character of early religion?" and his reply is +that "in the first stage we find that spirits, as such, are not +concerned with morality." That was also the answer which had +previously been given by Professor Höffding, who says in his +<I>Philosophy of Religion</I>: "in the lowest forms of it ... religion +cannot be said to have any ethical significance" (p. 323). Originally, +the gods were "purely natural forces which could be defied or evaded," +though eventually they "became ethical powers whom men neither could +nor wished to defy" (p. 324). This first stage of early religion seems +on the terms of the hypothesis to be supposed to be found in the period +of animism and fetichism; and "the primitive conception of spirit" is, +Mr. Hobhouse says (II, 16), of something "feeling and thinking like a +rather stupid man, and open like him to supplication, exhortation, or +intimidation." If +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P216"></A>216}</SPAN> +that is so, then Professor Höffding may be +justified in saying that in the lowest forms of religion "the gods +appear as powers on which man is dependent, but not as patterns of +conduct or administrators of an ethical world order" (p. 324). Now, in +the period termed animistic because inanimate things are supposed to be +animated and actuated by spirits, it may be that many or most of such +spirits are supposed to feel and think like a rather stupid man, and +therefore to be capable of being cajoled, deluded, intimidated, and +castigated by the human being who desires to make use of them. But it +is not all such spirits that are worshipped then. Indeed, it is +impossible, Mr. Hobhouse says (II, 15), that any such spirit could be +"an object of worship in our sense of the term." Worship implies the +superiority of the object worshipped to the person worshipping. But, +though not an object of worship in our sense of the term, the spirit +that could be deluded, intimidated, and castigated was, according to +Mr. Hobhouse, "the object of a religious cult" on the part of the man +who believed that he could and did intimidate and castigate the spirit. +Probably, however, most students of the science of religion would agree +that a cult which included or +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P217"></A>217}</SPAN> +allowed intimidation and +castigation of the object of the cult was as little entitled to be +termed religious as it is to be called worship. In the period of +animism, then, either there was no religious cult, no worship in our +sense of the term; or, if there was religion, then the spirit +worshipped was worshipped as a being higher than man. Whether man has +at any time been without religion is a question on which there is here +no need to enter. The allegation we are now considering is that +whenever religion does appear, then in its first and earliest stage it +is not concerned with morality; and the ground for that allegation is +that the spirits of the animistic period have nothing to do with +morality or conduct. Now, it may be that these spirits which animate +inanimate things are not concerned with morality; but then neither are +they worshipped, nor is the relation between them and man religious. +Religion implies a god; and a spirit to be a god must have worshippers, +a community of worshippers—whether that community be a nation, a +tribe, or a family. Further, it is as the protector of the interests +of that community—however small—that the god is worshipped by the +community. The indispensable condition of religion is the existence of +a community; +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P218"></A>218}</SPAN> +and from the beginning man must have lived in some +sort of community,—whether a family or a horde,—for the period of +helpless infancy is so long in the case of human beings that without +some sort of permanent community the race could not be perpetuated. +The indispensable condition of religion, therefore, has always existed +from the time when man was man. Further, whatever the form of +community in which man originally dwelt, it was only in the community +and by means of the community that the individual could exist—that is +to say, if the interest of any one individual conflicted or was +supposed to conflict with the interests of the community, then the +interests of the community must prevail, if the community was to exist. +Here, then, from the beginning we have the second condition +indispensable for the existence of religion, viz. the possibility that +the conduct of some member of the community might not be the conduct +required by the interests or supposed interests of the community, and +prescribed by the custom of the community. In the case of such +divergence of interests and conduct, the being worshipped by the +community was necessarily, as being the god of the community, and +receiving the worship of the community, on the side +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P219"></A>219}</SPAN> +of the +community and against the member who violated the custom of the +community. But, at this period in the history of humanity, the +morality of the community was the custom of the community; and the god +of the community from the first necessarily upheld the custom, that is, +the morality of the community. Spirits "as such," that is to say, +spirits which animated inanimate things but which were not the +protectors of any human community, were, for the very reason that they +were not the gods of any community, "not concerned with morality." +Spirits, however, which were the protectors of a community necessarily +upheld the customs and therefore the morality of the community; they +were not "without ethical significance." It was an essential part of +the very conception of such spirits—of spirits standing in this +relation to the community—that they were "ethical powers." Höffding's +dictum that "the gods appear as powers on which man is dependent, but +not as patterns of conduct or administrators of an ethical world order" +(p. 323), overlooks the fact that in the earliest times not only are +gods powers on which man is dependent, but powers which enforce the +conduct required by the custom of the community and sanction the +ethical order as +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P220"></A>220}</SPAN> +far as it has then been revealed. The fact that +"the worship of the family, of the clan, or of the nation is shared in +by all," not merely "helps to nourish a feeling of solidarity which may +acquire ethical significance," as Höffding says (p. 325), it creates a +solidarity which otherwise would not exist. If there were no worship +shared in by all, there would be no religious solidarity; and, judging +from the very general, if not universal, occurrence of religion in the +lowest races as well as the highest, we may conjecture that without +religious solidarity a tribe found it hard or impossible to survive in +the struggle for existence. That religious solidarity however is not, +as Höffding suggests, something which may eventually "acquire ethical +significance"; it is in its essence and from the beginning the worship +of a god who punishes the community for the ethical transgression of +its members, because they are not merely violations of the custom of +the community, but offences against him. When Höffding says (p. 328) +"religious faith ... assumes an independent human ethic, which has, as +a matter of fact, developed historically under the practical influence +of the ethical feeling of man," he seems to overlook the fact that as a +matter of history human +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P221"></A>221}</SPAN> +ethics have always been based—rightly or +wrongly—on religious faith, that moral transgressions have always been +regarded as not merely wrongs done to a man's neighbour, but also as +offences against the god or gods of the community, that the person +suffering from foul wrong for which he can get no human redress has +always appealed from man to God, and that the remorse of the wrong-doer +who has evaded human punishment has always taken shape in the fear of +what God may yet do. +</P> + +<P> +Those who desire to prove that at the present day morality can exist +apart from religion, and that in the future it will do so, finding its +basis in humanitarianism and not in religion, are moved to show that as +a matter of historic fact religion and morality have been things apart. +We have examined the assertion that religion in its lowest forms is not +concerned with morality; and we have attempted to show that the god of +a community, or the spirit worshipped by a community, is necessarily a +being conceived as concerned with the interests of the community and as +hostile to those who violate the customs—which is to transgress the +morality—of the community. But even if this be admitted, it may still +be said that it does not in the least disprove the assertion that +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P222"></A>222}</SPAN> +morality existed before religion did. The theory we are examining +freely admits that religion is supposed, in certain stages of the +history of humanity, to reënforce morality and to be necessary in the +interest of morals, though eventually it is found that morality needs +no such support; and not only needs now no such support but never did +need it; and the fact that it did not need it is shown by demonstrating +the existence of morality before religion existed. If, then, it be +admitted that religion from the moment it first appeared reënforced +morality, and did not pass through a non-moral period first, still +morality may have existed before religion was evolved, and must have so +existed if morality and religion are things essentially apart. What +evidence then is there on the point? We find Mr. Hobhouse saying (I, +80) that "at almost, if not quite, the lowest stages" of human +development there are "certain actions which are resented as involving +the community as a whole in misfortune and danger. These include, +besides actual treason, conduct which brings upon the people the wrath +of God, or of certain spirits, or which violates some mighty and +mysterious taboo. The actions most frequently regarded in this light +are certain breaches of the marriage law and witchcraft." +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P223"></A>223}</SPAN> +These +offences, we are told (<I>ib.</I>, 82), endanger the community itself, and +the punishment is "prompted by the sense of a danger to the whole +community." Here, then, from the beginning we find that offences +against the common good are punished, not simply as such, but as +misconduct bringing on the community, and not merely on the offender, +the wrath of gods or spirits. In other words—Mr. Hobhouse's words, p. +119—"in the evolution of public justice, we find that at the outset +the community interferes mainly on what we may call supernatural +grounds only with actions which are regarded as endangering its own +existence." We may then fairly say that if the community inflicts +punishments mainly on supernatural grounds from the time when the +evolution of public justice first begins, then morality from its very +beginning was reënforced—indeed prompted—by religion. The morality +was indeed only the custom of the community; but violation of the +custom was from the beginning regarded as a religious offence and was +punished on supernatural grounds. +</P> + +<P> +The view that morality and religion are essentially distinct, that +morality not only can stand alone, without support from religion, but +has in reality always stood without such support—however much +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P224"></A>224}</SPAN> +the fact has been obscured by religious prepossessions—this view +receives striking confirmation from the current and generally accepted +theory of the origin and nature of justice. That theory traces the +origin of justice back to the feeling of resentment experienced by the +individual against the particular cause of his pain (Westermarck, +<I>Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas</I>, I, 22). Resentment leads +to retaliation and takes the form of revenge. Vengeance, at first +executed by the person injured (or by his kin, if he be killed), comes +eventually, if slowly, to be taken out of the hands of the person +injured or his avengers, and to be exercised by the State in the +interests of the community and in furtherance, not of revenge, but of +justice and the good of society. Thus not only the origin of justice, +but the whole course of its growth and development, is entirely +independent of religion and religious considerations. Throughout, the +individual and society are the only parties involved; the gods do not +appear—or, if they do appear, they are intrusive and superfluous. If +this be the true view of the history and nature of justice, it may—and +probably must—be the truth about the whole of morality and not only +about justice. We have but +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P225"></A>225}</SPAN> +to follow Dr. Westermarck (<I>ib.</I>, p. +21) in grouping the moral emotions under the two heads of emotions of +approval and emotions of disapproval, we have but to note with him that +both groups belong to the class of retributive emotions, and we see +that the origin and history of justice are typical of the origin and +history of morals: morality in general, just as much as justice in +particular, both originates independently of religion and +developes—where moral progress is made—independently of religion. +</P> + +<P> +Let us now proceed to examine this view of the relation of religion and +morality and to consider whether their absolute independence of each +other is historic fact. It traces back justice to the feeling of +resentment experienced by the individual; but if the individual ever +existed by himself and apart from society, there could neither then be +justice nor anything analogous to justice, for justice implies, not +merely a plurality of individuals, but a society; it is a social +virtue. The individual existing by himself and apart from society is +not a historic fact but an impossible abstraction—a conception +essentially false because it expresses something which neither exists +nor has existed nor could possibly +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P226"></A>226}</SPAN> +exist. The origin of +justice—or of any virtue—cannot be found in the impossible and +self-contradictory conception of the individual existing apart from +society; it cannot be found in a mere plurality of such individuals: it +can only be found in a society—whether that society have the +organisation of a family, a tribe, or a nation. Justice in particular +and morality in general, like religion, imply the existence of a +society; neither is a merely individual affair. Justice is, as Mr. +Hobhouse states, "public action taken for the sake of public safety" +(I, 83): it is, from the outset of its history, public action; and back +of that we cannot go, for the individual did not, as a matter of +history, exist before society, and could not so have existed. +</P> + +<P> +In the next place, justice is not the resentment of any individual, it +is the sentiment of the community expressing itself in public action, +taken not for the sake of any individual, but for the sake of public +safety. Its object from the beginning is not the gratification of +individual resentment, but the safety and welfare of the community +which takes common action. Proof of this, if proof were needed, would +be found in the fact that the existence of the individual, as such, is +not recognised. Not only does +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P227"></A>227}</SPAN> +the community which has suffered +in the wrong done to any of its members take action as a community; it +proceeds, not against the individual who has inflicted the wrong, but +against the community to which he belongs. "The wrong done," is, as +Mr. Hobhouse says (I, 91), "the act of the family or clan and may be +avenged on any member of that family or clan." There is collective +responsibility for the wrong done, just as there is collective +responsibility for righting it. +</P> + +<P> +If, now, we enquire, What are the earliest offences against which +public action is taken? and why? we may remember that Mr. Hobhouse has +stated them to be witchcraft and breaches of the marriage law; and that +the punishment of those offences corresponds, as he has said, "roughly +to our own administration of justice" (I, 81). Now, in the case of +breaches of the marriage laws—mating with a cousin on the mother's +side instead of with a cousin on the father's side, marrying into a +forbidden class—it is obvious that there is no individual who has +suffered injury and that there is no individual to experience +resentment. It is the community that suffers or is expected to suffer; +and it expects to suffer, because it, in the person of one of its +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P228"></A>228}</SPAN> +members, has offended. Collectively it is responsible for the misdeeds +of its members. Whom, then, has it offended? To whom is it +responsible? Who will visit it with punishment, unless it makes haste +to set itself right? The answer given by a certain tribe of the Sea +Dyaks makes the matter clear: they, Mr. St. John tells us in his <I>Life +in the Forests of the Far East</I> (I, 63, quoted by Westermarck, I, 49), +"are of opinion that an unmarried girl proving with child must be +offensive to the superior powers, who, instead of always chastising the +individual, punish the tribe by misfortunes happening to its members. +They therefore on the discovery of the pregnancy fine the lovers, and +sacrifice a pig to propitiate offended heaven, and to avert that +sickness or those misfortunes that might otherwise follow." That is, +of course, only one instance. But we may safely say that the marriage +law is generally ascribed to the ordinance of the gods, even in the +lowest tribes, and that breaches of it are offences against heaven. It +is unnecessary to prove, it need only be mentioned, that witchcraft is +conspicuously offensive to the religious sentiment, and is punished as +an offence against the god or gods. When, then, we consider the origin +and nature of justice, not from +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P229"></A>229}</SPAN> +an abstract and <I>à priori</I> point +of view, but in the light of historic fact, so far from finding that it +originates and operates in complete independence of religion, we +discover that from the beginning the offences with which the justice of +the primitive community deals are offences, not against the community, +but against heaven. "In the evolution of public justice," as Mr. +Hobhouse says, "at the outset the community interferes mainly on what +we may call supernatural grounds." From the beginning misdeeds are +punished, not merely as wrongs done to society, but as wrong done to +the gods and as wrong-doing for which the community collectively is +responsible to the gods. Justice from the beginning is not individual +resentment, but "public action taken for the public safety." It is +not, as Mr. Hobhouse calls it, "revenge guided and limited by custom." +It is the customary action of the community taken to avert divine +vengeance. The action taken assumes in extreme cases the form of the +death penalty; but its usual form of action is that of taboo. +</P> + +<P> +If the origin of justice is to be sought in something that is not +justice, if justice in particular and morality in general are to be +treated as having been evolved out of something which was in a way +different +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P230"></A>230}</SPAN> +from them and yet in a way must have contained them, +inasmuch as they came forth from it, we shall do well to look for that +something, not in the unhistorical, unreal abstraction of an imaginary +individual, apart from society, but in society itself when it is as yet +not clearly conscious of the justice and morality at work within it. +Such a stage in the development of society is, I think, to be discerned. +</P> + +<P> +We have seen that, "at almost, if not quite, the lowest stages" of +human development, there is something which, according to Mr. Hobhouse, +corresponds "roughly to our own administration of justice" (I, 81). +But this rough justice implies conscious, deliberate action on the part +of the community. It implies that the community as such makes some +sort of enquiry into what can be the cause of the misfortunes which are +befalling it; and that, having found out the person responsible, it +deliberately takes the steps it deems necessary for putting itself +right with the supernatural power that has sent the sickness or famine. +Now, such conscious, purposive, deliberate action may and probably does +take place at almost the lowest stage of development of society; but +not, we may surmise, at quite the lowest. What eventually is done +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P231"></A>231}</SPAN> +consciously and deliberately is probably done in the first place +much more summarily and automatically. And—in quite the lowest stage +of social development—it is by means of the action of taboo that +summary and automatic punishment for breaches of the custom of the +community is inflicted. Its action is automatic and immediate: merely +to come in contact with the forbidden thing is to become tabooed +yourself; and so great is the horror and dread of such contact, even if +made unwittingly, that it is capable of causing, when discovered, +death. Like the justice, however, of which it is the forerunner, it +does not result always in death, nor does it produce that effect in +most cases. But what it does do is to make the offender himself taboo +and as infectious as the thing that rendered him taboo. Here, too, the +action of taboo, in excommunicating the offender, anticipates, or +rather foreshadows, the action of justice when it excludes the guilty +person from the community and makes of him an outlaw. Again, in the +rough justice found at almost, though not quite, the lowest stages, the +earliest offences of which official notice, so to speak, is taken, are +offences for which the punishment—disease or famine, etc.—falls on +the community as a whole, because the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P232"></A>232}</SPAN> +community, in the person of +one of its members, has offended as a whole against heaven. In the +earlier stage of feeling, also, which survives where taboo prevails, it +is the community as a whole which may be infected, and which must +suffer if the offender is allowed to spread the infection; it is the +community, as a whole, which is concerned to thrust out the guilty +person—every one shuns him because he is taboo. Thus, in this the +earliest stage, the offender against the custom of the community is +outlawed just as effectively as in later stages of social development. +But no formal sentence is pronounced; no meeting of the men or the +elders of the community is held to try the offender; no reason is given +or sought why the offence should thus be punished. The operation of +taboo is like that of the laws of nature: the man who eats poisonous +food dies with no reason given. A reason may eventually be found by +science, and is eventually discovered, though the process of discovery +is slow, and many mistakes are made, and many false reasons are given +before the true reason is found. So, too, the true reason for the +prohibition of many of the things, which the community feels to be +forbidden and pronounced to be taboo, is found, with the progress of +society—when it does +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P233"></A>233}</SPAN> +progress, which is not always—to be that +they are immoral and irreligious, though here, too, many mistakes are +made before true morality and true religion are found. But at the +outset no reason is given: the things are simply offensive to the +community and are tabooed as such. We, looking back at that stage in +the evolution of society, can see that amongst the things thus +offensive and tabooed are some which, in later stages, are equally +offensive, but are now forbidden for a reason that can be formulated +and given, viz. that they are offences against the law of morality and +the law of God. That reason, at the outset of society, may scarcely +have been consciously present to the mind of man: progress, in part at +least, has consisted in the discovery of the reasons of things. But +that man did from the beginning avoid some of the things which are +forbidden by morality and religion, and that those things were taboo to +him, is beyond the possibility of doubt. Nor can it be doubted that in +the prohibition and punishment of them there was inchoate justice and +inchoate religion. Such prohibition was due to the collective action +and expressed the collective feeling of the community as a whole. And +it is from such social action and feeling that +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P234"></A>234}</SPAN> +justice, I +suggest, has been evolved—not from the feeling of resentment +experienced by the individual as an individual. Personal resentment +and personal revenge may have stimulated justice to action. But, by +the hypothesis we have been examining, they were not justice. Neither +have they been transformed into justice: they still exist as something +distinct from justice and capable of perverting it. +</P> + +<P> +The form which justice takes in the period which is almost, but not +quite, the lowest stage of human evolution is the sense of the +collective responsibility of the community for all its actions, that is +to say, for the acts of all its members. And that responsibility in +its earliest shape is felt to be a responsibility to heaven, to the +supernatural powers that send disease and famine upon the community. +In those days no man sins to himself alone, just as, in still earlier +days, no man could break a taboo without becoming a source of danger to +the whole community. The wrong-doer has offended against the +supernatural powers and has brought down calamity upon the community. +He is therefore punished, directly as an offender against the god of +the community, and indirectly for having involved the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P235"></A>235}</SPAN> +community +in suffering. In Dr. Westermarck's words (I, 194), there is "genuine +indignation against the offender, both because he rebels against God, +and because he thereby exposes the whole community to supernatural +dangers." But though society for many long centuries continues to +punish rebellion against God, still in the long run it ceases, or tends +to cease, doing so. Its reason for so ceasing is interpreted +differently by different schools of thought. On the one hand, it is +said in derision, let the gods punish offences against the gods—the +implication being that there are no such offences to punish, because +there is no god. On the other hand, it is said, "I will repay, saith +the Lord"—the implication being that man may not assume to be the +minister of divine vengeance. If, then, we bear in mind that the fact +may be interpreted in either of these different ways, we shall not fall +into the fallacy of imagining that the mere existence of the fact +suffices to prove either interpretation to be true. Yet this fallacy +plays its part in lending fictitious support to the doctrine that +morality is in no wise dependent upon religion. The offences now +punished by law, it is argued, are no longer punished as offences +against religion, but solely as offences +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P236"></A>236}</SPAN> +against the good of the +community. To this argument the reply is that men believe the good of +the community to be the will of God, and do not believe murder, theft, +adultery, etc., to be merely offences against man's laws. Overlooking +this fact, which is fatal to the doctrine that morality is in no wise +dependent on religion, the argument we are discussing proceeds to +maintain that the basis for the enforcement of morality by the law is +recognised by every one who knows anything of the philosophy of law to +be what is good for the community and its members: fraud and violence +are punished as such, and not because they are offences against this or +that religion. The fact that the law no longer punishes them as +offences against God suffices to show that it is only as offences +against humanity that there is any sense, or ever was any sense, in +punishing them. Religion may have reënforced morality very usefully at +one time, by making out that moral misdeeds were offences against God, +but such arguments are not now required. The good and the well-being +of humanity is in itself sufficient argument. Humanitarianism is +taking the place of religion, and by so doing is demonstrating that +morality is, as it always has been, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P237"></A>237}</SPAN> +independent of religion; and +that in truth religion has built upon it, not it upon religion. As +Höffding puts it (p. 328): "Religious faith ... assumes an independent +human ethic developed historically under the practical influence of the +ethical feeling of man." That is to say, morality is in Höffding's +view independent of religion, and prior to religion, both as a matter +of logic and of history. As a matter of history—of the history of +religion—this seems to me, for the reasons already given, to be +contrary to the facts as they are known. The real reason for +maintaining that morality is and must be—and must have +been—independent of religion, seems to me to be a philosophical +reason. I may give it in Höffding's own words: "What other aims and +qualities," he asks (p. 324), "could man attribute to his gods or +conceive as divine, but those which he has learnt from his own +experience to recognise as the highest?" The answer expected to the +question plainly is not merely that it is from experience that man +learns, but that man has no experience of God from which he could +learn. The answer given by Mr. Hobhouse, in the concluding words of +his <I>Morals in Evolution</I> is that "the collective wisdom" of man "is +all that we directly know of the Divine." +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P238"></A>238}</SPAN> +Here, too, no direct +access to God is allowed to be possible to man. It is from his +experience of other men—perhaps even of himself and his own +doings—that man learns all he knows of God: but he has himself no +experience of God. Obviously, then, from this humanitarian point of +view, what a man goes through in his religious moments is not +experience, and we are mistaken if we imagine that it was experience; +it is only a misinterpretation of experience. It is on the supposition +that we are mistaken, on the assumption that we make a +misinterpretation, that the argument is built to prove that morality is +and must be independent of religion. Argument to show, or proof to +demonstrate, that we had not the experience, or, that we mistook +something else for it, is, of course, not forthcoming. But if we hold +fast to our conviction, we are told that we are fleeing "to the bosom +of faith." +</P> + +<P> +Until some better argument is produced, we may be well content not +merely to flee but to rest there. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="christianity"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P239"></A>239}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +CHRISTIANITY +</H3> + +<P> +The subject dealt with in this lecture will be the place of +Christianity in the evolution of religion; and I shall approach it by +considering the place of religion in the evolution of humanity. It +will be therefore advisable, indeed necessary, for me to consider what +is meant by evolution; and I wish to begin by explaining the point of +view from which I propose to approach the three ideas of evolution, of +the evolution of humanity and the evolution of religion. +</P> + +<P> +The individual exists, and can only exist, in society. Society cannot +exist without individuals as members thereof; and the individual cannot +exist save in society. From this it follows that from one point of +view the individual may be regarded as a means—a means by which +society attains its end or purpose: every one of us has his place or +function in society; and society thrives according as each member +performs his function and discharges his duty. From another point of +view +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P240"></A>240}</SPAN> +the individual may be regarded as an end. If man is a +social animal, if men live in society, it is because so alone can a man +do what is best for himself: it is by means of society that he realises +his end. It is then from this proposition, viz. that the individual is +both a means and an end, that I wish to approach the idea of evolution. +</P> + +<P> +I will begin by calling attention to the fact that that proposition is +true both statically, that is to say, is true of the individual's +position in a community, and is also true dynamically, that is to say, +is true of his place in the process of evolution. On the former point, +that the proposition is true statically, of the position of the +individual in the community, I need say but little. In moral +philosophy it is the utilitarian school which has particularly insisted +upon this truth. That school has steadily argued that, in the +distribution of happiness or of the good, every man is to count as one, +and nobody to count as more than one—that is to say, in the community +the individual is to be regarded as the end. The object to be aimed at +is not happiness in general and no one's happiness in particular, but +the happiness of each and every individual. It is the individual and +his happiness which is the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P241"></A>241}</SPAN> +end, for the sake of which society +exists and to which it is the means; otherwise the individual might +derive no benefit from society. But if the truth that the individual +is an end as well as a means is recognised by moral philosophy, that +truth has also played at least an equally important part in political +philosophy. It is the very breath of the cry for liberty, equality, +and fraternity,—a cry wrung out from the heart of man by the system of +oppression which denied that the ordinary citizen had a right to be +anything but a means for procuring enjoyment to the members of the +ruling class. The truth that any one man—whatever his place in +society, whatever the colour of his skin—has as much right as any +other to be treated as an end and that no man was merely a means to the +enjoyment or happiness or well-being of another, was the charter for +the emancipation of slaves. It is still the magna charta for the +freedom of every member of the human race. No man is or can be a +chattel—a thing existing for no other purpose than to subserve the +interests of its owner and to be a means to his ends. But though from +the truth that the individual is in himself an end as well as a means, +it follows that all men have the right to +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P242"></A>242}</SPAN> +freedom, it does not +follow as a logical inference that all men are equal as means—as means +to the material happiness or to the moral improvement of society. +</P> + +<P> +I need not further dwell upon the fact that statically as regards the +relations of men to one another in society at any moment, the truth is +fully recognised that the individual is not merely a means to the +happiness or well-being of others, but is also in himself an end. But +when we consider the proposition dynamically, when we wish to find out +the part it has played as one of the forces at work in evolution, we +find that its truth has been far from fully recognised—partly perhaps +because utilitarianism dates from a time when evolution, or the bearing +of it, was not understood. But the truth is at least of as great +importance dynamically as it is statically. And on one side, its truth +and the importance of its truth has been fully developed: that the +individual is a means to an end beyond him; and that, dynamically, he +has been and is a factor in evolution, and as a factor merely a means +and nothing else—all this has been worked out fully, if not to excess. +The other side of the truth, the fact that the individual is always an +end, has, however, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P243"></A>243}</SPAN> +been as much neglected by the scientific +evolutionist as it was by the slave-driver: he has been liable to +regard men as chattels, as instruments by which the work of evolution +is carried on. The work has got to be done (by men amongst other +animals and things), things have to be evolved, evolution must go on. +But, why? and for whom? with what purpose and for whose benefit? with +what end? are questions which science leaves to be answered by those +people who are foolish enough to ask them. Science is concerned simply +with the individual as a means, as one of the means, whereby evolution +is carried on; and doubtless science is justified—if only on the +principle of the division of labour—in confining itself to the +department of enquiry which it takes in hand and in refusing to travel +beyond it. Any theory of man, therefore, or of the evolution of +humanity, which professes to base itself strictly on scientific fact +and to exclude other considerations as unscientific and therefore as +unsafe material to build on, will naturally, and perhaps necessarily, +be dominated by the notion that the individual exists as a factor in +evolution, as one of the means by which, and not as in any sense the +end for which, evolution is carried on. +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P244"></A>244}</SPAN> + +<P> +Such seems to be the case with the theory of humanitarianism. It bases +itself upon science, upon experience, and rules out communion with God +as not being a scientific fact or a fact of experience at all. Based +upon science, it is a theory which seeks amongst other things to assign +to religion its place in the evolution of humanity. According to the +theory, the day of religion is over, its part played out, its function +in the evolution of humanity discharged. According to this theory, +three stages may be discerned in the evolution of humanity when we +regard man as a moral being, as an ethical consciousness. Those three +stages may be characterised first as custom, next religion, and finally +humanitarianism. +</P> + +<P> +By the theory, in the first stage—that of custom—the spirits to whom +cult is paid are vindictive. In the second stage—that of +religion—man, having attained to a higher morality, credits his gods +with that higher morality. In the third stage—that of +humanitarianism—he finds that the gods are but lay figures on which +the robes of righteousness have been displayed that man alone can +wear—when he is perfect. He is not yet perfect. If he were, the +evolution of humanity +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P245"></A>245}</SPAN> +would be attained—whereas at present it is +as yet in process. The end of evolution is not yet attained: it is to +establish, in some future generation, a perfect humanity. For that end +we must work; to it we may know that, as a matter of scientific +evolution, we are working. On it, we may be satisfied, man will not +enter in our generation. +</P> + +<P> +Now this theory of the evolution of humanity, and of the place religion +takes in that evolution, is in essential harmony with the scientific +treatment of the evolution theory, inasmuch as it treats of the +individual solely as an instrument to something other than himself, as +a means of producing a state of humanity to which he will not belong. +But if the assumption that the individual is always a means and never +an end in himself be false, then a theory of the evolution of man (as +an ethical consciousness) which is based on that wrong assumption will +itself be wrong. If each individual is an end, as valuable and as +important as any other individual; if each counts for one and not less +than any one other,—then his end and his good cannot lie in the +perfection of some future generation. In that case, his end would be +one that <I>ex hypothesi</I> he could never enjoy, a rest into which he +could never enter; +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P246"></A>246}</SPAN> +and consequently it would be an irrational +end, and could not serve as a basis for a rationalist theory of ethics. +Man's object (to be a rational object) must have reference to a society +of which he may be a member. The realisation of his object, therefore, +cannot be referred to a stage of society yet to come, on earth, after +he is dead,—a society of which he, whether dead or annihilated, could +not be a member. If, then, the individual's object is to be a rational +object, as the humanitarian or rationalist assumes, then that end must +be one in which he can share; and therefore cannot be in this world. +Nor can that end be attained by doing man's will—for man's will may be +evil, and regress as well as progress is a fact in the evolution of +humanity; its attainment, therefore, must be effected by doing God's +will. +</P> + +<P> +The truth that the individual is an end as well as a means is, I +suggest, valuable in considering the dynamics as well as the statics of +society. At least, it saves one from the self-complacency of imagining +that one's ancestors existed with no other end and for no higher +purpose than to produce—me; and if the golden days anticipated by the +theory of humanitarianism ever arrive, it is to be supposed that the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P247"></A>247}</SPAN> +men of that time will find it just as intolerable and revolting +as we do now, to believe that past generations toiled and suffered for +no other reason, for no other end, and to no other purpose than that +their successors should enter into the fruits of their labour. In a +word, the theory that in the evolution of man as an ethical +consciousness, as a moral being, religion is to be superseded by +humanitarianism, is only possible so long as we deny or ignore the fact +that the individual is an end and not merely a means. We will +therefore now go on to consider the evolution of religion from the +point of view that the individual is in himself an end as well as a +means. If, of the world religions, we take that which is the greatest, +as measured by the number of its adherents, viz. Buddhism, we shall see +that, tried by this test, it is at once found wanting. The object at +which Buddhism proclaims that man should aim is not the development, +the perfection, and the realisation of the individual to the fullest +extent: it is, on the contrary, the utter and complete effacement of +the individual, so that he is not merely absorbed, but absolutely wiped +out, in <I>nirvana</I>. In the <I>atman</I>, with which it is the duty of man to +seek to identify himself, the individuality of man does not survive: +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P248"></A>248}</SPAN> +it simply ceases to be. Now this obliteration of his existence +may seem to a man in a certain mood desirable; and that mood may be +cultivated, as indeed Buddhism seeks to cultivate it, systematically. +But here it is that the inner inconsistency, the self-contradictoriness +of Buddhism, becomes patent. The individual, to do anything, must +exist. If he is to desire nothing save to cease to exist, he must +exist to do that. But the teaching of Buddhism is that this world and +this life is illusion—and further, that the existence of the +individual self is precisely the most mischievous illusion, that +illusion above all others from which it is incumbent on us to free +ourselves. We are here for no other end than to free ourselves from +that illusion. Thus, then, by the teaching of Buddhism there is an +end, it may be said, for the individual to aim at. Yes! but by the +same teaching there is no individual to aim at it—individual existence +is the most pernicious of all illusions. And further, by the teaching, +the final end and object of religion is to get rid of an individual +existence, which does not exist to be got rid of, and which it is an +illusion to believe in. In fine, Buddhism denies that the individual +is either an end or a means, for it denies +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P249"></A>249}</SPAN> +the existence of the +individual, and contradicts itself in that denial. The individual is +not an end—the happiness or immortality, the continued existence, of +the individual is not to be aimed at. Neither is he a means, for his +very existence is an illusion, and as such is an obstacle or impediment +which has to be removed, in order that he who is not may cease to do +what he has never begun to do, viz. to exist. +</P> + +<P> +In Buddhism we have a developed religion—a religion which has been +developed by a system of philosophy, but scarcely, as religion, +improved by it. If, now, we turn to other religions less highly +developed, even if we turn to religions the development of which has +been early arrested, which have never got beyond the stage of infantile +development, we shall find that all proceed on the assumption that +communion between man and God is possible and does occur. In all, the +existence of the individual as well as of the god is assumed, even +though time and development may be required to realise, even +inadequately, what is contained in the assumption. In all, and from +the beginning, religion has been a social fact: the god has been the +god of the community; and, as such, has +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P250"></A>250}</SPAN> +represented the interests +of the community. Those interests have been regarded not merely as +other, but as higher, than the interests of the individual, when the +two have been at variance, for the simple reason (when the time came +for a reason to be sought and given) that the interests of the +community were the will of the community's god. Hence at all times the +man who has postponed his own interests to those under the sanction of +the god and the community—the man who has respected and upheld the +custom of the community—has been regarded as the higher type of man, +as the better man from the religious as well as from the moral point of +view; while the man who has sacrificed the higher interests to the +lower, has been punished—whether by the automatic action of taboo, or +the deliberate sentence of outlawry—as one who, by breaking custom, +has offended against the god and so brought suffering on the community. +</P> + +<P> +Now, if the interests, whether of the individual or the community, are +regarded as purely earthly, the divergence between them must be utter +and irreconcileable; and to expect the individual to forego his own +interests must be eventually discovered to be, as it fundamentally is, +unreasonable. +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P251"></A>251}</SPAN> +If, on the other hand, for the individual to +forego them is (as, in a cool moment, we all recognise it to be) +reasonable, then the interests under the sanction of the god and the +community—the higher interests—cannot be other than, they must be +identical with, the real interests of the individual. It is only in +and through society that the individual can attain his highest +interests, and only by doing the will of the god that he can so attain +them. Doubtless—despite of logic and feeling—in all communities all +individuals in a greater or less degree have deliberately preferred the +lower to the higher, and in so doing have been actuated neither by love +of God nor by love of their fellow-man. But, in so doing, they have at +all times, in the latest as well as the earliest stages of society, +been felt to be breaching the very basis of social solidarity, the +maintenance of which is the will of the God worshipped by society. +</P> + +<P> +From that point of view the individual is regarded as a means. But he +is also in himself an end, intrinsically as valuable as any other +member of the community, and therefore an end which society exists to +further and promote. It is impossible, therefore, that the end, viewed +as that which society +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P252"></A>252}</SPAN> +as well as the individual aims at, and +which society must realise, as far as it can realise it, through the +individual, should be one which can only be attained by some future +state of society in which he does not exist. "The kingdom of Heaven is +within you" and not something to which you cannot attain. God is not +far from us at any time. That truth was implicit at all stages in the +evolution of religion—consciously recognised, perhaps more, perhaps +less, but whether more or less consciously recognised, it was there. +That is the conviction implied in the fact that man everywhere seeks +God. If he seeks Him in plants, in animals, in stocks or stones, that +only shows that man has tried in many wrong directions—not that there +is not a right direction. It is the general law of evolution: of a +thousand seeds thrown out, perhaps one alone falls into good soil. But +the failure of the 999 avails nothing against the fact that the one +bears fruit abundantly. What sanctifies the failures is that they were +attempts. We indeed may, if we are so selfish and blind, regard the +attempts as made in order that we might succeed. Certainly we profit +by the work of our ancestors,—or rather we may profit, if we will. +But our savage ancestors were themselves ends, and +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P253"></A>253}</SPAN> +not merely +means to our benefit. It is monstrous to imagine that our salvation is +bought at the cost of their condemnation. No man can do more than turn +to such light as there may be to guide him. "To him that hath, shall +be given," it is true—but every man at every time had something; never +was there one to whom nothing was given. To us at this day, in this +dispensation, much has been given. But ten talents as well as one may +be wrapped up: one as well as ten may be put to profit. It is +monstrous to say that one could not be, cannot have been, used +properly. It was for not using the one talent he had that the +unfaithful servant was condemned—not for not having ten to use. +</P> + +<P> +Throughout the history of religion, then, two facts have been implied, +which, if implicit at the beginning, have been rendered explicit in the +course of its history or evolution. They are, first, the existence of +the individual as a member of society, in communion or seeking +communion with God; and, next, that while the individual is a means to +social ends, society is also a means of which the individual is the +end. Neither end—neither that of society nor that of the +individual—can be forwarded at +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P254"></A>254}</SPAN> +the cost of the other; the +realisation of each is to be attained only by the realisation of the +other. Two consequences then follow with regard to evolution: first, +it depends on us; evolution may have helped to make us, but we are +helping to make it. Next, the end of evolution is not wholly outside +any one of us, but in part is realised in us, or may be, if we so will. +That is to say, the true end may be realised by every one of us; for +each of us, as being himself an end, is an object of care to God—and +not merely those who are to live on earth at the final stage of +evolution. If the end is outside us, it is in love of neighbour; if +beyond us, it is in God's love. It is just because the end is (or may +be) both within us and without us that we are bound up with our +fellow-man and God. It is precisely because we are individuals that we +are not the be-all and the end-all—that the end is without us. And it +is because we are members of a community, that the end is not wholly +outside us. +</P> + +<P> +In his <I>Problems of Philosophy</I> (p. 163) Höffding says: "The test of +the perfection of a human society is: to what degree is every person so +placed and treated that he is not only a mere means, but also always at +the same time an end?" and he points +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P255"></A>255}</SPAN> +out that "this is Kant's +famous dictum, with another motive than that given to it by him." But +if it is reasonable to apply this test to society, regarded from the +point of view of statics, it is also reasonable to apply it to society +regarded dynamically. If it is the proper test for ascertaining what +degree of perfection society at any given moment has attained, it is +also the proper test for ascertaining what advance, if any, towards +perfection has been made by society between any two periods of its +growth, any two stages in its evolution. But the moment we admit the +possibility of applying a test to the process of evolution and of +discovering to what end the process is moving, we are abandoning +science and the scientific theory of evolution. Science formally +refuses to consider whether there be any end to which the process of +evolution is working: "end" is a category which science declines to +apply to its subject-matter. In the interests of knowledge it declines +to be influenced by any consideration of what the end aimed at by +evolution may be, or whether there be any end aimed at at all. It +simply notes what does take place, what is, what has been, and to some +extent what may be, the sequence of events—not their object or +purpose. And the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P256"></A>256}</SPAN> +science of religion, being a science, restricts +itself in the same way. As therefore science declines to use the +category, "end," progress is an idea impossible for science—for +progress is movement towards an end, the realisation of a purpose and +object. And science declines to consider whether progress is so much +as possible. But, so far as the subject-matter of the science of +religion is concerned, it is positive (that is to say, it is mere fact +of observation) that in religion an end is aimed at, for man everywhere +seeks God and communion with Him. What the science of religion +declines to do is to pronounce or even to consider whether that end is +possible or not, whether it is in any degree achieved or not, whether +progress is made or not. +</P> + +<P> +But if we do not, as science does, merely constate the fact that in +religion an end is aimed at, viz. that communion with God which issues +in doing His will from love of Him and therefore of our fellow-man; if +we recognise that end as the end that ought to be aimed at,—then our +attitude towards the whole process of evolution is changed: it is now a +process with an end—and that end the same for the individual and for +society. But at the same time it is no longer a process determined by +mechanical +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P257"></A>257}</SPAN> +causes worked by the iron hand of necessity—and +therefore it is no longer evolution in the scientific sense; it is no +longer evolution as understood by science. It is now a process in +which there may or may not be progress made; and in which, therefore, +it is necessary to have a test of progress—a test which is to be found +in the fact that the individual is not merely a means, but an end. +Whether progress is made depends in part on whether there is the will +in man to move towards the end proposed; and that will is not uniformly +exercised, as is shown by the fact that deterioration as well as +advance takes place—regress occurs as well as progress; whole nations, +and those not small ones, may be arrested in their religious +development. If we look with the eye of the missionary over the globe, +everywhere we see arrested development, imperfect communion with God. +It may be that in such cases of imperfect communion there is an +unconscious or hardly conscious recognition that the form of religion +there and then prevalent does not suffice to afford the communion +desired. Or, worse still, and much more general, there is the belief +that such communion as does exist is all that can exist—that advance +and improvement are impossible. From +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P258"></A>258}</SPAN> +this state it has been the +work of the religious spirit to wake us, to reveal to us God's will, to +make us understand that it is within us, and that it may, if we will, +work within us. It is as such a revelation of the will of God and the +love of God, and as the manifestation of the personality of God, that +our Lord appeared on earth. +</P> + +<P> +That appearance as a historic fact must take its place in the order of +historic events, and must stand in relation to what preceded and to +what followed and is yet to follow. In relation to what preceded, +Christianity claims "to be the fulfilment of all that is true in +previous religion" (Illingworth, <I>Personality: Human and Divine</I>, p. +75). The making of that claim assumes that there was some truth in +previous religion, that so far as previous forms were religious, they +were true—a fact that must constantly be borne in mind by the +missionary. The truth and the good inherent in all forms of religion +is that, in all, man seeks after God. The finality of Christianity +lies in the fact that it reveals the God for whom man seeks. What was +true in other religions was the belief in the possibility of communion +with God, and the belief that only as a member of a society could the +individual man attain +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P259"></A>259}</SPAN> +to that communion. What is offered by +Christianity is a means of grace whereby that communion may be attained +and a society in which the individual may attain it. Christianity +offers a means whereby the end aimed at by all religions may be +realised. Its finality, therefore, does not consist in its +chronological relation to other religions. It is not final because, or +in the sense that, it supervened in the order of time upon previous +religions, or that it fulfilled only their truth. Other religions +have, as a matter of chronology, followed it, and yet others may follow +it hereafter. But their chronological order is irrelevant to the +question: Which of them best realises the end at which religion, in all +its forms, aims? And it is the answer to that question which must +determine the finality of any form of religion. No one would consider +the fact that Mahommedanism dates some centuries after Christ any proof +of its superiority to Christianity. And the lapse of time, however +much greater, would constitute no greater proof. +</P> + +<P> +That different forms of religion do realise the end of religion in +different degrees is a point on which there is general agreement. +Monotheism is pronounced higher than polytheism, ethical religions +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P260"></A>260}</SPAN> +higher than non-ethical. What differentiates Christianity from +other ethical religions and from other forms of monotheism, is that in +them religion appears as ancillary to morality, and imposes penalties +and rewards with a view to enforce or encourage morality. In them, at +their highest, the love of man is for his fellow-man, and usually for +himself. Christianity alone makes love of God to be the true basis and +the only end of society, both that whereby personality exists and the +end in which it seeks its realisation. Therein the Christian theory of +society differs from all others. Not merely does it hold that man +cannot make himself better without making society better, that +development of personality cannot be effected without a corresponding +development of society. But it holds that such moral development and +improvement of the individual and of society can find no rational basis +and has no rational end, save in the love of God. +</P> + +<P> +In another way the Christian theory of society differs from all others. +Like all others it holds that the unifying bond of every society is +found in worship. Unlike others it recognises that the individual is +restricted by existing society, even where that society is based upon a +common worship. The +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P261"></A>261}</SPAN> +adequate realisation of the potentialities +of the individual postulates the realisation of a perfect society, just +as a perfect society is possible only provided that the potentialities +of the individual are realised to the full. Such perfection, to which +both society and the individual are means, is neither attained nor +possible on earth, even where communion with God is recognised to be +both the true end of society and the individual, and the only means by +which that end can be attained. Still less is such perfection a +possible end, if morality is set above religion, and the love of man be +substituted for the love of God. In that case the life of the +individual upon earth is pronounced to be the only life of which he is, +or can be, conscious; and the end to which he is a means is the good of +humanity as a whole. Now human society, from the beginning of its +evolution to its end, may be regarded as a whole, just as the society +existing at any given moment of its evolution may be regarded as a +whole. But if we are to consider human society from the former point +of view and to see in it, so regarded, the end to which the individual +is a means, then it is clear that, until perfection is attained in some +remote and very improbable future, the individual members of the +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P262"></A>262}</SPAN> +human race will have laboured and not earned their reward, will have +worked for an end which they have not attained, and for an end which +when, if ever, it is attained, society as a whole will not enjoy. Such +an end is an irrational and impossible object of pursuit. Perfection, +if it is to be attained by the individual or by society, is not to be +attained on earth, nor in man's communion with man. Religion from its +outset has been the quest of man for God. It has been the quest of +man, whether regarded as an individual or as a member of society. But +if that quest is to be realised, it is not to be realised either by +society or the individual, regarded as having a mere earthly existence. +A new conception of the real nature of both is requisite. Not only +must the individual be regarded as continuing to exist after death, but +the society of which he is truly a member must be regarded as one +which, if it manifests or begins to manifest itself on this earth, +requires for its realisation—that is, for perfect communion with +God—the postulate that though it manifests itself in this world, it is +realised in the next. This new conception of the real nature of +society and the individual, involving belief in the communion of the +saints, and in the kingdom of Heaven as that +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P263"></A>263}</SPAN> +which may be in each +individual, and therefore must extend beyond each and include all +whether in this world or the next—this conception is one which +Christianity alone, of all religions, offers to the world. +</P> + +<P> +Religion is the quest of man for God. Man everywhere has been in +search of God, peradventure he might find Him; and the history of +religion is the history of his search. But the moment we regard the +history—the evolution—of religion as a search, we abandon the +mechanical idea of evolution: the cause at work is not material or +mechanical, but final. The cause is no longer a necessary cause which +can only have one result and which, when it operates, must produce that +result. Progress is no longer something which must take place, which +is the inevitable result of antecedent causes. It is something which +may or may not take place and which cannot take place unless effort is +made. In a word, it is dependent in part upon man's will—without the +action of which neither search can be made nor progress in the search. +But though in part dependent upon man's will, progress can only be made +so far as man's will is to do God's will. And that is not always, and +has not been always, +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P264"></A>264}</SPAN> +man's will. Hence evolution has not always +been progress. Nor is it so now. There have been lapses in +civilisation, dark ages, periods when man's love for man has waned +<I>pari passu</I> with the waning of his love for God. Such lapses there +may be yet again. The fall of man may be greater, in the spiritual +sense, than it ever yet has been, for man's will is free. But God's +love is great, and our faith is in it. If Christianity should cease to +grow where it now grows, and cease to spread where it as yet is not, +there would be the greater fall. And on us would rest some, at least, +of the responsibility. Christianity cannot be stationary: if it +stands, let it beware; it is in danger of falling. Between religions, +as well as other organisations, there is a struggle for existence. In +that struggle we have to fight—for a religion to decline to fight is +for that religion to die. The missionary is not engaged in a work of +supererogation, something with which we at home have no concern. We +speak of him as in the forefront of the battle. We do not usually or +constantly realise that it is our battle he is fighting—that his +defeat, if he were defeated, would be the beginning of the end for us; +that on his success our fate depends. The metaphor of the missionary +as an +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P265"></A>265}</SPAN> +outpost sounds rather picturesque when heard in a +sermon,—or did so sound the first time it was used, I suppose,—but it +is not a mere picture; it is the barest truth. The extent to which we +push our outposts forward is the measure of our vitality, of how much +we have in us to do for the world. Six out of seven of Christendom's +missionaries come from the United States of America. Until I heard +that from the pulpit of Durham Cathedral, I had rather a horror of big +things and a certain apprehension about going to a land where bigness, +rather than the golden mean, seemed to be taken as the standard of +merit. But from that sermon I learnt something, viz. not only that +there are big things to be done in the world, but that America does +them, and that America does more of them than she talks about. