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+Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Cavalry in Future Wars
+
+Author: Frederick von Bernhardi
+
+Translator: Charles Sydney Goldman
+
+Release Date: March 9, 2009 [EBook #28298]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Chris Curnow, Joseph Cooper, Christine P.
+Travers and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS
+
+
+  By HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL
+  FREDERICK VON BERNHARDI
+
+  Commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army
+
+
+  Translated by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN
+
+  Author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa'
+  Editor of 'The Empire and the Century'
+
+
+  With an Introduction by
+
+  LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH
+  K.C.M.G., K.C.B., G.C.V.O.
+
+
+
+
+  LONDON
+  JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
+  1909
+
+  _First Edition, October, 1906_
+  _Second Edition, April, 1909_
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+I ventured to express the opinion in my book, 'With General French and
+the Cavalry in South Africa,' that if a high ideal of the duties and
+possibilities of Cavalry is set before our officers, and the means of
+instruction and training are placed within their reach, we shall
+possess in our next great War a force which, if led by men of the
+stamp of General Sir John French, will prove to the world that the day
+of Cavalry is far indeed from being past.
+
+In other words, I am convinced that, with good leadership and the
+right material in men, which the South African War has shown we
+possess, all that we need to perfect our system is a proper
+recognition of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, and a resolve
+to break with the old and adapt ourselves to the new situation.
+
+Reforms such as this would necessitate must affect all arms of the
+Service, but no branch more than the Cavalry, whose task in future
+will be more difficult, yet whose compensation lies in the
+possibilities of successes possessing greater significance than any
+hitherto attained.
+
+The South African War has roused the Cavalry into a renewal of
+activity, and has caused their leaders to encourage the study of
+Cavalry literature likely to develop the capacity of the officer for
+writing on these special subjects.
+
+As a step in that direction, I gave whatever little co-operation I
+could to the formation of the _Cavalry Journal_, in the hope that it
+may be conducive to the creation of a class of literature in which our
+Service is peculiarly deficient.
+
+It is of the first importance to realize the conditions that are
+revolutionizing the conduct of Modern Warfare.
+
+Such knowledge can alone enable us to appreciate the task which is
+given to the Cavalry, and to estimate the increased difficulties of
+their function. As their range of activity has become restricted in
+certain directions, their sphere of usefulness in others has largely
+increased.
+
+The want of an up-to-date work dealing with these facts has, I
+believe, been supplied by the recent publication of General von
+Bernhardi's book, 'Our Cavalry in Future Wars,' translated in the
+following pages with the object of making it more generally known in
+this country.
+
+Not only is the contribution valuable as having been written by a
+soldier of experience in the field, who has imbued his work with the
+dash and fire of the spirit of Cavalry, but it also reveals a profound
+insight into the modern conditions of War and the heightened demands
+exacted from Cavalry training. The author lays continual emphasis on
+the fact that Cavalry trained and organized on his lines should
+produce in the early stages of a War effects so decisive as to
+influence and even determine the succeeding phases of the campaign.
+
+General von Bernhardi has the gift of close and searching reasoning,
+and the ability to present his views in a vivid and trenchant form,
+as convincing as the writings of the late Colonel Henderson.
+
+His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War in
+the sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of the
+Cavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred.
+
+In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future will
+confront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will be
+exacted from this Arm.
+
+Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from the
+individual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for the
+task of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows in
+convincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success.
+
+Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field may
+have somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling of
+the Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissance
+and operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuit
+of a defeated Army.
+
+He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superior
+striking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, and
+emphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining a
+high fighting efficiency.
+
+In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and Tactical
+Conduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with the
+merits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of the
+latter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock,
+and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action when
+serving an offensive or defensive purpose.
+
+At the same time, he avers that success must depend upon the ability
+of the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities of decision,
+and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between the
+application respectively of shock and fire action.
+
+The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalry
+leader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of the
+profession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency.
+
+Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery of
+the instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutest
+detail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thorough
+training.
+
+The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who,
+drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that the
+united offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge,
+can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mounted
+riflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardi
+makes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assist
+us with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change of
+tactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirely
+abnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur.
+
+It must be remembered that after the first few weeks of 1900 the
+Cavalry in South Africa as an effective force had practically ceased
+to exist, and that its offensive action was greatly hampered by the
+strategical plan of campaign which we adopted subsequently to the
+occupation of Bloemfontein.
+
+All that might be deduced from the defensive tactics of a mounted
+force, such as the Boers put into the field, during this period, is
+that, possessing greater mobility, they were able to hold up, during
+short intervals, Cavalry whose capacity for mounted action was
+practically destroyed by the 'want of condition' of their horses.
+
+Acting strategically as they did at Colesberg, in the relief of
+Kimberley, and in the operations leading up to Paardeberg, results
+were obtained which affected the whole subsequent conduct of the War.
+From then onwards, with the Cavalry acting tactically on the enemy's
+flank, the Boer Army withdrew practically on Pretoria, and no decisive
+tactical result was obtained.
+
+If that was the object which the Superior Command had in view, the
+Cavalry carried out that purpose with remarkable distinction.
+
+It is, however, conceivable that their strategical employment in rear
+of the Boer Army might have produced a situation compelling the Boers
+to fight a pitched battle or to surrender.
+
+If the Cavalry failed to achieve more, it was not from any want of
+opportunity which the theatre of War presented, but because their true
+rôle was rarely assigned to them.
+
+That the Boers were able at a later period to develop a vigorous
+scheme of action was largely owing to our conception of a plan of
+campaign which made the occupation of small capitals rather than the
+destruction of the enemy's Army the strategic objective.
+
+Had the Boers understood the Art of War and taken advantage of the
+openings which their superior mobility gave them, or had they been
+possessed of a body of Cavalry capable of mounted action, say at
+Magersfontein, they might repeatedly have wrought confusion in our
+ranks.
+
+Although the Boer War was of an exceptional nature, and of a character
+unlikely to be met with again, it furnishes some useful object-lessons
+which exemplify the importance of preparedness in peace for the sudden
+outbreak of War, so that the Army may take the field in such force and
+so disposed as to compel decisive action on the part of the enemy in
+the first stages of the War, and be in a position to inflict a
+crushing defeat rather than a series of light blows, which latter tend
+to disperse rather than destroy the enemy's forces.
+
+The War further shows how highly mobile forces, such as those of the
+Boers, can withdraw from a combat to avoid defeat, and by scattering
+to elude pursuit, and then, by reassembling where least expected, can
+strike a sudden blow at the enemy's weakest point. That they failed to
+accomplish more was due to their ignorance of the higher Art of War.
+
+To this neglect of the strategic advantage which mobility gives we
+must add the many lost tactical opportunities of converting a British
+reverse into a decisive defeat. The Boers did all that could be
+expected of Mounted Infantry, but were powerless to crown victory as
+only the dash of Cavalry can do.
+
+If we take into account the many opportunities which the Boers gave
+for successful strategic and tactical employment to men trained to
+fight on horseback, we arrive at the conclusion that the Boer War may
+nevertheless, if studied carefully and intelligently, teach us the
+indispensability of Cavalry in the rôle so clearly described in
+General von Bernhardi's instructive work.
+
+In conclusion, I must express my thanks to His Excellency General von
+Bernhardi for his courtesy towards me in concurring in the idea of an
+English translation, and to General Sir John French for his valuable
+introductory comments.
+
+I also wish to express to Colonel F. N. Maude my best thanks for his
+friendly co-operation, which gave me the advantage of his expert
+interpretation of German technicalities.
+
+                                             C. S. GOLDMAN.
+
+  34, QUEEN ANNE'S GATE,
+       WESTMINSTER,
+           _September, 1906_.
+
+
+
+
+AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
+
+
+When, in the Spring of 1899, I published the first edition of this
+work, I ventured to express the hope that it might incite others both
+to thought and exertion, and might further prove of practical
+assistance to many.
+
+I think I may claim without undue immodesty that this wish of mine has
+in many directions been fulfilled. Of the demands, however, which I
+put forward concerning the organization and equipment of the Cavalry,
+none have as yet been put into execution, but much wholesome spade
+work has been accomplished, and the necessity of reforms, together
+with due recognition of their importance, has everywhere made further
+progress. It is to be hoped that the next few years will bring the
+fulfilment of some of these our most earnest desires.
+
+The principles of training and of tactics which I have advanced and
+endeavoured to establish have found very general acceptance throughout
+the Arm, and have helped to clear up difficulties, although, as indeed
+was to be expected, they have encountered opposition from several
+quarters.
+
+This result of my labours has encouraged me in the preparation of this
+new edition to make use of all the latest experience, to bring out
+with additional clearness essential points, and to add much new
+material.
+
+I trust that in this manner I have materially increased the practical
+value of the work, and hope that in its new form it will continue to
+exert its silent influence, winning new supporters for my views, and
+helping to gain for the splendid Arm to which I belong the place
+which, in the interest of the whole Army, it deserves.
+
+                                             THE AUTHOR.
+
+  STRAZBURG, IN THE WINTER OF 1902.
+
+
+
+
+AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
+
+
+It would be difficult for a layman to form even an approximate
+conception of the amount of work annually accomplished in the German
+Army.
+
+The very vivid consciousness stirring everywhere as to the magnitude
+of the demands the not far distant future may make upon us, and the
+knowledge that the means with which we are compelled to work are
+certainly not always in agreement with our ideals, incite us to strain
+every nerve to make the most of what we have; and I believe I am not
+far wrong in asserting that it is the Cavalry Arm which, under
+pressure of circumstances, responds to these demands with the greatest
+avidity. This is, in fact, but the necessary consequence of the
+many-sidedness of our duties.
+
+Whether, however, the end and aim of all our exertions is everywhere
+attained must remain an open question.
+
+In every long period of peace there lurks the danger that methods of
+training may deviate after false ideals, lose themselves in the cult
+of imposing appearances, and in the clash of individual opinions fail
+to distinguish the essential--_i.e._, what is really practicable under
+the conditions of active service.
+
+This danger is all the more imminent when the characters and forms of
+Warfare itself are constantly changing; hence, ever new demands have
+to be made upon the troops themselves, and the exact bearing of each
+of these is not easily to be appreciated in the humdrum surroundings
+of our peace-time duties.
+
+It seems, therefore, a most pressing necessity at the present moment,
+when changes in social conditions and constant technical progress are
+exerting on the external phenomena and conditions of Warfare a steady
+pressure in the direction of modification, that we should compare our
+peace training with the requirements likely to be made upon us in time
+of War. Thus we can note where further adjustments between the two are
+necessary and can be usefully made.
+
+In this process of analysis it will not suffice to take each changing
+factor independently, following it out to its utmost ramifications,
+but rather we must endeavour to take a general view of the whole, and
+balance the variables one against the other.
+
+The man who concentrates his attention only on one detail easily loses
+his grasp of relative values, and runs the risk of failing 'to see the
+wood for the trees,' and only the mind trained to contemplate each
+factor in its relation to the whole, and with a clear idea of the
+ultimate purpose for which this whole is intended, will be able to
+avoid this pitfall; for only an intellect thus prepared can
+successfully harmonize the whole with its part, and, while keeping the
+essentials clearly before its eyes, treat the unessential as it
+deserves.
+
+It is in order to bring out this point of view that the following
+pages have been undertaken.
+
+As I endeavoured to arrive at a thoroughly clear comprehension of the
+many conflicting interests involved in the training of men and horses,
+as I tried to decide how to apportion both time and means to each
+individual branch of their education, and to see how far the
+traditions of the past could be harmonized with the requirements of
+the future, or where and how they need further development and
+simplification, I found myself compelled at every turn to go back and
+seek my ideal standard in the demands which War itself must make upon
+all Arms.
+
+Thus my work must be considered as an attempt to represent in broad
+outlines the conditions of the coming War, and from these to deduce
+logically the requirements a rational system of organization and
+training must satisfy.
+
+Those who hold different opinions as to the tasks which will be
+entrusted to our particular Arm will naturally come to other
+conclusions as to the values to be assigned to peace education, and I
+do not wish to present my opinions as absolutely final, although I
+have done my utmost to treat my subject-matter objectively and without
+prejudice.
+
+Meanwhile, the problems I have submitted for investigation are not
+only of military interest, but of the utmost military importance, and
+it has, therefore, seemed to me well worth while to discuss them from
+every point of view.
+
+Further, because these investigations owe their origin to the
+practical need I experienced during the course of my service to clear
+up the many points I have dwelt on, I have considered it a duty to
+make them accessible to all those who have at heart the development in
+our Cavalry of a thoroughly sound spirit in full harmony with the
+necessities of our present times.
+
+                                             THE AUTHOR.
+
+  BERLIN,
+     _March, 1899_.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                                  Page
+
+  INTRODUCTION                                                     xxi
+
+
+  PART I
+
+  EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP
+
+  Chapter
+
+     I. THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE
+        EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY                         3
+
+    II. DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR    19
+
+   III. STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY                     38
+
+    IV. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION                   49
+
+     V. THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS                     62
+
+    VI. TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS                      90
+
+   VII. STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY                          104
+
+  VIII. PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS                 132
+
+
+  PART II
+
+  ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
+
+     I. NUMBERS                                                    151
+
+    II. RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING                              184
+
+   III. THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT                            213
+
+    IV. TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING                           247
+
+     V. FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES                      265
+
+    VI. THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS                       286
+
+
+  CONCLUSION                                                       294
+
+  INDEX                                                            298
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+General von Bernhardi's work, 'Cavalry in Future Wars' (translated
+from the German by Mr. C. S. Goldman), is a most valuable addition to
+modern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment to
+counteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have been
+drawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reported
+operations in the late Manchurian War.
+
+One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commented
+upon that campaign have said that what is termed the 'Cavalry spirit'
+is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that the
+Cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead of
+the means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that we
+must render our Cavalry less devoted to 'manoeuvres' and to
+'tournaments,' in order to enable them to fit themselves to take part
+in modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods of
+Warfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine to
+defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely.
+
+I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in European
+Armies, but as regards the British Cavalry, I am absolutely convinced
+that the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the utmost without
+in the least degree prejudicing either training in dismounted duties
+or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the part of leaders
+as will enable them to discern when and where to resort to dismounted
+methods.
+
+How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its rôle in war until the enemy's
+Cavalry is defeated and paralyzed? I challenge any Cavalry officer,
+British or foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as such
+against its own Arm, can never attain complete success unless it is
+proficient in shock tactics.
+
+Cavalry soldiers must of course learn to be expert rifle shots, but
+the attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer by
+ignoring the horse, the sword, or the lance. On the contrary, the
+'élan' and dash which perfection in Cavalry manoeuvre imparts to large
+bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their employment as
+mounted riflemen when the field is laid open to their enterprise in
+this rôle by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry.
+
+That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent War did not distinguish
+themselves or their Arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite
+apparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the
+riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence
+were only enabled to fulfil generally the rôle of Divisional Cavalry,
+which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on the
+Russian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have been
+trained on _exactly the same principles_ which these writers now
+advocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought of
+nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they
+lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display
+of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.
+
+The author of this book is an eminent soldier, possessing an intimate
+knowledge of practical fighting, gained chiefly in one of the greatest
+Wars of modern times--the Franco-German Campaign of 1870-1871.
+
+His opinions are entitled to profound respect, and demand close
+attention and consideration. The General has treated his subject and
+marshalled his arguments and statements in so logical and intelligent
+a manner, and the principles he deduces seem so sound and appropriate,
+that the conclusions he arrives at appear to me unanswerable.
+
+In the exhaustive and capable summary of the work of Cavalry in War,
+General von Bernhardi seems to follow very closely the line of thought
+which has in recent years occupied the brains of many practical
+Cavalry soldiers in this country. He appeals strongly to our
+intellectual sympathy when he first of all discusses the strategical
+employment of Cavalry in all its bearings, and afterwards proceeds to
+unfold his views as to the rôle of the Cavalry Arm, first when the
+enemy's Cavalry has been driven from the field, and secondly in
+conjunction with the other Arms. Personally, I have never known the
+'Case for the Cavalry' stated more clearly and intelligently.
+
+In recommending the study of the book to all British soldiers, I would
+draw particular attention to the author's constant and repeated
+references to the necessity of first seeking out and fighting the
+hostile Cavalry and driving them from the field--in other words, to
+the immediate and complete attainment of the moral superiority.
+
+In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the important
+results gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870-1871 campaign were
+due to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalry
+more than to anything else, and he contends that in future Wars, where
+the Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, this
+supremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormous
+increase in the difficulty with which the Cavalry Arm will carry out
+its rôle. He scoffs at the idea held by so many 'amateurs' that
+'Cavalry duels' are superfluous.
+
+Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, and
+have been charged with their training in peace-time, can realize to
+the full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which General
+von Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that the
+mischievous teaching which scoffs at 'manoeuvres,' 'tournaments,' and
+the 'Cavalry spirit,' proceeds almost entirely from the pens and from
+the brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling of
+the Cavalry Arm.
+
+The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-day
+seems to me to lie in the fact that this particular vein of thought
+and argument pervades it throughout.
+
+The General tells us, with the soundest arguments and the most
+positive proofs, that 'the brilliant field of enterprise which is open
+to the Cavalry soldier in his rôle as a mounted rifleman can only be
+attained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry.'
+
+The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminary
+overthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea that
+the Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismounted
+action when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically that
+the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostile
+Cavalry once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, a
+brilliant rôle lies open to that Arm by reason of their possession of
+an efficient firearm, in the use of which the cavalryman has received
+a thorough training.
+
+The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity of
+discovering a Leader who possesses the 'power of holding the balance
+correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the
+former never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter.'
+'Whether,' says the General, 'it be in the working out of some
+strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
+by united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment and
+absence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence in
+normal natures.'
+
+In dwelling so persistently upon the necessity for Cavalry being
+trained to the highest possible pitch to meet the enemy's Cavalry, I
+do not wish to be misunderstood. I agree absolutely with the author in
+the principle he lays down that the Cavalry fight is only a means to
+an end, but it is the most important means, and I have thought it
+right to comment upon this because it is a principle which in this
+country, since the South African War, we have been very much inclined
+to overlook. To place a force of Cavalry in the field in support of a
+great Army which is deficient in the power to overcome the opposing
+Cavalry is to act like one who would despatch a squadron of
+war-vessels badly armed, badly trained, and ill found, to blockade a
+distant coast-line defended by a powerful fleet. What is the naval
+fight in the open sea but a means to an end? It would be as sensible
+to dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleets
+as to lay down the principle that the 'Cavalry battle' in no way
+affects the mutual situation of hostile armies.
+
+But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid
+down must never be lost sight of.
+
+Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service of
+reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to
+a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry,
+when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in this
+way, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack.
+
+Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the
+increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on
+Cavalry at manoeuvres and elsewhere being _ultra-cautious_. They try
+to inculcate such a respect for Infantry fire that Cavalry is taught
+to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry come within sight,
+squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or dismount and shoot,
+regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the ground happens to be.
+
+I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war
+efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard
+altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on
+our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are
+many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable
+consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.
+
+After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following report
+to the King of Prussia:--
+
+'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in
+_self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres,
+where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore
+shirked independent bold action, and kept far in rear, and as much as
+possible out of sight' (Moltke's 'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze,'
+Berlin, 1900).
+
+By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey such
+timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words
+of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination
+to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which
+might bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run risk
+of suffering loss.
+
+History is full of similar instances of how _not_ to train Cavalry,
+and I hold most strongly that the Arm must be educated up to a
+readiness _to act_, to come to close quarters in co-operation with the
+other Arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry has often done before
+without losing its 'battle' value.
+
+To sum up, training with a view to self-sacrifice during peace
+exercises is essential for the success of all Arms in War, but
+especially so for Cavalry.
+
+With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General von
+Bernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject
+demanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced that
+he who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubt
+and will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast rôle his Arm is
+called upon to fulfil in War, and he will realize how, in mastering
+the great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be assisting
+in the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and glory of the
+great Service to which he belongs.
+
+
+
+
+I
+
+EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT
+AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY
+
+
+The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has been
+revolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition that
+affects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almost
+every particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree of
+perfection which compels us to take into account possibilities which
+did not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of the
+past can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universal
+introduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction in
+length of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed the
+character of almost all European Armies.
+
+All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former days
+disappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. New
+groupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities,
+and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization,
+together with the reduction in the period of service which has been
+very generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of the
+troops, whilst at the same time the 'masses' have risen to
+unimaginable dimensions. This '_folie des nombres_,' against which
+certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern reality.
+
+Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating
+year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in
+future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent
+come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which,
+from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.
+
+The enormous development of railway communication has changed all
+conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway
+to move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both
+in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies
+themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing
+degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably
+make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same
+time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions
+appear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of
+War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of
+communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously
+great vulnerability.
+
+On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers
+greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in
+the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished
+enormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by
+frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's
+flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His
+endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel
+his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'
+
+This increased importance of the communications, which in already
+exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will compel
+the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.
+
+All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the
+importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which,
+in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This
+final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may
+struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided
+experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of
+all operations due to the increased masses and the more concentrated
+susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive
+factors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategic
+direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they
+have attained and their endurance.'[1]
+
+         [Footnote 1: The contrary view to this was largely held by a
+         certain school in Germany, whose views the author is here
+         endeavouring to combat.]
+
+To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressure
+of which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development and
+forced the infantry to change their whole constitution (whether to
+their advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at all
+commensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in the
+Cavalry.
+
+Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from which
+they can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constant
+replenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service,
+because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of its existence, it can
+scarcely count on having the wastage of War made good by equally
+well-trained men and horses; still less is its complete replacement in
+case of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we have to
+recognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in all
+European Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of the
+other Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show this
+clearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:
+
+  1870.
+
+  463 Battalions.
+  460 Squadrons.
+  251 Batteries.
+  15-3/4 Pioneer Battalions.
+
+  1902.
+
+  625 Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles').
+  486 Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles).
+  562 Batteries.
+  38 Battalions Heavy Artillery.
+  28 Pioneer Battalions.
+
+This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent on
+mobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehr
+formations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the few
+new units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant.
+Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry forms
+numerically an almost insignificant factor.
+
+There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedly
+there has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On the
+basis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last forty
+years (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changes
+in armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, more
+particularly with regard to armament. The necessity and possibility
+of strategical reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry have
+been fully recognised.
+
+The conviction also has been arrived at that only when supplied with a
+useful firearm and an adequate allowance of Horse Artillery will such
+'masses' prove adequate for the accomplishment of this special task.
+With the same object in view, the means have been granted to them with
+which to destroy telegraphs and railways, to bridge rivers, and so
+forth. The conviction also has been gained that the Cavalry require to
+be so familiarized with tactical formations for their employment in
+'mass' that they shall have become a second nature to them if they are
+to fight with a reasonable prospect of success. But all that has been
+done in these directions still remains insufficient. On the one hand,
+the improvements introduced have not taken into account the decisive
+changes in the general conditions which only the last few years have
+brought about. On the other, we must not forget that neither the
+Prussian Cavalry in 1870 in France nor the Russians against the Turks
+in 1877-1878 had even approximately equal Cavalry to oppose them. Even
+the great results achieved alternately by the Cavalry on both sides
+during the American Civil War were obtained in general under
+conditions which can no longer be anticipated, for at the moment of
+collision neither encountered, as a rule, either equal quality or
+numbers sufficient to develop their full power of attack.
+
+The very important data obtained during the campaign of 1899-1900 in
+South Africa as to the employment of dismounted action by Cavalry were
+also not then before us. One could only, therefore, reason from
+one-sided experiences, which can no longer be recognised as generally
+sufficient for our purpose. In future the mere possibility of results
+such as in 1870-1871 we so often gained owing to the absence of any
+serious opposition on the part of the opposing Cavalry, will nowadays
+have to be obstinately fought for, not without considerable loss; and
+it needs no special proof to show what an enormous increase in the
+difficulty of our task this involves, and how, as a consequence, all
+the conditions of our future action must be modified.
+
+Thus, the Cavalry stands face to face with new conditions, and sees
+itself everywhere confronted--on the battle-field and in the wider
+field of strategical operations--with new problems, towards the
+solution of which the history of the past furnishes only very general
+indications.
+
+If we mean to maintain our position as an effective Arm, and satisfy
+the demands that of necessity must be made upon us by these new
+conditions, _we must break_ with many experiences of the past, and
+work out for ourselves principles of action which must be deduced
+essentially from the probable requirements of the future.
+
+Each epoch-making War makes new demands upon us and prescribes new
+tasks, and he only will reap the palm of success who is able to meet
+them, because, with wise prevision, he has prepared himself to solve
+their difficulties in peace.
+
+If we wish to make an approximately correct picture of the future that
+awaits us, we must first face the question, What will be the influence
+that the changed conditions in the Art of War considered as a whole
+must exercise on the possible scope of action of our Arm?
+
+From the answer to this we can deduce the demands on the Cavalry in
+particular, and these demands give us a means for determining the
+limits of its employment, its consequent organization, and the
+training best suited to enable it to meet these requirements.
+
+If we summarize all the conditions which have modified the conduct of
+War and contrast with them what Cavalry, from the very nature of its
+being, is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight as if
+every form of action of the mounted Arm has been impeded and rendered
+more difficult in the highest degree; more particularly is this the
+case when opposed to the increased power of modern arms. Certainly,
+the impact of a modern bullet may at times produce less immediate
+effect than formerly. Cases have occurred in which serious wounds did
+not place the individual out of action immediately, and we may
+therefore anticipate that many horses will not be stopped in the
+charge, despite severe injuries. But this drawback the Infantry can
+meet by opening fire sooner. To the Artillery this does not apply;
+and, in any case, this objection is not of such importance as to
+neutralize in any way the other advantages conferred by modern
+weapons.
+
+Owing to the fact that the extent of the danger zone has been very
+considerably increased, and that within these zones the amount of fire
+which has to be faced in a given time has been intensified to a degree
+which formerly could hardly have been dreamt of, it has ceased to be
+possible to ride straight at the front of an unshaken enemy.
+
+Thus, essentially the Cavalry has been driven out of its former place
+of honour on the battle-fields of the plains, and has been compelled
+to seek the assistance of the cover the ground affords in order to
+carry its own power of destruction into immediate contact with its
+enemy, and only under most exceptionally favourable conditions will it
+still be possible to deliver a charge direct across the open.
+
+Further, as far as the Infantry are concerned, it will be quite the
+exception to encounter them in closed bodies; generally we shall have
+to ride against extended lines, which offer a most unfavourable target
+for our purpose.
+
+The difficulties both of observation and reconnaissance have also been
+materially increased, for, on the one hand, the increased range of the
+firearm compels one to keep further away from the enemy, thus making
+it more difficult to judge with accuracy his strength and positions;
+on the other, the use of smokeless powder, which no longer reveals the
+position of the firing line, renders a more thorough searching of the
+ground even more indispensable than formerly.
+
+The possible participation of the civilian inhabitants of the invaded
+Nation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalry
+action other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts it
+may, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of all
+patrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by a
+new and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we may
+estimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of the
+Franco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all such
+experiences will be very much intensified.
+
+Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to the
+other Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of the
+latter cover larger areas, and whether to cover these or to
+reconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger spaces,
+notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers--_i.e._, on each square
+mile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reduced
+number of patrols, etc.
+
+Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity to
+intervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, but
+relatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage secured
+will thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent,
+since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents a
+smaller proportion of his whole Army.
+
+If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, is
+annihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if this
+Brigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps.
+
+If in these changed relations there are obviously factors which
+materially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which must
+make the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, on
+the other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of a
+future War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigation
+lead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is even
+greater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, and
+even on the battle-field revealing new chances of success.
+
+Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater the
+pitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, the
+greater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be the
+reaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them.
+
+Now that all European States are straining every nerve to employ
+enormous masses of men from the first moment of hostilities, in order
+thus to gain an advantage whilst their enemy is still concentrating,
+and when we further consider how these exertions must increase the
+strain throughout the nation to the very utmost, it must be apparent
+that the first great decision of Arms must be of overwhelming
+importance. Not only the troops directly concerned, but the 'masses'
+behind them, find themselves for the moment involved in the
+consequences of victory or defeat. Hence the reaction in either
+direction, owing to the lower average quality of the troops, their
+greater numbers, the increased difficulties of moving them, and the
+susceptibility to congestion of their rearward communications, must be
+far greater and far more disastrous than hitherto under similar
+tactical conditions.
+
+The more important it is to secure a favourable decision, the more
+difficult with growing masses to divert an operation once commenced,
+to give it a new direction or assign it a new objective, the less
+possible it becomes to alter dispositions which may have been issued
+on false premises; hence again _the greater grows the value of
+thorough and active reconnoitring_.
+
+If this holds good, more especially for the first great collision, it
+remains also a guiding principle for all future operations; for, on
+the one side, it is probable that even in its later stages the War
+will be conducted with comparatively great masses; on the other, as we
+have seen, _the importance of the strategical element has
+unquestionably grown_; hence the _value of efficient reconnaissance_
+has been proportionably intensified.
+
+In similar measure the importance of screening has also developed. In
+proportion as the assailant is compelled to resort to turning
+movements and surprises, the defender is obliged to have recourse to
+timely changes of front and unexpected counter-attacks; hence for
+both timely reconnaissance of the enemy's, as well as for trustworthy
+screening of one's own operations, the extended employment of the
+mounted Arms has become imperative. In other words, although
+reconnaissance and screening for strategical purposes by the Cavalry
+have been rendered more difficult by the conditions we must expect to
+meet in the future, on the other hand, they have gained enormously in
+importance. And it is not in this direction alone that the value of
+the Arm has increased, but it has also had a new and important field
+of activity thrown open to it owing to the increased susceptibility
+the rearward communications of the enemy and his railways have
+developed.
+
+As a consequence of the increased liability to interruption of these
+communications, and also of the far more serious confusion to which
+any such interruption can give rise, it has become far more difficult
+than in the past to execute offensive flanking operations, changes of
+front, or counter-attacks, all of which are movements which the
+practical strategist must bear in mind. On paper and on the map such
+undertakings appear to present no more elements of friction than
+formerly, but on the ground itself those who have once seen masses of
+several corps all huddled together know that things are very
+different. All such movements nowadays are tied to the railway-lines,
+and these, again, are congested by the flow of food and ammunition,
+which must at all costs be maintained. Fresh units also of troops may
+be coming up to the front, whose arrival is of the last importance in
+the plans of the generalissimo, and a single broken viaduct may throw
+confusion into the whole design.
+
+In a densely-populated and fruitful district the resulting failure of
+supply may be endured, but it is very different when in a
+poverty-stricken district the supply of a whole Army depends on
+perhaps a single line of railway.
+
+Thus the Cavalry sees itself confronted by a task in the solution of
+which it can achieve results of _decisive importance_ in a new
+direction, for the following reasons: The relative importance of the
+Arm during actual operations having been materially increased, the
+period of concentration preceding actual collision (notwithstanding
+the fact that the actual effectiveness of Cavalry in the face of
+modern firearms has been decreased) offers opportunities which under
+certain conditions promise higher results than formerly.
+
+If every delay in the march which may be caused by the action of
+Cavalry against the flanking lines of advance of an Army concentrating
+for battle is detrimental, how much greater would be the
+disorganization resulting from similar operations after defeat! Very
+rarely in such a case would it be possible to retire eccentrically by
+the same roads which were used for advance. The beaten troops
+generally drift back quite involuntarily in the direction into which
+they have been compelled by the results of the tactical decision. The
+wider the original front, the greater the masses of the troops
+concerned (which are now not only in a demoralized condition, but are
+compelled, under pressure of pursuit, to change their communications
+into new directions, and for this purpose to disentangle the columns
+drawn in for the concentration) and the greater the certainty that
+conditions must arise which will give to an active Cavalry an even
+richer opportunity of harvest than was formerly open to them.
+
+This will in future be all the more the case when troops of lower
+quality, and therefore more liable to become shaken and dispirited,
+have to be employed. Reserve formations--Landwehr and the like--which
+under favourable conditions might render excellent service, when once
+beaten, without officers, weary and hungry, lose all cohesion, when,
+with baggage, wounded, and stragglers, they are driven back over
+crowded roads; and then, no matter how well they are armed, they are
+an easy prey to a pursuing Cavalry.
+
+The man who throws his rifle away or shoots in the air will not find
+salvation either in clip-loading or smokeless powder against the lance
+in the hands of a relentless pursuing Cavalry.
+
+The same holds good for the fight itself. We cannot attack even
+inferior Infantry as long as it only keeps the muzzles of its rifles
+down and shoots straight; but once it is morally broken and surprised,
+then the greatest results are still to be achieved even on an open
+battle-field. That, at least, the campaign of 1870-1871 sufficiently
+proved, although the Cavalry were so seldom allowed the opportunity to
+reap the ripe harvest our strategy and the action of the other Arms
+had so abundantly prepared for them.
+
+A further point in our favour is to be found in the fact that the
+increased power of modern Artillery fire has rendered the defence of
+villages and woods practically an impossibility. The Infantry are thus
+compelled to seek open but rolling ground, and it is precisely such
+ground which favours the concealed approach and sudden attack of the
+Cavalry; but surprise is the very essence of successful Cavalry
+action.
+
+If we bring together all these points of view which have been hitherto
+only indicated, we find, on the one hand, the absolute fighting value
+of the Cavalry has considerably diminished, and that in modern War the
+conditions of Cavalry employment will in every direction be rendered
+more difficult; on the other hand, the strategical importance of the
+Arm, as well as the scope of the duties which it may be called upon to
+fulfil, have increased very decidedly, and very important new
+opportunities for successes have been thrown open to it.
+
+We cannot sufficiently insist upon the cumulative effects which all
+these general changes in the nature of War have exercised upon the
+Cavalry Arm; for not only has public opinion taken up the opposite
+view, but even in the Army itself these positive views have not
+received the attention they deserve.
+
+The exploits of our Cavalry in 1870-1871 have been universally
+admired, without, however, being appreciated at their true relative
+value. On the other hand, reasoning from the mechanical perfection of
+the firearm, the conclusion has been reached that, as against Infantry
+and Artillery, the Cavalry can no longer hope to achieve any results
+of importance. It has been shown that in 1870-1871 the German Cavalry
+possessed a great numerical superiority over its adversary--that, in
+fact, numerous regiments during the whole War either never came into
+action at all or at least never had the opportunity to exhibit their
+full value in other fields of employment, and hence it has been
+concluded that an increase or organic reform of what they are pleased
+to consider a somewhat antiquated Cavalry is quite superfluous.
+
+An attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to introduce an
+increase of establishments had to give way to more important
+considerations. In fact, practically the German Cavalry in number and
+organization remains to-day the same as in 1870.
+
+But the duties which in future will fall to the Cavalry are so
+wide-reaching, and for the conduct of the War are often of such
+decisive importance, that on the manner of their execution the
+ultimate results of a campaign must very materially depend.
+
+If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties,
+we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravest
+danger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply the
+reforming hand where important deficiencies and practical
+insufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever of
+reform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in our
+own minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of the
+Cavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of the
+demands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in what
+direction its further evolution can be initiated.
+
+We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands to
+be made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, test
+them with a view to their relative importance towards the result as a
+whole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success in
+each individual phase principally depends.
+
+In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made on
+the Cavalry during the early periods after the declaration of
+hostilities--that is, during mobilization and concentration. These
+require all the more attention because, as we have seen, it is
+particularly these introductory stages of future War which will be of
+particular importance, and because it is precisely in these very
+points that opinion is as yet not united.
+
+Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course of
+operations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the most
+important results are to be obtained.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR
+
+
+The importance which attaches to the first tactical decisions, the
+fact that their success is mainly determined by the uninterrupted
+execution of the railway deployment, the safe arrival of the troops
+and war material in the appointed zones of concentration, the
+consideration that the continuance of the operation after the first
+battle--retreat or pursuit--is mainly conditioned by the uninterrupted
+action of the rearward communications, make it indubitable that it is
+of the utmost importance to disturb the corresponding operations of
+the enemy, and thus place one's own Army from the very beginning in a
+position of material and strategic advantage.
+
+Since the Cavalry is not only able to cover great distances with
+overwhelming rapidity, but also, owing to its special character as a
+standing branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate,
+whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with their
+mobilization, the opinion has been freely expressed that it would be
+advantageous to utilize this period required for the mobilization and
+railway transport of the other Arms for Cavalry raids, either into
+the zone of concentration, or against the communications of the enemy.
+Russia has for this very purpose concentrated upon the German and
+Austrian frontiers enormous Cavalry forces, supported by light
+infantry. France also keeps a numerous Cavalry practically on a war
+footing on the frontiers of Lorraine.
+
+On the outbreak of War these masses are ready at the shortest notice
+to ride over our frontiers, to break up our railways, to seize our
+horses and depots, to destroy our magazines, and to carry terror and
+consternation into our zone of assembly.
+
+It cannot be denied that in such manner by no means inconsiderable
+damage could be caused, and hence one must earnestly consider, first,
+what chances of success such enterprises offer, and next, whether the
+relative magnitude of the probable results are proportionate to the
+probable losses they must necessarily entail.
+
+Cool and objective consideration of such ideas must, in my opinion,
+lead us to negative such undertakings--on our side, at any rate. In
+the first place, the enemy will always be in a position, by suitable
+organization of his frontier guards and the situation selected for the
+front of his strategic deployment, to withdraw himself either
+altogether from the radius of action of the Cavalry, or at least
+render its advance both difficult and dangerous. The danger will be
+the greater the more it has been possible to provide for the armament
+and organization of the population in the frontier provinces. Where
+the conditions on the side of the defender are not unusually
+unfavourable--as, for instance, in wide open districts--or where there
+is a want of troops in strategically unimportant provinces, then even
+if the invading masses break in on the very first day of mobilization,
+they will find railways, defiles, river-crossings already defended by
+infantry or popular levies. If they come upon an insurgent population
+they will find great difficulties both in reconnaissance and
+subsistence.
+
+At every step they advance, the numbers of the opponent will be
+constantly increasing, while their own strength diminishes. The
+defiles will be occupied between their several columns, and they must
+guard themselves in every direction. Their trains and baggage get into
+confusion, and supply becomes all the more difficult the more rapidly
+they advance, because the waggons cannot keep up with their movement,
+and there is no time for requisitioning. Field batteries and lines of
+infantry occupy the more important positions, the enemy's Cavalry
+appears on the flanks, and man and horse break down at length under
+the severity of the strain. Retreat becomes inevitable, and if they
+ever get back at all, they can only reach their own Army after heavy
+losses and with broken force. The damage which they can do to the
+enemy remains small in proportion to his total power, even though it
+is locally not inconsiderable. At the best one may hope to destroy
+some railway not too far from the frontier, interrupt some telegraph
+lines of communication, and disperse or capture some ammunition
+depots, magazines, or snap up some convoys of reserve men and horses.
+But the enemy has already taken these possibilities into account; they
+will soon be overcome, and his arrangements in general will be hardly
+disturbed.
+
+If, on the other hand, the Cavalry is accompanied by infantry, it will
+be even more hampered in its movements than by its own trains, and
+will soon have to decide whether it should make its movements
+dependent on those of its escort, thereby renouncing all hopes of
+further results, or whether it should abandon the infantry to its
+fate. Certain defiles in the vicinity of the frontier, which the
+combined forces were able in advancing to occupy, the infantry may
+well succeed in keeping open; but if it attempts to follow the tracks
+of its own Cavalry, there can be no doubt it would be exposed to
+inevitable destruction.
+
+This applies equally to the cyclist--at least, as far as the machine
+has as yet been developed; for though one cannot deny the great
+advantage which its mobility under certain circumstances offers, yet
+it remains too dependent on roads and weather to insure that freedom
+and certainty of movement which in such undertakings in conjunction
+with Cavalry are unconditionally necessary.
+
+The attempt to break up communications by well-mounted officers
+patrols boldly pushed forward in advance would seem to offer even less
+chances of securing permanent results. They, too, will find the
+country obstructed by the armed population, or by troops in the act of
+concentration. Even weak detachments or patrols along the railway
+would suffice to effectively resist them; they can depend for success
+only on their rapidity and cunning. But most rivers are unfordable,
+and in the woods patrols can hardly venture, because every tree may
+shelter a man with a rifle. Once they leave the roads, their pace
+diminishes; they easily lose their direction; nowhere can they obtain
+security for rest and food, even if they are fortunate enough in
+procuring any. If, in spite of all this, they do happen to succeed in
+blowing up a railway or cutting a telegraph, the effect is
+infinitesimal.
+
+The patrol itself will find its chances of escape decreasing in exact
+proportion to the distance it has penetrated into the enemy's country.
+
+The greater the number of the patrols employed, the more irreplaceable
+will the inevitable loss become; for it will always be the best
+officers, the men who put most energy and determination into the
+execution of their instructions, who are the most likely to fall
+victims to their courage and audacity.
+
+Premature advance of the Cavalry during mobilization and concentration
+can only procure information of little or no importance, for the
+existing railways, the direction of the frontiers, and the peace-time
+distribution of the troops reveal all this to the General Staff
+beforehand. These, together with the secret service, political
+conditions obtaining at the moment, and press intelligence, will
+enable one to forecast with some degree of precision the general
+situation.
+
+Now, the Cavalry can hardly expect to attain more--indeed, it is
+doubtful whether they would succeed even in confirming what is already
+known, for the difficulties to be overcome, as we have seen, are
+numerous, and nowhere can one find completed situations from which to
+make reliable deductions. At most they can determine that certain
+places are already occupied, and that the traffic on certain lines is
+considerable, things that one knew _a priori_, which, therefore, are
+not worth any serious sacrifice. Moreover, it is exceedingly doubtful
+whether, at such an early period, when conditions are changing from
+day to day, such information has any practical value.
+
+Of course, it is not intended to maintain that one should not from the
+very first moment after the declaration of War keep a sharp look-out
+upon the enemy, work up to him, and seek to determine as much as
+rapidity and daring can succeed, with any probability of success, in
+attaining--that goes without saying. Particular value will always
+attach to the taking of prisoners, whose regimental numbers enable us
+to check the accuracy of our existing information. But against this we
+must emphasize all the more forcibly that in this first period of
+hostilities an inundation of the enemy's zone of concentration with
+masses or by far-flung lines of patrols is not only not expedient, but
+absolutely detrimental, since the certain cost of such undertakings
+stands in no reasonable proportion to the probably negative, or at
+most insignificant, result to be expected. Further, our own
+concentration has already been so prepared in peace that it must be
+carried out with clock-like regularity, even should the results of the
+reconnaissance disclose that the conditions on the side of the enemy
+were not quite those that we had originally expected.
+
+Even the mere transference backwards of the line of strategic
+deployment, which in 1870 could still be carried out without serious
+difficulties or drawbacks, could nowadays, in view of the high tension
+induced by modern conditions, only be executed with extraordinary
+difficulty, whilst lateral displacement of such numbers is quite
+inconceivable. For even if the railway organization would suffice for
+the execution of such a design, the many other preparations in the
+zone of concentration can neither be moved nor improvised.
+
+Summarizing the whole question, the conclusion, I think, must be, that
+only that Army which has at its disposal a great preponderance of
+Cavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment of
+its mounted forces.
+
+In general, the difficulties of replacing the losses of the Cavalry
+with material of equal quality are so great that only the most
+important reasons could justify any such attempts. Hence the side
+which is weaker in Cavalry will meet the circumstances best by keeping
+back its horsemen, and not sacrificing its officers for infinitesimal,
+and probably unattainable, advantages. It will be better merely to
+work up to the enemy as close as may be possible without serious
+losses, allow the enemy's mounted forces to wreck themselves against
+the opposing infantry and armed population, and only then to put in
+its Cavalry for decisive action when the opponent has already wasted
+his best elements in the pursuit of insignificant advantages. After
+all, it is only then, when the strategical concentration commences,
+after railway movement is completed, that reconnaissance becomes both
+possible and important.
+
+Circumstances can, of course, arise in which, already during the first
+period of operations, exhaustive independent activity may be demanded
+from the Cavalry, as, for instance, when one has reason to believe
+that the enemy has changed his previously-selected zone of
+concentration, or, as when in 1870 on the German side, it becomes
+necessary to take steps to protect the frontier districts against the
+enemy's raids. In the first case the attempts to discover, by the
+employment of Cavalry, the changed dispositions of the enemy are
+certainly permissible. The patrols must then go forward until they can
+settle the decisive questions, and strong detachments must be pushed
+out so close behind them that the patrols and their following
+squadrons can find a safe retreat, and insure the transmission of the
+intelligence they have collected.
+
+In such enterprises tactical collision with the enemy's Cavalry and
+his frontier troops might ensue. It may therefore be necessary to
+support our squadrons by Infantry and Artillery.
+
+But in every case we must be careful to keep within the limits which
+are conditioned by the purpose of the undertaking, and not allow
+ourselves to be involved in desperate and doubtful enterprises.
+
+In the next case the duties of the Cavalry are merely defensive. All
+that then matters is to rob small bodies of the enemy of their
+opportunities, to block the traffic across the frontier, and to work
+round their patrols with our own forces; but in no case are they to
+attempt to obtain positive advantages by force, or to hazard important
+decisions against a superior enemy. Wherever possible every effort
+should be made to supplement the troops assigned to this defensive
+attitude by the armed population, or even to replace them by such
+levies altogether. The fortification and defence of villages and
+isolated farms, occupation of railways and watercourses, and, above
+all, the defence of woods which might favour the concealed advance of
+the enemy's patrols, can well be left to the care of these improvised
+formations.
+
+Hostile attempts can be generally met by dismounted fire action in
+well-chosen strong defensive country, possibly supported by
+detachments of Infantry, Artillery, and 'Landsturm.' If the enemy's
+superiority is great, then one must retire until the equilibrium of
+the forces is re-established, the strategical necessity compels us to
+fight, or, finally, the tactical situation gives good promise of
+success.
+
+One must, however, always keep this clearly before one's mind: that
+the essence of all Cavalry action in the opening stage of the War lies
+neither in this purely defensive attitude, nor in the offensive
+enterprises previously alluded to, by which the concentration of the
+enemy would be disturbed or other material successes might be
+achieved, but that the decisive purpose only begins when important and
+possible tasks can be given to the Cavalry--_i.e._, when the main
+bodies of the enemy become ready for operations.
+
+Then it becomes our duty to screen not only the advance of our own
+troops and to secure to our Infantry the advantages of being able to
+advance undisturbed, but the climax of all these duties will be
+reached _in the far more important duty_, in the now indispensable
+task, of securing the _widest possible sphere of intelligence_.
+
+Whereas, during the period of railway concentration the front of the
+enemy was conditioned by the ends of the lines employed in bringing up
+the troops, who in turn spread themselves out to utilize the resources
+of the country (hence generally our patrols, if sent out, would come
+in contact all along the threatened frontier or the enemy's line of
+detrainment, with defended villages, etc.), the troops will now be
+drawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group themselves
+together into clearly-defined masses.
+
+There will therefore now arise between separate portions of his Army
+and their lines of advance, spaces unoccupied by troops into which our
+Cavalry can penetrate. The heads and flanks of his columns can now be
+determined, and the direction in which they are marching, thus
+ascertained, becomes of essential importance.
+
+Now is the time when the Cavalry must put in its full strength to
+discover the strength and direction of the enemy's movements, and the
+fact of this concentration provides the Cavalry with the opportunities
+necessary to solve the problem before it.
+
+Of course, immediately after detraining, troops will have to march to
+the districts to which they are assigned for convenience of supply,
+and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which it
+will be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not be
+overlooked that observations during this period may easily lead to
+false conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes or
+introductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing upon
+the design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop after
+a certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence the
+essence of the whole question resolves itself into this--that the
+Cavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategical
+concentration begins.
+
+From the results now obtained the success of the whole campaign may
+entirely depend. At this climax no secondary consideration must be
+allowed to distract attention from the principal object. Even the
+desirability of screening the movements of one's own Army, in so far
+as this duty is not fulfilled by the reconnaissance itself, must give
+way to the attainment of the principal object in view, which is
+_intelligence_, not _security_.
+
+This point requires to be more particularly insisted upon, because
+fundamentally different arrangements are necessary to fulfil these two
+purposes. Anyone who attempted to entrust both the provision of
+intelligence and the protection of the troops to one and the same body
+of men would in the vast majority of cases fail to secure either
+purpose as long as the enemy's mounted forces still held the field.
+
+To secure information--_i.e._, intelligence--requires concentration of
+force. The reconnoitring Cavalry must beat their opponents out of the
+field in order to obtain opportunities for discovering what is going
+on behind the enemy's protective screen. To accomplish this, the
+Cavalry must endeavour to work round the adversary's flanks, and may
+in consequence have to leave the front of its own Army entirely
+uncovered. The protection of this Army, on the other hand, requires a
+wide extension of front and consequent subdivision of force, the exact
+opposite of the concentration the provision of intelligence
+imperatively calls for.
+
+Naturally this view encounters opposition. Some contend that the whole
+triumph of the Art consists in solving both problems simultaneously.
+They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with the
+enemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual destruction of
+both parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in the
+interests both of security and screening, on a certain breadth of
+front. If, then, circumstances compel one to fight, one must
+concentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessary
+degree of extension to cover the front of the Army. They would leave
+reconnaissance to be carried out by rapidly advancing patrols, which
+evade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageous
+points of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thus
+obtaining their objects in spite of the enemy.
+
+I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that any
+systematic application of this line of action will give sufficient
+results.
+
+Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched.
+
+Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1871 to obtain reliable
+information, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, and
+still more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time?
+How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, when
+we can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the country
+between the two Armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as well
+as we!
+
+Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate the
+enemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back through
+the district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be of
+use to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols are
+compelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersected
+country, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisite
+rapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modern
+War, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with.
+
+If from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securing
+communications with one's own Headquarters it becomes necessary to
+beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field to clear up the situation
+sufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all the
+greater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemy
+chances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objective
+of any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomes
+compulsory if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carry
+out screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that the
+enemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually driving
+them off the ground and depriving them of the power of breaking
+through our own screen. That a numerically and materially inferior
+Cavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, but
+fundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about
+collision with that of the enemy, so that from the very beginning it
+secures command of the ground between the two armies, and that the
+actual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations between
+the two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry.
+
+The victory of the 'masses' intensifies and invigorates the sense of
+superiority in the individual combatant, and this sense of individual
+superiority is essential if the patrols are to carry through their
+duties in the true Cavalry spirit.
+
+On the one hand, they are only able to solve their tasks both of
+screening and of reconnaissance by actually defeating the enemy's
+patrols; on the other hand, the moral factor tells heavily in the
+scale.
+
+How can one expect courage and determination or audacity from men who
+have always been taught to avoid their opponent and only fight when
+they are actually compelled?
+
+The man who leaves these psychic factors out of account will always
+find himself mistaken in War.
+
+That in certain cases it may be useful to push forward officers as
+stealthy patrols, with instruction to avoid being drawn into an
+action, as far as time and opportunity will allow, goes without
+saying; but nevertheless stress must be laid upon the point that
+already in the period which is in general taken up with the encounter
+with the enemy's Cavalry, no opportunity should be lost of keeping the
+principal masses of the enemy's Army under direct observation, and
+that therefore it is necessary from the very commencement of the
+advance to send out officers patrols for this special purpose.
+
+These patrols will derive their best support from a tactical victory
+obtained over the enemy's Cavalry, which is manoeuvring in their rear.
+
+Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight to
+screen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres of
+action can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of the
+proper form at the right time and place.
+
+A victory of the reconnoitring Cavalry by shattering the strength of
+the enemy's horsemen must always result, both directly and indirectly,
+in the advantage of our screening force.
+
+The whole consideration, therefore, leads me to the conclusion that
+the chief task for the Cavalry consists in obtaining a victory over
+the enemy's Cavalry in that direction which is of decisive importance
+for the further prosecution of reconnaissance as soon after the
+beginning of the great operations as possible.
+
+That it cannot be our object to seek the opponent's horsemen in the
+direction which they themselves have selected--merely to beat
+them--need scarcely be insisted upon. That would be to take the law
+from the enemy and allow one's self to be diverted from the principal
+direction in which reconnaissance is desirable.
+
+Time and direction of the advance must rather be so chosen that they
+compel the enemy to move to meet us. At the same time our effort must
+be to appear with numerical superiority, in order to be certain of
+victory.
+
+In what concerns the Cavalry in the further course of the War, the
+necessity both of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again;
+and in many cases even after the enemy has been beaten out of the
+field, these objects will still only be obtained by fighting. Such
+cases will occur in the duties of screening and security when the
+enemy still possesses enough offensive power to attempt a
+reconnaissance, with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselves
+are engaged in a similar manner; also in all such cases in which
+turning movements entail too much delay, or are rendered impossible by
+the extension of the enemy's front; or, again, when the enemy on their
+part renew offensive operations.
+
+The necessity of breaking through the line of Infantry outposts in
+order to discover the whereabouts of the enemy's principal masses and
+the direction of their movements will also from time to time arise,
+and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly and thoroughly
+attempts at armed resistance by the civilian population.
+
+Further, our Cavalry will be called on for attempts against the
+enemy's communications, the strategical importance of which has been
+already discussed, and these will be all the more important in cases
+where the district we are fighting over is too poor to supply the
+enemy's forces, or where operations have assumed a stationary
+character, as before Fredericksburg, Paris, and Plevna, and it becomes
+desirable to hinder the use of the railways for the transport of
+troops or evacuation of supplies.
+
+Lastly, the Cavalry may be called on to occupy wide stretches of
+country and exploit their resources, to nip in their very inception
+the formation of fresh bodies of armed defenders, or on the defensive,
+to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings by
+flying columns of the enemy.
+
+Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the enemy's
+Armies, will frequently assume the character of 'raids' in which the
+essential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often with the
+sacrifice of all communications with one's own forces, to appear
+suddenly at previously selected positions, and after completion of
+one's immediate object to disappear suddenly, before the enemy can
+bring overwhelming numbers against the assailant.
+
+The success of such undertakings will depend, on the one hand, on the
+rapidity with which the opportunities secured by such surprise are
+utilized, and, on the other, on the available fighting power, which
+must suffice to break down all opposition with certainty and speed.
+
+Their execution, however, will always encounter many difficulties,
+particularly when a hostile population has to be dealt with; but to
+consider them on this account as impracticable seems to me all the
+more impossible, because to my mind they embody an absolutely
+indispensable element of future operations.
+
+If it is feasible to enter upon them with fresh horses, and to make
+adequate provision for supply without delaying the rapidity of
+movement, either by utilizing the resources of the country, by taking
+suitably organized columns with one, or by living on stores captured
+from the enemy himself, then such 'raids' will succeed and exercise
+most far-reaching consequences.
+
+In my opinion all these conditions can be satisfied. We can preserve
+our horses by exercising greater moderation in the pursuit of
+non-essentials; difficulties of supply can be solved by suitable
+preparations even in an enemy's country, and when working in our own,
+the sympathetic and persistent support of our own population will
+level all obstacles; but in all cases we must never leave out of sight
+the cardinal point that only the concentration of sufficient force at
+the right time and place can guarantee the final result.
+
+Our conduct, however, will be different when our purpose is solely
+defensive, or when we have to occupy districts which the enemy does
+not seek to defend. In such cases, as also when our object is only the
+concealment of our own designs, a dispersion of force may be
+necessary, if only in order to occupy important defiles and defensive
+sections of the ground, or for the occupation of the most important
+centres of population in the enemy's country. From such tasks,
+however, it should be the business of the Supreme Command to preserve
+us, in order that the whole Cavalry strength should be retained intact
+for offensive purposes more in harmony with its whole character and
+the spirit of the Arm.
+
+For these, if great results are to be attained, it requires in the
+generality of cases concentration in time and space.
+
+With the execution of these strategical missions, which so far alone
+have attracted our attention, the duties of the Cavalry Arm are by no
+means exhausted.
+
+Nowadays, as formerly, it will still find work to its hands on the
+battle-field itself, and this work will be all the more important in
+proportion as the quality of the forces therein encountered is on a
+lower level (_e.g._, new formations, Militia, etc.). In any case,
+however, great results on the battle-field can only be expected from
+the employment of numerically formidable 'Masses.' This is conditioned
+by the very fact of the numbers which we must in future expect to see
+engaged.
+
+The portion of the enemy's forces affected by the results of a
+successful charge must be a sufficient part of the whole which, at a
+given time and place, is concerned in the task of endeavouring to
+secure a decision.
+
+Other factors also deserve consideration--above all, the increased
+range of modern firearms. If the front of the attacking Cavalry is too
+narrow, it will not only have to face the fire of the troops
+immediately in its front, but it will be the focus of the fire from
+all sides.
+
+If the formation for attack does not supply a sufficient sequence of
+successive efforts, then in many cases it can have no hope of
+permanent result, for an onslaught by a single line will not have
+strength enough to pierce the fire zone, and will be shot to pieces
+before it can reach the enemy.[2]
+
+         [Footnote 2: The same point also arises both in pursuit and
+         in the covering of a retreat, two of our most important
+         duties; for though, as already pointed out, the conditions of
+         the present day offer to the Arm the opportunities of the
+         richest harvests, it will only be able to utilize them when
+         employed with concentrated force.]
+
+The masses to be encountered are numerically so considerable that
+single squadrons, regiments, or brigades, hardly count in the scale of
+a great decision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but to
+bring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an important
+fraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a great
+retreat, numbers alone can avail.
+
+How many units to employ under any given circumstances it is, of
+course, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of the
+matter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excess
+of what any existing tactical unit can supply.
+
+If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open to
+horsemen in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks in
+the future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in the
+organization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not be
+able to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handling
+of the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Charges
+even of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can only
+lead to success under very special conditions, and even for the
+protection of a retreat our rôle can only be a subordinate one. But
+for reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy's
+communications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similar
+operations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the principal Arm.
+Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisite
+mobility and independence.
+
+At the same time, it is in these fields that its power is
+all-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure of
+necessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results even
+partially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orders
+without knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible to
+act against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone.
+
+It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it is
+to fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy in
+peace.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY
+
+
+We have seen in the previous chapter that the principal duties which
+can fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require its
+employment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatest
+economy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must be
+practised.
+
+This leads us to the consideration of the question in what manner we
+can group our available means to meet these requirements in the best
+possible way.
+
+Primarily we must start from this axiom--that no portion of the Army
+can do without Cavalry altogether; hence it follows that we must
+maintain both Divisional and independent Cavalry.
+
+The former remains permanently attached to each portion of the Army
+whose composition, by reason of this addition of Cavalry, permits of
+independent action. The latter is set aside for the great strategical
+missions that may be assigned to that Arm, for execution. The question
+now arises, In what proportion is this distribution to take place?
+
+The greater number of Infantry Divisions can, in my opinion, meet all
+demands upon them with a very small allotment of mounted men, as long
+as they are acting in combination with the rest of the Army.
+
+The circulation of intelligence and orders within the columns and
+their outposts can generally be entrusted to cyclists. Where
+independent Cavalry is deployed to cover the front of an army, the
+field of activity for the Divisional Cavalry in actual outpost duties
+and reconnaissance is of necessity very much limited. All they are
+really required to accomplish is to maintain the connection with the
+former, and for this duty the cyclist detachments above referred to
+will generally suffice.
+
+There remains, therefore, for the Divisional Cavalry only the service
+with the most advanced sections of the Infantry outposts (orderly
+duties with the Infantry piquets in cases where the ground precludes
+the use of the cycle), duties connected with requisitioning; and
+reconnaissance only during those periods in which the mass of the
+independent Cavalry has been drawn away towards the wings of the Army
+to clear its front for battle, carrying messages during the combat,
+and actual reconnaissance during the progress of the engagement
+itself. All these requirements can, I think, be met with a very small
+amount of force, all the more so because reconnaissance under fire in
+modern War seems to me practically impossible, and can generally only
+be initiated by those Divisions which form the wings of the Army, but
+even then their field would be a very limited one.
+
+Modern firearms compel us to remain at such a distance from the enemy
+that observation is rendered much more difficult, and the distances to
+be traversed are so great that before any reports from the wings can
+get round to the position of Headquarters, and suitable orders based
+on these reports can reach their destination, the whole situation may
+have changed again and again. We have only to remember the cases
+which occurred in the last War (1870).
+
+In the majority of these instances it was quite impossible that
+Cavalry patrols could have sent timely information of what was going
+on within the limits of the enemy's positions, and in the future the
+difficulties will be even greater.
+
+In no case, however, can such information during the progress of an
+action be obtained by the actual employment of the fighting power of
+the Divisional Cavalry.
+
+If it is to be done at all, then a few well-led officers patrols will
+suffice, and therefore no considerable numerical strength in the
+Divisional Cavalry is required. The lines of approach of the enemy and
+points on which his wings are resting must certainly be kept under
+observation, but this observation cannot in principle be initiated by
+the Infantry Divisions, but it is the province of the Army
+Headquarters to provide, for it will be precisely the wings and the
+flanks which the enemy will himself seek to protect by the massing of
+his own Cavalry.
+
+If the prospect of achieving anything by observation during the combat
+through the action of the Divisional Cavalry may be considered as
+well-nigh impossible, then any tactical action may also be considered
+as precluded, unless it takes place in combination with the
+independent Cavalry.
+
+Occasions may certainly even nowadays occur in which a few squadrons
+may achieve results by taking part in a combat between the other Arms,
+but such cases are too few and unimportant to be taken into account in
+a distribution of the Cavalry as a matter of organization.
+
+In Armies deprived of the screen of independent Cavalry the want of
+Divisional Cavalry will certainly be more markedly felt even in those
+Army Corps which form the flanks of Armies, and in the cases of
+detached expeditions, and in similar exceptional circumstances. In all
+these instances more Cavalry must be sent up to the outposts, and it
+will have both to screen and reconnoitre.
+
+The demands on its fighting efficiency can, under such circumstances,
+become of importance, and in these smaller operations, reconnaissance
+during action is more possible than with extended battle-fronts. But
+to demand for the Divisional Cavalry on these grounds a larger
+proportion of sabres, and thus to paralyze a great portion of the Arm
+by its inclusion in the long columns of march of the whole Army, is
+not justifiable. The scale on which we must decide the apportionment
+of Divisional Cavalry must depend on the fact that the Infantry does
+not generally operate in small detachments, but works in large masses,
+and it is the necessities of these large masses which fix the
+standard.
+
+To apportion to single columns or Divisions for particular
+circumstances an increased force of Cavalry, to be taken from the
+available mass of independent Cavalry Divisions, ought not in general
+to occasion unusual friction; but it is most difficult and troublesome
+to take away from the Infantry the squadrons definitely assigned to it
+by peace-time organization, and unite these in independent Cavalry
+Commands.
+
+We must not allow ourselves to be misled in this matter by the
+practice followed in peace manoeuvres. Even the largest concentration
+of troops for these purposes is, in proportion to the masses to be
+employed in our future War, on a most limited scale.
+
+Our smaller Brigade and Divisional manoeuvres are restricted within
+limits which can only be considered nowadays as exceptional. They are
+only too well adapted to give rise to entirely false conceptions as to
+the true character of the Cavalry service in these great struggles for
+national survival, unless we keep steadily in mind that they apply
+only to exceptional circumstances.
+
+We must, therefore, lay down as a principle that as much Cavalry as
+possible is to be organized for strategical independence, and as
+little as is expedient retained for the Infantry Divisions.
+
+My opinion is that, if we make fullest use of the bicycle, and, with
+this object in view, reorganize our system of conveying orders and
+intelligence, then two well-trained and effective squadrons should
+amply suffice for the ordinary duties with an Infantry Division.
+
+As to the allotment of the independent Cavalry Divisions, it follows
+from all that has been said above, that to divide them in equal
+proportions among the several Armies, according to their numerical
+strength, can only be considered as an obstacle to the full
+utilization of their potential fighting capacity. It would be better
+to arrange this distribution at the beginning of each War, in
+accordance with the conditions which the situation imposes. Where it
+appears expedient, we should not hesitate to form Divisions of
+different strength, and to group several of these to constitute
+Cavalry Corps, even to unite several of such Corps for employment in a
+particular strategical direction--_i.e._, in a particular portion of
+the theatre of operation--whilst leaving only individual brigades, or
+even regiments, to those fractions of the Army which for the moment
+can best dispense with Cavalry support.
+
+Of course, an Army taking the field with a great superiority of
+Cavalry can afford to deal less sparingly with it for secondary
+purposes; on the other hand, the numerically weaker side is driven to
+the utmost economy of its forces, and the utmost energy in its
+employment at the decisive moment. It will therefore be essential for
+the latter to concentrate at the commencement of the campaign the bulk
+of its Cavalry upon the decisive line of operations--that is to say,
+on that line on which, from the general strategical situation, one can
+expect to penetrate into the chief district of concentration of the
+enemy's Armies, and hence to find out what it is of the greatest
+importance for us to know, or, on the other hand, when it is to our
+interests to conceal our own operations, and hence to beat the enemy's
+Cavalry as thoroughly as possible wherever it shows itself. On the
+remaining portion of the front we must endeavour to employ as little
+Cavalry as possible, and to supplement it in the duties of security by
+Infantry, whilst leaving reconnaissance to be dealt with by patrols.
+If we thus gain the victory on the principal line, the results will
+soon be apparent in a reduction of pressure on the adjacent sections
+of the front, and then the Cavalry will find its opportunity for
+increased activity in offensive enterprises. For, once the enemy's
+horsemen are beaten, either he will concentrate his remaining Cavalry,
+from every direction, towards the threatened points, or the victor
+will be in a position to utilize the superiority he has acquired to
+support any portion of his force which may have got into temporary
+difficulties.
+
+If, thus, it is the necessity of beating the enemy's Cavalry out of
+the field at the very commencement of the campaign which compels the
+concentration of important numbers in the decisive direction, it
+follows naturally that this point of view must be fully considered in
+the plan of strategical deployment.
+
+In the further stages of Cavalry activity--_i.e._, after it has
+defeated the mass of the enemy's Cavalry--the tasks which can confront
+the Arm make the employment of considerable forces essential, unless,
+as so often happened in 1870, its operations are to be interfered
+with, if not altogether stopped, by weak Infantry detachments, or even
+by an insurgent population. Against this concentration of large masses
+of Cavalry many objections will naturally be raised; hence we must
+consider how these are to be met, and whether, as a fact, they are of
+sufficient importance to cause us to surrender the advantages they
+offer.
+
+First comes the difficulty of feeding large numbers. But military
+history, from the time of Frederick the Great and Napoleon down to the
+American Civil War, the unusual conditions of which latter must not be
+left out of account, show conclusively that it was possible to keep
+masses of 5,000 men and more together, and in full mobility, even in
+poor and almost roadless districts.
+
+If it was possible then, how much more will it be so now, with our
+modern means of communication, if proper arrangements are made in
+advance!
+
+It has been further objected that the rapid circulation of information
+from the front to Army Headquarters will be jeopardized by the
+insertion of an additional collecting station--viz., the Corps
+Command, between the two ends of the chain. But this fear can be shown
+to be groundless, for in any case where at all large bodies of
+Cavalry are sent out in advance, the service of intelligence must be
+organized in such a manner that all really important information will
+be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through the usual
+channels. Since this is already necessary with Cavalry Divisions,
+there can be no objection to applying it to yet higher commands.
+
+More important than this question of intelligence is the consideration
+that the command of Cavalry 'Masses' which exceed more than the
+present Division of six regiments involves exceptional difficulties,
+and this must be granted to a certain extent as long as the question
+is limited to the actual tactical handling (execution of manoeuvres)
+of the Division on the battle-field.
+
+It is, in fact, no longer possible to handle a force of six
+regiments according to any set scheme, such as that known as the
+'Dreitreffentaktik'--at any rate, not in hilly or difficult country. The
+transition from one formation to another, the deployment of the whole
+unit for attack, or the interchange of the duties between the separate
+lines, are certainly hardly possible on ground over which it is
+difficult to manoeuvre. It appears, however, to me that the conduct of
+great Cavalry 'Masses' by ordinary drill methods is not necessary to
+meet the condition of modern warfare.
+
+When once the Cavalry Corps Commander grasps the idea of handling the
+units at his disposal as the Infantry Corps Commander handles his
+Divisions, sending in first one Division, and then, according to
+circumstances, reinforcing it or prolonging the fighting line by
+drawing on the second one, or by employing the Divisions side by side,
+assigning to each a definite share in the attainment of the purpose,
+which he himself keeps steadily in view, there seems no reason why
+the leadership of such bodies should not be perfectly practicable.
+Indeed, one may safely say that the result will be all the more
+certain of attainment the more the final responsibility is
+concentrated on the one head; for there is obviously a greater
+possibility of a single mind pursuing consistently a given purpose
+than of two or more Divisional Commanders following out the same idea
+independently along the same lines.
+
+If, then, when the Corps is united for tactical action, the
+maintenance of a single Command is quite conceivable, this will be all
+the more the case in matters of Strategy. It is not so much a question
+then of handling the corps as a closed unit, for instance, on a single
+road, but of assigning within a certain sphere a united impulse to the
+constituent parts of the Command in such directions that in all cases
+they should reach the ground in force superior to anything the enemy
+can oppose to them. According to circumstances, different tasks may be
+assigned to the several Divisions. They may march on different roads,
+some of them extended, some closed, the only condition being that they
+all pursue a common strategic purpose, assigned to them by the Corps
+Commander, according to the same fundamental principles, and are
+prevented by this higher control from flying out in eccentric
+directions.
+
+Objections based on the alleged difficulties of the conduct of such
+masses are therefore untenable. On the contrary, the demand must be
+made on the Chief Command that, always in accordance with the
+strategical situation, it must clearly determine what it requires of
+the Cavalry, and group them in a suitable manner and in sufficient
+numerical strength under a single Leader, even if in the meanwhile
+there may be a deficiency of the Arm at less important points. This
+fundamental principle must be adhered to at all costs if full
+advantages are to be derived from the employment of our Arm, for with
+none other can the consequences of a dispersal of force exact more
+terrible retribution than with the Cavalry.
+
+Nevertheless, though the principle must be held inviolate, its
+application must not degenerate into hide-bound rigidity. 'Strategy is
+founded on a system of expedients' (Moltke), and hence expediency
+remains always our highest ideal.
+
+The essential point, however, is that our organization must be made so
+elastic that we can alter the strength of our units to meet the
+varying circumstances which may confront us, so that forces may not
+remain unutilized in one place whilst they may be most urgently
+required at another.
+
+It is no way essential that the units combined for the express
+purposes apparent at the commencement of the campaign should remain
+intact throughout the War. One should be able to detach from or
+reinforce them, as circumstances require; break up Corps and
+Divisions, to reform them elsewhere; and employ their Leaders and
+Staff first with one, then with the other.
+
+As an example of what I have just said, I would cite the manner in
+which the German Headquarters Command dealt with the Armies during the
+war of 1870-1871. According to the demands of the moment, the
+individual Corps or Divisions were grouped in manifold proportions to
+constitute such units, and the adaptability of this organization
+proved sufficient to cope with every eventuality.
+
+As an almost ideal type we can take the manner in which Napoleon
+dealt with his Cavalry Corps for the same purpose. At one moment his
+bodies of horsemen unite into Divisions and Corps; at another they
+dissolve into independent Brigades or regiments, operating singly,
+only once more to be united into formidable 'Masses,' as circumstances
+dictate. Here we see no rigid adherence to any rules, nothing pedantic
+in the method of employment, and the leader and troops deftly adapt
+themselves to the ever-changing conditions.
+
+This is the ideal to which we Germans should strive to attain, and all
+the more so in proportion as we are threatened by superior numbers.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION
+
+
+If the changed conditions of modern war have brought about new
+conditions and demands which require to be considered in the
+strategical combinations of the Cavalry, I believe that a similar
+influence must make itself felt in the field of tactics. Whereas
+formerly the _arme blanche_ was recognized as the principal method by
+which the Cavalry made its inherent fighting power felt, the
+employment of dismounted action nowadays has gained in importance to
+such an extent that the whole character of our activity appears
+completely changed.
+
+Although hitherto the general conception has been that Cavalry should
+only make use of the carbine for defence, nowadays its employment in
+attack must be recognized as of the utmost importance.
+
+Undoubtedly, however, it is, and must remain even to-day, the chief
+aim of every leader in whose veins flows the hot Cavalry blood to
+seize his opportunities wherever they offer themselves, and, above
+all, to attack the enemy's Cavalry wherever and whenever accessible
+with cold steel; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that
+nowadays numerous problems will present themselves to the Cavalry
+which can only be solved by fire action.
+
+In the first place, the opportunity will often arise for the weaker
+side to avoid an encounter in the open field, and, with the help of
+its firearm, at least to attempt behind defiles, or strong positions,
+to defy the enemy's superior forces. In such cases the assailant also
+will be compelled to have recourse to his carbine.
+
+Further considerations reveal that in future, quite apart from
+encounter with the enemy's Cavalry, our own horsemen will find tasks
+before them which will make appeal to the rifle inevitable.
+
+The enemy will cover his railways, and important depots by troops of
+the second and third class. Reinforced by the resisting power of
+popular levies, they will block woods, river crossings, and defiles.
+Even the guards of their Convoys will be amply provided with
+far-ranging firearms.
+
+In the pursuit of an enemy's beaten Cavalry we shall happen upon
+Infantry detachments sent out to cover their retreat, or upon defiles
+which have been occupied for a similar purpose. Important
+communications will be held by strong detachments of cyclist Infantry,
+who will find in woods and villages protection and favourable
+opportunities to use their weapons.
+
+All these means of resistance lie beyond the field of mounted action,
+but they must be overcome if success is to crown our efforts.
+
+Already in reconnaissances, particularly in those directed against the
+enemy's communications, we shall meet with these impediments, and the
+same will be the case when we come to the strategical pursuit, or the
+protection of a retreat.[3] In the pursuit the main object is to keep
+the beaten enemy on the run, to give him neither peace nor rest until
+complete exhaustion sets in. But for the mass of the Cavalry the idea
+of a purely frontal pursuit should not be encouraged, for Cavalry,
+even when supported by several batteries, can easily be held up by any
+rearguard position in which a few intact troops remain.
+
+         [Footnote 3: Compare 'Cavalry Regulations,' § 376.]
+
+The frontal pursuit must in such cases be left to the other Arms, only
+to be taken up again when the last resistance of the enemy is broken,
+and the exhaustion of our own Infantry and Horse Artillery renders
+further effort on their part impossible.
+
+On the other hand, all energy must be devoted to the initiation of a
+pursuit on parallel lines, in order that we may appear unexpectedly
+and repeatedly against the flanks of the enemy's columns, with the
+ultimate intention of anticipating him at some point on the line of
+his retreat, such as a defile, thus bringing him between two fires in
+a sheerly desperate position.
+
+Man and horse must in these cases be driven to the utmost limit of
+their powers of endurance.
+
+It is evident that in such situations the principal rôle falls to the
+firearm, for only in the fire fight is it possible to break off an
+attack without loss, in order to appear again at some other point and
+recommence the engagement. In case of anticipating an enemy at a
+defile, the rifle will be practically the only weapon that can find
+employment.
+
+What can be achieved in this direction is best illustrated by
+Sheridan's Cavalry, whose successful flanking operations against the
+lines of communication of General Lee's heroic Army brought about the
+capitulation of Clover Hill.
+
+The charge will only then secure a greater result than dismounted
+action, when the tactical cohesion of the enemy has been dissolved, and
+his fire power utterly broken; that is to say, generally it will be of
+greater service in tactical than in strategical pursuits--unless,
+indeed, as at Waterloo, the defeat has led to the complete and permanent
+dissolution of the enemy's fighting power.
+
+Further, in the endeavour to support the rearguard of a defeated Army
+in retreat it will be necessary, as soon as we have got rid of the
+pursuing Cavalry, to take to the rifle, because with the sword alone
+we cannot hope to make any impression upon the Infantry and Artillery
+of the victor.
+
+In such cases we must strive to attack with the firearm against the
+flanks of the pursuing columns, in order to draw off their attention
+from our beaten main body.
+
+Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit at
+defiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence.
+
+In such circumstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has not
+allowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluable
+services to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with the
+columns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect an
+orderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affording
+to its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion and
+tactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which will
+gain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed--_i.e._, time.
+
+The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itself
+in an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by short
+surprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infallible
+means of circumventing points of resistance. This conception, which
+restricts the functions of Cavalry within their narrowest limits,
+seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially indefensible when it
+is a matter of gaining time or of carrying a given position, such as a
+defensible post on the lines of communication, a convoy marching under
+escort, the destruction of a defended railway, or in any similar
+undertaking. It will be impossible to work round such positions--at
+least when engaged on the greater operations of War--both on account
+of the widths of the fronts occupied and the possibility of
+interfering with the sphere of operations of the neighbouring
+detachments. Often, indeed, the nature of the ground will preclude
+such attempts, and the experience of 1870-1871 should suffice to show
+how rarely such a circumvention can hope to succeed. But even where
+neither the strategic situation nor our immediate purpose compels us
+to fight, it is not always advisable or expedient to attempt to evade
+the opportunity. For every evasion leaves the front of our own Army
+clear, gives the enemy the very opportunity he is looking for to
+reconnoitre the position of our main bodies, uncovers our own
+communications (_i.e._, our own Cavalry trains and baggage), exposes
+our flank to the enemy, and thus offers him many chances of obtaining
+tactical results.
+
+Again, these attempts at circumvention lead easily to a loss of
+direction, which in certain cases might endanger the success of our
+whole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by such
+outflanking attempts may not be justified by the possible results. In
+such cases it might on the whole be better to attack direct, for
+turning movements mean always a postponement of the tactical decision,
+and hence are always a disadvantage to the attacking side.
+
+The theory that Cavalry, thanks to its mobility, can always ride round
+and turn the positions it encounters breaks down in practice before
+the tactical and strategical demands upon the Arm, partly by reason of
+the local conditions, and partly because of the consideration which
+has to be given to time, to the endurance of the horses, and the
+position of the following columns.
+
+The same applies to another theory with which one tries to explain
+away the necessity of dismounted combats. It is maintained that the
+fire power of the Horse Artillery will suffice to clear the road for
+the Cavalry; hence the latter will rarely be placed in a position
+which will require energetic dismounted action on their part. This
+assumption involves, in my opinion, an altogether overrated estimate
+of the power of Artillery. The same reasoning would lead us logically
+to the false conclusion that even Infantry do not require their
+rifles. One must demand from every reliable body of troops that they
+will not allow themselves to be driven out of a covered position by
+Artillery alone. All previous War experience testifies to the
+impossibility of achieving such results against even moderate
+Infantry, and it is only with such that we are here dealing. The fact
+that in 1870-1871 the Artillery often did succeed in driving a weak
+and demoralized enemy out of localities the possession of which was of
+no material consequence to him cannot be considered as to the point.
+Certainly the effect of modern guns is greater than anything of which
+we have had experience, and will act upon the defender with
+correspondingly greater intensity; but, on the other hand, it must be
+insisted upon that the assailant's Artillery will have to act under
+the increased effect of the defender's fire power, and the latter
+will choose different terrain, and utilize it far better than in the
+past. The actual assault remains necessary now, as ever, to bring
+about the final decision.
+
+Anyone who has had to conduct staff rides and similar operations of
+large bodies of independent Cavalry, and has endeavoured to carry
+these out in the spirit of actual warfare, can hardly have failed to
+notice the tendency which displays itself with all leaders to take to
+dismounted action, and will have realized that one has far more
+frequently to check rather than encourage this tendency; but he will
+also come to the conclusion, perhaps, that this desire is well founded
+on existing conditions, and that even a determined Cavalry will have
+to make use of their firearms almost every day; indeed, without
+adequate employment of their carbines they are no longer able to carry
+out the most important of their incumbent duties.
+
+Hence, if the use of the rifle is thus shown by instances taken from
+the most divergent directions to be of absolute necessity, the
+conclusion follows that even in the battle itself, that point on which
+all military action is focussed, it can hardly fail to find both its
+opportunities and its full justification.
+
+In this direction the horsemen of Stuart and Sheridan have set us a
+brilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles
+(Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding,
+rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediately
+afterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehement
+charges (Stuart at Brandy Station).
+
+The South African War also has shown us what can be done by a mounted
+force supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought exclusively
+as Cavalry (_sic_), supported by Artillery, and some of the most
+celebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at their hands
+as long as the numerical proportion was not altogether too
+unfavourable to the assailants.
+
+Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of the
+war, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus proved
+incontrovertibly that the double rôle of Cavalry on foot and on
+horseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of these
+same Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they were
+lacking in any kind of tactical training for this particular
+result.[4]
+
+         [Footnote 4: I venture to differ from the author. The Boers
+         did not fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of
+         Mounted Infantry. They did on one or two occasions bring
+         about a decision by rifle fire from their horses, but I can
+         recall no instance where they actually charged--_i.e._,
+         endeavoured to decide the action by shock.--C. S. G.]
+
+Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the days
+of the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa,
+largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and the
+out-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot be
+transferred to European circumstance without important modifications.
+But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, their
+power of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatest
+degree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon as
+they make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army,
+and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the best
+guarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of the
+Franco-German War demonstrated this possibility. What might not our
+Cavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined forces of
+the Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and sought of
+a set purpose for such opportunities?
+
+It would take us too far to produce the numerous proofs from the pages
+of our War records; only, as an example, I should like to quote the
+Battle of Bapaume. In this instance the 7th Cavalry Brigade belonging
+to the 3rd Cavalry Division lay on the flank--in fact, almost in rear
+of--the enemy's Army, without being able to come to the help of the
+hard-pressed 15th Division. Had they on that occasion been able to act
+by fire, by surprise, and with determination against the rear of the
+French Army of the North, the results must have been invaluable.
+
+In future, beyond doubt, we shall have to deal with much larger masses
+of the enemy than formerly, and against them one must make up for want
+of numbers by an enormous expenditure of ammunition, and further
+endeavour to reinforce our fire power by repeating-rifles. We must
+also aim at intensifying the effect of our fire power by attacking
+only at decisive points. On the other hand, it must be admitted, that
+in the magnitude of the masses themselves there lies the germ of
+weakness, and in our future wars we can hardly expect to find Infantry
+as firmly welded together as in the Armies of the past. I therefore by
+no means hold the opinion that dismounted Cavalry can achieve nothing
+against Infantry, or that their chances are limited to only very
+favourable opportunities.
+
+It is, of course, true that the Infantry receive a more thorough
+musketry training, particularly at long ranges, and that their
+education in the use of the ground, as well as in fire control, in
+peace is naturally better than with the Cavalry.
+
+But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are by
+no means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority of
+the latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm for
+the Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of the
+carbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source of
+weakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalry
+possesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization which
+render it materially superior to the Infantry.
+
+I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized,
+cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force--that is to
+say, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion.
+
+Let us look at this question a little more closely.
+
+A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made of
+the horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annual
+contingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consist
+pretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service,
+and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there will
+be at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder will
+consist half of men in their third year and half of men in their
+second year; but these seventy men are led by three officers,
+generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eight
+non-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong to
+the active list.
+
+Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength,
+is about seventy-five strong, consists of about forty men on the
+active list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in their
+second year of service, and of thirty-five reservists.
+
+It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained colour
+soldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehr
+officer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whom
+four on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, as
+a rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us,
+shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which body
+we shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to be
+able to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline are
+all essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition the
+number of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add, apart
+from all other considerations, that the direct influence of the
+Leaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much more
+highly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered that
+there are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partly
+because of their longer period of service and closer supervision, and
+partly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from his
+horse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment the
+best guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations,
+I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage the
+best existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects of
+success, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve its
+sense of superiority.
+
+Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormously
+increased.
+
+We can now approach tasks which hitherto had to be regarded as
+impossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance of
+the enemy's Infantry the rôle of Cavalry _ipso facto_ came to an end,
+unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry to
+charge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spirit
+of the Arm, to lay principal stress upon the offensive, even when
+fighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, with
+chances of success which no longer depend on the favour of special
+circumstances.
+
+Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion where
+formerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold it
+to be an altogether antiquated standpoint to assume that Cavalry on
+foot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach on
+horseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the most
+decisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize any
+special advantages offered by local circumstances.
+
+The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which the
+Cavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive,
+and was compelled to attack the enemy--exactly like the Infantry--in
+the most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Under
+modern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even more
+apparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of the
+independence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to its
+equipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only to
+exceptionally favourable circumstances. The Cavalry must, in fact, be
+able to attack on foot exactly like Infantry when the situation
+imperatively demands it; but if it is to be handled in this spirit,
+then it will require to be very strongly provided with Artillery.
+
+If it is already considered almost impossible for Infantry to turn
+well-covered defenders out of their position without Artillery
+support, the same naturally applies to the Cavalry. In fact, a strong
+Artillery will be all the more necessary, for the attack with Cavalry
+should be carried through with the utmost rapidity, and when acting on
+the defensive its purpose is to gain the greatest amount of time.
+Against this must be borne in mind that the Infantry should not
+without necessity be deprived of its due share of Artillery, but I
+think the two views can be readily united. As long as the Cavalry
+'Masses' are out in front of the Armies we can safely give them as
+many horse batteries as they require, and the same is the case after a
+victory or after a lost battle. In the decisive battle itself this
+Artillery reinforcement to the Cavalry must not be expended
+eccentrically, and must be utilized to the utmost in the most decisive
+direction on the battle-field itself. Here, too, a certain elasticity
+of organization is most desirable, and a strict adherence to a
+prearranged order of battle can only act most prejudicially.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS
+
+
+Having admitted that dismounted action has increased considerably in
+importance, particularly on the offensive, it nevertheless remains the
+fact that the combat with cold steel remains the chief _raison d'être_
+of the Cavalry, and when the principles have to be considered
+according to which troops have to be employed upon the battle-field,
+the actual collision of Cavalry 'Masses' remains the predominant
+factor.
+
+The task of the Leader must be to transmit the mechanical power
+inherent in the troops in the form of momentum upon the enemy. Where
+he, with a clear purpose before him, acts with daring and thorough
+comprehension, it is in his power to intensify this momentum many
+times over; and this holds true with the Cavalry to a greater degree
+than with any other Arm, for with the horsemen the personal impression
+conveyed by the appearance and bearing of the Leader reacts on the
+mass as in no other case. This reaction is further accentuated by the
+fact that the excitement of motion on horseback, inherent in the
+performance of Cavalry duties, contains something electrifying,
+kindling to the imagination and exciting to the nerves, which
+communicates its influence to the Leader, and thus in turn supports
+him.
+
+On the other hand, the evils of an indifferent Command make themselves
+nowhere more apparent than with Cavalry. In this Arm every impulse
+works itself out relentlessly down to the last consequence. Mistakes
+once made can rarely be remedied. This is the necessary consequence of
+the short time interval to which their activity is limited, the
+rapidity of their movements, and the irresistible momentum with which
+a Cavalry charge once launched presses on with ever-increasing
+momentum to its final decision.
+
+Whilst thus with the Cavalry the influence of the Command is the most
+important factor of success, any deficiency in which can rarely be
+made good by the excellence of the troops themselves, it is precisely
+with this Arm that it is the least frequently found; for admittedly
+there is nothing more difficult on the battle-field than correct
+disposition and execution at the head of a great body of horsemen.
+
+Several factors unite to explain this circumstance. In the first
+place, only the shortest moment of time is available for
+consideration, and then this rapid consideration and decision have to
+be given under the most unfavourable external conditions, at the
+fullest speed of one's horse, or in the maddening confusion of the
+mêlée. Further, in most, cases it will be quite impossible for the
+Leader of a Cavalry 'Mass' to take in with accuracy the strength and
+dispositions of the enemy. The more extended radius of action of
+modern firearms and the greater distance between the contending forces
+thereby conditioned must in the future render this much more difficult
+than in the past. Very rarely will it be possible for the Leader
+either to alter or cancel an order once given in consequence of
+information subsequently received. Even of the ground itself, the
+importance of which is so much greater for the Cavalry than for any
+other Arm, it will be impossible for the Leader to form for himself
+any actual picture. Either it is already in possession of the enemy
+and of his patrols, or at least in their sphere of action, or it
+cannot be readily grasped from a single standpoint, and the rapidity
+of movement allows no time to reconnoitre it sufficiently. Constant
+reference to maps, even when available, is impossible, and the best of
+these do not reveal exhaustively the actual nature of the ground to be
+traversed. The orders must therefore be based on a general
+consideration of the circumstances, for the Leader cannot gauge with
+even approximate accuracy the strength of his enemy from the
+resistance he encounters, like his more fortunate comrade of the
+Infantry. His only remaining means of influencing the course of the
+action lie in his intact reserves.
+
+For subordinates, indeed, the case is even worse, for they will rarely
+find existing conditions in accordance with the conception on which
+their orders were issued, and will seldom have time to refer to
+Headquarters for further instructions.
+
+It must, therefore, be apparent that only the most exceptional Cavalry
+training, combined with high executive talent, can suffice to
+compensate for all these difficulties. Really successful leading will
+only be assured to the Cavalry General when the machinery he sets in
+motion is technically finished down to the last detail.
+
+In the first place, the least that can be demanded is that the
+observation of the enemy and distribution of orders are so organized
+that the system works with absolute certainty. On the former depends
+the correct choice of the moment of attack; on the latter that the
+troops are employed in the required direction.
+
+The place of the responsible Leader until the moment of the charge is,
+therefore, well out to the front, in a position from which he can best
+overlook the situation as a whole. Even the Leaders of independent
+units, if possible down to the Regimental Commanders, should remain
+close to him, and try to see the situation through his eyes. The
+greatest fault of all is to stick too close to your troops.
+
+Every Cavalry officer must carry his map in his head as well as in his
+hand, particularly during the engagement. Every Leader must keep
+before his mind the hang of the ground, the lie of the roads, the
+peculiarities of the battle-field, with the chances it affords him.
+Any defects he must try to make good by reconnaissance. Every possible
+consequence of the collision must have been thought out beforehand.
+
+Never should the Chief Commander take part in the charge personally
+until he puts in his last reserve, and even then only when he is clear
+of all responsibility, which by that time will generally be the case.
+In all circumstances he must be in a position to rally his troops
+after they have dispersed themselves in a mêlée, and to take measures
+either to exploit the success, or, in case of reverse, to avert its
+worst consequences. This does not apply only to the Chief Commander.
+
+Here I would enter a particular protest against the opinion one hears
+far too frequently emitted, that the place of every Cavalry Leader in
+the charge is always in front of his command. This only holds good
+when units charge as parts of a higher organization, or where smaller
+bodies--_e.g._, squadrons, regiments, or brigades--attack as a whole,
+with no rearward lines or supports to be controlled, or further
+responsibilities arising out of the charge have to be considered. But
+this does not relieve the Commander from the necessity of setting a
+personal example in moments of wavering, or when it appears better,
+after cool reflection, to risk everything, to carry the men forward to
+the extreme limit of effort, rather than to reserve himself for
+subsequent emergencies.
+
+In all other cases the Commander, and his Staff, must avoid becoming
+entangled in the confusion of a fight in which he must lose all view
+and control over his men, and at best could achieve nothing more than
+any other equally brave and determined trooper. It is, on the
+contrary, his first duty to move in such a direction that he may at
+all times be ready to influence with rapidity and decision the
+mechanism of his command as a whole.
+
+If he falls, then his Staff Officer or Adjutant assumes the
+responsibility of the command until such time as the next senior can
+be notified of the circumstance. In no case may the continuity of
+action be interrupted by wasting time in looking for his successor.
+
+When the Cavalry is working in combination with the other Arms the
+point of observation of its Commander must be connected with the
+latter by suitable relays, and officers must be sent out into those
+sections of the ground which cannot be overlooked from the position
+the Leader has selected.
+
+Combat and security patrols must be sent out in all directions from
+which the enemy's reserves or fresh bodies of his troops might
+approach, and even towards our own rear the ground must be
+reconnoitred as far as possible by officers, who report the result of
+their operations, not only to the superior Leader, but to the Brigade
+and Regimental Commanders. It will also be advisable to keep the
+officers of the other Arms, particularly of the reserves, as well
+informed as possible about the nature of the ground and the observed
+movements of the enemy's forces, so that these may always act with
+full knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should be
+entrusted with the maintenance of communications with Army
+Headquarters itself.
+
+As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to the
+point of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, the
+Leader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of his
+troops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field of
+action and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, having
+previously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purpose
+of the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, he
+will despatch executive orders to the several échelons concerned. The
+line of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point of
+sight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, be
+assigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to which
+troop it is which is responsible for the direction.
+
+But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission of
+orders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large
+'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in a
+thoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless good
+observation, able leading, and circulation of orders are combined
+with two other most important factors:
+
+First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinate
+leaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when these
+can help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where the
+circumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the order
+received, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth,
+signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, can
+there be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for the
+common purpose.
+
+This independence must never be allowed to degenerate into selfish
+wilfulness; the actual situation, as encountered on the ground itself;
+must never be considered from the subordinate's point of view only,
+but rather must always be solved in the spirit of the original
+conception formed in the Leader's mind.
+
+In the second place, the Leader requires tactical means and forms of
+evolution which combine, with elementary simplicity and clearness, the
+greatest possible degree of adaptability. Nowhere else so much as with
+the Cavalry does the maxim hold good that 'In War only the simple
+secures success.'[5]
+
+         [Footnote 5: Clausewitz, 'Im Krieg ist aller Einfach, aber,
+         das Einfache ist schwer.']
+
+The prescribed orders must not place a strain on the memory of the
+Leader or troops, and must operate practically mechanically. Even the
+most far-reaching movements should never require either detailed
+instructions or commands.
+
+The application of the word of command should be limited to those
+units which it can actually control--namely, the squadron.
+
+The use of bugle-calls must be restricted to the utmost, and only be
+permitted in circumstances where no possibility of misunderstanding
+can arise--a danger not easily excluded where large bodies are acting
+together.
+
+Even the use of signs can only be relied on in a limited degree. In
+dust and closed country of course they cannot be seen.
+
+On the other hand, all movements depending on verbally transmitted
+commands must be executed without loss of the spirit of uniformity.
+
+In practice this is the only form for the communication of orders
+which can be depended on to act with any degree of certainty under all
+circumstances.
+
+The Regulations must insure the possibility that, no matter under what
+conditions, the unit can be formed without many words or commands into
+the most diverse fighting formations in any required direction, either
+from column of route, rendezvous formation, or even from the mêlée.
+Fundamental principles of action against the different Arms must be
+laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular
+case will not be required.
+
+The rapid change from one fighting form to another must be absolutely
+guaranteed, and equally so the possibility for each unit to assume
+that formation in depth called for by the circumstances of the combat,
+without recourse to complicated orders and movements.[6]
+
+         [Footnote 6: The Regimental Commander, therefore, requires
+         his Adjutant and an Orderly Officer, so as to be able to
+         transmit simultaneously his order to both wings of his
+         regiment.]
+
+If these requirements are to be fulfilled, then only such elementary
+movements must be prescribed and regulated as can be executed under
+all circumstances, as laid down in the Regulations.
+
+These matters being settled, then tactical regulations should lay down
+no fixed evolutions, but should confine themselves essentially to
+forms and principles of action, which should be treated with the
+utmost clearness and precision.
+
+It is hardly necessary to adduce elaborate proof to show that our
+existing Regulations by no means meet these requirements in all their
+sections.
+
+Above all, the movements and deployments laid down for the Regiment
+are far too formal, based too much on accurate intervals and fixed
+prescriptions for the movements of the individual squadrons to be
+suitable for use on the ground which Cavalry must nowadays be prepared
+to traverse, or to be executed, exactly as laid down, in face of the
+enemy. Such evolutions are only possible on the drill-ground, where
+bugle-sounds and words of command can still be heard, and are far too
+complicated for practical use.
+
+For instance, let us take the case of deployment to the front out of
+any 'deep' formation--columns of fours, half troops, or the like,
+which obviously cannot always be executed before the enemy precisely
+in the manner prescribed, because all must depend on the space
+available and the distance which separates us from the enemy. The head
+of the column must suit its movements to these conditions, and in turn
+the following sections must conform to the movements of the head;
+greater freedom of choice must, therefore, be left to the latter.
+
+On the other hand, there are evolutions of the utmost importance before
+the enemy for which the book gives no guidance whatever--_e.g._, the
+rapid passage from the double column into squadron columns, either to
+the front or flank.
+
+Even for the larger units all the prescriptions are by no means
+adapted to the requirements of active service. For instance, the
+relief of lines ('Treffen Wechsel') is an operation of no use except
+on the drill-ground, and is never attempted even in manoeuvres--at
+least, personally I know no instance of its ever being tried, except
+as a matter of drill.
+
+That a certain measure of justification may be found for this and
+similar formations, I do not wish to dispute.
+
+They certainly possess great educational value as a means to the
+acquisition of the requisite discipline and cohesion, and they are
+also well adapted for movements beyond the danger zone, when it
+becomes necessary to steady the troops by the most absolute insistence
+on accuracy of movement and precision of drill; and that such cases do
+arise no one who has had experience of War will for one moment
+dispute.[7] Hence, even if one may hold the opinion that the same
+purpose may be equally well served by less complicated means better
+adapted to practical requirements, one can nevertheless subscribe
+unconditionally to the soundness of the principle involved. But for
+actual purposes of combat we require simpler forms and more freedom in
+their application, and in so far as the Regulations tend towards this
+end they show a very considerable degree of improvement; for the
+squadron, Section 330 provides the necessary amount of independence,
+and Sections 331 and 333 give sufficient freedom to the Regiment,
+subject only to the limitations referred to above. Section 346 in
+particular and Section 348 are also of fundamental importance for the
+higher commands.[8] Indeed, I hold the former as the most important
+concession contained in the whole book, for it practically initiates a
+new phase in the whole course of our drill evolution, by marking the
+commencement of the breach with the old doctrine of the Three-Line
+system ('Drei Treffen Taktik'). It is true that it still lays chief
+importance on this method, but it no longer regards it as the one
+royal road to success. Thus we enter on a path on which the Infantry
+already long ago preceded us, and which, _mutatis mutandis_, offers
+also for the Cavalry similar great and undeniable advantages. It is
+safe to predict that Section 346 will prove the starting-point, by
+sheer pressure of natural conditions, of a fresh series of development
+in our Cavalry Tactics.
+
+         [Footnote 7: Rauch's Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division at
+         Vionville, under von Schmidt, August 16, 1870.]
+
+         [Footnote 8: Section 346 reads: 'The above general principles
+         applying to the conduct and relations between the several
+         "Lines" must not be allowed to lead to the adoption of any
+         stereotyped form of attack. The Division Commander has full
+         authority to employ his brigades as he thinks best for the
+         attainment of the purpose in view.']
+
+Thanks to these prescriptions, the Commander has now a free hand to
+arrange his units (Brigades or Regiments) side by side, and to give
+them the amount of depth that he considers necessary. Hence the
+commands remain immeasurably more in the hands of their leaders than
+was formerly the case--a point of particular importance on ground
+where the view is restricted; and every unit Commander can also form
+his own reserves, so that reinforcements from the rear will always
+join their own Regiment (or Brigade), and thus the intermixture of the
+different commands will be prevented as much as possible; and what a
+gain this will be towards rapid rallying after the confusion of an
+encounter will be obvious to every reader.
+
+Finally, and perhaps this is of even greater importance, a far higher
+measure of initiative will be given to the subordinate leaders than
+was conceivable under the old scheme ('Treffen Taktik').
+
+These advantages can hardly be over-estimated. There remain, however,
+yet two other directions in which this paragraph may lead to yet more
+important consequences.
+
+In the first place, it secures for the Commander himself an immense
+simplification of the whole mechanism he is called on to control--for
+he has no longer to occupy his mind with the fundamental conception of
+the 'Treffen'--_i.e._, Three-Line System.[9]
+
+         [Footnote 9: The 'Drei Treffen Taktik' owes its origin to the
+         study of the Wars of Frederick the Great, and claims to have
+         again brought to life the fundamental principles to which our
+         Cavalry successes in those days were due. Against this view I
+         would point out that Frederick's Cavalry were always formed
+         in two Lines under one common command. Besides these two
+         Lines ('Treffen') there was generally, but by no means
+         always, a 'Reserve'--constituted usually of Hussars
+         only--who, if I do not err, are only once spoken of as a
+         'Treffen' (Line). This Reserve, however, was under a special
+         Commander, and was quite independent of the two 'Treffen'
+         proper above referred to. Now, no one would venture to
+         suggest that Frederick's Infantry fought habitually in three
+         Lines ('Drei Treffen'), although a Reserve was frequently
+         held back in third Line, exactly as with the Cavalry. The
+         truth really is that the modern idea of the 'Drei Treffen
+         Taktik' has actually nothing in common with the methods of
+         employment of Frederick's days at all.]
+
+The term 'Treffen' (Lines), in the true spirit of Frederick the
+Great's day, defines the relation between a leading Line and one or
+more following Lines, which succeed one another in due sequence. The
+tactical evolution of the last few years has, however, led to this
+result--that this definition is no longer in harmony with the modern
+conception attaching to the word 'Treffen.' According to the existing
+regulations and practice, the second or third Line, or both together,
+may just as well form the fighting Line as the one which is
+momentarily called the first. The latter may equally be used for a
+flank attack or, under a change of circumstances, form the Reserve.
+
+The supporting squadrons, as defined in the new Regulations, or the
+second or third Line in the attack against Infantry or Artillery, are
+nowadays the only ones to which the original conception of the
+'Treffen' applies.
+
+Whilst at present the designation of particular Brigades, etc., as
+first, second, or third 'Treffen' (Lines), has practically no bearing
+on their use in action, but only assigns them a temporary place during
+the particular manoeuvre, we have had to invent, to express the actual
+conception of the 'Treffen,' or Line--which, after all, one cannot do
+without--all sorts of designations, such as supporting squadrons,
+formations according to depth, waves, and so forth. Hence the word
+'Treffen' has introduced a complication which finds no justification
+in the true spirit of the matter. These disadvantages, of course, are
+least evident when the Division is brought into action from a previous
+position of assembly; but they are very apparent indeed when it is a
+question of uniting a Division which has previously been acting in
+separate detachments upon the field of battle itself. Then we come
+face to face with the difficulty--in fact, almost impossibility--of
+adopting the modern idea of the 'Three Lines.'
+
+On the line of march a Division is divided into Advance guard and
+Main body, and if moving on several roads, then into a number of such
+constituent parts (two to each road). From this state of subdivision
+there result a number of Tactical units which it is practically
+impossible to fit into the 'Three-Line' formation without incurring
+great loss of time, and possibly the loss of one's opportunity. Hence,
+from the retention of this 'Three-Line' idea, we arrive at a tactical
+dilemma which must react detrimentally on the handling of the whole
+Arm, as long as the Leaders are compelled by Regulations to assume
+their 'Three-Line formation' before they can fight at all. It is from
+this contradiction that Section 346 releases us.
+
+Of equal importance is a further possibility which the wording of the
+same paragraph throws open to us. It allows, in fact, the Cavalry, no
+matter in what tactical connection it may find itself, to fight always
+in accordance with the same principles.
+
+As long as we adhered to the 'Three-Line system,' this, if not
+impossible, was at least practically inexpedient, for the Regulations
+took cognizance only of a Division composed of three Brigades of equal
+strength, were founded on this idea, and did not allow of adaptation
+to any other distribution of force which might have to be employed.
+
+It has already been pointed out in Chapter III. that they do not apply
+to a Corps made up of several Divisions, and the same holds good of
+Divisions of other than strictly normal composition. Everywhere, in
+cases such as referred to above, the subdivision into Lines
+('Treffen') in the spirit of the Regulations would very soon lead to
+even worse disruption of the units than already happens with normal
+Divisions of three Brigades. The want of proportion between the
+number of the Lines and the columns from which they have to be formed
+would be more glaring then than nowadays, when the number of Brigades
+happen to be the same as the number of Lines; with the larger units
+the difficulty of uniform speed and control would be a factor.
+
+Now, Section 346 helps us over all these difficulties by
+disembarrassing us of all stereotyped formations based upon numbers
+alone, and leaves the Commander free to choose in what proportion and
+in what order he will divide and move these masses.
+
+Under modern conditions this latitude is indispensable, for the amount
+of force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; but
+the special shape the attack itself assumes, and more particularly its
+breadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemy
+opposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as to
+depth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of the
+adversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of his
+possible reserves.
+
+The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to the
+numbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps,
+or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession to
+one another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' must
+depend on the circumstances of the movement, the order in which the
+troops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed;
+and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'Wing
+Attack,' for the reasons we have above developed.
+
+This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed when
+time is available to form up the troops systematically for action, or
+when the lines of approach of the units lead naturally to the
+adoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is absolutely
+necessary to deliver an attack from column of route as rapidly as
+possible, and hence the time is lacking for a more systematic
+formation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the deployment at
+the issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from Assembly
+formation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or under
+analogous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing command
+will endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing Attack' by the
+choice of some such formation as the 'double column,' which admits of
+deployment to either hand.
+
+Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader the
+possibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for the
+execution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficiently
+master of his art to know which to select.
+
+Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounter
+between manoeuvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily most
+favourable form of attack with reference to his own line of approach.
+It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner this can be
+best insured, for the circumstances of the operations themselves and
+the nature of the ground are capable of influencing the decision in
+too many ways. One can only lay down certain general principles which
+may form a basis in the appreciation of each situation as it happens
+to arise.
+
+In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such a
+direction that the following blow will force the enemy to retire in
+what will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and,
+conversely, for one's own purposes the best.
+
+But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages or
+otherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the enemy,
+for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to further
+results. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the advantage
+of the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the enemy. In
+this position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one another, and
+to avoid this predicament he will be compelled to endeavour to
+manoeuvre across our front, always a most dangerous undertaking.
+
+On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage of
+eccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces,
+and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if we
+can concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at the
+worst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with one
+another.
+
+It should be our constant endeavour to gain these positions on the
+'outer lines' by previous strategical operations, in order to avoid
+the danger of being compelled at the last moment to initiate wide
+flanking movements in face of the enemy. Again, a further advantage
+accrues if we can rest one flank on inaccessible or difficult ground.
+This flank at least will be secure, so we can spare troops from it to
+strengthen the other, and thus, perhaps, act with decisive effect.
+
+Finally, when it is presumable that we shall have to deal with
+considerable numerical superiority, we should direct all our efforts
+to throwing the whole weight of our charge against the enemy's flank,
+so as to compel him at the last moment to change his front to meet the
+blow. The opportunity for such action will arise in cases in which,
+thanks to our previous strategic direction, we can succeed in uniting
+the mass of our forces more rapidly than our opponent is able to do,
+and this may often be the case where the ground favours our advance
+and conceals the direction of our march.
+
+Generally, it may be laid down that a simultaneous attack directed
+against the enemy's front and flank is justified when we have the
+advantage of a considerable numerical superiority, or when our
+opponent retains for too long a faulty distribution of his forces; but
+in all other cases a blow with united force against his flank will
+give the most far-reaching consequences, as it brings immediate
+pressure against the adversary's line of retreat, and compels him to
+employ his own forces in succession, not in a concentrated effort.
+Hence this form of attack gives the chance of a success even to a
+force in a numerical minority, as it will often afford it the
+opportunity of beating the enemy in detail, whereas against a
+concentrated mass there would be no hope of success at all.
+
+It will be evident that for the execution of such an attack the forms
+laid down in the Regulations to be observed in the transition from
+rendezvous to attack formations are--one is almost tempted to
+write--about as unfavourable as they well can be. It is true they
+afford, as already pointed out, the possibility of presenting the same
+fighting formation in succession to any required point of the compass,
+an advantage which has no practical importance in warfare; but against
+this they increase the difficulties of deployment for attack to the
+front to the utmost. If it is necessary, for instance, to send the
+first Line at the enemy's flank, because at the moment that happens to
+be the shortest way, the front of one of the following Brigades is at
+once masked, and the latter hampered in its movements. Or if it is
+desirable to employ one of the rearward Brigades for a flank movement
+or any similar purposes, then either the leading 'Line' must be
+checked until the others have gained the required position, or it is
+certain that these latter will arrive too late to co-operate.
+
+Further, the forms prescribed by the Regulations render it more
+difficult to make use of such assistance as the nature of the ground
+may offer us.
+
+Plainly, it is very much more to our advantage in the conduct of
+offensive operations to bring up those units which one has at one's
+disposal--with the sole exception of a Reserve, which is not to be
+kept too weak, at deploying intervals on the same alignment--in
+formations which adapt themselves well to the ground, and insure rapid
+deployment to the front, with the necessary depth in the supports
+following. For this purpose I recommend primarily the 'double column'
+either in Brigades or in Regiments.
+
+This arrangement of the troops satisfies all practical conditions, and
+insures, above all, the possibility of bringing all forces
+simultaneously into action, and of carrying out offensive flanking
+operations; further, it makes it easier for the Commander to take
+advantage of such support as the ground affords, and to mass his chief
+strength on one wing; and, finally, it gives us the shortest line of
+attack upon the enemy, and makes it easier to avoid the use of inner
+lines. It unites thus all the advantages of the regulation 'Line'
+('Treffen') formation, and avoids its many serious disadvantages;
+hence it should be employed fundamentally wherever possible.
+
+Turning now to the employment of Cavalry on the battle-field, the
+first condition which has to be satisfied is to assign to the 'Masses'
+their proper place in the line of battle. They must not only be at
+hand when wanted, but also at the spot which promises the most
+favourable tactical chances and the greatest prospect of decisive
+results. Further, they must be able to recognise the right moment to
+take part in the combat.
+
+With reference to the first point, I should, above all, like to call
+attention to the writings of General von Schlichting.[10]
+
+         [Footnote 10: 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the
+         Present Day,' part i., chap, vii., B.]
+
+Theoretically, the Cavalry 'Mass' is best united on that wing of the
+battle front which is not supported, but destined for further
+manoeuvres, hence on which the Arm will enjoy freedom of movement as
+far as the ground allows. Naturally, it will not always be possible to
+assign them such a place, but their position will result generally
+from the course of the previous manoeuvring.
+
+Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for
+the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in
+which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander
+from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front
+will have to manoeuvre; or it must close in from a flank for the
+decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination.
+But they must always endeavour--and here I differ from General von
+Schlichting--to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own
+Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in
+rear of the general alignment--as, for instance, it is proposed to
+use them as a last resort in the interests of the other Arms, as at
+Mars la Tour--or where the battle front itself is broken up by the
+nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such manner that
+the whole engagement is divided into a series of individual actions,
+as may often be the case in future Wars, that this rule must be
+departed from.
+
+Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a
+certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the
+framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its
+fullest opportunity.
+
+That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped
+goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and
+particular circumstances of the moment.
+
+The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to
+the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the
+flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the
+Cavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank,
+and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically
+with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing
+their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy
+into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position
+to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or
+to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed
+to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.
+
+General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally
+superfluous--a kind of family concern which affects the rival
+Cavalries only--having no connection with the ultimate decision
+between the two armies.[11]
+
+         [Footnote 11: See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the
+         Future,' p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one
+         charge in the day is useless for the rest of the operations,
+         I cannot accept. It finds no support in the facts of Military
+         history--on the contrary, the most complete refutation.]
+
+I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly on
+peace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generally
+neutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usually
+opens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results.
+I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, but
+that the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out from
+the first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can
+open the door for further successful action against his other troops;
+otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Mars
+la Tour.
+
+If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock has
+supervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportant
+on the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has always
+been due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combat
+to its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Mars
+la Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force nor
+cohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitz
+and at Prague.
+
+Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is really
+adequate to its duties--when it not only beats the enemy out of the
+field, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further efforts
+in pursuit.
+
+To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and never
+rest satisfied, as on the plateau of Ville sur Yron (Mars la Tour),
+with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to gallop
+and handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his horse
+must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is no true
+'Cavalry Soldier.'
+
+If we have successfully achieved this first result--_i.e._, victory
+over the enemy's horsemen--then the next step is to secure rapid
+rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally
+driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main
+force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the
+enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring
+about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.
+
+That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this
+crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is
+inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension
+of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.
+
+It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his
+horsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of
+his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such
+conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own
+activity--a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be
+expected--and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove
+of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the
+offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces
+before such opportunity arrives.
+
+For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most
+suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it
+implies cannot be disregarded, and will compel him to find means to
+rid himself of such embarrassment.
+
+Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its
+position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should
+be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the
+most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each
+Division retains full space for deployment and room to manoeuvre for
+the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still
+apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.
+
+It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for
+action towards the front than, under the circumstances of the
+battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This
+latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the
+troops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet a
+coming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessity
+of gaining room for deployment,[12] the opportunity to strike will be
+lost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to the
+troops being put in without order and in confusion.
+
+         [Footnote 12: The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August
+         16, 1870.]
+
+The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whether
+Corps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field,
+preserving always their full deploying intervals.
+
+Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above all
+things the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in the
+shape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actual
+facts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation to
+be assumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clear
+in one's own mind as to which disposition to adopt and the
+consequences which must follow from one's choice.
+
+The chief difficulty always remains--viz., the chance of seizing the
+opportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solve
+the problem, and in the subsequent course of the War--particularly
+against the forces of the Republic--it might often have obtained far
+better results had it possessed a clearer conception of its mission
+and better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action at
+Coulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity.
+
+The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range of
+firearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is it
+that we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of our
+tactical power and its limitations, and it is above all things
+necessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not shirk even
+_heavy punishment_ if by so doing we can best secure opportunities for
+great results.
+
+If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requires
+to have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He must
+be able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General the
+general course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and the
+gradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers.
+
+At any moment he must be able to grasp in his mind the whole balance
+of forces in conflict on any point of the battle-field, so as to be
+able to decide whether the employment of his own command at any
+particular point and time is justified by the general situation of
+affairs.
+
+It is, and always must be, the moments of great crises which give the
+Cavalry the best opportunities.
+
+Since attempts to ride through the zone controlled and swept by
+effective Infantry fire may be looked on as synonymous with
+self-destruction, only such moments must be chosen for a charge during
+which the enemy is prevented from bringing his full fire power to bear
+against the assailants. These, however, only occur--except always
+where the nature of the ground allows of a thorough surprise
+action--when the moral disintegration of the enemy's Infantry is such
+that, under the impression of the threatening Cavalry attack, they are
+no longer under control, or when they are so completely taken up with
+their own fire action that it is impossible for them to concern
+themselves with the coming danger. Where such opportunities arise they
+must be seized with lightning-like decision and be exploited with the
+utmost energy. On the other hand, one should never allow one's self to
+be induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear no
+reasonable proportion to the possible results. Such conduct could only
+lead to the purposeless sacrifice of men and horses, just as happened
+to the French Cavalry at Woerth and Sedan.
+
+We can always take as an example the wise restraint exercised by von
+Seidlitz at Zorndorf, who, in spite of the Royal Command, refused to
+attack because he did not consider that the right moment had arrived.
+
+The Leader must always keep before his eyes the demands which either
+pursuit or retreat may make on his horses. One should never sacrifice,
+to secure results of secondary consideration, means that can be used
+to better purposes at other times and other places, for the calls
+which may be made upon Cavalry after the battle are quite exceptional
+in their nature.
+
+When, after long marches, hours of fighting, and heavy losses, the
+exhausted victor bivouacs on the hard-won field, when the day is
+drawing to its close and the shadows are spreading far across the
+pastures, then the real work of the Cavalry begins; then, without
+drawing rein, the horsemen must press forward to intercept the enemy's
+retreat, attack him anywhere where he least expects it, and harry him
+to utter exhaustion and dispersal (see Book I., Chap. IV., 1.4); or it
+must, under the difficult conditions of a retreat at night, sacrifice
+itself in charges or in protracted fire action in every direction in
+which the pursuing Army can threaten danger to the retreating columns.
+In such situations they must be prepared to hold suitable positions by
+the hour, without thought for their own retreat, without any knowledge
+of the general situation, and without any connection with the
+remainder of their forces. Threatened in flank and rear, and yet
+unshaken by the general collapse, by the flight and panic of their
+comrades, they must hold their own, relying on their own strength and
+self-reliance. These are the conditions which make the highest demands
+both on the material and moral excellence of the men, as well as on
+the indomitable energy and skill of the Cavalry Leader, and to few
+mortals is it given to prove equal to such contingencies; hence one
+must prepare one's self beforehand for such situations.
+
+Primarily one must remember to give opportunities to both men and
+horses to feed, water, and rest even during the progress of the
+battle. One must endeavour, even while the fight is still raging, to
+become perfectly clear in one's own mind as to the possible lines of
+retreat, and the probable ulterior operations. One must try to
+impress upon one's memory the lie of the roads according to the map,
+and the important defiles and positions which might be favourable
+either to pursuit or retreat, in order to be able to act at the right
+moment, without loss of time or hesitation, in full cognizance of the
+circumstances of the case. _Nothing helps a decision more than a
+complete intellectual command of the situation._
+
+Hence we see that the leading of Cavalry has been rendered
+immeasurably more difficult by a whole series of external
+considerations, as we have shown at the beginning of the chapter; that
+at every moment the highest demands will be made on the intellectual
+perception, the boldness and strength of character of the Leader, if
+on the battle-field of the future he is to handle the Arm with any
+prospect of success; and that the best Cavalry under modern
+circumstances must fail if their Leaders prove unequal to their task.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS
+
+
+If, in the shock between mounted men, the genius of the Leader is the
+principal factor of success, nevertheless, the successful conduct of a
+dismounted combat and of all the variations this form of action may
+assume make almost equal demands upon his capacity. For the timely
+recognition of opportunities which can only be turned to account by
+recourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action to
+another, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismounted
+engagement, require such a complete command of the situation and such
+certainty of military judgment and decision of character that the
+combination will be almost as rarely found.
+
+Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire
+power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow the
+troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the
+Cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great
+strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
+by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of
+judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal
+natures.
+
+The essential point which differentiates the action of Cavalry
+fighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation is the
+dependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that under
+all circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot to
+their means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once the
+most important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot of
+the Leader.
+
+Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile or
+immobile horses,[13] and in every case the question arises how the
+conditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best be
+dealt with.
+
+         [Footnote 13: When only three men in four dismount the horses
+         are said to be 'mobile.' When the proportion is greater the
+         horses become 'immobile.']
+
+Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action,
+consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance is
+made with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses can
+be led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue the
+prosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fight
+with 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successes
+with the same body of troops with which such success has been won.
+Either the position which has been captured must be retained for some
+considerable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left,
+at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk of
+intervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neither
+operation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit.
+
+On the whole, in attack the difficulty is best met by working with
+'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in the
+fighting line can then be provided by dismounting men from a larger
+number of units--Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades.
+
+From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to the
+proximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it is
+absolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, or
+when it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the
+'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for the
+appointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapid
+attainment of fire superiority must be striven for under all
+circumstances.
+
+If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion must
+be the exact converse.
+
+The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective,
+and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by the
+very conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive rôle in the
+first instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround a
+defensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, it
+is usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firing
+line, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack,
+constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser to
+adopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition.
+
+This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a larger
+mounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, and
+one should only depart from this principle when special circumstances
+make it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of the
+fire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses far
+behind the actual shooting line of the position.
+
+Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments, the
+Commander must decide how far away from the actual field of action he
+should dismount his men.
+
+Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as close
+as possible to the line to be held or the position from whence the
+advance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is only
+set by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for the
+led horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure that
+the men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from a
+distance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire
+of Artillery must not be left out of consideration altogether in the
+solution of this question.
+
+Hence, it can only happen very rarely, and then only under
+exceptionally favourable topographical conditions, that a suitable
+position for the led horses can be found in immediate proximity to the
+actual line of action.
+
+We may, however, be less particular when, in fairly favourable
+country, it is advisable to engage, without the intention of courting
+a decision, our object being only to annoy the enemy by sudden fire,
+disappearing again as soon as he retaliates, or when one is reasonably
+certain of success, as against inferior or badly shaken troops.
+
+But when such favourable conditions are not present, and a tactical
+repulse is always possible, then the place for the led horses can only
+be found so far to the rear that the enemy cannot take us under fire
+whilst in the act of remounting, and circumstances render it
+improbable that this emergency can arise before we have succeeded in
+breaking off fighting contact with the enemy.
+
+The Commander, therefore, who decides to undertake a serious fire
+action must be perfectly clear in his own mind that by the act of
+dismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a very
+considerable time; for if the enemy's resistance proves more obstinate
+than originally anticipated, and it becomes clear that the original
+purpose is not to be attained with the available means, the
+expectation that after once engaging the enemy the fight can be broken
+off and the horses remounted will in most cases prove entirely
+illusory.
+
+Since this operation of discontinuing a fire combat is most difficult
+to carry through, even for Infantry, the dangers are immensely greater
+for mounted men, owing to the added complication of their led horses.
+Only the passivity of the enemy, or unusually favourable topographical
+conditions, as in South Africa, can alter the general soundness of
+this conclusion; and it is entirely impracticable to escape these
+consequences by any attempt to lay down a limit and distance beyond
+which the fight is not to be prosecuted, in the hope that by so doing
+we can safely break off a combat once commenced. Generally it must be
+accepted, as laid down in Cavalry Regulations, Sections 362 and 364,
+that a fire action once accepted must be carried out to the end,
+unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flanks makes its
+interruption possible.
+
+One must never, therefore, in reliance on this possibility of
+withdrawal, allow one's self to be led into the mistake of keeping the
+led horses too close at hand; but the resolution to engage in a
+dismounted action must always involve measures which fully recognise
+the serious possibilities such decision entails, and must be on a
+scale which will insure the necessary vigour of execution.
+
+Hence, since in all cases in which a serious dismounted combat is
+absolutely necessary it is essential that the horses should be left in
+the greatest attainable security, the place for them should be
+selected in such a manner that they are protected against possible
+turning movements by the enemy--that is to say, behind suitable
+shelter provided by the ground, or behind defiles that can be easily
+defended. In cases in which these conditions cannot be complied with,
+which in practice will often arise, their security must be provided
+for by a sufficient reserve of mounted men, particularly when the
+enemy's Cavalry is in the vicinity, for 'immobile' detachments are
+practically at the mercy of every mounted patrol; and as a further
+precaution it will be well to spread around them a sufficient web of
+reconnoitring and security patrols, and to arrange for the support of
+one's own batteries.
+
+The covering of the led horses, however, is not the only duty of the
+mounted reserve: the protection of the Artillery also devolves upon
+it, and generally it must be ready to meet any of the demands for
+which Reserves are usually set aside. Hence it will have to provide
+not only for the safety of its own side and all pertaining thereto,
+but it must also threaten the enemy's flanks, undertake turning
+movements, reinforce, if necessary, the fighting lines, pursue the
+enemy, or cover the possible withdrawal of its own dismounted
+combatants; and, further on the offensive, it is its special mission
+to hold the conquered ground when the dismounted detachments are
+called off to remount, and to continue to carry on the original
+mission, interrupted by the combat, until relieved by the men who in
+the meanwhile have regained their horses, and again assumed the rôle
+of mounted combatants.
+
+The first point the Commander will therefore have to decide is, how
+strong it will be necessary to make his mounted reserve if it is to
+suffice to meet all these requirements, and then whether, with the
+remainder of the men in hand, he has any prospect of successfully
+carrying out his immediate purpose. From this it will depend whether
+he determines to fight or to reach his object by other means. In
+general, the Reserve can be reduced in proportion to the weakness of
+the enemy's Cavalry, and to the depth of the zone of security his
+patrols have been able to secure for him.
+
+Having by this line of reasoning determined the number of men he can
+afford to employ on foot, he must next make up his mind as to their
+tactical distribution.
+
+In this case there can be no doubt that the method of employment by
+'Wings' must commend itself even more than in cases involving only
+mounted combat, for, quite apart from all the many admitted advantages
+of this form, in no other way is it possible to guarantee that the
+dismounted men can safely and rapidly regain their horses.
+
+The 'Line' system would involve endless confusion and loss of time in
+sorting them out amongst their respective commands.
+
+As regards the general considerations of width of front and depth, the
+same principles apply as in the case of Infantry. In the defence to
+gain time is the main object, and the problem to be solved is to
+secure at one and the same moment both fire superiority and a
+sufficient reserve to meet all possible emergencies. A skilful
+utilization of the ground, previous ascertainment of the ranges, ample
+ammunition and sound fire discipline, will, as with the Infantry, be
+the best means of attaining one's object.
+
+Special conditions only arise in the defence of villages where the
+horses can be brought under cover close to the men, and here it seems
+to be necessary to distinguish between several possibilities, all of
+which require different treatment.
+
+If the place is to be obstinately defended, then the horses must be
+kept on the side away from the enemy, or in the centre of the
+buildings, the defence of the boundaries be suitably arranged, and the
+men told off to their several sections. The exits must be barricaded,
+and the approaches entangled with wire.
+
+A strong inlying piquet, to act eventually as a reserve, must be
+placed in a central position.
+
+If, however, the place is to be given up when seriously attacked, and
+resistance is only to be sufficient to cover withdrawal, then the
+horses should be kept saddled up in the stables, etc., and
+arrangements made to withdraw them rapidly without exciting attention.
+
+In the first case, as against Infantry or mounted Cavalry only, one
+can count on holding one's own without serious losses for a
+considerable time; but the matter becomes very different if the
+enemy's Artillery is also to be reckoned with, for modern shell fire
+will soon involve the destruction of all the horses, and one must be
+prepared to find retreat practically impossible once one has allowed
+one's self to be committed to an engagement of this nature. Hence such
+positions should only be occupied and defended when it is safe to
+count on support from following troops, or when it is improbable that
+the enemy will be able to bring Artillery into action. Such situations
+may frequently arise in the advanced lines of a concentration zone, in
+which the villages nearest the enemy form part of the general system
+of security.
+
+In all other cases, and particularly as regards the advanced
+squadrons, it will be better to take up 'Alarm' quarters, and the more
+unexpectedly the enemy can attack us the more stringent must be the
+precautions we adopt.
+
+If we decide to retire, a portion of the men will be detached to take
+the horses out of the village, or to have them drawn up in readiness
+for mounting behind the position selected, and meanwhile the remainder
+of the garrison must compensate for their diminution in numbers by a
+greater expenditure of ammunition, thus holding the enemy till all is
+ready, and then slipping rapidly back to their horses. Without
+losses--amounting, perhaps, to the sacrifice of the last covering
+party--such withdrawal can hardly hope to succeed; but previous
+systematic arrangements give the best chance of success, and the same
+prevision will be equally necessary, even if the place is to be held
+at all costs, for the situation may always change, and a retreat
+become advisable.