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="appendix"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P267"></A>267}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +APPENDIX +</H3> + +<P> +Since the chapter on Magic was written, the publication of Wilhelm +Wundt's <I>Völkerpsychologie</I>, Vol. II, Part II, has led me to believe +that I ought to have laid more stress on the power of the magician, +which I mention on pages 74, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, and less on the +savage's recognition of the principle that like produces like. In the +stage of human evolution known as Animism, every event which calls for +explanation is explained as the doing of some person or conscious +agent. When a savage falls ill, his sickness is regarded as the work +of some ill-disposed person, whose power cannot be doubted—for it is +manifest in the sickness it has caused—and whose power is as +mysterious as it is indubitable. That power is what a savage means by +magic; and the persons believed to possess it are magicians. It is the +business of the sick savage's friends to find out who is causing his +sickness. Their suspicion may fall on any one whose appearance or +behaviour is suspicious or mysterious; and the person +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P268"></A>268}</SPAN> +suspected +comes to be regarded as a witch or magician, from the very fact that he +is suspected. Such persons have the power of witchcraft or magic, +because they are believed to have the power: <I>possunt quia posse +videntur</I>. Not only are they believed to possess the power; they come +to believe, themselves, that they possess it. They believe that, +possessing it, they have but to exercise it. The Australian magician +has but to "point" his stick, and, in the belief both of himself and of +every one concerned, the victim will fall. All over the world the +witch has but to stab the image she has drawn or made, and the person +portrayed will feel the wound. In this proceeding, the image is like +the person, and the blow delivered is like the blow which the victim is +to feel. It is open to us, therefore, to say that, in this typical +case of "imitative" or "mimetic" magic, like is believed to produce +like. And on pages 75-77, and elsewhere, above, I have taken that +position. But I would now add two qualifications. The first is, as +already intimated, that, though stabbing an effigy is like stabbing the +victim, it is only a magician or witch that has the power thus to +inflict wounds, sickness, or death: the services of the magician or +witch are employed for no other reason than that +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P269"></A>269}</SPAN> +the ordinary +person has not the power, even by the aid of the rite, to cause the +effect. The second qualification is that, whereas we distinguish +between the categories of likeness and identity, the savage makes but +little distinction. To us it is evident that stabbing the image is +only like stabbing the victim; but to the believer in magic, stabbing +the image is the same thing as stabbing the victim; and in his belief, +as the waxen image melts, so the victim withers away. +</P> + +<P> +It would, therefore, be more precise and more correct to say (page 74, +above) that eating tiger to make you bold points rather to a confusion, +in the savage's mind, of the categories of likeness and identity, than +to a conscious recognition of the principle that like produces like: as +you eat tiger's flesh, so you become bold with the tiger's boldness. +The spirit of the tiger enters you. But no magic is necessary to +enable you to make the meal: any one can eat tiger. The belief that so +the tiger's spirit will enter you is a piece of Animism; but it is not +therefore a piece of magic. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="biblio"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P271"></A>271}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +BIBLIOGRAPHY +</H3> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +ABT, A. Die Apologie des Apuleius von Madaura und die antike Zauberei. +Giessen. 1908. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +ALVIELLA, G. Origin and Growth of the Conception of God. London. +1892. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +BASTIAN, A. Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde. Berlin. 1888. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +BOUSSET, W. What is Religion? (E. T.). London. 1907. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +DAVIES, T. W. Magic, Divination, and Demonology. Leipzig. 1898. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +ELLIS, A. B. The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast. London. +1890. The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast. London. 1887. +The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast. London. 1894. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +FAHZ, L. De poetarum Romanorum doctrina magica. Giessen. 1904. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +FARNELL, L. R. The Place of the Sonder-Götter in Greek Polytheism, in +Anthropological Essays. Oxford. 1907. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +FRAZER, J. G. Adonis, Attis, Osiris. London. 1905. The Golden +Bough. London. 1900. Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship. +London. 1905. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +GRANGER, F. The Worship of the Romans. London. 1895. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +HADDON, H. C. Magic and Fetishism. London. 1906. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +HARRISON, J. E. Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. +Cambridge. 1903. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +HARTLAND, E. S. The Legend of Perseus. London. 1895. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +HOBHOUSE, L. T. Morals in Evolution. London. 1906. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +HÖFFDING, H. Philosophy of Religion (E. T.). 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In Proceedings of the International +Congress for the History of Religions. 1908. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +LANG, A. Custom and Myth. London. 1893. Magic and Religion. +London. 1901. The Making of Religion. London. 1898. Modern +Mythology. London. 1897. Myth, Ritual, and Religion. London. 1887. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +LENORMANT, F. Chaldean Magic (E. T.). London. 1877. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +MACCULLOUGH, J. A. Comparative Theology. London. 1902. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +MARETT, R. R. Is Taboo a Negative Magic? In Anthropological Essays. +Oxford. 1907. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +MAUSS, M. Des Sociétés Eskimos. L'Année Sociologique. Paris. 1906. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +MÜLLER, J. G. Geschichte der amerikanischen Urreligionen. Basel. +1855. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +NASSAU, R. H. Fetichism in West Africa. London. 1904. +</P> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P273"></A>273}</SPAN> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +PARKER, K. L. The Euahlayi Tribe. London. 1905. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +PAYNE, E. J. History of the New World called America. Oxford. 1892. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +REINACH, S. Cultes, Mythes, et Religions. Paris. 1905. Reports of +the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits. Cambridge +(England). 1908. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +RHYS DAVIDS, T. W. Origin and Growth of Religion. London. 1891. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +RUHL, L. De Mortuorum indicio. Giessen. 1903. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +SCHMIDT, H. Veteres Philosophi quomodo indicaverint de precibus. +Giessen. 1907. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +SCHRADER, O. Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumer. Strassburg. +1901. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +SKEAT, W. W. Malay Magic. London. 1900. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +SMITH, W. R. Religion of the Semites. London. 1894. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +SPENCE, L. The Mythologies of Ancient Mexico and Peru. London. 1907. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +SPENCER & GILLEN. The Native Tribes of Central Australia. London. +1899. The Northern Tribes of Central Australia. London. 1904. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +TYLOR, E. B. Primitive Culture. London. 1873. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +WAITZ, T. Anthropologie der Naturvölker. Leipzig. 1864. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +WEBSTER, H. Primitive Secret Societies. London. 1908. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +WESTERMARCK, E. The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. +London. 1906. +</P> + +<P CLASS="biblio"> +WUNDT, W. Völkerpsychologie. Leipzig. 1904-1907. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="index"></A> + +<SPAN CLASS="pagenum">{<A NAME="P275"></A>275}</SPAN> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +INDEX +</H3> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Acosta, Father, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Agnostic, <A HREF="#P4">4</A>, <A HREF="#P6">6</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Agries, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Alfoors, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Algonquins, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +All-father, <A HREF="#P190">190</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ancestors, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ancestor worship, <A HREF="#P52">52</A>, <A HREF="#P53">53</A>; may be arrested by religion, <A HREF="#P53">53</A>, <A HREF="#P54">54</A>, <A HREF="#P55">55</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Andaman Islands, <A HREF="#P169">169</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Animal sacrifice, <A HREF="#P209">209</A>; animal meal, <A HREF="#P178">178</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Animals, worshipped, <A HREF="#P111">111</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Animism, <A HREF="#P204">204</A>, <A HREF="#P215">215</A>, <A HREF="#P216">216</A>, <A HREF="#P217">217</A>; and magic, <A HREF="#P89">89</A>, <A HREF="#P90">90</A>, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>; and fetichism, <A HREF="#P116">116</A>, +<A HREF="#P117">117</A>, <A HREF="#P118">118</A>; polytheism, <A HREF="#P131">131</A>; not religion, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Anticipation, of nature, <A HREF="#P73">73</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Antinomy, the, of religious feeling, <A HREF="#P174">174</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Anzam, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Applied science of religion, <A HREF="#P2">2</A> ff.; looks to the future, <A HREF="#P3">3</A>; is used by +the missionary as a practical man, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>, <A HREF="#P16">16</A>; its object, <A HREF="#P18">18</A>, <A HREF="#P21">21</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ashantee Land, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>, <A HREF="#P155">155</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Atheist, <A HREF="#P4">4</A>, <A HREF="#P6">6</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Atman, <A HREF="#P247">247</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +At-one-ment, <A HREF="#P178">178</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Attention, <A HREF="#P9">9</A>, <A HREF="#P10">10</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Australia, <A HREF="#P183">183</A> ff. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Australian tribes, religion of, <A HREF="#P27">27</A>, <A HREF="#P28">28</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Aztecs, <A HREF="#P188">188</A>, <A HREF="#P190">190</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Basutos, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Becoming, <A HREF="#P214">214</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Being, is in process of evolution, <A HREF="#P214">214</A>; still incomplete, <A HREF="#P214">214</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Belief, and desire, <A HREF="#P39">39</A>, <A HREF="#P40">40</A>; in immortality and God, <A HREF="#P31">31</A>, <A HREF="#P32">32</A>; erroneous, +and magic, <A HREF="#P79">79</A>; in magic, <A HREF="#P85">85</A>; religious, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Bhogaldai, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Billiards, <A HREF="#P78">78</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Blood, and rain, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Bones, of animals, hung up, <A HREF="#P78">78</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Boorah, <A HREF="#P162">162</A> ff. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Bosman, <A HREF="#P109">109</A> ff., <A HREF="#P112">112</A>, <A HREF="#P113">113</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Bread, prayer for daily, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Buddhism, <A HREF="#P247">247</A> ff.; and immortality, <A HREF="#P36">36</A>, <A HREF="#P37">37</A>, <A HREF="#P61">61</A>, <A HREF="#P62">62</A>, <A HREF="#P63">63</A>; its fundamental +illogicality, <A HREF="#P66">66</A>; its strength, <A HREF="#P66">66</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Buro, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Buzzard, <A HREF="#P76">76</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Byamee, <A HREF="#P162">162</A> ff., <A HREF="#P191">191</A>, <A HREF="#P198">198</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Cause, and conditions, <A HREF="#P77">77</A>, <A HREF="#P85">85</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Celebes, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ceram, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ceremonies, for rain, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Chain of existence, <A HREF="#P65">65</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Charms, and prayers, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>, <A HREF="#P115">115</A>, <A HREF="#P152">152</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Chattels, <A HREF="#P241">241</A>, <A HREF="#P243">243</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Cherokee Indian, <A HREF="#P50">50</A>, <A HREF="#P76">76</A>, <A HREF="#P77">77</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Chicomecoatl, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Childhood, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +China, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>, <A HREF="#P197">197</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Christianity, <A HREF="#P239">239</A> ff., <A HREF="#P258">258</A>, <A HREF="#P259">259</A>, <A HREF="#P260">260</A>; the highest form of religion, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>, +<A HREF="#P18">18</A>, <A HREF="#P22">22</A>, <A HREF="#P23">23</A>; and other forms of religion, <A HREF="#P26">26</A>, <A HREF="#P27">27</A>, <A HREF="#P28">28</A>, <A HREF="#P35">35</A>; alone teaches +self-sacrifice as the way to life eternal, <A HREF="#P69">69</A>; and sacrifice, <A HREF="#P209">209</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Clouds, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>; of smoke and rain, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Communal purposes, and magic, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Communion, <A HREF="#P175">175</A>; not so much an intellectual belief as an object of +desire, <A HREF="#P43">43</A>, <A HREF="#P44">44</A>; of man with God the basis of morality, <A HREF="#P62">62</A>; logically +incompatible with Buddhism, <A HREF="#P63">63</A>; involves personal existence, <A HREF="#P67">67</A>; with +God, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>; sought in prayer, <A HREF="#P172">172</A>; and sacrifice, <A HREF="#P172">172</A>; in Mexico, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>; +maintained by sacramental eating, <A HREF="#P195">195</A>; annually, <A HREF="#P196">196</A>; renewed, <A HREF="#P198">198</A>; the +true end of sacrifice, <A HREF="#P207">207</A>, <A HREF="#P208">208</A>; between man and God, <A HREF="#P249">249</A>; imperfect, +<A HREF="#P257">257</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Community, <A HREF="#P254">254</A>; and magic, <A HREF="#P81">81</A>, <A HREF="#P97">97</A>; and its God, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Community, the, and fetiches, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>; and its gods, <A HREF="#P135">135</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P146">146</A>, +<A HREF="#P147">147</A>, <A HREF="#P148">148</A>, <A HREF="#P166">166</A>; and the individual, <A HREF="#P218">218</A>, <A HREF="#P239">239</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Comparative method, <A HREF="#P20">20</A>, <A HREF="#P21">21</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Comparative Philology, <A HREF="#P20">20</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Comparison, method of, <A HREF="#P17">17</A>; implies similarity in the religions +compared, <A HREF="#P19">19</A>; and implies difference also, <A HREF="#P20">20</A>; contrasted with +comparative method, <A HREF="#P21">21</A>; deals with differences, <A HREF="#P22">22</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Comte, <A HREF="#P213">213</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Conciliation, and coercion, of spirits, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Congregations, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Contagious magic, <A HREF="#P85">85</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Continuation theory, <A HREF="#P55">55</A>, <A HREF="#P56">56</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Corn, eaten sacramentally, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>, <A HREF="#P195">195</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Corn-maiden, <A HREF="#P195">195</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Corn-mother, <A HREF="#P195">195</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Corn-spirit, <A HREF="#P196">196</A>, <A HREF="#P199">199</A>, <A HREF="#P200">200</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Cotton-mother, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Creator, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Creek Indians, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Custom, <A HREF="#P244">244</A>; protected by the god of the community, <A HREF="#P219">219</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Dances, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Dead, the, <A HREF="#P38">38</A>; return, <A HREF="#P47">47</A>; spirits of the, <A HREF="#P92">92</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Death, a mistake according to the primitive view, <A HREF="#P44">44</A>, <A HREF="#P45">45</A>; or else due +to magic, <A HREF="#P45">45</A>, <A HREF="#P46">46</A>, <A HREF="#P80">80</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Deer, <A HREF="#P74">74</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Degradation of religion, <A HREF="#P24">24</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Deification, <A HREF="#P53">53</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Deiphobus, <A HREF="#P54">54</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Delaware prayer, <A HREF="#P145">145</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Departmental deities, <A HREF="#P190">190</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Desacralisation, <A HREF="#P186">186</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Desire for immortality, is the origin of the belief in immortality, <A HREF="#P40">40</A>, +<A HREF="#P41">41</A>; is not a selfish desire, <A HREF="#P42">42</A>; the root of all evils, <A HREF="#P66">66</A>; religious, +<A HREF="#P115">115</A>, <A HREF="#P116">116</A>, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P142">142</A>, <A HREF="#P149">149</A>; and the worship of the gods, <A HREF="#P135">135</A>; +and religion, <A HREF="#P158">158</A>, <A HREF="#P166">166</A>; of the community, <A HREF="#P163">163</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Desire of all nations, <A HREF="#P115">115</A>, <A HREF="#P173">173</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Dieri, <A HREF="#P50">50</A>, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>, <A HREF="#P164">164</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Difference, implies similarity, <A HREF="#P27">27</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Differences, to be taken into account by method of comparison, <A HREF="#P22">22</A>; +their value, <A HREF="#P23">23</A>, <A HREF="#P24">24</A>; postulated by science, <A HREF="#P24">24</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Differentiation of the homogeneous, <A HREF="#P23">23</A>, <A HREF="#P24">24</A>, <A HREF="#P25">25</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Domesticated plants and animals, <A HREF="#P190">190</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Dreams, and the soul, <A HREF="#P37">37</A>; their emotional value, <A HREF="#P42">42</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Drought, <A HREF="#P164">164</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Dugongs, <A HREF="#P164">164</A>, <A HREF="#P165">165</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Dynamics, of society, <A HREF="#P246">246</A>, <A HREF="#P255">255</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +East Indies, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Eating of the god, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Eating tiger, <A HREF="#P74">74</A>, <A HREF="#P89">89</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ellis, Colonel, <A HREF="#P113">113</A>, <A HREF="#P120">120</A>, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Emotional element, in fetichism and religion, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +End, the, gives value to what we do, <A HREF="#P13">13</A>; and is a matter of will, <A HREF="#P13">13</A>; +of society, <A HREF="#P251">251</A>, <A HREF="#P253">253</A>; a category unknown to science, <A HREF="#P255">255</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ends, anti-social, <A HREF="#P81">81</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Error, <A HREF="#P25">25</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Euahlayi, <A HREF="#P48">48</A>, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>, <A HREF="#P191">191</A>, <A HREF="#P198">198</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Evolution, <A HREF="#P214">214</A>; of religion, <A HREF="#P6">6</A>, <A HREF="#P239">239</A>, <A HREF="#P247">247</A>, <A HREF="#P253">253</A>; and progress, <A HREF="#P9">9</A>, <A HREF="#P12">12</A>, <A HREF="#P24">24</A>, +<A HREF="#P264">264</A>; theory of, <A HREF="#P23">23</A>; and the history of religion, <A HREF="#P172">172</A>, <A HREF="#P173">173</A>; of humanity, +<A HREF="#P239">239</A>, <A HREF="#P244">244</A>, <A HREF="#P246">246</A>; law of, <A HREF="#P252">252</A>; end of, <A HREF="#P254">254</A>, <A HREF="#P256">256</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Faith, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>, <A HREF="#P238">238</A>; the conviction that we can attain our ends, <A HREF="#P14">14</A>; shared +by the religious man with all practical men, <A HREF="#P14">14</A>, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>; exhibited in +adopting method of comparison in religion, <A HREF="#P17">17</A>; in Christianity, <A HREF="#P18">18</A>; +banishes fear of comparisons, <A HREF="#P18">18</A>, <A HREF="#P19">19</A>; in the communion of man with God +manifests itself in the desire for immortality, <A HREF="#P68">68</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Family, and society, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Famine, <A HREF="#P205">205</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Father, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Feeling, religious, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>; moral and religious, <A HREF="#P81">81</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Fetich, defined, <A HREF="#P111">111</A>, <A HREF="#P112">112</A>; offerings made to it, <A HREF="#P112">112</A>; not merely an +"inanimate," <A HREF="#P113">113</A>, <A HREF="#P116">116</A>; but a spirit, <A HREF="#P116">116</A>, <A HREF="#P117">117</A>; possesses personality +and will, <A HREF="#P117">117</A>; aids in the accomplishment of desire, <A HREF="#P117">117</A>, <A HREF="#P119">119</A>; may be +made, <A HREF="#P120">120</A>; is feared, <A HREF="#P120">120</A>; has no religious value, <A HREF="#P120">120</A>, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>; distinct +from a god, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>; subservient to its owner, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>; has no plurality of +worshippers, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>; its principal object to work evil, <A HREF="#P123">123</A>; serves its +owner only, <A HREF="#P127">127</A>; permanence of its worship, <A HREF="#P129">129</A>; has no specialised +function, <A HREF="#P129">129</A>, <A HREF="#P130">130</A>; is prayed to and talked with, <A HREF="#P132">132</A>; worshipped by an +individual, <A HREF="#P134">134</A>; and not by the community, <A HREF="#P135">135</A>, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Fetichism, <A HREF="#P105">105</A> ff., <A HREF="#P215">215</A>; as the lowest form of religion, <A HREF="#P106">106</A>, <A HREF="#P107">107</A>; as +the source of religious values, <A HREF="#P107">107</A>, <A HREF="#P108">108</A>; and magic, <A HREF="#P90">90</A>; and religion, +<A HREF="#P114">114</A>, <A HREF="#P120">120</A>, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>; the law of its evolution, <A HREF="#P119">119</A>, <A HREF="#P120">120</A>; condemned by public +opinion, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>, <A HREF="#P123">123</A>; offensive to the morality of the native, <A HREF="#P126">126</A>; and at +variance with his religion, <A HREF="#P126">126</A>, <A HREF="#P127">127</A>; not the basis of religion, <A HREF="#P127">127</A>; +and polytheism, <A HREF="#P128">128</A>, <A HREF="#P131">131</A>, <A HREF="#P132">132</A>, <A HREF="#P133">133</A>; and fear, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Finality of Christianity, <A HREF="#P258">258</A>, <A HREF="#P259">259</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +First-fruit ceremonials, <A HREF="#P183">183</A>, <A HREF="#P184">184</A>; and the gods, <A HREF="#P185">185</A>, <A HREF="#P187">187</A>; an act of +worship, <A HREF="#P187">187</A>, <A HREF="#P188">188</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +First-fruits, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Flesh of the divine being, <A HREF="#P196">196</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Fly-totem, <A HREF="#P165">165</A>, <A HREF="#P166">166</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Folk-lore, <A HREF="#P85">85</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Food supply, <A HREF="#P205">205</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Footprints, <A HREF="#P74">74</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Forms of religion, <A HREF="#P19">19</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Framin women, <A HREF="#P152">152</A>, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>, <A HREF="#P155">155</A>, <A HREF="#P156">156</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Frazer, J. G., <A HREF="#P50">50</A>, <A HREF="#P76">76</A>, <A HREF="#P78">78</A>, <A HREF="#P79">79</A>, <A HREF="#P83">83</A>, <A HREF="#P92">92</A>, <A HREF="#P94">94</A>, <A HREF="#P102">102</A>, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>, <A HREF="#P157">157</A>, <A HREF="#P158">158</A>, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>, +<A HREF="#P180">180</A>, <A HREF="#P192">192</A>, <A HREF="#P194">194-200</A>, <A HREF="#P202">202</A>, <A HREF="#P205">205</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Fuegians, <A HREF="#P169">169</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Funerals, and prayer, <A HREF="#P163">163</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Future, knowledge of the, <A HREF="#P14">14</A>, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Future life, its relation to morality and religion, <A HREF="#P36">36</A>, <A HREF="#P37">37</A>, <A HREF="#P57">57</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Future punishments, and rewards, <A HREF="#P51">51</A>, <A HREF="#P61">61</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Future world, <A HREF="#P52">52</A> ff. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ghosts, <A HREF="#P38">38</A>, <A HREF="#P42">42</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Gift-theory of sacrifice, <A HREF="#P206">206</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +God, worshipped by community, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>; a supreme being, <A HREF="#P168">168</A>; etymology +of the word, <A HREF="#P133">133</A>, <A HREF="#P134">134</A>; a personal power, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>; correlative to a +community, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Gods and worshippers, <A HREF="#P53">53</A>; and fetichism, <A HREF="#P110">110</A>; made and broken, <A HREF="#P110">110</A>; +personal, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>; "departmental," <A HREF="#P129">129</A>; their personality, <A HREF="#P130">130</A>, <A HREF="#P131">131</A>; and +the good of the community, <A HREF="#P123">123</A>; and fetiches, <A HREF="#P124">124</A>; are the powers that +care for the welfare of the community, <A HREF="#P126">126</A>, <A HREF="#P172">172</A>; and spirits, <A HREF="#P128">128</A>; "of +a moment," <A HREF="#P128">128</A>, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>; their proper names, <A HREF="#P131">131</A>; worshipped by a +community, <A HREF="#P134">134</A>; and the desires of their worshippers, <A HREF="#P134">134</A>; not evolved +from fetiches, <A HREF="#P135">135</A>; promote the community's good, <A HREF="#P135">135</A>, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>, <A HREF="#P167">167</A>; and +prayer, <A HREF="#P140">140</A>, <A HREF="#P147">147</A>, <A HREF="#P148">148</A>; and morality, <A HREF="#P169">169</A>; of a community identified +with the community, <A HREF="#P177">177</A>; as ethical powers, <A HREF="#P215">215</A>; punish transgression, +<A HREF="#P220">220</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Gold Coast, prayer, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Golden Age, <A HREF="#P25">25</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Good, the, <A HREF="#P140">140</A>; and the gods, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Gotama, <A HREF="#P64">64</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +<I>Gott</I>, and <I>giessen</I>, <A HREF="#P134">134</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Grace, <A HREF="#P259">259</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Gratitude, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Great Spirit, the, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Guardian spirits, <A HREF="#P111">111</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Guinea, <A HREF="#P197">197</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Haddon, Dr., <A HREF="#P83">83</A>, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>, <A HREF="#P100">100</A>, <A HREF="#P101">101</A>, <A HREF="#P106">106</A>, <A HREF="#P107">107</A>, <A HREF="#P117">117</A>, <A HREF="#P118">118</A>, <A HREF="#P124">124</A>, <A HREF="#P129">129</A>, <A HREF="#P130">130</A>, <A HREF="#P132">132</A>, +<A HREF="#P133">133</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hades, <A HREF="#P58">58</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hallucinations, <A HREF="#P38">38</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Happiness, <A HREF="#P240">240</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hartford Theological Seminary, <A HREF="#P1">1</A>, <A HREF="#P22">22</A>, <A HREF="#P106">106</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Harvest, prayers and sacrifice, <A HREF="#P180">180</A> ff. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Harvest communion, <A HREF="#P188">188</A>, <A HREF="#P189">189</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Harvest customs, <A HREF="#P192">192</A>, <A HREF="#P198">198</A>, <A HREF="#P203">203</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Harvest supper, <A HREF="#P195">195</A> ff., <A HREF="#P200">200</A>; its sacramental character, <A HREF="#P197">197</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Health, and disease, <A HREF="#P138">138</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Heaven, kingdom of, <A HREF="#P252">252</A>, <A HREF="#P262">262</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hebrew prophets, <A HREF="#P207">207</A>, <A HREF="#P209">209</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hebrews, <A HREF="#P54">54</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hegel, <A HREF="#P213">213</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hindoo Koosh, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Historic science, has the historic order for its object, <A HREF="#P11">11</A>; but does +not therefore deny that its facts may have value other than truth +value, <A HREF="#P11">11</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +History, of art and literature, <A HREF="#P8">8</A>; of religion, <A HREF="#P253">253</A>, <A HREF="#P263">263</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ho dirge, <A HREF="#P47">47</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hobhouse, L. T., <A HREF="#P211">211</A>, <A HREF="#P214">214-216</A>, <A HREF="#P222">222</A>, <A HREF="#P223">223</A>, <A HREF="#P226">226-229</A>, <A HREF="#P230">230</A>, <A HREF="#P237">237</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Höffding, H., <A HREF="#P44">44</A>, <A HREF="#P166">166</A>, <A HREF="#P173">173</A>, <A HREF="#P254">254</A>; on fetichism, <A HREF="#P106">106</A>, <A HREF="#P114">114</A>, <A HREF="#P115">115</A>, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>, <A HREF="#P124">124</A>, +<A HREF="#P128">128-130</A>, <A HREF="#P133">133-137</A>; on antinomy of religious feeling, <A HREF="#P174">174</A>; and morality, +<A HREF="#P211">211</A>, <A HREF="#P214">214-216</A>, <A HREF="#P219">219</A>, <A HREF="#P220">220</A>, <A HREF="#P237">237</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Hollis, Mr., <A HREF="#P143">143</A> ff. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Homer, <A HREF="#P16">16</A>, <A HREF="#P17">17</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Homœopathic magic, <A HREF="#P80">80</A>, <A HREF="#P85">85</A>, <A HREF="#P93">93</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Homogeneous, the, <A HREF="#P23">23</A>, <A HREF="#P24">24</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Howitt, Mr., <A HREF="#P190">190</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +<I>Hu, huta</I>, <A HREF="#P134">134</A>, +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Humanitarianism, <A HREF="#P214">214</A>, <A HREF="#P215">215</A>, <A HREF="#P236">236</A>, <A HREF="#P244">244</A>, <A HREF="#P246">246</A>, <A HREF="#P247">247</A>; and morality, <A HREF="#P221">221</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Humanity, <A HREF="#P213">213</A>; its evolution, <A HREF="#P244">244</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Husband, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ideals, a matter of the will, <A HREF="#P13">13</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Idols, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Illingworth, J. R., <A HREF="#P258">258</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Illusion, <A HREF="#P64">64</A>, <A HREF="#P248">248</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Images, of dough, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>, <A HREF="#P196">196</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Imitative magic, <A HREF="#P157">157</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Immortality, <A HREF="#P34">34</A> ff. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Incorporation, <A HREF="#P178">178</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Individual, and the community, <A HREF="#P218">218</A>, <A HREF="#P239">239</A>; cannot exist save in society, +<A HREF="#P225">225</A>; both a means and an end for society, <A HREF="#P240">240</A> ff., <A HREF="#P246">246</A>, <A HREF="#P247">247</A>; existence +of, <A HREF="#P248">248</A>; interests of, <A HREF="#P250">250</A>, <A HREF="#P251">251</A>; end of, <A HREF="#P253">253</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Individuality, not destroyed but strengthened by uprooting selfish +desires, <A HREF="#P67">67</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Indo-China, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Indo-European languages, <A HREF="#P20">20</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Infancy, helpless, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Initiation ceremonies, <A HREF="#P190">190</A>, <A HREF="#P191">191</A>; admit to the worship of the gods, <A HREF="#P192">192</A>; +important for theory of sacrifice, <A HREF="#P192">192</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Interests, of the community, <A HREF="#P250">250</A>; and the individual, <A HREF="#P250">250</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Intoning, of prayer, <A HREF="#P147">147</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Israel, <A HREF="#P59">59</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Jaundice, <A HREF="#P89">89</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Jews, <A HREF="#P53">53</A>, <A HREF="#P54">54</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Judgments, of value, <A HREF="#P115">115</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Justice, public, <A HREF="#P223">223</A>, <A HREF="#P224">224</A> ff. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Kaitish rites, <A HREF="#P164">164</A>, <A HREF="#P165">165</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Kangaroo totem, <A HREF="#P197">197</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Kant, <A HREF="#P255">255</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Karma, <A HREF="#P64">64</A>, <A HREF="#P65">65</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Kei Islands, <A HREF="#P156">156</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Kern Baby, <A HREF="#P195">195</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Khonds of Orissa, and prayer, <A HREF="#P139">139</A>, <A HREF="#P167">167</A>, <A HREF="#P171">171</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Killing of the god, <A HREF="#P197">197</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Kingsley, Miss, <A HREF="#P48">48</A>, <A HREF="#P49">49</A>, <A HREF="#P116">116</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Lake Nyassa, <A HREF="#P146">146</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Lake Superior, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Lang, Andrew, <A HREF="#P129">129</A>, <A HREF="#P168">168</A>, <A HREF="#P169">169</A>, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +<I>L'Année Sociologique</I>, <A HREF="#P60">60</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Like produces like, <A HREF="#P72">72</A>, <A HREF="#P73">73</A>, <A HREF="#P74">74</A>, <A HREF="#P76">76</A>, <A HREF="#P79">79</A>, <A HREF="#P80">80</A>, <A HREF="#P84">84</A>, <A HREF="#P85">85</A>, <A HREF="#P86">86</A>, <A HREF="#P89">89</A>, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>, <A HREF="#P100">100</A>, +<A HREF="#P160">160</A>, <A HREF="#P189">189</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Litanies, <A HREF="#P163">163</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Love of neighbours, <A HREF="#P254">254</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +MacCullough, J. A., <A HREF="#P47">47</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +McTaggart, Dr., <A HREF="#P49">49</A>, <A HREF="#P50">50</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Magic, <A HREF="#P32">32</A>, <A HREF="#P70">70</A> ff.; and murder, <A HREF="#P45">45</A>, <A HREF="#P47">47</A>; a colourable imitation of +science, <A HREF="#P71">71</A>; a spurious system, <A HREF="#P71">71</A>, <A HREF="#P72">72</A>; fraudulent, <A HREF="#P75">75</A>, <A HREF="#P76">76</A>; origin of +belief in, <A HREF="#P79">79</A>; regarded with disapproval, <A HREF="#P79">79</A>; sympathetic or +homœopathic, <A HREF="#P80">80</A>; offensive to the god of the community, <A HREF="#P81">81</A>; not +prior to religion, <A HREF="#P97">97</A>; condemned when inconsistent with the public +good, <A HREF="#P97">97</A>; and anti-social purposes, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>; decline of, <A HREF="#P100">100</A>; and the +impossible, <A HREF="#P101">101</A>; private and public, <A HREF="#P83">83</A>; nefarious, <A HREF="#P83">83</A>; beneficent, <A HREF="#P87">87</A>, +<A HREF="#P88">88</A>; does not imply spirits, <A HREF="#P89">89</A>; and religion, <A HREF="#P92">92</A> ff.; fundamentally +different, <A HREF="#P95">95</A>, <A HREF="#P158">158</A>, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>; mimics science and religion, <A HREF="#P103">103</A>; and the +degradation of religion, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>, <A HREF="#P151">151</A>, <A HREF="#P152">152</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>, <A HREF="#P154">154</A>; priority +of, to religion, <A HREF="#P154">154</A>, <A HREF="#P157">157</A>; and sacramental eating, <A HREF="#P199">199-204</A>. <I>See</I> +Appendix. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Magician, his personality, <A HREF="#P87">87</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mahommedanism, <A HREF="#P259">259</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Maize-mother, <A HREF="#P190">190</A>, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>, <A HREF="#P195">195</A>, <A HREF="#P196">196</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Maker, the, <A HREF="#P168">168</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Manganja, <A HREF="#P146">146</A>, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mara tribe, <A HREF="#P164">164</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Marett, R. R., <A HREF="#P151">151</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Marriage law, <A HREF="#P222">222</A>, <A HREF="#P227">227</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Masai, and prayer, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>, <A HREF="#P144">144</A>, <A HREF="#P145">145</A>, <A HREF="#P153">153-156</A>, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Master of Life, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mauss, M., <A HREF="#P60">60</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mâyâ, <A HREF="#P64">64</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Medical advice, <A HREF="#P76">76</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mexico, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>, <A HREF="#P199">199</A>, <A HREF="#P200">200</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mimetic magic, <A HREF="#P85">85</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Minahassa, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mind of Humanity, <A HREF="#P213">213</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Missionary, <A HREF="#P6">6</A>, <A HREF="#P140">140</A>, <A HREF="#P210">210</A>, <A HREF="#P211">211</A>, <A HREF="#P257">257</A>, <A HREF="#P265">265</A>; interested in the value rather +than the chronological order of religions, <A HREF="#P12">12</A>; being practical, uses +applied science, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>; and method of comparison, <A HREF="#P17">17</A>; and notes +resemblances, <A HREF="#P22">22</A>; requires scientific knowledge of the material he has +to work on, <A HREF="#P34">34</A>; may use as a lever the belief in man's communion with +spirits, <A HREF="#P69">69</A>; and magic, <A HREF="#P102">102</A>, <A HREF="#P103">103</A>, <A HREF="#P104">104</A>; and fetichism, <A HREF="#P105">105</A>; and heathen +prayer, <A HREF="#P138">138</A>, <A HREF="#P173">173</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Momentary gods, <A HREF="#P128">128</A>, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Morality, <A HREF="#P81">81</A>, <A HREF="#P83">83</A>, <A HREF="#P84">84</A>, <A HREF="#P95">95</A>, <A HREF="#P211">211</A> ff., <A HREF="#P260">260</A>, <A HREF="#P261">261</A>; and communion with God, +<A HREF="#P62">62</A>; and the mysteries, <A HREF="#P191">191</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P148">148</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Moral transgression, and sin, <A HREF="#P221">221</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mosquito-totem, <A HREF="#P166">166</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mura-muras, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Mysteries, the Greek, <A HREF="#P58">58</A>, <A HREF="#P62">62</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P180">180</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Names, and gods, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Names, of gods, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>, <A HREF="#P131">131</A>, <A HREF="#P132">132</A>; of men, <A HREF="#P132">132</A>; and personality, <A HREF="#P133">133</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Nassau, Dr., <A HREF="#P116">116</A>, <A HREF="#P168">168</A>, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Natchez Indians, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Natural law, <A HREF="#P72">72</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Nature, uniformity of, <A HREF="#P14">14</A>, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Nefarious magic, <A HREF="#P83">83-87</A>, <A HREF="#P95">95</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Neilgherry Hills, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +New Caledonia, <A HREF="#P92">92</A>, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>, <A HREF="#P154">154</A>, <A HREF="#P155">155</A>, <A HREF="#P156">156</A>, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +New Hebrides, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +New South Wales, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Nias, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Niger, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Nirvana, <A HREF="#P247">247</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +North American Indians, <A HREF="#P111">111</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Nyankupon, <A HREF="#P169">169</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Offerings, <A HREF="#P178">178</A>; and their object, <A HREF="#P180">180</A>; made to fetiches, <A HREF="#P112">112</A>, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Old Testament, <A HREF="#P54">54</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Ol-kora, <A HREF="#P154">154</A>, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Onitsha, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Order of value, <A HREF="#P7">7</A>; distinct from chronological order, <A HREF="#P7">7</A>, <A HREF="#P9">9</A>, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>, <A HREF="#P16">16</A>; +historic, <A HREF="#P8">8</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Origin, and validity, <A HREF="#P38">38</A>, <A HREF="#P39">39</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Osages, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Parker, Mrs. L., <A HREF="#P162">162</A> ff., <A HREF="#P191">191</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Perception, <A HREF="#P9">9</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Personality, of magician, <A HREF="#P87">87</A>; of gods and fetiches, <A HREF="#P130">130</A>, <A HREF="#P131">131</A>, <A HREF="#P132">132</A>; of +God, <A HREF="#P258">258</A>; and proper names, <A HREF="#P133">133</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Personification, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Peru, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>, <A HREF="#P198">198</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Pestilence, <A HREF="#P205">205</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Pinkerton, <A HREF="#P109">109</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Plato, <A HREF="#P206">206</A>, <A HREF="#P207">207</A>, <A HREF="#P209">209</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Political economy, <A HREF="#P5">5</A>, <A HREF="#P6">6</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Political philosophy, <A HREF="#P241">241</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Polytheism and fetichism, <A HREF="#P128">128</A>, <A HREF="#P130">130</A>, <A HREF="#P131">131</A>, <A HREF="#P132">132</A>, <A HREF="#P133">133</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Pondos, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Power, personal, <A HREF="#P87">87</A>, <A HREF="#P88">88</A>, <A HREF="#P100">100</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Prayer, <A HREF="#P92">92</A>, <A HREF="#P93">93</A>, <A HREF="#P94">94</A>, <A HREF="#P138">138</A> ff.; among the heathen, <A HREF="#P138">138</A>; to fetiches, <A HREF="#P127">127</A>; +and desire, <A HREF="#P142">142</A>; and personal advantage, <A HREF="#P144">144</A>; and the community, <A HREF="#P146">146</A>; +of individuals, <A HREF="#P147">147</A>; unethical, <A HREF="#P148">148</A>, <A HREF="#P149">149</A>; and magic, <A HREF="#P154">154</A>; and spells, +<A HREF="#P155">155</A>, <A HREF="#P157">157</A>, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>; and famine, <A HREF="#P158">158</A>; for rain, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>; the expression of the +heart's desire, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>; never unknown to man, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>; in exceptional +distress, <A HREF="#P182">182</A>; of thanksgiving, <A HREF="#P182">182</A>; occasional and recurring, <A HREF="#P179">179</A> ff.; +and communion, <A HREF="#P180">180</A>; its purpose, <A HREF="#P175">175</A>; and external rites, <A HREF="#P176">176</A>; implies +sacrifice, <A HREF="#P176">176</A>; not always reported by observers, <A HREF="#P177">177</A>; and sacrifice go +together, <A HREF="#P169">169</A>; no worship without, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>; of Socrates, <A HREF="#P171">171</A>; and +sacrifice, <A HREF="#P172">172</A>; Our Lord's, <A HREF="#P172">172</A>, <A HREF="#P173">173</A>; practical, <A HREF="#P167">167</A>; the root of +religion, <A HREF="#P167">167</A>, <A HREF="#P168">168</A>; and its objects, <A HREF="#P163">163</A>; a mother's prayer, <A HREF="#P163">163</A>; +"singing," <A HREF="#P164">164</A>; and charms, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>, <A HREF="#P165">165</A>; at seed time, <A HREF="#P205">205</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Prayer-mill, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Priests, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>, <A HREF="#P193">193</A>; and gods, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>; and fetiches, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Primitive man, believes in immortality, <A HREF="#P37">37</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Private property, <A HREF="#P5">5</A>, <A HREF="#P6">6</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Progress, <A HREF="#P9">9</A>, <A HREF="#P246">246</A>, <A HREF="#P256">256</A>, <A HREF="#P257">257</A>, <A HREF="#P263">263</A>; and evolution, <A HREF="#P24">24</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Protective colouring, <A HREF="#P70">70</A>, <A HREF="#P103">103</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Psalmist, <A HREF="#P54">54</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Puluga, <A HREF="#P169">169</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Pure science of religion, is a historic science, <A HREF="#P2">2</A>; its facts may be +used for different and contradictory purposes, <A HREF="#P4">4</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Rain, prayed for, <A HREF="#P146">146</A>, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Rain-clouds, <A HREF="#P154">154</A>, <A HREF="#P156">156</A>, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Rain-god, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>, <A HREF="#P92">92</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Rain-making, <A HREF="#P84">84</A>, <A HREF="#P87">87</A>, <A HREF="#P88">88</A>, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>, <A HREF="#P164">164</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Rebirth, <A HREF="#P48">48</A>, <A HREF="#P49">49</A>, <A HREF="#P50">50</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Regress, <A HREF="#P246">246</A>, <A HREF="#P257">257</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Reincarnation, <A HREF="#P59">59</A>; in animal form, <A HREF="#P50">50</A>, <A HREF="#P51">51</A>, <A HREF="#P52">52</A>; in new-born children, +<A HREF="#P48">48-50</A>; in namesakes, <A HREF="#P50">50</A>; its relation to morality and religion, <A HREF="#P61">61</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Religion, is a fact, <A HREF="#P5">5</A>; never unknown to man, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>; essentially +practical, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>, <A HREF="#P175">175</A>; its evolution, <A HREF="#P239">239</A>; as a survival of barbarism, +<A HREF="#P24">24</A>; lowest forms to be studied first, <A HREF="#P26">26</A>, <A HREF="#P27">27</A>; is a yearning after and +search for God, <A HREF="#P28">28</A>, <A HREF="#P115">115</A>, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>; a bond of community from the first, <A HREF="#P43">43</A>, +<A HREF="#P59">59</A>, <A HREF="#P176">176</A>; implies gods and their worship, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>, <A HREF="#P177">177</A>, <A HREF="#P217">217</A>; implies +rites and prayers, <A HREF="#P176">176</A>; "under the guise of desire," <A HREF="#P44">44</A>, <A HREF="#P115">115</A>, <A HREF="#P149">149</A>, <A HREF="#P158">158</A>, +<A HREF="#P166">166</A>, <A HREF="#P173">173</A>; but it is the desire of the community, <A HREF="#P44">44</A>; and morality, <A HREF="#P37">37</A>, +<A HREF="#P81">81</A>, <A HREF="#P83">83</A>, <A HREF="#P84">84</A>, <A HREF="#P211">211</A>, <A HREF="#P215">215</A>; and animism, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>; and fetichism, <A HREF="#P106">106-109</A>, <A HREF="#P115">115</A>, +<A HREF="#P131">131</A>, <A HREF="#P132">132</A>, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>; and magic, <A HREF="#P70">70</A>, <A HREF="#P71">71</A>, <A HREF="#P72">72</A>, <A HREF="#P92">92-95</A>, <A HREF="#P96">96</A>, <A HREF="#P97">97</A>, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>, <A HREF="#P101">101</A>, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>, <A HREF="#P151">151</A>, +<A HREF="#P152">152</A>, <A HREF="#P154">154</A>; mechanical, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>; applied science of, <A HREF="#P105">105</A>; and its value, <A HREF="#P109">109</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Religious values, <A HREF="#P9">9</A>, <A HREF="#P16">16</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Resemblances, not more important than differences, for the method of +comparison, <A HREF="#P22">22</A>; their value, <A HREF="#P23">23</A>, <A HREF="#P24">24</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Resentment and justice, <A HREF="#P224">224</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Responsibility, collective, <A HREF="#P227">227</A>, <A HREF="#P228">228</A>, <A HREF="#P234">234</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Revelation, <A HREF="#P172">172</A>, <A HREF="#P255">255</A>; and evolution, <A HREF="#P173">173</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Revenge and justice, <A HREF="#P229">229</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Rheumatism, <A HREF="#P76">76</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Rhys Davids, <A HREF="#P64">64</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Saa, <A HREF="#P180">180</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Sacrament, in Central Australia, <A HREF="#P197">197</A>, <A HREF="#P200">200</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Sacramental meals, <A HREF="#P183">183</A> ff., <A HREF="#P197">197</A>, <A HREF="#P199">199</A>, <A HREF="#P200">200</A>, <A HREF="#P201">201</A>, <A HREF="#P203">203</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Sacrifice, <A HREF="#P92">92</A>, <A HREF="#P93">93</A>, <A HREF="#P94">94</A>, <A HREF="#P175">175</A> ff.; to fetiches, <A HREF="#P113">113</A>; and worship, <A HREF="#P137">137</A>, +<A HREF="#P177">177</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P172">172</A>, <A HREF="#P177">177</A>; and the gift theory, <A HREF="#P206">206</A>; and communion, +<A HREF="#P207">207</A>, <A HREF="#P208">208</A>; its ultimate form, <A HREF="#P209">209</A>, <A HREF="#P210">210</A>; and the etymology of "god," <A HREF="#P133">133</A> +ff., <A HREF="#P137">137</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Saffron, <A HREF="#P89">89</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Science, has truth, not assignment of value, for its object, <A HREF="#P10">10</A>, <A HREF="#P11">11</A>, +<A HREF="#P108">108</A>; and history, <A HREF="#P108">108</A>; does not deal with ends, <A HREF="#P255">255</A>; and evolution, +<A HREF="#P257">257</A>; and magic, <A HREF="#P70">70</A>, <A HREF="#P71">71</A>, <A HREF="#P72">72</A>, <A HREF="#P101">101</A>; of the savage, <A HREF="#P159">159</A>, <A HREF="#P189">189</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Science of religion, <A HREF="#P256">256</A>; pure and applied, <A HREF="#P2">2</A> ff.; supposed to be +incompatible with religious belief, <A HREF="#P4">4</A>; really has nothing to do with +the truth or value of religion, <A HREF="#P5">5</A>, <A HREF="#P10">10</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P140">140</A>, <A HREF="#P141">141</A>; and the +missionary, <A HREF="#P105">105</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Sea Dyaks, <A HREF="#P228">228</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Search for God, the, <A HREF="#P28">28</A>, <A HREF="#P29">29</A>, <A HREF="#P30">30</A>, <A HREF="#P34">34</A>, <A HREF="#P35">35</A>, <A HREF="#P252">252</A>, <A HREF="#P258">258</A>, <A HREF="#P262">262</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Seed time, <A HREF="#P188">188</A>, <A HREF="#P205">205</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Self-realising spirit, <A HREF="#P213">213</A>, <A HREF="#P214">214</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Seminole Indians, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Shakespeare, <A HREF="#P16">16</A>, <A HREF="#P17">17</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Sheol, <A HREF="#P54">54</A>, <A HREF="#P58">58</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Similarity, between higher and lower forms of religion, <A HREF="#P27">27</A>; the basis +for the missionary's work, <A HREF="#P28">28</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +"Singing," <A HREF="#P164">164</A>, <A HREF="#P165">165</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Slavery, <A HREF="#P241">241</A>, <A HREF="#P243">243</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +"Smelling out," <A HREF="#P84">84</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Social purpose, and magic, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Society, a means, <A HREF="#P253">253</A>; as an end, <A HREF="#P261">261</A>; perfection of, <A HREF="#P254">254</A>, <A HREF="#P261">261</A>; and the +family, <A HREF="#P98">98</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Society Islands, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Solidarity, <A HREF="#P212">212</A>, <A HREF="#P213">213</A>, <A HREF="#P251">251</A>; religious, <A HREF="#P220">220</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Solomon Islands, <A HREF="#P180">180</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Soul, the, <A HREF="#P37">37</A>; separable from the body, <A HREF="#P37">37</A>; its continued existence, <A HREF="#P38">38</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Spells, and prayers, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>, <A HREF="#P151">151</A>, <A HREF="#P152">152</A>, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>, <A HREF="#P155">155</A>, <A HREF="#P157">157</A>, <A HREF="#P160">160</A>, <A HREF="#P164">164</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Spencer and Gillen, <A HREF="#P45">45</A>, <A HREF="#P46">46</A>, <A HREF="#P164">164</A>, <A HREF="#P197">197</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Spinning, <A HREF="#P78">78</A>, <A HREF="#P79">79</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Spirits, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>; not essential to magic, <A HREF="#P89">89</A>, <A HREF="#P90">90</A>, <A HREF="#P91">91</A>; and fetiches, +<A HREF="#P118">118</A>, <A HREF="#P119">119</A>; of fetichism and gods of polytheism, <A HREF="#P128">128</A>; guardian, <A HREF="#P111">111</A>; +"momentary," and gods, <A HREF="#P135">135</A>; and prayer, <A HREF="#P166">166</A>; and morality, <A HREF="#P215">215</A>, <A HREF="#P217">217</A>, +<A HREF="#P219">219</A>; not worshipped, <A HREF="#P216">216</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Spring customs, <A HREF="#P192">192</A>, <A HREF="#P198">198</A>, <A HREF="#P203">203</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Squirrel, <A HREF="#P76">76</A>, <A HREF="#P78">78</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +State, the, and justice, <A HREF="#P224">224</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +St. John, Mr., <A HREF="#P228">228</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Stones, <A HREF="#P92">92</A>, <A HREF="#P93">93</A>, <A HREF="#P94">94</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Struggle for existence, <A HREF="#P264">264</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +<I>Suhman</I>, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>, <A HREF="#P123">123</A>, <A HREF="#P126">126</A>, <A HREF="#P136">136</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Sun, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>, <A HREF="#P157">157</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Superstition, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Sympathetic magic, <A HREF="#P80">80</A>, <A HREF="#P85">85</A>, <A HREF="#P93">93</A>, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>, <A HREF="#P157">157</A>, <A HREF="#P162">162</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Taboo, <A HREF="#P186">186</A> ff., <A HREF="#P222">222</A>, <A HREF="#P229">229</A>, <A HREF="#P231">231-234</A>, <A HREF="#P250">250</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Talents, <A HREF="#P253">253</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tana, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tanner, John, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tari, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>, <A HREF="#P183">183</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Taro, <A HREF="#P92">92</A>, <A HREF="#P93">93</A>, <A HREF="#P94">94</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Temples, <A HREF="#P178">178</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Test, of perfection in society, <A HREF="#P255">255</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Thanks, do not need words, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>, <A HREF="#P185">185</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Thank-offerings, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Thomsen, Professor, <A HREF="#P134">134</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tibetan Buddhists, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tiger, <A HREF="#P74">74</A>, <A HREF="#P89">89</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tjumba, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tonga, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Totems, <A HREF="#P51">51</A>, <A HREF="#P165">165</A>, <A HREF="#P166">166</A>, <A HREF="#P197">197</A>, <A HREF="#P203">203</A>; eating of, <A HREF="#P186">186</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Trade wind, <A HREF="#P101">101</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Transmigration, <A HREF="#P51">51</A>, <A HREF="#P61">61</A>, <A HREF="#P119">119</A>, <A HREF="#P120">120</A>; of character, <A HREF="#P64">64</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Truth, <A HREF="#P25">25</A>; and value, <A HREF="#P10">10</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tupinambas, <A HREF="#P56">56</A>, <A HREF="#P58">58</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Tylor, Professor, <A HREF="#P37">37</A>, <A HREF="#P47">47</A>, <A HREF="#P56">56</A>, <A HREF="#P112">112</A>, <A HREF="#P141">141-144</A>, <A HREF="#P147">147</A>, <A HREF="#P148">148</A>, <A HREF="#P150">150</A>, <A HREF="#P161">161</A>, <A HREF="#P166">166</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Unalits, <A HREF="#P59">59</A>, <A HREF="#P60">60</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Uncle John, knows his own pipe, <A HREF="#P49">49</A>, <A HREF="#P50">50</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Uniformity of nature, <A HREF="#P14">14</A>; matter of faith, not of knowledge, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Unselfishness, developes and does not weaken individuality, <A HREF="#P67">67</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Usener, Professor, <A HREF="#P128">128</A>, <A HREF="#P131">131</A>, <A HREF="#P133">133</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Utilitarianism, <A HREF="#P240">240</A>, <A HREF="#P242">242</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Value, <A HREF="#P7">7</A>; literary and artistic, <A HREF="#P8">8</A>, <A HREF="#P9">9</A>; religious, <A HREF="#P8">8</A>, <A HREF="#P9">9</A>, <A HREF="#P10">10</A>, <A HREF="#P107">107</A>, <A HREF="#P108">108</A>, +<A HREF="#P109">109</A>; carries a reference to the future, <A HREF="#P12">12</A>; relative to a purpose or +end, <A HREF="#P13">13</A>, <A HREF="#P15">15</A>; of literature and art, felt, not proved, <A HREF="#P16">16</A>, <A HREF="#P17">17</A>; of +fetichism, <A HREF="#P114">114</A>, <A HREF="#P115">115</A>, <A HREF="#P120">120</A>; of fetichism and religion for society, <A HREF="#P125">125</A>; +religious, and fetichism, <A HREF="#P127">127</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Virgil, <A HREF="#P54">54</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +West Africa, <A HREF="#P152">152</A>, <A HREF="#P153">153</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Westermarck, E., <A HREF="#P224">224</A>, <A HREF="#P225">225</A>, <A HREF="#P228">228</A>, <A HREF="#P235">235</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Whistling, to produce a wind, <A HREF="#P73">73</A>, <A HREF="#P74">74</A>, <A HREF="#P75">75</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Will, the, <A HREF="#P13">13</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Will to injure, <A HREF="#P81">81</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Will to live, the, <A HREF="#P41">41</A>; involves the desire for immortality, <A HREF="#P41">41</A>; +denounced by Buddhism, <A HREF="#P66">66</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Wind, <A HREF="#P100">100</A>, <A HREF="#P101">101</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Wisdom, collective, of man, <A HREF="#P237">237</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Witch, and witch-doctor, <A HREF="#P84">84</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Witchcraft, <A HREF="#P222">222</A>, <A HREF="#P227">227</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Wives, of hunters and warriors, <A HREF="#P78">78</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Wohkonda, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Worship, <A HREF="#P121">121</A>, <A HREF="#P122">122</A>, <A HREF="#P177">177</A>, <A HREF="#P180">180</A>, <A HREF="#P260">260</A>; and the etymology of "god," <A HREF="#P133">133</A> ff., +<A HREF="#P137">137</A>; of gods and of fetiches, <A HREF="#P123">123</A>, <A HREF="#P134">134</A>, <A HREF="#P135">135</A>; of the community, given to +the powers that protect it, <A HREF="#P126">126</A>; may break up, <A HREF="#P170">170</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Xenophon, <A HREF="#P171">171</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Xilonen, <A HREF="#P190">190</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Yams, <A HREF="#P93">93</A>, <A HREF="#P143">143</A>, <A HREF="#P180">180</A>, <A HREF="#P181">181</A>. +</P> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Yebu, <A HREF="#P147">147</A>. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="index"> +Zulus, <A HREF="#P194">194</A>. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<H5 ALIGN="center"> +Printed in the United States of America. +</H5> + +<BR><BR><BR><BR> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Introduction to the Study of +Comparative Religion, by Frank Byron Jevons + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRO TO COMPARATIVE RELIGION *** + +***** This file should be named 31875-h.htm or 31875-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/1/8/7/31875/ + +Produced by Al Haines + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: An Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion + +Author: Frank Byron Jevons + +Release Date: April 3, 2010 [EBook #31875] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRO TO COMPARATIVE RELIGION *** + + + + +Produced by Al Haines + + + + + + + + + + + THE HARTFORD-LAMSON LECTURES ON + THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD + + + +AN INTRODUCTION + +TO THE STUDY OF + +COMPARATIVE RELIGION + + +BY + +FRANK BYRON JEVONS + + +PRINCIPAL OF BISHOP HATFIELD'S HALL, DURHAM + UNIVERSITY, DURHAM, ENGLAND + + + + +New York + +THE MACMILLAN COMPANY + +1920 + +_All rights reserved_ + + + + +COPYRIGHT, 1908, + +By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. + + +Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1908. + + + + + Norwood Press + J. S. Cushing--Berwick & Smith Co. + Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. + + + + +{v} + +NOTE + +The Hartford-Lamson Lectures on "The Religions of the World" are +delivered at Hartford Theological Seminary in connection with the +Lamson Fund, which was established by a group of friends in honor of +the late Charles M. Lamson, D.D., sometime President of the American +Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, to assist in preparing +students for the foreign missionary field. The Lectures are designed +primarily to give to such students a good knowledge of the religious +history, beliefs, and customs of the peoples among whom they expect to +labor. As they are delivered by scholars of the first rank, who are +authorities in their respective fields, it is expected that in +published form they will prove to be of value to students generally. + + + + +{vii} + +CONTENTS + + + PAGE + + INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 + IMMORTALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 + MAGIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 + FETICHISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 + PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 + SACRIFICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 + MORALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 + CHRISTIANITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 + APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 + BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 + INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 + + + + +{ix} + +ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS + + +INTRODUCTION + +The use of any science lies in its application to practical purposes. +For Christianity, the use of the science of religion consists in +applying it to show that Christianity is the highest manifestation of +the religious spirit. To make this use of the science of religion, we +must fully and frankly accept the facts it furnishes, and must +recognise that others are at liberty to use them for any opposite +purpose. But we must also insist that the science of religion is +limited to the establishment of facts and is excluded from passing +judgment on the religious value of those facts. The science of +religion as a historical science is concerned with the chronological +order, and not with the religious value, of its facts; and the order of +those facts does not determine their value any more in the case of +religion than in the case of literature or art. But if their value is +a question on which the science refuses to enter, it does not follow +that the question is one which does not admit of a truthful answer: +science has no monopoly of truth. The value of anything always implies +a reference to the future: to be of value a thing must be of use for +some purpose, and what is purposed is in the future. Things have +value, or have not, according as they are useful or not for our +purposes. The conviction that we can attain our purposes and ideals, +the conviction without which we should not even attempt to attain them +is faith; and it is in faith and by faith that the man of religion +proposes to {x} conquer the world. It is by faith in Christianity that +the missionary undertakes to convert men to Christianity. The +comparative value of different religions can only be ascertained by +comparison of those religions; and the missionary, of all men, ought to +know what is to be learnt from such comparison. It is sometimes +supposed (wrongly) that to admit that all religions are comparable is +to admit that all are identical; but, in truth, it is only because they +differ that it is possible to compare them. For the purpose of +comparison both the differences and the resemblances must be assumed to +exist; and even for the purposes of the science of religion there is +nothing to compel us to postulate a period in which either the +differences or the resemblances were non-existent. But though there is +nothing to compel us to assume that the lowest form in which religion +is found was necessarily the earliest to exist, it is convenient for us +to start from the lowest forms. For the practical purposes of the +missionary it is desirable where possible to discover any points of +resemblance or traits of connection between the lower form with which +his hearers are familiar and the higher form to which he proposes to +lead them. It is therefore proper for him and reasonable in itself to +look upon the long history of religion as man's search for God, and to +regard it as the function of the missionary to keep others in that +search . . . 1-33 + + +IMMORTALITY + +The belief in immortality is more prominent, though less intimately +bound up with religion, amongst uncivilised than it is amongst +civilised peoples. In early times the fancy luxuriates, unchecked, on +this as on other matters. It is late in the history of religion that +the immortality of the soul is found to be postulated alike by morality +and religion. The belief that the soul exists after death doubtless +manifested itself first in the {xi} fact that men dream of those who +have died. But, were there no desire to believe, it may be doubted +whether the belief would survive, or even originate. The belief +originates in desire, in longing for one loved and lost; and dreams are +not the cause of that desire, though they are one region in which it +manifests itself, or rather one mode of its manifestation. The desire +is for continued communion; and its gratification is found in a +spiritual communion. Such communion also is believed to unite +worshippers both with one another and with their God. Where death is +regarded as a disruption of communion between the living and the +departed, death is regarded as unnatural, as a violation of the +original design of things, which calls for explanation; and the +explanation is provided in myths which account for it by showing that +the origin of death was due to accident or mistake. At first, it is +felt that the mistake cannot be one without remedy: the deceased is +invited "to come to us again." If he does not return in his old body, +then he is believed to reappear in some new-born child. Or the +doctrine of rebirth may be satisfied by the belief that the soul is +reincarnated in animal form. This belief is specially likely to grow +up where totem ancestors are believed to manifest themselves in the +shape of some animal. Belief in such animal reincarnation has, in its +origin, however, no connection with any theory that transmigration from +a human to an animal form is a punishment. Up to this point in the +evolution of the belief in immortality, the belief in another world +than this does not show itself. Even when ancestor-worship begins to +grow up, the ancestors' field of operations is in this world, rather +than in the next. But the fact that their aid and protection can be +invoked by the community tends to elevate them to the level of the god +or gods of the community. This tendency, however, may be defeated, as +it was in Judaea, where the religious sentiment will not permit the +difference between God and man to be blurred. {xii} Where the fact +that the dead do not return establishes itself as incontrovertible, the +belief grows up that as the dead continue to exist, it is in another +world that their existence must continue. At first they are conceived +to continue to be as they are remembered to have been in this life. +Later the idea grows up that they are punished or rewarded there, +according as they have been bad or good here; according as they have or +have not in this life sought communion with the true God. This belief +thus differs entirely from the earlier belief, _e.g._ as it is found +amongst the Eskimo, that it is in this world the spirits of the +departed reappear, and that their continued existence is unaffected by +considerations of morality or religion. It is, however, not merely the +belief in the next world that may come to be sanctified by religion and +moralised. The belief in reincarnation in animal form may come to be +employed in the service of religion and morality, as it is in Buddhism. +There, however, what was originally the transmigration of souls was +transformed by Gotama into the transmigration of character; and the +very existence of the individual soul, whether before death or after, +was held to be an illusion and a deception. This tenet pushes the +doctrine of self-sacrifice, which is essential both to religion and to +morality, to an extreme which is fatal in logic to morality and +religion alike: communion between man and God--the indispensable +presupposition of both religion and morals--is impossible, if the very +existence of man is illusory. The message of the missionary will be +that by Christianity self-sacrifice is shown to be the condition of +morality, the essence of communion with God and the way to life eternal +. . . 34-69 + + +MAGIC + +A view sometime held was that magic is religion, and religion magic. +With equal reason, or want of reason, it might be held that magic was +science, and science magic. {xiii} Even if we correct the definition, +and say that to us magic appears, in one aspect, as a spurious system +of science; and, in another, as a spurious system of religion; we still +have to note that, for those who believed in it, it could not have been +a spurious system, whether of science or religion. Primitive man acts +on the assumption that he can produce like by means of like; and about +that assumption there is no "magic" of any kind. It is only when an +effect thus produced is a thing not commonly done and not generally +approved of, that it is regarded as magic; and it is magic, because not +every one knows how to do it, or not every one has the power to do it, +or not every one cares to do it. About this belief, so long as every +one entertains it, there is nothing spurious. When however it begins +to be suspected that the magician has not the power to do what he +professes, his profession tends to become fraudulent and his belief +spurious. On the other hand, a thing commonly done and generally +approved of is not regarded as magical merely because the effect +resembles the cause, and like is in this instance produced by like. +Magic is a term of evil connotation; and the practice of using like to +produce like is condemned when and because it is employed for +anti-social purposes. Such practices are resented by the society, +amongst whom and on whom they are employed; and they are offensive to +the God who looks after the interests of the community. In fine, the +object and purpose of the practice determines the attitude of the +community towards the practice: if the object is anti-social, the +practice is nefarious; and the witch, if "smelled out," is killed. The +person who is willing to undertake such nefarious proceedings comes to +be credited with a nefarious personality, that is to say, with both the +power and the will to do what ordinary, decent members of the community +could not and would not do: personal power comes to be the most +important, because the most mysterious, characteristic of the man +believed to {xiv} be a magician. If we turn to things, such as +rain-making, which are socially beneficial, we find a similar growth in +the belief that some men have extraordinary power to work wonders on +behalf of the tribe. A further stage of development is reached when +the man who uses his personal power for nefarious purposes undertakes +by means of it to control spirits: magic then tends to pass into +fetichism. Similarly, when rain and other social benefits come to be +regarded as gifts of the gods, the power of the rainmaker comes to be +regarded as a power to procure from the gods the gifts that they have +to bestow: magic is displaced by religion. The opposition of principle +between magic and religion thus makes itself manifest. It makes itself +manifest in that the one promotes social and the other anti-social +purposes: the spirit worshipped by any community as its god is a spirit +who has the interests of the community at heart, and who _ex officio_ +condemns and punishes those who by magic or otherwise work injury to +the members of the community. Finally, the decline of the belief in +magic is largely due to the discovery that it does not produce the +effects it professes to bring about. But the missionary will also +dwell on the fact that his hearers feel it to be anti-social and to be +condemned alike by their moral sentiments and their religious feeling . +. . 70-104 + + +FETICHISM + +Fetichism is regarded by some as a stage of religious development, or +as the form of religion found amongst men at the lowest stage of +development known to us. From this the conclusion is sometimes drawn +that fetichism is the source of all religion and of all religious +values; and, therefore, that (as fetichism has no value) religion +(which is an evolved form of fetichism) has no value either. This +conclusion is then believed to be proved by the science of religion. +In fact, however, students of the science of religion disclaim this +conclusion and rightly {xv} assert that the science does not undertake +to prove anything as to the truth or the value of religion. + +Much confusion prevails as to what fetichism is; and the confusion is +primarily due to Bosman. He confuses, while the science of religion +distinguishes between, animal gods and fetiches. He asserts what we +now know to be false, viz., that a fetich is an inanimate object and +nothing more; and that the native rejects, or "breaks," one of these +gods, knowing it to be a god. + +Any small object which happens to arrest the attention of a negro, when +he has a desire to gratify, may impress him as being a fetich, _i.e._ +as having power to help him to gratify his desire. Here, Hoeffding +says, is the simplest conceivable construction of religious ideas: here +is presented religion under the guise of desire. Let it be granted, +then, that the object attracts attention and is involuntarily +associated with the possibility of attaining the desired end. It +follows that, as in the period of animism, all objects are believed to +be animated by spirits, fetich objects are distinguished from other +objects by the fact--not that they are animated by spirits but--that it +is believed they will aid in the accomplishment of the desired end. +The picking up of a fetich object, however, is not always followed by +the desired result; and the negro then explains "that it has lost its +spirit." The spirit goes out of it, indeed, but may perchance be +induced or even compelled to return into some other object; and then +fetiches may be purposely made as well as accidentally found, and are +liable to coercion as well as open to conciliation. + +But, throughout this process, there is no religion. Religion is the +worship of the gods of a community by the community for the good of the +community. The cult of a fetich is conducted by an individual for his +private ends; and the most important function of a fetich is to work +evil against those members of the community who have incurred the +fetich owner's resentment. Thus religion {xvi} and fetich-worship are +directed to ends not merely different but antagonistic. From the very +outset religion in social fetichism is anti-social. To seek the origin +of religion in fetichism is vain. Condemned, wherever it exists, by +the religious and moral feelings of the community, fetichism cannot +have been the primitive religion of mankind. The spirits of fetichism, +according to Hoeffding, become eventually the gods of polytheism: such a +spirit, so long as it is a fetich, is "the god of a moment," and must +come to be permanent if it is to attain to the ranks of the +polytheistic gods. But fetiches, even when their function becomes +permanent, remain fetiches and do not become gods. They do not even +become "departmental gods," for their powers are to further a man's +desires generally. On the other hand, they have personality, even if +they have not personal names. Finally, if, as Hoeffding believes, the +word "god" originally meant "he who is worshipped," and gods are +worshipped by the community, then fetiches, as they are nowhere +worshipped by the community, are in no case gods. + +The function of the fetich is anti-social; of the gods, to promote the +well-being of the community. To maintain that a god is evolved out of +a fetich is to maintain that practices destructive of society have only +to be pushed far enough and they will prove the salvation of society . +. . 105-137 + + +PRAYER + +Prayer is a phenomenon in the history of religion to which the science +of religion has devoted but little attention--the reason alleged being +that it is so simple and familiar as not to demand detailed study. It +may, however, be that the phenomenon is indeed familiar yet not simple. +Simple or not, it is a matter on which different views may be held. +Thus though it may be agreed that in the lower forms of religion it is +the accomplishment of desire that is asked for, a divergence of opinion +emerges {xvii} the moment the question is put, Whose desire? that of +the individual or of the community? And instances may be cited to show +that it is not for his own personal, selfish advantage alone that the +savage always or even usually prays. It is the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned to grant: the +petition of an individual is offered and harkened to only so far as it +is not prejudicial to the interests of the community. The statement +that savage prayer is unethical may be correct in the sense that pardon +for moral sin is not sought; it is incorrect, if understood to mean +that the savage does not pray to do the things which his morality makes +it incumbent on him to do, _e.g._ to fight successfully. The desires +which the god is prayed to grant are ordinarily desires which, being +felt by each and every member of the community, are the desires of the +community, as such, and not of any one member exclusively. + +Charms, it has been suggested, in some cases are prayers that by vain +repetition have lost their religious significance and become mere +spells. And similarly it has been suggested that out of mere spells +prayer may have been evolved. But, on the hypothesis that a spell is +something in which no religion is, it is clear that out of it no +religion can come; while if prayer, _i.e._ religion, has been evolved +out of spells, then there have never been spells wholly wanting in +every religious element. Whether a given formula then is prayer or +spell may be difficult to decide, when it has some features which seem +to be magical and others which seem to be religious. The magical +element may have been original and be in process of disappearing before +the dawn of the religious spirit. Now, the formula uttered is usually +accompanied by gestures performed. If the words are uttered to explain +the gesture or rite, the explanation is offered to some one, the words +are of the nature of a prayer to some one to grant the desire which the +gesture manifests. {xviii} On the other hand, if the gestures are +performed to make the words more intelligible, then the action +performed is, again, not magical, but is intended to make the +words--the prayer--more emphatic. In neither case, then, is the +gesture or rite magical in intent. Dr. Frazer's suggestion that it +required long ages for man to discover that he could not always +succeed--even by the aid of magic--in getting what he wanted; and that +only when he made this discovery did he take to religion and prayer, is +a suggestion which cannot be maintained in view of the fact that savage +man is much more at the mercy of accidents than is civilised man. The +suggestion, in fact, tells rather against than in favour of the view +that magic preceded religion, and that spells preceded prayer. + +The Australian black fellows might have been expected to present us +with the spectacle of a people unacquainted with prayer. But in point +of fact we find amongst them both prayers to Byamee and formulae which, +though now unintelligible even to the natives, may originally have been +prayers. And generally speaking the presumption is that races, who +distinctly admit the existence of spirits, pray to those spirits, even +though their prayers be concealed from the white man's observation. +Gods are there for the purpose of being prayed to. Prayer is the +essence of religion, as is shown by the fact that gods, when they cease +to be prayed to, are ignored rather than worshipped. Such gods--as in +Africa and elsewhere--become little more than memories, when they no +longer have a circle of worshippers to offer prayer and sacrifice to +them. + +The highest point reached in the evolution of pre-Christian prayer is +when the gods, as knowing best what is good, are petitioned simply for +things good. Our Lord's prayer is a revelation which the theory of +evolution cannot account for or explain. Nor does Hoeffding's "antinomy +of religious feeling" present itself to the Christian soul as an +antinomy . . . 138-174 + + +{xix} + +SACRIFICE + +Prayer and sacrifice historically go together, and logically are +indissoluble. Sacrifice, whether realised in an offering dedicated or +in a sacrificial meal, is prompted by the worshippers' desire to feel +that they are at one with the spirit worshipped. That desire manifests +itself specially on certain regularly occurring occasions (harvest, +seed time, initiation) and also in times of crisis. At harvest time +the sacrifices or offerings are thank-offerings, as is shown by the +fact that a formula of thanksgiving is employed. Primitive prayer does +not consist solely in petitions for favours to come; it includes +thanksgiving for blessings received. Such thanksgivings cannot by any +possibility be twisted into magic. + +Analogous to these thanksgivings at harvest time is the solemn eating +of first-fruits amongst the Australian black fellows. If this solemn +eating is not in Australia a survival of a sacramental meal, in which +the god and his worshippers were partakers, it must be merely a +ceremony whereby the food, which until it is eaten is taboo, is +"desacralised." But, as a matter of fact, such food is not taboo to +the tribe generally; and the object of the solemn eating cannot be to +remove the taboo and desacralise the food for the tribe. + +If the harvest rites or first-fruit ceremonials are sacrificial in +nature, then the presumption is that so, too, are the ceremonies +performed at seed time or the analogous period. + +At initiation ceremonies or mysteries, even amongst the Australian +black fellows, there is evidence to show that prayer is offered; and +generally speaking we may say that the boy initiated is admitted to the +worship of the tribal gods. + +The spring and harvest customs are closely allied to one another and +may be arranged in four groups: (1) In Mexico they plainly consist of +the worship of a god--by means of sacrifice and prayer--and of +communion. {xx} (2) In some other cases, though the god has no proper +or personal name, and no image is made of him, "the new corn," Dr. +Frazer says, "is itself eaten sacramentally, that is, as the body of +the corn spirit"; and it is by this sacramental meal that communion is +effected or maintained. (3) In the harvest customs of northern Europe, +bread and dumplings are made and eaten sacramentally, "as a substitute +for the real flesh of the divine being"; or an animal is slain and its +flesh and blood are partaken of. (4) Amongst the Australian tribes +there is a sacramental eating of the totem animal or plant. Now, these +four groups of customs may be all religious (and Dr. Frazer speaks of +them all as sacramental) or all magical; or it may be admitted that the +first three are religious, and maintained that the fourth is strictly +magical. But such a separation of the Australian group from the rest +does not commend itself as likely; further, it overlooks the fact that +it is at the period analogous to harvest time that the headman eats +solemnly and sparingly of the plant or animal, and that at harvest time +it is too late to work magic to cause the plant or animal to grow. The +probability is, then, that both the Australian group and the others are +sacrificial rites and are religious. + +Such sacrificial rites, however, though felt to be the means whereby +communion was effected and maintained between the god and his +worshippers, may come to be interpreted as the making of gifts to the +god, as the means of purchasing his favour, or as a full discharge of +their obligations. When so interpreted they will be denounced by true +religion. But though it be admitted that the sacrificial rite might be +made to bear this aspect, it does not follow, as is sometimes supposed, +that it was from the outset incapable of bearing any other. On the +contrary, it was, from the beginning, not only the rite of making +offerings to the god but, also, the rite whereby communion was +attained, whereby the society of worshippers was brought into the +presence of the god they {xxi} worshipped, even though the chief +benefits which the worshippers conceived themselves to receive were +earthly blessings. It is because the rite had from the beginning this +potentiality in it that it was possible for it to become the means +whereby, through Christ, all men might be brought to God . . . 175-210 + + +MORALITY + +The question whether morality is based on religion, or religion on +morality, is one which calls for discussion, inasmuch as it is apt to +proceed on a mistaken view of facts in the history of religion. It is +maintained that as a matter of history morality came first and religion +afterwards; and that as a matter of philosophy religion presupposes +morality. Reality, that is to say, is in the making; the spirit of man +is self-realising; being is in process of becoming rationalised and +moralised; religion in process of disappearing. + +Early religion, it is said, is unethical: it has to do with spirits, +which, as such, are not concerned with morality; with gods which are +not ethical or ideal, and are not objects of worship in our sense of +the term. + +Now, the spirits which, in the period of animism, are believed to +animate things, are not, it is true, concerned with morality; but then, +neither are they gods. To be a god a spirit must have a community of +worshippers; and it is as the protector of that community that he is +worshipped. He protects the community against any individual member +who violates the custom of the community. The custom of the community +constitutes the morality of the society. Offences against that custom +are offences against the god of the community. A god starts as an +ethical power, and as an object of worship. + +Still, it may be argued, before gods were, before religion was evolved, +morality was; and this may be shown by the origin and nature of +justice, which throughout is entirely independent of religion and +religious {xxii} considerations. On this theory, the origin of justice +is to be found in the resentment of the individual. But, first, the +individual, apart from society, is an abstraction and an impossibility: +the individual never exists apart from but always as a member of some +society. Next, justice is not the resentment of any individual, but +the sentiment of the community, expressing itself in the action not of +any individual but of the community as such. The responsibility both +for the wrong done and for righting it rests with the community. The +earliest offences against which public action is taken are said to be +witchcraft and breaches of the marriage laws. The latter are not +injuries resented by any individual: they are offences against the gods +and are punished to avert the misfortunes which otherwise would visit +the tribe. Witchcraft is especially offensive to the god of the +community. + +In almost, if not quite, the lowest stages of human development, +disease and famine are regarded as punishments which fall on the +community as a whole, because the community, in the person of one of +its members, has offended some supernatural power. In quite the lowest +stage the guilt of the offending member is also regarded as capable of +infecting the whole community; and he is, accordingly, avoided by the +whole community and tabooed. Taboo is due to the collective action, +and expresses the collective feeling of the community as a whole. It +is from such collective action and feeling that justice has been +evolved and not from individual resentment, which is still and always +was something different from justice. The offences punished by the +community have always been considered, so far as they are offences +against morality, to be offences against the gods of the community. +The fact that in course of time such offences come to be punished +always as militating against the good of society testifies merely to +the general assumption that the good of man is the will of God: men do +not believe that murder, adultery, etc., are merely offences {xxiii} +against man's laws. It is only by ignoring this patent fact that it +becomes possible to maintain that religion is built upon morality, and +that we are discovering religion to be a superfluous superstructure. + +It may be argued that the assumption that murder, adultery, etc., are +offences against God's will is a mere assumption, and that in making +the assumption we are fleeing "to the bosom of faith." The reply is +that we are content not merely to flee but to rest there . . . 211-238 + + +CHRISTIANITY + +If we are to understand the place of Christianity in the evolution of +religion, we must consider the place of religion in the evolution of +humanity; and I must explain the point of view from which I propose to +approach the three ideas of (1) evolution, (2) the evolution of +humanity, (3) the evolution of religion. + +I wish to approach the idea of evolution from the proposition that the +individual is both a means by which society attains its end, and an end +for the sake of which society exists. Utilitarianism has familiarised +us with the view that society exists for the sake of the individual and +for the purpose of realising the happiness and good of every +individual: no man is to be treated merely as a chattel, existing +solely as a means whereby his owner, or the governing class, may +benefit. But this aspect of the facts is entirely ignored by the +scientific theory of evolution: according to that theory, the +individual exists only as a factor in the process of evolution, as one +of the means by which, and not as in any sense the end for which, the +process is carried on. + +Next, this aspect of the facts is ignored not only by the scientific +theory of evolution, but also by the theory which humanitarianism holds +as to the evolution of humanity, viz. that it is a process moving +through the three stages of custom, religion, and humanitarianism. +That process is still, as it has long been in the past, far from +complete: {xxiv} the end is not yet. It is an end in which, whenever +and if ever realised on earth, we who are now living shall not live to +partake: we are--on this theory of the evolution of humanity--means, +and solely means, to an end which, when realised, we shall not partake +in. Being an end in which we cannot participate, it is not an end +which can be rationally set up for us to strive to attain. Nor will +the generation, which is ultimately to enjoy it, find much satisfaction +in reflecting that their enjoyment has been purchased at the cost of +others. To treat a minority of individuals as the end for which +humanity is evolved, and the majority as merely means, is a strange +pass for humanitarianism to come to. + +Approaching the evolution of religion from the point of view that the +individual must always be regarded both as an end and as a means, we +find that Buddhism denies the individual to be either the one or the +other, for his very existence is an illusion, and an illusion which +must be dispelled, in order that he may cease from an existence which +it is an illusion to imagine that he possesses. If, however, we turn +to other religions less highly developed than Buddhism, we find that, +in all, the existence of the individual as well as of the god of the +community is assumed; that the interests of the community are the will +of the community's god; that the interests of the community are higher +than the interests of the individual, when they appear to differ; and +that the man who prefers the interests of the community to his own is +regarded as the higher type of man. In fine, the individual, from this +point of view, acts voluntarily as the means whereby the end of society +may be realised. And, in so acting, he testifies to his conviction +that he will thereby realise his own end. + +Throughout the history of religion these two facts are implied: first, +the existence of the individual as a member of society seeking +communion with God; next, the existence of society as a means of which +the individual is {xxv} the end. Hence two consequences with regard to +evolution: first, evolution may have helped to make us, but we are +helping to make it; next, the end of evolution is not wholly outside +any one of us, but in part is realised in us. And it is just because +the end is both within us and without us that we are bound up with our +fellow-man and God. + +Whether the process of evolution is moving to any end whatever, is a +question which science declines--formally refuses--to consider. +Whether the end at which religion aims is possible or not, has in any +degree been achieved or not, is a question which the science of +religion formally declines to consider. If, however, we recognise that +the end of religion, viz. communion with God, is an end at which we +ought to aim, then the process whereby the end tends to be attained is +no longer evolution in the scientific sense. It is a process in which +progress may or may not be made. As a fact, the missionary everywhere +sees arrested development, imperfect communion with God; for the +different forms of religion realise the end of religion in different +degrees. Christianity claims to be "final," not in the chronological +sense, but in that it alone finds the true basis and the only end of +society in the love of God. The Christian theory of society again +differs from all other theories in that it not only regards the +individuals composing it as continuing to exist after death, but +teaches that the society of which the individual is truly a member, +though it manifests itself in this world, is realised in the next. + +The history of religion is the history of man's search for God. That +search depends for its success, in part, upon man's will. Christianity +cannot be stationary: the extent to which we push our missionary +outposts forward gives us the measure of our vitality. And in that +respect, as in others, the vitality of the United States is great . . . +239-265 + + +APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 _ad fin._ + + + + +{1} + +INTRODUCTION + +Of the many things that fill a visitor from the old country with +admiration, on his first visit to the United States, that which arrests +his attention most frequently, is the extent and success with which +science is applied to practical purposes. And it is beginning to dawn +upon me that in the United States it is not only pure science which is +thus practically applied,--the pure sciences of mechanics, physics, +mathematics,--but that the historic sciences also are expected to +justify themselves by their practical application; and that amongst the +historic sciences not even the science of religion is exempted from the +common lot. It also may be useful; and had better be so,--if any one +is to have any use for it. It must make itself useful to the man who +has practical need of its results and wishes to apply them--the +missionary. He it is who, for the practical purposes of the work to +which he is called, requires an applied science of religion; and +Hartford {2} Theological Seminary may, I believe, justly claim to be +the first institution in the world which has deliberately and +consciously set to work to create by the courses of lectures, of which +this series is the very humble beginning, an applied science of +religion. + +How, then, will the applied science differ from the pure science of +religion? In one way it will not differ: an applied science does not +sit in judgment upon the pure science on which it is based; it accepts +the truths which the pure science presents to all the world, and bases +itself upon them. The business of pure science is to discover facts; +that of the applied science is to use them. The business of the +science of religion is to discover all the facts necessary if we are to +understand the growth and history of religion. The business of the +applied science is, in our case, to use the discovered facts as a means +of showing that Christianity is the highest manifestation of the +religious spirit. + +In dealing with the applied science, then, we recover a liberty which +the pure science does not enjoy. The science of religion is a historic +science. Its student looks back upon the past; {3} and looks back upon +it with a single purpose, that of discovering what, as a matter of +fact, did happen, what was the order in which the events occurred. In +so looking back he may, and does, see many things which he could wish +had not occurred; but he has no power to alter them; he has no choice +but to record them; and his duty, his single duty, is to ascertain the +historic facts and to establish the historic truth. With the applied +science the case is very different. There the student sets his face to +the future, no longer to the past. The truths of pure science are the +weapons placed in his hand with which he is to conquer the world. It +is in the faith that the armour provided him by science is sure and +will not fail him that he addresses himself to his chosen work. The +implements are set in his hands. The liberty is his to employ them for +what end he will. That liberty is a consequence of the fact that the +student's object no longer is to ascertain the past, but to make the +future. + +The business of the pure science is to ascertain the facts and state +the truth. To what use the facts and truth are afterwards put, is a +question with which the pure science has nothing to do. {4} The same +facts may be put to very different uses: from the same facts very +different conclusions may be drawn. The facts which the science of +religion establishes may be used and are used for different and for +contradictory purposes. The man who is agnostic or atheist uses them +to support his atheism or agnosticism; or even, if he is so unwise, to +prove it. The man who has religion is equally at liberty to use them +in his support; and if he rarely does that, at any rate he still more +rarely commits the mistake of imagining that the science of religion +proves the truth of his particular views on the subject of religion. +Indeed, his tendency is rather in the opposite direction: he is +unreasonably uneasy and apt to have a disquieting alarm lest the +science of religion may really be a danger to religion. This alarm may +very naturally arise when he discovers that to the scientific student +one religion is as another, and the question is indifferent whether +there is any truth in any form. It is very easy to jump from these +facts to the erroneous conclusion that science of religion is wholly +incompatible with religious belief. And of course it is quite human +and perfectly intelligible that that conclusion should be proclaimed +aloud as correct {5} and inevitable by the man who, being an atheist, +fights for what he feels to be the truth. + +We must, therefore, once more insist upon the simple fact that science +of religion abstains necessarily from assuming either that religion is +true or is not true. What it does assume is what no one will deny, +viz. that religion is a fact. Religious beliefs may be right or they +may be wrong: but they exist. Therefore they can be studied, +described, classified, placed in order of development, and treated as a +branch of sociology and as one department of the evolution of the +world. And all this can be done without once asking the question +whether religious belief is true and right and good, or not. Whether +it is pronounced true or false by you or me, will not in the least +shake the fact that it has existed for thousands of years, that it has +had a history during that period, and that that history may be written. +We may have doubts whether the institution of private property is a +good thing, or whether barter and exchange are desirable proceedings. +But we shall not doubt that private property exists or that it may be +exchanged. And we shall not imagine that the science of political +economy, which deals, among other {6} things with the production and +exchange of wealth which is private property, makes any pronouncement +whatever on the question whether private property is or is not an +institution which we ought to support and believe in. The conclusions +established by the science of political economy are set forth before +the whole world; and men may use them for what purpose they will. They +may and do draw very different inferences from them, even contradictory +inferences. But if they do, it is because they use them for different +ends or contradictory purposes. And the fact that the communist or +socialist uses political economy to support his views no more proves +that socialism is the logical consequence of political economy than the +fact that the atheist uses or misuses, for his own purposes, the +conclusions of the science of religion proves his inferences to be the +logical outcome of the science. + +The science of religion deals essentially with the one fact that +religion has existed and does exist. It is from that fact that the +missionary will start; and it is with men who do not question the fact +that he will have to do. The science of religion seeks to trace the +historic growth, the evolution of religion; to establish what actually +was, not to {7} judge what ought to have been,--science knows no +"ought," in that sense or rather in that tense, the past tense. Its +work is done, its last word has been said, when it has demonstrated +what was. It is the heart which sighs to think what might have been, +and which puts on it a higher value than it does on what actually came +to pass. There is then another order in which facts may be ranged +besides the chronological order in which historically they occurred; +and that is the order of their value. It is an order in which we do +range facts, whenever we criticise them. It is the order in which we +range them, whenever we pass judgment on them. Or, rather, passing +judgment on them is placing them in the order of their value. And the +chronological order of their occurrence is quite a different thing from +the order in which we rank them when we judge them according to their +value and importance. It is, or rather it would be, quite absurd to +say, in the case of literature, or art, for instance, that the two +orders are identical. There it is obvious and universally admitted +that one period may reach a higher level than another which in point of +time is later. The classical period is followed by a post-classical +period; culmination is followed by decline. {8} Now, this difference +in point of the literary or artistic value of two periods is as real +and as fundamental as the time order or chronological relation of the +two periods. It would be patently ridiculous for any ardent maintainer +of the importance of distinguishing between good literature and bad, +good art and bad art, to say that the one period, being good, must have +been chronologically prior to the other, because, from the point of +art, it was better than that other. Every one can see that. The +chronological order, the historic order, is one thing; the order of +literary value or artistic importance is another. But if this is +granted, and every one will grant it, then it is also, and thereby, +granted that the historic order of events is not the same thing as the +order of their value, and is no guide to it. Thus far I have +illustrated these remarks by reference to literary and artistic values. +But I need hardly say that I have been thinking really all the time of +religious values. If the student of literature or of art surveys the +history of art and literature with the purpose of judging the value of +the works produced, the student of religion may and must survey the +history of religion with the same purpose. If the one student is +entitled, as he {9} justly is entitled, to say that the difference +between the literary or artistic value of two periods is as real and as +fundamental as is their difference in the order of time, then the +student of religion is claiming no exceptional or suspicious privilege +for himself. He is claiming no privilege at all; he is but exercising +the common rights of all students like himself, when he points out that +differences in religious values are just as real and just as +fundamental as the historic or chronological order itself. + +The assignment of values, then,--be it the assignment of the value of +works of art, literature, or religion,--is a proceeding which is not +only possible (as will be somewhat contemptuously admitted by those who +believe that evolution is progress, and that there is no order of value +distinct from the order of history and chronological succession); the +assignment of value is not only permissible (as may be admitted by +those who believe, or for want of thought fancy they believe, that the +historic order of events is the only order which can really exist), it +is absolutely inevitable. It is the concomitant or rather an integral +part of every act of perception. Everything that we perceive is either +dismissed from attention because it is judged at the moment to have +{10} no value, or, if it has value, attention is concentrated upon it. + +From this point of view, then, it should be clear that there is some +deficiency in such a science as the science of religion, which, by the +very conditions that determine its existence, is precluded from ever +raising the question of the value of any of the religions with which it +deals. Why does it voluntarily, deliberately, and of its own accord, +rigidly exclude the question whether religions have any value--whether +religion itself has any value? One answer there is to that question +which once would have been accepted as conclusive, viz. that the object +of science is truth. That answer delicately implies that whether +religion has any value is an enquiry to which no truthful answer can be +given. The object of science is truth; therefore science alone, with +all modesty be it said, can attain truth. Science will not ask the +question--or, when it is merciful, abstains from asking the +question--whether religion is true. So the reasonable and truthful man +must, on that point, necessarily be agnostic: whether religion is true, +he does not know. + +This train of inferences follows--so far as it is permitted illogical +inferences to follow at all--from {11} the premise that the object of +science is truth. Or, rather, it follows from that premise as we +should now understand it, viz. that the object of historic science is +historic truth. That is the object of the science of religion--to be +true to the historic facts, to discover and to state them accurately. +On the principle of the division of labour, or on the principle of +taking one thing at a time, it is obviously wise that when we are +endeavouring to discover the historic sequence of events, we should +confine ourselves to that task and not suffer ourselves to be +distracted and diverted by other and totally different considerations. +The science of religion, therefore, is justified, in the opinion of all +who are entitled to express an opinion, in steadfastly declining to +consider any other point than the historic order of the facts with +which it deals. But in so declining to go beyond its self-appointed +task of reconstituting the historic order of events and tracing the +evolution of religion, it does not, thereby, imply that it is +impossible to place them, or correctly place them, in their order of +value. To say that they have no value would be just as absurd as to +say that works of literature or art have no literary or artistic value. +To say that it is difficult to assign their value may be {12} true, but +is no argument against, it is rather a stimulus in favour of, making +the attempt. And it is just the order value, the relative value, of +forms of religion which is of absorbing interest to missionaries. It +is a valuation which is essential to what I have already designated as +the applied science of religion. Thus far in speaking of the +distinction between the historic order in which the various forms of +art, literature, and religion have occurred, and the order of value in +which the soul of every man who is sensible either to art or to +literature or to religion instinctively attempts to place them, I have +necessarily assumed the position of one who looks backward over the +past. It was impossible to compare and contrast the order value with +the historic order, save by doing so. It was necessary to point out +that the very same facts which can be arranged chronologically and in +the order of their evolution can also be--and, as a matter of fact, by +every man are--arranged more or less roughly, more or less correctly, +or incorrectly, in the order of their value. It is now necessary for +us to set our faces towards the future. I say "necessary" for the +simple reason that the idea of "value" carries with it a reference to +the future. If a thing has value, it is because we {13} judge that it +may produce some effect and serve some purpose which we foresee, or at +least surmise. If, on looking back upon past history, we pronounce +that an event had value, we do so because we see that it served, or +might have served, some end of which we approve. Its value is relative +in our eyes to some end or purpose which was relatively future to it. +The objects which we aim at, the ends after which we strive, are in the +future. Those things have value which may subserve our ends and help +us to attain our purposes. And our purposes, our ends, and objects are +in the future. There, there is hope and freedom, room to work, the +chance of remedying the errors of the past, the opportunity to make +some forward strides and to help others on. + +It is the end we aim at, the object we strive for, the ideal we set +before us, that gives value to what we do, and to what has been done by +us and others. Now our ends, our objects, and our ideals are matters +of the will, on which the will is set, and not merely matters of which +we have intellectual apprehension. They are not past events but future +possibilities. The conviction that we can attain them or attain toward +them is not, when stated as a proposition, a proposition that can be +proved, as a statement {14} referring to the past may be proved: but it +is a conviction which we hold, or a conviction which holds us, just as +strongly as any conviction that we have about any past event of +history. The whole action of mankind, every action that every man +performs, is based upon that conviction. It is the basis of all that +we do, of everything that is and has been done by us and others. And +it is Faith. In that sign alone can the world be conquered. + +When, then, the man of religion proposes by faith to conquer the world, +he is simply doing, wittingly and in full consciousness of what he is +doing, that which every man does in his every action, even though he +may not know it. To make it a sneer or a reproach that religion is a +mere matter of faith; to imagine that there is any better, or indeed +that there is any other, ground of action,--is demonstrably +unreasonable. The basis of such notions is, of course, the false idea +that the man of sense acts upon knowledge, and that the man who acts on +faith is not a sensible man. The error of such notions may be exposed +in a sentence. What knowledge have we of the future? We have none. +Absolutely none. We expect that nature will prove uniform, that causes +will produce their effects. We believe {15} the future will resemble, +to some extent, the past. But we have no knowledge of the future; and +such belief as we have about it, like all other belief,--whether it be +belief in religion or in science,--is simply faith. When, then, the +man of science consults the records of the past or the experiments of +the present for guidance as to what will or may be, he is exhibiting +his faith not in science, but in some reality, in some real being, in +which is no shadow of turning. When the practical man uses the results +of pure science for some practical end, he is taking them on faith and +uses them in the further faith that the end he aims at can be realised, +and shall by him be realised, if not in one way, then in another. The +missionary, then, who uses the results of the science of religion, who +seeks to benefit by an applied science of religion, is but following in +the footsteps of the practical man, and using business methods toward +the end he is going to realise. + +The end he is going to realise is to convert men to Christianity. The +faith in which he acts is that Christianity is the highest form which +religion can take, the final form it shall take. As works of art or +literature may be classed either according to order of history or order +of value, so the works of the {16} religious spirit may be classed, not +only in chronological order, but also in order of religious value. I +am not aware that any proof can be given to show that any given period +of art or literature is better than any other. The merits of +Shakespeare or of Homer may be pointed out; and they may, or they may +not, when pointed out, be felt. If they are felt, no proof is needed; +if they are not, no proof is possible. But they can be pointed out--by +one who feels them. And they can be contrasted with the work of other +poets in which they are less conspicuous. And the contrast may reveal +the truth in a way in which otherwise it could never have been made +plain. + +I know no other way in which the relative values of different forms of +religion can become known or be made known. You may have been tempted +to reflect, whilst I have been speaking, that, on the principle I have +laid down, there is no reason why there should not be five hundred +applied sciences, or applications of the science, of religion, instead +of one; for every one of the many forms of religion may claim to apply +the science of religion to its own ends. To that I may reply first, +that _a priori_ you would expect that every nation would set up {17} +its own literature as the highest; but, as a matter of fact, you find +Shakespeare generally placed highest amongst dramatists, Homer amongst +epic poets. You do not find the conception of literary merit varying +from nation to nation in such a way that there are as many standards of +value as there are persons to apply them. You find that there tends to +be one standard. Next, since the different forms of religion must be +compared if their relative values are to be ascertained, the method of +the applied science of religion must be the method of comparison. +Whatever the outcome that is anticipated from the employment of the +applied science, it is by the method of comparison that it must act. +And one indication of genuine faith is readiness to employ that method, +and assured confidence in the result of its employment. The +missionary's life is the best, because the most concrete example of the +practical working of the method of comparison; and the outcome of the +comparison which is made by those amongst whom and for whom he works +makes itself felt in their hearts, their lives, and sometimes in their +conversion. It is the best example, because the value of a religion to +be known must be felt. But though it is the best because it is the +{18} simplest, the most direct, and the most convincing it is not that +which addresses itself primarily to the reason, and it is not one which +is produced by the applied science of religion. It is not one which +can be produced by any science, pure or applied. The object of the +applied science of religion is to enable the missionary himself to +compare forms of religion, incidentally in order that he may know what +by faith he feels, and without faith he could not feel, viz. that +Christianity is the highest form; but still more in order that he may +teach others, and may have at his command the facts afforded by the +science of religion, wherewith to appeal, when necessary, to the reason +and intelligence as well as to the hearts and feelings of those for +whose salvation he is labouring. + +The time has happily gone by when the mere idea of comparing +Christianity with any other religion would have been rejected with +horror as treasonous and treacherous. The fact that that time has now +gone by is in itself evidence of a stronger faith in Christianity. +What, if it was not fear, at any rate presented the appearance of fear, +has been banished; and we can and do, in the greater faith that has +been vouchsafed to us, look with {19} confidence on the proposal to +compare Christianity with other religions. The truth cannot but gain +thereby, and we rest on Him who is the way and the truth. We recognise +fully and freely that comparison implies similarity, points of +resemblance, ay! and even features of identity. And of that admission +much has been made--and more than can be maintained. It has been +pressed to mean that all forms of religion, from the lowest to the +highest, are identical; that therefore there is nothing more or other +in the highest than in the lowest; and that in the lowest you see how +barbarous is religion and how unworthy of civilised man. Now, that +course of argument is open to one obvious objection which would be +fatal to it, even if it were the only objection, which it is not. That +objection is that whether we are using the method of comparison for the +purpose of estimating the relative values of different forms of +religion; or whether we are using the comparative method of science, +with the object of discovering and establishing facts, quite apart from +the value they may have for any purpose they may be put to when they +have been established; in either case, comparison is only applied, and +can only be applied to things which, {20} though they resemble one +another, also differ from one another. It is because they differ, at +first sight, that the discovery of their resemblance is important. And +it is on that aspect of the truth that the comparative method of +science dwells. Comparative philology, for instance, devotes itself to +establishing resemblances between, say, the Indo-European languages, +which for long were not suspected to bear any likeness to one another +or to have any connection with each other. Those resemblances are +examined more and more closely, are stated with more and more +precision, until they are stated as laws of comparative philology, and +recognised as laws of science to which there are no exceptions. Yet +when the resemblances have been worked out to the furthest detail, no +one imagines that Greek and Sanskrit are the same language, or that the +differences between them are negligible. It is then surprising that +any student of comparative religion should imagine that the discovery +or the recognition of points of likeness between the religions compared +will ever result in proving that the differences between them are +negligible or non-existent. Such an inference is unscientific, and it +has only to be stated to show that the student {21} of comparative +religion is but exercising a right