+
+At night, however, the aspect of affairs changes; then any attempt at
+withdrawal is to be deprecated, and, as a matter of principle, must
+not be contemplated. Even if the enemy breaks into the place by
+surprise, it is still better to fight him on the spot rather than to
+risk the certain destruction of the whole detachment by retreat. A
+successful resistance is in such cases all the more probable, since
+in the darkness the use of the enemy's Artillery is practically
+precluded--at any rate, can attain but little result. Only the
+squadrons far out in advance, and thus liable to be surrounded on all
+sides and captured before help can arrive, will have to be prepared
+for a night withdrawal before the assailants can close in around them.
+
+As to the principles to be observed in such cases, there should be no
+room for doubt. Everyone should know what he has to do when the case
+arises.
+
+Turning now to the consideration of the conduct to be observed in
+attack, it is clear that here also the same fundamental ideas apply as
+with the Infantry. Dismounted Cavalry must be prepared to work their
+way up to decisive distances, to break down from this limit the
+enemy's resistance, and finally to carry the position by storm. Hence
+the fighting line has need of constant reinforcements to give the
+necessary forward impulse, and hence we require the same distribution
+in regard to 'depth.'
+
+Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to adopt on this point any
+stereotyped formation. It must not be overlooked that the essence of
+such Cavalry attacks is rapidity of execution. Hence in all cases
+where this necessity for rapidity arises the endeavour must be made to
+bring from the very first as many rifles into the firing line as
+possible, and it follows that the greater the fire power thus obtained
+the less the need for subsequent reinforcement.
+
+If we try to picture to ourselves the conditions under which these
+dismounted Cavalry attacks can occur, it is evident that only in the
+most unusual instances will the necessity arise of launching them
+against wide fronts of dense lines of unbroken Infantry; on the other
+hand, we shall often be called upon to capture isolated villages,
+etc., such as posts on the line of communication, railway-stations,
+and important defiles, and in all such cases it will always be
+possible to combine attacks simultaneously against both flanks, front
+and rear. Thanks to its mobility, the Cavalry is exceptionally well
+suited to the performance of such undertakings, because it can combine
+both attack and surprise to the best advantage.
+
+If, thanks to this possibility, it is practicable to diminish the
+weight of the front attack, it follows, again, that less
+depth--_i.e._, fewer successive reinforcements--will require to be
+provided; but these can only be suppressed altogether when the object
+aimed at does not imply the actual maintenance of the position to be
+assaulted, but our purpose is only to reach a point from whence to
+overwhelm the enemy with fire, previous to riding him down by our
+closed squadrons, or to break off the action again and retire as soon
+as a counter-attack develops. These are cases which will often present
+themselves: either when in pursuit it is desirable to strike
+unexpectedly at the enemy's columns, or during a battle, when it is
+feasible to molest and disturb his reserves.
+
+In the above paragraphs I have put together the chief points to be
+considered in the action of dismounted Cavalry when acting
+unsupported; it remains now to consider the rôle assigned to the Horse
+Artillery allotted to it, if only to bring out those parts which, in
+my opinion, lie beyond its proper field.
+
+If we admit that in general, as between two great Cavalry masses in
+actual collision, the guns can play an important part, I must yet
+insist that the measure of this importance should not be overdrawn;
+for it is only when the former are confined to a defensive
+attitude--for instance, when they are still under cover or behind
+sheltering folds of the ground, or when moving in a widely-extended
+screen to mislead the enemy and tempt him into fire-swept ground, in
+order to fall upon him when he has ventured into the trap--that much
+is to be expected from their co-operation.
+
+But as soon as the Cavalry begins to advance, the part the Artillery
+has to play drops into the background. Then the guns become simply an
+impediment, because, since they generally require a special escort,
+they subtract from the total force available for the actual shock, and
+always act more or less as a pivot, which hampers the free movement of
+the Cavalry.
+
+On the contrary, the Cavalry must never allow itself to be influenced
+in its movements by the position of its own Artillery. The latter must
+adapt itself unconditionally to the movements of the former, and must
+endeavour to conform to its evolutions, so as not only to co-operate
+with it, but, if possible, to dispense with a special escort.
+
+It must, therefore, be the endeavour of the Artillery to keep well out
+in front of the Cavalry, so as to take the enemy under fire, and
+anticipate his batteries by coming into action first. The latter is a
+most important point, for it is the essential duty of the enemy's
+gunners to divert and beat down the fire which we endeavour to bring
+against their horsemen.
+
+If we can only succeed in unlimbering first, they are bound to accept
+the law from us, and are thereby prevented either of availing
+themselves of the advantages of the ground or of conforming to the
+tactical intentions of their Leader.
+
+The best position for Artillery must always be behind some sheltering
+roll of the ground, where it requires none, or at the most a weak,
+escort; and this desideratum will be best fulfilled when it is on the
+inner--that is, the supported--flank of its Cavalry, because in this
+position it can presumably remain in action longest, and hampers the
+movements of its own force least. Similarly, in pursuit or in covering
+a retreat its sphere of activity is distinctly limited. Its action can
+only then become effective when the actual tactical pursuit--_i.e._,
+with cold steel--ceases, the combatants have disentangled themselves,
+and the strategic pursuit sets in.
+
+The mobility of the target must naturally influence the fire effect to
+be expected from the guns, as it increases the difficulty of
+'ranging,' and limits the possible duration of action to a few
+moments.
+
+The batteries will only then be able to turn their fire on the enemy's
+Cavalry when the latter show themselves in considerable masses moving
+at the slower paces. But when the Cavalry sweep forward at full speed,
+the most they can do will be to take some stretch of ground through
+which the opposing Cavalry must pass, and on which there is still time
+to range, and then turn on shrapnel fire to its utmost intensity.
+
+But even for this the opportunity will only then arise when either our
+own Cavalry holds back, the enemy's Artillery does not require our
+full attention and fire power, or, finally, if our own guns are not
+attacked by the enemy's Cavalry.
+
+In view of all these considerations, it follows that it is impossible
+to assign a decisive importance to the participation of a few Horse
+Batteries in the actual shock of the opposing squadrons. Nevertheless,
+one should always do one's best to use to the utmost such Artillery
+power as is available, and particularly if there is any doubt as to
+the strength of the enemy, and we have reason to suspect that he
+possesses a marked numerical superiority.
+
+The chief rôle of the Artillery must always remain the support of
+dismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle,
+protected by their own horsemen, to strike against the enemy's flank
+and rear, shell his columns on the march, to drive him out of
+weakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circumstances,
+such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmost
+possible damage.
+
+In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions and
+the nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to the
+fundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick up
+their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their
+action.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY
+
+
+The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rules
+for the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, which
+will give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the grouping
+and employment of the available forces.
+
+Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigades
+march on separate roads in first line, with the third following behind
+the centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front,
+side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road,
+whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane.
+
+Even our Cavalry Regulations--which on this subject actually ventures
+to trespass on strategical ground--lays down (see Section 318) that
+'in Reconnaissance the mass of the Division must be kept together
+until the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field.'
+
+I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategic
+employment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the very
+essence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to be
+detrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly false
+views as to the conditions and demands with which in practical
+warfare we are confronted. All these regulations fall to the ground
+the moment they have to be applied to strategical units of variable
+dimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks which may
+fall to us are of such different natures that they cannot possibly be
+all solved by the same formulae.
+
+The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importance
+on the whole character of our action and the distribution of our
+forces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country also
+exercise their influence on our decision.
+
+To this must be added the fact that, in view of the many strategical
+necessities of a great Army, the Headquarters cannot always be in a
+position to allot to the Cavalry a clearly-defined task either of
+reconnaissance or security, attack or defence; thus higher
+considerations may prevent the massing of the Cavalry on a single road
+or any other similar simple distribution. More often than not one will
+have to suggest the simultaneous attainment of the most varied
+objectives, and the Cavalry Leader will be lucky if he is not called
+upon to solve problems of the most heterogeneous nature, things which
+in their execution mutually exclude one another.
+
+Hence one can only lay down the most general principles to govern the
+strategical employment of the Arm, and to meet this difficulty it
+becomes all the more important to develop the capacity for endurance
+of the troops to the utmost, so that they can successfully deal with
+these many variable demands.
+
+As to how far the independent Cavalry should be thrust out in front of
+the following columns of the Army, all that can be laid down is, that
+the wider the fronts and the deeper the Army--hence the longer time
+the Army will take to deploy, concentrate, change its position, or
+execute any similar operation depending on the reports of the
+Cavalry--the further that Cavalry must gain ground to the front.
+
+As to the principles governing the formal arrangement of the troops in
+contradiction to all attempts to lay down stereotyped formations, all
+that can be said is that every strategical operation, if for no other
+reason than to allow of reconnaissance and secure safety, requires a
+certain extension in breadth; but the combat itself demands
+concentration.
+
+It follows from the above that the Cavalry Commander must in every
+initial case weigh in his own mind how much the existing circumstances
+may allow him to extend, and, on the other hand, how closely they
+compel him to keep concentrated, and he will only be able to reconcile
+the dilemma when he is actually clear in his own mind as to the
+tactical and strategical results his conduct in either case will
+involve.
+
+If the essence of his duty is to secure and to screen, then, as stated
+above, extension and subdivision of his command naturally follows. But
+one must keep clearly before one's own eyes that any concentration for
+a combat jeopardizes the performances of these tasks, for the
+concentration for combat necessitates the uncovering of the front,
+which it is the very object of the enemy to bring about and take
+advantage of. Further, the wider the front, the less becomes the
+possibility of timely tactical concentration; hence, under such
+conditions, one would generally have to renounce the temptation to
+engage in combat with a positive object, and content one's self with
+keeping the enemy at a distance, for this purpose availing one's self
+to the utmost of the advantages the ground may confer, and such
+support as the reinforced Horse Artillery and mobile Infantry (in
+vehicles) can afford.
+
+When the width of extension becomes very great it will be an absolute
+mistake to keep back reserves, since by doing so the actual front is
+weakened, whilst there is no guarantee that the reserve can arrive in
+time at the threatened point.
+
+Further, the wider the front becomes, the greater the difficulty of
+strategical change of direction.
+
+A similar extension of front as that above indicated in this resume of
+'Security' duties may also become advisable when engaged on
+'Reconnaissance'--for instance, when lengthy obstacles, such as
+watercourses, mountains, etc., only traversable at bridges, dams, or
+defiles, have to be surmounted.
+
+In such cases, especially when resistance is to be anticipated, it
+will rarely be possible to count on being able to surmount the
+obstacle in one single column, since even unimportant forces under
+such circumstances can oppose a very protracted defence, and
+neutralize a large numerical superiority. When these difficulties are
+met with, it will be necessary even in reconnaissance to divide one's
+force into several columns, as then there is always the chance of
+successfully piercing the enemy's front at some one point, and thence
+rolling up his resistance all along the line.
+
+Even in open country conditions may be encountered that render the
+subdivision of one's forces over a considerable extent of front
+desirable--_i.e._, when it is necessary to find the enemy, and fix the
+fact of his presence in certain specific districts. As an example,
+the conduct of the Cavalry after the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18,
+1870), when it became imperative to ascertain whether MacMahon's Army
+was marching to the north-eastward or not.
+
+Here it was indispensable to sweep out a wide area. To attempt such
+tasks with patrols alone is unadvisable, for these always require a
+certain tactical support behind them, by which they can be either
+reinforced or relieved.
+
+Still, the point must never be lost sight of, that, since the enemy
+will also seek to screen his operations, a decisive collision may
+become necessary at any moment to tear his screen asunder. Hence it
+will be better, in opposition to the principles laid down for
+'security' only, to keep one's principal force in groups or masses,
+possessing considerable striking force, and to march in such manner
+that a certain degree of concentration is always attainable while
+meeting the necessity for extension in breadth by smaller
+reconnoitring patrols.
+
+Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained,
+whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then to
+reconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their complete
+concentration is assured in all cases, and only to divide them to the
+degree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roads
+and the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions also
+hold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In this
+case it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions for
+security, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage rather
+than run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed.
+
+Tactically the greater concentration guarantees tactical success, and
+strategically it allows greater freedom of movement and changes of
+direction to meet altered conditions; but one must never lose sight of
+the technical drawbacks such closer concentration entails.
+
+The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth than
+with divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march of
+troops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned is
+increased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air is
+not inconsiderable.
+
+If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holding
+him until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition of
+close concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhere
+either superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment.
+Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way for
+tactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and this
+is particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wide
+turning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best brought
+about by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of a
+mass from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented if
+attempted in a single column.
+
+Hence every principle has its limitations, and circumstances will
+always arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for
+'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentration
+is justified, even where the nature of the ground does not
+imperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency of
+one's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels one
+to combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it is
+precisely on the defensive that it may be of advantage to deal a blow
+with the concentrated strength. Equally on the strategic offensive,
+dispersion may be necessary, as when the enemy retreats eccentrically;
+or if it is necessary to occupy districts of considerable size to
+break down the resistance of the hostile population, or to interrupt
+railway communication over a considerable area.
+
+Finally, all principles fall to the ground where the enemy's Cavalry
+is finally beaten out of the field, or by a succession of mistakes he
+gives openings which we can seize with advantage. Thus our conduct
+always remains dependent on the topographical nature of the country,
+on our own purpose and the opposition of the enemy, and only one law
+governs all cases--namely, expediency. The greater art of leading will
+naturally be required when the necessity arises to operate with more
+or less widely-separated columns. In all such cases everything depends
+on the endurance of one's troops. The principal difficulty in the way
+of execution lies in harmonizing and maintaining the movements of the
+separate detachments.
+
+If one has to deal with Infantry only, then, since their rate of march
+is almost always the same, it is easy to calculate approximately where
+the several columns may be found; but it is quite different when one
+comes to deal with Cavalry, where the different Leaders may adopt very
+different rates of movement, or may have such variations forced upon
+them by other circumstances, and hence one has always to deal with
+quite indeterminable factors. This difficulty can never be altogether
+eliminated; one can only counteract it by laying down from the very
+first instructions for the advance of the several columns, according
+to time and space, from which no deviation is to be permitted without
+sufficient reasons, and organizing the circulation of orders and
+intelligence in such a manner that it will work with certainty. These
+two precautions supplement one another. If one can calculate
+approximately where the several detachments are to be found at a given
+time, then reports can be sent by the shortest way, and will reach
+their destination without delay.
+
+It will be decidedly advisable that all detachments should report to
+Headquarters, and if possible to all adjacent columns, without
+distinct instructions, and at certain time intervals, both as to their
+advance, their bearing in relation to adjacent columns, as also any
+news they may have obtained about the enemy.
+
+Nothing is more important to the Cavalry Leader than to be constantly
+informed as to the general situation of the units he controls; but it
+is equally important that the several groups should know what is
+happening to one another, for only then can they act in the spirit and
+in combination with the whole.
+
+This is all the more essential because, owing to the rapidity of all
+movements, and to the great extension which has often to be given to
+the front, it is impossible for the higher Command to interfere in
+good time, or to obtain information from its subordinates in any
+emergency that may suddenly arise. The results, then, depend entirely
+on the independent judgment of the man on the spot, and suitable
+action can only be obtained when the latter is kept fully informed as
+to the nature of the general situation.
+
+We should, therefore, avoid as far as possible the despatch of orders
+to individual Commanders without at the same time informing their
+comrades of the bearing of such instructions.
+
+Wherever possible in strategical operations, the orders should be
+comprehensive, and should be circulated simultaneously to all
+subordinates. Where it is impossible to convey an order simultaneously
+to all, those not immediately concerned in their execution should be
+informed of its issue as soon as possible. Certainly, this method
+requires a large number of gallopers, orderlies, and so forth; but
+this apparent waste of energy will in the end prove the best economy,
+because the troops will thereby be spared many unnecessary movements.
+
+However great the endeavour may be to diminish the difficulties of the
+united action of separated bodies in the combat itself, the issue of
+the Cavalry fight is decided so rapidly that its consequences must
+have begun to show themselves before either the adjacent columns or
+Headquarters have learnt of its commencement. We must, therefore, be
+clear in our own minds that successful combination of separated bodies
+in action can generally only be effected when the opponent is either
+stationary, in which case one can time one's movements against him, or
+when, by a protracted defence at other points, the more distant bodies
+have time and opportunity to reach the field.
+
+Even when the approach of the opponent's forces has been discovered in
+time, it will be difficult to calculate with any degree of precision
+the exact point at which collision will occur, as the marching rate of
+the enemy's Cavalry must always remain an uncertain factor. Hence it
+will not suffice to evade the enemy's advance until the adjacent
+columns can unite, as one cannot assign to them any definite point of
+concentration where the distance between the columns is at all
+considerable. Any attempt to concentrate strategically against an
+enemy in movement without at some point fighting to gain time must be
+dismissed as illusory. In all these cases one must not hesitate to
+take to the rifle, and to utilize all available means of defence.
+
+Similarly, when advancing in separated columns, it will be well to
+advance from one defensive section to another in rushes, and not to go
+beyond any one of these until fairly assured that one can reach the
+next without encountering the enemy's Cavalry.
+
+If one should have the misfortune of being surprised in a district
+which affords no points of support, then one must retire to the next
+best one in order to give the adjacent columns time to swing in
+against the enemy's flanks. The sound of the guns will be indication
+enough to these to hasten their pace.
+
+The more important it is, therefore, to march to the sound of the guns
+in order to save time, the more careful must one be in opening fire
+without sufficient cause. On the one hand, the side which wishes to
+attract support will not be satisfied with a few rounds, but will
+endeavour by continuous and heavy firing to make the danger of his
+situation evident; on the other, the adjacent columns will only then
+be justified in approaching if they are convinced that it is not a
+mere matter of local and transitory advantage. The Cavalry Commander
+must keep, therefore, a firm hand over his guns, and never allow these
+to come into action without express sanction, except in extreme
+necessity. Generally, the batteries should always march with the
+advance or the rear guard in order to break down rapidly any minor
+resistance, and to make the fullest use of such short opportunities as
+may arise for the utilization of their full power.
+
+The application of these principles is, of course, much simpler when
+it is possible to keep the several columns close together on a
+convenient group of roads, all running fairly near to one another. The
+disadvantages which then arise make less demand on the skill of the
+Leader, but more on the necessarily cramped form of the disposition
+which, as we have above pointed out, he is compelled to adopt.
+
+For every operation, in fact, except the direct attack, there is a
+certain degree of extension, which favours the immediate purpose the
+most, and this depends on the shape and nature of the ground; but one
+has always to resist the temptation to dispersion which arises,
+particularly when it is necessary to keep in mind the solution of
+several possible problems. Only very occasionally will it be expedient
+to divide one's troops to meet every emergency.
+
+The General must use his judgment to decide where the chief weight of
+his mission lies, the principal characteristics he must impress upon
+his operations, and how the subsidiary purposes can be best served
+without applying half-purposes to the primary object. It is these
+considerations--the reduction of the complicated to the simple--which
+create the chief difficulties which weigh upon the mind of the Leader.
+The capacity of coming to a correct decision in every special case is
+a mark of the intellectually capable Commander, and of itself gives a
+certain guarantee of its success by rendering possible the
+concentration of the force upon the decisive point; but it will not
+alone suffice to insure success. Boldness and energy of character is
+the final determining cause of successful results.
+
+Above all, every Cavalry leader must be inspired by the determination
+to keep the initiative under all circumstances, and never to
+relinquish it to his opponent. The initiative alone guarantees
+successes, often in a degree which one was hardly entitled to expect,
+for it forces the enemy to accept the law from our hands, disturbs his
+strategical combination, compels him to fight before his troops are
+united, and often gives to the numerically weaker the opportunity of
+establishing a relative local superiority. One must, therefore,
+endeavour to introduce as much of the initiative and offensive element
+as circumstances will permit even in the execution of defensive
+missions.
+
+A Leader must never allow himself to be hindered in an advance, or be
+driven into an attitude of expectation by the passive opposition of
+the enemy's Cavalry, as so often happens in peace.
+
+In all such cases, when a direct frontal attack holds out no prospect
+of success, he must immediately initiate a wide turning movement
+outside the effective range of the enemy's Artillery, and sacrifice
+without hesitation his own line of retreat. Victory restores at once
+the original line of advance, and the outflanking movement threatens
+also the enemy's retreat.
+
+It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superior
+commands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one's own
+initiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out.
+
+In this way we shall save the troops excessive exertions and
+purposeless riding about, for since the Headquarters can never grasp
+the situation as rapidly or as thoroughly as the General actually on
+the spot, it follows that their orders will generally arrive too
+late. Hence they often lag behind events, and call for excessive
+exertions, night and forced marches if the purpose is to be attained.
+The records of the Campaign of 1870-1871 give innumerable instances of
+these facts, based on experience. Finally, resolutions should never be
+made dependent on circumstances which may happen in the future, but
+must always be based on something positive, which must be followed up
+with all conceivable energy and circumspection. This most necessary
+circumspection on the part of the Leader demands a clearness of
+expression in the issue of orders which must never leave the
+subordinate officers and troops in doubt, and should always reflect a
+clear and determined purpose.
+
+It is, however, equally necessary that the superior Leader must
+himself be clear as to how he means to carry out his purpose, has also
+considered all other possibilities, and has made his arrangements in
+such a manner that, if necessary, he can give his operations a
+different direction. This must be particularly the case where success
+depends on cunning surprise. As concerns the first point, this will
+require the more thorough consideration, because it is most
+particularly difficult to change the strategic direction of a large
+body of Cavalry when once it has been launched forward on a broad
+front. In such a case the whole carefully-elaborated network of
+patrols would be left, so to speak, hanging in the air. To divert it
+sideways into a new direction is generally impracticable; it would, in
+fact, in most cases be impossible to transmit to all the advanced
+detachments the news of the change in the dispositions.
+
+A new system of patrols will, therefore, be absolutely necessary to
+save both energy and time, and the necessity for instituting this new
+service will be particularly detrimental to our whole operations,
+because the information from the new direction will generally arrive
+too late to be of service.
+
+It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the Cavalry Leader
+should not only reconnoitre in the direction prescribed by the higher
+Command for its particular purpose, but should also scout
+independently in every direction, and inform himself of all the
+circumstances in the whole district over which he is operating; if
+necessary, organize for himself an intelligence system.[14]
+
+         [Footnote 14: I here call attention to the instructions of
+         Frederick the Great on this subject, as well as to the
+         circumspection with which General J. E. B. Stuart prepared
+         for his own undertakings.]
+
+In short, he must exercise such prevision that he can never be overtaken
+by circumstances; and in every case in which action is called for in a
+new, and, perhaps, unexpected direction, he should be prepared to meet
+the emergency. In this way he will save himself much time and energy,
+but it will facilitate his very difficult task essentially if he is
+always kept informed in sufficient time of the views and possible
+intention of the Chief Command; for unless this condition is complied
+with, it will be impossible to insure that the whole energy of the Arm
+will be directed to the carrying out of its reconnoitring functions in
+conformity with the views entertained at Headquarters. It must be
+characterized as one of the most suicidal errors when the superior
+Command conceals its purposes from its executive organs. Diffused
+activity, waste of energy, misunderstandings, and confusion would be the
+inevitable consequences, and military history--not the least that of
+1870-1871--gives a long rôle of illustrative examples.
+
+As regards all those operations which depend on surprise, the
+circumspection of the Leader becomes the decisive factor. Everything
+must be thought out beforehand, and carefully considered. The very
+soul and being of the Leader must be grasped by the men under his
+Command, and the utmost energy in the execution of his design be
+demanded from every individual. As a general rule, smaller bodies,
+which can conceal themselves behind features of the ground, and hardly
+require a service of security, can act quite differently to larger
+ones, which cannot conceal their presence and always require a certain
+degree of precaution for reconnaissance and security. Above all,
+mobility is the essence of the whole situation, and darkness will
+serve as a most important contributor to success.
+
+On main roads, where it is impossible to lose one's way, darkness can
+be used for forced marches to advantage if beforehand we are clear
+about the conditions on the side of the enemy, and hence can act with
+a certain degree of confidence.
+
+One factor must never be left out of consideration--viz., that under
+modern conditions the difficulties of action by surprise have been
+enormously increased, and the enemy is under certain circumstances
+enabled to paralyze the tactical results of surprise. This factor
+arises from the existence of railways and telegraphs, and it will act
+most detrimentally against us when moving in the enemy's country,
+where both arrangements favour our opponents. Telegraphs carry the
+news of the appearance of Cavalry far and wide beyond the points where
+they have been seen by the enemy's troops, and the railways forward
+supports to the threatened districts.
+
+It is, therefore, of particular importance to destroy by means of
+advanced patrols both telegraphs and railways all over the district on
+which one hopes to act by surprise, and to repeat such active
+destruction again and again. In such enterprises there is a wide field
+for slimness and craftiness--qualities which might very well be
+combined in greater undertakings.
+
+Sudden changes in the line of advance behind the screen of advanced
+troops, unexpected concentration of separate columns at decisive
+points, separation and surprise reunions of one's forces,
+dissemination of false news, feints on points of subsidiary importance
+to distract the attention of the enemy--all these things can lead to
+the deception of the enemy, and in one's own country they will be
+materially supported by a friendly population; but timely and accurate
+information of all the circumstances of the enemy remains always a
+most necessary condition.
+
+If the importance of these measures is particularly striking in these
+cases where we are dealing with surprises, ambushes, and so forth,
+they form also in every other type of Cavalry action one of the
+principal foundations of success, for they alone insure timely
+resolutions and the consequent initiation of the movements necessary
+to bring about concentration and separation.
+
+The Cavalry Commander must, therefore, always choose his position when
+on the march, with the troops in immediate contact with the enemy; or
+if his troops are quartered in the neighbouring villages, then
+immediately behind the advanced line of cantonments, so that whenever
+possible he can see with his own eyes and base his decisions on
+first-hand evidence, where he can receive all reports as soon as
+possible, and make his dispositions in good time. Otherwise it will
+only too frequently happen that his orders and dispositions will drag
+behind events, and disorder and defeat will be the consequence.
+
+This personal supervision of matters in his front is also necessary to
+enable him to come to a correct decision as to his line of action,
+whereas a Commander of all Arms can better decide by the map, because
+his troops are less dependent on the ground than Independent Cavalry,
+move more slowly, and hence are more accessible to subsequent orders.
+But even the utmost energy in the Leader will not alone suffice to
+lead things into their proper lines without the most successful and
+rapid reconnaissance. Hence the practical organization of the system
+of reconnaissance remains the essential task of all strategical
+Cavalry leadership; but it requires to be supplemented by an equally
+practical system of security.
+
+On the two subjects so much has already been written that it is
+impossible to find anything new to say about them. Only one point has
+not been brought out sufficiently--namely, that both security and
+reconnaissance, in so far as both depend on patrols, will only then
+work successfully when they are based on a thoroughly systematized
+method of procedure. The subject is of such importance that I have
+considered it necessary to devote a short chapter to it (Book I.,
+Chap. VIII.).
+
+If reconnaissance--apart from the fact that the roads must be cleared
+for it in the first instance by the defeat of the enemy's
+Cavalry--lies exclusively in the hands of the patrols, nevertheless
+security depends on the arrangement and activity of the other
+branches, such as advance guards, rear guards, flanking detachments,
+and outposts, and the conduct of these depends, again, on thorough
+systematization.
+
+When on the move, safety lies in the distance that separates the main
+body from the advanced detachments, and it is scarcely necessary to
+point out that only systematic arrangements can guarantee the
+necessary time for the exploration of the ground and the enemy which
+is requisite for safety.
+
+Threatened flanks require special detachments, moving on the same
+level and at sufficient distance, and their co-operation will be
+insured by a careful regulation of the mutual rate of march.
+
+A uniform rate of advance in the whole mechanism is an essential
+condition of complete security. Hence every means must be exhausted
+down to the smallest detail. It will not be necessary to assign minor
+flanking detachments for the duration of a whole march. During such a
+period it is practically impossible to retain their relation to the
+main body without keeping them within sight, which in most cases is
+quite impracticable, for circumstances may suddenly check the main
+body, or necessitate a change of direction. To advise the flanking
+detachments of such occurrences will generally be impossible, or at
+any rate very difficult, if one has permanently detached them, and
+therefore has no certainty of finding them at any particular point.
+Hence it is advisable to work them always in sections--that is to say,
+when they have reached certain points to withdraw them to the main
+body, and send out reliefs for the next section.
+
+But in order that the security should never for one instant be
+relaxed, these fresh reliefs should always be sent out at some little
+distance before the point at which the former detachment is to be
+drawn in.
+
+Almost more important than security at night is security during
+prolonged periods of rest. In that case the arrangements must be made
+not only in accordance with tactical requirements, but the fact must
+be taken into account that horses, in order to remain permanently
+useful, require quite a different nature of rest than is needed by
+men.
+
+It is most desirable that as many horses as possible should every day
+be brought under shelter and unsaddled, and all bivouacking should be
+avoided as far as practicable.
+
+The readiness for action from a purely tactical point of view
+certainly suffers, but as rest at night is an absolute necessity for
+the horses, one has to make the best of the matter and minimize this
+disadvantage as much as possible by suitable arrangements.
+
+Against this view it is often urged that Cavalry used to bivouac much
+more frequently in former wars, and nevertheless remained fit for
+service, hence they ought to be able to do the same to-day. I consider
+this an entirely wrong deduction. In the first place, the demands upon
+the troops in former days were generally much less than at present.
+The periods of crisis in which great exertions had to be made by them
+were on the whole less frequent, and the subsequent intervals for rest
+and recuperation were usually longer.
+
+Considering the average marches of the Napoleonic Cavalry as a whole,
+they cannot be considered particularly great, and still less was this
+the case under Frederick the Great, although under both Generals we
+find instances of great individual exertion.
+
+Moreover, the horses in those days were much less well bred, and the
+commoner cold-blooded strain can stand bivouacs, cold and wet, much
+better than our present high-bred material, although the latter stand
+heat and exertion very much better. The leadership must adapt itself
+to these conditions. Where circumstances allow the bulk of the horses
+to take shelter behind the Infantry outposts, the most must be made of
+the opportunity, and only the more distant patrolling service be left
+to the Cavalry. Outpost service makes far less demands on the Infantry
+soldier than on the Cavalry horse, for the former is allowed to sleep
+when on piquet, the Cavalry horse cannot.
+
+The Cavalry soldier certainly gains an advantage here over the
+much-harassed Infantry man, for naturally the man derives advantage
+from the care bestowed on the horse; but I hold this point is of far
+too trifling a nature to take into consideration when the matter
+affects such a necessary and important factor of strength of the whole
+Army. Further, this advantage is more apparent than real, and is only
+intended to give us the means, while sparing the material in one
+direction, to make greater demands on it in another. When in critical
+moments bold and wide-sweeping movements on the enemy's flanks and
+rear become necessary, where our object is to keep the enemy's
+movements under constant observation while screening our own; where,
+finally, on the close of a battle we must pursue the enemy
+relentlessly, or sacrifice ourselves to cover and protect the weary
+and retreating Infantry, then the Cavalry which has been properly
+nursed will be capable of exertions far beyond what could be expected
+of troops less thoughtfully managed. These exertions can then be
+unconditionally demanded, and will repay a hundredfold, both
+tactically and strategically, the care bestowed in easier days.
+
+Only rarely, however, will cases arise in which Cavalry can avail
+themselves of the shelter of the Infantry, for the essence of all
+Cavalry activity lies in the future in its independent undertakings.
+If we were to apply to them the same principles as to the
+Infantry--that is to say, make a principle of bivouacking the outposts
+and exposing them daily to the effects of the weather--this would
+result in a steady drain upon the horses, which would lead to serious
+deterioration in their endurance. Hence the question of bringing them
+under cover does not apply merely to the mass of the forces, but must
+be extended to the whole system of outposts, and wherever practicable
+the greatest possible number of horses must be placed under shelter in
+full and complete security. This security must be sought for by the
+increased depth assigned to the outpost system. Even after a
+victorious advance one must not hesitate, under certain circumstances,
+to withdraw the troops in order to obtain the necessary distances
+between the enemy and the advance guard, as also between the advance
+guard and the main body. Slightly increased distance to be covered
+next day is nothing as compared to the advantage of greater security.
+It will be particularly desirable to make the most of all positions
+the ground may afford, which, being traversable at only certain
+points, hinders the approach of the enemy--such as rivers, which can
+only be crossed at the bridges, woods in which movement is confined to
+the roads, marshes, and so forth. Behind these one can generally go
+into cantonments without anxiety, and they offer the further advantage
+that they can generally be held by small forces of dismounted men.
+Hence the horses can generally be sent back and brought under shelter
+at a distance, and in case of alarm can be saddled up and be made
+ready by men detailed for that purpose.
+
+Where such positions are not available, one must either go back
+further, or, if not altogether too near to the enemy, make the most
+advanced cantonments serve the purpose of the line of security.
+
+Every evening these localities must be hastily prepared for defence,
+with the determination, in case of attack, of defending them carbine
+in hand, and without bringing out the horses until the support can
+come up from the rearward cantonments.
+
+The details of such defence I have already discussed elsewhere.
+
+This method of defence, however, must be supplemented by a suitable
+system of observation sent out towards the enemy. Even detachments far
+advanced towards the enemy may, under favourable circumstances, find
+temporary cover in villages, and every such period of rest is of
+advantage for the horse.
+
+The Cavalry, however, which, in full confidence of its firearms and
+the alertness of its patrols, can venture to go into cantonments, and
+thus save its horses from bivouacking, will very soon assert its
+superiority over an enemy which seeks for safety by remaining
+constantly under arms, and thus dissipates its inherent energy.
+
+This tendency towards cantonments must not be allowed to become
+stereotyped. Occasions will constantly arise when the Cavalry must
+remain in immediate touch with the enemy; then it will be compelled
+not only to bivouac, but will have to stand to its horses, ready to
+mount at a moment's notice. Such occasions will only arise in
+critical situations necessarily of short duration, and the conditions
+both of the weather and the ground must be taken into careful
+consideration in making the arrangements for the outposts.
+
+Thus it is evident that it is not possible to lay down fixed rules of
+conduct either for operations or for the outposts, but all must be
+left to the capacity of the Leader and the adaptability of his men. On
+this capacity depends in the last resort the greater or less strategic
+value of the Arm. Its foundation can only be laid in peace, and will
+depend on thorough and successful training, together with suitable
+preparation of the whole organization for War. To both points I will
+recur in the second part of this work. Here I would only insist that
+naturally the collective strategic employment of the Arm must take a
+thoroughly different form in proportion as the troops are rendered
+more or less independent by their equipment, the leaders of all ranks
+are qualified to act on their own responsibility, and mobility is not
+hampered by difficulties in the provisioning of man and horse, and in
+the supply of ammunition. In the one case the Leader can act with
+courage and daring in the true Cavalry spirit; in the other he will
+feel himself hampered at every step, will not be able to act with the
+necessary degree of self-confidence, and will have to renounce the
+most promising undertakings because the inefficiency of his troops
+leaves him no alternative. However great his genius, no Leader can
+compensate for want of efficiency in his command; but it is the duty
+of such leader to maintain and increase the endurance inherent in his
+material to the utmost limits of its capacity.
+
+In this connection a well-thought-out system of saving and caring for
+one's horses occupies the first position, for this is the bed-rock
+foundation of all subsequent developments. We have seen of what immense
+importance in this respect the sheltering and arrangements for the
+outposts may be. But there are other factors to be considered--above
+all, a rational arrangement of the marches. In the first instance, it is
+a mistake to believe that Cavalry in the long-run can out-stay and
+out-march the Infantry--that, in other words, the Cavalry horse can
+endure greater hardships than well-trained Infantry. For a few days that
+may well be so, but for continuous exertion it is by no means proved.
+
+The German Cavalry horse is much more dependent on a sufficiency of
+food than the man; the nature of his load, together with the rapidity
+of movement, and hence the greater intensity of the exertions demanded
+of him, attack the animal in a far greater degree than the more
+uniform march performance of the men, who, moreover, are susceptible
+to moral influences, capable of greatly increasing their powers;
+finally, sore backs and lameness in long-continued exertions decimate
+the ranks of the horses to a much greater degree than a well-trained
+and equipped Infantry suffers from similar causes.
+
+In normal conditions demands should not be made upon the Cavalry which
+would be justified only in moments of a crisis. We must endeavour to
+reduce the daily performance to the lowest limit that our purpose
+allows. Only in exceptional instances should one move off at such an
+early hour as to interfere materially with the night rest of the
+horses. Unfortunately, there are still officers who will not be
+convinced that it is the horse which most requires rest, and who are
+never satisfied unless they keep the Cavalry night after night on
+their legs, although in darkness they are useless either for
+reconnaissance or for fighting.
+
+Further, in War games and Staff rides it is a custom to make demands
+which in practice are absolutely impossible, mostly by superior
+officers who have never ridden 100 kilometres (66 miles) in a single
+day.
+
+An average of twenty to twenty-five miles a day is in practice a very
+considerable performance. To demand much more of them, day in and day
+out, is impracticable. On the march itself a suitable change of pace
+is very necessary.
+
+To trot hour after hour is the most fruitful source of ruin to our
+horseflesh. Where it becomes necessary it is usually due to the want
+of care on the part of the Leader. Much may be done to spare the
+horses if we never march with considerable numbers on a single road
+without absolute necessity; and when this is not to be avoided, then
+we must seek to maintain an even pace throughout the column by the
+intercalation of suitable distances between the several bodies;
+otherwise there is a continuous hurrying up or checking of the
+rearward detachments, which strains the horses to the very utmost.
+
+One must always arrange for the halts necessary for the horses, water
+them whenever opportunity offers, and never continue a movement to the
+complete exhaustion of the animals. Well-timed periods of rest
+increase the collective power of endurance of the horses most
+materially, and as the training improves, the demands made upon them
+can gradually be raised.
+
+To bring this greater improvement into harmony with the military
+requirements of the situation, next in importance to an intelligent
+execution of a rational marching system comes a wise economy of forces
+with regard to the performance of detached duties and patrolling. It
+is particularly with the Divisional Cavalry that the lavish assignment
+of orderlies and messengers to the leaders of the other Arms and to
+the Infantry outposts has to be kept in check, and it must be insisted
+upon that the men thus allotted should be returned punctually to their
+commands, and not be employed in duties for which they are not
+intended.
+
+Thus one finds Generals who use their messengers as patrols even when
+special patrols have been entrusted with this duty; others who keep
+the detachments assigned to the outposts long after the outposts
+themselves have been relieved. In all these things there is a
+tremendous waste of energy, which must be all the more injurious the
+smaller the proportion of Cavalry which can be detailed to the
+Infantry Divisions.
+
+It is a special duty of every Cavalry Commander to resist this
+tendency to the utmost of his power.
+
+Apart from the regulation of the marching column and the economy of
+forces above referred to, a rational treatment of the rearward
+communications, particularly with the Independent Cavalry, will go far
+to maintain the troops in efficiency, and is also from the strategic
+point of view an important part of the Leader's duty. The daily
+despatch of numerous requisitioning detachments to great distances
+weakens and diminishes the troops to an inadmissible degree, unless it
+is managed with a wise foresight and on a rational system; often on
+great marches it will be altogether impossible. Then the horses must
+manage with what they find at their halting-places for the night. In
+the case of great concentration this will be altogether insufficient.
+Short rations reduce the horses very rapidly and only too thoroughly.
+It is, therefore, necessary in all independent operations of great
+Cavalry 'Masses' to take with one an organized and mobile supply
+train, and, where circumstances require, to arrange for its defence.
+
+The timely arrival of the supply waggons, the rational utilization of
+the resources of the district, the contiguous replenishment of the
+moving supply reserves, are matters which cannot be left entirely to
+the Army Service Corps, but the Cavalry General must himself overlook
+the whole matter, and keep the general control in his own hands. For
+these arrangements must be regulated from the strategic point of view
+since the power of operating at all depends essentially upon them. Of
+course, the Supreme Command must lend assistance also.
+
+In general, it will be advisable to carry with one a five to six days'
+ration of corn if one is to be prepared for all emergencies. That, at
+least, was the practical teaching of the War of 1870-1871. But one
+must add, the further the Cavalry is separated from the masses of the
+Army, and the more it renounces its communications with the latter,
+the greater must be the bulk of supply it takes with it; and the
+closer these supplies have to be kept to the troops, the more thorough
+must be the arrangements for their protection. The latter will be of
+particular importance when operating on a narrow front which favours
+an enemy's outflanking endeavours, whereas wider fronts of themselves
+give a certain degree of security to the rearward communications.
+
+If we are entirely cut off from our home resources, then we must
+select some point to be occupied on the flank or in the rear of the
+enemy's Army, and there arrange a supply centre of our own, and make
+it the point of departure for separate operations.
+
+All means are, then, proper to accumulate in such places a sufficient
+forage reserve, for the subsistence of the horses is the most
+important task which falls upon the Commander. A delay in this
+direction can wreck the most brilliant undertakings--jeopardize the
+result even of the best executed ones. Theory does not attach
+sufficient importance to the point here involved.
+
+Thus we see that the tasks of the independent Cavalry Leader are both
+many-sided and responsible. He can only then prove equal to them when
+all subordinates on whom he has to count support him with the utmost
+goodwill and reliability.
+
+With this necessity a new demand is made upon him--namely, to raise
+the spirit of the men he commands in such a manner that they will be
+equal to the highest requirements. Only a bold, self-confident, and
+active man, who everywhere sets the best example, will be able in this
+manner to inspire and stimulate his command. The sum of the stimulated
+individual performances brings with it also increased opportunities of
+success.
+
+Hence the last and greatest demand for the successful conduct of a
+Cavalry Mass remains always the man who will inspire and stimulate the
+troops under him, and thus lead them to victory.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS
+
+
+I have already, in a former section, insisted on the fundamental
+proposition that reconnaissance and security are two diametrically
+opposite conceptions, and cannot on a large scale be confided to one
+and the same body of troops. This conflict of purpose becomes most
+evident when we come to the service of patrols in the field.
+
+Reconnoitring patrols regulate their movements on those of the enemy.
+They must keep touch with and follow him, quite irrespective of the
+movement of their own side, often being compelled to creep after
+him--_i.e._, to utilize intersected ground in order to avoid the
+necessity of fighting.
+
+Security patrols, on the other hand, flanking detachments, piquets,
+vedettes, and the like, have to choose their position with reference
+to the force it is their purpose to cover, and with which they must
+remain in communication. It is their duty to attack and beat off the
+enemy's patrols, as far as their strength will allow them, to prevent
+these latter gaining an insight into the conditions of the marching or
+resting troops whose safety they are intended to secure.
+
+If they were to attempt to follow up their enemy to find out his
+position--_i.e._, to reconnoitre--they would lose their connection
+with their own troops, and endanger the security of the latter by
+relinquishing the special object they are set apart to provide for.
+
+Hence it is absolutely necessary that the two systems should be kept
+separate one from the other, and that each patrol should know clearly
+and distinctly for which of the two purposes it is specifically
+intended. Only then can the troops in rear rely on being kept
+thoroughly informed, and at the same time secure from the possible
+attempts of the enemy.
+
+The more clear and precise the mission, the more can the patrols be
+relied on to execute it; but this, of course, does not exclude the
+necessity for them to keep their eyes open for other things, and to
+report all they may notice.
+
+Such a systematic arrangement brings other advantages in its train. It
+effects a marked economy of one's available forces, for being certain
+that every mission will be settled by a special party detailed for that
+purpose, it ceases to be necessary to keep on despatching fresh patrols
+again and again in the same direction, a practice most detrimental to
+the troops, which is constantly followed in peace-time; and it can never
+happen that a body is surprised by the enemy because its scouts are
+absent reconnoitring, or that it fails to receive information because
+its patrols are busy with security. If, therefore, all patrols thus
+naturally fall into one of these two groups--reconnoitring and security
+patrols--there is still another line of distinction to be observed
+between these patrols themselves, arising from the nature of the tasks
+which the circumstances impose upon them.
+
+It is impossible to lay down any distinct rules in this matter--for
+War will always present new and changing problems--but broadly two
+points of view must be kept in sight, which require fundamentally
+different treatment, and are conditioned by our distance from the
+enemy.
+
+If the opposing forces are still engaged in preliminary approaches one
+to the other, and separated by wide stretches of country, the
+procedure will be altogether distinct from that to be adopted when the
+outposts mutually confront one another.
+
+Between the two extremes there are innumerable intermediate degrees,
+to which one's conduct must be adapted without losing sight of the
+guiding points involved.
+
+Let us take first the period of approach, and consider the
+reconnoitring problem from this aspect, taking into consideration the
+broad requirements of modern War.
+
+It will be apparent at once that there is here a double purpose to be
+fulfilled--viz., to ascertain the whereabouts and direction of
+movement of the elements of the enemy's main fighting force, the
+primary object of all reconnaissance; and, secondly, to find the
+enemy's preceding Cavalry screen, whose purpose it is, on the one
+hand, to prevent our object, and, on the other hand, to conceal their
+own main body. This cavalry we shall have to defeat, but we cannot
+afford to await this event, but must initiate our own reconnaissance
+before the decision, and endeavour to carry this through, even if the
+latter prove unfavourable to us.
+
+Hence it follows that our patrols must be systematically divided from
+the first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as to
+whether they are intended to find the enemy's main army or to beat his
+Cavalry.
+
+The former must not allow themselves to be held up by the enemy's
+Cavalry, but must endeavour to ride through the opposing
+screen--straight for the heads of the enemy's marching columns. They
+must, therefore, avoid all fighting, and act by cunning and stealth,
+and hence their conduct should be entrusted always to officers. They
+will be directed against the probable lines of the enemy's approach,
+as determined by the general strategic situation, and will further be
+given all possible information as to the known whereabouts of the
+enemy, together with the intentions of their own Superior Command, in
+order that they may be in a position to distinguish between important
+and unimportant details, and adapt their action accordingly.
+
+That the position of heads of columns in time and place, their depths,
+the flanks of the enemy's positions, extent of his outposts, districts
+in which troops are quartered, the appearance of new uniforms,
+indicating the presence of regiments believed to be elsewhere, etc.,
+should all be carefully determined, forms part of their normal
+instructions; but, in spite of that, it is very desirable to direct
+their attention very particularly to all such points as are at the
+moment of preponderating consequence. They must also be kept well
+informed as to the mission of their neighbouring patrols, so that
+under all circumstances the systematic subdivision of their several
+tasks can be maintained intact.
+
+For these patrols one must choose the best mounted officers and men
+and horses, since long distances must be covered under difficult
+circumstances, and it would be well to allot to each a competent
+non-commissioned officer, who can carry through the task if his
+Commander is killed or taken prisoner. If possible, they should also
+be supplied with a concentrated horse-ration, so as to be as far as
+possible independent of the resources of the country. (See Part II.,
+Section I.)
+
+As to the strength of these patrols, it will be necessary to keep
+within very narrow limits, because if they are large it is difficult
+for them to escape observation; on the other hand, a certain degree of
+strength is necessary, because one cannot, of course, count on being
+able to send back one's information by single messengers. Since it is
+a prime condition of the problem that a district thoroughly commanded
+by the enemy must be ridden through, the safe return of a single
+messenger can never be guaranteed; hence the Commander will either be
+obliged to send his reports in duplicate or triplicate, or in the last
+resort fight his way through with them himself. Hence it will be
+advisable to compose each party of two or three patrols, each of three
+men, assigning a smart lance-corporal to each.
+
+One officer, one non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals, and
+five men must, therefore, be considered as a fairly normal type.
+
+The Commander can then despatch two reports, and the third he must
+bring in himself, and must well consider how long it will be safe to
+continue his observation, and what it is of real importance for his
+superiors to know.
+
+But he must never allow himself to be hurried into the despatch of
+unimportant information. He must always keep before his mind the
+essential strategical elements of the whole situation. It seems to me
+altogether wrong to send off such patrols with general instructions to
+keep in touch with the enemy, a common manoeuvre practice. Since
+these latter generally last only a few days, there is not much
+difficulty in maintaining such a system, particularly when information
+is sent by single messengers. But in War everything is very different.
+One would very soon have got through all one's officers and still not
+be well informed. The patrols must, therefore, be told to return
+within a certain time limit, and their reliefs, who are to be fully
+instructed as far as the information available goes, must be
+despatched before this time limit is expired. Even then we shall soon
+exhaust the available supply of officers who will have been driven to
+the limit of their endurance in purely strategic missions, and in the
+end we shall have to fall back upon Non-commissioned Officers for
+tactical observation.
+
+This tactical reconnaissance will, in the first place, devote its
+attention to the enemy's Cavalry. The patrols assigned to these duties
+will attack the enemy wherever they meet him, to find out what is
+going on, and as soon as possible establish a moral superiority over
+them.
+
+But even they cannot remain permanently in touch with the enemy,
+because they, too, must send in their information by messenger, their
+strength thus rapidly diminishing, and they, in turn, will require
+relief.
+
+If permanent observation of a yet distant enemy is necessary, we must
+turn to other means. It will, then, be as well to send out whole
+reconnoitring squadrons or troops (F.D.O.,[15] 128) towards the enemy,
+and through them maintain a permanent tactical observation.
+
+         [Footnote 15: Feld Dienst Ordnung.]
+
+These serve as a patrol reserve and collecting station for
+information, remaining day and night in touch with the enemy, and, of
+course, will also require periodical reliefs.
+
+It goes without saying that, in addition to these squadrons, single
+patrols may be despatched in important directions from the main body
+of the Cavalry, whose duty it will be to report to the latter direct.
+
+These, again, must send off their reports by several men, whilst those
+despatched from the patrols sent out by the reconnoitring squadrons
+will often, owing to the shorter distance and the nearness of the
+support, be able to avail themselves of the despatch riders. In
+general, it cannot be insisted upon too much that the despatch rider,
+so very popular in peace, can only be very occasionally employed in
+War in the interval before the enemy's Cavalry is completely beaten
+out of the field. In peace a man is always riding in his own country;
+if he himself has not a map, he has at least been instructed from a
+map, and every civilian will help him out. Even if he stumbles up
+against an enemy's patrol they will generally let him pass unnoticed;
+but it is quite different in War. Here even a patrol leader has rarely
+got a map. The despatch rider rides across thoroughly unknown
+districts, coming in contact with a foreign, perhaps hostile,
+population; he cannot make himself understood, if, indeed, he is not
+obliged to avoid them. The enemy's patrols are also everywhere, and if
+anything happens to his horse the message does not arrive. Further,
+the enormously increased distances to be traversed in modern War have
+to be taken into account, and these alone render the despatch of
+single horsemen a very doubtful undertaking. We must, therefore,
+recognise that the conveyance of reports by individual despatch riders
+is only possible under very limited conditions, and within the
+districts fully controlled by one's own troops, and that even in one's
+own country reconnoitring patrols sent out to a great distance can
+only be very occasionally employed.
+
+Here we come upon an increased difficulty in the whole system of
+intelligence, and yet all reconnaissance is useless unless the return
+of information works without a hitch. We must, therefore, endeavour to
+regulate it accordingly.
+
+Above all, the connection between the reconnoitring squadrons and the
+main body by relays must be very carefully assured, and their strength
+must be proportionate to the number of the enemy's patrols moving in
+the district. In these cases a co-operation between Cavalry and
+cyclists will be of service, whilst within the radius which we
+completely command the whole rearward intelligence service, so far as
+it can move upon roads, must be left as much as possible to cyclists.
+
+_Fundamentally, no Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to the
+rear without pressing circumstances._ This is an absolute necessity if
+we are to spare our valuable and almost irreplaceable horses. Towards
+these safe lines of communication all reports must be directed, in
+order to be forwarded with the utmost rapidity by fresh horses or
+cyclists.
+
+If these main roads do not run as far as the reconnoitring squadrons,
+in order to allow of the patrols making use of them without long
+detours, then further collecting stations, protected by other troops,
+must be interpolated. (F.D.O., 273.)
+
+Occasionally the Cavalry Telegraph equipment may be of assistance, but
+we must not expect too much from it in periods of rapid movement,
+because since its application depends upon a number of favourable
+circumstances, its value in such changing conditions is more or less
+illusory.
+
+Results obtained in manoeuvres, in my opinion, convey no correct
+experience in this matter.
+
+Another point, however, must be specially brought out--namely, the
+necessity, not only of sending back information through the proper
+channels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to the
+principal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It is
+of the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of the
+War should receive information about the enemy simultaneously with
+their subordinates, so that they always remain in the position to
+dispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not find
+themselves bound by instructions previously issued by their
+subordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in
+1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reached
+Headquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it.
+
+The fault lay chiefly in the fact that the subordinates, not being
+informed as to the connection of events, did not perceive the
+importance of the information, and therefore did not forward it on,
+and partly because the telegraph wires were overburdened by the
+private messages of distinguished persons who had nothing whatever to
+do with the conduct of operations.
+
+The control of the wires for purely military purposes must, therefore,
+be maintained with rigid severity, and information to Headquarters or
+Army Commands must have precedence over all other business.
+
+If collecting stations for information are not available, the
+question arises, Which groups should be Authorized to report direct to
+Headquarters? In my opinion this cannot be determined by the strength
+of the troops concerned, but must always depend on the strategic
+situation. Generally it may be laid down that the lie of the roads
+must decide.
+
+Those detachments entrusted with the reconnaissance of a single line
+of road will report direct any important information gained within
+their own sphere if no stronger body should be moving along the same
+line, and this reporting body may, therefore, according to
+circumstances, be a patrol, a regiment, or a brigade. It is desirable
+from this point of view that all Cavalry officers down to patrol
+leaders should be kept so thoroughly informed as to the general
+situation that they may judge of the importance of the information
+obtained, and hence know where to send the information they have
+secured.
+
+As the opposing Cavalries first, then the larger bodies of the Army,
+approach one another the situation changes. The reconnoitring
+squadrons clear the front and turn their attention to the enemy's
+flanks. The advanced squadrons are withdrawn, and the larger Cavalry
+bodies drawn off towards the wings of the Army, and seek shelter
+behind the Infantry columns, if they have been defeated in the Cavalry
+duel, or turn against flank and rear of the enemy's Army if they have
+been victorious. In front of the Armies reconnaissance now falls to
+the Divisional Cavalry. Here the strategical and tactical duties
+coincide. What the conduct of the Independent Cavalry will be must
+depend on whether it is still held in check by the enemy or not. If
+the latter have been finally beaten out of the field so that one has a
+free hand, then the strategic patrols will direct their attention to
+the enemy's rearward communications, and will seek to determine the
+approach of his reserves, but tactical reconnaissance will be directed
+against his flanks.
+
+The principles governing our conduct remain the same, only the
+reconnoitring and advanced squadrons now act primarily as supports to
+the strategic patrols. If, however, a decision between the two
+Cavalries has not been finally arrived at, one will now endeavour to
+bring it about, and for this purpose unite all available forces,
+leaving meanwhile the reconnaissance to strong patrols, who in this
+period of the combat must never avoid those of the enemy, for now our
+object is to get information quickly, and the time for circumvention
+and evasion is at an end.
+
+When the first battle has been decided, there follows either pursuit
+or retreat--operations in which the tactical reconnaissance cannot for
+one moment be omitted. Then by degrees, as the defeated side succeeds
+in disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normal
+conditions again. The two Armies are separated by a certain area in
+depth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before,
+reconnaissance is required.
+
+Matters are somewhat different as regards security. Here also in
+general a distinction must be drawn between safety obtained by bodies
+detached in advance and that derived from piquets, etc., immediately
+at hand. But too much importance cannot be laid upon the principle
+that, as above pointed out, reconnaissance alone cannot suffice to
+insure safety; the reconnoitring detachments must rather always be
+followed by a line of security troops, so that as a general type
+three lines of patrols result--viz., strategical patrols far in
+advance, tactical patrols, and security patrols, which latter, when
+the main body is halted, become the standing outposts.
+
+Coming next to the measures of security necessary for Independent
+Cavalry when in movement, the tactical reconnoitring patrols, by
+sending in early information of the enemy, will make a far-spread line
+of security patrols unnecessary. In general, the ordinary point of the
+advance guard and flankers will suffice. For the latter the same holds
+good which has been said in the previous section on the subject of
+flanking detachments altogether--viz., that they must be worked by
+sections, and arranged in a proper system of reliefs.
+
+If the necessity arises to screen, as well as to secure--_i.e._, to
+hide absolutely our movements from the enemy--then all roads leading
+towards him and the section of the ground comprised between them must
+be occupied in such manner that the enemy cannot find intervals at
+which to break through, and this will be best attained by a system of
+local patrols, tied to definite beats. These patrols must fight the
+enemy wherever he appears, and must, therefore, be given sufficient
+strength and be followed by small supports duly allotted to each
+section of the whole front.
+
+When the main body is stationary, the conditions are different,
+because the troops require a certain time to turn out; therefore more
+precautions are necessary, and the end can be best attained by placing
+the patrols further to the front. Hence we arrive at a double system
+of security--the first line formed by outpost squadrons, with
+officers, non-commissioned officers, and small patrols, to which a
+certain district to be ridden over will be assigned, and which must
+maintain a systematic connection by patrols between its separate
+parts, to insure absolutely the control of the ground around them; and
+the second, formed of far advanced posts of observation at suitable
+points--road crossings, defiles, etc.--from whence they can detect at
+the earliest moment any approach of the enemy. These are indispensable
+at night, when reconnaissance is always more or less liable to break
+down, for darkness interferes with sight, and the horses require rest.
+Their importance also increases naturally with the vicinity of the
+enemy, and the consequent greater risk of surprise. In the case of the
+larger bodies, whole squadrons (see F.D.O., No. 272) must be detached
+for this purpose, and communication with them assured by strong relay
+lines. These strong advanced detachments can, under favourable
+circumstances, get shelter in villages, so that the horses at least
+obtain better rest and care for a few hours, and the same applies
+naturally to the reconnoitring squadrons. In all such instances the
+guiding idea must be to evacuate the village the moment the enemy
+appears, and evade collision with him. How this is to be managed has
+been already explained (Book I., Chap. VI.). Accurate knowledge of
+where all the roads lead to, the barricading of those running towards
+the enemy's position, and extreme alertness on the part of the
+patrols, are in such cases all-important.
+
+Above all, the Commander must be confident in the steadiness and
+coolness of his men.
+
+As to the immediate security of the Army itself, this depends in the
+first place on the Divisional Cavalry, but during the advance the
+Independent Cavalry on the front and flanks guarantees this security
+so thoroughly that the former can confine themselves to the most
+elementary precautions, which must include primarily the maintenance
+of connection with the latter for this purpose. Then they will not
+only have to provide for security in the most thorough manner, but
+will also have to reconnoitre, and for this purpose follow the same
+rules which we have laid down for the Independent Cavalry. If the
+enemy's horse prove overpowering, then they will use their power of
+defence to the utmost, and seek to increase it by cyclists belonging
+to the Infantry, Maxims, and Artillery, in order to beat off the enemy
+with loss, and to clear the path for the reconnoitring patrols.
+
+Speaking generally, the system I propose is in harmony with the
+spirit, if not with the letter, of our Field Service Regulations, in
+which the systematic distinction between reconnoitring and security,
+as also between strategic and tactical patrols, is, in my opinion, not
+sufficiently defined. The essential point which necessitates this
+distinction has not been grasped with sufficient precision. If we are
+to follow literally the wording of the Field Service Regulations, and
+not the spirit which pervades it, which disregards all stereotyped
+formations and keeps always the practical in view, then it would be
+impossible to carry out screening operations on the scale which the
+conditions of modern War will render indispensable. Sufficient stress
+has not been laid on the necessary systematizing of the whole
+procedure. Finally, too, much weight has been laid upon the employment
+of the despatch rider (_Meldereiter_), although the experience of
+1870-1871 has sufficiently shown that this system was unreliable. I
+recall as an instance the pursuit of Vinoy's Corps (after Sedan), in
+which case the most important report was entrusted to a despatch
+rider, who only reached his destination twenty-four hours after he
+was despatched, and by that time it was too late to take any action on
+the information he conveyed.
+
+The Field Service Regulations should also contain detailed
+instructions as to the employment of cyclists with the Cavalry, for
+the rapid development of this mode of locomotion has rendered this
+absolutely indispensable. But the point must be brought out that the
+use of a cyclist is always only conditional, as it depends on the
+weather, the roads, and the country. On heavy, steep, and stony roads,
+on which the tyres are only too apt to be punctured, the cyclists are
+obliged to dismount; against a head wind they can only make progress
+with difficulty. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that for the
+transmission of reports from the advanced lines, as well as for
+communication between separated bodies of troops within the district
+controlled by our Cavalry, they are of inestimable service. Granted
+that in particularly unfavourable weather and bad roads they must be
+supplemented by Cavalry, they, nevertheless, on the whole, make it
+possible to expedite materially the delivery of despatches. This is of
+all the greater importance because in case of War the German Armies
+will be relatively weak in Cavalry, and under certain circumstances
+they will have to fight against a great numerical superiority.
+
+Even though the principal use of the cyclists lies in the transmission
+of information in which they can help the Divisional Cavalry most
+materially, nevertheless one must not base too sanguine hopes on their
+activity.
+
+The reason is that because of their wheels they are tied to the roads,
+and in consequence they can neither reconnoitre nor provide for
+security independently. If for these purposes Cavalry patrols are
+attached to them, the chief advantage of their greater mobility is
+sacrificed, but without such supports in difficult country they are
+tolerably helpless against surprise attacks. If one further takes into
+account that a hill takes off from their speed to such a degree that a
+horseman can easily catch them up, one must admit that they afford no
+sufficient guarantee for the fulfilment of independent missions
+outside of the country which our own Cavalry commands. In such
+districts they can only be employed on relays, as already pointed out.
+Here the duty of providing safety can best be fulfilled by the
+Cavalry, because it is not a question of rapid advance, but only of
+the protection of stationary posts and certain defined road stretches.
+But for the defence of these posts, and for the transmission of
+intelligence, the cyclists will do even better service than the
+horsemen, because they can cover the ground faster, and when fighting
+are not hampered by their horses. Their employment here is all the
+more desirable because the relay service makes enormous demands upon
+the Cavalry. That was proved up to the hilt in the War of 1870-1871;
+the complaints under this head repeat themselves over and over again,
+as the records of the Campaign abundantly testify.
+
+Besides, on these relay duties the cyclists can be tactically employed
+in the district which our Cavalry by its patrols commands, for the
+rapid occupation of far-advanced posts which neither Cavalry nor
+Infantry can reach with sufficient celerity and in adequate force; for
+the defence of defiles lying to our rear, which must be kept open to
+secure the retreat of the Cavalry; for the support of Independent
+Cavalry on outpost duty, particularly at night; and for other similar
+purposes. To satisfy all these conditions, these cyclist detachments
+require a sufficient tactical training, but in times of peace one sees
+in this respect feats performed whose impracticability in War are
+glaringly apparent. For instance, men keep their cycles with them
+right up in the firing line, and when they want to retreat or break
+off the fight they try to mount under fire. As they are generally tied
+to the roads, they then file off to the flanks. I have, indeed, often
+seen Cyclist detachments lay down their cycles in the front of the
+position, and then advance to mount them again in the teeth of the
+enemy's fire. All these kind of things are absurd. The cycles must be
+treated like the led horses of the Cavalry--that is to say, the men
+must dismount under cover, then move up to the firing line, and then
+move back to cover in order to mount again. The position must,
+moreover, be so chosen as to enable them to move off without exposing
+themselves. All these points, which in practice are rendered
+difficult, diminish very materially the usefulness of cyclists, and
+take away from them, above all, their power of offence; and in all
+missions entrusted to them these limitations must be carefully kept in
+mind.
+
+
+
+
+II
+
+ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+NUMBERS
+
+ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
+
+
+When we take into consideration the conditions of modern Warfare, as I
+have endeavoured in the foregoing pages to develop them--the numerical
+strength of modern Armies; the numerous formations of Artillery and
+Infantry set on foot on the outbreak of hostilities; the area of
+future theatres of operations--when, further, we consider how many
+important tasks await the Cavalry from the moment when the first shot
+is fired, and how the most important of these, as I have endeavoured
+to establish, can only be dealt with satisfactorily by the employment
+of Cavalry 'Masses,' the conviction must force itself home to every
+mind that our German Cavalry is numerically inadequate to meet even
+the principal demands the future must make upon it.
+
+If, further, we reflect that, owing to causes which it would be out of
+place to deal with in these pages at length, it is precisely upon our
+Cavalry that the rôle of fighting against crushing numerical
+superiority must devolve, this conviction must give rise to the
+gravest anxiety, more especially when it is remembered that the
+difficulty of securing a supply of reinforcements adequate for the
+performance of our duties is greater with the Cavalry than with any
+other Arm. A few days' training at a pinch will turn out an Infantry
+soldier or gunner, whose presence need not necessarily be either
+dangerous or even detrimental to the efficiency of his company or
+battery. An unbroken horse or a bad rider may create confusion in the
+ranks of the steadiest squadron.
+
+The danger is still further aggravated by the fact that a rapid
+reduction in their available numbers is certain to take place, owing
+to the increased demands which the future must make upon the endurance
+of our horsemen, and presumably also the heavier losses they will be
+called upon to suffer in action, both of which must be intensified in
+proportion as their numerical inadequacy for the tasks incurring on
+them increases. Germany is certainly comparatively well supplied with
+horses; but owing to the demands of the aforesaid new formations,
+which must be set on foot immediately on the declaration of
+hostilities, upon the complement of animals fit for War purposes
+within our own frontiers, the country will be practically denuded, and
+only those horses still too young or those too old for the field will
+be left behind.
+
+Even among those classified as 'fit for War' but few are fit for
+Cavalry purposes. Riding horses good enough for the Infantry and
+Train--even for the Artillery--may, no doubt, be found; but equal to
+the requirements made on the Cavalry horse there are but few indeed,
+and even this number is diminishing yearly. As regards the supply from
+foreign sources, this must depend on the political situation--i.e., on
+conditions which lie beyond our control. Even when these conditions
+are favourable, horses cannot be usefully drafted into the ranks
+without prolonged training and breaking to fit them for their new
+duties. Hence the conclusion is inevitable that the numerical strength
+of our Cavalry, already, as I have shown, so inadequate, must fall off
+very rapidly at the commencement of a campaign, because its rapid
+reinforcement with satisfactory material is, under the circumstances,
+quite out of the question.
+
+From this conclusion there is no escape; and in view of the increased
+importance I have above assigned to the due performance of all Cavalry
+duties, its recognition carries with it, as its corollary, the
+absolute need for the numerical augmentation of this branch of the
+service.
+
+The enormous mechanism of our modern Armies can only work normally and
+successfully when its constituent 'power factors'--_i.e._, the three
+Arms--have been apportioned with due regard to the work to be
+accomplished. If driving-power fails any one portion, the danger lies
+near that at some critical moment the whole apparatus will suffer in
+sympathy, and fail to respond to the strain it is called upon to
+endure.
+
+The question of this increase in the Cavalry has, indeed, often before
+been raised, but never with the weight of concentrated conviction the
+situation, in my opinion, deserves. For the most part, only expedients
+to avoid the bitter necessity of a serious augmentation have been
+suggested. Thus it has been proposed to form new regiments of four
+squadrons each by taking away from the existing ones their fifth
+squadron, and the suggestion has been supported by an appeal to the
+fact that in War-time only four squadrons per regiment take the field.
+
+No expert, however, can fail to agree with Lieutenant-General von
+Pelet-Narbonne, who maintains in his 'Cavalry Regiments of Four
+Squadrons' (_Kreuz Zeitung_, January 17, 1899) that such a measure
+would entail the ruin of our Cavalry, and would destroy with one blow
+all that the reorganizations of 1859 and 1860 have done for the War
+efficiency of our regiments by entailing a depreciation of the value
+of the squadrons at the very moment when called on to move out and
+face the enemy.
+
+Thus he writes: 405 squadrons are in Peace retained on the lower
+establishment of 133, or the middle one of 137. Their numbers are 170
+of the former, 235 of the latter, and the War strength averages 150
+per squadron. To attain this figure those on the lower establishment
+need 17 horses, those on the middle 13.
+
+With no fifth squadron to draw upon for horses, as at present, these
+vacancies would have to be filled by 'augmentation horses'--_i.e._,
+animals straight from the country, thoroughly raw and unaccustomed to
+work under the rider, often also of inferior quality. But these 13 to
+17 horses per squadron by no means exhaust the situation. The field
+squadrons must leave their youngest remounts--say 15 in number--still
+too young and unbroken, behind them; for the experiences of the last
+War proved abundantly that where this precaution was neglected the
+greater part of them broke down under the hardships of the Campaign.
+Taking even the most favourable time of year for mobilization--viz.,
+in May--then out of the 15 young remounts of good material, and with
+careful choice, not more than 8 will be found fit for the ranks; the
+remainder will have to be left behind with the 'Depot' squadron, to
+be sent on afterwards. Any other procedure would only lead to the
+useless sacrifice of these valuable young animals. The places of the
+horses thus left behind will, therefore, also have to be filled by
+augmentation horses, thus bringing the number of these up to 24 and 20
+respectively.
+
+Then we still have to provide for the wants of the Depot squadron,
+which has to train the recruits, and for these a further number of
+trained horses, averaging 32, must be left behind, or another 8 from
+each squadron; and, finally, another 2 per squadron will be required
+for Staff orderlies and Staff guard duties.
+
+According to this calculation, the Field squadron would have to move
+out with from 34 to 30 augmentation horses (the sixty squadrons on the
+higher establishment with 27).
+
+The matter, however, presents a totally different appearance when in
+peace five squadrons are in existence, of which one remains behind as
+a depot. Taking away the 35 horses for recruits, and following our
+previous calculation of 7 young remounts, there would remain on the
+lower establishment 91 efficient horses to be divided amongst the
+other four squadrons, or 23 each, so that these would take the field
+with only 11, 7, or 4 'augmentation horses,' according to the
+respective peace establishments of the regiments. With these numbers
+the squadron suffers no reduction of its efficiency, for these few can
+always be employed--in the squadron carts, etc.--at any rate, need not
+be in the ranks.
+
+These figures, worked out in the spring of 1899, are still
+substantially correct, and it appears to me General von Pelet-Narbonne
+deals too leniently with this proposal for forming the fifth squadrons
+into new regiments, because many of the calls made on the squadrons
+are even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always in every
+squadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will presently have to
+be cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to take eight remounts
+into the field, for these young animals are by no means equal to the
+demands which modern conditions must make upon them from the very
+first days of mobilization.
+
+Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increased
+above General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correct
+in his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals will
+exercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions than
+formerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often had
+a considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituent
+elements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to the
+front by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities the
+fullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, and
+others not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannot
+possibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a day
+straight across country. After a very short spell most of the
+augmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would only
+have brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of their
+squadrons.
+
+These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if the
+squadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment and
+somewhat above it--say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this would
+mean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, our
+Peace conditions would be difficult to adapt to such an organization.
+Without going closer into these details, it will be sufficient to
+point out that all our barracks and riding-schools are designed for
+five squadrons; and further, that we do not need numerically stronger
+regiments, but a greater number, in order to satisfy all requirements.
+
+Hence, if it is admitted that swamping our squadrons with thirty or
+more augmentation horses must diminish most seriously the efficiency
+of our Cavalry, then it follows that a still further increase in their
+number will make matters still worse. Such proposals have no doubt
+been made, and it certainly would be convenient if our Cavalry could
+thus easily on mobilization be increased by one-third to one-half its
+strength; but after what has been said, above all such suggestions
+must be seen to be impracticable, for squadrons which consisted, for
+instance, of one-half augmentation horses would be simply useless for
+War purposes. A proceeding, therefore, which brought such results in
+its train would imply no increase of the Arm, but rather the
+destruction of the existing standard of Peace-time efficiency.
+
+Even as Divisional Cavalry such squadrons would be useless, for these
+require good individual horsemanship even more than those of the
+Independent Division for the performance of their special duties, and
+the necessary standard can never be attained with untrained horses.
+
+All who put forward proposals of this nature are labouring under the
+dominion of a fundamental fallacy. They overlook the fact I have
+explained in the foregoing section, that Cavalry by its very nature
+can never be other than a highly-specialized Arm, and hence that the
+system adopted by the Infantry of raising the cadres to War strength
+by the absorption of reserve men is for the Cavalry fundamentally
+impossible. For in the Infantry the ranks are filled by the addition
+of trained men; in the Cavalry they must be completed with untrained
+horses, and the untrained horses break down under service conditions
+much more rapidly than the men.
+
+Our experience in 1870-1871 was conclusive on this point. Already
+towards the end of August--_i.e._, in less than six weeks from the
+outbreak of the War--the greater part of the augmentation horses were
+quite useless for field purposes. If one looks up the reports in the
+War Archives, everywhere this complaint about the untrained animals is
+recurrent.
+
+From all the above-mentioned circumstances it must be clear that a
+numerical increase in the Cavalry is most urgently called for, and in
+my opinion it would be best if this indispensable increase, the need
+for which is becoming apparent even to public opinion, were grafted
+upon the existing five-squadron system, which at least guarantees a
+certain amount of preparation of the augmentation horses, without
+entailing the reduction of the squadrons below the minimum standard
+necessary for efficiency. I would, however, be willing to support any
+other method which would give a sensible increase in the Cavalry
+strength of our Peace establishment, and only protest against any
+scheme which would seek to swell out the ranks or create new units on
+mobilization; for all these are mere self-delusion, increasing, no
+doubt, the numbers on paper, but in reality striking at the efficiency
+of the Arm in the most vital manner.
+
+If, then, at the moment there may be conditions outside my ken which
+render a measure of the nature I have indicated impracticable, we
+must, nevertheless, not close our eyes to the fact that, after the
+recent reorganization of the Artillery, the creation of an adequate
+number of Cavalry regiments in the nearest future is an absolute
+necessity, and that in the meanwhile any such palliative as a recourse
+to the cadre system must be absolutely rejected.
+
+As an indispensable complement of the proposal to form new regiments,
+so that we shall not be compelled to fall back on an inferior class of
+horse to meet their requirements, and at the same time to insure as
+far as possible a supply of suitable remounts to replace our losses in
+War, further encouragement of horse-breeding operations in our own
+territories is most urgently called for. This can only be attained by
+a further reasonable increase in the price paid for remounts.[16]
+
+         [Footnote 16: In passing, I may note that some portions of
+         Lorraine are amongst the richest in horseflesh in all
+         Germany. Here, by the introduction of suitable stallions, an
+         excellent Artillery horse might be bred; but nothing is being
+         done in this direction.]
+
+Such a measure must form a preliminary to the coming increase of the
+Arm, and the sooner it is undertaken the better will be the result.
+
+These points of view cannot be insisted upon too vehemently, since
+even in Military circles they have not everywhere received the
+consideration they deserve, and it is most necessary that public
+opinion, which finds its ultimate expression within the walls of the
+Reichstag, should receive adequate instruction as to the vital
+interests involved.
+
+In any case, the difficulties attending any adequate increase of our
+Cavalry must not be underrated, and we must remain prepared to face
+the strain of a European Campaign with a strength inadequate for the
+difficult and most momentous problems we shall be called on to
+face--problems which, according to the measure of success or the
+reverse attending their solution, will exercise the most far-reaching
+consequences on the whole course of the War.
+
+Under all circumstances we shall have to endeavour to attain at least
+that measure of success which the Army Headquarters unconditionally
+require to render possible their own effective operations.
+
+Superior energy and skill in the conduct of our operations,
+concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance both
+of the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in our
+undertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of our
+objectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness,
+and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directly
+conducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at the
+psychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces in
+hand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superiority
+such concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the end
+of the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with this
+purpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, and
+material strength of the troops, the more we are justified in
+demanding that, at least as regards organization and training, they
+shall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them.
+If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing the
+highest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even on
+the most necessary results in time of War.
+
+The question, then, arises whether from these points of view our
+German Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on to
+endure.
+
+As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that those
+commands which form the basis of our War organization--_i.e._, the
+Cavalry Divisions--should exist already in Peace as concrete units;
+and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know each
+other mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to be
+realized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions were
+definitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they would
+more frequently be brought together for manoeuvres on a large scale,
+to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned.
+
+It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question of
+organization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Division
+in Peace than people generally imagine.
+
+The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannot
+accept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. However
+desirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is one
+which has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. The
+practicable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles in
+accordance with which the commands are handled should be so thoroughly
+flesh and blood of both leaders and led, that under all circumstances
+a sufficient result is secure. To reach this ideal is the true purpose
+of our training.
+
+In the permanent existence of Divisions it seems to me there is great
+danger that such a guarantee for their successful employment would be
+sacrificed.
+
+We have seen that the demands likely to be made on the Cavalry require
+widely different arrangement of the disposable forces; that this
+requirement increases in importance as the Arm falls numerically
+beneath the needs of the situation, and that only a most adaptable
+organization can deal adequately with the emergencies this numerical
+insufficiency may entail. Hence it is to be feared that a permanent
+constitution in Divisions might lose this requisite adaptability, and,
+however highly we may appreciate the advantages of a firmly welded War
+organization, one should never allow the form to interfere with the
+practical application of the means--_i.e._, never allow the troops to
+become so rigid as to hamper their employment in the field. But this
+is just what would happen if the Divisions were maintained on a
+permanent War footing.
+
+Every application of Cavalry Masses requires a certain measure of
+drill control, because it depends always on the movement of closed
+bodies of troops, and if the Cavalry Divisions are constantly drilled
+together under the same Leader in Peace, there is at least a very
+great risk that this certain degree of drill control, which we
+recognise as indispensable, will degenerate into hard-and-fast
+prescription, since the Leader has always the same number of units at
+his disposal, and will thus by degrees habituate himself to consider
+these as invariable quantities in the solution of every tactical
+problem.
+
+Our experiences with the Regulations for 1876 show that this danger is
+by no means imaginary, for by the constant practice of the so-called
+'Three-Line Tactics' we had already progressed far on the downward
+path which leads to tactical destruction. If the 'Form' would not fit
+the conditions, so much the worse for the conditions. Fortunately,
+thanks to subsequent changes, we have shed the worst of these
+tendencies, and are on the high-road towards freer and more adaptable
+tactical formations, but to me it seems that any attempt to fetter
+this progress by the adoption of a more or less rigid organization can
+only result in evil for the whole Arm. Rather should we lay down as a
+fixed principle that all Cavalry units must be able both to move and
+fight according to the same tactical principles, no matter in what
+order these units may be grouped together.
+
+The question now arises whether our present formation of six regiments
+to a Division is really equal to all demands which may be made upon
+it; whether, in fact, in view of the strategical requirements it may
+be called on to fulfil, and the degree of resistance to their
+execution it is likely to encounter, six regiments will prove
+numerically equal to their task.
+
+Considered in relation to the enormous Armies of the present day, and
+the still greater possibilities a general call to arms of a whole
+nation may involve, six regiments represent a very small actual factor
+of strength. If they should have to take the field for an independent
+mission, it would not even be possible to keep them all together. The
+protection of the flanks, and of the necessary baggage and supply
+trains, the far-reaching reconnaissances, and the need for extended
+requisitions, all unite to compel the creation of detachments, which
+in the aggregate must make considerable inroads on the total strength.
+Then there is the inevitable tale of losses on the march, the
+necessity for subdivision of one's forces for the passage or the
+turning of defiles; in fact, the demands are so many that the true
+fighting body of the Division--_i.e._, the squadrons available for the
+ultimate decisive shock--is represented by a very small fraction of
+its original forces. If a complete Division can place only 3,600
+sabres in the field, or, dismounted, from 1,680 to 3,000 rifles,
+according to the number of horse-holders required--figures which even
+without the above-mentioned detachments are quite inconsiderable in
+relation to what even an inconsiderable Infantry opponent can bring
+into action--what prospect of success is there for the weakened
+Independent Division in the execution of quite minor operations, when
+even in 1870-1871, not once, but frequently, the main body of our
+Cavalry Divisions shrank often to six or seven weak squadrons.
+
+It is chiefly the consequences of our, on the whole, satisfactory
+experiences in the above Campaign which have led us to accept the
+existing Division of six regiments as a satisfactory solution of this
+problem of strength; but we forget that in those days we had no
+Cavalry opponent to encounter, and that our sphere of action, owing to
+the want on our side of an adequate equipment of firearms, was small
+indeed in comparison with what we must expect in the future. We are
+encouraged in our illusion by the fact that in our Peace manoeuvres
+the strength of the opposing forces is generally nearly equal, and
+also because the actual demands War will make upon the Arm are still
+in these exercises very imperfectly realized, and from the nature of
+the case cannot receive full recognition. Further, there is the fact
+that our possible opponents have adopted the same organization, and
+last, but not least, there remains the view that every tactical unit
+of the Cavalry must not only be capable of being strategically
+employed as a whole, but must also be in point of size within the
+control of its Leader as a tactical unit.
+
+Our unfortunate experiences with larger formations in 1866 are often
+cited in favour of our present system, the point being ignored that it
+was not the size of these bodies, but the faulty methods in which
+they were employed, both strategically and tactically, that led to our
+disappointment.
+
+I think, therefore, that unprejudiced consideration must come to the
+conclusion that our Divisions as they now exist are too weak for the
+many and most decisive operations they will be called on to undertake.
+The absolute necessity to secure the victory over the enemy's Cavalry
+at the decisive point under all circumstances, and at the same time to
+retain a sufficient force in hand to reap all the consequences of that
+victory, will, I am convinced, lead to a materially greater
+concentration of power in the single unit.
+
+If from this point of view the permanent constitution of Cavalry
+Divisions cannot be upheld, it follows that even less is to be said
+for the formation of still stronger units in Peace-time, for this
+measure would entail in even greater degree the very same strategical
+and tactical limitations we have noted in the case of the Divisions,
+and still further cramp the necessary adaptability of the organization
+to meet the conditions of our Peace-time training. At the same time,
+it is clear that it is of the utmost importance that the formation of
+these stronger formations, Corps, or Divisions of greater numerical
+strength, the necessity for which can be recognised in advance, should
+be arranged for in the mobilization plans, and not built up afterwards
+by the mere combination of existing Divisions.
+
+For such bodies cannot be improvised altogether. In order to develop
+their full efficiency they require a carefully selected and ample
+staff of men who can be trusted to pull well together, and who have at
+their disposal all the auxiliary services necessary for greater
+independent operations. For these both trains and columns are needed,
+which must be larger than those of two or even three single Divisions;
+for, on the one hand, the greater size of the Corps entails closer
+concentration of its units, thus making heavier demands on the
+provision columns; and, on the other, the Corps must be capable of
+carrying out longer and more obstinate engagements than a single
+Division.
+
+It is, therefore, most essential that the several Staffs required for
+the Corps to be created in War-time should be thoroughly trained so as
+to insure their working together, and the trains and columns necessary
+to complete these units should be held ready for them in time of
+Peace.[17]
+
+         [Footnote 17: In a report addressed to H.M. the King in 1868
+         by General von Moltke on the experiences deduced from the
+         events of 1866, it is proposed that there should be at Army
+         Headquarters the Staff of a Cavalry Corps Command, together
+         with its necessary Administrative services, always ready for
+         the field. As Field Marshal he returns to the idea in another
+         place, adding, 'particularly when we have found the right
+         "Murat" to lead it' (Moltke's 'Militarische Werke,' II.,
+         Second Part, First Group, B).]
+
+To hand over the functions of Corps Commander to the senior of the two
+or three Divisional Commanders would hardly be an adequate means of
+securing satisfactory results even for a single day of battle; still
+less could it suffice in the case of an independent strategic
+operation. On the other hand, it is not at all essential that the
+Corps thus formed at the outset of operations should be retained
+intact throughout their whole period. One can make detachments from
+them, or reinforce them according to circumstances, and thus attain
+that very flexibility of organization which I have endeavoured to
+prove to be an absolutely indispensable factor to meet the conditions
+of our times.
+
+It appears to me also that the same advantage which it is hoped to
+realize by the creation of permanent Divisions can be reached by other
+roads, and with still better results.
+
+I would divide the whole territory of the German Empire into a number
+of territorial districts, and call them Cavalry Inspections, or
+Corps--the name is immaterial--each to comprise about twenty
+regiments, and subdivide these again into sub-Inspections (_i.e._,
+Divisions and Brigades), and thus obtain, not only the foundations and
+the Staffs for a practical War formation, but for a systematic
+preparation of the Arm in time of Peace. The Inspections would detail
+annually the necessary squadrons on a War strength for manoeuvres of
+the three Arms, according to a changing roster, and hold special
+Cavalry manoeuvres in a manner I propose to develop hereafter.
+
+We should thus, from the point of view of organization, gain the
+advantage of having the cadres for both Corps and Divisions ready in
+time of Peace, without being bound once for all to a hard-and-fast
+strength for the Division.
+
+It may be objected that it would be illogical to separate the Cavalry
+from the Army Corps and Divisional Commands at the very moment that we
+have assigned the whole of the Artillery to the Infantry Divisions,
+but for the latter Arm the conditions are quite different. It always
+fights in combination with the other Arms; by itself it cannot fight
+at all.
+
+The Cavalry, on the other hand, as regards its principal masses, is
+quite independent, and only occasionally in moments of crisis
+intervenes in the action of the other Arms, even then still as an
+independent unit. The connection with the remainder of the Army would
+be sufficiently secured by its participation in the annual manoeuvres
+of the three Arms, and, as at present, Cavalry Brigade Commanders
+would still have to be employed in the arrangement of the Brigade
+manoeuvres. The participation of the Cavalry Regiments in the Garrison
+Field Service exercises would remain matter of arrangement between the
+respective Commands, but definite rules would have to be drawn up to
+secure their effective co-operation.
+
+The necessary trains for the Inspections and Divisions would be kept
+ready in time of Peace, and, whether Horse Artillery--possibly also
+Maxim guns--should be permanently allotted to them or otherwise, might
+remain open for further discussion, though there is undoubtedly much
+to be urged in favour of the suggestion.
+
+In this manner I believe an organization could be created which would
+meet all reasonable requirements. Certain new Staffs, fully equipped
+with both General Staff Officers and those necessary for the
+contemplated trains, etc., would be of course necessary, for in case
+of War such creations cannot be improvised to work together without
+most detrimental friction for any units, and least of all for those
+which from the first moment of hostilities will be called on for
+decisive action, and thus have less time and opportunity to shake down
+into their new duties.
+
+A practical Peace Organization, such as in fact we do not at present
+possess, is a necessity of the first importance. But 'Mobility' in the
+Arm itself remains the prime condition of efficiency in its
+strategical activity, which, as we have seen above, must henceforward
+be considered the most important sphere of its duties.
+
+To secure this mobility is, therefore, our unconditional duty, and it
+is in this direction in particular that, in my opinion, our Cavalry is
+as yet hardly sufficiently prepared for the tasks that await it.
+
+Strategical 'mobility' certainly depends in the first place on the
+excellence of the horse supply and the suitable 'training' both of man
+and horse; but the tactical independence of the troops themselves, and
+the means of maintaining them in condition--_i.e._, conditions of
+supply--are at least of equal importance. Owing to our experiences in
+the French Campaign, where food and fodder were generally abundant,
+sufficient attention has not been given universally to this factor.
+Had we been compelled to undergo the same hardships as the Russians in
+1877-1878, our views would doubtless have been very different.
+
+The amount of forage that even under most favourable circumstances can
+be carried on the horses is very small. To count on finding even that
+amount always in the country through which we may have to operate
+would be more than imprudent. Even in 1870-1871 we could not always
+find what we needed in spite of the very favourable agricultural
+conditions, and with the enormous Armies of the present day we shall
+probably find the country even more exhausted of supplies than
+formerly, particularly in the latter phases of the struggle, except
+when one has the good-fortune to fall upon rich stretches of the
+country which by chance may have escaped the devastation of previous
+operations.
+
+We may also be called on to work in sparsely settled districts with a
+large export trade in corn, in which at times stocks may sink very
+low. In short, unless we wish to be hampered at every step of our
+movements by the necessity for wide-reaching foraging expeditions, we
+shall have to rely upon our magazines and the supplies which can be
+transmitted from them to the front through the agency of our supply
+columns. The carrying capacity and mobility of the latter, therefore,
+condition inexorably the degree of mobility in strategical operations
+which, under all circumstances, the Cavalry can be counted on to
+develop. Whoever relies on more will lay himself open to most bitter
+disappointments exactly at the decisive moments.
+
+The supply trains must, therefore, be able to march at least as fast
+as the troops themselves, for only on this condition is there any
+guarantee that even under difficult circumstances the necessary
+supplies will be forthcoming; yet though experience most abundantly
+demonstrates the difficulties of maintaining the supplies of the
+Infantry in spite of the fact that, as a rule, their columns can cover
+the ground faster than the men can march, there appears to be a tacit
+assumption that with the Cavalry the trains will always arrive in
+time, although they move far slower than the troops they follow and
+supply.
+
+There was, indeed, a certain amount of justification for this idea in
+the days when Cavalry were more or less tied to the movements of the
+rest of the Army; but nowadays, when Cavalry operates independently,
+and must cover long distances in the shortest time, it has become
+simply preposterous.
+
+We have only to consider that we have now to reckon with average daily
+marches of from twenty-five to thirty miles, and that a beaten or
+evading force may have to retrace the same distance, perhaps even on
+the very same day, at a much faster rate than that at which it
+advanced, to perceive its absurdity. What chance would there be for
+waggons which could not go out of a walk, and cannot reverse on the
+road itself, which check at every hill, and sink to the axles in mud
+or sand? How can strategically independent Cavalry provide for the
+security of its baggage when it must often be left some days' marches
+behind? And yet it is precisely when operating against an active
+opposing Cavalry or an insurgent population that protection for the
+baggage becomes most indispensable. Again, how are such trains to be
+cleared away from the front when the main bodies of the two armies are
+closing on one another for battle? or how, after it is decided, can
+they be brought forward again to follow their Cavalry in pursuit, and
+convey to it the supplies which in such moments it will most need, and
+on whose prompt arrival its striking radius will depend? How, with
+insufficient mobility, will they maintain the connection between the
+combatants in front and the standing magazines, or even with the
+movable supply depots following behind the marching Army?
+
+Here we come upon one of the most difficult problems of the day, and
+it cannot be insisted on too strongly that its solution during Peace
+is an indispensable condition of the efficiency of the Arm in War. The
+Cavalry trains must be organized in such a manner that they will be
+able to march at least as fast as the Cavalry itself, and be adequate
+in number to carry from five to six days' corn. Only when this demand
+has been complied with will it be possible to count on the attainment
+of the strategical independence at which we aim, and to attempt all
+that this implies with less would only lead to the complete breakdown
+of the Arm, which, as we have already seen, under existing conditions,
+can never be efficiently replaced during the same Campaign.
+
+It is not alone with the splendid chaussées of France that we must
+reckon, but with the sand roads of East and West Prussia, the swamps
+of Poland and Russia, and so forth, on all of which the same degree of
+mobility must be developed, for the speed of the Cavalry itself is
+practically independent of the nature of the roads. Without going
+further into the detailed measures necessary to attain this ideal, the
+importance of which must be evident to every practical soldier. I
+would call attention to only one fundamental consideration: the desire
+to curtail the length of supply columns by concentrating the loads,
+with the object of lessening the congestion of the roads and
+diminishing the time needed to bring their contents to the troops, is
+sound as long as it attains its object, fatal everywhere else.[18]
+
+         [Footnote 18: Generally defeats its own object; the heavy
+         load destroys the roads, causes breakdowns and delays, etc.]
+
+Now, the Cavalry Masses move under different conditions to the rest of
+the Army. Either they are in the front of or on the flanks; in the
+latter case, they have roads at their own disposal, in the former,
+being generally some days' march in advance, they clear the front when
+collision is imminent by moving to the flanks, and only quite
+exceptionally retire through the advancing columns, and in all cases
+they must be able to get off the roads quickly. The depth of these
+columns is comparatively unimportant.
+
+Hence, from the strategical relations of the Cavalry Masses to the
+rest of the Army there arises no particular reason to endeavour to
+shorten their trains. If the heavy baggage of a Cavalry Division is
+two and a half or five kilometres in length it is tolerably
+immaterial, but it is imperative, as we have seen, that they should be
+able to move and get out of the way. Hence, it is not the number of
+waggons which concerns us, but their individual lightness and
+mobility, so that on all roads they can follow their units at a trot,
+and only in the case of Divisional Cavalry can the other point of view
+be admitted.
+
+The possibility must also not be overlooked that it may not always be
+practical for Cavalry masses to fill up their supply columns direct
+from the Army reserves; and to meet this, second échelons of waggons
+will be required, in every degree as mobile as the first, and so
+organized as to require a minimum escort for their safety.
+
+For such escorts Cavalry Reservists and men of the Landwehr exist in
+adequate numbers, and armed with a useful carbine and mounted on
+horses, only as a means of locomotion, they will answer their purpose
+well enough.
+
+No matter, however, how ample the supply of these columns may be, or
+how mobile, circumstances will still arise during periods of great
+concentration in which it will be impossible to bring up supply
+waggons in sufficient numbers. In these cases we require an emergency
+horse ration, which within a small compass contains great nourishment.
+
+Too much cannot be expected from such a ration; for instance, it
+cannot be bulky enough to fill the animal's stomach. All that is
+necessary is that it should be willingly eaten by the horses, keep
+well, and be easily carried. It should contain about three times the
+nutritive qualities, weight for weight, of oats, and should suffice to
+keep horses in condition for three or four days in succession. These
+demands are fairly satisfied by a food manufactured by Marck at
+Darmstadt. It should be always carried in the field and replenished as
+consumed, and with it even the most advanced patrols might be made
+independent of requisitions, a matter which appears to me of the
+greatest importance.
+
+The fundamental condition of mobility being thus satisfied, the next
+step will be to insure the technical and tactical independence of the
+units under all circumstances which can be reasonably foreseen.
+
+In this direction much has been done, and materials for the
+destruction of railways, folding pontoons, and a field telegraph, now
+form part of our equipment. The opportunities for the use of the
+latter in the course of rapid movements--_i.e._, just in the most
+important sphere of our activities--seem to me highly problematical,
+as I have already pointed out; and the waggons which transport the
+bridging equipment are too heavy to be always at hand when most
+needed. Essentially, it seems only fitted to facilitate the progress
+of smaller bodies of troops, and would hardly suffice to secure rapid
+and safe passage of Cavalry Masses with all their attendant trains
+over the rivers for which we ought to be prepared. For such purposes
+they would only suffice if all the boats of a whole Division were
+united into one bridging train.
+
+Nevertheless, the collapsible boats are a most useful concession, and
+they would be still more so if the load was more suitably subdivided;
+as it is, the weight of the whole waggon ties us too much to the made
+roads. For the Divisional Cavalry, which always moves in close
+connection with the Infantry, and in need can always fall back upon
+the Divisional Bridge Train, it has no particular value, and it would
+therefore be better if, in War-time, all the collapsible boat
+equipment were handed over to the independent Cavalry Divisions, and
+their bridging equipment thus augmented.
+
+More important, however, than this collapsible boat question is the
+matter of the pioneer detachments to be assigned to the Cavalry
+Divisions which require further equipment. A waggon of bridging
+material just sufficient to cross smaller ditches and watercourses,
+which can neither be jumped nor scrambled over, but which require only
+one, or at most two, bays, would be invaluable, for it is just these
+little hindrances, whose importance cannot be measured or deduced from
+the map, which may bring most important Cavalry undertakings
+unexpectedly to a check, particularly when in an enemy's country all
+the culverts, etc., have been destroyed. In the days of Frederick the
+Great such bridging equipment was often assigned to the Cavalry
+marching at the head of the Columns, in order to help them over
+similar obstacles.
+
+Given, however, that all has been done to attain the degree of
+collective mobility we require, a point of equal importance is that
+the troops should be adequately provided with all they require for
+their tactical action. In this respect, it cannot be too much insisted
+upon that carbine ammunition should be placed in the very first line;
+our present allowance is altogether insufficient.
+
+The importance of dismounted action, as we have already seen, has
+enormously increased. Almost daily, under certain conditions, we shall
+have to have recourse to our firearms, and often be obliged to expend
+very considerable quantities of ammunition to attain the object we
+fight for. The replenishment of this consumption is far more difficult
+in our case than with the Infantry, particularly in operations
+partaking of the nature of raids, in which our communications are
+likely to be interrupted. These conditions require first of all a
+considerable increase in the number of rounds carried on the man's
+person, and also in the number of Small Arm Ammunition waggons
+attached to the units, and the regulations for the replenishment of
+these require also corresponding development.
+
+Further, it must be pointed out with all possible insistence that the
+present equipment of the trooper is thoroughly impracticable. That the
+carbine should be carried on the horse and the sword on the man is
+opposed to common sense, for the latter is only of use when mounted,
+the former only on foot. The sword should, therefore, be attached to
+the saddle, the carbine to the man, as is, in fact, the practice of
+all races of born horsemen. A practicable method of attachment is
+certainly capable of being devised; it is probably only the question
+of expense that stands in the way of its solution. The consequences,
+however, of the existing attachment to the saddle are that the weapon
+must be shorter than that of the Infantry soldier, and hence has a
+lesser range; but it is precisely the Cavalry that requires to be able
+to obtain good results at long ranges. Even against Infantry it must
+always be in a position to obtain decisive results in the shortest
+time. To obtain these ends it needs a weapon at least equal, if
+possible superior, to that of the Infantry; and instead it has only
+the carbine, a weapon of most restricted range, and most inadequately
+sighted. It is required of Cavalry that it should break off an
+engagement when the enemy approaches within 700 metres (Drill
+Regulations, No. 562), and all the training the man gets in Peace is
+at 600 metres at target practice, and only quite occasionally, if at
+all, at greater distances at field practice.
+
+I consider it most important that the Cavalry should be supplied with
+a weapon which admits of accurate practice at long ranges, and for
+which the greatest number of rounds can be carried. This would entail,
+on the one hand, an increase in the length of the weapon carried; on
+the other, a reduction in calibre, which should be made as small as
+possible. We might thus safely go down to a 6-millimetre bore, and
+increase the ammunition accordingly. The desire to retain the same
+cartridge as the Infantry, to facilitate mutual assistance in
+ammunition supply on occasions, seems to me of quite secondary
+importance. As long as the Cavalry were still tied to the Infantry on
+the line of march this consideration had indeed some weight; but now
+that it moves far in front of, or on the flanks of, the Infantry
+columns, and has its own arrangements for ammunition supply, the case
+is quite different. The point nowadays is to make sure of that degree
+of effect which is unconditionally necessary to our purpose, and for
+this we require a weapon specially adapted to our particular need.
+
+Our method of carrying our cartridges in the pouch attached to the
+cross-belt is also impracticable. The bandoliers of the Boers would be
+undoubtedly preferable, and could at the same time be made use of to
+secure the carbine on the back.
+
+It is also a matter for serious consideration whether cycle
+detachments should not be attached to the Cavalry,[19] and I think I
+am not going too far in estimating fifteen to twenty cyclists per
+regiment as a suitable number to perform the many duties which may
+fall to their lot. On the advantages they confer I have already dwelt
+(Book I., Chap. VIII.), and further, I would advocate the addition of
+portable or wheelable Maxims to the Cavalry to add to their fire
+power. The latest patterns of this weapon are capable of easy
+transportation, and can come into action very rapidly. Naturally such
+heavy batteries as we now possess should be avoided. As regards this
+latter weapon, one should not think of it primarily as destined to
+take part in the real Cavalry duel; one should do nothing in this
+direction to rob the horsemen of their confidence in themselves by
+teaching them to lean on the firearm for support. Even the effect of
+the Artillery in this respect is not always and everywhere
+advantageous. One is too much inclined to make the action of the
+Cavalry depend on the effect of the guns, and thus to sacrifice the
+initiative when opposed to an enemy's horse. Nor would there be many
+opportunities in practice for the Maxims to render support to the
+charge. In the introductory phases of an engagement--_i.e._, when the
+enemy is still at a considerable distance--they promise little
+results, and in the moments when the 'Masses' are sent forward to the
+attack, they would get in the way and hinder their freedom of
+movement. On the other hand, they would be of great use in cases where
+it is necessary to overcome or parry an Infantry opponent, and in the
+battle, or in pursuit, when the Cavalry succeed in getting in on the
+flanks or rear of the enemy's chief masses, they might prove
+invaluable. Here, where reserves, columns, and trains all form
+suitable targets, they would not only add materially to the striking
+power of the Cavalry, but increase its radius of action very
+materially.
+
+         [Footnote 19: The wheel should be so low that the man could
+         use his rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it
+         should be 'transportable' (?'folding').]
+
+By their side the Artillery will always maintain its high importance
+for the fight against localities, woods, and defiles, and with this
+Arm the German Cavalry is, in my opinion, sufficiently supplied;
+only--and this is of the greatest importance--more adequate steps to
+insure ammunition supply are essential in the case of the Independent
+Cavalry Masses. Here, too, we shall have to reckon with far higher
+consumption than in 1870-1871, and the greater distances will make it
+impossible to replenish from the general Reserves of the Army. The
+Cavalry, therefore, require sufficient ammunition columns of its very
+own.
+
+The nature of Cavalry operations indicate yet another
+requirement--namely, batteries so organized that to every brigade of
+two regiments one battery of four pieces should be assigned. Many will
+be the occasions in our strategical operations on which guns will be
+required, and in most of these it is more a question of having _some_
+Artillery at hand rather than of the development of superior fire
+power--_i.e._, a few shells into a village at the right time may be
+all that is needed for our purpose. Further, in operating on several
+roads it can seldom be foretold with exactness on which road the need
+may first arise.
+
+Under these conditions it is of the greatest importance to be able, if
+necessary, to assign a battery to each brigade, and at the same time
+not to allow the half of the whole available Artillery to escape from
+control.[20]
+
+         [Footnote 20: With stronger Divisions, a corresponding
+         increase in Artillery must, of course, be made.]
+
+Further, these small batteries are both handier and more mobile in
+themselves; they are, therefore, better suited to Cavalry
+requirements, and at the same time the power of concentration when
+such is required is fully retained.
+
+The advantage of this proposed division seems, therefore, to me
+sufficiently clear to need no further recommendation.[21]
+
+         [Footnote 21: King William I. had already suggested the
+         formation of batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in
+         1869--in a marginal note on the report of Moltke's of
+         1868--already referred to in the note on p. 166 above.]
+
+This organization of the Artillery requires, however, to be
+supplemented by the introduction of a true quick-firing gun, even if
+it is necessary to reduce the calibre somewhat to keep down the
+weight. For it is particularly with the Cavalry, and especially in the
+Cavalry duel, when the opportunities for Artillery action are often
+compressed into a very few moments, and yet a great effect must be
+attained, that a gun without recoil and a great rapidity of loading is
+most urgently required. If the Cavalry is thus equipped with all that
+the conditions of War demand and modern technical skill can supply,
+then it will find in these--at least in part--compensation for its
+numerical weakness on condition that at the same time it also succeeds
+in raising its training to a corresponding height.
+
+It cannot be denied that in this direction all ranks have worked with
+most devoted and admirable industry, and that new points of view, new
+methods, and new aims towards which to strive have been opened up.
+But, on the whole, this question of the training of our Cavalry is
+still based upon the ideas of a period which lies behind us. There has
+been no conscious breach with the past, even in those very fields
+wherein the developments and demands of modern times have brought
+about a complete disturbance of all military relations.
+
+That a method of training which does not take into account the
+phenomena of modern Warfare, and follow them even to their furthermost
+consequences, can never give satisfactory results, needs no
+demonstration. But a method free from these objections we have to
+find. In its training our Cavalry _must_ excel all others if it would
+maintain its position on the field of battle, and it can do so, for it
+possesses by far the best material both in men and horses of any
+country in the Continent of Europe. There are only two essentials
+which we must bear in mind. First, we must be absolutely clear as to
+those points in which our system is behind the requirements of the
+time, and what objectives we must now pursue. Secondly, being
+satisfied as to the above, that we should take the straightest way
+which leads towards them, not hesitating to break with tradition
+wherever it hinders our advance.
+
+If we now consider in the spirit of this first requirement the
+separate branches of Cavalry work which our training must embrace, the
+very first point which attracts attention is the vastly increased
+demands on the endurance of our horseflesh that will now be made, far
+exceeding what was required in our last Wars. Increase of endurance is
+thus an unconditional necessity.
+
+Further, it is perfectly clear that in the combat of Cavalry against
+Cavalry, the decision will depend on the action of the great tactical
+units, and that with regard to dismounted fighting, a complete
+revolution in the conditions has occurred. In future this will tend
+evermore to come to the front, and both points of view must be kept in
+mind in our training.
+
+Finally, it is evident that the centre of gravity of these two factors
+is no longer in the same position. As long as decisive results in the
+combat itself were expected from the Cavalry, it was quite right and
+expedient to train them to meet this special requirement. But now,
+when it is clear that the combat is only a means to an end--that end
+being the possibility opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre,
+screen, or break the enemy's communications--this change in the
+conditions must be taken into account in the process of our education.
+
+Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that we can afford
+to neglect the training for the actual combat: the defeat of the
+enemy's Cavalry remains now, as always, the necessary condition of all
+subsequent activity; but the Arm must be taught to understand that
+victory in combat is only the first link in the chain of operations,
+and to extend its outlook beyond the point of actual collision, and to
+appreciate the tasks which are the consequence of success.
+
+To this end we must undergo a preparation of a quite different
+character, for nowadays, freed from the chains which formerly bound us
+to conform to the action of the other Arms, we appear within the
+framework of the Great Armies indeed, but operating in independent
+'Masses,' and this change in conditions extends its influence even to
+the smallest reconnoitring patrol.
+
+In this new field our training must seek to follow the demands of War.
+It must accustom the troops to the greatness of their mission both
+with regard to time and space, attain higher results with the
+individual, raise the education of its officers above the sphere of
+the technicalities special to the Arm, and give them a wider horizon
+of general military conditions.
+
+In what way we can reach these new ideals, in the best and most
+practical manner, I propose to investigate in the following chapters,
+and need only point out here that it is not my object to discuss every
+detail of military education, but rather to bring out the essentials,
+and lay stress on those questions which, in my opinion, compel us to
+strike out new ways to find our objective.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING
+
+
+When we discuss the training of the Cavalry, the first point which
+naturally occurs to us is the question of 'horsemanship'--_i.e._, the
+breaking-in of the horses and the teaching of equitation to the men.
+Horsemanship is so absolutely the bed-rock of all Cavalry
+performances, that the advantages of improved methods of breaking and
+of equitation must bear fruit in every branch of their activity. Above
+all, they exercise the most enduring influence both on the
+conservation and endurance of the horses themselves.
+
+Anglomaniacs and faddists, who, in spite of many a healthy impulse
+they have imparted, have nevertheless exercised, and still seek to
+exercise, an influence the reverse of favourable upon our Cavalry,
+maintain that for certain purposes one can obtain better results with
+horses broken by one of their short-cuts to the object, and then
+'trained' in the sense that racehorses and hunters are prepared for
+their work, than with those who have been gradually brought forward by
+the methods in use in our Cavalry schools, and at the same time secure
+the advantage of 'unconditional obedience' in the horse, a result
+which they allege cannot be always counted on with our existing
+methods.
+
+On the other hand, the fact remains that our recruits, in the short
+time available for their education, can only be well and quickly
+taught on well-trained pliable horses. That such horses, with
+sufficient exercise, go better and more safely across country than
+those brought forward by more hasty methods, is sufficiently proved by
+the fact that all our steeplechase riders in the Army take the
+greatest pains to prepare their horses thoroughly (by school methods
+understood), because experience shows that this preparation alone
+gives them a chance against the more highly-priced animals with which
+they are called on to compete. Only this thorough training guarantees
+good individual riding, and insures the 'pliability' which alone makes
+it possible to correct disobedience rapidly should it arise. And,
+further, there can be no question that this prolonged preparation
+improves the endurance of the horse--on that point at least experience
+leaves no room for doubt. The thoroughly broken horse, which moves in
+easy balance, with all its muscle thoroughly well and equally
+developed, not only saves its forelegs and joints, and supports the
+spinal arch better, but trots easier, and hence for longer periods
+with less fatigue, than the unpliable animal, who stiffens itself
+against the rider's load, and thus expends its power uselessly, and
+the rider himself is far less shaken about under the former, a point
+by no means to be neglected.
+
+The recognition of these facts has at length led us to break with the
+Anglomania of former years, and the tendency towards improved
+preparation has become more evident, whilst the centrifugal strivings
+of individuals no longer find acceptance. On the other hand, it seems
+to me beyond a doubt that the objects which we wish to obtain from
+our Military school of horsemanship could in many respects be reached
+more directly and better than is at present the case.
+
+In conformity with the whole essence of modern War, the individual
+training of both man and horse must form the foundation of our whole
+education--that is to say, steadiness in the movement of closed bodies
+must be the consequence of individual horsemanship. Only in this way
+can the bodily, intellectual, and moral qualities of both man and
+horse be brought into useful activity, and in this way only can we
+conquer the gregarious instincts of the horses and develop in their
+riders the individuality which modern conditions absolutely demand.
+
+More stress requires to be laid on riding with one hand only and with
+arms (_i.e._, drawn swords), for the bit, with or without a feeling on
+the bridoon, is in War the only practical method of direction; and the
+use of his weapons when mounted must have become second nature to the
+man if they are not to be a constant impediment to him in the control
+of his horse. Finally, independent riding across country must be
+encouraged by every conceivable means.
+
+To attain all this will only be possible if we succeed in overcoming
+the preliminary steps of the man's education--_i.e._, the elementary
+training of man and horse--more rapidly than has hitherto been the
+case, and thus gain time for the true practical preparation for the
+field. If from this standpoint we look at our present system, it will
+soon be clear where to apply the lever.
+
+First, it should be possible, with the better bred and stauncher
+material we now receive, to make more rapid progress in the first year
+than has hitherto been generally the case. By the increased demands
+and the greater freedom in the choice of means allowed us by the new
+Regulations as compared with the conditions formerly prevalent,
+considerable changes have been made; the point now is, in what manner
+to derive the fullest advantage from this greater freedom for the
+practical curtailment of the periods previously allotted for each
+stage in the training.
+
+But prudence is necessary in this direction. That the English
+thoroughbred, for instance, develops better under work in its early
+years, admits of no doubt whatever; but there is room to question
+whether this experience can be transferred without modification to our
+present Remounts, although many of them have a strong strain of
+English blood. Our Prussian horses, for instance, only reach their
+full development between the seventh and eighth years; it would,
+therefore, be a mistake to attempt to force them up to the full
+demands made on a Cavalry horse before that age. This slowness of
+growth must always be considered, and the animals be saved as much as
+possible; but there is still room to unite with this necessary
+concession increased demands on the degree of training.
+
+Without any detriment to their efficiency, the young remounts can be
+taken in hand immediately on joining their regiments, instead of
+waiting till the conclusion of the manoeuvres, as is still a common
+practice. It seems feasible, also, to begin with the gallop earlier
+than was formerly the custom; and, finally, it is by no means
+absolutely necessary to go back to the bridoon again at the
+commencement of their second year's training.[22] One can well go on
+with riding on the bit at the point where the course was interrupted
+by the manoeuvres.
+
+         [Footnote 22: Under the new Regulations this is now left to
+         the discretion of the Regimental Commander.]
+
+All these measures together produce quite a remarkable saving of time,
+and there cannot well be any doubt that in this way, as far as
+concerns the riding education of the horse alone--_i.e._, without
+arms--the same standard of progress can be reached by Christmas of the
+second year as was formerly often only reached at the end of the
+second winter.
+
+If from this foundation we go on to specific training of the
+charger--still working, of course, concurrently at the gymnastic side
+of his training also--to accustoming him to the curb, then by the end
+of February the remount ought easily to be ready to be placed in the
+ranks.
+
+Side by side with this increase of rapidity in his training, we both
+can and must make the individual training the foundation of his whole
+education, so that from the very first the horse learns to go alone
+and with safety in all kinds of ground.
+
+The very first lessons to accustom him to both saddle and rider are
+better given on the lunging rein than when led by an older horse, for
+nothing teaches the bad habit of 'sticking' more than this last
+practice. And since now the first months of training fall in the
+summer, we can avail ourselves of the fine weather to send out the
+young horses in charge of trustworthy riders, some of whom must be
+left behind even during the manoeuvres, to go singly or in small
+groups under suitable supervision, which can easily be arranged, out
+into the country, if possible into woods and fairly difficult ground,
+to habituate them to minor obstacles and the objects one meets with,
+instead of, as formerly, keeping them in the school or manège, and
+making them into 'stickers' first, only to have the trouble of
+breaking them of the habit, often after many a hard tussle,
+afterwards.
+
+All through their subsequent training they must constantly be sent out
+singly into the country, and even in the school itself they should be
+exercised as little as possible in squads one behind the other.
+
+It goes without saying that only the best horsemen should be trusted
+with the young horses, for bad habits developed at the beginning of
+their instruction are of all the most difficult to correct hereafter,
+and may ruin the result of all one's trouble.
+
+That in this way we can meet the requirements of the service much more
+rapidly than by existing methods cannot be open to question and may be
+taken as practically settled, and similar considerations apply to the
+recruits.
+
+The system laid down in the regulations does not go directly enough to
+the purpose, a consequence, no doubt, of the fact that we have now
+better horses on which to instruct them than at the time these
+instructions were evolved.
+
+If one begins as soon as possible with the gallop and individual
+riding--if necessary on the lunge--and allows the recruit as soon as
+he has acquired anything approaching a firm seat to practise the aids
+for the leg and the side paces--passage and shoulder-in--one will
+attain quite different results than from riding only on straight lines
+and practising closing in the ranks. The practice in the use of the
+legs makes the men more independent and individual, compels them to
+trust to their seat, and not to hang on by the reins.
+
+The individual riding makes the man drive his horse forward by the
+pressure of his legs, which he is not compelled to do in the squad,
+where the horses follow one another almost automatically. The horses,
+too, are saved from becoming dull and heavy, as they are only too apt
+to do under the recruits of the old system.
+
+By Christmas the recruits can thus be brought forward as far and
+farther than they now are by the time of the inspection on the
+bridoon, and can then go on to riding on the curb, so that by February
+they should be able to ride the side paces, gallop and change, and all
+other school paces, without arms, and generally be so firm in the
+saddle that they may be advanced to drilling with arms, and can begin
+their real instruction as troopers. Of course, it is not to be
+expected that these school paces should be ridden as yet in perfect
+form, but the men must understand what these lessons are intended for,
+and the effort to get the correct bend should be recognisable. And we
+may add that to teach them to rely on their seat and not on their
+hands suitable exercises with the lance may be introduced even at an
+earlier period.
+
+As regards the remainder of the squadron, the so-called 'Dressur'[23]
+detachment, it is hardly necessary to point out that one can ask of it
+at least all that can be attained by the remounts and the
+recruits--that is to say, that by the beginning of February the men
+and horses should reach the highest point of their purely riding
+training. Of course, to achieve this they must not be put back every
+autumn to the very ABC of their work--riding on the bridoon. They must
+go on with the curb, to which by this time they are accustomed, and in
+the place of the bridoon work, individual riding must be encouraged
+as much as possible.
+
+         [Footnote 23: 'Dressur' literally means 'preparation.' We use
+         the term 'breaking-in.' Note the difference.--TRANSLATOR.]
+
+Only those squads will require somewhat different treatment in which
+the best men of the second year are being trained on the best horses
+for the riding of the remounts in the following year. These men will
+certainly require more bridoon work in the autumn, but even these
+should be sufficiently forward by Christmas-time to pass on to the
+bit, so that, in spite of the very high degree of perfection required
+from their horses, they can be dismissed the school by the middle of
+February.
+
+From the increased demands made on the individual training of man and
+horse, it follows as a necessary consequence that a different kind of
+inspection in equitation will be required to that hitherto in vogue.
+
+The presentation of closed detachments must be restricted as much as
+possible, and all previous rehearsals of a special inspection
+programme absolutely prohibited. Horse and rider, since they have been
+trained individually, must be inspected and judged on their individual
+merits, not otherwise. In this manner not only is it easier to
+appreciate difficulties, but good work also has a fairer chance of
+securing recognition. It needs an expert to bring together the sum of
+all the performances, and express a fair judgment on the total result.
+In any case, however, such a judgment will be nearer the truth because
+it is uninfluenced by 'eye-wash' and mere externals.
+
+Hence we arrive at the conclusion that in the manner we have above
+indicated the whole squadron can have completed its training in
+equitation by the middle of February.
+
+That many objections will have to be met and many difficulties
+overcome before this end is attained goes without saying; but where in
+human affairs can it be said that this is not the case?
+
+It may be urged that both for horses and men there is a distinct
+advantage in beginning again every year with bridoon riding.
+
+The action of the rider is easier to control than on the bit, and if
+once the men take to holding on by the curb, the consequences are much
+worse than with the former. On the other hand, also, it is easier for
+the horses on the curb to assume a false bend or poise, or to refuse
+to go up to their bits, and thus deceive the instructor. Wrong
+application of the aids with the bit entail worse consequences on the
+horses than with the bridoon; hence almost exclusive work on the bit
+requires better teachers and lighter hands, and if one has few of
+these at one's disposal, undoubtedly a disadvantage will accrue.
+
+It may further be objected that for such a thorough extension of the
+course of individual riding as I have demanded there is neither time,
+school accommodation, nor teachers available, and it must be granted
+that the regulation allowance of three schools per regiment is, in
+fact, insufficient for the attainment of the required standard by the
+methods I have in view. Nor will it suffice to allow each training
+detachment only three-quarters of an hour in the school at a time.
+Detachments of average strength require daily one hour and a quarter,
+if the necessary skill in individual riding is to be acquired, and
+recruit squads even longer. Further, it will not do to exclude
+recruits who begin early with the side paces and the gallop altogether
+from the school; on the contrary, they require to attend it at least
+once or twice a week.
+
+But with only three schools per regiment, particularly in our northern
+provinces, these requirements cannot be fulfilled. Four I consider as
+the least number, and it would be still better if each squadron had
+its own school, so that difficult animals and backward men could be
+taken individually, and work on the lunge and circle thoroughly
+carried out.
+
+Still, all these obstacles can be overcome. With increased practice,
+comprehension of the management of the bit in military riding would
+gradually increase both with teacher and pupils, and work with the
+reins in both hands be usefully employed to facilitate the transition
+from the bridoon to the bit and counteract the possible evils of
+riding on the bit alone.
+
+The better training of the Remounts, which will be obtained by the
+means I have indicated, will in course of time give us better, more
+obedient, and more pliable horses, and better-trained recruits again
+will give us a better choice of riders for the young remounts.
+
+Our instructional staff for equitation is thoroughly satisfactory. In
+this respect the Riding-School in Hanover has done excellent work. We
+have also amongst our senior non-commissioned officers some excellent
+instructors.
+
+The necessary time for all my demands can very well be saved if we
+make up our minds to leave out all superfluities in the daily routine
+of duty; and as regards the question of school accommodation, it is
+well within the bounds of possibility for most regiments to provide
+themselves with a fourth school--eventually even with a fifth--out of
+their own financial resources. No investment could be more
+remunerative. Certainly under circumstances red tape may stand in the
+way; but when his superiors will support the Regimental Commander, and
+sometimes without, one will generally find appreciative backing, even
+from the War Office (_Intendantur_).
+
+If the drawbacks and difficulties in the way of the proposed changes
+are, as I have endeavoured to show, to be surmounted, on the other
+hand, the advantages accruing therefrom are so enormous that the
+former need not be taken into consideration at all. In the first
+place, as we have seen, better individual horsemanship and more
+practice in riding on the bit are in themselves advantages which react
+directly on the War efficiency of the whole squadron. Secondly, the
+earlier completion of the remount training is a direct gain, for, in
+case of mobilization, we shall be better able to place remounts in the
+mobilized squadrons, leaving in exchange older horses behind, which is
+again an advantage for the training of the recruits destined hereafter
+to join us at the front. I cannot too earnestly warn against the
+taking of _all_ the old horses into the field. No man can foretell how
+great the losses will be, but that they will be great admits of no
+doubt whatever. Nor is it at all certain that future Wars will be of
+short duration; on the contrary, they may drag on for a very long
+time. Hence it is absolutely indispensable that suitable horses for
+recruit training should be left behind, even if the marching out
+strength per squadron should be reduced by a file or two--it cannot be
+many in any case. For the rest, the quicker and better training of the
+recruits will be all to the good in case of War breaking out, as one
+will be able to detail men for the field squadrons towards the close
+of the winter season--_i.e._, some weeks sooner than under the old
+system; and finally the proposed procedure brings with it an enormous
+gain of time in the training of the whole arm.
+
+To begin with, we gain in winter the months from the middle of
+February to the beginning of the Drill Season (April). This time can
+be devoted to direct training for the demands War must make upon us.
+We can practise again, and confirm the men in the fundamental
+principle of dressing in motion, the exact squareness of the horses to
+the alignment and rallying, with which one had already commenced in
+the early months of winter, before being driven into the schools by
+frost and snow; and, further, take advantage of fine days and similar
+circumstances to practise men in taking jumps, scrambling, etc., the
+development of the regulation drill gallop (fifteen miles an hour),
+whilst still maintaining the control and standard of equitation for
+which the school training is specially adapted. The winter exercises
+in field service duties, which, as long as they are allowed constantly
+to interrupt the formal lessons in equitation, do more harm than good,
+can be postponed to this period, when the recruits will now be able to
+take part in them--a point of essential importance in case War breaks
+out. Above all, the time thus saved must be devoted to individual
+riding and single combat.
+
+Our Regulations (Sections 129 and 324) lay special stress on this
+latter point, and in most regiments it is constantly practised. The
+results, however, are sometimes questionable, and many Squadron
+Commanders are of opinion that such training can be overdone. Nor is
+this view without foundation. If single combats are carried out in the
+regulation way on imperfectly broken horses, the horse is not only
+spoilt, but the rider also, and a clumsy rider will very soon make a
+good horse hard in the mouth and refractory.
+
+Now, since we have neither ideal horses nor riders at our disposal,
+there is much danger in overdoing these exercises, because the method
+of their execution is often thoroughly unpractical. The combatants
+ride round one another in unnatural circles, one retreats, the other
+pursues, and both tear at their horses' mouths to turn them sharply
+about, all things which, except the latter, they never do in action.
+
+Nor should we overlook the really imminent danger which lies in
+teaching the men to run away before an opponent. Few of them are
+'Horatios,' and if, in fact, they once turn about, it is, to say the
+least, highly problematical whether, in a real fight, they will ever
+stop again. In the field matters are very different. If one has but
+one adversary, one tries to ride him down, and, if unsuccessful, then
+after one turn about both get locked together, turning only on the
+fore hand; and the man who turns a second time can only trust to the
+speed of his horse--he has given up the fight.
+
+Such duels are rare indeed; in most engagements the man fights between
+crowds of his own comrades and the other side, in wild confusion,
+under clouds of dust. He must attack at one moment to the right, at
+the next to the left, and guard himself. The essential here is not so
+much the skilful use of the lance, as complete command over the horse,
+and the determination to _kill_, which must rise to the height of
+_fanaticism_. He who can twist and turn his horse by his weight alone,
+without dragging at its mouth, whose arm does not tire, and who can
+make sure of striking what he aims at, even at speed, and with the
+energy born of hatred, thinking only of destroying his enemy, never on
+retreating--he alone can hope to remain the conqueror; but such a one
+very soon learns all that is practical in the use of sword or lance.
+
+The exercises in single combats, therefore, must be based mainly on
+preparatory practice, intended to strengthen the arm, give command of
+the weapon, heighten the man's energy, and, above all, aim at securing
+the most perfect harmony between man and horse by constant exercise in
+those forms of individual riding which are really needed in the fight:
+the rapid turning about of the horse; serpentining between, and
+cutting and thrusting at, different objects in varying directions, as
+far as possible without reins, and never according to a prescribed
+formula.
+
+The actual combats between squads should follow only when considerable
+excellence in these preliminary exercises has been attained--_i.e._,
+for recruits--about the end of the summer, before the manoeuvres; and
+they should always be kept down to the lowest limits, and then only
+carried out in thoroughly practical form--_i.e._, between squads, and
+not larger detachments. I believe that in this way a far higher
+standard will be reached, and with less damage to the horses than is
+possible under existing conditions, in which one generally begins with
+single combats, man against man, at the very commencement of the drill
+season. In any case, we shall at least obtain this advantage--that the
+work to be done in the latter will be materially reduced if the
+exercises I have suggested are begun already in the winter months.
+
+The more the men have learnt to ride with a light hand on the bit, the
+greater command they possess over their lances--thanks to more
+constant practice--and the more thoroughly they have been grounded in
+the principles of direction, pace, alignment, and rallying. Further,
+the more quietly the horses move--and even at rapid paces have learnt
+to carry their heads not too high, with a firm bearing on the
+reins--the easier it will be for the Commander to drill his squadron,
+and to eliminate all the plunging and surging in movement which is
+fatal to all excellence in manoeuvring.
+
+The drill season can thus be cut down, and the time thus saved devoted
+to field service practices and riding across country, because the
+whole system, thanks to this considerable saving of time it effects,
+enables one to extend the education of man and horse over the whole
+year instead of confining it to the winter months.
+
+Though every efficient squadron possesses a considerable number of
+horses that do not require six months' practice in 'shouldering in,'
+and in 'collected paces,' on the other hand, everyone has some horses
+that do urgently need 're-making,' but which one has to entrust to
+inferior riders, because the better ones are all needed for the
+remounts and young horses.
+
+This is a consequence of the whole system in which the training of the
+horses and of the men eventually react on one another. There will be
+remounts which need correction, and horses ridden by recruits to be
+cured of acquired bad habits; and on my system there will now be time
+and opportunity to hand these over, say from the beginning of
+February, to non-commissioned officers and the better riders, either
+by forming them in a special squad or entrusting them to individuals,
+and the process of re-making the horses can be continued throughout
+the whole summer, for now there will be ample time.
+
+On the importance of this latter point I would especially insist. If
+this work of equitation ceases for the whole summer, and the difficult
+horses are kept incessantly at drill and field service, it is
+inevitable that their defects will develop and become more firmly
+fixed; hence one will never get a good average of well-broken horses
+in the ranks. That some of them must always be taken for drill goes
+without saying; but the point is, that from February onwards, and
+throughout the summer, they should be constantly taken in hand and
+corrected by good riders. If this idea is applied with thoroughgoing
+energy, particularly with the young horses--even if it entails at
+first a diminution in the number of files on parade--the number of
+difficult horses in the squadron will soon show a most encouraging
+diminution.
+
+To all these advantages there comes yet another, to my mind even more
+important. According to established custom, after the inspection in
+riding on the bit which forms the conclusion of the winter's training,
+the whole squadron is completely reformed before it begins the drills.