common to all students of all +sciences, when he claims that points of difference cannot be overlooked +or thrust aside. + +If, then, the student of the science of religion directs his attention +primarily to the discovery of resemblances between religions which at +first sight bear no more resemblance to one another than Greek did to +the Celtic tongues; if the comparative method of science dwells upon +the fact that things which differ from one another may also resemble +one another, and that their resemblances may be stated in the form of +scientific laws,--there is still another aspect of the truth, and it is +that between things which resemble one another there are also +differences. And the jury of the world will ultimately demand to know +the truth and the whole truth. + +Now, to get not only at the truth, but at the whole of the truth, is +precisely the business of the applied science of religion, and is the +very object of that which, in order to distinguish it from the +comparative method of science, I have called the method of comparison. +For the purposes of fair comparison not only must the resemblances, +which the {22} comparative method of science dwells on, be taken into +account, but the differences, also, must be weighed. And it is the +business of the method of comparison, the object of the applied science +of religion, to do both things. Neither of the two can be dispensed +with; neither is more important than the other; but for the practical +purposes of the missionary it is important to begin with the +resemblances; and on grounds of logic and of theory, the resemblances +must be first established, if the importance, nay! the decisive value, +of the differences is to go home to the hearts and minds of the +missionary's hearers. The resemblances are there and are to be studied +ultimately in order to bring out the differences and make them stand +forth so plainly as to make choice between the higher form of religion +and the lower easy, simply because the difference is so manifest. Now, +the missionary's hearer could not know, much less appreciate, the +difference, the superiority of Christianity, as long as Christianity +was unknown to him. And it is equally manifest, though it has never +been officially recognised until now and by the Hartford Theological +Seminary, that neither can the missionary adequately set forth the +superiority of Christianity to {23} the lower forms of religion, unless +he knows something about them and about the points in which their +inferiority consists. Hitherto he has had to learn that for himself, +as he went on, and, as it were, by rule of thumb. But, on business +principles, economy of labour and efficiency in work will be better +secured if he is taught before he goes out, and is taught on scientific +methods. What he has to learn is the resemblances between the various +forms of religion, the differences between them, and the relative +values of those differences. + +It may perhaps be asked, Why should those differences exist? And if +the question should be put, I am inclined to say that to give the +answer is beyond the scope of the applied science of religion. The +method of comparison assumes that the differences do exist, and it +cannot begin to be employed unless and until they exist. They are and +must be taken for granted, at any rate by the applied science of +religion, and if the method of comparison is to be set to work. +Indeed, if we may take the principle of evolution to be the +differentiation of the homogeneous, we may go further and say that the +whole theory of evolution, and not merely a particular historic +science, such as the science of religion, {24} postulates +differentiation and the principle of difference, and does not explain +it,--evolution cannot start, the homogeneous cannot be other than +homogeneous, until the principle of difference and the power of +differentiation is assumed. + +That the science of religion at the end leaves untouched those +differences between religions which it recognised at the beginning, is +a point on which I insisted, as against those who unwarrantably +proclaim the science to have demonstrated that all religions alike are +barbarisms or survivals of barbarism. It is well, therefore, to bear +that fact in mind when attempts are made to explain the existence of +the differences by postulating a period when they were non-existent. +That postulate may take form in the supposition that originally the +true religion alone existed, and that the differences arose later. +That is a supposition which has been made by more than one people, and +in more ages than one. It carries with it the consequence that the +history--it would be difficult to call it the evolution and impossible +to call it the progress--of religion has been one of degradation +generally. Owing, however, to the far-reaching and deep-penetrating +influence of the theory of evolution, it has of late grown {25} +customary to assume that the movement, the course of religious history, +has been in the opposite direction; and that it has moved upwards from +the lowest forms of religion known to us, or from some form analogous +to the lowest known forms, through the higher to the highest. This +second theory, however different in its arrangement of the facts from +the Golden Age theory first alluded to, is still fundamentally in +agreement with it, inasmuch as it also assumes that the differences +exhibited later in the history of religion at first were non-existent. +Both theories assume the existence of the originally homogeneous, but +they disagree as to the nature of the differences which supervened, and +also as to the nature of the originally homogeneous. + +I wish therefore to call attention to the simple truth that the facts +at the disposal of the science of religion neither enable nor warrant +us to decide between these two views. If we were to come to a decision +on the point, we should have to travel far beyond the confines of the +science of religion, or the widest bounds of the theory of evolution, +and enquire why there should be error as well as truth--or, to put the +matter very differently, why there should be truth at all. But if we +started travelling {26} on that enquiry, we should not get back in time +for this course of lectures. Fortunately it is not necessary to take a +ticket for that journey--perhaps not possible to secure a return +ticket. We have only to recognise that the science of religion +confines itself to constating and tracing the differences, and does not +attempt to explain why they should exist; while the applied science of +religion is concerned with the practical business of bringing home the +difference between Christianity and other forms of religion to the +hearts of those whose salvation may turn on whether the missionary has +been properly equipped for his task. + +If, now, I announce that for the student of the applied science it is +advisable that he should turn his attention in the first place to the +lowest forms of religion, the announcement need not be taken to mean +that a man cannot become a student of the science of religion, whether +pure or applied, unless he assumes that the lowest is the most +primitive form. The science of religion, as it pushes its enquiries, +may possibly come across--may even already have come across--the lowest +form to which it is possible for man to descend. But whether that form +is the most primitive as well as {27} the lowest,--still more, whether +it is the most primitive because it is the lowest,--will be questions +which will not admit of being settled offhand. And in the meantime we +are not called upon to answer them in the affirmative as a _sine qua +non_ of being admitted students of the science. + +The reason for beginning with the lowest forms is--as is proper in a +practical science--a practical one. As I have already said, if the +missionary is to succeed in his work, he must know and teach the +difference and the value of the difference between Christianity and +other religions. But difference implies similarity: we cannot specify +the points of difference between two things without presupposing some +similarity between them,--at any rate sufficient similarity to make a +comparison of them profitable. Now, the similarity between the higher +forms of religion is such that there is no need to demonstrate it, in +order to justify our proceeding to dwell upon the differences. But the +similarity between the higher and the lower forms is far from being +thus obvious. Indeed, in some cases, for example in the case of some +Australian tribes, there is alleged, by some students of the science of +religion, to be such a total absence of similarity that we are entitled +or {28} compelled to recognise that however liberally, or loosely, we +relax our definition of religion, we must pronounce those tribes to be +without religion. The allegation thus made, the question thus raised, +evidently is of practical importance for the practical purposes of the +missionary. Where some resemblances exist between the higher and the +lower forms of religion, those resemblances may be made, and should be +made, the ground from which the missionary should proceed to point out +by contrast the differences, and so to set forth the higher value of +Christianity. But if no such resemblances should exist, they cannot be +made a basis for the missionary's work. Without proceeding in this +introductory lecture to discuss the question whether there are any +tribes whatever that are without religion, I may point out that +religion, in all its forms, is, in one of its aspects, a yearning and +aspiration after God, a search after Him, peradventure we may find Him. +And if it be alleged that in some cases there is no search after +Him,--that amongst civilised men, amongst our own acquaintances, there +is in some cases no search and no aspiration, and that therefore among +the more backward peoples of the earth there may also be tribes to whom +the very idea of {29} such a search is unknown,--then we must bear in +mind that a search, after any object whatever, may be dropped, may even +be totally abandoned; and yet the heart may yearn after that which it +is persuaded--or, it may be, is deluded into thinking--it can never +find. Perhaps, however, that way of putting it may be objected to, on +the ground that it is a _petitio principii_ and assumes the very fact +it is necessary to prove, viz. that the lowest tribes that are or can +be known to us have made the search and given it up, whereas the +contention is that they have never made the search. That contention, I +will remark in passing, is one which never can be proved. But to those +who consider that it is probable in itself, and that it is a necessary +stage in the evolution of belief, I would point out that every search +is made in hope--or, it may be, in fear--that search presupposes hope +and fear. Vague, of course, the hope may be; scarce conscious, if +conscious at all, of what is hoped. But without hope, until there are +some dim stirrings, however vague, search is unconceivable, and it is +in and by the process of search that the hope becomes stronger and the +object sought more definite to view. Now, inasmuch as it is doubtful +whether any tribe of {30} people is without religion, it may reasonably +be held that the vast majority, at any rate, of the peoples of the +earth have proceeded from hope to aspiration and to search; and if +there should be found a tribe which had not yet entered consciously on +the search, the reasonable conclusion would be not that it is exempted +from the laws which we see exemplified in all other peoples, but that +it is tending to obey the same laws and is starting from the same point +as they,--that hope which is the desire of all nations and has been +made manifest in the Son of Man. + +Whatever be the earliest history of that hope, whatever was its nature +and course in prehistoric times, it has been worked out in history in +many directions, under the influence of many errors, into many forms of +religion. But in them all we feel that there is the same striving, the +same yearning; and we see it with the same pity and distress as we may +observe the distorted motions of the man who, though partially +paralysed, yet strives to walk, and move to the place where he would +be. It is with these attempts to walk, in the hope of giving help to +them who need it, that we who are here to-day are concerned. We must +study them, if we are to {31} understand them and to remedy them. And +there is no understanding them, unless we recognise that in them all +there is the striving and yearning after God, which may be cruelly +distorted, but is always there. + +It so happens that there has been great readiness on the part of +students of the science of religion to recognise that belief in the +continued existence of the soul after the death of the body has +comparative universality amongst the lower races of mankind. Their +yearning after continued existence developes into hope of a future +life; and the hope, or fear, takes many forms: the continued existence +may or may not be on this earth; it may or may not take the shape of a +belief in the transmigration of souls; it sometimes does, and sometimes +does not, lead to belief in the judgment of the dead and future +punishments and rewards; it may or may not postulate the immortality of +the soul; it may shrink to comparative, if not absolute, unimportance; +or it may be dreaded and denounced by philosophy and even by religion. +But whether dreaded or delighted in, whether developed by religion or +denounced, the tendency to the belief is there--universal among mankind +and ineradicable. + +{32} + +The parallel, then, between this belief and the belief or tendency to +believe in God is close and instructive; and I shall devote my next +lecture therefore to the belief in a future life among the primitive +races of mankind. That belief manifests itself, as I shall hope to +show, from the beginning, in a yearning hope for the continued +existence of the beloved ones who have been taken from us by death, as +well as in dread of the ghosts of those who during their life were +feared. But in either case what it postulates and points to is man +living in community with man. It implies society; and there again is +parallel to religion. It is with the hopes and fears of the community +as such that religion has to do: and it is from that point of view that +I shall start when I come to deal with the subject of magic, and its +resemblance to and difference from religion. Its resemblance is not +accidental and the difference is not arbitrary: the difference is that +between social and anti-social purposes. That difference, if borne in +mind, may give us the clue to the real nature of fetichism,--a subject +which will require a lecture to itself. I shall then proceed to a +topic which has been ignored to a surprising extent by the science of +religion; that is, the subject of {33} prayer: and the light which is +to be derived thence will, I trust, give fresh illumination to the +meaning of sacrifice. The relation of religion to morality will then +fall to be considered; and my final lecture will deal with the place of +Christianity in the evolution of religion. + + + + +{34} + +IMMORTALITY + +The missionary, like any other practical man, requires to know what +science can teach him about the material on which he has to work. So +far as is possible, he should know what materials are sound and can be +used with safety in his constructive work, and what must be thrown +aside, what must be destroyed, if his work is to escape dry-rot and to +stand as a permanent edifice. He should be able to feel confidence, +for instance, not merely that magic and fetichism are the negation of +religion, but that in teaching that fact he has to support him the +evidence collected by the science of religion; and he should have that +evidence placed at his disposal for effective use, if need be. + +It may be also that amongst much unsound material he will find some +that is sound, that may be used, and that he cannot afford to cast +away. He has to work upon our common humanity, upon the humanity +common to him and his hearers. He has to remember that no man and no +community of {35} men ever is or has been or ever can be excluded from +the search after God. And his duty, his chosen duty, is to help them +in that search, and as far as may be to make the way clear for them, +and to guide their feet in the right path. He will find that they have +attempted to make paths for themselves; and it is not impossible that +he will find that some of those paths for some distance do go in the +right direction; that some of their beliefs have in them an element of +truth, or a groping after truth which, rightly understood, may be made +to lead to Christianity. It is with one of those beliefs--the belief +in immortality--that I shall deal in this lecture. + +It is a fact worthy of notice that the belief in immortality fills, I +will not say a more important, but a more prominent, place in the +hearts and hopes of uncivilised than of civilised man; and it is also a +fact worthy of notice that among primitive men the belief in +immortality is much less intimately bound up with religion than it +comes to be at a later period of evolution. The two facts are probably +not wholly without relation to one another. So long as the belief in +immortality luxuriates and grows wild, so to speak, untrained and +unrestrained by religion, it {36} developes as the fancy wills, and +lives by flattering the fancy. When, however, the relations of a +future life to morality and religion come to be realised, when the +conception of the next world comes to be moralised, then it becomes the +subject of fear as well as of hope; and the fancy loses much of the +freedom with which it tricked out the pictures that once it drew, +purely according to its own sweet liking, of a future state. On the +one hand, the guilty mind prefers not to dwell upon the day of +reckoning, so long as it can stave off the idea; and it may succeed +more or less in putting it on one side until the proximity of death +makes the idea insistent. Thus the mind more or less deliberately +dismisses the future life from attention. On the other hand, religion +itself insists persistently on the fact that you have your duty here +and now in this world to perform, and that the rest, the future +consequences, you must leave to God. Thus, once more, and this time +not from unworthy motives, attention is directed to this life rather +than to the next; and it is this point that is critical for the fate +both of the belief in immortality and of religion itself. At this +point, religion may, as in the case of Buddhism it actually has done, +formally give up and disavow {37} belief in immortality. And in that +case it sows the seed of its own destruction. Or it may recognise that +the immortality of the soul is postulated by and essential to morality +and religion alike. And in that case, even in that case alone, is +religion in a position to provide a logical basis for morality and to +place the natural desire for a future life on a firmer basis than the +untutored fancy of primitive man could find for it. + +It is then with primitive man or with the lower races that we will +begin, and with "the comparative universality of their belief in the +continued existence of the soul after the death of the body" (Tylor, +_Primitive Culture_, II, i). Now, the classical theory of this belief +is that set forth by Professor Tylor in his _Primitive Culture_. +Whence does primitive man get his idea that the soul continues to exist +after the death of the body? the answer given is, in the first place, +from the fact that man dreams. He dreams of distant scenes that he +visits in his sleep; it is clear, from the evidence of those who saw +his sleeping body, that his body certainly did not travel; therefore he +or his soul must be separable from the body and must have travelled +whilst his body lay unmoving and unmoved. But he also dreams of {38} +those who are now dead, and whose bodies he knows, it may be, to have +been incinerated. The explanation then is obvious that they, too, or +their souls, are separable from their bodies; and the fact that they +survive death and the destruction of the body is demonstrated by their +appearance in his dreams. About the reality of their appearance in his +dreams he has no more doubt than he has about the reality of what he +himself does and suffers in his dreams. If, however, the dead appeared +only in his dreams, their existence after death might seem to be +limited to the dream-time. But as a matter of fact they appear to him +in his waking moments also: ghosts are at least as familiar to the +savage as to the civilised man; and thus the evidence of his dreams, +which first suggested his belief, is confirmed by the evidence of his +senses. + +Thus the belief in the continued existence of the soul after the death +of the body is traced back to the action of dreams and waking +hallucinations. Now, it is inevitable that the inference should be +drawn that the belief in immortality has thus been tracked to its +basis. And it is inevitable that those who start with an inclination +to regard the belief as palpably absurd should welcome this exhibition +of {39} its evolution as proof conclusive that the belief could only +have originated in and can only impose upon immature minds. To that +doubtless it is a perfectly sound reply to say that the origin of a +belief is one thing and its validity quite another. The way in which +we came to hold the belief is a matter of historical investigation, and +undoubtedly may form a very fascinating enquiry. But the question +whether the belief is true is a question which has to be considered, no +matter how I got it, just as the question whether I am committing a +trespass or not in being on a piece of ground cannot be settled by any +amount of explaining how I got there. Or, to put it in another way, +the very risky path by which I have scrambled up a cliff does not make +the top any the less safe when I have got there. + +But though it is perfectly logical to insist on the distinction between +the origin and the validity of any belief, and to refuse to question or +doubt the validity of the belief in immortality merely because of the +origin ascribed to it by authorities on primitive culture,--that is no +reason why we should not examine the origin suggested for it, to see +whether it is a satisfactory origin. And that is what I propose now to +do. I wish to suggest first that belief in the appearance of {40} the +dead, whether to the dreamer or the ghost-seer, is an intellectual +belief as to what occurs as a matter of fact; and next that thereby it +is distinguished from the desire for immortality which manifests itself +with comparative universality amongst the lower races. + +Now, that the appearance of the dead, whether to the waking or the +sleeping eye, is sufficient to start the intellectual belief will be +admitted alike by those who do and those who do not hold that it is +sufficient logically to warrant the belief. But to say that it starts +the desire to see him or her whom we have lost, would be ridiculous. +On the contrary, it would be much nearer the truth to say that it is +the longing and the desire to see, once again, the loved one, that sets +the mind a-dreaming, and first gives to the heart hope. The fact that, +were there no desire for the continuance of life after the death of the +body, the belief would never have caught on--that it either would never +have arisen or would have soon ceased to exist--is shown by the simple +consideration that only where the desire for the continuance of life +after death dies down does the belief in immortality tend to wane. If +any further evidence of that is required it may be found in the +teaching of those {41} forms of philosophy and religion which endeavour +to dispense with the belief in immortality, for they all recognise and +indeed proclaim that they are based on the denial of the desire and the +will to live. If, and only if--as, and only as--the desire to live, +here and hereafter, can be suppressed, can the belief in immortality be +eradicated. The basis of the belief is the desire for continued +existence; and that is why the attempt to trace the origin of the +belief in immortality back to the belief in dreams and apparitions is +one which is not perfectly satisfactory; it leaves out of account the +desire without which the belief would not be and is not operative. + +But though it leaves out an element which is at least as important as +any element it includes, it would be an error to take no account of +what it does contribute. It would be an error of this kind if we +closed our eyes to the fact that what first arrests the attention of +man, in the lower stages of his evolution, is the survival of others +than himself. That is the belief which first manifests itself in his +heart and mind; and what first reveals it to him is the appearance of +the dead to his sleeping or his waking eye. He does not first hope or +believe that he himself will survive the death of the body and then go +{42} on to infer that therefore others also will similarly survive. On +the contrary, it is the appearance of others in his sleeping or waking +moments that first gives him the idea; and it is only later and on +reflection that it occurs to him that he also will have, or be, a ghost. + +But though we must recognise the intellectual element in the belief and +the intellectual processes which are involved in the belief, we must +also take into account the emotional element, the element of desire. +And first we should notice that the desire is not a selfish or +self-regarding desire; it is the longing for one loved and lost, of the +mother for her child, or of the child for its mother. It is desire of +that kind which gives to dreams and apparitions their emotional value, +without which they would have little significance and no spiritual +importance. That is the direction in which we must look for the reason +why, on the one hand, belief in the continuation of existence after +death seems at first to have no connection with religion, while, on the +other hand, the connection is ultimately shown by the evolution of +belief to be so intimate that neither can attain its proper development +without the other. + +Dreams are occasions on which the longing for {43} one loved and lost +manifests itself, but they are not the cause or the origin of the +affection and the longing. But dreams are not exclusively, specially, +or even usually the domain in which religion plays a part. Hence the +visions of the night, in which the memory of the departed and the +craving for reunion with them are manifested, bear no necessary +reference to religion; and it is therefore possible, and _prima facie_ +plausible, to maintain that the belief in the immortality of the soul +has its origin in a centre quite distinct from the sphere of religion, +and that it is only very slowly, if at all, that the belief in +immortality comes to be incorporated with religion. On the other hand, +the very craving for reunion or continued communion with those who are +felt not to be lost but gone before, is itself the feeling which is, +not the base, but at the base, of religion. In the lowest forms to +which religion can be reduced, or in which it manifests itself, +religion is a bond of community; it manifests itself externally in +joint acts of worship, internally in the feeling that the worshippers +are bound together by it and united with the object of their worship. +This feeling of communion is not a mere article of intellectual belief, +nor is it imposed upon the members; it is what they themselves desire. +{44} Hoeffding states the truth when he says that in its most +rudimentary form we encounter "religion under the guise of desire"; but +in saying so he omits the essence of the truth, that essence without +which the truth that he partially enunciates may become wholly +misleading,--he omits to say, and I think he fails to see, that the +desire which alone can claim to be considered as religious is the +desire of the community, not of the individual as such, and the desire +of the community as united in common worship. The idea of religion as +a bond of spiritual communion is implicit from the first, even though a +long process of evolution be necessary to disentangle it and set it +forth self-consciously. Now, it is precisely this spiritual communion +of which man becomes conscious in his craving after reunion or +continued communion with those who have departed this life. And it is +with the history of his attempts to harmonise this desire with what he +knows and demands of the universe otherwise, that we are here and now +concerned. + +So strong is that desire, so inconceivable is the idea that death ends +all, and divorces from us forever those we have loved and lost awhile, +that the lower races of mankind have been pretty generally driven {45} +to the conclusion that death is a mistake or due to a mistake. It is +widely held that there is no such thing as a natural death. Men do of +course die, they may be killed; but it is not an ordinance of nature +that a man must be killed; and, if he is killed, his death is not +natural. So strong is this feeling that when a man dies and his death +is not obviously a case of murder, the inference which the savage +prefers to draw is that the death is really a case of murder, but that +the murder has been worked by witchcraft or magic. Amongst the +Australian black fellows, as we are told by Messrs. Spencer and Gillen, +"no such thing as natural death is realised by the native; a man who +dies has of necessity been killed by some other man or perhaps even by +a woman, and sooner or later that man or woman will be attacked;" +consequently, "in very many cases there takes place what the white man, +not seeing beneath the surface, not unnaturally describes as secret +murder; but in reality ... every case of such secret murder, when one +or more men stealthily stalk their prey with the object of killing him, +is in reality the exacting of a life for a life, the accused person +being indicated by the so-called medicine man as one who has brought +about the death of another man by magic, and whose {46} life must +therefore be forfeited" (_Native Tribes of Central Australia_, p. 48). + +What underlies this idea that by man alone is death brought into the +world is that death is unnatural and is no part of the original design +of things. When the fact comes to be recognised undeniably that deaths +not caused by human agency do take place, then the fact requires +explanation; and the explanation on which primitive races, quite +independently of each other, hit is that as death was no part of the +original design of things, its introduction was due to accident or +mistake. Either men were originally exempt from death, or they were +intended to be exempt. If they were intended to be exempt, then the +inference drawn is that the intention was frustrated by the +carelessness of the agent intrusted with the duty of making men +deathless. If they were originally exempt from death, then the loss of +the exemption has to be accounted for. And in either case the +explanation takes the form of a narrative which relates how the mistake +took place or what event it was that caused the loss of the exemption. +I need not quote examples of either class of narrative. What I wish to +do is to emphasise the fact that by primitive man death is felt to be +inconsistent with the {47} scheme of things. First, therefore, he +denies that it can come in the course of nature, though he admits that +it may be procured by the wicked man in the way of murder or magic. +And it is at this stage that his hope of reunion with those loved and +lost scarcely stretches beyond the prospect of their return to this +world. Evidence of this stage is found partly in tales such as those +told of the mother who returns to revisit her child, or of persons +restored to life. Stories of this latter kind come from Tasmania, +Australia, and Samoa, amongst other places, and are found amongst the +Eskimo and American Indians, as well as amongst the Fjorts (J. A. +MacCullough, _The Childhood of Fiction_, ch. IV). Even more direct +evidence of the emotion which prompts these stories is afforded by the +Ho dirge, quoted by Professor Tylor (_P. C._, II, 32, 33):-- + + "We never scolded you; never wronged you; + Come to us back! + We ever loved and cherished you; and have lived long together + Under the same roof; + Desert it not now! + The rainy nights and the cold blowing days are coming on; + Do not wander here! + Do not stand by the burnt ashes; come to us again! + You cannot find shelter under the peepul, when the rain comes down. + +{48} + + The saul will not shield you from the cold bitter wind. + Come to your home! + It is swept for you and clean; and we are there who loved you ever; + And there is rice put for you and water; + Come home, come home, come to us again!" + + +In these verses it is evident that the death of the body is recognised +as a fact. It is even more manifest that the death of the body is put +aside as weighing for naught against the absolute conviction that the +loved one still exists. But reunion is sought in this world; another +world is not yet thought of. The next world has not yet been called +into existence to redress the sorrows and the sufferings of this life. +Where the discovery of that solution has not been made, the human mind +seeks such consolation as may be found elsewhere. If the aspiration, +"come to us, come to us again," can find no other realisation, it +welcomes the reappearance of the lost one in another form. In +Australia, amongst the Euahlayi tribe, the mother who has lost her baby +or her young child may yet believe that it is restored to her and born +again in the form of another child. In West Africa, according to Miss +Kingsley, "the new babies as they arrived in the family were shown a +selection of small articles belonging to deceased members whose souls +{49} were still absent,--the thing the child caught hold of identified +him. 'Why, he's Uncle John; see! he knows his own pipe;' or 'That's +Cousin Emma; see! she knows her market calabash;' and so on." But it +is not only amongst Australian black fellows or West African negroes +that the attempt is made to extract consolation for death from the +speculation that we die only to be reborn in this world. The theory of +rebirth is put forward by a distinguished student of Hegel--Dr. +McTaggart--in a work entitled _Some Dogmas of Religion_. It is +admitted by Dr. McTaggart to be true that we have no memory whatever of +our previous stages of existence; but he declares, "we may say that, in +spite of the loss of memory, it is the same person who lives in the +successive lives" (p. 130); and he appears to find the same consolation +as his remote forefathers did in looking forward to a future stage of +existence in which he will have no more memory of his present +existence, and no more reason to believe in it, than he now has memory +of, or reason to believe in, his preexistence. "It is certain," he +says, "that in this life we remember no previous lives," and he accepts +the position that it is equally certain we shall have in our next life +absolutely no memory of our {50} present existence. That, of course, +distinguishes Dr. McTaggart from the West African Uncle John who, when +he is reborn, at any rate "knows his own pipe." + +The human mind, as I have said, seeks such consolation as it may find +in the doctrine of rebirth. It finds evidence of rebirth either in the +behaviour of the new-born child or in its resemblance to deceased +relations. But it also comes to the conclusion that the reincarnation +may be in animal form. Whether that conclusion is suggested by the +strangely human expression in the eyes of some animals, or whether it +is based upon the belief in the power of transformation, need not be +discussed. It is beyond doubt that transformation is believed in: the +Cherokee Indian sings a verse to the effect that he becomes a real +wolf; and "after stating that he has become a real wolf, the songster +utters a prolonged howl, and paws the ground like a wolf with his feet" +(Frazer, _Kingship_, p. 71). Indeed, identity may be attained or +manifested without any process of transformation; in Australia, amongst +the Dieri tribe, the head man of a totem consisting of a particular +sort of a seed is spoken of by his people as being the plant itself +which yields the seed (_ib._, p. 109). {51} Where such beliefs are +prevalent, the doctrine of the reincarnation of the soul in animal form +will obviously arise at the stage of evolution which we are now +discussing, that is to say when the soul is not yet supposed to depart +to another world, and must therefore manifest itself in this world in +one way or another, if not in human shape, then in animal form. In the +form of what animal the deceased will be reincarnated is a question +which will be answered in different ways. Purely fortuitous +circumstances may lead to particular animals being considered to be the +reincarnation of the deceased. Or the fact that the deceased has a +particular animal for totem may lead the survivors to expect his +reappearance in the form of that particular animal. The one fact of +importance for our present purpose is that at its origin the belief in +animal reincarnation had no necessary connection with the theory of +future punishments and rewards. At the stage of evolution in which the +belief in transmigration arose many animals were the object of genuine +respect because of the virtues of courage, etc., which were manifested +by them; or because of the position they occupied as totems. +Consequently no loss of status was involved when the soul transmigrated +from a {52} human to an animal form. No notion of punishment was +involved in the belief. + +The doctrines of reincarnation and transmigration belong to a stage in +the evolution of belief, or to a system of thought, in which the +conviction that the death of the body does not entail the destruction +of the soul is undoubted, but from which the conception, indeed the +very idea, of another world than this is excluded. That conception +begins to manifest itself where ancestor worship establishes itself; +but the manifestation is incomplete. Deceased chieftains and heroes, +who have been benefactors to the tribe, are remembered; and the good +they did is remembered also. They are themselves remembered as the +doers of good; and their spirits are naturally conceived as continuing +to be benevolent, or ready to confer benefits when properly approached. +But thus envisaged, they are seen rather in their relation to the +living than in their relation to each other. It is their assistance in +this world that is sought; their condition in the next world is of less +practical importance and therefore provokes less of speculation, in the +first instance. But when speculation is provoked, it proves ultimately +fatal to ancestor worship. + +{53} + +First, it may lead to the question of the relation of the spirits of +the deceased benefactors to the god or gods of the community. There +will be a tendency to blur the distinction between the god and his +worshippers, if any of the worshippers come to be regarded as being +after death spirits from whom aid may be invoked and to whom offerings +must be made. And if the distinction ceases after death, it is +difficult and sometimes impossible to maintain it during life; an +emperor who is to be deified after death may find his deification +beginning before his death. Belief in such deification may be accepted +by some members of the community. Others will regard it as proof that +religion is naught; and yet others will be driven to seek for a form of +religion which affords no place for such deifications, but maintains +explicitly that distinction between a god and his worshippers which is +present in the most rudimentary forms of religion. + +But though the tendency of ancestor worship is to run this course and +to pass in this way out of the evolution of religion, it may be +arrested at the very outset, if the religious spirit is, as it has been +in one case at least, strong enough to stand against it at the +beginning. Thus, amongst the Jews there {54} was a tendency to +ancestor worship, as is shown by the fact of its prohibition. But it +was stamped out; and it was stamped out so effectually that belief in +the continued existence of the soul after death ceased for long to have +any practical influence. "Generally speaking, the Hebrews regarded the +grave as the final end of all sentient and intelligent existence, 'the +land where all things are forgotten'" (Smith's _Dictionary of the +Bible_, _s.v._ Sheol). "In death," the Psalmist says to the Lord, +"there is no remembrance of thee: in Sheol who shall give thee thanks?" +"Shall they that are deceased arise and praise thee? Shall thy +loving-kindness be declared in the grave?" or "thy righteousness in the +land of forgetfulness?" Thus the Sheol of the Old Testament remains to +testify to the view taken of the state of the dead by a people amongst +whom the worship of ancestors was arrested at the outset. Amongst such +a people the dead are supposed simply to continue in the next world as +they left this: "in Sheol the kings of the nations have their thrones, +and the mighty their weapons of war," just as in Virgil the ghost of +Deiphobus still shows the ghastly wounds by which he perished (Jevons, +_History of Religion_, p. 301). + +{55} + +This continuation theory, the view that the dead continue in the next +world as they left this, means that, to the people who entertain it, +the dead are merely a memory. It is forbidden to think of them as +doing anything, as affecting the living in any way. They are conceived +as powerless to gratify the wishes of the living, or to thwart them. +Where the Lord God is a jealous God, religion cannot tolerate the idea +that any other spirit should be conceived as usurping His functions, +still less that such spirits should receive the offerings and the +prayers which are the due of Him alone. But though the dead are thus +reduced to a mere memory, the memory itself does not and cannot die. +Accordingly the dead, or rather those whose bodies are dead, continue +to live. But, as they exercise no action in, or control over, the +world of the living, their place of abode comes to be regarded as +another world, to which they are confined. Speculation, therefore, +where speculation is made, as to the case of the inhabitants of this +other world, must take the direction of enquiring as to their fate. +Where speculation is not made, the dead are conceived merely to +continue to be as they are remembered to have been in this life. But, +if there is to be room for any speculation {56} at all, there must be +assumed to be some diversity in their fate, and therefore some reason, +intelligible to man, for that diversity. That is a conclusion to which +tribes attain who have apparently gone through no period of ancestor +worship,--indeed, ancestor worship only impedes or defers the +attainment of that conclusion. The diversity of fate could only +consist in the difference between being where you would be and being +where you would not. But the reasons for that diversity may be very +different amongst different peoples. First, where religion is at its +lowest or is in its least developed form, the gods are not the cause of +the diversity nor do they seem concerned in it. Such diversity as +there is seems in its simplest form merely to be a continuance of the +social distinctions which prevail among the living: the high chieftains +rest in a calm, plenteous, sunny land in the sky; while "all Indians of +low degree go deep down under the earth to the land of Chay-her, with +its poor houses and no salmon and no deer, and blankets so small and +thin, that when the dead are buried the friends often bury blankets +with them" (Tylor, _P. C._, II, 85). Elsewhere, it is not social +distinctions, but moral, that make the difference: "the rude Tupinambas +of Brazil think {57} the souls of such as had lived virtuously, that is +to say who have well avenged themselves and eaten many of their +enemies," (_ib._) rejoin the souls of their fathers in the happy land, +while the cowards go to the other place. Thus, though the distinctions +in the next world do not seem originally to have sprung from or to have +been connected with morality, and still less with religion, they are, +or may be at a very early period, seized upon by the moral +consciousness as containing truth or implying it, when rightly +understood. Truth indeed of the highest import for morality is implied +in the distinctions thus essayed to be drawn. But before the truth +implicit could be made explicit, it was necessary that the distinctions +should be recognised to have their basis in religion. And that was +impossible where religion was at its lowest or in its least developed +form. + +From the fact that on the one hand the conception of a future life in +another world, when it arose amongst people in a low stage of religious +development, bore but little moral and no religious fruit; and on the +other, where it did yield fruit, there had been a previous period when +religion closed its eyes as far as possible to the condition of the +dead {58} in Hades or in Sheol,--we may draw the inference that the +conception of the future state formed by such people, as "the rude +Tupinambas of Brazil" had to be sterilised, so to speak,--to be +purified from associations dangerous both to morality and religion. We +may fairly say that as a matter of fact that was the consequence which +actually happened, and that both in Greece and Judaea the prospect of a +future life at one time became practically a _tabula rasa_ on which +might be written a fairer message of hope than had ever been given +before. In Greece the message was written, indeed, and was received +with hope by the thousands who joined in the celebration of the +mysteries. But the characters in which it was written faded soon. The +message was found to reveal nothing. It revealed nothing because it +demanded nothing. It demanded neither a higher life nor a higher +conception of the deity. It did not set forth a new and nobler +morality; and it accommodated itself to the existing polytheism. What +it did do was to familiarise the Hellenic world with the conviction +that there was a life hereafter, better than this life; and that the +condition of its attainment was communion with the true God, +peradventure He could be found. It was by this {59} conviction and +this expectation that the ground was prepared, wherever Hellenism +existed, for the message that was to come from Israel. + +From the beginning, or let us say in the lowest forms in which religion +manifests itself, religion is the bond in which the worshippers are +united with one another and with their God. The community which is +thus united is at first the earliest form of society, whatever that +form may have been, in which men dwell together for their common +purposes. It is the fact that its members have common purposes and +common interests which constitute them a community; and amongst the +common interests without which there could be no community is that of +common worship: knowledge of the sacra, being confined to the members +of the community, is the test by which members are known, outsiders +excluded, and the existence of the community as a community secured. +At this stage, in a large number of societies--negro, +Malayo-Polynesian, North American Indians, Eskimo, Australians--the +belief in reincarnation takes a form in which the presence of souls of +the departed is recognised as necessary to the very conception of the +community. Thus in Alaska, among the Unalits of St. Michael's {60} +Bay, a festival of the dead is observed, the equivalent of which +appears to be found amongst all the Eskimo. M. Mauss (_L'Annee +Sociologique_, IX, 99) thus describes it: "It comprises two essential +parts. It begins with praying the souls of the dead graciously to +consent to reincarnate themselves for the moment in the namesake which +each deceased person has; for the custom is that in each station the +child last born always takes the name of the last person who has died. +Then these living representatives of the deceased receive presents, and +having received them the souls are dismissed from the abodes of the +living to return to the land of the dead. Thus at this festival not +only does the group regain its unity, but the rite reconstitutes the +ideal group which consists of all the generations which have succeeded +one another from the earliest times. Mythical and historic ancestors +as well as later ones thus mingle with the living, and communion +between them is conducted by means of the exchange of presents." +Amongst people other than the Eskimo, a new-born child not only takes +the name of the last member of the family or clan who has died, but is +regarded as the reincarnation of the deceased. "Thus the number of +individuals, {61} of names, of souls, of social functions in the clan +is limited; and the life of the clan consists in the death and rebirth +of individuals who are always identically the same" (_l.c._ 267). + +The line of evolution thus followed by the belief in reincarnation +results in the total separation of the belief from morality and from +religion, and results in rendering it infertile alike for morality, +religion, and progress in civilisation generally. Where the belief in +reincarnation takes the form of belief in the transmigration of the +soul into some animal form, it may be utilised for moral purposes, +provided that the people amongst whom the belief obtains have otherwise +advanced so far as to see that the punishments and rewards which are +essential to the development of morality are by no means always +realised in this life. When that conviction has established itself, +the reincarnation theory will provide machinery by which the belief in +future punishments and rewards can be conceived as operative: rebirth +in animal form, if the belief in it already exists, may be held out as +a deterrent to wrongdoing. That is, as a matter of fact, the use to +which the belief has been put by Buddhism. The form and station in +which the deceased will be {62} reborn is no longer, as amongst the +peoples just mentioned, conceived to be determined automatically, so to +speak, but is supposed to depend on the moral qualities exhibited +during life. If this view of the future life has struck deeper root +and has spread over a greater surface than the doctrine taught in the +Greek mysteries ever did, the reason may probably be found in the fact +that the Greek mysteries had no higher morality to teach than was +already recognised, whilst the moral teaching of the Buddha was far +more exalted and far more profoundly true than anything that had been +preached in India before. If a moral system by itself, on its own +merits, were capable of affording a sure foundation for religion, +Buddhism would be built upon a rock. To the spiritual community by +which man may be united to his fellow-man and to his God, morality is +essential and indispensable. But the moral life derives its value +solely from the fact that on it depends, and by means of it is +realised, that communion of man with God after which man has from the +beginning striven. If then that communion and the very possibility of +that communion is denied, the denial must prove fatal alike to religion +and to morality. Now, that is the denial which Buddhism {63} makes. +But the fact of the denial is obscured to those who believe, and to +those who would like to believe, in Buddhism, by the way in which it is +made. It is made in such a way that it appears and is believed to be +an affirmation instead of a denial. Communion with God is declared to +be the final end to which the transmigration of souls conducts. But +the communion to which it leads is so intimate that the human soul, the +individual, ceases to be. Obviously, therefore, if it ceases to be, +the communion also must cease; there is no real communion subsisting +between two spirits, the human and the divine, for two spirits do not +exist, but only one. If this way of stating the case be looked upon +with suspicion as possibly not doing justice to the teaching of +Buddhism, or as pressing unduly far the union between the human and the +divine which is the ultimate goal of the transmigration of souls, the +reply is that in truth the case against Buddhism is stronger than +appears from this mode of stating it. To say that from the Buddhist +point of view the human soul, the individual, eventually ceases to be, +is indeed an incorrect way of putting the matter. It implies that the +human soul, the individual, now is; and hereafter ceases to be. But so +far from {64} admitting that the individual now is, the Buddhist +doctrine is that the existence of the soul, now, is mere illusion, +_maya_. It is therefore logical enough, and at any rate +self-consistent, to say that hereafter, when the series of +transmigrations is complete, the individual will not indeed cease to +be, for he never was, but the illusion that he existed will be +dissipated. Logically again, it follows from this that if the +existence of the individual soul is an illusion from the beginning, +then there can strictly speaking be no transmigration of souls, for +there is no soul to transmigrate. But with perfect self-consistency +Buddhism accepts this position: what is transmitted from one being to +the next in the chain of existences is not the individuality or the +soul, but the character. Professor Rhys Davids says (_Hibbert +Lectures_, pp. 91, 92): "I have no hesitation in maintaining that +Gotama did not teach the transmigration of souls. What he did teach +would be better summarized, if we wish to retain the word +transmigration, as the transmigration of character. But it would be +more accurate to drop the word transmigration altogether when speaking +of Buddhism, and to call its doctrine the doctrine of karma. Gotama +held that after the death of any being, {65} whether human or not, +there survived nothing at all but that being's 'karma,' the result, +that is, of its mental and bodily actions." "He discarded the theory +of the presence, within each human body, of a soul which could have a +separate and eternal existence. He therefore established a new +identity between the individuals in the chain of existence, which he, +like his forerunners, acknowledged, by the new assertion that that +which made two beings to be the same being was--not soul, but--karma" +(_ib._, pp. 93, 94). Thus once more it appears that there can be no +eventual communion between the human soul, at the end of its chain of +existence, and the divine, for the reason, not that the human soul +ultimately ceases to be, but that it never is or was, and therefore +neither transmigrates from one body to another, nor is eventually +absorbed in the _atman_. + +Logically consistent though this train of argument be, it leaves +unanswered the simple question, How can the result of my actions have +any interest for me--not hereafter, but at the present moment--if I not +only shall not exist hereafter but do not exist at the present moment? +It is not impossible for a man who believes that his existence will +absolutely {66} cease at death to take some interest in and labour for +the good of others who will come after him; but it is impossible for a +man who does not exist now to believe in anything whatever. And it is +on that fundamental absurdity that Buddhism is built: it is directed to +the conversion of those who do not exist to be converted, and it is +directed to the object of relieving from existence those who have no +existence from which to be relieved. + +Where then lies the strength of Buddhism, if as a logical structure it +is rent from top to bottom by glaring inconsistency? It lies in its +appeal to the spirit of self-sacrifice. What it denounces, from +beginning to end, is the will to live. The reason why it denounces the +will to live is that that will manifests itself exclusively in the +desires of the individual; and it is to the desires of man that all the +misery in the world are directly due. Destroy those desires by +annihilating the will to live--and in no other way can they be +destroyed--and the misery of the world will cease. The only +termination to the misery of the world which Buddhism can imagine is +the voluntary cessation of life which will ultimately ensue on the +cessation of the will to live. And the means by which that is to be +brought about is {67} the uprooting and destruction of the +self-regarding desires by means of the higher morality of +self-sacrifice. What the Buddhist overlooks is that the uprooting and +destruction of the self-regarding desires results, not in the +annihilation, but in the purification and enhanced vitality, of the +self that uproots them. The outcome of the unselfish and +self-sacrificing life is not the destruction of individuality, but its +highest realisation. Now, it is only in society and by living for +others that this unselfishness and self-sacrifice can be carried out; +man can only exist and unselfishness can only operate in society, and +society means the communion of man with his fellows. It is true that +only in society can selfishness exist; but it is recognized from the +beginning as that which is destructive of society, and it is therefore +condemned alike by the morality and the religion of the society. The +communion of man with his fellows and his God is hindered, impeded, and +blocked wholly and solely by his self-regarding desires; it is +furthered and realised solely by his unselfish desires. But his +unselfish desires involve and imply his existence--I was going to say, +just as much, I mean--far more than his selfish desires, for they +imply, and are only possible on, the assumption of {68} the existence +of his fellow-man, and of his communion with him. Nay! more, by the +testimony of Buddhism itself as well as of the religious experience of +mankind at large, the unselfish desires, the spirit of self-sacrifice, +require both for their logical and their emotional justification, still +more for their practical operation, the faith that by means of them the +will of God is carried out, and that in them man shows likest God. It +is in them and by them that the communion of man with his fellow-man +and with his God is realised. It is the faith that such communion, +though it may be interrupted, can never be entirely broken which +manifests itself in the belief in immortality. That belief may take +shape in the idea that the souls of the departed revisit this earth +temporarily in ghostly form, or more permanently as reincarnated in the +new-born members of the tribe; it may body forth another world of bliss +or woe, and if it is to subserve the purposes of morality, it must so +do; nay! more, if it is to subserve the purposes of morality, it is +into the presence of the Lord that the soul must go. But in any and +whatever shape the belief takes, the soul is conceived or implied to be +in communion with other spirits. There is no other way in which it is +{69} possible to conceive the existence of a soul; just as any particle +of matter, to be comprehended in its full reality, implies not only +every other particle of matter but the universe which comprehends them, +so the existence of any spirit logically implies not only the existence +of every other but also of Him without whom no one of them could be. + +It is in this belief in the communion of spirits wherever he may find +it--and where will he not?--that the missionary may obtain a leverage +for his work. It is a sure basis for his operations because the desire +for communion is universal; and Christianity alone, of the religions of +the world, teaches that self-sacrifice is the way to life eternal. + + + + +{70} + +MAGIC + +Of all the topics which present themselves to the student of the +science of religion for investigation and explanation there is none +which has caused more diversity of opinion, none which has produced +more confusion of thought, than magic. The fact is that the belief in +magic is condemned alike by science and religion,--by the one as +essentially irrational, and by the other as essentially irreligious. +But though it is thus condemned, it flourishes, where it does flourish, +as being science, though of a more secret kind than that usually +recognised, or as being a more potent application of the rites and +ceremonies of religion. It is indeed neither science nor religion; it +lives by mimicking one or other or both. In the natural history of +belief it owes its survival, so long as it does survive, to its +"protective colouring" and its power of mimicry. It is, always and +everywhere, an error,--whether tried by the canons of science or +religion; {71} but it lives, as error can only live, by posing and +passing itself off as truth. + +If now the only persons deceived by it were the persons who believed in +it, students of the science of religion would have been saved from much +fruitless controversy. But so subtly protective is its colouring that +some scientific enquirers have confidently and unhesitatingly +identified it with religion, and have declared that magic is religion, +and religion is magic. The tyranny of that error, however, is now +well-nigh overpast. It is erroneous, and we may suppose is seen to be +erroneous, in exactly the same way as it would be to say that science +is magic, and magic science. The truth is that magic in one aspect is +a colourable imitation of science: "in short," as Dr. Frazer says +(_Early History of the Kingship_, p. 38), "magic is a spurious system +of natural law." That is, we must note, it is a system which is +spurious in our eyes, but which, to those who believed in it, was "a +statement of the rules which determine the sequence of events +throughout the world--a set of precepts which human beings observe in +order to compare their ends" (_ib._, p. 39). + +The point, then, from which I wish to start is that {72} magic, as it +is now viewed by students of the science of religion, on the one hand +is a spurious system of natural law or science, and on the other a +spurious system of religion. + +Our next point is that magic could not be spurious for those who +believed in it: they held that they knew some things and could do +things which ordinary people did not know and could not do; and, +whether their knowledge was of the secrets of nature or of the spirit +world, it was not in their eyes spurious. + +Our third point is more difficult to explain, though it will appear not +merely obvious, but self-evident, if I succeed in explaining it. It +will facilitate the work of explanation, if you will for the moment +suppose--without considering whether the supposition is true or +not--that there was a time when no one had heard that there was such a +thing as magic. Let us further suppose that at that time man had +observed such facts as that heat produces warmth, that the young of +animals and man resemble their parents: in a word, that he had attained +more or less consciously to the idea, as a matter of observation, that +like produces like, and as a matter of practice that like may be +produced by like. Having attained to that practical idea, he will of +{73} course work it not only for all that it is worth, but for more. +That is indeed the only way he has of finding out how much it is good +for; and it is only repeated failure which will convince him that here +at length he has reached the limit, that in this particular point +things do not realise his expectations, that in this instance his +anticipation of nature has been "too previous." Until that fact has +been hammered into him, he will go on expecting and believing that in +this instance also like will produce like, when he sets it to work; and +he will be perfectly convinced that he is employing the natural and +reasonable means for attaining his end. As a matter of fact, however, +as we with our superior knowledge can see, in the first place those +means never can produce the desired effect; and next, the idea that +they can, as it withers and before it finally falls to the ground, will +change its colour and assume the hue of magic. Thus the idea that by +whistling you can produce a wind is at first as natural and as purely +rational as the idea that you can produce warmth by means of fire. +There is nothing magical in either. Both are matter-of-fact +applications of the practical maxim that like produces like. + +{74} + +That, then, is the point which I have been wishing to make, the third +of the three points from which I wish to start. There are three ways +of looking at identically the same thing, _e.g._ whistling to produce a +wind. First, we may regard it, and I suggest that it was in the +beginning regarded, as an application, having nothing to distinguish it +from any other application, of the general maxim that like produces +like. The idea that eating the flesh of deer makes a man timid, or +that if you wish to be strong and bold you should eat tiger, is, in +this stage of thought, no more magical than is the idea of drinking +water because you are dry. + +Next, the idea of whistling to produce a wind, or of sticking splinters +of bone into a man's footprints in order to injure his feet, may be an +idea not generally known, a thing not commonly done, a proceeding not +generally approved of. It is thus marked off from the commonplace +actions of drinking water to moisten your parched throat or sitting by +a fire to get warm. When it is thus marked off, it is regarded as +magic: not every one knows how to do it, or not every one has the power +to do it, or not every one cares to do it. That is the second stage, +the heyday of magic. + +{75} + +The third and final stage is that in which no educated person believes +in it, when, if a man thinks to get a wind by whistling he may whistle +for it. These three ways of looking at identically the same thing may +and do coexist. The idea of whistling for a wind is for you and me +simply a mistaken idea; but possibly at this moment there are sailors +acting upon the idea and to some of them it appears a perfectly natural +thing to do, while to others there is a flavour of the magical about +it. But though the three ways may and do coexist, it is obvious that +our way of looking at it is and must be the latest of the three, for +the simple reason that an error must exist before it can be exploded. +I say that our way of looking at it must be the latest, but in saying +so I do not mean to imply that this way of looking at it originates +only at a late stage in the history of mankind. On the contrary, it is +present in a rudimentary form from very early times; and the proof is +the fact generally recognised that magicians amongst the lowest races, +though they may believe to a certain extent in their own magical +powers, do practise a good deal of magic which they themselves know to +be fraudulent. Progress takes place when other people also, and a {76} +steadily increasing number of people, come to see that it is fraudulent. + +In the next place, just as amongst very primitive peoples we see that +some magic is known by some people, viz. the magicians themselves, to +be fraudulent, though other people believe in it; so, amongst very +primitive peoples, we find beliefs and practices existing which have +not yet come to be regarded as magical, though they are such as might +come, and do elsewhere come, to be considered pure magic. Thus, for +instance, when Cherokee Indians who suffer from rheumatism abstain from +eating the flesh of the common grey squirrel "because the squirrel eats +in a cramped position, which would clearly aggravate the pangs of the +rheumatic patient" (Frazer, _History of the Kingship_, p. 70), or when +"they will not wear the feathers of the bald-headed buzzard for fear of +themselves becoming bald" (_ib._), they are simply following the best +medical advice of their day,--they certainly do not imagine they are +practising magic, any more than you or I do when we are following the +prescriptions of our medical adviser. On the contrary, it is quite as +obvious, then, that the feathers of the bald-headed buzzard are +infectious as it is now that the clothes {77} of a fever patient are +infectious. Neither proposition, to be accepted as true, requires us +to believe in magic: either might spring up where magic had never been +heard of. And, if that is the case, it simply complicates things +unnecessarily to talk of magic in such cases. The tendency to believe +that like produces like is not a consequence of or a deduction from a +belief in magic: on the contrary, magic has its root or one of its +roots in that tendency of the human mind. But though that tendency +helps to produce magic amongst other things, magic is not the only +thing which it produces: it produces beliefs such as those of the +Cherokees just quoted, which are no more magical than the belief that +fire produces warmth, or that _causa aequat effectum_, that an effect +is, when analysed, indistinguishable from the conditions which +constitute it. + +To attempt to define magic is a risky thing; and, instead of doing so +at once, I will try to mark off proceedings which are not magical; and +I would venture to say that things which it is believed any one can do, +and felt that any one may do, are not magical in the eyes of those who +have that belief and that feeling. You may abstain from eating {78} +squirrel or wearing fine feathers because of the consequences; and +every one will think you are showing your common sense. You may hang +up the bones of animals you have killed, in order to attract more +animals of the like kind; and you are simply practising a dodge which +you think will be useful. Wives whose husbands are absent on hunting +or fighting expeditions may do or abstain from doing things which, on +the principle that like produces like, will affect their husbands' +success; and this application of the principle may be as +irrational--and as perfectly natural--as the behaviour of the beginner +at billiards whose body writhes, when he has made his stroke, in excess +of sympathy with the ball which just won't make the cannon. In both +cases the principle acted on,--deliberately in the one case, less +voluntarily in the other,--the instinctive feeling is that like +produces like, not as a matter of magic but as a matter of fact. If +the behaviour of the billiard player is due to an impulse which is in +itself natural and in his case is not magical, we may fairly take the +same view of the hunter's wife who abstains from spinning for fear the +game should turn and wind like the spindle and the hunter be unable to +hit it (Frazer, {79} p. 55). The principle in both cases is that like +produces like. Some applications of that principle are correct; some +are not. The incorrectness of the latter is not at once discovered: +the belief in their case is erroneous, but is not known to be +erroneous. And unless we are prepared to take up the position that +magic is the only form of erroneous belief which is to be found amongst +primitive men, we must endeavour to draw a line between those erroneous +beliefs which are magical and those erroneous beliefs which are not. +The line will not be a hard and fast line, because a belief which +originally had nothing magical about it may come to be regarded as +magical. Indeed, on the assumption that belief in magic is an error, +we have to enquire how men come to fall into the error. If there is no +such thing as magic, how did man come to believe that there was? My +suggestion is that the rise of the belief is not due to the +introduction of a novel practice, but to a new way of looking at an +existing practice. It is due in the first instance to the fact that +the practice is regarded with disapproval as far as its consequences +are concerned and without regard to the means employed to produce them. +Injury to a member of the community, {80} especially injury which +causes death, is viewed by the community with indignant disapproval. +Whether the death is produced by actual blows or "by drawing the figure +of a person and then stabbing it or doing it any other injury" (Frazer, +p. 41), it is visited with the condemnation of the community. And +consequently all such attempts "to injure or destroy an enemy by +injuring or destroying an effigy of him" (_ib._), whenever they are +made, whether they come off or not, are resented and disapproved by +society. On the other hand, sympathetic or hom[oe]opathic magic of +this kind, when used by the hunter or the fisherman to secure food, +meets with no condemnation. Both assassin and hunter use substantially +the same means to effect their object; but the disapproval with which +the community views the object of the assassin is extended also to the +means which he employs. In fine, the practice of using like to produce +like comes to be looked on with loathing and with dread when it is +employed for antisocial purposes. Any one can injure or destroy his +private enemy by injuring an effigy of him, just as any one can injure +or destroy his enemy by assaulting and wounding him. But though any +one may do this, it is felt {81} that no one ought to do it. Such +practices are condemned by public opinion. Further, as they are +condemned by the community, they are _ipso facto_ offensive to the god +of the community. To him only those prayers can be offered, and by him +only those practices can be approved, which are not injurious to the +community or are not felt by the community to be injurious. That is +the reason why such practices are condemned by the religious as well as +by the moral feeling of the community. And they are condemned by +religion and morality long before their futility is exposed by science +or recognised by common sense. When they are felt to be futile, there +is no call upon religion or morality especially to condemn the +practices--though the intention and the will to injure our fellow-man +remains offensive both to morality and religion. With the means +adopted for realising the will and carrying out the intention, morality +and religion have no concern. If the same or similar means can be used +for purposes consistent with the common weal, they do not, so far as +they are used for such purposes, come under the ban of either morality +or religion. Therein we have, I suggest, the reason of a certain +confusion of thought {82} in the minds of students of the science of +religion. We of the present day look at the means employed. We see +the same means employed for ends that are, and for ends that are not, +antisocial; and, inasmuch as the means are the same and are alike +irrational, we group them all together under the head of magic. The +grouping is perfectly correct, inasmuch as the proceedings grouped +together have the common attribute of being proceedings which cannot +possibly produce the effects which those who employ them believe that +they will and do produce. But this grouping becomes perfectly +misleading, if we go on to infer, as is sometimes inferred, that +primitive man adopted it. First, it is based on the fact that the +proceedings are uniformly irrational--a fact of which man is at first +wholly unaware; and which, when it begins to dawn upon him, presents +itself in the form of the further error that while some of these +proceedings are absurd, others are not. In neither case does he adopt +the modern, scientific position that all are irrational, impossible, +absurd. Next, the modern position deals only with the proceedings as +means,--declaring them all absurd,--and overlooks entirely what is to +primitive man the point of fundamental importance, viz. the object {83} +and purpose with which they are used. Yet it is the object and purpose +which determine the social value of these proceedings. For him, or in +his eyes, to class together the things which he approves of and the +things of which he disapproves would be monstrous: the means employed +in the two cases may be the same, but that is of no importance in face +of the fact that the ends aimed at in the two cases are not merely +different but contradictory. In the one case the object promotes the +common weal, or is supposed by him to promote it. In the other it is +destructive of the common weal. + +If, therefore, we wish to avoid confusion of thought, we must in +discussing magic constantly bear in mind that we group together--and +therefore are in danger of confusing--things which to the savage differ +_toto caelo_ from one another. A step towards avoiding this confusion +is taken by Dr. Frazer, when he distinguishes (_History of the +Kingship_, p. 89) between private magic and public magic. The +distinction is made still more emphatic by Dr. Haddon (_Magic and +Fetichism_, p. 20) when he speaks of "nefarious magic." The very same +means when employed against the good of the community are regarded, by +morality and religion {84} alike, as nefarious, which when employed for +the good of the community are regarded with approval. The very same +illegitimate application,--I mean logically illegitimate in our +eyes,--the very same application of the principle that like produces +like will be condemned by the public opinion of the community when it +is employed for purposes of murder and praised by public opinion when +it is employed to produce the rain which the community desires. The +distinction drawn by primitive man between the two cases is that, +though any one can use the means to do either, no one ought to do the +one which the community condemns. That is condemned as nefarious; and +because it is nefarious, the "witch" may be "smelled out" by the +"witch-doctor" and destroyed by, or with the approval of, the community. + +But though that is, I suggest, the first stage in the process by which +the belief in magic is evolved, it is by no means the whole of the +process. Indeed, it may fairly be urged that practices which any one +can perform, though no one ought to perform, may be nefarious (as +simple, straightforward murder is), but so far there is nothing magical +about them. And I am prepared to accept that view. Indeed, {85} it is +an essential part of my argument, for I seek to show that the belief in +magic had a beginning and was evolved out of something that was not a +belief in magic, though it gave rise to it. The belief that like +produces like can be entertained where magic has not so much as been +heard of. And, though it may ultimately be worked out into the +scientific position that the sum of conditions necessary to produce an +effect is indistinguishable from the effect, it may also be worked out +on other lines into a belief in magic; and the first step in that +evolution is taken when the belief that like produces like is used for +purposes pronounced by public opinion to be nefarious. + +The next step is taken when it comes to be believed not only that the +thing is nefarious but that not every one can do it. The reason why +only a certain person can do it may be that he alone knows how to do +it--or he and the person from whom he learnt it. The lore of such +persons when examined by folk-lore students is found generally to come +under one or other of the two classes known as sympathetic and mimetic +magic, or hom[oe]opathic and contagious magic. In these cases it is +obvious that the _modus operandi_ is the same as it {86} was in what I +have called the first stage in the evolution of magic and have already +described at great length. What differentiates this second stage from +the first is that whereas in the first stage these applications of the +principle that like produces like are known to every one, though not +practised by every one, in the second stage these applications are not +known to every one, but only to the dealers in magic. Some of those +applications of the principle may be applications which have descended +to the dealer and have passed out of the general memory; and others may +simply be extensions of the principle which have been invented by the +dealer or his teacher. Again, the public disapproval of nefarious arts +will tend first to segregate the followers of such arts from the rest +of the community; and next to foster the notion that the arts thus +segregated, and thereby made more or less mysterious, include not only +things which the ordinary decent member of society would not do if he +could, but also things which he could not do if he would. The mere +belief in the possibility of such arts creates an atmosphere of +suspicion in which things are believed because they are impossible. +When this stage has been reached, when he who {87} practises nefarious +arts is reported and believed to do things which ordinary decent people +could not do if they would, his personality inevitably comes to be +considered as a factor in the results that he produces; he is credited +with a power to produce them which other people, that is to say +ordinary people, do not possess. And it is that personal power which +eventually comes to be the most important, because the most mysterious, +article in his equipment. It is in virtue of that personal power that +he is commonly believed to be able to do things which are impossible +for the ordinary member of the tribe. + +Thus far I have been tracing the steps of the process by which the +worker of nefarious arts starts by employing for nefarious purposes +means which any one could use if he would, and ends by being credited +with a power peculiar to himself of working impossibilities. I now +wish to point out that a process exactly parallel is simultaneously +carried on by which arts beneficent to society are supposed to be +evolved. Rain-making may be taken as an art socially beneficial. The +_modus operandi_ of rain-making appears in all cases to be based on the +principle that like produces like; and to be in its {88} nature a +process which any one can carry out and which requires no mysterious +art to effect and no mysterious personal power to produce. At the same +time, as it is a proceeding which is beneficial to the tribe as a +whole, it is one in which the whole tribe, and no one tribesman in +particular, is interested. It must be carried out in the interest of +the tribe and by some one who in carrying it out acts for the tribe. +The natural representative of the tribe is the head-man of the tribe; +and, though any one might perform the simple actions necessary, and +could perform them just as well as the head-man, they tend to fall into +the hands of the head-man; and in any case the person who performs them +performs them as the representative of the tribe. The natural +inference comes in course of time to be drawn that he who alone +performs them is the man who alone can perform them; and when that +inference is drawn it becomes obvious that his personality, or the +power peculiar to him personally, is necessary if rain is to be made, +and that the acts and ceremonies through which he goes and through +which any one could go would not be efficacious, or not as efficacious, +without his personal agency and mysterious power. Hence the man who +works {89} wonders for his tribe or in the interests of his tribe, in +virtue of his personal power, does things which are impossible for the +ordinary member of the tribe. + +Up to this point, in tracing the evolution of magic, we have not found +it once necessary to bring in or even to refer to any belief in the +existence of spiritual beings of any kind. So far as the necessities +of the argument are concerned, the belief in magic might have +originated in the way I have described and might have developed on the +lines suggested, in a tribe which had never so much as heard of +spirits. Of course, as a matter of fact, every tribe in which the +belief in magic is found does also believe in the existence of spirits; +animism is a stage of belief lower than which or back of which science +does not profess to go. But it is only in an advanced stage of its +evolution that the belief in magic becomes involved with the belief in +spirits. Originally, eating tiger to make you bold, or eating saffron +to cure jaundice, was just as matter of fact a proceeding as drinking +water to moisten your throat or sitting by a fire to get warm; like +produces like, and beyond that obvious fact it was not necessary to +go--there was no more need to imagine that the action of the saffron +was due to a spirit than to imagine {90} that it was a water spirit +which slakes your thirst. The fact seems to be that animism is a +savage philosophy which is competent to explain everything when called +upon, but that the savage does not spend every moment of his waking +life in invoking it: until there is some need to fall back upon it, he +goes on treating inanimate things as things which he can utilise for +his own purposes without reference to spirits. That is the attitude +also of the man who in virtue of his lore or his personal power can +produce effects which the ordinary man cannot or will not: he performs +his ceremony and the effect follows--or will follow--because he knows +how to do it or has mysterious personal power to produce the effect. +But he consults no spirits--at any rate in the first instance. +Eventually he may do so; and then magic enters on a further stage in +its evolution. (See Appendix.) + +If the man who has the lore or the personal power, and who uses it for +nefarious purposes, proposes to employ it on obtaining the same control +over spirits as he has over things, his magic reaches a stage of +evolution in which it is difficult and practically unnecessary to +distinguish it from the stage of fetichism in which the owner of a +fetich {91} applies coercion to make the fetich spirit do what he +wishes. With fetichism I deal in another lecture. If, on the other +hand, the man who has the lore or the personal power and uses it for +social or "communal" purposes (Haddon, p. 41) comes to believe that, +for the effects which he has hitherto sought to produce by means of his +superior knowledge or superior power, it is necessary to invoke the aid +of spirits, he will naturally address himself to the spirit or god who +is worshipped by the community because he has at heart the general +interests of the community; or it may be that the spirit who produces +such a benefit for the community at large, as rain for example, will +take his place among the gods of the community as the rain-god, in +virtue of the benefit which he confers upon the community generally. +In either case, the attitude of the priest or person who approaches him +on behalf of the community will be that which befits a supplicant +invoking a favour from a power that has shown favour in the past to the +community. And it will not surprise us if we find that the ceremonies +which were used for the purpose of rain-making, before rain was +recognised as the gift of the gods, continue for a time to be practised +as the proper rites with {92} which to approach the god of the +community or the rain-god in particular. Such survivals are then in +danger of being misinterpreted by students of the science of religion, +for they may be regarded as evidence that religion was evolved out of +magic, when in truth they show that religion tends to drive out magic. +Thus Dr. Frazer, in his _Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship_ +(pp. 73-75), describes the practice of the New Caledonians who, to +promote the growth of taro, "bury in the field certain stones +resembling taros, praying to their ancestors at the same time," and he +goes on to say: "In these practices of the New Caledonians the magical +efficacy of the stones appears to be deemed insufficient of itself to +accomplish the end in view; it has to be reinforced by the spirits of +the dead, whose help is sought by prayer and sacrifice. Thus in New +Caledonia sorcery is blent with the worship of the dead; in other +words, magic is combined with religion. If the stones ceased to be +employed, and the prayers and sacrifices to the ancestors remained, the +transition from magic to religion would be complete." Thus it seems to +be suggested in these words of Dr. Frazer's that religion may be +evolved out of magic. If that is what is suggested, {93} then there is +little doubt that the suggestion is not borne out by the instance +given. Let us concede for the moment what some of us would be inclined +to doubt, viz. that prayers and sacrifice offered to a human being, +alive or dead, is religion; and let us enquire whether this form of +religion is evolved out of magic. The magic here is quite clear: +stones resembling taros are buried in the taro field to promote the +growth of taros. That is an application of the principle that like +produces like which might be employed by men who had never heard of +ancestor worship or of any kind of religion, and who had never uttered +prayers or offered sacrifices of any kind. Next, the religious +element, according to Dr. Frazer, is also quite clear: it consists in +offering sacrifices to the dead with the prayer or the words, "Here are +your offerings, in order that the crop of yams may be good." Now, it +is not suggested, even by Dr. Frazer, that this religious element is a +form of magic or is in any way developed out of or evolved from magic. +On the contrary, if this element is religious--indeed, whether it be +really religious or not--it is obviously entirely distinct and +different from sympathetic or hom[oe]opathic magic. The mere fact that +the magical {94} rite of burying in the taro fields stones which +resemble taros has to be supplemented by rites which are, on Dr. +Frazer's own showing, non-magical, shows that the primitive belief in +this application of the principle that like produces like was already +dying out, and was in process of becoming a mere survival. Suppose +that it died out entirely and the rite of burying stones became an +unintelligible survival, or was dropped altogether, and suppose that +the prayers and sacrifices remained in possession of the field, which +would be the more correct way of stating the facts, to say that the +magic had died out and its place had been taken by something totally +different, viz. religion; or that what was magic had become religion, +that magic and religion are but two manifestations, two stages, in the +evolution of the same principle? The latter statement was formally +rejected by Dr. Frazer in the second edition of his _Golden Bough_, +when he declared that he had come to recognise "a fundamental +distinction and even opposition of principle between magic and +religion" (Preface, xvi). His words, therefore, justify us in assuming +that when he speaks, in his _Lectures on the Early History of the +Kingship_, of the "transition from magic to religion," he cannot {95} +mean that magic becomes religion, or that religion is evolved out of +magic, for the "distinction and even opposition of principle" between +the two is "fundamental." He can, therefore, only mean that magic is +followed and may be driven out by something which is fundamentally +opposed to it, viz. religion. + +What then is the fundamental opposition between magic and religion? and +is it such as to require us to believe with Dr. Frazer that magic +preceded religion, and that of two opposite ideas the mind can conceive +the one without conceiving--and rejecting--the other? + +The fundamental opposition between magic and religion I take to be that +religion is supposed to promote the interests of the community, and +that magic, so far forth as it is nefarious, is condemned by the moral +and by the religious feeling of the community. It is the ends for +which nefarious magic is used that are condemned, and not the means. +The means may be and, as we see, are silly and futile; and, for +intellectual progress, their silliness and futility must be recognised +by the intellect. But, it is only when they are used for purposes +inimical to the public good that they are {96} condemned by religion +and morality as nefarious. If therefore we talk of a fundamental +opposition between magic and religion, we must understand that the +fundamental opposition is that between nefarious magic and religion; +neither religion nor morality condemns the desire to increase the food +supply or to promote any other interest of the community. Whether a +man uses skill that he has acquired, or personal power, or force of +will, matters not, provided he uses it for the general good. The +question whether, as a cold matter of fact, the means he uses are +efficacious is not one which moral fervour or religious ardour is +competent by itself to settle: the cool atmosphere and dry light of +reason have rather that function to perform; and they have to perform +it in the case both of means that are used for the general good and of +those used against it. + +I take it therefore that what religion is fundamentally opposed to is +magic--or anything else--that is used for nefarious purposes. + +The question then arises whether we have any reason to believe that +magic used for nefarious purposes must have existed before religion. +Now by nefarious purposes I mean purposes inconsistent with or +destructive of the common good. {97} There can be no such purposes, +however, unless and until there is a community, however small, having +common interests and a common good. As soon as there exists such a +community, there will be a distinction between actions which promote +and actions which are destructive of the common good. The one class +will be approved, the other disapproved, of by public opinion. Magic +will be approved and disapproved of according as it is or is not used +in a way inconsistent with the public good. If there is a spirit or a +god who is worshipped by the community because he is believed to be +concerned with the good of the community, then he will disapprove of +nefarious proceedings whether magical or not. But Dr. Frazer's +position I take to be that no such spirit or god can come to be +believed in, unless there has been previously a belief in magic. Now, +that argument either is or is not based on the assumption that magic +and religion are but two manifestations, two stages, in the evolution +of the same principle. If that is the basis, then what manifested +itself at first as magic subsequently manifests itself as religion; and +"the transition from magic to religion" implies the priority of magic +to religion. But, as we have seen, Dr. Frazer {98} formally +postulates, not an identity, but an "opposition of principle" between +the two. We must therefore reject the assumption of an identity of +principle; and accept the "opposition of principle." But if so, then +there must be two principles which are opposed to one another, religion +and magic; and we might urge that line of argument consistently enough +to show that there can be no magic save where there is religion to be +opposed to it. + +Now, there is an opposition of principle between magic used for +nefarious purposes and religion; and the opposition is that the one +promotes social and the other anti-social purposes. Nefarious +purposes, whether worked by magic or by other means, are condemned by +religion and are nefarious especially because offensive to the god who +has the interests of the community at heart. That from the moment +society existed anti-social tendencies also manifested themselves will +not be doubted; and neither need we doubt that the principle that like +produces like was employed from the beginning for social as well as for +anti-social purposes. The question is whether, in the stage of +animism, the earliest and the lowest stage which science recognises in +the evolution of man, there is ever found a society {99} of human +beings which has not appropriated some one or more of the spirits by +which all things, on the animistic principle, are worked, to the +purposes of the community. No such society has yet been proved to +exist; still less has any _a priori_ proof been produced to show that +such a society must have existed. The presumption indeed is rather the +other way. Children go through a period of helpless infancy longer +than the young of any other creatures; and could not reach the age of +self-help, if the family did not hold together for some years at least. +But where there is a family there is a society, even if it be confined +to members of the family. There also, therefore, there are social and +anti-social tendencies and purposes; and, in the animistic stage, the +spirits, by which man conceives himself to be surrounded, are either +hostile or not hostile to the society, and are accordingly either +worshipped or not worshipped by it. Doubtless, even in those early +times, the father and the husband conceived himself to be the whole +family; and if that view had its unamiable side--and it still has--it +also on occasion had the inestimable advantage of sinking self, of +self-sacrifice, in defence of the family. + +{100} + +Thus far I have been concerned to show how, starting from a principle +such as that like produces like, about which there is nothing magical +in the eyes either of those who believe in magic or of those who have +left the belief behind, man might evolve the conception of magic as +being the lore or the personal power which enables a man to do what +ordinary people cannot do. A few words are necessary as to the decline +of the belief. The first is that the belief is rotten before it is +ripe. Those applications of the principle that like produces like +which are magical are generally precisely those which are false. The +fact that they are false has not prevented them from surviving in +countless numbers to the present day. But some suspicion of their +falsity in some cases does arise; and the person who has the most +frequent opportunities of discovering their falsity, the person on +whose notice the discovery of their falsity is thrust most pointedly, +is the person who deals habitually and professionally in magic. Hence, +though it is his profession to work wonders, he takes care as far as +may be not to attempt impossibilities. Thus Dr. Haddon (_l.c._, p. 62) +found that the men of Murray Island, Torres Straits, who made a "big +wind" by magic, only made it in the {101} season of the southeast trade +wind. "On my asking," he says, "whether the ceremony was done in the +north monsoon, my informant said emphatically, 'Can't do it in +northwest.' That is, the charm is performed only at that season of the +year when the required result is possible--indeed when it is of normal +occurrence. In this, as in other cases, I found that the impossible +was never attempted. A rain charm would not be made when there was no +expectation of rain coming, or a southeast wind be raised during the +wrong season." The instance thus given to us by Dr. Haddon shows how +the belief in magic begins to give way before the scientific +observation of fact. The collapse of magic becomes complete when every +one sees that the southeast trade wind blows at its appointed time, +whether the magic rites are performed or not. In fine, what kills +magic regarded as a means for producing effects is the discovery that +it is superfluous, when for instance the desired wind or rain is +coming, and futile when it is not. And whereas morality and religion +only condemn the end aimed at by magic, and only condemn it when it is +anti-social, science slowly shows that magic as a means to any end is +superfluous and silly. + +{102} + +Science, however, shows this but slowly; and if we wish to understand +how it is that the belief in the magician's power has survived for +thousands of years down to the present moment amongst numerous peoples, +we must remember that his equipment and apparatus are not limited to +purely nonsensical notions. On the contrary, in his stock of +knowledge, carefully handed down, are many truths and facts not +generally known; and they are the most efficacious articles of his +stock in trade. Dr. Frazer may not go farther than his argument +requires, but he certainly goes farther than the facts will support +him, when he says (_l.c._, p. 83) "for it must always be remembered +that every single profession and claim put forward by the magician as +such is false; not one of them can be maintained without deception, +conscious or unconscious." + +If now, in conclusion, we look once more at the subject of magic and +look at it from the practical point of view of the missionary, we shall +see that there are several conclusions which may be of use to him. In +the first place, his attitude to magic will be hostile, and in his +hostility to it he will find the best starting-point for his campaign +against it to be in the fact that everywhere magic is felt, to a +greater {103} or less extent, to be anti-social, and is condemned both +by the moral sentiments and the religious feeling of the community. It +is felt to be essentially wicked; and in warring against it the +missionary will be championing the cause of those who know it to be +wrong but who simply dare not defy it. The fact that defiance is not +ventured on is essential to the continuance of the tyranny; and what is +necessary, if it is to be defied, is an actual concrete example of the +fact that when defied it is futile. + +Next, where magic is practised for social purposes, where it mimics +science or religion and survives in virtue of its power of "protective +colouring," it is in fact superfluous and silly; and where the natives +themselves are beginning to recognise that the magic which is supposed, +for instance, to raise the southeast trade wind won't act at the wrong +season, it should not be difficult to get them to see that it is +unnecessary at the right season. The natural process which tends thus +to get rid of magic may be accelerated by the sensible missionary; and +some knowledge of science will be found in this, as in other matters, +an indispensable part of his training. + +Finally, the missionary may rest assured in the conviction that his +flank will not be turned by the {104} science of religion. The idea +that religion was preceded by and evolved out of magic may have been +entertained by some students of the science of religion in the past, +and may not yet have been thrown off by all. But it holds no place now +in the science of religion. To derive either science or religion from +the magic which exists only by mimicking one or the other is just as +absurd as to imagine that the insect which imitates the colour of the +leaf whereon it lives precedes and creates the tree which is to support +it. + + + + +{105} + +FETICHISM + +The line of action taken by the missionary at work will, like that of +any other practical man, be conditioned, not only by the object which +he wishes to attain, but also by the nature of the material on which +and with which he has to work. He requires therefore all the +information which the science of religion can place at his disposal +about the beliefs and practices of those amongst whom his work is cast; +and, if he is to make practical use of that information, he must know +not only that certain beliefs and practices do as a matter of fact +obtain, he must know also what is their value for his special +purpose--what, if any, are the points about them which have religious +value, and can be utilized by him; and what are those points about them +which are obstructive to his purpose, and how best they may be removed +and counteracted. To supply him with this information, to give him +this estimate of values, to guide him as to the attitude he should +assume and the way in which he may utilise or must {106} attack native +practices and beliefs, is the object with which the applied science of +religion, when it has been constituted by the action of Hartford +Theological Seminary, will address itself. + +Now, it may seem from the practical point of view of the missionary +that with regard to fetichism there can be no question as to what its +value is or as to what his attitude should be towards it. But, even if +we should ultimately find that fetichism is obstructive to religion, we +shall still want to know what hints we can extract from the science of +religion as to the best way of cutting at the roots of fetichism; and +therefore it will be necessary to consider what exactly fetichism is. +And, as a matter of fact, there is a tendency manifesting itself +amongst students of the science of religion to say, as Dr. Haddon says +(_Magic and Fetichism_, p. 91), that "fetichism is a stage of religious +development"; and amongst writers on the philosophy of religion to take +fetichism and treat it, provisionally at any rate, if not as the +primitive religion of mankind, then as that form of religion which "we +find amongst men at the lowest stage of development known to us" +(Hoeffding, _Philosophy of Religion_, E. T., Secs. 45, 46). If, then, +fetichism is the primitive religion of {107} mankind or a stage of +religious development, "a basis from which many other modes of +religious thought have been developed" (Haddon, p. 91), it will have a +value which the missionary must recognise. And in any case he must +know what value, if any, it has. + +Now, if we are, I will not say to do justice to the view that fetichism +is the primitive religion of mankind or a stage from which other modes +of religious thought have been developed, but if we are simply to +understand it, we must clearly distinguish it from the view--somewhat +paradoxical to say the least--that fetichism has no religious value, +and yet is the source of all religious values. The inference which may +legitimately be drawn from this second view is that all forms of +religious thought, having been evolved from this primitive religion of +mankind, have precisely the same value as it has; they do but make +explicit what it really was; the history of religion does but write +large and set out at length what was contained in it from the first; in +fetichism we see what from the first religion was, and what at the last +religion is. On this view, the source from which all religious values +spring is fetichism; fetichism has no value of any kind, and therefore +the {108} evolved forms of fetichism which we call forms of religion +have no value either of any kind. Thus, science--the science of +religion--is supposed to demonstrate by scientific methods the real +nature and the essential character of all religion. + +Now, the error in this reasoning proceeds partly on a false conception +of the object and method of science--a false conception which is slowly +but surely disappearing. The object of all science, whether it be +physical science or other, whether it be historic science or other, is +to establish facts. The object of the historic science of religion is +to record the facts of the history of religion in such a way that the +accuracy of the record as a record will be disputed by no one qualified +to judge the fact. For that purpose, it abstains deliberately and +consistently from asking or considering the religious value of any of +the facts with which it deals. It has not to consider, and does not +consider, what would have been, still less what ought to have been, the +course of history, but simply what it was. In this it is following +merely the dictates of common sense; before we can profitably express +an opinion on any occurrence, we must know what exactly it was that +occurred; and to learn what occurred we must {109} divest our minds of +preconceptions. It is the business of the science of religion to set +aside preconceptions as to whether religion has or has not any value; +and if it does set them aside, that is to say so far as it is +scientific, it will end as it began without touching on the question of +the value of religion. In fine, it is, and would I think now be +generally admitted to be, a misconception of the function of the +science of religion to imagine that it does, or can, prove anything as +to the truth of religion, one way or the other. + +There is, however, another error in the reasoning which is directed to +show that in fetichism we see what religion was and essentially is. +That error consists not only in a false conception of what religion +is,--the man who has himself no religion may be excused if he fails to +understand fully what it is,--it is based on a misunderstanding of what +fetichism is. And so confusion is doubly confounded. The source of +that misunderstanding is to be found in Bosman (Pinkerton, _Voyages and +Travels_, London, 1814, XVI, 493), who says: "I once asked a negro with +whom I could talk very freely ... how they celebrated their divine +worship, and what number of gods they had; he, laughing, answered that +I had {110} puzzled him; and assured me that nobody in the whole +country could give me an exact account of it. 'For, as for my own +part, I have a very large number of gods, and doubt not but that others +have as many. For any of us being resolved to undertake anything of +importance, we first of all search out a god to prosper our designed +undertaking; and going out of doors with the design, take the first +creature that presents itself to our eyes, whether dog, cat, or the +most contemptible creature in the world for our god; or, perhaps, +instead of that, any inanimate that falls in our way, whether a stone, +a piece of wood, or anything else of the same nature. This new-chosen +god is immediately presented with an offering, which is accompanied by +a solemn vow, that if it pleaseth him to prosper our undertakings, for +the future we will always worship and esteem him as a god. If our +design prove successful, we have discovered a new and assisting god, +which is daily presented with a fresh offering; but if the contrary +happen, the new god is rejected as a useless tool, and consequently +returns to his primitive estate. We make and break our gods daily, and +consequently are the masters and inventors of what we sacrifice to.'" +Now, all this was said by the {111} negro, as Bosman himself observed, +to "ridicule his own country gods." And it is not surprising that it +should have been, or should be, accepted as a trustworthy description +of the earliest form of religion by those who in the highest form can +find no more than this negro found in fetichism when he wished to +ridicule it. + +Let us hold over for the moment the question whether fetichism is or is +not a form of religion; and let us enquire how far the account given by +Bosman's negro accords with the facts. First, though there is no doubt +that animals are worshipped as gods, and though there is no doubt that +the guardian spirits of individuals are chosen, or are supposed to +manifest themselves, for example, amongst the North American Indians, +in animal form, and that "the first creature that presents itself" to +the man seeking the manifestation of his guardian spirit may be taken +to be his god, even though it be "the most contemptible creature in the +world "; still students of the science of religion are fairly satisfied +that such gods or guardian spirits are not to be confused with +fetiches. A fetich is an inanimate or lifeless object, even if it is +the feather, claw, bone, eyeball, or any other part of an animal or +even of a man. It is as {112} Bosman's negro said, "any inanimate that +falls in our way." When he goes on to say that it "is immediately +presented with an offering," and, so long as its owner believes in it, +"is daily presented with a fresh offering," he is stating a fact that +is beyond dispute, and which is fully recognised by all students. A +typical instance is given by Professor Tylor (_Primitive Culture_, II, +158) of the owner of a stone which had been taken as a fetich: "He was +once going out on important business, but crossing the threshold he +trod on this stone and hurt himself. Ha! ha! thought he, art thou +there? So he took the stone, and it helped him through his undertaking +for days." When Bosman's negro further goes on to state that if the +fetich is discovered by its owner not to prosper his undertakings, as +he expected it to do, "it is rejected as a useless tool," he makes a +statement which is admitted to be true and which, in its truth, may be +understood to mean that when the owner finds that the object is not a +fetich, he casts it aside as being nothing but the "inanimate" which it +is. Bosman's negro, however, says not that the inanimate but that "the +new god is rejected as a useless tool." That we must take as being but +a carelessness of expression; the evidence of Colonel {113} Ellis, an +observer whose competence is undoubted, is: "Every native with whom I +have conversed on the subject has laughed at the possibility of it +being supposed that he could worship or offer sacrifice to some such +object as a stone, which of itself would be perfectly obvious to his +senses was a stone only and nothing more" (_The Tshi-speaking Peoples_, +p. 192). From these words it follows that the object worshipped as a +fetich is a stone (or whatever it is) and something more, and that the +object "rejected as a useless tool" is a stone (or whatever it is) and +nothing more. When, then, Bosman's negro goes on to say, "we make and +break our gods daily," he is not describing accurately the processes as +they are conceived by those who perform them. The fetich worshipper +believes that the object which arrests his attention has already the +powers which he ascribes to it; and it is in consequence of that belief +that he takes it as his fetich. And it is only when he is convinced +that it is not a fetich that he rejects it as a useless tool. But what +Bosman's negro suggests, and apparently intended to suggest, is that +the fetich worshipper makes, say, a stone his god, knowing that it is a +stone and nothing more; and that he breaks his fetich believing it to +be a god. {114} Thus the worshipper knows that the object is no god +when he is worshipping it; but believes it to be a god when he rejects +it as a useless tool. Now that is, consciously or unconsciously, +deliberately or not, a misrepresentation of fetichism; and it is +precisely on that misconception of what fetichism is that they base +themselves who identify religion with fetichism, and then argue that, +as fetichism has no value, religious or reasonable, neither has +religion itself. + +Returning now to the question what fetichism is--a question which must +be answered before we can enquire what religious value it possesses, +and whether it can be of any use for the practical purposes of the +missionary in his work--we have now seen that a fetich is not merely an +"inanimate," but something more; and that an object to become regarded +as a fetich must attract the attention of the man who is to adopt it, +and must attract the attention of the man when he has business on hand, +that is to say when he has some end in view which he desires to attain, +or generally when he is in a state of expectancy. The process of +choice is one of "natural selection." Professor Hoeffding sees in it +"the simplest conceivable construction of religious ideas. The choice +is entirely elementary {115} and involuntary, as elementary and +involuntary as the exclamation which is the simplest form of a judgment +of worth. The object chosen must be something or other which is +closely bound up with whatever engrosses the mind. It perhaps awakens +memories of earlier events in which it was present or cooperative, or +else it presents a certain--perhaps a very distant--similarity to +objects which helped in previous times of need. Or it may be merely +the first object which presents itself in a moment of strained +expectation. It attracts attention, and is therefore involuntarily +associated with what is about to happen, with the possibility of +attaining the desired end" (_Philosophy of Religion_, E. T., p. 139). +And then Professor Hoeffding goes on to say, "In such phenomena as these +we encounter religion under the guise of desire." Now, without denying +that there are such things as religious desires--and holding as we do +that religion is the search after God and the yearning of the human +heart after Him, "the desire of all nations," we shall have no +temptation to deny that there are such things as religious desires--yet +we must for the moment reserve our decision on the question whether it +is in such phenomena {116} as these that we encounter religious +desires, and we must bear in mind that there are desires which are not +religious, and that we want to know whether it is in the phenomena of +fetichism that we encounter religious desires. + +That in the phenomena of fetichism we encounter desires other than +religious is beyond dispute: the use of a fetich is, as Dr. Nassau +says, "to aid the possessor in the accomplishment of some specific +wish" (_Fetichism in West Africa_, p. 82); that is, of any specific +wish. Now, a fetich is, as we have seen, an inanimate object and +something more. What more? In actual truth, nothing more than the +fact that it is "involuntarily associated with what is about to happen, +with the possibility of attaining the desired end." But to the +possessor the something more, it may be said, is the fact that it is +not merely an "inanimate" but also a spirit, or the habitation of a +spiritual being. When, however, we reflect that fetichism goes back to +the animistic stage of human thought, in which all the things that we +term inanimate are believed to be animated by spirits, it is obvious +that we require some differentia to mark off those things (animated by +spirits) which are fetiches from those things (animated by spirits) +{117} which are not. And the differentia is, of course, that fetiches +are spirits, or objects animated by spirits, which will aid the +possessor in the accomplishment of some specific wish, and are thought +to be willing so to aid, owing to the fact that by an involuntary +association of ideas they become connected in the worshipper's mind +with the possibility of attaining the end he has in view at the moment. +To recognise fetichism, then, in its simplest if not in its most +primitive form, all we need postulate is animism--the belief that all +things are animated by spirits--and the process of very natural +selection which has already been described. At this stage in the +history of fetichism it is especially difficult to judge whether the +fetich is the spirit or the object animated by the spirit. As Dr. +Haddon says (p. 83), "Just as the human body and soul form one +individual, so the material object and its occupying spirit or power +form one individual, more vague, perhaps, but still with many +attributes distinctively human. It possesses personality and will ... +it possesses most of the human passions,--anger, revenge, also +generosity and gratitude; it is within reach of influence and may be +benevolent, hence to be deprecated and placated, and its aid enlisted." + +{118} + +A more advanced stage in the history of fetichism is that which is +reached by reflection on the fact that a fetich not unfrequently ceases +to prosper the undertakings of its possessor in the way he expected it +to do. On the principles of animism, everything that is--whether +animate, or inanimate according to our notions--is made up of spirit, +or soul, and body. In the case of man, when he dies, the spirit leaves +the body. When, therefore, a fetich ceases to act, the explanation by +analogy is that the spirit has left the body, the inanimate, with which +it was originally associated; and when that is the case, then, as we +learn from Miss Kingsley (_Travels in West Africa_, pp. 304-305), "the +little thing you kept the spirit in is no more use now, and only fit to +sell to a white man as 'a big curio.'" The fact that, in native +belief, what we call an inanimate thing may lose its soul and become +really dead is shown by Miss Kingsley in a passage quoted by Dr. +Haddon: "Everything that he," the native, "knows by means of his senses +he regards as a twofold entity--part spirit, part not spirit, or, as we +should say, matter; the connection of a certain spirit with a certain +mass of matter, he holds, is not permanent. He will point out to you a +lightning-struck tree, and tell {119} you its spirit has been broken; +he will tell you when the cooking-pot has been broken, that it has lost +its spirit" (_Folk-Lore_, VIII, 141). We might safely infer then that +as any object may lose its spirit, so too may an object which has been +chosen as a fetich; even if we had not, as we have, direct testimony to +the belief. + +Next, when it is believed that an object may lose its spirit and become +dead indeed, there is room and opportunity for the belief to grow that +its spirit may pass into some other object: that there may be a +transmigration of spirits. And when this belief arises, a fresh stage +in the history of fetichism is evolved. And the fresh stage is evolved +in accordance with the law that governs the whole evolution of +fetichism. That law is that a fetich is an object believed to aid its +possessor in attaining the end he desires. In the earliest stage of +its history anything which happens to arrest a man's attention when he +is in a state of expectancy "is involuntarily associated with what is +about to happen," and so becomes a fetich. In the most developed stage +of fetichism, men are not content to wait until they stumble across a +fetich, and when they do so to say, "Ha! ha! art thou there?" Their +mental attitude becomes {120} interrogative: "Ha! ha! where art thou?" +They no longer wait to stumble across a fetich, they proceed to make +one; and for that procedure a belief in the transmigration of spirits +is essential. An object, a habitation for the spirit, is prepared; and +he is invited, conjured, or conjured, into it. If he is conjured into +it, the attitude of the man who invites him is submissive; if conjured, +the mental attitude of the performer is one of superiority. Colonel +Ellis throughout all his careful enquiries found that "so great is the +fear of giving possible offence to any superhuman agent" that (in the +region of his observation) we may well believe that even the makers of +fetiches did not assume to command the spirits. But elsewhere, in +other regions, it is impossible to doubt but that the owners of +fetiches not only conjure the spirits into the objects, but also apply +coercion to them when they fail to aid their possessor in the +accomplishment of his wishes. That, I take it, is the ultimate stage +in the evolution, the fine flower, of fetichism. And it is not +religion, it has no value as religion, or rather its value is +anti-religious. Even if we were to accept as a definition of religion +that it is the conciliation of beings conceived to be superior, we +should be compelled by {121} the definition to say that fetichism in +its eventual outcome is not religion, for the attitude of the owner +towards his fetich is then one of superiority, and his method is, when +conciliation fails, to apply coercion. + +But it may perhaps be argued that fetichism, except in what I have +termed its ultimate evolution, is religion and has religious value; or, +to put it otherwise, that what I have represented as the eventual +outcome is really a perversion or the decline of fetichism. Then, in +the fetichism which is or represents the primitive religion of mankind +we meet, according to Professor Hoeffding, "religion under the guise of +desire." Now, not all desires are religious; and the question, which +is purely a question of fact, arises whether the desires which +fetichism subserves are religious. And in using the word "religious" I +will not here place any extravagant meaning on the word; I will take it +in the meaning which would be understood by the community in which the +owner of a fetich dwells himself. In the tribes described by Colonel +Ellis, for instance, there are worshipped personal gods having proper +names; and the worship is served by duly appointed priests; and the +worshippers consist of a body of {122} persons whose welfare the god +has at heart. Such are some of the salient features of what all +students of the science of religion would include under the head of the +religion of those tribes. Now amongst those same tribes the fetich, or +_suhman_, as it is termed by them, is found; and there are several +features which make a fetich quite distinguishable from any of the gods +which are worshipped there. Thus, the fetich has no body of +worshippers: it is the private property, of its owner, who alone makes +offerings to it. Its _raison d'etre_, its special and only function, +is to subserve the private wishes of its owner. In so far as he makes +offerings to it he may be called its priest; but he is not, as in the +case of the priests of the gods who are worshipped there, the +representative of the community or congregation, for a fetich has no +plurality of worshippers; and none of the priests of the gods will have +anything to do with it. Next, "though offerings are made to the +_suhman_ by its owner, they are made in private" (Jevons, _History of +Religion_, p. 165)--there is no public worship--and "public opinion +does not approve of them." The interests and the desires which the +fetich exists to promote are not those of the community: they are +antisocial, for, as Colonel Ellis {123} tells us, "one of the special +attributes of a _suhman_ is to procure the death of any person whom its +worshipper may wish to have removed"--indeed "the most important +function of the _suhman_ appears to be to work evil against those who +have injured or offended its worshipper." + +Thus, a very clear distinction exists between the worship of a fetich +and the worship of the gods. It is not merely that the fetich is +invoked occasionally in aid of antisocial desires: nothing can prevent +the worshipper of a god, if the worshipper be bad enough, from praying +for that which he ought not to pray for. It is that the gods of the +community are there to sanction and further all desires which are for +the good of the community, and that the fetich is there to further +desires which are not for the good of the community,--hence it is that +"public opinion does not approve of them." At another stage of +religious evolution, it becomes apparent and is openly pronounced that +neither does the god of the community approve of them; and then +fetichism, like the sin of witchcraft, is stamped out more or less. +But amongst the tribes who have only reached the point of religious +progress attained by the natives of West Africa, public opinion has +{124} only gone so far as to express disapproval, not to declare war. + +If, then, we are to hold to the view of Professor Hoeffding and of Dr. +Haddon, that fetichism is in its essence, or was at the beginning, +religious in its nature, though it may be perverted into something +non-religious or anti-religious, we must at any rate admit that it has +become non-religious not only in the case of those fetichists who +assume an attitude of superiority and command to their fetiches, but +also in the earlier stage of evolution when the fetichist preserves an +attitude of submission and conciliation towards his fetich, but assumes +the attitude only for the purpose of realising desires which are +anti-social and recognised to be anti-religious. + +But, if we take--as I think we must take--that line of argument, the +conclusion to which it will bring us is fairly clear and is not far +off. The differentia or rather that differentia which +characteristically marks off the fetich from the god is the nature of +the desires which each exists to promote; the function which each +exists to fulfil, the end which is there for each to subserve. But the +ends are different. Not only are they different, they are +antagonistic. And the process of evolution does {125} but bring out +the antagonism, it does not create it. It was there from the +beginning. From the moment there was society, there were desires which +could only be realised at the cost and to the loss of society, as well +as desires in the realisation of which the good of society was +realised. The assistance of powers other than human might be sought; +and the nature of the power which was sought was determined by the end +or purpose for which its aid was employed or invoked--if for the good +of society, it was approved by society; if not, not. Its function, the +end it subserved, determined its value for society--determined whether +public opinion should approve or disapprove of it, whether it was a god +of the community or the fetich of an individual. Society can only +exist where there is a certain community of purpose among its members; +and can only continue to exist where anti-social tendencies are to some +extent suppressed or checked by force of public opinion. + +Fetichism, then, in its tendency and in its purpose, in the function +which it performs and the end at which it aims is not only +distinguishable from religion, it is antagonistic to it, from the +earliest period of its history to the latest. Religion is social, an +{126} affair of the community; fetichism is anti-social, condemned by +the community. Public opinion, expressing the moral sentiments of the +community as well as its religious feeling, pronounces both moral and +religious disapproval of the man who uses a _suhman_ for its special +purpose of causing death--committing murder. Fetichism is offensive to +the morality as well as to the religion even of the native. To seek +the origin of religion in fetichism is as vain as to seek the origin of +morality in the selfish and self-seeking tendencies of man. There is +no need to enquire whether fetichism is historically prior to religion, +or whether religion is historically prior to fetichism. Man, as long +as he has lived in societies, must have had desires which were +incompatible with the welfare of the community as well as desires which +promoted its welfare. The powers which are supposed to care whether +the community fares well are the gods of the community; and their +worship is the religion of the community. The powers which have no +such care are not gods, nor is their worship--if coercion or cajolery +can be called worship--religion. The essence of fetichism on its +external side is that the owner of the fetich alone has access {127} to +it, alone can pray to it, alone can offer sacrifices to it. It is +therefore in its inward essence directly destructive of the unity of +interests and purposes that society demands and religion promotes. +Perhaps it would be going too far to say that the practice of making +prayers and offerings to a fetich is borrowed from religious worship: +they are the natural and instinctive method of approaching any power +which is capable of granting or refusing what we desire. It is the +quarter to which they are addressed, and the end for which they are +employed, that makes the difference between them. It is the fact that +in the one case they are, and in the other are not, addressed to the +quarter to which they ought to be addressed, and employed for the end +for which they ought to be employed, that makes the difference in +religious value between them. + +If we bear in mind the simple fact that fetichism is condemned by the +religious and moral feelings of the communities in which it exists, we +shall not fall into the mistake of regarding fetichism either as the +primitive religion of mankind or as a stage of religious development or +as "a basis from which many other modes of religious thought have been +developed." + +{128} + +Professor Hoeffding, holding that fetichism is the primitive religion, +out of which polytheism was developed, adopts Usener's theory as to the +mode of its evolution. "The fetich," Professor Hoeffding says (p. 140), +"is only the provisional and momentary dwelling-place of a spirit. As +Hermann Usener has strikingly called it, it is 'the god of a moment.'" +But though Professor Hoeffding adopts this definition of a fetich, it is +obvious that the course of his argument requires us to understand it as +subject to a certain limitation. His