+The new exercises in unaccustomed surroundings are begun by the men on
+strange horses, to which they have had no opportunity to accustom
+themselves. This drawback can be obviated, if the squadron is
+definitely made up already in February--_i.e._, after the close of the
+purely equitation course. The men can now ride the same horses in the
+school on the drill-ground, and in the country, which they are to
+retain throughout the summer, and the squadron will commence the drill
+season with much steadier ranks than would otherwise be the case,
+particularly if its Commander understands how to make the most of all
+the advantages his good methods and well-broken horses secure for him
+by changing them about individually as circumstances require.
+
+Much, no doubt, may be urged against this proposal, and the expert
+will hardly need my assistance to recognise the difficulties that
+await him. But they can be overcome, and their advantages thus
+secured--and these seem to me the essential points--enormously
+outweigh the minor troubles that follow in their train.
+
+I do not believe that either thorough or essential changes are needed
+in our Regulations to adapt them to the principles I have developed.
+All that is important is that we should definitely break with the
+routine of the several courses and inspections.
+
+To constitute a framework, not with a view of developing a fresh
+network of red tape, I here submit an outline programme of the
+time-table I suggest, so far as concerns the equitation and the
+training of the horses in their several periods.
+
+Commencement of Remount training, at the latest, the end of July. It
+is worth consideration whether the young horses could not be sent to
+the Regiments even earlier.
+
+Inspection of recruits on the bridoon, and of the Second Ride Second
+Class shortly before Christmas.
+
+Inspection of the second year's remounts on the bit of the whole of
+the remount training squads, and of the recruits, concluding with the
+latter and Second Ride Second Class about the middle of February. Then
+constitution of the squadron to meet the requirements of the coming
+drill season.
+
+End of March, or beginning of April, bridoon inspection of the young
+remounts, in which generally side-paces, collected canter, and the
+canter and change, may be demanded.
+
+Inspection of the squadron in 'Military riding' (_i.e._, with arms,
+and on the curb); preparatory exercises for single combat, thrusting
+at targets, regulation gallop, riding in the ranks, together with a
+careful investigation of the teaching received in the school.
+Inspection of all difficult horses.
+
+Shortly before the manoeuvres, inspection of the young remounts on the
+bit. Inspection of the second year remounts in 'rides' (at the same
+time note their condition after the drill). Inspection of the
+difficult horses.
+
+Inspection of single combats.
+
+If one tries, naturally with due regard to local and climatic
+variations, to adapt the course of training to this plan of
+inspection, and endeavours to arrange that every man, if only for a
+few minutes every day, should practise lance exercises to develop his
+hand and arm, that he should ride every day individually, and every
+difficult horse should be taken in hand and corrected at once; that
+the principles of dressing, alignment, and of wheeling, are daily
+impressed on the men in the school, as I have already indicated; and,
+if further, wherever it is in any way possible, the men are exercised
+in boldly riding across country--for which purpose funds to cover
+possible damage to crops, etc., must be provided by the
+authorities--then I believe, and base my belief on the result of my
+practical experience, that not only will a higher standard of training
+for specifically military purposes be attained, but also a
+considerable improvement in equitation.
+
+It will be worth while here to add a few words on the methods of
+training the horses I recommend, for it is precisely on this point that
+ideas so often divide, and the most opposite views on this subject find
+their expression in current literature. To stir up all these
+controversies is not my object, but I want to state quite generally that
+it is under all circumstances a downright evil to try to follow out any
+theoretical system to its logical development, whether the one selected
+be that of Captain Plinzner[24] or another's. We have neither such a
+uniform type of horse nor sufficiently skilled riders as to be able to
+employ the same method to all indiscriminately.
+
+         [Footnote 24: Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H.M. the
+         Emperor, and is author of a well-known work on equitation.]
+
+We must exercise our powers of selection, and find the best method to
+meet the idiosyncrasies of each man and each horse, always keeping in
+mind the aim to be obtained. What we want are horses that can use
+their back muscles, especially in the gallop, with pliable necks,
+light on the hand, able to turn easily, and safe across country (with
+special reference to rat-holes, etc., not fences), that do not refuse
+to quit the ranks, and are not headstrong. To reach this aim with our
+material, our present riding instructions applied in their spirit, not
+their letter, are for the present, I think, a sufficiently firm
+foundation.
+
+A higher standard of riding alone will not, however, suffice. We have
+seen that modern War makes also increased demands on the endurance of
+the horses, and, in fact, in two directions: first, on their marching
+power, and secondly, on their capacity to execute the long gallops at
+the regulation pace which are indispensable for the manoeuvring of
+large masses and of attacks against modern firearms. That a thorough
+physical preparation of the horse increases indirectly its endurance
+has been already pointed out, and when exceptional exertions are
+called for, breeding plays a great part; but great as is the influence
+of these two factors, the ultimate foundation on which the endurance
+of our horses depends is the general 'condition' of the animal, and
+this again is a consequence of the quality of his food and his
+'training,' used here in the same sense as in a racing stable. I lay
+special stress on this question of food, because great demands, both
+in the way of covering long distances and on the drill ground, can
+only be met without injury to the horses if they are supplied with a
+sufficient quantity of nourishment, and our peace-time ration is
+undoubtedly too small to satisfy this condition. No regiment could
+maintain itself always at the high pitch of condition we have
+undoubtedly attained if it did not have recourse to all manner of
+expedients to increase, at any rate for the time, the amount of the
+ration. Of these expedients there are quite an imposing number, and
+since, however desirable an increase of the ration may be, we are not
+likely to obtain it, it seems to me well worth while to develop them
+to the utmost.
+
+How this is to be done will depend mainly on the local conditions of
+each garrison. The point is to make the most of the opportunities each
+locality offers, and as an example it may be of interest to give my
+personal experience on this head.
+
+Thanks to the confidence reposed in me by my General and to his
+liberality, I was allowed to draw the equivalent of sixty rations of
+oats per day and per squadron in cash, and to handle this money to the
+best of my judgment.
+
+Since peas, beans, and white American maize--the yellow Hungarian
+quality is generally considered inferior--were ninepence to one
+shilling cheaper per hundredweight than oats, I laid in a stock of
+them, and was able to give not only an increased weight of ration, but
+one of considerably greater nutritive value. Thus I gained the double
+advantage, not only of not being compelled to stint the corn ration in
+winter in order to save up for the harder work of the summers, but I
+was able to increase even the winter ration itself. This I consider an
+essential gain, for horses that after the winter season are well fed
+and in their full condition are equal to far higher exertions than
+those which have been kept low, and then fed up for perhaps a very
+short time before the increased strain is thrown upon them.
+
+The food was thus divided: After the manoeuvres, in cases where an
+increased ration was required, American maize was issued, and the
+ration improved by half a pound. From about Christmas-time onwards
+peas and beans were served out, and the amount increased until midway
+through the Squadron drills, after which it was kept at the same level
+until the manoeuvres. In the end it amounted to the equivalent of 15
+pounds of oats, which can be considered as the normal scale for our
+medium and light Cavalry horses. The peas and beans were soaked for
+twelve hours, the water being twice changed during this time to
+prevent their turning sour.
+
+During the manoeuvres, according to circumstances, I laid down at
+suitable points in the district stores of forage, or gave the Squadron
+Commanders money with which to supply themselves locally, and thus was
+able to keep up the increase in the ration during the greater part of
+this trying period.
+
+The experiment was continued for nearly two years, and its results
+were astonishingly satisfactory. Not only did the visible condition of
+the horses develop markedly, and maintain itself throughout the
+greatest exertions, both during the manoeuvres and the Divisional
+exercises, but in spite of increased performances the numbers of
+breakdowns and cases of lameness sensibly diminished; the paces were
+fresher; in short, the material improved most noticeably. Are not
+these breakdowns, lameness, and dulness in the horses, in the great
+majority of cases but the consequences of over-exertion of the animals
+when in a low state of condition? The cases of colic, too, diminished
+rather than increased, which speaks well for the harmlessness of the
+foods employed, but may in part also have been due to the fact that
+both the bulk of the ration and the amount of exertion demanded were
+only gradually diminished after the manoeuvres.
+
+The experiment also showed that most horses would not touch the white
+beans at all, or only unwillingly, and the best proved to be either
+the green Smyrna or brown Dutch beans, which for the same weight and
+nutritive value bulked bigger, for instance, than the peas, and were
+very willingly eaten. Peas and beans as a ration alone were found not
+to answer, as the horse misses the mechanical action--irritation of
+the bowel and stomach--and requires also certain chemical constituents
+present in oats to assist digestion. Even with the proportion of oats
+and beans actually used--seventy-six to seventy-eight oats to sixty
+beans--it was found advisable to increase the 'Rauffutter' ration to
+replace the missing oat-husks. But to provide this addition there were
+ample means, since the manure fund of the regiment, or of the
+squadron, was available; and in spite of the increased ration it
+became possible to make savings which in a single year sufficed to
+build a spacious riding-school, and thus contributed in another way
+to the training and general efficiency of the squadrons.
+
+In the third year the price of oats fell, and that of the other feed
+rose; hence, and for other reasons also, the conversion of the oat
+ration into other more nourishing materials had to be abandoned,
+although it would still have been possible to maintain a considerable
+increase in the nutritive value of the food issued. To keep the ration
+up to approximately the same level as in the preceding year, recourse
+had to be had to other means.
+
+It was found by experiment that a couple of pounds of straw per horse
+could easily be saved per day, and again ample funds for a supplement
+to the ration were available, a measure particularly applicable when
+the price of straw rules high. This year, too, as the expenditure on
+the riding-school was closed, the manure fund was also available, and
+the horses did nearly as well as before.
+
+I would not maintain that similar results are everywhere obtainable.
+The price of grains varies; the receipts from manure are everywhere
+different; in some garrisons peas and beans are difficult to obtain;
+the cost of transport also fluctuates. But all this is no reason why
+we should not seize an advantage even if we cannot always retain it.
+Even a few years of more and better food bring about an improvement in
+the horses, which lasts for a considerable time, and every effort,
+therefore, should be made to obtain these advantages offered by price
+variations whenever it is possible to do so.
+
+It is well to call attention to the fact that to accustom horses to
+the most varied food--rye, barley, wheat, etc.--is part of their
+indispensable training for War, where such foods are all they can
+get, as the experience of our last War sufficiently demonstrated. To
+this end it is necessary--and I wish particularly to insist upon this
+point--that our Regimental Commanders should have the utmost latitude
+of action within certain fixed limits, and should not be dependent on
+the consideration of the Commissariat, with its innumerable
+regulations and formal considerations. I consider the objection
+sometimes urged against me that in the purchase of supplementary foods
+by the Regimental Commander there would be an opening for fraud and
+speculation on the part of under officials quite untenable, for a
+proper system of audit and check could be quite easily devised.
+
+The capacity of the Commander to manage affairs in a businesslike
+manner can hardly be called in question, and his interest in the
+matter would grow in proportion to the degree of freedom allowed to
+him.
+
+Next in importance to the question of food comes the preparation of
+the horses for efforts of long duration. That this preparation must go
+hand in hand with the food question is obvious, but apart from this
+interdependence, it is not possible to keep horses always up to the
+necessary standard of endurance; for this training not only throws
+heavy strains on the muscles, joints, and sinews, but on the nervous
+system of the animal, and in particular attacks the nerves of the
+stomach if maintained too long. If one wishes to preserve one's
+material, the horses must be allowed from time to time a thorough
+rest, during which their feeding must enable them to put on the degree
+of fat which is requisite for health.
+
+The best time for this rest is about Christmas, during which one can
+reduce the work to the very minimum, and feed with 'Rastfutter' hay,
+maize, malt--dried brewer's--molasses, even potatoes; and also, after
+reaching the highest points of the training for galloping, there must
+be a certain relaxation of the strain to give the nerves time to
+recuperate.
+
+Generally, the course of training must be conducted from the
+standpoint of what War demands, and never allowed to assume the
+characteristics of the racing stable, for the purposes of the two are
+entirely distinct, and this is particularly the case with regard to
+the gallop.
+
+It is precisely in this respect that the necessities of War are not
+always seen with sufficient clearness.
+
+We obtain from our troops by means of most careful preparation quite
+remarkable performances in galloping. I have myself seen whole
+regiments cover 8,800 yards (5 miles) at the regulation gallop, and
+the horses at the end of it had still both strength and wind to
+increase the pace. On such and similar performances we then base our
+tactical exercises both for the Brigade and Division, and many horses
+are sacrificed as a consequence. Now, I am the last man to suggest
+that accurate drill at the gallop is not the crowning work of all
+tactical education, but it must be accomplished under War conditions,
+and it cannot be too persistently insisted on that all these tactical
+pictures and the deductions founded thereon, which we attain in the
+manner indicated, have practically nothing to do with real War at all.
+
+In these peace exercises we usually ride with considerably less than
+field service weights, on specially selected and favourable ground,
+and on specially trained horses. All these conditions are wanting in
+War. Then horses must carry their full marching-order kit, and
+generally they will be entirely lacking in specific training for this
+fast kind of work. The ordinary pace on the march and patrol is the
+marching trot; only single patrols have now and again to gallop, the
+troops as a whole only on the rare occasions when a charge has
+actually to be delivered. Then, the carefully-selected conditions of
+the drill ground are generally lacking; and, finally, in all War
+strength squadrons there are always some augmentation horses and
+remounts, whose weaknesses must be taken into account if they are not
+to be broken down at the very beginning of operations, as too often
+happened in 1870, in which case it would have been better to have left
+them behind from the first. Thus the galloping possibilities are
+reduced most considerably, and it is only with these reduced
+possibilities that the Leader can safely reckon.
+
+That these conditions have a most important influence on tactics is
+apparent. The question is whether it is worth while to strain towards
+false ideals, at a considerable cost in horseflesh, when in War they
+are quite unattainable, and only serve to call up in men's minds false
+pictures of the reality.
+
+To this I return an unqualified negative. Certainly, it is
+indisputable that the horses must be trained to gallop for long
+distances and in suitable poise, and that men should learn to retain a
+correct seat even in gallops of long duration; that they should have
+their horses under complete control, and learn to turn and check by
+the use of the weight of their bodies; but these demands can only be
+satisfied by continuous practice under conditions which render control
+over the poise both of man and horse comparatively easy to
+maintain--that is to say, singly on the galloping track or in squads,
+and also as closed tactical units.
+
+Speaking generally, however, such exercises do not need to be extended
+materially beyond the limit which can be attained by horses not
+specifically trained to galloping under full marching order weights.
+
+This limit depends on the degree of breeding, the strength and
+condition of the horses, and may be estimated at the most at two and a
+half miles for our Light Cavalry, and somewhat less for the
+Cuirassiers. To exceed these distances seems both superfluous and
+injurious, particularly when it goes so far as to risk permanent
+depreciation of the material.
+
+It is far more important, in my opinion, to habituate the horses to
+gallop with their full marching order weights, under service
+conditions, and in all kinds of ground; for nothing is more difficult
+than to preserve the proper rates of movement and keep the ranks
+closed under such circumstances, as experience even in the manoeuvres
+abundantly shows.
+
+The 'trot' tends always to get shorter, for the regulation pace is
+already as much as Light Cavalry can manage on the Drill ground; and
+the gallop, too, falls generally behind the prescribed rate, the
+reason being, in my opinion, that as a rule the distances demanded are
+too great, and that we do not drill with sufficient frequency in full
+marching order, partly to save wear and tear of the kit, but also
+because with lighter weights we can undertake in the same time more
+exercises, covering a greater area, than would otherwise be possible
+without knocking up the horses. Much may be used in defence of this
+procedure from the point of view of the training of the Leaders, but
+the dangers to the true training of the troops themselves for War
+must not be overlooked, and practice under full War service conditions
+must thus ever remain the keystone of our whole educational edifice.
+
+But it is not only the training in galloping which suffers from this
+practice of riding light. The preparation of the horses as regards
+endurance suffers equally, for patrols and long-distance rides are
+generally undertaken with stripped saddles; it is only for manoeuvres
+and the larger tactical exercises away from the garrison that marching
+order is carried. To me this system seems hardly rational. Rather, it
+would appear to me, must such sudden increase in the weights on the
+horses tend to break them down, and experience confirms this view, for
+the first day's marches in the manoeuvres in marching order tire out
+the horses to a quite disproportionate degree.
+
+We can never eliminate this evil altogether, for the attempt would
+entail either marching order all the year round, or the limitation of
+practical exercises to certain periods of the year only, both or
+either of which would conflict on the one hand with the necessity of
+saving the horses as much as possible, on the other with the needs of
+the military training of the men; but a gradual increase in the loads
+carried and distances covered seems well within the scope of a
+practical policy.
+
+The Company Commander, who wishes to get his men fit for marching,
+increases quite gradually and systematically the weight in the men's
+knapsacks, till these are scarcely noticed as a hindrance by their
+wearers, and similarly one could arrange in the Cavalry. In each
+period we should begin with stripped saddles, progressing onwards to
+the full kit; but the inspections of tactical units, and the final
+inspection in individual combat, should fundamentally be taken in full
+marching order always, and horses should be prepared gradually for the
+full weight carried in the manoeuvres.
+
+I believe such a system would not only bring about a considerable
+improvement in the training for War both of men and horses, but would
+secure us from many disappointments by insuring in the Leaders a true
+idea of what may reasonably be expected from their commands in the
+field. Naturally the demands made on them in the inspections must
+undergo a corresponding diminution.
+
+Only by constantly keeping these points in view and combining them in
+harmonious progression will it be possible to attain the degree of
+perfection in the elementary instruction of men and horses which can
+alone guarantee the highest results in practice.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT
+
+
+In the same manner as, in the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to
+show that in many points in equitation, in the school of individual
+combat, and in the 'training' both of man and horse, we can, by
+alterations of method, attain more directly to a possibly higher
+standard in our performances than is at present achieved, I now
+propose to consider the tactical education of the troops as a whole,
+with a view to their best utilization in mounted engagements.
+
+According to the existing Regulations, the chief importance is still
+laid on the efficiency of the small and medium-sized combinations.
+Squadrons, Regiments, and Brigades are prepared with the utmost care
+and attention, but exercises of the larger bodies only take place more
+or less exceptionally, and on a very restricted scale. The systematic
+education of the Cavalry does not, in fact, extend beyond the Brigade.
+
+That this state of affairs no longer responds to the changed nature of
+Warfare follows from all that I have already said, and does not
+require to be insisted on.
+
+If in War the employment of 'Masses' has become the decisive element,
+our system of training must be correspondingly extended, so as to
+insure the existence of the skill and power needed for their
+successful application. To this end all, even the most elementary,
+exercises must be permeated thoroughly by the idea of preparing the
+troops for united action in adequate numbers; and the relative
+importance of the several periods of training, the allotment of time
+to each step in the progression, as well as the exercises themselves,
+must all be dominated by the same idea.
+
+The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, as
+ever, the school of the squadron. The cohesion of this unit and the
+ease with which it can be moved is the first condition of its useful
+employment at the right time and place, and the importance of
+thoroughness in this branch of training grows with every increment in
+the total number to be handled. Even more attention, therefore, should
+be given to squadron drill in the future than in the past.
+
+Next comes the question of regimental drill. Here, as we shall
+presently see, the chief point is to develop the independence of the
+Squadron Commander and the tactical handiness of his unit; and as I
+understand the problem, this calls for a more extended framework,
+within which the regiment must be prepared, than was formerly the
+case.
+
+If, even under present conditions, it is scarcely possible in the few
+days allowed by the Field Service Regulations to train the squadrons
+up to the requirements of active service, even on a level drill
+ground, it is obvious that in the future this difficulty will become
+intensified. It is a question, therefore, to be considered, whether it
+would not be better to remove these time limitations altogether, and
+leave it to the Cavalry Commanders themselves to determine
+everywhere, with regard to local conditions, how to make the best use
+of the total time available. Where considerable expense would be
+incurred in bringing in squadrons detached at a distance, the consent
+of the War Ministry would, of course, have to be obtained.
+
+Brigade drill, however, stands on quite a different footing; it forms,
+as it were, the preparatory school for the movement of 'Masses,' in
+which the principle of the employment of the constituent parts of the
+'Mass,' whether in 'Lines' or by 'Wings,' has to be inculcated. But as
+one has now to deal with tactically thoroughly trained bodies, less
+time is required than for either squadron or regimental drill.
+
+On the other hand, it is most essential that the 'Mass' itself, consisting
+as it does of several Brigades, should be thoroughly drilled as a
+Division or Corps, for it is with these units, and not with Brigades,
+that one has to deal in War, and their duties are so many-sided, and
+require for their due performance such thoroughly-trained Commanders,
+that perfection is not to be attained in a few days, which are not even
+available every year. On this point, in my opinion, there is no room for
+doubt, and hence it becomes absolutely essential that, if necessary,
+Brigade drill must be curtailed in order to give to all Brigades an
+annual opportunity of exercising, as part of the higher units.
+
+It might well be possible to allow a wider latitude to the Brigade
+Commanders in regard to the choice of time for their special
+exercises, in which they might be guided by the special circumstances
+of the locality in which they are quartered, and by the advice of
+their superiors.
+
+For the exercise of the greater 'Masses,' for which, under all
+circumstances, troops have to be brought together from considerable
+distances, a particular period must, of necessity, be fixed by
+regulations; but it must be borne in mind that these 'Masses' should
+not always be formed of equal strength in Divisions of three Brigades,
+for the danger to the higher education which lies in always working
+with units of similar composition has already been sufficiently dwelt
+on. The conditions of War absolutely demand that the higher Cavalry
+Leaders should be equally at home in handling 'Masses' with certainty
+and precision, no matter what their composition, and the troops
+themselves must learn to apply the principles on which efficiency in
+action really depends under all and every circumstance.
+
+As regards the manner in which the several periods into which the
+training is divided should follow one another, the question arises
+whether the squadron, regimental, and brigade drill periods should
+follow one another as a continuous whole, or whether they should go
+hand in hand with Field Service Exercises.
+
+This seems to me to need a specific reply, because, as a fact, it is
+differently answered in different Army Corps.
+
+Where the troops have to leave their garrisons in order to be
+quartered in the vicinity of the ground specially selected for those
+purposes, the question of expense must play an important part in the
+decision; but the principle involved can hardly be affected by these
+exceptional circumstances, for in by far the greater number of cases
+the troops can find room to drill either within the district of their
+own garrisons or on the manoeuvre grounds in the vicinity, and in
+these latter the question of extra cost should hardly stand in the way
+of an extension of the time allowance. Hence, if such an extension,
+due to the intercalation of Field Service practices, really does offer
+advantages, one could decide in principle in favour of this solution,
+in spite of all other circumstances; but it still seems to me open to
+discussion whether it is advisable to make the same principle
+applicable in equal measure to all the time intervals.
+
+For the squadron drill, which begins with an entirely untrained troop,
+the conditions are obviously quite different to those in the
+subsequent exercises, in which the point lies in the working together
+of units already finished and completed in themselves; and taking
+these differences into account, we must first examine more especially
+the case of the squadron.
+
+At the beginning of its drill season, the exertions demanded are
+comparatively slight. The distance covered either at the trot or
+gallop is only gradually increased, and the paces are at first kept
+somewhat below the regulation limits--at least, from practical
+experience I should recommend that they should be, for the Instructor
+can control and correct the precision of all movements, and the
+individual conduct both of man and horse, better at the slower paces
+than when moving fast. Riders and horses accustom themselves
+gradually, and hence more easily, to movement in closed bodies, and it
+is of decisive importance for the whole subsequent course of their
+training that at the very beginning of the drills this harmony between
+man and horse under the new and unaccustomed conditions should be
+secured to the utmost possible degree.
+
+If this point of view be kept in mind, then I think the drills should
+be continued daily, for, on the one hand, there is no risk of
+overtiring the horses, and, on the other, the object is to weld the
+men into a cohesive whole, and impress on them the essential
+principles of the elementary tactical evolutions, in order to make
+them as soon as possible into a combatant unit.
+
+Towards the latter end of the squadron drills, however, the conditions
+change. Now, it becomes necessary to drive into the whole body a
+proper appreciation of the several 'paces,' to fit them for long
+gallops, and to train them for actual combat. At this period I
+consider it better to interpolate one or more Field Service days,
+partly because it is of practical moment to press on this side of
+their training as quick as possible, and, further, because the drills
+now begin to make very considerable demands upon the horses. These
+Field Service days afford an opportunity to rest the horses, and thus
+to prevent small and inconsiderable injuries developing into severe
+lameness and ultimate breakdowns. Further, a quiet ride in the country
+gives those horses which have become nervously excited by the
+unaccustomed conditions of the drill ground a chance of cooling down,
+and thus saving themselves very materially; and this must certainly be
+considered as one of the most important functions of the Commander,
+whether in Peace or War, to keep his horses fresh on their legs, and
+ready to turn out in good condition at whatever hour the call may
+sound. Of course, these precautions must not go so far as to endanger
+the training for service of the squadron, but drill and manoeuvre
+results at excessive cost of horseflesh must be absolutely condemned.
+
+If these reasons speak for an intercalation of Field Service exercises
+between the drill days, I am further of opinion that the result which
+would be arrived at by this system would give a better standard of
+the drill efficiency of the unit for War than can be attained by
+continuous drill alone.
+
+With the latter, it is certainly much easier to secure unity,
+cohesion, and precision in the movements; but we must remember that in
+War the emergency calling for drill performances may arise after weeks
+of marching, during which no drill has been practised at all, and our
+Peace training must take into account such conditions, and accustom
+the troops to execute with safety and cohesion such drill movement as
+may be necessary without having practised them day for day.
+
+In still greater degree do these principles apply both to regimental
+and brigade drills; since in these the demands on the horses are
+constantly increasing, the need to give them opportunity for rest and
+recovery becomes even more pronounced.
+
+Moreover, the purpose of these exercises is not so much to secure a
+single representation of acquired skill in the exhibition of drill
+evolutions, but rather to develop and confirm in the men an
+ever-increasing familiarity with the principles of their tactical
+employment, and this will only then be attained when, as far as
+possible, these practices are continued during the whole summer, so
+that the Grand Manoeuvres either in the Division or in the Corps form
+the natural conclusion of the whole series. In the period of combined
+manoeuvres, it is, of course, impossible, in order to save the horses,
+to lengthen the fixed period allotted to them; but all the more
+necessary, therefore, does it appear to spare them as much as possible
+by the introduction of these Field Service days (exclusive of the
+ordinary 'rest days') during the time of the drill exercises. In the
+course of the subsequent considerations, we shall see that not only
+will our horses gain thereby, but many other important objects of our
+training be served as well.
+
+Turning now to the subject of these exercises themselves, it must be
+laid down generally that throughout a steady intensification of the
+exertions demanded must be maintained, and that the gallop is not to
+be employed except when, under service conditions, its use would be
+practicable. Further, whatever the Regulations prescribe must be
+practised, no matter what the views of the Commanding Officer as to
+their practicability or otherwise may be. This is absolutely essential
+to secure a uniform standard of execution throughout the Arm.
+
+Nevertheless, it makes a very essential difference in what spirit the
+Regulations are approached, for the result will depend upon which
+points in the training the chief stress is laid, and generally on the
+character given to the exercises.
+
+In drilling the squadron this point is of less importance. Here, in
+accordance with the spirit of the whole Arm, it is a matter of formal
+drill, and nothing more. It is here that the foundation has to be laid
+for smart, never-failing 'drill,' for the unconditional cohesion of
+the squadron in itself, and for the certain interpretation of its
+Leader's views, whether the latter makes use of commands, signals, or
+merely rides in the required direction.
+
+Here the paces must be hammered into the troops till they become
+mechanical habit, and the several forms of movement and attack be
+practised, so that they can be executed in any direction, whether the
+squadron has been told off or not. No matter how hasty the rally may
+be, the troop must charge at the moment and without hesitation.
+
+The only difference that can arise here will be due to the
+individuality of the Leader, and all are good which lead to the
+required end, only the Regulations are not quite clear as to
+practising the charge, and the guiding points might be laid down with
+rather greater precision.
+
+In the charge against Cavalry cohesion is the first and dominating
+condition. It must be absolutely impossible for the horses to swerve
+either to right or left. Accurate dressing and the maintenance of the
+two ranks come only in the second place. Against Infantry or
+Artillery, on the other hand, the essential is that every horse should
+have room to gallop in his own form, so that no crowding or jostling
+arises, thus giving the horses a chance of avoiding or jumping clear
+over falling men or animals. Hence, although on the level drill ground
+the requirements of Regulations as regards dressing and the
+maintenance of the two well-defined lines must be attended to, one
+must remember that it may be impossible to comply with these demands
+across country and be prepared in such cases to stick to the spirit,
+not to the letter, of the law.
+
+In both cases it will hardly be of advantage to lay too much stress on
+dressing and touch. Against Cavalry it is rather a case of jamming the
+files together by pressure from the flanks, and the men must hold as a
+vital article of faith that only the closest knee-to-knee riding will
+guarantee either victory or their personal safety. Against Infantry,
+on the contrary, the files must be loosened, and every horse go in his
+normal stride, as in hunting; nor must anyone allow himself to be
+squeezed out of the ranks to the rear or remain behind as long as the
+strength of his horse holds out.
+
+Utmost speed consistent with closely-locked files against Cavalry, a
+natural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery--these are the
+two cardinal points to be observed in attacking. Maintenance of
+dressing or of the ranks become positive evils if the above are
+sacrificed to either. There, in my opinion, should be the essentials
+to guide the decision of superior officers in their criticisms.
+
+With these exceptions the lines for the squadron training are so
+closely drawn that differences in practice can scarcely arise. The
+matter, however, assumes quite a different aspect with the regiment,
+and still more with the higher units.
+
+Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troops
+by the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teaching
+the forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, these
+points of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is to
+teach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in the
+Regulations for the combat.
+
+A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and with
+precision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the most
+has merely laid the foundations on which such a training can be
+subsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, each
+of which has practised and made certain of the execution of such
+movements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes of
+front or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselves
+necessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill of
+the Leaders, only requiring an accurate knowledge of the book, and a
+certain degree of routine in the application of its prescriptions; but
+War makes quite different demands on their ability, and it is for War
+that we have to be prepared.
+
+First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress must
+especially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually be
+applied on the battle-field.
+
+Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only on
+the drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, the
+tactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must,
+be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act on
+fundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principles
+everywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing at
+once the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adapting
+practically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy in
+the field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be granted
+to the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separated
+bodies to a single tactical purpose.
+
+In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tactical
+training remains far too elementary in character, and does not tend
+with sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War.
+
+The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on the
+shoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causes
+which are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes the
+passive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and tradition
+everywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that the
+troops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomed
+ruts, when more especially the methods applied in our inspections are
+not always of a nature to encourage such attempts.
+
+A further cause is to be found in the Regulations themselves. These
+give no firm foothold for the decision of the question as to what
+forms and movements really are practicable in War-time, and, probably
+in the endeavours not to hamper too much the initiative of the
+Leaders, does not express the principle on which the conduct of the
+combat is based with sufficient precision to preclude very different
+opinions as to what these principles really are. Finally, the local
+conditions of many of our garrisons often create an almost insuperable
+difficulty for the proper training of the troops over country.
+
+In face of these conditions, we must strike out new paths for our
+guidance if we do not intend to remain behind the times altogether.
+
+We must first, however, be perfectly clear in our own minds as to
+which of the Regulation forms are really practicable, and hence
+require increased attention. Then we must endeavour to formulate the
+guiding principles for the conduct of an engagement in a manner so
+clear and definite that they can easily be fixed in the memory, and
+then work out the best way in which the troops can be thoroughly
+grounded in their application. Finally, we must acquire a quite
+distinct grasp of what can be practised over country, and from what
+points of view such exercises are to be undertaken in order to make
+them of direct utility in the solution of the problems modern Warfare
+will set before us.
+
+To clear up the first point it will be best to sketch in its general
+outline the course in which events succeed one another in an
+engagement, and then to deduce the forms of movement which are
+essentially practical.
+
+Taking the case of Cavalry in combination with the other Arms, at the
+commencement of the action we find the squadrons in 'rendezvous'
+formation under cover outside the immediate danger sphere, either on
+the flanks or behind the general line of battle.
+
+When the moment to act arrives, they advance at a rapid pace, either
+in closed-up column of route or in any other dense formation which
+permits of ready deployment in the direction of their allotted target.
+Often in this movement they will have to overcome difficulties of the
+ground--defiles and the like, of varying breadth.
+
+Arrived in the vicinity of the field of attack, they deploy into lines
+of squadron columns, form line to the front, and execute the charge.
+
+In such cases it may often become necessary to secure one's own flanks
+by forming protective échelons, or to endeavour to surround those of
+the enemy by corresponding offensive movements.
+
+In the case of Cavalry acting alone, it will often be necessary to
+form for action directly from column of route, and it will be
+essential to establish co-operation not only between the advance guard
+and the main body, but also between columns concentrating from
+different directions upon the field of coming action.
+
+It is at once evident that for these few manoeuvres few and simple
+formations and movements will suffice, and that, in view of the
+excitement of the battle-field, only such are, in fact,
+applicable.[25]
+
+         [Footnote 25: As a measure of this excitement the following
+         example may be useful. During the great Cavalry engagement on
+         the plateau west of the Yron brook near Mars-la-Tour a
+         squadron under most brilliant leadership galloped out in
+         column of troops to threaten the enemy's flank. When,
+         however, the order to wheel into line was given, the men were
+         so excited that it was only with the utmost difficulty that
+         its Captain succeeded in getting three troops to obey, whilst
+         the leading one continued on in its original direction. The
+         Squadron Commander was Rittmeister von Rosenberg, who
+         afterwards became Inspector-General of Cavalry, and the
+         above-mentioned incident was related by him personally to the
+         author.]
+
+Hence it follows that all complicated movements and changes of lines,
+and similar formations occurring in the Regulations, may be classed in
+the category of evolutions intended mainly for disciplinary purposes.
+On the other hand, we must practise, as thoroughly as practicable,
+long movements at a rapid pace in the closest formations for
+manoeuvre--_i.e._, in double and Regimental Columns; changes of
+direction in these columns by shouldering, passage of defiles,
+deployments into fighting formations with simultaneous slight
+alterations in the line of advance; further, measures to secure one's
+own flanks, or to threaten those of the enemy; deployments to the
+front immediately out of column of route or after the passage of
+defiles; the combination of detachments arriving from different
+directions; and, finally, the charge itself under the most varied
+assumptions, the transition from the mêlée to pursuit, and rallying in
+order to attack again in a new direction against a fresh enemy.
+Naturally, the most rapid deployments out of any and every formation
+against a suddenly appearing enemy must also be practised, for such
+surprises are always possible in War-time.
+
+To be avoided, on the other hand, as for the most part quite
+impracticable, are all movements of a dilatory nature for the
+formation of fronts of attack, as well as long movements of manoeuvres
+and considerable changes of front when already deployed into line.
+
+In all these exercises, as a general and fundamental principle, such a
+grouping of the available forces must be striven for that the units
+can be employed by 'Wings'; for, as I have endeavoured to point out,
+it is this form of employment which best satisfies the requirements of
+the combat and meets the needs of the Commander.
+
+For instance, under many circumstances the Regimental Column can be
+employed as a practical tactical formation. Thus, if against Infantry
+or Artillery, it is desirable to attack in many following 'Lines.' The
+need is at once satisfied if our advance is made in a number of
+Regimental Columns, wheeled into line to a flank. For a flank attack,
+if the movement is initiated in a number of Regimental Columns formed
+to the front and following one another, forming line by a subsequent
+wheel. In both cases--in the latter after the wheel--one has only to
+insure that the laterally adjacent squadrons move off together at
+'Treffen' (_i.e._, Line) distance to have all one's Lines complete.
+Such a formation can secure its flanks with the greatest ease by the
+retention of closed units, or, by bringing up the rearward squadrons,
+can prolong its front to either flank. In any case it is preferable to
+the triple column of troops, which makes all influence of the leader
+impossible, mixes all units in the charge, and hence would best be
+left out of the Regulations altogether. Nevertheless, practice in the
+employment of 'Treffen' (_i.e._, 'Lines' as opposed to 'Wings') must
+not be entirely neglected, as under certain circumstances this form
+may also become necessary.
+
+This tendency to group the available forces by 'Wings' in the larger
+units from the Brigade upwards must also be extended downwards to the
+regiment, which represents the fundamental tactical unit of the
+Cavalry, and those formations for manoeuvre which favour the
+arrangement of its constituent squadrons one behind the
+other--formations which, at the same time, are both handier and
+susceptible of more convenient control--must be constantly practised.
+
+That Squadron Columns to the Front hardly meet these demands ideally
+can scarcely be denied. They are unhandy, render all changes of
+direction materially more difficult, lose direction and distance very
+easily, and necessitate complex movements in order to arrange them one
+behind the other. Already in Brigade formations these drawbacks are
+apparent, and in larger masses they prove most formidable. The
+Squadron Column is, in fact, a formation derived exclusively with a
+view to 'Line' tactics, and for this reason alone they hamper all
+other demands. There is, however, no compelling reason why they should
+be retained as the principal working formation for Cavalry, and
+therefore as fundamentally beyond the reach of criticism.
+
+It seems to me that a formation which would group every two Squadron
+Columns as a unit would be far preferable. The Regimental Commander
+would then have only two units to direct, which would maintain their
+mutual relations of distance and interval more easily than four, could
+change direction more readily, and form line quicker, and allow of a
+far easier transition to wing formations and other columns than is
+possible at present.
+
+The Regulations certainly do not mention this formation specifically,
+but, on the other hand, this regimental double column offers
+advantages for certain circumstances greater than can be found in any
+of the forms it suggests. It allows in the simplest manner of
+deployment into 'Lines,' either to the front or flank, the formation
+of échelons in any desired direction; it is very mobile, easily
+concealed in folds of the ground, and combines the advantages of
+reduced depth both as a marching and as a manoeuvre formation. As the
+latter, it is peculiarly adapted to the purposes of large units in
+close country; for, as already pointed out, it is easy to conceal, and
+whilst keeping the troops well in the hands of the Regimental
+Commander, allows also of the most rapid deployments into 'Lines'
+either to the front or to the flank. It confers also the same
+advantages in brigade when the regiments are formed side by side, and
+is particularly applicable to flanking movements in which it is
+especially desirable to be able at any moment to develop strong
+fighting power in the direction of the movement, and after the wheel
+into line, to be formed in successive lines and protected on the
+uncovered flank.
+
+[Illustration: Double column.]
+
+It would take us too far at this point to compare in detail the
+advantages and disadvantages of this or alternative formations. I only
+desire to indicate in what direction practical progress is possible,
+even in the domain of formal tactics, without exceeding the limits
+laid down by Regulations, although it can only be most desirable that
+changes in the Regulations[26] themselves should be forthwith
+undertaken. I would, in conclusion, only bring forward one point which
+seems to me of particular importance.
+
+         [Footnote 26: This formation has since been adopted, and is
+         almost invariably employed.--TRANSLATOR.]
+
+The more this employment of Cavalry by 'Wings' gains ground, the more
+apparent becomes the advantages of the use of the bugle-calls assigned
+to the several units, particularly of the regimental call; because
+when it is used, the regiment or other unit remains as a closed body,
+unmixed with other units, and hence can be employed as a distinct
+tactical entity, which is not so much the case when working in
+'Lines.'
+
+These sounds are the only ones which never lead to confusion, if they
+are employed not as cautions only, but as a call on which the unit
+moves at once, whether in line or in column--preferably the latter--in
+the direction from which the call is heard. With the call the
+Commander would have the means of collecting his men behind him, and
+leading them in the direction he desires, no matter in what degree of
+order or the reverse they might be, without any verbal commands or
+instructions.
+
+Used in this sense these sounds--but particularly the regimental
+call--might become the principal drill and manoeuvre calls for the
+Cavalry.
+
+Thus it appears to me we could achieve a considerable reduction in the
+amount of practical drill necessary, and the change would tell all the
+more the more frequently the call was employed, until at last it
+became ingrained in the very flesh and blood of each man in the ranks.
+
+Unfortunately the Regulations do not allow their employment in this
+sense, but permit them only as cautionary sounds (Section 115, note);
+but even in this restricted sense they deserve most constant use in
+drilling, for they are always a means of preventing, in a measure,
+misapprehensions in the execution of other sounds.
+
+We come now to the second portion of our requirements--viz., how to
+obtain clearness in the appreciation of tactical principles.
+Fortunately they are few in number, but it is absolutely indispensable
+that every Cavalry Leader should most fully have mastered their
+meaning. No knowledge, however accurate, of the formal prescriptions
+of the Regulations can in any way compensate for a deficiency in this
+respect. They are certainly not indicated as 'General Principles' in
+the Regulations themselves, but may be read between the lines with
+more or less precision from its several paragraphs.
+
+
+FOR CAVALRY VERSUS CAVALRY.
+
+1. The German Cavalry must always endeavour to attack first in order
+to utilize to the utmost its superior 'moral,' and to catch the enemy
+in the act of deployment. If an opening for such an attack is offered,
+then even the risks of a long preliminary gallop must be accepted
+(Section 339).
+
+2. The leading lines must _always_ be followed by supporting squadrons
+in adequate numbers (Section 843, and note also Section 346); that is
+to say, the enemy's Cavalry will always be attacked in two 'Lines,'
+unless special circumstances compel departure from this prescription.
+
+3. One must always endeavour to keep the last closed Reserve in hand,
+because in the mêlée the impetus of the last closed body generally
+decides. One must never, therefore, as long as one suspects that the
+enemy has still further Reserves in hand, engage a greater number of
+squadrons than he shows, in order to save up Reserves.
+
+4. Success must be looked for in the vehemence of the onslaught, not
+in superiority of numbers (Section 313). The greatest importance must
+be attached to cohesion; hence, unless necessary to surprise the enemy
+in the act of deployment, the 'gallop' should not be sounded too soon,
+or the 'charge' too late (Section 339).
+
+5. Outflanking detachments, or troops in the following lines, turn
+against the enemy's Reserves, or remain in reserve. They must never,
+except in most pressing circumstances, throw themselves into a mêlée
+already formed (Section 313). Following Lines must therefore not keep
+too close to the leading ones--a mistake often committed in peace--as
+otherwise they are committed to an attack in the same direction. They
+should therefore keep so far to the rear that they can overlook the
+line of collisions, and move in full freedom wherever their
+intervention is most called for. This important principle was always
+observed by Frederick the Great's Cavalry.
+
+6. One must always try to cover at least one flank by obstacles of the
+ground or by one's own troops; but having satisfied this condition,
+then attack on the outer Lines, and endeavour to gain them by previous
+strategical directions.
+
+7. Superfluous forces, which do not follow the front as supporting
+squadrons, échelon themselves in general, forwards or backwards of the
+outer (unsupported) wing, to protect one's own flank and threaten
+that of the enemy, also to be ready to engage the enemy's Reserves
+(Sections 323, 343, 345), or they are kept together as Reserves behind
+the fighting line, if it is not possible to foresee in what direction
+they may be required. They must not be too weak.
+
+8. Attempts to surround us made by the enemy are best met by a flank
+movement on the original line without change of front (_cf._ Section
+338). Defensive flanking cover, with the front turned outwards, gives
+the worst conceivable direction for attack, since in case of failure
+one is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body.
+
+9. Being in 'rendezvous formation,' the leading units are, if
+possible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have the
+shortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success if
+they are unnoticed by the enemy--_i.e._, can be executed under the
+concealment of the ground--or if the enemy has neither time nor space
+to encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemy
+to use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him to
+undertake manoeuvres before attacking.
+
+10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneously
+must never be arranged so that a part follows in échelon
+backwards--they must always be disposed on the same alignment.
+
+11. In case of a mêlée, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily,
+the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, not
+directed against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, the
+less effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too often
+mere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy.
+
+12. Out of every victorious mêlée one must endeavour, as soon as
+possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate
+pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed
+(Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the
+utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power--if
+possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed
+must be adequate for the attainment of this end.
+
+
+CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY.
+
+1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different
+directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are
+always to be employed by 'Wings.'
+
+2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he
+should be attacked from the flank.
+
+3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even
+against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less
+shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines'
+(Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the
+leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire.
+
+4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the
+rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances.
+
+5. Only _closed_ 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on for
+success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of
+attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each
+individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for
+the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects
+in the defender's lines will hardly be recognisable. Once within the
+zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to undertake
+those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so constantly in
+peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire line, and
+penetrates through as far as one can.
+
+6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks
+for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's
+Cavalry.
+
+7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up
+on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in
+order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities.
+
+8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible
+outside the principal fire zone of the enemy.
+
+9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature
+of the enemy's fire.
+
+To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant
+care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At
+the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them
+independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled
+to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander
+(Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate
+must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section
+317).
+
+To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient mastery
+of the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary to
+append a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentials
+of these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgment
+and independence of the junior officers.
+
+Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined tactical
+situation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry is
+'Independent,' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind the
+middle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on the
+enemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation,
+under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance of
+the enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formation
+to another--flank attacks, deployment from column of route or after
+the passage of defiles--must be practised. In all these exercises the
+point at issue must be clearly and comprehensively expressed. When one
+has attained a certain degree of security in the application of these
+principles, these exercises must be repeated under conditions of
+ever-increasing difficulty.
+
+The order for deployment must be given whilst the troops are in rapid
+motion. Observation, thought, and command when in full gallop have to
+be learnt; they do not come naturally. The most various movements,
+without command or bugle-call, must be executed from a message brought
+by a galloper. The troops will be practised against a suddenly
+appearing enemy on simple warnings such as 'Against Cavalry,' 'Against
+Infantry,' or merely on the sound 'Alert,' and pains must always be
+taken to see that the fundamentally right formation is adopted. In
+these exercises it must be left to the initiative of the subordinates
+to judge the situation for themselves, and always move to their proper
+place in the prescribed formation by the shortest path. Of course, in
+such movements the first principle is that the troops nearest the
+enemy furnish the first 'Line'; the remainder fall into their places
+as flank coverers, supporting squadrons or reserve.
+
+If, in this manner, we succeed in imparting to the junior Leaders
+thorough clearness as to the principles of the game, and to make them
+both quick and skilful in their appreciation of the situation, then
+the work of education on the drill ground is complete, and the troops
+are ready for exercises over country. No pains must be spared to
+separate the purely formal and ceremonial side of drill from the
+practical field-training. The former keeps always, as I have indicated
+in the first section, its full value for the creation of discipline
+and alertness, but leads only too easily to a routine which has
+nothing in common with the battle-field, and to that poverty-stricken
+'schematisimus' to which human nature so readily inclines.
+
+To the formal school of training, which I have hitherto only had in
+mind, a whole series of exercises must now be coupled, having for
+their purpose the application of the acquired forms and principles
+under all circumstances of the ground. But before we proceed to their
+detail consideration, we must answer the question how far the drill
+ground only suffices for the purpose of training. Generally, one can
+subscribe to General von Schlichting's principle--that forms and
+principles must be learnt in the drill book, but their application in
+action only in the open country. Tactical exercises on the drill
+ground, which have not for sole purposes to bring to expression
+certain formal principles, are always an evil, and mislead the troops.
+On the other hand, the principles of the tactical employment of
+Cavalry are particularly suited to representation on the drill ground
+because they are frequently of a purely formal nature.
+
+Keeping firmly to these established principles, then, to define the
+limits of usefulness of the drill ground, we have only to answer the
+question within what tactical units this formal drilling is still
+instructive or possible. My opinion is that the Brigade marks the
+highest limit, as within it all tactical principles find their
+application, and it is the largest body which can still in any way be
+handled by drill methods only. In the Division, and still more in the
+higher units, the strategical element preponderates so greatly that
+anything approaching real drill is out of the question, and all
+movements which they can execute are based on a complete command of
+these principles already. Of course, it is not intended to prohibit
+altogether the formal working together of these masses at the
+beginning in order to secure complete control and knowledge of them
+for further instruction; but one must not delay over these formal
+movements a moment longer than absolutely necessary, since the real
+centre of gravity lies in the practical training, and no doubt must be
+allowed to exist as to which exercises are intended as purely drill
+and which as practical preparation for War.
+
+Nor would I have it implied that brigade and regimental training
+should be entirely confined to the drill ground. On the contrary, the
+exercises over country are absolutely essential for practical
+training, and form the keystone of the whole edifice; but it seems to
+me not merely permissible but desirable that a portion of these
+exercises should be carried out on the drill ground in order to
+expedite this portion of the work. But all the more energetically must
+it be insisted on that the remainder of the programme--the greater
+part in regard to time--should be executed, as far as possible, in
+variable ground, and that all exercises of the larger formations
+should be confined to such ground as we shall have to work over in
+War; not alone are they by far the most important for the higher
+tactical education of the Arm, but they cannot be represented on drill
+grounds at all; their whole essence is too entirely out of harmony
+with the conditions of a level plain.
+
+That the degree of cultivation existing in the vicinity of the
+garrisons may interfere seriously with these demands is obvious, and
+in the absence of the necessary spaces to work over we must fall back
+on the great training grounds (Truppenübungs Plätze); even the
+possibilities of these are very soon exhausted. But this, at least, is
+certain: that it is better to hold these exercises on these training
+grounds than to confine them exclusively to the drill field. Every
+effort must, therefore, be made to transfer all exercises of bodies
+above the regiment to the training grounds, on which one will always
+find some portion sufficiently suitable for the amount of drill
+required, and to extend the period of work on these grounds so that in
+all periods it will be possible to interpose between the drill days a
+sufficient number of field service days, always supposing that these
+training grounds offer sufficient diversity of contour, etc., for our
+purposes. Where this is not the case, then, in spite of the expense
+entailed by possible damage to crops, etc., suitable ground will have
+to be acquired. The extra cost of a few thousand pounds cannot be
+allowed to stand in the way of the adequate training of the Arm which,
+owing to its numerical strength, relatively small in comparison with
+the magnitude of its tasks, is in the last resort dependent for its
+success on its internal excellence alone.
+
+As concerns the nature of these exercises, with special reference to
+the larger formations, first of all we must secure, by means of a
+graduated series, the certain co-operation of the constituent elements
+and of their leaders. Next, it must be insisted on that, for the
+further actual practical training, as well as for the purely formal
+drill, a systematic procedure should be the fundamental principle, so
+that all who participate in them may become clearly aware of the
+conditions of Warfare, and the means of dealing with them. It is
+evident that these conditions must form the foundation of the required
+system.
+
+As in War these are constantly changing, there seems a certain degree
+of contradiction in this demand; but in reality this is not the case,
+for no matter how the situation may vary, there will always be for its
+proper criticism some one chief point which will characterize the
+whole procedure, and thus be decisive for the systematic arrangement
+of these exercises.
+
+The latter can then be divided into two principal groups, according as
+to whether they are based on the assumption of a Cavalry force acting
+as an independent unit or in combination with the other Arms. The
+general conditions in both cases must be clearly brought out, and give
+them the point of attachment for the further subdivision of the
+exercises.
+
+Thus, with regard to the first case:
+
+Reconnaissance from a great distance. Deployment of one or more
+columns out of defiles or in open country. The land in the vicinity of
+the training ground can here be advantageously employed. It is not
+desirable to place the heads of the separate columns at once on the
+scene of action, using these points as starting-points for the
+forthcoming exercise. One must give the columns longer marches, and
+demand that--assisted by a properly-working mechanism for circulating
+information and orders--they should arrive at the point of action at
+the proper time, in spite of possible delays or interference on the
+road. The enemy, whether skeleton or otherwise, must, of course, be
+handled so that collision occurs within the limits of the training
+ground.
+
+Transition from the relations of advance (or rear) guard and main body
+to the order these assume on the battle-field.
+
+Attacks on a railway or hostile post.
+
+Government boundaries form no support for the flanks; these can only
+be considered as secure when protected by natural obstacles; hence, as
+a rule, measures must be taken to cover both flanks.
+
+Transition from the tactical to the strategical form after completion
+of an encounter; pursuit of the enemy with one fraction of the force,
+and continuation of the operation with the remainder; for the latter,
+only orders need be issued; but it is a matter of considerable
+importance how this division of force rendered necessary by the
+tactical encounters is arranged.
+
+Retreat after a repulse, in one or several columns.
+
+Retirement through defiles.
+
+In the second case:
+
+Selection of position on the battle-field in a proper relation to the
+fighting line, zone of danger, etc., and reconnaissance to front and
+flanks.
+
+Advance from a position in reserve to attack on the enemy's Cavalry
+round one wing of an Army.
+
+Transition from a victorious charge against Cavalry to a further
+attack against the enemy's flank.
+
+Protection of the outer flank in either case.
+
+Retreat after defeat by the enemy's Cavalry to the protection of one's
+own Army wing.
+
+Advance for frontal attack against the enemy's line of battle; passage
+through the intervals of one's own Artillery and Cavalry. Protection
+of both flanks. Attack upon Infantry, Artillery, or both; disengaging
+a front attacked by Cavalry; combat against the latter.
+
+Flank attacks against retreating columns; ambushes at defiles.
+
+Of course, it is not intended in the above to lay down a hard-and-fast
+scheme of instruction, but only to indicate how the work to be done
+can be systematically arranged, and brought under one point of view,
+so that the lessons they are intended to convey become impressed on
+the mind. It is also evident that by the supposed conduct of the
+enemy, and the strength assigned to him, the utmost variation can be
+brought about in the grouping and representation of the several
+conditioning circumstances. In short, these exercises must be taken
+direct from the most diverse demands of War, and be based, as far as
+possible, on an assumed general situation. They must never be allowed
+to descend to mere fighting on horseback backwards and forwards across
+the training ground, and with often quite unnatural sequence of ideas,
+having no connection with the natural order of events. It is also most
+desirable that Infantry and additional Artillery should be made
+available for their execution.
+
+How far the dismounted action of the Arm is to be represented in these
+series will be gone into in the next section; but in all cases,
+whether working mounted or on foot, the Leader must insist that the
+troops are handled in accordance with tactical precepts suitably
+applied in every case to the special circumstances of the given
+situation; and for this, even on the smallest training grounds, a
+proper utilization of the features of the country is essential.
+
+The desire to suit the formation to the ground; to carry out turning
+movements under cover; to find support for the flanks in natural
+obstacles, so that they cannot be surrounded; to choose the actual
+field of encounter, so that every advantage of the ground, the
+direction of the wind, of the sun, of covered approach, etc., all fall
+to our advantage; to deal with defiles and passes on correct
+principles; to utilize suitably strong defensive positions--all these
+must be clearly brought to light, and in the 'Critique' these points
+must be particularly borne in mind, for they are by no means
+universally current in the Cavalry, which has a tendency always and
+everywhere in peace to revert to the levellest ground obtainable. I
+have seen at Cavalry Division Exercises troops handled without the
+slightest regard to the nature of the country, and without the fact
+attracting attention at the 'Critique'; but these are conditions
+which, thanks to the energetic action of the Inspector-General, we may
+hope, are now everywhere overcome.
+
+It must, further, be brought out in the clearest possible manner under
+what conditions the employment of the units by 'Wings' is to be
+recommended, and under which others their employment in 'Lines'
+becomes necessary. The principles regulating this matter have already
+received attention in Book I., Chap. V. The freedom which, as we have
+seen, is given us by Section 346 of the Regulations must be utilized
+to the fullest extent, for it alone answers to the demands of the
+modern battle-field.[27]
+
+         [Footnote 27: If, in the course of time, as I fully
+         anticipate, the necessity should become apparent to give
+         further expression in the form of Regulations to the point of
+         view laid down in Section 346, it would certainly necessitate
+         a complete rearrangement of the whole Regulations, out of
+         which, in that case, other defects might then be eliminated.
+         The following ideas might then be taken into consideration:
+
+         1. Fundamental and formal separation of tactical prescription
+         from instructions concerning the methods of training.
+
+         2. Simplification of the Regimental drill in the direction of
+         conferring increased freedom of movements to the Squadrons
+         and double Squadrons. Limitations in the application of
+         Squadron Columns, and their partial replacement by more
+         suitable formations.
+
+         3. More precise wording of the tactical principles, and their
+         extension to prescriptions as to the use of 'Wing' or 'Line'
+         formation.
+
+         4. Re-introduction of the true idea of 'Line tactics,'
+         limitation of the word 'Échelon' to troops overlapping the
+         first line, of 'Reserve' for all held back behind it.
+
+         5. The preparation for all instructions for the movement and
+         combat of masses larger than Brigades without reference to
+         any fixed standard of strength.
+
+         6. More extended use of the different bugle sounds.
+
+         7. Extension of the instructions for dismounted action to
+         cover the employment of several Squadrons, Regiments, or
+         Brigades, and with especial stress on the decisive offensive.
+         (See next section.)]
+
+One last point requires further consideration, which is of
+considerable importance for Cavalry exercises--viz., the use of
+skeleton enemies.
+
+In no Arm does the skeleton enemy replace an actual enemy less than
+with the Cavalry.
+
+If it rides the prescribed paces, then, as a consequence of the ease
+of movement and rapidity of deployment, it has an unfair advantage; if
+it rides slowly or halts altogether as a target, it makes things
+altogether too easy for the other side. Besides, it is a very much
+easier matter to judge a number of flags correctly than to estimate
+the actual strength of a rapidly moving body of horse.
+
+Most movements in practice develop so quickly, and, owing to the
+ground, the direction in which the dust drives, etc., give such
+changing pictures, that it is most difficult to judge them accurately
+when one's self is in rapid motion.
+
+Often the Cavalry Commanders must decide, at least in general, on the
+instant, strength, tactical distribution, and direction of movement of
+a rapidly approaching enemy almost hidden in dense dust clouds; in the
+same instant he must make up his mind with reference to the conditions
+disclosed by the adversary and the nature of the ground, and issue his
+orders clearly and intelligibly. The demand is such a great one that
+both the physical and mental sight even of a born Leader needs
+constant practice against real objects in order to be in any way equal
+to it. Hence the necessity for bringing great Cavalry 'Masses'--at
+least, Divisions--as frequently as possible together to manoeuvre
+against one another, and in such a manner that the strength of the
+opposing forces remains unknown, which, with a little management, can
+easily be arranged. If one knows beforehand the precise number of the
+opposing forces, as with Divisions of uniform composition will
+generally be the case, the matter is very much simplified indeed, but
+in proportion it is less practical, a consideration which still
+further supports our already formulated demand for Cavalry Divisions
+differing as far as possible in their composition.
+
+Thus, it is clear that the field is wide indeed which opens itself for
+the practical training of Cavalry as soon as one gets down to the
+bed-rock conditions which determine success in actual War, and frees
+one's self of all conventional suppositions. Whether we shall succeed
+in satisfying the new conditions which press upon us from every side,
+taking into consideration the excellence of our existing material,
+equal to the highest performances, will depend in the main on the
+support of the superior authorities. For the manner in which Cavalry
+are inspected decides how they practise and what they learn, just as
+the way in which they are led determines what they can do.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING
+
+
+If in the previous pages it has been shown that increased attention
+must be devoted, in the training of our Cavalry for its mounted
+duties, to the changed conditions we shall encounter in modern War--if
+it is to do justice to itself on the battle-fields of the future--it
+must, on the other hand, be insisted on that the foundation available
+for such further effort is indeed an excellent one. Our squadrons are,
+in general, exceptionally well trained, capable of great endeavour,
+and well in the hands of their Commanders.
+
+It needs, therefore, in my opinion, but a slight change in the
+direction, the practical consideration of certain new points, and,
+above all, a wider range of practice in the higher Commands, to attain
+the very highest mark.
+
+With its dismounted action, however, it is a different matter.
+
+In spite of the increased importance this form of fighting has
+acquired in modern War, our Cavalry has not as yet paid anything like
+the amount of attention to the subject that it deserves. Almost
+everywhere it is treated as of quite minor importance, and many
+Cavalrymen still close their eyes to the view that, without a training
+at once as thorough and earnest for dismounted action as that
+bestowed on the Arm to fit it for its mounted duties, modern Cavalry
+will hardly survive the trials it will encounter in the future.
+
+This idea rests on long-standing tradition, which is difficult to
+overcome. It is not so very long ago that on the rifle ranges some
+officers caused volleys to be fired in order to get through their
+cartridges so as to get back to quarters the sooner; but mainly, it is
+up-borne and continued by the fact that in the Inspections the
+superior Commanders generally treat dismounted fighting as a matter
+hardly worth their serious consideration, or judge it by
+false--_i.e._, too narrow--standards. Further, because in the
+manoeuvres, as in the principal Cavalry exercises generally,
+situations requiring dismounted action for their due solution hardly
+ever arise; and lastly, because of the manner in which the whole
+subject is discussed in the Regulations themselves.
+
+The latter approach the question from a far narrower standpoint than I
+propose. They lay down quite openly that only under especially
+favourable circumstances can Cavalry hope to obtain easy and minor
+results from their carbine, fire, and that they are not in a position
+to enter on and carry through obstinate encounters.
+
+They lay principal stress on the defensive, and practically exclude
+the combat of larger 'Masses' altogether from their horizon.[28] In
+fact, they consider only the minimum conditions which the Cavalry must
+fulfil if it is not to fall into the background altogether.
+
+         [Footnote 28: Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366.]
+
+The final consequences of modern development, hardly even those
+resulting from the experiences of 1870-1871, they have emphatically
+not yet even approached.
+
+Those who have studied the action of our Cavalry in that campaign
+thoroughly--as I myself had full opportunity of doing--will agree that
+we seldom had to have recourse to the carbine except on the offensive,
+as I have pointed out above, and only in the rarest cases did we need
+them for defensive purposes; and though in future against overwhelming
+forces this necessity may arise more frequently, still, as in 1870,
+this tendency towards a resolute offensive must always stand in the
+foreground. Nevertheless, the Regulations, in spite of all practical
+experience and theoretical considerations, lay down that in most cases
+fire action will be confined to the defensive (Cavalry Regulations,
+Section 357).
+
+It is quite natural that the troops themselves should not place their
+ideal higher than the Regulations require; all the more necessary,
+therefore, do I hold it to express with all emphasis that _our
+training must go far beyond the limits prescribed for it officially_
+if we are in any degree to satisfy the demands that War will make upon
+us. But for these, I hold our Cavalry thoroughly capable (when
+trained, understood), and even if they were not, one should never
+breathe such a suspicion to the men themselves. For should such an
+impression get abroad, one would dig at once the grave of initiative,
+daring, and resolution in the execution of all necessary undertakings.
+
+Keenness, the very life and soul of all Cavalry action, can only grow
+where the troops believe themselves fully equal to all eventualities.
+The idea, therefore, that Cavalry, even when dismounted, is not equal
+to any Infantry, must never be allowed to show its head; rather, the
+men must be brought up in the conviction that, owing to their longer
+term of service, absence of reservists, etc., they are, unit for unit,
+more than a match for the best. Only when they feel this thoroughly
+will they develop their utmost fighting value. But it is indispensable
+that they should be thoroughly at home in all forms of the dismounted
+combat, for only then will they feel confidence in the weapons they
+carry.
+
+This ideal is as yet far from being attained in our service, and we
+must break entirely with the existing training and enter on new paths
+if it is in any way to be attained.
+
+For the tactical subdivision of the squadron, and the elementary forms
+of skirmishing action, the Regulations afford a sufficient foundation,
+but their application must be brought home to the men in a totally
+different manner to that at present in use.
+
+A few weeks after their arrival--at latest the beginning of
+November--the recruits must be taken out into the country and
+practised in utilizing all the advantages it offers, both as a group
+and in firing lines, and at the same time they must be taught with the
+carbine, aiming, judging distance, etc., always from the point of view
+of making each man a practical independent shot, without any
+theoretical mystification or pedantry. Soon after Christmas they must
+be sufficiently far advanced to commence practice on the range, which
+must be carried out with the utmost individual care.
+
+_A considerable increase in the amount of ammunition is essential_ to
+keep the men constantly in practice, so that there are no long pauses
+between the days set aside for shooting, that these are divided over
+the whole year, and that firing at long distances and under field
+conditions can be carried out on a greater scale than at present.
+Before the beginning of the squadron drills, the men must be
+thoroughly at home both in mounting and dismounting for fire action;
+with this object, vaulting exercises with horses in full kit must be
+especially practised. They must also have progressed so far in the
+elementary preliminaries that tactical training of the dismounted
+squadron can be proceeded with at once; but the individual exercises
+must be continued throughout the whole year if knowledge of them is to
+pass over into the flesh and blood of the men.
+
+Special importance is to be attached to field firing, and for this in
+particular far more ammunition must be provided. In this most
+important respect Cavalry must be put on precisely the same footing as
+the Infantry, and be able to practise at real service targets exactly
+like the latter. But these exercises must not be begun until the men
+are thoroughly at home in judging distance and aiming, the class
+shooting is at an end, and the tactical training of the squadron
+completed.
+
+In aiming practices, low targets, representing men lying down, or
+well-covered shooting lines at great distances, are to be preferred;
+but in field firing the targets should be so disposed as to make the
+typical cases it is desired to represent, in which Cavalry will
+generally have to employ their firearms on service, sufficiently clear
+to the men's understanding--such, for instance, as the following:
+
+1. Attack of an occupied position.--Fire opens according to ground at
+1,100 to 1,200 yards; gradual advances by rushes to decisive
+distances, which, with modern weapons and in open country, may be put
+at 700 to 900 yards. Development of the principal fire effort at this
+range, and beating down of the enemy's return fire. After attainment
+of the fire superiority, rapid advance by rushes, and in larger
+bodies. These rushes must be covered by the fire of those still lying
+down, until the point for the commencement of their assault is
+reached. Meanwhile, advance of the last Reserves, also by rushes, to
+the last fire position to give the final impulse for assault; assault;
+pursuit by fire. The strongest development possible of concentric fire
+consistent with the retention of adequate reserves to carry forward
+the fighting line.
+
+2. Defence of a position.--(_a_) Obstinate defence; object not to let
+the assailant come too close; hence from 1,100 yards a considerable
+development of fire power; continuation of the fight at decisive
+range, and, according to the result, either pursuit by fire or rapid
+evacuation of the position with ultimate sacrifice of the rearguard to
+be formed by the last reserve. (_b_) Defence without the intention of
+standing fast, either to gain time or compel the enemy to deploy.
+Hence, principal fire effort between 1,000 and 1,300 yards, and then
+gradual break-off of the fight before the enemy can approach too
+close.
+
+N.B. In practice a favourable position is essential.
+
+3. Surprise fire against marching columns or reserves whilst
+reconnoitring the enemy's approach, or whilst working round his flank
+and rear in the battle, or in pursuit without the intention of
+charging or defending one's self, mainly with the purpose of securing
+a momentary but considerable moral and material effect, then
+disappearing and renewing the attempt from another place, hence sudden
+'Mass' fire from 1,500 to not less than 1,000 yards. At the same
+time, it must be explained that with our present carbine even a
+nominal effect can hardly be secured at the greater distances. Here I
+have anticipated the issue of a better weapon, an unconditional
+necessity for the Cavalry in any case.
+
+All these practices, however, will only then be of value when the
+officers possess a far more thorough knowledge of musketry and the
+capabilities of their weapon than is at present the case with us. It
+must therefore be insisted upon that, first our Regimental Commanders,
+and then the junior officers, should be ordered to attend the Infantry
+School of Musketry, in order that they may thoroughly master this new
+branch of knowledge.
+
+It will be asserted that the time for such thorough training in
+musketry cannot be found except at the cost of neglecting still more
+important branches of our service. But from my practical experience I
+cannot assent to this view. There is ample time, if it is not wasted
+on unpractical affairs.
+
+Judging distance and the use of ground can be most thoroughly taught
+during field-service practices, whilst the troops are on piquet, or
+the squadron at the reserve of the outposts, when the men who do not
+at the moment happen to be on patrol or vedette often lie about for
+hours doing nothing. We have then opportunities to take these matters
+in hand in the most practical manner; particularly the former, on
+which shooting in the field so essentially depends, and whose
+importance is so little appreciated by our Cavalry.
+
+The duties in the afternoon can also be much reduced to save time for
+the same purpose. For instance, let me call attention to the waste of
+time involved by lengthy parades for lance exercise. No man can keep
+on at lance practice for an hour at a time. The consequence is that
+most of it is spent in standing easy, and therefore wasted. But the
+object--viz., of gradually strengthening the muscles of the arm and
+making the man handy with the weapon--can be equally well attained by
+a couple of parades for the purpose weekly. Perhaps still better, if
+before every afternoon parade and every mounted duty throughout the
+year the men are exercised with the lance for a few minutes only. In
+this manner the muscles of the arm will develop more rapidly and much
+time will be saved. Similarly, more can be gained by the method of
+imparting the instruction pursued, if attention is restrained to the
+thing that the man must know only, and everything superfluous, such as
+the learning by heart of the names of every portion of the weapon and
+so forth--at any rate with the recruits--is left out, and at the same
+time all such opportunities as occur in stable duty, on the march, in
+the cleaning hour, etc., are made the most of.
+
+Finally, speaking generally, not only is more time than is necessary
+spent on squadron drill, but also more than is advantageous. If one is
+constantly drilling for four weeks at a stretch, that is ample, and
+then there is time for a considerable extension of our shooting
+training; and if the inspection of the squadron is postponed for any
+particular reason, then shooting and field-service days can be
+interpolated, which in itself is a very good thing.
+
+If in these ways time for the elementary training for dismounted work
+and for shooting can be gained, it is still easier to arrange things
+for the foot training of the squadron as a unit. During the drill
+period the pauses to rest the horses which must be granted to them
+can be utilized, and in the field-service exercise the schemes must
+often be framed so as to afford practice in dismounted operations in
+suitable ground. For the technical training of the men it is of
+particular importance that they should be accustomed, with immobile
+horses, to couple (? knee halter) them rapidly, and with mobile horses
+in bringing them up or retiring them.
+
+These two essential practices receive far too little attention in the
+German Cavalry. The chief difficulty of the latter lies in the way in
+which the spare lances which the man cannot hold fast in his hand fly
+backwards and forwards when in rapid motion; and the ease with which a
+lance can be jerked out of the shoe, and then trail on the ground can
+give rise to the gravest disorder, not to mention danger.
+
+It is most desirable that something should be done to remove this
+evil. The best, perhaps, would be to devise some arrangement by which
+each lance could be attached to its own horse. If that is possible,
+then the shoe must be made so deep that the lance cannot be thrown
+out. It is obvious that this problem will not be long in finding a
+solution as soon as attention is directed to its absolute necessity.
+
+The above will suffice to make it abundantly clear that as far as
+concerns the thorough training of the squadron for dismounted purposes
+no serious difficulties exist. These only begin when we come to the
+employment of larger forces, and principally because the Regulations
+give us no point of support for the purpose, whilst our Cavalry
+officers themselves are in no way prepared for this branch of their
+duties. For the employment of the tactical units and the fundamental
+principles governing their use in action we are therefore compelled to
+lean on the Infantry Regulations. But how many of our Cavalry officers
+are sufficiently acquainted with these to employ them practically? How
+is it to be expected that they should be, when nobody expects such
+knowledge of them?
+
+Hence to prepare for the training of the Leaders, officers of all
+ranks should be encouraged, whenever time and opportunity offers, to
+attend the more important tactical exercises of the Infantry. It would
+be better still if a sufficient number of Cavalry officers were to be
+attached--Lieutenants to Companies, senior officers to Battalions and
+Regiments--for suitable periods. But we must be quite clear in our
+minds that in this way we have at most an expedient to meet a period
+of transition, which will not suffice as a permanent remedy.
+
+It can never be considered otherwise than as a grave disadvantage when
+one Arm is compelled to seek the instruction necessary for its
+practical application in War from the Regulations and parade grounds
+of another, and more especially when, as in this case, the principles
+of the Cavalry are by no means applicable without modification to the
+other.
+
+Actually, the peculiarities and the duties of Cavalry render many
+variations from Infantry practice essential which require
+consideration. For instance, the Infantry company is told off in
+three, the dismounted squadron with mobile horses in two, with
+immobile ones in three fractions, which are always very much weaker
+than those of the Infantry, and, therefore, entail entirely different
+methods of husbanding their respective strengths. I can only consider
+it, therefore, as a most pressing need, and one which can no longer
+be delayed, that the Cavalry Regulations should receive the necessary
+expansion to meet the different conditions, and that the practical
+training of the men on foot should be carried on in the same
+systematic way as their preparation for mounted duties.
+
+For these alterations in the Regulations the principles of the Company
+Column tactics must, in my opinion, form the general groundwork. A
+dismounted squadron with immobile horses bring 125, with mobile ones
+about 70, carbines in the line of fire; a regiment, therefore, from
+280 to 500--numbers, therefore, materially smaller than those of a
+company or battalion respectively, and their power in action is
+correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless, it will be well, with regard to
+the conditions of command, to treat the squadron tactically on the
+same footing as the company, and within these limits the principles
+governing extensions, depth and arrangement of the units for attack or
+defence must be laid down clear and distinct in the Regulations.
+
+These principles must be formulated in general on the lines which in
+discussing the question of tactical direction (Book I., Chap. V.) I
+have already attempted to develop. They must distinguish clearly
+between the cases of the detachment acting for itself alone or with
+either or both flanks protected, and lay down what distribution of
+force and apportionment of reserves is of decisive importance, and,
+therefore, requiring special instructions.
+
+The chief stress, in opposition to all previous prescriptions, must
+now be laid on the combat of the regiment and the brigade, as those
+units whose employment will be principally called for in modern War,
+and the principle of the offensive must be steadily kept in view.
+Fights for localities and about defiles require especial attention,
+and further, the conditions must be laid down by Regulation in which
+action is to be engaged in with mobile or immobile horses, and how
+these led horses are to be placed and protected.
+
+The present Regulations pass lightly over these questions, because, as
+I have pointed out, the standpoint from which they view the matter is
+fundamentally different. If, however, the increased importance of
+dismounted action is granted, then these points call for decision, and
+how they are to be dealt with as a matter of principle cannot be left
+to the goodwill of the Leader.
+
+A very important defect in the Regulations lies in the uncertainty it
+allows to exist as to the subdivision of the dismounted squadron, and
+how the skirmishers on dismounting are to form.
+
+According to Section 54 the squadron dismounted is divided into four
+troops of twelve files, or if the number of files does not suffice,
+into three troops. According to Section 87, eight to twelve men form a
+group, two or three groups a troop. In Section 155 the skirmishers of
+a troop when dismounted, with mobile horses, form one group. How many
+'troops' are to be formed is not indicated. 'The skirmishers fall in,
+in front of or by the side of the squadron, arranged as on horseback.'
+When working with immobile detachments, then, according to Section
+156, the skirmishers form in front or by the side of the squadrons in
+two ranks, and in how many groups or troops they are to be told off is
+not specified.
+
+The confusion here cannot be explained away, and its consequences are
+frequently manifested. It must be laid down once for all that with
+mobile horses the dismounted men of a squadron form one troop in four
+groups, or with immobile ones two troops, also of four groups, and
+that they always form up in front of the squadrons, each troop in
+line, and one behind the other. Then everyone should know exactly what
+he has to do. It is altogether a misfortune that the dismounted
+squadron and the squadron on foot parade are two entirely different
+things. The latter is only required for ceremonial, and everything
+relating to it should be consigned to Part IV. of the Regulations
+(ceremonial, etc.); whilst the training of the squadron on foot should
+from the beginning be based on the needs of the squadron dismounted
+for action. Then there would be unity and system in the matter.
+
+Turning now to the practical education in larger units, it is
+necessary that the fundamental principles guiding the distribution of
+the men in attack or defence in the typical kinds of encounter should
+be taught and practised on the drill ground. The corresponding
+positions of the led horses must also be represented. As typical
+situations I would enumerate the following:
+
+Attack on localities, with or without the tendency to outflank.
+
+Attack by surprise, or after preparation.
+
+Defence of a section or of a locality, with known direction of the
+enemy's advance, or when the flanks may be threatened.
+
+Obstinate defence and maintenance of an isolated locality.
+
+Keeping open the entrance of a defile, and its utilization for a
+further offensive or retreat.
+
+Deployment for surprise fire action, in order to disappear again
+immediately.
+
+Combined action of dismounted men with a mounted reserve, to ward off
+an attack or pursue a retreating enemy.
+
+In all these cases we require not only fundamentally different
+methods, but the methods themselves will be different according to
+whether the led horses are mobile or immobile, because in each case
+the strength of the tactical units is an entirely different one.
+
+These more or less elementary exercises, after the squadron
+inspections, both mounted and on foot, have been concluded, must be
+principally carried out in the regiment, which also when dismounted
+remains the true tactical unit of the Cavalry; but they must be
+continued by the brigade, in which the employment of the regiments
+formed side by side--_i.e._, by 'Wings'--must be represented under
+most varying circumstances.
+
+It appears to me that in the present state of our training it is
+exactly these elementary exercises which are the most important,
+because more than any others they are adapted to make clear and
+comprehensible the general conditions of successful fire employment.
+This comprehension, owing to the specifically Cavalry tendencies of
+our training, is in general almost entirely lacking in our Cavalry
+Commanders, so that in this direction the tactical education of our
+officers requires to be built up almost from the ground.
+
+For the rest, these exercises, like the corresponding ones when
+mounted, form only the basis for the true practical training, which it
+is not possible to impart on a drill ground, and requires, as a first
+condition, natural country, with all its changing features. For this
+reason it must be insisted on that a part of the regimental and
+brigade drill season should be spent in the country and on wide open
+spaces, with great variety of topographical expression. Where such are
+not to be had, then we must go to the troop training grounds; and
+hence the desire, above expressed, to extend as far as possible the
+period spent by the troops in the district or on these training
+grounds, and which I have based on the necessity for holding annual
+exercises for the higher units, in which all regiments should take
+part, finds additional support.
+
+Of course, this does not preclude the necessity of utilizing the
+surroundings of the garrisons to their utmost.
+
+As regards the arrangement and nature of these exercises, when working
+on the drill ground they will have to be inserted between the pauses
+in mounted movements necessary to rest the horses, but they must never
+on this account be allowed to be treated as of any less importance.
+When out in the country in larger and continuous movements, this
+opportunity, from the nature of things, will not be available.
+
+But it is precisely on the larger movements, if possible of whole
+Divisions, that the principal stress should be laid. In these the
+fight can be initiated under the most varied conditions, as a
+consequence of the direction of approach, and after its execution
+further operations arising out of the resulting situation can be set
+on foot, which, as we have seen (Book I., Chap. VI.), will generally
+entail the interaction of dismounted men with mounted reserves.
+
+Such exercises must naturally be laid out quite independently, and
+must take rank in the programmes for Brigade and Divisional drills on
+an equal footing with the others. All Leaders must by degrees learn
+to control the whole of this section, and find themselves as much at
+home in every tactical situation on foot as if they were in the
+saddle.
+
+Hence great importance must be laid on the capacity for exercising
+independent resolve in all ranks of the subordinate officers; but,
+above all, they must be made to acquire that relentless tendency to go
+forward which is the very soul of their service, and generally the
+best adapted to its tactical requirements. Officers and men must
+realize that, once dismounted, victory alone can restore to them their
+horses. These latter must be so disposed that the impossibility of
+making use of them to break off the engagement springs in the eyes of
+every man. Only in this way can one get clear ideas: so long as the
+men do not look on their action on foot as in itself something
+serious, but are thinking principally of how to get back to their
+horses, as long as the Leader himself makes his action dependent on
+this possibility, for just so long will the men fail to put their
+whole soul into their work, and we shall obtain only partial results,
+with uncertain handling.
+
+This point of view must be constantly kept in mind throughout the
+training, and every effort be made to habituate the men to work up to
+it. But we shall only then succeed in breaking with the old
+traditions, and in fitting ourselves to meet the changed conditions of
+War, when the superior officers in their inspections attach _as much
+importance to the combat dismounted as they now do to the fight in the
+saddle_, and submit the Leaders to an equally searching and practical
+examination in each.
+
+Amongst these changed conditions we must include the intelligent
+co-operation of the Artillery with the skirmishers, and also of the
+machine-guns, which latter may be expected to play a considerable part
+in defence, and also on occasions requiring the sudden development of
+a great intensity of fire. It is in this connection that lies (Book
+I., Chap. VI.) the chief importance of the Horse Artillery batteries,
+and yet in peace they have practically no opportunity to make
+themselves familiar with its peculiarities.
+
+Instead, we find in the great Cavalry manoeuvres the constantly
+recurring tendency to theatrical display. Batteries accompany the
+formal drill evolutions of the Divisions--a performance which, in my
+opinion, has not the slightest practical value, but only subjects the
+horses to unnecessary exertion, and prevents the Leaders from devoting
+their attention to the really important elements of their
+business--the enemy and the nature of the ground. Against all such
+methods the sharpest protest should be entered.
+
+As long as formal evolutions are being practised, the Artillery has no
+place on the drill ground; the Cavalry only require its services when
+the tactical training commences, and the batteries belong to the
+places they would occupy in War--_i.e._, in the advance guard, or
+before the front. But, above all, they must be given opportunity to
+co-operate in the dismounted engagements, and not merely for their own
+training--though this, of course, is of importance--but principally
+for the education of the Cavalry officers, who must learn to employ
+the power of this Arm tactically, wait for its effect, and utilize it.
+
+That this object can only partially be obtained on the larger
+exercising grounds, and not at all on the drill grounds, is
+sufficiently obvious, and it is only necessary to call to mind the
+attacks on villages, railway-stations, and the like, which are not
+usually found on such places to make the difficulty apparent. The
+keystone, therefore, for our purposes can only be found in the country
+itself, or in manoeuvres, in which the application of every tactical
+form develops naturally, and finds its justification in the general
+scheme of operations, and in which the varying conditions are always
+creating new situations, more or less practical in their nature.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES
+
+
+If in the above sections we have dealt almost exclusively with the
+training of the Cavalry for actual combat, the cause lies in the
+nature of things. Victory whether in the shock of 'Masses' or even in
+the minor encounters of patrols, forms so much the foundation of every
+possible success, whether strategical or otherwise, that training with
+this end in view naturally comes first under our consideration.
+
+But as the chief importance of Cavalry no longer lies in its
+application on the battle-field, but rather in the solution of the
+strategical problems encountered in the progress of operations, so its
+training for battle is no longer the one aim and object, but only one
+element of its whole preparation for the field. Field service, its
+true duties in reconnaissance and strategic movements, must all be
+taken into account as factors of equal importance.
+
+I wish to bring this necessity most especially into the foreground,
+since hitherto, and particularly in view of the changed conditions of
+modern Warfare, it has not attracted anything approaching the
+attention it deserves.
+
+What do we practise in the field-service exercises and in the
+manoeuvres beyond the normal Cavalry versus Cavalry encounters?
+Principally, only formal outpost duties in combination with Infantry,
+the smallest incidents of War on the smallest scaled tactical
+scouting, and the participation of small Cavalry bodies in the
+encounter between the combined Arms--all matters which nowadays come
+within the sphere of the Divisional Cavalry; and, indeed, only then
+when the divisions to which they belong, or even smaller bodies, are
+operating independently, for the daily routine of the Divisional
+Cavalry in the enormous Armies of the present day will be on a most
+modest scale. At most in the Army Corps manoeuvres we may get as far
+as the employment of Brigades, and perhaps to the shadowing of an
+enemy's line of advance.
+
+For the most important field of our enterprise, which is to be sought
+in the activity of the Independent Cavalry, all this is of small
+account. The real duties of Cavalry in War are only practised in peace
+on the most confined scale, and often not at all.
+
+Long marches of endurance, independent outposts, attack and defence of
+localities, the forcing of defiles, passage of rivers, etc., which are
+held by an enemy's dismounted men, reconnaissances in the widest
+sense, undertakings against the enemy's communications, pursuit,
+protracted engagements covering retreats, marches with columns and
+convoys, finally, the arrangement and execution of wide strategic
+movements under practical conditions, with accurate computation of
+time and space, the suitable employment of fighting power for the
+attainment of the strategical object, and the best strategic
+introduction of the consciously sought-out combat, all within the
+limits imposed by the magnitude of the masses handled, are matters
+which in future will form the principal sum of all Cavalry activity,
+but find no place in our scheme of education.
+
+Even the Imperial Manoeuvres do not meet the situation, because, in
+the first place, only comparatively few regiments are annually
+affected by them; and in the second, the forces are generally from the
+outset in such close proximity with one another that it is only,
+perhaps, on the first day that a suitable situation for their
+strategic employment may be said to arise at all.
+
+Whilst in this manner our whole training is adopted for conditions
+which in future campaigns can only arise exceptionally, whilst it
+practically ignores the true sphere of action of the Cavalry, we are
+working in a vicious circle of forms and misrepresentations which
+belong to an extinct era of Warfare, and which have long since ceased
+to have any but the smallest connection with the facts of stern
+reality.
+
+That things were no better in the period before the last Wars the
+negative results obtained by our Cavalry in 1866 and 1870 sufficiently
+prove. In no sphere of their action during these campaigns did they
+obtain the results the Arm is really capable of--not because the
+material in the ranks was inferior, but simply and solely because in
+equipment and training they had lagged behind the requirements of the
+time. These experiences should have been to us a serious warning not
+to fall into similar errors a second time; and yet at the present
+there is most serious danger that a future War may again find us
+regarding by far the most important branch of our duties from a
+standpoint which has long since passed away.
+
+The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me of a twofold
+character. In the first place, the tasks accruing to the Arm in War do
+not receive either amongst its own officers, still less amongst those
+of the rest of the Army, their proper appreciation, because in this
+direction guidance and instruction are alike lacking; in the second,
+because most serious difficulties lie in the way of a practical
+adaptation of our training to modern conditions.
+
+In contradistinction to former times, the tasks which await the
+Cavalry lie principally in the sphere of strategical operations, and
+here is the root of our special difficulty.
+
+Great Armies, with their communications, reconnaissances and raids
+under really warlike conditions--that is to say, with their full
+allowance of trains and baggage--extended retreats with beaten troops,
+and the consequent pursuit, can only with difficulty be represented in
+peace, owing to their expense and the consideration necessary to be
+shown to local circumstances; but it is precisely in exercises of this
+description, which might give a really working representation of the
+conditions we shall be called upon to deal with, that circumstances
+leave us entirely deficient.
+
+Considering all these conditions, it must be recognised that an ideal
+method of instruction is practically beyond the bounds of the
+attainable; but for that very reason, in my opinion, we must pursue
+with all energy the practically possible, and for the unattainable
+find the best substitute we can.
+
+The first point which strikes one, and which lies at the bottom of all
+Cavalry undertakings, but in which no real education ever takes place,
+is the conduct of patrols, and particularly of those employed for
+reconnoitring purposes.
+
+Instruction in the matter is certainly universal, and in the writing
+of reports the non-commissioned officers have considerable practice,
+but no uniform or systematic method or fixed principle is observed,
+and the practical performances of the men are subject to no superior
+check. It is left to the Leaders to apply practically their, for the
+most part, very nebulous, theoretical knowledge. The young officer in
+particular is altogether left to his own devices; no one takes the
+trouble to teach him what is essential, and yet he is expected to
+instruct his inferiors. The consequences are what might be
+anticipated. The performances of the patrols in covering distances are
+generally most commendable, but their reports most deficient. Seldom
+is a clear distinction drawn between the essential and the
+non-essential; the most trivial news is forwarded with the same
+expenditure of horses' power as matter of greatest moment; for most
+patrol Leaders find it very difficult, for want of an imagination
+trained by the study of military history, to think themselves into and
+see the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act and
+ride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Most
+information, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner;
+and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situation
+affords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point,
+and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, with
+a proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty change
+is imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundation
+of the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner.
+Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War.
+
+How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers, which forms
+the basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and imparted forms
+the subject of this next section. Here we can only consider what can
+and must be done within the regiments and brigades, and the following
+suggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty.
+
+In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, the
+Regimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commanders
+must take the training in hand. He must begin with a definite
+strategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise corresponding
+schemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood of
+the garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as in
+practice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity in
+which contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what the
+patrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, write
+their reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure.
+
+In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to be
+followed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts of
+exercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completely
+assimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particular
+importance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders never
+lose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations always
+to this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their true
+importance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what time
+the report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of use
+for the special operation.
+
+The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so often
+happened, it arrives too late. This the patrol leader must keep in
+mind throughout his ride, and thence deduce the time at which his
+report must be despatched. He must also not only state clearly and
+precisely what he has seen, but call attention to its probable bearing
+on the operations, and inform his superior as to any peculiarities of
+the ground that may influence his future conduct. The object of the
+ride must be constantly in view, and the report not be overburdened
+with trivialities about the enemy's patrols and the like, which are
+often in War of quite negligible importance.
+
+If the Commanding Officer chooses to take the whole of his officers
+out to these expeditions, he is, of course, free to do so.
+
+The Squadron Commanders now take their subordinates in hand and pass
+on the instruction in the same spirit and manner, or hand over the
+matter to the senior lieutenant, if he has been thoroughly instructed
+for the purpose. In this manner a good uniform system of patrol
+leading based on sound principles can be attained if the Commanding
+Officer and his subordinates take all types of patrol duty into the
+sphere of their practical instruction. The Brigade Commander can use
+his discretion in its supervision, and give any assistance he may
+consider necessary.
+
+For the practical training of the men, the foundation must, of course,
+be found in the squadron. But the teaching must start from constantly
+changing standpoints, and must be systematically carried on in the
+higher Commands, which is at present not the case. For though at times
+such exercises are carried out by the regiments, there is no
+systematic progress, and no consequent development or representation
+of the most important elements, whilst higher up no attempt is even
+made to continue the instruction further. The influence of the
+Brigadier is confined in general to the detail education and drill,
+and though the Division is now and again drilled, it never 'operates'
+in the strategical sense.
+
+As concerns the education of the squadron, this must from the very
+beginning be rooted in modern conditions, which in the first place
+demand the development in the man of the greatest possible
+individuality. War requires this, as well as the gift of grasp and
+resolution even in difficult situations, from every Cavalry soldier,
+from the highest to the lowest. The exercise, however, of such
+qualities can only be demanded from men who bring with them at least a
+certain degree of comprehension for the nature of War, and it is
+therefore of the utmost importance that this comprehension should be
+developed by suitable instruction. This is often sinned against,
+because sufficient attention is not paid to such instruction, and also
+because we still work on out-of-date lines, and without any
+well-defined principles. In my opinion the recruit must not be
+overwhelmed with a whole mass of thoroughly unpractical knowledge.
+
+In this period of education one must limit the scope to only the most
+important and necessary matters, but teach these so that the men
+understand them clearly and thoroughly.
+
+In the latter years one can build out systematically on this
+foundation. Thus I consider it quite unnecessary to harass the recruit
+with long-winded explanations of the military virtues--loyalty,
+obedience, and courage--or with long lists of different salutes to be
+given, the recipients of which never come within his ken. It is quite
+superfluous to teach them the different parts of the lock of the
+carbine and their mutual interaction, all about stable duty and guard
+mounting. Even the theoretical instruction about the organization of
+the Army, treatment of sore backs, horse sickness, etc., can be
+reduced to much smaller dimensions than at present. Stable work and
+guard duties, and so forth, a man learns much quicker and better from
+daily practice. On the other hand, the time gained by curtailing these
+matters must be used most zealously to teach him what he absolutely
+must know for War. That is to say, the simplest principles of Field
+Service, the composition of mixed detachments, practical shooting, and
+the exterior treatment of the carbine. The instruction in Field
+Service, which interests us here the most, can, for the recruits, be
+kept down to very narrow limits. The principles to be observed in
+placing pickets, vedettes, etc., he can very well do without. On the
+other hand, he must know thoroughly those things which he will have to
+do himself--his duty on patrols, or as bearer of a message, or
+orderly, also the general connection of the military conditions
+amongst which he will have to move or to notice amongst the enemy,
+such as organization of the troops, arrangement of the outposts,
+relation of the commands, plan and appearance of entrenchments,
+shelter trenches, gun epaulments, cover, etc.[29]
+
+         [Footnote 29: Instruction with models helps the man quickest;
+         it is very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture
+         of military things.]
+
+He must know, too, that if taken prisoner, he must give no correct
+answers as to anything concerning his own Army.
+
+It is quite possible to awaken the intellectual faculties of the man
+and to develop them even within these narrow limits, for the more
+tersely the facts are stated, and the more thorough the instructions,
+the more is his thinking power stimulated, whereas a mass of material
+to be absorbed merely confuses him. This intellectual pressure of the
+instructor must not, of course, be limited solely to the lesson hour,
+but he must seize every possible opportunity to assert his influence.
+Especial attention is to be directed to habituate the men to carry in
+their minds verbal messages for a considerable period, and then to
+repeat them clearly and concisely. It is of great assistance to the
+intellectual development of the men if they are compelled always to
+express themselves in grammatically complete sentences, instead of in
+broken phrases; but I should consider it as a serious error to attempt
+to teach the recruit the neighbourhood of the garrison, both on the
+map and on the ground. For in this way one deprives the man of one of
+his few opportunities which occur to him during his whole service of
+learning to find his way in unknown country, and thus to develop the
+instinct of finding his way, which requires considerable practice.
+
+That this faculty is one of the most important in War-time for every
+Cavalry soldier can hardly be open to doubt. From the same point of
+view I must enter a protest against the absurd misuse of maps in
+Peace-time. Of course, the men, and particularly the patrol leaders,
+must understand how to read a map and find their way by it, and all
+non-commissioned officers and men out of their first year's service
+must be trained in so doing, but it is altogether impractical, and
+therefore a bad preparation for war, if in the interests of better
+manoeuvre results maps are issued in uncounted numbers even on the
+larger scales, so that not only every patrol leader, but every
+orderly, can obtain one for a couple of pence. In War, and
+particularly in an enemy's country, such extravagance in their issue
+is obviously out of the question.
+
+The education of the non-commissioned officers must also be
+systematically set in hand. They should be divided, according to their
+intelligence and performances, in different groups--two will generally
+suffice--and the abler men should not only receive instruction for the
+higher branches of their duties, but must also be rationally taught
+how to teach others. The non-commissioned officers' school must also
+receive thorough attention; if it is not conducted seriously, it
+involves a scandalous waste of time, but if the men receive a really
+earnest and stimulating instruction, it helps most materially in their
+intellectual development, and thus reacts most favourably on their
+military capacity.
+
+As concerns the practical exercises of the squadron, these must, as
+far as possible, cut themselves free from the spirit of minor tactics,
+and work as directly as they can towards the requirements of War on a
+great scale. The destruction of railways and bridges, service on
+requisitioning duties, etc., must naturally continue to be practised;
+for though in spirit they belong to minor tactics, they are also
+required in great Wars. But, above all, one must break with the old
+one-sided schemes of outpost squadron--officers and non-commissioned
+officers, posts and vedettes--and the whole subject must be treated on
+wider lines more in accordance with the changing requirements of
+active service. The different purposes for which localities are held
+and utilized in different manners, the use of woods, and waves of the
+ground, must all be drawn most thoroughly into the scope of the
+exercises; and whilst still at squadron work the men must be made
+clearly to understand the difference between mixed outposts and those
+of Independent Cavalry, and the chief importance of their whole
+training in this branch of their duty must be laid on the latter,
+which is even nowadays not yet sufficiently the case. Further, there
+must be thorough training in duties of security and reconnoitring at
+night, and in particular of the defence of cantonments against
+nocturnal attacks.
+
+In general, it must be clearly understood that all squadron training
+can only be elementary, and hence must be regarded as a stepping-stone
+towards the whole field-service training. Where this is left
+altogether to the squadrons, the men never have the opportunity of
+becoming acquainted with the conditions of time and space which limit
+their action when in large bodies. Continuous exercises also, always
+in the same units, lead only too easily to empty repetition and many
+misunderstandings. The Squadron Field Service training must,
+therefore, be limited in time, and as soon as it is completed it must
+be continued in the regiment, and where the conditions at all
+allow--_i.e._, where the garrisons are not too far apart--it must
+culminate in brigade work.
+
+The 'training'--_i.e._, the condition of the horses-must by this time
+have made such progress that marches of twenty to thirty miles for the
+main body are well within their power. Here a wide and profitable
+field opens for the Brigade Commander, but it is important in every
+case--security, screening, reconnaissance, raid, or surprise--to bring
+out systematically and clearly the essential difference of procedure
+required, so that all grades of Leaders learn to realize the
+fundamental distinction which exists between these various forms of
+their several duties.
+
+It is also equally important that in each Command operations in
+several detachments, the regulation of their marching speed, their
+combined action in the fight, the proper working of the arrangements
+for collecting information or transmitting orders, should be practised
+again and again till certainty in their interaction is secured.
+
+It is further necessary to call attention to the necessity, in the
+interests of a prudent economy of one's forces, to arrange the patrol
+service systematically, not only as regards the sphere of action
+allotted to each, but also as to the time of their departure.
+
+Thus, in the march of a single body, the duty of attending to its
+security may be assigned to the troops themselves, whilst the
+reconnoitring task is allotted by the officer directing the
+operations; or, in the case of separate bodies, that each receives its
+own particular scouting mission, with which, then, the Director
+refrains from interfering. Otherwise it may easily happen that patrols
+are despatched for the same purpose by different Commanders, with a
+corresponding waste of power and the risks of leaving gaps in the
+whole line.
+
+The Commanders of mixed detachments should also make this need of
+systematic procedure clear to themselves, and either leave the whole
+duty of reconnaissance in the hands of the Cavalry, or if they elect
+to retain certain portions of the work in their own hands they should
+inform the Cavalry Commander of the fact, and not interfere afterwards
+with his arrangements, or fail to keep him acquainted with the
+measures they have themselves taken.
+
+The first course is correct in principle, and will always give the
+best results when a competent Cavalry officer is kept sufficiently
+acquainted with the views of his superior, and made personally
+responsible for results.
+
+Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms,
+these, too, must lead into different paths from those at present
+pursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry for
+reconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalry
+itself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance,
+except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization and
+development of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinion
+when viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalry
+with companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all,
+and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important to
+secure practice for the troops in judging the appearance of
+considerable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position,
+and thence deducing their probable numerical strength.
+
+The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted a
+scale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and by
+arrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often be
+made. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade to
+further the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, although
+such exercises can in no way replace the actual manoeuvring of large
+bodies.
+
+It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training of
+the Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in the
+strategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units.
+Even the manoeuvres, important as they undoubtedly are, can never
+replace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing of equal
+importance with the great drill practices of the higher units, since
+the strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander of the Army
+depends on its intelligent handling in this particular field, and it
+is here that the difficulties to be overcome are especially great.
+
+Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of the
+several problems is to be produced.
+
+It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible,
+trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should be
+employed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents;
+otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of under-estimating
+the difficulties with which in real War we shall have to contend. But to
+guard against this self-deception should be the end and object of all
+our efforts.
+
+It will, therefore, be necessary to calculate distance and the width
+of areas to be swept over, with reference to modern conditions, and
+not to work on the scale that sufficed us in France in 1870. The
+telegraph must also be taken into account, and it must be strictly
+insisted on that it is only to be used for such reports and in such
+cases in which it would be available on service. It should, therefore,
+be laid down beforehand which side is to be considered as in an
+enemy's country. For the representation of following portions of the
+Army, flag columns and peace garrisons may be employed, as this is of
+the utmost importance for the systematic practice of the patrol
+service.
+
+The formation of territorial Cavalry Inspections and Sub-Inspections,
+already advocated above, would give the necessary foundation for our
+purposes. After finding the Divisional Cavalry necessary on a War
+strength, the remaining regiments in their several districts could be
+formed in Divisions and Corps of always varying composition in order
+to carry out Independent Cavalry manoeuvres.
+
+To practise the participation of the other Arms, corresponding
+arrangements with the adjacent Corps Commanders could be made, so that
+their annual manoeuvres could work in with the Cavalry scheme, but the
+strategic side should have the preference. Operations would not always
+culminate in a great Cavalry engagement, but a skilful conduct of the
+manoeuvres in practical country would generally insure such encounters
+without too great a charge for agricultural compensation.
+
+I do not believe that such a scheme, though it would certainly mean a
+complete break with established Routine, would materially increase the
+cost of the manoeuvres. The damage, now disseminated by the many
+regiments without any corresponding gain to their efficiency, would
+now be concentrated on the same district, but the gain to the Arm
+itself, as well as for the whole Army, would be both decisive and
+epoch-making.
+
+Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seems
+to me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly count
+on seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile we
+must search for expedients.
+
+From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the period
+allotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such a
+degree that Field-Service days can be interposed between the drill
+days, in which at least the combined action of masses within the
+limits of Field-Service exercises can be practised.
+
+The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrifice
+a part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in the
+interest of the proposed strategic manoeuvres, and whether the
+advantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any rate
+partially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to a
+certain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up our
+minds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the present
+exercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed in
+groups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carried
+out without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are so
+managed that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters,
+during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very small
+cost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not at
+all necessary to carry them through to their culmination in an
+engagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, when
+necessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery for
+reconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation,
+the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonable
+limits.
+
+An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regiments
+in Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those in
+Saarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forces
+are constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by which
+each element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screen
+covering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night the
+points at which they are actually quartered. The distances of the
+places named one from another are such that they fairly represent a
+possible situation in War, and a single day's march might well bring
+them into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could easily be found
+in the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and the Infantry in
+the respective garrisons might represent the heads of the following
+Armies' columns without undue interference with their programme of
+training. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons only per
+regiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train, the point
+being not so much the number of such waggons provided as the service
+loading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night preceding
+the march, outposts could be established, and the service of
+exploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercise
+for the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low cost
+and with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally be
+conducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the example
+shows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easily
+organized.[30]
+
+         [Footnote 30: Taking into account these and similar demands
+         on the Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the
+         time has not come to attach to them permanently officers of
+         the General Staff. Every increase in the number of these
+         officers employed in peace is a great advantage for War,
+         because the War formations require far more Staff Officers to
+         fill the new positions created on mobilization than are
+         employed in peace--a very serious disadvantage. I consider it
+         absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry
+         should be provided with a permanent Staff.]
+
+Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into account
+the numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in future
+Warfare, it would be a great gain to the Arm if in the manoeuvres, in
+which its action in combination with the other Arms should be taught,
+this point of view was brought more into the foreground.
+
+Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Arms
+should be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather is
+whether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; the
+importance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background,
+and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses.'
+Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficiently
+practised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising the
+large units are far more difficult to find.
+
+I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms if
+present Brigade manoeuvres, with all their superannuated customs, were
+abolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps manoeuvres. The
+Cavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its point
+of view these manoeuvres could be made far more practical, and it
+would be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in accordance
+with reality.
+
+It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry should
+have opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action on
+a grand scale. At present these only arise in the manoeuvres with
+mixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry manoeuvres they are
+difficult of representation.
+
+The Director of the manoeuvres can also do much to make the operations
+instructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the interests of
+all engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon the Cavalry
+are kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens that patrols
+are despatched at far too late an hour to make it possible for their
+reports to arrive in time. Commanders, again, frequently wish to be
+informed as to the exact position of every battalion on the other
+side, although they generally know his total force with accuracy, or
+they want to know the exact strength of the Garrison holding a certain
+village or locality, as if Cavalry could under any circumstances
+supply such information; and if at night no sketch of the enemy's
+outpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are held to have failed
+in their duty. All these demands are, in my opinion, entirely
+unpractical; in War one never has such precise information, and no
+rational man dreams of wasting the strength of his Cavalry in
+endeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere remnants of
+the Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme case when
+perhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly unpractical to
+require under all circumstances complete information as to the
+progress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is impossible,
+unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not merely are
+such demands unpractical, but they exercise a most prejudicial effect,
+for too accurate and too detailed information gets the Generals into
+bad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is well-nigh ruined.
+Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men must not be afraid to
+keep well up to the enemy, and bring back intelligence even out of the
+zone of his fire; but, generally, reliable observations are only made
+out of range. The Cavalry must learn principally to judge the enemy's
+arrangements from a distance; they must direct their attention to the
+essential only, and not waste their time in unnecessary side issues.
+If justice is to be done to these requirements, it is quite impossible
+to collect all the information the Generals so frequently require.
+Thus they get in the habit of observing in an unpractical manner, and
+the whole of this most important branch of their education suffers
+accordingly. So much is this the case that nowadays the patrol leaders
+often exchange mutual confidences to one another, as it is practically
+impossible, owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain the
+required information otherwise, and they consider it better to get it
+in this manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats of
+riding.
+
+Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the training
+when kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates.
+
+Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic element
+in which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is the
+constant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of the
+enemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning element
+in which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work,
+and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in our
+Peace-time training.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS
+
+
+The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the
+various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions
+of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon
+the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an
+absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready
+to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of
+the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony
+with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods
+of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able
+to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with
+swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in
+addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess
+inexhaustible activity of mind and body.
+
+If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders
+of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified
+in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental
+qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various
+problems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increased
+amount of military knowledge and executive ability.
+
+The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry
+engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of
+the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above,
+and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole
+situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such
+moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education
+which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness,
+and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the
+great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with
+accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of
+an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results
+deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by
+Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a
+large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be
+reported--deductions will not be drawn. There will be no
+discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the
+Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to
+the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what
+it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform.
+They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce
+the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to
+divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to
+determine the most important points and directions in which to follow
+up any available clue.
+
+If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, he
+should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to
+determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point
+to direct his further advance.
+
+If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to
+decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their
+subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other
+direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest
+importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in
+face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.
+
+Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all
+points to the same conclusion--viz., that a comprehensive military
+education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the
+Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The
+history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable
+examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the
+future.
+
+Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only--the point was
+to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or
+were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose
+doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence,
+seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would
+have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for
+the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction
+in which the troops they saw were moving--a matter of most vital
+importance--or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or
+reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were
+all moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily have
+ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus,
+because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led
+to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence--the
+actual position of the French right flank--could not be determined
+until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire
+misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have
+repeated themselves times without number.
+
+When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable
+information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a
+proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is
+of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently
+guarantee their competence.
+
+The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is
+on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these
+schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the
+more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry
+Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the
+practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with
+nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training.
+Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details,
+which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the
+whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and
+in the few great manoeuvres in which an Officer might find an
+opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in
+the foundation necessary to make full use of it.
+
+The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted to the needs
+of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find himself in
+situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for their
+solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military
+authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical
+and practical education.
+
+The latter could best be provided for in connection with the
+development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt
+with above. The former--_i.e._, the scientific side--could be most
+adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of
+the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for
+the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have
+spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their
+own units.
+
+If on the broader foundations of the military sciences--principally
+those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and
+Tactics--thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by
+practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the
+training were modified in conformity with the views therein already
+expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst
+our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs
+only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be
+achieved.
+
+Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing
+School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of
+Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to
+the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably
+to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides.
+
+So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, we must
+strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our existing
+educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no delay.
+
+We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers'
+training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they
+are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical
+relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an
+enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the
+other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given
+strategical situation.
+
+All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.
+
+One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual
+horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every
+circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert
+force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how
+to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre
+before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results
+than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.
+
+Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other
+soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress
+of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men
+most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.
+
+Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard
+of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the
+remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the
+unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the exercises in
+Field-Service duties, in manoeuvres and Cavalry exercises, always
+provided that these are all conducted in conformity with the spirit of
+modern operations. But since we have seen this practical duty, as at
+present carried on, nowhere meets the above conditions, we must find a
+supplement to it by recourse to systematic training in Field-Service
+rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for which, of course, the necessary
+funds must be provided.
+
+These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through
+each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being
+enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.
+
+But they will only then possess value and importance when based on
+connected military situations arising from the operations of modern
+Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution
+of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their
+mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own
+Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is
+necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he
+has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me,
+therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with
+these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all
+interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever
+placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate
+conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations,
+to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the
+framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently
+trivial in themselves, can mount up in the mass until they may
+jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.
+
+The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider
+becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative
+importance of each individual link in the chain.
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+
+If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief
+results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:
+
+The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen
+materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced
+into the conduct of modern War--viz., those due to changes in the
+composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc.
+Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the
+battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.
+
+Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal
+importance. Great results--whether strategical or tactical--can only
+be obtained by the employment of 'Masses.'
+
+The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both
+organic, strategic, and tactical.
+
+The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions,
+have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has
+remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence
+we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it
+must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of
+which the following are the most important items:
+
+Increase in the price paid for our remounts.
+
+Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, on the
+lines of our existing and well-tried organization.
+
+Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically
+equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.
+
+Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in
+peace and War.
+
+Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.
+
+Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding
+increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true
+quick-firer.
+
+Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the
+supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary
+strategical mobility.
+
+Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both
+individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the
+horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.
+
+Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field
+service, to fit us for employment in 'Masses,' and to meet the new
+strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must
+be taken into account.
+
+Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only
+simplification in many details, but the addition of sections
+developing the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the several
+units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action,
+and more precise formulation of tactical principles.
+
+Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance,
+security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service
+regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where
+practicable.
+
+A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers;
+creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on
+scientific principles.
+
+Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts,
+to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions),
+which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.
+
+Annual Cavalry Manoeuvres.
+
+Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare.
+
+This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a
+few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a
+single stroke of the pen--indeed, it needs a considerable degree of
+optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am
+equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the
+extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our
+minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall
+short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.
+
+Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be
+attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms,
+safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain
+victory.
+
+Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races
+which will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' which
+seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but
+rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the
+evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of
+force--fighting power--which conditions the development of all other
+social interests. If we possess the 'force,' the rest will follow.
+Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our power the
+utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our own minds
+as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in any other
+'act of human intercourse,' is the 'best' ever reached by mortal
+executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of
+destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made
+the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.
+
+In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us,
+unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart
+and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be
+encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we
+shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: _Per aspera
+ad Astra_.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+  Action, typical case of Cavalry, 225;
+    example of Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
+
+  Advance, time to be selected for, 32;
+    rate of, 121;
+    of enemy marks period for pushing forward, 27
+
+  Advantages, in War, must be fought for, 29
+
+  Ammunition, carbine, insufficiency of, 175, 179;
+    increase in amount of, for practice, 250
+
+  Ammunition columns, special, required for Cavalry, 179
+
+  Armies, change of character of modern, 3
+
+  Art of War, new conditions in, 3;
+    their effect on Cavalry, 9;
+    result of first engagement of overwhelming importance, 12
+
+  Artillery, effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, 15;
+    power of, can be over-estimated, 54;
+    support of dismounted Cavalry by, 60, 100;
+    protection of, 95;
+    Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action, 100;
+    position for, 101;
+    one battery per brigade recommended, 179;
+    quick-firing guns wanted, 180;
+    should be attacked from flank, 234;
+    co-operation in Cavalry training, 263
+
+  Attack, stereotyped forms of, prohibited, 72;
+    on flank when advisable, 78;
+    simultaneous, on front and flank, 79;
+    'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during, 91;
+    by dismounted troops, 99;
+    change of direction of, when permissible, 116;
+    importance of vehemence of onslaught, 232;
+    formation for, against Infantry and Artillery, 234;
+    distribution and duties of dismounted men in, 259
+
+
+  Baggage-train should be represented at manoeuvres, 279
+
+  Bapaume, Battle of, 57
+
+  Barley as forage, 206
+
+  Battle-field, place of Cavalry in, 81, 84;
+    case of Mars la Tour, 82;
+    best formation for, 85;
+    decided by circumstances of case, 82, 85;
+    simple formations alone applicable on, 225;
+    Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
+
+  Beans as a ration, 205
+
+  Bit and bridoon, merits of, 192, 197
+
+  Bivouac, disadvantages of, 122, 125
+
+  Breaking in. See 'Training'
+
+  Bridging material, sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with
+    small streams, etc., 175
+
+  Bridoon. See 'Bit'
+
+  Brigade, highest unit for drill purposes, 238
+
+  Bugle calls, when allowable, 69;
+    value of, 230;
+    regimental calls, 230;
+    movements to be practised without, 236
+
+
+  Cantonments, advantages of providing, 125
+
+  Carbine, method of attachment, 176;
+    improved pattern needed, 177
+
+  Cartridges, method of carrying, 177
+
+  Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,' 7;
+    during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878, 7;
+    experiences of the past insufficient, 8;
+    proportion to other Arms, 10;
+    importance of, greater than formerly, 11;
+    new tasks for, 14;
+    actual fighting value diminished, 16;
+    best strategic value increased, 16;
+    public opinion at fault, 16;
+    exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged, 16;
+    German organization of, requires reform, 17;
+    clear conception of requirements during each phase needed, 17;
+    advance during mobilization deprecated, 23;
+    should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins, 28;
+    importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement, 31;
+    in what cases the principal Arm, 37;
+    Divisional, 38;
+    Independent, 38;
+    fire action of, during battles, 55;
+    greater tactical cohesion than Infantry, 58;
+    scope of, enormously increased, 59;
+    importance of good leadership, 63;
+    place of, in line of battle, 81, 84;
+    formation of, on battle-field, 85;
+    factors determining strategic employment of, 126;
+    difficulty of supplying reinforcements, 151;
+    augmentation of German, necessary, 153;
+    and not to be postponed till mobilization, 158;
+    training of, requires reforming, 181 _et seq._;
+    Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs, 257;
+    tasks for, in future War not properly appreciated, 268
+
+  Change of formation during action, 69;
+    from 'rendezvous' to 'attack,' 79
+
+  Charge, the, when preferable to fire action, 52;
+    example of Waterloo, 52;
+    position of Commander during, 65;
+    choice of moment for, 87;
+    cohesion during, 221;
+    speed of, 221
+
+  Chargers. See 'Horses'
+
+  Chotusitz, Battle of, 83
+
+  Civilians, possible participation in future Wars by, 10;
+    armed resistance by, to be suppressed, 33
+
+  Column, regimental, value of, for War, 227;
+    squadron, disadvantages of, 228
+
+  Combined action, factors essential to success of, 68
+
+  Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments, 45;
+    must be under a single leader, 46;
+    efficiency of, more important with Cavalry than Infantry, 63
+
+  Commander, qualities needed in a good, 64, 286;
+    place of, before and during charges, 65;
+    when working with other Arms, 66;
+    choice of formation to be left to, 72, 76, 77;
+    must be informed of progress of Infantry combat, 86;
+    qualities required in covering a retreat, 86;
+    in dismounted action, 93;
+    must decide as to extension in strategy, 106;
+    and concentration in combat, 106;
+    to be kept informed of general situation, 111, 117;
+    must organize his own reconnaissance, 120;
+    personal supervision of front by, 121;
+    forage reserve to be formed by, 131;
+    to arrange times for drill, 215;
+    but not to deviate from Regulations, 220;
+    importance of handling 'masses,' 216.
+    See also 'Leader'
+
+  Commencement of War, essence of all Cavalry action during, 26;
+    obtaining intelligence during, 27
+
+  Communications, increased liability to interruption of, 13;
+    greater opportunities for Cavalry to interfere with, 14;
+    especially after victory, 14;
+    to be maintained with Headquarters on field of battle, 67
+
+  Comparison between Cavalry and Infantry, 59
+
+  Concentration, question of disturbing enemy's communications during, 19;
+    views of other Powers on this, 20;
+    value of raids during, 20;
+    premature commitment of Cavalry during, 24;
+    reasons against sacrificing Cavalry during, 25;
+    defensive duties during, 26;
+    advantages of pushing forward during enemy's, 28;
+    of force for raids, 35;
+    of considerable masses, when essential, 44;
+    for combat, 106, 108, 109
+
+  Corn, amount of, to be carried by Cavalry, 130;
+    author's experiment, 203
+
+  Coulmiers, Battle of, 86
+
+  'Critique' after field days, 243
+
+  Cyclists, value of, in conjunction with Cavalry, 22, 147;
+    circulation of intelligence by, 39;
+    should enable Divisional Cavalry to be economized, 42;
+    further Regulations required, 146;
+    limitations of, 148;
+    to be attached to Cavalry, 178
+
+
+  Deception of enemy, means towards, 119
+
+  Defects in horses, correction of, 199
+
+  Defence of villages, 97
+
+  Defensive duties at commencement of War, 26;
+    combat, 92;
+    'immobile' detachments during, 92;
+    action, breaking off a, 94;
+    action, duties of dismounted men during, 259
+
+  Despatch riders, 138, 145
+
+  Detachments, economy in use of, 38;
+    reports from, to Headquarters, 111;
+    outflanking, during attack, 232
+
+  Direction, change of, during action, 117
+
+  Dismounted action, increased importance of, 49;
+    when desirable in attack, 49;
+    when inevitable, 50;
+    Sheridan's Cavalry in, 51;
+    during rearguard actions, 52;
+    during general engagements, 55;
+    examples of Fredericksburg and Five Forks, 55;
+    in South African War, 56;
+    Franco-German War, 57;
+    'mobile' and 'immobile' horses, 91;
+    in defensive combat, 92, 93;
+    tactical distribution of men in, 96;
+    'Wing' or 'Line' systems, 96;
+    in defence of villages, 97 _et seq._;
+    in attack, 99;
+    training for, 247;
+    importance of, not sufficiently appreciated, 248 _et seq._;
+    not to be confined to the defensive, 249;
+    recruits' course, 250;
+    Regulations as to, require expansion, 257 _et seq._;
+    as important as fighting in the saddle, 262
+
+  Dispersion of troops for raids, 35;
+    for screening and security, 106, 109
+
+  Divisional Cavalry defined, 38;
+    duties of, 39;
+    apportionment of, 41;
+    as little as possible should be retained for Infantry Divisions, 42;
+    reconnaissance duties of, 141;
+    security duties of, 144
+
+  Divisions of Cavalry, maintenance of, during peace, 161;
+    present strength insufficient, 165;
+    permanent creation of, not advisable, 167
+
+  'Double-column' formation, when recommended, 80, 229
+
+  'Drei Treffen Taktik,' 73
+
+  'Dressur' detachment, 190
+
+  Drill, shortening of season for, 198;
+    importance of Squadron and Regimental, 214 _et seq._;
+    merits of Brigade and Divisional, 215 _et seq._;
+    ceremonial to be separated from practical, 237;
+    Brigade, the highest unit for formal, 238
+
+
+  Education, military, for man and horse, 186;
+    tactical, for troops generally, 213 _et seq._;
+    of recruits, 272;
+    of non-commissioned ranks, 275;
+    higher, of officers, 286 _et seq._
+
+  Efficiency of troops essential to good leadership, 126
+
+  Enemy, advance of, marks period for pushing forward Cavalry, 27;
+    Cavalry of, must be beaten off field to obtain information, 30;
+    outposts of, to be broken through, 33;
+    communications, of, to be attacked, 33
+
+  Equipment for bridging and telegraphs, 174
+
+  Equitation, Staff for, 193;
+    proposed new procedure, 200;
+    school of, in Hanover, 290
+
+  Exercises to develop 'tactical principles,' 236;
+    of larger formations than Brigades, 239;
+   'field-service' exercises, 240 _et seq._
+
+  Expediency, the highest ideal of strategy, 47
+
+  Extension of front when advisable, 107;
+    in action when favourable, 240 _et seq._
+
+
+  Field-firing, increased importance of, 251;
+    scheme for, 252
+
+  'Field-service' exercises, 218;
+    nature of, 240;
+    ground for, 239;
+
+  Cavalry acting independently, 240;
+    Cavalry in combination with other Arms, 241;
+    existing deficiencies in, 266
+
+  Fire action often imperative nowadays, 47;
+    occasions when it will decide the day, 50;
+    General Lee's capitulation, 51;
+    South African War, 56;
+    Franco-German War, 57
+
+  Firearms, increased range of, 36;
+    better class of, needed by Cavalry, 58
+
+  Flank attack, when advisable, 78, 79;
+    after victory, 83;
+    during charge, 233
+
+  Flanks of enemy to be worked round to obtain information, 29
+
+  Forage, reserve of, 131;
+    amount to be carried on horses, 169;
+    author's experiment, 203
+
+  Force necessary to be employed in various circumstances, 36
+
+  Formation for attack, 36;
+    change of, during action, 69;
+    latitude to be allowed to Commander, 76, 77;
+    merits of 'double column,' 80;
+    'mass' when suitable, 81;
+    on battle-field, 85;
+    of dismounted men in action, 96;
+    in defence of villages, 96;
+    in dismounted attack, 100;
+    best, suitable for War, 226;
+    to be avoided, 226;
+    regimental column, 227
+
+  Four-squadron regiments, 154
+
+  Frederick the Great on length of marches, 122
+
+  Front, extension and concentration of, 107
+
+  Frontal attack against Infantry and Artillery, 235
+
+
+  Galloping, exercises in, 209
+
+  German Cavalry, numerically inadequate, 151;
+    expedients for augmenting, 153;
+    proposed territorial organization, 167
+
+  Gravelotte, example of faulty reconnaissance reports, 288
+
+  Ground, value of tactical advantage of, 78;
+    acquisition of, for field-training, 239
+
+
+  Halts on march, 128
+
+  Headquarters, reports to be sent to, from detachments, 111
+
+  Horsemanship, 184
+
+  Horses, demands on, 87;
+    'mobile' or 'immobile,' 91;
+    position for led, 93 _et seq._;
+    protection of, 95;
+    rest for, 122;
+    security of, during rest, 122, 124;
+    bivouac on march, 122;
+    on outpost, 123;
+    importance of care bestowed on, 123, 127;
+    excessive demands on, 128;
+    shortage of, in Germany, 152;
+    'augmentation,' 155;
+    'untrained,' of small use, 158;
+    increased demands on, 181;
+    training of, 185 _et seq._;
+    English thoroughbreds, 187;
+    Prussian, 187;
+    old, 194;
+    food for, increase of, 203;
+    endurance of, 202;
+    feeding, author's experiment in, 203;
+    galloping powers, 209;
+    weight to be put on, 212
+
+
+  Increase of German Cavalry needed, 158
+
+  Independence, when to be given to subordinates, 68
+
+  'Independent Cavalry' defined, 38;
+    conditions which determine allotment of, 42;
+    in what cases it should be concentrated on decisive lines, 43;
+    security duties of, 144
+
+  Individual superiority essential for patrols, 31
+
+  Infantry, effect on Cavalry of extended zone of fire of, 9;
+    difficult for Cavalry to encounter in close bodies, 10;
+    when once broken offer great opportunity to Cavalry, 15;
+    defence of villages and woods by, more difficult now, 15;
+    compared with Cavalry, 59
+
+  Initial success, great importance of, 12
+
+  Initiative, value of, 115
+
+  Inspections, new scheme of, for recruits and schools, 200;
+    importance of thorough, 246
+
+  Inspector-General of Cavalry, position of, 282 and footnote
+
+  Intelligence indispensable at commencement of War, 27;
+    spaces between enemy's columns to be penetrated to obtain, 27;
+    when more important than security, 28;
+    circulation of, 39;
+    during progress of action, 40;
+    experience of 1870, 40;
+    to be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through
+      usual channel, 45
+
+
+  Lance-exercises, 254;
+    better attachment of, necessary, 255
+
+  Leader, importance of-independence of, in combined action, 68, 76;
+    more initiative to be given to, 73;
+    to be careful about his horses, 87;
+    duty when covering a retreat, 88;
+    modern requirements in a good, 89, 90;
+    to be kept informed of the general situation, 111, 117;
+    clearness of intention, 116;
+    must organize his own intelligence, 117;
+    capacity of, 126;
+    of great Cavalry masses, 286
+
+  Led horses, 91;
+    place for, 93, 94;
+    in dismounted practice, 259
+
+  Lines--three-line system, 73
+
+  Locality, faculty of finding way in unknown, 274
+
+  Lunging rein, 188
+
+
+  Manoeuvres, Brigade and Divisional, little criterion of work in War, 42;
+    trotting and galloping at, 210;
+    weight to be carried at, 210;
+    movements which are of use for War, 226;
+    theatrical display in great Cavalry, 263;
+    deficiencies in existing, 266;
+    Imperial, 267;
+    baggage train to be represented at, 279;
+    limitations of telegraphs at, 279;
+    of Brigades to be abolished in favour of Divisional and Corps, 283;
+    limitation of demands on Cavalry at, 284
+
+  Maps, misuse of, 274
+
+  Marches, flanking detachments to, 121;
+    length of, 122;
+    endurance of horses on, 127;
+    excessive lengths of, 128;
+    average lengths of, 128;
+    trotting and halts on, 128
+
+  Mars la Tour, 82, 83, 86, 225 (footnote)
+
+  'Mass' when suitable, 81, 82
+
+  Masses, training of Cavalry in large, 214, 215;
+    necessity for bringing Cavalry together frequently in, 245
+
+  Maxim guns with Cavalry, 178
+
+  Messengers, employment of, to be limited, 129
+
+  Mobility, essential in surprise actions, 118;
+    German Cavalry deficient in, 169;
+    of supply waggons, 173
+
+  Mounted Reserve, duties of, 95;
+    strength of, 96
+
+  Movements most suitable for battle-field, 226;
+    to be avoided, 226;
+    to be practised on simple warnings, 236
+
+  Musketry, importance of knowledge of, by officers, 253;
+    judging distances, 253
+
+
+  Napoleon on length of Cavalry marches, 122
+
+  Narbonne, General von Pelet, proposals of, 155
+
+  Numbers alone can prevail in victory or in covering retreat, 36;
+    give opportunities of dismounted action, 57
+
+
+  Oats, 205
+
+  Observation of masses of enemy's army by officers patrol, 31;
+    during combat, 40
+
+  Offensive against Infantry, Cavalry capable of taking the, 60
+
+  Officers of Cavalry have better knowledge of their men than in
+      Infantry, 59;
+    importance of training of, 64;
+    increased importance of knowledge of musketry, 253;
+    to be attached to Infantry for instruction, 256;
+    higher education of, 286 _et seq._;
+    training in horsemanship of, 291
+
+  Officers patrols, when necessary, 31
+
+  Orderlies to be limited, 128
+
+  Orders, simplicity essential in, 68;
+    how to be transmitted in the field, 69;
+    by bugle call, 69;
+    verbal, 69;
+    to be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates, 112;
+    importance of clearness in, 116
+
+  Organization of German Cavalry unchanged, 17;
+    requires reform, 17;
+    must be elastic, 47;
+    example of 1870, 47;
+    also of Napoleon, 48;
+    of German Cavalry to be by territorial districts, 167
+
+  'Outer lines,' advantages of, 78
+
+  Outflanking tactics, when undesirable, 53;
+    detachments, work of, during charge, 232
+
+  Outposts, necessity for breaking through enemy's, 33;
+    fixed rules for, impossible, 126
+
+
+  Patrols, causes of possible danger in the future, 10;
+    breaking up of enemy's communications by officers, 22;
+    must ascertain changes in enemy's initial dispositions, 25;
+    must protect frontier districts from raids, 25;
+    must avoid becoming desperately involved, 26;
+    superiority in individual patroller essential, 31;
+    defeat of enemy's, necessary, 31;
+    'reconnoitring' distinct from 'security' patrols, 133;
+    strength of, 136;
+    duties of commander, 136;
+    transmission of despatches by, 138;
+    must report to Headquarters as well as through ordinary channel, 140;
+    'tactical,' 143;
+    'security,' 143;
+    screening by, 144;
+    Regulations need amendment, 145;
+    training for scouting basis of all reconnaissance instruction, 269;
+    suggestion as to instruction, 270
+
+  Place on battle-field of Cavalry, 84, 85
+
+  Prague, Battle of, 83
+
+  'Principles,' tactical, of Cavalry opposed to Cavalry, 231;
+    of Cavalry opposed to Infantry and Artillery, 234
+
+  Prisoners, value of capturing, during enemy's mobilization, 24
+
+  Protection of main force, steps required differ from those for
+      obtaining information, 29;
+    opposite views held, 29
+
+  Pursuit of beaten enemy imperative, 84;
+    methods of, 51;
+    dismounted action during, 51;
+    Waterloo, 52;
+    wars of 1866 and 1870, 84;
+    duties during, 88;
+    to be practised on a grand scale, 283
+
+
+  Quick-firing guns, employment of 180
+
+
+  Raids, value of, on outbreak of War, 20;
+    to exploit enemy's resources, 34;
+    indispensable element in future, 34;
+    depend on rapidity and surprise, 34;
+    and on concentration of force at night-time, 35;
+    dispersion during, 35
+
+  Rapidity essential in raids, 34;
+    and in dismounted attack, 99
+
+  Rations, emergency, for horses, 174;
+    author's experiment with forage, 203 _et seq._
+
+  Rearguard actions, to be practised on a grand scale, 283
+
+  Reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry necessary, 7;
+    rendered more difficult by range of modern firearms, 10;
+    and by smokeless powder, 10;
+    value of intensified, 12;
+    must be a separate service from screening, 31;
+    an exception to this, 41;
+    advantage of defeating enemy's reconnoitrers, 31;
+    under fire very difficult to effect, 39;
+    on the battle-field, 66;
+    cavalry leader must organize his own, 120;
+    training for scouting the basis of instruction in, 269;
+    knowledge of principles of 'higher strategy' essential, 288
+
+  Reconnoitring patrols, 134 _et seq._
+
+  Recruits, training of, 188 _et seq._, 273. See also 'Training'
+
+  Regiment, the fundamental tactical unit, 228
+
+  Regimental call, value of, 230 _et seq._
+
+  'Regimental column' formation, 227;
+    merits of double, 229
+
+  Regulations should not lay down fixed evolutions, 70;
+    but only essential principles of action, 70;
+    existing edition of, requires revision, 70, 79;
+    importance of Section 346, 76;
+    rearrangement recommended, 244;
+    as to training of dismounted squadrons, 253
+
+  Reinforcements, difficulty of supplying Cavalry, 151
+
+  Remounts, supply of, in War, 159;
+    English blood in, 187;
+    training of, 187
+
+  Reports in the field to be made to Headquarters and to adjacent
+      columns, 11;
+    transmission of, 138 _et seq._
+
+  Reserve forage, 131
+
+  Reserve squadrons, position for, during attack, 232
+
+  Reserve troops an easy prey to Cavalry when once beaten, 15
+
+  Rest, importance of, to horses, 124, 125
+
+  Retreat, advantages of 'outer lines' in, 78;
+    duty of Cavalry covering a, 88
+
+  Riding, cross-country, 186;
+    individual, 189
+
+  Riding School, 193 _et seq._
+
+  Roszbach, Battle of, 83
+
+  Rushes, advancing by, 113
+
+  Rye as forage, 206
+
+
+  Schlichting, General von, writings of, 81;
+    criticism of, 83;
+    on application of drill-book principles, 237
+
+  School, Riding, 192;
+    War (see 'War School');
+    of Cavalry, 290
+
+  Screening, importance of, 12;
+    during absence of troops, 27;
+    must give way to obtaining intelligence, 28;
+    distinct from reconnoitring, 32;
+    must be fought for, 33
+
+  Security when secondary to obtaining intelligence, 28;
+    during rest, 122;
+    general advantages of, 124
+
+  Sedan, Battle of, 87
+
+  Seidlitz, Von, at Zorndorf, 87
+
+  Simplicity essential to successful tactics, 68
+
+  Single combat exercises, 195 _et seq._
+
+  Skeleton enemy, 244
+
+  Soor, action of, 83
+
+  Squadron School, the basis of tactical training, 214;
+    drill, 217;
+    tactical training of dismounted, 258;
+    general education of, 272, 276;
+    practical exercises for, 275
+
+  'Squadron column,' merits of, 228
+
+  Staff required for Cavalry corps, 228
+
+  Strategical handling of Cavalry, importance of, 37;
+    fixed regulations inapplicable to, 105;
+    general principles, 105
+
+  Subdivision of force, 107
+
+  Summary of opinions on Cavalry generally, 294
+
+  Supply trains must march as fast as Cavalry, 171;
+    length of, 172;
+    mobility of, 173
+
+  Supreme Commander, presence of Cavalry essential to success of, 37
+
+  Surprise the essence of Cavalry actions, 16;
+    indispensable in raids, 34;
+    requirements for success in, 118
+
+  System, the 'three-line,' 74
+
+
+  Tactical action by Divisional Cavalry precluded, 40;
+    of Cavalry changed by new conditions, 49;
+    'Drei Treffen,' 73;
+    training for, too elementary, 223
+
+  Tactical education for troops generally, 213 _et seq._
+
+  Tactical principles, Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 231 _et seq._;
+    Cavalry _v._ Infantry and Artillery, 232 _et seq._;
+    exercises to develop the, 236
+
+  Tactical and strategical principles of the future, 83
+
+  Telegraph, control of, 140;
+    limitations as to the use of, in Manoeuvres, 279
+
+  'Three-line' system, 73
+
+  Training, true purpose of, 161
+    of Cavalry Staff, 166;
+    Von Moltke's proposals, 166;
+    changes must be met by new methods, 181;
+    of horses and men, 184 _et seq._;
+    length of period of, 188, 194;
+    proposed programme for, 200;
+    preparation for endurance, 207;
+    War conditions essential to, 208;
+    tactical, too elementary at present, 223;
+    for dismounted fighting, 247 _et seq._;
+    some deficiencies in present, 217;
+    of squadrons a stepping-stone to field service, 276
+
+  Training grounds ('Truppenübungs Plätze'), 239
+
+  Transmission of orders during action, 69
+
+  'Treffen,' definition of, 74
+
+  Trotting on march, 128
+
+  Turning movements, when imperative, 115
+
+
+  Verbal orders, 69
+
+  Villages, dismounted defence of, 97 _et seq._;
+    withdrawal from, 99
+
+  Vionville, Battle of, 107
+
+  Von-Rosenberg at Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
+
+
+  Waggons, supply, pace of, 171
+
+  War conditions essential to training, 208
+
+  War School, extent of teaching at, 289;
+    creation of school for Cavalry desirable, 290
+
+  Weight to be carried by horses, 212
+
+  Wheat as forage, 206
+
+  'Wing attack,' 76;
+    best formation for requirements of combat, 227;
+    in action against Infantry and Artillery, 234;
+    freedom as to use of, 244
+
+  Woerth, Battle of, 87
+
+
+  Zone of fire, results of extension of, 9
+
+  Zorndorf, Battle of, 87
+
+
+
+
+THE END
+
+
+BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD
+
+
+
+
+THE ART OF RECONNAISSANCE. By
+
+Colonel DAVID HENDERSON, D.S.O. With Diagrams. Small Crown 8vo., 5s.
+net.
+
+'The details of procedure suggested for a patrol are simpler, more
+practicable, and more efficacious than I have yet seen in any
+textbook. These chapters may be warmly recommended to every officer
+who wishes to prepare himself and his men for the most difficult and
+most important of those minor operations of war which form so great a
+part of its every-day reality.'--_Morning Post._
+
+
+THE FRONTIERSMAN'S POCKET BOOK.
+
+Compiled and Edited by ROGER POCOCK, on behalf of the Council of the
+Legion of Frontiersmen. With Illustrations. Leather, 5s. net.
+
+'A very handy and well-packed little volume.... It brings together a
+large amount of well-digested practical information about camping, means
+of travel, signals, shooting, first-aid, and, in short, everything that
+a pioneering, handy man ought to know.... May be heartily recommended to
+all classes of scouts and frontiersmen.'--_Scotsman._
+
+
+IMPERIAL STRATEGY. By the Military Correspondent of _The Times_. With
+Maps. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.
+
+'"Imperial Strategy" is one of the most valuable volumes published
+within recent years. The admirable volume should stand upon the shelf
+of every soldier, and of every thinker upon Imperial things.'--_Army
+and Navy Gazette._
+
+
+ARTILLERY AND EXPLOSIVES. Essays and Lectures written and delivered at
+various times. By Sir ANDREW NOBLE, K.C.B., D.C.L., F.R.S. With
+numerous Diagrams and Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.
+
+'The experience of Sir Andrew Noble covers such a wide field, and so
+many important changes have taken place in connection with rifled guns,
+their ammunition and projectiles, during the long period dealt with,
+that the views of so eminent an expert are of an incalculable value. He
+is therefore to be congratulated on his decision to bring into one
+volume the mass of important information and invaluable details
+respecting the progress in naval and artillery science.'--_Broad Arrow._
+
+
+FORTIFICATION: Its Past Achievements, Recent Developments, Future
+Progress. By Colonel Sir GEORGE S. CLARKE, R.E., K.C.M.G., F.R.S.,
+Governor of Bombay. New Edition, enlarged. With numerous
+Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 18s. net.
+
+'The reflections of this great soldier-statesman will be found as
+fascinating as they are instructive, and that reasonable intelligence
+is the only essential qualification for reading them with profit as
+well as with interest and pleasure.'--_Westminster Gazette._
+
+
+THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR. By Monsieur E. K. NOJINE, Accredited
+Russian War Correspondent during the Siege. Translated and abridged by
+Captain A. B. LINDSAY. Edited by Major E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O. With Maps
+and Illustrations. Demy 8vo., 15s. net.
+
+'M. Nojine is unusually well qualified to offer testimony on the long
+beleaguerment. He writes with vivacity and force, and the translation
+is competent and spirited, both on account of its vivid narrative and
+by reason of the extraordinary revelations it contains.... It is the
+most remarkable book about the war yet issued.'--_Times._
+
+
+THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA. Between the Japanese and Russian Fleets,
+fought on 27th May, 1905. By Captain VLADIMIR SEMENOFF (one of the
+survivors). Translated by Captain A. B. LINDSAY. Crown 8vo., 3s. 6d.
+net.
+
+'The most thrilling and touching records of naval warfare that we have
+ever read, and its very simplicity and lack of literary ornament make
+it the more impressive.... We share the emotions on board, feel the
+nervous thrill behind the gallant spirit and the cheerful
+countenance,'--_Westminster Gazette._
+
+
+FROM LIBAU TO TSU-SHIMA. A Narrative of the Voyage of Admiral
+Rojdestvensky's Squadron to the East, including a Detailed Account of
+the Dogger Bank Incident. By the late EUGENE POLITOVSKY, Chief
+Engineer of the Squadron. Translated by Major F. R. GODFREY, R.M.L.I.
+Large Crown 8vo., 2s. 6d. net.
+
+'Among terrible stories of the sea this is unique. In sentences whose
+graphic power Defoe did not exceed, he jots down from day to day what he
+sees and suffers.... The story of the sinking of the British
+fishing-boats in the North Sea is told with superb simplicity.'--PUNCH.
+
+
+OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, 1878--1880. Produced in the
+Intelligence Branch, Army Headquarters, India. Abridged Official
+Account. With numerous Maps and Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.
+
+'An excellent compendium of the whole war, clearly written and amply
+illustrated by photographs, maps, and diagrams.... It is a narrative
+that will fascinate the many who love to read about warlike
+movements.... It is a story of wise and patient preparation, carefully
+arranged generalship, supreme daring, amazing tenacity. Undoubtedly the
+right thing has been done in giving to the world a stirring story, which
+has remained too long, many will think, a secret record.'--_Sheffield
+Independent._
+
+
+THE GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. Prepared in
+the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlin. With Maps
+and Plans. Demy 8vo., 15s. net each.
+
+Part I.--From its Commencement in 1899 the Capture of General Cronje's
+Forces at Paardeburg. Translated by Colonel W. H. H. WATERS, R.A.,
+C.V.O.
+
+Part II.--The Advance to Pretoria, the Upper Tugela Campaign, etc.,
+etc. Translated by Colonel HUBERT DU CANE, R.A., M.V.O.
+
+'The most valuable work in which, since its close, the war has been
+discussed. It stands alone, because it is the only work in which the
+war has been surveyed by trained and competent students of war, the
+only one of which the judgments are based on a familiarity with the
+modern theory of war. The best book that has yet appeared on the South
+African War.'--_Morning Post._
+
+
+THE BATTLE OF WAVRE AND GROUCHY'S RETREAT. A Study of an obscure part
+of the Waterloo Campaign. By W. HYDE KELLY, R.E. With Maps and Plans.
+Demy 8vo., 8s. net.
+
+'... brings forward, with a vividness and brilliancy which compel
+attention throughout one of the most obscure pages in the story of the
+famous struggle.'--_Birmingham Post._
+
+
+THE BOOK OF WAR. Translated into English by Captain E. F. CALTHROP,
+R.A. Crown 8vo., 2s. 6d. net.
+
+This work, the writings of Suntzu and Wutzu, Chinese strategists of
+about the fifth century B.C., is the most famous work on the art of
+war in the Far East. It deals with operations of war, statecraft,
+moral and training of troops, stratagem, the use of spies, etc., and
+for twenty-five centuries it has been the bible of the Chinese or
+Japanese ruler. The book is distinguished alike by the poetry and
+grandeur of its language and the modernity of its spirit.
+
+
+LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi
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+Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi
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+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
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+
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+Title: Cavalry in Future Wars
+
+Author: Frederick von Bernhardi
+
+Translator: Charles Sydney Goldman
+
+Release Date: March 9, 2009 [EBook #28298]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1
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+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS ***
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+
+<h1>CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS</h1>
+
+
+<h2 class="b1">By HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL<br>
+  FREDERICK VON BERNHARDI</h2>
+
+<p class="center">Commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army</p>
+
+
+<h2 class="b1">Translated by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN</h2>
+
+<p class="center">Author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa'<br>
+  Editor of 'The Empire and the Century'</p>
+
+<p class="p4 center">With an Introduction by</p>
+
+<h2>LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH<br>
+  K.C.M.G., K.C.B., G.C.V.O.</h2>
+
+<p class="p4 center smaller">LONDON<br>
+  JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.<br>
+  1909</p>
+
+<p class="p2 center smaller"><i>First Edition, October, 1906</i><br>
+  <i>Second Edition, April, 1909</i></p>
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagev" name="pagev"></a>(p. v)</span> PREFACE</h2>
+
+<p>I ventured to express the opinion in my book, 'With General French and
+the Cavalry in South Africa,' that if a high ideal of the duties and
+possibilities of Cavalry is set before our officers, and the means of
+instruction and training are placed within their reach, we shall
+possess in our next great War a force which, if led by men of the
+stamp of General Sir John French, will prove to the world that the day
+of Cavalry is far indeed from being past.</p>
+
+<p>In other words, I am convinced that, with good leadership and the
+right material in men, which the South African War has shown we
+possess, all that we need to perfect our system is a proper
+recognition of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, and a resolve
+to break with the old and adapt ourselves to the new situation.</p>
+
+<p>Reforms such as this would necessitate must affect all arms of the
+Service, but no branch more than the Cavalry, whose task in future
+will be more difficult, yet whose compensation lies in the
+possibilities of successes possessing greater significance than any
+hitherto attained.</p>
+
+<p>The South African War has roused the Cavalry into a renewal of
+activity, and has caused their leaders to encourage the study of
+Cavalry literature likely to <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevi" name="pagevi"></a>(p. vi)</span> develop the capacity of the
+officer for writing on these special subjects.</p>
+
+<p>As a step in that direction, I gave whatever little co-operation I
+could to the formation of the <i>Cavalry Journal</i>, in the hope that it
+may be conducive to the creation of a class of literature in which our
+Service is peculiarly deficient.</p>
+
+<p>It is of the first importance to realize the conditions that are
+revolutionizing the conduct of Modern Warfare.</p>
+
+<p>Such knowledge can alone enable us to appreciate the task which is
+given to the Cavalry, and to estimate the increased difficulties of
+their function. As their range of activity has become restricted in
+certain directions, their sphere of usefulness in others has largely
+increased.</p>
+
+<p>The want of an up-to-date work dealing with these facts has, I
+believe, been supplied by the recent publication of General von
+Bernhardi's book, 'Our Cavalry in Future Wars,' translated in the
+following pages with the object of making it more generally known in
+this country.</p>
+
+<p>Not only is the contribution valuable as having been written by a
+soldier of experience in the field, who has imbued his work with the
+dash and fire of the spirit of Cavalry, but it also reveals a profound
+insight into the modern conditions of War and the heightened demands
+exacted from Cavalry training. The author lays continual emphasis on
+the fact that Cavalry trained and organized on his lines should
+produce in the early stages of a War effects so decisive as to
+influence and even determine the succeeding phases of the campaign.</p>
+
+<p>General von Bernhardi has the gift of close and searching reasoning,
+and the ability to present his <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagevii" name="pagevii"></a>(p. vii)</span> views in a vivid and
+trenchant form, as convincing as the writings of the late Colonel
+Henderson.</p>
+
+<p>His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War in
+the sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of the
+Cavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred.</p>
+
+<p>In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future will
+confront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will be
+exacted from this Arm.</p>
+
+<p>Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from the
+individual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for the
+task of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows in
+convincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success.</p>
+
+<p>Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field may
+have somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling of
+the Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissance
+and operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuit
+of a defeated Army.</p>
+
+<p>He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superior
+striking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, and
+emphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining a
+high fighting efficiency.</p>
+
+<p>In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and Tactical
+Conduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with the
+merits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of the
+latter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock,
+and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action when
+serving an offensive or defensive purpose.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time, he avers that success must depend <span class="pagenum"><a id="pageviii" name="pageviii"></a>(p. viii)</span> upon
+the ability of the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities
+of decision, and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between
+the application respectively of shock and fire action.</p>
+
+<p>The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalry
+leader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of the
+profession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency.</p>
+
+<p>Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery of
+the instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutest
+detail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thorough
+training.</p>
+
+<p>The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who,
+drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that the
+united offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge,
+can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mounted
+riflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardi
+makes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assist
+us with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change of
+tactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirely
+abnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur.</p>
+
+<p>It must be remembered that after the first few weeks of 1900 the
+Cavalry in South Africa as an effective force had practically ceased
+to exist, and that its offensive action was greatly hampered by the
+strategical plan of campaign which we adopted subsequently to the
+occupation of Bloemfontein.</p>
+
+<p>All that might be deduced from the defensive tactics of a mounted
+force, such as the Boers put into the field, during this period, is
+that, possessing greater mobility, <span class="pagenum"><a id="pageix" name="pageix"></a>(p. ix)</span> they were able to hold up,
+during short intervals, Cavalry whose capacity for mounted action was
+practically destroyed by the 'want of condition' of their horses.</p>
+
+<p>Acting strategically as they did at Colesberg, in the relief of
+Kimberley, and in the operations leading up to Paardeberg, results
+were obtained which affected the whole subsequent conduct of the War.
+From then onwards, with the Cavalry acting tactically on the enemy's
+flank, the Boer Army withdrew practically on Pretoria, and no decisive
+tactical result was obtained.</p>
+
+<p>If that was the object which the Superior Command had in view, the
+Cavalry carried out that purpose with remarkable distinction.</p>
+
+<p>It is, however, conceivable that their strategical employment in rear
+of the Boer Army might have produced a situation compelling the Boers
+to fight a pitched battle or to surrender.</p>
+
+<p>If the Cavalry failed to achieve more, it was not from any want of
+opportunity which the theatre of War presented, but because their true
+rôle was rarely assigned to them.</p>
+
+<p>That the Boers were able at a later period to develop a vigorous
+scheme of action was largely owing to our conception of a plan of
+campaign which made the occupation of small capitals rather than the
+destruction of the enemy's Army the strategic objective.</p>
+
+<p>Had the Boers understood the Art of War and taken advantage of the
+openings which their superior mobility gave them, or had they been
+possessed of a body of Cavalry capable of mounted action, say at
+Magersfontein, they might repeatedly have wrought confusion in our
+ranks.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagex" name="pagex"></a>(p. x)</span> Although the Boer War was of an exceptional nature, and of a
+character unlikely to be met with again, it furnishes some useful
+object-lessons which exemplify the importance of preparedness in peace
+for the sudden outbreak of War, so that the Army may take the field in
+such force and so disposed as to compel decisive action on the part of
+the enemy in the first stages of the War, and be in a position to
+inflict a crushing defeat rather than a series of light blows, which
+latter tend to disperse rather than destroy the enemy's forces.</p>
+
+<p>The War further shows how highly mobile forces, such as those of the
+Boers, can withdraw from a combat to avoid defeat, and by scattering
+to elude pursuit, and then, by reassembling where least expected, can
+strike a sudden blow at the enemy's weakest point. That they failed to
+accomplish more was due to their ignorance of the higher Art of War.</p>
+
+<p>To this neglect of the strategic advantage which mobility gives we
+must add the many lost tactical opportunities of converting a British
+reverse into a decisive defeat. The Boers did all that could be
+expected of Mounted Infantry, but were powerless to crown victory as
+only the dash of Cavalry can do.</p>
+
+<p>If we take into account the many opportunities which the Boers gave
+for successful strategic and tactical employment to men trained to
+fight on horseback, we arrive at the conclusion that the Boer War may
+nevertheless, if studied carefully and intelligently, teach us the
+indispensability of Cavalry in the rôle so clearly described in
+General von Bernhardi's instructive work.</p>
+
+<p>In conclusion, I must express my thanks to His Excellency General von
+Bernhardi for his courtesy <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexi" name="pagexi"></a>(p. xi)</span> towards me in concurring in the
+idea of an English translation, and to General Sir John French for his
+valuable introductory comments.</p>
+
+<p>I also wish to express to Colonel F. N. Maude my best thanks for his
+friendly co-operation, which gave me the advantage of his expert
+interpretation of German technicalities.</p>
+
+<p class="right10">C. S. GOLDMAN.</p>
+
+<p class="noindent">34, <span class="smcap">Queen Anne's Gate</span>,<br>
+<span class="add2em smcap">Westminster,</span><br>
+<span class="add4em"><i>September, 1906</i>.</span></p>
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexiii" name="pagexiii"></a>(p. xiii)</span> AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION</h2>
+
+
+<p>When, in the Spring of 1899, I published the first edition of this
+work, I ventured to express the hope that it might incite others both
+to thought and exertion, and might further prove of practical
+assistance to many.</p>
+
+<p>I think I may claim without undue immodesty that this wish of mine has
+in many directions been fulfilled. Of the demands, however, which I
+put forward concerning the organization and equipment of the Cavalry,
+none have as yet been put into execution, but much wholesome spade
+work has been accomplished, and the necessity of reforms, together
+with due recognition of their importance, has everywhere made further
+progress. It is to be hoped that the next few years will bring the
+fulfilment of some of these our most earnest desires.</p>
+
+<p>The principles of training and of tactics which I have advanced and
+endeavoured to establish have found very general acceptance throughout
+the Arm, and have helped to clear up difficulties, although, as indeed
+was to be expected, they have encountered opposition from several
+quarters.</p>
+
+<p>This result of my labours has encouraged me in the preparation of this
+new edition to make use of all the latest experience, to bring out
+with additional <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexiv" name="pagexiv"></a>(p. xiv)</span> clearness essential points, and to add much
+new material.</p>
+
+<p>I trust that in this manner I have materially increased the practical
+value of the work, and hope that in its new form it will continue to
+exert its silent influence, winning new supporters for my views, and
+helping to gain for the splendid Arm to which I belong the place
+which, in the interest of the whole Army, it deserves.</p>
+
+<p class="right10">THE AUTHOR.</p>
+
+<p class="smcap">Strazburg, in the winter of 1902.</p>
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexv" name="pagexv"></a>(p. xv)</span> AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION</h2>
+
+
+<p>It would be difficult for a layman to form even an approximate
+conception of the amount of work annually accomplished in the German
+Army.</p>
+
+<p>The very vivid consciousness stirring everywhere as to the magnitude
+of the demands the not far distant future may make upon us, and the
+knowledge that the means with which we are compelled to work are
+certainly not always in agreement with our ideals, incite us to strain
+every nerve to make the most of what we have; and I believe I am not
+far wrong in asserting that it is the Cavalry Arm which, under
+pressure of circumstances, responds to these demands with the greatest
+avidity. This is, in fact, but the necessary consequence of the
+many-sidedness of our duties.</p>
+
+<p>Whether, however, the end and aim of all our exertions is everywhere
+attained must remain an open question.</p>
+
+<p>In every long period of peace there lurks the danger that methods of
+training may deviate after false ideals, lose themselves in the cult
+of imposing appearances, and in the clash of individual opinions fail
+to distinguish the essential&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, what is really practicable under
+the conditions of active service.</p>
+
+<p>This danger is all the more imminent when the <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexvi" name="pagexvi"></a>(p. xvi)</span> characters and
+forms of Warfare itself are constantly changing; hence, ever new
+demands have to be made upon the troops themselves, and the exact
+bearing of each of these is not easily to be appreciated in the
+humdrum surroundings of our peace-time duties.</p>
+
+<p>It seems, therefore, a most pressing necessity at the present moment,
+when changes in social conditions and constant technical progress are
+exerting on the external phenomena and conditions of Warfare a steady
+pressure in the direction of modification, that we should compare our
+peace training with the requirements likely to be made upon us in time
+of War. Thus we can note where further adjustments between the two are
+necessary and can be usefully made.</p>
+
+<p>In this process of analysis it will not suffice to take each changing
+factor independently, following it out to its utmost ramifications,
+but rather we must endeavour to take a general view of the whole, and
+balance the variables one against the other.</p>
+
+<p>The man who concentrates his attention only on one detail easily loses
+his grasp of relative values, and runs the risk of failing 'to see the
+wood for the trees,' and only the mind trained to contemplate each
+factor in its relation to the whole, and with a clear idea of the
+ultimate purpose for which this whole is intended, will be able to
+avoid this pitfall; for only an intellect thus prepared can
+successfully harmonize the whole with its part, and, while keeping the
+essentials clearly before its eyes, treat the unessential as it
+deserves.</p>
+
+<p>It is in order to bring out this point of view that the following
+pages have been undertaken.</p>
+
+<p>As I endeavoured to arrive at a thoroughly clear comprehension of the
+many conflicting interests involved in the training of men and horses,
+as I tried to decide how to apportion both time and means to each
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexvii" name="pagexvii"></a>(p. xvii)</span> individual branch of their education, and to see how far
+the traditions of the past could be harmonized with the requirements
+of the future, or where and how they need further development and
+simplification, I found myself compelled at every turn to go back and
+seek my ideal standard in the demands which War itself must make upon
+all Arms.</p>
+
+<p>Thus my work must be considered as an attempt to represent in broad
+outlines the conditions of the coming War, and from these to deduce
+logically the requirements a rational system of organization and
+training must satisfy.</p>
+
+<p>Those who hold different opinions as to the tasks which will be
+entrusted to our particular Arm will naturally come to other
+conclusions as to the values to be assigned to peace education, and I
+do not wish to present my opinions as absolutely final, although I
+have done my utmost to treat my subject-matter objectively and without
+prejudice.</p>
+
+<p>Meanwhile, the problems I have submitted for investigation are not
+only of military interest, but of the utmost military importance, and
+it has, therefore, seemed to me well worth while to discuss them from
+every point of view.</p>
+
+<p>Further, because these investigations owe their origin to the
+practical need I experienced during the course of my service to clear
+up the many points I have dwelt on, I have considered it a duty to
+make them accessible to all those who have at heart the development in
+our Cavalry of a thoroughly sound spirit in full harmony with the
+necessities of our present times.</p>
+
+<p class="right10">THE AUTHOR.</p>
+
+<p class="noindent"><span class="smcap">Berlin</span>,<br>
+<span class="add2em"><i>March, 1899</i>.</span></p>
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexix" name="pagexix"></a>(p. xix)</span> CONTENTS</h2>
+
+<div class="toc">
+<a id="toc" name="toc"></a>
+
+<ul class="none">
+<li>&nbsp;<span class="ralign smcap">PAGE</span></li>
+<li>INTRODUCTION      <span class="ralign"><a href="#pagexxi">xxi</a></span></li>
+</ul>
+
+<p class="p2 center">PART I</p>
+
+<p class="center">EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF
+  LEADERSHIP</p>
+
+<p class="smcap">CHAPTER</p>
+
+<ul class="roman smcap">
+<li>THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE
+  ON THE EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF
+  CAVALRY      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page003">3</a></span></li>
+
+<li>DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE
+  OF THE WAR      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page019">19</a></span></li>
+
+<li>STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page038">38</a></span></li>
+
+<li>INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page049">49</a></span></li>
+
+<li>THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page062">62</a></span></li>
+
+<li>TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page090">90</a></span></li>
+
+<li>STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page104">104</a></span></li>
+
+<li>PATROLS&mdash;TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS&mdash;CYCLISTS      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page132">132</a></span></li>
+</ul>
+
+<p class="p2 center">PART II</p>
+
+<p class="center">ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING</p>
+
+<ul class="roman smcap">
+<li>NUMBERS      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page151">151</a></span></li>
+
+<li>RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page184">184</a></span></li>
+
+<li>THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page213">213</a></span></li>
+
+<li>TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page247">247</a></span></li>
+
+<li>FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MAN&OElig;UVRES      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page265">265</a></span></li>
+
+<li>THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page286">286</a></span></li>
+</ul>
+
+<ul class="none smcap">
+<li>CONCLUSION      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page294">294</a></span></li>
+
+<li>INDEX      <span class="ralign"><a href="#page298">298</a></span></li>
+</ul>
+</div>
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxi" name="pagexxi"></a>(p. xxi)</span> INTRODUCTION</h2>
+
+
+<p>General von Bernhardi's work, 'Cavalry in Future Wars' (translated
+from the German by Mr. C. S. Goldman), is a most valuable addition to
+modern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment to
+counteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have been
+drawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reported
+operations in the late Manchurian War.</p>
+
+<p>One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commented
+upon that campaign have said that what is termed the 'Cavalry spirit'
+is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that the
+Cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead of
+the means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that we
+must render our Cavalry less devoted to 'man&oelig;uvres' and to
+'tournaments,' in order to enable them to fit themselves to take part
+in modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods of
+Warfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine to
+defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely.</p>
+
+<p>I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in European
+Armies, but as regards the <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxii" name="pagexxii"></a>(p. xxii)</span> British Cavalry, I am absolutely
+convinced that the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the
+utmost without in the least degree prejudicing either training in
+dismounted duties or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the
+part of leaders as will enable them to discern when and where to
+resort to dismounted methods.</p>
+
+<p>How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its rôle in war until the enemy's
+Cavalry is defeated and paralyzed? I challenge any Cavalry officer,
+British or foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as such
+against its own Arm, can never attain complete success unless it is
+proficient in shock tactics.</p>
+
+<p>Cavalry soldiers must of course learn to be expert rifle shots, but
+the attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer by
+ignoring the horse, the sword, or the lance. On the contrary, the
+'élan' and dash which perfection in Cavalry man&oelig;uvre imparts to
+large bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their
+employment as mounted riflemen when the field is laid open to their
+enterprise in this rôle by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent War did not distinguish
+themselves or their Arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite
+apparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the
+riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence
+were only enabled to fulfil generally the rôle of Divisional Cavalry,
+which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on the
+Russian side is to be found in the fact that for <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxiii" name="pagexxiii"></a>(p. xxiii)</span> years
+they have been trained on <i>exactly the same principles</i> which these
+writers now advocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they
+thought of nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence
+they lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a
+display of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.</p>
+
+<p>The author of this book is an eminent soldier, possessing an intimate
+knowledge of practical fighting, gained chiefly in one of the greatest
+Wars of modern times&mdash;the Franco-German Campaign of 1870-1871.</p>
+
+<p>His opinions are entitled to profound respect, and demand close
+attention and consideration. The General has treated his subject and
+marshalled his arguments and statements in so logical and intelligent
+a manner, and the principles he deduces seem so sound and appropriate,
+that the conclusions he arrives at appear to me unanswerable.</p>
+
+<p>In the exhaustive and capable summary of the work of Cavalry in War,
+General von Bernhardi seems to follow very closely the line of thought
+which has in recent years occupied the brains of many practical
+Cavalry soldiers in this country. He appeals strongly to our
+intellectual sympathy when he first of all discusses the strategical
+employment of Cavalry in all its bearings, and afterwards proceeds to
+unfold his views as to the rôle of the Cavalry Arm, first when the
+enemy's Cavalry has been driven from the field, and secondly in
+conjunction with the other Arms. Personally, I have never known the
+'Case for the Cavalry' stated more clearly and intelligently.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxiv" name="pagexxiv"></a>(p. xxiv)</span> In recommending the study of the book to all British
+soldiers, I would draw particular attention to the author's constant
+and repeated references to the necessity of first seeking out and
+fighting the hostile Cavalry and driving them from the field&mdash;in other
+words, to the immediate and complete attainment of the moral
+superiority.</p>
+
+<p>In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the important
+results gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870-1871 campaign were
+due to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalry
+more than to anything else, and he contends that in future Wars, where
+the Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, this
+supremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormous
+increase in the difficulty with which the Cavalry Arm will carry out
+its rôle. He scoffs at the idea held by so many 'amateurs' that
+'Cavalry duels' are superfluous.</p>
+
+<p>Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, and
+have been charged with their training in peace-time, can realize to
+the full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which General
+von Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that the
+mischievous teaching which scoffs at 'man&oelig;uvres,' 'tournaments,'
+and the 'Cavalry spirit,' proceeds almost entirely from the pens and
+from the brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling
+of the Cavalry Arm.</p>
+
+<p>The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-day
+seems to me to lie in the fact that this <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxv" name="pagexxv"></a>(p. xxv)</span> particular vein of
+thought and argument pervades it throughout.</p>
+
+<p>The General tells us, with the soundest arguments and the most
+positive proofs, that 'the brilliant field of enterprise which is open
+to the Cavalry soldier in his rôle as a mounted rifleman can only be
+attained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry.'</p>
+
+<p>The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminary
+overthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea that
+the Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismounted
+action when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically that
+the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostile
+Cavalry once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, a
+brilliant rôle lies open to that Arm by reason of their possession of
+an efficient firearm, in the use of which the cavalryman has received
+a thorough training.</p>
+
+<p>The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity of
+discovering a Leader who possesses the 'power of holding the balance
+correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the
+former never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter.'
+'Whether,' says the General, 'it be in the working out of some
+strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
+by united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment and
+absence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence in
+normal natures.'</p>
+
+<p>In dwelling so persistently upon the necessity for Cavalry being
+trained to the highest possible pitch to <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxvi" name="pagexxvi"></a>(p. xxvi)</span> meet the enemy's
+Cavalry, I do not wish to be misunderstood. I agree absolutely with
+the author in the principle he lays down that the Cavalry fight is
+only a means to an end, but it is the most important means, and I have
+thought it right to comment upon this because it is a principle which
+in this country, since the South African War, we have been very much
+inclined to overlook. To place a force of Cavalry in the field in
+support of a great Army which is deficient in the power to overcome
+the opposing Cavalry is to act like one who would despatch a squadron
+of war-vessels badly armed, badly trained, and ill found, to blockade
+a distant coast-line defended by a powerful fleet. What is the naval
+fight in the open sea but a means to an end? It would be as sensible
+to dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleets
+as to lay down the principle that the 'Cavalry battle' in no way
+affects the mutual situation of hostile armies.</p>
+
+<p>But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid
+down must never be lost sight of.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service of
+reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to
+a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry,
+when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in this
+way, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack.</p>
+
+<p>Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the
+increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on
+Cavalry at man&oelig;uvres <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxvii" name="pagexxvii"></a>(p. xxvii)</span> and elsewhere being
+<i>ultra-cautious</i>. They try to inculcate such a respect for Infantry
+fire that Cavalry is taught to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry
+come within sight, squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or
+dismount and shoot, regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the
+ground happens to be.</p>
+
+<p>I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war
+efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard
+altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on
+our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are
+many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable
+consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.</p>
+
+<p>After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following report
+to the King of Prussia:&mdash;</p>
+
+<p>'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in
+<i>self-confidence</i>. All its initiative had been destroyed at
+man&oelig;uvres, where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous,
+and it therefore shirked independent bold action, and kept far in
+rear, and as much as possible out of sight' (Moltke's
+'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze,' Berlin, 1900).</p>
+
+<p>By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey such
+timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words
+of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination
+to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which
+might bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run risk
+of suffering loss.</p>
+
+<p>History is full of similar instances of how <i>not</i> to <span class="pagenum"><a id="pagexxviii" name="pagexxviii"></a>(p. xxviii)</span>
+train Cavalry, and I hold most strongly that the Arm must be educated
+up to a readiness <i>to act</i>, to come to close quarters in co-operation
+with the other Arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry has often
+done before without losing its 'battle' value.</p>
+
+<p>To sum up, training with a view to self-sacrifice during peace
+exercises is essential for the success of all Arms in War, but
+especially so for Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General von
+Bernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject
+demanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced that
+he who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubt
+and will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast rôle his Arm is
+called upon to fulfil in War, and he will realize how, in mastering
+the great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be assisting
+in the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and glory of the
+great Service to which he belongs.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page001" name="page001"></a>(p. 001)</span> I<br>
+
+EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP</h2>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page003" name="page003"></a>(p. 003)</span> CHAPTER I</h2>
+
+<p class="title">THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT
+AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY</p>
+
+
+<p>The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has been
+revolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition that
+affects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almost
+every particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree of
+perfection which compels us to take into account possibilities which
+did not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of the
+past can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universal
+introduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction in
+length of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed the
+character of almost all European Armies.</p>
+
+<p>All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former days
+disappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. New
+groupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities,
+and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization,
+together with the reduction in the period of service which has been
+very generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of the
+troops, whilst at the same time the 'masses' have risen to
+unimaginable dimensions. This '<i>folie des nombres</i>,' against which
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page004" name="page004"></a>(p. 004)</span> certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern
+reality.</p>
+
+<p>Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating
+year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in
+future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent
+come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which,
+from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.</p>
+
+<p>The enormous development of railway communication has changed all
+conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway
+to move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both
+in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies
+themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing
+degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably
+make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same
+time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions
+appear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of
+War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of
+communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously
+great vulnerability.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers
+greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in
+the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished
+enormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by
+frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's
+flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His
+endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel
+his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page005" name="page005"></a>(p. 005)</span> This increased importance of the communications, which in
+already exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will
+compel the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.</p>
+
+<p>All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the
+importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which,
+in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This
+final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may
+struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided
+experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of
+all operations due to the increased masses and the more concentrated
+susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive
+factors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategic
+direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they
+have attained and their endurance.'<a id="footnotetag1" name="footnotetag1"></a><a href="#footnote1" title="Go to footnote 1"><span class="smaller">[1]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressure
+of which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development and
+forced the infantry to change their whole constitution (whether to
+their advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at all
+commensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in the
+Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from which
+they can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constant
+replenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service,
+because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of its existence, it can
+scarcely count on having the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page006" name="page006"></a>(p. 006)</span> wastage of War made good by
+equally well-trained men and horses; still less is its complete
+replacement in case of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we
+have to recognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in
+all European Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of the
+other Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show this
+clearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:</p>
+
+<table cellpadding="2" summary="German's figures">
+<colgroup>
+    <col width="30%">
+    <col width="70%">
+</colgroup>
+
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td>1870.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">463</td>
+<td>Battalions.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">460</td>
+<td>Squadrons.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">251</td>
+<td>Batteries.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">15&frac34;</td>
+<td>Pioneer Battalions.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td colspan="2">&nbsp;</td></tr>
+<tr>
+<td>&nbsp;</td>
+<td>1902.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">625</td>
+<td>Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles').</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">486</td>
+<td>Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles).</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">562</td>
+<td>Batteries.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">38</td>
+<td>Battalions Heavy Artillery.</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td class="right">28</td>
+<td>Pioneer Battalions.</td>
+</tr>
+</table>
+
+<p>This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent on
+mobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehr
+formations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the few
+new units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant.
+Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry forms
+numerically an almost insignificant factor.</p>
+
+<p>There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedly
+there has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On the
+basis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last forty
+years (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changes
+in armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, more
+particularly with regard to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page007" name="page007"></a>(p. 007)</span> armament. The necessity and
+possibility of strategical reconnaissance by independent bodies of
+Cavalry have been fully recognised.</p>
+
+<p>The conviction also has been arrived at that only when supplied with a
+useful firearm and an adequate allowance of Horse Artillery will such
+'masses' prove adequate for the accomplishment of this special task.
+With the same object in view, the means have been granted to them with
+which to destroy telegraphs and railways, to bridge rivers, and so
+forth. The conviction also has been gained that the Cavalry require to
+be so familiarized with tactical formations for their employment in
+'mass' that they shall have become a second nature to them if they are
+to fight with a reasonable prospect of success. But all that has been
+done in these directions still remains insufficient. On the one hand,
+the improvements introduced have not taken into account the decisive
+changes in the general conditions which only the last few years have
+brought about. On the other, we must not forget that neither the
+Prussian Cavalry in 1870 in France nor the Russians against the Turks
+in 1877-1878 had even approximately equal Cavalry to oppose them. Even
+the great results achieved alternately by the Cavalry on both sides
+during the American Civil War were obtained in general under
+conditions which can no longer be anticipated, for at the moment of
+collision neither encountered, as a rule, either equal quality or
+numbers sufficient to develop their full power of attack.</p>
+
+<p>The very important data obtained during the campaign of 1899-1900 in
+South Africa as to the employment of dismounted action by Cavalry were
+also not then before us. One could only, therefore, reason from
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page008" name="page008"></a>(p. 008)</span> one-sided experiences, which can no longer be recognised as
+generally sufficient for our purpose. In future the mere possibility
+of results such as in 1870-1871 we so often gained owing to the
+absence of any serious opposition on the part of the opposing Cavalry,
+will nowadays have to be obstinately fought for, not without
+considerable loss; and it needs no special proof to show what an
+enormous increase in the difficulty of our task this involves, and
+how, as a consequence, all the conditions of our future action must be
+modified.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, the Cavalry stands face to face with new conditions, and sees
+itself everywhere confronted&mdash;on the battle-field and in the wider
+field of strategical operations&mdash;with new problems, towards the
+solution of which the history of the past furnishes only very general
+indications.</p>
+
+<p>If we mean to maintain our position as an effective Arm, and satisfy
+the demands that of necessity must be made upon us by these new
+conditions, <i>we must break</i> with many experiences of the past, and
+work out for ourselves principles of action which must be deduced
+essentially from the probable requirements of the future.</p>
+
+<p>Each epoch-making War makes new demands upon us and prescribes new
+tasks, and he only will reap the palm of success who is able to meet
+them, because, with wise prevision, he has prepared himself to solve
+their difficulties in peace.</p>
+
+<p>If we wish to make an approximately correct picture of the future that
+awaits us, we must first face the question, What will be the influence
+that the changed conditions in the Art of War considered as a whole
+must exercise on the possible scope of action of our Arm?</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page009" name="page009"></a>(p. 009)</span> From the answer to this we can deduce the demands on the
+Cavalry in particular, and these demands give us a means for
+determining the limits of its employment, its consequent organization,
+and the training best suited to enable it to meet these requirements.</p>
+
+<p>If we summarize all the conditions which have modified the conduct of
+War and contrast with them what Cavalry, from the very nature of its
+being, is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight as if
+every form of action of the mounted Arm has been impeded and rendered
+more difficult in the highest degree; more particularly is this the
+case when opposed to the increased power of modern arms. Certainly,
+the impact of a modern bullet may at times produce less immediate
+effect than formerly. Cases have occurred in which serious wounds did
+not place the individual out of action immediately, and we may
+therefore anticipate that many horses will not be stopped in the
+charge, despite severe injuries. But this drawback the Infantry can
+meet by opening fire sooner. To the Artillery this does not apply;
+and, in any case, this objection is not of such importance as to
+neutralize in any way the other advantages conferred by modern
+weapons.</p>
+
+<p>Owing to the fact that the extent of the danger zone has been very
+considerably increased, and that within these zones the amount of fire
+which has to be faced in a given time has been intensified to a degree
+which formerly could hardly have been dreamt of, it has ceased to be
+possible to ride straight at the front of an unshaken enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, essentially the Cavalry has been driven out of its former place
+of honour on the battle-fields of the plains, and has been compelled
+to seek the assistance <span class="pagenum"><a id="page010" name="page010"></a>(p. 010)</span> of the cover the ground affords in
+order to carry its own power of destruction into immediate contact
+with its enemy, and only under most exceptionally favourable
+conditions will it still be possible to deliver a charge direct across
+the open.</p>
+
+<p>Further, as far as the Infantry are concerned, it will be quite the
+exception to encounter them in closed bodies; generally we shall have
+to ride against extended lines, which offer a most unfavourable target
+for our purpose.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulties both of observation and reconnaissance have also been
+materially increased, for, on the one hand, the increased range of the
+firearm compels one to keep further away from the enemy, thus making
+it more difficult to judge with accuracy his strength and positions;
+on the other, the use of smokeless powder, which no longer reveals the
+position of the firing line, renders a more thorough searching of the
+ground even more indispensable than formerly.</p>
+
+<p>The possible participation of the civilian inhabitants of the invaded
+Nation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalry
+action other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts it
+may, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of all
+patrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by a
+new and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we may
+estimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of the
+Franco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all such
+experiences will be very much intensified.</p>
+
+<p>Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to the
+other Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of the
+latter cover larger areas, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page011" name="page011"></a>(p. 011)</span> and whether to cover these or to
+reconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger spaces,
+notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, on each square
+mile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reduced
+number of patrols, etc.</p>
+
+<p>Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity to
+intervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, but
+relatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage secured
+will thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent,
+since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents a
+smaller proportion of his whole Army.</p>
+
+<p>If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, is
+annihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if this
+Brigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps.</p>
+
+<p>If in these changed relations there are obviously factors which
+materially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which must
+make the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, on
+the other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of a
+future War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigation
+lead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is even
+greater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, and
+even on the battle-field revealing new chances of success.</p>
+
+<p>Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater the
+pitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, the
+greater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be the
+reaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them.</p>
+
+<p>Now that all European States are straining every nerve to employ
+enormous masses of men from the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page012" name="page012"></a>(p. 012)</span> first moment of hostilities,
+in order thus to gain an advantage whilst their enemy is still
+concentrating, and when we further consider how these exertions must
+increase the strain throughout the nation to the very utmost, it must
+be apparent that the first great decision of Arms must be of
+overwhelming importance. Not only the troops directly concerned, but
+the 'masses' behind them, find themselves for the moment involved in
+the consequences of victory or defeat. Hence the reaction in either
+direction, owing to the lower average quality of the troops, their
+greater numbers, the increased difficulties of moving them, and the
+susceptibility to congestion of their rearward communications, must be
+far greater and far more disastrous than hitherto under similar
+tactical conditions.</p>
+
+<p>The more important it is to secure a favourable decision, the more
+difficult with growing masses to divert an operation once commenced,
+to give it a new direction or assign it a new objective, the less
+possible it becomes to alter dispositions which may have been issued
+on false premises; hence again <i>the greater grows the value of
+thorough and active reconnoitring</i>.</p>
+
+<p>If this holds good, more especially for the first great collision, it
+remains also a guiding principle for all future operations; for, on
+the one side, it is probable that even in its later stages the War
+will be conducted with comparatively great masses; on the other, as we
+have seen, <i>the importance of the strategical element has
+unquestionably grown</i>; hence the <i>value of efficient reconnaissance</i>
+has been proportionably intensified.</p>
+
+<p>In similar measure the importance of screening has also developed. In
+proportion as the assailant is compelled to resort to turning
+movements and surprises, the defender is obliged to have recourse to
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page013" name="page013"></a>(p. 013)</span> timely changes of front and unexpected counter-attacks;
+hence for both timely reconnaissance of the enemy's, as well as for
+trustworthy screening of one's own operations, the extended employment
+of the mounted Arms has become imperative. In other words, although
+reconnaissance and screening for strategical purposes by the Cavalry
+have been rendered more difficult by the conditions we must expect to
+meet in the future, on the other hand, they have gained enormously in
+importance. And it is not in this direction alone that the value of
+the Arm has increased, but it has also had a new and important field
+of activity thrown open to it owing to the increased susceptibility
+the rearward communications of the enemy and his railways have
+developed.</p>
+
+<p>As a consequence of the increased liability to interruption of these
+communications, and also of the far more serious confusion to which
+any such interruption can give rise, it has become far more difficult
+than in the past to execute offensive flanking operations, changes of
+front, or counter-attacks, all of which are movements which the
+practical strategist must bear in mind. On paper and on the map such
+undertakings appear to present no more elements of friction than
+formerly, but on the ground itself those who have once seen masses of
+several corps all huddled together know that things are very
+different. All such movements nowadays are tied to the railway-lines,
+and these, again, are congested by the flow of food and ammunition,
+which must at all costs be maintained. Fresh units also of troops may
+be coming up to the front, whose arrival is of the last importance in
+the plans of the generalissimo, and a single broken viaduct may throw
+confusion into the whole design.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page014" name="page014"></a>(p. 014)</span> In a densely-populated and fruitful district the resulting
+failure of supply may be endured, but it is very different when in a
+poverty-stricken district the supply of a whole Army depends on
+perhaps a single line of railway.</p>
+
+<p>Thus the Cavalry sees itself confronted by a task in the solution of
+which it can achieve results of <i>decisive importance</i> in a new
+direction, for the following reasons: The relative importance of the
+Arm during actual operations having been materially increased, the
+period of concentration preceding actual collision (notwithstanding
+the fact that the actual effectiveness of Cavalry in the face of
+modern firearms has been decreased) offers opportunities which under
+certain conditions promise higher results than formerly.</p>
+
+<p>If every delay in the march which may be caused by the action of
+Cavalry against the flanking lines of advance of an Army concentrating
+for battle is detrimental, how much greater would be the
+disorganization resulting from similar operations after defeat! Very
+rarely in such a case would it be possible to retire eccentrically by
+the same roads which were used for advance. The beaten troops
+generally drift back quite involuntarily in the direction into which
+they have been compelled by the results of the tactical decision. The
+wider the original front, the greater the masses of the troops
+concerned (which are now not only in a demoralized condition, but are
+compelled, under pressure of pursuit, to change their communications
+into new directions, and for this purpose to disentangle the columns
+drawn in for the concentration) and the greater the certainty that
+conditions must arise which will give to an active <span class="pagenum"><a id="page015" name="page015"></a>(p. 015)</span> Cavalry
+an even richer opportunity of harvest than was formerly open to them.</p>
+
+<p>This will in future be all the more the case when troops of lower
+quality, and therefore more liable to become shaken and dispirited,
+have to be employed. Reserve formations&mdash;Landwehr and the like&mdash;which
+under favourable conditions might render excellent service, when once
+beaten, without officers, weary and hungry, lose all cohesion, when,
+with baggage, wounded, and stragglers, they are driven back over
+crowded roads; and then, no matter how well they are armed, they are
+an easy prey to a pursuing Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>The man who throws his rifle away or shoots in the air will not find
+salvation either in clip-loading or smokeless powder against the lance
+in the hands of a relentless pursuing Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>The same holds good for the fight itself. We cannot attack even
+inferior Infantry as long as it only keeps the muzzles of its rifles
+down and shoots straight; but once it is morally broken and surprised,
+then the greatest results are still to be achieved even on an open
+battle-field. That, at least, the campaign of 1870-1871 sufficiently
+proved, although the Cavalry were so seldom allowed the opportunity to
+reap the ripe harvest our strategy and the action of the other Arms
+had so abundantly prepared for them.</p>
+
+<p>A further point in our favour is to be found in the fact that the
+increased power of modern Artillery fire has rendered the defence of
+villages and woods practically an impossibility. The Infantry are thus
+compelled to seek open but rolling ground, and it is precisely such
+ground which favours the concealed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page016" name="page016"></a>(p. 016)</span> approach and sudden
+attack of the Cavalry; but surprise is the very essence of successful
+Cavalry action.</p>
+
+<p>If we bring together all these points of view which have been hitherto
+only indicated, we find, on the one hand, the absolute fighting value
+of the Cavalry has considerably diminished, and that in modern War the
+conditions of Cavalry employment will in every direction be rendered
+more difficult; on the other hand, the strategical importance of the
+Arm, as well as the scope of the duties which it may be called upon to
+fulfil, have increased very decidedly, and very important new
+opportunities for successes have been thrown open to it.</p>
+
+<p>We cannot sufficiently insist upon the cumulative effects which all
+these general changes in the nature of War have exercised upon the
+Cavalry Arm; for not only has public opinion taken up the opposite
+view, but even in the Army itself these positive views have not
+received the attention they deserve.</p>
+
+<p>The exploits of our Cavalry in 1870-1871 have been universally
+admired, without, however, being appreciated at their true relative
+value. On the other hand, reasoning from the mechanical perfection of
+the firearm, the conclusion has been reached that, as against Infantry
+and Artillery, the Cavalry can no longer hope to achieve any results
+of importance. It has been shown that in 1870-1871 the German Cavalry
+possessed a great numerical superiority over its adversary&mdash;that, in
+fact, numerous regiments during the whole War either never came into
+action at all or at least never had the opportunity to exhibit their
+full value in other fields of employment, and hence it has been
+concluded that an increase or organic reform of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page017" name="page017"></a>(p. 017)</span> what they
+are pleased to consider a somewhat antiquated Cavalry is quite
+superfluous.</p>
+
+<p>An attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to introduce an
+increase of establishments had to give way to more important
+considerations. In fact, practically the German Cavalry in number and
+organization remains to-day the same as in 1870.</p>
+
+<p>But the duties which in future will fall to the Cavalry are so
+wide-reaching, and for the conduct of the War are often of such
+decisive importance, that on the manner of their execution the
+ultimate results of a campaign must very materially depend.</p>
+
+<p>If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties,
+we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravest
+danger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply the
+reforming hand where important deficiencies and practical
+insufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever of
+reform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in our
+own minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of the
+Cavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of the
+demands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in what
+direction its further evolution can be initiated.</p>
+
+<p>We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands to
+be made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, test
+them with a view to their relative importance towards the result as a
+whole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success in
+each individual phase principally depends.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made on
+the Cavalry during the early <span class="pagenum"><a id="page018" name="page018"></a>(p. 018)</span> periods after the declaration
+of hostilities&mdash;that is, during mobilization and concentration. These
+require all the more attention because, as we have seen, it is
+particularly these introductory stages of future War which will be of
+particular importance, and because it is precisely in these very
+points that opinion is as yet not united.</p>
+
+<p>Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course of
+operations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the most
+important results are to be obtained.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page019" name="page019"></a>(p. 019)</span> CHAPTER II</h2>
+
+<p class="title">DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR</p>
+
+
+<p>The importance which attaches to the first tactical decisions, the
+fact that their success is mainly determined by the uninterrupted
+execution of the railway deployment, the safe arrival of the troops
+and war material in the appointed zones of concentration, the
+consideration that the continuance of the operation after the first
+battle&mdash;retreat or pursuit&mdash;is mainly conditioned by the uninterrupted
+action of the rearward communications, make it indubitable that it is
+of the utmost importance to disturb the corresponding operations of
+the enemy, and thus place one's own Army from the very beginning in a
+position of material and strategic advantage.</p>
+
+<p>Since the Cavalry is not only able to cover great distances with
+overwhelming rapidity, but also, owing to its special character as a
+standing branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate,
+whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with their
+mobilization, the opinion has been freely expressed that it would be
+advantageous to utilize this period required for the mobilization and
+railway transport of the other Arms for Cavalry raids, either into
+the zone of concentration, or against the communications <span class="pagenum"><a id="page020" name="page020"></a>(p. 020)</span> of
+the enemy. Russia has for this very purpose concentrated upon the
+German and Austrian frontiers enormous Cavalry forces, supported by
+light infantry. France also keeps a numerous Cavalry practically on a
+war footing on the frontiers of Lorraine.</p>
+
+<p>On the outbreak of War these masses are ready at the shortest notice
+to ride over our frontiers, to break up our railways, to seize our
+horses and depots, to destroy our magazines, and to carry terror and
+consternation into our zone of assembly.</p>
+
+<p>It cannot be denied that in such manner by no means inconsiderable
+damage could be caused, and hence one must earnestly consider, first,
+what chances of success such enterprises offer, and next, whether the
+relative magnitude of the probable results are proportionate to the
+probable losses they must necessarily entail.</p>
+
+<p>Cool and objective consideration of such ideas must, in my opinion,
+lead us to negative such undertakings&mdash;on our side, at any rate. In
+the first place, the enemy will always be in a position, by suitable
+organization of his frontier guards and the situation selected for the
+front of his strategic deployment, to withdraw himself either
+altogether from the radius of action of the Cavalry, or at least
+render its advance both difficult and dangerous. The danger will be
+the greater the more it has been possible to provide for the armament
+and organization of the population in the frontier provinces. Where
+the conditions on the side of the defender are not unusually
+unfavourable&mdash;as, for instance, in wide open districts&mdash;or where there
+is a want of troops in strategically unimportant provinces, then even
+if the invading masses break in on the very first day of mobilization,
+they will find railways, defiles, river-crossings already defended by
+infantry or <span class="pagenum"><a id="page021" name="page021"></a>(p. 021)</span> popular levies. If they come upon an insurgent
+population they will find great difficulties both in reconnaissance
+and subsistence.</p>
+
+<p>At every step they advance, the numbers of the opponent will be
+constantly increasing, while their own strength diminishes. The
+defiles will be occupied between their several columns, and they must
+guard themselves in every direction. Their trains and baggage get into
+confusion, and supply becomes all the more difficult the more rapidly
+they advance, because the waggons cannot keep up with their movement,
+and there is no time for requisitioning. Field batteries and lines of
+infantry occupy the more important positions, the enemy's Cavalry
+appears on the flanks, and man and horse break down at length under
+the severity of the strain. Retreat becomes inevitable, and if they
+ever get back at all, they can only reach their own Army after heavy
+losses and with broken force. The damage which they can do to the
+enemy remains small in proportion to his total power, even though it
+is locally not inconsiderable. At the best one may hope to destroy
+some railway not too far from the frontier, interrupt some telegraph
+lines of communication, and disperse or capture some ammunition
+depots, magazines, or snap up some convoys of reserve men and horses.
+But the enemy has already taken these possibilities into account; they
+will soon be overcome, and his arrangements in general will be hardly
+disturbed.</p>
+
+<p>If, on the other hand, the Cavalry is accompanied by infantry, it will
+be even more hampered in its movements than by its own trains, and
+will soon have to decide whether it should make its movements
+dependent on those of its escort, thereby renouncing all <span class="pagenum"><a id="page022" name="page022"></a>(p. 022)</span>
+hopes of further results, or whether it should abandon the infantry to
+its fate. Certain defiles in the vicinity of the frontier, which the
+combined forces were able in advancing to occupy, the infantry may
+well succeed in keeping open; but if it attempts to follow the tracks
+of its own Cavalry, there can be no doubt it would be exposed to
+inevitable destruction.</p>
+
+<p>This applies equally to the cyclist&mdash;at least, as far as the machine
+has as yet been developed; for though one cannot deny the great
+advantage which its mobility under certain circumstances offers, yet
+it remains too dependent on roads and weather to insure that freedom
+and certainty of movement which in such undertakings in conjunction
+with Cavalry are unconditionally necessary.</p>
+
+<p>The attempt to break up communications by well-mounted officers
+patrols boldly pushed forward in advance would seem to offer even less
+chances of securing permanent results. They, too, will find the
+country obstructed by the armed population, or by troops in the act of
+concentration. Even weak detachments or patrols along the railway
+would suffice to effectively resist them; they can depend for success
+only on their rapidity and cunning. But most rivers are unfordable,
+and in the woods patrols can hardly venture, because every tree may
+shelter a man with a rifle. Once they leave the roads, their pace
+diminishes; they easily lose their direction; nowhere can they obtain
+security for rest and food, even if they are fortunate enough in
+procuring any. If, in spite of all this, they do happen to succeed in
+blowing up a railway or cutting a telegraph, the effect is
+infinitesimal.</p>
+
+<p>The patrol itself will find its chances of escape <span class="pagenum"><a id="page023" name="page023"></a>(p. 023)</span> decreasing
+in exact proportion to the distance it has penetrated into the enemy's
+country.</p>
+
+<p>The greater the number of the patrols employed, the more irreplaceable
+will the inevitable loss become; for it will always be the best
+officers, the men who put most energy and determination into the
+execution of their instructions, who are the most likely to fall
+victims to their courage and audacity.</p>
+
+<p>Premature advance of the Cavalry during mobilization and concentration
+can only procure information of little or no importance, for the
+existing railways, the direction of the frontiers, and the peace-time
+distribution of the troops reveal all this to the General Staff
+beforehand. These, together with the secret service, political
+conditions obtaining at the moment, and press intelligence, will
+enable one to forecast with some degree of precision the general
+situation.</p>
+
+<p>Now, the Cavalry can hardly expect to attain more&mdash;indeed, it is
+doubtful whether they would succeed even in confirming what is already
+known, for the difficulties to be overcome, as we have seen, are
+numerous, and nowhere can one find completed situations from which to
+make reliable deductions. At most they can determine that certain
+places are already occupied, and that the traffic on certain lines is
+considerable, things that one knew <i>a priori</i>, which, therefore, are
+not worth any serious sacrifice. Moreover, it is exceedingly doubtful
+whether, at such an early period, when conditions are changing from
+day to day, such information has any practical value.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, it is not intended to maintain that one should not from the
+very first moment after the declaration of War keep a sharp look-out
+upon the enemy, work up to him, and seek to determine as <span class="pagenum"><a id="page024" name="page024"></a>(p. 024)</span>
+much as rapidity and daring can succeed, with any probability of
+success, in attaining&mdash;that goes without saying. Particular value will
+always attach to the taking of prisoners, whose regimental numbers
+enable us to check the accuracy of our existing information. But
+against this we must emphasize all the more forcibly that in this
+first period of hostilities an inundation of the enemy's zone of
+concentration with masses or by far-flung lines of patrols is not only
+not expedient, but absolutely detrimental, since the certain cost of
+such undertakings stands in no reasonable proportion to the probably
+negative, or at most insignificant, result to be expected. Further,
+our own concentration has already been so prepared in peace that it
+must be carried out with clock-like regularity, even should the
+results of the reconnaissance disclose that the conditions on the side
+of the enemy were not quite those that we had originally expected.</p>
+
+<p>Even the mere transference backwards of the line of strategic
+deployment, which in 1870 could still be carried out without serious
+difficulties or drawbacks, could nowadays, in view of the high tension
+induced by modern conditions, only be executed with extraordinary
+difficulty, whilst lateral displacement of such numbers is quite
+inconceivable. For even if the railway organization would suffice for
+the execution of such a design, the many other preparations in the
+zone of concentration can neither be moved nor improvised.</p>
+
+<p>Summarizing the whole question, the conclusion, I think, must be, that
+only that Army which has at its disposal a great preponderance of
+Cavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment of
+its mounted forces.</p>
+
+<p>In general, the difficulties of replacing the losses of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page025" name="page025"></a>(p. 025)</span> the
+Cavalry with material of equal quality are so great that only the most
+important reasons could justify any such attempts. Hence the side
+which is weaker in Cavalry will meet the circumstances best by keeping
+back its horsemen, and not sacrificing its officers for infinitesimal,
+and probably unattainable, advantages. It will be better merely to
+work up to the enemy as close as may be possible without serious
+losses, allow the enemy's mounted forces to wreck themselves against
+the opposing infantry and armed population, and only then to put in
+its Cavalry for decisive action when the opponent has already wasted
+his best elements in the pursuit of insignificant advantages. After
+all, it is only then, when the strategical concentration commences,
+after railway movement is completed, that reconnaissance becomes both
+possible and important.</p>
+
+<p>Circumstances can, of course, arise in which, already during the first
+period of operations, exhaustive independent activity may be demanded
+from the Cavalry, as, for instance, when one has reason to believe
+that the enemy has changed his previously-selected zone of
+concentration, or, as when in 1870 on the German side, it becomes
+necessary to take steps to protect the frontier districts against the
+enemy's raids. In the first case the attempts to discover, by the
+employment of Cavalry, the changed dispositions of the enemy are
+certainly permissible. The patrols must then go forward until they can
+settle the decisive questions, and strong detachments must be pushed
+out so close behind them that the patrols and their following
+squadrons can find a safe retreat, and insure the transmission of the
+intelligence they have collected.</p>
+
+<p>In such enterprises tactical collision with the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page026" name="page026"></a>(p. 026)</span> enemy's
+Cavalry and his frontier troops might ensue. It may therefore be
+necessary to support our squadrons by Infantry and Artillery.</p>
+
+<p>But in every case we must be careful to keep within the limits which
+are conditioned by the purpose of the undertaking, and not allow
+ourselves to be involved in desperate and doubtful enterprises.</p>
+
+<p>In the next case the duties of the Cavalry are merely defensive. All
+that then matters is to rob small bodies of the enemy of their
+opportunities, to block the traffic across the frontier, and to work
+round their patrols with our own forces; but in no case are they to
+attempt to obtain positive advantages by force, or to hazard important
+decisions against a superior enemy. Wherever possible every effort
+should be made to supplement the troops assigned to this defensive
+attitude by the armed population, or even to replace them by such
+levies altogether. The fortification and defence of villages and
+isolated farms, occupation of railways and watercourses, and, above
+all, the defence of woods which might favour the concealed advance of
+the enemy's patrols, can well be left to the care of these improvised
+formations.</p>
+
+<p>Hostile attempts can be generally met by dismounted fire action in
+well-chosen strong defensive country, possibly supported by
+detachments of Infantry, Artillery, and 'Landsturm.' If the enemy's
+superiority is great, then one must retire until the equilibrium of
+the forces is re-established, the strategical necessity compels us to
+fight, or, finally, the tactical situation gives good promise of
+success.</p>
+
+<p>One must, however, always keep this clearly before one's mind: that
+the essence of all Cavalry action in the opening stage of the War lies
+neither in this purely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page027" name="page027"></a>(p. 027)</span> defensive attitude, nor in the
+offensive enterprises previously alluded to, by which the
+concentration of the enemy would be disturbed or other material
+successes might be achieved, but that the decisive purpose only begins
+when important and possible tasks can be given to the Cavalry&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>,
+when the main bodies of the enemy become ready for operations.</p>
+
+<p>Then it becomes our duty to screen not only the advance of our own
+troops and to secure to our Infantry the advantages of being able to
+advance undisturbed, but the climax of all these duties will be
+reached <i>in the far more important duty</i>, in the now indispensable
+task, of securing the <i>widest possible sphere of intelligence</i>.</p>
+
+<p>Whereas, during the period of railway concentration the front of the
+enemy was conditioned by the ends of the lines employed in bringing up
+the troops, who in turn spread themselves out to utilize the resources
+of the country (hence generally our patrols, if sent out, would come
+in contact all along the threatened frontier or the enemy's line of
+detrainment, with defended villages, etc.), the troops will now be
+drawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group themselves
+together into clearly-defined masses.</p>
+
+<p>There will therefore now arise between separate portions of his Army
+and their lines of advance, spaces unoccupied by troops into which our
+Cavalry can penetrate. The heads and flanks of his columns can now be
+determined, and the direction in which they are marching, thus
+ascertained, becomes of essential importance.</p>
+
+<p>Now is the time when the Cavalry must put in its full strength to
+discover the strength and direction of the enemy's movements, and the
+fact of this concentration <span class="pagenum"><a id="page028" name="page028"></a>(p. 028)</span> provides the Cavalry with the
+opportunities necessary to solve the problem before it.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, immediately after detraining, troops will have to march to
+the districts to which they are assigned for convenience of supply,
+and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which it
+will be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not be
+overlooked that observations during this period may easily lead to
+false conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes or
+introductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing upon
+the design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop after
+a certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence the
+essence of the whole question resolves itself into this&mdash;that the
+Cavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategical
+concentration begins.</p>
+
+<p>From the results now obtained the success of the whole campaign may
+entirely depend. At this climax no secondary consideration must be
+allowed to distract attention from the principal object. Even the
+desirability of screening the movements of one's own Army, in so far
+as this duty is not fulfilled by the reconnaissance itself, must give
+way to the attainment of the principal object in view, which is
+<i>intelligence</i>, not <i>security</i>.</p>
+
+<p>This point requires to be more particularly insisted upon, because
+fundamentally different arrangements are necessary to fulfil these two
+purposes. Anyone who attempted to entrust both the provision of
+intelligence and the protection of the troops to one and the same body
+of men would in the vast majority of cases fail to secure either
+purpose as long as the enemy's mounted forces still held the field.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page029" name="page029"></a>(p. 029)</span> To secure information&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, intelligence&mdash;requires
+concentration of force. The reconnoitring Cavalry must beat their
+opponents out of the field in order to obtain opportunities for
+discovering what is going on behind the enemy's protective screen. To
+accomplish this, the Cavalry must endeavour to work round the
+adversary's flanks, and may in consequence have to leave the front of
+its own Army entirely uncovered. The protection of this Army, on the
+other hand, requires a wide extension of front and consequent
+subdivision of force, the exact opposite of the concentration the
+provision of intelligence imperatively calls for.</p>
+
+<p>Naturally this view encounters opposition. Some contend that the whole
+triumph of the Art consists in solving both problems simultaneously.
+They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with the
+enemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual destruction of
+both parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in the
+interests both of security and screening, on a certain breadth of
+front. If, then, circumstances compel one to fight, one must
+concentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessary
+degree of extension to cover the front of the Army. They would leave
+reconnaissance to be carried out by rapidly advancing patrols, which
+evade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageous
+points of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thus
+obtaining their objects in spite of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that any
+systematic application of this line of action will give sufficient
+results.</p>
+
+<p>Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page030" name="page030"></a>(p. 030)</span> Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1871 to obtain reliable
+information, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, and
+still more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time?
+How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, when
+we can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the country
+between the two Armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as well
+as we!</p>
+
+<p>Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate the
+enemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back through
+the district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be of
+use to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols are
+compelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersected
+country, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisite
+rapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modern
+War, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with.</p>
+
+<p>If from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securing
+communications with one's own Headquarters it becomes necessary to
+beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field to clear up the situation
+sufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all the
+greater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemy
+chances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objective
+of any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomes
+compulsory if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carry
+out screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that the
+enemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually driving
+them off the ground and depriving them of the power of breaking
+through our own screen. That a numerically and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page031" name="page031"></a>(p. 031)</span> materially
+inferior Cavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, but
+fundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about
+collision with that of the enemy, so that from the very beginning it
+secures command of the ground between the two armies, and that the
+actual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations between
+the two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>The victory of the 'masses' intensifies and invigorates the sense of
+superiority in the individual combatant, and this sense of individual
+superiority is essential if the patrols are to carry through their
+duties in the true Cavalry spirit.</p>
+
+<p>On the one hand, they are only able to solve their tasks both of
+screening and of reconnaissance by actually defeating the enemy's
+patrols; on the other hand, the moral factor tells heavily in the
+scale.</p>
+
+<p>How can one expect courage and determination or audacity from men who
+have always been taught to avoid their opponent and only fight when
+they are actually compelled?</p>
+
+<p>The man who leaves these psychic factors out of account will always
+find himself mistaken in War.</p>
+
+<p>That in certain cases it may be useful to push forward officers as
+stealthy patrols, with instruction to avoid being drawn into an
+action, as far as time and opportunity will allow, goes without
+saying; but nevertheless stress must be laid upon the point that
+already in the period which is in general taken up with the encounter
+with the enemy's Cavalry, no opportunity should be lost of keeping the
+principal masses of the enemy's Army under direct observation, and
+that therefore it is necessary from the very commencement <span class="pagenum"><a id="page032" name="page032"></a>(p. 032)</span> of
+the advance to send out officers patrols for this special purpose.</p>
+
+<p>These patrols will derive their best support from a tactical victory
+obtained over the enemy's Cavalry, which is man&oelig;uvring in their
+rear.</p>
+
+<p>Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight to
+screen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres of
+action can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of the
+proper form at the right time and place.</p>
+
+<p>A victory of the reconnoitring Cavalry by shattering the strength of
+the enemy's horsemen must always result, both directly and indirectly,
+in the advantage of our screening force.</p>
+
+<p>The whole consideration, therefore, leads me to the conclusion that
+the chief task for the Cavalry consists in obtaining a victory over
+the enemy's Cavalry in that direction which is of decisive importance
+for the further prosecution of reconnaissance as soon after the
+beginning of the great operations as possible.</p>
+
+<p>That it cannot be our object to seek the opponent's horsemen in the
+direction which they themselves have selected&mdash;merely to beat
+them&mdash;need scarcely be insisted upon. That would be to take the law
+from the enemy and allow one's self to be diverted from the principal
+direction in which reconnaissance is desirable.</p>
+
+<p>Time and direction of the advance must rather be so chosen that they
+compel the enemy to move to meet us. At the same time our effort must
+be to appear with numerical superiority, in order to be certain of
+victory.</p>
+
+<p>In what concerns the Cavalry in the further course of the War, the
+necessity both of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again;
+and in many cases <span class="pagenum"><a id="page033" name="page033"></a>(p. 033)</span> even after the enemy has been beaten out
+of the field, these objects will still only be obtained by fighting.
+Such cases will occur in the duties of screening and security when the
+enemy still possesses enough offensive power to attempt a
+reconnaissance, with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselves
+are engaged in a similar manner; also in all such cases in which
+turning movements entail too much delay, or are rendered impossible by
+the extension of the enemy's front; or, again, when the enemy on their
+part renew offensive operations.</p>
+
+<p>The necessity of breaking through the line of Infantry outposts in
+order to discover the whereabouts of the enemy's principal masses and
+the direction of their movements will also from time to time arise,
+and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly and thoroughly
+attempts at armed resistance by the civilian population.</p>
+
+<p>Further, our Cavalry will be called on for attempts against the
+enemy's communications, the strategical importance of which has been
+already discussed, and these will be all the more important in cases
+where the district we are fighting over is too poor to supply the
+enemy's forces, or where operations have assumed a stationary
+character, as before Fredericksburg, Paris, and Plevna, and it becomes
+desirable to hinder the use of the railways for the transport of
+troops or evacuation of supplies.</p>
+
+<p>Lastly, the Cavalry may be called on to occupy wide stretches of
+country and exploit their resources, to nip in their very inception
+the formation of fresh bodies of armed defenders, or on the defensive,
+to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings by
+flying columns of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page034" name="page034"></a>(p. 034)</span> Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the
+enemy's Armies, will frequently assume the character of 'raids' in
+which the essential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often
+with the sacrifice of all communications with one's own forces, to
+appear suddenly at previously selected positions, and after completion
+of one's immediate object to disappear suddenly, before the enemy can
+bring overwhelming numbers against the assailant.</p>
+
+<p>The success of such undertakings will depend, on the one hand, on the
+rapidity with which the opportunities secured by such surprise are
+utilized, and, on the other, on the available fighting power, which
+must suffice to break down all opposition with certainty and speed.</p>
+
+<p>Their execution, however, will always encounter many difficulties,
+particularly when a hostile population has to be dealt with; but to
+consider them on this account as impracticable seems to me all the
+more impossible, because to my mind they embody an absolutely
+indispensable element of future operations.</p>
+
+<p>If it is feasible to enter upon them with fresh horses, and to make
+adequate provision for supply without delaying the rapidity of
+movement, either by utilizing the resources of the country, by taking
+suitably organized columns with one, or by living on stores captured
+from the enemy himself, then such 'raids' will succeed and exercise
+most far-reaching consequences.</p>
+
+<p>In my opinion all these conditions can be satisfied. We can preserve
+our horses by exercising greater moderation in the pursuit of
+non-essentials; difficulties of supply can be solved by suitable
+preparations even in an enemy's country, and when working in our
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page035" name="page035"></a>(p. 035)</span> own, the sympathetic and persistent support of our own
+population will level all obstacles; but in all cases we must never
+leave out of sight the cardinal point that only the concentration of
+sufficient force at the right time and place can guarantee the final
+result.</p>
+
+<p>Our conduct, however, will be different when our purpose is solely
+defensive, or when we have to occupy districts which the enemy does
+not seek to defend. In such cases, as also when our object is only the
+concealment of our own designs, a dispersion of force may be
+necessary, if only in order to occupy important defiles and defensive
+sections of the ground, or for the occupation of the most important
+centres of population in the enemy's country. From such tasks,
+however, it should be the business of the Supreme Command to preserve
+us, in order that the whole Cavalry strength should be retained intact
+for offensive purposes more in harmony with its whole character and
+the spirit of the Arm.</p>
+
+<p>For these, if great results are to be attained, it requires in the
+generality of cases concentration in time and space.</p>
+
+<p>With the execution of these strategical missions, which so far alone
+have attracted our attention, the duties of the Cavalry Arm are by no
+means exhausted.</p>
+
+<p>Nowadays, as formerly, it will still find work to its hands on the
+battle-field itself, and this work will be all the more important in
+proportion as the quality of the forces therein encountered is on a
+lower level (<i>e.g.</i>, new formations, Militia, etc.). In any case,
+however, great results on the battle-field can only be expected from
+the employment of numerically formidable 'Masses.' This is conditioned
+by the very fact of the numbers which we must in future expect to see
+engaged.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page036" name="page036"></a>(p. 036)</span> The portion of the enemy's forces affected by the results of
+a successful charge must be a sufficient part of the whole which, at a
+given time and place, is concerned in the task of endeavouring to
+secure a decision.</p>
+
+<p>Other factors also deserve consideration&mdash;above all, the increased
+range of modern firearms. If the front of the attacking Cavalry is too
+narrow, it will not only have to face the fire of the troops
+immediately in its front, but it will be the focus of the fire from
+all sides.</p>
+
+<p>If the formation for attack does not supply a sufficient sequence of
+successive efforts, then in many cases it can have no hope of
+permanent result, for an onslaught by a single line will not have
+strength enough to pierce the fire zone, and will be shot to pieces
+before it can reach the enemy.<a id="footnotetag2" name="footnotetag2"></a><a href="#footnote2" title="Go to footnote 2"><span class="smaller">[2]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The masses to be encountered are numerically so considerable that
+single squadrons, regiments, or brigades, hardly count in the scale of
+a great decision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but to
+bring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an important
+fraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a great
+retreat, numbers alone can avail.</p>
+
+<p>How many units to employ under any given circumstances it is, of
+course, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of the
+matter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excess
+of what any existing tactical unit can supply.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page037" name="page037"></a>(p. 037)</span> If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open
+to horsemen in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks
+in the future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in the
+organization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not be
+able to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handling
+of the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Charges
+even of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can only
+lead to success under very special conditions, and even for the
+protection of a retreat our rôle can only be a subordinate one. But
+for reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy's
+communications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similar
+operations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the principal Arm.
+Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisite
+mobility and independence.</p>
+
+<p>At the same time, it is in these fields that its power is
+all-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure of
+necessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results even
+partially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orders
+without knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible to
+act against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone.</p>
+
+<p>It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it is
+to fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy in
+peace.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page038" name="page038"></a>(p. 038)</span> CHAPTER III</h2>
+
+<p class="title">STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY</p>
+
+
+<p>We have seen in the previous chapter that the principal duties which
+can fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require its
+employment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatest
+economy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must be
+practised.</p>
+
+<p>This leads us to the consideration of the question in what manner we
+can group our available means to meet these requirements in the best
+possible way.</p>
+
+<p>Primarily we must start from this axiom&mdash;that no portion of the Army
+can do without Cavalry altogether; hence it follows that we must
+maintain both Divisional and independent Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>The former remains permanently attached to each portion of the Army
+whose composition, by reason of this addition of Cavalry, permits of
+independent action. The latter is set aside for the great strategical
+missions that may be assigned to that Arm, for execution. The question
+now arises, In what proportion is this distribution to take place?</p>
+
+<p>The greater number of Infantry Divisions can, in my opinion, meet all
+demands upon them with a very small allotment of mounted men, as long
+as they are acting in combination with the rest of the Army.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page039" name="page039"></a>(p. 039)</span> The circulation of intelligence and orders within the columns
+and their outposts can generally be entrusted to cyclists. Where
+independent Cavalry is deployed to cover the front of an army, the
+field of activity for the Divisional Cavalry in actual outpost duties
+and reconnaissance is of necessity very much limited. All they are
+really required to accomplish is to maintain the connection with the
+former, and for this duty the cyclist detachments above referred to
+will generally suffice.</p>
+
+<p>There remains, therefore, for the Divisional Cavalry only the service
+with the most advanced sections of the Infantry outposts (orderly
+duties with the Infantry piquets in cases where the ground precludes
+the use of the cycle), duties connected with requisitioning; and
+reconnaissance only during those periods in which the mass of the
+independent Cavalry has been drawn away towards the wings of the Army
+to clear its front for battle, carrying messages during the combat,
+and actual reconnaissance during the progress of the engagement
+itself. All these requirements can, I think, be met with a very small
+amount of force, all the more so because reconnaissance under fire in
+modern War seems to me practically impossible, and can generally only
+be initiated by those Divisions which form the wings of the Army, but
+even then their field would be a very limited one.</p>
+
+<p>Modern firearms compel us to remain at such a distance from the enemy
+that observation is rendered much more difficult, and the distances to
+be traversed are so great that before any reports from the wings can
+get round to the position of Headquarters, and suitable orders based
+on these reports can reach their destination, the whole situation may
+have changed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page040" name="page040"></a>(p. 040)</span> again and again. We have only to remember the
+cases which occurred in the last War (1870).</p>
+
+<p>In the majority of these instances it was quite impossible that
+Cavalry patrols could have sent timely information of what was going
+on within the limits of the enemy's positions, and in the future the
+difficulties will be even greater.</p>
+
+<p>In no case, however, can such information during the progress of an
+action be obtained by the actual employment of the fighting power of
+the Divisional Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>If it is to be done at all, then a few well-led officers patrols will
+suffice, and therefore no considerable numerical strength in the
+Divisional Cavalry is required. The lines of approach of the enemy and
+points on which his wings are resting must certainly be kept under
+observation, but this observation cannot in principle be initiated by
+the Infantry Divisions, but it is the province of the Army
+Headquarters to provide, for it will be precisely the wings and the
+flanks which the enemy will himself seek to protect by the massing of
+his own Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>If the prospect of achieving anything by observation during the combat
+through the action of the Divisional Cavalry may be considered as
+well-nigh impossible, then any tactical action may also be considered
+as precluded, unless it takes place in combination with the
+independent Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>Occasions may certainly even nowadays occur in which a few squadrons
+may achieve results by taking part in a combat between the other Arms,
+but such cases are too few and unimportant to be taken into account in
+a distribution of the Cavalry as a matter of organization.</p>
+
+<p>In Armies deprived of the screen of independent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page041" name="page041"></a>(p. 041)</span> Cavalry the
+want of Divisional Cavalry will certainly be more markedly felt even
+in those Army Corps which form the flanks of Armies, and in the cases
+of detached expeditions, and in similar exceptional circumstances. In
+all these instances more Cavalry must be sent up to the outposts, and
+it will have both to screen and reconnoitre.</p>
+
+<p>The demands on its fighting efficiency can, under such circumstances,
+become of importance, and in these smaller operations, reconnaissance
+during action is more possible than with extended battle-fronts. But
+to demand for the Divisional Cavalry on these grounds a larger
+proportion of sabres, and thus to paralyze a great portion of the Arm
+by its inclusion in the long columns of march of the whole Army, is
+not justifiable. The scale on which we must decide the apportionment
+of Divisional Cavalry must depend on the fact that the Infantry does
+not generally operate in small detachments, but works in large masses,
+and it is the necessities of these large masses which fix the
+standard.</p>
+
+<p>To apportion to single columns or Divisions for particular
+circumstances an increased force of Cavalry, to be taken from the
+available mass of independent Cavalry Divisions, ought not in general
+to occasion unusual friction; but it is most difficult and troublesome
+to take away from the Infantry the squadrons definitely assigned to it
+by peace-time organization, and unite these in independent Cavalry
+Commands.</p>
+
+<p>We must not allow ourselves to be misled in this matter by the
+practice followed in peace man&oelig;uvres. Even the largest
+concentration of troops for these purposes is, in proportion to the
+masses to be employed in our future War, on a most limited scale.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page042" name="page042"></a>(p. 042)</span> Our smaller Brigade and Divisional man&oelig;uvres are
+restricted within limits which can only be considered nowadays as
+exceptional. They are only too well adapted to give rise to entirely
+false conceptions as to the true character of the Cavalry service in
+these great struggles for national survival, unless we keep steadily
+in mind that they apply only to exceptional circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>We must, therefore, lay down as a principle that as much Cavalry as
+possible is to be organized for strategical independence, and as
+little as is expedient retained for the Infantry Divisions.</p>
+
+<p>My opinion is that, if we make fullest use of the bicycle, and, with
+this object in view, reorganize our system of conveying orders and
+intelligence, then two well-trained and effective squadrons should
+amply suffice for the ordinary duties with an Infantry Division.</p>
+
+<p>As to the allotment of the independent Cavalry Divisions, it follows
+from all that has been said above, that to divide them in equal
+proportions among the several Armies, according to their numerical
+strength, can only be considered as an obstacle to the full
+utilization of their potential fighting capacity. It would be better
+to arrange this distribution at the beginning of each War, in
+accordance with the conditions which the situation imposes. Where it
+appears expedient, we should not hesitate to form Divisions of
+different strength, and to group several of these to constitute
+Cavalry Corps, even to unite several of such Corps for employment in a
+particular strategical direction&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, in a particular portion of
+the theatre of operation&mdash;whilst leaving only individual brigades, or
+even regiments, to those fractions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page043" name="page043"></a>(p. 043)</span> of the Army which for the
+moment can best dispense with Cavalry support.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, an Army taking the field with a great superiority of
+Cavalry can afford to deal less sparingly with it for secondary
+purposes; on the other hand, the numerically weaker side is driven to
+the utmost economy of its forces, and the utmost energy in its
+employment at the decisive moment. It will therefore be essential for
+the latter to concentrate at the commencement of the campaign the bulk
+of its Cavalry upon the decisive line of operations&mdash;that is to say,
+on that line on which, from the general strategical situation, one can
+expect to penetrate into the chief district of concentration of the
+enemy's Armies, and hence to find out what it is of the greatest
+importance for us to know, or, on the other hand, when it is to our
+interests to conceal our own operations, and hence to beat the enemy's
+Cavalry as thoroughly as possible wherever it shows itself. On the
+remaining portion of the front we must endeavour to employ as little
+Cavalry as possible, and to supplement it in the duties of security by
+Infantry, whilst leaving reconnaissance to be dealt with by patrols.
+If we thus gain the victory on the principal line, the results will
+soon be apparent in a reduction of pressure on the adjacent sections
+of the front, and then the Cavalry will find its opportunity for
+increased activity in offensive enterprises. For, once the enemy's
+horsemen are beaten, either he will concentrate his remaining Cavalry,
+from every direction, towards the threatened points, or the victor
+will be in a position to utilize the superiority he has acquired to
+support any portion of his force which may have got into temporary
+difficulties.</p>
+
+<p>If, thus, it is the necessity of beating the enemy's <span class="pagenum"><a id="page044" name="page044"></a>(p. 044)</span> Cavalry
+out of the field at the very commencement of the campaign which
+compels the concentration of important numbers in the decisive
+direction, it follows naturally that this point of view must be fully
+considered in the plan of strategical deployment.</p>
+
+<p>In the further stages of Cavalry activity&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, after it has
+defeated the mass of the enemy's Cavalry&mdash;the tasks which can confront
+the Arm make the employment of considerable forces essential, unless,
+as so often happened in 1870, its operations are to be interfered
+with, if not altogether stopped, by weak Infantry detachments, or even
+by an insurgent population. Against this concentration of large masses
+of Cavalry many objections will naturally be raised; hence we must
+consider how these are to be met, and whether, as a fact, they are of
+sufficient importance to cause us to surrender the advantages they
+offer.</p>
+
+<p>First comes the difficulty of feeding large numbers. But military
+history, from the time of Frederick the Great and Napoleon down to the
+American Civil War, the unusual conditions of which latter must not be
+left out of account, show conclusively that it was possible to keep
+masses of 5,000 men and more together, and in full mobility, even in
+poor and almost roadless districts.</p>
+
+<p>If it was possible then, how much more will it be so now, with our
+modern means of communication, if proper arrangements are made in
+advance!</p>
+
+<p>It has been further objected that the rapid circulation of information
+from the front to Army Headquarters will be jeopardized by the
+insertion of an additional collecting station&mdash;viz., the Corps
+Command, between the two ends of the chain. But this fear can be shown
+to be groundless, for in any case where at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page045" name="page045"></a>(p. 045)</span> all large bodies
+of Cavalry are sent out in advance, the service of intelligence must
+be organized in such a manner that all really important information
+will be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through the
+usual channels. Since this is already necessary with Cavalry
+Divisions, there can be no objection to applying it to yet higher
+commands.</p>
+
+<p>More important than this question of intelligence is the consideration
+that the command of Cavalry 'Masses' which exceed more than the
+present Division of six regiments involves exceptional difficulties,
+and this must be granted to a certain extent as long as the question
+is limited to the actual tactical handling (execution of man&oelig;uvres)
+of the Division on the battle-field.</p>
+
+<p>It is, in fact, no longer possible to handle a force of six regiments
+according to any set scheme, such as that known as the
+'Dreitreffentaktik'&mdash;at any rate, not in hilly or difficult country.
+The transition from one formation to another, the deployment of the
+whole unit for attack, or the interchange of the duties between the
+separate lines, are certainly hardly possible on ground over which it
+is difficult to man&oelig;uvre. It appears, however, to me that the
+conduct of great Cavalry 'Masses' by ordinary drill methods is not
+necessary to meet the condition of modern warfare.</p>
+
+<p>When once the Cavalry Corps Commander grasps the idea of handling the
+units at his disposal as the Infantry Corps Commander handles his
+Divisions, sending in first one Division, and then, according to
+circumstances, reinforcing it or prolonging the fighting line by
+drawing on the second one, or by employing the Divisions side by side,
+assigning to each a definite share in the attainment of the purpose,
+which he <span class="pagenum"><a id="page046" name="page046"></a>(p. 046)</span> himself keeps steadily in view, there seems no
+reason why the leadership of such bodies should not be perfectly
+practicable. Indeed, one may safely say that the result will be all
+the more certain of attainment the more the final responsibility is
+concentrated on the one head; for there is obviously a greater
+possibility of a single mind pursuing consistently a given purpose
+than of two or more Divisional Commanders following out the same idea
+independently along the same lines.</p>
+
+<p>If, then, when the Corps is united for tactical action, the
+maintenance of a single Command is quite conceivable, this will be all
+the more the case in matters of Strategy. It is not so much a question
+then of handling the corps as a closed unit, for instance, on a single
+road, but of assigning within a certain sphere a united impulse to the
+constituent parts of the Command in such directions that in all cases
+they should reach the ground in force superior to anything the enemy
+can oppose to them. According to circumstances, different tasks may be
+assigned to the several Divisions. They may march on different roads,
+some of them extended, some closed, the only condition being that they
+all pursue a common strategic purpose, assigned to them by the Corps
+Commander, according to the same fundamental principles, and are
+prevented by this higher control from flying out in eccentric
+directions.</p>
+
+<p>Objections based on the alleged difficulties of the conduct of such
+masses are therefore untenable. On the contrary, the demand must be
+made on the Chief Command that, always in accordance with the
+strategical situation, it must clearly determine what it requires of
+the Cavalry, and group them in a suitable manner and in sufficient
+numerical strength under a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page047" name="page047"></a>(p. 047)</span> single Leader, even if in the
+meanwhile there may be a deficiency of the Arm at less important
+points. This fundamental principle must be adhered to at all costs if
+full advantages are to be derived from the employment of our Arm, for
+with none other can the consequences of a dispersal of force exact
+more terrible retribution than with the Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>Nevertheless, though the principle must be held inviolate, its
+application must not degenerate into hide-bound rigidity. 'Strategy is
+founded on a system of expedients' (Moltke), and hence expediency
+remains always our highest ideal.</p>
+
+<p>The essential point, however, is that our organization must be made so
+elastic that we can alter the strength of our units to meet the
+varying circumstances which may confront us, so that forces may not
+remain unutilized in one place whilst they may be most urgently
+required at another.</p>
+
+<p>It is no way essential that the units combined for the express
+purposes apparent at the commencement of the campaign should remain
+intact throughout the War. One should be able to detach from or
+reinforce them, as circumstances require; break up Corps and
+Divisions, to reform them elsewhere; and employ their Leaders and
+Staff first with one, then with the other.</p>
+
+<p>As an example of what I have just said, I would cite the manner in
+which the German Headquarters Command dealt with the Armies during the
+war of 1870-1871. According to the demands of the moment, the
+individual Corps or Divisions were grouped in manifold proportions to
+constitute such units, and the adaptability of this organization
+proved sufficient to cope with every eventuality.</p>
+
+<p>As an almost ideal type we can take the manner <span class="pagenum"><a id="page048" name="page048"></a>(p. 048)</span> in which
+Napoleon dealt with his Cavalry Corps for the same purpose. At one
+moment his bodies of horsemen unite into Divisions and Corps; at
+another they dissolve into independent Brigades or regiments,
+operating singly, only once more to be united into formidable
+'Masses,' as circumstances dictate. Here we see no rigid adherence to
+any rules, nothing pedantic in the method of employment, and the
+leader and troops deftly adapt themselves to the ever-changing
+conditions.</p>
+
+<p>This is the ideal to which we Germans should strive to attain, and all
+the more so in proportion as we are threatened by superior numbers.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page049" name="page049"></a>(p. 049)</span> CHAPTER IV</h2>
+
+<p class="title">INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION</p>
+
+
+<p>If the changed conditions of modern war have brought about new
+conditions and demands which require to be considered in the
+strategical combinations of the Cavalry, I believe that a similar
+influence must make itself felt in the field of tactics. Whereas
+formerly the <i>arme blanche</i> was recognized as the principal method by
+which the Cavalry made its inherent fighting power felt, the
+employment of dismounted action nowadays has gained in importance to
+such an extent that the whole character of our activity appears
+completely changed.</p>
+
+<p>Although hitherto the general conception has been that Cavalry should
+only make use of the carbine for defence, nowadays its employment in
+attack must be recognized as of the utmost importance.</p>
+
+<p>Undoubtedly, however, it is, and must remain even to-day, the chief
+aim of every leader in whose veins flows the hot Cavalry blood to
+seize his opportunities wherever they offer themselves, and, above
+all, to attack the enemy's Cavalry wherever and whenever accessible
+with cold steel; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that
+nowadays numerous problems will present themselves to the Cavalry
+which can only be solved by fire action.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page050" name="page050"></a>(p. 050)</span> In the first place, the opportunity will often arise for the
+weaker side to avoid an encounter in the open field, and, with the
+help of its firearm, at least to attempt behind defiles, or strong
+positions, to defy the enemy's superior forces. In such cases the
+assailant also will be compelled to have recourse to his carbine.</p>
+
+<p>Further considerations reveal that in future, quite apart from
+encounter with the enemy's Cavalry, our own horsemen will find tasks
+before them which will make appeal to the rifle inevitable.</p>
+
+<p>The enemy will cover his railways, and important depots by troops of
+the second and third class. Reinforced by the resisting power of
+popular levies, they will block woods, river crossings, and defiles.
+Even the guards of their Convoys will be amply provided with
+far-ranging firearms.</p>
+
+<p>In the pursuit of an enemy's beaten Cavalry we shall happen upon
+Infantry detachments sent out to cover their retreat, or upon defiles
+which have been occupied for a similar purpose. Important
+communications will be held by strong detachments of cyclist Infantry,
+who will find in woods and villages protection and favourable
+opportunities to use their weapons.</p>
+
+<p>All these means of resistance lie beyond the field of mounted action,
+but they must be overcome if success is to crown our efforts.</p>
+
+<p>Already in reconnaissances, particularly in those directed against the
+enemy's communications, we shall meet with these impediments, and the
+same will be the case when we come to the strategical pursuit, or the
+protection of a retreat.<a id="footnotetag3" name="footnotetag3"></a><a href="#footnote3" title="Go to footnote 3"><span class="smaller">[3]</span></a> In the pursuit the main object is to keep
+the beaten enemy on the run, to give him neither peace nor rest until
+complete exhaustion sets in. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page051" name="page051"></a>(p. 051)</span> But for the mass of the Cavalry
+the idea of a purely frontal pursuit should not be encouraged, for
+Cavalry, even when supported by several batteries, can easily be held
+up by any rearguard position in which a few intact troops remain.</p>
+
+<p>The frontal pursuit must in such cases be left to the other Arms, only
+to be taken up again when the last resistance of the enemy is broken,
+and the exhaustion of our own Infantry and Horse Artillery renders
+further effort on their part impossible.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, all energy must be devoted to the initiation of a
+pursuit on parallel lines, in order that we may appear unexpectedly
+and repeatedly against the flanks of the enemy's columns, with the
+ultimate intention of anticipating him at some point on the line of
+his retreat, such as a defile, thus bringing him between two fires in
+a sheerly desperate position.</p>
+
+<p>Man and horse must in these cases be driven to the utmost limit of
+their powers of endurance.</p>
+
+<p>It is evident that in such situations the principal rôle falls to the
+firearm, for only in the fire fight is it possible to break off an
+attack without loss, in order to appear again at some other point and
+recommence the engagement. In case of anticipating an enemy at a
+defile, the rifle will be practically the only weapon that can find
+employment.</p>
+
+<p>What can be achieved in this direction is best illustrated by
+Sheridan's Cavalry, whose successful flanking operations against the
+lines of communication of General Lee's heroic Army brought about the
+capitulation of Clover Hill.</p>
+
+<p>The charge will only then secure a greater result than dismounted
+action, when the tactical cohesion of the enemy has been dissolved,
+and his fire power <span class="pagenum"><a id="page052" name="page052"></a>(p. 052)</span> utterly broken; that is to say, generally
+it will be of greater service in tactical than in strategical
+pursuits&mdash;unless, indeed, as at Waterloo, the defeat has led to the
+complete and permanent dissolution of the enemy's fighting power.</p>
+
+<p>Further, in the endeavour to support the rearguard of a defeated Army
+in retreat it will be necessary, as soon as we have got rid of the
+pursuing Cavalry, to take to the rifle, because with the sword alone
+we cannot hope to make any impression upon the Infantry and Artillery
+of the victor.</p>
+
+<p>In such cases we must strive to attack with the firearm against the
+flanks of the pursuing columns, in order to draw off their attention
+from our beaten main body.</p>
+
+<p>Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit at
+defiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence.</p>
+
+<p>In such circumstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has not
+allowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluable
+services to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with the
+columns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect an
+orderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affording
+to its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion and
+tactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which will
+gain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, time.</p>
+
+<p>The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itself
+in an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by short
+surprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infallible
+means of circumventing points of resistance. This conception,
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page053" name="page053"></a>(p. 053)</span> which restricts the functions of Cavalry within their
+narrowest limits, seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially
+indefensible when it is a matter of gaining time or of carrying a
+given position, such as a defensible post on the lines of
+communication, a convoy marching under escort, the destruction of a
+defended railway, or in any similar undertaking. It will be impossible
+to work round such positions&mdash;at least when engaged on the greater
+operations of War&mdash;both on account of the widths of the fronts
+occupied and the possibility of interfering with the sphere of
+operations of the neighbouring detachments. Often, indeed, the nature
+of the ground will preclude such attempts, and the experience of
+1870-1871 should suffice to show how rarely such a circumvention can
+hope to succeed. But even where neither the strategic situation nor
+our immediate purpose compels us to fight, it is not always advisable
+or expedient to attempt to evade the opportunity. For every evasion
+leaves the front of our own Army clear, gives the enemy the very
+opportunity he is looking for to reconnoitre the position of our main
+bodies, uncovers our own communications (<i>i.e.</i>, our own Cavalry
+trains and baggage), exposes our flank to the enemy, and thus offers
+him many chances of obtaining tactical results.</p>
+
+<p>Again, these attempts at circumvention lead easily to a loss of
+direction, which in certain cases might endanger the success of our
+whole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by such
+outflanking attempts may not be justified by the possible results. In
+such cases it might on the whole be better to attack direct, for
+turning movements mean always a postponement of the tactical decision,
+and hence are always a disadvantage to the attacking side.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page054" name="page054"></a>(p. 054)</span> The theory that Cavalry, thanks to its mobility, can always
+ride round and turn the positions it encounters breaks down in
+practice before the tactical and strategical demands upon the Arm,
+partly by reason of the local conditions, and partly because of the
+consideration which has to be given to time, to the endurance of the
+horses, and the position of the following columns.</p>
+
+<p>The same applies to another theory with which one tries to explain
+away the necessity of dismounted combats. It is maintained that the
+fire power of the Horse Artillery will suffice to clear the road for
+the Cavalry; hence the latter will rarely be placed in a position
+which will require energetic dismounted action on their part. This
+assumption involves, in my opinion, an altogether overrated estimate
+of the power of Artillery. The same reasoning would lead us logically
+to the false conclusion that even Infantry do not require their
+rifles. One must demand from every reliable body of troops that they
+will not allow themselves to be driven out of a covered position by
+Artillery alone. All previous War experience testifies to the
+impossibility of achieving such results against even moderate
+Infantry, and it is only with such that we are here dealing. The fact
+that in 1870-1871 the Artillery often did succeed in driving a weak
+and demoralized enemy out of localities the possession of which was of
+no material consequence to him cannot be considered as to the point.
+Certainly the effect of modern guns is greater than anything of which
+we have had experience, and will act upon the defender with
+correspondingly greater intensity; but, on the other hand, it must be
+insisted upon that the assailant's Artillery will have to act under
+the increased effect of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page055" name="page055"></a>(p. 055)</span> the defender's fire power, and the
+latter will choose different terrain, and utilize it far better than
+in the past. The actual assault remains necessary now, as ever, to
+bring about the final decision.</p>
+
+<p>Anyone who has had to conduct staff rides and similar operations of
+large bodies of independent Cavalry, and has endeavoured to carry
+these out in the spirit of actual warfare, can hardly have failed to
+notice the tendency which displays itself with all leaders to take to
+dismounted action, and will have realized that one has far more
+frequently to check rather than encourage this tendency; but he will
+also come to the conclusion, perhaps, that this desire is well founded
+on existing conditions, and that even a determined Cavalry will have
+to make use of their firearms almost every day; indeed, without
+adequate employment of their carbines they are no longer able to carry
+out the most important of their incumbent duties.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, if the use of the rifle is thus shown by instances taken from
+the most divergent directions to be of absolute necessity, the
+conclusion follows that even in the battle itself, that point on which
+all military action is focussed, it can hardly fail to find both its
+opportunities and its full justification.</p>
+
+<p>In this direction the horsemen of Stuart and Sheridan have set us a
+brilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles
+(Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding,
+rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediately
+afterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehement
+charges (Stuart at Brandy Station).</p>
+
+<p>The South African War also has shown us what <span class="pagenum"><a id="page056" name="page056"></a>(p. 056)</span> can be done by
+a mounted force supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought
+exclusively as Cavalry (<i>sic</i>), supported by Artillery, and some of
+the most celebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at
+their hands as long as the numerical proportion was not altogether too
+unfavourable to the assailants.</p>
+
+<p>Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of the
+war, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus proved
+incontrovertibly that the double rôle of Cavalry on foot and on
+horseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of these
+same Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they were
+lacking in any kind of tactical training for this particular
+result.<a id="footnotetag4" name="footnotetag4"></a><a href="#footnote4" title="Go to footnote 4"><span class="smaller">[4]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the days
+of the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa,
+largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and the
+out-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot be
+transferred to European circumstance without important modifications.
+But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, their
+power of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatest
+degree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon as
+they make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army,
+and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the best
+guarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of the
+Franco-German <span class="pagenum"><a id="page057" name="page057"></a>(p. 057)</span> War demonstrated this possibility. What might
+not our Cavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined
+forces of the Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and
+sought of a set purpose for such opportunities?</p>
+
+<p>It would take us too far to produce the numerous proofs from the pages
+of our War records; only, as an example, I should like to quote the
+Battle of Bapaume. In this instance the 7th Cavalry Brigade belonging
+to the 3rd Cavalry Division lay on the flank&mdash;in fact, almost in rear
+of&mdash;the enemy's Army, without being able to come to the help of the
+hard-pressed 15th Division. Had they on that occasion been able to act
+by fire, by surprise, and with determination against the rear of the
+French Army of the North, the results must have been invaluable.</p>
+
+<p>In future, beyond doubt, we shall have to deal with much larger masses
+of the enemy than formerly, and against them one must make up for want
+of numbers by an enormous expenditure of ammunition, and further
+endeavour to reinforce our fire power by repeating-rifles. We must
+also aim at intensifying the effect of our fire power by attacking
+only at decisive points. On the other hand, it must be admitted, that
+in the magnitude of the masses themselves there lies the germ of
+weakness, and in our future wars we can hardly expect to find Infantry
+as firmly welded together as in the Armies of the past. I therefore by
+no means hold the opinion that dismounted Cavalry can achieve nothing
+against Infantry, or that their chances are limited to only very
+favourable opportunities.</p>
+
+<p>It is, of course, true that the Infantry receive a more thorough
+musketry training, particularly at long <span class="pagenum"><a id="page058" name="page058"></a>(p. 058)</span> ranges, and that
+their education in the use of the ground, as well as in fire control,
+in peace is naturally better than with the Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are by
+no means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority of
+the latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm for
+the Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of the
+carbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source of
+weakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalry
+possesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization which
+render it materially superior to the Infantry.</p>
+
+<p>I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized,
+cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force&mdash;that is to
+say, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion.</p>
+
+<p>Let us look at this question a little more closely.</p>
+
+<p>A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made of
+the horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annual
+contingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consist
+pretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service,
+and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there will
+be at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder will
+consist half of men in their third year and half of men in their
+second year; but these seventy men are led by three officers,
+generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eight
+non-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong to
+the active list.</p>
+
+<p>Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength,
+is about seventy-five strong, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page059" name="page059"></a>(p. 059)</span> consists of about forty men on
+the active list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in
+their second year of service, and of thirty-five reservists.</p>
+
+<p>It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained colour
+soldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehr
+officer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whom
+four on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, as
+a rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us,
+shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which body
+we shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to be
+able to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline are
+all essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition the
+number of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add, apart
+from all other considerations, that the direct influence of the
+Leaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much more
+highly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered that
+there are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partly
+because of their longer period of service and closer supervision, and
+partly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from his
+horse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment the
+best guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations,
+I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage the
+best existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects of
+success, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve its
+sense of superiority.</p>
+
+<p>Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormously
+increased.</p>
+
+<p>We can now approach tasks which hitherto had <span class="pagenum"><a id="page060" name="page060"></a>(p. 060)</span> to be regarded
+as impossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance
+of the enemy's Infantry the rôle of Cavalry <i>ipso facto</i> came to an
+end, unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry to
+charge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spirit
+of the Arm, to lay principal stress upon the offensive, even when
+fighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, with
+chances of success which no longer depend on the favour of special
+circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion where
+formerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold it
+to be an altogether antiquated standpoint to assume that Cavalry on
+foot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach on
+horseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the most
+decisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize any
+special advantages offered by local circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which the
+Cavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive,
+and was compelled to attack the enemy&mdash;exactly like the Infantry&mdash;in
+the most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Under
+modern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even more
+apparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of the
+independence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to its
+equipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only to
+exceptionally favourable circumstances. The Cavalry must, in fact, be
+able to attack on foot exactly like Infantry when the situation
+imperatively demands it; but if it is to be handled in this spirit,
+then it will require to be very strongly provided with Artillery.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page061" name="page061"></a>(p. 061)</span> If it is already considered almost impossible for Infantry to
+turn well-covered defenders out of their position without Artillery
+support, the same naturally applies to the Cavalry. In fact, a strong
+Artillery will be all the more necessary, for the attack with Cavalry
+should be carried through with the utmost rapidity, and when acting on
+the defensive its purpose is to gain the greatest amount of time.
+Against this must be borne in mind that the Infantry should not
+without necessity be deprived of its due share of Artillery, but I
+think the two views can be readily united. As long as the Cavalry
+'Masses' are out in front of the Armies we can safely give them as
+many horse batteries as they require, and the same is the case after a
+victory or after a lost battle. In the decisive battle itself this
+Artillery reinforcement to the Cavalry must not be expended
+eccentrically, and must be utilized to the utmost in the most decisive
+direction on the battle-field itself. Here, too, a certain elasticity
+of organization is most desirable, and a strict adherence to a
+prearranged order of battle can only act most prejudicially.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page062" name="page062"></a>(p. 062)</span> CHAPTER V</h2>
+
+<p class="title">THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS</p>
+
+
+<p>Having admitted that dismounted action has increased considerably in
+importance, particularly on the offensive, it nevertheless remains the
+fact that the combat with cold steel remains the chief <i>raison d'être</i>
+of the Cavalry, and when the principles have to be considered
+according to which troops have to be employed upon the battle-field,
+the actual collision of Cavalry 'Masses' remains the predominant
+factor.</p>
+
+<p>The task of the Leader must be to transmit the mechanical power
+inherent in the troops in the form of momentum upon the enemy. Where
+he, with a clear purpose before him, acts with daring and thorough
+comprehension, it is in his power to intensify this momentum many
+times over; and this holds true with the Cavalry to a greater degree
+than with any other Arm, for with the horsemen the personal impression
+conveyed by the appearance and bearing of the Leader reacts on the
+mass as in no other case. This reaction is further accentuated by the
+fact that the excitement of motion on horseback, inherent in the
+performance of Cavalry duties, contains something electrifying,
+kindling to the imagination and exciting <span class="pagenum"><a id="page063" name="page063"></a>(p. 063)</span> to the nerves,
+which communicates its influence to the Leader, and thus in turn
+supports him.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, the evils of an indifferent Command make themselves
+nowhere more apparent than with Cavalry. In this Arm every impulse
+works itself out relentlessly down to the last consequence. Mistakes
+once made can rarely be remedied. This is the necessary consequence of
+the short time interval to which their activity is limited, the
+rapidity of their movements, and the irresistible momentum with which
+a Cavalry charge once launched presses on with ever-increasing
+momentum to its final decision.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst thus with the Cavalry the influence of the Command is the most
+important factor of success, any deficiency in which can rarely be
+made good by the excellence of the troops themselves, it is precisely
+with this Arm that it is the least frequently found; for admittedly
+there is nothing more difficult on the battle-field than correct
+disposition and execution at the head of a great body of horsemen.</p>
+
+<p>Several factors unite to explain this circumstance. In the first
+place, only the shortest moment of time is available for
+consideration, and then this rapid consideration and decision have to
+be given under the most unfavourable external conditions, at the
+fullest speed of one's horse, or in the maddening confusion of the
+mêlée. Further, in most, cases it will be quite impossible for the
+Leader of a Cavalry 'Mass' to take in with accuracy the strength and
+dispositions of the enemy. The more extended radius of action of
+modern firearms and the greater distance between the contending forces
+thereby conditioned must in the future render this much more difficult
+than in the past. Very rarely will it be possible for the Leader
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page064" name="page064"></a>(p. 064)</span> either to alter or cancel an order once given in consequence
+of information subsequently received. Even of the ground itself, the
+importance of which is so much greater for the Cavalry than for any
+other Arm, it will be impossible for the Leader to form for himself
+any actual picture. Either it is already in possession of the enemy
+and of his patrols, or at least in their sphere of action, or it
+cannot be readily grasped from a single standpoint, and the rapidity
+of movement allows no time to reconnoitre it sufficiently. Constant
+reference to maps, even when available, is impossible, and the best of
+these do not reveal exhaustively the actual nature of the ground to be
+traversed. The orders must therefore be based on a general
+consideration of the circumstances, for the Leader cannot gauge with
+even approximate accuracy the strength of his enemy from the
+resistance he encounters, like his more fortunate comrade of the
+Infantry. His only remaining means of influencing the course of the
+action lie in his intact reserves.</p>
+
+<p>For subordinates, indeed, the case is even worse, for they will rarely
+find existing conditions in accordance with the conception on which
+their orders were issued, and will seldom have time to refer to
+Headquarters for further instructions.</p>
+
+<p>It must, therefore, be apparent that only the most exceptional Cavalry
+training, combined with high executive talent, can suffice to
+compensate for all these difficulties. Really successful leading will
+only be assured to the Cavalry General when the machinery he sets in
+motion is technically finished down to the last detail.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, the least that can be demanded is that the
+observation of the enemy and distribution of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page065" name="page065"></a>(p. 065)</span> orders are so
+organized that the system works with absolute certainty. On the former
+depends the correct choice of the moment of attack; on the latter that
+the troops are employed in the required direction.</p>
+
+<p>The place of the responsible Leader until the moment of the charge is,
+therefore, well out to the front, in a position from which he can best
+overlook the situation as a whole. Even the Leaders of independent
+units, if possible down to the Regimental Commanders, should remain
+close to him, and try to see the situation through his eyes. The
+greatest fault of all is to stick too close to your troops.</p>
+
+<p>Every Cavalry officer must carry his map in his head as well as in his
+hand, particularly during the engagement. Every Leader must keep
+before his mind the hang of the ground, the lie of the roads, the
+peculiarities of the battle-field, with the chances it affords him.
+Any defects he must try to make good by reconnaissance. Every possible
+consequence of the collision must have been thought out beforehand.</p>
+
+<p>Never should the Chief Commander take part in the charge personally
+until he puts in his last reserve, and even then only when he is clear
+of all responsibility, which by that time will generally be the case.
+In all circumstances he must be in a position to rally his troops
+after they have dispersed themselves in a mêlée, and to take measures
+either to exploit the success, or, in case of reverse, to avert its
+worst consequences. This does not apply only to the Chief Commander.</p>
+
+<p>Here I would enter a particular protest against the opinion one hears
+far too frequently emitted, that the place of every Cavalry Leader in
+the charge is always in front of his command. This only holds good
+when <span class="pagenum"><a id="page066" name="page066"></a>(p. 066)</span> units charge as parts of a higher organization, or
+where smaller bodies&mdash;<i>e.g.</i>, squadrons, regiments, or
+brigades&mdash;attack as a whole, with no rearward lines or supports to be
+controlled, or further responsibilities arising out of the charge have
+to be considered. But this does not relieve the Commander from the
+necessity of setting a personal example in moments of wavering, or
+when it appears better, after cool reflection, to risk everything, to
+carry the men forward to the extreme limit of effort, rather than to
+reserve himself for subsequent emergencies.</p>
+
+<p>In all other cases the Commander, and his Staff, must avoid becoming
+entangled in the confusion of a fight in which he must lose all view
+and control over his men, and at best could achieve nothing more than
+any other equally brave and determined trooper. It is, on the
+contrary, his first duty to move in such a direction that he may at
+all times be ready to influence with rapidity and decision the
+mechanism of his command as a whole.</p>
+
+<p>If he falls, then his Staff Officer or Adjutant assumes the
+responsibility of the command until such time as the next senior can
+be notified of the circumstance. In no case may the continuity of
+action be interrupted by wasting time in looking for his successor.</p>
+
+<p>When the Cavalry is working in combination with the other Arms the
+point of observation of its Commander must be connected with the
+latter by suitable relays, and officers must be sent out into those
+sections of the ground which cannot be overlooked from the position
+the Leader has selected.</p>
+
+<p>Combat and security patrols must be sent out in all directions from
+which the enemy's reserves or fresh bodies of his troops might
+approach, and even towards <span class="pagenum"><a id="page067" name="page067"></a>(p. 067)</span> our own rear the ground must be
+reconnoitred as far as possible by officers, who report the result of
+their operations, not only to the superior Leader, but to the Brigade
+and Regimental Commanders. It will also be advisable to keep the
+officers of the other Arms, particularly of the reserves, as well
+informed as possible about the nature of the ground and the observed
+movements of the enemy's forces, so that these may always act with
+full knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should be
+entrusted with the maintenance of communications with Army
+Headquarters itself.</p>
+
+<p>As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to the
+point of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, the
+Leader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of his
+troops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field of
+action and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, having
+previously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purpose
+of the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, he
+will despatch executive orders to the several échelons concerned. The
+line of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point of
+sight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, be
+assigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to which
+troop it is which is responsible for the direction.</p>
+
+<p>But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission of
+orders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large
+'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in a
+thoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless good
+observation, able leading, and circulation <span class="pagenum"><a id="page068" name="page068"></a>(p. 068)</span> of orders are
+combined with two other most important factors:</p>
+
+<p>First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinate
+leaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when these
+can help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where the
+circumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the order
+received, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth,
+signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, can
+there be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for the
+common purpose.</p>
+
+<p>This independence must never be allowed to degenerate into selfish
+wilfulness; the actual situation, as encountered on the ground itself;
+must never be considered from the subordinate's point of view only,
+but rather must always be solved in the spirit of the original
+conception formed in the Leader's mind.</p>
+
+<p>In the second place, the Leader requires tactical means and forms of
+evolution which combine, with elementary simplicity and clearness, the
+greatest possible degree of adaptability. Nowhere else so much as with
+the Cavalry does the maxim hold good that 'In War only the simple
+secures success.'<a id="footnotetag5" name="footnotetag5"></a><a href="#footnote5" title="Go to footnote 5"><span class="smaller">[5]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The prescribed orders must not place a strain on the memory of the
+Leader or troops, and must operate practically mechanically. Even the
+most far-reaching movements should never require either detailed
+instructions or commands.</p>
+
+<p>The application of the word of command should be limited to those
+units which it can actually control&mdash;namely, the squadron.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page069" name="page069"></a>(p. 069)</span> The use of bugle-calls must be restricted to the utmost, and
+only be permitted in circumstances where no possibility of
+misunderstanding can arise&mdash;a danger not easily excluded where large
+bodies are acting together.</p>
+
+<p>Even the use of signs can only be relied on in a limited degree. In
+dust and closed country of course they cannot be seen.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, all movements depending on verbally transmitted
+commands must be executed without loss of the spirit of uniformity.</p>
+
+<p>In practice this is the only form for the communication of orders
+which can be depended on to act with any degree of certainty under all
+circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>The Regulations must insure the possibility that, no matter under what
+conditions, the unit can be formed without many words or commands into
+the most diverse fighting formations in any required direction, either
+from column of route, rendezvous formation, or even from the mêlée.
+Fundamental principles of action against the different Arms must be
+laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular
+case will not be required.</p>
+
+<p>The rapid change from one fighting form to another must be absolutely
+guaranteed, and equally so the possibility for each unit to assume
+that formation in depth called for by the circumstances of the combat,
+without recourse to complicated orders and movements.<a id="footnotetag6" name="footnotetag6"></a><a href="#footnote6" title="Go to footnote 6"><span class="smaller">[6]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>If these requirements are to be fulfilled, then only such elementary
+movements must be prescribed and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page070" name="page070"></a>(p. 070)</span> regulated as can be
+executed under all circumstances, as laid down in the Regulations.</p>
+
+<p>These matters being settled, then tactical regulations should lay down
+no fixed evolutions, but should confine themselves essentially to
+forms and principles of action, which should be treated with the
+utmost clearness and precision.</p>
+
+<p>It is hardly necessary to adduce elaborate proof to show that our
+existing Regulations by no means meet these requirements in all their
+sections.</p>
+
+<p>Above all, the movements and deployments laid down for the Regiment
+are far too formal, based too much on accurate intervals and fixed
+prescriptions for the movements of the individual squadrons to be
+suitable for use on the ground which Cavalry must nowadays be prepared
+to traverse, or to be executed, exactly as laid down, in face of the
+enemy. Such evolutions are only possible on the drill-ground, where
+bugle-sounds and words of command can still be heard, and are far too
+complicated for practical use.</p>
+
+<p>For instance, let us take the case of deployment to the front out of
+any 'deep' formation&mdash;columns of fours, half troops, or the like,
+which obviously cannot always be executed before the enemy precisely
+in the manner prescribed, because all must depend on the space
+available and the distance which separates us from the enemy. The head
+of the column must suit its movements to these conditions, and in turn
+the following sections must conform to the movements of the head;
+greater freedom of choice must, therefore, be left to the latter.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, there are evolutions of the utmost importance
+before the enemy for which the book gives no guidance
+whatever&mdash;<i>e.g.</i>, the rapid passage from <span class="pagenum"><a id="page071" name="page071"></a>(p. 071)</span> the double column
+into squadron columns, either to the front or flank.</p>
+
+<p>Even for the larger units all the prescriptions are by no means
+adapted to the requirements of active service. For instance, the
+relief of lines ('Treffen Wechsel') is an operation of no use except
+on the drill-ground, and is never attempted even in man&oelig;uvres&mdash;at
+least, personally I know no instance of its ever being tried, except
+as a matter of drill.</p>
+
+<p>That a certain measure of justification may be found for this and
+similar formations, I do not wish to dispute.</p>
+
+<p>They certainly possess great educational value as a means to the
+acquisition of the requisite discipline and cohesion, and they are
+also well adapted for movements beyond the danger zone, when it
+becomes necessary to steady the troops by the most absolute insistence
+on accuracy of movement and precision of drill; and that such cases do
+arise no one who has had experience of War will for one moment
+dispute.<a id="footnotetag7" name="footnotetag7"></a><a href="#footnote7" title="Go to footnote 7"><span class="smaller">[7]</span></a> Hence, even if one may hold the opinion that the same
+purpose may be equally well served by less complicated means better
+adapted to practical requirements, one can nevertheless subscribe
+unconditionally to the soundness of the principle involved. But for
+actual purposes of combat we require simpler forms and more freedom in
+their application, and in so far as the Regulations tend towards this
+end they show a very considerable degree of improvement; for the
+squadron, Section 330 provides the necessary amount of independence,
+and Sections 331 and 333 give sufficient freedom to the Regiment,
+subject only to the limitations referred to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page072" name="page072"></a>(p. 072)</span> above. Section
+346 in particular and Section 348 are also of fundamental importance
+for the higher commands.<a id="footnotetag8" name="footnotetag8"></a><a href="#footnote8" title="Go to footnote 8"><span class="smaller">[8]</span></a> Indeed, I hold the former as the most
+important concession contained in the whole book, for it practically
+initiates a new phase in the whole course of our drill evolution, by
+marking the commencement of the breach with the old doctrine of the
+Three-Line system ('Drei Treffen Taktik'). It is true that it still
+lays chief importance on this method, but it no longer regards it as
+the one royal road to success. Thus we enter on a path on which the
+Infantry already long ago preceded us, and which, <i>mutatis mutandis</i>,
+offers also for the Cavalry similar great and undeniable advantages.