argument in effect is that +fetichism is not polytheism, but something different, something out of +which polytheism was evolved. And the difference is that polytheism +means a plurality of gods, whereas fetichism knows no gods, but only +spirits. Inasmuch then as, on the theory--whether it is held by +Hoeffding or by anybody else--that the spirits of fetichism become the +gods of polytheism, there must be differences between the spirits of +the one and the gods of the other, let us enquire what the differences +are supposed to be. + +First, there is the statement that a fetich is the "god of a moment," +by which must be meant that the spirits which, so long as they are +momentary and {129} temporary, are fetiches, must come to be permanent +if they are to attain to the rank of gods. + +But on this point Dr. Haddon differs. He is quite clear that a fetich +may be worshipped permanently without ceasing to be a fetich. And it +is indeed abundantly clear that an object only ceases to be worshipped +when its owner is convinced that it is not really a fetich; as long as +he is satisfied that it is a fetich, he continues its cult--and he +continues it because it is his personal property, because he, and not +the rest of the community, has access to it. + +Next, Hoeffding argues that it is from these momentary fetiches that +special or specialised deities--"departmental gods," as Mr. Andrew Lang +has termed them--arise. And these "specialised divinities constitute +an advance on gods of the moment" (p. 142). Now, what is implied in +this argument, what is postulated but not expressed, is that a fetich +has only one particular thing which it can do. A departmental god can +only do one particular sort of thing, has one specialised function. A +departmental god is but a fetich advanced one stage in the hierarchy of +divine beings. Therefore the function of the fetich in the first +instance was specialised {130} and limited. But there it is that the +_a priori_ argument comes into collision with the actual facts. A +fetich, when it presents itself to a man, assists him in the particular +business on which he is at the moment engaged. But it only continues +to act as a fetich, provided that it assists him afterwards and in +other matters also. The desires of the owner are not limited, and +consequently neither are his expectations; the business of the fetich +is to procure him general prosperity (Haddon, p. 83). As far as +fetiches are concerned, it is simply reversing the facts to suppose +that it is because one fetich can only do one thing, that many fetiches +are picked up. Many objects are picked up on the chance of their +proving fetiches, because if the object turns out really to be a fetich +it will bring its owner good luck and prosperity generally--there is no +knowing what it may do. But it is only to its owner that it brings +prosperity--not to other people, not to the community, for the +community is debarred access to it. + +The next difference between fetichism and polytheism, according to +Hoeffding, is that the gods of polytheism have developed that +personality which is not indeed absolutely wanting in the spirits of +fetichism but can hardly be said to be properly {131} there. "The +transition," he says, "from momentary and special gods to gods which +can properly be called personal is one of the most important +transitions in the history of religion. It denotes the transition from +animism to polytheism" (p. 145). And one of the outward signs that the +transition has been effected is, as Usener points out with special +emphasis, "that only at a certain stage of evolution, _i.e._, on the +appearance of polytheism, do the gods acquire proper names" (_ib._ 147). + +Now, this argument, I suggest, seeks to make, or to make much of, a +difference between fetichism and polytheism which scarcely exists, and +so far as it does exist is not the real difference between them. It +seeks to minimise, if not to deny, the personality of the fetich, in +order to exalt that of the gods of polytheism. And then this +difference in degree of personality, this transition from the one +degree to the other, is exhibited as "one of the most important +transitions in the history of religion." The question therefore is +first whether the difference is so great, and next whether it is the +real difference between fetichism and religion in the polytheistic +stage. + +The difference in point of personality between the spirits of fetichism +and the gods of polytheism is not {132} absolute. The fetich, +according to Dr. Haddon, "_possesses personality_ and will, it has also +many human characters. It possesses most of the human passions, anger, +revenge, also generosity and gratitude; it is within reach of influence +and may be benevolent, is hence to be deprecated and placated, and its +aid to be enlisted" (p. 83); "the fetich is worshipped, prayed to, +sacrificed to, and talked with" (p. 89). + +But, perhaps it may be said that, though the fetich does "possess +personality," it is only when it has acquired sufficient personality to +enjoy a proper name that it becomes a god, or fetichism passes into +polytheism. To this the reply is that polytheism does not wait thus +deferentially on the evolution of proper names. There was a period in +the evolution of the human race when men neither had proper names of +their own nor knew their fellows by proper names; and yet they doubted +not their personality. The simple fact is that he who is to receive a +name--whether he be a human being or a spiritual being--must be there +in order to be named. When he is there he may receive a name which has +lost all meaning, as proper names at the present day have generally +done; or one which has a meaning. {133} A mother may address her child +as "John" or as "boy," but, whichever form of address she uses, she has +no doubt that the child has a personality. The fact that a fetich has +not acquired a proper name is not a proof that it has acquired no +personality; if it can, as Dr. Haddon says it can, be "petted or +ill-treated with regard to its past or future behaviour" (p. 90), its +personality is undeniable. If it can be "worshipped, prayed to, +sacrificed to, talked with," it is as personal as any deity in a +pantheon. If it has no proper name, neither at one time had men +themselves. And Hoeffding himself seems disinclined to follow Usener on +this point: "no important period," he says (p. 147), "in the history of +religion can begin with an empty word. The word can neither be the +beginning nor exist at the beginning." Finally Hoeffding, to enforce +the conclusion that polytheism is evolved from fetichism, says: "The +influence exerted by worship on the life of religious ideas can find no +more striking exemplification than in the word 'god' itself: when we +study those etymologies of this word which, from the philological point +of view, appear most likely to be correct, we find the word really +means 'he to whom sacrifice is made,' or 'he who is worshipped'" (p. +148). {134} Professor Wilhelm Thomsen considers the first explanation +the more probable: "In that case there would be a relationship between +the root of the word '_gott_' and '_giessen_' (to pour), as also +between the Greek _cheein_, whose root _chu_ = the Sanskrit _hu_, from +which comes _huta_, which means 'sacrificed,' as well as 'he to whom +sacrifices are made'" (p. 396). Now, if "god" means either "he to whom +sacrifice is made" or "he who is worshipped," we have only to enquire +by whom the sacrifice is made or the worship paid, according to +Professor Hoeffding, in order to see the value of this philological +argument. A leading difference between a fetich and a god is that +sacrifice is made and worship paid to the fetich by its owner, to the +god by the community. Now this philological derivation of "god" throws +no light whatever on the question by whom the "god" is worshipped; but +the content of the passage which I have quoted shows that Professor +Hoeffding himself here understands the worship of a god to be the +worship paid by the community. If that is so, and if the function or a +function of the being worshipped is to grant the desires of his +worshippers, then the function of the being worshipped by the community +is to grant the desires of the community. {135} And if that is the +distinguishing mark or a distinguishing mark of a god, then the worship +of a god differs _toto caelo_ from the worship paid to a fetich, whose +distinguishing mark is that it is subservient to the anti-social wishes +of its owner, and is not worshipped by the community. And it is just +as impossible to maintain that a god is evolved out of a fetich as it +would be to argue--indeed it is arguing--that practices destructive of +society or social welfare have only to be pushed far enough and they +will prove the salvation of society. + +If in the animistic stage, when everything that is is worked by +spirits, it is possible and desirable for the individual to gain his +individual ends by the cooperation of some spirit, it is equally +possible and more desirable for the community to gain the aid of a +spirit which will further the ends for the sake of which the community +exists. But those ends are not transient or momentary, neither +therefore can the spirit who promotes them be a "momentary" god. And +if we accept Hoeffding's description of the simplest and earliest +manifestation of the religious spirit as being belief "in a power which +cares whether he [man] has or has not experiences which he values," we +must be careful to make it clear that the {136} power worshipped by a +community is worshipped because he is believed to care that the +community should have the experiences which the community values. +Having made that stipulation, we may accept Hoeffding's further +statement (p. 147) that "even the momentary and special gods implied +the existence of a personifying tendency and faculty"; for, although +from our point of view a momentary god is a self-contradictory notion, +we are quite willing to agree that this tendency to personification may +be taken as primary and primitive: religion from the beginning has been +the search after a power essentially personal. But that way of +conceiving spiritual powers is not in itself distinctive of or confined +to religion: it is an intellectual conception; it is the essence of +animism, and animism is not religion. To say that an emotional element +also must be present is true; but neither will that serve to mark off +fetichism from religion. Fetichism also is emotional in tone: it is in +hope that the savage picks up the thing that may prove to have the +fetich power; and it is with fear that he recognises his neighbour's +_suhman_. A god is not merely a power conceived of intellectually and +felt emotionally to be a personal power from whom things may {137} be +hoped or feared; he must indeed be a personal power and be regarded +with hope and fear, but it is by a community that he must be so +regarded. And the community, in turning to such a power, worships him +with sacrifice: a god is indeed he to whom sacrifice is made and +worship paid by the community, with whose interests and whose +morality--with whose good, in a word, he is from the beginning +identified. "In the absence of experience of good as one of the +realities of life, no one," Hoeffding says, "would ever have believed in +the goodness of the gods"; and, we may add, it is as interested in and +caring for the good of the community that the god of the community is +worshipped. It is in the conviction that he does so care, that +religious feeling is rooted; or, as Hoeffding puts it (p. 162), it is +rooted in "the need to collect and concentrate ourselves, to resign +ourselves, to feel ourselves supported and carried by a power raised +above all struggle and opposition and beyond all change." There we +have, implicit from the beginning, that communion with god, or striving +thereafter, which is essential to worship. It is faith. It is rest. +It is the heart's desire. And it is not fetichism, nor is fetichism it. + + + + +{138} + +PRAYER + +The physician, if he is to do his work, must know both a healthy and a +diseased body, or organ, when he sees it. He must know the difference +between the two and the symptoms both of health and disease. Otherwise +he is in danger of trying to cure an organ which is healthy already--in +which case his remedies will simply aggravate the disease. That is +obviously true of the physician who seeks to heal the body, and it is +equally, if not so obviously, true of the physician who seeks to +minister to a mind, or a soul, diseased. Now, the missionary will find +that the heathen, to whom he is to minister, have the habit of prayer; +and the question arises, What is to be his attitude towards it? He +cannot take up the position that prayer is in itself a habit to be +condemned; he is not there to eradicate the habit, or to uproot the +tendency. Neither is he there to create the habit; it already exists, +and the wise missionary will acknowledge its existence with +thankfulness. His business is not to teach his flock to {139} pray, +but how to pray, that is to say, for what and to whom. But even if he +thus wisely recognises that prayer is a habit not to be created, but to +be trained by him, it is still possible for him to assume rashly that +it is simply impossible for a heathen ever to pray for anything that is +right, and therefore, that it is a missionary's duty first to insist +that everything for which a savage or barbarian prays must be condemned +as essentially irreligious and wicked. In that case, what will such a +missionary, if sent to the Khonds of Orissa, say, when he finds them +praying thus: "We are ignorant of what it is good to ask for. You know +what is good for us. Give it to us!"? Can he possibly say to his +flock, "All your prayers, all the things that you pray for now, are +wicked; and your only hope of salvation lies in ceasing to pray for +them"? If not, then he must recognise the fact that it is possible for +the heathen to pray, and to pray for some things that it is right to +pray for. And he must not only recognise the fact, but he must utilise +it. Nay! more, he must not only recognise the fact if it chances to +force itself upon him, he must go out of his way with the deliberate +purpose of finding out what things are prayed for. He will then find +himself in {140} more intimate contact with the soul of the man than he +can ever attain to in any other way; and he may then find that there +are other things for which petitions are put up which could not be +prayed for save by a man who had a defective or erroneous conception of +Him who alone can answer prayer. + +But it is a blundering, unbusinesslike way of managing things if the +missionary has to go out to his work unprepared in this essential +matter, and has to find out these things for himself--and perhaps not +find them out at all. The applied science of religion should equip him +in this respect; it should be able to take the facts and truths +established by the science of religion and apply them to the purposes +of the missionary. But it is a striking example of the youth and +immaturity of the science of religion that no attempt has yet been made +by it to collect the facts, much less to coordinate and state them +scientifically. If a thing is clear, when we come to think of it, in +the history of religion, it is that the gods are there to be prayed to: +man worships them because it is on their knees that all things lie. It +is from them that man hopes all things; it is in prayer that man +expresses his hopes and desires. It is from his prayers that we should +be able to find out {141} what the gods really are to whom man prays. +What is said about them in mythology--or even in theology--is the +product of reflection, and is in many cases demonstrably different from +what is given in consciousness at the moment when man is striving after +communion with the Highest. Yet it is from mythology, or from the +still more reflective and deliberative expression of ritual, of rites +and ceremonies, that the science of religion has sought to infer the +nature of the gods man worships. The whole apparatus of religion, +rites and ceremonies, sacrifice and altars, nature-worship and +polytheism, has been investigated; the one thing overlooked has been +the one thing for the sake of which all the others exist, the prayer in +which man's soul rises, or seeks to rise, to God. + +The reason given by Professor Tylor (_Primitive Culture_, II, 364) for +this is not that the subject is unimportant, but that it is so simple; +"so simple and familiar," he says, "is the nature of prayer that its +study does not demand that detail of fact and argument which must be +given to rites in comparison practically insignificant." Now, it is +indeed the case that things which are familiar may appear to be simple; +but it is also the case that sometimes things {142} are considered +simple merely because they are familiar, and not because they are +simple. The fact that they are not so simple as every one has assumed +comes to be suspected when it is discovered that people take slightly +different views of them. Such slightly different views may be detected +in this case. + +Professor Hoeffding holds that, in the lowest form in which religion +manifests itself, "religion appears under the guise of desire," thus +ranging himself on the side of an opinion mentioned by Professor Tylor +(_op. cit._, II, 464) that, as regards the religion of the lower +culture, in prayer "the accomplishment of desire is asked for, but +desire is as yet limited to personal advantage." Now, starting from +this position that prayer is the expression of desire, we have only to +ask, whose desire? that of the individual or that of the community? and +we shall see that under the simple and familiar phrase of "the +accomplishment of desire" there lurks a difference of view which may +possibly widen out into a very wide difference of opinion. If we +appeal to the facts, we may take as an instance a prayer uttered "in +loud uncouth voice of plaintive, piteous tone" by one of the Osages to +Wohkonda, {143} the Master of Life: "Wohkonda, pity me, I am very poor; +give me what I need; give me success against mine enemies, that I may +avenge the death of my friends. May I be able to take scalps, to take +horses!" etc. (Tylor, II, 365). So on the Gold Coast a negro in the +morning will pray, "Heaven! grant that I may have something to eat this +day" (_ib._, 368), not "give us this day our daily bread"; or, raising +his eyes to heaven, he will thus address the god of heaven: "God, give +me to-day rice and yams, gold and agries, give me slaves, riches and +health, and that I may be brisk and swift!" (_ib._). On the other +hand, John Tanner (_Narrative_, p. 46) relates that when Algonquin +Indians were setting out in a fleet of frail bark canoes across Lake +Superior, the chief addressed a prayer to the Great Spirit: "You have +made this lake; and you have made us, your children; you can now cause +that the water shall remain smooth while we pass over in safety." The +chief, it will be observed, did not expressly call the Great Spirit +"our Father," but he did speak of himself and his men as "your +children." If we cross over to Africa, again, we find the Masai women +praying thus; and be it observed that though the first person singular +is used, {144} it is used by the chorus of women, and is plural in +effect:-- + + I + + "My God, to thee alone I pray + That offspring may to me be given. + Thee only I invoke each day, + O morning star in highest heaven. + God of the thunder and the rain, + Give ear unto my suppliant strain. + Lord of the powers of the air, + To thee I raise my daily prayer. + + II + + "My God, to thee alone I pray, + Whose savour is as passing sweet + As only choicest herbs display, + Thy blessing daily I entreat. + Thou hearest when I pray to thee, + And listenest in thy clemency. + Lord of the powers of the air, + To thee I raise my daily prayer." + --HOLLIS, _The Masai_, p. 346. + + +When Professor Tylor says that by the savage "the accomplishment of +desire is asked for, but desire is as yet limited to personal +advantage," we must be careful not to infer that the only advantage a +savage is capable of praying for is his own selfish advantage. +Professor Tylor himself quotes (II, {145} 366) the following prayer +from the war-song of a Delaware:-- + + "O Great Spirit there above, + Have pity on my children + And my wife! + Prevent that they shall mourn for me! + Let me succeed in this undertaking, + That I may slay my enemy + And bring home the tokens of victory + To my dear family and my friends + That we may rejoice together.... + Have pity on me and protect my life, + And I will bring thee an offering." + +Nor is it exclusively for their own personal advantage that the Masai +women are concerned when they pray for the safe return of their sons +from the wars:-- + + "O thou who gavest, thou to whom we pray + For offspring, take not now thy gift away. + O morning star, that shinest from afar, + Bring back our sons in safety from the war." + --HOLLIS, p. 351. + +Nor is it in a purely selfish spirit that the Masai women pray that +their warriors may have the advantage over all their enemies:-- + + I + + "O God of battles, break + The power of the foe. + +{146} + + Their cattle may we take, + Their mightiest lay low. + + II + + "Sing, O ye maidens fair, + For triumph o'er the foe. + This is the time for prayer + Success our arms may know. + + III + + "Morning and evening stars + That in the heavens glow, + Break, as in other wars, + The power of the foe. + + IV + + "O dweller, where on high + Flushes at dawn the snow, + O Cloud God, break, we cry, + The power of the foe." + --_Ib._, p. 352. + +Again, the rain that is prayed for by the Manganja of Lake Nyassa is an +advantage indeed, but one enjoyed by the community and prayed for by +the community. They made offerings to the Supreme Deity that he might +give them rain, and "the priestess dropped the meal handful by handful +on the ground, each time calling in a high-pitched voice, {147} 'Hear +thou, O God, and send rain!' and the assembled people responded, +clapping their hands softly and intoning (they always intone their +prayers), 'Hear thou, O God'" (Tylor, p. 368). + +The appeal then to facts shows that it is with the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned, and that it is by +a representative of the community that those desires are offered up in +prayer, and that the community may join in. The appeal to facts shows, +also, that an individual may put up individual petitions, as when a +Yebu will pray: "God in heaven protect me from sickness and death. God +give me happiness and wisdom." But we may safely infer that the only +prayers that the god of the community is expected to harken to are +prayers that are consistent with the interests and welfare of the +community. + +From that point of view we must refuse to give more than a guarded +assent to the "opinion that prayer appeared in the religion of the +lower culture, but that in this its earlier stage it was unethical" +(Tylor, 364). Prayer obviously does appear in the religion of the +lower culture, but to say that it there is unethical is to make a +statement which requires defining. The statement means what {148} +Professor Tylor expresses later on in the words: "It scarcely appears +as though any savage prayer, authentically native in its origin, were +ever directed to obtain moral goodness or to ask pardon for moral sin" +(p. 373). But it might be misunderstood to mean that among savages it +was customary or possible to pray for things recognised by the savage +himself as wrong, and condemned by the community at large. In the +first place, however, the god of the community simply as being the god +of the community would not tolerate such prayers. Next, the range and +extent of savage morality is less extensive than it is--or at any rate +than it ought to be--in our day; and though we must recognise and at +the right time insist upon the difference, that ought not to make us +close our eyes to the fact that the savage does pray to do the things +which savage morality holds it incumbent on him to do, for instance to +fight bravely for the good of his wife, his children, and his tribe, to +carry out the duty of avenging murder. And if he prays for wealth he +also prays for wisdom; if he prays that his god may deliver him from +sickness, that shows he is human rather than that he is a low type of +humanity. + +It would seem, then, that though in religions of low {149} culture we +meet religion under the guise of desire, we also find that religion +makes a distinction between desires; there are desires which may be +expressed to the god of the community, and desires which may not. +Further, though it is in the heart of a person and an individual that +desire must originate, it does not follow that prayer originates in +individual desire. To say so, we must assume that the same desire +cannot possibly originate simultaneously in different persons. But +that is a patently erroneous assumption: in time of war, the desire for +victory will spring up simultaneously in the hearts of all the tribe; +in time of drought, the prayer for rain will ascend from the hearts of +all the people; at the time of the sowing of seed a prayer for "the +kindly fruits of the earth" may be uttered by every member of the +community. Now it is precisely these desires, which being desires must +originate in individual souls, yet being desires of every individual in +the community are the desires of the community, that are the desires +which take the form of prayer offered by the community or its +representative to the god of the community. Anti-social desires cannot +be expressed by the community or sanctioned by religion. Prayer is the +essential {150} expression of true socialism; and the spirit which +prompts it is and has always been the moving spirit of social progress. + +Professor Tylor, noticing the "extreme development of mechanical +religion, the prayer-mill of the Tibetan Buddhists," suggests that it +"may perhaps lead us to form an opinion of large application in the +study of religion and superstition; namely, that the theory of prayers +may explain the origin of charms. Charm-formulae," he says, "are in +very many cases actual prayers, and as such are intelligible. Where +they are mere verbal forms, producing their effect on nature and man by +some unexplained process, may not they or the types they have been +modelled on have been originally prayers, since dwindled into mystic +sentences?" (_P. C._ II, 372-373). Now, if this suggestion of +Professor Tylor's be correct, it will follow that as charms and spells +are degraded survivals of prayer, so magic generally--of which charms +and spells are but one department--is a degradation of religion. That +in many cases charms and spells are survivals of prayer--formulae from +which all spirit of religion has entirely evaporated--all students of +the science of religion would now admit. That prayers may {151} +stiffen into traditional formulae, and then become vain repetitions +which may actually be unintelligible to those who utter them, and so be +conceived to have a force which is purely magical and a "nature +practically assimilated more or less to that of charms" (_l.c._), is a +fact which cannot be denied. But when once the truth has been admitted +that prayers may pass into spells, the possibility is suggested that it +is out of spells that prayer has originated. Mercury raised to a high +temperature becomes red precipitate; and red precipitate exposed to a +still greater heat becomes mercury again. Spells may be the origin of +prayers, if prayers show a tendency to relapse into spells. That +possibility fits in either with the theory that magic preceded religion +or still more exactly with the theory that religion simply is magic +raised, so to speak, to a higher moral temperature. We have therefore +to consider the possibility that the process of evolution has been from +spell to prayer (R. R. Marett, _Folk-Lore_ XV, 2, pp. 132-166); and let +us begin the consideration by observing that the reverse passage--from +prayer to spell--is only possible on the condition that religion +evaporates entirely in the process. The prayer does not become a charm +until the {152} religion has disappeared entirely from it: a charm +therefore is that in which no religion is, and out of which +consequently no religion can be extracted. If then, _per impossibile_, +it could be demonstrated that there was a period in the history of +mankind, when charms and magic existed, and religion was utterly +unknown; if it be argued that the spirit of religion, when at length it +breathed upon mankind, transformed spells into prayers--still all that +would then be maintained is that spoken formulae which were spells were +followed by other formulae which are the very opposite of spells. Must +we not, however, go one step further and admit that one and the same +form of words may be prayer and religion when breathed in one spirit, +and vain repetition and mere magic when uttered in another? Let us +admit that the difference between prayer and spell lies in the +difference of the spirit inspiring them; and then we shall see that the +difference is essential, fundamental, as little to be ignored as it is +impossible to bridge. + +The formula used by the person employing it to express his desire may +or may not in itself suffice to show whether it is religious in intent +and value. Thus in West Africa the women of Framin dance {153} and +sing, "Our husbands have gone to Ashantee land; may they sweep their +enemies off the face of the earth" (Frazer, _Golden Bough_,^2 I, 34). +We may compare the song sung in time of war by the Masai women: "O God, +to whom I pray for offspring, may our children return hither" (Hollis, +p. 351); and there seems no reason why, since the Masai song is +religious, the Framin song may not be regarded as religious also. But +we have to remember that both prayers and spells have a setting of +their own: the desires which they express manifest themselves not only +in what is said but in what is done; and, when we enquire what the +Framin women do whilst they sing the words quoted above, we find that +they dance with brushes in their hands. The brushes are quite as +essential as the words. It is therefore suggested that the whole +ceremony is magical, that the sweeping is sympathetic magic and the +song is a spell. The words explain what the action is intended to +effect, just as in New Caledonia when a man has kindled a smoky fire +and has performed certain acts, he "invokes his ancestors and says, +'Sun! I do this that you may be burning hot, and eat up all the clouds +in the sky'" (Frazer, _ib._, 116). Again, amongst the Masai in time of +{154} drought a charm called ol-kora is thrown into a fire; the old men +encircle the fire and sing:-- + + "God of the rain-cloud, slake our thirst, + We know thy far-extending powers, + As herdsmen lead their kine to drink, + Refresh us with thy cooling showers." + --HOLLIS, p. 348. + +If the ol-kora which is thrown into the fire makes it rise in clouds of +smoke, resembling the rain-clouds which are desired, then here too the +ceremony taken as a whole presents the appearance of a magical rite +accompanied by a spoken spell. It is true that in this case the +ceremony is reenforced by an appeal to a god, just as in the New +Caledonian case it is reenforced by an appeal to ancestor worship. But +this may be explained as showing that here we have magic and charms +being gradually superseded by religion and prayer; the old formula and +the old rite are in process of being suffused by a new spirit, the +spirit of religion, which is the very negation and ultimately the +destruction of the old spirit of magic. Before accepting this +interpretation, however, which is intended to show the priority of +magic to religion, we may notice that it is not the only interpretation +of which the facts are susceptible. It is {155} based on the +assumption that the words uttered are intended as an explanation of the +meaning of the acts performed. If that assumption is correct, then the +performer of the ceremony is explaining its meaning and intention to +somebody. To whom? In the case of the New Caledonian ceremony, to the +ancestral spirits; in the case of the Masai old men, to the god. Thus, +the religious aspect of the ceremony appears after all to be an +essential part of the ceremony, and not a new element in an old rite. +And, then, we may consistently argue that the Framin women who sing, +"Our husbands have gone to Ashantee land; may they sweep their enemies +off the face of the earth," are either still conscious that they are +addressing a prayer to their native god; or that, if they are no longer +conscious of the fact, they once were, and what was originally prayer +has become by vain repetition a mere spell. All this is on the +assumption that in these ceremonies, the words are intended to explain +the meaning of the acts performed, and therefore to explain it to +somebody, peradventure he will understand and grant the performer of +the ceremony his heart's desire. But, as the consequences of the +assumption do not favour the theory that prayer must be {156} preceded +by spell, let us discard the assumption that the words explain the +meaning of the acts performed. Let us consider the possibility that +perhaps the actions which are gone through are meant to explain the +words and make them more forcible. It is undeniable that in moments of +emotion we express ourselves by gesture and the play of our features as +well as by our words; indeed, in reading a play we are apt to miss the +full meaning of the words simply because they are not assisted and +interpreted by the actor's gestures and features. If we take up this +position, that the things done are explanatory of the words uttered and +reenforce them, then the sweeping which is acted by the Framin women +again is not magical; it simply emphasises the words, "may they sweep +their enemies off the face of the earth," and shows to the power +appealed to what it is that is desired. The smoke sent up by the New +Caledonian ancestor worshipper or the Masai old men is a way of +indicating the clouds which they wish to attract or avert respectively. +An equally clear case comes from the Kei Islands: "When the warriors +have departed, the women return indoors and bring out certain baskets +containing fruits and stones. These fruits and stones they anoint and +place on a board, {157} murmuring as they do so, 'O lord sun, moon, let +the bullets rebound from our husbands, brothers, betrothed, and other +relations, just as raindrops rebound from these objects which are +smeared with oil'" (Frazer, _op. cit._, p. 33). It is, I think, +perfectly reasonable to regard the act performed as explanatory of the +words uttered and of the thing desired; the women themselves explain to +their lords, the sun and moon,--with the precision natural to women +when explaining what they want,--exactly how they want the bullets to +bounce off, just like raindrops. Dr. Frazer, however, from whom I have +quoted this illustration, not having perhaps considered the possibility +that the acts performed may be explanatory of the words, is compelled +to explain the action as magical: "in this custom the ceremony of +anointing stones in order that the bullets may recoil from the men like +raindrops from the stones is a piece of pure sympathetic or imitative +magic." He is therefore compelled to suggest that the prayer to the +sun is a prayer that he will give effect to the charm, and is perhaps a +later addition. But independently of the possibility that the actions +performed are explanatory of the words, or rather that words and +actions both are intended to make clear to the sun precisely {158} what +the petition is, what tells against Dr. Frazer's suggestion is that the +women want the bullets to bounce off, and it is the power of the god to +which they appeal and on which they rely for the fulfilment of their +prayer. + +There is, however, a further consideration which we should perhaps take +into account. Man, when he has a desire which he wishes to +realise,--and the whole of our life is spent in trying to realise what +we wish,--takes all the steps which experience shows to be necessary or +reason suggests; and, when he has done everything that he can do, he +may still feel that nothing is certain in this life, and the thing may +not come off. Under those circumstances he may, and often does, pray +that success may attend his efforts. Now Dr. Frazer, in the second +edition of his _Golden Bough_, wishing to show that the period of +religion was preceded by a non-religious period in the history of +mankind, suggests that at first man had no idea that his attempts to +realise his desires could fail, and that it was his "tardy recognition" +of the fact that led him to religion. This tardy recognition, he says, +probably "proceeded very slowly, and required long ages for its more or +less perfect accomplishment. For the recognition of man's +powerlessness to influence the course of {159} nature on a grand scale +must have been gradual" (I, 78). I would suggest, however, that it +cannot have taken "long ages" for savage man to discover that his +wishes and his plans did not always come off. It is, I think, going +too far to imagine that for long ages man had no idea that his attempts +to realise his desires could fail. If religion arises, as Dr. Frazer +suggests, when man recognises his own weakness and his own +powerlessness, often, to effect what he most desires, then man in his +most primitive and most helpless condition must have been most ready to +recognise that there were powers other than himself, and to desire, +that is to pray for, their assistance. Doubtless it would be at the +greater crises, times of pestilence, drought, famine and war, that his +prayers would be most insistent; but it is in the period of savagery +that famine is most frequent and drought most to be feared. Against +them he takes all the measures known to him, all the practical steps +which natural science, as understood by him, can suggest. Now his +theory and practice include many things which, though they are in later +days regarded as uncanny and magical, are to him the ordinary natural +means of producing the effects which he desires. But when he has taken +all {160} the steps which practical reason suggests, and experience of +the past approves, savage man, harassed by the dread of approaching +drought or famine, may still breathe out the Manganja prayer, "Hear +thou, O God, and send rain." When, however, he does so, it is, I +suggest, doubly erroneous to infer that this prayer takes the place of +a spell or that apart from the prayer the acts performed are, and +originally were, magical. These acts may be based on the principle +that like produces like and may be performed as the ordinary, natural +means for producing the effect, which have nothing magical about them. +And they are accompanied by a prayer which is not a mere explanation or +statement of the purpose with which the acts are performed, but is the +expression of the heart's desire. + +No _a priori_ proofs of any cogency, therefore, have been adduced by +Dr. Frazer, and none therefore are likely to be produced by any one +else, to show that there was ever a period in the history of man when +prayers and religion were unknown to him. The question remains whether +any actual instances are known to the science of religion. +Unfortunately, as I pointed out at the beginning of this lecture, so +neglected by the science of religion has been the subject of prayer +that even now we are scarcely {161} able to go beyond the statement +made more than a quarter of a century ago by Professor Tylor that, "at +low levels of civilisation there are many races who distinctly admit +the existence of spirits, but are not certainly known to pray to them +even in thought" (_P. C._ II, 364). Professor Tylor's statement is +properly guarded: there are races not certainly known to pray. The +possibility that they may yet be discovered to make prayers is not +excluded. + +Now, if we turn to one of the lowest levels of culture, that of the +Australian black fellows, we shall find that there is much doubt +amongst students whether the "aborigines have consciously any form of +religion whatever" (Howitt, _Native Tribes of S. E. Australia_), and in +southeast Australia Mr. Howitt thinks it cannot be alleged that they +have, though their beliefs are such that they might easily have +developed into an actual religion (p. 507). Now one of the tribes of +southeast Australia is that of the Dieri. With them rain is very +important, for periods of drought are frequent; and "rain-making +ceremonies are considered of much consequence" (p. 394). The +ceremonies are symbolic: there is "blood to symbolise the rain" and two +large stones "representing gathering {162} clouds presaging rain," just +as the New Caledonian sends up clouds of smoke to symbolise +rain-clouds, and the Masai, we have conjectured, throw ol-kora into the +fire for the same purpose. But the New Caledonian not only performs +the actions prescribed for the rite, he also invokes the spirits of his +ancestors; and the Masai not only go through the proper dance, but call +upon the god of the rain-cloud. The Dieri, however, ought to be +content with their symbolic or sympathetic magic and not offer up any +prayer. But, being unaware of this fact, they do pray: they call "upon +the rain-making _Mura-muras_ to give them power to make a heavy +rainfall, crying out in loud voices the impoverished state of the +country, and the half-starved condition of the tribe, in consequence of +the difficulty in procuring food in sufficient quantity to preserve +life" (p. 394). The _Mura-muras_ seem to be ancestral spirits, like +those invoked by the New Caledonian. If we turn to the Euahlayi tribe +of northwestern New South Wales, we find that at the Boorah rites a +prayer is offered to Byamee, "asking him to let the blacks live long, +for they have been faithful to his charge as shown by the observance of +the Boorah ceremony" (L. Parker, _The Euahlayi {163} Tribe_, p. 79). +That is the prayer of the community to Byamee, and is in conformity +with what we have noted before, viz. that it is with the desires of the +community that the god of the community is concerned. Another prayer, +the nature of which is not stated by Mrs. Parker, by whom the +information is given us, is put up at funerals, presumably to Byamee by +the community or its representative. Mrs. Parker adds: "Though we say +that actually these people have but two attempts at prayers, one at the +grave and one at the inner Boorah ring, I think perhaps we are wrong. +When a man invokes aid on the eve of battle, or in his hour of danger +and need; when a woman croons over her baby an incantation to keep him +honest and true, and that he shall be spared in danger,--surely these +croonings are of the nature of prayers born of the same elementary +frame of mind as our more elaborate litanies." As an instance of the +croonings Mrs. Parker gives the mother's song over her baby as soon as +it begins to crawl:--- + + "Kind be, + Do not steal, + Do not touch what to another belongs, + Leave all such alone, + Kind be." + +{164} + +These instances may suffice to show that it would not have been safe to +infer, a year or two ago, from the fact that the Australians were not +known to pray, that therefore prayer was unknown to them. Indeed, we +may safely go farther and surmise that other instances besides those +noted really exist, though they have not been observed or if observed +have not been understood. Among the northern tribes of central +Australia rites are performed to secure food, just as they are +performed by the Dieri to avert drought. The Dieri rites are +accompanied by a prayer, as we have seen. The Kaitish rites to promote +the growth of grass are accompanied by the singing of words, which +"have no meaning known to the natives of the present day" (Spencer and +Gillen, _Northern Tribes_, p. 292). Amongst the Mara tribe the +rain-making rite consists simply in "singing" the water, drinking it +and spitting it out in all directions. In the Anula tribe "dugongs are +a favourite article of food," and if the natives desire to bring them +out from the rocks, they "can do so by 'singing' and throwing sticks at +the rocks" (_ib._, pp. 313, 314). It is reasonable to suppose that in +all these cases the "singing" is now merely a charm. But if we +remember that prayers, when {165} their meaning is forgotten, pass by +vain repetitions into mere charms, we may also reasonably suppose that +these Australian charms are degraded prayers; and we shall be confirmed +in this supposition to some extent by the fact that in the Kaitish +tribes the words sung "have no meaning known to the natives of the +present day." If the meaning has evaporated, the religion may have +evaporated with it. That the rites, of which the "singing" is an +essential part, have now become magical and are used and understood to +be practised purely to promote the supply of dugongs and other articles +of food, may be freely admitted; but it is unsafe to infer that the +purpose with which the rites continue to be practised is the whole of +the purpose with which they were originally performed. If the meaning +of the "singing" has passed entirely away, the meaning of the rites may +have suffered a change. At the present day the rite is understood to +increase the supply of dugongs or other articles of food. But it may +have been used originally for other purposes. Presumably rites of a +similar kind, certainly of some kind, are practised by the Australians +who have for their totem the blow-fly, the water-beetle, or the evening +star. But they do not {166} eat flies or beetles. Their original +purpose in choosing the evening star cannot have been to increase its +number. Nor can that have been the object of choosing the mosquito for +a totem. But if the object of the rites is not to increase the number +of mosquitoes, flies, and beetles, it need not in the first instance +have been the object with which the rites were celebrated in the case +of other totems. + +Let us now return to Professor Tylor's statement that "at low levels of +civilisation there are many races who distinctly admit the existence of +spirits, but are not certainly known to pray to them even in thought." +The number of those races who are not known to pray is being reduced, +as we have seen. And I think we may go even farther than that and say +that where the existence of spirits is not merely believed in, but is +utilised for the purpose of establishing permanent relations between a +community and a spirit, we may safely infer that the community offers +prayer to the spirit, even though the fact may have escaped the notice +of travellers. The reason why we may infer it is that at the lower +levels of civilisation we meet with religion, in Hoeffding's words, "in +the guise of desire." We may put the same truth in other words and say +that religion is {167} from the beginning practical. Such prayers as +are known to us to be put up by the lowest races are always practical: +they may be definite petitions for definite goods such as harvest or +rain or victory in time of war; or they may be general petitions such +as that of the Khonds: "We are ignorant of what it is good for us to +ask for. You know what is good for us. Give it us." But in any case +what the god of a community is there for is to promote the good of the +community. It is because the savage has petitions to put up that he +believes there are powers who can grant his petitions. Prayer is the +very root of religion. When the savage has taken every measure he +knows of to produce the result he desires, he then goes on to pray for +the rainfall he desires, crying out in a loud voice "the impoverished +state of the country and the half-starved condition of the tribe." It +is true that it is in moments of stress particularly, if not solely, +that the savage turns to his god--and the same may be said of many of +us--but it is with confidence and hope that he turns to him. If he had +no confidence and no hope, he would offer no prayers. But he has hope, +he has faith; and every time he prays his heart says, if his words do +not, "in Thee, Lord, do we put our trust." + +{168} + +That prayer is the essence, the very breath, of religion, without which +it dies, is shown by the fact that amongst the very lowest races of +mankind we find frequent traditions of the existence of a high god or +supreme being, the creator of the world and the father of mankind. The +numerous traces of this dying tradition have been collected by the +untiring energy and the unrivalled knowledge of Mr. Andrew Lang in his +book, _The Making of Religion_. In West Africa Dr. Nassau (_Fetichism +in West Africa_, pp. 36 ff.) "hundreds of times" (p. 37) has found that +"they know of a Being superior to themselves, of whom they themselves," +he says, "inform me that he is the Maker and the Father." What is +characteristic of the belief of the savages in this god is that, in Dr. +Nassau's words, "it is an accepted belief, but it does not often +influence their life. 'God is not in all their thought.' In practice +they give Him no worship." The belief is in fact a dying tradition; +and it is dying because prayer is not offered to this remote and +traditional god. I say that the belief is a dying tradition, and I say +so because its elements, which are all found present and active where a +community believes in, prays to, and worships the god of the community, +{169} are found partially, but only partially, present where the belief +survives but as a tradition. Thus, for instance, where the belief is +fully operative, the god of the community sanctions the morality of the +community; but sometimes where the belief has become merely +traditional, this traditional god is supposed to take no interest in +the community and exercises no ethical influence over the community. +Thus, in West Africa, Nyankupon is "ignored rather than worshipped." +In the Andaman Islands, on the other hand, where the god Puluga is +still angered by sin or wrong-doing, he is pitiful to those in pain or +distress and "sometimes deigns to afford relief" (Lang p. 212 quoting +_Man_, _J. A._ I., XII, 158). Again, where the belief in the god of +the community is fully operative, the occasions on which the prayers of +the community are offered are also the occasions on which sacrifice is +made. Where sacrifice and prayers are not offered, the belief may +still for a time survive, at it does among the Fuegians. They make no +sacrifice and, as far as is known, offer no prayers; but to kill a man +brings down the wrath of their god, the big man in the woods: "Rain +come down, snow come down, hail come down, wind blow, blow, very much +blow. {170} Very bad to kill man. Big man in woods no like it, he +very angry" (Lang, p. 188, quoting Fitzroy, II, 180). But when +sacrifice and prayer cease, the ultimate outcome is that which is found +amongst the West African natives, who, as Dr. Nassau tells us (p. 38), +say with regard to Anzam, whom they admit to be their Creator and +Father, "Why should we care for him? He does not help nor harm us. It +is the spirits who can harm us whom we fear and worship, and for whom +we care." Who the spirits are Dr. Nassau does not say, but they must +be either the other gods of the place or the fetich spirits. And the +reason why Anzam is no longer believed to help or harm the natives is +obviously that, from some cause or other, there is now no longer any +established form of worship of him. The community of which he was +originally the god may have broken up, or more probably may have been +broken up, with the result that the congregation which met to offer +prayer and sacrifice to Anzam was scattered; and the memory of him +alone survives. Nothing would be more natural, then, than that the +natives, when asked by Dr. Nassau, "Why do you not worship him?" (p. +38), should invent a reason, viz. that it is no use worshipping {171} +him now--the truth being that the form of worship has perished for +reasons now no longer present to the natives' mind. In any case, when +prayers cease to be offered--whether because the community is broken up +or because some new quarter is discovered to which prayers can be +offered with greater hope of success--when prayers, for any reason, do +cease to be offered to a god, the worship of him begins to cease also, +for the breath of life has departed from it. + +In this lecture, as my subject is primitive religion, I have made no +attempt to trace the history of prayer farther than the highest point +which it reaches in the lower levels of religion. That is the point +reached by the Khond prayer: "We are ignorant of what it is good to ask +for. You know what is good for us. Give it us." That is also the +highest point reached by the most religious mind amongst the ancient +Greeks: Socrates prayed the gods simply for things good, because the +gods knew best what is good (Xen., _Mem._, I, iii, 2). The general +impression left on one's mind by the prayers offered in this stage of +religious development is that man is here and the gods are--there. But +"there" is such a long way off. And yet, far off as it is, man {172} +never came to think it was so far off that the gods could not hear. +The possibility of man's entering into some sort of communication with +them was always present. Nay! more, a community of interests between +him and them was postulated: the gods were to promote the interests of +the community, and man was to serve the gods. On occasions when +sacrifice was made and prayer was offered, the worshippers entered into +the presence of God, and communion with Him was sought; but stress was +laid rather on the sacrifice offered than on the prayers sent up. The +communion at which animal sacrifice aimed may have been gross at times, +and at others mystic; but it was the sacrifice rather than the prayer +which accompanied it that was regarded as essential to the communion +desired, as the means of bridging the gap between man here and the gods +there. If, however, the gap was to be bridged, a new revelation was +necessary, one revealing the real nature of the sacrifice required by +God, and of the communion desired by man. And that revelation is made +in Our Lord's Prayer. With the most earnest and unfeigned desire to +use the theory of evolution as a means of ordering the facts of the +history of religion and of enabling {173} us--so far as it can enable +us--to understand them, one is bound to notice as a fact that the +theory of evolution is unable to account for or explain the revelation, +made in Our Lord's Prayer, of the spirit which is both human and +divine. It is the beam of light which, when turned on the darkness of +the past, enables us to see whither man with his prayers and his +sacrifices had been blindly striving, the place where he fain would be. +It is the surest beacon the missionary can hold out to those who are +still in darkness and who show by the fact that they pray--if only for +rain, for harvest, and victory over all their enemies--that they are +battling with the darkness and that they have not turned entirely away +from the light of His countenance who is never at any time far from any +one of us. Their heart within them is ready to bear witness. Religion +is present in them, if only under "the guise of desire"; but it is "the +desire of all nations" for which they yearn. + +There are, Hoeffding says, "two tendencies in the nature of religious +feeling: on the one hand there is the need to collect and concentrate +ourselves, to resign ourselves, to feel ourselves supported and carried +by a power raised above all {174} struggle and opposition and beyond +all change. But within the religious consciousness another need makes +itself felt, the need of feeling that in the midst of the struggle we +have a fellow-struggler at our side, a fellow-struggler who knows from +his own experience what it is to suffer and meet resistance" (_The +Philosophy of Religion_, Sec. 54). Between these two tendencies Hoeffding +discovers an opposition or contradiction, an "antinomy of religious +feeling." But it is precisely because Christianity alone of all +religions recognises both needs that it transcends the antinomy. The +antinomy is indeed purely intellectual. Hoeffding himself says, "only +when recollection, collation, and comparison are possible do we +discover the opposition or the contradiction between the two +tendencies." And in saying that, inasmuch as recollection, collation, +and comparison are intellectual processes, he admits that the antinomy +is intellectual. That it is not an antinomy of religious feeling is +shown by the fact that the two needs exist, that is to say, are both +felt. To say _a priori_ that both cannot be satisfied is useless in +face of the fact that those who feel them find that Christianity +satisfies them. + + + + +{175} + +SACRIFICE + +In my last lecture I called attention to the fact that the subject of +prayer has been strangely neglected by the science of religion. +Religion, in whatever form it manifests itself, is essentially +practical; man desires to enter into communication or into communion +with his god, and in so doing he has a practical purpose in view. That +purpose may be to secure a material blessing of a particular kind, such +as victory in war or the enjoyment of the fruits of the earth in their +due season, or the purpose may be to offer thanks for a harvest and to +pray for a continuance of prosperity generally. Or the purpose of +prayer may be to ask for deliverance from material evils, such as +famine or plague. Or it may be to ask for deliverance from moral evils +and for power to do God's will. In a word, if man had no prayer to +make, the most powerful, if not the only, motive inciting him to seek +communion would be wanting. Now, to some of us it may seem _a priori_ +that there is no reason why the communion thus sought in {176} prayer +should require any external rite to sanction or condition it. If that +is our _a priori_ view, we shall be the more surprised to find that in +actual fact an external rite has always been felt to be essential; and +that rite has always been and still is sacrifice, in one or other of +its forms. Or, to put the same fact in another way, public worship has +been from the beginning the condition without which private worship +could not begin and without which private worship cannot continue. To +any form of religion, whatever it be, it is essential, if it is to be +religion, that there shall be a community of worshippers and a god +worshipped. The bond which unites the worshippers with one another and +with their god is religion. From the beginning the public worship in +which the worshippers have united has expressed itself in rites--rites +of sacrifice--and in the prayers of the community. To the end, the +prayers offered are prayers to "Our Father"; and if the worshipper is +spatially separated from, he is spiritually united to, his +fellow-worshippers even in private prayer. + +We may then recognise that prayer logically and ultimately implies +sacrifice in one or other of its senses; and that sacrifice as a rite +is meaningless and impossible without prayer. But if we recognise +{177} that sacrifice wherever it occurs implies prayer, then the fact +that the observers of savage or barbarous rites have described the +ritual acts of sacrifice, but have not observed or have neglected to +report the prayers implied, will not lead us into the error of +imagining that sacrifice is a rite which can exist--that it can have a +religious existence--without prayer. We may attend to either, the +sacrifice or to the prayer, as we may attend either to the concavity or +the convexity of a curve, but we may not deny the existence and +presence of the one because our attention happens to be concentrated on +the other. The relation in primitive religion of the one to the other +we may express by saying that prayer states the motive with which the +sacrifice is made, and that sacrifice is essential to the prayer, which +would not be efficacious without the sacrifice. The reason why a +community can address the god which it worships is that the god is felt +to be identified in some way with the community and to have its +interests in his charge and care. And the rite of sacrifice is felt to +make the identification more real. Prayer, again, is possible only to +the god to whom the community is known; with whom it is identified, +more or less; and with whom, when his help is required, the {178} +community seeks to identify itself more effectually. The means of that +identification without which the prayers of the community would be +ineffectual is sacrifice. The earliest form of sacrifice may probably +be taken to be the sacrifice of an animal, followed by a sacrificial +meal. Later, when the god has a stated place in which he is believed +to manifest himself,--tree or temple,--then the identification may be +effected by attaching offerings to the tree or temple. But in either +case what is sought by the offering dedicated or the meal of sacrifice +is in a word "incorporation." The worshippers desire to feel that they +are at one with the spirit whom they worship. And the desire to +experience this sense of union is particularly strong when plague or +famine makes it evident that some estrangement has taken place between +the god and the community which is normally in his care and under his +protection. The sacrifices and prayers that are offered in such a case +obviously do not open up communication for the first time between the +god and his tribe: they revive and reenforce a communion which is felt +to exist already, even though temporal misfortunes, such as drought or +famine, testify that it has been allowed by the tribe to become less +close than it ought to be, or that {179} it has been strained by +transgressions on the part of individual members of the community. But +it is not only in times of public distress that the community +approaches its god with sacrifice and prayer. It so happens that the +prayers offered for victory in war or for rain or for deliverance from +famine are instances of prayer of so marked a character that they have +forced themselves on the notice of travellers in all parts of the +world, from the Eskimo to the Australian black fellows or the negroes +of Africa. And it was to this class of prayers that I called your +attention principally in the last lecture. But they are, when we come +to think of it, essentially occasional prayers, prayers that are +offered at the great crises of tribal life, when the very existence of +the tribe is at stake. Such crises, however, by their very nature are +not regular or normal; and it would be an error to suppose that it is +only on these occasions that prayers are made by savage or barbarous +peoples. If we wish to discover the earliest form of regularly +recurring public worship, we must look for some regularly recurring +occasion for it. One such regularly recurring occasion is harvest +time, another is seed time, another is the annual ceremonial at which +the boys who {180} attain in the course of the year to the age of +manhood are initiated into the secrets or "mysteries" of the tribe. +These are the chief and perhaps the only regularly recurring occasions +of public worship as distinguished from the irregular crises of war, +pestilence, drought, and famine which affect the community as a whole, +and from the irregular occasions when the individual member of the +community prays for offspring or for delivery from sickness or for +success in the private undertaking in which he happens to be engaged. + +Of the regularly recurring occasions of public worship I will select, +to begin with, the rites which are associated with harvest time. And I +will do so partly because the science of religion provides us with very +definite particulars both as to the sacrifices and as to the prayers +which are usually made on these occasions; and partly because the +prayers that are made are of a special kind and throw a fresh light on +the nature of the communion that the tribe seeks to effect by means of +the sacrificial offering. + +At Saa, in the Solomon Islands, yams are offered, and the person +offering them cries in a loud voice, "This is yours to eat" (Frazer, +_G. B._^2, II, 465). In {181} the Society Islands the formula is, +"Here, Tari, I have brought you something to eat" (_ib._, 469). In +Indo-China, the invitation is the same: "Taste, O goddess, these +first-fruits which have just been reaped" (_ib._, 325). There are no +actually expressed words of thanks in these instances; but we may +safely conjecture that the offerings are thank-offerings and that the +feeling with which the offerings are made is one of gratitude and +thankfulness. Thus in Ceram we are told that first-fruits are offered +"as a token of gratitude" (_ib._, 463). On the Niger the Onitsha +formula is explicit: "I thank God for being permitted to eat the new +yam" (_ib._, 325). At Tjumba in the East Indies, "vessels filled with +rice are presented as a thank-offering to the gods" (_ib._, 462). The +people of Nias on these occasions offer thanks for the blessings +bestowed on them (_ib._, 463). By a very natural transition of thought +and feeling, thankfulness for past favours leads to prayer for the +continuance of favour in the future. Thus in Tana, in the New +Hebrides, the formula is: "Compassionate father! here is some food for +you; eat it; be kind to us on account of it" (_ib._, 464); while the +Basutos say: "Thank you, gods; give us bread to-morrow also" (_ib._, +459); and in Tonga the prayers {182} made at the offering of +first-fruits implore the protection of the gods, and beseech them for +welfare generally, though in especial for the fruits of the earth +(_ib._, 466). + +The