+It is safe to predict that Section 346 will prove the starting-point,
+by sheer pressure of natural conditions, of a fresh series of
+development in our Cavalry Tactics.</p>
+
+<p>Thanks to these prescriptions, the Commander has now a free hand to
+arrange his units (Brigades or Regiments) side by side, and to give
+them the amount of depth that he considers necessary. Hence the
+commands remain immeasurably more in the hands of their leaders than
+was formerly the case&mdash;a point of particular importance on ground
+where the view is restricted; and every unit Commander can also form
+his own reserves, so that reinforcements from the rear will always
+join their own Regiment (or Brigade), and thus the intermixture of the
+different commands will be prevented as much as possible; and
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page073" name="page073"></a>(p. 073)</span> what a gain this will be towards rapid rallying after the
+confusion of an encounter will be obvious to every reader.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, and perhaps this is of even greater importance, a far higher
+measure of initiative will be given to the subordinate leaders than
+was conceivable under the old scheme ('Treffen Taktik').</p>
+
+<p>These advantages can hardly be over-estimated. There remain, however,
+yet two other directions in which this paragraph may lead to yet more
+important consequences.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, it secures for the Commander himself an immense
+simplification of the whole mechanism he is called on to control&mdash;for
+he has no longer to occupy his mind with the fundamental conception of
+the 'Treffen'&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, Three-Line System.<a id="footnotetag9" name="footnotetag9"></a><a href="#footnote9" title="Go to footnote 9"><span class="smaller">[9]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>The term 'Treffen' (Lines), in the true spirit of Frederick the
+Great's day, defines the relation between a leading Line and one or
+more following Lines, which succeed one another in due sequence. The
+tactical evolution of the last few years has, however, led <span class="pagenum"><a id="page074" name="page074"></a>(p. 074)</span>
+to this result&mdash;that this definition is no longer in harmony with the
+modern conception attaching to the word 'Treffen.' According to the
+existing regulations and practice, the second or third Line, or both
+together, may just as well form the fighting Line as the one which is
+momentarily called the first. The latter may equally be used for a
+flank attack or, under a change of circumstances, form the Reserve.</p>
+
+<p>The supporting squadrons, as defined in the new Regulations, or the
+second or third Line in the attack against Infantry or Artillery, are
+nowadays the only ones to which the original conception of the
+'Treffen' applies.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst at present the designation of particular Brigades, etc., as
+first, second, or third 'Treffen' (Lines), has practically no bearing
+on their use in action, but only assigns them a temporary place during
+the particular man&oelig;uvre, we have had to invent, to express the
+actual conception of the 'Treffen,' or Line&mdash;which, after all, one
+cannot do without&mdash;all sorts of designations, such as supporting
+squadrons, formations according to depth, waves, and so forth. Hence
+the word 'Treffen' has introduced a complication which finds no
+justification in the true spirit of the matter. These disadvantages,
+of course, are least evident when the Division is brought into action
+from a previous position of assembly; but they are very apparent
+indeed when it is a question of uniting a Division which has
+previously been acting in separate detachments upon the field of
+battle itself. Then we come face to face with the difficulty&mdash;in fact,
+almost impossibility&mdash;of adopting the modern idea of the 'Three
+Lines.'</p>
+
+<p>On the line of march a Division is divided into <span class="pagenum"><a id="page075" name="page075"></a>(p. 075)</span> Advance
+guard and Main body, and if moving on several roads, then into a
+number of such constituent parts (two to each road). From this state
+of subdivision there result a number of Tactical units which it is
+practically impossible to fit into the 'Three-Line' formation without
+incurring great loss of time, and possibly the loss of one's
+opportunity. Hence, from the retention of this 'Three-Line' idea, we
+arrive at a tactical dilemma which must react detrimentally on the
+handling of the whole Arm, as long as the Leaders are compelled by
+Regulations to assume their 'Three-Line formation' before they can
+fight at all. It is from this contradiction that Section 346 releases
+us.</p>
+
+<p>Of equal importance is a further possibility which the wording of the
+same paragraph throws open to us. It allows, in fact, the Cavalry, no
+matter in what tactical connection it may find itself, to fight always
+in accordance with the same principles.</p>
+
+<p>As long as we adhered to the 'Three-Line system,' this, if not
+impossible, was at least practically inexpedient, for the Regulations
+took cognizance only of a Division composed of three Brigades of equal
+strength, were founded on this idea, and did not allow of adaptation
+to any other distribution of force which might have to be employed.</p>
+
+<p>It has already been pointed out in Chapter III. that they do not apply
+to a Corps made up of several Divisions, and the same holds good of
+Divisions of other than strictly normal composition. Everywhere, in
+cases such as referred to above, the subdivision into Lines
+('Treffen') in the spirit of the Regulations would very soon lead to
+even worse disruption of the units than already happens with normal
+Divisions of three Brigades. The want of proportion between the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page076" name="page076"></a>(p. 076)</span> number of the Lines and the columns from which they have to
+be formed would be more glaring then than nowadays, when the number of
+Brigades happen to be the same as the number of Lines; with the larger
+units the difficulty of uniform speed and control would be a factor.</p>
+
+<p>Now, Section 346 helps us over all these difficulties by
+disembarrassing us of all stereotyped formations based upon numbers
+alone, and leaves the Commander free to choose in what proportion and
+in what order he will divide and move these masses.</p>
+
+<p>Under modern conditions this latitude is indispensable, for the amount
+of force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; but
+the special shape the attack itself assumes, and more particularly its
+breadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemy
+opposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as to
+depth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of the
+adversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of his
+possible reserves.</p>
+
+<p>The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to the
+numbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps,
+or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession to
+one another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' must
+depend on the circumstances of the movement, the order in which the
+troops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed;
+and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'Wing
+Attack,' for the reasons we have above developed.</p>
+
+<p>This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed when
+time is available to form up the troops systematically for action, or
+when the lines of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page077" name="page077"></a>(p. 077)</span> approach of the units lead naturally to
+the adoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is
+absolutely necessary to deliver an attack from column of route as
+rapidly as possible, and hence the time is lacking for a more
+systematic formation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the
+deployment at the issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from
+Assembly formation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or
+under analogous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing
+command will endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing
+Attack' by the choice of some such formation as the 'double column,'
+which admits of deployment to either hand.</p>
+
+<p>Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader the
+possibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for the
+execution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficiently
+master of his art to know which to select.</p>
+
+<p>Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounter
+between man&oelig;uvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily
+most favourable form of attack with reference to his own line of
+approach. It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner
+this can be best insured, for the circumstances of the operations
+themselves and the nature of the ground are capable of influencing the
+decision in too many ways. One can only lay down certain general
+principles which may form a basis in the appreciation of each
+situation as it happens to arise.</p>
+
+<p>In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such a
+direction that the following blow will force the enemy to retire in
+what will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and,
+conversely, for one's own purposes the best.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page078" name="page078"></a>(p. 078)</span> But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages
+or otherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the
+enemy, for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to
+further results. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the
+advantage of the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the
+enemy. In this position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one
+another, and to avoid this predicament he will be compelled to
+endeavour to man&oelig;uvre across our front, always a most dangerous
+undertaking.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage of
+eccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces,
+and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if we
+can concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at the
+worst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with one
+another.</p>
+
+<p>It should be our constant endeavour to gain these positions on the
+'outer lines' by previous strategical operations, in order to avoid
+the danger of being compelled at the last moment to initiate wide
+flanking movements in face of the enemy. Again, a further advantage
+accrues if we can rest one flank on inaccessible or difficult ground.
+This flank at least will be secure, so we can spare troops from it to
+strengthen the other, and thus, perhaps, act with decisive effect.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, when it is presumable that we shall have to deal with
+considerable numerical superiority, we should direct all our efforts
+to throwing the whole weight of our charge against the enemy's flank,
+so as to compel him at the last moment to change his front to meet the
+blow. The opportunity for such action will arise in cases in which,
+thanks to our previous <span class="pagenum"><a id="page079" name="page079"></a>(p. 079)</span> strategic direction, we can succeed
+in uniting the mass of our forces more rapidly than our opponent is
+able to do, and this may often be the case where the ground favours
+our advance and conceals the direction of our march.</p>
+
+<p>Generally, it may be laid down that a simultaneous attack directed
+against the enemy's front and flank is justified when we have the
+advantage of a considerable numerical superiority, or when our
+opponent retains for too long a faulty distribution of his forces; but
+in all other cases a blow with united force against his flank will
+give the most far-reaching consequences, as it brings immediate
+pressure against the adversary's line of retreat, and compels him to
+employ his own forces in succession, not in a concentrated effort.
+Hence this form of attack gives the chance of a success even to a
+force in a numerical minority, as it will often afford it the
+opportunity of beating the enemy in detail, whereas against a
+concentrated mass there would be no hope of success at all.</p>
+
+<p>It will be evident that for the execution of such an attack the forms
+laid down in the Regulations to be observed in the transition from
+rendezvous to attack formations are&mdash;one is almost tempted to
+write&mdash;about as unfavourable as they well can be. It is true they
+afford, as already pointed out, the possibility of presenting the same
+fighting formation in succession to any required point of the compass,
+an advantage which has no practical importance in warfare; but against
+this they increase the difficulties of deployment for attack to the
+front to the utmost. If it is necessary, for instance, to send the
+first Line at the enemy's flank, because at the moment that happens to
+be the shortest way, the front of one of the following <span class="pagenum"><a id="page080" name="page080"></a>(p. 080)</span>
+Brigades is at once masked, and the latter hampered in its movements.
+Or if it is desirable to employ one of the rearward Brigades for a
+flank movement or any similar purposes, then either the leading 'Line'
+must be checked until the others have gained the required position, or
+it is certain that these latter will arrive too late to co-operate.</p>
+
+<p>Further, the forms prescribed by the Regulations render it more
+difficult to make use of such assistance as the nature of the ground
+may offer us.</p>
+
+<p>Plainly, it is very much more to our advantage in the conduct of
+offensive operations to bring up those units which one has at one's
+disposal&mdash;with the sole exception of a Reserve, which is not to be
+kept too weak, at deploying intervals on the same alignment&mdash;in
+formations which adapt themselves well to the ground, and insure rapid
+deployment to the front, with the necessary depth in the supports
+following. For this purpose I recommend primarily the 'double column'
+either in Brigades or in Regiments.</p>
+
+<p>This arrangement of the troops satisfies all practical conditions, and
+insures, above all, the possibility of bringing all forces
+simultaneously into action, and of carrying out offensive flanking
+operations; further, it makes it easier for the Commander to take
+advantage of such support as the ground affords, and to mass his chief
+strength on one wing; and, finally, it gives us the shortest line of
+attack upon the enemy, and makes it easier to avoid the use of inner
+lines. It unites thus all the advantages of the regulation 'Line'
+('Treffen') formation, and avoids its many serious disadvantages;
+hence it should be employed fundamentally wherever possible.</p>
+
+<p>Turning now to the employment of Cavalry on the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page081" name="page081"></a>(p. 081)</span>
+battle-field, the first condition which has to be satisfied is to
+assign to the 'Masses' their proper place in the line of battle. They
+must not only be at hand when wanted, but also at the spot which
+promises the most favourable tactical chances and the greatest
+prospect of decisive results. Further, they must be able to recognise
+the right moment to take part in the combat.</p>
+
+<p>With reference to the first point, I should, above all, like to call
+attention to the writings of General von Schlichting.<a id="footnotetag10" name="footnotetag10"></a><a href="#footnote10" title="Go to footnote 10"><span class="smaller">[10]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Theoretically, the Cavalry 'Mass' is best united on that wing of the
+battle front which is not supported, but destined for further
+man&oelig;uvres, hence on which the Arm will enjoy freedom of movement as
+far as the ground allows. Naturally, it will not always be possible to
+assign them such a place, but their position will result generally
+from the course of the previous man&oelig;uvring.</p>
+
+<p>Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for
+the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in
+which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander
+from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front
+will have to man&oelig;uvre; or it must close in from a flank for the
+decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination.
+But they must always endeavour&mdash;and here I differ from General von
+Schlichting&mdash;to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own
+Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in
+rear of the general alignment&mdash;as, for instance, it is proposed
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page082" name="page082"></a>(p. 082)</span> to use them as a last resort in the interests of the other
+Arms, as at Mars la Tour&mdash;or where the battle front itself is broken
+up by the nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such
+manner that the whole engagement is divided into a series of
+individual actions, as may often be the case in future Wars, that this
+rule must be departed from.</p>
+
+<p>Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a
+certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the
+framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its
+fullest opportunity.</p>
+
+<p>That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped
+goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and
+particular circumstances of the moment.</p>
+
+<p>The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to
+the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the
+flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the
+Cavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank,
+and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically
+with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing
+their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy
+into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position
+to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or
+to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed
+to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally
+superfluous&mdash;a kind of family concern which affects the rival
+Cavalries only&mdash;having no <span class="pagenum"><a id="page083" name="page083"></a>(p. 083)</span> connection with the ultimate
+decision between the two armies.<a id="footnotetag11" name="footnotetag11"></a><a href="#footnote11" title="Go to footnote 11"><span class="smaller">[11]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly on
+peace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generally
+neutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usually
+opens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results.
+I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, but
+that the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out from
+the first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can
+open the door for further successful action against his other troops;
+otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Mars
+la Tour.</p>
+
+<p>If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock has
+supervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportant
+on the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has always
+been due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combat
+to its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Mars
+la Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force nor
+cohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitz
+and at Prague.</p>
+
+<p>Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is really
+adequate to its duties&mdash;when it not only beats the enemy out of the
+field, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further efforts
+in pursuit.</p>
+
+<p>To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and never
+rest satisfied, as on the plateau <span class="pagenum"><a id="page084" name="page084"></a>(p. 084)</span> of Ville sur Yron (Mars la
+Tour), with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to
+gallop and handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his
+horse must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is
+no true 'Cavalry Soldier.'</p>
+
+<p>If we have successfully achieved this first result&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, victory
+over the enemy's horsemen&mdash;then the next step is to secure rapid
+rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally
+driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main
+force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the
+enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring
+about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.</p>
+
+<p>That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this
+crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is
+inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension
+of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.</p>
+
+<p>It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his
+horsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of
+his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such
+conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own
+activity&mdash;a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be
+expected&mdash;and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove
+of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the
+offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces
+before such opportunity arrives.</p>
+
+<p>For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most
+suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it
+implies cannot be disregarded, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page085" name="page085"></a>(p. 085)</span> and will compel him to find
+means to rid himself of such embarrassment.</p>
+
+<p>Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its
+position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should
+be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the
+most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each
+Division retains full space for deployment and room to man&oelig;uvre for
+the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still
+apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.</p>
+
+<p>It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for
+action towards the front than, under the circumstances of the
+battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This
+latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the
+troops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet a
+coming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessity
+of gaining room for deployment,<a id="footnotetag12" name="footnotetag12"></a><a href="#footnote12" title="Go to footnote 12"><span class="smaller">[12]</span></a> the opportunity to strike will be
+lost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to the
+troops being put in without order and in confusion.</p>
+
+<p>The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whether
+Corps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field,
+preserving always their full deploying intervals.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above all
+things the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in the
+shape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actual
+facts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation to
+be assumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clear
+in one's own <span class="pagenum"><a id="page086" name="page086"></a>(p. 086)</span> mind as to which disposition to adopt and the
+consequences which must follow from one's choice.</p>
+
+<p>The chief difficulty always remains&mdash;viz., the chance of seizing the
+opportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solve
+the problem, and in the subsequent course of the War&mdash;particularly
+against the forces of the Republic&mdash;it might often have obtained far
+better results had it possessed a clearer conception of its mission
+and better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action at
+Coulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity.</p>
+
+<p>The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range of
+firearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is it
+that we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of our
+tactical power and its limitations, and it is above all things
+necessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not shirk even
+<i>heavy punishment</i> if by so doing we can best secure opportunities for
+great results.</p>
+
+<p>If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requires
+to have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He must
+be able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General the
+general course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and the
+gradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers.</p>
+
+<p>At any moment he must be able to grasp in his mind the whole balance
+of forces in conflict on any point of the battle-field, so as to be
+able to decide whether the employment of his own command at any
+particular point and time is justified by the general situation of
+affairs.</p>
+
+<p>It is, and always must be, the moments of great crises which give the
+Cavalry the best opportunities.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page087" name="page087"></a>(p. 087)</span> Since attempts to ride through the zone controlled and swept
+by effective Infantry fire may be looked on as synonymous with
+self-destruction, only such moments must be chosen for a charge during
+which the enemy is prevented from bringing his full fire power to bear
+against the assailants. These, however, only occur&mdash;except always
+where the nature of the ground allows of a thorough surprise
+action&mdash;when the moral disintegration of the enemy's Infantry is such
+that, under the impression of the threatening Cavalry attack, they are
+no longer under control, or when they are so completely taken up with
+their own fire action that it is impossible for them to concern
+themselves with the coming danger. Where such opportunities arise they
+must be seized with lightning-like decision and be exploited with the
+utmost energy. On the other hand, one should never allow one's self to
+be induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear no
+reasonable proportion to the possible results. Such conduct could only
+lead to the purposeless sacrifice of men and horses, just as happened
+to the French Cavalry at Woerth and Sedan.</p>
+
+<p>We can always take as an example the wise restraint exercised by von
+Seidlitz at Zorndorf, who, in spite of the Royal Command, refused to
+attack because he did not consider that the right moment had arrived.</p>
+
+<p>The Leader must always keep before his eyes the demands which either
+pursuit or retreat may make on his horses. One should never sacrifice,
+to secure results of secondary consideration, means that can be used
+to better purposes at other times and other places, for the calls
+which may be made upon Cavalry after the battle are quite exceptional
+in their nature.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page088" name="page088"></a>(p. 088)</span> When, after long marches, hours of fighting, and heavy
+losses, the exhausted victor bivouacs on the hard-won field, when the
+day is drawing to its close and the shadows are spreading far across
+the pastures, then the real work of the Cavalry begins; then, without
+drawing rein, the horsemen must press forward to intercept the enemy's
+retreat, attack him anywhere where he least expects it, and harry him
+to utter exhaustion and dispersal (see Book I., Chap. IV., 1.4); or it
+must, under the difficult conditions of a retreat at night, sacrifice
+itself in charges or in protracted fire action in every direction in
+which the pursuing Army can threaten danger to the retreating columns.
+In such situations they must be prepared to hold suitable positions by
+the hour, without thought for their own retreat, without any knowledge
+of the general situation, and without any connection with the
+remainder of their forces. Threatened in flank and rear, and yet
+unshaken by the general collapse, by the flight and panic of their
+comrades, they must hold their own, relying on their own strength and
+self-reliance. These are the conditions which make the highest demands
+both on the material and moral excellence of the men, as well as on
+the indomitable energy and skill of the Cavalry Leader, and to few
+mortals is it given to prove equal to such contingencies; hence one
+must prepare one's self beforehand for such situations.</p>
+
+<p>Primarily one must remember to give opportunities to both men and
+horses to feed, water, and rest even during the progress of the
+battle. One must endeavour, even while the fight is still raging, to
+become perfectly clear in one's own mind as to the possible lines of
+retreat, and the probable ulterior operations. One <span class="pagenum"><a id="page089" name="page089"></a>(p. 089)</span> must try
+to impress upon one's memory the lie of the roads according to the
+map, and the important defiles and positions which might be favourable
+either to pursuit or retreat, in order to be able to act at the right
+moment, without loss of time or hesitation, in full cognizance of the
+circumstances of the case. <i>Nothing helps a decision more than a
+complete intellectual command of the situation.</i></p>
+
+<p>Hence we see that the leading of Cavalry has been rendered
+immeasurably more difficult by a whole series of external
+considerations, as we have shown at the beginning of the chapter; that
+at every moment the highest demands will be made on the intellectual
+perception, the boldness and strength of character of the Leader, if
+on the battle-field of the future he is to handle the Arm with any
+prospect of success; and that the best Cavalry under modern
+circumstances must fail if their Leaders prove unequal to their task.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page090" name="page090"></a>(p. 090)</span> CHAPTER VI</h2>
+
+<p class="title">TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS</p>
+
+
+<p>If, in the shock between mounted men, the genius of the Leader is the
+principal factor of success, nevertheless, the successful conduct of a
+dismounted combat and of all the variations this form of action may
+assume make almost equal demands upon his capacity. For the timely
+recognition of opportunities which can only be turned to account by
+recourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action to
+another, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismounted
+engagement, require such a complete command of the situation and such
+certainty of military judgment and decision of character that the
+combination will be almost as rarely found.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire
+power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow the
+troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the
+Cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great
+strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
+by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of
+judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal
+natures.</p>
+
+<p>The essential point which differentiates the action <span class="pagenum"><a id="page091" name="page091"></a>(p. 091)</span> of
+Cavalry fighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation
+is the dependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that
+under all circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot
+to their means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once
+the most important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot
+of the Leader.</p>
+
+<p>Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile or
+immobile horses,<a id="footnotetag13" name="footnotetag13"></a><a href="#footnote13" title="Go to footnote 13"><span class="smaller">[13]</span></a> and in every case the question arises how the
+conditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best be
+dealt with.</p>
+
+<p>Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action,
+consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance is
+made with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses can
+be led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue the
+prosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fight
+with 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successes
+with the same body of troops with which such success has been won.
+Either the position which has been captured must be retained for some
+considerable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left,
+at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk of
+intervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neither
+operation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit.</p>
+
+<p>On the whole, in attack the difficulty is best met by working with
+'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in the
+fighting line can <span class="pagenum"><a id="page092" name="page092"></a>(p. 092)</span> then be provided by dismounting men from a
+larger number of units&mdash;Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades.</p>
+
+<p>From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to the
+proximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it is
+absolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, or
+when it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the
+'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for the
+appointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapid
+attainment of fire superiority must be striven for under all
+circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion must
+be the exact converse.</p>
+
+<p>The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective,
+and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by the
+very conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive rôle in the
+first instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround a
+defensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, it
+is usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firing
+line, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack,
+constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser to
+adopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition.</p>
+
+<p>This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a larger
+mounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, and
+one should only depart from this principle when special circumstances
+make it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of the
+fire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses far
+behind the actual shooting line of the position.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page093" name="page093"></a>(p. 093)</span> Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments,
+the Commander must decide how far away from the actual field of action
+he should dismount his men.</p>
+
+<p>Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as close
+as possible to the line to be held or the position from whence the
+advance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is only
+set by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for the
+led horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure that
+the men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from a
+distance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire
+of Artillery must not be left out of consideration altogether in the
+solution of this question.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, it can only happen very rarely, and then only under
+exceptionally favourable topographical conditions, that a suitable
+position for the led horses can be found in immediate proximity to the
+actual line of action.</p>
+
+<p>We may, however, be less particular when, in fairly favourable
+country, it is advisable to engage, without the intention of courting
+a decision, our object being only to annoy the enemy by sudden fire,
+disappearing again as soon as he retaliates, or when one is reasonably
+certain of success, as against inferior or badly shaken troops.</p>
+
+<p>But when such favourable conditions are not present, and a tactical
+repulse is always possible, then the place for the led horses can only
+be found so far to the rear that the enemy cannot take us under fire
+whilst in the act of remounting, and circumstances render it
+improbable that this emergency can arise <span class="pagenum"><a id="page094" name="page094"></a>(p. 094)</span> before we have
+succeeded in breaking off fighting contact with the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The Commander, therefore, who decides to undertake a serious fire
+action must be perfectly clear in his own mind that by the act of
+dismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a very
+considerable time; for if the enemy's resistance proves more obstinate
+than originally anticipated, and it becomes clear that the original
+purpose is not to be attained with the available means, the
+expectation that after once engaging the enemy the fight can be broken
+off and the horses remounted will in most cases prove entirely
+illusory.</p>
+
+<p>Since this operation of discontinuing a fire combat is most difficult
+to carry through, even for Infantry, the dangers are immensely greater
+for mounted men, owing to the added complication of their led horses.
+Only the passivity of the enemy, or unusually favourable topographical
+conditions, as in South Africa, can alter the general soundness of
+this conclusion; and it is entirely impracticable to escape these
+consequences by any attempt to lay down a limit and distance beyond
+which the fight is not to be prosecuted, in the hope that by so doing
+we can safely break off a combat once commenced. Generally it must be
+accepted, as laid down in Cavalry Regulations, Sections 362 and 364,
+that a fire action once accepted must be carried out to the end,
+unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flanks makes its
+interruption possible.</p>
+
+<p>One must never, therefore, in reliance on this possibility of
+withdrawal, allow one's self to be led into the mistake of keeping the
+led horses too close at hand; but the resolution to engage in a
+dismounted action must always involve measures which fully recognise
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page095" name="page095"></a>(p. 095)</span> the serious possibilities such decision entails, and must be
+on a scale which will insure the necessary vigour of execution.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, since in all cases in which a serious dismounted combat is
+absolutely necessary it is essential that the horses should be left in
+the greatest attainable security, the place for them should be
+selected in such a manner that they are protected against possible
+turning movements by the enemy&mdash;that is to say, behind suitable
+shelter provided by the ground, or behind defiles that can be easily
+defended. In cases in which these conditions cannot be complied with,
+which in practice will often arise, their security must be provided
+for by a sufficient reserve of mounted men, particularly when the
+enemy's Cavalry is in the vicinity, for 'immobile' detachments are
+practically at the mercy of every mounted patrol; and as a further
+precaution it will be well to spread around them a sufficient web of
+reconnoitring and security patrols, and to arrange for the support of
+one's own batteries.</p>
+
+<p>The covering of the led horses, however, is not the only duty of the
+mounted reserve: the protection of the Artillery also devolves upon
+it, and generally it must be ready to meet any of the demands for
+which Reserves are usually set aside. Hence it will have to provide
+not only for the safety of its own side and all pertaining thereto,
+but it must also threaten the enemy's flanks, undertake turning
+movements, reinforce, if necessary, the fighting lines, pursue the
+enemy, or cover the possible withdrawal of its own dismounted
+combatants; and, further on the offensive, it is its special mission
+to hold the conquered ground when the dismounted detachments are
+called off to remount, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page096" name="page096"></a>(p. 096)</span> and to continue to carry on the
+original mission, interrupted by the combat, until relieved by the men
+who in the meanwhile have regained their horses, and again assumed the
+rôle of mounted combatants.</p>
+
+<p>The first point the Commander will therefore have to decide is, how
+strong it will be necessary to make his mounted reserve if it is to
+suffice to meet all these requirements, and then whether, with the
+remainder of the men in hand, he has any prospect of successfully
+carrying out his immediate purpose. From this it will depend whether
+he determines to fight or to reach his object by other means. In
+general, the Reserve can be reduced in proportion to the weakness of
+the enemy's Cavalry, and to the depth of the zone of security his
+patrols have been able to secure for him.</p>
+
+<p>Having by this line of reasoning determined the number of men he can
+afford to employ on foot, he must next make up his mind as to their
+tactical distribution.</p>
+
+<p>In this case there can be no doubt that the method of employment by
+'Wings' must commend itself even more than in cases involving only
+mounted combat, for, quite apart from all the many admitted advantages
+of this form, in no other way is it possible to guarantee that the
+dismounted men can safely and rapidly regain their horses.</p>
+
+<p>The 'Line' system would involve endless confusion and loss of time in
+sorting them out amongst their respective commands.</p>
+
+<p>As regards the general considerations of width of front and depth, the
+same principles apply as in the case of Infantry. In the defence to
+gain time is the main object, and the problem to be solved is to
+secure <span class="pagenum"><a id="page097" name="page097"></a>(p. 097)</span> at one and the same moment both fire superiority and
+a sufficient reserve to meet all possible emergencies. A skilful
+utilization of the ground, previous ascertainment of the ranges, ample
+ammunition and sound fire discipline, will, as with the Infantry, be
+the best means of attaining one's object.</p>
+
+<p>Special conditions only arise in the defence of villages where the
+horses can be brought under cover close to the men, and here it seems
+to be necessary to distinguish between several possibilities, all of
+which require different treatment.</p>
+
+<p>If the place is to be obstinately defended, then the horses must be
+kept on the side away from the enemy, or in the centre of the
+buildings, the defence of the boundaries be suitably arranged, and the
+men told off to their several sections. The exits must be barricaded,
+and the approaches entangled with wire.</p>
+
+<p>A strong inlying piquet, to act eventually as a reserve, must be
+placed in a central position.</p>
+
+<p>If, however, the place is to be given up when seriously attacked, and
+resistance is only to be sufficient to cover withdrawal, then the
+horses should be kept saddled up in the stables, etc., and
+arrangements made to withdraw them rapidly without exciting attention.</p>
+
+<p>In the first case, as against Infantry or mounted Cavalry only, one
+can count on holding one's own without serious losses for a
+considerable time; but the matter becomes very different if the
+enemy's Artillery is also to be reckoned with, for modern shell fire
+will soon involve the destruction of all the horses, and one must be
+prepared to find retreat practically impossible once one has allowed
+one's self to be committed to an engagement of this nature. Hence such
+positions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page098" name="page098"></a>(p. 098)</span> should only be occupied and defended when it is
+safe to count on support from following troops, or when it is
+improbable that the enemy will be able to bring Artillery into action.
+Such situations may frequently arise in the advanced lines of a
+concentration zone, in which the villages nearest the enemy form part
+of the general system of security.</p>
+
+<p>In all other cases, and particularly as regards the advanced
+squadrons, it will be better to take up 'Alarm' quarters, and the more
+unexpectedly the enemy can attack us the more stringent must be the
+precautions we adopt.</p>
+
+<p>If we decide to retire, a portion of the men will be detached to take
+the horses out of the village, or to have them drawn up in readiness
+for mounting behind the position selected, and meanwhile the remainder
+of the garrison must compensate for their diminution in numbers by a
+greater expenditure of ammunition, thus holding the enemy till all is
+ready, and then slipping rapidly back to their horses. Without
+losses&mdash;amounting, perhaps, to the sacrifice of the last covering
+party&mdash;such withdrawal can hardly hope to succeed; but previous
+systematic arrangements give the best chance of success, and the same
+prevision will be equally necessary, even if the place is to be held
+at all costs, for the situation may always change, and a retreat
+become advisable.</p>
+
+<p>At night, however, the aspect of affairs changes; then any attempt at
+withdrawal is to be deprecated, and, as a matter of principle, must
+not be contemplated. Even if the enemy breaks into the place by
+surprise, it is still better to fight him on the spot rather than to
+risk the certain destruction of the whole detachment by retreat. A
+successful resistance is in such cases <span class="pagenum"><a id="page099" name="page099"></a>(p. 099)</span> all the more
+probable, since in the darkness the use of the enemy's Artillery is
+practically precluded&mdash;at any rate, can attain but little result. Only
+the squadrons far out in advance, and thus liable to be surrounded on
+all sides and captured before help can arrive, will have to be
+prepared for a night withdrawal before the assailants can close in
+around them.</p>
+
+<p>As to the principles to be observed in such cases, there should be no
+room for doubt. Everyone should know what he has to do when the case
+arises.</p>
+
+<p>Turning now to the consideration of the conduct to be observed in
+attack, it is clear that here also the same fundamental ideas apply as
+with the Infantry. Dismounted Cavalry must be prepared to work their
+way up to decisive distances, to break down from this limit the
+enemy's resistance, and finally to carry the position by storm. Hence
+the fighting line has need of constant reinforcements to give the
+necessary forward impulse, and hence we require the same distribution
+in regard to 'depth.'</p>
+
+<p>Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to adopt on this point any
+stereotyped formation. It must not be overlooked that the essence of
+such Cavalry attacks is rapidity of execution. Hence in all cases
+where this necessity for rapidity arises the endeavour must be made to
+bring from the very first as many rifles into the firing line as
+possible, and it follows that the greater the fire power thus obtained
+the less the need for subsequent reinforcement.</p>
+
+<p>If we try to picture to ourselves the conditions under which these
+dismounted Cavalry attacks can occur, it is evident that only in the
+most unusual instances will the necessity arise of launching them
+against wide fronts of dense lines of unbroken Infantry; on the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page100" name="page100"></a>(p. 100)</span> other hand, we shall often be called upon to capture
+isolated villages, etc., such as posts on the line of communication,
+railway-stations, and important defiles, and in all such cases it will
+always be possible to combine attacks simultaneously against both
+flanks, front and rear. Thanks to its mobility, the Cavalry is
+exceptionally well suited to the performance of such undertakings,
+because it can combine both attack and surprise to the best advantage.</p>
+
+<p>If, thanks to this possibility, it is practicable to diminish the
+weight of the front attack, it follows, again, that less
+depth&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, fewer successive reinforcements&mdash;will require to be
+provided; but these can only be suppressed altogether when the object
+aimed at does not imply the actual maintenance of the position to be
+assaulted, but our purpose is only to reach a point from whence to
+overwhelm the enemy with fire, previous to riding him down by our
+closed squadrons, or to break off the action again and retire as soon
+as a counter-attack develops. These are cases which will often present
+themselves: either when in pursuit it is desirable to strike
+unexpectedly at the enemy's columns, or during a battle, when it is
+feasible to molest and disturb his reserves.</p>
+
+<p>In the above paragraphs I have put together the chief points to be
+considered in the action of dismounted Cavalry when acting
+unsupported; it remains now to consider the rôle assigned to the Horse
+Artillery allotted to it, if only to bring out those parts which, in
+my opinion, lie beyond its proper field.</p>
+
+<p>If we admit that in general, as between two great Cavalry masses in
+actual collision, the guns can play an important part, I must yet
+insist that the measure of this importance should not be overdrawn;
+for it is <span class="pagenum"><a id="page101" name="page101"></a>(p. 101)</span> only when the former are confined to a defensive
+attitude&mdash;for instance, when they are still under cover or behind
+sheltering folds of the ground, or when moving in a widely-extended
+screen to mislead the enemy and tempt him into fire-swept ground, in
+order to fall upon him when he has ventured into the trap&mdash;that much
+is to be expected from their co-operation.</p>
+
+<p>But as soon as the Cavalry begins to advance, the part the Artillery
+has to play drops into the background. Then the guns become simply an
+impediment, because, since they generally require a special escort,
+they subtract from the total force available for the actual shock, and
+always act more or less as a pivot, which hampers the free movement of
+the Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>On the contrary, the Cavalry must never allow itself to be influenced
+in its movements by the position of its own Artillery. The latter must
+adapt itself unconditionally to the movements of the former, and must
+endeavour to conform to its evolutions, so as not only to co-operate
+with it, but, if possible, to dispense with a special escort.</p>
+
+<p>It must, therefore, be the endeavour of the Artillery to keep well out
+in front of the Cavalry, so as to take the enemy under fire, and
+anticipate his batteries by coming into action first. The latter is a
+most important point, for it is the essential duty of the enemy's
+gunners to divert and beat down the fire which we endeavour to bring
+against their horsemen.</p>
+
+<p>If we can only succeed in unlimbering first, they are bound to accept
+the law from us, and are thereby prevented either of availing
+themselves of the advantages of the ground or of conforming to the
+tactical intentions of their Leader.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page102" name="page102"></a>(p. 102)</span> The best position for Artillery must always be behind some
+sheltering roll of the ground, where it requires none, or at the most
+a weak, escort; and this desideratum will be best fulfilled when it is
+on the inner&mdash;that is, the supported&mdash;flank of its Cavalry, because in
+this position it can presumably remain in action longest, and hampers
+the movements of its own force least. Similarly, in pursuit or in
+covering a retreat its sphere of activity is distinctly limited. Its
+action can only then become effective when the actual tactical
+pursuit&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, with cold steel&mdash;ceases, the combatants have
+disentangled themselves, and the strategic pursuit sets in.</p>
+
+<p>The mobility of the target must naturally influence the fire effect to
+be expected from the guns, as it increases the difficulty of
+'ranging,' and limits the possible duration of action to a few
+moments.</p>
+
+<p>The batteries will only then be able to turn their fire on the enemy's
+Cavalry when the latter show themselves in considerable masses moving
+at the slower paces. But when the Cavalry sweep forward at full speed,
+the most they can do will be to take some stretch of ground through
+which the opposing Cavalry must pass, and on which there is still time
+to range, and then turn on shrapnel fire to its utmost intensity.</p>
+
+<p>But even for this the opportunity will only then arise when either our
+own Cavalry holds back, the enemy's Artillery does not require our
+full attention and fire power, or, finally, if our own guns are not
+attacked by the enemy's Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>In view of all these considerations, it follows that it is impossible
+to assign a decisive importance to the participation of a few Horse
+Batteries in the actual shock of the opposing squadrons. Nevertheless,
+one <span class="pagenum"><a id="page103" name="page103"></a>(p. 103)</span> should always do one's best to use to the utmost such
+Artillery power as is available, and particularly if there is any
+doubt as to the strength of the enemy, and we have reason to suspect
+that he possesses a marked numerical superiority.</p>
+
+<p>The chief rôle of the Artillery must always remain the support of
+dismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle,
+protected by their own horsemen, to strike against the enemy's flank
+and rear, shell his columns on the march, to drive him out of
+weakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circumstances,
+such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmost
+possible damage.</p>
+
+<p>In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions and
+the nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to the
+fundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick up
+their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their
+action.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page104" name="page104"></a>(p. 104)</span> CHAPTER VII</h2>
+
+<p class="title">STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY</p>
+
+
+<p>The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rules
+for the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, which
+will give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the grouping
+and employment of the available forces.</p>
+
+<p>Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigades
+march on separate roads in first line, with the third following behind
+the centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front,
+side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road,
+whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane.</p>
+
+<p>Even our Cavalry Regulations&mdash;which on this subject actually ventures
+to trespass on strategical ground&mdash;lays down (see Section 318) that
+'in Reconnaissance the mass of the Division must be kept together
+until the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field.'</p>
+
+<p>I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategic
+employment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the very
+essence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to be
+detrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly false
+views as to the conditions and demands with which in practical
+warfare we are confronted. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page105" name="page105"></a>(p. 105)</span> All these regulations fall to the
+ground the moment they have to be applied to strategical units of
+variable dimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks
+which may fall to us are of such different natures that they cannot
+possibly be all solved by the same formulae.</p>
+
+<p>The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importance
+on the whole character of our action and the distribution of our
+forces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country also
+exercise their influence on our decision.</p>
+
+<p>To this must be added the fact that, in view of the many strategical
+necessities of a great Army, the Headquarters cannot always be in a
+position to allot to the Cavalry a clearly-defined task either of
+reconnaissance or security, attack or defence; thus higher
+considerations may prevent the massing of the Cavalry on a single road
+or any other similar simple distribution. More often than not one will
+have to suggest the simultaneous attainment of the most varied
+objectives, and the Cavalry Leader will be lucky if he is not called
+upon to solve problems of the most heterogeneous nature, things which
+in their execution mutually exclude one another.</p>
+
+<p>Hence one can only lay down the most general principles to govern the
+strategical employment of the Arm, and to meet this difficulty it
+becomes all the more important to develop the capacity for endurance
+of the troops to the utmost, so that they can successfully deal with
+these many variable demands.</p>
+
+<p>As to how far the independent Cavalry should be thrust out in front of
+the following columns of the Army, all that can be laid down is, that
+the wider the fronts and the deeper the Army&mdash;hence the longer time
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page106" name="page106"></a>(p. 106)</span> the Army will take to deploy, concentrate, change its
+position, or execute any similar operation depending on the reports of
+the Cavalry&mdash;the further that Cavalry must gain ground to the front.</p>
+
+<p>As to the principles governing the formal arrangement of the troops in
+contradiction to all attempts to lay down stereotyped formations, all
+that can be said is that every strategical operation, if for no other
+reason than to allow of reconnaissance and secure safety, requires a
+certain extension in breadth; but the combat itself demands
+concentration.</p>
+
+<p>It follows from the above that the Cavalry Commander must in every
+initial case weigh in his own mind how much the existing circumstances
+may allow him to extend, and, on the other hand, how closely they
+compel him to keep concentrated, and he will only be able to reconcile
+the dilemma when he is actually clear in his own mind as to the
+tactical and strategical results his conduct in either case will
+involve.</p>
+
+<p>If the essence of his duty is to secure and to screen, then, as stated
+above, extension and subdivision of his command naturally follows. But
+one must keep clearly before one's own eyes that any concentration for
+a combat jeopardizes the performances of these tasks, for the
+concentration for combat necessitates the uncovering of the front,
+which it is the very object of the enemy to bring about and take
+advantage of. Further, the wider the front, the less becomes the
+possibility of timely tactical concentration; hence, under such
+conditions, one would generally have to renounce the temptation to
+engage in combat with a positive object, and content one's self with
+keeping the enemy at a distance, for this purpose availing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page107" name="page107"></a>(p. 107)</span>
+one's self to the utmost of the advantages the ground may confer, and
+such support as the reinforced Horse Artillery and mobile Infantry (in
+vehicles) can afford.</p>
+
+<p>When the width of extension becomes very great it will be an absolute
+mistake to keep back reserves, since by doing so the actual front is
+weakened, whilst there is no guarantee that the reserve can arrive in
+time at the threatened point.</p>
+
+<p>Further, the wider the front becomes, the greater the difficulty of
+strategical change of direction.</p>
+
+<p>A similar extension of front as that above indicated in this resume of
+'Security' duties may also become advisable when engaged on
+'Reconnaissance'&mdash;for instance, when lengthy obstacles, such as
+watercourses, mountains, etc., only traversable at bridges, dams, or
+defiles, have to be surmounted.</p>
+
+<p>In such cases, especially when resistance is to be anticipated, it
+will rarely be possible to count on being able to surmount the
+obstacle in one single column, since even unimportant forces under
+such circumstances can oppose a very protracted defence, and
+neutralize a large numerical superiority. When these difficulties are
+met with, it will be necessary even in reconnaissance to divide one's
+force into several columns, as then there is always the chance of
+successfully piercing the enemy's front at some one point, and thence
+rolling up his resistance all along the line.</p>
+
+<p>Even in open country conditions may be encountered that render the
+subdivision of one's forces over a considerable extent of front
+desirable&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, when it is necessary to find the enemy, and fix the
+fact of his presence in certain specific districts. As an example,
+the conduct of the Cavalry after the Battle of Gravelotte <span class="pagenum"><a id="page108" name="page108"></a>(p. 108)</span>
+(August 18, 1870), when it became imperative to ascertain whether
+MacMahon's Army was marching to the north-eastward or not.</p>
+
+<p>Here it was indispensable to sweep out a wide area. To attempt such
+tasks with patrols alone is unadvisable, for these always require a
+certain tactical support behind them, by which they can be either
+reinforced or relieved.</p>
+
+<p>Still, the point must never be lost sight of, that, since the enemy
+will also seek to screen his operations, a decisive collision may
+become necessary at any moment to tear his screen asunder. Hence it
+will be better, in opposition to the principles laid down for
+'security' only, to keep one's principal force in groups or masses,
+possessing considerable striking force, and to march in such manner
+that a certain degree of concentration is always attainable while
+meeting the necessity for extension in breadth by smaller
+reconnoitring patrols.</p>
+
+<p>Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained,
+whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then to
+reconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their complete
+concentration is assured in all cases, and only to divide them to the
+degree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roads
+and the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions also
+hold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In this
+case it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions for
+security, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage rather
+than run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed.</p>
+
+<p>Tactically the greater concentration guarantees <span class="pagenum"><a id="page109" name="page109"></a>(p. 109)</span> tactical
+success, and strategically it allows greater freedom of movement and
+changes of direction to meet altered conditions; but one must never
+lose sight of the technical drawbacks such closer concentration
+entails.</p>
+
+<p>The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth than
+with divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march of
+troops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned is
+increased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air is
+not inconsiderable.</p>
+
+<p>If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holding
+him until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition of
+close concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhere
+either superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment.
+Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way for
+tactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and this
+is particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wide
+turning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best brought
+about by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of a
+mass from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented if
+attempted in a single column.</p>
+
+<p>Hence every principle has its limitations, and circumstances will
+always arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for
+'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentration
+is justified, even where the nature of the ground does not
+imperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency of
+one's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels one
+to combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it is
+precisely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page110" name="page110"></a>(p. 110)</span> on the defensive that it may be of advantage to
+deal a blow with the concentrated strength. Equally on the strategic
+offensive, dispersion may be necessary, as when the enemy retreats
+eccentrically; or if it is necessary to occupy districts of
+considerable size to break down the resistance of the hostile
+population, or to interrupt railway communication over a considerable
+area.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, all principles fall to the ground where the enemy's Cavalry
+is finally beaten out of the field, or by a succession of mistakes he
+gives openings which we can seize with advantage. Thus our conduct
+always remains dependent on the topographical nature of the country,
+on our own purpose and the opposition of the enemy, and only one law
+governs all cases&mdash;namely, expediency. The greater art of leading will
+naturally be required when the necessity arises to operate with more
+or less widely-separated columns. In all such cases everything depends
+on the endurance of one's troops. The principal difficulty in the way
+of execution lies in harmonizing and maintaining the movements of the
+separate detachments.</p>
+
+<p>If one has to deal with Infantry only, then, since their rate of march
+is almost always the same, it is easy to calculate approximately where
+the several columns may be found; but it is quite different when one
+comes to deal with Cavalry, where the different Leaders may adopt very
+different rates of movement, or may have such variations forced upon
+them by other circumstances, and hence one has always to deal with
+quite indeterminable factors. This difficulty can never be altogether
+eliminated; one can only counteract it by laying down from the very
+first <span class="pagenum"><a id="page111" name="page111"></a>(p. 111)</span> instructions for the advance of the several columns,
+according to time and space, from which no deviation is to be
+permitted without sufficient reasons, and organizing the circulation
+of orders and intelligence in such a manner that it will work with
+certainty. These two precautions supplement one another. If one can
+calculate approximately where the several detachments are to be found
+at a given time, then reports can be sent by the shortest way, and
+will reach their destination without delay.</p>
+
+<p>It will be decidedly advisable that all detachments should report to
+Headquarters, and if possible to all adjacent columns, without
+distinct instructions, and at certain time intervals, both as to their
+advance, their bearing in relation to adjacent columns, as also any
+news they may have obtained about the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Nothing is more important to the Cavalry Leader than to be constantly
+informed as to the general situation of the units he controls; but it
+is equally important that the several groups should know what is
+happening to one another, for only then can they act in the spirit and
+in combination with the whole.</p>
+
+<p>This is all the more essential because, owing to the rapidity of all
+movements, and to the great extension which has often to be given to
+the front, it is impossible for the higher Command to interfere in
+good time, or to obtain information from its subordinates in any
+emergency that may suddenly arise. The results, then, depend entirely
+on the independent judgment of the man on the spot, and suitable
+action can only be obtained when the latter is kept fully informed as
+to the nature of the general situation.</p>
+
+<p>We should, therefore, avoid as far as possible the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page112" name="page112"></a>(p. 112)</span> despatch
+of orders to individual Commanders without at the same time informing
+their comrades of the bearing of such instructions.</p>
+
+<p>Wherever possible in strategical operations, the orders should be
+comprehensive, and should be circulated simultaneously to all
+subordinates. Where it is impossible to convey an order simultaneously
+to all, those not immediately concerned in their execution should be
+informed of its issue as soon as possible. Certainly, this method
+requires a large number of gallopers, orderlies, and so forth; but
+this apparent waste of energy will in the end prove the best economy,
+because the troops will thereby be spared many unnecessary movements.</p>
+
+<p>However great the endeavour may be to diminish the difficulties of the
+united action of separated bodies in the combat itself, the issue of
+the Cavalry fight is decided so rapidly that its consequences must
+have begun to show themselves before either the adjacent columns or
+Headquarters have learnt of its commencement. We must, therefore, be
+clear in our own minds that successful combination of separated bodies
+in action can generally only be effected when the opponent is either
+stationary, in which case one can time one's movements against him, or
+when, by a protracted defence at other points, the more distant bodies
+have time and opportunity to reach the field.</p>
+
+<p>Even when the approach of the opponent's forces has been discovered in
+time, it will be difficult to calculate with any degree of precision
+the exact point at which collision will occur, as the marching rate of
+the enemy's Cavalry must always remain an uncertain factor. Hence it
+will not suffice to evade the enemy's advance until the adjacent
+columns can unite, as one <span class="pagenum"><a id="page113" name="page113"></a>(p. 113)</span> cannot assign to them any definite
+point of concentration where the distance between the columns is at
+all considerable. Any attempt to concentrate strategically against an
+enemy in movement without at some point fighting to gain time must be
+dismissed as illusory. In all these cases one must not hesitate to
+take to the rifle, and to utilize all available means of defence.</p>
+
+<p>Similarly, when advancing in separated columns, it will be well to
+advance from one defensive section to another in rushes, and not to go
+beyond any one of these until fairly assured that one can reach the
+next without encountering the enemy's Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>If one should have the misfortune of being surprised in a district
+which affords no points of support, then one must retire to the next
+best one in order to give the adjacent columns time to swing in
+against the enemy's flanks. The sound of the guns will be indication
+enough to these to hasten their pace.</p>
+
+<p>The more important it is, therefore, to march to the sound of the guns
+in order to save time, the more careful must one be in opening fire
+without sufficient cause. On the one hand, the side which wishes to
+attract support will not be satisfied with a few rounds, but will
+endeavour by continuous and heavy firing to make the danger of his
+situation evident; on the other, the adjacent columns will only then
+be justified in approaching if they are convinced that it is not a
+mere matter of local and transitory advantage. The Cavalry Commander
+must keep, therefore, a firm hand over his guns, and never allow these
+to come into action without express sanction, except in extreme
+necessity. Generally, the batteries should always march with the
+advance or the rear guard in order to break down <span class="pagenum"><a id="page114" name="page114"></a>(p. 114)</span> rapidly any
+minor resistance, and to make the fullest use of such short
+opportunities as may arise for the utilization of their full power.</p>
+
+<p>The application of these principles is, of course, much simpler when
+it is possible to keep the several columns close together on a
+convenient group of roads, all running fairly near to one another. The
+disadvantages which then arise make less demand on the skill of the
+Leader, but more on the necessarily cramped form of the disposition
+which, as we have above pointed out, he is compelled to adopt.</p>
+
+<p>For every operation, in fact, except the direct attack, there is a
+certain degree of extension, which favours the immediate purpose the
+most, and this depends on the shape and nature of the ground; but one
+has always to resist the temptation to dispersion which arises,
+particularly when it is necessary to keep in mind the solution of
+several possible problems. Only very occasionally will it be expedient
+to divide one's troops to meet every emergency.</p>
+
+<p>The General must use his judgment to decide where the chief weight of
+his mission lies, the principal characteristics he must impress upon
+his operations, and how the subsidiary purposes can be best served
+without applying half-purposes to the primary object. It is these
+considerations&mdash;the reduction of the complicated to the simple&mdash;which
+create the chief difficulties which weigh upon the mind of the Leader.
+The capacity of coming to a correct decision in every special case is
+a mark of the intellectually capable Commander, and of itself gives a
+certain guarantee of its success by rendering possible the
+concentration of the force upon the decisive point; but it will not
+alone suffice to insure success. Boldness and energy of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page115" name="page115"></a>(p. 115)</span>
+character is the final determining cause of successful results.</p>
+
+<p>Above all, every Cavalry leader must be inspired by the determination
+to keep the initiative under all circumstances, and never to
+relinquish it to his opponent. The initiative alone guarantees
+successes, often in a degree which one was hardly entitled to expect,
+for it forces the enemy to accept the law from our hands, disturbs his
+strategical combination, compels him to fight before his troops are
+united, and often gives to the numerically weaker the opportunity of
+establishing a relative local superiority. One must, therefore,
+endeavour to introduce as much of the initiative and offensive element
+as circumstances will permit even in the execution of defensive
+missions.</p>
+
+<p>A Leader must never allow himself to be hindered in an advance, or be
+driven into an attitude of expectation by the passive opposition of
+the enemy's Cavalry, as so often happens in peace.</p>
+
+<p>In all such cases, when a direct frontal attack holds out no prospect
+of success, he must immediately initiate a wide turning movement
+outside the effective range of the enemy's Artillery, and sacrifice
+without hesitation his own line of retreat. Victory restores at once
+the original line of advance, and the outflanking movement threatens
+also the enemy's retreat.</p>
+
+<p>It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superior
+commands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one's own
+initiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out.</p>
+
+<p>In this way we shall save the troops excessive exertions and
+purposeless riding about, for since the Headquarters can never grasp
+the situation as rapidly or as thoroughly as the General actually on
+the spot, it <span class="pagenum"><a id="page116" name="page116"></a>(p. 116)</span> follows that their orders will generally arrive
+too late. Hence they often lag behind events, and call for excessive
+exertions, night and forced marches if the purpose is to be attained.
+The records of the Campaign of 1870-1871 give innumerable instances of
+these facts, based on experience. Finally, resolutions should never be
+made dependent on circumstances which may happen in the future, but
+must always be based on something positive, which must be followed up
+with all conceivable energy and circumspection. This most necessary
+circumspection on the part of the Leader demands a clearness of
+expression in the issue of orders which must never leave the
+subordinate officers and troops in doubt, and should always reflect a
+clear and determined purpose.</p>
+
+<p>It is, however, equally necessary that the superior Leader must
+himself be clear as to how he means to carry out his purpose, has also
+considered all other possibilities, and has made his arrangements in
+such a manner that, if necessary, he can give his operations a
+different direction. This must be particularly the case where success
+depends on cunning surprise. As concerns the first point, this will
+require the more thorough consideration, because it is most
+particularly difficult to change the strategic direction of a large
+body of Cavalry when once it has been launched forward on a broad
+front. In such a case the whole carefully-elaborated network of
+patrols would be left, so to speak, hanging in the air. To divert it
+sideways into a new direction is generally impracticable; it would, in
+fact, in most cases be impossible to transmit to all the advanced
+detachments the news of the change in the dispositions.</p>
+
+<p>A new system of patrols will, therefore, be absolutely <span class="pagenum"><a id="page117" name="page117"></a>(p. 117)</span>
+necessary to save both energy and time, and the necessity for
+instituting this new service will be particularly detrimental to our
+whole operations, because the information from the new direction will
+generally arrive too late to be of service.</p>
+
+<p>It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the Cavalry Leader
+should not only reconnoitre in the direction prescribed by the higher
+Command for its particular purpose, but should also scout
+independently in every direction, and inform himself of all the
+circumstances in the whole district over which he is operating; if
+necessary, organize for himself an intelligence system.<a id="footnotetag14" name="footnotetag14"></a><a href="#footnote14" title="Go to footnote 14"><span class="smaller">[14]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>In short, he must exercise such prevision that he can never be
+overtaken by circumstances; and in every case in which action is
+called for in a new, and, perhaps, unexpected direction, he should be
+prepared to meet the emergency. In this way he will save himself much
+time and energy, but it will facilitate his very difficult task
+essentially if he is always kept informed in sufficient time of the
+views and possible intention of the Chief Command; for unless this
+condition is complied with, it will be impossible to insure that the
+whole energy of the Arm will be directed to the carrying out of its
+reconnoitring functions in conformity with the views entertained at
+Headquarters. It must be characterized as one of the most suicidal
+errors when the superior Command conceals its purposes from its
+executive organs. Diffused activity, waste of energy,
+misunderstandings, and confusion would be the inevitable consequences,
+and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page118" name="page118"></a>(p. 118)</span> military history&mdash;not the least that of 1870-1871&mdash;gives
+a long rôle of illustrative examples.</p>
+
+<p>As regards all those operations which depend on surprise, the
+circumspection of the Leader becomes the decisive factor. Everything
+must be thought out beforehand, and carefully considered. The very
+soul and being of the Leader must be grasped by the men under his
+Command, and the utmost energy in the execution of his design be
+demanded from every individual. As a general rule, smaller bodies,
+which can conceal themselves behind features of the ground, and hardly
+require a service of security, can act quite differently to larger
+ones, which cannot conceal their presence and always require a certain
+degree of precaution for reconnaissance and security. Above all,
+mobility is the essence of the whole situation, and darkness will
+serve as a most important contributor to success.</p>
+
+<p>On main roads, where it is impossible to lose one's way, darkness can
+be used for forced marches to advantage if beforehand we are clear
+about the conditions on the side of the enemy, and hence can act with
+a certain degree of confidence.</p>
+
+<p>One factor must never be left out of consideration&mdash;viz., that under
+modern conditions the difficulties of action by surprise have been
+enormously increased, and the enemy is under certain circumstances
+enabled to paralyze the tactical results of surprise. This factor
+arises from the existence of railways and telegraphs, and it will act
+most detrimentally against us when moving in the enemy's country,
+where both arrangements favour our opponents. Telegraphs carry the
+news of the appearance of Cavalry far and wide beyond the points where
+they have been seen by the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page119" name="page119"></a>(p. 119)</span> enemy's troops, and the railways
+forward supports to the threatened districts.</p>
+
+<p>It is, therefore, of particular importance to destroy by means of
+advanced patrols both telegraphs and railways all over the district on
+which one hopes to act by surprise, and to repeat such active
+destruction again and again. In such enterprises there is a wide field
+for slimness and craftiness&mdash;qualities which might very well be
+combined in greater undertakings.</p>
+
+<p>Sudden changes in the line of advance behind the screen of advanced
+troops, unexpected concentration of separate columns at decisive
+points, separation and surprise reunions of one's forces,
+dissemination of false news, feints on points of subsidiary importance
+to distract the attention of the enemy&mdash;all these things can lead to
+the deception of the enemy, and in one's own country they will be
+materially supported by a friendly population; but timely and accurate
+information of all the circumstances of the enemy remains always a
+most necessary condition.</p>
+
+<p>If the importance of these measures is particularly striking in these
+cases where we are dealing with surprises, ambushes, and so forth,
+they form also in every other type of Cavalry action one of the
+principal foundations of success, for they alone insure timely
+resolutions and the consequent initiation of the movements necessary
+to bring about concentration and separation.</p>
+
+<p>The Cavalry Commander must, therefore, always choose his position when
+on the march, with the troops in immediate contact with the enemy; or
+if his troops are quartered in the neighbouring villages, then
+immediately behind the advanced line of cantonments, so that whenever
+possible he can see with his own <span class="pagenum"><a id="page120" name="page120"></a>(p. 120)</span> eyes and base his decisions
+on first-hand evidence, where he can receive all reports as soon as
+possible, and make his dispositions in good time. Otherwise it will
+only too frequently happen that his orders and dispositions will drag
+behind events, and disorder and defeat will be the consequence.</p>
+
+<p>This personal supervision of matters in his front is also necessary to
+enable him to come to a correct decision as to his line of action,
+whereas a Commander of all Arms can better decide by the map, because
+his troops are less dependent on the ground than Independent Cavalry,
+move more slowly, and hence are more accessible to subsequent orders.
+But even the utmost energy in the Leader will not alone suffice to
+lead things into their proper lines without the most successful and
+rapid reconnaissance. Hence the practical organization of the system
+of reconnaissance remains the essential task of all strategical
+Cavalry leadership; but it requires to be supplemented by an equally
+practical system of security.</p>
+
+<p>On the two subjects so much has already been written that it is
+impossible to find anything new to say about them. Only one point has
+not been brought out sufficiently&mdash;namely, that both security and
+reconnaissance, in so far as both depend on patrols, will only then
+work successfully when they are based on a thoroughly systematized
+method of procedure. The subject is of such importance that I have
+considered it necessary to devote a short chapter to it (Book I.,
+Chap. VIII.).</p>
+
+<p>If reconnaissance&mdash;apart from the fact that the roads must be cleared
+for it in the first instance by the defeat of the enemy's
+Cavalry&mdash;lies exclusively in the hands of the patrols, nevertheless
+security depends on the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page121" name="page121"></a>(p. 121)</span> arrangement and activity of the
+other branches, such as advance guards, rear guards, flanking
+detachments, and outposts, and the conduct of these depends, again, on
+thorough systematization.</p>
+
+<p>When on the move, safety lies in the distance that separates the main
+body from the advanced detachments, and it is scarcely necessary to
+point out that only systematic arrangements can guarantee the
+necessary time for the exploration of the ground and the enemy which
+is requisite for safety.</p>
+
+<p>Threatened flanks require special detachments, moving on the same
+level and at sufficient distance, and their co-operation will be
+insured by a careful regulation of the mutual rate of march.</p>
+
+<p>A uniform rate of advance in the whole mechanism is an essential
+condition of complete security. Hence every means must be exhausted
+down to the smallest detail. It will not be necessary to assign minor
+flanking detachments for the duration of a whole march. During such a
+period it is practically impossible to retain their relation to the
+main body without keeping them within sight, which in most cases is
+quite impracticable, for circumstances may suddenly check the main
+body, or necessitate a change of direction. To advise the flanking
+detachments of such occurrences will generally be impossible, or at
+any rate very difficult, if one has permanently detached them, and
+therefore has no certainty of finding them at any particular point.
+Hence it is advisable to work them always in sections&mdash;that is to say,
+when they have reached certain points to withdraw them to the main
+body, and send out reliefs for the next section.</p>
+
+<p>But in order that the security should never for one instant be
+relaxed, these fresh reliefs should always be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page122" name="page122"></a>(p. 122)</span> sent out at
+some little distance before the point at which the former detachment
+is to be drawn in.</p>
+
+<p>Almost more important than security at night is security during
+prolonged periods of rest. In that case the arrangements must be made
+not only in accordance with tactical requirements, but the fact must
+be taken into account that horses, in order to remain permanently
+useful, require quite a different nature of rest than is needed by
+men.</p>
+
+<p>It is most desirable that as many horses as possible should every day
+be brought under shelter and unsaddled, and all bivouacking should be
+avoided as far as practicable.</p>
+
+<p>The readiness for action from a purely tactical point of view
+certainly suffers, but as rest at night is an absolute necessity for
+the horses, one has to make the best of the matter and minimize this
+disadvantage as much as possible by suitable arrangements.</p>
+
+<p>Against this view it is often urged that Cavalry used to bivouac much
+more frequently in former wars, and nevertheless remained fit for
+service, hence they ought to be able to do the same to-day. I consider
+this an entirely wrong deduction. In the first place, the demands upon
+the troops in former days were generally much less than at present.
+The periods of crisis in which great exertions had to be made by them
+were on the whole less frequent, and the subsequent intervals for rest
+and recuperation were usually longer.</p>
+
+<p>Considering the average marches of the Napoleonic Cavalry as a whole,
+they cannot be considered particularly great, and still less was this
+the case under Frederick the Great, although under both Generals we
+find instances of great individual exertion.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, the horses in those days were much less <span class="pagenum"><a id="page123" name="page123"></a>(p. 123)</span> well bred,
+and the commoner cold-blooded strain can stand bivouacs, cold and wet,
+much better than our present high-bred material, although the latter
+stand heat and exertion very much better. The leadership must adapt
+itself to these conditions. Where circumstances allow the bulk of the
+horses to take shelter behind the Infantry outposts, the most must be
+made of the opportunity, and only the more distant patrolling service
+be left to the Cavalry. Outpost service makes far less demands on the
+Infantry soldier than on the Cavalry horse, for the former is allowed
+to sleep when on piquet, the Cavalry horse cannot.</p>
+
+<p>The Cavalry soldier certainly gains an advantage here over the
+much-harassed Infantry man, for naturally the man derives advantage
+from the care bestowed on the horse; but I hold this point is of far
+too trifling a nature to take into consideration when the matter
+affects such a necessary and important factor of strength of the whole
+Army. Further, this advantage is more apparent than real, and is only
+intended to give us the means, while sparing the material in one
+direction, to make greater demands on it in another. When in critical
+moments bold and wide-sweeping movements on the enemy's flanks and
+rear become necessary, where our object is to keep the enemy's
+movements under constant observation while screening our own; where,
+finally, on the close of a battle we must pursue the enemy
+relentlessly, or sacrifice ourselves to cover and protect the weary
+and retreating Infantry, then the Cavalry which has been properly
+nursed will be capable of exertions far beyond what could be expected
+of troops less thoughtfully managed. These exertions can then be
+unconditionally demanded, and will repay a hundredfold, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page124" name="page124"></a>(p. 124)</span> both
+tactically and strategically, the care bestowed in easier days.</p>
+
+<p>Only rarely, however, will cases arise in which Cavalry can avail
+themselves of the shelter of the Infantry, for the essence of all
+Cavalry activity lies in the future in its independent undertakings.
+If we were to apply to them the same principles as to the
+Infantry&mdash;that is to say, make a principle of bivouacking the outposts
+and exposing them daily to the effects of the weather&mdash;this would
+result in a steady drain upon the horses, which would lead to serious
+deterioration in their endurance. Hence the question of bringing them
+under cover does not apply merely to the mass of the forces, but must
+be extended to the whole system of outposts, and wherever practicable
+the greatest possible number of horses must be placed under shelter in
+full and complete security. This security must be sought for by the
+increased depth assigned to the outpost system. Even after a
+victorious advance one must not hesitate, under certain circumstances,
+to withdraw the troops in order to obtain the necessary distances
+between the enemy and the advance guard, as also between the advance
+guard and the main body. Slightly increased distance to be covered
+next day is nothing as compared to the advantage of greater security.
+It will be particularly desirable to make the most of all positions
+the ground may afford, which, being traversable at only certain
+points, hinders the approach of the enemy&mdash;such as rivers, which can
+only be crossed at the bridges, woods in which movement is confined to
+the roads, marshes, and so forth. Behind these one can generally go
+into cantonments without anxiety, and they offer the further advantage
+that they can generally be held by small forces of dismounted
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page125" name="page125"></a>(p. 125)</span> men. Hence the horses can generally be sent back and brought
+under shelter at a distance, and in case of alarm can be saddled up
+and be made ready by men detailed for that purpose.</p>
+
+<p>Where such positions are not available, one must either go back
+further, or, if not altogether too near to the enemy, make the most
+advanced cantonments serve the purpose of the line of security.</p>
+
+<p>Every evening these localities must be hastily prepared for defence,
+with the determination, in case of attack, of defending them carbine
+in hand, and without bringing out the horses until the support can
+come up from the rearward cantonments.</p>
+
+<p>The details of such defence I have already discussed elsewhere.</p>
+
+<p>This method of defence, however, must be supplemented by a suitable
+system of observation sent out towards the enemy. Even detachments far
+advanced towards the enemy may, under favourable circumstances, find
+temporary cover in villages, and every such period of rest is of
+advantage for the horse.</p>
+
+<p>The Cavalry, however, which, in full confidence of its firearms and
+the alertness of its patrols, can venture to go into cantonments, and
+thus save its horses from bivouacking, will very soon assert its
+superiority over an enemy which seeks for safety by remaining
+constantly under arms, and thus dissipates its inherent energy.</p>
+
+<p>This tendency towards cantonments must not be allowed to become
+stereotyped. Occasions will constantly arise when the Cavalry must
+remain in immediate touch with the enemy; then it will be compelled
+not only to bivouac, but will have to stand to its horses, ready to
+mount at a moment's notice. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page126" name="page126"></a>(p. 126)</span> Such occasions will only arise
+in critical situations necessarily of short duration, and the
+conditions both of the weather and the ground must be taken into
+careful consideration in making the arrangements for the outposts.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it is evident that it is not possible to lay down fixed rules of
+conduct either for operations or for the outposts, but all must be
+left to the capacity of the Leader and the adaptability of his men. On
+this capacity depends in the last resort the greater or less strategic
+value of the Arm. Its foundation can only be laid in peace, and will
+depend on thorough and successful training, together with suitable
+preparation of the whole organization for War. To both points I will
+recur in the second part of this work. Here I would only insist that
+naturally the collective strategic employment of the Arm must take a
+thoroughly different form in proportion as the troops are rendered
+more or less independent by their equipment, the leaders of all ranks
+are qualified to act on their own responsibility, and mobility is not
+hampered by difficulties in the provisioning of man and horse, and in
+the supply of ammunition. In the one case the Leader can act with
+courage and daring in the true Cavalry spirit; in the other he will
+feel himself hampered at every step, will not be able to act with the
+necessary degree of self-confidence, and will have to renounce the
+most promising undertakings because the inefficiency of his troops
+leaves him no alternative. However great his genius, no Leader can
+compensate for want of efficiency in his command; but it is the duty
+of such leader to maintain and increase the endurance inherent in his
+material to the utmost limits of its capacity.</p>
+
+<p>In this connection a well-thought-out system of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page127" name="page127"></a>(p. 127)</span> saving and
+caring for one's horses occupies the first position, for this is the
+bed-rock foundation of all subsequent developments. We have seen of
+what immense importance in this respect the sheltering and
+arrangements for the outposts may be. But there are other factors to
+be considered&mdash;above all, a rational arrangement of the marches. In
+the first instance, it is a mistake to believe that Cavalry in the
+long-run can out-stay and out-march the Infantry&mdash;that, in other
+words, the Cavalry horse can endure greater hardships than
+well-trained Infantry. For a few days that may well be so, but for
+continuous exertion it is by no means proved.</p>
+
+<p>The German Cavalry horse is much more dependent on a sufficiency of
+food than the man; the nature of his load, together with the rapidity
+of movement, and hence the greater intensity of the exertions demanded
+of him, attack the animal in a far greater degree than the more
+uniform march performance of the men, who, moreover, are susceptible
+to moral influences, capable of greatly increasing their powers;
+finally, sore backs and lameness in long-continued exertions decimate
+the ranks of the horses to a much greater degree than a well-trained
+and equipped Infantry suffers from similar causes.</p>
+
+<p>In normal conditions demands should not be made upon the Cavalry which
+would be justified only in moments of a crisis. We must endeavour to
+reduce the daily performance to the lowest limit that our purpose
+allows. Only in exceptional instances should one move off at such an
+early hour as to interfere materially with the night rest of the
+horses. Unfortunately, there are still officers who will not be
+convinced that it is the horse which most requires rest, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page128" name="page128"></a>(p. 128)</span> and
+who are never satisfied unless they keep the Cavalry night after night
+on their legs, although in darkness they are useless either for
+reconnaissance or for fighting.</p>
+
+<p>Further, in War games and Staff rides it is a custom to make demands
+which in practice are absolutely impossible, mostly by superior
+officers who have never ridden 100 kilometres (66 miles) in a single
+day.</p>
+
+<p>An average of twenty to twenty-five miles a day is in practice a very
+considerable performance. To demand much more of them, day in and day
+out, is impracticable. On the march itself a suitable change of pace
+is very necessary.</p>
+
+<p>To trot hour after hour is the most fruitful source of ruin to our
+horseflesh. Where it becomes necessary it is usually due to the want
+of care on the part of the Leader. Much may be done to spare the
+horses if we never march with considerable numbers on a single road
+without absolute necessity; and when this is not to be avoided, then
+we must seek to maintain an even pace throughout the column by the
+intercalation of suitable distances between the several bodies;
+otherwise there is a continuous hurrying up or checking of the
+rearward detachments, which strains the horses to the very utmost.</p>
+
+<p>One must always arrange for the halts necessary for the horses, water
+them whenever opportunity offers, and never continue a movement to the
+complete exhaustion of the animals. Well-timed periods of rest
+increase the collective power of endurance of the horses most
+materially, and as the training improves, the demands made upon them
+can gradually be raised.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page129" name="page129"></a>(p. 129)</span> To bring this greater improvement into harmony with the
+military requirements of the situation, next in importance to an
+intelligent execution of a rational marching system comes a wise
+economy of forces with regard to the performance of detached duties
+and patrolling. It is particularly with the Divisional Cavalry that
+the lavish assignment of orderlies and messengers to the leaders of
+the other Arms and to the Infantry outposts has to be kept in check,
+and it must be insisted upon that the men thus allotted should be
+returned punctually to their commands, and not be employed in duties
+for which they are not intended.</p>
+
+<p>Thus one finds Generals who use their messengers as patrols even when
+special patrols have been entrusted with this duty; others who keep
+the detachments assigned to the outposts long after the outposts
+themselves have been relieved. In all these things there is a
+tremendous waste of energy, which must be all the more injurious the
+smaller the proportion of Cavalry which can be detailed to the
+Infantry Divisions.</p>
+
+<p>It is a special duty of every Cavalry Commander to resist this
+tendency to the utmost of his power.</p>
+
+<p>Apart from the regulation of the marching column and the economy of
+forces above referred to, a rational treatment of the rearward
+communications, particularly with the Independent Cavalry, will go far
+to maintain the troops in efficiency, and is also from the strategic
+point of view an important part of the Leader's duty. The daily
+despatch of numerous requisitioning detachments to great distances
+weakens and diminishes the troops to an inadmissible degree, unless it
+is managed with a wise foresight and on a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page130" name="page130"></a>(p. 130)</span> rational system;
+often on great marches it will be altogether impossible. Then the
+horses must manage with what they find at their halting-places for the
+night. In the case of great concentration this will be altogether
+insufficient. Short rations reduce the horses very rapidly and only
+too thoroughly. It is, therefore, necessary in all independent
+operations of great Cavalry 'Masses' to take with one an organized and
+mobile supply train, and, where circumstances require, to arrange for
+its defence.</p>
+
+<p>The timely arrival of the supply waggons, the rational utilization of
+the resources of the district, the contiguous replenishment of the
+moving supply reserves, are matters which cannot be left entirely to
+the Army Service Corps, but the Cavalry General must himself overlook
+the whole matter, and keep the general control in his own hands. For
+these arrangements must be regulated from the strategic point of view
+since the power of operating at all depends essentially upon them. Of
+course, the Supreme Command must lend assistance also.</p>
+
+<p>In general, it will be advisable to carry with one a five to six days'
+ration of corn if one is to be prepared for all emergencies. That, at
+least, was the practical teaching of the War of 1870-1871. But one
+must add, the further the Cavalry is separated from the masses of the
+Army, and the more it renounces its communications with the latter,
+the greater must be the bulk of supply it takes with it; and the
+closer these supplies have to be kept to the troops, the more thorough
+must be the arrangements for their protection. The latter will be of
+particular importance when operating on a narrow front which favours
+an enemy's outflanking endeavours, whereas wider fronts of themselves
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page131" name="page131"></a>(p. 131)</span> give a certain degree of security to the rearward
+communications.</p>
+
+<p>If we are entirely cut off from our home resources, then we must
+select some point to be occupied on the flank or in the rear of the
+enemy's Army, and there arrange a supply centre of our own, and make
+it the point of departure for separate operations.</p>
+
+<p>All means are, then, proper to accumulate in such places a sufficient
+forage reserve, for the subsistence of the horses is the most
+important task which falls upon the Commander. A delay in this
+direction can wreck the most brilliant undertakings&mdash;jeopardize the
+result even of the best executed ones. Theory does not attach
+sufficient importance to the point here involved.</p>
+
+<p>Thus we see that the tasks of the independent Cavalry Leader are both
+many-sided and responsible. He can only then prove equal to them when
+all subordinates on whom he has to count support him with the utmost
+goodwill and reliability.</p>
+
+<p>With this necessity a new demand is made upon him&mdash;namely, to raise
+the spirit of the men he commands in such a manner that they will be
+equal to the highest requirements. Only a bold, self-confident, and
+active man, who everywhere sets the best example, will be able in this
+manner to inspire and stimulate his command. The sum of the stimulated
+individual performances brings with it also increased opportunities of
+success.</p>
+
+<p>Hence the last and greatest demand for the successful conduct of a
+Cavalry Mass remains always the man who will inspire and stimulate the
+troops under him, and thus lead them to victory.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page132" name="page132"></a>(p. 132)</span> CHAPTER VIII</h2>
+
+<p class="title">PATROLS&mdash;TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS&mdash;CYCLISTS</p>
+
+
+<p>I have already, in a former section, insisted on the fundamental
+proposition that reconnaissance and security are two diametrically
+opposite conceptions, and cannot on a large scale be confided to one
+and the same body of troops. This conflict of purpose becomes most
+evident when we come to the service of patrols in the field.</p>
+
+<p>Reconnoitring patrols regulate their movements on those of the enemy.
+They must keep touch with and follow him, quite irrespective of the
+movement of their own side, often being compelled to creep after
+him&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, to utilize intersected ground in order to avoid the
+necessity of fighting.</p>
+
+<p>Security patrols, on the other hand, flanking detachments, piquets,
+vedettes, and the like, have to choose their position with reference
+to the force it is their purpose to cover, and with which they must
+remain in communication. It is their duty to attack and beat off the
+enemy's patrols, as far as their strength will allow them, to prevent
+these latter gaining an insight into the conditions of the marching or
+resting troops whose safety they are intended to secure.</p>
+
+<p>If they were to attempt to follow up their enemy to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page133" name="page133"></a>(p. 133)</span> find out
+his position&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, to reconnoitre&mdash;they would lose their connection
+with their own troops, and endanger the security of the latter by
+relinquishing the special object they are set apart to provide for.</p>
+
+<p>Hence it is absolutely necessary that the two systems should be kept
+separate one from the other, and that each patrol should know clearly
+and distinctly for which of the two purposes it is specifically
+intended. Only then can the troops in rear rely on being kept
+thoroughly informed, and at the same time secure from the possible
+attempts of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>The more clear and precise the mission, the more can the patrols be
+relied on to execute it; but this, of course, does not exclude the
+necessity for them to keep their eyes open for other things, and to
+report all they may notice.</p>
+
+<p>Such a systematic arrangement brings other advantages in its train. It
+effects a marked economy of one's available forces, for being certain
+that every mission will be settled by a special party detailed for
+that purpose, it ceases to be necessary to keep on despatching fresh
+patrols again and again in the same direction, a practice most
+detrimental to the troops, which is constantly followed in peace-time;
+and it can never happen that a body is surprised by the enemy because
+its scouts are absent reconnoitring, or that it fails to receive
+information because its patrols are busy with security. If, therefore,
+all patrols thus naturally fall into one of these two
+groups&mdash;reconnoitring and security patrols&mdash;there is still another
+line of distinction to be observed between these patrols themselves,
+arising from the nature of the tasks which the circumstances impose
+upon them.</p>
+
+<p>It is impossible to lay down any distinct rules in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page134" name="page134"></a>(p. 134)</span> this
+matter&mdash;for War will always present new and changing problems&mdash;but
+broadly two points of view must be kept in sight, which require
+fundamentally different treatment, and are conditioned by our distance
+from the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>If the opposing forces are still engaged in preliminary approaches one
+to the other, and separated by wide stretches of country, the
+procedure will be altogether distinct from that to be adopted when the
+outposts mutually confront one another.</p>
+
+<p>Between the two extremes there are innumerable intermediate degrees,
+to which one's conduct must be adapted without losing sight of the
+guiding points involved.</p>
+
+<p>Let us take first the period of approach, and consider the
+reconnoitring problem from this aspect, taking into consideration the
+broad requirements of modern War.</p>
+
+<p>It will be apparent at once that there is here a double purpose to be
+fulfilled&mdash;viz., to ascertain the whereabouts and direction of
+movement of the elements of the enemy's main fighting force, the
+primary object of all reconnaissance; and, secondly, to find the
+enemy's preceding Cavalry screen, whose purpose it is, on the one
+hand, to prevent our object, and, on the other hand, to conceal their
+own main body. This cavalry we shall have to defeat, but we cannot
+afford to await this event, but must initiate our own reconnaissance
+before the decision, and endeavour to carry this through, even if the
+latter prove unfavourable to us.</p>
+
+<p>Hence it follows that our patrols must be systematically divided from
+the first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as to
+whether they are intended to find the enemy's main army or to beat his
+Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page135" name="page135"></a>(p. 135)</span> The former must not allow themselves to be held up by the
+enemy's Cavalry, but must endeavour to ride through the opposing
+screen&mdash;straight for the heads of the enemy's marching columns. They
+must, therefore, avoid all fighting, and act by cunning and stealth,
+and hence their conduct should be entrusted always to officers. They
+will be directed against the probable lines of the enemy's approach,
+as determined by the general strategic situation, and will further be
+given all possible information as to the known whereabouts of the
+enemy, together with the intentions of their own Superior Command, in
+order that they may be in a position to distinguish between important
+and unimportant details, and adapt their action accordingly.</p>
+
+<p>That the position of heads of columns in time and place, their depths,
+the flanks of the enemy's positions, extent of his outposts, districts
+in which troops are quartered, the appearance of new uniforms,
+indicating the presence of regiments believed to be elsewhere, etc.,
+should all be carefully determined, forms part of their normal
+instructions; but, in spite of that, it is very desirable to direct
+their attention very particularly to all such points as are at the
+moment of preponderating consequence. They must also be kept well
+informed as to the mission of their neighbouring patrols, so that
+under all circumstances the systematic subdivision of their several
+tasks can be maintained intact.</p>
+
+<p>For these patrols one must choose the best mounted officers and men
+and horses, since long distances must be covered under difficult
+circumstances, and it would be well to allot to each a competent
+non-commissioned officer, who can carry through the task if his
+Commander <span class="pagenum"><a id="page136" name="page136"></a>(p. 136)</span> is killed or taken prisoner. If possible, they
+should also be supplied with a concentrated horse-ration, so as to be
+as far as possible independent of the resources of the country. (See
+Part II., Section I.)</p>
+
+<p>As to the strength of these patrols, it will be necessary to keep
+within very narrow limits, because if they are large it is difficult
+for them to escape observation; on the other hand, a certain degree of
+strength is necessary, because one cannot, of course, count on being
+able to send back one's information by single messengers. Since it is
+a prime condition of the problem that a district thoroughly commanded
+by the enemy must be ridden through, the safe return of a single
+messenger can never be guaranteed; hence the Commander will either be
+obliged to send his reports in duplicate or triplicate, or in the last
+resort fight his way through with them himself. Hence it will be
+advisable to compose each party of two or three patrols, each of three
+men, assigning a smart lance-corporal to each.</p>
+
+<p>One officer, one non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals, and
+five men must, therefore, be considered as a fairly normal type.</p>
+
+<p>The Commander can then despatch two reports, and the third he must
+bring in himself, and must well consider how long it will be safe to
+continue his observation, and what it is of real importance for his
+superiors to know.</p>
+
+<p>But he must never allow himself to be hurried into the despatch of
+unimportant information. He must always keep before his mind the
+essential strategical elements of the whole situation. It seems to me
+altogether wrong to send off such patrols with general instructions to
+keep in touch with the enemy, a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page137" name="page137"></a>(p. 137)</span> common man&oelig;uvre practice.
+Since these latter generally last only a few days, there is not much
+difficulty in maintaining such a system, particularly when information
+is sent by single messengers. But in War everything is very different.
+One would very soon have got through all one's officers and still not
+be well informed. The patrols must, therefore, be told to return
+within a certain time limit, and their reliefs, who are to be fully
+instructed as far as the information available goes, must be
+despatched before this time limit is expired. Even then we shall soon
+exhaust the available supply of officers who will have been driven to
+the limit of their endurance in purely strategic missions, and in the
+end we shall have to fall back upon Non-commissioned Officers for
+tactical observation.</p>
+
+<p>This tactical reconnaissance will, in the first place, devote its
+attention to the enemy's Cavalry. The patrols assigned to these duties
+will attack the enemy wherever they meet him, to find out what is
+going on, and as soon as possible establish a moral superiority over
+them.</p>
+
+<p>But even they cannot remain permanently in touch with the enemy,
+because they, too, must send in their information by messenger, their
+strength thus rapidly diminishing, and they, in turn, will require
+relief.</p>
+
+<p>If permanent observation of a yet distant enemy is necessary, we must
+turn to other means. It will, then, be as well to send out whole
+reconnoitring squadrons or troops (F.D.O.,<a id="footnotetag15" name="footnotetag15"></a><a href="#footnote15" title="Go to footnote 15"><span class="smaller">[15]</span></a> 128) towards the enemy,
+and through them maintain a permanent tactical observation.</p>
+
+<p>These serve as a patrol reserve and collecting station for
+information, remaining day and night in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page138" name="page138"></a>(p. 138)</span> touch with the
+enemy, and, of course, will also require periodical reliefs.</p>
+
+<p>It goes without saying that, in addition to these squadrons, single
+patrols may be despatched in important directions from the main body
+of the Cavalry, whose duty it will be to report to the latter direct.</p>
+
+<p>These, again, must send off their reports by several men, whilst those
+despatched from the patrols sent out by the reconnoitring squadrons
+will often, owing to the shorter distance and the nearness of the
+support, be able to avail themselves of the despatch riders. In
+general, it cannot be insisted upon too much that the despatch rider,
+so very popular in peace, can only be very occasionally employed in
+War in the interval before the enemy's Cavalry is completely beaten
+out of the field. In peace a man is always riding in his own country;
+if he himself has not a map, he has at least been instructed from a
+map, and every civilian will help him out. Even if he stumbles up
+against an enemy's patrol they will generally let him pass unnoticed;
+but it is quite different in War. Here even a patrol leader has rarely
+got a map. The despatch rider rides across thoroughly unknown
+districts, coming in contact with a foreign, perhaps hostile,
+population; he cannot make himself understood, if, indeed, he is not
+obliged to avoid them. The enemy's patrols are also everywhere, and if
+anything happens to his horse the message does not arrive. Further,
+the enormously increased distances to be traversed in modern War have
+to be taken into account, and these alone render the despatch of
+single horsemen a very doubtful undertaking. We must, therefore,
+recognise that the conveyance of reports by individual despatch riders
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page139" name="page139"></a>(p. 139)</span> is only possible under very limited conditions, and within
+the districts fully controlled by one's own troops, and that even in
+one's own country reconnoitring patrols sent out to a great distance
+can only be very occasionally employed.</p>
+
+<p>Here we come upon an increased difficulty in the whole system of
+intelligence, and yet all reconnaissance is useless unless the return
+of information works without a hitch. We must, therefore, endeavour to
+regulate it accordingly.</p>
+
+<p>Above all, the connection between the reconnoitring squadrons and the
+main body by relays must be very carefully assured, and their strength
+must be proportionate to the number of the enemy's patrols moving in
+the district. In these cases a co-operation between Cavalry and
+cyclists will be of service, whilst within the radius which we
+completely command the whole rearward intelligence service, so far as
+it can move upon roads, must be left as much as possible to cyclists.</p>
+
+<p><i>Fundamentally, no Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to the
+rear without pressing circumstances.</i> This is an absolute necessity if
+we are to spare our valuable and almost irreplaceable horses. Towards
+these safe lines of communication all reports must be directed, in
+order to be forwarded with the utmost rapidity by fresh horses or
+cyclists.</p>
+
+<p>If these main roads do not run as far as the reconnoitring squadrons,
+in order to allow of the patrols making use of them without long
+detours, then further collecting stations, protected by other troops,
+must be interpolated. (F.D.O., 273.)</p>
+
+<p>Occasionally the Cavalry Telegraph equipment may be of assistance, but
+we must not expect too much <span class="pagenum"><a id="page140" name="page140"></a>(p. 140)</span> from it in periods of rapid
+movement, because since its application depends upon a number of
+favourable circumstances, its value in such changing conditions is
+more or less illusory.</p>
+
+<p>Results obtained in man&oelig;uvres, in my opinion, convey no correct
+experience in this matter.</p>
+
+<p>Another point, however, must be specially brought out&mdash;namely, the
+necessity, not only of sending back information through the proper
+channels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to the
+principal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It is
+of the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of the
+War should receive information about the enemy simultaneously with
+their subordinates, so that they always remain in the position to
+dispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not find
+themselves bound by instructions previously issued by their
+subordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in
+1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reached
+Headquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it.</p>
+
+<p>The fault lay chiefly in the fact that the subordinates, not being
+informed as to the connection of events, did not perceive the
+importance of the information, and therefore did not forward it on,
+and partly because the telegraph wires were overburdened by the
+private messages of distinguished persons who had nothing whatever to
+do with the conduct of operations.</p>
+
+<p>The control of the wires for purely military purposes must, therefore,
+be maintained with rigid severity, and information to Headquarters or
+Army Commands must have precedence over all other business.</p>
+
+<p>If collecting stations for information are not available, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page141" name="page141"></a>(p. 141)</span>
+the question arises, Which groups should be Authorized to report
+direct to Headquarters? In my opinion this cannot be determined by the
+strength of the troops concerned, but must always depend on the
+strategic situation. Generally it may be laid down that the lie of the
+roads must decide.</p>
+
+<p>Those detachments entrusted with the reconnaissance of a single line
+of road will report direct any important information gained within
+their own sphere if no stronger body should be moving along the same
+line, and this reporting body may, therefore, according to
+circumstances, be a patrol, a regiment, or a brigade. It is desirable
+from this point of view that all Cavalry officers down to patrol
+leaders should be kept so thoroughly informed as to the general
+situation that they may judge of the importance of the information
+obtained, and hence know where to send the information they have
+secured.</p>
+
+<p>As the opposing Cavalries first, then the larger bodies of the Army,
+approach one another the situation changes. The reconnoitring
+squadrons clear the front and turn their attention to the enemy's
+flanks. The advanced squadrons are withdrawn, and the larger Cavalry
+bodies drawn off towards the wings of the Army, and seek shelter
+behind the Infantry columns, if they have been defeated in the Cavalry
+duel, or turn against flank and rear of the enemy's Army if they have
+been victorious. In front of the Armies reconnaissance now falls to
+the Divisional Cavalry. Here the strategical and tactical duties
+coincide. What the conduct of the Independent Cavalry will be must
+depend on whether it is still held in check by the enemy or not. If
+the latter have been finally beaten out of the field so that one has a
+free hand, then the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page142" name="page142"></a>(p. 142)</span> strategic patrols will direct their
+attention to the enemy's rearward communications, and will seek to
+determine the approach of his reserves, but tactical reconnaissance
+will be directed against his flanks.</p>
+
+<p>The principles governing our conduct remain the same, only the
+reconnoitring and advanced squadrons now act primarily as supports to
+the strategic patrols. If, however, a decision between the two
+Cavalries has not been finally arrived at, one will now endeavour to
+bring it about, and for this purpose unite all available forces,
+leaving meanwhile the reconnaissance to strong patrols, who in this
+period of the combat must never avoid those of the enemy, for now our
+object is to get information quickly, and the time for circumvention
+and evasion is at an end.</p>
+
+<p>When the first battle has been decided, there follows either pursuit
+or retreat&mdash;operations in which the tactical reconnaissance cannot for
+one moment be omitted. Then by degrees, as the defeated side succeeds
+in disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normal
+conditions again. The two Armies are separated by a certain area in
+depth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before,
+reconnaissance is required.</p>
+
+<p>Matters are somewhat different as regards security. Here also in
+general a distinction must be drawn between safety obtained by bodies
+detached in advance and that derived from piquets, etc., immediately
+at hand. But too much importance cannot be laid upon the principle
+that, as above pointed out, reconnaissance alone cannot suffice to
+insure safety; the reconnoitring detachments must rather always be
+followed by a line of security troops, so that as a general type
+three lines of patrols result&mdash;viz., strategical <span class="pagenum"><a id="page143" name="page143"></a>(p. 143)</span> patrols far
+in advance, tactical patrols, and security patrols, which latter, when
+the main body is halted, become the standing outposts.</p>
+
+<p>Coming next to the measures of security necessary for Independent
+Cavalry when in movement, the tactical reconnoitring patrols, by
+sending in early information of the enemy, will make a far-spread line
+of security patrols unnecessary. In general, the ordinary point of the
+advance guard and flankers will suffice. For the latter the same holds
+good which has been said in the previous section on the subject of
+flanking detachments altogether&mdash;viz., that they must be worked by
+sections, and arranged in a proper system of reliefs.</p>
+
+<p>If the necessity arises to screen, as well as to secure&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, to
+hide absolutely our movements from the enemy&mdash;then all roads leading
+towards him and the section of the ground comprised between them must
+be occupied in such manner that the enemy cannot find intervals at
+which to break through, and this will be best attained by a system of
+local patrols, tied to definite beats. These patrols must fight the
+enemy wherever he appears, and must, therefore, be given sufficient
+strength and be followed by small supports duly allotted to each
+section of the whole front.</p>
+
+<p>When the main body is stationary, the conditions are different,
+because the troops require a certain time to turn out; therefore more
+precautions are necessary, and the end can be best attained by placing
+the patrols further to the front. Hence we arrive at a double system
+of security&mdash;the first line formed by outpost squadrons, with
+officers, non-commissioned officers, and small patrols, to which a
+certain district to be ridden over will be assigned, and which must
+maintain <span class="pagenum"><a id="page144" name="page144"></a>(p. 144)</span> a systematic connection by patrols between its
+separate parts, to insure absolutely the control of the ground around
+them; and the second, formed of far advanced posts of observation at
+suitable points&mdash;road crossings, defiles, etc.&mdash;from whence they can
+detect at the earliest moment any approach of the enemy. These are
+indispensable at night, when reconnaissance is always more or less
+liable to break down, for darkness interferes with sight, and the
+horses require rest. Their importance also increases naturally with
+the vicinity of the enemy, and the consequent greater risk of
+surprise. In the case of the larger bodies, whole squadrons (see
+F.D.O., No. 272) must be detached for this purpose, and communication
+with them assured by strong relay lines. These strong advanced
+detachments can, under favourable circumstances, get shelter in
+villages, so that the horses at least obtain better rest and care for
+a few hours, and the same applies naturally to the reconnoitring
+squadrons. In all such instances the guiding idea must be to evacuate
+the village the moment the enemy appears, and evade collision with
+him. How this is to be managed has been already explained (Book I.,
+Chap. VI.). Accurate knowledge of where all the roads lead to, the
+barricading of those running towards the enemy's position, and extreme
+alertness on the part of the patrols, are in such cases all-important.</p>
+
+<p>Above all, the Commander must be confident in the steadiness and
+coolness of his men.</p>
+
+<p>As to the immediate security of the Army itself, this depends in the
+first place on the Divisional Cavalry, but during the advance the
+Independent Cavalry on the front and flanks guarantees this security
+so thoroughly that the former can confine themselves to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page145" name="page145"></a>(p. 145)</span> the
+most elementary precautions, which must include primarily the
+maintenance of connection with the latter for this purpose. Then they
+will not only have to provide for security in the most thorough
+manner, but will also have to reconnoitre, and for this purpose follow
+the same rules which we have laid down for the Independent Cavalry. If
+the enemy's horse prove overpowering, then they will use their power
+of defence to the utmost, and seek to increase it by cyclists
+belonging to the Infantry, Maxims, and Artillery, in order to beat off
+the enemy with loss, and to clear the path for the reconnoitring
+patrols.</p>
+
+<p>Speaking generally, the system I propose is in harmony with the
+spirit, if not with the letter, of our Field Service Regulations, in
+which the systematic distinction between reconnoitring and security,
+as also between strategic and tactical patrols, is, in my opinion, not
+sufficiently defined. The essential point which necessitates this
+distinction has not been grasped with sufficient precision. If we are
+to follow literally the wording of the Field Service Regulations, and
+not the spirit which pervades it, which disregards all stereotyped
+formations and keeps always the practical in view, then it would be
+impossible to carry out screening operations on the scale which the
+conditions of modern War will render indispensable. Sufficient stress
+has not been laid on the necessary systematizing of the whole
+procedure. Finally, too, much weight has been laid upon the employment
+of the despatch rider (<i>Meldereiter</i>), although the experience of
+1870-1871 has sufficiently shown that this system was unreliable. I
+recall as an instance the pursuit of Vinoy's Corps (after Sedan), in
+which case the most important report was entrusted to a despatch
+rider, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page146" name="page146"></a>(p. 146)</span> who only reached his destination twenty-four hours
+after he was despatched, and by that time it was too late to take any
+action on the information he conveyed.</p>
+
+<p>The Field Service Regulations should also contain detailed
+instructions as to the employment of cyclists with the Cavalry, for
+the rapid development of this mode of locomotion has rendered this
+absolutely indispensable. But the point must be brought out that the
+use of a cyclist is always only conditional, as it depends on the
+weather, the roads, and the country. On heavy, steep, and stony roads,
+on which the tyres are only too apt to be punctured, the cyclists are
+obliged to dismount; against a head wind they can only make progress
+with difficulty. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that for the
+transmission of reports from the advanced lines, as well as for
+communication between separated bodies of troops within the district
+controlled by our Cavalry, they are of inestimable service. Granted
+that in particularly unfavourable weather and bad roads they must be
+supplemented by Cavalry, they, nevertheless, on the whole, make it
+possible to expedite materially the delivery of despatches. This is of
+all the greater importance because in case of War the German Armies
+will be relatively weak in Cavalry, and under certain circumstances
+they will have to fight against a great numerical superiority.</p>
+
+<p>Even though the principal use of the cyclists lies in the transmission
+of information in which they can help the Divisional Cavalry most
+materially, nevertheless one must not base too sanguine hopes on their
+activity.</p>
+
+<p>The reason is that because of their wheels they are tied to the roads,
+and in consequence they can neither reconnoitre nor provide for
+security independently. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page147" name="page147"></a>(p. 147)</span> If for these purposes Cavalry
+patrols are attached to them, the chief advantage of their greater
+mobility is sacrificed, but without such supports in difficult country
+they are tolerably helpless against surprise attacks. If one further
+takes into account that a hill takes off from their speed to such a
+degree that a horseman can easily catch them up, one must admit that
+they afford no sufficient guarantee for the fulfilment of independent
+missions outside of the country which our own Cavalry commands. In
+such districts they can only be employed on relays, as already pointed
+out. Here the duty of providing safety can best be fulfilled by the
+Cavalry, because it is not a question of rapid advance, but only of
+the protection of stationary posts and certain defined road stretches.
+But for the defence of these posts, and for the transmission of
+intelligence, the cyclists will do even better service than the
+horsemen, because they can cover the ground faster, and when fighting
+are not hampered by their horses. Their employment here is all the
+more desirable because the relay service makes enormous demands upon
+the Cavalry. That was proved up to the hilt in the War of 1870-1871;
+the complaints under this head repeat themselves over and over again,
+as the records of the Campaign abundantly testify.</p>
+
+<p>Besides, on these relay duties the cyclists can be tactically employed
+in the district which our Cavalry by its patrols commands, for the
+rapid occupation of far-advanced posts which neither Cavalry nor
+Infantry can reach with sufficient celerity and in adequate force; for
+the defence of defiles lying to our rear, which must be kept open to
+secure the retreat of the Cavalry; for the support of Independent
+Cavalry on outpost duty, particularly at night; and for other similar
+purposes. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page148" name="page148"></a>(p. 148)</span> To satisfy all these conditions, these cyclist
+detachments require a sufficient tactical training, but in times of
+peace one sees in this respect feats performed whose impracticability
+in War are glaringly apparent. For instance, men keep their cycles
+with them right up in the firing line, and when they want to retreat
+or break off the fight they try to mount under fire. As they are
+generally tied to the roads, they then file off to the flanks. I have,
+indeed, often seen Cyclist detachments lay down their cycles in the
+front of the position, and then advance to mount them again in the
+teeth of the enemy's fire. All these kind of things are absurd. The
+cycles must be treated like the led horses of the Cavalry&mdash;that is to
+say, the men must dismount under cover, then move up to the firing
+line, and then move back to cover in order to mount again. The
+position must, moreover, be so chosen as to enable them to move off
+without exposing themselves. All these points, which in practice are
+rendered difficult, diminish very materially the usefulness of
+cyclists, and take away from them, above all, their power of offence;
+and in all missions entrusted to them these limitations must be
+carefully kept in mind.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page149" name="page149"></a>(p. 149)</span> II<br>
+
+ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING</h2>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page151" name="page151"></a>(p. 151)</span> CHAPTER I</h2>
+
+<p class="title">NUMBERS</p>
+
+<p class="center smcap">Organization and Training</p>
+
+
+<p>When we take into consideration the conditions of modern Warfare, as I
+have endeavoured in the foregoing pages to develop them&mdash;the numerical
+strength of modern Armies; the numerous formations of Artillery and
+Infantry set on foot on the outbreak of hostilities; the area of
+future theatres of operations&mdash;when, further, we consider how many
+important tasks await the Cavalry from the moment when the first shot
+is fired, and how the most important of these, as I have endeavoured
+to establish, can only be dealt with satisfactorily by the employment
+of Cavalry 'Masses,' the conviction must force itself home to every
+mind that our German Cavalry is numerically inadequate to meet even
+the principal demands the future must make upon it.</p>
+
+<p>If, further, we reflect that, owing to causes which it would be out of
+place to deal with in these pages at length, it is precisely upon our
+Cavalry that the rôle of fighting against crushing numerical
+superiority must devolve, this conviction must give rise to the
+gravest anxiety, more especially when it is remembered that the
+difficulty of securing a supply of reinforcements adequate for the
+performance of our duties is <span class="pagenum"><a id="page152" name="page152"></a>(p. 152)</span> greater with the Cavalry than
+with any other Arm. A few days' training at a pinch will turn out an
+Infantry soldier or gunner, whose presence need not necessarily be
+either dangerous or even detrimental to the efficiency of his company
+or battery. An unbroken horse or a bad rider may create confusion in
+the ranks of the steadiest squadron.</p>
+
+<p>The danger is still further aggravated by the fact that a rapid
+reduction in their available numbers is certain to take place, owing
+to the increased demands which the future must make upon the endurance
+of our horsemen, and presumably also the heavier losses they will be
+called upon to suffer in action, both of which must be intensified in
+proportion as their numerical inadequacy for the tasks incurring on
+them increases. Germany is certainly comparatively well supplied with
+horses; but owing to the demands of the aforesaid new formations,
+which must be set on foot immediately on the declaration of
+hostilities, upon the complement of animals fit for War purposes
+within our own frontiers, the country will be practically denuded, and
+only those horses still too young or those too old for the field will
+be left behind.</p>
+
+<p>Even among those classified as 'fit for War' but few are fit for
+Cavalry purposes. Riding horses good enough for the Infantry and
+Train&mdash;even for the Artillery&mdash;may, no doubt, be found; but equal to
+the requirements made on the Cavalry horse there are but few indeed,
+and even this number is diminishing yearly. As regards the supply from
+foreign sources, this must depend on the political situation&mdash;i.e., on
+conditions which lie beyond our control. Even when these conditions
+are favourable, horses cannot be usefully drafted into the ranks
+without prolonged <span class="pagenum"><a id="page153" name="page153"></a>(p. 153)</span> training and breaking to fit them for
+their new duties. Hence the conclusion is inevitable that the
+numerical strength of our Cavalry, already, as I have shown, so
+inadequate, must fall off very rapidly at the commencement of a
+campaign, because its rapid reinforcement with satisfactory material
+is, under the circumstances, quite out of the question.</p>
+
+<p>From this conclusion there is no escape; and in view of the increased
+importance I have above assigned to the due performance of all Cavalry
+duties, its recognition carries with it, as its corollary, the
+absolute need for the numerical augmentation of this branch of the
+service.</p>
+
+<p>The enormous mechanism of our modern Armies can only work normally and
+successfully when its constituent 'power factors'&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the three
+Arms&mdash;have been apportioned with due regard to the work to be
+accomplished. If driving-power fails any one portion, the danger lies
+near that at some critical moment the whole apparatus will suffer in
+sympathy, and fail to respond to the strain it is called upon to
+endure.</p>
+
+<p>The question of this increase in the Cavalry has, indeed, often before
+been raised, but never with the weight of concentrated conviction the
+situation, in my opinion, deserves. For the most part, only expedients
+to avoid the bitter necessity of a serious augmentation have been
+suggested. Thus it has been proposed to form new regiments of four
+squadrons each by taking away from the existing ones their fifth
+squadron, and the suggestion has been supported by an appeal to the
+fact that in War-time only four squadrons per regiment take the field.</p>
+
+<p>No expert, however, can fail to agree with Lieutenant-General
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page154" name="page154"></a>(p. 154)</span> von Pelet-Narbonne, who maintains in his 'Cavalry Regiments
+of Four Squadrons' (<i>Kreuz Zeitung</i>, January 17, 1899) that such a
+measure would entail the ruin of our Cavalry, and would destroy with
+one blow all that the reorganizations of 1859 and 1860 have done for
+the War efficiency of our regiments by entailing a depreciation of the
+value of the squadrons at the very moment when called on to move out
+and face the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>Thus he writes: 405 squadrons are in Peace retained on the lower
+establishment of 133, or the middle one of 137. Their numbers are 170
+of the former, 235 of the latter, and the War strength averages 150
+per squadron. To attain this figure those on the lower establishment
+need 17 horses, those on the middle 13.</p>
+
+<p>With no fifth squadron to draw upon for horses, as at present, these
+vacancies would have to be filled by 'augmentation horses'&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>,
+animals straight from the country, thoroughly raw and unaccustomed to
+work under the rider, often also of inferior quality. But these 13 to
+17 horses per squadron by no means exhaust the situation. The field
+squadrons must leave their youngest remounts&mdash;say 15 in number&mdash;still
+too young and unbroken, behind them; for the experiences of the last
+War proved abundantly that where this precaution was neglected the
+greater part of them broke down under the hardships of the Campaign.
+Taking even the most favourable time of year for mobilization&mdash;viz.,
+in May&mdash;then out of the 15 young remounts of good material, and with
+careful choice, not more than 8 will be found fit for the ranks; the
+remainder will have to be left behind with the 'Depot' squadron, to
+be sent on afterwards. Any <span class="pagenum"><a id="page155" name="page155"></a>(p. 155)</span> other procedure would only lead to
+the useless sacrifice of these valuable young animals. The places of
+the horses thus left behind will, therefore, also have to be filled by
+augmentation horses, thus bringing the number of these up to 24 and 20
+respectively.</p>
+
+<p>Then we still have to provide for the wants of the Depot squadron,
+which has to train the recruits, and for these a further number of
+trained horses, averaging 32, must be left behind, or another 8 from
+each squadron; and, finally, another 2 per squadron will be required
+for Staff orderlies and Staff guard duties.</p>
+
+<p>According to this calculation, the Field squadron would have to move
+out with from 34 to 30 augmentation horses (the sixty squadrons on the
+higher establishment with 27).</p>
+
+<p>The matter, however, presents a totally different appearance when in
+peace five squadrons are in existence, of which one remains behind as
+a depot. Taking away the 35 horses for recruits, and following our
+previous calculation of 7 young remounts, there would remain on the
+lower establishment 91 efficient horses to be divided amongst the
+other four squadrons, or 23 each, so that these would take the field
+with only 11, 7, or 4 'augmentation horses,' according to the
+respective peace establishments of the regiments. With these numbers
+the squadron suffers no reduction of its efficiency, for these few can
+always be employed&mdash;in the squadron carts, etc.&mdash;at any rate, need not
+be in the ranks.</p>
+
+<p>These figures, worked out in the spring of 1899, are still
+substantially correct, and it appears to me General von Pelet-Narbonne
+deals too leniently with this proposal for forming the fifth squadrons
+into new <span class="pagenum"><a id="page156" name="page156"></a>(p. 156)</span> regiments, because many of the calls made on the
+squadrons are even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always
+in every squadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will
+presently have to be cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to
+take eight remounts into the field, for these young animals are by no
+means equal to the demands which modern conditions must make upon them
+from the very first days of mobilization.</p>
+
+<p>Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increased
+above General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correct
+in his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals will
+exercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions than
+formerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often had
+a considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituent
+elements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to the
+front by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities the
+fullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, and
+others not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannot
+possibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a day
+straight across country. After a very short spell most of the
+augmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would only
+have brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of their
+squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if the
+squadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment and
+somewhat above it&mdash;say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this would
+mean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, our
+Peace conditions would be difficult <span class="pagenum"><a id="page157" name="page157"></a>(p. 157)</span> to adapt to such an
+organization. Without going closer into these details, it will be
+sufficient to point out that all our barracks and riding-schools are
+designed for five squadrons; and further, that we do not need
+numerically stronger regiments, but a greater number, in order to
+satisfy all requirements.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, if it is admitted that swamping our squadrons with thirty or
+more augmentation horses must diminish most seriously the efficiency
+of our Cavalry, then it follows that a still further increase in their
+number will make matters still worse. Such proposals have no doubt
+been made, and it certainly would be convenient if our Cavalry could
+thus easily on mobilization be increased by one-third to one-half its
+strength; but after what has been said, above all such suggestions
+must be seen to be impracticable, for squadrons which consisted, for
+instance, of one-half augmentation horses would be simply useless for
+War purposes. A proceeding, therefore, which brought such results in
+its train would imply no increase of the Arm, but rather the
+destruction of the existing standard of Peace-time efficiency.</p>
+
+<p>Even as Divisional Cavalry such squadrons would be useless, for these
+require good individual horsemanship even more than those of the
+Independent Division for the performance of their special duties, and
+the necessary standard can never be attained with untrained horses.</p>
+
+<p>All who put forward proposals of this nature are labouring under the
+dominion of a fundamental fallacy. They overlook the fact I have
+explained in the foregoing section, that Cavalry by its very nature
+can never be other than a highly-specialized Arm, and hence that the
+system adopted by the Infantry of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page158" name="page158"></a>(p. 158)</span> raising the cadres to War
+strength by the absorption of reserve men is for the Cavalry
+fundamentally impossible. For in the Infantry the ranks are filled by
+the addition of trained men; in the Cavalry they must be completed
+with untrained horses, and the untrained horses break down under
+service conditions much more rapidly than the men.</p>
+
+<p>Our experience in 1870-1871 was conclusive on this point. Already
+towards the end of August&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, in less than six weeks from the
+outbreak of the War&mdash;the greater part of the augmentation horses were
+quite useless for field purposes. If one looks up the reports in the
+War Archives, everywhere this complaint about the untrained animals is
+recurrent.</p>
+
+<p>From all the above-mentioned circumstances it must be clear that a
+numerical increase in the Cavalry is most urgently called for, and in
+my opinion it would be best if this indispensable increase, the need
+for which is becoming apparent even to public opinion, were grafted
+upon the existing five-squadron system, which at least guarantees a
+certain amount of preparation of the augmentation horses, without
+entailing the reduction of the squadrons below the minimum standard
+necessary for efficiency. I would, however, be willing to support any
+other method which would give a sensible increase in the Cavalry
+strength of our Peace establishment, and only protest against any
+scheme which would seek to swell out the ranks or create new units on
+mobilization; for all these are mere self-delusion, increasing, no
+doubt, the numbers on paper, but in reality striking at the efficiency
+of the Arm in the most vital manner.</p>
+
+<p>If, then, at the moment there may be conditions outside my ken which
+render a measure of the nature <span class="pagenum"><a id="page159" name="page159"></a>(p. 159)</span> I have indicated
+impracticable, we must, nevertheless, not close our eyes to the fact
+that, after the recent reorganization of the Artillery, the creation
+of an adequate number of Cavalry regiments in the nearest future is an
+absolute necessity, and that in the meanwhile any such palliative as a
+recourse to the cadre system must be absolutely rejected.</p>
+
+<p>As an indispensable complement of the proposal to form new regiments,
+so that we shall not be compelled to fall back on an inferior class of
+horse to meet their requirements, and at the same time to insure as
+far as possible a supply of suitable remounts to replace our losses in
+War, further encouragement of horse-breeding operations in our own
+territories is most urgently called for. This can only be attained by
+a further reasonable increase in the price paid for remounts.<a id="footnotetag16" name="footnotetag16"></a><a href="#footnote16" title="Go to footnote 16"><span class="smaller">[16]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Such a measure must form a preliminary to the coming increase of the
+Arm, and the sooner it is undertaken the better will be the result.</p>
+
+<p>These points of view cannot be insisted upon too vehemently, since
+even in Military circles they have not everywhere received the
+consideration they deserve, and it is most necessary that public
+opinion, which finds its ultimate expression within the walls of the
+Reichstag, should receive adequate instruction as to the vital
+interests involved.</p>
+
+<p>In any case, the difficulties attending any adequate increase of our
+Cavalry must not be underrated, and we must remain prepared to face
+the strain of a European <span class="pagenum"><a id="page160" name="page160"></a>(p. 160)</span> Campaign with a strength inadequate
+for the difficult and most momentous problems we shall be called on to
+face&mdash;problems which, according to the measure of success or the
+reverse attending their solution, will exercise the most far-reaching
+consequences on the whole course of the War.</p>
+
+<p>Under all circumstances we shall have to endeavour to attain at least
+that measure of success which the Army Headquarters unconditionally
+require to render possible their own effective operations.</p>
+
+<p>Superior energy and skill in the conduct of our operations,
+concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance both
+of the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in our
+undertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of our
+objectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness,
+and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directly
+conducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at the
+psychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces in
+hand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superiority
+such concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the end
+of the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with this
+purpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, and
+material strength of the troops, the more we are justified in
+demanding that, at least as regards organization and training, they
+shall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them.
+If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing the
+highest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even on
+the most necessary results in time of War.</p>
+
+<p>The question, then, arises whether from these points <span class="pagenum"><a id="page161" name="page161"></a>(p. 161)</span> of view
+our German Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on
+to endure.</p>
+
+<p>As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that those
+commands which form the basis of our War organization&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the
+Cavalry Divisions&mdash;should exist already in Peace as concrete units;
+and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know each
+other mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to be
+realized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions were
+definitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they would
+more frequently be brought together for man&oelig;uvres on a large scale,
+to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned.</p>
+
+<p>It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question of
+organization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Division
+in Peace than people generally imagine.</p>
+
+<p>The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannot
+accept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. However
+desirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is one
+which has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. The
+practicable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles in
+accordance with which the commands are handled should be so thoroughly
+flesh and blood of both leaders and led, that under all circumstances
+a sufficient result is secure. To reach this ideal is the true purpose
+of our training.</p>
+
+<p>In the permanent existence of Divisions it seems to me there is great
+danger that such a guarantee for their successful employment would be
+sacrificed.</p>
+
+<p>We have seen that the demands likely to be made on the Cavalry require
+widely different arrangement <span class="pagenum"><a id="page162" name="page162"></a>(p. 162)</span> of the disposable forces; that
+this requirement increases in importance as the Arm falls numerically
+beneath the needs of the situation, and that only a most adaptable
+organization can deal adequately with the emergencies this numerical
+insufficiency may entail. Hence it is to be feared that a permanent
+constitution in Divisions might lose this requisite adaptability, and,
+however highly we may appreciate the advantages of a firmly welded War
+organization, one should never allow the form to interfere with the
+practical application of the means&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, never allow the troops to
+become so rigid as to hamper their employment in the field. But this
+is just what would happen if the Divisions were maintained on a
+permanent War footing.</p>
+
+<p>Every application of Cavalry Masses requires a certain measure of
+drill control, because it depends always on the movement of closed
+bodies of troops, and if the Cavalry Divisions are constantly drilled
+together under the same Leader in Peace, there is at least a very
+great risk that this certain degree of drill control, which we
+recognise as indispensable, will degenerate into hard-and-fast
+prescription, since the Leader has always the same number of units at
+his disposal, and will thus by degrees habituate himself to consider
+these as invariable quantities in the solution of every tactical
+problem.</p>
+
+<p>Our experiences with the Regulations for 1876 show that this danger is
+by no means imaginary, for by the constant practice of the so-called
+'Three-Line Tactics' we had already progressed far on the downward
+path which leads to tactical destruction. If the 'Form' would not fit
+the conditions, so much the worse for the conditions. Fortunately,
+thanks to subsequent changes, we have shed the worst of these
+tendencies, and are on the high-road towards freer and more <span class="pagenum"><a id="page163" name="page163"></a>(p. 163)</span>
+adaptable tactical formations, but to me it seems that any attempt to
+fetter this progress by the adoption of a more or less rigid
+organization can only result in evil for the whole Arm. Rather should
+we lay down as a fixed principle that all Cavalry units must be able
+both to move and fight according to the same tactical principles, no
+matter in what order these units may be grouped together.</p>
+
+<p>The question now arises whether our present formation of six regiments
+to a Division is really equal to all demands which may be made upon
+it; whether, in fact, in view of the strategical requirements it may
+be called on to fulfil, and the degree of resistance to their
+execution it is likely to encounter, six regiments will prove
+numerically equal to their task.</p>
+
+<p>Considered in relation to the enormous Armies of the present day, and
+the still greater possibilities a general call to arms of a whole
+nation may involve, six regiments represent a very small actual factor
+of strength. If they should have to take the field for an independent
+mission, it would not even be possible to keep them all together. The
+protection of the flanks, and of the necessary baggage and supply
+trains, the far-reaching reconnaissances, and the need for extended
+requisitions, all unite to compel the creation of detachments, which
+in the aggregate must make considerable inroads on the total strength.
+Then there is the inevitable tale of losses on the march, the
+necessity for subdivision of one's forces for the passage or the
+turning of defiles; in fact, the demands are so many that the true
+fighting body of the Division&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the squadrons available for the
+ultimate decisive shock&mdash;is represented by a very small fraction of
+its original forces. If a complete Division can place only 3,600
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page164" name="page164"></a>(p. 164)</span> sabres in the field, or, dismounted, from 1,680 to 3,000
+rifles, according to the number of horse-holders required&mdash;figures
+which even without the above-mentioned detachments are quite
+inconsiderable in relation to what even an inconsiderable Infantry
+opponent can bring into action&mdash;what prospect of success is there for
+the weakened Independent Division in the execution of quite minor
+operations, when even in 1870-1871, not once, but frequently, the main
+body of our Cavalry Divisions shrank often to six or seven weak
+squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>It is chiefly the consequences of our, on the whole, satisfactory
+experiences in the above Campaign which have led us to accept the
+existing Division of six regiments as a satisfactory solution of this
+problem of strength; but we forget that in those days we had no
+Cavalry opponent to encounter, and that our sphere of action, owing to
+the want on our side of an adequate equipment of firearms, was small
+indeed in comparison with what we must expect in the future. We are
+encouraged in our illusion by the fact that in our Peace man&oelig;uvres
+the strength of the opposing forces is generally nearly equal, and
+also because the actual demands War will make upon the Arm are still
+in these exercises very imperfectly realized, and from the nature of
+the case cannot receive full recognition. Further, there is the fact
+that our possible opponents have adopted the same organization, and
+last, but not least, there remains the view that every tactical unit
+of the Cavalry must not only be capable of being strategically
+employed as a whole, but must also be in point of size within the
+control of its Leader as a tactical unit.</p>
+
+<p>Our unfortunate experiences with larger formations in 1866 are often
+cited in favour of our present system, the point being ignored that it
+was not the size of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page165" name="page165"></a>(p. 165)</span> these bodies, but the faulty methods in
+which they were employed, both strategically and tactically, that led
+to our disappointment.</p>
+
+<p>I think, therefore, that unprejudiced consideration must come to the
+conclusion that our Divisions as they now exist are too weak for the
+many and most decisive operations they will be called on to undertake.
+The absolute necessity to secure the victory over the enemy's Cavalry
+at the decisive point under all circumstances, and at the same time to
+retain a sufficient force in hand to reap all the consequences of that
+victory, will, I am convinced, lead to a materially greater
+concentration of power in the single unit.</p>
+
+<p>If from this point of view the permanent constitution of Cavalry
+Divisions cannot be upheld, it follows that even less is to be said
+for the formation of still stronger units in Peace-time, for this
+measure would entail in even greater degree the very same strategical
+and tactical limitations we have noted in the case of the Divisions,
+and still further cramp the necessary adaptability of the organization
+to meet the conditions of our Peace-time training. At the same time,
+it is clear that it is of the utmost importance that the formation of
+these stronger formations, Corps, or Divisions of greater numerical
+strength, the necessity for which can be recognised in advance, should
+be arranged for in the mobilization plans, and not built up afterwards
+by the mere combination of existing Divisions.</p>
+
+<p>For such bodies cannot be improvised altogether. In order to develop
+their full efficiency they require a carefully selected and ample
+staff of men who can be trusted to pull well together, and who have at
+their disposal all the auxiliary services necessary for greater
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page166" name="page166"></a>(p. 166)</span> independent operations. For these both trains and columns
+are needed, which must be larger than those of two or even three
+single Divisions; for, on the one hand, the greater size of the Corps
+entails closer concentration of its units, thus making heavier demands
+on the provision columns; and, on the other, the Corps must be capable
+of carrying out longer and more obstinate engagements than a single
+Division.</p>
+
+<p>It is, therefore, most essential that the several Staffs required for
+the Corps to be created in War-time should be thoroughly trained so as
+to insure their working together, and the trains and columns necessary
+to complete these units should be held ready for them in time of
+Peace.<a id="footnotetag17" name="footnotetag17"></a><a href="#footnote17" title="Go to footnote 17"><span class="smaller">[17]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>To hand over the functions of Corps Commander to the senior of the two
+or three Divisional Commanders would hardly be an adequate means of
+securing satisfactory results even for a single day of battle; still
+less could it suffice in the case of an independent strategic
+operation. On the other hand, it is not at all essential that the
+Corps thus formed at the outset of operations should be retained
+intact throughout their whole period. One can make detachments from
+them, or reinforce them according to circumstances, and thus attain
+that very flexibility of organization which I have endeavoured to
+prove to be an absolutely indispensable factor to meet the conditions
+of our times.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page167" name="page167"></a>(p. 167)</span> It appears to me also that the same advantage which it is
+hoped to realize by the creation of permanent Divisions can be reached
+by other roads, and with still better results.</p>
+
+<p>I would divide the whole territory of the German Empire into a number
+of territorial districts, and call them Cavalry Inspections, or
+Corps&mdash;the name is immaterial&mdash;each to comprise about twenty
+regiments, and subdivide these again into sub-Inspections (<i>i.e.</i>,
+Divisions and Brigades), and thus obtain, not only the foundations and
+the Staffs for a practical War formation, but for a systematic
+preparation of the Arm in time of Peace. The Inspections would detail
+annually the necessary squadrons on a War strength for man&oelig;uvres of
+the three Arms, according to a changing roster, and hold special
+Cavalry man&oelig;uvres in a manner I propose to develop hereafter.</p>
+
+<p>We should thus, from the point of view of organization, gain the
+advantage of having the cadres for both Corps and Divisions ready in
+time of Peace, without being bound once for all to a hard-and-fast
+strength for the Division.</p>
+
+<p>It may be objected that it would be illogical to separate the Cavalry
+from the Army Corps and Divisional Commands at the very moment that we
+have assigned the whole of the Artillery to the Infantry Divisions,
+but for the latter Arm the conditions are quite different. It always
+fights in combination with the other Arms; by itself it cannot fight
+at all.</p>
+
+<p>The Cavalry, on the other hand, as regards its principal masses, is
+quite independent, and only occasionally in moments of crisis
+intervenes in the action of the other Arms, even then still as an
+independent <span class="pagenum"><a id="page168" name="page168"></a>(p. 168)</span> unit. The connection with the remainder of the
+Army would be sufficiently secured by its participation in the annual
+man&oelig;uvres of the three Arms, and, as at present, Cavalry Brigade
+Commanders would still have to be employed in the arrangement of the
+Brigade man&oelig;uvres. The participation of the Cavalry Regiments in
+the Garrison Field Service exercises would remain matter of
+arrangement between the respective Commands, but definite rules would
+have to be drawn up to secure their effective co-operation.</p>
+
+<p>The necessary trains for the Inspections and Divisions would be kept
+ready in time of Peace, and, whether Horse Artillery&mdash;possibly also
+Maxim guns&mdash;should be permanently allotted to them or otherwise, might
+remain open for further discussion, though there is undoubtedly much
+to be urged in favour of the suggestion.</p>
+
+<p>In this manner I believe an organization could be created which would
+meet all reasonable requirements. Certain new Staffs, fully equipped
+with both General Staff Officers and those necessary for the
+contemplated trains, etc., would be of course necessary, for in case
+of War such creations cannot be improvised to work together without
+most detrimental friction for any units, and least of all for those
+which from the first moment of hostilities will be called on for
+decisive action, and thus have less time and opportunity to shake down
+into their new duties.</p>
+
+<p>A practical Peace Organization, such as in fact we do not at present
+possess, is a necessity of the first importance. But 'Mobility' in the
+Arm itself remains the prime condition of efficiency in its
+strategical activity, which, as we have seen above, must henceforward
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page169" name="page169"></a>(p. 169)</span> be considered the most important sphere of its duties.</p>
+
+<p>To secure this mobility is, therefore, our unconditional duty, and it
+is in this direction in particular that, in my opinion, our Cavalry is
+as yet hardly sufficiently prepared for the tasks that await it.</p>
+
+<p>Strategical 'mobility' certainly depends in the first place on the
+excellence of the horse supply and the suitable 'training' both of man
+and horse; but the tactical independence of the troops themselves, and
+the means of maintaining them in condition&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, conditions of
+supply&mdash;are at least of equal importance. Owing to our experiences in
+the French Campaign, where food and fodder were generally abundant,
+sufficient attention has not been given universally to this factor.
+Had we been compelled to undergo the same hardships as the Russians in
+1877-1878, our views would doubtless have been very different.</p>
+
+<p>The amount of forage that even under most favourable circumstances can
+be carried on the horses is very small. To count on finding even that
+amount always in the country through which we may have to operate
+would be more than imprudent. Even in 1870-1871 we could not always
+find what we needed in spite of the very favourable agricultural
+conditions, and with the enormous Armies of the present day we shall
+probably find the country even more exhausted of supplies than
+formerly, particularly in the latter phases of the struggle, except
+when one has the good-fortune to fall upon rich stretches of the
+country which by chance may have escaped the devastation of previous
+operations.</p>
+
+<p>We may also be called on to work in sparsely settled districts with a
+large export trade in corn, in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page170" name="page170"></a>(p. 170)</span> which at times stocks may
+sink very low. In short, unless we wish to be hampered at every step
+of our movements by the necessity for wide-reaching foraging
+expeditions, we shall have to rely upon our magazines and the supplies
+which can be transmitted from them to the front through the agency of
+our supply columns. The carrying capacity and mobility of the latter,
+therefore, condition inexorably the degree of mobility in strategical
+operations which, under all circumstances, the Cavalry can be counted
+on to develop. Whoever relies on more will lay himself open to most
+bitter disappointments exactly at the decisive moments.</p>
+
+<p>The supply trains must, therefore, be able to march at least as fast
+as the troops themselves, for only on this condition is there any
+guarantee that even under difficult circumstances the necessary
+supplies will be forthcoming; yet though experience most abundantly
+demonstrates the difficulties of maintaining the supplies of the
+Infantry in spite of the fact that, as a rule, their columns can cover
+the ground faster than the men can march, there appears to be a tacit
+assumption that with the Cavalry the trains will always arrive in
+time, although they move far slower than the troops they follow and
+supply.</p>
+
+<p>There was, indeed, a certain amount of justification for this idea in
+the days when Cavalry were more or less tied to the movements of the
+rest of the Army; but nowadays, when Cavalry operates independently,
+and must cover long distances in the shortest time, it has become
+simply preposterous.</p>
+
+<p>We have only to consider that we have now to reckon with average daily
+marches of from twenty-five to thirty miles, and that a beaten or
+evading force may have to retrace the same distance, perhaps even
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page171" name="page171"></a>(p. 171)</span> on the very same day, at a much faster rate than that at
+which it advanced, to perceive its absurdity. What chance would there
+be for waggons which could not go out of a walk, and cannot reverse on
+the road itself, which check at every hill, and sink to the axles in
+mud or sand? How can strategically independent Cavalry provide for the
+security of its baggage when it must often be left some days' marches
+behind? And yet it is precisely when operating against an active
+opposing Cavalry or an insurgent population that protection for the
+baggage becomes most indispensable. Again, how are such trains to be
+cleared away from the front when the main bodies of the two armies are
+closing on one another for battle? or how, after it is decided, can
+they be brought forward again to follow their Cavalry in pursuit, and
+convey to it the supplies which in such moments it will most need, and
+on whose prompt arrival its striking radius will depend? How, with
+insufficient mobility, will they maintain the connection between the
+combatants in front and the standing magazines, or even with the
+movable supply depots following behind the marching Army?</p>
+
+<p>Here we come upon one of the most difficult problems of the day, and
+it cannot be insisted on too strongly that its solution during Peace
+is an indispensable condition of the efficiency of the Arm in War. The
+Cavalry trains must be organized in such a manner that they will be
+able to march at least as fast as the Cavalry itself, and be adequate
+in number to carry from five to six days' corn. Only when this demand
+has been complied with will it be possible to count on the attainment
+of the strategical independence at which we aim, and to attempt all
+that this implies <span class="pagenum"><a id="page172" name="page172"></a>(p. 172)</span> with less would only lead to the complete
+breakdown of the Arm, which, as we have already seen, under existing
+conditions, can never be efficiently replaced during the same
+Campaign.</p>
+
+<p>It is not alone with the splendid chaussées of France that we must
+reckon, but with the sand roads of East and West Prussia, the swamps
+of Poland and Russia, and so forth, on all of which the same degree of
+mobility must be developed, for the speed of the Cavalry itself is
+practically independent of the nature of the roads. Without going
+further into the detailed measures necessary to attain this ideal, the
+importance of which must be evident to every practical soldier. I
+would call attention to only one fundamental consideration: the desire
+to curtail the length of supply columns by concentrating the loads,
+with the object of lessening the congestion of the roads and
+diminishing the time needed to bring their contents to the troops, is
+sound as long as it attains its object, fatal everywhere else.<a id="footnotetag18" name="footnotetag18"></a><a href="#footnote18" title="Go to footnote 18"><span class="smaller">[18]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Now, the Cavalry Masses move under different conditions to the rest of
+the Army. Either they are in the front of or on the flanks; in the
+latter case, they have roads at their own disposal, in the former,
+being generally some days' march in advance, they clear the front when
+collision is imminent by moving to the flanks, and only quite
+exceptionally retire through the advancing columns, and in all cases
+they must be able to get off the roads quickly. The depth of these
+columns is comparatively unimportant.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, from the strategical relations of the Cavalry Masses to the
+rest of the Army there arises no particular <span class="pagenum"><a id="page173" name="page173"></a>(p. 173)</span> reason to
+endeavour to shorten their trains. If the heavy baggage of a Cavalry
+Division is two and a half or five kilometres in length it is
+tolerably immaterial, but it is imperative, as we have seen, that they
+should be able to move and get out of the way. Hence, it is not the
+number of waggons which concerns us, but their individual lightness
+and mobility, so that on all roads they can follow their units at a
+trot, and only in the case of Divisional Cavalry can the other point
+of view be admitted.</p>
+
+<p>The possibility must also not be overlooked that it may not always be
+practical for Cavalry masses to fill up their supply columns direct
+from the Army reserves; and to meet this, second échelons of waggons
+will be required, in every degree as mobile as the first, and so
+organized as to require a minimum escort for their safety.</p>
+
+<p>For such escorts Cavalry Reservists and men of the Landwehr exist in
+adequate numbers, and armed with a useful carbine and mounted on
+horses, only as a means of locomotion, they will answer their purpose
+well enough.</p>
+
+<p>No matter, however, how ample the supply of these columns may be, or
+how mobile, circumstances will still arise during periods of great
+concentration in which it will be impossible to bring up supply
+waggons in sufficient numbers. In these cases we require an emergency
+horse ration, which within a small compass contains great nourishment.</p>
+
+<p>Too much cannot be expected from such a ration; for instance, it
+cannot be bulky enough to fill the animal's stomach. All that is
+necessary is that it should be willingly eaten by the horses, keep
+well, and be easily carried. It should contain about three <span class="pagenum"><a id="page174" name="page174"></a>(p. 174)</span>
+times the nutritive qualities, weight for weight, of oats, and should
+suffice to keep horses in condition for three or four days in
+succession. These demands are fairly satisfied by a food manufactured
+by Marck at Darmstadt. It should be always carried in the field and
+replenished as consumed, and with it even the most advanced patrols
+might be made independent of requisitions, a matter which appears to
+me of the greatest importance.</p>
+
+<p>The fundamental condition of mobility being thus satisfied, the next
+step will be to insure the technical and tactical independence of the
+units under all circumstances which can be reasonably foreseen.</p>
+
+<p>In this direction much has been done, and materials for the
+destruction of railways, folding pontoons, and a field telegraph, now
+form part of our equipment. The opportunities for the use of the
+latter in the course of rapid movements&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, just in the most
+important sphere of our activities&mdash;seem to me highly problematical,
+as I have already pointed out; and the waggons which transport the
+bridging equipment are too heavy to be always at hand when most
+needed. Essentially, it seems only fitted to facilitate the progress
+of smaller bodies of troops, and would hardly suffice to secure rapid
+and safe passage of Cavalry Masses with all their attendant trains
+over the rivers for which we ought to be prepared. For such purposes
+they would only suffice if all the boats of a whole Division were
+united into one bridging train.</p>
+
+<p>Nevertheless, the collapsible boats are a most useful concession, and
+they would be still more so if the load was more suitably subdivided;
+as it is, the weight of the whole waggon ties us too much to the made
+roads. For the Divisional Cavalry, which always moves in <span class="pagenum"><a id="page175" name="page175"></a>(p. 175)</span>
+close connection with the Infantry, and in need can always fall back
+upon the Divisional Bridge Train, it has no particular value, and it
+would therefore be better if, in War-time, all the collapsible boat
+equipment were handed over to the independent Cavalry Divisions, and
+their bridging equipment thus augmented.</p>
+
+<p>More important, however, than this collapsible boat question is the
+matter of the pioneer detachments to be assigned to the Cavalry
+Divisions which require further equipment. A waggon of bridging
+material just sufficient to cross smaller ditches and watercourses,
+which can neither be jumped nor scrambled over, but which require only
+one, or at most two, bays, would be invaluable, for it is just these
+little hindrances, whose importance cannot be measured or deduced from
+the map, which may bring most important Cavalry undertakings
+unexpectedly to a check, particularly when in an enemy's country all
+the culverts, etc., have been destroyed. In the days of Frederick the
+Great such bridging equipment was often assigned to the Cavalry
+marching at the head of the Columns, in order to help them over
+similar obstacles.</p>
+
+<p>Given, however, that all has been done to attain the degree of
+collective mobility we require, a point of equal importance is that
+the troops should be adequately provided with all they require for
+their tactical action. In this respect, it cannot be too much insisted
+upon that carbine ammunition should be placed in the very first line;
+our present allowance is altogether insufficient.</p>
+
+<p>The importance of dismounted action, as we have already seen, has
+enormously increased. Almost daily, under certain conditions, we shall
+have to have <span class="pagenum"><a id="page176" name="page176"></a>(p. 176)</span> recourse to our firearms, and often be obliged
+to expend very considerable quantities of ammunition to attain the
+object we fight for. The replenishment of this consumption is far more
+difficult in our case than with the Infantry, particularly in
+operations partaking of the nature of raids, in which our
+communications are likely to be interrupted. These conditions require
+first of all a considerable increase in the number of rounds carried
+on the man's person, and also in the number of Small Arm Ammunition
+waggons attached to the units, and the regulations for the
+replenishment of these require also corresponding development.</p>
+
+<p>Further, it must be pointed out with all possible insistence that the
+present equipment of the trooper is thoroughly impracticable. That the
+carbine should be carried on the horse and the sword on the man is
+opposed to common sense, for the latter is only of use when mounted,
+the former only on foot. The sword should, therefore, be attached to
+the saddle, the carbine to the man, as is, in fact, the practice of
+all races of born horsemen. A practicable method of attachment is
+certainly capable of being devised; it is probably only the question
+of expense that stands in the way of its solution. The consequences,
+however, of the existing attachment to the saddle are that the weapon
+must be shorter than that of the Infantry soldier, and hence has a
+lesser range; but it is precisely the Cavalry that requires to be able
+to obtain good results at long ranges. Even against Infantry it must
+always be in a position to obtain decisive results in the shortest
+time. To obtain these ends it needs a weapon at least equal, if
+possible superior, to that of the Infantry; and instead it has only
+the carbine, a <span class="pagenum"><a id="page177" name="page177"></a>(p. 177)</span> weapon of most restricted range, and most
+inadequately sighted. It is required of Cavalry that it should break
+off an engagement when the enemy approaches within 700 metres (Drill
+Regulations, No. 562), and all the training the man gets in Peace is
+at 600 metres at target practice, and only quite occasionally, if at
+all, at greater distances at field practice.</p>
+
+<p>I consider it most important that the Cavalry should be supplied with
+a weapon which admits of accurate practice at long ranges, and for
+which the greatest number of rounds can be carried. This would entail,
+on the one hand, an increase in the length of the weapon carried; on
+the other, a reduction in calibre, which should be made as small as
+possible. We might thus safely go down to a 6-millimetre bore, and
+increase the ammunition accordingly. The desire to retain the same
+cartridge as the Infantry, to facilitate mutual assistance in
+ammunition supply on occasions, seems to me of quite secondary
+importance. As long as the Cavalry were still tied to the Infantry on
+the line of march this consideration had indeed some weight; but now
+that it moves far in front of, or on the flanks of, the Infantry
+columns, and has its own arrangements for ammunition supply, the case
+is quite different. The point nowadays is to make sure of that degree
+of effect which is unconditionally necessary to our purpose, and for
+this we require a weapon specially adapted to our particular need.</p>
+
+<p>Our method of carrying our cartridges in the pouch attached to the
+cross-belt is also impracticable. The bandoliers of the Boers would be
+undoubtedly preferable, and could at the same time be made use of to
+secure the carbine on the back.</p>
+
+<p>It is also a matter for serious consideration whether <span class="pagenum"><a id="page178" name="page178"></a>(p. 178)</span> cycle
+detachments should not be attached to the Cavalry,<a id="footnotetag19" name="footnotetag19"></a><a href="#footnote19" title="Go to footnote 19"><span class="smaller">[19]</span></a> and I think I
+am not going too far in estimating fifteen to twenty cyclists per
+regiment as a suitable number to perform the many duties which may
+fall to their lot. On the advantages they confer I have already dwelt
+(Book I., Chap. VIII.), and further, I would advocate the addition of
+portable or wheelable Maxims to the Cavalry to add to their fire
+power. The latest patterns of this weapon are capable of easy
+transportation, and can come into action very rapidly. Naturally such
+heavy batteries as we now possess should be avoided. As regards this
+latter weapon, one should not think of it primarily as destined to
+take part in the real Cavalry duel; one should do nothing in this
+direction to rob the horsemen of their confidence in themselves by
+teaching them to lean on the firearm for support. Even the effect of
+the Artillery in this respect is not always and everywhere
+advantageous. One is too much inclined to make the action of the
+Cavalry depend on the effect of the guns, and thus to sacrifice the
+initiative when opposed to an enemy's horse. Nor would there be many
+opportunities in practice for the Maxims to render support to the
+charge. In the introductory phases of an engagement&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, when the
+enemy is still at a considerable distance&mdash;they promise little
+results, and in the moments when the 'Masses' are sent forward to the
+attack, they would get in the way and hinder their freedom of
+movement. On the other hand, they would be of great use in cases where
+it is necessary to overcome or parry an Infantry opponent, and in
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page179" name="page179"></a>(p. 179)</span> the battle, or in pursuit, when the Cavalry succeed in
+getting in on the flanks or rear of the enemy's chief masses, they
+might prove invaluable. Here, where reserves, columns, and trains all
+form suitable targets, they would not only add materially to the
+striking power of the Cavalry, but increase its radius of action very
+materially.</p>
+
+<p>By their side the Artillery will always maintain its high importance
+for the fight against localities, woods, and defiles, and with this
+Arm the German Cavalry is, in my opinion, sufficiently supplied;
+only&mdash;and this is of the greatest importance&mdash;more adequate steps to
+insure ammunition supply are essential in the case of the Independent
+Cavalry Masses. Here, too, we shall have to reckon with far higher
+consumption than in 1870-1871, and the greater distances will make it
+impossible to replenish from the general Reserves of the Army. The
+Cavalry, therefore, require sufficient ammunition columns of its very
+own.</p>
+
+<p>The nature of Cavalry operations indicate yet another
+requirement&mdash;namely, batteries so organized that to every brigade of
+two regiments one battery of four pieces should be assigned. Many will
+be the occasions in our strategical operations on which guns will be
+required, and in most of these it is more a question of having <i>some</i>
+Artillery at hand rather than of the development of superior fire
+power&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, a few shells into a village at the right time may be
+all that is needed for our purpose. Further, in operating on several
+roads it can seldom be foretold with exactness on which road the need
+may first arise.</p>
+
+<p>Under these conditions it is of the greatest importance to be able, if
+necessary, to assign a battery to each brigade, and at the same time
+not to allow the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page180" name="page180"></a>(p. 180)</span> half of the whole available Artillery to
+escape from control.<a id="footnotetag20" name="footnotetag20"></a><a href="#footnote20" title="Go to footnote 20"><span class="smaller">[20]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Further, these small batteries are both handier and more mobile in
+themselves; they are, therefore, better suited to Cavalry
+requirements, and at the same time the power of concentration when
+such is required is fully retained.</p>
+
+<p>The advantage of this proposed division seems, therefore, to me
+sufficiently clear to need no further recommendation.<a id="footnotetag21" name="footnotetag21"></a><a href="#footnote21" title="Go to footnote 21"><span class="smaller">[21]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>This organization of the Artillery requires, however, to be
+supplemented by the introduction of a true quick-firing gun, even if
+it is necessary to reduce the calibre somewhat to keep down the
+weight. For it is particularly with the Cavalry, and especially in the
+Cavalry duel, when the opportunities for Artillery action are often
+compressed into a very few moments, and yet a great effect must be
+attained, that a gun without recoil and a great rapidity of loading is
+most urgently required. If the Cavalry is thus equipped with all that
+the conditions of War demand and modern technical skill can supply,
+then it will find in these&mdash;at least in part&mdash;compensation for its
+numerical weakness on condition that at the same time it also succeeds
+in raising its training to a corresponding height.</p>
+
+<p>It cannot be denied that in this direction all ranks have worked with
+most devoted and admirable industry, and that new points of view, new
+methods, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page181" name="page181"></a>(p. 181)</span> and new aims towards which to strive have been
+opened up. But, on the whole, this question of the training of our
+Cavalry is still based upon the ideas of a period which lies behind
+us. There has been no conscious breach with the past, even in those
+very fields wherein the developments and demands of modern times have
+brought about a complete disturbance of all military relations.</p>
+
+<p>That a method of training which does not take into account the
+phenomena of modern Warfare, and follow them even to their furthermost
+consequences, can never give satisfactory results, needs no
+demonstration. But a method free from these objections we have to
+find. In its training our Cavalry <i>must</i> excel all others if it would
+maintain its position on the field of battle, and it can do so, for it
+possesses by far the best material both in men and horses of any
+country in the Continent of Europe. There are only two essentials
+which we must bear in mind. First, we must be absolutely clear as to
+those points in which our system is behind the requirements of the
+time, and what objectives we must now pursue. Secondly, being
+satisfied as to the above, that we should take the straightest way
+which leads towards them, not hesitating to break with tradition
+wherever it hinders our advance.</p>
+
+<p>If we now consider in the spirit of this first requirement the
+separate branches of Cavalry work which our training must embrace, the
+very first point which attracts attention is the vastly increased
+demands on the endurance of our horseflesh that will now be made, far
+exceeding what was required in our last Wars. Increase of endurance is
+thus an unconditional necessity.</p>
+
+<p>Further, it is perfectly clear that in the combat of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page182" name="page182"></a>(p. 182)</span> Cavalry
+against Cavalry, the decision will depend on the action of the great
+tactical units, and that with regard to dismounted fighting, a
+complete revolution in the conditions has occurred. In future this
+will tend evermore to come to the front, and both points of view must
+be kept in mind in our training.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, it is evident that the centre of gravity of these two factors
+is no longer in the same position. As long as decisive results in the
+combat itself were expected from the Cavalry, it was quite right and
+expedient to train them to meet this special requirement. But now,
+when it is clear that the combat is only a means to an end&mdash;that end
+being the possibility opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre,
+screen, or break the enemy's communications&mdash;this change in the
+conditions must be taken into account in the process of our education.</p>
+
+<p>Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that we can afford
+to neglect the training for the actual combat: the defeat of the
+enemy's Cavalry remains now, as always, the necessary condition of all
+subsequent activity; but the Arm must be taught to understand that
+victory in combat is only the first link in the chain of operations,
+and to extend its outlook beyond the point of actual collision, and to
+appreciate the tasks which are the consequence of success.</p>
+
+<p>To this end we must undergo a preparation of a quite different
+character, for nowadays, freed from the chains which formerly bound us
+to conform to the action of the other Arms, we appear within the
+framework of the Great Armies indeed, but operating in independent
+'Masses,' and this change in conditions extends its influence even to
+the smallest reconnoitring patrol.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page183" name="page183"></a>(p. 183)</span> In this new field our training must seek to follow the
+demands of War. It must accustom the troops to the greatness of their
+mission both with regard to time and space, attain higher results with
+the individual, raise the education of its officers above the sphere
+of the technicalities special to the Arm, and give them a wider
+horizon of general military conditions.</p>
+
+<p>In what way we can reach these new ideals, in the best and most
+practical manner, I propose to investigate in the following chapters,
+and need only point out here that it is not my object to discuss every
+detail of military education, but rather to bring out the essentials,
+and lay stress on those questions which, in my opinion, compel us to
+strike out new ways to find our objective.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page184" name="page184"></a>(p. 184)</span> CHAPTER II</h2>
+
+<p class="title">RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING</p>
+
+
+<p>When we discuss the training of the Cavalry, the first point which
+naturally occurs to us is the question of 'horsemanship'&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the
+breaking-in of the horses and the teaching of equitation to the men.
+Horsemanship is so absolutely the bed-rock of all Cavalry
+performances, that the advantages of improved methods of breaking and
+of equitation must bear fruit in every branch of their activity. Above
+all, they exercise the most enduring influence both on the
+conservation and endurance of the horses themselves.</p>
+
+<p>Anglomaniacs and faddists, who, in spite of many a healthy impulse
+they have imparted, have nevertheless exercised, and still seek to
+exercise, an influence the reverse of favourable upon our Cavalry,
+maintain that for certain purposes one can obtain better results with
+horses broken by one of their short-cuts to the object, and then
+'trained' in the sense that racehorses and hunters are prepared for
+their work, than with those who have been gradually brought forward by
+the methods in use in our Cavalry schools, and at the same time secure
+the advantage of 'unconditional obedience' in the horse, a result
+which they allege cannot be always counted on with our existing
+methods.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page185" name="page185"></a>(p. 185)</span> On the other hand, the fact remains that our recruits, in the
+short time available for their education, can only be well and quickly
+taught on well-trained pliable horses. That such horses, with
+sufficient exercise, go better and more safely across country than
+those brought forward by more hasty methods, is sufficiently proved by
+the fact that all our steeplechase riders in the Army take the
+greatest pains to prepare their horses thoroughly (by school methods
+understood), because experience shows that this preparation alone
+gives them a chance against the more highly-priced animals with which
+they are called on to compete. Only this thorough training guarantees
+good individual riding, and insures the 'pliability' which alone makes
+it possible to correct disobedience rapidly should it arise. And,
+further, there can be no question that this prolonged preparation
+improves the endurance of the horse&mdash;on that point at least experience
+leaves no room for doubt. The thoroughly broken horse, which moves in
+easy balance, with all its muscle thoroughly well and equally
+developed, not only saves its forelegs and joints, and supports the
+spinal arch better, but trots easier, and hence for longer periods
+with less fatigue, than the unpliable animal, who stiffens itself
+against the rider's load, and thus expends its power uselessly, and
+the rider himself is far less shaken about under the former, a point
+by no means to be neglected.</p>
+
+<p>The recognition of these facts has at length led us to break with the
+Anglomania of former years, and the tendency towards improved
+preparation has become more evident, whilst the centrifugal strivings
+of individuals no longer find acceptance. On the other hand, it seems
+to me beyond a doubt that the objects which <span class="pagenum"><a id="page186" name="page186"></a>(p. 186)</span> we wish to
+obtain from our Military school of horsemanship could in many respects
+be reached more directly and better than is at present the case.</p>
+
+<p>In conformity with the whole essence of modern War, the individual
+training of both man and horse must form the foundation of our whole
+education&mdash;that is to say, steadiness in the movement of closed bodies
+must be the consequence of individual horsemanship. Only in this way
+can the bodily, intellectual, and moral qualities of both man and
+horse be brought into useful activity, and in this way only can we
+conquer the gregarious instincts of the horses and develop in their
+riders the individuality which modern conditions absolutely demand.</p>
+
+<p>More stress requires to be laid on riding with one hand only and with
+arms (<i>i.e.</i>, drawn swords), for the bit, with or without a feeling on
+the bridoon, is in War the only practical method of direction; and the
+use of his weapons when mounted must have become second nature to the
+man if they are not to be a constant impediment to him in the control
+of his horse. Finally, independent riding across country must be
+encouraged by every conceivable means.</p>
+
+<p>To attain all this will only be possible if we succeed in overcoming
+the preliminary steps of the man's education&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the elementary
+training of man and horse&mdash;more rapidly than has hitherto been the
+case, and thus gain time for the true practical preparation for the
+field. If from this standpoint we look at our present system, it will
+soon be clear where to apply the lever.</p>
+
+<p>First, it should be possible, with the better bred and stauncher
+material we now receive, to make more rapid progress in the first year
+than has hitherto been <span class="pagenum"><a id="page187" name="page187"></a>(p. 187)</span> generally the case. By the increased
+demands and the greater freedom in the choice of means allowed us by
+the new Regulations as compared with the conditions formerly
+prevalent, considerable changes have been made; the point now is, in
+what manner to derive the fullest advantage from this greater freedom
+for the practical curtailment of the periods previously allotted for
+each stage in the training.</p>
+
+<p>But prudence is necessary in this direction. That the English
+thoroughbred, for instance, develops better under work in its early
+years, admits of no doubt whatever; but there is room to question
+whether this experience can be transferred without modification to our
+present Remounts, although many of them have a strong strain of
+English blood. Our Prussian horses, for instance, only reach their
+full development between the seventh and eighth years; it would,
+therefore, be a mistake to attempt to force them up to the full
+demands made on a Cavalry horse before that age. This slowness of
+growth must always be considered, and the animals be saved as much as
+possible; but there is still room to unite with this necessary
+concession increased demands on the degree of training.</p>
+
+<p>Without any detriment to their efficiency, the young remounts can be
+taken in hand immediately on joining their regiments, instead of
+waiting till the conclusion of the man&oelig;uvres, as is still a common
+practice. It seems feasible, also, to begin with the gallop earlier
+than was formerly the custom; and, finally, it is by no means
+absolutely necessary to go back to the bridoon again at the
+commencement of their second year's training.<a id="footnotetag22" name="footnotetag22"></a><a href="#footnote22" title="Go to footnote 22"><span class="smaller">[22]</span></a> One can well go on
+with riding on the bit <span class="pagenum"><a id="page188" name="page188"></a>(p. 188)</span> at the point where the course was
+interrupted by the man&oelig;uvres.</p>
+
+<p>All these measures together produce quite a remarkable saving of time,
+and there cannot well be any doubt that in this way, as far as
+concerns the riding education of the horse alone&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, without
+arms&mdash;the same standard of progress can be reached by Christmas of the
+second year as was formerly often only reached at the end of the
+second winter.</p>
+
+<p>If from this foundation we go on to specific training of the
+charger&mdash;still working, of course, concurrently at the gymnastic side
+of his training also&mdash;to accustoming him to the curb, then by the end
+of February the remount ought easily to be ready to be placed in the
+ranks.</p>
+
+<p>Side by side with this increase of rapidity in his training, we both
+can and must make the individual training the foundation of his whole
+education, so that from the very first the horse learns to go alone
+and with safety in all kinds of ground.</p>
+
+<p>The very first lessons to accustom him to both saddle and rider are
+better given on the lunging rein than when led by an older horse, for
+nothing teaches the bad habit of 'sticking' more than this last
+practice. And since now the first months of training fall in the
+summer, we can avail ourselves of the fine weather to send out the
+young horses in charge of trustworthy riders, some of whom must be
+left behind even during the man&oelig;uvres, to go singly or in small
+groups under suitable supervision, which can easily be arranged, out
+into the country, if possible into woods and fairly difficult ground,
+to habituate them to minor obstacles and the objects one meets with,
+instead of, as formerly, keeping them in the school or manège, and
+making <span class="pagenum"><a id="page189" name="page189"></a>(p. 189)</span> them into 'stickers' first, only to have the trouble
+of breaking them of the habit, often after many a hard tussle,
+afterwards.</p>
+
+<p>All through their subsequent training they must constantly be sent out
+singly into the country, and even in the school itself they should be
+exercised as little as possible in squads one behind the other.</p>
+
+<p>It goes without saying that only the best horsemen should be trusted
+with the young horses, for bad habits developed at the beginning of
+their instruction are of all the most difficult to correct hereafter,
+and may ruin the result of all one's trouble.</p>
+
+<p>That in this way we can meet the requirements of the service much more
+rapidly than by existing methods cannot be open to question and may be
+taken as practically settled, and similar considerations apply to the
+recruits.</p>
+
+<p>The system laid down in the regulations does not go directly enough to
+the purpose, a consequence, no doubt, of the fact that we have now
+better horses on which to instruct them than at the time these
+instructions were evolved.</p>
+
+<p>If one begins as soon as possible with the gallop and individual
+riding&mdash;if necessary on the lunge&mdash;and allows the recruit as soon as
+he has acquired anything approaching a firm seat to practise the aids
+for the leg and the side paces&mdash;passage and shoulder-in&mdash;one will
+attain quite different results than from riding only on straight lines
+and practising closing in the ranks. The practice in the use of the
+legs makes the men more independent and individual, compels them to
+trust to their seat, and not to hang on by the reins.</p>
+
+<p>The individual riding makes the man drive his horse forward by the
+pressure of his legs, which he is not <span class="pagenum"><a id="page190" name="page190"></a>(p. 190)</span> compelled to do in the
+squad, where the horses follow one another almost automatically. The
+horses, too, are saved from becoming dull and heavy, as they are only
+too apt to do under the recruits of the old system.</p>
+
+<p>By Christmas the recruits can thus be brought forward as far and
+farther than they now are by the time of the inspection on the
+bridoon, and can then go on to riding on the curb, so that by February
+they should be able to ride the side paces, gallop and change, and all
+other school paces, without arms, and generally be so firm in the
+saddle that they may be advanced to drilling with arms, and can begin
+their real instruction as troopers. Of course, it is not to be
+expected that these school paces should be ridden as yet in perfect
+form, but the men must understand what these lessons are intended for,
+and the effort to get the correct bend should be recognisable. And we
+may add that to teach them to rely on their seat and not on their
+hands suitable exercises with the lance may be introduced even at an
+earlier period.</p>
+
+<p>As regards the remainder of the squadron, the so-called 'Dressur'<a id="footnotetag23" name="footnotetag23"></a><a href="#footnote23" title="Go to footnote 23"><span class="smaller">[23]</span></a>
+detachment, it is hardly necessary to point out that one can ask of it
+at least all that can be attained by the remounts and the
+recruits&mdash;that is to say, that by the beginning of February the men
+and horses should reach the highest point of their purely riding
+training. Of course, to achieve this they must not be put back every
+autumn to the very ABC of their work&mdash;riding on the bridoon. They must
+go on with the curb, to which by this time they are accustomed, and in
+the place of the bridoon work, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page191" name="page191"></a>(p. 191)</span> individual riding must be
+encouraged as much as possible.</p>
+
+<p>Only those squads will require somewhat different treatment in which
+the best men of the second year are being trained on the best horses
+for the riding of the remounts in the following year. These men will
+certainly require more bridoon work in the autumn, but even these
+should be sufficiently forward by Christmas-time to pass on to the
+bit, so that, in spite of the very high degree of perfection required
+from their horses, they can be dismissed the school by the middle of
+February.</p>
+
+<p>From the increased demands made on the individual training of man and
+horse, it follows as a necessary consequence that a different kind of
+inspection in equitation will be required to that hitherto in vogue.</p>
+
+<p>The presentation of closed detachments must be restricted as much as
+possible, and all previous rehearsals of a special inspection
+programme absolutely prohibited. Horse and rider, since they have been
+trained individually, must be inspected and judged on their individual
+merits, not otherwise. In this manner not only is it easier to
+appreciate difficulties, but good work also has a fairer chance of
+securing recognition. It needs an expert to bring together the sum of
+all the performances, and express a fair judgment on the total result.
+In any case, however, such a judgment will be nearer the truth because
+it is uninfluenced by 'eye-wash' and mere externals.</p>
+
+<p>Hence we arrive at the conclusion that in the manner we have above
+indicated the whole squadron can have completed its training in
+equitation by the middle of February.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page192" name="page192"></a>(p. 192)</span> That many objections will have to be met and many
+difficulties overcome before this end is attained goes without saying;
+but where in human affairs can it be said that this is not the case?</p>
+
+<p>It may be urged that both for horses and men there is a distinct
+advantage in beginning again every year with bridoon riding.</p>
+
+<p>The action of the rider is easier to control than on the bit, and if
+once the men take to holding on by the curb, the consequences are much
+worse than with the former. On the other hand, also, it is easier for
+the horses on the curb to assume a false bend or poise, or to refuse
+to go up to their bits, and thus deceive the instructor. Wrong
+application of the aids with the bit entail worse consequences on the
+horses than with the bridoon; hence almost exclusive work on the bit
+requires better teachers and lighter hands, and if one has few of
+these at one's disposal, undoubtedly a disadvantage will accrue.</p>
+
+<p>It may further be objected that for such a thorough extension of the
+course of individual riding as I have demanded there is neither time,
+school accommodation, nor teachers available, and it must be granted
+that the regulation allowance of three schools per regiment is, in
+fact, insufficient for the attainment of the required standard by the
+methods I have in view. Nor will it suffice to allow each training
+detachment only three-quarters of an hour in the school at a time.
+Detachments of average strength require daily one hour and a quarter,
+if the necessary skill in individual riding is to be acquired, and
+recruit squads even longer. Further, it will not do to exclude
+recruits who begin early with the side paces and the gallop altogether
+from the school; on the contrary, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page193" name="page193"></a>(p. 193)</span> they require to attend it
+at least once or twice a week.</p>
+
+<p>But with only three schools per regiment, particularly in our northern
+provinces, these requirements cannot be fulfilled. Four I consider as
+the least number, and it would be still better if each squadron had
+its own school, so that difficult animals and backward men could be
+taken individually, and work on the lunge and circle thoroughly
+carried out.</p>
+
+<p>Still, all these obstacles can be overcome. With increased practice,
+comprehension of the management of the bit in military riding would
+gradually increase both with teacher and pupils, and work with the
+reins in both hands be usefully employed to facilitate the transition
+from the bridoon to the bit and counteract the possible evils of
+riding on the bit alone.</p>
+
+<p>The better training of the Remounts, which will be obtained by the
+means I have indicated, will in course of time give us better, more
+obedient, and more pliable horses, and better-trained recruits again
+will give us a better choice of riders for the young remounts.</p>
+
+<p>Our instructional staff for equitation is thoroughly satisfactory. In
+this respect the Riding-School in Hanover has done excellent work. We
+have also amongst our senior non-commissioned officers some excellent
+instructors.</p>
+
+<p>The necessary time for all my demands can very well be saved if we
+make up our minds to leave out all superfluities in the daily routine
+of duty; and as regards the question of school accommodation, it is
+well within the bounds of possibility for most regiments to provide
+themselves with a fourth school&mdash;eventually even with a fifth&mdash;out of
+their own <span class="pagenum"><a id="page194" name="page194"></a>(p. 194)</span> financial resources. No investment could be more
+remunerative. Certainly under circumstances red tape may stand in the
+way; but when his superiors will support the Regimental Commander, and
+sometimes without, one will generally find appreciative backing, even
+from the War Office (<i>Intendantur</i>).</p>
+
+<p>If the drawbacks and difficulties in the way of the proposed changes
+are, as I have endeavoured to show, to be surmounted, on the other
+hand, the advantages accruing therefrom are so enormous that the
+former need not be taken into consideration at all. In the first
+place, as we have seen, better individual horsemanship and more
+practice in riding on the bit are in themselves advantages which react
+directly on the War efficiency of the whole squadron. Secondly, the
+earlier completion of the remount training is a direct gain, for, in
+case of mobilization, we shall be better able to place remounts in the
+mobilized squadrons, leaving in exchange older horses behind, which is
+again an advantage for the training of the recruits destined hereafter
+to join us at the front. I cannot too earnestly warn against the
+taking of <i>all</i> the old horses into the field. No man can foretell how
+great the losses will be, but that they will be great admits of no
+doubt whatever. Nor is it at all certain that future Wars will be of
+short duration; on the contrary, they may drag on for a very long
+time. Hence it is absolutely indispensable that suitable horses for
+recruit training should be left behind, even if the marching out
+strength per squadron should be reduced by a file or two&mdash;it cannot be
+many in any case. For the rest, the quicker and better training of the
+recruits will be all to the good in case of War breaking out, as one
+will be able to detail men for the field squadrons <span class="pagenum"><a id="page195" name="page195"></a>(p. 195)</span> towards
+the close of the winter season&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, some weeks sooner than under
+the old system; and finally the proposed procedure brings with it an
+enormous gain of time in the training of the whole arm.</p>
+
+<p>To begin with, we gain in winter the months from the middle of
+February to the beginning of the Drill Season (April). This time can
+be devoted to direct training for the demands War must make upon us.
+We can practise again, and confirm the men in the fundamental
+principle of dressing in motion, the exact squareness of the horses to
+the alignment and rallying, with which one had already commenced in
+the early months of winter, before being driven into the schools by
+frost and snow; and, further, take advantage of fine days and similar
+circumstances to practise men in taking jumps, scrambling, etc., the
+development of the regulation drill gallop (fifteen miles an hour),
+whilst still maintaining the control and standard of equitation for
+which the school training is specially adapted. The winter exercises
+in field service duties, which, as long as they are allowed constantly
+to interrupt the formal lessons in equitation, do more harm than good,
+can be postponed to this period, when the recruits will now be able to
+take part in them&mdash;a point of essential importance in case War breaks
+out. Above all, the time thus saved must be devoted to individual
+riding and single combat.</p>
+
+<p>Our Regulations (Sections 129 and 324) lay special stress on this
+latter point, and in most regiments it is constantly practised. The
+results, however, are sometimes questionable, and many Squadron
+Commanders are of opinion that such training can be overdone. Nor is
+this view without foundation. If single combats are carried out in the
+regulation way on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page196" name="page196"></a>(p. 196)</span> imperfectly broken horses, the horse is
+not only spoilt, but the rider also, and a clumsy rider will very soon
+make a good horse hard in the mouth and refractory.</p>
+
+<p>Now, since we have neither ideal horses nor riders at our disposal,
+there is much danger in overdoing these exercises, because the method
+of their execution is often thoroughly unpractical. The combatants
+ride round one another in unnatural circles, one retreats, the other
+pursues, and both tear at their horses' mouths to turn them sharply
+about, all things which, except the latter, they never do in action.</p>
+
+<p>Nor should we overlook the really imminent danger which lies in
+teaching the men to run away before an opponent. Few of them are
+'Horatios,' and if, in fact, they once turn about, it is, to say the
+least, highly problematical whether, in a real fight, they will ever
+stop again. In the field matters are very different. If one has but
+one adversary, one tries to ride him down, and, if unsuccessful, then
+after one turn about both get locked together, turning only on the
+fore hand; and the man who turns a second time can only trust to the
+speed of his horse&mdash;he has given up the fight.</p>
+
+<p>Such duels are rare indeed; in most engagements the man fights between
+crowds of his own comrades and the other side, in wild confusion,
+under clouds of dust. He must attack at one moment to the right, at
+the next to the left, and guard himself. The essential here is not so
+much the skilful use of the lance, as complete command over the horse,
+and the determination to <i>kill</i>, which must rise to the height of
+<i>fanaticism</i>. He who can twist and turn his horse by his weight alone,
+without dragging at its mouth, whose arm does not tire, and who can
+make sure of striking what he aims <span class="pagenum"><a id="page197" name="page197"></a>(p. 197)</span> at, even at speed, and
+with the energy born of hatred, thinking only of destroying his enemy,
+never on retreating&mdash;he alone can hope to remain the conqueror; but
+such a one very soon learns all that is practical in the use of sword
+or lance.</p>
+
+<p>The exercises in single combats, therefore, must be based mainly on
+preparatory practice, intended to strengthen the arm, give command of
+the weapon, heighten the man's energy, and, above all, aim at securing
+the most perfect harmony between man and horse by constant exercise in
+those forms of individual riding which are really needed in the fight:
+the rapid turning about of the horse; serpentining between, and
+cutting and thrusting at, different objects in varying directions, as
+far as possible without reins, and never according to a prescribed
+formula.</p>
+
+<p>The actual combats between squads should follow only when considerable
+excellence in these preliminary exercises has been attained&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>,
+for recruits&mdash;about the end of the summer, before the man&oelig;uvres;
+and they should always be kept down to the lowest limits, and then
+only carried out in thoroughly practical form&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, between squads,
+and not larger detachments. I believe that in this way a far higher
+standard will be reached, and with less damage to the horses than is
+possible under existing conditions, in which one generally begins with
+single combats, man against man, at the very commencement of the drill
+season. In any case, we shall at least obtain this advantage&mdash;that the
+work to be done in the latter will be materially reduced if the
+exercises I have suggested are begun already in the winter months.</p>
+
+<p>The more the men have learnt to ride with a light hand on the bit, the
+greater command they possess over <span class="pagenum"><a id="page198" name="page198"></a>(p. 198)</span> their lances&mdash;thanks to
+more constant practice&mdash;and the more thoroughly they have been
+grounded in the principles of direction, pace, alignment, and
+rallying. Further, the more quietly the horses move&mdash;and even at rapid
+paces have learnt to carry their heads not too high, with a firm
+bearing on the reins&mdash;the easier it will be for the Commander to drill
+his squadron, and to eliminate all the plunging and surging in
+movement which is fatal to all excellence in man&oelig;uvring.</p>
+
+<p>The drill season can thus be cut down, and the time thus saved devoted
+to field service practices and riding across country, because the
+whole system, thanks to this considerable saving of time it effects,
+enables one to extend the education of man and horse over the whole
+year instead of confining it to the winter months.</p>
+
+<p>Though every efficient squadron possesses a considerable number of
+horses that do not require six months' practice in 'shouldering in,'
+and in 'collected paces,' on the other hand, everyone has some horses
+that do urgently need 're-making,' but which one has to entrust to
+inferior riders, because the better ones are all needed for the
+remounts and young horses.</p>
+
+<p>This is a consequence of the whole system in which the training of the
+horses and of the men eventually react on one another. There will be
+remounts which need correction, and horses ridden by recruits to be
+cured of acquired bad habits; and on my system there will now be time
+and opportunity to hand these over, say from the beginning of
+February, to non-commissioned officers and the better riders, either
+by forming them in a special squad or entrusting them to individuals,
+and the process of re-making the horses can be continued throughout
+the whole summer, for now there will be ample time.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page199" name="page199"></a>(p. 199)</span> On the importance of this latter point I would especially
+insist. If this work of equitation ceases for the whole summer, and
+the difficult horses are kept incessantly at drill and field service,
+it is inevitable that their defects will develop and become more
+firmly fixed; hence one will never get a good average of well-broken
+horses in the ranks. That some of them must always be taken for drill
+goes without saying; but the point is, that from February onwards, and
+throughout the summer, they should be constantly taken in hand and
+corrected by good riders. If this idea is applied with thoroughgoing
+energy, particularly with the young horses&mdash;even if it entails at
+first a diminution in the number of files on parade&mdash;the number of
+difficult horses in the squadron will soon show a most encouraging
+diminution.</p>
+
+<p>To all these advantages there comes yet another, to my mind even more
+important. According to established custom, after the inspection in
+riding on the bit which forms the conclusion of the winter's training,
+the whole squadron is completely reformed before it begins the drills.
+The new exercises in unaccustomed surroundings are begun by the men on
+strange horses, to which they have had no opportunity to accustom
+themselves. This drawback can be obviated, if the squadron is
+definitely made up already in February&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, after the close of the
+purely equitation course. The men can now ride the same horses in the
+school on the drill-ground, and in the country, which they are to
+retain throughout the summer, and the squadron will commence the drill
+season with much steadier ranks than would otherwise be the case,
+particularly if its Commander understands how to make the most of all
+the advantages his good methods and well-broken <span class="pagenum"><a id="page200" name="page200"></a>(p. 200)</span> horses secure
+for him by changing them about individually as circumstances require.</p>
+
+<p>Much, no doubt, may be urged against this proposal, and the expert
+will hardly need my assistance to recognise the difficulties that
+await him. But they can be overcome, and their advantages thus
+secured&mdash;and these seem to me the essential points&mdash;enormously
+outweigh the minor troubles that follow in their train.</p>
+
+<p>I do not believe that either thorough or essential changes are needed
+in our Regulations to adapt them to the principles I have developed.
+All that is important is that we should definitely break with the
+routine of the several courses and inspections.</p>
+
+<p>To constitute a framework, not with a view of developing a fresh
+network of red tape, I here submit an outline programme of the
+time-table I suggest, so far as concerns the equitation and the
+training of the horses in their several periods.</p>
+
+<p>Commencement of Remount training, at the latest, the end of July. It
+is worth consideration whether the young horses could not be sent to
+the Regiments even earlier.</p>
+
+<p>Inspection of recruits on the bridoon, and of the Second Ride Second
+Class shortly before Christmas.</p>
+
+<p>Inspection of the second year's remounts on the bit of the whole of
+the remount training squads, and of the recruits, concluding with the
+latter and Second Ride Second Class about the middle of February. Then
+constitution of the squadron to meet the requirements of the coming
+drill season.</p>
+
+<p>End of March, or beginning of April, bridoon inspection of the young
+remounts, in which generally side-paces, collected canter, and the
+canter and change, may be demanded.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page201" name="page201"></a>(p. 201)</span> Inspection of the squadron in 'Military riding' (<i>i.e.</i>, with
+arms, and on the curb); preparatory exercises for single combat,
+thrusting at targets, regulation gallop, riding in the ranks, together
+with a careful investigation of the teaching received in the school.
+Inspection of all difficult horses.</p>
+
+<p>Shortly before the man&oelig;uvres, inspection of the young remounts on
+the bit. Inspection of the second year remounts in 'rides' (at the
+same time note their condition after the drill). Inspection of the
+difficult horses.</p>
+
+<p>Inspection of single combats.</p>
+
+<p>If one tries, naturally with due regard to local and climatic
+variations, to adapt the course of training to this plan of
+inspection, and endeavours to arrange that every man, if only for a
+few minutes every day, should practise lance exercises to develop his
+hand and arm, that he should ride every day individually, and every
+difficult horse should be taken in hand and corrected at once; that
+the principles of dressing, alignment, and of wheeling, are daily
+impressed on the men in the school, as I have already indicated; and,
+if further, wherever it is in any way possible, the men are exercised
+in boldly riding across country&mdash;for which purpose funds to cover
+possible damage to crops, etc., must be provided by the
+authorities&mdash;then I believe, and base my belief on the result of my
+practical experience, that not only will a higher standard of training
+for specifically military purposes be attained, but also a
+considerable improvement in equitation.</p>
+
+<p>It will be worth while here to add a few words on the methods of
+training the horses I recommend, for it is precisely on this point
+that ideas so often divide, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page202" name="page202"></a>(p. 202)</span> and the most opposite views on
+this subject find their expression in current literature. To stir up
+all these controversies is not my object, but I want to state quite
+generally that it is under all circumstances a downright evil to try
+to follow out any theoretical system to its logical development,
+whether the one selected be that of Captain Plinzner<a id="footnotetag24" name="footnotetag24"></a><a href="#footnote24" title="Go to footnote 24"><span class="smaller">[24]</span></a> or another's.
+We have neither such a uniform type of horse nor sufficiently skilled
+riders as to be able to employ the same method to all
+indiscriminately.</p>
+
+<p>We must exercise our powers of selection, and find the best method to
+meet the idiosyncrasies of each man and each horse, always keeping in
+mind the aim to be obtained. What we want are horses that can use
+their back muscles, especially in the gallop, with pliable necks,
+light on the hand, able to turn easily, and safe across country (with
+special reference to rat-holes, etc., not fences), that do not refuse
+to quit the ranks, and are not headstrong. To reach this aim with our
+material, our present riding instructions applied in their spirit, not
+their letter, are for the present, I think, a sufficiently firm
+foundation.</p>
+
+<p>A higher standard of riding alone will not, however, suffice. We have
+seen that modern War makes also increased demands on the endurance of
+the horses, and, in fact, in two directions: first, on their marching
+power, and secondly, on their capacity to execute the long gallops at
+the regulation pace which are indispensable for the man&oelig;uvring of
+large masses and of attacks against modern firearms. That a thorough
+physical preparation of the horse increases indirectly its endurance
+has been already pointed out, and when <span class="pagenum"><a id="page203" name="page203"></a>(p. 203)</span> exceptional exertions
+are called for, breeding plays a great part; but great as is the
+influence of these two factors, the ultimate foundation on which the
+endurance of our horses depends is the general 'condition' of the
+animal, and this again is a consequence of the quality of his food and
+his 'training,' used here in the same sense as in a racing stable. I
+lay special stress on this question of food, because great demands,
+both in the way of covering long distances and on the drill ground,
+can only be met without injury to the horses if they are supplied with
+a sufficient quantity of nourishment, and our peace-time ration is
+undoubtedly too small to satisfy this condition. No regiment could
+maintain itself always at the high pitch of condition we have
+undoubtedly attained if it did not have recourse to all manner of
+expedients to increase, at any rate for the time, the amount of the
+ration. Of these expedients there are quite an imposing number, and
+since, however desirable an increase of the ration may be, we are not
+likely to obtain it, it seems to me well worth while to develop them
+to the utmost.</p>
+
+<p>How this is to be done will depend mainly on the local conditions of
+each garrison. The point is to make the most of the opportunities each
+locality offers, and as an example it may be of interest to give my
+personal experience on this head.</p>
+
+<p>Thanks to the confidence reposed in me by my General and to his
+liberality, I was allowed to draw the equivalent of sixty rations of
+oats per day and per squadron in cash, and to handle this money to the
+best of my judgment.</p>
+
+<p>Since peas, beans, and white American maize&mdash;the yellow Hungarian
+quality is generally considered inferior&mdash;were ninepence to one
+shilling cheaper per <span class="pagenum"><a id="page204" name="page204"></a>(p. 204)</span> hundredweight than oats, I laid in a
+stock of them, and was able to give not only an increased weight of
+ration, but one of considerably greater nutritive value. Thus I gained
+the double advantage, not only of not being compelled to stint the
+corn ration in winter in order to save up for the harder work of the
+summers, but I was able to increase even the winter ration itself.
+This I consider an essential gain, for horses that after the winter
+season are well fed and in their full condition are equal to far
+higher exertions than those which have been kept low, and then fed up
+for perhaps a very short time before the increased strain is thrown
+upon them.</p>
+
+<p>The food was thus divided: After the man&oelig;uvres, in cases where an
+increased ration was required, American maize was issued, and the
+ration improved by half a pound. From about Christmas-time onwards
+peas and beans were served out, and the amount increased until midway
+through the Squadron drills, after which it was kept at the same level
+until the man&oelig;uvres. In the end it amounted to the equivalent of 15
+pounds of oats, which can be considered as the normal scale for our
+medium and light Cavalry horses. The peas and beans were soaked for
+twelve hours, the water being twice changed during this time to
+prevent their turning sour.</p>
+
+<p>During the man&oelig;uvres, according to circumstances, I laid down at
+suitable points in the district stores of forage, or gave the Squadron
+Commanders money with which to supply themselves locally, and thus was
+able to keep up the increase in the ration during the greater part of
+this trying period.</p>
+
+<p>The experiment was continued for nearly two years, and its results
+were astonishingly satisfactory. Not only did the visible condition of
+the horses develop <span class="pagenum"><a id="page205" name="page205"></a>(p. 205)</span> markedly, and maintain itself throughout
+the greatest exertions, both during the man&oelig;uvres and the
+Divisional exercises, but in spite of increased performances the
+numbers of breakdowns and cases of lameness sensibly diminished; the
+paces were fresher; in short, the material improved most noticeably.
+Are not these breakdowns, lameness, and dulness in the horses, in the
+great majority of cases but the consequences of over-exertion of the
+animals when in a low state of condition? The cases of colic, too,
+diminished rather than increased, which speaks well for the
+harmlessness of the foods employed, but may in part also have been due
+to the fact that both the bulk of the ration and the amount of
+exertion demanded were only gradually diminished after the
+man&oelig;uvres.</p>
+
+<p>The experiment also showed that most horses would not touch the white
+beans at all, or only unwillingly, and the best proved to be either
+the green Smyrna or brown Dutch beans, which for the same weight and
+nutritive value bulked bigger, for instance, than the peas, and were
+very willingly eaten. Peas and beans as a ration alone were found not
+to answer, as the horse misses the mechanical action&mdash;irritation of
+the bowel and stomach&mdash;and requires also certain chemical constituents
+present in oats to assist digestion. Even with the proportion of oats
+and beans actually used&mdash;seventy-six to seventy-eight oats to sixty
+beans&mdash;it was found advisable to increase the 'Rauffutter' ration to
+replace the missing oat-husks. But to provide this addition there were
+ample means, since the manure fund of the regiment, or of the
+squadron, was available; and in spite of the increased ration it
+became possible to make savings which in a single year sufficed to
+build a spacious riding-school, and thus contributed <span class="pagenum"><a id="page206" name="page206"></a>(p. 206)</span> in
+another way to the training and general efficiency of the squadrons.</p>
+
+<p>In the third year the price of oats fell, and that of the other feed
+rose; hence, and for other reasons also, the conversion of the oat
+ration into other more nourishing materials had to be abandoned,
+although it would still have been possible to maintain a considerable
+increase in the nutritive value of the food issued. To keep the ration
+up to approximately the same level as in the preceding year, recourse
+had to be had to other means.</p>
+
+<p>It was found by experiment that a couple of pounds of straw per horse
+could easily be saved per day, and again ample funds for a supplement
+to the ration were available, a measure particularly applicable when
+the price of straw rules high. This year, too, as the expenditure on
+the riding-school was closed, the manure fund was also available, and
+the horses did nearly as well as before.</p>
+
+<p>I would not maintain that similar results are everywhere obtainable.
+The price of grains varies; the receipts from manure are everywhere
+different; in some garrisons peas and beans are difficult to obtain;
+the cost of transport also fluctuates. But all this is no reason why
+we should not seize an advantage even if we cannot always retain it.
+Even a few years of more and better food bring about an improvement in
+the horses, which lasts for a considerable time, and every effort,
+therefore, should be made to obtain these advantages offered by price
+variations whenever it is possible to do so.</p>
+
+<p>It is well to call attention to the fact that to accustom horses to
+the most varied food&mdash;rye, barley, wheat, etc.&mdash;is part of their
+indispensable training for War, where <span class="pagenum"><a id="page207" name="page207"></a>(p. 207)</span> such foods are all
+they can get, as the experience of our last War sufficiently
+demonstrated. To this end it is necessary&mdash;and I wish particularly to
+insist upon this point&mdash;that our Regimental Commanders should have the
+utmost latitude of action within certain fixed limits, and should not
+be dependent on the consideration of the Commissariat, with its
+innumerable regulations and formal considerations. I consider the
+objection sometimes urged against me that in the purchase of
+supplementary foods by the Regimental Commander there would be an
+opening for fraud and speculation on the part of under officials quite
+untenable, for a proper system of audit and check could be quite
+easily devised.</p>
+
+<p>The capacity of the Commander to manage affairs in a businesslike
+manner can hardly be called in question, and his interest in the
+matter would grow in proportion to the degree of freedom allowed to
+him.</p>
+
+<p>Next in importance to the question of food comes the preparation of
+the horses for efforts of long duration. That this preparation must go
+hand in hand with the food question is obvious, but apart from this
+interdependence, it is not possible to keep horses always up to the
+necessary standard of endurance; for this training not only throws
+heavy strains on the muscles, joints, and sinews, but on the nervous
+system of the animal, and in particular attacks the nerves of the
+stomach if maintained too long. If one wishes to preserve one's
+material, the horses must be allowed from time to time a thorough
+rest, during which their feeding must enable them to put on the degree
+of fat which is requisite for health.</p>
+
+<p>The best time for this rest is about Christmas, during which one can
+reduce the work to the very minimum, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page208" name="page208"></a>(p. 208)</span> and feed with
+'Rastfutter' hay, maize, malt&mdash;dried brewer's&mdash;molasses, even
+potatoes; and also, after reaching the highest points of the training
+for galloping, there must be a certain relaxation of the strain to
+give the nerves time to recuperate.</p>
+
+<p>Generally, the course of training must be conducted from the
+standpoint of what War demands, and never allowed to assume the
+characteristics of the racing stable, for the purposes of the two are
+entirely distinct, and this is particularly the case with regard to
+the gallop.</p>
+
+<p>It is precisely in this respect that the necessities of War are not
+always seen with sufficient clearness.</p>
+
+<p>We obtain from our troops by means of most careful preparation quite
+remarkable performances in galloping. I have myself seen whole
+regiments cover 8,800 yards (5 miles) at the regulation gallop, and
+the horses at the end of it had still both strength and wind to
+increase the pace. On such and similar performances we then base our
+tactical exercises both for the Brigade and Division, and many horses
+are sacrificed as a consequence. Now, I am the last man to suggest
+that accurate drill at the gallop is not the crowning work of all
+tactical education, but it must be accomplished under War conditions,
+and it cannot be too persistently insisted on that all these tactical
+pictures and the deductions founded thereon, which we attain in the
+manner indicated, have practically nothing to do with real War at all.</p>
+
+<p>In these peace exercises we usually ride with considerably less than
+field service weights, on specially selected and favourable ground,
+and on specially trained horses. All these conditions are wanting in
+War. Then horses must carry their full marching-order <span class="pagenum"><a id="page209" name="page209"></a>(p. 209)</span> kit,
+and generally they will be entirely lacking in specific training for
+this fast kind of work. The ordinary pace on the march and patrol is
+the marching trot; only single patrols have now and again to gallop,
+the troops as a whole only on the rare occasions when a charge has
+actually to be delivered. Then, the carefully-selected conditions of
+the drill ground are generally lacking; and, finally, in all War
+strength squadrons there are always some augmentation horses and
+remounts, whose weaknesses must be taken into account if they are not
+to be broken down at the very beginning of operations, as too often
+happened in 1870, in which case it would have been better to have left
+them behind from the first. Thus the galloping possibilities are
+reduced most considerably, and it is only with these reduced
+possibilities that the Leader can safely reckon.</p>
+
+<p>That these conditions have a most important influence on tactics is
+apparent. The question is whether it is worth while to strain towards
+false ideals, at a considerable cost in horseflesh, when in War they
+are quite unattainable, and only serve to call up in men's minds false
+pictures of the reality.</p>
+
+<p>To this I return an unqualified negative. Certainly, it is
+indisputable that the horses must be trained to gallop for long
+distances and in suitable poise, and that men should learn to retain a
+correct seat even in gallops of long duration; that they should have
+their horses under complete control, and learn to turn and check by
+the use of the weight of their bodies; but these demands can only be
+satisfied by continuous practice under conditions which render control
+over the poise both of man and horse comparatively easy to
+maintain&mdash;that is to say, singly on the galloping <span class="pagenum"><a id="page210" name="page210"></a>(p. 210)</span> track or
+in squads, and also as closed tactical units.</p>
+
+<p>Speaking generally, however, such exercises do not need to be extended
+materially beyond the limit which can be attained by horses not
+specifically trained to galloping under full marching order weights.</p>
+
+<p>This limit depends on the degree of breeding, the strength and
+condition of the horses, and may be estimated at the most at two and a
+half miles for our Light Cavalry, and somewhat less for the
+Cuirassiers. To exceed these distances seems both superfluous and
+injurious, particularly when it goes so far as to risk permanent
+depreciation of the material.</p>
+
+<p>It is far more important, in my opinion, to habituate the horses to
+gallop with their full marching order weights, under service
+conditions, and in all kinds of ground; for nothing is more difficult
+than to preserve the proper rates of movement and keep the ranks
+closed under such circumstances, as experience even in the
+man&oelig;uvres abundantly shows.</p>
+
+<p>The 'trot' tends always to get shorter, for the regulation pace is
+already as much as Light Cavalry can manage on the Drill ground; and
+the gallop, too, falls generally behind the prescribed rate, the
+reason being, in my opinion, that as a rule the distances demanded are
+too great, and that we do not drill with sufficient frequency in full
+marching order, partly to save wear and tear of the kit, but also
+because with lighter weights we can undertake in the same time more
+exercises, covering a greater area, than would otherwise be possible
+without knocking up the horses. Much may be used in defence of this
+procedure from the point of view of the training of the Leaders, but
+the dangers to the true training of the troops themselves <span class="pagenum"><a id="page211" name="page211"></a>(p. 211)</span>
+for War must not be overlooked, and practice under full War service
+conditions must thus ever remain the keystone of our whole educational
+edifice.</p>
+
+<p>But it is not only the training in galloping which suffers from this
+practice of riding light. The preparation of the horses as regards
+endurance suffers equally, for patrols and long-distance rides are
+generally undertaken with stripped saddles; it is only for
+man&oelig;uvres and the larger tactical exercises away from the garrison
+that marching order is carried. To me this system seems hardly
+rational. Rather, it would appear to me, must such sudden increase in
+the weights on the horses tend to break them down, and experience
+confirms this view, for the first day's marches in the man&oelig;uvres in
+marching order tire out the horses to a quite disproportionate degree.</p>
+
+<p>We can never eliminate this evil altogether, for the attempt would
+entail either marching order all the year round, or the limitation of
+practical exercises to certain periods of the year only, both or
+either of which would conflict on the one hand with the necessity of
+saving the horses as much as possible, on the other with the needs of
+the military training of the men; but a gradual increase in the loads
+carried and distances covered seems well within the scope of a
+practical policy.</p>
+
+<p>The Company Commander, who wishes to get his men fit for marching,
+increases quite gradually and systematically the weight in the men's
+knapsacks, till these are scarcely noticed as a hindrance by their
+wearers, and similarly one could arrange in the Cavalry. In each
+period we should begin with stripped saddles, progressing onwards to
+the full kit; but the inspections of tactical units, and the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page212" name="page212"></a>(p. 212)</span>
+final inspection in individual combat, should fundamentally be taken
+in full marching order always, and horses should be prepared gradually
+for the full weight carried in the man&oelig;uvres.</p>
+
+<p>I believe such a system would not only bring about a considerable
+improvement in the training for War both of men and horses, but would
+secure us from many disappointments by insuring in the Leaders a true
+idea of what may reasonably be expected from their commands in the
+field. Naturally the demands made on them in the inspections must
+undergo a corresponding diminution.</p>
+
+<p>Only by constantly keeping these points in view and combining them in
+harmonious progression will it be possible to attain the degree of
+perfection in the elementary instruction of men and horses which can
+alone guarantee the highest results in practice.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page213" name="page213"></a>(p. 213)</span> CHAPTER III</h2>
+
+<p class="title">THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT</p>
+
+
+<p>In the same manner as, in the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to
+show that in many points in equitation, in the school of individual
+combat, and in the 'training' both of man and horse, we can, by
+alterations of method, attain more directly to a possibly higher
+standard in our performances than is at present achieved, I now
+propose to consider the tactical education of the troops as a whole,
+with a view to their best utilization in mounted engagements.</p>
+
+<p>According to the existing Regulations, the chief importance is still
+laid on the efficiency of the small and medium-sized combinations.
+Squadrons, Regiments, and Brigades are prepared with the utmost care
+and attention, but exercises of the larger bodies only take place more
+or less exceptionally, and on a very restricted scale. The systematic
+education of the Cavalry does not, in fact, extend beyond the Brigade.</p>
+
+<p>That this state of affairs no longer responds to the changed nature of
+Warfare follows from all that I have already said, and does not
+require to be insisted on.</p>
+
+<p>If in War the employment of 'Masses' has become the decisive element,
+our system of training must be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page214" name="page214"></a>(p. 214)</span> correspondingly extended, so
+as to insure the existence of the skill and power needed for their
+successful application. To this end all, even the most elementary,
+exercises must be permeated thoroughly by the idea of preparing the
+troops for united action in adequate numbers; and the relative
+importance of the several periods of training, the allotment of time
+to each step in the progression, as well as the exercises themselves,
+must all be dominated by the same idea.</p>
+
+<p>The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, as
+ever, the school of the squadron. The cohesion of this unit and the
+ease with which it can be moved is the first condition of its useful
+employment at the right time and place, and the importance of
+thoroughness in this branch of training grows with every increment in
+the total number to be handled. Even more attention, therefore, should
+be given to squadron drill in the future than in the past.</p>
+
+<p>Next comes the question of regimental drill. Here, as we shall
+presently see, the chief point is to develop the independence of the
+Squadron Commander and the tactical handiness of his unit; and as I
+understand the problem, this calls for a more extended framework,
+within which the regiment must be prepared, than was formerly the
+case.</p>
+
+<p>If, even under present conditions, it is scarcely possible in the few
+days allowed by the Field Service Regulations to train the squadrons
+up to the requirements of active service, even on a level drill
+ground, it is obvious that in the future this difficulty will become
+intensified. It is a question, therefore, to be considered, whether it
+would not be better to remove these time limitations altogether, and
+leave it to the Cavalry Commanders themselves to determine
+everywhere, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page215" name="page215"></a>(p. 215)</span> with regard to local conditions, how to make the
+best use of the total time available. Where considerable expense would
+be incurred in bringing in squadrons detached at a distance, the
+consent of the War Ministry would, of course, have to be obtained.</p>
+
+<p>Brigade drill, however, stands on quite a different footing; it forms,
+as it were, the preparatory school for the movement of 'Masses,' in
+which the principle of the employment of the constituent parts of the
+'Mass,' whether in 'Lines' or by 'Wings,' has to be inculcated. But as
+one has now to deal with tactically thoroughly trained bodies, less
+time is required than for either squadron or regimental drill.</p>
+
+<p>On the other hand, it is most essential that the 'Mass' itself,
+consisting as it does of several Brigades, should be thoroughly
+drilled as a Division or Corps, for it is with these units, and not
+with Brigades, that one has to deal in War, and their duties are so
+many-sided, and require for their due performance such
+thoroughly-trained Commanders, that perfection is not to be attained
+in a few days, which are not even available every year. On this point,
+in my opinion, there is no room for doubt, and hence it becomes
+absolutely essential that, if necessary, Brigade drill must be
+curtailed in order to give to all Brigades an annual opportunity of
+exercising, as part of the higher units.</p>
+
+<p>It might well be possible to allow a wider latitude to the Brigade
+Commanders in regard to the choice of time for their special
+exercises, in which they might be guided by the special circumstances
+of the locality in which they are quartered, and by the advice of
+their superiors.</p>
+
+<p>For the exercise of the greater 'Masses,' for which, under all
+circumstances, troops have to be brought <span class="pagenum"><a id="page216" name="page216"></a>(p. 216)</span> together from
+considerable distances, a particular period must, of necessity, be
+fixed by regulations; but it must be borne in mind that these 'Masses'
+should not always be formed of equal strength in Divisions of three
+Brigades, for the danger to the higher education which lies in always
+working with units of similar composition has already been
+sufficiently dwelt on. The conditions of War absolutely demand that
+the higher Cavalry Leaders should be equally at home in handling
+'Masses' with certainty and precision, no matter what their
+composition, and the troops themselves must learn to apply the
+principles on which efficiency in action really depends under all and
+every circumstance.</p>
+
+<p>As regards the manner in which the several periods into which the
+training is divided should follow one another, the question arises
+whether the squadron, regimental, and brigade drill periods should
+follow one another as a continuous whole, or whether they should go
+hand in hand with Field Service Exercises.</p>
+
+<p>This seems to me to need a specific reply, because, as a fact, it is
+differently answered in different Army Corps.</p>
+
+<p>Where the troops have to leave their garrisons in order to be
+quartered in the vicinity of the ground specially selected for those
+purposes, the question of expense must play an important part in the
+decision; but the principle involved can hardly be affected by these
+exceptional circumstances, for in by far the greater number of cases
+the troops can find room to drill either within the district of their
+own garrisons or on the man&oelig;uvre grounds in the vicinity, and in
+these latter the question of extra cost should hardly stand in the way
+of an extension of the time allowance. <span class="pagenum"><a id="page217" name="page217"></a>(p. 217)</span> Hence, if such an
+extension, due to the intercalation of Field Service practices, really
+does offer advantages, one could decide in principle in favour of this
+solution, in spite of all other circumstances; but it still seems to
+me open to discussion whether it is advisable to make the same
+principle applicable in equal measure to all the time intervals.</p>
+
+<p>For the squadron drill, which begins with an entirely untrained troop,
+the conditions are obviously quite different to those in the
+subsequent exercises, in which the point lies in the working together
+of units already finished and completed in themselves; and taking
+these differences into account, we must first examine more especially
+the case of the squadron.</p>
+
+<p>At the beginning of its drill season, the exertions demanded are
+comparatively slight. The distance covered either at the trot or
+gallop is only gradually increased, and the paces are at first kept
+somewhat below the regulation limits&mdash;at least, from practical
+experience I should recommend that they should be, for the Instructor
+can control and correct the precision of all movements, and the
+individual conduct both of man and horse, better at the slower paces
+than when moving fast. Riders and horses accustom themselves
+gradually, and hence more easily, to movement in closed bodies, and it
+is of decisive importance for the whole subsequent course of their
+training that at the very beginning of the drills this harmony between
+man and horse under the new and unaccustomed conditions should be
+secured to the utmost possible degree.</p>
+
+<p>If this point of view be kept in mind, then I think the drills should
+be continued daily, for, on the one hand, there is no risk of
+overtiring the horses, and, on <span class="pagenum"><a id="page218" name="page218"></a>(p. 218)</span> the other, the object is to
+weld the men into a cohesive whole, and impress on them the essential
+principles of the elementary tactical evolutions, in order to make
+them as soon as possible into a combatant unit.</p>
+
+<p>Towards the latter end of the squadron drills, however, the conditions
+change. Now, it becomes necessary to drive into the whole body a
+proper appreciation of the several 'paces,' to fit them for long
+gallops, and to train them for actual combat. At this period I
+consider it better to interpolate one or more Field Service days,
+partly because it is of practical moment to press on this side of
+their training as quick as possible, and, further, because the drills
+now begin to make very considerable demands upon the horses. These
+Field Service days afford an opportunity to rest the horses, and thus
+to prevent small and inconsiderable injuries developing into severe
+lameness and ultimate breakdowns. Further, a quiet ride in the country
+gives those horses which have become nervously excited by the
+unaccustomed conditions of the drill ground a chance of cooling down,
+and thus saving themselves very materially; and this must certainly be
+considered as one of the most important functions of the Commander,
+whether in Peace or War, to keep his horses fresh on their legs, and
+ready to turn out in good condition at whatever hour the call may
+sound. Of course, these precautions must not go so far as to endanger
+the training for service of the squadron, but drill and man&oelig;uvre
+results at excessive cost of horseflesh must be absolutely condemned.</p>
+
+<p>If these reasons speak for an intercalation of Field Service exercises
+between the drill days, I am further of opinion that the result which
+would be arrived at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page219" name="page219"></a>(p. 219)</span> by this system would give a better
+standard of the drill efficiency of the unit for War than can be
+attained by continuous drill alone.</p>
+
+<p>With the latter, it is certainly much easier to secure unity,
+cohesion, and precision in the movements; but we must remember that in
+War the emergency calling for drill performances may arise after weeks
+of marching, during which no drill has been practised at all, and our
+Peace training must take into account such conditions, and accustom
+the troops to execute with safety and cohesion such drill movement as
+may be necessary without having practised them day for day.</p>
+
+<p>In still greater degree do these principles apply both to regimental
+and brigade drills; since in these the demands on the horses are
+constantly increasing, the need to give them opportunity for rest and
+recovery becomes even more pronounced.</p>
+
+<p>Moreover, the purpose of these exercises is not so much to secure a
+single representation of acquired skill in the exhibition of drill
+evolutions, but rather to develop and confirm in the men an
+ever-increasing familiarity with the principles of their tactical
+employment, and this will only then be attained when, as far as
+possible, these practices are continued during the whole summer, so
+that the Grand Man&oelig;uvres either in the Division or in the Corps
+form the natural conclusion of the whole series. In the period of
+combined man&oelig;uvres, it is, of course, impossible, in order to save
+the horses, to lengthen the fixed period allotted to them; but all the
+more necessary, therefore, does it appear to spare them as much as
+possible by the introduction of these Field Service days (exclusive of
+the ordinary 'rest days') during the time of the drill <span class="pagenum"><a id="page220" name="page220"></a>(p. 220)</span>
+exercises. In the course of the subsequent considerations, we shall
+see that not only will our horses gain thereby, but many other
+important objects of our training be served as well.</p>
+
+<p>Turning now to the subject of these exercises themselves, it must be
+laid down generally that throughout a steady intensification of the
+exertions demanded must be maintained, and that the gallop is not to
+be employed except when, under service conditions, its use would be
+practicable. Further, whatever the Regulations prescribe must be
+practised, no matter what the views of the Commanding Officer as to
+their practicability or otherwise may be. This is absolutely essential
+to secure a uniform standard of execution throughout the Arm.</p>
+
+<p>Nevertheless, it makes a very essential difference in what spirit the
+Regulations are approached, for the result will depend upon which
+points in the training the chief stress is laid, and generally on the
+character given to the exercises.</p>
+
+<p>In drilling the squadron this point is of less importance. Here, in
+accordance with the spirit of the whole Arm, it is a matter of formal
+drill, and nothing more. It is here that the foundation has to be laid
+for smart, never-failing 'drill,' for the unconditional cohesion of
+the squadron in itself, and for the certain interpretation of its
+Leader's views, whether the latter makes use of commands, signals, or
+merely rides in the required direction.</p>
+
+<p>Here the paces must be hammered into the troops till they become
+mechanical habit, and the several forms of movement and attack be
+practised, so that they can be executed in any direction, whether the
+squadron has been told off or not. No matter how <span class="pagenum"><a id="page221" name="page221"></a>(p. 221)</span> hasty the
+rally may be, the troop must charge at the moment and without
+hesitation.</p>
+
+<p>The only difference that can arise here will be due to the
+individuality of the Leader, and all are good which lead to the
+required end, only the Regulations are not quite clear as to
+practising the charge, and the guiding points might be laid down with
+rather greater precision.</p>
+
+<p>In the charge against Cavalry cohesion is the first and dominating
+condition. It must be absolutely impossible for the horses to swerve
+either to right or left. Accurate dressing and the maintenance of the
+two ranks come only in the second place. Against Infantry or
+Artillery, on the other hand, the essential is that every horse should
+have room to gallop in his own form, so that no crowding or jostling
+arises, thus giving the horses a chance of avoiding or jumping clear
+over falling men or animals. Hence, although on the level drill ground
+the requirements of Regulations as regards dressing and the
+maintenance of the two well-defined lines must be attended to, one
+must remember that it may be impossible to comply with these demands
+across country and be prepared in such cases to stick to the spirit,
+not to the letter, of the law.</p>
+
+<p>In both cases it will hardly be of advantage to lay too much stress on
+dressing and touch. Against Cavalry it is rather a case of jamming the
+files together by pressure from the flanks, and the men must hold as a
+vital article of faith that only the closest knee-to-knee riding will
+guarantee either victory or their personal safety. Against Infantry,
+on the contrary, the files must be loosened, and every horse go in his
+normal stride, as in hunting; nor <span class="pagenum"><a id="page222" name="page222"></a>(p. 222)</span> must anyone allow himself
+to be squeezed out of the ranks to the rear or remain behind as long
+as the strength of his horse holds out.</p>
+
+<p>Utmost speed consistent with closely-locked files against Cavalry, a
+natural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery&mdash;these are the
+two cardinal points to be observed in attacking. Maintenance of
+dressing or of the ranks become positive evils if the above are
+sacrificed to either. There, in my opinion, should be the essentials
+to guide the decision of superior officers in their criticisms.</p>
+
+<p>With these exceptions the lines for the squadron training are so
+closely drawn that differences in practice can scarcely arise. The
+matter, however, assumes quite a different aspect with the regiment,
+and still more with the higher units.</p>
+
+<p>Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troops
+by the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teaching
+the forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, these
+points of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is to
+teach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in the
+Regulations for the combat.</p>
+
+<p>A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and with
+precision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the most
+has merely laid the foundations on which such a training can be
+subsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, each
+of which has practised and made certain of the execution of such
+movements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes of
+front or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselves
+necessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill of
+the Leaders, only requiring an accurate <span class="pagenum"><a id="page223" name="page223"></a>(p. 223)</span> knowledge of the
+book, and a certain degree of routine in the application of its
+prescriptions; but War makes quite different demands on their ability,
+and it is for War that we have to be prepared.</p>
+
+<p>First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress must
+especially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually be
+applied on the battle-field.</p>
+
+<p>Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only on
+the drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, the
+tactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must,
+be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act on
+fundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principles
+everywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing at
+once the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adapting
+practically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy in
+the field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be granted
+to the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separated
+bodies to a single tactical purpose.</p>
+
+<p>In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tactical
+training remains far too elementary in character, and does not tend
+with sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War.</p>
+
+<p>The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on the
+shoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causes
+which are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes the
+passive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and tradition
+everywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that the
+troops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomed
+ruts, when more <span class="pagenum"><a id="page224" name="page224"></a>(p. 224)</span> especially the methods applied in our
+inspections are not always of a nature to encourage such attempts.</p>
+
+<p>A further cause is to be found in the Regulations themselves. These
+give no firm foothold for the decision of the question as to what
+forms and movements really are practicable in War-time, and, probably
+in the endeavours not to hamper too much the initiative of the
+Leaders, does not express the principle on which the conduct of the
+combat is based with sufficient precision to preclude very different
+opinions as to what these principles really are. Finally, the local
+conditions of many of our garrisons often create an almost insuperable
+difficulty for the proper training of the troops over country.</p>
+
+<p>In face of these conditions, we must strike out new paths for our
+guidance if we do not intend to remain behind the times altogether.</p>
+
+<p>We must first, however, be perfectly clear in our own minds as to
+which of the Regulation forms are really practicable, and hence
+require increased attention. Then we must endeavour to formulate the
+guiding principles for the conduct of an engagement in a manner so
+clear and definite that they can easily be fixed in the memory, and
+then work out the best way in which the troops can be thoroughly
+grounded in their application. Finally, we must acquire a quite
+distinct grasp of what can be practised over country, and from what
+points of view such exercises are to be undertaken in order to make
+them of direct utility in the solution of the problems modern Warfare
+will set before us.</p>
+
+<p>To clear up the first point it will be best to sketch in its general
+outline the course in which events succeed one another in an
+engagement, and then <span class="pagenum"><a id="page225" name="page225"></a>(p. 225)</span> to deduce the forms of movement which
+are essentially practical.</p>
+
+<p>Taking the case of Cavalry in combination with the other Arms, at the
+commencement of the action we find the squadrons in 'rendezvous'
+formation under cover outside the immediate danger sphere, either on
+the flanks or behind the general line of battle.</p>
+
+<p>When the moment to act arrives, they advance at a rapid pace, either
+in closed-up column of route or in any other dense formation which
+permits of ready deployment in the direction of their allotted target.
+Often in this movement they will have to overcome difficulties of the
+ground&mdash;defiles and the like, of varying breadth.</p>
+
+<p>Arrived in the vicinity of the field of attack, they deploy into lines
+of squadron columns, form line to the front, and execute the charge.</p>
+
+<p>In such cases it may often become necessary to secure one's own flanks
+by forming protective échelons, or to endeavour to surround those of
+the enemy by corresponding offensive movements.</p>
+
+<p>In the case of Cavalry acting alone, it will often be necessary to
+form for action directly from column of route, and it will be
+essential to establish co-operation not only between the advance guard
+and the main body, but also between columns concentrating from
+different directions upon the field of coming action.</p>
+
+<p>It is at once evident that for these few man&oelig;uvres few and simple
+formations and movements will suffice, and that, in view of the
+excitement of the battle-field, only such are, in fact,
+applicable.<a id="footnotetag25" name="footnotetag25"></a><a href="#footnote25" title="Go to footnote 25"><span class="smaller">[25]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page226" name="page226"></a>(p. 226)</span> Hence it follows that all complicated movements and changes
+of lines, and similar formations occurring in the Regulations, may be
+classed in the category of evolutions intended mainly for disciplinary
+purposes. On the other hand, we must practise, as thoroughly as
+practicable, long movements at a rapid pace in the closest formations
+for man&oelig;uvre&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, in double and Regimental Columns; changes of
+direction in these columns by shouldering, passage of defiles,
+deployments into fighting formations with simultaneous slight
+alterations in the line of advance; further, measures to secure one's
+own flanks, or to threaten those of the enemy; deployments to the
+front immediately out of column of route or after the passage of
+defiles; the combination of detachments arriving from different
+directions; and, finally, the charge itself under the most varied
+assumptions, the transition from the mêlée to pursuit, and rallying in
+order to attack again in a new direction against a fresh enemy.
+Naturally, the most rapid deployments out of any and every formation
+against a suddenly appearing enemy must also be practised, for such
+surprises are always possible in War-time.</p>
+
+<p>To be avoided, on the other hand, as for the most part quite
+impracticable, are all movements of a dilatory nature for the
+formation of fronts of attack, as well as long movements of
+man&oelig;uvres and considerable <span class="pagenum"><a id="page227" name="page227"></a>(p. 227)</span> changes of front when already
+deployed into line.</p>
+
+<p>In all these exercises, as a general and fundamental principle, such a
+grouping of the available forces must be striven for that the units
+can be employed by 'Wings'; for, as I have endeavoured to point out,
+it is this form of employment which best satisfies the requirements of
+the combat and meets the needs of the Commander.</p>
+
+<p>For instance, under many circumstances the Regimental Column can be
+employed as a practical tactical formation. Thus, if against Infantry
+or Artillery, it is desirable to attack in many following 'Lines.' The
+need is at once satisfied if our advance is made in a number of
+Regimental Columns, wheeled into line to a flank. For a flank attack,
+if the movement is initiated in a number of Regimental Columns formed
+to the front and following one another, forming line by a subsequent
+wheel. In both cases&mdash;in the latter after the wheel&mdash;one has only to
+insure that the laterally adjacent squadrons move off together at
+'Treffen' (<i>i.e.</i>, Line) distance to have all one's Lines complete.
+Such a formation can secure its flanks with the greatest ease by the
+retention of closed units, or, by bringing up the rearward squadrons,
+can prolong its front to either flank. In any case it is preferable to
+the triple column of troops, which makes all influence of the leader
+impossible, mixes all units in the charge, and hence would best be
+left out of the Regulations altogether. Nevertheless, practice in the
+employment of 'Treffen' (<i>i.e.</i>, 'Lines' as opposed to 'Wings') must
+not be entirely neglected, as under certain circumstances this form
+may also become necessary.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page228" name="page228"></a>(p. 228)</span> This tendency to group the available forces by 'Wings' in the
+larger units from the Brigade upwards must also be extended downwards
+to the regiment, which represents the fundamental tactical unit of the
+Cavalry, and those formations for man&oelig;uvre which favour the
+arrangement of its constituent squadrons one behind the
+other&mdash;formations which, at the same time, are both handier and
+susceptible of more convenient control&mdash;must be constantly practised.</p>
+
+<p>That Squadron Columns to the Front hardly meet these demands ideally
+can scarcely be denied. They are unhandy, render all changes of
+direction materially more difficult, lose direction and distance very
+easily, and necessitate complex movements in order to arrange them one
+behind the other. Already in Brigade formations these drawbacks are
+apparent, and in larger masses they prove most formidable. The
+Squadron Column is, in fact, a formation derived exclusively with a
+view to 'Line' tactics, and for this reason alone they hamper all
+other demands. There is, however, no compelling reason why they should
+be retained as the principal working formation for Cavalry, and
+therefore as fundamentally beyond the reach of criticism.</p>
+
+<p>It seems to me that a formation which would group every two Squadron
+Columns as a unit would be far preferable. The Regimental Commander
+would then have only two units to direct, which would maintain their
+mutual relations of distance and interval more easily than four, could
+change direction more readily, and form line quicker, and allow of a
+far easier transition to wing formations and other columns than is
+possible at present.</p>
+
+<p>The Regulations certainly do not mention this <span class="pagenum"><a id="page229" name="page229"></a>(p. 229)</span> formation
+specifically, but, on the other hand, this regimental double column
+offers advantages for certain circumstances greater than can be found
+in any of the forms it suggests. It allows in the simplest manner of
+deployment into 'Lines,' either to the front or flank, the formation
+of échelons in any desired direction; it is very mobile, easily
+concealed in folds of the ground, and combines the advantages of
+reduced depth both as a marching and as a man&oelig;uvre formation. As
+the latter, it is peculiarly adapted to the purposes of large units in
+close country; for, as already pointed out, it is easy to conceal, and
+whilst keeping the troops well in the hands of the Regimental
+Commander, allows also of the most rapid deployments into 'Lines'
+either to the front or to the flank. It confers also the same
+advantages in brigade when the regiments are formed side by side, and
+is particularly applicable to flanking movements in which it is
+especially desirable to be able at any moment to develop strong
+fighting power in the direction of the movement, and after the wheel
+into line, to be formed in successive lines and protected on the
+uncovered flank.</p>
+
+<a id="img001" name="img001"></a>
+<div class="figcenter">
+<img src="images/img001.jpg" width="400" height="67" alt="Formation." title="">
+</div>
+
+<p>It would take us too far at this point to compare in detail the
+advantages and disadvantages of this or alternative formations. I only
+desire to indicate in what direction practical progress is possible,
+even in the domain of formal tactics, without exceeding the limits
+laid down by Regulations, although it can only <span class="pagenum"><a id="page230" name="page230"></a>(p. 230)</span> be most
+desirable that changes in the Regulations<a id="footnotetag26" name="footnotetag26"></a><a href="#footnote26" title="Go to footnote 26"><span class="smaller">[26]</span></a> themselves should be
+forthwith undertaken. I would, in conclusion, only bring forward one
+point which seems to me of particular importance.</p>
+
+<p>The more this employment of Cavalry by 'Wings' gains ground, the more
+apparent becomes the advantages of the use of the bugle-calls assigned
+to the several units, particularly of the regimental call; because
+when it is used, the regiment or other unit remains as a closed body,
+unmixed with other units, and hence can be employed as a distinct
+tactical entity, which is not so much the case when working in
+'Lines.'</p>
+
+<p>These sounds are the only ones which never lead to confusion, if they
+are employed not as cautions only, but as a call on which the unit
+moves at once, whether in line or in column&mdash;preferably the latter&mdash;in
+the direction from which the call is heard. With the call the
+Commander would have the means of collecting his men behind him, and
+leading them in the direction he desires, no matter in what degree of
+order or the reverse they might be, without any verbal commands or
+instructions.</p>
+
+<p>Used in this sense these sounds&mdash;but particularly the regimental
+call&mdash;might become the principal drill and man&oelig;uvre calls for the
+Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>Thus it appears to me we could achieve a considerable reduction in the
+amount of practical drill necessary, and the change would tell all the
+more the more frequently the call was employed, until at last it
+became ingrained in the very flesh and blood of each man in the ranks.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page231" name="page231"></a>(p. 231)</span> Unfortunately the Regulations do not allow their employment
+in this sense, but permit them only as cautionary sounds (Section 115,
+note); but even in this restricted sense they deserve most constant
+use in drilling, for they are always a means of preventing, in a
+measure, misapprehensions in the execution of other sounds.</p>
+
+<p>We come now to the second portion of our requirements&mdash;viz., how to
+obtain clearness in the appreciation of tactical principles.
+Fortunately they are few in number, but it is absolutely indispensable
+that every Cavalry Leader should most fully have mastered their
+meaning. No knowledge, however accurate, of the formal prescriptions
+of the Regulations can in any way compensate for a deficiency in this
+respect. They are certainly not indicated as 'General Principles' in
+the Regulations themselves, but may be read between the lines with
+more or less precision from its several paragraphs.</p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">For Cavalry versus Cavalry.</span></h3>
+
+<p>1. The German Cavalry must always endeavour to attack first in order
+to utilize to the utmost its superior 'moral,' and to catch the enemy
+in the act of deployment. If an opening for such an attack is offered,
+then even the risks of a long preliminary gallop must be accepted
+(Section 339).</p>
+
+<p>2. The leading lines must <i>always</i> be followed by supporting squadrons
+in adequate numbers (Section 843, and note also Section 346); that is
+to say, the enemy's Cavalry will always be attacked in two 'Lines,'
+unless special circumstances compel departure from this prescription.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page232" name="page232"></a>(p. 232)</span> 3. One must always endeavour to keep the last closed Reserve
+in hand, because in the mêlée the impetus of the last closed body
+generally decides. One must never, therefore, as long as one suspects
+that the enemy has still further Reserves in hand, engage a greater
+number of squadrons than he shows, in order to save up Reserves.</p>
+
+<p>4. Success must be looked for in the vehemence of the onslaught, not
+in superiority of numbers (Section 313). The greatest importance must
+be attached to cohesion; hence, unless necessary to surprise the enemy
+in the act of deployment, the 'gallop' should not be sounded too soon,
+or the 'charge' too late (Section 339).</p>
+
+<p>5. Outflanking detachments, or troops in the following lines, turn
+against the enemy's Reserves, or remain in reserve. They must never,
+except in most pressing circumstances, throw themselves into a mêlée
+already formed (Section 313). Following Lines must therefore not keep
+too close to the leading ones&mdash;a mistake often committed in peace&mdash;as
+otherwise they are committed to an attack in the same direction. They
+should therefore keep so far to the rear that they can overlook the
+line of collisions, and move in full freedom wherever their
+intervention is most called for. This important principle was always
+observed by Frederick the Great's Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>6. One must always try to cover at least one flank by obstacles of the
+ground or by one's own troops; but having satisfied this condition,
+then attack on the outer Lines, and endeavour to gain them by previous
+strategical directions.</p>
+
+<p>7. Superfluous forces, which do not follow the front as supporting
+squadrons, échelon themselves in general, forwards or backwards of the
+outer (unsupported) <span class="pagenum"><a id="page233" name="page233"></a>(p. 233)</span> wing, to protect one's own flank and
+threaten that of the enemy, also to be ready to engage the enemy's
+Reserves (Sections 323, 343, 345), or they are kept together as
+Reserves behind the fighting line, if it is not possible to foresee in
+what direction they may be required. They must not be too weak.</p>
+
+<p>8. Attempts to surround us made by the enemy are best met by a flank
+movement on the original line without change of front (<i>cf.</i> Section
+338). Defensive flanking cover, with the front turned outwards, gives
+the worst conceivable direction for attack, since in case of failure
+one is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body.</p>
+
+<p>9. Being in 'rendezvous formation,' the leading units are, if
+possible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have the
+shortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success if
+they are unnoticed by the enemy&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, can be executed under the
+concealment of the ground&mdash;or if the enemy has neither time nor space
+to encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemy
+to use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him to
+undertake man&oelig;uvres before attacking.</p>
+
+<p>10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneously
+must never be arranged so that a part follows in échelon
+backwards&mdash;they must always be disposed on the same alignment.</p>
+
+<p>11. In case of a mêlée, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily,
+the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, not
+directed against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, the
+less effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too often
+mere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page234" name="page234"></a>(p. 234)</span> 12. Out of every victorious mêlée one must endeavour, as soon
+as possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate
+pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed
+(Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the
+utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power&mdash;if
+possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed
+must be adequate for the attainment of this end.</p>
+
+
+<h3><span class="smcap">Cavalry against Infantry and Artillery.</span></h3>
+
+<p>1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different
+directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are
+always to be employed by 'Wings.'</p>
+
+<p>2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he
+should be attacked from the flank.</p>
+
+<p>3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even
+against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less
+shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines'
+(Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the
+leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire.</p>
+
+<p>4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the
+rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>5. Only <i>closed</i> 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on for
+success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of
+attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each
+individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for
+the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects
+in the defender's lines will hardly <span class="pagenum"><a id="page235" name="page235"></a>(p. 235)</span> be recognisable. Once
+within the zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to
+undertake those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so
+constantly in peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire
+line, and penetrates through as far as one can.</p>
+
+<p>6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks
+for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's
+Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up
+on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in
+order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities.</p>
+
+<p>8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible
+outside the principal fire zone of the enemy.</p>
+
+<p>9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature
+of the enemy's fire.</p>
+
+<p>To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant
+care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At
+the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them
+independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled
+to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander
+(Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate
+must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section
+317).</p>
+
+<p>To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient mastery
+of the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary to
+append a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentials
+of these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgment
+and independence of the junior officers.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page236" name="page236"></a>(p. 236)</span> Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined
+tactical situation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry
+is 'Independent,' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind the
+middle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on the
+enemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation,
+under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance of
+the enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formation
+to another&mdash;flank attacks, deployment from column of route or after
+the passage of defiles&mdash;must be practised. In all these exercises the
+point at issue must be clearly and comprehensively expressed. When one
+has attained a certain degree of security in the application of these
+principles, these exercises must be repeated under conditions of
+ever-increasing difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>The order for deployment must be given whilst the troops are in rapid
+motion. Observation, thought, and command when in full gallop have to
+be learnt; they do not come naturally. The most various movements,
+without command or bugle-call, must be executed from a message brought
+by a galloper. The troops will be practised against a suddenly
+appearing enemy on simple warnings such as 'Against Cavalry,' 'Against
+Infantry,' or merely on the sound 'Alert,' and pains must always be
+taken to see that the fundamentally right formation is adopted. In
+these exercises it must be left to the initiative of the subordinates
+to judge the situation for themselves, and always move to their proper
+place in the prescribed formation by the shortest path. Of course, in
+such movements the first principle is that the troops nearest the
+enemy furnish the first 'Line'; the remainder fall into their
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page237" name="page237"></a>(p. 237)</span> places as flank coverers, supporting squadrons or reserve.</p>
+
+<p>If, in this manner, we succeed in imparting to the junior Leaders
+thorough clearness as to the principles of the game, and to make them
+both quick and skilful in their appreciation of the situation, then
+the work of education on the drill ground is complete, and the troops
+are ready for exercises over country. No pains must be spared to
+separate the purely formal and ceremonial side of drill from the
+practical field-training. The former keeps always, as I have indicated
+in the first section, its full value for the creation of discipline
+and alertness, but leads only too easily to a routine which has
+nothing in common with the battle-field, and to that poverty-stricken
+'schematisimus' to which human nature so readily inclines.</p>
+
+<p>To the formal school of training, which I have hitherto only had in
+mind, a whole series of exercises must now be coupled, having for
+their purpose the application of the acquired forms and principles
+under all circumstances of the ground. But before we proceed to their
+detail consideration, we must answer the question how far the drill
+ground only suffices for the purpose of training. Generally, one can
+subscribe to General von Schlichting's principle&mdash;that forms and
+principles must be learnt in the drill book, but their application in
+action only in the open country. Tactical exercises on the drill
+ground, which have not for sole purposes to bring to expression
+certain formal principles, are always an evil, and mislead the troops.
+On the other hand, the principles of the tactical employment of
+Cavalry are particularly suited to representation on the drill
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page238" name="page238"></a>(p. 238)</span> ground because they are frequently of a purely formal
+nature.</p>
+
+<p>Keeping firmly to these established principles, then, to define the
+limits of usefulness of the drill ground, we have only to answer the
+question within what tactical units this formal drilling is still
+instructive or possible. My opinion is that the Brigade marks the
+highest limit, as within it all tactical principles find their
+application, and it is the largest body which can still in any way be
+handled by drill methods only. In the Division, and still more in the
+higher units, the strategical element preponderates so greatly that
+anything approaching real drill is out of the question, and all
+movements which they can execute are based on a complete command of
+these principles already. Of course, it is not intended to prohibit
+altogether the formal working together of these masses at the
+beginning in order to secure complete control and knowledge of them
+for further instruction; but one must not delay over these formal
+movements a moment longer than absolutely necessary, since the real
+centre of gravity lies in the practical training, and no doubt must be
+allowed to exist as to which exercises are intended as purely drill
+and which as practical preparation for War.</p>
+
+<p>Nor would I have it implied that brigade and regimental training
+should be entirely confined to the drill ground. On the contrary, the
+exercises over country are absolutely essential for practical
+training, and form the keystone of the whole edifice; but it seems to
+me not merely permissible but desirable that a portion of these
+exercises should be carried out on the drill ground in order to
+expedite this portion of the work. But all the more energetically must
+it be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page239" name="page239"></a>(p. 239)</span> insisted on that the remainder of the programme&mdash;the
+greater part in regard to time&mdash;should be executed, as far as
+possible, in variable ground, and that all exercises of the larger
+formations should be confined to such ground as we shall have to work
+over in War; not alone are they by far the most important for the
+higher tactical education of the Arm, but they cannot be represented
+on drill grounds at all; their whole essence is too entirely out of
+harmony with the conditions of a level plain.</p>
+
+<p>That the degree of cultivation existing in the vicinity of the
+garrisons may interfere seriously with these demands is obvious, and
+in the absence of the necessary spaces to work over we must fall back
+on the great training grounds (Truppenübungs Plätze); even the
+possibilities of these are very soon exhausted. But this, at least, is
+certain: that it is better to hold these exercises on these training
+grounds than to confine them exclusively to the drill field. Every
+effort must, therefore, be made to transfer all exercises of bodies
+above the regiment to the training grounds, on which one will always
+find some portion sufficiently suitable for the amount of drill
+required, and to extend the period of work on these grounds so that in
+all periods it will be possible to interpose between the drill days a
+sufficient number of field service days, always supposing that these
+training grounds offer sufficient diversity of contour, etc., for our
+purposes. Where this is not the case, then, in spite of the expense
+entailed by possible damage to crops, etc., suitable ground will have
+to be acquired. The extra cost of a few thousand pounds cannot be
+allowed to stand in the way of the adequate training of the Arm which,
+owing to its numerical strength, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page240" name="page240"></a>(p. 240)</span> relatively small in
+comparison with the magnitude of its tasks, is in the last resort
+dependent for its success on its internal excellence alone.</p>
+
+<p>As concerns the nature of these exercises, with special reference to
+the larger formations, first of all we must secure, by means of a
+graduated series, the certain co-operation of the constituent elements
+and of their leaders. Next, it must be insisted on that, for the
+further actual practical training, as well as for the purely formal
+drill, a systematic procedure should be the fundamental principle, so
+that all who participate in them may become clearly aware of the
+conditions of Warfare, and the means of dealing with them. It is
+evident that these conditions must form the foundation of the required
+system.</p>
+
+<p>As in War these are constantly changing, there seems a certain degree
+of contradiction in this demand; but in reality this is not the case,
+for no matter how the situation may vary, there will always be for its
+proper criticism some one chief point which will characterize the
+whole procedure, and thus be decisive for the systematic arrangement
+of these exercises.</p>
+
+<p>The latter can then be divided into two principal groups, according as
+to whether they are based on the assumption of a Cavalry force acting
+as an independent unit or in combination with the other Arms. The
+general conditions in both cases must be clearly brought out, and give
+them the point of attachment for the further subdivision of the
+exercises.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, with regard to the first case:</p>
+
+<p>Reconnaissance from a great distance. Deployment of one or more
+columns out of defiles or in open country. The land in the vicinity of
+the training ground can here be advantageously employed. It is
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page241" name="page241"></a>(p. 241)</span> not desirable to place the heads of the separate columns at
+once on the scene of action, using these points as starting-points for
+the forthcoming exercise. One must give the columns longer marches,
+and demand that&mdash;assisted by a properly-working mechanism for
+circulating information and orders&mdash;they should arrive at the point of
+action at the proper time, in spite of possible delays or interference
+on the road. The enemy, whether skeleton or otherwise, must, of
+course, be handled so that collision occurs within the limits of the
+training ground.</p>
+
+<p>Transition from the relations of advance (or rear) guard and main body
+to the order these assume on the battle-field.</p>
+
+<p>Attacks on a railway or hostile post.</p>
+
+<p>Government boundaries form no support for the flanks; these can only
+be considered as secure when protected by natural obstacles; hence, as
+a rule, measures must be taken to cover both flanks.</p>
+
+<p>Transition from the tactical to the strategical form after completion
+of an encounter; pursuit of the enemy with one fraction of the force,
+and continuation of the operation with the remainder; for the latter,
+only orders need be issued; but it is a matter of considerable
+importance how this division of force rendered necessary by the
+tactical encounters is arranged.</p>
+
+<p>Retreat after a repulse, in one or several columns.</p>
+
+<p>Retirement through defiles.</p>
+
+<p>In the second case:</p>
+
+<p>Selection of position on the battle-field in a proper relation to the
+fighting line, zone of danger, etc., and reconnaissance to front and
+flanks.</p>
+
+<p>Advance from a position in reserve to attack on the enemy's Cavalry
+round one wing of an Army.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page242" name="page242"></a>(p. 242)</span> Transition from a victorious charge against Cavalry to a
+further attack against the enemy's flank.</p>
+
+<p>Protection of the outer flank in either case.</p>
+
+<p>Retreat after defeat by the enemy's Cavalry to the protection of one's
+own Army wing.</p>
+
+<p>Advance for frontal attack against the enemy's line of battle; passage
+through the intervals of one's own Artillery and Cavalry. Protection
+of both flanks. Attack upon Infantry, Artillery, or both; disengaging
+a front attacked by Cavalry; combat against the latter.</p>
+
+<p>Flank attacks against retreating columns; ambushes at defiles.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, it is not intended in the above to lay down a hard-and-fast
+scheme of instruction, but only to indicate how the work to be done
+can be systematically arranged, and brought under one point of view,
+so that the lessons they are intended to convey become impressed on
+the mind. It is also evident that by the supposed conduct of the
+enemy, and the strength assigned to him, the utmost variation can be
+brought about in the grouping and representation of the several
+conditioning circumstances. In short, these exercises must be taken
+direct from the most diverse demands of War, and be based, as far as
+possible, on an assumed general situation. They must never be allowed
+to descend to mere fighting on horseback backwards and forwards across
+the training ground, and with often quite unnatural sequence of ideas,
+having no connection with the natural order of events. It is also most
+desirable that Infantry and additional Artillery should be made
+available for their execution.</p>
+
+<p>How far the dismounted action of the Arm is to be represented in these
+series will be gone into in the next section; but in all cases,
+whether working <span class="pagenum"><a id="page243" name="page243"></a>(p. 243)</span> mounted or on foot, the Leader must insist
+that the troops are handled in accordance with tactical precepts
+suitably applied in every case to the special circumstances of the
+given situation; and for this, even on the smallest training grounds,
+a proper utilization of the features of the country is essential.</p>
+
+<p>The desire to suit the formation to the ground; to carry out turning
+movements under cover; to find support for the flanks in natural
+obstacles, so that they cannot be surrounded; to choose the actual
+field of encounter, so that every advantage of the ground, the
+direction of the wind, of the sun, of covered approach, etc., all fall
+to our advantage; to deal with defiles and passes on correct
+principles; to utilize suitably strong defensive positions&mdash;all these
+must be clearly brought to light, and in the 'Critique' these points
+must be particularly borne in mind, for they are by no means
+universally current in the Cavalry, which has a tendency always and
+everywhere in peace to revert to the levellest ground obtainable. I
+have seen at Cavalry Division Exercises troops handled without the
+slightest regard to the nature of the country, and without the fact
+attracting attention at the 'Critique'; but these are conditions
+which, thanks to the energetic action of the Inspector-General, we may
+hope, are now everywhere overcome.</p>
+
+<p>It must, further, be brought out in the clearest possible manner under
+what conditions the employment of the units by 'Wings' is to be
+recommended, and under which others their employment in 'Lines'
+becomes necessary. The principles regulating this matter have already
+received attention in Book I., Chap. V. The freedom which, as we have
+seen, is given us by Section 346 of the Regulations must be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page244" name="page244"></a>(p. 244)</span>
+utilized to the fullest extent, for it alone answers to the demands of
+the modern battle-field.<a id="footnotetag27" name="footnotetag27"></a><a href="#footnote27" title="Go to footnote 27"><span class="smaller">[27]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>One last point requires further consideration, which is of
+considerable importance for Cavalry exercises&mdash;viz., the use of
+skeleton enemies.</p>
+
+<p>In no Arm does the skeleton enemy replace an actual enemy less than
+with the Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>If it rides the prescribed paces, then, as a consequence of the ease
+of movement and rapidity of deployment, it has an unfair advantage; if
+it rides slowly or halts altogether as a target, it makes things
+altogether too easy for the other side. Besides, it is a very much
+easier matter to judge a number of flags correctly than to estimate
+the actual strength of a rapidly moving body of horse.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page245" name="page245"></a>(p. 245)</span> Most movements in practice develop so quickly, and, owing to
+the ground, the direction in which the dust drives, etc., give such
+changing pictures, that it is most difficult to judge them accurately
+when one's self is in rapid motion.</p>
+
+<p>Often the Cavalry Commanders must decide, at least in general, on the
+instant, strength, tactical distribution, and direction of movement of
+a rapidly approaching enemy almost hidden in dense dust clouds; in the
+same instant he must make up his mind with reference to the conditions
+disclosed by the adversary and the nature of the ground, and issue his
+orders clearly and intelligibly. The demand is such a great one that
+both the physical and mental sight even of a born Leader needs
+constant practice against real objects in order to be in any way equal
+to it. Hence the necessity for bringing great Cavalry 'Masses'&mdash;at
+least, Divisions&mdash;as frequently as possible together to man&oelig;uvre
+against one another, and in such a manner that the strength of the
+opposing forces remains unknown, which, with a little management, can
+easily be arranged. If one knows beforehand the precise number of the
+opposing forces, as with Divisions of uniform composition will
+generally be the case, the matter is very much simplified indeed, but
+in proportion it is less practical, a consideration which still
+further supports our already formulated demand for Cavalry Divisions
+differing as far as possible in their composition.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, it is clear that the field is wide indeed which opens itself for
+the practical training of Cavalry as soon as one gets down to the
+bed-rock conditions which determine success in actual War, and frees
+one's self of all conventional suppositions. Whether we shall succeed
+in satisfying the new conditions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page246" name="page246"></a>(p. 246)</span> which press upon us from
+every side, taking into consideration the excellence of our existing
+material, equal to the highest performances, will depend in the main
+on the support of the superior authorities. For the manner in which
+Cavalry are inspected decides how they practise and what they learn,
+just as the way in which they are led determines what they can do.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page247" name="page247"></a>(p. 247)</span> CHAPTER IV</h2>
+
+<p class="title">TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING</p>
+
+
+<p>If in the previous pages it has been shown that increased attention
+must be devoted, in the training of our Cavalry for its mounted
+duties, to the changed conditions we shall encounter in modern War&mdash;if
+it is to do justice to itself on the battle-fields of the future&mdash;it
+must, on the other hand, be insisted on that the foundation available
+for such further effort is indeed an excellent one. Our squadrons are,
+in general, exceptionally well trained, capable of great endeavour,
+and well in the hands of their Commanders.</p>
+
+<p>It needs, therefore, in my opinion, but a slight change in the
+direction, the practical consideration of certain new points, and,
+above all, a wider range of practice in the higher Commands, to attain
+the very highest mark.</p>
+
+<p>With its dismounted action, however, it is a different matter.</p>
+
+<p>In spite of the increased importance this form of fighting has
+acquired in modern War, our Cavalry has not as yet paid anything like
+the amount of attention to the subject that it deserves. Almost
+everywhere it is treated as of quite minor importance, and many
+Cavalrymen still close their eyes to the view that, without a training
+at once as thorough and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page248" name="page248"></a>(p. 248)</span> earnest for dismounted action as
+that bestowed on the Arm to fit it for its mounted duties, modern
+Cavalry will hardly survive the trials it will encounter in the
+future.</p>
+
+<p>This idea rests on long-standing tradition, which is difficult to
+overcome. It is not so very long ago that on the rifle ranges some
+officers caused volleys to be fired in order to get through their
+cartridges so as to get back to quarters the sooner; but mainly, it is
+up-borne and continued by the fact that in the Inspections the
+superior Commanders generally treat dismounted fighting as a matter
+hardly worth their serious consideration, or judge it by
+false&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, too narrow&mdash;standards. Further, because in the
+man&oelig;uvres, as in the principal Cavalry exercises generally,
+situations requiring dismounted action for their due solution hardly
+ever arise; and lastly, because of the manner in which the whole
+subject is discussed in the Regulations themselves.</p>
+
+<p>The latter approach the question from a far narrower standpoint than I
+propose. They lay down quite openly that only under especially
+favourable circumstances can Cavalry hope to obtain easy and minor
+results from their carbine, fire, and that they are not in a position
+to enter on and carry through obstinate encounters.</p>
+
+<p>They lay principal stress on the defensive, and practically exclude
+the combat of larger 'Masses' altogether from their horizon.<a id="footnotetag28" name="footnotetag28"></a><a href="#footnote28" title="Go to footnote 28"><span class="smaller">[28]</span></a> In
+fact, they consider only the minimum conditions which the Cavalry must
+fulfil if it is not to fall into the background altogether.</p>
+
+<p>The final consequences of modern development, hardly even those
+resulting from the experiences of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page249" name="page249"></a>(p. 249)</span> 1870-1871, they have
+emphatically not yet even approached.</p>
+
+<p>Those who have studied the action of our Cavalry in that campaign
+thoroughly&mdash;as I myself had full opportunity of doing&mdash;will agree that
+we seldom had to have recourse to the carbine except on the offensive,
+as I have pointed out above, and only in the rarest cases did we need
+them for defensive purposes; and though in future against overwhelming
+forces this necessity may arise more frequently, still, as in 1870,
+this tendency towards a resolute offensive must always stand in the
+foreground. Nevertheless, the Regulations, in spite of all practical
+experience and theoretical considerations, lay down that in most cases
+fire action will be confined to the defensive (Cavalry Regulations,
+Section 357).</p>
+
+<p>It is quite natural that the troops themselves should not place their
+ideal higher than the Regulations require; all the more necessary,
+therefore, do I hold it to express with all emphasis that <i>our
+training must go far beyond the limits prescribed for it officially</i>
+if we are in any degree to satisfy the demands that War will make upon
+us. But for these, I hold our Cavalry thoroughly capable (when
+trained, understood), and even if they were not, one should never
+breathe such a suspicion to the men themselves. For should such an
+impression get abroad, one would dig at once the grave of initiative,
+daring, and resolution in the execution of all necessary undertakings.</p>
+
+<p>Keenness, the very life and soul of all Cavalry action, can only grow
+where the troops believe themselves fully equal to all eventualities.
+The idea, therefore, that Cavalry, even when dismounted, is not equal
+to any Infantry, must never be allowed to show <span class="pagenum"><a id="page250" name="page250"></a>(p. 250)</span> its head;
+rather, the men must be brought up in the conviction that, owing to
+their longer term of service, absence of reservists, etc., they are,
+unit for unit, more than a match for the best. Only when they feel
+this thoroughly will they develop their utmost fighting value. But it
+is indispensable that they should be thoroughly at home in all forms
+of the dismounted combat, for only then will they feel confidence in
+the weapons they carry.</p>
+
+<p>This ideal is as yet far from being attained in our service, and we
+must break entirely with the existing training and enter on new paths
+if it is in any way to be attained.</p>
+
+<p>For the tactical subdivision of the squadron, and the elementary forms
+of skirmishing action, the Regulations afford a sufficient foundation,
+but their application must be brought home to the men in a totally
+different manner to that at present in use.</p>
+
+<p>A few weeks after their arrival&mdash;at latest the beginning of
+November&mdash;the recruits must be taken out into the country and
+practised in utilizing all the advantages it offers, both as a group
+and in firing lines, and at the same time they must be taught with the
+carbine, aiming, judging distance, etc., always from the point of view
+of making each man a practical independent shot, without any
+theoretical mystification or pedantry. Soon after Christmas they must
+be sufficiently far advanced to commence practice on the range, which
+must be carried out with the utmost individual care.</p>
+
+<p><i>A considerable increase in the amount of ammunition is essential</i> to
+keep the men constantly in practice, so that there are no long pauses
+between the days set aside for shooting, that these are divided over
+the whole <span class="pagenum"><a id="page251" name="page251"></a>(p. 251)</span> year, and that firing at long distances and under
+field conditions can be carried out on a greater scale than at
+present. Before the beginning of the squadron drills, the men must be
+thoroughly at home both in mounting and dismounting for fire action;
+with this object, vaulting exercises with horses in full kit must be
+especially practised. They must also have progressed so far in the
+elementary preliminaries that tactical training of the dismounted
+squadron can be proceeded with at once; but the individual exercises
+must be continued throughout the whole year if knowledge of them is to
+pass over into the flesh and blood of the men.</p>
+
+<p>Special importance is to be attached to field firing, and for this in
+particular far more ammunition must be provided. In this most
+important respect Cavalry must be put on precisely the same footing as
+the Infantry, and be able to practise at real service targets exactly
+like the latter. But these exercises must not be begun until the men
+are thoroughly at home in judging distance and aiming, the class
+shooting is at an end, and the tactical training of the squadron
+completed.</p>
+
+<p>In aiming practices, low targets, representing men lying down, or
+well-covered shooting lines at great distances, are to be preferred;
+but in field firing the targets should be so disposed as to make the
+typical cases it is desired to represent, in which Cavalry will
+generally have to employ their firearms on service, sufficiently clear
+to the men's understanding&mdash;such, for instance, as the following:</p>
+
+<p>1. Attack of an occupied position.&mdash;Fire opens according to ground at
+1,100 to 1,200 yards; gradual advances by rushes to decisive
+distances, which, with <span class="pagenum"><a id="page252" name="page252"></a>(p. 252)</span> modern weapons and in open country,
+may be put at 700 to 900 yards. Development of the principal fire
+effort at this range, and beating down of the enemy's return fire.
+After attainment of the fire superiority, rapid advance by rushes, and
+in larger bodies. These rushes must be covered by the fire of those
+still lying down, until the point for the commencement of their
+assault is reached. Meanwhile, advance of the last Reserves, also by
+rushes, to the last fire position to give the final impulse for
+assault; assault; pursuit by fire. The strongest development possible
+of concentric fire consistent with the retention of adequate reserves
+to carry forward the fighting line.</p>
+
+<p>2. Defence of a position.&mdash;(<i>a</i>) Obstinate defence; object not to let
+the assailant come too close; hence from 1,100 yards a considerable
+development of fire power; continuation of the fight at decisive
+range, and, according to the result, either pursuit by fire or rapid
+evacuation of the position with ultimate sacrifice of the rearguard to
+be formed by the last reserve. (<i>b</i>) Defence without the intention of
+standing fast, either to gain time or compel the enemy to deploy.
+Hence, principal fire effort between 1,000 and 1,300 yards, and then
+gradual break-off of the fight before the enemy can approach too
+close.</p>
+
+<p>N.B. In practice a favourable position is essential.</p>
+
+<p>3. Surprise fire against marching columns or reserves whilst
+reconnoitring the enemy's approach, or whilst working round his flank
+and rear in the battle, or in pursuit without the intention of
+charging or defending one's self, mainly with the purpose of securing
+a momentary but considerable moral and material effect, then
+disappearing and renewing the attempt from another place, hence sudden
+'Mass' fire from 1,500 to <span class="pagenum"><a id="page253" name="page253"></a>(p. 253)</span> not less than 1,000 yards. At the
+same time, it must be explained that with our present carbine even a
+nominal effect can hardly be secured at the greater distances. Here I
+have anticipated the issue of a better weapon, an unconditional
+necessity for the Cavalry in any case.</p>
+
+<p>All these practices, however, will only then be of value when the
+officers possess a far more thorough knowledge of musketry and the
+capabilities of their weapon than is at present the case with us. It
+must therefore be insisted upon that, first our Regimental Commanders,
+and then the junior officers, should be ordered to attend the Infantry
+School of Musketry, in order that they may thoroughly master this new
+branch of knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>It will be asserted that the time for such thorough training in
+musketry cannot be found except at the cost of neglecting still more
+important branches of our service. But from my practical experience I
+cannot assent to this view. There is ample time, if it is not wasted
+on unpractical affairs.</p>
+
+<p>Judging distance and the use of ground can be most thoroughly taught
+during field-service practices, whilst the troops are on piquet, or
+the squadron at the reserve of the outposts, when the men who do not
+at the moment happen to be on patrol or vedette often lie about for
+hours doing nothing. We have then opportunities to take these matters
+in hand in the most practical manner; particularly the former, on
+which shooting in the field so essentially depends, and whose
+importance is so little appreciated by our Cavalry.</p>
+
+<p>The duties in the afternoon can also be much reduced to save time for
+the same purpose. For instance, let me call attention to the waste of
+time involved by <span class="pagenum"><a id="page254" name="page254"></a>(p. 254)</span> lengthy parades for lance exercise. No man
+can keep on at lance practice for an hour at a time. The consequence
+is that most of it is spent in standing easy, and therefore wasted.
+But the object&mdash;viz., of gradually strengthening the muscles of the arm
+and making the man handy with the weapon&mdash;can be equally well attained
+by a couple of parades for the purpose weekly. Perhaps still better,
+if before every afternoon parade and every mounted duty throughout the
+year the men are exercised with the lance for a few minutes only. In
+this manner the muscles of the arm will develop more rapidly and much
+time will be saved. Similarly, more can be gained by the method of
+imparting the instruction pursued, if attention is restrained to the
+thing that the man must know only, and everything superfluous, such as
+the learning by heart of the names of every portion of the weapon and
+so forth&mdash;at any rate with the recruits&mdash;is left out, and at the same
+time all such opportunities as occur in stable duty, on the march, in
+the cleaning hour, etc., are made the most of.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, speaking generally, not only is more time than is necessary
+spent on squadron drill, but also more than is advantageous. If one is
+constantly drilling for four weeks at a stretch, that is ample, and
+then there is time for a considerable extension of our shooting
+training; and if the inspection of the squadron is postponed for any
+particular reason, then shooting and field-service days can be
+interpolated, which in itself is a very good thing.</p>
+
+<p>If in these ways time for the elementary training for dismounted work
+and for shooting can be gained, it is still easier to arrange things
+for the foot training of the squadron as a unit. During the drill
+period the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page255" name="page255"></a>(p. 255)</span> pauses to rest the horses which must be granted
+to them can be utilized, and in the field-service exercise the schemes
+must often be framed so as to afford practice in dismounted operations
+in suitable ground. For the technical training of the men it is of
+particular importance that they should be accustomed, with immobile
+horses, to couple (? knee halter) them rapidly, and with mobile horses
+in bringing them up or retiring them.</p>
+
+<p>These two essential practices receive far too little attention in the
+German Cavalry. The chief difficulty of the latter lies in the way in
+which the spare lances which the man cannot hold fast in his hand fly
+backwards and forwards when in rapid motion; and the ease with which a
+lance can be jerked out of the shoe, and then trail on the ground can
+give rise to the gravest disorder, not to mention danger.</p>
+
+<p>It is most desirable that something should be done to remove this
+evil. The best, perhaps, would be to devise some arrangement by which
+each lance could be attached to its own horse. If that is possible,
+then the shoe must be made so deep that the lance cannot be thrown
+out. It is obvious that this problem will not be long in finding a
+solution as soon as attention is directed to its absolute necessity.</p>
+
+<p>The above will suffice to make it abundantly clear that as far as
+concerns the thorough training of the squadron for dismounted purposes
+no serious difficulties exist. These only begin when we come to the
+employment of larger forces, and principally because the Regulations
+give us no point of support for the purpose, whilst our Cavalry
+officers themselves are in no way prepared for this branch of their
+duties. For the employment of the tactical units and the fundamental
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page256" name="page256"></a>(p. 256)</span> principles governing their use in action we are therefore
+compelled to lean on the Infantry Regulations. But how many of our
+Cavalry officers are sufficiently acquainted with these to employ them
+practically? How is it to be expected that they should be, when nobody
+expects such knowledge of them?</p>
+
+<p>Hence to prepare for the training of the Leaders, officers of all
+ranks should be encouraged, whenever time and opportunity offers, to
+attend the more important tactical exercises of the Infantry. It would
+be better still if a sufficient number of Cavalry officers were to be
+attached&mdash;Lieutenants to Companies, senior officers to Battalions and
+Regiments&mdash;for suitable periods. But we must be quite clear in our
+minds that in this way we have at most an expedient to meet a period
+of transition, which will not suffice as a permanent remedy.</p>
+
+<p>It can never be considered otherwise than as a grave disadvantage when
+one Arm is compelled to seek the instruction necessary for its
+practical application in War from the Regulations and parade grounds
+of another, and more especially when, as in this case, the principles
+of the Cavalry are by no means applicable without modification to the
+other.</p>
+
+<p>Actually, the peculiarities and the duties of Cavalry render many
+variations from Infantry practice essential which require
+consideration. For instance, the Infantry company is told off in
+three, the dismounted squadron with mobile horses in two, with
+immobile ones in three fractions, which are always very much weaker
+than those of the Infantry, and, therefore, entail entirely different
+methods of husbanding their respective strengths. I can only consider
+it, therefore, as a most pressing need, and one which can no <span class="pagenum"><a id="page257" name="page257"></a>(p. 257)</span>
+longer be delayed, that the Cavalry Regulations should receive the
+necessary expansion to meet the different conditions, and that the
+practical training of the men on foot should be carried on in the same
+systematic way as their preparation for mounted duties.</p>
+
+<p>For these alterations in the Regulations the principles of the Company
+Column tactics must, in my opinion, form the general groundwork. A
+dismounted squadron with immobile horses bring 125, with mobile ones
+about 70, carbines in the line of fire; a regiment, therefore, from
+280 to 500&mdash;numbers, therefore, materially smaller than those of a
+company or battalion respectively, and their power in action is
+correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless, it will be well, with regard to
+the conditions of command, to treat the squadron tactically on the
+same footing as the company, and within these limits the principles
+governing extensions, depth and arrangement of the units for attack or
+defence must be laid down clear and distinct in the Regulations.</p>
+
+<p>These principles must be formulated in general on the lines which in
+discussing the question of tactical direction (Book I., Chap. V.) I
+have already attempted to develop. They must distinguish clearly
+between the cases of the detachment acting for itself alone or with
+either or both flanks protected, and lay down what distribution of
+force and apportionment of reserves is of decisive importance, and,
+therefore, requiring special instructions.</p>
+
+<p>The chief stress, in opposition to all previous prescriptions, must
+now be laid on the combat of the regiment and the brigade, as those
+units whose employment will be principally called for in modern
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page258" name="page258"></a>(p. 258)</span> War, and the principle of the offensive must be steadily
+kept in view. Fights for localities and about defiles require especial
+attention, and further, the conditions must be laid down by Regulation
+in which action is to be engaged in with mobile or immobile horses,
+and how these led horses are to be placed and protected.</p>
+
+<p>The present Regulations pass lightly over these questions, because, as
+I have pointed out, the standpoint from which they view the matter is
+fundamentally different. If, however, the increased importance of
+dismounted action is granted, then these points call for decision, and
+how they are to be dealt with as a matter of principle cannot be left
+to the goodwill of the Leader.</p>
+
+<p>A very important defect in the Regulations lies in the uncertainty it
+allows to exist as to the subdivision of the dismounted squadron, and
+how the skirmishers on dismounting are to form.</p>
+
+<p>According to Section 54 the squadron dismounted is divided into four
+troops of twelve files, or if the number of files does not suffice,
+into three troops. According to Section 87, eight to twelve men form a
+group, two or three groups a troop. In Section 155 the skirmishers of
+a troop when dismounted, with mobile horses, form one group. How many
+'troops' are to be formed is not indicated. 'The skirmishers fall in,
+in front of or by the side of the squadron, arranged as on horseback.'
+When working with immobile detachments, then, according to Section
+156, the skirmishers form in front or by the side of the squadrons in
+two ranks, and in how many groups or troops they are to be told off is
+not specified.</p>
+
+<p>The confusion here cannot be explained away, and <span class="pagenum"><a id="page259" name="page259"></a>(p. 259)</span> its
+consequences are frequently manifested. It must be laid down once for
+all that with mobile horses the dismounted men of a squadron form one
+troop in four groups, or with immobile ones two troops, also of four
+groups, and that they always form up in front of the squadrons, each
+troop in line, and one behind the other. Then everyone should know
+exactly what he has to do. It is altogether a misfortune that the
+dismounted squadron and the squadron on foot parade are two entirely
+different things. The latter is only required for ceremonial, and
+everything relating to it should be consigned to Part IV. of the
+Regulations (ceremonial, etc.); whilst the training of the squadron on
+foot should from the beginning be based on the needs of the squadron
+dismounted for action. Then there would be unity and system in the
+matter.</p>
+
+<p>Turning now to the practical education in larger units, it is
+necessary that the fundamental principles guiding the distribution of
+the men in attack or defence in the typical kinds of encounter should
+be taught and practised on the drill ground. The corresponding
+positions of the led horses must also be represented. As typical
+situations I would enumerate the following:</p>
+
+<p>Attack on localities, with or without the tendency to outflank.</p>
+
+<p>Attack by surprise, or after preparation.</p>
+
+<p>Defence of a section or of a locality, with known direction of the
+enemy's advance, or when the flanks may be threatened.</p>
+
+<p>Obstinate defence and maintenance of an isolated locality.</p>
+
+<p>Keeping open the entrance of a defile, and its utilization for a
+further offensive or retreat.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page260" name="page260"></a>(p. 260)</span> Deployment for surprise fire action, in order to disappear
+again immediately.</p>
+
+<p>Combined action of dismounted men with a mounted reserve, to ward off
+an attack or pursue a retreating enemy.</p>
+
+<p>In all these cases we require not only fundamentally different
+methods, but the methods themselves will be different according to
+whether the led horses are mobile or immobile, because in each case
+the strength of the tactical units is an entirely different one.</p>
+
+<p>These more or less elementary exercises, after the squadron
+inspections, both mounted and on foot, have been concluded, must be
+principally carried out in the regiment, which also when dismounted
+remains the true tactical unit of the Cavalry; but they must be
+continued by the brigade, in which the employment of the regiments
+formed side by side&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, by 'Wings'&mdash;must be represented under
+most varying circumstances.</p>
+
+<p>It appears to me that in the present state of our training it is
+exactly these elementary exercises which are the most important,
+because more than any others they are adapted to make clear and
+comprehensible the general conditions of successful fire employment.
+This comprehension, owing to the specifically Cavalry tendencies of
+our training, is in general almost entirely lacking in our Cavalry
+Commanders, so that in this direction the tactical education of our
+officers requires to be built up almost from the ground.</p>
+
+<p>For the rest, these exercises, like the corresponding ones when
+mounted, form only the basis for the true practical training, which it
+is not possible to impart on a drill ground, and requires, as a first
+condition, natural country, with all its changing features. For
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page261" name="page261"></a>(p. 261)</span> this reason it must be insisted on that a part of the
+regimental and brigade drill season should be spent in the country and
+on wide open spaces, with great variety of topographical expression.
+Where such are not to be had, then we must go to the troop training
+grounds; and hence the desire, above expressed, to extend as far as
+possible the period spent by the troops in the district or on these
+training grounds, and which I have based on the necessity for holding
+annual exercises for the higher units, in which all regiments should
+take part, finds additional support.</p>
+
+<p>Of course, this does not preclude the necessity of utilizing the
+surroundings of the garrisons to their utmost.</p>
+
+<p>As regards the arrangement and nature of these exercises, when working
+on the drill ground they will have to be inserted between the pauses
+in mounted movements necessary to rest the horses, but they must never
+on this account be allowed to be treated as of any less importance.
+When out in the country in larger and continuous movements, this
+opportunity, from the nature of things, will not be available.</p>
+
+<p>But it is precisely on the larger movements, if possible of whole
+Divisions, that the principal stress should be laid. In these the
+fight can be initiated under the most varied conditions, as a
+consequence of the direction of approach, and after its execution
+further operations arising out of the resulting situation can be set
+on foot, which, as we have seen (Book I., Chap. VI.), will generally
+entail the interaction of dismounted men with mounted reserves.</p>
+
+<p>Such exercises must naturally be laid out quite independently, and
+must take rank in the programmes for Brigade and Divisional drills on
+an equal footing <span class="pagenum"><a id="page262" name="page262"></a>(p. 262)</span> with the others. All Leaders must by
+degrees learn to control the whole of this section, and find
+themselves as much at home in every tactical situation on foot as if
+they were in the saddle.</p>
+
+<p>Hence great importance must be laid on the capacity for exercising
+independent resolve in all ranks of the subordinate officers; but,
+above all, they must be made to acquire that relentless tendency to go
+forward which is the very soul of their service, and generally the
+best adapted to its tactical requirements. Officers and men must
+realize that, once dismounted, victory alone can restore to them their
+horses. These latter must be so disposed that the impossibility of
+making use of them to break off the engagement springs in the eyes of
+every man. Only in this way can one get clear ideas: so long as the
+men do not look on their action on foot as in itself something
+serious, but are thinking principally of how to get back to their
+horses, as long as the Leader himself makes his action dependent on
+this possibility, for just so long will the men fail to put their
+whole soul into their work, and we shall obtain only partial results,
+with uncertain handling.</p>
+
+<p>This point of view must be constantly kept in mind throughout the
+training, and every effort be made to habituate the men to work up to
+it. But we shall only then succeed in breaking with the old
+traditions, and in fitting ourselves to meet the changed conditions of
+War, when the superior officers in their inspections attach <i>as much
+importance to the combat dismounted as they now do to the fight in the
+saddle</i>, and submit the Leaders to an equally searching and practical
+examination in each.</p>
+
+<p>Amongst these changed conditions we must include <span class="pagenum"><a id="page263" name="page263"></a>(p. 263)</span> the
+intelligent co-operation of the Artillery with the skirmishers, and
+also of the machine-guns, which latter may be expected to play a
+considerable part in defence, and also on occasions requiring the
+sudden development of a great intensity of fire. It is in this
+connection that lies (Book I., Chap. VI.) the chief importance of the
+Horse Artillery batteries, and yet in peace they have practically no
+opportunity to make themselves familiar with its peculiarities.</p>
+
+<p>Instead, we find in the great Cavalry man&oelig;uvres the constantly
+recurring tendency to theatrical display. Batteries accompany the
+formal drill evolutions of the Divisions&mdash;a performance which, in my
+opinion, has not the slightest practical value, but only subjects the
+horses to unnecessary exertion, and prevents the Leaders from devoting
+their attention to the really important elements of their
+business&mdash;the enemy and the nature of the ground. Against all such
+methods the sharpest protest should be entered.</p>
+
+<p>As long as formal evolutions are being practised, the Artillery has no
+place on the drill ground; the Cavalry only require its services when
+the tactical training commences, and the batteries belong to the
+places they would occupy in War&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, in the advance guard, or
+before the front. But, above all, they must be given opportunity to
+co-operate in the dismounted engagements, and not merely for their own
+training&mdash;though this, of course, is of importance&mdash;but principally
+for the education of the Cavalry officers, who must learn to employ
+the power of this Arm tactically, wait for its effect, and utilize it.</p>
+
+<p>That this object can only partially be obtained on the larger
+exercising grounds, and not at all on the drill grounds, is
+sufficiently obvious, and it is only <span class="pagenum"><a id="page264" name="page264"></a>(p. 264)</span> necessary to call to
+mind the attacks on villages, railway-stations, and the like, which
+are not usually found on such places to make the difficulty apparent.