prayers of primitive man which I quoted in my last lecture were in +the nature of petitions or requests, as was natural and indeed +inevitable in view of the fact that they were preferred on occasions +when the tribe was in exceptional distress and required the aid of the +gods on whose protection the community relied. But the prayers which I +have just quoted are not in their essence petitions or requests, even +though in some cases they tend to become so. They are essentially +prayers of thanksgiving and the offerings made are thank-offerings. +Thus our conception of primitive prayer must be extended to include +both mental attitudes--that of thankfulness for past or present +blessings as well as the hope of blessings yet to come. And inasmuch +as sacrifice is the concomitant of prayer, we must recognise that +sacrificial offerings also serve as the expression of both mental +attitudes. And we must note that in the regularly recurring form of +public or tribal worship with which we are now dealing the dominant +feeling to which expression is given is {183} that of thankfulness. +The tribe seeks for communion with its god for the purpose of +expressing its thanks. Even the savage who simply says, "Here, Tari, I +have brought you something to eat," or, still more curtly, "This is +yours to eat," is expressing thanks, albeit in savage fashion. And the +means which the savage adopts for securing that communion which he +seeks to renew regularly with the tribal god is a sacrificial meal, of +which the god and his worshippers partake. Throughout the whole +ceremony, whether we regard the spoken words or the acts performed, +there is no suggestion of magic and no possibility of twisting the +ceremony into a piece of magic intended to produce some desired result +or to exercise any constraint over the powers to which the ceremony is +addressed. The mental attitude is that of thankfulness. + +Now, it is, I venture to suggest, impossible to dissociate from the +first-fruits ceremonials which I have described the ceremonies observed +by Australian black fellows on similar occasions. And it is also +impossible to overlook the differences between the ceremony in +Australia and the ceremony elsewhere. In Australia, as elsewhere, when +the time of year arrives at which the food becomes fit for eating, +{184} a ceremony has to be performed before custom permits the food to +be eaten freely. In Australia, as elsewhere, a ceremonial eating, a +sacramental meal, has to take place. But whereas elsewhere the god of +the community is expressly invited to partake of the sacramental meal, +even though he be not mentioned by name and though the invitation take +the curt form of "This is yours to eat," in Australia no words whatever +are spoken; the person who performs the ceremony performs it indeed +with every indication of reverential feeling, he eats solemnly and +sparingly, that is to say formally and because the eating is a matter +of ritual, but no reference is made by him so far as we know, to any +god. How then are we to explain the absence of any such reference? +There seems to me to be only one explanation which is reasonably +possible. It is that in the Australian ceremony, which would be +perfectly intelligible and perfectly in line with the ceremony as it +occurs everywhere else, the reference to the god who is or was invited +to partake of the first-fruits has in the process of time and, we must +add, in the course of religious decay, gradually dropped out. The +invitation may never have been more ample than the curt form, "This is +yours to eat." Even in the {185} absence of any verbal invitation +whatever, a gesture may long have sufficed to indicate what was in the +mind and was implied by the act of the savage performing the ceremony. +Words may not have been felt necessary to explain what every person +present at the ceremony knew to be the purpose of the rite. But in the +absence of any verbal formula whatever the purpose and meaning of the +rite would be apt to pass out of mind, to evaporate, even though custom +maintained, as it does in Australia to this day maintain, the punctual +and punctilious performance of the outward ceremony. I suggest, +therefore, that in Australia, as elsewhere, the solemn eating of the +first-fruits has been a sacramental meal of which both the god and his +worshippers were partakers. The alternative is to my mind much less +probable: it is to use the Australian ceremony as it now exists to +explain the origin of the ceremony as we find it elsewhere. In +Australia it is not now apparently associated with the worship of any +god; therefore it may be argued in other countries also it was not +originally part of the worship of any god either. If, then, it was not +an act of public worship originally, how are we to understand it? The +suggestion is that the fruits of the earth or the animals which become +the food of {186} man are, until they become fit for eating, regarded +as sacred or taboo, and therefore may not be eaten. That suggestion +derives some support from the fact that in Australia anything that is +eaten may be a totem and being a totem is taboo. But if it is thus +sacred, then in order to be eaten it must be "desacralised," the taboo +must be taken off. And it is suggested that that precisely is what is +effected by the ceremonial eating of the totem by the headman of the +totem clan: the totem is desacralised by the mere fact that it is +formally and ceremonially eaten by the headman, after which it may be +consumed by others as an ordinary article of food. But this +explanation of the first-fruits ceremony is based upon an assumption +which is contrary to the facts of the case as it occurs in Australia. +It assumes that the plant or the animal until desacralised is taboo to +all members of the tribe, and that none of them can eat it until it has +been desacralised by the ceremonial eating. But the assumption is +false; the plant or animal is sacred and taboo only to members of the +clan whose totem it is. It is not sacred to the vast majority of the +tribe, for they have totems of their own; to them it is not sacred or +taboo, they may kill it--and they do--without breaking any taboo. The +ceremonial {187} eating of the first-fruits raises no taboo as far as +the tribe generally is concerned, for the plant or animal is not taboo +to them. As far as the tribe generally is concerned, no process of +desacralisation takes place and none is effected by the ceremonial +eating. It is the particular totem group alone which is affected by +the ceremony; and the inference which it seems to me preferable to draw +is that the ceremonial eating of the first-fruits is, or rather has +been, in Australia what it is elsewhere, viz. an instance of prayer and +sacrifice in which the worshippers of a god are brought into +periodic--in this case annual--communion with their god. The +difference between the Australian case and others seems to be that in +the other cases the god who partakes of the first-fruits is the god of +the whole community, while in Australia he is the god of the particular +totem group and is analogous to the family gods who are worshipped +elsewhere, even where there is a tribal or national god to be +worshipped as well. + +We are then inclined, for these and other reasons, to explain the +ceremonial eating of the totem plant or animal in Australia by the +analogy of the ceremonial eating of first-fruits elsewhere, and to +regard the ceremony as being in all cases an act of worship, {188} in +which at harvest time the worshippers of a god seek communion with him +by means of sacrifice and prayers of thanksgiving. But if we take this +view of the sacrifice and prayers offered at harvest time, we shall be +inclined to regard the rites which are performed at seed time, or the +period analogous to it, as being also possibly, in part, of a religious +character. In the case of agricultural peoples it is beyond doubt that +some of the ceremonies are religious in character: where the food plant +is itself regarded as a deity or the mode in which a deity is +manifested, not only may there be at harvest time a sacramental meal in +which, as amongst the Aztecs, the deity is formally "communicated" to +his worshippers, but at seed time sacrifice and prayer may be made to +the deity. Such a religious ceremony, whatever be the degree of +civilisation or semicivilisation which has been reached by those who +observe the ceremony, does not of course take the place of the +agricultural operations which are necessary if the fruits are to be +produced in due season. And the combination of the religious rites and +the agricultural operations does not convert the agricultural +operations into magical operations, or prove that the religious rites +are merely pieces of magic {189} intended to constrain the superior +power of the deity concerned. Indeed, if among the operations +performed at seed time we find some that from the point of view of +modern science are perfectly ineffectual, as vain as eating tiger to +make you bold, we shall be justified in regarding them as pieces of +primitive science, eventually discarded indeed in the progress of +advancing knowledge, but originally practised (on the principle that +like produces like) as the natural means of producing the effect +desired. If we so regard them, we shall escape the error of +considering them to be magical; and we shall have no difficulty in +distinguishing them from the religious rites which may be combined with +them. Further, where harvest time is marked by the offering of +sacrifice and prayers of thanksgiving, we may not unreasonably take it +that the religious rites observed at seed time or the period analogous +to it are in the nature of sacrifice and prayers addressed to the +appropriate deity to beseech him to favour the growth of the plant or +animal in question. In a word, the practice of giving thanks to a god +at harvest time for the harvest creates a reasonable presumption that +prayer is offered to him at seed time; and if thanks are given at a +period analogous to {190} harvest time by a people like the Australian +black fellows, who have no domesticated plants or animals, prayers of +the nature of petitions may be offered by them at the period analogous +to seed time. + +The deity to whom prayers are offered at the one period and +thanksgiving is made at the other may be, as in the case of the Aztec +Xilonen, or the Hindoo Maize-mother, the spirit of the plant envisaged +as a deity; or may be, not a "departmental" deity of this kind, but a +supreme deity having power over all things. But when we turn from the +regularly recurring acts of public worship connected with seed time and +harvest to the regularly recurring ceremonies at which the boys of a +tribe are initiated into the duties and rights of manhood, it is +obvious that the deity concerned in them, even if we assume (as is by +no means necessary) that he was originally "departmental" and at first +connected merely with the growth of a plant or animal, must be regarded +at the initiation ceremonies as a god having in his care all the +interests of that tribe of which the boys to be initiated are about to +become full members. Unmistakable traces of such a deity are found +amongst the Australian black fellows in the "father of all," "the +all-father" described by Mr. Howitt. The {191} worship of the +"all-father" is indeed now of a fragmentary kind; but it fortunately +happens that in the case of one tribe, the Euahlayi, we have evidence, +rescued by Mrs. Langloh Parker, to show that prayer is offered to +Byamee; the Euahlayi pray to him for long life, because they have kept +his law. The nature of Byamee's law may safely be inferred from the +fact that at this festival, both amongst the Euahlayi and other +Australians, the boys who are being initiated are taught the moral laws +or the customary morality of the tribe. But though prayers are still +offered by the Euahlayi and may have at one time been offered by all +the Australian tribes, there is no evidence at present to show that the +prayer is accompanied by a sacrifice, as is customary amongst tribes +whose worship has not disintegrated so much as is the case amongst the +Australians. + +The ceremonies by which boys are admitted to the status of manhood are, +probably amongst all the peoples of the earth who observe them, of a +religious character, for the simple reason that the community to which +the boy is admitted when he attains the age of manhood is a community, +united together by religious bonds as a community worshipping the same +god or gods; and it is to the {192} worship and the service of these +gods that he is admitted. But the ceremonies themselves vary too much +to allow of our drawing from them any valuable or important conclusion +as to the nature and import of sacrifice as a religious institution. +On the other hand, the ceremonies observed at harvest time, or the +analogous period, have, wherever they occur, such marked similarity +among themselves, and the institution of prayer and sacrifice is such a +prominent feature in them, that the evidence they afford must be +decisive for us in attempting to form a theory of sacrifice. Nor can +we dissociate the ceremonies observed in spring from the harvest +ceremonies; as Dr. Frazer remarks (_G. B._, II, 190), "Plainly these +spring and harvest customs are based on the same ancient modes of +thought and form parts of the same primitive heathendom." What, then, +are these "ancient modes of thought" and what the primitive customs +based upon them? We may, I think, classify them in four groups. If we +are to take first those instances in which the "ancient mode of +thought" is most clearly expressed--whether because they are the most +fully developed or because they retain the ancient mode most faithfully +and with the least disintegration--we must {193} turn to ancient Mexico +and Peru. In Mexico a paste idol or dough image of the god was made; +the priest hurled a dart into its breast; and this was called the +killing of the god, "so that his body might be eaten." The dough image +was broken and the pieces were given in the manner of a communion to +the people, "who received it with such tears, fear, and reverence, as +it was an admirable thing," says Father Acosta, "saying that they did +eat the flesh and bones of God." Or, again, an image of the goddess +Chicomecoatl was made of dough and exhibited by the priest, saying, +"This is your god." All kinds of maize, beans, etc., were offered to +it and then were eaten in the temple "in a general scramble, take who +could." In Peru ears of maize were dressed in rich garments and +worshipped as the Mother of the Maize; or little loaves of maize +mingled with the blood of sheep were made; the priest gave to each of +the people a morsel of these loaves, "and all did receive and eat these +pieces," and prayed that the god "would show them favour, granting them +children and happy years and abundance and all that they required." In +this, the first group of instances, it is plain beyond all possibility +of gainsaying that the spring and harvest customs consist {194} of the +worship of a god, of sacrifice and prayers to him, and of a communion +which bound the worshippers to one another and to him. + +Our second group of instances consists of cases in which the corn or +dough or paste is not indeed made into the form or image of a god, but, +as Dr. Frazer says (_G. B._ II, 318), "the new corn is itself eaten +sacramentally, that is, as the body of the corn spirit." The spirit +thus worshipped may not yet have acquired a proper name; the only +designation used may have been such a one as the Hindoo Bhogaldai, +meaning simply Cotton-mother. Indeed, even amongst the Peruvians, the +goddess had not yet acquired a proper name, but was known only as the +Mother of the Maize. But precisely because the stage illustrated in +our second group of instances is not so highly developed as in Mexico +or Peru it is much more widely spread. It is found in the East Indian +island of Euro, amongst the Alfoors of Minahassa, in the Celebes, in +the Neilgherry Hills of South India, in the Hindoo Koosh, in +Indo-China, on the Niger, amongst the Zulus and the Pondos, and amongst +the Creek, Seminole, and Natchez Indians (_ib._ 321-342). In this, the +second group of instances, then, though the god {195} may have no +special, proper, name, and though no image of him is made out of the +dough or paste, still "the new corn is itself eaten sacramentally, that +is as the body of the corn spirit"; by means of the sacramental eating, +of sacrifice and prayer, communion between the god and his worshippers +is renewed and maintained. + +The third group of instances consists of the harvest customs of +northern Europe--the harvest supper and the rites of the Corn-mother or +the Corn-maiden or the Kern Baby. It can scarcely be contended that +these rites and customs, so far as they survive at the present day, +retain, if they ever had, any religious value; they are performed as a +matter of tradition and custom and not because any one knows why they +are performed. But that they originally had a meaning--even though now +it has evaporated--cannot be doubted. Nor can it be doubted that the +meaning, if it is to be recovered, must be recovered by means of the +comparative method. And, if the comparative method is to be applied, +the Corn-mother of northern Europe cannot be dissociated from the +Maize-mother of ancient Peru. But if we go thus far, then we must, +with Dr. Frazer (_ib._ 288), recognise "clearly the {196} sacramental +character of the harvest-supper," in which, "as a substitute for the +real flesh of the divine being, bread and dumplings are made and eaten +sacramentally." Thus, once more, harvest customs testify in northern +Europe, as elsewhere, to the fact that there was once a stated, annual, +period at which communion between the god and his worshipper was sought +by prayer and sacrifice. + +The North-European harvest customs are further interesting and +important because, if they are clearly connected on the one hand with +the groups of instances already given, they are also connected on the +other with the group to which we have yet to call attention. Thus far +the wheat or maize, if not eaten in the form of little loaves or cakes, +has been made into a dough image, or else the ears of maize have been +dressed in rich garments to indicate that they represent the Mother of +the Maize; and in Europe also both forms of symbolism are found. But +in northern Europe, the corn spirit is also believed to be manifested, +Dr. Frazer says, in "the animal which is present in the corn and is +caught or killed in the last sheaf." The animal may be a wolf, dog, +cock, hare, cat, goat, bull, cow, horse, or pig. "The animal is slain +and its flesh and blood are partaken {197} of by the harvesters," and, +Dr. Frazer says, "these customs bring out clearly the sacramental +character of the harvest supper." Now, this manifestation of the corn +spirit in animal form is not confined to Europe; it occurs for instance +in Guinea and in all the provinces and districts of China. And it is +important as forming a link between the agricultural and the +pre-agricultural periods; in Dr. Frazer's words, "hunting and pastoral +tribes, as well as agricultural peoples, have been in the habit of +killing their gods" (_ib._ 366). In the pastoral period, as well as in +agricultural times, the god who is worshipped by the tribe and with +whom the tribe seeks communion by means of prayer and sacrifice, may +manifest himself in animal form, and "the animal is slain and its flesh +and blood are partaken of." + +We now come to the fourth and the last of our groups of instances. It +consists of the rites observed by Australian tribes. Amongst these +tribes too there is what Dr. Frazer terms "a sacramental eating" of the +totem plant or animal. Thus Central Australian black men of the +kangaroo totem eat a little kangaroo flesh, as a sacrament (Spencer and +Gillen, p. 204 ff.). Now, it is impossible, I think, to {198} +dissociate the Australian rite, to separate this fourth group, from the +three groups already described. In Australia, as in the other cases, +the customs are observed in spring and harvest time, and in harvest +time, in Australia as well as elsewhere, there is a solemn and sparing +eating of the plant or animal; and, in Dr. Frazer's words, "plainly +these spring and harvest customs are based on the same ancient modes of +thought, and form part of the same primitive heathendom." What, then, +is this ancient and primitive mode of thought? In all the cases except +the Australian, the thought manifestly implied and expressed is that by +the solemn eating of the plant or the animal, or the dough image or +paste idol, or the little loaves, the community enters into communion +with its god, or renews communion with him. On this occasion the +Peruvians prayed for children, happy years and abundance. On this +occasion, even among the Australians, the Euahlayi tribe pray for long +life, because they have kept Byamee's law. It would not, therefore, be +unreasonable to interpret the Australian custom by the same ancient +mode of thought which explains the custom wherever else--and that is +all over the world--it is found. But perhaps, if we can find some +other interpretation {199} of the Australian custom, we should do +better to reverse the process and explain the spring and harvest +customs which are found elsewhere by means of, and in accordance with, +the Australian custom. Now another interpretation of the Australian +custom has been put forward by Dr. Frazer. He treats the Australian +ceremony as being a piece of pure magic, the purpose of which is to +promote the growth and increase of the plants and animals which provide +the black fellows with food. But if we start from this point of view, +we must go further and say that amongst other peoples than the +Australian the killing of the representative animal of the spirit of +vegetation is, in Dr. Frazer's words, "a magical rite intended to +assure the revival of nature in spring." And if that is the nature of +the rite which appears in northern Europe as the harvest supper, it +will also be the nature of the rite as it appears both in our second +group of instances, where the corn is eaten "as the body of the +corn-spirit," and in the first group, where the dough image or paste +idol was eaten in Mexico as the flesh and bones of the god. That this +line of thought runs through Dr. Frazer's _Golden Bough_, in its second +edition, is indicated by the fact that the rite is spoken of throughout +as a {200} sacrament. That the Mexican rite as described in our first +group is sacramental, is clear. Of the rites which form our second +group of instances, Dr. Frazer says that the corn-spirit, or god, "is +killed in the person of his representative and eaten sacramentally," +and that "the new corn is itself eaten sacramentally; that is, as the +body of the corn-spirit" (p. 318). Of the North European rites, again, +he says, "the animal is slain and its flesh and blood are partaken of +by the harvesters"--"these customs bring out clearly the sacramental +character of the harvest supper"--"as a substitute for the real flesh +of the divine being, bread or dumplings are made in his image and eaten +sacramentally." Finally, even when speaking of the Australians as men +who have no gods to worship, and with whom the rite is pure and +unadulterated magic, he yet describes the rite as a sacrament. + +Now if, on the one hand, from its beginning amongst the Australians to +the form which it finally took amongst the Mexicans the rite is, as Dr. +Frazer systematically calls it, a sacrament; and if, on the other, it +is, in Dr. Frazer's words, "a magical rite intended to assure the +revival of nature in spring," then the conclusion which the reader +cannot help {201} drawing is that a sacrament, or this sacrament at +least, is in its origin, and in its nature throughout, a piece of +magic. Religion is but magic written in different characters; and for +those who can interpret them it spells the same thing. But though this +is the conclusion to which Dr. Frazer's argument leads, and to which in +the first edition of his _Golden Bough_ it clearly seemed to point; in +the preface to the second edition he formally disavows it. He +recognises that religion does not spring from magic, but is +fundamentally opposed to it. A sacrament, therefore, we may infer, +cannot be a piece of magic. The Australian sacrament, therefore, as +Dr. Frazer calls it, cannot, we should be inclined to say, be a piece +of magic. But Dr. Frazer still holds that the Australian rite or +sacrament is pure magic--religious it cannot be, for in Dr. Frazer's +view the Australians know no religion and have no gods. + +Now if the rite as it occurs in Australia is pure magic, and if +religion is not a variety of magic but fundamentally different from it, +then the rite which, as it occurs everywhere else, is religious, cannot +be derived from, or a variety of, the Australian piece of magic; and +the spring and harvest customs which are found in Australia cannot be +"based on the {202} same ancient modes of thought or form part of the +same primitive heathendom" as the sacramental rites which are found +everywhere else in the world. The solemn annual eating of the totem +plant or animal in Australia must have a totally different basis from +that on which the sacrament and communion stands in every other part of +the globe: in Australia it is based on magic, elsewhere on that which +is, according to Dr. Frazer, fundamentally different and opposed to +magic, viz. religion. Before, however, we commit ourselves to this +conclusion, we may be allowed to ask, What is it that compels us thus +to sever the Australian from the other forms of the rite? The reply +would seem to be that, whereas the other forms are admittedly +religious, the Australian is "a magical rite intended to assure the +revival of nature in spring." Now, if that were really the nature of +the Australian rite, we might have to accept the conclusion to which we +hesitate to commit ourselves. But, as a matter of fact, the Australian +rite is not intended to assure the revival of nature in spring, and has +nothing magical about it. It is perfectly true that in spring in +Australia certain proceedings are performed which are based upon the +principle that like produces like; and {203} that these proceedings +are, by students of the science of religion, termed--perhaps +incorrectly--magical. But these spring customs are quite different +from the harvest customs; and it is the harvest customs which +constitute the link between the rite in Australia and the rite in the +rest of the world. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the +Australian harvest rite is magical, or is even based on the principle +that like produces like. And the answer is that it is plainly not. +The harvest rite in Australia consists, as we know it now, simply in +the fact that at the appointed time a little of the totem plant or +animal is solemnly and sparingly eaten by the headman of the totem. +The solemnity with which the rite is performed is unmistakable, and may +well be termed religious. And no attempt even, so far as I am aware, +has been made to show that this solemn eating is regarded as magic by +the performers of the rite, or how it can be so regarded by students of +the science of religion. Until the attempt is made and made +successfully, we are more than justified in refusing to regard the rite +as magical; we are bound to refuse to regard it as such. But if the +rite is not magical--and _a fortiori_ if it is, as Dr. Frazer terms it, +sacramental--then it is {204} religious; and the ancient mode of +thought, forming part of primitive heathendom, which is at the base of +the rite, is the conviction that manifests itself wherever the rite +continues to live, viz. that by prayer and sacrifice the worshippers in +any community are brought into communion with the god they worship. +The rite is, in truth, what Dr. Frazer terms it as it occurs in +Australia--a sacrament. But not even in Australia is a sacrament a +piece of magic. + +In the animistic stage of the evolution of humanity, the only causes +man can conceive of are animated things; and, in the presence of any +occurrence sufficiently striking to arrest his attention, the questions +which present themselves to his mind are, Who did this thing, and why? +Occurrences which arrest the attention of the community are occurrences +which affect the community; and in a low stage of evolution, when the +most pressing of all practical questions is how to live, the +occurrences which most effectually arrest attention are those which +affect the food supply of the community. If, then, the food supply +fails, the occurrence is due to some of the personal, or +quasi-personal, powers by whom the community is surrounded; and the +reason why such power so acted is found in the wrath which {205} must +have actuated him. The situation is abnormal, for famine is abnormal; +and it indicates anger and wrath on the part of the power who brought +it about. But it also implies that when things go on in the normal +way,--when the relations between the spirit and the community are +normal,--the attitude of the spirit to the community is peaceable and +friendly. Not only, however, does the community desire to renew +peaceable and friendly relations, where pestilence or famine show that +they have been disturbed: the community also desires to benefit by them +when they are in their normal condition. The spirits that can disturb +the normal conditions by sending pestilence or famine can also assist +the community in undertakings, the success of which is indispensable if +the community is to maintain its existence; for instance, those +undertakings on which the food supply of the community depends. Hence +the petitions which are put up at seed time, or, in the +pre-agricultural period, at seasons analogous to seed time. Hence, +also, the rites at harvest time or the analogous season, rites which +are instituted and developed for the purpose of maintaining friendly +relation and communion between the community, and the spirit whose +favour {206} is sought and whose anger is dreaded by the community. +Such sacrificial rites may indeed be interpreted as the making of gifts +to the gods; and they do, as a matter of fact, often come so to be +regarded by those who perform them. From this undeniable fact the +inference may then be drawn, and by many students of the science of +religion it is inferred, that from the beginning there was in such +sacrificial rites no other intention than to bribe the god or to +purchase his favour and the good things he had to give. But the +inference, which, when properly limited, has some truth in it, becomes +misleading when put forward as being the whole truth. Unless there +were some truth in it, the rite of sacrifice could never have developed +into the form which was denounced by the Hebrew prophets and +mercilessly exposed by Plato. But had that been the whole truth, the +rite would have been incapable of discharging the really religious +function which it has in its history fulfilled. That function has been +to place and maintain the society which practises it in communion with +its god. Doubtless in the earliest stages of the history of the rite, +the communion thus felt to be established was prized and was mainly +sought for the external blessings which were believed {207} to follow +from it, or, as a means to avert the public disasters which a breach of +communion entailed. Doubtless it was only by degrees, and by slow +degrees, that the communion thus established came to be regarded as +being in itself the end which the rite of sacrifice was truly intended +to attain. But the communion of the worshippers with their god was not +a purpose originally foreign to the rite, and which, when introduced, +transformed the rite from what it at first was into something radically +different. On the contrary, it was present, even though not prominent +or predominant, from the beginning; and the rite, as a religious +institution, followed different lines of evolution, according as the +one aspect or the other was developed. Where the aspect under which +the sacrificial rite was regarded was that the offering was a gift made +to the deity in order to secure some specified temporal advantage, the +religious value of the rite diminished to the vanishing point in the +eyes both of those who, like Plato, could see the intrinsic absurdity +of pretending to make gifts to Him from whom alone all good things +come, and of those who felt that the sacrificial rite so conceived did +not afford the spiritual communion for which they yearned. Where even +the {208} sacrificial rite was regarded as a means whereby communion +between the worshipper and his god was attained or maintained, the +emphasis might be thrown on the rite and its due performance rather +than on the spiritual communion of which it was the condition. That is +to say, with the growth of formalism attention was concentrated on the +ritual and correspondingly withdrawn from the prayer which, from the +beginning, had been of the essence of the rite. By the rite of +sacrifice the community had always been brought into the presence of +the god it worshipped; and, in the prayers then offered on behalf of +the society, the society had been brought into communion with its god. +From that communion it was possible to fall away, even though the +performance of the rite was maintained. The very object of that +communion might be misinterpreted and mistaken to be a means merely to +temporal blessings for the community, or even to personal advantages +for the individual. Or the punctilious performance of each and every +detail of the rite might tend to become an end in itself and displace +the spiritual communion, the attainment of which had been from the +beginning the highest, even if not the only or the most prominent, +{209} end which the rite might subserve. The difference between the +possibilities which the rite might have realised and the actual +purposes for which it had come to be used before the birth of Christ is +a difference patent to the most casual observer of the facts. The +dissatisfaction felt alike by Plato and the Hebrew prophets with the +rite as it had come to be practised may be regarded, if we choose so to +regard it, as the necessary consequence of pre-existing facts, and as +necessarily entailing the rejection or the reconstitution of the rite. +As a matter of history, the rite was reconstituted and not rejected; +and as reconstituted it became the central fact of the Christian +religion. It became the means whereby, through Christ, all men might +be brought to God. We may say, if we will, that a new meaning was put +into the rite, or that its true meaning was now made manifest. The +facts themselves clearly indicate that from the beginning the rite was +the means whereby a society sought or might seek communion with its +god. They also indicate that the rite of animal sacrifice came to be +found insufficient as a means. It was through our Lord that mankind +learned what sacrifice was needed--learned to "offer and present unto +thee, O Lord, ourselves, our {210} souls and bodies, to be a +reasonable, holy and lively sacrifice unto thee." That is the +sacrifice Christ showed us the example of; that is the example which +the missionary devotes himself to follow and to teach. + + + + +{211} + +MORALITY + +In this lecture I propose to consider the question whether morality is +based on religion or religion on morality. It is a question which may +be approached from the point of view either of philosophy or of +history. Quite recently it has been treated from the former point of +view by Professor Hoeffding in _The Philosophy of Religion_ (translated +into English, 1906); and from the point of view of the history of +morality by Mr. Hobhouse in his _Morals in Evolution_ (1906). It may, +of course, also be quite properly approached from the point of view of +the history of religion; and from whatever standpoint it is treated, +the question is one of importance for the missionary, both because of +its intrinsic interest for the philosophy of religion, and because its +discussion is apt to proceed on a mistaken view of facts in the history +of religion. About those facts and their meaning, the missionary, who +is to be properly equipped for his work, should be in no doubt: a right +view and a proper estimate of the facts are essential both for {212} +his practical work and for the theoretical justification of his +position. + +One answer to the question before us is that morality is the basal +fact--the bottom fact: if we regard the question historically, we shall +find that morality came first and religion afterwards; and, even if +that were not so, we should find that as a matter of logic and +philosophy religion presupposes morality--religion may, for a time, be +the lever that moves the world, but it would be powerless if it had not +a fulcrum, and that fulcrum is morality. So long and so far as +religion operates beneficially on the world, it does so simply because +it supports and reenforces morality. But the time is not far distant, +and may even now be come, when morality no longer requires any support +from religion--and then religion becomes useless, nay! an encumbrance +which must either fall off or be lopped off. If, therefore, morality +can stand by itself, and all along has not merely stood by itself, but +has really upheld religion, in what is morality rooted? The answer is +that morality has its roots, not in the command that thou shalt love +the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all thy soul, but in human +solidarity, in humanity regarded as a spiritual whole. To {213} this +conclusion, it is said, the history of recent philosophy has steadily +been moving. If the movement had taken place in only one school of +philosophic thought, it might have been a movement running into a +side-track. But it is the direction taken by schools so different in +their presuppositions and their methods as that of Hegel and that of +Comte; and it is the undesigned coincidence of their tendency, which at +first could never have been surmised, that carries with it a conviction +of its correctness. Human solidarity, humanity regarded as a spiritual +whole, may be called, as Hegel calls it, self-conscious spirit; or you +may call it, as Comte calls it, the Mind of Humanity--it is but the +collective wisdom "of a common humanity with a common aim"; and, that +being so, morality is rooted, not in the will and the love of a +beneficent and omnipotent Providence, but in the self-realising spirit +in man setting up its "common aim" at morality. The very conception of +a beneficent and omnipotent God--having now done its work as an aid to +morality--must now be put aside, because it stands in the way of our +recognising what is the real spiritual whole, besides which there is +none other spirit, viz. the self-realising spirit in man. That spirit +is only realising; it is not yet {214} realised. It is in process of +realisation; and the conception of it, as in process of realisation, +enables it to be brought into harmony, or rather reveals its inner +harmony, with the notion of evolution. There is nothing outside +evolution, no being to whom evolution is presented as a spectacle or by +whom, as a process, it is directed. "Being itself," as Hoeffding says +(_Problems of Philosophy_, p. 136), "is to be conceived as in process +of becoming, of evolution." The spirit in man, as we have just said, +is the real spiritual whole, and it is self-realising; it is evolving +and progressing both morally and rationally. In Hoeffding's words +"Being itself becomes more rational than before" (_ib._, p. 137). +"Being itself is not ready-made but still incomplete, and rather to be +conceived as a continual becoming, like the individual personality and +like knowledge" (_ib._, p. 120). We may say, then, that being is +becoming rationalised and moralised as and because the spirit in man +realises itself. For a time the process of moralisation and +self-realisation was worked by and through the conception of a +beneficent and omnipotent god. That conception was, it would seem, a +hypothesis, valuable as long it was a working hypothesis, but to be +cast aside now that humanitarianism is found {215} more adequate to the +facts and more in harmony with the consistent application of the theory +of evolution. We have, then, to consider whether it is adequate to the +facts, whether, when we regard the facts of the history of religion, we +do find that morality comes first and religion later. + +"What," Mr. Hobhouse enquires in his _Morals in Evolution_ (II, 74), +"What is the ethical character of early religion?" and his reply is +that "in the first stage we find that spirits, as such, are not +concerned with morality." That was also the answer which had +previously been given by Professor Hoeffding, who says in his +_Philosophy of Religion_: "in the lowest forms of it ... religion +cannot be said to have any ethical significance" (p. 323). Originally, +the gods were "purely natural forces which could be defied or evaded," +though eventually they "became ethical powers whom men neither could +nor wished to defy" (p. 324). This first stage of early religion seems +on the terms of the hypothesis to be supposed to be found in the period +of animism and fetichism; and "the primitive conception of spirit" is, +Mr. Hobhouse says (II, 16), of something "feeling and thinking like a +rather stupid man, and open like him to supplication, exhortation, or +intimidation." If {216} that is so, then Professor Hoeffding may be +justified in saying that in the lowest forms of religion "the gods +appear as powers on which man is dependent, but not as patterns of +conduct or administrators of an ethical world order" (p. 324). Now, in +the period termed animistic because inanimate things are supposed to be +animated and actuated by spirits, it may be that many or most of such +spirits are supposed to feel and think like a rather stupid man, and +therefore to be capable of being cajoled, deluded, intimidated, and +castigated by the human being who desires to make use of them. But it +is not all such spirits that are worshipped then. Indeed, it is +impossible, Mr. Hobhouse says (II, 15), that any such spirit could be +"an object of worship in our sense of the term." Worship implies the +superiority of the object worshipped to the person worshipping. But, +though not an object of worship in our sense of the term, the spirit +that could be deluded, intimidated, and castigated was, according to +Mr. Hobhouse, "the object of a religious cult" on the part of the man +who believed that he could and did intimidate and castigate the spirit. +Probably, however, most students of the science of religion would agree +that a cult which included or {217} allowed intimidation and +castigation of the object of the cult was as little entitled to be +termed religious as it is to be called worship. In the period of +animism, then, either there was no religious cult, no worship in our +sense of the term; or, if there was religion, then the spirit +worshipped was worshipped as a being higher than man. Whether man has +at any time been without religion is a question on which there is here +no need to enter. The allegation we are now considering is that +whenever religion does appear, then in its first and earliest stage it +is not concerned with morality; and the ground for that allegation is +that the spirits of the animistic period have nothing to do with +morality or conduct. Now, it may be that these spirits which animate +inanimate things are not concerned with morality; but then neither are +they worshipped, nor is the relation between them and man religious. +Religion implies a god; and a spirit to be a god must have worshippers, +a community of worshippers--whether that community be a nation, a +tribe, or a family. Further, it is as the protector of the interests +of that community--however small--that the god is worshipped by the +community. The indispensable condition of religion is the existence of +a community; {218} and from the beginning man must have lived in some +sort of community,--whether a family or a horde,--for the period of +helpless infancy is so long in the case of human beings that without +some sort of permanent community the race could not be perpetuated. +The indispensable condition of religion, therefore, has always existed +from the time when man was man. Further, whatever the form of +community in which man originally dwelt, it was only in the community +and by means of the community that the individual could exist--that is +to say, if the interest of any one individual conflicted or was +supposed to conflict with the interests of the community, then the +interests of the community must prevail, if the community was to exist. +Here, then, from the beginning we have the second condition +indispensable for the existence of religion, viz. the possibility that +the conduct of some member of the community might not be the conduct +required by the interests or supposed interests of the community, and +prescribed by the custom of the community. In the case of such +divergence of interests and conduct, the being worshipped by the +community was necessarily, as being the god of the community, and +receiving the worship of the community, on the side {219} of the +community and against the member who violated the custom of the +community. But, at this period in the history of humanity, the +morality of the community was the custom of the community; and the god +of the community from the first necessarily upheld the custom, that is, +the morality of the community. Spirits "as such," that is to say, +spirits which animated inanimate things but which were not the +protectors of any human community, were, for the very reason that they +were not the gods of any community, "not concerned with morality." +Spirits, however, which were the protectors of a community necessarily +upheld the customs and therefore the morality of the community; they +were not "without ethical significance." It was an essential part of +the very conception of such spirits--of spirits standing in this +relation to the community--that they were "ethical powers." Hoeffding's +dictum that "the gods appear as powers on which man is dependent, but +not as patterns of conduct or administrators of an ethical world order" +(p. 323), overlooks the fact that in the earliest times not only are +gods powers on which man is dependent, but powers which enforce the +conduct required by the custom of the community and sanction the +ethical order as {220} far as it has then been revealed. The fact that +"the worship of the family, of the clan, or of the nation is shared in +by all," not merely "helps to nourish a feeling of solidarity which may +acquire ethical significance," as Hoeffding says (p. 325), it creates a +solidarity which otherwise would not exist. If there were no worship +shared in by all, there would be no religious solidarity; and, judging +from the very general, if not universal, occurrence of religion in the +lowest races as well as the highest, we may conjecture that without +religious solidarity a tribe found it hard or impossible to survive in +the struggle for existence. That religious solidarity however is not, +as Hoeffding suggests, something which may eventually "acquire ethical +significance"; it is in its essence and from the beginning the worship +of a god who punishes the community for the ethical transgression of +its members, because they are not merely violations of the custom of +the community, but offences against him. When Hoeffding says (p. 328) +"religious faith ... assumes an independent human ethic, which has, as +a matter of fact, developed historically under the practical influence +of the ethical feeling of man," he seems to overlook the fact that as a +matter of history human {221} ethics have always been based--rightly or +wrongly--on religious faith, that moral transgressions have always been +regarded as not merely wrongs done to a man's neighbour, but also as +offences against the god or gods of the community, that the person +suffering from foul wrong for which he can get no human redress has +always appealed from man to God, and that the remorse of the wrong-doer +who has evaded human punishment has always taken shape in the fear of +what God may yet do. + +Those who desire to prove that at the present day morality can exist +apart from religion, and that in the future it will do so, finding its +basis in humanitarianism and not in religion, are moved to show that as +a matter of historic fact religion and morality have been things apart. +We have examined the assertion that religion in its lowest forms is not +concerned with morality; and we have attempted to show that the god of +a community, or the spirit worshipped by a community, is necessarily a +being conceived as concerned with the interests of the community and as +hostile to those who violate the customs--which is to transgress the +morality--of the community. But even if this be admitted, it may still +be said that it does not in the least disprove the assertion that {222} +morality existed before religion did. The theory we are examining +freely admits that religion is supposed, in certain stages of the +history of humanity, to reenforce morality and to be necessary in the +interest of morals, though eventually it is found that morality needs +no such support; and not only needs now no such support but never did +need it; and the fact that it did not need it is shown by demonstrating +the existence of morality before religion existed. If, then, it be +admitted that religion from the moment it first appeared reenforced +morality, and did not pass through a non-moral period first, still +morality may have existed before religion was evolved, and must have so +existed if morality and religion are things essentially apart. What +evidence then is there on the point? We find Mr. Hobhouse saying (I, +80) that "at almost, if not quite, the lowest stages" of human +development there are "certain actions which are resented as involving +the community as a whole in misfortune and danger. These include, +besides actual treason, conduct which brings upon the people the wrath +of God, or of certain spirits, or which violates some mighty and +mysterious taboo. The actions most frequently regarded in this light +are certain breaches of the marriage law and witchcraft." {223} These +offences, we are told (_ib._, 82), endanger the community itself, and +the punishment is "prompted by the sense of a danger to the whole +community." Here, then, from the beginning we find that offences +against the common good are punished, not simply as such, but as +misconduct bringing on the community, and not merely on the offender, +the wrath of gods or spirits. In other words--Mr. Hobhouse's words, p. +119--"in the evolution of public justice, we find that at the outset +the community interferes mainly on what we may call supernatural +grounds only with actions which are regarded as endangering its own +existence." We may then fairly say that if the community inflicts +punishments mainly on supernatural grounds from the time when the +evolution of public justice first begins, then morality from its very +beginning was reenforced--indeed prompted--by religion. The morality +was indeed only the custom of the community; but violation of the +custom was from the beginning regarded as a religious offence and was +punished on supernatural grounds. + +The view that morality and religion are essentially distinct, that +morality not only can stand alone, without support from religion, but +has in reality always stood without such support--however much {224} +the fact has been obscured by religious prepossessions--this view +receives striking confirmation from the current and generally accepted +theory of the origin and nature of justice. That theory traces the +origin of justice back to the feeling of resentment experienced by the +individual against the particular cause of his pain (Westermarck, +_Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas_, I, 22). Resentment leads +to retaliation and takes the form of revenge. Vengeance, at first +executed by the person injured (or by his kin, if he be killed), comes +eventually, if slowly, to be taken out of the hands of the person +injured or his avengers, and to be exercised by the State in the +interests of the community and in furtherance, not of revenge, but of +justice and the good of society. Thus not only the origin of justice, +but the whole course of its growth and development, is entirely +independent of religion and religious considerations. Throughout, the +individual and society are the only parties involved; the gods do not +appear--or, if they do appear, they are intrusive and superfluous. If +this be the true view of the history and nature of justice, it may--and +probably must--be the truth about the whole of morality and not only +about justice. We have but {225} to follow Dr. Westermarck (_ib._, p. +21) in grouping the moral emotions under the two heads of emotions of +approval and emotions of disapproval, we have but to note with him that +both groups belong to the class of retributive emotions, and we see +that the origin and history of justice are typical of the origin and +history of morals: morality in general, just as much as justice in +particular, both originates independently of religion and +developes--where moral progress is made--independently of religion. + +Let us now proceed to examine this view of the relation of religion and +morality and to consider whether their absolute independence of each +other is historic fact. It traces back justice to the feeling of +resentment experienced by the individual; but if the individual ever +existed by himself and apart from society, there could neither then be +justice nor anything analogous to justice, for justice implies, not +merely a plurality of individuals, but a society; it is a social +virtue. The individual existing by himself and apart from society is +not a historic fact but an impossible abstraction--a conception +essentially false because it expresses something which neither exists +nor has existed nor could possibly {226} exist. The origin of +justice--or of any virtue--cannot be found in the impossible and +self-contradictory conception of the individual existing apart from +society; it cannot be found in a mere plurality of such individuals: it +can only be found in a society--whether that society have the +organisation of a family, a tribe, or a nation. Justice in particular +and morality in general, like religion, imply the existence of a +society; neither is a merely individual affair. Justice is, as Mr. +Hobhouse states, "public action taken for the sake of public safety" +(I, 83): it is, from the outset of its history, public action; and back +of that we cannot go, for the individual did not, as a matter of +history, exist before society, and could not so have existed. + +In the next place, justice is not the resentment of any individual, it +is the sentiment of the community expressing itself in public action, +taken not for the sake of any individual, but for the sake of public +safety. Its object from the beginning is not the gratification of +individual resentment, but the safety and welfare of the community +which takes common action. Proof of this, if proof were needed, would +be found in the fact that the existence of the individual, as such, is +not recognised. Not only does {227} the community which has suffered +in the wrong done to any of its members take action as a community; it +proceeds, not against the individual who has inflicted the wrong, but +against the community to which he belongs. "The wrong done," is, as +Mr. Hobhouse says (I, 91), "the act of the family or clan and may be +avenged on any member of that family or clan." There is collective +responsibility for the wrong done, just as there is collective +responsibility for righting it. + +If, now, we enquire, What are the earliest offences against which +public action is taken? and why? we may remember that Mr. Hobhouse has +stated them to be witchcraft and breaches of the marriage law; and that +the punishment of those offences corresponds, as he has said, "roughly +to our own administration of justice" (I, 81). Now, in the case of +breaches of the marriage laws--mating with a cousin on the mother's +side instead of with a cousin on the father's side, marrying into a +forbidden class--it is obvious that there is no individual who has +suffered injury and that there is no individual to experience +resentment. It is the community that suffers or is expected to suffer; +and it expects to suffer, because it, in the person of one of its {228} +members, has offended. Collectively it is responsible for the misdeeds +of its members. Whom, then, has it offended? To whom is it +responsible? Who will visit it with punishment, unless it makes haste +to set itself right? The answer given by a certain tribe of the Sea +Dyaks makes the matter clear: they, Mr. St. John tells us in his _Life +in the Forests of the Far East_ (I, 63, quoted by Westermarck, I, 49), +"are of opinion that an unmarried girl proving with child must be +offensive to the superior powers, who, instead of always chastising the +individual, punish the tribe by misfortunes happening to its members. +They therefore on the discovery of the pregnancy fine the lovers, and +sacrifice a pig to propitiate offended heaven, and to avert that +sickness or those misfortunes that might otherwise follow." That is, +of course, only one instance. But we may safely say that the marriage +law is generally ascribed to the ordinance of the gods, even in the +lowest tribes, and that breaches of it are offences against heaven. It +is unnecessary to prove, it need only be mentioned, that witchcraft is +conspicuously offensive to the religious sentiment, and is punished as +an offence against the god or gods. When, then, we consider the origin +and nature of justice, not from {229} an abstract and _a priori_ point +of view, but in the light of historic fact, so far from finding that it +originates and operates in complete independence of religion, we +discover that from the beginning the offences with which the justice of +the primitive community deals are offences, not against the community, +but against heaven. "In the evolution of public justice," as Mr. +Hobhouse says, "at the outset the community interferes mainly on what +we may call supernatural grounds." From the beginning misdeeds are +punished, not merely as wrongs done to society, but as wrong done to +the gods and as wrong-doing for which the community collectively is +responsible to the gods. Justice from the beginning is not individual +resentment, but "public action taken for the public safety." It is +not, as Mr. Hobhouse calls it, "revenge guided and limited by custom." +It is the customary action of the community taken to avert divine +vengeance. The action taken assumes in extreme cases the form of the +death penalty; but its usual form of action is that of taboo. + +If the origin of justice is to be sought in something that is not +justice, if justice in particular and morality in general are to be +treated as having been evolved out of something which was in a way +different {230} from them and yet in a way must have contained them, +inasmuch as they came forth from it, we shall do well to look for that +something, not in the unhistorical, unreal abstraction of an imaginary +individual, apart from society, but in society itself when it is as yet +not clearly conscious of the justice and morality at work within it. +Such a stage in the development of society is, I think, to be discerned. + +We have seen that, "at almost, if not quite, the lowest stages" of +human development, there is something which, according to Mr. Hobhouse, +corresponds "roughly to our own administration of justice" (I, 81). +But this rough justice implies conscious, deliberate action on the part +of the community. It implies that the community as such makes some +sort of enquiry into what can be the cause of the misfortunes which are +befalling it; and that, having found out the person responsible, it +deliberately takes the steps it deems necessary for putting itself +right with the supernatural power that has sent the sickness or famine. +Now, such conscious, purposive, deliberate action may and probably does +take place at almost the lowest stage of development of society; but +not, we may surmise, at quite the lowest. What eventually is done +{231} consciously and deliberately is probably done in the first place +much more summarily and automatically. And--in quite the lowest stage +of social development--it is by means of the action of taboo that +summary and automatic punishment for breaches of the custom of the +community is inflicted. Its action is automatic and immediate: merely +to come in contact with the forbidden thing is to become tabooed +yourself; and so great is the horror and dread of such contact, even if +made unwittingly, that it is capable of causing, when discovered, +death. Like the justice, however, of which it is the forerunner, it +does not result always in death, nor does it produce that effect in +most cases. But what it does do is to make the offender himself taboo +and as infectious as the thing that rendered him taboo. Here, too, the +action of taboo, in excommunicating the offender, anticipates, or +rather foreshadows, the action of justice when it excludes the guilty +person from the community and makes of him an outlaw. Again, in the +rough justice found at almost, though not quite, the lowest stages, the +earliest offences of which official notice, so to speak, is taken, are +offences for which the punishment--disease or famine, etc.