+The keystone, therefore, for our purposes can only be found in the
+country itself, or in man&oelig;uvres, in which the application of every
+tactical form develops naturally, and finds its justification in the
+general scheme of operations, and in which the varying conditions are
+always creating new situations, more or less practical in their
+nature.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page265" name="page265"></a>(p. 265)</span> CHAPTER V</h2>
+
+<p class="title">FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MAN&OElig;UVRES</p>
+
+
+<p>If in the above sections we have dealt almost exclusively with the
+training of the Cavalry for actual combat, the cause lies in the
+nature of things. Victory whether in the shock of 'Masses' or even in
+the minor encounters of patrols, forms so much the foundation of every
+possible success, whether strategical or otherwise, that training with
+this end in view naturally comes first under our consideration.</p>
+
+<p>But as the chief importance of Cavalry no longer lies in its
+application on the battle-field, but rather in the solution of the
+strategical problems encountered in the progress of operations, so its
+training for battle is no longer the one aim and object, but only one
+element of its whole preparation for the field. Field service, its
+true duties in reconnaissance and strategic movements, must all be
+taken into account as factors of equal importance.</p>
+
+<p>I wish to bring this necessity most especially into the foreground,
+since hitherto, and particularly in view of the changed conditions of
+modern Warfare, it has not attracted anything approaching the
+attention it deserves.</p>
+
+<p>What do we practise in the field-service exercises and in the
+man&oelig;uvres beyond the normal Cavalry <span class="pagenum"><a id="page266" name="page266"></a>(p. 266)</span> versus Cavalry
+encounters? Principally, only formal outpost duties in combination
+with Infantry, the smallest incidents of War on the smallest scaled
+tactical scouting, and the participation of small Cavalry bodies in
+the encounter between the combined Arms&mdash;all matters which nowadays
+come within the sphere of the Divisional Cavalry; and, indeed, only
+then when the divisions to which they belong, or even smaller bodies,
+are operating independently, for the daily routine of the Divisional
+Cavalry in the enormous Armies of the present day will be on a most
+modest scale. At most in the Army Corps man&oelig;uvres we may get as far
+as the employment of Brigades, and perhaps to the shadowing of an
+enemy's line of advance.</p>
+
+<p>For the most important field of our enterprise, which is to be sought
+in the activity of the Independent Cavalry, all this is of small
+account. The real duties of Cavalry in War are only practised in peace
+on the most confined scale, and often not at all.</p>
+
+<p>Long marches of endurance, independent outposts, attack and defence of
+localities, the forcing of defiles, passage of rivers, etc., which are
+held by an enemy's dismounted men, reconnaissances in the widest
+sense, undertakings against the enemy's communications, pursuit,
+protracted engagements covering retreats, marches with columns and
+convoys, finally, the arrangement and execution of wide strategic
+movements under practical conditions, with accurate computation of
+time and space, the suitable employment of fighting power for the
+attainment of the strategical object, and the best strategic
+introduction of the consciously sought-out combat, all within the
+limits imposed by the magnitude of the masses handled, are <span class="pagenum"><a id="page267" name="page267"></a>(p. 267)</span>
+matters which in future will form the principal sum of all Cavalry
+activity, but find no place in our scheme of education.</p>
+
+<p>Even the Imperial Man&oelig;uvres do not meet the situation, because, in
+the first place, only comparatively few regiments are annually
+affected by them; and in the second, the forces are generally from the
+outset in such close proximity with one another that it is only,
+perhaps, on the first day that a suitable situation for their
+strategic employment may be said to arise at all.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst in this manner our whole training is adopted for conditions
+which in future campaigns can only arise exceptionally, whilst it
+practically ignores the true sphere of action of the Cavalry, we are
+working in a vicious circle of forms and misrepresentations which
+belong to an extinct era of Warfare, and which have long since ceased
+to have any but the smallest connection with the facts of stern
+reality.</p>
+
+<p>That things were no better in the period before the last Wars the
+negative results obtained by our Cavalry in 1866 and 1870 sufficiently
+prove. In no sphere of their action during these campaigns did they
+obtain the results the Arm is really capable of&mdash;not because the
+material in the ranks was inferior, but simply and solely because in
+equipment and training they had lagged behind the requirements of the
+time. These experiences should have been to us a serious warning not
+to fall into similar errors a second time; and yet at the present
+there is most serious danger that a future War may again find us
+regarding by far the most important branch of our duties from a
+standpoint which has long since passed away.</p>
+
+<p>The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me of <span class="pagenum"><a id="page268" name="page268"></a>(p. 268)</span> a
+twofold character. In the first place, the tasks accruing to the Arm
+in War do not receive either amongst its own officers, still less
+amongst those of the rest of the Army, their proper appreciation,
+because in this direction guidance and instruction are alike lacking;
+in the second, because most serious difficulties lie in the way of a
+practical adaptation of our training to modern conditions.</p>
+
+<p>In contradistinction to former times, the tasks which await the
+Cavalry lie principally in the sphere of strategical operations, and
+here is the root of our special difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>Great Armies, with their communications, reconnaissances and raids
+under really warlike conditions&mdash;that is to say, with their full
+allowance of trains and baggage&mdash;extended retreats with beaten troops,
+and the consequent pursuit, can only with difficulty be represented in
+peace, owing to their expense and the consideration necessary to be
+shown to local circumstances; but it is precisely in exercises of this
+description, which might give a really working representation of the
+conditions we shall be called upon to deal with, that circumstances
+leave us entirely deficient.</p>
+
+<p>Considering all these conditions, it must be recognised that an ideal
+method of instruction is practically beyond the bounds of the
+attainable; but for that very reason, in my opinion, we must pursue
+with all energy the practically possible, and for the unattainable
+find the best substitute we can.</p>
+
+<p>The first point which strikes one, and which lies at the bottom of all
+Cavalry undertakings, but in which no real education ever takes place,
+is the conduct of patrols, and particularly of those employed for
+reconnoitring purposes.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page269" name="page269"></a>(p. 269)</span> Instruction in the matter is certainly universal, and in the
+writing of reports the non-commissioned officers have considerable
+practice, but no uniform or systematic method or fixed principle is
+observed, and the practical performances of the men are subject to no
+superior check. It is left to the Leaders to apply practically their,
+for the most part, very nebulous, theoretical knowledge. The young
+officer in particular is altogether left to his own devices; no one
+takes the trouble to teach him what is essential, and yet he is
+expected to instruct his inferiors. The consequences are what might be
+anticipated. The performances of the patrols in covering distances are
+generally most commendable, but their reports most deficient. Seldom
+is a clear distinction drawn between the essential and the
+non-essential; the most trivial news is forwarded with the same
+expenditure of horses' power as matter of greatest moment; for most
+patrol Leaders find it very difficult, for want of an imagination
+trained by the study of military history, to think themselves into and
+see the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act and
+ride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Most
+information, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner;
+and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situation
+affords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point,
+and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, with
+a proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty change
+is imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundation
+of the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner.
+Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page270" name="page270"></a>(p. 270)</span> How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers,
+which forms the basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and
+imparted forms the subject of this next section. Here we can only
+consider what can and must be done within the regiments and brigades,
+and the following suggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty.</p>
+
+<p>In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, the
+Regimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commanders
+must take the training in hand. He must begin with a definite
+strategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise corresponding
+schemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood of
+the garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as in
+practice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity in
+which contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what the
+patrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, write
+their reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure.</p>
+
+<p>In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to be
+followed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts of
+exercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completely
+assimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particular
+importance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders never
+lose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations always
+to this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their true
+importance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what time
+the report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of use
+for the special operation.</p>
+
+<p>The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so often
+happened, it arrives too late. This the patrol <span class="pagenum"><a id="page271" name="page271"></a>(p. 271)</span> leader must
+keep in mind throughout his ride, and thence deduce the time at which
+his report must be despatched. He must also not only state clearly and
+precisely what he has seen, but call attention to its probable bearing
+on the operations, and inform his superior as to any peculiarities of
+the ground that may influence his future conduct. The object of the
+ride must be constantly in view, and the report not be overburdened
+with trivialities about the enemy's patrols and the like, which are
+often in War of quite negligible importance.</p>
+
+<p>If the Commanding Officer chooses to take the whole of his officers
+out to these expeditions, he is, of course, free to do so.</p>
+
+<p>The Squadron Commanders now take their subordinates in hand and pass
+on the instruction in the same spirit and manner, or hand over the
+matter to the senior lieutenant, if he has been thoroughly instructed
+for the purpose. In this manner a good uniform system of patrol
+leading based on sound principles can be attained if the Commanding
+Officer and his subordinates take all types of patrol duty into the
+sphere of their practical instruction. The Brigade Commander can use
+his discretion in its supervision, and give any assistance he may
+consider necessary.</p>
+
+<p>For the practical training of the men, the foundation must, of course,
+be found in the squadron. But the teaching must start from constantly
+changing standpoints, and must be systematically carried on in the
+higher Commands, which is at present not the case. For though at times
+such exercises are carried out by the regiments, there is no
+systematic progress, and no consequent development or representation
+of the most important elements, whilst higher up no attempt is
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page272" name="page272"></a>(p. 272)</span> even made to continue the instruction further. The influence
+of the Brigadier is confined in general to the detail education and
+drill, and though the Division is now and again drilled, it never
+'operates' in the strategical sense.</p>
+
+<p>As concerns the education of the squadron, this must from the very
+beginning be rooted in modern conditions, which in the first place
+demand the development in the man of the greatest possible
+individuality. War requires this, as well as the gift of grasp and
+resolution even in difficult situations, from every Cavalry soldier,
+from the highest to the lowest. The exercise, however, of such
+qualities can only be demanded from men who bring with them at least a
+certain degree of comprehension for the nature of War, and it is
+therefore of the utmost importance that this comprehension should be
+developed by suitable instruction. This is often sinned against,
+because sufficient attention is not paid to such instruction, and also
+because we still work on out-of-date lines, and without any
+well-defined principles. In my opinion the recruit must not be
+overwhelmed with a whole mass of thoroughly unpractical knowledge.</p>
+
+<p>In this period of education one must limit the scope to only the most
+important and necessary matters, but teach these so that the men
+understand them clearly and thoroughly.</p>
+
+<p>In the latter years one can build out systematically on this
+foundation. Thus I consider it quite unnecessary to harass the recruit
+with long-winded explanations of the military virtues&mdash;loyalty,
+obedience, and courage&mdash;or with long lists of different salutes to be
+given, the recipients of which never come within his ken. It is quite
+superfluous to teach them the different <span class="pagenum"><a id="page273" name="page273"></a>(p. 273)</span> parts of the lock of
+the carbine and their mutual interaction, all about stable duty and
+guard mounting. Even the theoretical instruction about the
+organization of the Army, treatment of sore backs, horse sickness,
+etc., can be reduced to much smaller dimensions than at present.
+Stable work and guard duties, and so forth, a man learns much quicker
+and better from daily practice. On the other hand, the time gained by
+curtailing these matters must be used most zealously to teach him what
+he absolutely must know for War. That is to say, the simplest
+principles of Field Service, the composition of mixed detachments,
+practical shooting, and the exterior treatment of the carbine. The
+instruction in Field Service, which interests us here the most, can,
+for the recruits, be kept down to very narrow limits. The principles
+to be observed in placing pickets, vedettes, etc., he can very well do
+without. On the other hand, he must know thoroughly those things which
+he will have to do himself&mdash;his duty on patrols, or as bearer of a
+message, or orderly, also the general connection of the military
+conditions amongst which he will have to move or to notice amongst the
+enemy, such as organization of the troops, arrangement of the
+outposts, relation of the commands, plan and appearance of
+entrenchments, shelter trenches, gun epaulments, cover, etc.<a id="footnotetag29" name="footnotetag29"></a><a href="#footnote29" title="Go to footnote 29"><span class="smaller">[29]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>He must know, too, that if taken prisoner, he must give no correct
+answers as to anything concerning his own Army.</p>
+
+<p>It is quite possible to awaken the intellectual faculties of the man
+and to develop them even within these narrow limits, for the more
+tersely the facts are stated, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page274" name="page274"></a>(p. 274)</span> and the more thorough the
+instructions, the more is his thinking power stimulated, whereas a
+mass of material to be absorbed merely confuses him. This intellectual
+pressure of the instructor must not, of course, be limited solely to
+the lesson hour, but he must seize every possible opportunity to
+assert his influence. Especial attention is to be directed to
+habituate the men to carry in their minds verbal messages for a
+considerable period, and then to repeat them clearly and concisely. It
+is of great assistance to the intellectual development of the men if
+they are compelled always to express themselves in grammatically
+complete sentences, instead of in broken phrases; but I should
+consider it as a serious error to attempt to teach the recruit the
+neighbourhood of the garrison, both on the map and on the ground. For
+in this way one deprives the man of one of his few opportunities which
+occur to him during his whole service of learning to find his way in
+unknown country, and thus to develop the instinct of finding his way,
+which requires considerable practice.</p>
+
+<p>That this faculty is one of the most important in War-time for every
+Cavalry soldier can hardly be open to doubt. From the same point of
+view I must enter a protest against the absurd misuse of maps in
+Peace-time. Of course, the men, and particularly the patrol leaders,
+must understand how to read a map and find their way by it, and all
+non-commissioned officers and men out of their first year's service
+must be trained in so doing, but it is altogether impractical, and
+therefore a bad preparation for war, if in the interests of better
+man&oelig;uvre results maps are issued in uncounted numbers even on the
+larger scales, so that not only every patrol leader, but every
+orderly, can obtain one <span class="pagenum"><a id="page275" name="page275"></a>(p. 275)</span> for a couple of pence. In War, and
+particularly in an enemy's country, such extravagance in their issue
+is obviously out of the question.</p>
+
+<p>The education of the non-commissioned officers must also be
+systematically set in hand. They should be divided, according to their
+intelligence and performances, in different groups&mdash;two will generally
+suffice&mdash;and the abler men should not only receive instruction for the
+higher branches of their duties, but must also be rationally taught
+how to teach others. The non-commissioned officers' school must also
+receive thorough attention; if it is not conducted seriously, it
+involves a scandalous waste of time, but if the men receive a really
+earnest and stimulating instruction, it helps most materially in their
+intellectual development, and thus reacts most favourably on their
+military capacity.</p>
+
+<p>As concerns the practical exercises of the squadron, these must, as
+far as possible, cut themselves free from the spirit of minor tactics,
+and work as directly as they can towards the requirements of War on a
+great scale. The destruction of railways and bridges, service on
+requisitioning duties, etc., must naturally continue to be practised;
+for though in spirit they belong to minor tactics, they are also
+required in great Wars. But, above all, one must break with the old
+one-sided schemes of outpost squadron&mdash;officers and non-commissioned
+officers, posts and vedettes&mdash;and the whole subject must be treated on
+wider lines more in accordance with the changing requirements of
+active service. The different purposes for which localities are held
+and utilized in different manners, the use of woods, and waves of the
+ground, must all be drawn most thoroughly into the scope of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page276" name="page276"></a>(p. 276)</span> exercises; and whilst still at squadron work the men must be
+made clearly to understand the difference between mixed outposts and
+those of Independent Cavalry, and the chief importance of their whole
+training in this branch of their duty must be laid on the latter,
+which is even nowadays not yet sufficiently the case. Further, there
+must be thorough training in duties of security and reconnoitring at
+night, and in particular of the defence of cantonments against
+nocturnal attacks.</p>
+
+<p>In general, it must be clearly understood that all squadron training
+can only be elementary, and hence must be regarded as a stepping-stone
+towards the whole field-service training. Where this is left
+altogether to the squadrons, the men never have the opportunity of
+becoming acquainted with the conditions of time and space which limit
+their action when in large bodies. Continuous exercises also, always
+in the same units, lead only too easily to empty repetition and many
+misunderstandings. The Squadron Field Service training must,
+therefore, be limited in time, and as soon as it is completed it must
+be continued in the regiment, and where the conditions at all
+allow&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, where the garrisons are not too far apart&mdash;it must
+culminate in brigade work.</p>
+
+<p>The 'training'&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the condition of the horses-must by this time
+have made such progress that marches of twenty to thirty miles for the
+main body are well within their power. Here a wide and profitable
+field opens for the Brigade Commander, but it is important in every
+case&mdash;security, screening, reconnaissance, raid, or surprise&mdash;to bring
+out systematically and clearly the essential difference of procedure
+required, so that all grades of Leaders learn <span class="pagenum"><a id="page277" name="page277"></a>(p. 277)</span> to realize the
+fundamental distinction which exists between these various forms of
+their several duties.</p>
+
+<p>It is also equally important that in each Command operations in
+several detachments, the regulation of their marching speed, their
+combined action in the fight, the proper working of the arrangements
+for collecting information or transmitting orders, should be practised
+again and again till certainty in their interaction is secured.</p>
+
+<p>It is further necessary to call attention to the necessity, in the
+interests of a prudent economy of one's forces, to arrange the patrol
+service systematically, not only as regards the sphere of action
+allotted to each, but also as to the time of their departure.</p>
+
+<p>Thus, in the march of a single body, the duty of attending to its
+security may be assigned to the troops themselves, whilst the
+reconnoitring task is allotted by the officer directing the
+operations; or, in the case of separate bodies, that each receives its
+own particular scouting mission, with which, then, the Director
+refrains from interfering. Otherwise it may easily happen that patrols
+are despatched for the same purpose by different Commanders, with a
+corresponding waste of power and the risks of leaving gaps in the
+whole line.</p>
+
+<p>The Commanders of mixed detachments should also make this need of
+systematic procedure clear to themselves, and either leave the whole
+duty of reconnaissance in the hands of the Cavalry, or if they elect
+to retain certain portions of the work in their own hands they should
+inform the Cavalry Commander of the fact, and not interfere afterwards
+with his arrangements, or fail to keep him acquainted with the
+measures they have themselves taken.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page278" name="page278"></a>(p. 278)</span> The first course is correct in principle, and will always
+give the best results when a competent Cavalry officer is kept
+sufficiently acquainted with the views of his superior, and made
+personally responsible for results.</p>
+
+<p>Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms,
+these, too, must lead into different paths from those at present
+pursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry for
+reconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalry
+itself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance,
+except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization and
+development of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinion
+when viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalry
+with companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all,
+and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important to
+secure practice for the troops in judging the appearance of
+considerable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position,
+and thence deducing their probable numerical strength.</p>
+
+<p>The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted a
+scale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and by
+arrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often be
+made. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade to
+further the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, although
+such exercises can in no way replace the actual man&oelig;uvring of large
+bodies.</p>
+
+<p>It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training of
+the Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in the
+strategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units.
+Even the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page279" name="page279"></a>(p. 279)</span> man&oelig;uvres, important as they undoubtedly are,
+can never replace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing
+of equal importance with the great drill practices of the higher
+units, since the strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander
+of the Army depends on its intelligent handling in this particular
+field, and it is here that the difficulties to be overcome are
+especially great.</p>
+
+<p>Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of the
+several problems is to be produced.</p>
+
+<p>It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible,
+trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should be
+employed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents;
+otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of
+under-estimating the difficulties with which in real War we shall have
+to contend. But to guard against this self-deception should be the end
+and object of all our efforts.</p>
+
+<p>It will, therefore, be necessary to calculate distance and the width
+of areas to be swept over, with reference to modern conditions, and
+not to work on the scale that sufficed us in France in 1870. The
+telegraph must also be taken into account, and it must be strictly
+insisted on that it is only to be used for such reports and in such
+cases in which it would be available on service. It should, therefore,
+be laid down beforehand which side is to be considered as in an
+enemy's country. For the representation of following portions of the
+Army, flag columns and peace garrisons may be employed, as this is of
+the utmost importance for the systematic practice of the patrol
+service.</p>
+
+<p>The formation of territorial Cavalry Inspections <span class="pagenum"><a id="page280" name="page280"></a>(p. 280)</span> and
+Sub-Inspections, already advocated above, would give the necessary
+foundation for our purposes. After finding the Divisional Cavalry
+necessary on a War strength, the remaining regiments in their several
+districts could be formed in Divisions and Corps of always varying
+composition in order to carry out Independent Cavalry man&oelig;uvres.</p>
+
+<p>To practise the participation of the other Arms, corresponding
+arrangements with the adjacent Corps Commanders could be made, so that
+their annual man&oelig;uvres could work in with the Cavalry scheme, but
+the strategic side should have the preference. Operations would not
+always culminate in a great Cavalry engagement, but a skilful conduct
+of the man&oelig;uvres in practical country would generally insure such
+encounters without too great a charge for agricultural compensation.</p>
+
+<p>I do not believe that such a scheme, though it would certainly mean a
+complete break with established Routine, would materially increase the
+cost of the man&oelig;uvres. The damage, now disseminated by the many
+regiments without any corresponding gain to their efficiency, would
+now be concentrated on the same district, but the gain to the Arm
+itself, as well as for the whole Army, would be both decisive and
+epoch-making.</p>
+
+<p>Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seems
+to me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly count
+on seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile we
+must search for expedients.</p>
+
+<p>From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the period
+allotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such a
+degree that Field-Service days <span class="pagenum"><a id="page281" name="page281"></a>(p. 281)</span> can be interposed between the
+drill days, in which at least the combined action of masses within the
+limits of Field-Service exercises can be practised.</p>
+
+<p>The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrifice
+a part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in the
+interest of the proposed strategic man&oelig;uvres, and whether the
+advantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any rate
+partially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to a
+certain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up our
+minds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the present
+exercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed in
+groups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carried
+out without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are so
+managed that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters,
+during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very small
+cost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not at
+all necessary to carry them through to their culmination in an
+engagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, when
+necessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery for
+reconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation,
+the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonable
+limits.</p>
+
+<p>An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regiments
+in Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those in
+Saarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forces
+are constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by which
+each element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screen
+covering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night the
+points at <span class="pagenum"><a id="page282" name="page282"></a>(p. 282)</span> which they are actually quartered. The distances
+of the places named one from another are such that they fairly
+represent a possible situation in War, and a single day's march might
+well bring them into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could
+easily be found in the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and
+the Infantry in the respective garrisons might represent the heads of
+the following Armies' columns without undue interference with their
+programme of training. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons
+only per regiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train,
+the point being not so much the number of such waggons provided as the
+service loading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night
+preceding the march, outposts could be established, and the service of
+exploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercise
+for the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low cost
+and with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally be
+conducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the example
+shows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easily
+organized.<a id="footnotetag30" name="footnotetag30"></a><a href="#footnote30" title="Go to footnote 30"><span class="smaller">[30]</span></a></p>
+
+<p>Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into account
+the numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in future
+Warfare, it would be <span class="pagenum"><a id="page283" name="page283"></a>(p. 283)</span> a great gain to the Arm if in the
+man&oelig;uvres, in which its action in combination with the other Arms
+should be taught, this point of view was brought more into the
+foreground.</p>
+
+<p>Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Arms
+should be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather is
+whether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; the
+importance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background,
+and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses.'
+Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficiently
+practised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising the
+large units are far more difficult to find.</p>
+
+<p>I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms if
+present Brigade man&oelig;uvres, with all their superannuated customs,
+were abolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps man&oelig;uvres.
+The Cavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its
+point of view these man&oelig;uvres could be made far more practical, and
+it would be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in
+accordance with reality.</p>
+
+<p>It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry should
+have opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action on
+a grand scale. At present these only arise in the man&oelig;uvres with
+mixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry man&oelig;uvres they are
+difficult of representation.</p>
+
+<p>The Director of the man&oelig;uvres can also do much to make the
+operations instructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the
+interests of all engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon
+the Cavalry are kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page284" name="page284"></a>(p. 284)</span> that patrols are despatched at far too late an hour to make
+it possible for their reports to arrive in time. Commanders, again,
+frequently wish to be informed as to the exact position of every
+battalion on the other side, although they generally know his total
+force with accuracy, or they want to know the exact strength of the
+Garrison holding a certain village or locality, as if Cavalry could
+under any circumstances supply such information; and if at night no
+sketch of the enemy's outpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are
+held to have failed in their duty. All these demands are, in my
+opinion, entirely unpractical; in War one never has such precise
+information, and no rational man dreams of wasting the strength of his
+Cavalry in endeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere
+remnants of the Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme
+case when perhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly
+unpractical to require under all circumstances complete information as
+to the progress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is
+impossible, unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not
+merely are such demands unpractical, but they exercise a most
+prejudicial effect, for too accurate and too detailed information gets
+the Generals into bad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is
+well-nigh ruined. Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men
+must not be afraid to keep well up to the enemy, and bring back
+intelligence even out of the zone of his fire; but, generally,
+reliable observations are only made out of range. The Cavalry must
+learn principally to judge the enemy's arrangements from a distance;
+they must direct their attention to the essential only, and not waste
+their time in unnecessary <span class="pagenum"><a id="page285" name="page285"></a>(p. 285)</span> side issues. If justice is to be
+done to these requirements, it is quite impossible to collect all the
+information the Generals so frequently require. Thus they get in the
+habit of observing in an unpractical manner, and the whole of this
+most important branch of their education suffers accordingly. So much
+is this the case that nowadays the patrol leaders often exchange
+mutual confidences to one another, as it is practically impossible,
+owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain the required
+information otherwise, and they consider it better to get it in this
+manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats of riding.</p>
+
+<p>Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the training
+when kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates.</p>
+
+<p>Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic element
+in which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is the
+constant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of the
+enemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning element
+in which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work,
+and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in our
+Peace-time training.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+<h2 class="b1"><span class="pagenum"><a id="page286" name="page286"></a>(p. 286)</span> CHAPTER VI</h2>
+
+<p class="title">THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS</p>
+
+
+<p>The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the
+various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions
+of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon
+the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an
+absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready
+to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of
+the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony
+with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods
+of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able
+to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with
+swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in
+addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess
+inexhaustible activity of mind and body.</p>
+
+<p>If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders
+of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified
+in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental
+qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various
+problems with which they will be confronted, <span class="pagenum"><a id="page287" name="page287"></a>(p. 287)</span> an immensely
+increased amount of military knowledge and executive ability.</p>
+
+<p>The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry
+engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of
+the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above,
+and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole
+situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such
+moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education
+which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness,
+and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the
+great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with
+accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of
+an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results
+deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by
+Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a
+large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be
+reported&mdash;deductions will not be drawn. There will be no
+discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the
+Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to
+the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what
+it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform.
+They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce
+the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to
+divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to
+determine the most important points and directions in which to follow
+up any available clue.</p>
+
+<p>If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied <span class="pagenum"><a id="page288" name="page288"></a>(p. 288)</span> position,
+he should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to
+determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point
+to direct his further advance.</p>
+
+<p>If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to
+decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their
+subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other
+direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest
+importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in
+face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.</p>
+
+<p>Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all
+points to the same conclusion&mdash;viz., that a comprehensive military
+education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the
+Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The
+history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable
+examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the
+future.</p>
+
+<p>Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only&mdash;the point was
+to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or
+were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose
+doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence,
+seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would
+have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for
+the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction
+in which the troops they saw were moving&mdash;a matter of most vital
+importance&mdash;or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or
+reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were
+all moving in the immediate <span class="pagenum"><a id="page289" name="page289"></a>(p. 289)</span> vicinity, and might easily have
+ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus,
+because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led
+to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence&mdash;the
+actual position of the French right flank&mdash;could not be determined
+until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire
+misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have
+repeated themselves times without number.</p>
+
+<p>When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable
+information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a
+proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is
+of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently
+guarantee their competence.</p>
+
+<p>The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is
+on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these
+schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the
+more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry
+Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the
+practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with
+nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training.
+Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details,
+which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the
+whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and
+in the few great man&oelig;uvres in which an Officer might find an
+opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in
+the foundation necessary to make full use of it.</p>
+
+<p>The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted <span class="pagenum"><a id="page290" name="page290"></a>(p. 290)</span> to
+the needs of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find
+himself in situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for
+their solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military
+authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical
+and practical education.</p>
+
+<p>The latter could best be provided for in connection with the
+development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt
+with above. The former&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, the scientific side&mdash;could be most
+adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of
+the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for
+the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have
+spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their
+own units.</p>
+
+<p>If on the broader foundations of the military sciences&mdash;principally
+those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and
+Tactics&mdash;thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by
+practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the
+training were modified in conformity with the views therein already
+expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst
+our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs
+only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be
+achieved.</p>
+
+<p>Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing
+School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of
+Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to
+the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably
+to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page291" name="page291"></a>(p. 291)</span> So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal,
+we must strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our
+existing educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no
+delay.</p>
+
+<p>We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers'
+training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they
+are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical
+relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an
+enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the
+other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given
+strategical situation.</p>
+
+<p>All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.</p>
+
+<p>One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual
+horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every
+circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert
+force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how
+to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre
+before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results
+than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.</p>
+
+<p>Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other
+soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress
+of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men
+most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.</p>
+
+<p>Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard
+of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the
+remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page292" name="page292"></a>(p. 292)</span> unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the
+exercises in Field-Service duties, in man&oelig;uvres and Cavalry
+exercises, always provided that these are all conducted in conformity
+with the spirit of modern operations. But since we have seen this
+practical duty, as at present carried on, nowhere meets the above
+conditions, we must find a supplement to it by recourse to systematic
+training in Field-Service rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for
+which, of course, the necessary funds must be provided.</p>
+
+<p>These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through
+each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being
+enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.</p>
+
+<p>But they will only then possess value and importance when based on
+connected military situations arising from the operations of modern
+Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution
+of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their
+mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own
+Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is
+necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he
+has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me,
+therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with
+these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all
+interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever
+placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate
+conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations,
+to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the
+framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently
+trivial in themselves, can mount up in the <span class="pagenum"><a id="page293" name="page293"></a>(p. 293)</span> mass until they
+may jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.</p>
+
+<p>The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider
+becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative
+importance of each individual link in the chain.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page294" name="page294"></a>(p. 294)</span> CONCLUSION</h2>
+
+
+<p>If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief
+results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:</p>
+
+<p>The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen
+materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced
+into the conduct of modern War&mdash;viz., those due to changes in the
+composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc.
+Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the
+battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.</p>
+
+<p>Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal
+importance. Great results&mdash;whether strategical or tactical&mdash;can only
+be obtained by the employment of 'Masses.'</p>
+
+<p>The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both
+organic, strategic, and tactical.</p>
+
+<p>The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions,
+have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has
+remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence
+we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it
+must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of
+which the following are the most important items:</p>
+
+<p>Increase in the price paid for our remounts.</p>
+
+<p><span class="pagenum"><a id="page295" name="page295"></a>(p. 295)</span> Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible,
+on the lines of our existing and well-tried organization.</p>
+
+<p>Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically
+equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.</p>
+
+<p>Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in
+peace and War.</p>
+
+<p>Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.</p>
+
+<p>Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding
+increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true
+quick-firer.</p>
+
+<p>Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the
+supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary
+strategical mobility.</p>
+
+<p>Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both
+individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the
+horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.</p>
+
+<p>Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field
+service, to fit us for employment in 'Masses,' and to meet the new
+strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must
+be taken into account.</p>
+
+<p>Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only
+simplification in many details, but the addition of sections
+developing the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the several
+units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action,
+and more precise formulation of tactical principles.</p>
+
+<p>Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance,
+<span class="pagenum"><a id="page296" name="page296"></a>(p. 296)</span> security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service
+regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where
+practicable.</p>
+
+<p>A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers;
+creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on
+scientific principles.</p>
+
+<p>Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts,
+to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions),
+which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.</p>
+
+<p>Annual Cavalry Man&oelig;uvres.</p>
+
+<p>Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare.</p>
+
+<p>This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a
+few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a
+single stroke of the pen&mdash;indeed, it needs a considerable degree of
+optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am
+equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the
+extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our
+minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall
+short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.</p>
+
+<p>Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be
+attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms,
+safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain
+victory.</p>
+
+<p>Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races
+which will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' which
+seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but
+rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the
+evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of
+force&mdash;fighting power&mdash;which conditions <span class="pagenum"><a id="page297" name="page297"></a>(p. 297)</span> the development of
+all other social interests. If we possess the 'force,' the rest will
+follow. Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our
+power the utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our
+own minds as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in
+any other 'act of human intercourse,' is the 'best' ever reached by
+mortal executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of
+destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made
+the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.</p>
+
+<p>In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us,
+unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart
+and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be
+encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we
+shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: <i>Per aspera
+ad Astra</i>.<a href="#toc"><span class="small">[Back to Contents]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+<h2><span class="pagenum"><a id="page298" name="page298"></a>(p. 298)</span> INDEX</h2>
+
+<div class="index">
+
+<p>
+  <span class="min2em">Action,</span> typical case of Cavalry,
+<a href="#page225">225</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">example of Mars la Tour,</span>
+<a href="#page225">225</a> (footnote)<br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Advance,</span> time to be selected for,
+<a href="#page032">32</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">rate of,</span>
+<a href="#page121">121</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of enemy marks period for pushing forward,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Advantages,</span> in War, must be fought for,
+<a href="#page029">29</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Ammunition,</span> carbine, insufficiency of,
+<a href="#page175">175</a>,
+<a href="#page179">179</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">increase in amount of,</span> for practice,
+<a href="#page250">250</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Ammunition columns,</span> special, required for Cavalry,
+<a href="#page179">179</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Armies,</span> change of character of modern,
+<a href="#page003">3</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Art of War,</span> new conditions in,
+<a href="#page003">3</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">their effect on Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page009">9</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">result of first engagement of overwhelming importance,</span>
+<a href="#page012">12</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Artillery,</span> effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods,
+<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">power of,</span> can be over-estimated,
+<a href="#page054">54</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">support of dismounted Cavalry by,</span>
+<a href="#page060">60</a>,
+<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">protection of,</span>
+<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action,</span>
+<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">position for,</span>
+<a href="#page101">101</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">one battery per brigade recommended,</span>
+<a href="#page179">179</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">quick-firing guns wanted,</span>
+<a href="#page180">180</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">should be attacked from flank,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">co-operation in Cavalry training,</span>
+<a href="#page263">263</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Attack,</span> stereotyped forms of, prohibited,
+<a href="#page072">72</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">on flank when advisable,</span>
+<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">simultaneous, on front and flank,</span>
+<a href="#page079">79</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during,</span>
+<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">by dismounted troops,</span>
+<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">change of direction of, when permissible,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of vehemence of onslaught,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">formation for, against Infantry and Artillery,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">distribution and duties of dismounted men in,</span>
+<a href="#page259">259</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Baggage-train should be represented at man&oelig;uvres,</span>
+<a href="#page279">279</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Bapaume, Battle of,</span>
+<a href="#page057">57</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Barley as forage,</span>
+<a href="#page206">206</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Battle-field, place of Cavalry in,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>,
+<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">case of Mars la Tour,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">best formation for,</span>
+<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">decided by circumstances of case,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>,
+<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">simple formations alone applicable on,</span>
+<a href="#page225">225</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Mars la Tour,</span>
+<a href="#page225">225</a> (footnote)<br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Beans as a ration,</span>
+<a href="#page205">205</a><br>
+
+<a id="bit" name="bit"></a>
+  <span class="min2em">Bit and bridoon, merits of,</span>
+<a href="#page192">192</a>,
+<a href="#page197">197</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Bivouac, disadvantages of,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a>,
+<a href="#page125">125</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Breaking in.</span> See <a href="#training">'Training'</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Bridging material,</span> sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with small streams, etc.,
+<a href="#page175">175</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Bridoon.</span> See <a href="#bit">'Bit'</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Brigade,</span> highest unit for drill purposes,
+<a href="#page238">238</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Bugle calls,</span> when allowable,
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">value of,</span>
+<a href="#page230">230</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">regimental calls,</span>
+<a href="#page230">230</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min2em">movements to be practised without,</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Cantonments,</span> advantages of providing,
+<a href="#page125">125</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Carbine,</span> method of attachment,
+<a href="#page176">176</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">improved pattern needed,</span>
+<a href="#page177">177</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Cartridges,</span> method of carrying,
+<a href="#page177">177</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,'</span>
+<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878,</span>
+<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">experiences of the past insufficient,</span>
+<a href="#page008">8</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proportion to other Arms,</span>
+<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of,</span> greater than formerly,
+<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">new tasks for,</span>
+<a href="#page014">14</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">actual fighting value diminished,</span>
+<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">best strategic value increased,</span>
+<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">public opinion at fault,</span>
+<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged,</span>
+<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">German organization of,</span> requires reform,
+<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">clear conception of requirements during each phase needed,</span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advance during mobilization deprecated,</span>
+<a href="#page023">23</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in what cases the principal Arm,</span>
+<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Divisional,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Independent,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">fire action of,</span> during battles,
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">greater tactical cohesion than Infantry,</span>
+<a href="#page058">58</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">scope of,</span> enormously increased,
+<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of good leadership,</span>
+<a href="#page063">63</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">place of,</span> in line of battle,
+<a href="#page081">81</a>,
+<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">formation of,</span> on battle-field,
+<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">factors determining strategic employment of,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">difficulty of supplying reinforcements,</span>
+<a href="#page151">151</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">augmentation of German,</span> necessary,
+<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">and not to be postponed till mobilization,</span>
+<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">training of,</span> requires reforming,
+<a href="#page181">181</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs,</span>
+<a href="#page257">257</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">tasks for,</span> in future War not properly appreciated,
+<a href="#page268">268</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Change of formation during action,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">from 'rendezvous' to 'attack,'</span>
+<a href="#page079">79</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Charge,</span> the, when preferable to fire action,
+<a href="#page052">52</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">example of Waterloo,</span>
+<a href="#page052">52</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">position of Commander during,</span>
+<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">choice of moment for,</span>
+<a href="#page087">87</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">cohesion during,</span>
+<a href="#page221">221</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">speed of,</span>
+<a href="#page221">221</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Chargers.</span> See <a href="#horses">'Horses'</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Chotusitz,</span> Battle of,
+<a href="#page083">83</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Civilians,</span> possible participation in future Wars by,
+<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">armed resistance by,</span> to be suppressed,
+<a href="#page033">33</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Column,</span> regimental, value of, for War,
+<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">squadron,</span> disadvantages of,
+<a href="#page228">228</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Combined action,</span> factors essential to success of,
+<a href="#page068">68</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments,</span>
+<a href="#page045">45</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must be under a single leader,</span>
+<a href="#page046">46</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">efficiency of,</span> more important with Cavalry than Infantry,
+<a href="#page063">63</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Commander,</span> qualities needed in a good,
+<a href="#page064">64</a>,
+<a href="#page286">286</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">place of,</span> before and during charges,
+<a href="#page065">65</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">when working with other Arms,</span>
+<a href="#page066">66</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">choice of formation to be left to,</span>
+<a href="#page072">72</a>,
+<a href="#page076">76</a>,
+<a href="#page077">77</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must be informed of progress of Infantry combat,</span>
+<a href="#page086">86</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">qualities required in covering a retreat,</span>
+<a href="#page086">86</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in dismounted action,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must decide as to extension in strategy,</span>
+<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">and concentration in combat,</span>
+<a href="#page106">106</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be kept informed of general situation,</span>
+<a href="#page111">111</a>,
+<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must organize his own reconnaissance,</span>
+<a href="#page120">120</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">personal supervision of front by,</span>
+<a href="#page121">121</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">forage reserve to be formed by,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to arrange times for drill,</span>
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">but not to deviate from Regulations,</span>
+<a href="#page220">220</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of handling 'masses,'</span>
+<a href="#page216">216</a>.<br>
+    <span class="min1em">See also <a href="#leader">'Leader'</a></span><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Commencement of War,</span> essence of all Cavalry action during,
+<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">obtaining intelligence during,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Communications,</span> increased liability to interruption of,
+<a href="#page013">13</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">greater opportunities for Cavalry to interfere with,</span>
+<a href="#page014">14</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">especially after victory,</span>
+<a href="#page014">14</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be maintained with Headquarters on field of battle,</span>
+<a href="#page067">67</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Comparison between Cavalry and Infantry,</span>
+<a href="#page059">59</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Concentration,</span> question of disturbing enemy's communications during,
+<a href="#page019">19</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">views of other Powers on this,</span>
+<a href="#page020">20</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">value of raids during,</span>
+<a href="#page020">20</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">premature commitment of Cavalry during,</span>
+<a href="#page024">24</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reasons against sacrificing Cavalry during,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defensive duties during,</span>
+<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advantages of pushing forward during enemy's,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of force for raids,</span>
+<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of considerable masses, when essential,</span>
+<a href="#page044">44</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">for combat,</span>
+<a href="#page106">106</a>,
+<a href="#page108">108</a>,
+<a href="#page109">109</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Corn, amount of,</span> to be carried by Cavalry,
+<a href="#page130">130</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">author's experiment,</span>
+<a href="#page203">203</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Coulmiers,</span> Battle of,
+<a href="#page086">86</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Critique' after field days,</span>
+<a href="#page243">243</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Cyclists,</span> value of, in conjunction with Cavalry,
+<a href="#page022">22</a>,
+<a href="#page147">147</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">circulation of intelligence by,</span>
+<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">should enable Divisional Cavalry to be economized,</span>
+<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">further Regulations required,</span>
+<a href="#page146">146</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">limitations of,</span>
+<a href="#page148">148</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be attached to Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page178">178</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Deception of enemy,</span> means towards,
+<a href="#page119">119</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Defects in horses,</span> correction of,
+<a href="#page199">199</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Defence of villages,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Defensive duties at commencement of War,</span>
+<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">combat,</span>
+<a href="#page092">92</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'immobile' detachments during,</span>
+<a href="#page092">92</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">action, breaking off a,</span>
+<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">action,</span> duties of dismounted men during,
+<a href="#page259">259</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Despatch riders,</span>
+<a href="#page138">138</a>,
+<a href="#page145">145</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Detachments,</span> economy in use of,
+<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reports from,</span> to Headquarters,
+<a href="#page111">111</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">outflanking,</span> during attack,
+<a href="#page232">232</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Direction,</span> change of, during action,
+<a href="#page117">117</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Dismounted action,</span> increased importance of,
+<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">when desirable in attack,</span>
+<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">when inevitable,</span>
+<a href="#page050">50</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Sheridan's Cavalry in,</span>
+<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">during rearguard actions,</span>
+<a href="#page052">52</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">during general engagements,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">examples of Fredericksburg and Five Forks,</span>
+<a href="#page055">55</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in South African War,</span>
+<a href="#page056">56</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Franco-German War,</span>
+<a href="#page057">57</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'mobile' and 'immobile' horses,</span>
+<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in defensive combat,</span>
+<a href="#page092">92</a>,
+<a href="#page093">93</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">tactical distribution of men in,</span>
+<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'Wing' or 'Line' systems,</span>
+<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in defence of villages,</span>
+<a href="#page097">97</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in attack,</span>
+<a href="#page099">99</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">training for,</span>
+<a href="#page247">247</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of,</span> not sufficiently appreciated,
+<a href="#page248">248</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">not to be confined to the defensive,</span>
+<a href="#page249">249</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">recruits' course,</span>
+<a href="#page250">250</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Regulations as to,</span> require expansion,
+<a href="#page257">257</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">as important as fighting in the saddle,</span>
+<a href="#page262">262</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Dispersion of troops for raids,</span>
+<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">for screening and security,</span>
+<a href="#page106">106</a>,
+<a href="#page109">109</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Divisional Cavalry defined,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">duties of,</span>
+<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">apportionment of,</span>
+<a href="#page041">41</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">as little as possible should be retained for Infantry Divisions,</span>
+<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">reconnaissance duties of,</span>
+<a href="#page141">141</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">security duties of,</span>
+<a href="#page144">144</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Divisions of Cavalry,</span> maintenance of, during peace,
+<a href="#page161">161</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">present strength insufficient,</span>
+<a href="#page165">165</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">permanent creation of,</span> not advisable,
+<a href="#page167">167</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Double-column' formation, when recommended,</span>
+<a href="#page080">80</a>,
+<a href="#page229">229</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Drei Treffen Taktik,'</span>
+<a href="#page073">73</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Dressur' detachment,</span>
+<a href="#page190">190</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Drill,</span> shortening of season for,
+<a href="#page198">198</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of Squadron and Regimental,</span>
+<a href="#page214">214</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">merits of Brigade and Divisional,</span>
+<a href="#page215">215</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">ceremonial to be separated from practical,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Brigade,</span> the highest unit for formal,
+<a href="#page238">238</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Education,</span> military, for man and horse,
+<a href="#page186">186</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">tactical,</span> for troops generally,
+<a href="#page213">213</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of recruits,</span>
+<a href="#page272">272</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of non-commissioned ranks,</span>
+<a href="#page275">275</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">higher,</span> of officers,
+<a href="#page286">286</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Efficiency of troops essential to good leadership,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Enemy,</span> advance of, marks period for pushing forward Cavalry,
+<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Cavalry of,</span> must be beaten off field to obtain information,
+<a href="#page030">30</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">outposts of,</span> to be broken through,
+<a href="#page033">33</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">communications,</span> of, to be attacked,
+<a href="#page033">33</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Equipment for bridging and telegraphs,</span>
+<a href="#page174">174</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Equitation,</span> Staff for,
+<a href="#page193">193</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proposed new procedure,</span>
+<a href="#page200">200</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">school of,</span> in Hanover,
+<a href="#page290">290</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Exercises to develop 'tactical principles,'</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of larger formations than Brigades,</span>
+<a href="#page239">239</a>;<br>
+   <span class="min1em">'field-service' exercises,</span>
+<a href="#page240">240</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Expediency,</span> the highest ideal of strategy,
+<a href="#page047">47</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Extension of front when advisable,</span>
+<a href="#page107">107</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in action when favourable,</span>
+<a href="#page240">240</a> <i>et seq.</i></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Field-firing,</span> increased importance of,
+<a href="#page251">251</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">scheme for,</span>
+<a href="#page252">252</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Field-service' exercises,</span>
+<a href="#page218">218</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">nature of,</span>
+<a href="#page240">240</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">ground for,</span>
+<a href="#page239">239</a>;<br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Cavalry acting independently,</span>
+<a href="#page240">240</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Cavalry in combination with other Arms,</span>
+<a href="#page241">241</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">existing deficiencies in,</span>
+<a href="#page266">266</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Fire action often imperative nowadays,</span>
+<a href="#page047">47</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">occasions when it will decide the day,</span>
+<a href="#page050">50</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">General Lee's capitulation,</span>
+<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">South African War,</span>
+<a href="#page056">56</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Franco-German War,</span>
+<a href="#page057">57</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Firearms,</span> increased range of,
+<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">better class of,</span> needed by Cavalry,
+<a href="#page058">58</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Flank attack,</span> when advisable,
+<a href="#page078">78</a>,
+<a href="#page079">79</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">after victory,</span>
+<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">during charge,</span>
+<a href="#page233">233</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Flanks of enemy to be worked round to obtain information,</span>
+<a href="#page029">29</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Forage,</span> reserve of,
+<a href="#page131">131</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">amount to be carried on horses,</span>
+<a href="#page169">169</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">author's experiment,</span>
+<a href="#page203">203</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Force necessary to be employed in various circumstances,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Formation for attack,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">change of,</span> during action,
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">latitude to be allowed to Commander,</span>
+<a href="#page076">76</a>,
+<a href="#page077">77</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">merits of 'double column,'</span>
+<a href="#page080">80</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'mass' when suitable,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">on battle-field,</span>
+<a href="#page085">85</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of dismounted men in action,</span>
+<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in defence of villages,</span>
+<a href="#page096">96</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in dismounted attack,</span>
+<a href="#page100">100</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">best,</span> suitable for War,
+<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be avoided,</span>
+<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">regimental column,</span>
+<a href="#page227">227</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Four-squadron regiments,</span>
+<a href="#page154">154</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Frederick the Great on length of marches,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Front,</span> extension and concentration of,
+<a href="#page107">107</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Frontal attack against Infantry and Artillery,</span>
+<a href="#page235">235</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Galloping,</span> exercises in,
+<a href="#page209">209</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">German Cavalry,</span> numerically inadequate,
+<a href="#page151">151</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">expedients for augmenting,</span>
+<a href="#page153">153</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proposed territorial organization,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Gravelotte, example of faulty reconnaissance reports,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Ground,</span> value of tactical advantage of,
+<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min2em">acquisition of, for field-training,</span>
+<a href="#page239">239</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Halts on march,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Headquarters,</span> reports to be sent to, from detachments,
+<a href="#page111">111</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Horsemanship,</span>
+<a href="#page184">184</a><br>
+
+<a id="horses" name="horses"></a>
+  <span class="min2em">Horses,</span> demands on,
+<a href="#page087">87</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'mobile' or 'immobile,'</span>
+<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">position for led,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">protection of,</span>
+<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">rest for,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">security of,</span> during rest,
+<a href="#page122">122</a>,
+<a href="#page124">124</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">bivouac on march,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">on outpost,</span>
+<a href="#page123">123</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of care bestowed on,</span>
+<a href="#page123">123</a>,
+<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">excessive demands on,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">shortage of,</span> in Germany,
+<a href="#page152">152</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'augmentation,'</span>
+<a href="#page155">155</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'untrained,'</span> of small use,
+<a href="#page158">158</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">increased demands on,</span>
+<a href="#page181">181</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">training of,</span>
+<a href="#page185">185</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">English thoroughbreds,</span>
+<a href="#page187">187</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Prussian,</span>
+<a href="#page187">187</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">old,</span>
+<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">food for,</span> increase of,
+<a href="#page203">203</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">endurance of,</span>
+<a href="#page202">202</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">feeding,</span> author's experiment in,
+<a href="#page203">203</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">galloping powers,</span>
+<a href="#page209">209</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">weight to be put on,</span>
+<a href="#page212">212</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Increase of German Cavalry needed,</span>
+<a href="#page158">158</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Independence,</span> when to be given to subordinates,
+<a href="#page068">68</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Independent Cavalry' defined,</span>
+<a href="#page038">38</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">conditions which determine allotment of,</span>
+<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in what cases it should be concentrated on decisive lines,</span>
+<a href="#page043">43</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">security duties of,</span>
+<a href="#page144">144</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Individual superiority essential for patrols,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Infantry,</span> effect on Cavalry of extended zone of fire of,
+<a href="#page009">9</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">difficult for Cavalry to encounter in close bodies,</span>
+<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">when once broken offer great opportunity to Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defence of villages and woods by,</span> more difficult now,
+<a href="#page015">15</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">compared with Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page059">59</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Initial success,</span> great importance of,
+<a href="#page012">12</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Initiative,</span> value of,
+<a href="#page115">115</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Inspections,</span> new scheme of, for recruits and schools,
+<a href="#page200">200</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of thorough,</span>
+<a href="#page246">246</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Inspector-General of Cavalry,</span> position of,
+<a href="#page282">282</a> and footnote<br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Intelligence indispensable at commencement of War,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">spaces between enemy's columns to be penetrated to obtain,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">when more important than security,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">circulation of,</span>
+<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">during progress of action,</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">experience of 1870,</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be transmitted direct to Headquarters,</span> as well as through usual channel,
+<a href="#page045">45</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Lance-exercises,</span>
+<a href="#page254">254</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">better attachment of,</span> necessary,
+<a href="#page255">255</a><br>
+
+<a id="leader" name="leader"></a>
+  <span class="min2em">Leader,</span> importance of-independence of, in combined action,
+<a href="#page068">68</a>,
+<a href="#page076">76</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">more initiative to be given to,</span>
+<a href="#page073">73</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be careful about his horses,</span>
+<a href="#page087">87</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">duty when covering a retreat,</span>
+<a href="#page088">88</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">modern requirements in a good,</span>
+<a href="#page089">89</a>,
+<a href="#page090">90</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be kept informed of the general situation,</span>
+<a href="#page111">111</a>,
+<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">clearness of intention,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must organize his own intelligence,</span>
+<a href="#page117">117</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">capacity of,</span>
+<a href="#page126">126</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of great Cavalry masses,</span>
+<a href="#page286">286</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Led horses,</span>
+<a href="#page091">91</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">place for,</span>
+<a href="#page093">93</a>,
+<a href="#page094">94</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in dismounted practice,</span>
+<a href="#page259">259</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Lines&mdash;three-line system,</span>
+<a href="#page073">73</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Locality,</span> faculty of finding way in unknown,
+<a href="#page274">274</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Lunging rein,</span>
+<a href="#page188">188</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Man&oelig;uvres,</span> Brigade and Divisional, little criterion of work in War,
+<a href="#page042">42</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">trotting and galloping at,</span>
+<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">weight to be carried at,</span>
+<a href="#page210">210</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">movements which are of use for War,</span>
+<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">theatrical display in great Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page263">263</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">deficiencies in existing,</span>
+<a href="#page266">266</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Imperial,</span>
+<a href="#page267">267</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">baggage train to be represented at,</span>
+<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">limitations of telegraphs at,</span>
+<a href="#page279">279</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of Brigades to be abolished in favour of Divisional and Corps,</span>
+<a href="#page283">283</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">limitation of demands on Cavalry at,</span>
+<a href="#page284">284</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Maps,</span> misuse of,
+<a href="#page274">274</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Marches,</span> flanking detachments to,
+<a href="#page121">121</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">length of,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">endurance of horses on,</span>
+<a href="#page127">127</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">excessive lengths of,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">average lengths of,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">trotting and halts on,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Mars la Tour,</span>
+<a href="#page082">82</a>,
+<a href="#page083">83</a>,
+<a href="#page086">86</a>,
+<a href="#page225">225</a> (footnote)<br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Mass' when suitable,</span>
+<a href="#page081">81</a>,
+<a href="#page082">82</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Masses,</span> training of Cavalry in large,
+<a href="#page214">214</a>,
+<a href="#page215">215</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">necessity for bringing Cavalry together frequently in,</span>
+<a href="#page245">245</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Maxim guns with Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page178">178</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Messengers,</span> employment of, to be limited,
+<a href="#page129">129</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Mobility,</span> essential in surprise actions,
+<a href="#page118">118</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">German Cavalry deficient in,</span>
+<a href="#page169">169</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of supply waggons,</span>
+<a href="#page173">173</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Mounted Reserve,</span> duties of,
+<a href="#page095">95</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">strength of,</span>
+<a href="#page096">96</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Movements most suitable for battle-field,</span>
+<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be avoided,</span>
+<a href="#page226">226</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be practised on simple warnings,</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Musketry,</span> importance of knowledge of, by officers,
+<a href="#page253">253</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">judging distances,</span>
+<a href="#page253">253</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Napoleon on length of Cavalry marches,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Narbonne,</span> General von Pelet, proposals of,
+<a href="#page155">155</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Numbers alone can prevail in victory or in covering retreat,</span>
+<a href="#page036">36</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">give opportunities of dismounted action,</span>
+<a href="#page057">57</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Oats,</span>
+<a href="#page205">205</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Observation of masses of enemy's army by officers patrol,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">during combat,</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Offensive against Infantry,</span> Cavalry capable of taking the,
+<a href="#page060">60</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Officers of Cavalry have better knowledge of their men than in Infantry,</span>
+<a href="#page059">59</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of training of,</span>
+<a href="#page064">64</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">increased importance of knowledge of musketry,</span>
+<a href="#page253">253</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be attached to Infantry for instruction,</span>
+<a href="#page256">256</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">higher education of,</span>
+<a href="#page286">286</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">training in horsemanship of,</span>
+<a href="#page291">291</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Officers patrols,</span> when necessary,
+<a href="#page031">31</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Orderlies to be limited,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Orders,</span> simplicity essential in,
+<a href="#page068">68</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">how to be transmitted in the field,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">by bugle call,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">verbal,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates,</span>
+<a href="#page112">112</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of clearness in,</span>
+<a href="#page116">116</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Organization of German Cavalry unchanged,</span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">requires reform,</span>
+<a href="#page017">17</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must be elastic,</span>
+<a href="#page047">47</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">example of 1870,</span> 47;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">also of Napoleon,</span>
+<a href="#page048">48</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of German Cavalry to be by territorial districts,</span>
+<a href="#page167">167</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Outer lines,'</span> advantages of,
+<a href="#page078">78</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Outflanking tactics,</span> when undesirable,
+<a href="#page053">53</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">detachments,</span> work of, during charge,
+<a href="#page232">232</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Outposts,</span> necessity for breaking through enemy's,
+<a href="#page033">33</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">fixed rules for,</span> impossible,
+<a href="#page126">126</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Patrols,</span> causes of possible danger in the future,
+<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">breaking up of enemy's communications by officers,</span>
+<a href="#page022">22</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must ascertain changes in enemy's initial dispositions,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must protect frontier districts from raids,</span>
+<a href="#page025">25</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must avoid becoming desperately involved,</span>
+<a href="#page026">26</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">superiority in individual patroller essential,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">defeat of enemy's,</span> necessary,
+<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'reconnoitring' distinct from 'security' patrols,</span>
+<a href="#page133">133</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">strength of,</span>
+<a href="#page136">136</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">duties of commander,</span>
+<a href="#page136">136</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">transmission of despatches by,</span>
+<a href="#page138">138</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must report to Headquarters as well as through ordinary channel,</span>
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'tactical,'</span>
+<a href="#page143">143</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'security,'</span>
+<a href="#page143">143</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">screening by,</span>
+<a href="#page144">144</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Regulations need amendment,</span>
+<a href="#page145">145</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">training for scouting basis of all reconnaissance instruction,</span>
+<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">suggestion as to instruction,</span>
+<a href="#page270">270</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Place on battle-field of Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>,
+<a href="#page085">85</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Prague,</span> Battle of,
+<a href="#page083">83</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Principles,'</span> tactical, of Cavalry opposed to Cavalry,
+<a href="#page231">231</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of Cavalry opposed to Infantry and Artillery,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Prisoners,</span> value of capturing, during enemy's mobilization,
+<a href="#page024">24</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Protection of main force,</span> steps required differ from those for obtaining information,
+<a href="#page029">29</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">opposite views held,</span>
+<a href="#page029">29</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Pursuit of beaten enemy imperative,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">methods of,</span>
+<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">dismounted action during,</span>
+<a href="#page051">51</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Waterloo,</span>
+<a href="#page052">52</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">wars of 1866 and 1870,</span>
+<a href="#page084">84</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">duties during,</span>
+<a href="#page088">88</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to be practised on a grand scale,</span>
+<a href="#page283">283</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Quick-firing guns,</span> employment of
+<a href="#page180">180</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Raids,</span> value of, on outbreak of War,
+<a href="#page020">20</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">to exploit enemy's resources,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">indispensable element in future,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">depend on rapidity and surprise,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">and on concentration of force at night-time,</span>
+<a href="#page035">35</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">dispersion during,</span>
+<a href="#page035">35</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Rapidity essential in raids,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">and in dismounted attack,</span>
+<a href="#page099">99</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Rations,</span> emergency, for horses,
+<a href="#page174">174</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">author's experiment with forage,</span>
+<a href="#page203">203</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Rearguard actions,</span> to be practised on a grand scale,
+<a href="#page283">283</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry necessary,</span>
+<a href="#page007">7</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">rendered more difficult by range of modern firearms,</span>
+<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">and by smokeless powder,</span>
+<a href="#page010">10</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">value of intensified,</span>
+<a href="#page012">12</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must be a separate service from screening,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">an exception to this,</span>
+<a href="#page041">41</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">advantage of defeating enemy's reconnoitrers,</span>
+<a href="#page031">31</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">under fire very difficult to effect,</span>
+<a href="#page039">39</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">on the battle-field,</span>
+<a href="#page066">66</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">cavalry leader must organize his own,</span>
+<a href="#page120">120</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">training for scouting the basis of instruction in,</span>
+<a href="#page269">269</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">knowledge of principles of 'higher strategy' essential,</span>
+<a href="#page288">288</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Reconnoitring patrols,</span>
+<a href="#page134">134</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Recruits,</span> training of,
+<a href="#page188">188</a> <i>et seq.</i>,
+<a href="#page273">273</a>. See also <a href="#training">'Training'</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Regiment,</span> the fundamental tactical unit,
+<a href="#page228">228</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Regimental call,</span> value of,
+<a href="#page230">230</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Regimental column'</span> formation,
+<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">merits of double,</span>
+<a href="#page229">229</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Regulations should not lay down fixed evolutions,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">but only essential principles of action,</span>
+<a href="#page070">70</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">existing edition of,</span> requires revision,
+<a href="#page070">70</a>,
+<a href="#page079">79</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">importance of Section 346,</span>
+<a href="#page076">76</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">rearrangement recommended,</span>
+<a href="#page244">244</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">as to training of dismounted squadrons,</span>
+<a href="#page253">253</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Reinforcements,</span> difficulty of supplying Cavalry,
+<a href="#page151">151</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Remounts,</span> supply of, in War,
+<a href="#page159">159</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">English blood in,</span>
+<a href="#page187">187</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">training of,</span>
+<a href="#page187">187</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Reports in the field to be made to Headquarters and to adjacent columns,</span>
+<a href="#page011">11</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">transmission of,</span>
+<a href="#page138">138</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Reserve forage,</span>
+<a href="#page131">131</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Reserve squadrons,</span> position for, during attack,
+<a href="#page232">232</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Reserve troops an easy prey to Cavalry when once beaten,</span>
+<a href="#page015">15</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Rest,</span> importance of, to horses,
+<a href="#page124">124</a>,
+<a href="#page125">125</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Retreat,</span> advantages of 'outer lines' in,
+<a href="#page078">78</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">duty of Cavalry covering a,</span>
+<a href="#page088">88</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Riding,</span> cross-country,
+<a href="#page186">186</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">individual,</span>
+<a href="#page189">189</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Riding School,</span>
+<a href="#page193">193</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Roszbach,</span> Battle of,
+<a href="#page083">83</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Rushes,</span> advancing by,
+<a href="#page113">113</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Rye as forage,</span>
+<a href="#page206">206</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Schlichting,</span> General von, writings of,
+<a href="#page081">81</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">criticism of,</span>
+<a href="#page083">83</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">on application of drill-book principles,</span>
+<a href="#page237">237</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">School,</span> Riding,
+<a href="#page192">192</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">War (see <a href="#warschool">'War School'</a>);</span><br>
+    <span class="min1em">of Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page290">290</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Screening,</span> importance of,
+<a href="#page012">12</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">during absence of troops,</span>
+<a href="#page027">27</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must give way to obtaining intelligence,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">distinct from reconnoitring,</span>
+<a href="#page032">32</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">must be fought for,</span>
+<a href="#page033">33</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Security when secondary to obtaining intelligence,</span>
+<a href="#page028">28</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">during rest,</span>
+<a href="#page122">122</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">general advantages of,</span>
+<a href="#page124">124</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Sedan,</span> Battle of,
+<a href="#page087">87</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Seidlitz,</span> Von, at Zorndorf,
+<a href="#page087">87</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Simplicity essential to successful tactics,</span>
+<a href="#page068">68</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Single combat exercises,</span>
+<a href="#page195">195</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Skeleton enemy,</span>
+<a href="#page244">244</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Soor,</span> action of,
+<a href="#page083">83</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Squadron School,</span> the basis of tactical training,
+<a href="#page214">214</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">drill,</span>
+<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">tactical training of dismounted,</span>
+<a href="#page258">258</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">general education of,</span>
+<a href="#page272">272</a>,
+<a href="#page276">276</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">practical exercises for,</span>
+<a href="#page275">275</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Squadron column,'</span> merits of,
+<a href="#page228">228</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Staff required for Cavalry corps,</span>
+<a href="#page228">228</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Strategical handling of Cavalry,</span> importance of,
+<a href="#page037">37</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">fixed regulations inapplicable to,</span>
+<a href="#page105">105</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">general principles,</span>
+<a href="#page105">105</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Subdivision of force,</span>
+<a href="#page107">107</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Summary of opinions on Cavalry generally,</span>
+<a href="#page294">294</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Supply trains must march as fast as Cavalry,</span>
+<a href="#page171">171</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">length of,</span>
+<a href="#page172">172</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">mobility of,</span>
+<a href="#page173">173</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Supreme Commander,</span> presence of Cavalry essential to success of,
+<a href="#page037">37</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Surprise the essence of Cavalry actions,</span>
+<a href="#page016">16</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">indispensable in raids,</span>
+<a href="#page034">34</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">requirements for success in,</span>
+<a href="#page118">118</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">System,</span> the 'three-line,'
+<a href="#page074">74</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Tactical action by Divisional Cavalry precluded,</span>
+<a href="#page040">40</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of Cavalry changed by new conditions,</span>
+<a href="#page049">49</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">'Drei Treffen,'</span>
+<a href="#page073">73</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">training for,</span> too elementary,
+<a href="#page223">223</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Tactical education for troops generally,</span>
+<a href="#page213">213</a> <i>et seq.</i><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Tactical principles,</span> Cavalry <i>v.</i> Cavalry,
+<a href="#page231">231</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Cavalry <i>v.</i> Infantry and Artillery,</span>
+<a href="#page232">232</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">exercises to develop the,</span>
+<a href="#page236">236</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Tactical and strategical principles of the future,</span>
+<a href="#page083">83</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Telegraph,</span> control of,
+<a href="#page140">140</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">limitations as to the use of,</span> in Man&oelig;uvres,
+<a href="#page279">279</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Three-line' system,</span>
+<a href="#page073">73</a><br>
+
+<a id="training" name="training"></a>
+  <span class="min2em">Training,</span> true purpose of,
+<a href="#page161">161</a><br>
+    <span class="min1em">of Cavalry Staff,</span>
+<a href="#page166">166</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">Von Moltke's proposals,</span>
+<a href="#page166">166</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">changes must be met by new methods,</span>
+<a href="#page181">181</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of horses and men,</span>
+<a href="#page184">184</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">length of period of,</span>
+<a href="#page188">188</a>,
+<a href="#page194">194</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">proposed programme for,</span>
+<a href="#page200">200</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">preparation for endurance,</span>
+<a href="#page207">207</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">War conditions essential to,</span>
+<a href="#page208">208</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">tactical,</span> too elementary at present,
+<a href="#page223">223</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">for dismounted fighting,</span>
+<a href="#page247">247</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">some deficiencies in present,</span>
+<a href="#page217">217</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">of squadrons a stepping-stone to field service,</span>
+<a href="#page276">276</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Training grounds</span> ('Truppenübungs Plätze'),
+<a href="#page239">239</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Transmission of orders during action,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Treffen,'</span> definition of,
+<a href="#page074">74</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Trotting on march,</span>
+<a href="#page128">128</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Turning movements,</span> when imperative,
+<a href="#page115">115</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Verbal orders,</span>
+<a href="#page069">69</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Villages,</span> dismounted defence of,
+<a href="#page097">97</a> <i>et seq.</i>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">withdrawal from,</span>
+<a href="#page099">99</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Vionville,</span> Battle of,
+<a href="#page107">107</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Von-Rosenberg at Mars la Tour,</span>
+<a href="#page225">225</a> (footnote)</p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Waggons,</span> supply, pace of,
+<a href="#page171">171</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">War conditions essential to training,</span>
+<a href="#page208">208</a><br>
+
+<a id="warschool" name="warschool"></a>
+  <span class="min2em">War School,</span> extent of teaching at,
+<a href="#page289">289</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">creation of school for Cavalry desirable,</span>
+<a href="#page290">290</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Weight to be carried by horses,</span>
+<a href="#page212">212</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Wheat as forage,</span>
+<a href="#page206">206</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">'Wing attack,'</span>
+<a href="#page076">76</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">best formation for requirements of combat,</span>
+<a href="#page227">227</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">in action against Infantry and Artillery,</span>
+<a href="#page234">234</a>;<br>
+    <span class="min1em">freedom as to use of,</span>
+<a href="#page244">244</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Woerth,</span> Battle of,
+<a href="#page087">87</a></p>
+
+<p class="p2">
+  <span class="min2em">Zone of fire,</span> results of extension of,
+<a href="#page009">9</a><br>
+
+  <span class="min2em">Zorndorf,</span> Battle of,
+<a href="#page087">87</a></p>
+</div>
+
+<p class="p4 center">THE END</p>
+
+<p class="center smaller">BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD</p>
+
+<p class="p4 book"><span class="min2em">THE ART OF RECONNAISSANCE.</span>
+By Colonel <span class="smcap">David Henderson</span>, D.S.O. With Diagrams. Small Crown 8vo., 5s.
+net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'The details of procedure suggested for a patrol are simpler,
+     more practicable, and more efficacious than I have yet seen in
+     any textbook. These chapters may be warmly recommended to every
+     officer who wishes to prepare himself and his men for the most
+     difficult and most important of those minor operations of war
+     which form so great a part of its every-day reality.'&mdash;<i>Morning
+     Post.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE FRONTIERSMAN'S POCKET BOOK.</span>
+Compiled and Edited by <span class="smcap">Roger Pocock</span>, on behalf of the Council of the
+Legion of Frontiersmen. With Illustrations. Leather, 5s. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'A very handy and well-packed little volume.... It brings
+     together a large amount of well-digested practical information
+     about camping, means of travel, signals, shooting, first-aid,
+     and, in short, everything that a pioneering, handy man ought to
+     know.... May be heartily recommended to all classes of scouts and
+     frontiersmen.'&mdash;<i>Scotsman.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">IMPERIAL STRATEGY.</span>
+By the Military Correspondent of <i>The Times</i>. With
+Maps. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     '"Imperial Strategy" is one of the most valuable volumes
+     published within recent years. The admirable volume should stand
+     upon the shelf of every soldier, and of every thinker upon
+     Imperial things.'&mdash;<i>Army and Navy Gazette.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">ARTILLERY AND EXPLOSIVES.</span>
+Essays and Lectures written and delivered at
+various times. By Sir <span class="smcap">Andrew Noble</span>, K.C.B., D.C.L., F.R.S. With
+numerous Diagrams and Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'The experience of Sir Andrew Noble covers such a wide field, and
+     so many important changes have taken place in connection with
+     rifled guns, their ammunition and projectiles, during the long
+     period dealt with, that the views of so eminent an expert are of
+     an incalculable value. He is therefore to be congratulated on his
+     decision to bring into one volume the mass of important
+     information and invaluable details respecting the progress in
+     naval and artillery science.'&mdash;<i>Broad Arrow.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">FORTIFICATION:</span> Its Past Achievements, Recent Developments, Future
+Progress. By Colonel Sir <span class="smcap">George S. Clarke</span>, R.E., K.C.M.G., F.R.S.,
+Governor of Bombay. New Edition, enlarged. With numerous
+Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 18s. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'The reflections of this great soldier-statesman will be found as
+     fascinating as they are instructive, and that reasonable
+     intelligence is the only essential qualification for reading them
+     with profit as well as with interest and pleasure.'&mdash;<i>Westminster
+     Gazette.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR.</span> By Monsieur <span class="smcap">E. K. Nojine</span>, Accredited
+Russian War Correspondent during the Siege. Translated and abridged by
+Captain <span class="smcap">A. B. Lindsay</span>. Edited by Major <span class="smcap">E. D. Swinton</span>, D.S.O. With Maps
+and Illustrations. Demy 8vo., 15s. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'M. Nojine is unusually well qualified to offer testimony on the
+     long beleaguerment. He writes with vivacity and force, and the
+     translation is competent and spirited, both on account of its
+     vivid narrative and by reason of the extraordinary revelations it
+     contains.... It is the most remarkable book about the war yet
+     issued.'&mdash;<i>Times.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA.</span> Between the Japanese and Russian Fleets,
+fought on 27th May, 1905. By Captain <span class="smcap">Vladimir Semenoff</span> (one of the
+survivors). Translated by Captain <span class="smcap">A. B. Lindsay</span>. Crown 8vo., 3s. 6d.
+net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'The most thrilling and touching records of naval warfare that we
+     have ever read, and its very simplicity and lack of literary
+     ornament make it the more impressive.... We share the emotions on
+     board, feel the nervous thrill behind the gallant spirit and the
+     cheerful countenance,'&mdash;<i>Westminster Gazette.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">FROM LIBAU TO TSU-SHIMA.</span> A Narrative of the Voyage of Admiral
+Rojdestvensky's Squadron to the East, including a Detailed Account of
+the Dogger Bank Incident. By the late <span class="smcap">Eugene Politovsky</span>, Chief
+Engineer of the Squadron. Translated by Major <span class="smcap">F. R. Godfrey</span>, R.M.L.I.
+Large Crown 8vo., 2s. 6d. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'Among terrible stories of the sea this is unique. In sentences
+     whose graphic power Defoe did not exceed, he jots down from day
+     to day what he sees and suffers.... The story of the sinking of
+     the British fishing-boats in the North Sea is told with superb
+     simplicity.'&mdash;<span class="smcap">Punch.</span></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, 1878&mdash;1880.</span> Produced in the
+Intelligence Branch, Army Headquarters, India. Abridged Official
+Account. With numerous Maps and Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'An excellent compendium of the whole war, clearly written and
+     amply illustrated by photographs, maps, and diagrams.... It is a
+     narrative that will fascinate the many who love to read about
+     warlike movements.... It is a story of wise and patient
+     preparation, carefully arranged generalship, supreme daring,
+     amazing tenacity. Undoubtedly the right thing has been done in
+     giving to the world a stirring story, which has remained too
+     long, many will think, a secret record.'&mdash;<i>Sheffield
+     Independent.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.</span> Prepared in
+the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlin. With Maps
+and Plans. Demy 8vo., 15s. net each.</p>
+
+<p class="book2">Part I.&mdash;From its Commencement in 1899 the Capture of General Cronje's
+Forces at Paardeburg. Translated by Colonel <span class="smcap">W. H. H. Waters</span>, R.A.,
+C.V.O.</p>
+
+<p class="book2">Part II.&mdash;The Advance to Pretoria, the Upper Tugela Campaign, etc.,
+etc. Translated by Colonel <span class="smcap">Hubert du Cane</span>, R.A., M.V.O.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     'The most valuable work in which, since its close, the war has
+     been discussed. It stands alone, because it is the only work in
+     which the war has been surveyed by trained and competent students
+     of war, the only one of which the judgments are based on a
+     familiarity with the modern theory of war. The best book that has
+     yet appeared on the South African War.'&mdash;<i>Morning Post.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE BATTLE OF WAVRE AND GROUCHY'S RETREAT.</span> A Study of an obscure part
+of the Waterloo Campaign. By <span class="smcap">W. Hyde Kelly</span>, R.E. With Maps and Plans.
+Demy 8vo., 8s. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     '... brings forward, with a vividness and brilliancy which compel
+     attention throughout one of the most obscure pages in the story
+     of the famous struggle.'&mdash;<i>Birmingham Post.</i></p>
+
+<p class="book"><span class="min2em">THE BOOK OF WAR.</span> Translated into English by Captain <span class="smcap">E. F. Calthrop</span>,
+R.A. Crown 8vo., 2s. 6d. net.</p>
+<p class="critic">
+     This work, the writings of Suntzu and Wutzu, Chinese strategists
+     of about the fifth century <span class="smcap">b.c.</span>, is the most famous work on the
+     art of war in the Far East. It deals with operations of war,
+     statecraft, moral and training of troops, stratagem, the use of
+     spies, etc., and for twenty-five centuries it has been the bible
+     of the Chinese or Japanese ruler. The book is distinguished alike
+     by the poetry and grandeur of its language and the modernity of
+     its spirit.</p>
+
+
+<p class="p4 center"><span class="smcap">London</span>: JOHN MURRAY, <span class="smcap">Albemarle Street</span>, W.</p>
+
+
+<p class="p4"><a id="footnote1" name="footnote1"></a>
+<b>Footnote 1:</b> The contrary view to this was largely held by a certain
+school in Germany, whose views the author is here endeavouring to
+combat.<a href="#footnotetag1"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote2" name="footnote2"></a>
+<b>Footnote 2:</b> The same point also arises both in pursuit and in the
+covering of a retreat, two of our most important duties; for though,
+as already pointed out, the conditions of the present day offer to the
+Arm the opportunities of the richest harvests, it will only be able to
+utilize them when employed with concentrated force.<a href="#footnotetag2"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote3" name="footnote3"></a>
+<b>Footnote 3:</b> Compare 'Cavalry Regulations,' § 376.<a href="#footnotetag3"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote4" name="footnote4"></a>
+<b>Footnote 4:</b> I venture to differ from the author. The Boers did not
+fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of Mounted Infantry.
+They did on one or two occasions bring about a decision by rifle fire
+from their horses, but I can recall no instance where they actually
+charged&mdash;<i>i.e.</i>, endeavoured to decide the action by shock.&mdash;C. S. G.<a href="#footnotetag4"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote5" name="footnote5"></a>
+<b>Footnote 5:</b> Clausewitz, 'Im Krieg ist aller Einfach, aber, das
+Einfache ist schwer.'<a href="#footnotetag5"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote6" name="footnote6"></a>
+<b>Footnote 6:</b> The Regimental Commander, therefore, requires his
+Adjutant and an Orderly Officer, so as to be able to transmit
+simultaneously his order to both wings of his regiment.<a href="#footnotetag6"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote7" name="footnote7"></a>
+<b>Footnote 7:</b> Rauch's Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville,
+under von Schmidt, August 16, 1870.<a href="#footnotetag7"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote8" name="footnote8"></a>
+<b>Footnote 8:</b> Section 346 reads: 'The above general principles applying
+to the conduct and relations between the several "Lines" must not be
+allowed to lead to the adoption of any stereotyped form of attack. The
+Division Commander has full authority to employ his brigades as he
+thinks best for the attainment of the purpose in view.'<a href="#footnotetag8"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote9" name="footnote9"></a>
+<b>Footnote 9:</b> The 'Drei Treffen Taktik' owes its origin to the study of
+the Wars of Frederick the Great, and claims to have again brought to
+life the fundamental principles to which our Cavalry successes in
+those days were due. Against this view I would point out that
+Frederick's Cavalry were always formed in two Lines under one common
+command. Besides these two Lines ('Treffen') there was generally, but
+by no means always, a 'Reserve'&mdash;constituted usually of Hussars
+only&mdash;who, if I do not err, are only once spoken of as a 'Treffen'
+(Line). This Reserve, however, was under a special Commander, and was
+quite independent of the two 'Treffen' proper above referred to. Now,
+no one would venture to suggest that Frederick's Infantry fought
+habitually in three Lines ('Drei Treffen'), although a Reserve was
+frequently held back in third Line, exactly as with the Cavalry. The
+truth really is that the modern idea of the 'Drei Treffen Taktik' has
+actually nothing in common with the methods of employment of
+Frederick's days at all.<a href="#footnotetag9"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote10" name="footnote10"></a>
+<b>Footnote 10:</b> 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Present
+Day,' part i., chap, vii., B.<a href="#footnotetag10"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote11" name="footnote11"></a>
+<b>Footnote 11:</b> See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the Future,'
+p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one charge in the day
+is useless for the rest of the operations, I cannot accept. It finds
+no support in the facts of Military history&mdash;on the contrary, the most
+complete refutation.<a href="#footnotetag11"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote12" name="footnote12"></a>
+<b>Footnote 12:</b> The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August 16, 1870.<a href="#footnotetag12"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote13" name="footnote13"></a>
+<b>Footnote 13:</b> When only three men in four dismount the horses are said
+to be 'mobile.' When the proportion is greater the horses become
+'immobile.'<a href="#footnotetag13"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote14" name="footnote14"></a>
+<b>Footnote 14:</b> I here call attention to the instructions of Frederick
+the Great on this subject, as well as to the circumspection with which
+General J. E. B. Stuart prepared for his own undertakings.<a href="#footnotetag14"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote15" name="footnote15"></a>
+<b>Footnote 15:</b> Feld Dienst Ordnung.<a href="#footnotetag15"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote16" name="footnote16"></a>
+<b>Footnote 16:</b> In passing, I may note that some portions of Lorraine
+are amongst the richest in horseflesh in all Germany. Here, by the
+introduction of suitable stallions, an excellent Artillery horse might
+be bred; but nothing is being done in this direction.<a href="#footnotetag16"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote17" name="footnote17"></a>
+<b>Footnote 17:</b> In a report addressed to H.M. the King in 1868 by
+General von Moltke on the experiences deduced from the events of 1866,
+it is proposed that there should be at Army Headquarters the Staff of
+a Cavalry Corps Command, together with its necessary Administrative
+services, always ready for the field. As Field Marshal he returns to
+the idea in another place, adding, 'particularly when we have found
+the right "Murat" to lead it' (Moltke's 'Militarische Werke,' II.,
+Second Part, First Group, B).<a href="#footnotetag17"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote18" name="footnote18"></a>
+<b>Footnote 18:</b> Generally defeats its own object; the heavy load
+destroys the roads, causes breakdowns and delays, etc.<a href="#footnotetag18"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote19" name="footnote19"></a>
+<b>Footnote 19:</b> The wheel should be so low that the man could use his
+rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it should be
+'transportable' (?'folding').<a href="#footnotetag19"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote20" name="footnote20"></a>
+<b>Footnote 20:</b> With stronger Divisions, a corresponding increase in
+Artillery must, of course, be made.<a href="#footnotetag20"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote21" name="footnote21"></a>
+<b>Footnote 21:</b> King William I. had already suggested the formation of
+batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in 1869&mdash;in a marginal note on
+the report of Moltke's of 1868&mdash;already referred to in the note on p.
+166 above.<a href="#footnotetag21"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote22" name="footnote22"></a>
+<b>Footnote 22:</b> Under the new Regulations this is now left to the
+discretion of the Regimental Commander.<a href="#footnotetag22"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote23" name="footnote23"></a>
+<b>Footnote 23:</b> 'Dressur' literally means 'preparation.' We use the term
+'breaking-in.' Note the difference.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Translator.</span><a href="#footnotetag23"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote24" name="footnote24"></a>
+<b>Footnote 24:</b> Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H.M. the Emperor, and is
+author of a well-known work on equitation.<a href="#footnotetag24"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote25" name="footnote25"></a>
+<b>Footnote 25:</b> As a measure of this excitement the following example
+may be useful. During the great Cavalry engagement on the plateau west
+of the Yron brook near Mars-la-Tour a squadron under most brilliant
+leadership galloped out in column of troops to threaten the enemy's
+flank. When, however, the order to wheel into line was given, the men
+were so excited that it was only with the utmost difficulty that its
+Captain succeeded in getting three troops to obey, whilst the leading
+one continued on in its original direction. The Squadron Commander was
+Rittmeister von Rosenberg, who afterwards became Inspector-General of
+Cavalry, and the above-mentioned incident was related by him
+personally to the author.<a href="#footnotetag25"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote26" name="footnote26"></a>
+<b>Footnote 26:</b> This formation has since been adopted, and is almost
+invariably employed.&mdash;<span class="smcap">Translator.</span><a href="#footnotetag26"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote27" name="footnote27"></a>
+<b>Footnote 27:</b> If, in the course of time, as I fully anticipate, the
+necessity should become apparent to give further expression in the
+form of Regulations to the point of view laid down in Section 346, it
+would certainly necessitate a complete rearrangement of the whole
+Regulations, out of which, in that case, other defects might then be
+eliminated. The following ideas might then be taken into
+consideration:</p>
+
+<p>1. Fundamental and formal separation of tactical prescription from
+instructions concerning the methods of training.</p>
+
+<p>2. Simplification of the Regimental drill in the direction of
+conferring increased freedom of movements to the Squadrons and double
+Squadrons. Limitations in the application of Squadron Columns, and
+their partial replacement by more suitable formations.</p>
+
+<p>3. More precise wording of the tactical principles, and their
+extension to prescriptions as to the use of 'Wing' or 'Line'
+formation.</p>
+
+<p>4. Re-introduction of the true idea of 'Line tactics,' limitation of
+the word 'Échelon' to troops overlapping the first line, of 'Reserve'
+for all held back behind it.</p>
+
+<p>5. The preparation for all instructions for the movement and combat of
+masses larger than Brigades without reference to any fixed standard of
+strength.</p>
+
+<p>6. More extended use of the different bugle sounds.</p>
+
+<p>7. Extension of the instructions for dismounted action to cover the
+employment of several Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades, and with
+especial stress on the decisive offensive. (See next section.)<a href="#footnotetag27"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote28" name="footnote28"></a>
+<b>Footnote 28:</b> Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366.<a href="#footnotetag28"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote29" name="footnote29"></a>
+<b>Footnote 29:</b> Instruction with models helps the man quickest; it is
+very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture of military
+things.<a href="#footnotetag29"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+<p><a id="footnote30" name="footnote30"></a>
+<b>Footnote 30:</b> Taking into account these and similar demands on the
+Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the time has not come
+to attach to them permanently officers of the General Staff. Every
+increase in the number of these officers employed in peace is a great
+advantage for War, because the War formations require far more Staff
+Officers to fill the new positions created on mobilization than are
+employed in peace&mdash;a very serious disadvantage. I consider it
+absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry should be
+provided with a permanent Staff.<a href="#footnotetag30"><span class="small">[Back to Main Text]</span></a></p>
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+<pre>
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi
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+Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Cavalry in Future Wars
+
+Author: Frederick von Bernhardi
+
+Translator: Charles Sydney Goldman
+
+Release Date: March 9, 2009 [EBook #28298]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Chris Curnow, Joseph Cooper, Christine P.
+Travers and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at
+https://www.pgdp.net
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+  CAVALRY IN FUTURE WARS
+
+
+  By HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL
+  FREDERICK VON BERNHARDI
+
+  Commander of the Seventh Division of the German Army
+
+
+  Translated by CHARLES SYDNEY GOLDMAN
+
+  Author of 'With General French and the Cavalry in South Africa'
+  Editor of 'The Empire and the Century'
+
+
+  With an Introduction by
+
+  LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN FRENCH
+  K.C.M.G., K.C.B., G.C.V.O.
+
+
+
+
+  LONDON
+  JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
+  1909
+
+  _First Edition, October, 1906_
+  _Second Edition, April, 1909_
+
+
+
+
+PREFACE
+
+
+I ventured to express the opinion in my book, 'With General French and
+the Cavalry in South Africa,' that if a high ideal of the duties and
+possibilities of Cavalry is set before our officers, and the means of
+instruction and training are placed within their reach, we shall
+possess in our next great War a force which, if led by men of the
+stamp of General Sir John French, will prove to the world that the day
+of Cavalry is far indeed from being past.
+
+In other words, I am convinced that, with good leadership and the
+right material in men, which the South African War has shown we
+possess, all that we need to perfect our system is a proper
+recognition of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, and a resolve
+to break with the old and adapt ourselves to the new situation.
+
+Reforms such as this would necessitate must affect all arms of the
+Service, but no branch more than the Cavalry, whose task in future
+will be more difficult, yet whose compensation lies in the
+possibilities of successes possessing greater significance than any
+hitherto attained.
+
+The South African War has roused the Cavalry into a renewal of
+activity, and has caused their leaders to encourage the study of
+Cavalry literature likely to develop the capacity of the officer for
+writing on these special subjects.
+
+As a step in that direction, I gave whatever little co-operation I
+could to the formation of the _Cavalry Journal_, in the hope that it
+may be conducive to the creation of a class of literature in which our
+Service is peculiarly deficient.
+
+It is of the first importance to realize the conditions that are
+revolutionizing the conduct of Modern Warfare.
+
+Such knowledge can alone enable us to appreciate the task which is
+given to the Cavalry, and to estimate the increased difficulties of
+their function. As their range of activity has become restricted in
+certain directions, their sphere of usefulness in others has largely
+increased.
+
+The want of an up-to-date work dealing with these facts has, I
+believe, been supplied by the recent publication of General von
+Bernhardi's book, 'Our Cavalry in Future Wars,' translated in the
+following pages with the object of making it more generally known in
+this country.
+
+Not only is the contribution valuable as having been written by a
+soldier of experience in the field, who has imbued his work with the
+dash and fire of the spirit of Cavalry, but it also reveals a profound
+insight into the modern conditions of War and the heightened demands
+exacted from Cavalry training. The author lays continual emphasis on
+the fact that Cavalry trained and organized on his lines should
+produce in the early stages of a War effects so decisive as to
+influence and even determine the succeeding phases of the campaign.
+
+General von Bernhardi has the gift of close and searching reasoning,
+and the ability to present his views in a vivid and trenchant form,
+as convincing as the writings of the late Colonel Henderson.
+
+His opening chapter deals with the conception of the conduct of War in
+the sense of to-day, and he proceeds to analyze the functions of the
+Cavalry as modified by the changes which have occurred.
+
+In lively detail he explains the difficulties which in future will
+confront all Cavalry operations, and the sacrifices that will be
+exacted from this Arm.
+
+Serious study and untiring perseverance must be claimed from the
+individual in order to equip himself mentally and physically for the
+task of overcoming these obstacles, while Bernhardi shows in
+convincing argument the brilliant opportunities of success.
+
+Although the opportunity of tactical action on the battle-field may
+have somewhat suffered, Bernhardi sees in the strategical handling of
+the Arm its chief possibilities, and here he includes reconnaissance
+and operations against the enemy's rearward communications and pursuit
+of a defeated Army.
+
+He considers cohesion and mobility to be essential to insure superior
+striking power by shock and fire action at the decisive point, and
+emphasizes this principle again and again as the means of attaining a
+high fighting efficiency.
+
+In the chapters on Tactical Leading in Mounted Combats and Tactical
+Conduct of Dismounted Action, General von Bernhardi deals with the
+merits of shock and fire action, and the enhanced importance of the
+latter as an accessory to, though never as a substitute for, shock,
+and he defines the respective dispositions for dismounted action when
+serving an offensive or defensive purpose.
+
+At the same time, he avers that success must depend upon the ability
+of the leader to realize the situation, on his qualities of decision,
+and on his capacity to maintain a correct balance between the
+application respectively of shock and fire action.
+
+The qualifications which General von Bernhardi expects in the Cavalry
+leader and those under him go to prove the scientific character of the
+profession, which demands a standard of extreme efficiency.
+
+Successful Cavalry leading will only be possible when the machinery of
+the instrument employed is technically perfected down to the minutest
+detail, and this can only be attained by a very elaborate and thorough
+training.
+
+The book should commend itself particularly to those critics who,
+drawing conclusions from the South African War, contend that the
+united offensive action of man and horse, culminating in the charge,
+can no longer avail, and that the future lies with the mounted
+riflemen, trained only to dismounted action. General von Bernhardi
+makes it clear that the theatre of War in South Africa does not assist
+us with any complete object-lessons from which to evolve a change of
+tactical principles, inasmuch as the conditions were entirely
+abnormal, and in European Warfare are unlikely to recur.
+
+It must be remembered that after the first few weeks of 1900 the
+Cavalry in South Africa as an effective force had practically ceased
+to exist, and that its offensive action was greatly hampered by the
+strategical plan of campaign which we adopted subsequently to the
+occupation of Bloemfontein.
+
+All that might be deduced from the defensive tactics of a mounted
+force, such as the Boers put into the field, during this period, is
+that, possessing greater mobility, they were able to hold up, during
+short intervals, Cavalry whose capacity for mounted action was
+practically destroyed by the 'want of condition' of their horses.
+
+Acting strategically as they did at Colesberg, in the relief of
+Kimberley, and in the operations leading up to Paardeberg, results
+were obtained which affected the whole subsequent conduct of the War.
+From then onwards, with the Cavalry acting tactically on the enemy's
+flank, the Boer Army withdrew practically on Pretoria, and no decisive
+tactical result was obtained.
+
+If that was the object which the Superior Command had in view, the
+Cavalry carried out that purpose with remarkable distinction.
+
+It is, however, conceivable that their strategical employment in rear
+of the Boer Army might have produced a situation compelling the Boers
+to fight a pitched battle or to surrender.
+
+If the Cavalry failed to achieve more, it was not from any want of
+opportunity which the theatre of War presented, but because their true
+role was rarely assigned to them.
+
+That the Boers were able at a later period to develop a vigorous
+scheme of action was largely owing to our conception of a plan of
+campaign which made the occupation of small capitals rather than the
+destruction of the enemy's Army the strategic objective.
+
+Had the Boers understood the Art of War and taken advantage of the
+openings which their superior mobility gave them, or had they been
+possessed of a body of Cavalry capable of mounted action, say at
+Magersfontein, they might repeatedly have wrought confusion in our
+ranks.
+
+Although the Boer War was of an exceptional nature, and of a character
+unlikely to be met with again, it furnishes some useful object-lessons
+which exemplify the importance of preparedness in peace for the sudden
+outbreak of War, so that the Army may take the field in such force and
+so disposed as to compel decisive action on the part of the enemy in
+the first stages of the War, and be in a position to inflict a
+crushing defeat rather than a series of light blows, which latter tend
+to disperse rather than destroy the enemy's forces.
+
+The War further shows how highly mobile forces, such as those of the
+Boers, can withdraw from a combat to avoid defeat, and by scattering
+to elude pursuit, and then, by reassembling where least expected, can
+strike a sudden blow at the enemy's weakest point. That they failed to
+accomplish more was due to their ignorance of the higher Art of War.
+
+To this neglect of the strategic advantage which mobility gives we
+must add the many lost tactical opportunities of converting a British
+reverse into a decisive defeat. The Boers did all that could be
+expected of Mounted Infantry, but were powerless to crown victory as
+only the dash of Cavalry can do.
+
+If we take into account the many opportunities which the Boers gave
+for successful strategic and tactical employment to men trained to
+fight on horseback, we arrive at the conclusion that the Boer War may
+nevertheless, if studied carefully and intelligently, teach us the
+indispensability of Cavalry in the role so clearly described in
+General von Bernhardi's instructive work.
+
+In conclusion, I must express my thanks to His Excellency General von
+Bernhardi for his courtesy towards me in concurring in the idea of an
+English translation, and to General Sir John French for his valuable
+introductory comments.
+
+I also wish to express to Colonel F. N. Maude my best thanks for his
+friendly co-operation, which gave me the advantage of his expert
+interpretation of German technicalities.
+
+                                             C. S. GOLDMAN.
+
+  34, QUEEN ANNE'S GATE,
+       WESTMINSTER,
+           _September, 1906_.
+
+
+
+
+AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
+
+
+When, in the Spring of 1899, I published the first edition of this
+work, I ventured to express the hope that it might incite others both
+to thought and exertion, and might further prove of practical
+assistance to many.
+
+I think I may claim without undue immodesty that this wish of mine has
+in many directions been fulfilled. Of the demands, however, which I
+put forward concerning the organization and equipment of the Cavalry,
+none have as yet been put into execution, but much wholesome spade
+work has been accomplished, and the necessity of reforms, together
+with due recognition of their importance, has everywhere made further
+progress. It is to be hoped that the next few years will bring the
+fulfilment of some of these our most earnest desires.
+
+The principles of training and of tactics which I have advanced and
+endeavoured to establish have found very general acceptance throughout
+the Arm, and have helped to clear up difficulties, although, as indeed
+was to be expected, they have encountered opposition from several
+quarters.
+
+This result of my labours has encouraged me in the preparation of this
+new edition to make use of all the latest experience, to bring out
+with additional clearness essential points, and to add much new
+material.
+
+I trust that in this manner I have materially increased the practical
+value of the work, and hope that in its new form it will continue to
+exert its silent influence, winning new supporters for my views, and
+helping to gain for the splendid Arm to which I belong the place
+which, in the interest of the whole Army, it deserves.
+
+                                             THE AUTHOR.
+
+  STRAZBURG, IN THE WINTER OF 1902.
+
+
+
+
+AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
+
+
+It would be difficult for a layman to form even an approximate
+conception of the amount of work annually accomplished in the German
+Army.
+
+The very vivid consciousness stirring everywhere as to the magnitude
+of the demands the not far distant future may make upon us, and the
+knowledge that the means with which we are compelled to work are
+certainly not always in agreement with our ideals, incite us to strain
+every nerve to make the most of what we have; and I believe I am not
+far wrong in asserting that it is the Cavalry Arm which, under
+pressure of circumstances, responds to these demands with the greatest
+avidity. This is, in fact, but the necessary consequence of the
+many-sidedness of our duties.
+
+Whether, however, the end and aim of all our exertions is everywhere
+attained must remain an open question.
+
+In every long period of peace there lurks the danger that methods of
+training may deviate after false ideals, lose themselves in the cult
+of imposing appearances, and in the clash of individual opinions fail
+to distinguish the essential--_i.e._, what is really practicable under
+the conditions of active service.
+
+This danger is all the more imminent when the characters and forms of
+Warfare itself are constantly changing; hence, ever new demands have
+to be made upon the troops themselves, and the exact bearing of each
+of these is not easily to be appreciated in the humdrum surroundings
+of our peace-time duties.
+
+It seems, therefore, a most pressing necessity at the present moment,
+when changes in social conditions and constant technical progress are
+exerting on the external phenomena and conditions of Warfare a steady
+pressure in the direction of modification, that we should compare our
+peace training with the requirements likely to be made upon us in time
+of War. Thus we can note where further adjustments between the two are
+necessary and can be usefully made.
+
+In this process of analysis it will not suffice to take each changing
+factor independently, following it out to its utmost ramifications,
+but rather we must endeavour to take a general view of the whole, and
+balance the variables one against the other.
+
+The man who concentrates his attention only on one detail easily loses
+his grasp of relative values, and runs the risk of failing 'to see the
+wood for the trees,' and only the mind trained to contemplate each
+factor in its relation to the whole, and with a clear idea of the
+ultimate purpose for which this whole is intended, will be able to
+avoid this pitfall; for only an intellect thus prepared can
+successfully harmonize the whole with its part, and, while keeping the
+essentials clearly before its eyes, treat the unessential as it
+deserves.
+
+It is in order to bring out this point of view that the following
+pages have been undertaken.
+
+As I endeavoured to arrive at a thoroughly clear comprehension of the
+many conflicting interests involved in the training of men and horses,
+as I tried to decide how to apportion both time and means to each
+individual branch of their education, and to see how far the
+traditions of the past could be harmonized with the requirements of
+the future, or where and how they need further development and
+simplification, I found myself compelled at every turn to go back and
+seek my ideal standard in the demands which War itself must make upon
+all Arms.
+
+Thus my work must be considered as an attempt to represent in broad
+outlines the conditions of the coming War, and from these to deduce
+logically the requirements a rational system of organization and
+training must satisfy.
+
+Those who hold different opinions as to the tasks which will be
+entrusted to our particular Arm will naturally come to other
+conclusions as to the values to be assigned to peace education, and I
+do not wish to present my opinions as absolutely final, although I
+have done my utmost to treat my subject-matter objectively and without
+prejudice.
+
+Meanwhile, the problems I have submitted for investigation are not
+only of military interest, but of the utmost military importance, and
+it has, therefore, seemed to me well worth while to discuss them from
+every point of view.
+
+Further, because these investigations owe their origin to the
+practical need I experienced during the course of my service to clear
+up the many points I have dwelt on, I have considered it a duty to
+make them accessible to all those who have at heart the development in
+our Cavalry of a thoroughly sound spirit in full harmony with the
+necessities of our present times.
+
+                                             THE AUTHOR.
+
+  BERLIN,
+     _March, 1899_.
+
+
+
+
+CONTENTS
+
+
+                                                                  Page
+
+  INTRODUCTION                                                     xxi
+
+
+  PART I
+
+  EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP
+
+  Chapter
+
+     I. THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE
+        EMPLOYMENT AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY                         3
+
+    II. DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR    19
+
+   III. STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY                     38
+
+    IV. INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION                   49
+
+     V. THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS                     62
+
+    VI. TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS                      90
+
+   VII. STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY                          104
+
+  VIII. PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS                 132
+
+
+  PART II
+
+  ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
+
+     I. NUMBERS                                                    151
+
+    II. RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING                              184
+
+   III. THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT                            213
+
+    IV. TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING                           247
+
+     V. FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES                      265
+
+    VI. THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS                       286
+
+
+  CONCLUSION                                                       294
+
+  INDEX                                                            298
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+General von Bernhardi's work, 'Cavalry in Future Wars' (translated
+from the German by Mr. C. S. Goldman), is a most valuable addition to
+modern Cavalry literature, and appears at an opportune moment to
+counteract and dispel some misleading conclusions which have been
+drawn by certain writers (both English and foreign) from reported
+operations in the late Manchurian War.
+
+One or two distinguished foreign soldiers who have publicly commented
+upon that campaign have said that what is termed the 'Cavalry spirit'
+is opposed to the idea of dismounted action. They hold that the
+Cavalry disdain to dismount, and they see in riding the end instead of
+the means. They consider that events in the Far East teach us that we
+must render our Cavalry less devoted to 'manoeuvres' and to
+'tournaments,' in order to enable them to fit themselves to take part
+in modern fighting; that the times have come when the methods of
+Warfare should be changed; and that the Cavalry must determine to
+defeat the enemy by dismounted action entirely.
+
+I cannot speak with any certainty as to what has happened in European
+Armies, but as regards the British Cavalry, I am absolutely convinced
+that the Cavalry spirit is and may be encouraged to the utmost without
+in the least degree prejudicing either training in dismounted duties
+or the acquirement of such tactical knowledge on the part of leaders
+as will enable them to discern when and where to resort to dismounted
+methods.
+
+How, I ask, can the Cavalry perform its role in war until the enemy's
+Cavalry is defeated and paralyzed? I challenge any Cavalry officer,
+British or foreign, to deny the principle that Cavalry, acting as such
+against its own Arm, can never attain complete success unless it is
+proficient in shock tactics.
+
+Cavalry soldiers must of course learn to be expert rifle shots, but
+the attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer by
+ignoring the horse, the sword, or the lance. On the contrary, the
+'elan' and dash which perfection in Cavalry manoeuvre imparts to large
+bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their employment as
+mounted riflemen when the field is laid open to their enterprise in
+this role by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry.
+
+That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent War did not distinguish
+themselves or their Arm is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite
+apparent. On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the
+riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence
+were only enabled to fulfil generally the role of Divisional Cavalry,
+which they appear to have done very well. The cause of failure on the
+Russian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have been
+trained on _exactly the same principles_ which these writers now
+advocate. They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought of
+nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they
+lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display
+of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.
+
+The author of this book is an eminent soldier, possessing an intimate
+knowledge of practical fighting, gained chiefly in one of the greatest
+Wars of modern times--the Franco-German Campaign of 1870-1871.
+
+His opinions are entitled to profound respect, and demand close
+attention and consideration. The General has treated his subject and
+marshalled his arguments and statements in so logical and intelligent
+a manner, and the principles he deduces seem so sound and appropriate,
+that the conclusions he arrives at appear to me unanswerable.
+
+In the exhaustive and capable summary of the work of Cavalry in War,
+General von Bernhardi seems to follow very closely the line of thought
+which has in recent years occupied the brains of many practical
+Cavalry soldiers in this country. He appeals strongly to our
+intellectual sympathy when he first of all discusses the strategical
+employment of Cavalry in all its bearings, and afterwards proceeds to
+unfold his views as to the role of the Cavalry Arm, first when the
+enemy's Cavalry has been driven from the field, and secondly in
+conjunction with the other Arms. Personally, I have never known the
+'Case for the Cavalry' stated more clearly and intelligently.
+
+In recommending the study of the book to all British soldiers, I would
+draw particular attention to the author's constant and repeated
+references to the necessity of first seeking out and fighting the
+hostile Cavalry and driving them from the field--in other words, to
+the immediate and complete attainment of the moral superiority.
+
+In support of his opinions, he reminds us forcibly that the important
+results gained by the German Cavalry in the 1870-1871 campaign were
+due to the absence of opposition on the part of the French Cavalry
+more than to anything else, and he contends that in future Wars, where
+the Cavalry on either side have been properly trained as such, this
+supremacy will have to be fought for, and will involve an enormous
+increase in the difficulty with which the Cavalry Arm will carry out
+its role. He scoffs at the idea held by so many 'amateurs' that
+'Cavalry duels' are superfluous.
+
+Only those who have led Cavalry on active service in the field, and
+have been charged with their training in peace-time, can realize to
+the full the absolute soundness of the conclusions at which General
+von Bernhardi has arrived, and it is much to be feared that the
+mischievous teaching which scoffs at 'manoeuvres,' 'tournaments,' and
+the 'Cavalry spirit,' proceeds almost entirely from the pens and from
+the brains of men who have no practical knowledge of the handling of
+the Cavalry Arm.
+
+The great value of this book to the British Cavalry officer of to-day
+seems to me to lie in the fact that this particular vein of thought
+and argument pervades it throughout.
+
+The General tells us, with the soundest arguments and the most
+positive proofs, that 'the brilliant field of enterprise which is open
+to the Cavalry soldier in his role as a mounted rifleman can only be
+attained by him when he has overthrown the enemy's Cavalry.'
+
+The author, having unmistakably insisted upon the preliminary
+overthrow of the enemy's Cavalry, proceeds to vindicate the idea that
+the Cavalry spirit is in any degree opposed to the idea of dismounted
+action when necessary. On the contrary, he declares emphatically that
+the Cavalry fight is only a means to an end, and that the hostile
+Cavalry once disposed of by means of horse and cold steel alone, a
+brilliant role lies open to that Arm by reason of their possession of
+an efficient firearm, in the use of which the cavalryman has received
+a thorough training.
+
+The great difficulty, he tells us, lies in the necessity of
+discovering a Leader who possesses the 'power of holding the balance
+correctly between fire power and shock, and in the training for the
+former never to allow troops to lose confidence in the latter.'
+'Whether,' says the General, 'it be in the working out of some
+strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
+by united fire action some common purpose, a balance of judgment and
+absence of prejudice is implied which is of the rarest occurrence in
+normal natures.'
+
+In dwelling so persistently upon the necessity for Cavalry being
+trained to the highest possible pitch to meet the enemy's Cavalry, I
+do not wish to be misunderstood. I agree absolutely with the author in
+the principle he lays down that the Cavalry fight is only a means to
+an end, but it is the most important means, and I have thought it
+right to comment upon this because it is a principle which in this
+country, since the South African War, we have been very much inclined
+to overlook. To place a force of Cavalry in the field in support of a
+great Army which is deficient in the power to overcome the opposing
+Cavalry is to act like one who would despatch a squadron of
+war-vessels badly armed, badly trained, and ill found, to blockade a
+distant coast-line defended by a powerful fleet. What is the naval
+fight in the open sea but a means to an end? It would be as sensible
+to dwell on the inutility and waste of a duel between hostile fleets
+as to lay down the principle that the 'Cavalry battle' in no way
+affects the mutual situation of hostile armies.
+
+But the 'end' in view which General von Bernhardi has so clearly laid
+down must never be lost sight of.
+
+Whilst the conditions of modern War have rendered the service of
+reconnaissance far more difficult, the same causes lend themselves to
+a much easier deception of the enemy by means of feints, etc. Cavalry,
+when working with the other Arms, can render valuable service in this
+way, and also in bringing rapid support to a main or counter attack.
+
+Another most important point must be noticed. I allude to the
+increasing tendency of umpires and superior officers to insist on
+Cavalry at manoeuvres and elsewhere being _ultra-cautious_. They try
+to inculcate such a respect for Infantry fire that Cavalry is taught
+to shirk exposure, and the moment Infantry come within sight,
+squadrons are made either to retire altogether, or dismount and shoot,
+regardless of what the 'Cavalry value' of the ground happens to be.
+
+I have no hesitation in saying that immense harm is done to the war
+efficiency of Cavalry by decisions of this kind, which disregard
+altogether the human factor in the problem. We ought the more to be on
+our guard against false teaching of this nature, seeing that there are
+many grave warnings to be found in history of the inevitable
+consequences of thus placing the weapon above the men.
+
+After the war of 1866 the great von Moltke made the following report
+to the King of Prussia:--
+
+'Our Cavalry failed, perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in
+_self-confidence_. All its initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres,
+where criticism and blame had become almost synonymous, and it therefore
+shirked independent bold action, and kept far in rear, and as much as
+possible out of sight' (Moltke's 'Taktisch-Strategische Aufsaetze,'
+Berlin, 1900).
+
+By like methods in peace training prior to the War with Turkey such
+timidity had been developed in the Russian Cavalry that, in the words
+of General Baykow, Cavalry commanders showed a marked disinclination
+to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which
+might bring them in contact with the Turkish Infantry, and so run risk
+of suffering loss.
+
+History is full of similar instances of how _not_ to train Cavalry,
+and I hold most strongly that the Arm must be educated up to a
+readiness _to act_, to come to close quarters in co-operation with the
+other Arms, and to risk casualties, as Infantry has often done before
+without losing its 'battle' value.
+
+To sum up, training with a view to self-sacrifice during peace
+exercises is essential for the success of all Arms in War, but
+especially so for Cavalry.
+
+With remarkable perspicuity and telling conviction, General von
+Bernhardi has dealt in an exhaustive manner with every subject
+demanding a Cavalry soldier's study and thought. I am convinced that
+he who thoroughly masters the contents of his book will feel no doubt
+and will entertain no misapprehension as to the vast role his Arm is
+called upon to fulfil in War, and he will realize how, in mastering
+the great essentials of which it treats, he will himself be assisting
+in the best possible manner to maintain the prestige and glory of the
+great Service to which he belongs.
+
+
+
+
+I
+
+EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY AND ESSENTIALS OF LEADERSHIP
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+THE MODERN CONDITIONS OF WAR, AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE EMPLOYMENT
+AND USEFULNESS OF CAVALRY
+
+
+The Art of War has undergone a momentous change; indeed, it has been
+revolutionized since the Franco-German War. Every condition that
+affects the conduct of warlike operations seems changed in almost
+every particular. Arms of precision have reached a degree of
+perfection which compels us to take into account possibilities which
+did not exist a few years ago, and for which the experience of the
+past can offer no scale of comparison. The all but universal
+introduction of Compulsory Service, and the consequent reduction in
+length of time spent by the soldier with the colours, have changed the
+character of almost all European Armies.
+
+All the most typical factors in the standing Armies of former days
+disappear more or less on the issue of the order to mobilize. New
+groupings of units are formed from the first outbreak of hostilities,
+and the fact that these bodies are put together only on mobilization,
+together with the reduction in the period of service which has been
+very generally accepted, tend to depreciate the average value of the
+troops, whilst at the same time the 'masses' have risen to
+unimaginable dimensions. This '_folie des nombres_,' against which
+certain French Authorities have warned us, is a very stern reality.
+
+Experience has shown that the mere preparation for War, penetrating
+year by year more deeply into the very heart of nations, must in
+future unchain, from the first moment that the Armies of the Continent
+come into collision, all the horrors of a racial conflict, in which,
+from the first, the interests of every individual are involved.
+
+The enormous development of railway communication has changed all
+conditions of strategical operations. Whilst the power of the railway
+to move masses since 1871 has increased, owing to the development both
+in the number and condition of the great trunk lines, the Armies
+themselves have become dependent on the railways in an ever-increasing
+degree. Further developments in Steam and Electricity will probably
+make these rearward communications both more necessary and at the same
+time more susceptible to injury. Thus all strategical conditions
+appear modified. Masses necessitate, even in the richest theatre of
+War, the return to the magazine system; hence the lines of
+communication are acquiring increased importance, and simultaneously
+great vulnerability.
+
+On the other hand, the increased power of the weapons in use offers
+greater advantages to the local defence. The prospects of success in
+the direct frontal attack of strong positions have diminished
+enormously. The assailant, therefore, no longer able to succeed by
+frontal attack, is compelled to endeavour to work round the enemy's
+flanks, and thus exercise pressure upon his communications. His
+endeavour must be, as Frederick the Great would have said, 'to compel
+his opponent to fight outside of his chosen position.'
+
+This increased importance of the communications, which in already
+exhausted districts will make itself particularly felt, will compel
+the defenders to take greater measures for their protection.
+
+All these conditions taken together must of necessity increase the
+importance of strategy in the Wars of the future to an extent which,
+in my opinion, no sufficient conception has as yet been made. This
+final conclusion at least we must recognise, however much we may
+struggle against it (partly as a consequence of our somewhat one-sided
+experiences in 1870, and partly through the increased difficulty of
+all operations due to the increased masses and the more concentrated
+susceptibility of the railway communication): that the decisive
+factors in the next War must be 'superiority in the strategic
+direction of the troops, together with the increased efficiency they
+have attained and their endurance.'[1]
+
+         [Footnote 1: The contrary view to this was largely held by a
+         certain school in Germany, whose views the author is here
+         endeavouring to combat.]
+
+To meet this drastic revolution in all these conditions, the pressure
+of which has compelled the artillery into new lines of development and
+forced the infantry to change their whole constitution (whether to
+their advantage or not may remain an open question), no changes at all
+commensurate to their importance have as yet been initiated in the
+Cavalry.
+
+Artillery and Infantry now have behind them the nation, from which
+they can draw inexhaustible reserves of trained men for their constant
+replenishment. The Cavalry alone remains a specialized service,
+because, owing to the peculiar circumstances of its existence, it can
+scarcely count on having the wastage of War made good by equally
+well-trained men and horses; still less is its complete replacement in
+case of disaster to be hoped for. In spite of this, we have to
+recognise the fact that the proportion the Cavalry bears in all
+European Armies to the ever-increasing numerical proportion of the
+other Arms has steadily receded. The Peace establishments show this
+clearly. Thus, taking the Germans' figures for 1870, we had:
+
+  1870.
+
+  463 Battalions.
+  460 Squadrons.
+  251 Batteries.
+  15-3/4 Pioneer Battalions.
+
+  1902.
+
+  625 Battalions (including 18 of 'Rifles').
+  486 Squadrons (including 16 squadrons of Mounted Rifles).
+  562 Batteries.
+  38 Battalions Heavy Artillery.
+  28 Pioneer Battalions.
+
+This ratio to the disadvantage of the Cavalry is even more apparent on
+mobilization for War, owing to the many Reserve and Landwehr
+formations of Infantry and Artillery, in comparison with which the few
+new units provided by the Cavalry are relatively unimportant.
+Considering the mobilized Army as a whole, the Cavalry forms
+numerically an almost insignificant factor.
+
+There remains yet another point of view to be considered. Undoubtedly
+there has been in the Cavalry a most active spirit of reform. On the
+basis of the experience derived from the great Wars of the last forty
+years (in the list I include the American War of Secession), changes
+in armament and equipment have taken place in every direction, more
+particularly with regard to armament. The necessity and possibility
+of strategical reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry have
+been fully recognised.
+
+The conviction also has been arrived at that only when supplied with a
+useful firearm and an adequate allowance of Horse Artillery will such
+'masses' prove adequate for the accomplishment of this special task.
+With the same object in view, the means have been granted to them with
+which to destroy telegraphs and railways, to bridge rivers, and so
+forth. The conviction also has been gained that the Cavalry require to
+be so familiarized with tactical formations for their employment in
+'mass' that they shall have become a second nature to them if they are
+to fight with a reasonable prospect of success. But all that has been
+done in these directions still remains insufficient. On the one hand,
+the improvements introduced have not taken into account the decisive
+changes in the general conditions which only the last few years have
+brought about. On the other, we must not forget that neither the
+Prussian Cavalry in 1870 in France nor the Russians against the Turks
+in 1877-1878 had even approximately equal Cavalry to oppose them. Even
+the great results achieved alternately by the Cavalry on both sides
+during the American Civil War were obtained in general under
+conditions which can no longer be anticipated, for at the moment of
+collision neither encountered, as a rule, either equal quality or
+numbers sufficient to develop their full power of attack.
+
+The very important data obtained during the campaign of 1899-1900 in
+South Africa as to the employment of dismounted action by Cavalry were
+also not then before us. One could only, therefore, reason from
+one-sided experiences, which can no longer be recognised as generally
+sufficient for our purpose. In future the mere possibility of results
+such as in 1870-1871 we so often gained owing to the absence of any
+serious opposition on the part of the opposing Cavalry, will nowadays
+have to be obstinately fought for, not without considerable loss; and
+it needs no special proof to show what an enormous increase in the
+difficulty of our task this involves, and how, as a consequence, all
+the conditions of our future action must be modified.
+
+Thus, the Cavalry stands face to face with new conditions, and sees
+itself everywhere confronted--on the battle-field and in the wider
+field of strategical operations--with new problems, towards the
+solution of which the history of the past furnishes only very general
+indications.
+
+If we mean to maintain our position as an effective Arm, and satisfy
+the demands that of necessity must be made upon us by these new
+conditions, _we must break_ with many experiences of the past, and
+work out for ourselves principles of action which must be deduced
+essentially from the probable requirements of the future.
+
+Each epoch-making War makes new demands upon us and prescribes new
+tasks, and he only will reap the palm of success who is able to meet
+them, because, with wise prevision, he has prepared himself to solve
+their difficulties in peace.
+
+If we wish to make an approximately correct picture of the future that
+awaits us, we must first face the question, What will be the influence
+that the changed conditions in the Art of War considered as a whole
+must exercise on the possible scope of action of our Arm?
+
+From the answer to this we can deduce the demands on the Cavalry in
+particular, and these demands give us a means for determining the
+limits of its employment, its consequent organization, and the
+training best suited to enable it to meet these requirements.
+
+If we summarize all the conditions which have modified the conduct of
+War and contrast with them what Cavalry, from the very nature of its
+being, is capable of performing, it would appear at first sight as if
+every form of action of the mounted Arm has been impeded and rendered
+more difficult in the highest degree; more particularly is this the
+case when opposed to the increased power of modern arms. Certainly,
+the impact of a modern bullet may at times produce less immediate
+effect than formerly. Cases have occurred in which serious wounds did
+not place the individual out of action immediately, and we may
+therefore anticipate that many horses will not be stopped in the
+charge, despite severe injuries. But this drawback the Infantry can
+meet by opening fire sooner. To the Artillery this does not apply;
+and, in any case, this objection is not of such importance as to
+neutralize in any way the other advantages conferred by modern
+weapons.
+
+Owing to the fact that the extent of the danger zone has been very
+considerably increased, and that within these zones the amount of fire
+which has to be faced in a given time has been intensified to a degree
+which formerly could hardly have been dreamt of, it has ceased to be
+possible to ride straight at the front of an unshaken enemy.
+
+Thus, essentially the Cavalry has been driven out of its former place
+of honour on the battle-fields of the plains, and has been compelled
+to seek the assistance of the cover the ground affords in order to
+carry its own power of destruction into immediate contact with its
+enemy, and only under most exceptionally favourable conditions will it
+still be possible to deliver a charge direct across the open.
+
+Further, as far as the Infantry are concerned, it will be quite the
+exception to encounter them in closed bodies; generally we shall have
+to ride against extended lines, which offer a most unfavourable target
+for our purpose.
+
+The difficulties both of observation and reconnaissance have also been
+materially increased, for, on the one hand, the increased range of the
+firearm compels one to keep further away from the enemy, thus making
+it more difficult to judge with accuracy his strength and positions;
+on the other, the use of smokeless powder, which no longer reveals the
+position of the firing line, renders a more thorough searching of the
+ground even more indispensable than formerly.
+
+The possible participation of the civilian inhabitants of the invaded
+Nation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalry
+action other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts it
+may, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of all
+patrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by a
+new and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we may
+estimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of the
+Franco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all such
+experiences will be very much intensified.
+
+Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to the
+other Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of the
+latter cover larger areas, and whether to cover these or to
+reconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger spaces,
+notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers--_i.e._, on each square
+mile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reduced
+number of patrols, etc.
+
+Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity to
+intervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, but
+relatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage secured
+will thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent,
+since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents a
+smaller proportion of his whole Army.
+
+If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, is
+annihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if this
+Brigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps.
+
+If in these changed relations there are obviously factors which
+materially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which must
+make the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, on
+the other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of a
+future War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigation
+lead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is even
+greater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, and
+even on the battle-field revealing new chances of success.
+
+Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater the
+pitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, the
+greater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be the
+reaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them.
+
+Now that all European States are straining every nerve to employ
+enormous masses of men from the first moment of hostilities, in order
+thus to gain an advantage whilst their enemy is still concentrating,
+and when we further consider how these exertions must increase the
+strain throughout the nation to the very utmost, it must be apparent
+that the first great decision of Arms must be of overwhelming
+importance. Not only the troops directly concerned, but the 'masses'
+behind them, find themselves for the moment involved in the
+consequences of victory or defeat. Hence the reaction in either
+direction, owing to the lower average quality of the troops, their
+greater numbers, the increased difficulties of moving them, and the
+susceptibility to congestion of their rearward communications, must be
+far greater and far more disastrous than hitherto under similar
+tactical conditions.
+
+The more important it is to secure a favourable decision, the more
+difficult with growing masses to divert an operation once commenced,
+to give it a new direction or assign it a new objective, the less
+possible it becomes to alter dispositions which may have been issued
+on false premises; hence again _the greater grows the value of
+thorough and active reconnoitring_.
+
+If this holds good, more especially for the first great collision, it
+remains also a guiding principle for all future operations; for, on
+the one side, it is probable that even in its later stages the War
+will be conducted with comparatively great masses; on the other, as we
+have seen, _the importance of the strategical element has
+unquestionably grown_; hence the _value of efficient reconnaissance_
+has been proportionably intensified.
+
+In similar measure the importance of screening has also developed. In
+proportion as the assailant is compelled to resort to turning
+movements and surprises, the defender is obliged to have recourse to
+timely changes of front and unexpected counter-attacks; hence for
+both timely reconnaissance of the enemy's, as well as for trustworthy
+screening of one's own operations, the extended employment of the
+mounted Arms has become imperative. In other words, although
+reconnaissance and screening for strategical purposes by the Cavalry
+have been rendered more difficult by the conditions we must expect to
+meet in the future, on the other hand, they have gained enormously in
+importance. And it is not in this direction alone that the value of
+the Arm has increased, but it has also had a new and important field
+of activity thrown open to it owing to the increased susceptibility
+the rearward communications of the enemy and his railways have
+developed.
+
+As a consequence of the increased liability to interruption of these
+communications, and also of the far more serious confusion to which
+any such interruption can give rise, it has become far more difficult
+than in the past to execute offensive flanking operations, changes of
+front, or counter-attacks, all of which are movements which the
+practical strategist must bear in mind. On paper and on the map such
+undertakings appear to present no more elements of friction than
+formerly, but on the ground itself those who have once seen masses of
+several corps all huddled together know that things are very
+different. All such movements nowadays are tied to the railway-lines,
+and these, again, are congested by the flow of food and ammunition,
+which must at all costs be maintained. Fresh units also of troops may
+be coming up to the front, whose arrival is of the last importance in
+the plans of the generalissimo, and a single broken viaduct may throw
+confusion into the whole design.
+
+In a densely-populated and fruitful district the resulting failure of
+supply may be endured, but it is very different when in a
+poverty-stricken district the supply of a whole Army depends on
+perhaps a single line of railway.
+
+Thus the Cavalry sees itself confronted by a task in the solution of
+which it can achieve results of _decisive importance_ in a new
+direction, for the following reasons: The relative importance of the
+Arm during actual operations having been materially increased, the
+period of concentration preceding actual collision (notwithstanding
+the fact that the actual effectiveness of Cavalry in the face of
+modern firearms has been decreased) offers opportunities which under
+certain conditions promise higher results than formerly.
+
+If every delay in the march which may be caused by the action of
+Cavalry against the flanking lines of advance of an Army concentrating
+for battle is detrimental, how much greater would be the
+disorganization resulting from similar operations after defeat! Very
+rarely in such a case would it be possible to retire eccentrically by
+the same roads which were used for advance. The beaten troops
+generally drift back quite involuntarily in the direction into which
+they have been compelled by the results of the tactical decision. The
+wider the original front, the greater the masses of the troops
+concerned (which are now not only in a demoralized condition, but are
+compelled, under pressure of pursuit, to change their communications
+into new directions, and for this purpose to disentangle the columns
+drawn in for the concentration) and the greater the certainty that
+conditions must arise which will give to an active Cavalry an even
+richer opportunity of harvest than was formerly open to them.
+
+This will in future be all the more the case when troops of lower
+quality, and therefore more liable to become shaken and dispirited,
+have to be employed. Reserve formations--Landwehr and the like--which
+under favourable conditions might render excellent service, when once
+beaten, without officers, weary and hungry, lose all cohesion, when,
+with baggage, wounded, and stragglers, they are driven back over
+crowded roads; and then, no matter how well they are armed, they are
+an easy prey to a pursuing Cavalry.
+
+The man who throws his rifle away or shoots in the air will not find
+salvation either in clip-loading or smokeless powder against the lance
+in the hands of a relentless pursuing Cavalry.
+
+The same holds good for the fight itself. We cannot attack even
+inferior Infantry as long as it only keeps the muzzles of its rifles
+down and shoots straight; but once it is morally broken and surprised,
+then the greatest results are still to be achieved even on an open
+battle-field. That, at least, the campaign of 1870-1871 sufficiently
+proved, although the Cavalry were so seldom allowed the opportunity to
+reap the ripe harvest our strategy and the action of the other Arms
+had so abundantly prepared for them.
+
+A further point in our favour is to be found in the fact that the
+increased power of modern Artillery fire has rendered the defence of
+villages and woods practically an impossibility. The Infantry are thus
+compelled to seek open but rolling ground, and it is precisely such
+ground which favours the concealed approach and sudden attack of the
+Cavalry; but surprise is the very essence of successful Cavalry
+action.
+
+If we bring together all these points of view which have been hitherto
+only indicated, we find, on the one hand, the absolute fighting value
+of the Cavalry has considerably diminished, and that in modern War the
+conditions of Cavalry employment will in every direction be rendered
+more difficult; on the other hand, the strategical importance of the
+Arm, as well as the scope of the duties which it may be called upon to
+fulfil, have increased very decidedly, and very important new
+opportunities for successes have been thrown open to it.
+
+We cannot sufficiently insist upon the cumulative effects which all
+these general changes in the nature of War have exercised upon the
+Cavalry Arm; for not only has public opinion taken up the opposite
+view, but even in the Army itself these positive views have not
+received the attention they deserve.
+
+The exploits of our Cavalry in 1870-1871 have been universally
+admired, without, however, being appreciated at their true relative
+value. On the other hand, reasoning from the mechanical perfection of
+the firearm, the conclusion has been reached that, as against Infantry
+and Artillery, the Cavalry can no longer hope to achieve any results
+of importance. It has been shown that in 1870-1871 the German Cavalry
+possessed a great numerical superiority over its adversary--that, in
+fact, numerous regiments during the whole War either never came into
+action at all or at least never had the opportunity to exhibit their
+full value in other fields of employment, and hence it has been
+concluded that an increase or organic reform of what they are pleased
+to consider a somewhat antiquated Cavalry is quite superfluous.
+
+An attempt on the part of the Imperial Government to introduce an
+increase of establishments had to give way to more important
+considerations. In fact, practically the German Cavalry in number and
+organization remains to-day the same as in 1870.
+
+But the duties which in future will fall to the Cavalry are so
+wide-reaching, and for the conduct of the War are often of such
+decisive importance, that on the manner of their execution the
+ultimate results of a campaign must very materially depend.
+
+If the Cavalry is not in a condition to prove equal to these duties,
+we shall find ourselves confronted with a situation of the gravest
+danger. Hence it becomes unconditionally necessary to apply the
+reforming hand where important deficiencies and practical
+insufficiencies can be recognised. In order to apply the lever of
+reform at once to the best advantage, we must be quite clear in our
+own minds in which part of the conduct of War the importance of the
+Cavalry will principally be felt. Only from the recognition of the
+demands which will there be made upon it can we conclude in what
+direction its further evolution can be initiated.
+
+We must, therefore, get a clear conception of the probable demands to
+be made upon the Arm in each individual phase of a future War, test
+them with a view to their relative importance towards the result as a
+whole, and then endeavour to recognise on which factors the success in
+each individual phase principally depends.