--falls on +the community as a whole, because the {232} community, in the person of +one of its members, has offended as a whole against heaven. In the +earlier stage of feeling, also, which survives where taboo prevails, it +is the community as a whole which may be infected, and which must +suffer if the offender is allowed to spread the infection; it is the +community, as a whole, which is concerned to thrust out the guilty +person--every one shuns him because he is taboo. Thus, in this the +earliest stage, the offender against the custom of the community is +outlawed just as effectively as in later stages of social development. +But no formal sentence is pronounced; no meeting of the men or the +elders of the community is held to try the offender; no reason is given +or sought why the offence should thus be punished. The operation of +taboo is like that of the laws of nature: the man who eats poisonous +food dies with no reason given. A reason may eventually be found by +science, and is eventually discovered, though the process of discovery +is slow, and many mistakes are made, and many false reasons are given +before the true reason is found. So, too, the true reason for the +prohibition of many of the things, which the community feels to be +forbidden and pronounced to be taboo, is found, with the progress of +society--when it does {233} progress, which is not always--to be that +they are immoral and irreligious, though here, too, many mistakes are +made before true morality and true religion are found. But at the +outset no reason is given: the things are simply offensive to the +community and are tabooed as such. We, looking back at that stage in +the evolution of society, can see that amongst the things thus +offensive and tabooed are some which, in later stages, are equally +offensive, but are now forbidden for a reason that can be formulated +and given, viz. that they are offences against the law of morality and +the law of God. That reason, at the outset of society, may scarcely +have been consciously present to the mind of man: progress, in part at +least, has consisted in the discovery of the reasons of things. But +that man did from the beginning avoid some of the things which are +forbidden by morality and religion, and that those things were taboo to +him, is beyond the possibility of doubt. Nor can it be doubted that in +the prohibition and punishment of them there was inchoate justice and +inchoate religion. Such prohibition was due to the collective action +and expressed the collective feeling of the community as a whole. And +it is from such social action and feeling that {234} justice, I +suggest, has been evolved--not from the feeling of resentment +experienced by the individual as an individual. Personal resentment +and personal revenge may have stimulated justice to action. But, by +the hypothesis we have been examining, they were not justice. Neither +have they been transformed into justice: they still exist as something +distinct from justice and capable of perverting it. + +The form which justice takes in the period which is almost, but not +quite, the lowest stage of human evolution is the sense of the +collective responsibility of the community for all its actions, that is +to say, for the acts of all its members. And that responsibility in +its earliest shape is felt to be a responsibility to heaven, to the +supernatural powers that send disease and famine upon the community. +In those days no man sins to himself alone, just as, in still earlier +days, no man could break a taboo without becoming a source of danger to +the whole community. The wrong-doer has offended against the +supernatural powers and has brought down calamity upon the community. +He is therefore punished, directly as an offender against the god of +the community, and indirectly for having involved the {235} community +in suffering. In Dr. Westermarck's words (I, 194), there is "genuine +indignation against the offender, both because he rebels against God, +and because he thereby exposes the whole community to supernatural +dangers." But though society for many long centuries continues to +punish rebellion against God, still in the long run it ceases, or tends +to cease, doing so. Its reason for so ceasing is interpreted +differently by different schools of thought. On the one hand, it is +said in derision, let the gods punish offences against the gods--the +implication being that there are no such offences to punish, because +there is no god. On the other hand, it is said, "I will repay, saith +the Lord"--the implication being that man may not assume to be the +minister of divine vengeance. If, then, we bear in mind that the fact +may be interpreted in either of these different ways, we shall not fall +into the fallacy of imagining that the mere existence of the fact +suffices to prove either interpretation to be true. Yet this fallacy +plays its part in lending fictitious support to the doctrine that +morality is in no wise dependent upon religion. The offences now +punished by law, it is argued, are no longer punished as offences +against religion, but solely as offences {236} against the good of the +community. To this argument the reply is that men believe the good of +the community to be the will of God, and do not believe murder, theft, +adultery, etc., to be merely offences against man's laws. Overlooking +this fact, which is fatal to the doctrine that morality is in no wise +dependent on religion, the argument we are discussing proceeds to +maintain that the basis for the enforcement of morality by the law is +recognised by every one who knows anything of the philosophy of law to +be what is good for the community and its members: fraud and violence +are punished as such, and not because they are offences against this or +that religion. The fact that the law no longer punishes them as +offences against God suffices to show that it is only as offences +against humanity that there is any sense, or ever was any sense, in +punishing them. Religion may have reenforced morality very usefully at +one time, by making out that moral misdeeds were offences against God, +but such arguments are not now required. The good and the well-being +of humanity is in itself sufficient argument. Humanitarianism is +taking the place of religion, and by so doing is demonstrating that +morality is, as it always has been, {237} independent of religion; and +that in truth religion has built upon it, not it upon religion. As +Hoeffding puts it (p. 328): "Religious faith ... assumes an independent +human ethic developed historically under the practical influence of the +ethical feeling of man." That is to say, morality is in Hoeffding's +view independent of religion, and prior to religion, both as a matter +of logic and of history. As a matter of history--of the history of +religion--this seems to me, for the reasons already given, to be +contrary to the facts as they are known. The real reason for +maintaining that morality is and must be--and must have +been--independent of religion, seems to me to be a philosophical +reason. I may give it in Hoeffding's own words: "What other aims and +qualities," he asks (p. 324), "could man attribute to his gods or +conceive as divine, but those which he has learnt from his own +experience to recognise as the highest?" The answer expected to the +question plainly is not merely that it is from experience that man +learns, but that man has no experience of God from which he could +learn. The answer given by Mr. Hobhouse, in the concluding words of +his _Morals in Evolution_ is that "the collective wisdom" of man "is +all that we directly know of the Divine." {238} Here, too, no direct +access to God is allowed to be possible to man. It is from his +experience of other men--perhaps even of himself and his own +doings--that man learns all he knows of God: but he has himself no +experience of God. Obviously, then, from this humanitarian point of +view, what a man goes through in his religious moments is not +experience, and we are mistaken if we imagine that it was experience; +it is only a misinterpretation of experience. It is on the supposition +that we are mistaken, on the assumption that we make a +misinterpretation, that the argument is built to prove that morality is +and must be independent of religion. Argument to show, or proof to +demonstrate, that we had not the experience, or, that we mistook +something else for it, is, of course, not forthcoming. But if we hold +fast to our conviction, we are told that we are fleeing "to the bosom +of faith." + +Until some better argument is produced, we may be well content not +merely to flee but to rest there. + + + + +{239} + +CHRISTIANITY + +The subject dealt with in this lecture will be the place of +Christianity in the evolution of religion; and I shall approach it by +considering the place of religion in the evolution of humanity. It +will be therefore advisable, indeed necessary, for me to consider what +is meant by evolution; and I wish to begin by explaining the point of +view from which I propose to approach the three ideas of evolution, of +the evolution of humanity and the evolution of religion. + +The individual exists, and can only exist, in society. Society cannot +exist without individuals as members thereof; and the individual cannot +exist save in society. From this it follows that from one point of +view the individual may be regarded as a means--a means by which +society attains its end or purpose: every one of us has his place or +function in society; and society thrives according as each member +performs his function and discharges his duty. From another point of +view {240} the individual may be regarded as an end. If man is a +social animal, if men live in society, it is because so alone can a man +do what is best for himself: it is by means of society that he realises +his end. It is then from this proposition, viz. that the individual is +both a means and an end, that I wish to approach the idea of evolution. + +I will begin by calling attention to the fact that that proposition is +true both statically, that is to say, is true of the individual's +position in a community, and is also true dynamically, that is to say, +is true of his place in the process of evolution. On the former point, +that the proposition is true statically, of the position of the +individual in the community, I need say but little. In moral +philosophy it is the utilitarian school which has particularly insisted +upon this truth. That school has steadily argued that, in the +distribution of happiness or of the good, every man is to count as one, +and nobody to count as more than one--that is to say, in the community +the individual is to be regarded as the end. The object to be aimed at +is not happiness in general and no one's happiness in particular, but +the happiness of each and every individual. It is the individual and +his happiness which is the {241} end, for the sake of which society +exists and to which it is the means; otherwise the individual might +derive no benefit from society. But if the truth that the individual +is an end as well as a means is recognised by moral philosophy, that +truth has also played at least an equally important part in political +philosophy. It is the very breath of the cry for liberty, equality, +and fraternity,--a cry wrung out from the heart of man by the system of +oppression which denied that the ordinary citizen had a right to be +anything but a means for procuring enjoyment to the members of the +ruling class. The truth that any one man--whatever his place in +society, whatever the colour of his skin--has as much right as any +other to be treated as an end and that no man was merely a means to the +enjoyment or happiness or well-being of another, was the charter for +the emancipation of slaves. It is still the magna charta for the +freedom of every member of the human race. No man is or can be a +chattel--a thing existing for no other purpose than to subserve the +interests of its owner and to be a means to his ends. But though from +the truth that the individual is in himself an end as well as a means, +it follows that all men have the right to {242} freedom, it does not +follow as a logical inference that all men are equal as means--as means +to the material happiness or to the moral improvement of society. + +I need not further dwell upon the fact that statically as regards the +relations of men to one another in society at any moment, the truth is +fully recognised that the individual is not merely a means to the +happiness or well-being of others, but is also in himself an end. But +when we consider the proposition dynamically, when we wish to find out +the part it has played as one of the forces at work in evolution, we +find that its truth has been far from fully recognised--partly perhaps +because utilitarianism dates from a time when evolution, or the bearing +of it, was not understood. But the truth is at least of as great +importance dynamically as it is statically. And on one side, its truth +and the importance of its truth has been fully developed: that the +individual is a means to an end beyond him; and that, dynamically, he +has been and is a factor in evolution, and as a factor merely a means +and nothing else--all this has been worked out fully, if not to excess. +The other side of the truth, the fact that the individual is always an +end, has, however, {243} been as much neglected by the scientific +evolutionist as it was by the slave-driver: he has been liable to +regard men as chattels, as instruments by which the work of evolution +is carried on. The work has got to be done (by men amongst other +animals and things), things have to be evolved, evolution must go on. +But, why? and for whom? with what purpose and for whose benefit? with +what end? are questions which science leaves to be answered by those +people who are foolish enough to ask them. Science is concerned simply +with the individual as a means, as one of the means, whereby evolution +is carried on; and doubtless science is justified--if only on the +principle of the division of labour--in confining itself to the +department of enquiry which it takes in hand and in refusing to travel +beyond it. Any theory of man, therefore, or of the evolution of +humanity, which professes to base itself strictly on scientific fact +and to exclude other considerations as unscientific and therefore as +unsafe material to build on, will naturally, and perhaps necessarily, +be dominated by the notion that the individual exists as a factor in +evolution, as one of the means by which, and not as in any sense the +end for which, evolution is carried on. + +{244} + +Such seems to be the case with the theory of humanitarianism. It bases +itself upon science, upon experience, and rules out communion with God +as not being a scientific fact or a fact of experience at all. Based +upon science, it is a theory which seeks amongst other things to assign +to religion its place in the evolution of humanity. According to the +theory, the day of religion is over, its part played out, its function +in the evolution of humanity discharged. According to this theory, +three stages may be discerned in the evolution of humanity when we +regard man as a moral being, as an ethical consciousness. Those three +stages may be characterised first as custom, next religion, and finally +humanitarianism. + +By the theory, in the first stage--that of custom--the spirits to whom +cult is paid are vindictive. In the second stage--that of +religion--man, having attained to a higher morality, credits his gods +with that higher morality. In the third stage--that of +humanitarianism--he finds that the gods are but lay figures on which +the robes of righteousness have been displayed that man alone can +wear--when he is perfect. He is not yet perfect. If he were, the +evolution of humanity {245} would be attained--whereas at present it is +as yet in process. The end of evolution is not yet attained: it is to +establish, in some future generation, a perfect humanity. For that end +we must work; to it we may know that, as a matter of scientific +evolution, we are working. On it, we may be satisfied, man will not +enter in our generation. + +Now this theory of the evolution of humanity, and of the place religion +takes in that evolution, is in essential harmony with the scientific +treatment of the evolution theory, inasmuch as it treats of the +individual solely as an instrument to something other than himself, as +a means of producing a state of humanity to which he will not belong. +But if the assumption that the individual is always a means and never +an end in himself be false, then a theory of the evolution of man (as +an ethical consciousness) which is based on that wrong assumption will +itself be wrong. If each individual is an end, as valuable and as +important as any other individual; if each counts for one and not less +than any one other,--then his end and his good cannot lie in the +perfection of some future generation. In that case, his end would be +one that _ex hypothesi_ he could never enjoy, a rest into which he +could never enter; {246} and consequently it would be an irrational +end, and could not serve as a basis for a rationalist theory of ethics. +Man's object (to be a rational object) must have reference to a society +of which he may be a member. The realisation of his object, therefore, +cannot be referred to a stage of society yet to come, on earth, after +he is dead,--a society of which he, whether dead or annihilated, could +not be a member. If, then, the individual's object is to be a rational +object, as the humanitarian or rationalist assumes, then that end must +be one in which he can share; and therefore cannot be in this world. +Nor can that end be attained by doing man's will--for man's will may be +evil, and regress as well as progress is a fact in the evolution of +humanity; its attainment, therefore, must be effected by doing God's +will. + +The truth that the individual is an end as well as a means is, I +suggest, valuable in considering the dynamics as well as the statics of +society. At least, it saves one from the self-complacency of imagining +that one's ancestors existed with no other end and for no higher +purpose than to produce--me; and if the golden days anticipated by the +theory of humanitarianism ever arrive, it is to be supposed that the +{247} men of that time will find it just as intolerable and revolting +as we do now, to believe that past generations toiled and suffered for +no other reason, for no other end, and to no other purpose than that +their successors should enter into the fruits of their labour. In a +word, the theory that in the evolution of man as an ethical +consciousness, as a moral being, religion is to be superseded by +humanitarianism, is only possible so long as we deny or ignore the fact +that the individual is an end and not merely a means. We will +therefore now go on to consider the evolution of religion from the +point of view that the individual is in himself an end as well as a +means. If, of the world religions, we take that which is the greatest, +as measured by the number of its adherents, viz. Buddhism, we shall see +that, tried by this test, it is at once found wanting. The object at +which Buddhism proclaims that man should aim is not the development, +the perfection, and the realisation of the individual to the fullest +extent: it is, on the contrary, the utter and complete effacement of +the individual, so that he is not merely absorbed, but absolutely wiped +out, in _nirvana_. In the _atman_, with which it is the duty of man to +seek to identify himself, the individuality of man does not survive: +{248} it simply ceases to be. Now this obliteration of his existence +may seem to a man in a certain mood desirable; and that mood may be +cultivated, as indeed Buddhism seeks to cultivate it, systematically. +But here it is that the inner inconsistency, the self-contradictoriness +of Buddhism, becomes patent. The individual, to do anything, must +exist. If he is to desire nothing save to cease to exist, he must +exist to do that. But the teaching of Buddhism is that this world and +this life is illusion--and further, that the existence of the +individual self is precisely the most mischievous illusion, that +illusion above all others from which it is incumbent on us to free +ourselves. We are here for no other end than to free ourselves from +that illusion. Thus, then, by the teaching of Buddhism there is an +end, it may be said, for the individual to aim at. Yes! but by the +same teaching there is no individual to aim at it--individual existence +is the most pernicious of all illusions. And further, by the teaching, +the final end and object of religion is to get rid of an individual +existence, which does not exist to be got rid of, and which it is an +illusion to believe in. In fine, Buddhism denies that the individual +is either an end or a means, for it denies {249} the existence of the +individual, and contradicts itself in that denial. The individual is +not an end--the happiness or immortality, the continued existence, of +the individual is not to be aimed at. Neither is he a means, for his +very existence is an illusion, and as such is an obstacle or impediment +which has to be removed, in order that he who is not may cease to do +what he has never begun to do, viz. to exist. + +In Buddhism we have a developed religion--a religion which has been +developed by a system of philosophy, but scarcely, as religion, +improved by it. If, now, we turn to other religions less highly +developed, even if we turn to religions the development of which has +been early arrested, which have never got beyond the stage of infantile +development, we shall find that all proceed on the assumption that +communion between man and God is possible and does occur. In all, the +existence of the individual as well as of the god is assumed, even +though time and development may be required to realise, even +inadequately, what is contained in the assumption. In all, and from +the beginning, religion has been a social fact: the god has been the +god of the community; and, as such, has {250} represented the interests +of the community. Those interests have been regarded not merely as +other, but as higher, than the interests of the individual, when the +two have been at variance, for the simple reason (when the time came +for a reason to be sought and given) that the interests of the +community were the will of the community's god. Hence at all times the +man who has postponed his own interests to those under the sanction of +the god and the community--the man who has respected and upheld the +custom of the community--has been regarded as the higher type of man, +as the better man from the religious as well as from the moral point of +view; while the man who has sacrificed the higher interests to the +lower, has been punished--whether by the automatic action of taboo, or +the deliberate sentence of outlawry--as one who, by breaking custom, +has offended against the god and so brought suffering on the community. + +Now, if the interests, whether of the individual or the community, are +regarded as purely earthly, the divergence between them must be utter +and irreconcileable; and to expect the individual to forego his own +interests must be eventually discovered to be, as it fundamentally is, +unreasonable. {251} If, on the other hand, for the individual to +forego them is (as, in a cool moment, we all recognise it to be) +reasonable, then the interests under the sanction of the god and the +community--the higher interests--cannot be other than, they must be +identical with, the real interests of the individual. It is only in +and through society that the individual can attain his highest +interests, and only by doing the will of the god that he can so attain +them. Doubtless--despite of logic and feeling--in all communities all +individuals in a greater or less degree have deliberately preferred the +lower to the higher, and in so doing have been actuated neither by love +of God nor by love of their fellow-man. But, in so doing, they have at +all times, in the latest as well as the earliest stages of society, +been felt to be breaching the very basis of social solidarity, the +maintenance of which is the will of the God worshipped by society. + +From that point of view the individual is regarded as a means. But he +is also in himself an end, intrinsically as valuable as any other +member of the community, and therefore an end which society exists to +further and promote. It is impossible, therefore, that the end, viewed +as that which society {252} as well as the individual aims at, and +which society must realise, as far as it can realise it, through the +individual, should be one which can only be attained by some future +state of society in which he does not exist. "The kingdom of Heaven is +within you" and not something to which you cannot attain. God is not +far from us at any time. That truth was implicit at all stages in the +evolution of religion--consciously recognised, perhaps more, perhaps +less, but whether more or less consciously recognised, it was there. +That is the conviction implied in the fact that man everywhere seeks +God. If he seeks Him in plants, in animals, in stocks or stones, that +only shows that man has tried in many wrong directions--not that there +is not a right direction. It is the general law of evolution: of a +thousand seeds thrown out, perhaps one alone falls into good soil. But +the failure of the 999 avails nothing against the fact that the one +bears fruit abundantly. What sanctifies the failures is that they were +attempts. We indeed may, if we are so selfish and blind, regard the +attempts as made in order that we might succeed. Certainly we profit +by the work of our ancestors,--or rather we may profit, if we will. +But our savage ancestors were themselves ends, and {253} not merely +means to our benefit. It is monstrous to imagine that our salvation is +bought at the cost of their condemnation. No man can do more than turn +to such light as there may be to guide him. "To him that hath, shall +be given," it is true--but every man at every time had something; never +was there one to whom nothing was given. To us at this day, in this +dispensation, much has been given. But ten talents as well as one may +be wrapped up: one as well as ten may be put to profit. It is +monstrous to say that one could not be, cannot have been, used +properly. It was for not using the one talent he had that the +unfaithful servant was condemned--not for not having ten to use. + +Throughout the history of religion, then, two facts have been implied, +which, if implicit at the beginning, have been rendered explicit in the +course of its history or evolution. They are, first, the existence of +the individual as a member of society, in communion or seeking +communion with God; and, next, that while the individual is a means to +social ends, society is also a means of which the individual is the +end. Neither end--neither that of society nor that of the +individual--can be forwarded at {254} the cost of the other; the +realisation of each is to be attained only by the realisation of the +other. Two consequences then follow with regard to evolution: first, +it depends on us; evolution may have helped to make us, but we are +helping to make it. Next, the end of evolution is not wholly outside +any one of us, but in part is realised in us, or may be, if we so will. +That is to say, the true end may be realised by every one of us; for +each of us, as being himself an end, is an object of care to God--and +not merely those who are to live on earth at the final stage of +evolution. If the end is outside us, it is in love of neighbour; if +beyond us, it is in God's love. It is just because the end is (or may +be) both within us and without us that we are bound up with our +fellow-man and God. It is precisely because we are individuals that we +are not the be-all and the end-all--that the end is without us. And it +is because we are members of a community, that the end is not wholly +outside us. + +In his _Problems of Philosophy_ (p. 163) Hoeffding says: "The test of +the perfection of a human society is: to what degree is every person so +placed and treated that he is not only a mere means, but also always at +the same time an end?" and he points {255} out that "this is Kant's +famous dictum, with another motive than that given to it by him." But +if it is reasonable to apply this test to society, regarded from the +point of view of statics, it is also reasonable to apply it to society +regarded dynamically. If it is the proper test for ascertaining what +degree of perfection society at any given moment has attained, it is +also the proper test for ascertaining what advance, if any, towards +perfection has been made by society between any two periods of its +growth, any two stages in its evolution. But the moment we admit the +possibility of applying a test to the process of evolution and of +discovering to what end the process is moving, we are abandoning +science and the scientific theory of evolution. Science formally +refuses to consider whether there be any end to which the process of +evolution is working: "end" is a category which science declines to +apply to its subject-matter. In the interests of knowledge it declines +to be influenced by any consideration of what the end aimed at by +evolution may be, or whether there be any end aimed at at all. It +simply notes what does take place, what is, what has been, and to some +extent what may be, the sequence of events--not their object or +purpose. And the {256} science of religion, being a science, restricts +itself in the same way. As therefore science declines to use the +category, "end," progress is an idea impossible for science--for +progress is movement towards an end, the realisation of a purpose and +object. And science declines to consider whether progress is so much +as possible. But, so far as the subject-matter of the science of +religion is concerned, it is positive (that is to say, it is mere fact +of observation) that in religion an end is aimed at, for man everywhere +seeks God and communion with Him. What the science of religion +declines to do is to pronounce or even to consider whether that end is +possible or not, whether it is in any degree achieved or not, whether +progress is made or not. + +But if we do not, as science does, merely constate the fact that in +religion an end is aimed at, viz. that communion with God which issues +in doing His will from love of Him and therefore of our fellow-man; if +we recognise that end as the end that ought to be aimed at,--then our +attitude towards the whole process of evolution is changed: it is now a +process with an end--and that end the same for the individual and for +society. But at the same time it is no longer a process determined by +mechanical {257} causes worked by the iron hand of necessity--and +therefore it is no longer evolution in the scientific sense; it is no +longer evolution as understood by science. It is now a process in +which there may or may not be progress made; and in which, therefore, +it is necessary to have a test of progress--a test which is to be found +in the fact that the individual is not merely a means, but an end. +Whether progress is made depends in part on whether there is the will +in man to move towards the end proposed; and that will is not uniformly +exercised, as is shown by the fact that deterioration as well as +advance takes place--regress occurs as well as progress; whole nations, +and those not small ones, may be arrested in their religious +development. If we look with the eye of the missionary over the globe, +everywhere we see arrested development, imperfect communion with God. +It may be that in such cases of imperfect communion there is an +unconscious or hardly conscious recognition that the form of religion +there and then prevalent does not suffice to afford the communion +desired. Or, worse still, and much more general, there is the belief +that such communion as does exist is all that can exist--that advance +and improvement are impossible. From {258} this state it has been the +work of the religious spirit to wake us, to reveal to us God's will, to +make us understand that it is within us, and that it may, if we will, +work within us. It is as such a revelation of the will of God and the +love of God, and as the manifestation of the personality of God, that +our Lord appeared on earth. + +That appearance as a historic fact must take its place in the order of +historic events, and must stand in relation to what preceded and to +what followed and is yet to follow. In relation to what preceded, +Christianity claims "to be the fulfilment of all that is true in +previous religion" (Illingworth, _Personality: Human and Divine_, p. +75). The making of that claim assumes that there was some truth in +previous religion, that so far as previous forms were religious, they +were true--a fact that must constantly be borne in mind by the +missionary. The truth and the good inherent in all forms of religion +is that, in all, man seeks after God. The finality of Christianity +lies in the fact that it reveals the God for whom man seeks. What was +true in other religions was the belief in the possibility of communion +with God, and the belief that only as a member of a society could the +individual man attain {259} to that communion. What is offered by +Christianity is a means of grace whereby that communion may be attained +and a society in which the individual may attain it. Christianity +offers a means whereby the end aimed at by all religions may be +realised. Its finality, therefore, does not consist in its +chronological relation to other religions. It is not final because, or +in the sense that, it supervened in the order of time upon previous +religions, or that it fulfilled only their truth. Other religions +have, as a matter of chronology, followed it, and yet others may follow +it hereafter. But their chronological order is irrelevant to the +question: Which of them best realises the end at which religion, in all +its forms, aims? And it is the answer to that question which must +determine the finality of any form of religion. No one would consider +the fact that Mahommedanism dates some centuries after Christ any proof +of its superiority to Christianity. And the lapse of time, however +much greater, would constitute no greater proof. + +That different forms of religion do realise the end of religion in +different degrees is a point on which there is general agreement. +Monotheism is pronounced higher than polytheism, ethical religions +{260} higher than non-ethical. What differentiates Christianity from +other ethical religions and from other forms of monotheism, is that in +them religion appears as ancillary to morality, and imposes penalties +and rewards with a view to enforce or encourage morality. In them, at +their highest, the love of man is for his fellow-man, and usually for +himself. Christianity alone makes love of God to be the true basis and +the only end of society, both that whereby personality exists and the +end in which it seeks its realisation. Therein the Christian theory of +society differs from all others. Not merely does it hold that man +cannot make himself better without making society better, that +development of personality cannot be effected without a corresponding +development of society. But it holds that such moral development and +improvement of the individual and of society can find no rational basis +and has no rational end, save in the love of God. + +In another way the Christian theory of society differs from all others. +Like all others it holds that the unifying bond of every society is +found in worship. Unlike others it recognises that the individual is +restricted by existing society, even where that society is based upon a +common worship. The {261} adequate realisation of the potentialities +of the individual postulates the realisation of a perfect society, just +as a perfect society is possible only provided that the potentialities +of the individual are realised to the full. Such perfection, to which +both society and the individual are means, is neither attained nor +possible on earth, even where communion with God is recognised to be +both the true end of society and the individual, and the only means by +which that end can be attained. Still less is such perfection a +possible end, if morality is set above religion, and the love of man be +substituted for the love of God. In that case the life of the +individual upon earth is pronounced to be the only life of which he is, +or can be, conscious; and the end to which he is a means is the good of +humanity as a whole. Now human society, from the beginning of its +evolution to its end, may be regarded as a whole, just as the society +existing at any given moment of its evolution may be regarded as a +whole. But if we are to consider human society from the former point +of view and to see in it, so regarded, the end to which the individual +is a means, then it is clear that, until perfection is attained in some +remote and very improbable future, the individual members of the {262} +human race will have laboured and not earned their reward, will have +worked for an end which they have not attained, and for an end which +when, if ever, it is attained, society as a whole will not enjoy. Such +an end is an irrational and impossible object of pursuit. Perfection, +if it is to be attained by the individual or by society, is not to be +attained on earth, nor in man's communion with man. Religion from its +outset has been the quest of man for God. It has been the quest of +man, whether regarded as an individual or as a member of society. But +if that quest is to be realised, it is not to be realised either by +society or the individual, regarded as having a mere earthly existence. +A new conception of the real nature of both is requisite. Not only +must the individual be regarded as continuing to exist after death, but +the society of which he is truly a member must be regarded as one +which, if it manifests or begins to manifest itself on this earth, +requires for its realisation--that is, for perfect communion with +God--the postulate that though it manifests itself in this world, it is +realised in the next. This new conception of the real nature of +society and the individual, involving belief in the communion of the +saints, and in the kingdom of Heaven as that {263} which may be in each +individual, and therefore must extend beyond each and include all +whether in this world or the next--this conception is one which +Christianity alone, of all religions, offers to the world. + +Religion is the quest of man for God. Man everywhere has been in +search of God, peradventure he might find Him; and the history of +religion is the history of his search. But the moment we regard the +history--the evolution--of religion as a search, we abandon the +mechanical idea of evolution: the cause at work is not material or +mechanical, but final. The cause is no longer a necessary cause which +can only have one result and which, when it operates, must produce that +result. Progress is no longer something which must take place, which +is the inevitable result of antecedent causes. It is something which +may or may not take place and which cannot take place unless effort is +made. In a word, it is dependent in part upon man's will--without the +action of which neither search can be made nor progress in the search. +But though in part dependent upon man's will, progress can only be made +so far as man's will is to do God's will. And that is not always, and +has not been always, {264} man's will. Hence evolution has not always +been progress. Nor is it so now. There have been lapses in +civilisation, dark ages, periods when man's love for man has waned +_pari passu_ with the waning of his love for God. Such lapses there +may be yet again. The fall of man may be greater, in the spiritual +sense, than it ever yet has been, for man's will is free. But God's +love is great, and our faith is in it. If Christianity should cease to +grow where it now grows, and cease to spread where it as yet is not, +there would be the greater fall. And on us would rest some, at least, +of the responsibility. Christianity cannot be stationary: if it +stands, let it beware; it is in danger of falling. Between religions, +as well as other organisations, there is a struggle for existence. In +that struggle we have to fight--for a religion to decline to fight is +for that religion to die. The missionary is not engaged in a work of +supererogation, something with which we at home have no concern. We +speak of him as in the forefront of the battle. We do not usually or +constantly realise that it is our battle he is fighting--that his +defeat, if he were defeated, would be the beginning of the end for us; +that on his success our fate depends. The metaphor of the missionary +as an {265} outpost sounds rather picturesque when heard in a +sermon,--or did so sound the first time it was used, I suppose,--but it +is not a mere picture; it is the barest truth. The extent to which we +push our outposts forward is the measure of our vitality, of how much +we have in us to do for the world. Six out of seven of Christendom's +missionaries come from the United States of America. Until I heard +that from the pulpit of Durham Cathedral, I had rather a horror of big +things and a certain apprehension about going to a land where bigness, +rather than the golden mean, seemed to be taken as the standard of +merit. But from that sermon I learnt something, viz. not only that +there are big things to be done in the world, but that America does +them, and that America does more of them than she talks about. + + + + +{267} + +APPENDIX + +Since the chapter on Magic was written, the publication of Wilhelm +Wundt's _Voelkerpsychologie_, Vol. II, Part II, has led me to believe +that I ought to have laid more stress on the power of the magician, +which I mention on pages 74, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, and less on the +savage's recognition of the principle that like produces like. In the +stage of human evolution known as Animism, every event which calls for +explanation is explained as the doing of some person or conscious +agent. When a savage falls ill, his sickness is regarded as the work +of some ill-disposed person, whose power cannot be doubted--for it is +manifest in the sickness it has caused--and whose power is as +mysterious as it is indubitable. That power is what a savage means by +magic; and the persons believed to possess it are magicians. It is the +business of the sick savage's friends to find out who is causing his +sickness. Their suspicion may fall on any one whose appearance or +behaviour is suspicious or mysterious; and the person {268} suspected +comes to be regarded as a witch or magician, from the very fact that he +is suspected. Such persons have the power of witchcraft or magic, +because they are believed to have the power: _possunt quia posse +videntur_. Not only are they believed to possess the power; they come +to believe, themselves, that they possess it. They believe that, +possessing it, they have but to exercise it. The Australian magician +has but to "point" his stick, and, in the belief both of himself and of +every one concerned, the victim will fall. All over the world the +witch has but to stab the image she has drawn or made, and the person +portrayed will feel the wound. In this proceeding, the image is like +the person, and the blow delivered is like the blow which the victim is +to feel. It is open to us, therefore, to say that, in this typical +case of "imitative" or "mimetic" magic, like is believed to produce +like. And on pages 75-77, and elsewhere, above, I have taken that +position. But I would now add two qualifications. The first is, as +already intimated, that, though stabbing an effigy is like stabbing the +victim, it is only a magician or witch that has the power thus to +inflict wounds, sickness, or death: the services of the magician or +witch are employed for no other reason than that {269} the ordinary +person has not the power, even by the aid of the rite, to cause the +effect. The second qualification is that, whereas we distinguish +between the categories of likeness and identity, the savage makes but +little distinction. To us it is evident that stabbing the image is +only like stabbing the victim; but to the believer in magic, stabbing +the image is the same thing as stabbing the victim; and in his belief, +as the waxen image melts, so the victim withers away. + +It would, therefore, be more precise and more correct to say (page 74, +above) that eating tiger to make you bold points rather to a confusion, +in the savage's mind, of the categories of likeness and identity, than +to a conscious recognition of the principle that like produces like: as +you eat tiger's flesh, so you become bold with the tiger's boldness. +The spirit of the tiger enters you. But no magic is necessary to +enable you to make the meal: any one can eat tiger. The belief that so +the tiger's spirit will enter you is a piece of Animism; but it is not +therefore a piece of magic. + + + + +{271} + +BIBLIOGRAPHY + +ABT, A. Die Apologie des Apuleius von Madaura und die antike Zauberei. +Giessen. 1908. + +ALVIELLA, G. Origin and Growth of the Conception of God. London. +1892. + +BASTIAN, A. Allerlei aus Volks- und Menschenkunde. Berlin. 1888. + +BOUSSET, W. What is Religion? (E. T.). London. 1907. + +DAVIES, T. W. Magic, Divination, and Demonology. Leipzig. 1898. + +ELLIS, A. B. The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast. London. +1890. The Tshi-speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast. London. 1887. +The Yoruba-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast. London. 1894. + +FAHZ, L. De poetarum Romanorum doctrina magica. Giessen. 1904. + +FARNELL, L. R. The Place of the Sonder-Goetter in Greek Polytheism, in +Anthropological Essays. Oxford. 1907. + +FRAZER, J. G. Adonis, Attis, Osiris. London. 1905. The Golden +Bough. London. 1900. Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship. +London. 1905. + +GRANGER, F. The Worship of the Romans. London. 1895. + +HADDON, H. C. Magic and Fetishism. London. 1906. + +HARRISON, J. E. Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion. +Cambridge. 1903. + +HARTLAND, E. S. The Legend of Perseus. London. 1895. + +HOBHOUSE, L. T. Morals in Evolution. London. 1906. + +HOeFFDING, H. Philosophy of Religion (E. T.). London. 1906. + +{272} + +HOLLIS. The Masai. Oxford. 1905. + +HOWITT, A. W. The Native Tribes of South East Australia. London. +1904. + +HUBERT, H. Magia. In Daremberg Saglio's Dictionnaire des Antiquites. +Paris. 1904. + +HUBERT, H. & MAUSS, M. Theorie generale de la magie. L'Annee +Sociologique. Paris. 1904. La Nature et la fonction du sacrifice. +L'Annee Sociologique. Paris. 1899. + +HUVELIN, P. Magie et droit individual. L'Annee Sociologique. Paris. +1907. + +ILLINGWORTH, J. R. Personality: Human and Divine. London. 1894. + +JEVONS, F. B. The Definition of Magic. Sociological Review for April, +1908. London. The Evolution of the Religious Consciousness. In +Pan-Anglican Papers. London. 1908. Introduction to the History of +Religion. London. 1896. Magic. In Proceedings of the International +Congress for the History of Religions. 1908. + +LANG, A. Custom and Myth. London. 1893. Magic and Religion. +London. 1901. The Making of Religion. London. 1898. Modern +Mythology. London. 1897. Myth, Ritual, and Religion. London. 1887. + +LENORMANT, F. Chaldean Magic (E. T.). London. 1877. + +MACCULLOUGH, J. A. Comparative Theology. London. 1902. + +MARETT, R. R. Is Taboo a Negative Magic? In Anthropological Essays. +Oxford. 1907. + +MAUSS, M. Des Societes Eskimos. L'Annee Sociologique. Paris. 1906. + +MUeLLER, J. G. Geschichte der amerikanischen Urreligionen. Basel. +1855. + +NASSAU, R. H. Fetichism in West Africa. London. 1904. + +{273} + +PARKER, K. L. The Euahlayi Tribe. London. 1905. + +PAYNE, E. J. History of the New World called America. Oxford. 1892. + +REINACH, S. Cultes, Mythes, et Religions. Paris. 1905. Reports of +the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to Torres Straits. Cambridge +(England). 1908. + +RHYS DAVIDS, T. W. Origin and Growth of Religion. London. 1891. + +RUHL, L. De Mortuorum indicio. Giessen. 1903. + +SCHMIDT, H. Veteres Philosophi quomodo indicaverint de precibus. +Giessen. 1907. + +SCHRADER, O. Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumer. Strassburg. +1901. + +SKEAT, W. W. Malay Magic. London. 1900. + +SMITH, W. R. Religion of the Semites. London. 1894. + +SPENCE, L. The Mythologies of Ancient Mexico and Peru. London. 1907. + +SPENCER & GILLEN. The Native Tribes of Central Australia. London. +1899. The Northern Tribes of Central Australia. London. 1904. + +TYLOR, E. B. Primitive Culture. London. 1873. + +WAITZ, T. Anthropologie der Naturvoelker. Leipzig. 1864. + +WEBSTER, H. Primitive Secret Societies. London. 1908. + +WESTERMARCK, E. The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas. +London. 1906. + +WUNDT, W. Voelkerpsychologie. Leipzig. 1904-1907. + + + + +{275} + +INDEX + + +Acosta, Father, 193. + +Agnostic, 4, 6. + +Agries, 143. + +Alfoors, 194. + +Algonquins, 143. + +All-father, 190. + +Ancestors, 162. + +Ancestor worship, 52, 53; may be arrested by religion, 53, 54, 55. + +Andaman Islands, 169. + +Animal sacrifice, 209; animal meal, 178. + +Animals, worshipped, 111. + +Animism, 204, 215, 216, 217; and magic, 89, 90, 98; and fetichism, 116, +117, 118; polytheism, 131; not religion, 136. + +Anticipation, of nature, 73. + +Antinomy, the, of religious feeling, 174. + +Anzam, 170. + +Applied science of religion, 2 ff.; looks to the future, 3; is used by +the missionary as a practical man, 15, 16; its object, 18, 21. + +Ashantee Land, 153, 155. + +Atheist, 4, 6. + +Atman, 247. + +At-one-ment, 178. + +Attention, 9, 10. + +Australia, 183 ff. + +Australian tribes, religion of, 27, 28. + +Aztecs, 188, 190. + + +Basutos, 181. + +Becoming, 214. + +Being, is in process of evolution, 214; still incomplete, 214. + +Belief, and desire, 39, 40; in immortality and God, 31, 32; erroneous, +and magic, 79; in magic, 85; religious, 137. + +Bhogaldai, 194. + +Billiards, 78. + +Blood, and rain, 161. + +Bones, of animals, hung up, 78. + +Boorah, 162 ff. + +Bosman, 109 ff., 112, 113. + +Bread, prayer for daily, 181. + +Buddhism, 247 ff.; and immortality, 36, 37, 61, 62, 63; its fundamental +illogicality, 66; its strength, 66. + +Buro, 194. + +Buzzard, 76. + +Byamee, 162 ff., 191, 198. + + +Cause, and conditions, 77, 85. + +Celebes, 194. + +Ceram, 181. + +Ceremonies, for rain, 161. + +Chain of existence, 65. + +Charms, and prayers, 150, 115, 152. + +Chattels, 241, 243. + +Cherokee Indian, 50, 76, 77. + +Chicomecoatl, 193. + +Childhood, 98. + +China, 194, 197. + +Christianity, 239 ff., 258, 259, 260; the highest form of religion, 15, +18, 22, 23; and other forms of religion, 26, 27, 28, 35; alone teaches +self-sacrifice as the way to life eternal, 69; and sacrifice, 209. + +Clouds, 153; of smoke and rain, 161, 162. + +Communal purposes, and magic, 91. + +Communion, 175; not so much an intellectual belief as an object of +desire, 43, 44; of man with God the basis of morality, 62; logically +incompatible with Buddhism, 63; involves personal existence, 67; with +God, 137; sought in prayer, 172; and sacrifice, 172; in Mexico, 193; +maintained by sacramental eating, 195; annually, 196; renewed, 198; the +true end of sacrifice, 207, 208; between man and God, 249; imperfect, +257. + +Community, 254; and magic, 81, 97; and its God, 91. + +Community, the, and fetiches, 122; and its gods, 135; and prayer, 146, +147, 148, 166; and the individual, 218, 239. + +Comparative method, 20, 21. + +Comparative Philology, 20. + +Comparison, method of, 17; implies similarity in the religions +compared, 19; and implies difference also, 20; contrasted with +comparative method, 21; deals with differences, 22. + +Comte, 213. + +Conciliation, and coercion, of spirits, 121. + +Congregations, 170. + +Contagious magic, 85. + +Continuation theory, 55, 56. + +Corn, eaten sacramentally, 194, 195. + +Corn-maiden, 195. + +Corn-mother, 195. + +Corn-spirit, 196, 199, 200. + +Cotton-mother, 194. + +Creator, 170. + +Creek Indians, 194. + +Custom, 244; protected by the god of the community, 219. + + +Dances, 162; and prayer, 153. + +Dead, the, 38; return, 47; spirits of the, 92. + +Death, a mistake according to the primitive view, 44, 45; or else due +to magic, 45, 46, 80. + +Deer, 74. + +Degradation of religion, 24. + +Deification, 53. + +Deiphobus, 54. + +Delaware prayer, 145. + +Departmental deities, 190. + +Desacralisation, 186. + +Desire for immortality, is the origin of the belief in immortality, 40, +41; is not a selfish desire, 42; the root of all evils, 66; religious, +115, 116, 121; and prayer, 142, 149; and the worship of the gods, 135; +and religion, 158, 166; of the community, 163. + +Desire of all nations, 115, 173. + +Dieri, 50, 161, 164. + +Difference, implies similarity, 27. + +Differences, to be taken into account by method of comparison, 22; +their value, 23, 24; postulated by science, 24. + +Differentiation of the homogeneous, 23, 24, 25. + +Domesticated plants and animals, 190. + +Dreams, and the soul, 37; their emotional value, 42. + +Drought, 164. + +Dugongs, 164, 165. + +Dynamics, of society, 246, 255. + + +East Indies, 181. + +Eating of the god, 193. + +Eating tiger, 74, 89. + +Ellis, Colonel, 113, 120, 121, 122. + +Emotional element, in fetichism and religion, 136. + +End, the, gives value to what we do, 13; and is a matter of will, 13; +of society, 251, 253; a category unknown to science, 255. + +Ends, anti-social, 81. + +Error, 25. + +Euahlayi, 48, 162, 191, 198. + +Evolution, 214; of religion, 6, 239, 247, 253; and progress, 9, 12, 24, +264; theory of, 23; and the history of religion, 172, 173; of humanity, +239, 244, 246; law of, 252; end of, 254, 256. + + +Faith, 137, 238; the conviction that we can attain our ends, 14; shared +by the religious man with all practical men, 14, 15; exhibited in +adopting method of comparison in religion, 17; in Christianity, 18; +banishes fear of comparisons, 18, 19; in the communion of man with God +manifests itself in the desire for immortality, 68. + +Family, and society, 98. + +Famine, 205. + +Father, 98. + +Feeling, religious, 137; moral and religious, 81. + +Fetich, defined, 111, 112; offerings made to it, 112; not merely an +"inanimate," 113, 116; but a spirit, 116, 117; possesses personality +and will, 117; aids in the accomplishment of desire, 117, 119; may be +made, 120; is feared, 120; has no religious value, 120, 121; distinct +from a god, 122; subservient to its owner, 122; has no plurality of +worshippers, 122; its principal object to work evil, 123; serves its +owner only, 127; permanence of its worship, 129; has no specialised +function, 129, 130; is prayed to and talked with, 132; worshipped by an +individual, 134; and not by the community, 135, 170. + +Fetichism, 105 ff., 215; as the lowest form of religion, 106, 107; as +the source of religious values, 107, 108; and magic, 90; and religion, +114, 120, 136; the law of its evolution, 119, 120; condemned by public +opinion, 122, 123; offensive to the morality of the native, 126; and at +variance with his religion, 126, 127; not the basis of religion, 127; +and polytheism, 128, 131, 132, 133; and fear, 136. + +Finality of Christianity, 258, 259. + +First-fruit ceremonials, 183, 184; and the gods, 185, 187; an act of +worship, 187, 188. + +First-fruits, 181. + +Flesh of the divine being, 196. + +Fly-totem, 165, 166. + +Folk-lore, 85. + +Food supply, 205. + +Footprints, 74. + +Forms of religion, 19. + +Framin women, 152, 153, 155, 156. + +Frazer, J. G., 50, 76, 78, 79, 83, 92, 94, 102, 153, 157, 158, 160, +180, 192, 194-200, 202, 205. + +Fuegians, 169. + +Funerals, and prayer, 163. + +Future, knowledge of the, 14, 15. + +Future life, its relation to morality and religion, 36, 37, 57. + +Future punishments, and rewards, 51, 61. + +Future world, 52 ff. + + +Ghosts, 38, 42. + +Gift-theory of sacrifice, 206. + +God, worshipped by community, 91, 98; a supreme being, 168; etymology +of the word, 133, 134; a personal power, 136, 137; correlative to a +community, 137. + +Gods and worshippers, 53; and fetichism, 110; made and broken, 110; +personal, 121; "departmental," 129; their personality, 130, 131; and +the good of the community, 123; and fetiches, 124; are the powers that +care for the welfare of the community, 126, 172; and spirits, 128; "of +a moment," 128, 136; their proper names, 131; worshipped by a +community, 134; and the desires of their worshippers, 134; not evolved +from fetiches, 135; promote the community's good, 135, 137, 167; and +prayer, 140, 147, 148; and morality, 169; of a community identified +with the community, 177; as ethical powers, 215; punish transgression, +220. + +Gold Coast, prayer, 143. + +Golden Age, 25. + +Good, the, 140; and the gods, 137. + +Gotama, 64. + +_Gott_, and _giessen_, 134. + +Grace, 259. + +Gratitude, 181. + +Great Spirit, the, 143. + +Guardian spirits, 111. + +Guinea, 197. + + +Haddon, Dr., 83, 91, 100, 101, 106, 107, 117, 118, 124, 129, 130, 132, +133. + +Hades, 58. + +Hallucinations, 38. + +Happiness, 240. + +Hartford Theological Seminary, 1, 22, 106. + +Harvest, prayers and sacrifice, 180 ff. + +Harvest communion, 188, 189. + +Harvest customs, 192, 198, 203. + +Harvest supper, 195 ff., 200; its sacramental character, 197. + +Health, and disease, 138. + +Heaven, kingdom of, 252, 262. + +Hebrew prophets, 207, 209. + +Hebrews, 54. + +Hegel, 213. + +Hindoo Koosh, 194. + +Historic science, has the historic order for its object, 11; but does +not therefore deny that its facts may have value other than truth +value, 11. + +History, of art and literature, 8; of religion, 253, 263. + +Ho dirge, 47. + +Hobhouse, L. T., 211, 214-216, 222, 223, 226-229, 230, 237. + +Hoeffding, H., 44, 166, 173, 254; on fetichism, 106, 114, 115, 121, 124, +128-130, 133-137; on antinomy of religious feeling, 174; and morality, +211, 214-216, 219, 220, 237. + +Hollis, Mr., 143 ff. + +Homer, 16, 17. + +Hom[oe]opathic magic, 80, 85, 93. + +Homogeneous, the, 23, 24. + +Howitt, Mr., 190. + +_Hu, huta_, 134, + +Humanitarianism, 214, 215, 236, 244, 246, 247; and morality, 221. + +Humanity, 213; its evolution, 244. + +Husband, 98. + + +Ideals, a matter of the will, 13. + +Idols, 193. + +Illingworth, J. R., 258. + +Illusion, 64, 248. + +Images, of dough, 193, 196. + +Imitative magic, 157. + +Immortality, 34 ff. + +Incorporation, 178. + +Individual, and the community, 218, 239; cannot exist save in society, +225; both a means and an end for society, 240 ff., 246, 247; existence +of, 248; interests of, 250, 251; end of, 253. + +Individuality, not destroyed but strengthened by uprooting selfish +desires, 67. + +Indo-China, 181, 194. + +Indo-European languages, 20. + +Infancy, helpless, 98. + +Initiation ceremonies, 190, 191; admit to the worship of the gods, 192; +important for theory of sacrifice, 192. + +Interests, of the community, 250; and the individual, 250. + +Intoning, of prayer, 147. + +Israel, 59. + + +Jaundice, 89. + +Jews, 53, 54. + +Judgments, of value, 115. + +Justice, public, 223, 224 ff. + + +Kaitish rites, 164, 165. + +Kangaroo totem, 197. + +Kant, 255. + +Karma, 64, 65. + +Kei Islands, 156. + +Kern Baby, 195. + +Khonds of Orissa, and prayer, 139, 167, 171. + +Killing of the god, 197. + +Kingsley, Miss, 48, 49, 116. + + +Lake Nyassa, 146. + +Lake Superior, 143. + +Lang, Andrew, 129, 168, 169, 170. + +_L'Annee Sociologique_, 60. + +Like produces like, 72, 73, 74, 76, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 89, 98, 100, +160, 189. + +Litanies, 163. + +Love of neighbours, 254. + + +MacCullough, J. A., 47. + +McTaggart, Dr., 49, 50. + +Magic, 32, 70 ff.; and murder, 45, 47; a colourable imitation of +science, 71; a spurious system, 71, 72; fraudulent, 75, 76; origin of +belief in, 79; regarded with disapproval, 79; sympathetic or +hom[oe]opathic, 80; offensive to the god of the community, 81; not +prior to religion, 97; condemned when inconsistent with the public +good, 97; and anti-social purposes, 98; decline of, 100; and the +impossible, 101; private and public, 83; nefarious, 83; beneficent, 87, +88; does not imply spirits, 89; and religion, 92 ff.; fundamentally +different, 95, 158, 160; mimics science and religion, 103; and the +degradation of religion, 150, 151, 152; and prayer, 153, 154; priority +of, to religion, 154, 157; and sacramental eating, 199-204. _See_ +Appendix. + +Magician, his personality, 87. + +Mahommedanism, 259. + +Maize-mother, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196. + +Maker, the, 168. + +Manganja, 146, 160. + +Mara tribe, 164. + +Marett, R. R., 151. + +Marriage law, 222, 227. + +Masai, and prayer, 143, 144, 145, 153-156, 162. + +Master of Life, 143. + +Mauss, M., 60. + +Maya, 64. + +Medical advice, 76. + +Mexico, 193, 194, 199, 200. + +Mimetic magic, 85. + +Minahassa, 194. + +Mind of Humanity, 213. + +Missionary, 6, 140, 210, 211, 257, 265; interested in the value rather +than the chronological order of religions, 12; being practical, uses +applied science, 15; and method of comparison, 17; and notes +resemblances, 22; requires scientific knowledge of the material he has +to work on, 34; may use as a lever the belief in man's communion with +spirits, 69; and magic, 102, 103, 104; and fetichism, 105; and heathen +prayer, 138, 173. + +Momentary gods, 128, 136. + +Morality, 81, 83, 84, 95, 211 ff., 260, 261; and communion with God, +62; and the mysteries, 191; and prayer, 148. + +Moral transgression, and sin, 221. + +Mosquito-totem, 166. + +Mura-muras, 162. + +Mysteries, the Greek, 58, 62; and prayer, 180. + + +Names, and gods, 121. + +Names, of gods, 121, 131, 132; of men, 132; and personality, 133. + +Nassau, Dr., 116, 168, 170. + +Natchez Indians, 194. + +Natural law, 72. + +Nature, uniformity of, 14, 15. + +Nefarious magic, 83-87, 95. + +Neilgherry Hills, 194. + +New Caledonia, 92, 153, 154, 155, 156, 162. + +New Hebrides, 181. + +New South Wales, 162. + +Nias, 181. + +Niger, 181. + +Nirvana, 247. + +North American Indians, 111. + +Nyankupon, 169. + + +Offerings, 178; and their object, 180; made to fetiches, 112, 122. + +Old Testament, 54. + +Ol-kora, 154, 162. + +Onitsha, 181. + +Order of value, 7; distinct from chronological order, 7, 9, 15, 16; +historic, 8. + +Origin, and validity, 38, 39. + +Osages, 143. + + +Parker, Mrs. L., 162 ff., 191. + +Perception, 9. + +Personality, of magician, 87; of gods and fetiches, 130, 131, 132; of +God, 258; and proper names, 133. + +Personification, 136. + +Peru, 193, 194, 198. + +Pestilence, 205. + +Pinkerton, 109. + +Plato, 206, 207, 209. + +Political economy, 5, 6. + +Political philosophy, 241. + +Polytheism and fetichism, 128, 130, 131, 132, 133. + +Pondos, 194. + +Power, personal, 87, 88, 100. + +Prayer, 92, 93, 94, 138 ff.; among the heathen, 138; to fetiches, 127; +and desire, 142; and personal advantage, 144; and the community, 146; +of individuals, 147; unethical, 148, 149; and magic, 154; and spells, +155, 157, 160; and famine, 158; for rain, 160; the expression of the +heart's desire, 160; never unknown to man, 160, 161; in exceptional +distress, 182; of thanksgiving, 182; occasional and recurring, 179 ff.; +and communion, 180; its purpose, 175; and external rites, 176; implies +sacrifice, 176; not always reported by observers, 177; and sacrifice go +together, 169; no worship without, 170; of Socrates, 171; and +sacrifice, 172; Our Lord's, 172, 173; practical, 167; the root of +religion, 167, 168; and its objects, 163; a mother's prayer, 163; +"singing," 164; and charms, 150, 165; at seed time, 205. + +Prayer-mill, 150. + +Priests, 91, 193; and gods, 121; and fetiches, 122. + +Primitive man, believes in immortality, 37. + +Private property, 5, 6. + +Progress, 9, 246, 256, 257, 263; and evolution, 24. + +Protective colouring, 70, 103. + +Psalmist, 54. + +Puluga, 169. + +Pure science of religion, is a historic science, 2; its facts may be +used for different and contradictory purposes, 4. + + +Rain, prayed for, 146, 160, 161. + +Rain-clouds, 154, 156, 161, 162. + +Rain-god, 91, 92. + +Rain-making, 84, 87, 88, 91, 161, 164. + +Rebirth, 48, 49, 50. + +Regress, 246, 257. + +Reincarnation, 59; in animal form, 50, 51, 52; in new-born children, +48-50; in namesakes, 50; its relation to morality and religion, 61. + +Religion, is a fact, 5; never unknown to man, 160, 161; essentially +practical, 160, 175; its evolution, 239; as a survival of barbarism, +24; lowest forms to be studied first, 26, 27; is a yearning after and +search for God, 28, 115, 136; a bond of community from the first, 43, +59, 176; implies gods and their worship, 121, 122, 177, 217; implies +rites and prayers, 176; "under the guise of desire," 44, 115, 149, 158, +166, 173; but it is the desire of the community, 44; and morality, 37, +81, 83, 84, 211, 215; and animism, 136; and fetichism, 106-109, 115, +131, 132, 136; and magic, 70, 71, 72, 92-95, 96, 97, 98, 101, 150, 151, +152, 154; mechanical, 150; applied science of, 105; and its value, 109. + +Religious values, 9, 16. + +Resemblances, not more important than differences, for the method of +comparison, 22; their value, 23, 24. + +Resentment and justice, 224. + +Responsibility, collective, 227, 228, 234. + +Revelation, 172, 255; and evolution, 173. + +Revenge and justice, 229. + +Rheumatism, 76. + +Rhys Davids, 64. + + +Saa, 180. + +Sacrament, in Central Australia, 197, 200. + +Sacramental meals, 183 ff., 197, 199, 200, 201, 203. + +Sacrifice, 92, 93, 94, 175 ff.; to fetiches, 113; and worship, 137, +177; and prayer, 172, 177; and the gift theory, 206; and communion, +207, 208; its ultimate form, 209, 210; and the etymology of "god," 133 +ff., 137. + +Saffron, 89. + +Science, has truth, not assignment of value, for its object, 10, 11, +108; and history, 108; does not deal with ends, 255; and evolution, +257; and magic, 70, 71, 72, 101; of the savage, 159, 189. + +Science of religion, 256; pure and applied, 2 ff.; supposed to be +incompatible with religious belief, 4; really has nothing to do with +the truth or value of religion, 5, 10; and prayer, 140, 141; and the +missionary, 105. + +Sea Dyaks, 228. + +Search for God, the, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 252, 258, 262. + +Seed time, 188, 205. + +Self-realising spirit, 213, 214. + +Seminole Indians, 194. + +Shakespeare, 16, 17. + +Sheol, 54, 58. + +Similarity, between higher and lower forms of religion, 27; the basis +for the missionary's work, 28. + +"Singing," 164, 165. + +Slavery, 241, 243. + +"Smelling out," 84. + +Social purpose, and magic, 91. + +Society, a means, 253; as an end, 261; perfection of, 254, 261; and the +family, 98. + +Society Islands, 181. + +Solidarity, 212, 213, 251; religious, 220. + +Solomon Islands, 180. + +Soul, the, 37; separable from the body, 37; its continued existence, 38. + +Spells, and prayers, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 160, 164. + +Spencer and Gillen, 45, 46, 164, 197. + +Spinning, 78, 79. + +Spirits, 162, 170; not essential to magic, 89, 90, 91; and fetiches, +118, 119; of fetichism and gods of polytheism, 128; guardian, 111; +"momentary," and gods, 135; and prayer, 166; and morality, 215, 217, +219; not worshipped, 216. + +Spring customs, 192, 198, 203. + +Squirrel, 76, 78. + +State, the, and justice, 224. + +St. John, Mr., 228. + +Stones, 92, 93, 94. + +Struggle for existence, 264. + +_Suhman_, 122, 123, 126, 136. + +Sun, 153, 157. + +Superstition, 150. + +Sympathetic magic, 80, 85, 93, 153, 157, 162. + + +Taboo, 186 ff., 222, 229, 231-234, 250. + +Talents, 253. + +Tana, 181. + +Tanner, John, 143. + +Tari, 181, 183. + +Taro, 92, 93, 94. + +Temples, 178. + +Test, of perfection in society, 255. + +Thanks, do not need words, 181, 185. + +Thank-offerings, 181. + +Thomsen, Professor, 134. + +Tibetan Buddhists, 150. + +Tiger, 74, 89. + +Tjumba, 181. + +Tonga, 181. + +Totems, 51, 165, 166, 197, 203; eating of, 186. + +Trade wind, 101. + +Transmigration, 51, 61, 119, 120; of character, 64. + +Truth, 25; and value, 10. + +Tupinambas, 56, 58. + +Tylor, Professor, 37, 47, 56, 112, 141-144, 147, 148, 150, 161, 166. + + +Unalits, 59, 60. + +Uncle John, knows his own pipe, 49, 50. + +Uniformity of nature, 14; matter of faith, not of knowledge, 15. + +Unselfishness, developes and does not weaken individuality, 67. + +Usener, Professor, 128, 131, 133. + +Utilitarianism, 240, 242. + + +Value, 7; literary and artistic, 8, 9; religious, 8, 9, 10, 107, 108, +109; carries a reference to the future, 12; relative to a purpose or +end, 13, 15; of literature and art, felt, not proved, 16, 17; of +fetichism, 114, 115, 120; of fetichism and religion for society, 125; +religious, and fetichism, 127. + +Virgil, 54. + + +West Africa, 152, 153. + +Westermarck, E., 224, 225, 228, 235. + +Whistling, to produce a wind, 73, 74, 75. + +Will, the, 13. + +Will to injure, 81. + +Will to live, the, 41; involves the desire for immortality, 41; +denounced by Buddhism, 66. + +Wind, 100, 101. + +Wisdom, collective, of man, 237. + +Witch, and witch-doctor, 84. + +Witchcraft, 222, 227. + +Wives, of hunters and warriors, 78. + +Wohkonda, 143. + +Worship, 121, 122, 177, 180, 260; and the etymology of "god," 133 ff., +137; of gods and of fetiches, 123, 134, 135; of the community, given to +the powers that protect it, 126; may break up, 170. + + +Xenophon, 171. + +Xilonen, 190. + + +Yams, 93, 143, 180, 181. + +Yebu, 147. + + +Zulus, 194. + + + + +Printed in the United States of America. + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of An Introduction to the Study of +Comparative Religion, by Frank Byron Jevons + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK INTRO TO COMPARATIVE RELIGION *** + +***** This file should be named 31875.txt or 31875.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/3/1/8/7/31875/ + +Produced by Al Haines + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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