+
+In the first place stands naturally the demands which will be made on
+the Cavalry during the early periods after the declaration of
+hostilities--that is, during mobilization and concentration. These
+require all the more attention because, as we have seen, it is
+particularly these introductory stages of future War which will be of
+particular importance, and because it is precisely in these very
+points that opinion is as yet not united.
+
+Then we must follow the employment of the Arm in the further course of
+operations, and endeavour to determine in what direction the most
+important results are to be obtained.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+DUTIES AT THE BEGINNING AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE WAR
+
+
+The importance which attaches to the first tactical decisions, the
+fact that their success is mainly determined by the uninterrupted
+execution of the railway deployment, the safe arrival of the troops
+and war material in the appointed zones of concentration, the
+consideration that the continuance of the operation after the first
+battle--retreat or pursuit--is mainly conditioned by the uninterrupted
+action of the rearward communications, make it indubitable that it is
+of the utmost importance to disturb the corresponding operations of
+the enemy, and thus place one's own Army from the very beginning in a
+position of material and strategic advantage.
+
+Since the Cavalry is not only able to cover great distances with
+overwhelming rapidity, but also, owing to its special character as a
+standing branch of the Army, is always ready to march and operate,
+whilst the other portions of the Army are still occupied with their
+mobilization, the opinion has been freely expressed that it would be
+advantageous to utilize this period required for the mobilization and
+railway transport of the other Arms for Cavalry raids, either into
+the zone of concentration, or against the communications of the enemy.
+Russia has for this very purpose concentrated upon the German and
+Austrian frontiers enormous Cavalry forces, supported by light
+infantry. France also keeps a numerous Cavalry practically on a war
+footing on the frontiers of Lorraine.
+
+On the outbreak of War these masses are ready at the shortest notice
+to ride over our frontiers, to break up our railways, to seize our
+horses and depots, to destroy our magazines, and to carry terror and
+consternation into our zone of assembly.
+
+It cannot be denied that in such manner by no means inconsiderable
+damage could be caused, and hence one must earnestly consider, first,
+what chances of success such enterprises offer, and next, whether the
+relative magnitude of the probable results are proportionate to the
+probable losses they must necessarily entail.
+
+Cool and objective consideration of such ideas must, in my opinion,
+lead us to negative such undertakings--on our side, at any rate. In
+the first place, the enemy will always be in a position, by suitable
+organization of his frontier guards and the situation selected for the
+front of his strategic deployment, to withdraw himself either
+altogether from the radius of action of the Cavalry, or at least
+render its advance both difficult and dangerous. The danger will be
+the greater the more it has been possible to provide for the armament
+and organization of the population in the frontier provinces. Where
+the conditions on the side of the defender are not unusually
+unfavourable--as, for instance, in wide open districts--or where there
+is a want of troops in strategically unimportant provinces, then even
+if the invading masses break in on the very first day of mobilization,
+they will find railways, defiles, river-crossings already defended by
+infantry or popular levies. If they come upon an insurgent population
+they will find great difficulties both in reconnaissance and
+subsistence.
+
+At every step they advance, the numbers of the opponent will be
+constantly increasing, while their own strength diminishes. The
+defiles will be occupied between their several columns, and they must
+guard themselves in every direction. Their trains and baggage get into
+confusion, and supply becomes all the more difficult the more rapidly
+they advance, because the waggons cannot keep up with their movement,
+and there is no time for requisitioning. Field batteries and lines of
+infantry occupy the more important positions, the enemy's Cavalry
+appears on the flanks, and man and horse break down at length under
+the severity of the strain. Retreat becomes inevitable, and if they
+ever get back at all, they can only reach their own Army after heavy
+losses and with broken force. The damage which they can do to the
+enemy remains small in proportion to his total power, even though it
+is locally not inconsiderable. At the best one may hope to destroy
+some railway not too far from the frontier, interrupt some telegraph
+lines of communication, and disperse or capture some ammunition
+depots, magazines, or snap up some convoys of reserve men and horses.
+But the enemy has already taken these possibilities into account; they
+will soon be overcome, and his arrangements in general will be hardly
+disturbed.
+
+If, on the other hand, the Cavalry is accompanied by infantry, it will
+be even more hampered in its movements than by its own trains, and
+will soon have to decide whether it should make its movements
+dependent on those of its escort, thereby renouncing all hopes of
+further results, or whether it should abandon the infantry to its
+fate. Certain defiles in the vicinity of the frontier, which the
+combined forces were able in advancing to occupy, the infantry may
+well succeed in keeping open; but if it attempts to follow the tracks
+of its own Cavalry, there can be no doubt it would be exposed to
+inevitable destruction.
+
+This applies equally to the cyclist--at least, as far as the machine
+has as yet been developed; for though one cannot deny the great
+advantage which its mobility under certain circumstances offers, yet
+it remains too dependent on roads and weather to insure that freedom
+and certainty of movement which in such undertakings in conjunction
+with Cavalry are unconditionally necessary.
+
+The attempt to break up communications by well-mounted officers
+patrols boldly pushed forward in advance would seem to offer even less
+chances of securing permanent results. They, too, will find the
+country obstructed by the armed population, or by troops in the act of
+concentration. Even weak detachments or patrols along the railway
+would suffice to effectively resist them; they can depend for success
+only on their rapidity and cunning. But most rivers are unfordable,
+and in the woods patrols can hardly venture, because every tree may
+shelter a man with a rifle. Once they leave the roads, their pace
+diminishes; they easily lose their direction; nowhere can they obtain
+security for rest and food, even if they are fortunate enough in
+procuring any. If, in spite of all this, they do happen to succeed in
+blowing up a railway or cutting a telegraph, the effect is
+infinitesimal.
+
+The patrol itself will find its chances of escape decreasing in exact
+proportion to the distance it has penetrated into the enemy's country.
+
+The greater the number of the patrols employed, the more irreplaceable
+will the inevitable loss become; for it will always be the best
+officers, the men who put most energy and determination into the
+execution of their instructions, who are the most likely to fall
+victims to their courage and audacity.
+
+Premature advance of the Cavalry during mobilization and concentration
+can only procure information of little or no importance, for the
+existing railways, the direction of the frontiers, and the peace-time
+distribution of the troops reveal all this to the General Staff
+beforehand. These, together with the secret service, political
+conditions obtaining at the moment, and press intelligence, will
+enable one to forecast with some degree of precision the general
+situation.
+
+Now, the Cavalry can hardly expect to attain more--indeed, it is
+doubtful whether they would succeed even in confirming what is already
+known, for the difficulties to be overcome, as we have seen, are
+numerous, and nowhere can one find completed situations from which to
+make reliable deductions. At most they can determine that certain
+places are already occupied, and that the traffic on certain lines is
+considerable, things that one knew _a priori_, which, therefore, are
+not worth any serious sacrifice. Moreover, it is exceedingly doubtful
+whether, at such an early period, when conditions are changing from
+day to day, such information has any practical value.
+
+Of course, it is not intended to maintain that one should not from the
+very first moment after the declaration of War keep a sharp look-out
+upon the enemy, work up to him, and seek to determine as much as
+rapidity and daring can succeed, with any probability of success, in
+attaining--that goes without saying. Particular value will always
+attach to the taking of prisoners, whose regimental numbers enable us
+to check the accuracy of our existing information. But against this we
+must emphasize all the more forcibly that in this first period of
+hostilities an inundation of the enemy's zone of concentration with
+masses or by far-flung lines of patrols is not only not expedient, but
+absolutely detrimental, since the certain cost of such undertakings
+stands in no reasonable proportion to the probably negative, or at
+most insignificant, result to be expected. Further, our own
+concentration has already been so prepared in peace that it must be
+carried out with clock-like regularity, even should the results of the
+reconnaissance disclose that the conditions on the side of the enemy
+were not quite those that we had originally expected.
+
+Even the mere transference backwards of the line of strategic
+deployment, which in 1870 could still be carried out without serious
+difficulties or drawbacks, could nowadays, in view of the high tension
+induced by modern conditions, only be executed with extraordinary
+difficulty, whilst lateral displacement of such numbers is quite
+inconceivable. For even if the railway organization would suffice for
+the execution of such a design, the many other preparations in the
+zone of concentration can neither be moved nor improvised.
+
+Summarizing the whole question, the conclusion, I think, must be, that
+only that Army which has at its disposal a great preponderance of
+Cavalry could allow itself the luxury of such premature commitment of
+its mounted forces.
+
+In general, the difficulties of replacing the losses of the Cavalry
+with material of equal quality are so great that only the most
+important reasons could justify any such attempts. Hence the side
+which is weaker in Cavalry will meet the circumstances best by keeping
+back its horsemen, and not sacrificing its officers for infinitesimal,
+and probably unattainable, advantages. It will be better merely to
+work up to the enemy as close as may be possible without serious
+losses, allow the enemy's mounted forces to wreck themselves against
+the opposing infantry and armed population, and only then to put in
+its Cavalry for decisive action when the opponent has already wasted
+his best elements in the pursuit of insignificant advantages. After
+all, it is only then, when the strategical concentration commences,
+after railway movement is completed, that reconnaissance becomes both
+possible and important.
+
+Circumstances can, of course, arise in which, already during the first
+period of operations, exhaustive independent activity may be demanded
+from the Cavalry, as, for instance, when one has reason to believe
+that the enemy has changed his previously-selected zone of
+concentration, or, as when in 1870 on the German side, it becomes
+necessary to take steps to protect the frontier districts against the
+enemy's raids. In the first case the attempts to discover, by the
+employment of Cavalry, the changed dispositions of the enemy are
+certainly permissible. The patrols must then go forward until they can
+settle the decisive questions, and strong detachments must be pushed
+out so close behind them that the patrols and their following
+squadrons can find a safe retreat, and insure the transmission of the
+intelligence they have collected.
+
+In such enterprises tactical collision with the enemy's Cavalry and
+his frontier troops might ensue. It may therefore be necessary to
+support our squadrons by Infantry and Artillery.
+
+But in every case we must be careful to keep within the limits which
+are conditioned by the purpose of the undertaking, and not allow
+ourselves to be involved in desperate and doubtful enterprises.
+
+In the next case the duties of the Cavalry are merely defensive. All
+that then matters is to rob small bodies of the enemy of their
+opportunities, to block the traffic across the frontier, and to work
+round their patrols with our own forces; but in no case are they to
+attempt to obtain positive advantages by force, or to hazard important
+decisions against a superior enemy. Wherever possible every effort
+should be made to supplement the troops assigned to this defensive
+attitude by the armed population, or even to replace them by such
+levies altogether. The fortification and defence of villages and
+isolated farms, occupation of railways and watercourses, and, above
+all, the defence of woods which might favour the concealed advance of
+the enemy's patrols, can well be left to the care of these improvised
+formations.
+
+Hostile attempts can be generally met by dismounted fire action in
+well-chosen strong defensive country, possibly supported by
+detachments of Infantry, Artillery, and 'Landsturm.' If the enemy's
+superiority is great, then one must retire until the equilibrium of
+the forces is re-established, the strategical necessity compels us to
+fight, or, finally, the tactical situation gives good promise of
+success.
+
+One must, however, always keep this clearly before one's mind: that
+the essence of all Cavalry action in the opening stage of the War lies
+neither in this purely defensive attitude, nor in the offensive
+enterprises previously alluded to, by which the concentration of the
+enemy would be disturbed or other material successes might be
+achieved, but that the decisive purpose only begins when important and
+possible tasks can be given to the Cavalry--_i.e._, when the main
+bodies of the enemy become ready for operations.
+
+Then it becomes our duty to screen not only the advance of our own
+troops and to secure to our Infantry the advantages of being able to
+advance undisturbed, but the climax of all these duties will be
+reached _in the far more important duty_, in the now indispensable
+task, of securing the _widest possible sphere of intelligence_.
+
+Whereas, during the period of railway concentration the front of the
+enemy was conditioned by the ends of the lines employed in bringing up
+the troops, who in turn spread themselves out to utilize the resources
+of the country (hence generally our patrols, if sent out, would come
+in contact all along the threatened frontier or the enemy's line of
+detrainment, with defended villages, etc.), the troops will now be
+drawn into closer cantonments, or bivouacs, and group themselves
+together into clearly-defined masses.
+
+There will therefore now arise between separate portions of his Army
+and their lines of advance, spaces unoccupied by troops into which our
+Cavalry can penetrate. The heads and flanks of his columns can now be
+determined, and the direction in which they are marching, thus
+ascertained, becomes of essential importance.
+
+Now is the time when the Cavalry must put in its full strength to
+discover the strength and direction of the enemy's movements, and the
+fact of this concentration provides the Cavalry with the opportunities
+necessary to solve the problem before it.
+
+Of course, immediately after detraining, troops will have to march to
+the districts to which they are assigned for convenience of supply,
+and this will lead to the formation of temporary groupings, which it
+will be advisable, if possible, for us to observe. But it must not be
+overlooked that observations during this period may easily lead to
+false conclusions, as such movements serve only secondary purposes or
+introductory measures, and seldom justify any conclusions bearing upon
+the design of the ultimate operations. These latter only develop after
+a certain degree of concentration has been attained, and hence the
+essence of the whole question resolves itself into this--that the
+Cavalry should not be put in until shortly before the strategical
+concentration begins.
+
+From the results now obtained the success of the whole campaign may
+entirely depend. At this climax no secondary consideration must be
+allowed to distract attention from the principal object. Even the
+desirability of screening the movements of one's own Army, in so far
+as this duty is not fulfilled by the reconnaissance itself, must give
+way to the attainment of the principal object in view, which is
+_intelligence_, not _security_.
+
+This point requires to be more particularly insisted upon, because
+fundamentally different arrangements are necessary to fulfil these two
+purposes. Anyone who attempted to entrust both the provision of
+intelligence and the protection of the troops to one and the same body
+of men would in the vast majority of cases fail to secure either
+purpose as long as the enemy's mounted forces still held the field.
+
+To secure information--_i.e._, intelligence--requires concentration of
+force. The reconnoitring Cavalry must beat their opponents out of the
+field in order to obtain opportunities for discovering what is going
+on behind the enemy's protective screen. To accomplish this, the
+Cavalry must endeavour to work round the adversary's flanks, and may
+in consequence have to leave the front of its own Army entirely
+uncovered. The protection of this Army, on the other hand, requires a
+wide extension of front and consequent subdivision of force, the exact
+opposite of the concentration the provision of intelligence
+imperatively calls for.
+
+Naturally this view encounters opposition. Some contend that the whole
+triumph of the Art consists in solving both problems simultaneously.
+They reason that it is superfluous to seek an encounter with the
+enemy's Cavalry. Cavalry duels only lead to the mutual destruction of
+both parties. They maintain that one ought to advance, in the
+interests both of security and screening, on a certain breadth of
+front. If, then, circumstances compel one to fight, one must
+concentrate quickly, and after the combat gain again the necessary
+degree of extension to cover the front of the Army. They would leave
+reconnaissance to be carried out by rapidly advancing patrols, which
+evade those of the enemy, find cover in the ground, gain advantageous
+points of observation on the flanks and in rear of the opponent, thus
+obtaining their objects in spite of the enemy.
+
+I hold it to be a grave error of judgment to believe that any
+systematic application of this line of action will give sufficient
+results.
+
+Advantages in war must be fought for; they cannot be filched.
+
+Was it not difficult enough in 1870-1871 to obtain reliable
+information, although we had no true Cavalry opponent against us, and
+still more difficult to get that news through to Headquarters in time?
+How much more difficult, therefore, will it not be in the future, when
+we can no longer count on controlling unconditionally the country
+between the two Armies, and the enemy's Cavalry hold the field as well
+as we!
+
+Who will then guarantee that our patrols will really penetrate the
+enemy's screen; above all, that their reports will get back through
+the district controlled by the enemy's Cavalry in time enough to be of
+use to Headquarters in forming its decisions? If the patrols are
+compelled to elude those of the enemy, to seek for intersected
+country, and to make detours, one cannot count on the requisite
+rapidity; and the greater the total numbers brought together in modern
+War, the greater the distances become which have to be reckoned with.
+
+If from the very necessity of finding the shortest way and securing
+communications with one's own Headquarters it becomes necessary to
+beat the enemy's Cavalry out of the field to clear up the situation
+sufficiently, the need of fighting is brought home to one with all the
+greater force, because any other line of action leaves the enemy
+chances at least as good as our own, which can never be the objective
+of any form of military action, and ultimately fighting becomes
+compulsory if, in addition to reconnaissance, one attempts to carry
+out screen duties at the same time. It stands to reason that the
+enemy's Cavalry can only be prevented from seeing by actually driving
+them off the ground and depriving them of the power of breaking
+through our own screen. That a numerically and materially inferior
+Cavalry does well to avoid action goes without saying, but
+fundamentally the duty of the Cavalry must be to seek to bring about
+collision with that of the enemy, so that from the very beginning it
+secures command of the ground between the two armies, and that the
+actual and moral superiority in the whole zone of operations between
+the two armies is obtained from the outset for our own Cavalry.
+
+The victory of the 'masses' intensifies and invigorates the sense of
+superiority in the individual combatant, and this sense of individual
+superiority is essential if the patrols are to carry through their
+duties in the true Cavalry spirit.
+
+On the one hand, they are only able to solve their tasks both of
+screening and of reconnaissance by actually defeating the enemy's
+patrols; on the other hand, the moral factor tells heavily in the
+scale.
+
+How can one expect courage and determination or audacity from men who
+have always been taught to avoid their opponent and only fight when
+they are actually compelled?
+
+The man who leaves these psychic factors out of account will always
+find himself mistaken in War.
+
+That in certain cases it may be useful to push forward officers as
+stealthy patrols, with instruction to avoid being drawn into an
+action, as far as time and opportunity will allow, goes without
+saying; but nevertheless stress must be laid upon the point that
+already in the period which is in general taken up with the encounter
+with the enemy's Cavalry, no opportunity should be lost of keeping the
+principal masses of the enemy's Army under direct observation, and
+that therefore it is necessary from the very commencement of the
+advance to send out officers patrols for this special purpose.
+
+These patrols will derive their best support from a tactical victory
+obtained over the enemy's Cavalry, which is manoeuvring in their rear.
+
+Thus the fact remains that we must fight to reconnoitre and fight to
+screen, and that only a systematic division of the two spheres of
+action can give us the freedom necessary to insure the adoption of the
+proper form at the right time and place.
+
+A victory of the reconnoitring Cavalry by shattering the strength of
+the enemy's horsemen must always result, both directly and indirectly,
+in the advantage of our screening force.
+
+The whole consideration, therefore, leads me to the conclusion that
+the chief task for the Cavalry consists in obtaining a victory over
+the enemy's Cavalry in that direction which is of decisive importance
+for the further prosecution of reconnaissance as soon after the
+beginning of the great operations as possible.
+
+That it cannot be our object to seek the opponent's horsemen in the
+direction which they themselves have selected--merely to beat
+them--need scarcely be insisted upon. That would be to take the law
+from the enemy and allow one's self to be diverted from the principal
+direction in which reconnaissance is desirable.
+
+Time and direction of the advance must rather be so chosen that they
+compel the enemy to move to meet us. At the same time our effort must
+be to appear with numerical superiority, in order to be certain of
+victory.
+
+In what concerns the Cavalry in the further course of the War, the
+necessity both of screening and reconnoitring recurs again and again;
+and in many cases even after the enemy has been beaten out of the
+field, these objects will still only be obtained by fighting. Such
+cases will occur in the duties of screening and security when the
+enemy still possesses enough offensive power to attempt a
+reconnaissance, with the threat of attack combined, and we ourselves
+are engaged in a similar manner; also in all such cases in which
+turning movements entail too much delay, or are rendered impossible by
+the extension of the enemy's front; or, again, when the enemy on their
+part renew offensive operations.
+
+The necessity of breaking through the line of Infantry outposts in
+order to discover the whereabouts of the enemy's principal masses and
+the direction of their movements will also from time to time arise,
+and it may become necessary to suppress rapidly and thoroughly
+attempts at armed resistance by the civilian population.
+
+Further, our Cavalry will be called on for attempts against the
+enemy's communications, the strategical importance of which has been
+already discussed, and these will be all the more important in cases
+where the district we are fighting over is too poor to supply the
+enemy's forces, or where operations have assumed a stationary
+character, as before Fredericksburg, Paris, and Plevna, and it becomes
+desirable to hinder the use of the railways for the transport of
+troops or evacuation of supplies.
+
+Lastly, the Cavalry may be called on to occupy wide stretches of
+country and exploit their resources, to nip in their very inception
+the formation of fresh bodies of armed defenders, or on the defensive,
+to secure our own communications or districts against undertakings by
+flying columns of the enemy.
+
+Such undertakings, particularly when they lead in rear of the enemy's
+Armies, will frequently assume the character of 'raids' in which the
+essential purpose is to cover great distances rapidly, often with the
+sacrifice of all communications with one's own forces, to appear
+suddenly at previously selected positions, and after completion of
+one's immediate object to disappear suddenly, before the enemy can
+bring overwhelming numbers against the assailant.
+
+The success of such undertakings will depend, on the one hand, on the
+rapidity with which the opportunities secured by such surprise are
+utilized, and, on the other, on the available fighting power, which
+must suffice to break down all opposition with certainty and speed.
+
+Their execution, however, will always encounter many difficulties,
+particularly when a hostile population has to be dealt with; but to
+consider them on this account as impracticable seems to me all the
+more impossible, because to my mind they embody an absolutely
+indispensable element of future operations.
+
+If it is feasible to enter upon them with fresh horses, and to make
+adequate provision for supply without delaying the rapidity of
+movement, either by utilizing the resources of the country, by taking
+suitably organized columns with one, or by living on stores captured
+from the enemy himself, then such 'raids' will succeed and exercise
+most far-reaching consequences.
+
+In my opinion all these conditions can be satisfied. We can preserve
+our horses by exercising greater moderation in the pursuit of
+non-essentials; difficulties of supply can be solved by suitable
+preparations even in an enemy's country, and when working in our own,
+the sympathetic and persistent support of our own population will
+level all obstacles; but in all cases we must never leave out of sight
+the cardinal point that only the concentration of sufficient force at
+the right time and place can guarantee the final result.
+
+Our conduct, however, will be different when our purpose is solely
+defensive, or when we have to occupy districts which the enemy does
+not seek to defend. In such cases, as also when our object is only the
+concealment of our own designs, a dispersion of force may be
+necessary, if only in order to occupy important defiles and defensive
+sections of the ground, or for the occupation of the most important
+centres of population in the enemy's country. From such tasks,
+however, it should be the business of the Supreme Command to preserve
+us, in order that the whole Cavalry strength should be retained intact
+for offensive purposes more in harmony with its whole character and
+the spirit of the Arm.
+
+For these, if great results are to be attained, it requires in the
+generality of cases concentration in time and space.
+
+With the execution of these strategical missions, which so far alone
+have attracted our attention, the duties of the Cavalry Arm are by no
+means exhausted.
+
+Nowadays, as formerly, it will still find work to its hands on the
+battle-field itself, and this work will be all the more important in
+proportion as the quality of the forces therein encountered is on a
+lower level (_e.g._, new formations, Militia, etc.). In any case,
+however, great results on the battle-field can only be expected from
+the employment of numerically formidable 'Masses.' This is conditioned
+by the very fact of the numbers which we must in future expect to see
+engaged.
+
+The portion of the enemy's forces affected by the results of a
+successful charge must be a sufficient part of the whole which, at a
+given time and place, is concerned in the task of endeavouring to
+secure a decision.
+
+Other factors also deserve consideration--above all, the increased
+range of modern firearms. If the front of the attacking Cavalry is too
+narrow, it will not only have to face the fire of the troops
+immediately in its front, but it will be the focus of the fire from
+all sides.
+
+If the formation for attack does not supply a sufficient sequence of
+successive efforts, then in many cases it can have no hope of
+permanent result, for an onslaught by a single line will not have
+strength enough to pierce the fire zone, and will be shot to pieces
+before it can reach the enemy.[2]
+
+         [Footnote 2: The same point also arises both in pursuit and
+         in the covering of a retreat, two of our most important
+         duties; for though, as already pointed out, the conditions of
+         the present day offer to the Arm the opportunities of the
+         richest harvests, it will only be able to utilize them when
+         employed with concentrated force.]
+
+The masses to be encountered are numerically so considerable that
+single squadrons, regiments, or brigades, hardly count in the scale of
+a great decision. Partial results they may, indeed, attain, but to
+bring about the defeat of a whole Army, or even of an important
+fraction of it, to reap the fruits of such a victory or cover a great
+retreat, numbers alone can avail.
+
+How many units to employ under any given circumstances it is, of
+course, impossible to lay down beforehand; but the essence of the
+matter is that the limit of force to be thus employed is far in excess
+of what any existing tactical unit can supply.
+
+If, after this short survey of the many fields of action open to
+horsemen in the future, we ask the decisive question, Which tasks in
+the future will need to be most carefully kept in mind in the
+organization and training of this Arm in peace time? we shall not be
+able to conceal from ourselves that it is in the strategical handling
+of the Cavalry that by far the greatest possibilities lie. Charges
+even of numerically considerable bodies on the battle-field can only
+lead to success under very special conditions, and even for the
+protection of a retreat our role can only be a subordinate one. But
+for reconnaissance and screening, for operations against the enemy's
+communications, for the pursuit of a beaten enemy, and all similar
+operations of warfare, the Cavalry is, and remains, the principal Arm.
+Here no other can take its place, for none possesses the requisite
+mobility and independence.
+
+At the same time, it is in these fields that its power is
+all-important to the Supreme Command. Battles, under pressure of
+necessity, can be fought without Cavalry at all, and the results even
+partially utilized; but it is impossible to issue suitable orders
+without knowledge of the enemy's operations, and equally impossible to
+act against an enemy's flanks and rear with Infantry alone.
+
+It is in these directions that the future of Cavalry lies, and it is
+to fit ourselves for the tasks that we should bend all our energy in
+peace.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+STRATEGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE CAVALRY
+
+
+We have seen in the previous chapter that the principal duties which
+can fall to the lot of Cavalry in modern War will require its
+employment in considerable force; hence it follows that the greatest
+economy in the use of detachments for secondary purposes must be
+practised.
+
+This leads us to the consideration of the question in what manner we
+can group our available means to meet these requirements in the best
+possible way.
+
+Primarily we must start from this axiom--that no portion of the Army
+can do without Cavalry altogether; hence it follows that we must
+maintain both Divisional and independent Cavalry.
+
+The former remains permanently attached to each portion of the Army
+whose composition, by reason of this addition of Cavalry, permits of
+independent action. The latter is set aside for the great strategical
+missions that may be assigned to that Arm, for execution. The question
+now arises, In what proportion is this distribution to take place?
+
+The greater number of Infantry Divisions can, in my opinion, meet all
+demands upon them with a very small allotment of mounted men, as long
+as they are acting in combination with the rest of the Army.
+
+The circulation of intelligence and orders within the columns and
+their outposts can generally be entrusted to cyclists. Where
+independent Cavalry is deployed to cover the front of an army, the
+field of activity for the Divisional Cavalry in actual outpost duties
+and reconnaissance is of necessity very much limited. All they are
+really required to accomplish is to maintain the connection with the
+former, and for this duty the cyclist detachments above referred to
+will generally suffice.
+
+There remains, therefore, for the Divisional Cavalry only the service
+with the most advanced sections of the Infantry outposts (orderly
+duties with the Infantry piquets in cases where the ground precludes
+the use of the cycle), duties connected with requisitioning; and
+reconnaissance only during those periods in which the mass of the
+independent Cavalry has been drawn away towards the wings of the Army
+to clear its front for battle, carrying messages during the combat,
+and actual reconnaissance during the progress of the engagement
+itself. All these requirements can, I think, be met with a very small
+amount of force, all the more so because reconnaissance under fire in
+modern War seems to me practically impossible, and can generally only
+be initiated by those Divisions which form the wings of the Army, but
+even then their field would be a very limited one.
+
+Modern firearms compel us to remain at such a distance from the enemy
+that observation is rendered much more difficult, and the distances to
+be traversed are so great that before any reports from the wings can
+get round to the position of Headquarters, and suitable orders based
+on these reports can reach their destination, the whole situation may
+have changed again and again. We have only to remember the cases
+which occurred in the last War (1870).
+
+In the majority of these instances it was quite impossible that
+Cavalry patrols could have sent timely information of what was going
+on within the limits of the enemy's positions, and in the future the
+difficulties will be even greater.
+
+In no case, however, can such information during the progress of an
+action be obtained by the actual employment of the fighting power of
+the Divisional Cavalry.
+
+If it is to be done at all, then a few well-led officers patrols will
+suffice, and therefore no considerable numerical strength in the
+Divisional Cavalry is required. The lines of approach of the enemy and
+points on which his wings are resting must certainly be kept under
+observation, but this observation cannot in principle be initiated by
+the Infantry Divisions, but it is the province of the Army
+Headquarters to provide, for it will be precisely the wings and the
+flanks which the enemy will himself seek to protect by the massing of
+his own Cavalry.
+
+If the prospect of achieving anything by observation during the combat
+through the action of the Divisional Cavalry may be considered as
+well-nigh impossible, then any tactical action may also be considered
+as precluded, unless it takes place in combination with the
+independent Cavalry.
+
+Occasions may certainly even nowadays occur in which a few squadrons
+may achieve results by taking part in a combat between the other Arms,
+but such cases are too few and unimportant to be taken into account in
+a distribution of the Cavalry as a matter of organization.
+
+In Armies deprived of the screen of independent Cavalry the want of
+Divisional Cavalry will certainly be more markedly felt even in those
+Army Corps which form the flanks of Armies, and in the cases of
+detached expeditions, and in similar exceptional circumstances. In all
+these instances more Cavalry must be sent up to the outposts, and it
+will have both to screen and reconnoitre.
+
+The demands on its fighting efficiency can, under such circumstances,
+become of importance, and in these smaller operations, reconnaissance
+during action is more possible than with extended battle-fronts. But
+to demand for the Divisional Cavalry on these grounds a larger
+proportion of sabres, and thus to paralyze a great portion of the Arm
+by its inclusion in the long columns of march of the whole Army, is
+not justifiable. The scale on which we must decide the apportionment
+of Divisional Cavalry must depend on the fact that the Infantry does
+not generally operate in small detachments, but works in large masses,
+and it is the necessities of these large masses which fix the
+standard.
+
+To apportion to single columns or Divisions for particular
+circumstances an increased force of Cavalry, to be taken from the
+available mass of independent Cavalry Divisions, ought not in general
+to occasion unusual friction; but it is most difficult and troublesome
+to take away from the Infantry the squadrons definitely assigned to it
+by peace-time organization, and unite these in independent Cavalry
+Commands.
+
+We must not allow ourselves to be misled in this matter by the
+practice followed in peace manoeuvres. Even the largest concentration
+of troops for these purposes is, in proportion to the masses to be
+employed in our future War, on a most limited scale.
+
+Our smaller Brigade and Divisional manoeuvres are restricted within
+limits which can only be considered nowadays as exceptional. They are
+only too well adapted to give rise to entirely false conceptions as to
+the true character of the Cavalry service in these great struggles for
+national survival, unless we keep steadily in mind that they apply
+only to exceptional circumstances.
+
+We must, therefore, lay down as a principle that as much Cavalry as
+possible is to be organized for strategical independence, and as
+little as is expedient retained for the Infantry Divisions.
+
+My opinion is that, if we make fullest use of the bicycle, and, with
+this object in view, reorganize our system of conveying orders and
+intelligence, then two well-trained and effective squadrons should
+amply suffice for the ordinary duties with an Infantry Division.
+
+As to the allotment of the independent Cavalry Divisions, it follows
+from all that has been said above, that to divide them in equal
+proportions among the several Armies, according to their numerical
+strength, can only be considered as an obstacle to the full
+utilization of their potential fighting capacity. It would be better
+to arrange this distribution at the beginning of each War, in
+accordance with the conditions which the situation imposes. Where it
+appears expedient, we should not hesitate to form Divisions of
+different strength, and to group several of these to constitute
+Cavalry Corps, even to unite several of such Corps for employment in a
+particular strategical direction--_i.e._, in a particular portion of
+the theatre of operation--whilst leaving only individual brigades, or
+even regiments, to those fractions of the Army which for the moment
+can best dispense with Cavalry support.
+
+Of course, an Army taking the field with a great superiority of
+Cavalry can afford to deal less sparingly with it for secondary
+purposes; on the other hand, the numerically weaker side is driven to
+the utmost economy of its forces, and the utmost energy in its
+employment at the decisive moment. It will therefore be essential for
+the latter to concentrate at the commencement of the campaign the bulk
+of its Cavalry upon the decisive line of operations--that is to say,
+on that line on which, from the general strategical situation, one can
+expect to penetrate into the chief district of concentration of the
+enemy's Armies, and hence to find out what it is of the greatest
+importance for us to know, or, on the other hand, when it is to our
+interests to conceal our own operations, and hence to beat the enemy's
+Cavalry as thoroughly as possible wherever it shows itself. On the
+remaining portion of the front we must endeavour to employ as little
+Cavalry as possible, and to supplement it in the duties of security by
+Infantry, whilst leaving reconnaissance to be dealt with by patrols.
+If we thus gain the victory on the principal line, the results will
+soon be apparent in a reduction of pressure on the adjacent sections
+of the front, and then the Cavalry will find its opportunity for
+increased activity in offensive enterprises. For, once the enemy's
+horsemen are beaten, either he will concentrate his remaining Cavalry,
+from every direction, towards the threatened points, or the victor
+will be in a position to utilize the superiority he has acquired to
+support any portion of his force which may have got into temporary
+difficulties.
+
+If, thus, it is the necessity of beating the enemy's Cavalry out of
+the field at the very commencement of the campaign which compels the
+concentration of important numbers in the decisive direction, it
+follows naturally that this point of view must be fully considered in
+the plan of strategical deployment.
+
+In the further stages of Cavalry activity--_i.e._, after it has
+defeated the mass of the enemy's Cavalry--the tasks which can confront
+the Arm make the employment of considerable forces essential, unless,
+as so often happened in 1870, its operations are to be interfered
+with, if not altogether stopped, by weak Infantry detachments, or even
+by an insurgent population. Against this concentration of large masses
+of Cavalry many objections will naturally be raised; hence we must
+consider how these are to be met, and whether, as a fact, they are of
+sufficient importance to cause us to surrender the advantages they
+offer.
+
+First comes the difficulty of feeding large numbers. But military
+history, from the time of Frederick the Great and Napoleon down to the
+American Civil War, the unusual conditions of which latter must not be
+left out of account, show conclusively that it was possible to keep
+masses of 5,000 men and more together, and in full mobility, even in
+poor and almost roadless districts.
+
+If it was possible then, how much more will it be so now, with our
+modern means of communication, if proper arrangements are made in
+advance!
+
+It has been further objected that the rapid circulation of information
+from the front to Army Headquarters will be jeopardized by the
+insertion of an additional collecting station--viz., the Corps
+Command, between the two ends of the chain. But this fear can be shown
+to be groundless, for in any case where at all large bodies of
+Cavalry are sent out in advance, the service of intelligence must be
+organized in such a manner that all really important information will
+be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through the usual
+channels. Since this is already necessary with Cavalry Divisions,
+there can be no objection to applying it to yet higher commands.
+
+More important than this question of intelligence is the consideration
+that the command of Cavalry 'Masses' which exceed more than the
+present Division of six regiments involves exceptional difficulties,
+and this must be granted to a certain extent as long as the question
+is limited to the actual tactical handling (execution of manoeuvres)
+of the Division on the battle-field.
+
+It is, in fact, no longer possible to handle a force of six
+regiments according to any set scheme, such as that known as the
+'Dreitreffentaktik'--at any rate, not in hilly or difficult country. The
+transition from one formation to another, the deployment of the whole
+unit for attack, or the interchange of the duties between the separate
+lines, are certainly hardly possible on ground over which it is
+difficult to manoeuvre. It appears, however, to me that the conduct of
+great Cavalry 'Masses' by ordinary drill methods is not necessary to
+meet the condition of modern warfare.
+
+When once the Cavalry Corps Commander grasps the idea of handling the
+units at his disposal as the Infantry Corps Commander handles his
+Divisions, sending in first one Division, and then, according to
+circumstances, reinforcing it or prolonging the fighting line by
+drawing on the second one, or by employing the Divisions side by side,
+assigning to each a definite share in the attainment of the purpose,
+which he himself keeps steadily in view, there seems no reason why
+the leadership of such bodies should not be perfectly practicable.
+Indeed, one may safely say that the result will be all the more
+certain of attainment the more the final responsibility is
+concentrated on the one head; for there is obviously a greater
+possibility of a single mind pursuing consistently a given purpose
+than of two or more Divisional Commanders following out the same idea
+independently along the same lines.
+
+If, then, when the Corps is united for tactical action, the
+maintenance of a single Command is quite conceivable, this will be all
+the more the case in matters of Strategy. It is not so much a question
+then of handling the corps as a closed unit, for instance, on a single
+road, but of assigning within a certain sphere a united impulse to the
+constituent parts of the Command in such directions that in all cases
+they should reach the ground in force superior to anything the enemy
+can oppose to them. According to circumstances, different tasks may be
+assigned to the several Divisions. They may march on different roads,
+some of them extended, some closed, the only condition being that they
+all pursue a common strategic purpose, assigned to them by the Corps
+Commander, according to the same fundamental principles, and are
+prevented by this higher control from flying out in eccentric
+directions.
+
+Objections based on the alleged difficulties of the conduct of such
+masses are therefore untenable. On the contrary, the demand must be
+made on the Chief Command that, always in accordance with the
+strategical situation, it must clearly determine what it requires of
+the Cavalry, and group them in a suitable manner and in sufficient
+numerical strength under a single Leader, even if in the meanwhile
+there may be a deficiency of the Arm at less important points. This
+fundamental principle must be adhered to at all costs if full
+advantages are to be derived from the employment of our Arm, for with
+none other can the consequences of a dispersal of force exact more
+terrible retribution than with the Cavalry.
+
+Nevertheless, though the principle must be held inviolate, its
+application must not degenerate into hide-bound rigidity. 'Strategy is
+founded on a system of expedients' (Moltke), and hence expediency
+remains always our highest ideal.
+
+The essential point, however, is that our organization must be made so
+elastic that we can alter the strength of our units to meet the
+varying circumstances which may confront us, so that forces may not
+remain unutilized in one place whilst they may be most urgently
+required at another.
+
+It is no way essential that the units combined for the express
+purposes apparent at the commencement of the campaign should remain
+intact throughout the War. One should be able to detach from or
+reinforce them, as circumstances require; break up Corps and
+Divisions, to reform them elsewhere; and employ their Leaders and
+Staff first with one, then with the other.
+
+As an example of what I have just said, I would cite the manner in
+which the German Headquarters Command dealt with the Armies during the
+war of 1870-1871. According to the demands of the moment, the
+individual Corps or Divisions were grouped in manifold proportions to
+constitute such units, and the adaptability of this organization
+proved sufficient to cope with every eventuality.
+
+As an almost ideal type we can take the manner in which Napoleon
+dealt with his Cavalry Corps for the same purpose. At one moment his
+bodies of horsemen unite into Divisions and Corps; at another they
+dissolve into independent Brigades or regiments, operating singly,
+only once more to be united into formidable 'Masses,' as circumstances
+dictate. Here we see no rigid adherence to any rules, nothing pedantic
+in the method of employment, and the leader and troops deftly adapt
+themselves to the ever-changing conditions.
+
+This is the ideal to which we Germans should strive to attain, and all
+the more so in proportion as we are threatened by superior numbers.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF DISMOUNTED ACTION
+
+
+If the changed conditions of modern war have brought about new
+conditions and demands which require to be considered in the
+strategical combinations of the Cavalry, I believe that a similar
+influence must make itself felt in the field of tactics. Whereas
+formerly the _arme blanche_ was recognized as the principal method by
+which the Cavalry made its inherent fighting power felt, the
+employment of dismounted action nowadays has gained in importance to
+such an extent that the whole character of our activity appears
+completely changed.
+
+Although hitherto the general conception has been that Cavalry should
+only make use of the carbine for defence, nowadays its employment in
+attack must be recognized as of the utmost importance.
+
+Undoubtedly, however, it is, and must remain even to-day, the chief
+aim of every leader in whose veins flows the hot Cavalry blood to
+seize his opportunities wherever they offer themselves, and, above
+all, to attack the enemy's Cavalry wherever and whenever accessible
+with cold steel; but we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact that
+nowadays numerous problems will present themselves to the Cavalry
+which can only be solved by fire action.
+
+In the first place, the opportunity will often arise for the weaker
+side to avoid an encounter in the open field, and, with the help of
+its firearm, at least to attempt behind defiles, or strong positions,
+to defy the enemy's superior forces. In such cases the assailant also
+will be compelled to have recourse to his carbine.
+
+Further considerations reveal that in future, quite apart from
+encounter with the enemy's Cavalry, our own horsemen will find tasks
+before them which will make appeal to the rifle inevitable.
+
+The enemy will cover his railways, and important depots by troops of
+the second and third class. Reinforced by the resisting power of
+popular levies, they will block woods, river crossings, and defiles.
+Even the guards of their Convoys will be amply provided with
+far-ranging firearms.
+
+In the pursuit of an enemy's beaten Cavalry we shall happen upon
+Infantry detachments sent out to cover their retreat, or upon defiles
+which have been occupied for a similar purpose. Important
+communications will be held by strong detachments of cyclist Infantry,
+who will find in woods and villages protection and favourable
+opportunities to use their weapons.
+
+All these means of resistance lie beyond the field of mounted action,
+but they must be overcome if success is to crown our efforts.
+
+Already in reconnaissances, particularly in those directed against the
+enemy's communications, we shall meet with these impediments, and the
+same will be the case when we come to the strategical pursuit, or the
+protection of a retreat.[3] In the pursuit the main object is to keep
+the beaten enemy on the run, to give him neither peace nor rest until
+complete exhaustion sets in. But for the mass of the Cavalry the idea
+of a purely frontal pursuit should not be encouraged, for Cavalry,
+even when supported by several batteries, can easily be held up by any
+rearguard position in which a few intact troops remain.
+
+         [Footnote 3: Compare 'Cavalry Regulations,' Sec. 376.]
+
+The frontal pursuit must in such cases be left to the other Arms, only
+to be taken up again when the last resistance of the enemy is broken,
+and the exhaustion of our own Infantry and Horse Artillery renders
+further effort on their part impossible.
+
+On the other hand, all energy must be devoted to the initiation of a
+pursuit on parallel lines, in order that we may appear unexpectedly
+and repeatedly against the flanks of the enemy's columns, with the
+ultimate intention of anticipating him at some point on the line of
+his retreat, such as a defile, thus bringing him between two fires in
+a sheerly desperate position.
+
+Man and horse must in these cases be driven to the utmost limit of
+their powers of endurance.
+
+It is evident that in such situations the principal role falls to the
+firearm, for only in the fire fight is it possible to break off an
+attack without loss, in order to appear again at some other point and
+recommence the engagement. In case of anticipating an enemy at a
+defile, the rifle will be practically the only weapon that can find
+employment.
+
+What can be achieved in this direction is best illustrated by
+Sheridan's Cavalry, whose successful flanking operations against the
+lines of communication of General Lee's heroic Army brought about the
+capitulation of Clover Hill.
+
+The charge will only then secure a greater result than dismounted
+action, when the tactical cohesion of the enemy has been dissolved, and
+his fire power utterly broken; that is to say, generally it will be of
+greater service in tactical than in strategical pursuits--unless,
+indeed, as at Waterloo, the defeat has led to the complete and permanent
+dissolution of the enemy's fighting power.
+
+Further, in the endeavour to support the rearguard of a defeated Army
+in retreat it will be necessary, as soon as we have got rid of the
+pursuing Cavalry, to take to the rifle, because with the sword alone
+we cannot hope to make any impression upon the Infantry and Artillery
+of the victor.
+
+In such cases we must strive to attack with the firearm against the
+flanks of the pursuing columns, in order to draw off their attention
+from our beaten main body.
+
+Cases may frequently arise when we in turn can hold up the pursuit at
+defiles and other positions by a purely frontal defence.
+
+In such circumstances a fresh and intact Cavalry, which has not
+allowed itself to be dispirited or demoralized, may render invaluable
+services to the beaten Infantry, and enable them, together with the
+columns and the whole supply organization of the Army, to effect an
+orderly withdrawal without being molested by the enemy, thus affording
+to its commander an opportunity of restoring the lost cohesion and
+tactical order. It will only be the rifle of the Cavalry which will
+gain for our hard-pressed comrades what is most needed--_i.e._, time.
+
+The idea is often put forward that Cavalry should not involve itself
+in an obstinate fight on foot, that it should act only by short
+surprise attacks, and that it possesses in its mobility the infallible
+means of circumventing points of resistance. This conception, which
+restricts the functions of Cavalry within their narrowest limits,
+seems to me entirely untenable. It is essentially indefensible when it
+is a matter of gaining time or of carrying a given position, such as a
+defensible post on the lines of communication, a convoy marching under
+escort, the destruction of a defended railway, or in any similar
+undertaking. It will be impossible to work round such positions--at
+least when engaged on the greater operations of War--both on account
+of the widths of the fronts occupied and the possibility of
+interfering with the sphere of operations of the neighbouring
+detachments. Often, indeed, the nature of the ground will preclude
+such attempts, and the experience of 1870-1871 should suffice to show
+how rarely such a circumvention can hope to succeed. But even where
+neither the strategic situation nor our immediate purpose compels us
+to fight, it is not always advisable or expedient to attempt to evade
+the opportunity. For every evasion leaves the front of our own Army
+clear, gives the enemy the very opportunity he is looking for to
+reconnoitre the position of our main bodies, uncovers our own
+communications (_i.e._, our own Cavalry trains and baggage), exposes
+our flank to the enemy, and thus offers him many chances of obtaining
+tactical results.
+
+Again, these attempts at circumvention lead easily to a loss of
+direction, which in certain cases might endanger the success of our
+whole operations; and, finally, the amount of time required by such
+outflanking attempts may not be justified by the possible results. In
+such cases it might on the whole be better to attack direct, for
+turning movements mean always a postponement of the tactical decision,
+and hence are always a disadvantage to the attacking side.
+
+The theory that Cavalry, thanks to its mobility, can always ride round
+and turn the positions it encounters breaks down in practice before
+the tactical and strategical demands upon the Arm, partly by reason of
+the local conditions, and partly because of the consideration which
+has to be given to time, to the endurance of the horses, and the
+position of the following columns.
+
+The same applies to another theory with which one tries to explain
+away the necessity of dismounted combats. It is maintained that the
+fire power of the Horse Artillery will suffice to clear the road for
+the Cavalry; hence the latter will rarely be placed in a position
+which will require energetic dismounted action on their part. This
+assumption involves, in my opinion, an altogether overrated estimate
+of the power of Artillery. The same reasoning would lead us logically
+to the false conclusion that even Infantry do not require their
+rifles. One must demand from every reliable body of troops that they
+will not allow themselves to be driven out of a covered position by
+Artillery alone. All previous War experience testifies to the
+impossibility of achieving such results against even moderate
+Infantry, and it is only with such that we are here dealing. The fact
+that in 1870-1871 the Artillery often did succeed in driving a weak
+and demoralized enemy out of localities the possession of which was of
+no material consequence to him cannot be considered as to the point.
+Certainly the effect of modern guns is greater than anything of which
+we have had experience, and will act upon the defender with
+correspondingly greater intensity; but, on the other hand, it must be
+insisted upon that the assailant's Artillery will have to act under
+the increased effect of the defender's fire power, and the latter
+will choose different terrain, and utilize it far better than in the
+past. The actual assault remains necessary now, as ever, to bring
+about the final decision.
+
+Anyone who has had to conduct staff rides and similar operations of
+large bodies of independent Cavalry, and has endeavoured to carry
+these out in the spirit of actual warfare, can hardly have failed to
+notice the tendency which displays itself with all leaders to take to
+dismounted action, and will have realized that one has far more
+frequently to check rather than encourage this tendency; but he will
+also come to the conclusion, perhaps, that this desire is well founded
+on existing conditions, and that even a determined Cavalry will have
+to make use of their firearms almost every day; indeed, without
+adequate employment of their carbines they are no longer able to carry
+out the most important of their incumbent duties.
+
+Hence, if the use of the rifle is thus shown by instances taken from
+the most divergent directions to be of absolute necessity, the
+conclusion follows that even in the battle itself, that point on which
+all military action is focussed, it can hardly fail to find both its
+opportunities and its full justification.
+
+In this direction the horsemen of Stuart and Sheridan have set us a
+brilliant example, taking part on foot in regular pitched battles
+(Stuart at Fredericksburg, and Sheridan at Five Forks), and deciding,
+rifle in hand, the fate of numerous engagements, in order immediately
+afterwards to mount and pursue the enemy by a succession of vehement
+charges (Stuart at Brandy Station).
+
+The South African War also has shown us what can be done by a mounted
+force supplied with a reliable firearm. The Boers fought exclusively
+as Cavalry (_sic_), supported by Artillery, and some of the most
+celebrated British Infantry regiments suffered defeat at their hands
+as long as the numerical proportion was not altogether too
+unfavourable to the assailants.
+
+Even in dismounted attack, particularly in the later period of the
+war, they often attained very considerable successes, and thus proved
+incontrovertibly that the double role of Cavalry on foot and on
+horseback is thoroughly practical; for even the charge itself of these
+same Boers often achieved brilliant results, although they were
+lacking in any kind of tactical training for this particular
+result.[4]
+
+         [Footnote 4: I venture to differ from the author. The Boers
+         did not fight as Cavalry. Their whole tactics were those of
+         Mounted Infantry. They did on one or two occasions bring
+         about a decision by rifle fire from their horses, but I can
+         recall no instance where they actually charged--_i.e._,
+         endeavoured to decide the action by shock.--C. S. G.]
+
+Certainly weapons and numbers have altered materially since the days
+of the American Civil War, and the experiences of South Africa,
+largely conditioned by the peculiar topographical conditions and the
+out-of-door habits and sporting instincts of the Boers, cannot be
+transferred to European circumstance without important modifications.
+But even in Europe the Cavalry retain, thanks to their mobility, their
+power of opening fire in a manner calculated to create the greatest
+degree of surprise against the flanks and rear of the enemy as soon as
+they make up their minds to cut themselves adrift from their own Army,
+and get in rear of the enemy's troops. Such enterprises offer the best
+guarantee of producing a great moral result. The history of the
+Franco-German War demonstrated this possibility. What might not our
+Cavalry have achieved in 1870-1871 against the undisciplined forces of
+the Republic had they been provided with a good firearm, and sought of
+a set purpose for such opportunities?
+
+It would take us too far to produce the numerous proofs from the pages
+of our War records; only, as an example, I should like to quote the
+Battle of Bapaume. In this instance the 7th Cavalry Brigade belonging
+to the 3rd Cavalry Division lay on the flank--in fact, almost in rear
+of--the enemy's Army, without being able to come to the help of the
+hard-pressed 15th Division. Had they on that occasion been able to act
+by fire, by surprise, and with determination against the rear of the
+French Army of the North, the results must have been invaluable.
+
+In future, beyond doubt, we shall have to deal with much larger masses
+of the enemy than formerly, and against them one must make up for want
+of numbers by an enormous expenditure of ammunition, and further
+endeavour to reinforce our fire power by repeating-rifles. We must
+also aim at intensifying the effect of our fire power by attacking
+only at decisive points. On the other hand, it must be admitted, that
+in the magnitude of the masses themselves there lies the germ of
+weakness, and in our future wars we can hardly expect to find Infantry
+as firmly welded together as in the Armies of the past. I therefore by
+no means hold the opinion that dismounted Cavalry can achieve nothing
+against Infantry, or that their chances are limited to only very
+favourable opportunities.
+
+It is, of course, true that the Infantry receive a more thorough
+musketry training, particularly at long ranges, and that their
+education in the use of the ground, as well as in fire control, in
+peace is naturally better than with the Cavalry.
+
+But the results obtained by the Cavalry in the field practices are by
+no means so much behind those of the Infantry that any superiority of
+the latter on the battle-field need be expected. A better firearm for
+the Cavalry is unquestionably a necessity, for the inferiority of the
+carbine compared with the infantry rifle is undoubtedly a source of
+weakness; but, on the other hand, we must insist that the Cavalry
+possesses sources of strength peculiar to its whole organization which
+render it materially superior to the Infantry.
+
+I have already pointed out that modern Infantry, when mobilized,
+cannot be considered like the Cavalry as a standing force--that is to
+say, that the latter possess much greater tactical and moral cohesion.
+
+Let us look at this question a little more closely.
+
+A squadron at War strength can dismount, after due deduction made of
+the horse-holders, seventy carbines. These seventy men, if the annual
+contingent is equally divided throughout the squadron, will consist
+pretty uniformly of men belonging to all three terms of their service,
+and will not include more than eight reserve men, so that there will
+be at most twenty recruits amongst them, whilst the remainder will
+consist half of men in their third year and half of men in their
+second year; but these seventy men are led by three officers,
+generally all on the active list, who in turn are supported by eight
+non-commissioned officers and one trumpeter, who also mostly belong to
+the active list.
+
+Against this a section of Infantry which, when raised to War strength,
+is about seventy-five strong, consists of about forty men on the
+active list, of whom half are recruits, the other half men in their
+second year of service, and of thirty-five reservists.
+
+It possesses, therefore, at the outside twenty trained colour
+soldiers, and these are led in most cases by a Reserve or Landwehr
+officer, supported by at most seven non-commissioned officers, of whom
+four on an average will belong to the Reserve. This Infantry will, as
+a rule, under normal peace-time conditions, as experience teaches us,
+shoot very well; but it is scarcely necessary to discuss in which body
+we shall find greater cohesion, or on which one is more likely to be
+able to depend in cases where moral qualities and fire discipline are
+all essential, and it is these qualities which primarily condition the
+number of hits in the firing line. I should only like to add, apart
+from all other considerations, that the direct influence of the
+Leaders in the Cavalry and their knowledge of their men is much more
+highly developed than in the Infantry. It must also be remembered that
+there are generally much fewer skulkers in the mounted arms, partly
+because of their longer period of service and closer supervision, and
+partly because everybody endeavours not to be separated from his
+horse, and finds in his presence with the men of his detachment the
+best guarantee of getting back to it. In view of these considerations,
+I think that our Cavalry can safely claim that they can engage the
+best existing Continental Infantry with reasonable prospects of
+success, and against inferior foot soldiers may always preserve its
+sense of superiority.
+
+Granted this much, then, the scope of our activity is enormously
+increased.
+
+We can now approach tasks which hitherto had to be regarded as
+impossible, because the conviction existed that on the appearance of
+the enemy's Infantry the role of Cavalry _ipso facto_ came to an end,
+unless, indeed, an opportunity could be found for the Cavalry to
+charge. For now we are in a position, in harmony with the whole spirit
+of the Arm, to lay principal stress upon the offensive, even when
+fighting on foot. We can carry through even serious engagements, with
+chances of success which no longer depend on the favour of special
+circumstances.
+
+Confident in our own strength, we can apply tactical compulsion where
+formerly we could only trust to cunning, rapidity, or luck. I hold it
+to be an altogether antiquated standpoint to assume that Cavalry on
+foot can only attack with hope of success when it can approach on
+horseback near to its enemy, suddenly deploy against him in the most
+decisive directions, and generally is in a position to utilize any
+special advantages offered by local circumstances.
+
+The campaign of 1870-1871 shows that in most cases in which the
+Cavalry had to take to its firearms it was acting on the offensive,
+and was compelled to attack the enemy--exactly like the Infantry--in
+the most diverse situations, and to shoot its way up to him. Under
+modern conditions it is clear this necessity will be even more
+apparent, and it would be to deprive the Cavalry again of the
+independence secured for it by the addition of the rifle to its
+equipment if one were to limit its power of attack on foot only to
+exceptionally favourable circumstances. The Cavalry must, in fact, be
+able to attack on foot exactly like Infantry when the situation
+imperatively demands it; but if it is to be handled in this spirit,
+then it will require to be very strongly provided with Artillery.
+
+If it is already considered almost impossible for Infantry to turn
+well-covered defenders out of their position without Artillery
+support, the same naturally applies to the Cavalry. In fact, a strong
+Artillery will be all the more necessary, for the attack with Cavalry
+should be carried through with the utmost rapidity, and when acting on
+the defensive its purpose is to gain the greatest amount of time.
+Against this must be borne in mind that the Infantry should not
+without necessity be deprived of its due share of Artillery, but I
+think the two views can be readily united. As long as the Cavalry
+'Masses' are out in front of the Armies we can safely give them as
+many horse batteries as they require, and the same is the case after a
+victory or after a lost battle. In the decisive battle itself this
+Artillery reinforcement to the Cavalry must not be expended
+eccentrically, and must be utilized to the utmost in the most decisive
+direction on the battle-field itself. Here, too, a certain elasticity
+of organization is most desirable, and a strict adherence to a
+prearranged order of battle can only act most prejudicially.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+THE TACTICAL LEADING IN MOUNTED COMBATS
+
+
+Having admitted that dismounted action has increased considerably in
+importance, particularly on the offensive, it nevertheless remains the
+fact that the combat with cold steel remains the chief _raison d'etre_
+of the Cavalry, and when the principles have to be considered
+according to which troops have to be employed upon the battle-field,
+the actual collision of Cavalry 'Masses' remains the predominant
+factor.
+
+The task of the Leader must be to transmit the mechanical power
+inherent in the troops in the form of momentum upon the enemy. Where
+he, with a clear purpose before him, acts with daring and thorough
+comprehension, it is in his power to intensify this momentum many
+times over; and this holds true with the Cavalry to a greater degree
+than with any other Arm, for with the horsemen the personal impression
+conveyed by the appearance and bearing of the Leader reacts on the
+mass as in no other case. This reaction is further accentuated by the
+fact that the excitement of motion on horseback, inherent in the
+performance of Cavalry duties, contains something electrifying,
+kindling to the imagination and exciting to the nerves, which
+communicates its influence to the Leader, and thus in turn supports
+him.
+
+On the other hand, the evils of an indifferent Command make themselves
+nowhere more apparent than with Cavalry. In this Arm every impulse
+works itself out relentlessly down to the last consequence. Mistakes
+once made can rarely be remedied. This is the necessary consequence of
+the short time interval to which their activity is limited, the
+rapidity of their movements, and the irresistible momentum with which
+a Cavalry charge once launched presses on with ever-increasing
+momentum to its final decision.
+
+Whilst thus with the Cavalry the influence of the Command is the most
+important factor of success, any deficiency in which can rarely be
+made good by the excellence of the troops themselves, it is precisely
+with this Arm that it is the least frequently found; for admittedly
+there is nothing more difficult on the battle-field than correct
+disposition and execution at the head of a great body of horsemen.
+
+Several factors unite to explain this circumstance. In the first
+place, only the shortest moment of time is available for
+consideration, and then this rapid consideration and decision have to
+be given under the most unfavourable external conditions, at the
+fullest speed of one's horse, or in the maddening confusion of the
+melee. Further, in most, cases it will be quite impossible for the
+Leader of a Cavalry 'Mass' to take in with accuracy the strength and
+dispositions of the enemy. The more extended radius of action of
+modern firearms and the greater distance between the contending forces
+thereby conditioned must in the future render this much more difficult
+than in the past. Very rarely will it be possible for the Leader
+either to alter or cancel an order once given in consequence of
+information subsequently received. Even of the ground itself, the
+importance of which is so much greater for the Cavalry than for any
+other Arm, it will be impossible for the Leader to form for himself
+any actual picture. Either it is already in possession of the enemy
+and of his patrols, or at least in their sphere of action, or it
+cannot be readily grasped from a single standpoint, and the rapidity
+of movement allows no time to reconnoitre it sufficiently. Constant
+reference to maps, even when available, is impossible, and the best of
+these do not reveal exhaustively the actual nature of the ground to be
+traversed. The orders must therefore be based on a general
+consideration of the circumstances, for the Leader cannot gauge with
+even approximate accuracy the strength of his enemy from the
+resistance he encounters, like his more fortunate comrade of the
+Infantry. His only remaining means of influencing the course of the
+action lie in his intact reserves.
+
+For subordinates, indeed, the case is even worse, for they will rarely
+find existing conditions in accordance with the conception on which
+their orders were issued, and will seldom have time to refer to
+Headquarters for further instructions.
+
+It must, therefore, be apparent that only the most exceptional Cavalry
+training, combined with high executive talent, can suffice to
+compensate for all these difficulties. Really successful leading will
+only be assured to the Cavalry General when the machinery he sets in
+motion is technically finished down to the last detail.
+
+In the first place, the least that can be demanded is that the
+observation of the enemy and distribution of orders are so organized
+that the system works with absolute certainty. On the former depends
+the correct choice of the moment of attack; on the latter that the
+troops are employed in the required direction.
+
+The place of the responsible Leader until the moment of the charge is,
+therefore, well out to the front, in a position from which he can best
+overlook the situation as a whole. Even the Leaders of independent
+units, if possible down to the Regimental Commanders, should remain
+close to him, and try to see the situation through his eyes. The
+greatest fault of all is to stick too close to your troops.
+
+Every Cavalry officer must carry his map in his head as well as in his
+hand, particularly during the engagement. Every Leader must keep
+before his mind the hang of the ground, the lie of the roads, the
+peculiarities of the battle-field, with the chances it affords him.
+Any defects he must try to make good by reconnaissance. Every possible
+consequence of the collision must have been thought out beforehand.
+
+Never should the Chief Commander take part in the charge personally
+until he puts in his last reserve, and even then only when he is clear
+of all responsibility, which by that time will generally be the case.
+In all circumstances he must be in a position to rally his troops
+after they have dispersed themselves in a melee, and to take measures
+either to exploit the success, or, in case of reverse, to avert its
+worst consequences. This does not apply only to the Chief Commander.
+
+Here I would enter a particular protest against the opinion one hears
+far too frequently emitted, that the place of every Cavalry Leader in
+the charge is always in front of his command. This only holds good
+when units charge as parts of a higher organization, or where smaller
+bodies--_e.g._, squadrons, regiments, or brigades--attack as a whole,
+with no rearward lines or supports to be controlled, or further
+responsibilities arising out of the charge have to be considered. But
+this does not relieve the Commander from the necessity of setting a
+personal example in moments of wavering, or when it appears better,
+after cool reflection, to risk everything, to carry the men forward to
+the extreme limit of effort, rather than to reserve himself for
+subsequent emergencies.
+
+In all other cases the Commander, and his Staff, must avoid becoming
+entangled in the confusion of a fight in which he must lose all view
+and control over his men, and at best could achieve nothing more than
+any other equally brave and determined trooper. It is, on the
+contrary, his first duty to move in such a direction that he may at
+all times be ready to influence with rapidity and decision the
+mechanism of his command as a whole.
+
+If he falls, then his Staff Officer or Adjutant assumes the
+responsibility of the command until such time as the next senior can
+be notified of the circumstance. In no case may the continuity of
+action be interrupted by wasting time in looking for his successor.
+
+When the Cavalry is working in combination with the other Arms the
+point of observation of its Commander must be connected with the
+latter by suitable relays, and officers must be sent out into those
+sections of the ground which cannot be overlooked from the position
+the Leader has selected.
+
+Combat and security patrols must be sent out in all directions from
+which the enemy's reserves or fresh bodies of his troops might
+approach, and even towards our own rear the ground must be
+reconnoitred as far as possible by officers, who report the result of
+their operations, not only to the superior Leader, but to the Brigade
+and Regimental Commanders. It will also be advisable to keep the
+officers of the other Arms, particularly of the reserves, as well
+informed as possible about the nature of the ground and the observed
+movements of the enemy's forces, so that these may always act with
+full knowledge of the circumstances. A General Staff Officer should be
+entrusted with the maintenance of communications with Army
+Headquarters itself.
+
+As the crisis approaches the troops must be drawn in nearer to the
+point of collision. As soon as the attack has been determined on, the
+Leader will be well advised to take up a position on the flank of his
+troops from which he will be able to overlook the whole field of
+action and keep the enemy well in view. From this point, having
+previously instructed his subordinates as to the situation and purpose
+of the coming combat, and having sent them back to their troops, he
+will despatch executive orders to the several echelons concerned. The
+line of attack must be defined with particular care, and a point of
+sight visible from a considerable distance must, if possible, be
+assigned to them. No room for doubt must be left open as to which
+troop it is which is responsible for the direction.
+
+But even with the finest system for reconnaissance and transmission of
+orders it will be impossible to guarantee the combined action of large
+'Masses' for a common purpose, and to put them into the fight, in a
+thoroughly practical and not parade-ground fashion, unless good
+observation, able leading, and circulation of orders are combined
+with two other most important factors:
+
+First comes the utmost possible independence of the subordinate
+leaders, down to the limit of the Squadron Commander. Only when these
+can help one out in cases where an order fails to arrive, or where the
+circumstances compel a deviation from the letter of the order
+received, or where these can only be indicated by word of mouth,
+signs, bugle-calls, or even by riding in the required direction, can
+there be any guarantee that all will combine intelligently for the
+common purpose.
+
+This independence must never be allowed to degenerate into selfish
+wilfulness; the actual situation, as encountered on the ground itself;
+must never be considered from the subordinate's point of view only,
+but rather must always be solved in the spirit of the original
+conception formed in the Leader's mind.
+
+In the second place, the Leader requires tactical means and forms of
+evolution which combine, with elementary simplicity and clearness, the
+greatest possible degree of adaptability. Nowhere else so much as with
+the Cavalry does the maxim hold good that 'In War only the simple
+secures success.'[5]
+
+         [Footnote 5: Clausewitz, 'Im Krieg ist aller Einfach, aber,
+         das Einfache ist schwer.']
+
+The prescribed orders must not place a strain on the memory of the
+Leader or troops, and must operate practically mechanically. Even the
+most far-reaching movements should never require either detailed
+instructions or commands.
+
+The application of the word of command should be limited to those
+units which it can actually control--namely, the squadron.
+
+The use of bugle-calls must be restricted to the utmost, and only be
+permitted in circumstances where no possibility of misunderstanding
+can arise--a danger not easily excluded where large bodies are acting
+together.
+
+Even the use of signs can only be relied on in a limited degree. In
+dust and closed country of course they cannot be seen.
+
+On the other hand, all movements depending on verbally transmitted
+commands must be executed without loss of the spirit of uniformity.
+
+In practice this is the only form for the communication of orders
+which can be depended on to act with any degree of certainty under all
+circumstances.
+
+The Regulations must insure the possibility that, no matter under what
+conditions, the unit can be formed without many words or commands into
+the most diverse fighting formations in any required direction, either
+from column of route, rendezvous formation, or even from the melee.
+Fundamental principles of action against the different Arms must be
+laid down so definitely that complicated orders in each particular
+case will not be required.
+
+The rapid change from one fighting form to another must be absolutely
+guaranteed, and equally so the possibility for each unit to assume
+that formation in depth called for by the circumstances of the combat,
+without recourse to complicated orders and movements.[6]
+
+         [Footnote 6: The Regimental Commander, therefore, requires
+         his Adjutant and an Orderly Officer, so as to be able to
+         transmit simultaneously his order to both wings of his
+         regiment.]
+
+If these requirements are to be fulfilled, then only such elementary
+movements must be prescribed and regulated as can be executed under
+all circumstances, as laid down in the Regulations.
+
+These matters being settled, then tactical regulations should lay down
+no fixed evolutions, but should confine themselves essentially to
+forms and principles of action, which should be treated with the
+utmost clearness and precision.
+
+It is hardly necessary to adduce elaborate proof to show that our
+existing Regulations by no means meet these requirements in all their
+sections.
+
+Above all, the movements and deployments laid down for the Regiment
+are far too formal, based too much on accurate intervals and fixed
+prescriptions for the movements of the individual squadrons to be
+suitable for use on the ground which Cavalry must nowadays be prepared
+to traverse, or to be executed, exactly as laid down, in face of the
+enemy. Such evolutions are only possible on the drill-ground, where
+bugle-sounds and words of command can still be heard, and are far too
+complicated for practical use.
+
+For instance, let us take the case of deployment to the front out of
+any 'deep' formation--columns of fours, half troops, or the like,
+which obviously cannot always be executed before the enemy precisely
+in the manner prescribed, because all must depend on the space
+available and the distance which separates us from the enemy. The head
+of the column must suit its movements to these conditions, and in turn
+the following sections must conform to the movements of the head;
+greater freedom of choice must, therefore, be left to the latter.
+
+On the other hand, there are evolutions of the utmost importance before
+the enemy for which the book gives no guidance whatever--_e.g._, the
+rapid passage from the double column into squadron columns, either to
+the front or flank.
+
+Even for the larger units all the prescriptions are by no means
+adapted to the requirements of active service. For instance, the
+relief of lines ('Treffen Wechsel') is an operation of no use except
+on the drill-ground, and is never attempted even in manoeuvres--at
+least, personally I know no instance of its ever being tried, except
+as a matter of drill.
+
+That a certain measure of justification may be found for this and
+similar formations, I do not wish to dispute.
+
+They certainly possess great educational value as a means to the
+acquisition of the requisite discipline and cohesion, and they are
+also well adapted for movements beyond the danger zone, when it
+becomes necessary to steady the troops by the most absolute insistence
+on accuracy of movement and precision of drill; and that such cases do
+arise no one who has had experience of War will for one moment
+dispute.[7] Hence, even if one may hold the opinion that the same
+purpose may be equally well served by less complicated means better
+adapted to practical requirements, one can nevertheless subscribe
+unconditionally to the soundness of the principle involved. But for
+actual purposes of combat we require simpler forms and more freedom in
+their application, and in so far as the Regulations tend towards this
+end they show a very considerable degree of improvement; for the
+squadron, Section 330 provides the necessary amount of independence,
+and Sections 331 and 333 give sufficient freedom to the Regiment,
+subject only to the limitations referred to above. Section 346 in
+particular and Section 348 are also of fundamental importance for the
+higher commands.[8] Indeed, I hold the former as the most important
+concession contained in the whole book, for it practically initiates a
+new phase in the whole course of our drill evolution, by marking the
+commencement of the breach with the old doctrine of the Three-Line
+system ('Drei Treffen Taktik'). It is true that it still lays chief
+importance on this method, but it no longer regards it as the one
+royal road to success. Thus we enter on a path on which the Infantry
+already long ago preceded us, and which, _mutatis mutandis_, offers
+also for the Cavalry similar great and undeniable advantages. It is
+safe to predict that Section 346 will prove the starting-point, by
+sheer pressure of natural conditions, of a fresh series of development
+in our Cavalry Tactics.
+
+         [Footnote 7: Rauch's Brigade of the 6th Cavalry Division at
+         Vionville, under von Schmidt, August 16, 1870.]
+
+         [Footnote 8: Section 346 reads: 'The above general principles
+         applying to the conduct and relations between the several
+         "Lines" must not be allowed to lead to the adoption of any
+         stereotyped form of attack. The Division Commander has full
+         authority to employ his brigades as he thinks best for the
+         attainment of the purpose in view.']
+
+Thanks to these prescriptions, the Commander has now a free hand to
+arrange his units (Brigades or Regiments) side by side, and to give
+them the amount of depth that he considers necessary. Hence the
+commands remain immeasurably more in the hands of their leaders than
+was formerly the case--a point of particular importance on ground
+where the view is restricted; and every unit Commander can also form
+his own reserves, so that reinforcements from the rear will always
+join their own Regiment (or Brigade), and thus the intermixture of the
+different commands will be prevented as much as possible; and what a
+gain this will be towards rapid rallying after the confusion of an
+encounter will be obvious to every reader.
+
+Finally, and perhaps this is of even greater importance, a far higher
+measure of initiative will be given to the subordinate leaders than
+was conceivable under the old scheme ('Treffen Taktik').
+
+These advantages can hardly be over-estimated. There remain, however,
+yet two other directions in which this paragraph may lead to yet more
+important consequences.
+
+In the first place, it secures for the Commander himself an immense
+simplification of the whole mechanism he is called on to control--for
+he has no longer to occupy his mind with the fundamental conception of
+the 'Treffen'--_i.e._, Three-Line System.[9]
+
+         [Footnote 9: The 'Drei Treffen Taktik' owes its origin to the
+         study of the Wars of Frederick the Great, and claims to have
+         again brought to life the fundamental principles to which our
+         Cavalry successes in those days were due. Against this view I
+         would point out that Frederick's Cavalry were always formed
+         in two Lines under one common command. Besides these two
+         Lines ('Treffen') there was generally, but by no means
+         always, a 'Reserve'--constituted usually of Hussars
+         only--who, if I do not err, are only once spoken of as a
+         'Treffen' (Line). This Reserve, however, was under a special
+         Commander, and was quite independent of the two 'Treffen'
+         proper above referred to. Now, no one would venture to
+         suggest that Frederick's Infantry fought habitually in three
+         Lines ('Drei Treffen'), although a Reserve was frequently
+         held back in third Line, exactly as with the Cavalry. The
+         truth really is that the modern idea of the 'Drei Treffen
+         Taktik' has actually nothing in common with the methods of
+         employment of Frederick's days at all.]
+
+The term 'Treffen' (Lines), in the true spirit of Frederick the
+Great's day, defines the relation between a leading Line and one or
+more following Lines, which succeed one another in due sequence. The
+tactical evolution of the last few years has, however, led to this
+result--that this definition is no longer in harmony with the modern
+conception attaching to the word 'Treffen.' According to the existing
+regulations and practice, the second or third Line, or both together,
+may just as well form the fighting Line as the one which is
+momentarily called the first. The latter may equally be used for a
+flank attack or, under a change of circumstances, form the Reserve.
+
+The supporting squadrons, as defined in the new Regulations, or the
+second or third Line in the attack against Infantry or Artillery, are
+nowadays the only ones to which the original conception of the
+'Treffen' applies.
+
+Whilst at present the designation of particular Brigades, etc., as
+first, second, or third 'Treffen' (Lines), has practically no bearing
+on their use in action, but only assigns them a temporary place during
+the particular manoeuvre, we have had to invent, to express the actual
+conception of the 'Treffen,' or Line--which, after all, one cannot do
+without--all sorts of designations, such as supporting squadrons,
+formations according to depth, waves, and so forth. Hence the word
+'Treffen' has introduced a complication which finds no justification
+in the true spirit of the matter. These disadvantages, of course, are
+least evident when the Division is brought into action from a previous
+position of assembly; but they are very apparent indeed when it is a
+question of uniting a Division which has previously been acting in
+separate detachments upon the field of battle itself. Then we come
+face to face with the difficulty--in fact, almost impossibility--of
+adopting the modern idea of the 'Three Lines.'
+
+On the line of march a Division is divided into Advance guard and
+Main body, and if moving on several roads, then into a number of such
+constituent parts (two to each road). From this state of subdivision
+there result a number of Tactical units which it is practically
+impossible to fit into the 'Three-Line' formation without incurring
+great loss of time, and possibly the loss of one's opportunity. Hence,
+from the retention of this 'Three-Line' idea, we arrive at a tactical
+dilemma which must react detrimentally on the handling of the whole
+Arm, as long as the Leaders are compelled by Regulations to assume
+their 'Three-Line formation' before they can fight at all. It is from
+this contradiction that Section 346 releases us.
+
+Of equal importance is a further possibility which the wording of the
+same paragraph throws open to us. It allows, in fact, the Cavalry, no
+matter in what tactical connection it may find itself, to fight always
+in accordance with the same principles.
+
+As long as we adhered to the 'Three-Line system,' this, if not
+impossible, was at least practically inexpedient, for the Regulations
+took cognizance only of a Division composed of three Brigades of equal
+strength, were founded on this idea, and did not allow of adaptation
+to any other distribution of force which might have to be employed.
+
+It has already been pointed out in Chapter III. that they do not apply
+to a Corps made up of several Divisions, and the same holds good of
+Divisions of other than strictly normal composition. Everywhere, in
+cases such as referred to above, the subdivision into Lines
+('Treffen') in the spirit of the Regulations would very soon lead to
+even worse disruption of the units than already happens with normal
+Divisions of three Brigades. The want of proportion between the
+number of the Lines and the columns from which they have to be formed
+would be more glaring then than nowadays, when the number of Brigades
+happen to be the same as the number of Lines; with the larger units
+the difficulty of uniform speed and control would be a factor.
+
+Now, Section 346 helps us over all these difficulties by
+disembarrassing us of all stereotyped formations based upon numbers
+alone, and leaves the Commander free to choose in what proportion and
+in what order he will divide and move these masses.
+
+Under modern conditions this latitude is indispensable, for the amount
+of force to be applied depends on what is known about the enemy; but
+the special shape the attack itself assumes, and more particularly its
+breadth of front, will be determined by the width of front the enemy
+opposes and the nature of the ground it has to move over; whilst as to
+depth, this must be decided by our estimate of the quality of the
+adversary's force, hence his shock power and the amount of his
+possible reserves.
+
+The consideration of all these conditions may, in proportion to the
+numbers in hand, lead us to employ whole Brigades, Divisions, Corps,
+or portions of these units, arranged in the most varied succession to
+one another. Whether we should attack by 'Wings' or by 'Lines' must
+depend on the circumstances of the movement, the order in which the
+troops reach the field, and the nature of the country to be traversed;
+and generally the preference will have to be given to the 'Wing
+Attack,' for the reasons we have above developed.
+
+This 'Wing Attack' will, therefore, always have to be employed when
+time is available to form up the troops systematically for action, or
+when the lines of approach of the units lead naturally to the
+adoption of the formation. 'Lines' only then, when it is absolutely
+necessary to deliver an attack from column of route as rapidly as
+possible, and hence the time is lacking for a more systematic
+formation. Such cases can, for instance, arise in the deployment at
+the issue of a defile, or in bringing up troops from Assembly
+formation through the intervals of a crowded battle-field, or under
+analogous conditions; but even in these cases a foreseeing command
+will endeavour to facilitate the execution of the 'Wing Attack' by the
+choice of some such formation as the 'double column,' which admits of
+deployment to either hand.
+
+Thus we see that our Regulations at least give to the Leader the
+possibility of choosing the best and most suitable formations for the
+execution of his purpose, but the latter also must be sufficiently
+master of his art to know which to select.
+
+Further, it is the duty of the Leader, in the case of mutual encounter
+between manoeuvring bodies of the Arm, to choose the momentarily most
+favourable form of attack with reference to his own line of approach.
+It is not easy to lay down in general terms in what manner this can be
+best insured, for the circumstances of the operations themselves and
+the nature of the ground are capable of influencing the decision in
+too many ways. One can only lay down certain general principles which
+may form a basis in the appreciation of each situation as it happens
+to arise.
+
+In the first place, one must select one's own base of attack in such a
+direction that the following blow will force the enemy to retire in
+what will be for him the most disadvantageous direction, and,
+conversely, for one's own purposes the best.
+
+But, naturally, in making this choice the tactical advantages or
+otherwise of the ground must not be overlooked or left to the enemy,
+for the tactical victory is the necessary preliminary to further
+results. Further, we should always endeavour to secure the advantage
+of the 'outer lines' so as to act concentrically upon the enemy. In
+this position, if beaten, his lines of retreat cross one another, and
+to avoid this predicament he will be compelled to endeavour to
+manoeuvre across our front, always a most dangerous undertaking.
+
+On the other hand, if our attack fails, we have still the advantage of
+eccentric retreat, which compels the adversary to divide his forces,
+and thus opens to us the opportunity of further tactical success if we
+can concentrate our own men with sufficient rapidity, whilst at the
+worst we run no risk of seeing our own troops entangled with one
+another.
+
+It should be our constant endeavour to gain these positions on the
+'outer lines' by previous strategical operations, in order to avoid
+the danger of being compelled at the last moment to initiate wide
+flanking movements in face of the enemy. Again, a further advantage
+accrues if we can rest one flank on inaccessible or difficult ground.
+This flank at least will be secure, so we can spare troops from it to
+strengthen the other, and thus, perhaps, act with decisive effect.
+
+Finally, when it is presumable that we shall have to deal with
+considerable numerical superiority, we should direct all our efforts
+to throwing the whole weight of our charge against the enemy's flank,
+so as to compel him at the last moment to change his front to meet the
+blow. The opportunity for such action will arise in cases in which,
+thanks to our previous strategic direction, we can succeed in uniting
+the mass of our forces more rapidly than our opponent is able to do,
+and this may often be the case where the ground favours our advance
+and conceals the direction of our march.
+
+Generally, it may be laid down that a simultaneous attack directed
+against the enemy's front and flank is justified when we have the
+advantage of a considerable numerical superiority, or when our
+opponent retains for too long a faulty distribution of his forces; but
+in all other cases a blow with united force against his flank will
+give the most far-reaching consequences, as it brings immediate
+pressure against the adversary's line of retreat, and compels him to
+employ his own forces in succession, not in a concentrated effort.
+Hence this form of attack gives the chance of a success even to a
+force in a numerical minority, as it will often afford it the
+opportunity of beating the enemy in detail, whereas against a
+concentrated mass there would be no hope of success at all.
+
+It will be evident that for the execution of such an attack the forms
+laid down in the Regulations to be observed in the transition from
+rendezvous to attack formations are--one is almost tempted to
+write--about as unfavourable as they well can be. It is true they
+afford, as already pointed out, the possibility of presenting the same
+fighting formation in succession to any required point of the compass,
+an advantage which has no practical importance in warfare; but against
+this they increase the difficulties of deployment for attack to the
+front to the utmost. If it is necessary, for instance, to send the
+first Line at the enemy's flank, because at the moment that happens to
+be the shortest way, the front of one of the following Brigades is at
+once masked, and the latter hampered in its movements. Or if it is
+desirable to employ one of the rearward Brigades for a flank movement
+or any similar purposes, then either the leading 'Line' must be
+checked until the others have gained the required position, or it is
+certain that these latter will arrive too late to co-operate.
+
+Further, the forms prescribed by the Regulations render it more
+difficult to make use of such assistance as the nature of the ground
+may offer us.
+
+Plainly, it is very much more to our advantage in the conduct of
+offensive operations to bring up those units which one has at one's
+disposal--with the sole exception of a Reserve, which is not to be
+kept too weak, at deploying intervals on the same alignment--in
+formations which adapt themselves well to the ground, and insure rapid
+deployment to the front, with the necessary depth in the supports
+following. For this purpose I recommend primarily the 'double column'
+either in Brigades or in Regiments.
+
+This arrangement of the troops satisfies all practical conditions, and
+insures, above all, the possibility of bringing all forces
+simultaneously into action, and of carrying out offensive flanking
+operations; further, it makes it easier for the Commander to take
+advantage of such support as the ground affords, and to mass his chief
+strength on one wing; and, finally, it gives us the shortest line of
+attack upon the enemy, and makes it easier to avoid the use of inner
+lines. It unites thus all the advantages of the regulation 'Line'
+('Treffen') formation, and avoids its many serious disadvantages;
+hence it should be employed fundamentally wherever possible.
+
+Turning now to the employment of Cavalry on the battle-field, the
+first condition which has to be satisfied is to assign to the 'Masses'
+their proper place in the line of battle. They must not only be at
+hand when wanted, but also at the spot which promises the most
+favourable tactical chances and the greatest prospect of decisive
+results. Further, they must be able to recognise the right moment to
+take part in the combat.
+
+With reference to the first point, I should, above all, like to call
+attention to the writings of General von Schlichting.[10]
+
+         [Footnote 10: 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the
+         Present Day,' part i., chap, vii., B.]
+
+Theoretically, the Cavalry 'Mass' is best united on that wing of the
+battle front which is not supported, but destined for further
+manoeuvres, hence on which the Arm will enjoy freedom of movement as
+far as the ground allows. Naturally, it will not always be possible to
+assign them such a place, but their position will result generally
+from the course of the previous manoeuvring.
+
+Either the Cavalry must clear the front of the Army in preparation for
+the battle, in which case it is not always a matter of free choice in
+which direction one has to clear off, nor can the Cavalry Commander
+from his standpoint always determine which wing of the battle front
+will have to manoeuvre; or it must close in from a flank for the
+decision, in which case the nearest wing is their natural destination.
+But they must always endeavour--and here I differ from General von
+Schlichting--to range themselves forwards and sidewards of their own
+Army. It will only be in cases where it is necessary to keep them in
+rear of the general alignment--as, for instance, it is proposed to
+use them as a last resort in the interests of the other Arms, as at
+Mars la Tour--or where the battle front itself is broken up by the
+nature of the ground or the grouping of the forces in such manner that
+the whole engagement is divided into a series of individual actions,
+as may often be the case in future Wars, that this rule must be
+departed from.
+
+Such dispositions are always less favourable because they imply in a
+certain degree defensive action, whereas when placed forward in the
+framework of the battle the offensive element of the Arm finds its
+fullest opportunity.
+
+That the desire to occupy such positions must not become stereotyped
+goes without saying; it must always be conditioned by the general and
+particular circumstances of the moment.
+
+The course of events may, indeed, require us to take up a position to
+the flank and rear of the Army, but fundamentally, forwards and to the
+flank, remains the most desirable disposition. In this position the
+Cavalry 'Masses' are best prepared to act against the enemy's flank,
+and can best combine the fire of their own Artillery concentrically
+with that of the guns and Infantry of the main body without losing
+their tactical connection, and thus divert the forces of the enemy
+into eccentric operations. Here they occupy the most suitable position
+to initiate without loss of time a parallel pursuit of the enemy, or
+to counter his attempts at pursuit; and here also they are best placed
+to accept the inevitable challenge of the enemy's Cavalry.
+
+General von Schlichting considers these combats as generally
+superfluous--a kind of family concern which affects the rival
+Cavalries only--having no connection with the ultimate decision
+between the two armies.[11]
+
+         [Footnote 11: See 'Tactical and Strategical Principles of the
+         Future,' p. 83. The view that Cavalry which has delivered one
+         charge in the day is useless for the rest of the operations,
+         I cannot accept. It finds no support in the facts of Military
+         history--on the contrary, the most complete refutation.]
+
+I cannot share this opinion, which seems to me to be based mainly on
+peace-time experiences, in which the opposing Cavalry forces generally
+neutralize one another. In actual War, however, victory more usually
+opens the path to other and proportionately more far-reaching results.
+I hold, therefore, not only that such Cavalry duels are essential, but
+that the opportunity for engaging in them should be sought out from
+the first; for it is only the defeat of the enemy's horse which can
+open the door for further successful action against his other troops;
+otherwise the two Cavalries mutually paralyze one another, as at Mars
+la Tour.
+
+If in practice it has often happened that this Cavalry deadlock has
+supervened, and the result of their encounter has remained unimportant
+on the decision of the day, this result, in my opinion, has always
+been due to a reluctance on one or the other sides to press the combat
+to its utmost limitations, as in the above-mentioned instance of Mars
+la Tour, or because the victorious side has retained neither force nor
+cohesion sufficient to act against the enemy's flanks, as at Chotusitz
+and at Prague.
+
+Matters, however, will be very different when the Cavalry is really
+adequate to its duties--when it not only beats the enemy out of the
+field, but remains, as at Roszbach and Soor, fit for further efforts
+in pursuit.
+
+To reach this ideal we must strain every fibre of our being, and never
+rest satisfied, as on the plateau of Ville sur Yron (Mars la Tour),
+with half results as long as a single trooper remains fit to gallop
+and handle his lance. The last man and the last breath of his horse
+must be risked, and he who is not willing to stake his soul is no true
+'Cavalry Soldier.'
+
+If we have successfully achieved this first result--_i.e._, victory
+over the enemy's horsemen--then the next step is to secure rapid
+rallying and the pursuit of the beaten enemy till they are finally
+driven from the field; and whilst detachments follow up, the main
+force of our Cavalry must wheel in upon the flank and rear of the
+enemy's Army, ready to act with all vigour and determination to bring
+about the final decision when and where the opportunity offers.
+
+That we failed in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 to obtain this
+crowning purpose of the Arm is no evidence in itself that the ideal is
+inaccessible, only proof that neither our training nor comprehension
+of our duties was on a level with the requirements of the time.
+
+It is certainly possible that our opponent may seek to withdraw his
+horsemen from the Duel to save their strength for the protection of
+his threatened flanks; but the consideration remains that by such
+conduct he voluntarily renounces the best sphere of his own
+activity--a degree of renunciation on his part hardly to be
+expected--and precisely because its action to avert defeat may prove
+of essential consequence, it is our part, in accordance with the
+offensive spirit of the Arm, to seek him out and destroy his forces
+before such opportunity arrives.
+
+For this purpose, again, the position to the front and flank is most
+suitable. The constant threat upon the enemy's communications it
+implies cannot be disregarded, and will compel him to find means to
+rid himself of such embarrassment.
+
+Having, therefore, made it clear where the Cavalry should seek its
+position on the battle-field, the next step is to settle how it should
+be formed. In this direction General von Schlichting has reached the
+most practicable solution in laying down that a position in which each
+Division retains full space for deployment and room to manoeuvre for
+the common purpose is theoretically the ideal, and this would still
+apply to Divisions united to form a Corps.
+
+It is, indeed, evident that it is far easier to unite troops for
+action towards the front than, under the circumstances of the
+battle-field, to deploy them outwards from a common centre. This
+latter operation will be all the more difficult in proportion as the
+troops themselves have been brought forward to the front to meet a
+coming crisis. The danger then is ever present that, by the necessity
+of gaining room for deployment,[12] the opportunity to strike will be
+lost, or that the endeavour to seize the opportunity will lead to the
+troops being put in without order and in confusion.
+
+         [Footnote 12: The 6th Cavalry Division at Vionville, August
+         16, 1870.]
+
+The fundamental principle, therefore, follows that troops, whether
+Corps, Divisions, or Brigades, should be grouped on the battle-field,
+preserving always their full deploying intervals.
+
+Of course, local conditions must be taken into account, above all
+things the necessity of finding cover both from view and fire in the
+shape of the ground. In practice, therefore, it is only the actual
+facts as one finds them which can decide as to the best formation to
+be assumed, but it must always be of advantage to be perfectly clear
+in one's own mind as to which disposition to adopt and the
+consequences which must follow from one's choice.
+
+The chief difficulty always remains--viz., the chance of seizing the
+opportunity. In the Battle of Mars la Tour our Cavalry failed to solve
+the problem, and in the subsequent course of the War--particularly
+against the forces of the Republic--it might often have obtained far
+better results had it possessed a clearer conception of its mission
+and better tactical training, as, for instance, in the action at
+Coulmiers, where we missed a grand opportunity.
+
+The more difficult it becomes, with every increment in the range of
+firearms, to recognise our opportunities, the more essential is it
+that we should take the field with a thorough knowledge of our
+tactical power and its limitations, and it is above all things
+necessary that we should keep well up to the front, and not shirk even
+_heavy punishment_ if by so doing we can best secure opportunities for
+great results.
+
+If this end is to be obtained, then every Cavalry Commander requires
+to have a complete grasp of the nature of the Infantry combat. He must
+be able to estimate with as equal certainty as an Infantry General the
+general course of an engagement, the consumption of reserves, and the
+gradual moral degradation of the enemy's foot soldiers.
+
+At any moment he must be able to grasp in his mind the whole balance
+of forces in conflict on any point of the battle-field, so as to be
+able to decide whether the employment of his own command at any
+particular point and time is justified by the general situation of
+affairs.
+
+It is, and always must be, the moments of great crises which give the
+Cavalry the best opportunities.
+
+Since attempts to ride through the zone controlled and swept by
+effective Infantry fire may be looked on as synonymous with
+self-destruction, only such moments must be chosen for a charge during
+which the enemy is prevented from bringing his full fire power to bear
+against the assailants. These, however, only occur--except always
+where the nature of the ground allows of a thorough surprise
+action--when the moral disintegration of the enemy's Infantry is such
+that, under the impression of the threatening Cavalry attack, they are
+no longer under control, or when they are so completely taken up with
+their own fire action that it is impossible for them to concern
+themselves with the coming danger. Where such opportunities arise they
+must be seized with lightning-like decision and be exploited with the
+utmost energy. On the other hand, one should never allow one's self to
+be induced to undertake charges in which the probable losses bear no
+reasonable proportion to the possible results. Such conduct could only
+lead to the purposeless sacrifice of men and horses, just as happened
+to the French Cavalry at Woerth and Sedan.
+
+We can always take as an example the wise restraint exercised by von
+Seidlitz at Zorndorf, who, in spite of the Royal Command, refused to
+attack because he did not consider that the right moment had arrived.
+
+The Leader must always keep before his eyes the demands which either
+pursuit or retreat may make on his horses. One should never sacrifice,
+to secure results of secondary consideration, means that can be used
+to better purposes at other times and other places, for the calls
+which may be made upon Cavalry after the battle are quite exceptional
+in their nature.
+
+When, after long marches, hours of fighting, and heavy losses, the
+exhausted victor bivouacs on the hard-won field, when the day is
+drawing to its close and the shadows are spreading far across the
+pastures, then the real work of the Cavalry begins; then, without
+drawing rein, the horsemen must press forward to intercept the enemy's
+retreat, attack him anywhere where he least expects it, and harry him
+to utter exhaustion and dispersal (see Book I., Chap. IV., 1.4); or it
+must, under the difficult conditions of a retreat at night, sacrifice
+itself in charges or in protracted fire action in every direction in
+which the pursuing Army can threaten danger to the retreating columns.
+In such situations they must be prepared to hold suitable positions by
+the hour, without thought for their own retreat, without any knowledge
+of the general situation, and without any connection with the
+remainder of their forces. Threatened in flank and rear, and yet
+unshaken by the general collapse, by the flight and panic of their
+comrades, they must hold their own, relying on their own strength and
+self-reliance. These are the conditions which make the highest demands
+both on the material and moral excellence of the men, as well as on
+the indomitable energy and skill of the Cavalry Leader, and to few
+mortals is it given to prove equal to such contingencies; hence one
+must prepare one's self beforehand for such situations.
+
+Primarily one must remember to give opportunities to both men and
+horses to feed, water, and rest even during the progress of the
+battle. One must endeavour, even while the fight is still raging, to
+become perfectly clear in one's own mind as to the possible lines of
+retreat, and the probable ulterior operations. One must try to
+impress upon one's memory the lie of the roads according to the map,
+and the important defiles and positions which might be favourable
+either to pursuit or retreat, in order to be able to act at the right
+moment, without loss of time or hesitation, in full cognizance of the
+circumstances of the case. _Nothing helps a decision more than a
+complete intellectual command of the situation._
+
+Hence we see that the leading of Cavalry has been rendered
+immeasurably more difficult by a whole series of external
+considerations, as we have shown at the beginning of the chapter; that
+at every moment the highest demands will be made on the intellectual
+perception, the boldness and strength of character of the Leader, if
+on the battle-field of the future he is to handle the Arm with any
+prospect of success; and that the best Cavalry under modern
+circumstances must fail if their Leaders prove unequal to their task.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+TACTICAL CONDUCT OF DISMOUNTED ACTIONS
+
+
+If, in the shock between mounted men, the genius of the Leader is the
+principal factor of success, nevertheless, the successful conduct of a
+dismounted combat and of all the variations this form of action may
+assume make almost equal demands upon his capacity. For the timely
+recognition of opportunities which can only be turned to account by
+recourse to fire power, the transition from one form of action to
+another, the skilful and systematic arrangement of a dismounted
+engagement, require such a complete command of the situation and such
+certainty of military judgment and decision of character that the
+combination will be almost as rarely found.
+
+Moreover, in the power of holding the balance correctly between fire
+power and shock, and in the training for the former never to allow the
+troops to lose confidence in the latter, lies the real essence of the
+Cavalry spirit. This, whether it be in the working out of some great
+strategical design, or in joining hands with the other Arms to obtain
+by united fire action some common purpose, implies a balance of
+judgment and absence of prejudice of the rarest occurrence in normal
+natures.
+
+The essential point which differentiates the action of Cavalry
+fighting on foot and of Infantry engaged in the same operation is the
+dependence of the former on their horses; and to arrange that under
+all circumstances of the combat the relation of the men on foot to
+their means of locomotion shall be suitably maintained is at once the
+most important and the most difficult task that falls to the lot of
+the Leader.
+
+Primarily we have to decide whether we intend to fight with mobile or
+immobile horses,[13] and in every case the question arises how the
+conditions of the moment, whether in attack or defence, can best be
+dealt with.
+
+         [Footnote 13: When only three men in four dismount the horses
+         are said to be 'mobile.' When the proportion is greater the
+         horses become 'immobile.']
+
+Turning first to the attack, as the most important form of action,
+consideration leads to the following conclusions: If the advance is
+made with 'mobile' detachments, then in case of success the horses can
+be led forward after us. It is then easy to remount, and continue the
+prosecution of our ultimate purpose. If, on the other hand, we fight
+with 'immobile' detachments, one cannot at once pursue one's successes
+with the same body of troops with which such success has been won.
+Either the position which has been captured must be retained for some
+considerable period, or we must go back to where the horses were left,
+at the cost of considerable loss of time, and at the risk of
+intervening circumstances robbing us of further opportunity. Neither
+operation commends itself to the true Cavalry spirit.
+
+On the whole, in attack the difficulty is best met by working with
+'mobile' detachments, and the requisite number of rifles in the
+fighting line can then be provided by dismounting men from a larger
+number of units--Squadrons, Regiments, or Brigades.
+
+From this principle one should only deviate when, owing to the
+proximity of the enemy's Cavalry or other circumstances, it is
+absolutely indispensable to keep a strong mounted reserve at hand, or
+when it can be foreseen that the number of rifles available, if the
+'mobile' form is preferred, will obviously not be sufficient for the
+appointed task; for it must never be forgotten that the rapid
+attainment of fire superiority must be striven for under all
+circumstances.
+
+If we turn to the consideration of the Defensive, our conclusion must
+be the exact converse.
+
+The maintenance of fire superiority now becomes the primary objective,
+and since, in case of success, a general advance is precluded by the
+very conditions which compelled us to adopt the defensive role in the
+first instance, and further, owing to the conditions which surround a
+defensive combat generally, particularly the nature of the ground, it
+is usually practicable to bring the led horses closer up to the firing
+line, which remains stationary, and does not, as in the attack,
+constantly increase the distance between the two, it will be wiser to
+adopt the 'immobile' detachment as a fundamental proposition.
+
+This gives us the further advantage of being able to retain a larger
+mounted reserve in hand for the initiation of a possible pursuit, and
+one should only depart from this principle when special circumstances
+make it appear desirable to advance rapidly after the decision of the
+fire fight, and the ground compels us to leave the led horses far
+behind the actual shooting line of the position.
+
+Next to this question of 'mobile' or 'immobile' detachments, the
+Commander must decide how far away from the actual field of action he
+should dismount his men.
+
+Fundamentally, the idea must hold good that one must ride up as close
+as possible to the line to be held or the position from whence the
+advance is to be made; and the limit to the mounted approach is only
+set by the necessity of retaining cover, at least from sight, for the
+led horses, and time enough, in the event of failure, to insure that
+the men can remount before fire can be brought upon them, even from a
+distance. The possibilities of becoming exposed to the indirect fire
+of Artillery must not be left out of consideration altogether in the
+solution of this question.
+
+Hence, it can only happen very rarely, and then only under
+exceptionally favourable topographical conditions, that a suitable
+position for the led horses can be found in immediate proximity to the
+actual line of action.
+
+We may, however, be less particular when, in fairly favourable
+country, it is advisable to engage, without the intention of courting
+a decision, our object being only to annoy the enemy by sudden fire,
+disappearing again as soon as he retaliates, or when one is reasonably
+certain of success, as against inferior or badly shaken troops.
+
+But when such favourable conditions are not present, and a tactical
+repulse is always possible, then the place for the led horses can only
+be found so far to the rear that the enemy cannot take us under fire
+whilst in the act of remounting, and circumstances render it
+improbable that this emergency can arise before we have succeeded in
+breaking off fighting contact with the enemy.
+
+The Commander, therefore, who decides to undertake a serious fire
+action must be perfectly clear in his own mind that by the act of
+dismounting he has severed his connection with his horses for a very
+considerable time; for if the enemy's resistance proves more obstinate
+than originally anticipated, and it becomes clear that the original
+purpose is not to be attained with the available means, the
+expectation that after once engaging the enemy the fight can be broken
+off and the horses remounted will in most cases prove entirely
+illusory.
+
+Since this operation of discontinuing a fire combat is most difficult
+to carry through, even for Infantry, the dangers are immensely greater
+for mounted men, owing to the added complication of their led horses.
+Only the passivity of the enemy, or unusually favourable topographical
+conditions, as in South Africa, can alter the general soundness of
+this conclusion; and it is entirely impracticable to escape these
+consequences by any attempt to lay down a limit and distance beyond
+which the fight is not to be prosecuted, in the hope that by so doing
+we can safely break off a combat once commenced. Generally it must be
+accepted, as laid down in Cavalry Regulations, Sections 362 and 364,
+that a fire action once accepted must be carried out to the end,
+unless the arrival of fresh troops on the flanks makes its
+interruption possible.
+
+One must never, therefore, in reliance on this possibility of
+withdrawal, allow one's self to be led into the mistake of keeping the
+led horses too close at hand; but the resolution to engage in a
+dismounted action must always involve measures which fully recognise
+the serious possibilities such decision entails, and must be on a
+scale which will insure the necessary vigour of execution.
+
+Hence, since in all cases in which a serious dismounted combat is
+absolutely necessary it is essential that the horses should be left in
+the greatest attainable security, the place for them should be
+selected in such a manner that they are protected against possible
+turning movements by the enemy--that is to say, behind suitable
+shelter provided by the ground, or behind defiles that can be easily
+defended. In cases in which these conditions cannot be complied with,
+which in practice will often arise, their security must be provided
+for by a sufficient reserve of mounted men, particularly when the
+enemy's Cavalry is in the vicinity, for 'immobile' detachments are
+practically at the mercy of every mounted patrol; and as a further
+precaution it will be well to spread around them a sufficient web of
+reconnoitring and security patrols, and to arrange for the support of
+one's own batteries.
+
+The covering of the led horses, however, is not the only duty of the
+mounted reserve: the protection of the Artillery also devolves upon
+it, and generally it must be ready to meet any of the demands for
+which Reserves are usually set aside. Hence it will have to provide
+not only for the safety of its own side and all pertaining thereto,
+but it must also threaten the enemy's flanks, undertake turning
+movements, reinforce, if necessary, the fighting lines, pursue the
+enemy, or cover the possible withdrawal of its own dismounted
+combatants; and, further on the offensive, it is its special mission
+to hold the conquered ground when the dismounted detachments are
+called off to remount, and to continue to carry on the original
+mission, interrupted by the combat, until relieved by the men who in
+the meanwhile have regained their horses, and again assumed the role
+of mounted combatants.
+
+The first point the Commander will therefore have to decide is, how
+strong it will be necessary to make his mounted reserve if it is to
+suffice to meet all these requirements, and then whether, with the
+remainder of the men in hand, he has any prospect of successfully
+carrying out his immediate purpose. From this it will depend whether
+he determines to fight or to reach his object by other means. In
+general, the Reserve can be reduced in proportion to the weakness of
+the enemy's Cavalry, and to the depth of the zone of security his
+patrols have been able to secure for him.
+
+Having by this line of reasoning determined the number of men he can
+afford to employ on foot, he must next make up his mind as to their
+tactical distribution.
+
+In this case there can be no doubt that the method of employment by
+'Wings' must commend itself even more than in cases involving only
+mounted combat, for, quite apart from all the many admitted advantages
+of this form, in no other way is it possible to guarantee that the
+dismounted men can safely and rapidly regain their horses.
+
+The 'Line' system would involve endless confusion and loss of time in
+sorting them out amongst their respective commands.
+
+As regards the general considerations of width of front and depth, the
+same principles apply as in the case of Infantry. In the defence to
+gain time is the main object, and the problem to be solved is to
+secure at one and the same moment both fire superiority and a
+sufficient reserve to meet all possible emergencies. A skilful
+utilization of the ground, previous ascertainment of the ranges, ample
+ammunition and sound fire discipline, will, as with the Infantry, be
+the best means of attaining one's object.
+
+Special conditions only arise in the defence of villages where the
+horses can be brought under cover close to the men, and here it seems
+to be necessary to distinguish between several possibilities, all of
+which require different treatment.
+
+If the place is to be obstinately defended, then the horses must be
+kept on the side away from the enemy, or in the centre of the
+buildings, the defence of the boundaries be suitably arranged, and the
+men told off to their several sections. The exits must be barricaded,
+and the approaches entangled with wire.
+
+A strong inlying piquet, to act eventually as a reserve, must be
+placed in a central position.
+
+If, however, the place is to be given up when seriously attacked, and
+resistance is only to be sufficient to cover withdrawal, then the
+horses should be kept saddled up in the stables, etc., and
+arrangements made to withdraw them rapidly without exciting attention.
+
+In the first case, as against Infantry or mounted Cavalry only, one
+can count on holding one's own without serious losses for a
+considerable time; but the matter becomes very different if the
+enemy's Artillery is also to be reckoned with, for modern shell fire
+will soon involve the destruction of all the horses, and one must be
+prepared to find retreat practically impossible once one has allowed
+one's self to be committed to an engagement of this nature. Hence such
+positions should only be occupied and defended when it is safe to
+count on support from following troops, or when it is improbable that
+the enemy will be able to bring Artillery into action. Such situations
+may frequently arise in the advanced lines of a concentration zone, in
+which the villages nearest the enemy form part of the general system
+of security.
+
+In all other cases, and particularly as regards the advanced
+squadrons, it will be better to take up 'Alarm' quarters, and the more
+unexpectedly the enemy can attack us the more stringent must be the
+precautions we adopt.
+
+If we decide to retire, a portion of the men will be detached to take
+the horses out of the village, or to have them drawn up in readiness
+for mounting behind the position selected, and meanwhile the remainder
+of the garrison must compensate for their diminution in numbers by a
+greater expenditure of ammunition, thus holding the enemy till all is
+ready, and then slipping rapidly back to their horses. Without
+losses--amounting, perhaps, to the sacrifice of the last covering
+party--such withdrawal can hardly hope to succeed; but previous
+systematic arrangements give the best chance of success, and the same
+prevision will be equally necessary, even if the place is to be held
+at all costs, for the situation may always change, and a retreat
+become advisable.
+
+At night, however, the aspect of affairs changes; then any attempt at
+withdrawal is to be deprecated, and, as a matter of principle, must
+not be contemplated. Even if the enemy breaks into the place by
+surprise, it is still better to fight him on the spot rather than to
+risk the certain destruction of the whole detachment by retreat. A
+successful resistance is in such cases all the more probable, since
+in the darkness the use of the enemy's Artillery is practically
+precluded--at any rate, can attain but little result. Only the
+squadrons far out in advance, and thus liable to be surrounded on all
+sides and captured before help can arrive, will have to be prepared
+for a night withdrawal before the assailants can close in around them.
+
+As to the principles to be observed in such cases, there should be no
+room for doubt. Everyone should know what he has to do when the case
+arises.
+
+Turning now to the consideration of the conduct to be observed in
+attack, it is clear that here also the same fundamental ideas apply as
+with the Infantry. Dismounted Cavalry must be prepared to work their
+way up to decisive distances, to break down from this limit the
+enemy's resistance, and finally to carry the position by storm. Hence
+the fighting line has need of constant reinforcements to give the
+necessary forward impulse, and hence we require the same distribution
+in regard to 'depth.'
+
+Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to adopt on this point any
+stereotyped formation. It must not be overlooked that the essence of
+such Cavalry attacks is rapidity of execution. Hence in all cases
+where this necessity for rapidity arises the endeavour must be made to
+bring from the very first as many rifles into the firing line as
+possible, and it follows that the greater the fire power thus obtained
+the less the need for subsequent reinforcement.
+
+If we try to picture to ourselves the conditions under which these
+dismounted Cavalry attacks can occur, it is evident that only in the
+most unusual instances will the necessity arise of launching them
+against wide fronts of dense lines of unbroken Infantry; on the other
+hand, we shall often be called upon to capture isolated villages,
+etc., such as posts on the line of communication, railway-stations,
+and important defiles, and in all such cases it will always be
+possible to combine attacks simultaneously against both flanks, front
+and rear. Thanks to its mobility, the Cavalry is exceptionally well
+suited to the performance of such undertakings, because it can combine
+both attack and surprise to the best advantage.
+
+If, thanks to this possibility, it is practicable to diminish the
+weight of the front attack, it follows, again, that less
+depth--_i.e._, fewer successive reinforcements--will require to be
+provided; but these can only be suppressed altogether when the object
+aimed at does not imply the actual maintenance of the position to be
+assaulted, but our purpose is only to reach a point from whence to
+overwhelm the enemy with fire, previous to riding him down by our
+closed squadrons, or to break off the action again and retire as soon
+as a counter-attack develops. These are cases which will often present
+themselves: either when in pursuit it is desirable to strike
+unexpectedly at the enemy's columns, or during a battle, when it is
+feasible to molest and disturb his reserves.
+
+In the above paragraphs I have put together the chief points to be
+considered in the action of dismounted Cavalry when acting
+unsupported; it remains now to consider the role assigned to the Horse
+Artillery allotted to it, if only to bring out those parts which, in
+my opinion, lie beyond its proper field.
+
+If we admit that in general, as between two great Cavalry masses in
+actual collision, the guns can play an important part, I must yet
+insist that the measure of this importance should not be overdrawn;
+for it is only when the former are confined to a defensive
+attitude--for instance, when they are still under cover or behind
+sheltering folds of the ground, or when moving in a widely-extended
+screen to mislead the enemy and tempt him into fire-swept ground, in
+order to fall upon him when he has ventured into the trap--that much
+is to be expected from their co-operation.
+
+But as soon as the Cavalry begins to advance, the part the Artillery
+has to play drops into the background. Then the guns become simply an
+impediment, because, since they generally require a special escort,
+they subtract from the total force available for the actual shock, and
+always act more or less as a pivot, which hampers the free movement of
+the Cavalry.
+
+On the contrary, the Cavalry must never allow itself to be influenced
+in its movements by the position of its own Artillery. The latter must
+adapt itself unconditionally to the movements of the former, and must
+endeavour to conform to its evolutions, so as not only to co-operate
+with it, but, if possible, to dispense with a special escort.
+
+It must, therefore, be the endeavour of the Artillery to keep well out
+in front of the Cavalry, so as to take the enemy under fire, and
+anticipate his batteries by coming into action first. The latter is a
+most important point, for it is the essential duty of the enemy's
+gunners to divert and beat down the fire which we endeavour to bring
+against their horsemen.
+
+If we can only succeed in unlimbering first, they are bound to accept
+the law from us, and are thereby prevented either of availing
+themselves of the advantages of the ground or of conforming to the
+tactical intentions of their Leader.
+
+The best position for Artillery must always be behind some sheltering
+roll of the ground, where it requires none, or at the most a weak,
+escort; and this desideratum will be best fulfilled when it is on the
+inner--that is, the supported--flank of its Cavalry, because in this
+position it can presumably remain in action longest, and hampers the
+movements of its own force least. Similarly, in pursuit or in covering
+a retreat its sphere of activity is distinctly limited. Its action can
+only then become effective when the actual tactical pursuit--_i.e._,
+with cold steel--ceases, the combatants have disentangled themselves,
+and the strategic pursuit sets in.
+
+The mobility of the target must naturally influence the fire effect to
+be expected from the guns, as it increases the difficulty of
+'ranging,' and limits the possible duration of action to a few
+moments.
+
+The batteries will only then be able to turn their fire on the enemy's
+Cavalry when the latter show themselves in considerable masses moving
+at the slower paces. But when the Cavalry sweep forward at full speed,
+the most they can do will be to take some stretch of ground through
+which the opposing Cavalry must pass, and on which there is still time
+to range, and then turn on shrapnel fire to its utmost intensity.
+
+But even for this the opportunity will only then arise when either our
+own Cavalry holds back, the enemy's Artillery does not require our
+full attention and fire power, or, finally, if our own guns are not
+attacked by the enemy's Cavalry.
+
+In view of all these considerations, it follows that it is impossible
+to assign a decisive importance to the participation of a few Horse
+Batteries in the actual shock of the opposing squadrons. Nevertheless,
+one should always do one's best to use to the utmost such Artillery
+power as is available, and particularly if there is any doubt as to
+the strength of the enemy, and we have reason to suspect that he
+possesses a marked numerical superiority.
+
+The chief role of the Artillery must always remain the support of
+dismounted action of Cavalry in attack and defence; in the battle,
+protected by their own horsemen, to strike against the enemy's flank
+and rear, shell his columns on the march, to drive him out of
+weakly-defended places or defiles, and in all similar circumstances,
+such as war always develops afresh, to inflict upon him the utmost
+possible damage.
+
+In all these cases the batteries can choose their own positions and
+the nature of their fire with absolute freedom, according to the
+fundamental principles of their own Arm; they have time to pick up
+their own range, and to insure results by the duration of their
+action.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VII
+
+STRATEGICAL EMPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY
+
+
+The attempt has often been made to advance formal principles and rules
+for the strategical, as well as tactical employment of the Arm, which
+will give a more or less safe foundation on which to base the grouping
+and employment of the available forces.
+
+Some regard a Cavalry Division as normally deployed when two brigades
+march on separate roads in first line, with the third following behind
+the centre in Reserve. Others want to see all brigades on one front,
+side by side; whilst yet others wish to see two brigades on one road,
+whilst the third pursues the same objective on a country lane.
+
+Even our Cavalry Regulations--which on this subject actually ventures
+to trespass on strategical ground--lays down (see Section 318) that
+'in Reconnaissance the mass of the Division must be kept together
+until the enemy's Cavalry has been beaten out of the field.'
+
+I hold all these attempts which only hamper the free strategic
+employment of the Arm as not only mistaken, but contrary to the very
+essence of our being, and for the same reason I hold them even to be
+detrimental, because they are calculated to produce thoroughly false
+views as to the conditions and demands with which in practical
+warfare we are confronted. All these regulations fall to the ground
+the moment they have to be applied to strategical units of variable
+dimensions. Further, as I have developed above, the tasks which may
+fall to us are of such different natures that they cannot possibly be
+all solved by the same formulae.
+
+The strength of the enemy must naturally exercise decisive importance
+on the whole character of our action and the distribution of our
+forces. The lie of the roads and the nature of the country also
+exercise their influence on our decision.
+
+To this must be added the fact that, in view of the many strategical
+necessities of a great Army, the Headquarters cannot always be in a
+position to allot to the Cavalry a clearly-defined task either of
+reconnaissance or security, attack or defence; thus higher
+considerations may prevent the massing of the Cavalry on a single road
+or any other similar simple distribution. More often than not one will
+have to suggest the simultaneous attainment of the most varied
+objectives, and the Cavalry Leader will be lucky if he is not called
+upon to solve problems of the most heterogeneous nature, things which
+in their execution mutually exclude one another.
+
+Hence one can only lay down the most general principles to govern the
+strategical employment of the Arm, and to meet this difficulty it
+becomes all the more important to develop the capacity for endurance
+of the troops to the utmost, so that they can successfully deal with
+these many variable demands.
+
+As to how far the independent Cavalry should be thrust out in front of
+the following columns of the Army, all that can be laid down is, that
+the wider the fronts and the deeper the Army--hence the longer time
+the Army will take to deploy, concentrate, change its position, or
+execute any similar operation depending on the reports of the
+Cavalry--the further that Cavalry must gain ground to the front.
+
+As to the principles governing the formal arrangement of the troops in
+contradiction to all attempts to lay down stereotyped formations, all
+that can be said is that every strategical operation, if for no other
+reason than to allow of reconnaissance and secure safety, requires a
+certain extension in breadth; but the combat itself demands
+concentration.
+
+It follows from the above that the Cavalry Commander must in every
+initial case weigh in his own mind how much the existing circumstances
+may allow him to extend, and, on the other hand, how closely they
+compel him to keep concentrated, and he will only be able to reconcile
+the dilemma when he is actually clear in his own mind as to the
+tactical and strategical results his conduct in either case will
+involve.
+
+If the essence of his duty is to secure and to screen, then, as stated
+above, extension and subdivision of his command naturally follows. But
+one must keep clearly before one's own eyes that any concentration for
+a combat jeopardizes the performances of these tasks, for the
+concentration for combat necessitates the uncovering of the front,
+which it is the very object of the enemy to bring about and take
+advantage of. Further, the wider the front, the less becomes the
+possibility of timely tactical concentration; hence, under such
+conditions, one would generally have to renounce the temptation to
+engage in combat with a positive object, and content one's self with
+keeping the enemy at a distance, for this purpose availing one's self
+to the utmost of the advantages the ground may confer, and such
+support as the reinforced Horse Artillery and mobile Infantry (in
+vehicles) can afford.
+
+When the width of extension becomes very great it will be an absolute
+mistake to keep back reserves, since by doing so the actual front is
+weakened, whilst there is no guarantee that the reserve can arrive in
+time at the threatened point.
+
+Further, the wider the front becomes, the greater the difficulty of
+strategical change of direction.
+
+A similar extension of front as that above indicated in this resume of
+'Security' duties may also become advisable when engaged on
+'Reconnaissance'--for instance, when lengthy obstacles, such as
+watercourses, mountains, etc., only traversable at bridges, dams, or
+defiles, have to be surmounted.
+
+In such cases, especially when resistance is to be anticipated, it
+will rarely be possible to count on being able to surmount the
+obstacle in one single column, since even unimportant forces under
+such circumstances can oppose a very protracted defence, and
+neutralize a large numerical superiority. When these difficulties are
+met with, it will be necessary even in reconnaissance to divide one's
+force into several columns, as then there is always the chance of
+successfully piercing the enemy's front at some one point, and thence
+rolling up his resistance all along the line.
+
+Even in open country conditions may be encountered that render the
+subdivision of one's forces over a considerable extent of front
+desirable--_i.e._, when it is necessary to find the enemy, and fix the
+fact of his presence in certain specific districts. As an example,
+the conduct of the Cavalry after the Battle of Gravelotte (August 18,
+1870), when it became imperative to ascertain whether MacMahon's Army
+was marching to the north-eastward or not.
+
+Here it was indispensable to sweep out a wide area. To attempt such
+tasks with patrols alone is unadvisable, for these always require a
+certain tactical support behind them, by which they can be either
+reinforced or relieved.
+
+Still, the point must never be lost sight of, that, since the enemy
+will also seek to screen his operations, a decisive collision may
+become necessary at any moment to tear his screen asunder. Hence it
+will be better, in opposition to the principles laid down for
+'security' only, to keep one's principal force in groups or masses,
+possessing considerable striking force, and to march in such manner
+that a certain degree of concentration is always attainable while
+meeting the necessity for extension in breadth by smaller
+reconnoitring patrols.
+
+Against an opponent whose general whereabouts has been ascertained,
+whom one is determined at any price to beat, in order then to
+reconnoitre, one's troops must be kept in hand, so that their complete
+concentration is assured in all cases, and only to divide them to the
+degree rendered indispensable by the general direction of the roads
+and the nature of the ground to be traversed. The same conditions also
+hold good where surprise is the essence of the undertaking. In this
+case it may even be advisable to suppress one's own dispositions for
+security, and accept the risk of being taken at a disadvantage rather
+than run the risk of having one's intentions prematurely disclosed.
+
+Tactically the greater concentration guarantees tactical success, and
+strategically it allows greater freedom of movement and changes of
+direction to meet altered conditions; but one must never lose sight of
+the technical drawbacks such closer concentration entails.
+
+The zone of reconnaissance is naturally always of less breadth than
+with divided columns; hence the possibility of screening the march of
+troops in the rear is diminished, the risk of being turned is
+increased, and the possibility of delivering a stroke in the air is
+not inconsiderable.
+
+If the enemy wishes to evade us, we have scarcely any means of holding
+him until our main force can arrive; and finally, this condition of
+close concentration by no means guarantees always and everywhere
+either superior readiness for action or a more favourable deployment.
+Cases can arise in which strategic dispersion will prepare the way for
+tactical encounter even better than the concentrated advance; and this
+is particularly so when, to attain the object of our mission, a wide
+turning movement is necessary, for this will generally be best brought
+about by previous strategic dispositions; whilst the deployment of a
+mass from a defile or its retreat may be entirely prevented if
+attempted in a single column.
+
+Hence every principle has its limitations, and circumstances will
+always arise which defy all stereotyped formations. Thus, even for
+'screening' and 'security' cases can arise under which concentration
+is justified, even where the nature of the ground does not
+imperatively dictate it, as when, for instance, the insufficiency of
+one's own force excludes any distribution in breadth, and compels one
+to combine all efforts for the defence of decisive points. And it is
+precisely on the defensive that it may be of advantage to deal a blow
+with the concentrated strength. Equally on the strategic offensive,
+dispersion may be necessary, as when the enemy retreats eccentrically;
+or if it is necessary to occupy districts of considerable size to
+break down the resistance of the hostile population, or to interrupt
+railway communication over a considerable area.
+
+Finally, all principles fall to the ground where the enemy's Cavalry
+is finally beaten out of the field, or by a succession of mistakes he
+gives openings which we can seize with advantage. Thus our conduct
+always remains dependent on the topographical nature of the country,
+on our own purpose and the opposition of the enemy, and only one law
+governs all cases--namely, expediency. The greater art of leading will
+naturally be required when the necessity arises to operate with more
+or less widely-separated columns. In all such cases everything depends
+on the endurance of one's troops. The principal difficulty in the way
+of execution lies in harmonizing and maintaining the movements of the
+separate detachments.
+
+If one has to deal with Infantry only, then, since their rate of march
+is almost always the same, it is easy to calculate approximately where
+the several columns may be found; but it is quite different when one
+comes to deal with Cavalry, where the different Leaders may adopt very
+different rates of movement, or may have such variations forced upon
+them by other circumstances, and hence one has always to deal with
+quite indeterminable factors. This difficulty can never be altogether
+eliminated; one can only counteract it by laying down from the very
+first instructions for the advance of the several columns, according
+to time and space, from which no deviation is to be permitted without
+sufficient reasons, and organizing the circulation of orders and
+intelligence in such a manner that it will work with certainty. These
+two precautions supplement one another. If one can calculate
+approximately where the several detachments are to be found at a given
+time, then reports can be sent by the shortest way, and will reach
+their destination without delay.
+
+It will be decidedly advisable that all detachments should report to
+Headquarters, and if possible to all adjacent columns, without
+distinct instructions, and at certain time intervals, both as to their
+advance, their bearing in relation to adjacent columns, as also any
+news they may have obtained about the enemy.
+
+Nothing is more important to the Cavalry Leader than to be constantly
+informed as to the general situation of the units he controls; but it
+is equally important that the several groups should know what is
+happening to one another, for only then can they act in the spirit and
+in combination with the whole.
+
+This is all the more essential because, owing to the rapidity of all
+movements, and to the great extension which has often to be given to
+the front, it is impossible for the higher Command to interfere in
+good time, or to obtain information from its subordinates in any
+emergency that may suddenly arise. The results, then, depend entirely
+on the independent judgment of the man on the spot, and suitable
+action can only be obtained when the latter is kept fully informed as
+to the nature of the general situation.
+
+We should, therefore, avoid as far as possible the despatch of orders
+to individual Commanders without at the same time informing their
+comrades of the bearing of such instructions.
+
+Wherever possible in strategical operations, the orders should be
+comprehensive, and should be circulated simultaneously to all
+subordinates. Where it is impossible to convey an order simultaneously
+to all, those not immediately concerned in their execution should be
+informed of its issue as soon as possible. Certainly, this method
+requires a large number of gallopers, orderlies, and so forth; but
+this apparent waste of energy will in the end prove the best economy,
+because the troops will thereby be spared many unnecessary movements.
+
+However great the endeavour may be to diminish the difficulties of the
+united action of separated bodies in the combat itself, the issue of
+the Cavalry fight is decided so rapidly that its consequences must
+have begun to show themselves before either the adjacent columns or
+Headquarters have learnt of its commencement. We must, therefore, be
+clear in our own minds that successful combination of separated bodies
+in action can generally only be effected when the opponent is either
+stationary, in which case one can time one's movements against him, or
+when, by a protracted defence at other points, the more distant bodies
+have time and opportunity to reach the field.
+
+Even when the approach of the opponent's forces has been discovered in
+time, it will be difficult to calculate with any degree of precision
+the exact point at which collision will occur, as the marching rate of
+the enemy's Cavalry must always remain an uncertain factor. Hence it
+will not suffice to evade the enemy's advance until the adjacent
+columns can unite, as one cannot assign to them any definite point of
+concentration where the distance between the columns is at all
+considerable. Any attempt to concentrate strategically against an
+enemy in movement without at some point fighting to gain time must be
+dismissed as illusory. In all these cases one must not hesitate to
+take to the rifle, and to utilize all available means of defence.
+
+Similarly, when advancing in separated columns, it will be well to
+advance from one defensive section to another in rushes, and not to go
+beyond any one of these until fairly assured that one can reach the
+next without encountering the enemy's Cavalry.
+
+If one should have the misfortune of being surprised in a district
+which affords no points of support, then one must retire to the next
+best one in order to give the adjacent columns time to swing in
+against the enemy's flanks. The sound of the guns will be indication
+enough to these to hasten their pace.
+
+The more important it is, therefore, to march to the sound of the guns
+in order to save time, the more careful must one be in opening fire
+without sufficient cause. On the one hand, the side which wishes to
+attract support will not be satisfied with a few rounds, but will
+endeavour by continuous and heavy firing to make the danger of his
+situation evident; on the other, the adjacent columns will only then
+be justified in approaching if they are convinced that it is not a
+mere matter of local and transitory advantage. The Cavalry Commander
+must keep, therefore, a firm hand over his guns, and never allow these
+to come into action without express sanction, except in extreme
+necessity. Generally, the batteries should always march with the
+advance or the rear guard in order to break down rapidly any minor
+resistance, and to make the fullest use of such short opportunities as
+may arise for the utilization of their full power.
+
+The application of these principles is, of course, much simpler when
+it is possible to keep the several columns close together on a
+convenient group of roads, all running fairly near to one another. The
+disadvantages which then arise make less demand on the skill of the
+Leader, but more on the necessarily cramped form of the disposition
+which, as we have above pointed out, he is compelled to adopt.
+
+For every operation, in fact, except the direct attack, there is a
+certain degree of extension, which favours the immediate purpose the
+most, and this depends on the shape and nature of the ground; but one
+has always to resist the temptation to dispersion which arises,
+particularly when it is necessary to keep in mind the solution of
+several possible problems. Only very occasionally will it be expedient
+to divide one's troops to meet every emergency.
+
+The General must use his judgment to decide where the chief weight of
+his mission lies, the principal characteristics he must impress upon
+his operations, and how the subsidiary purposes can be best served
+without applying half-purposes to the primary object. It is these
+considerations--the reduction of the complicated to the simple--which
+create the chief difficulties which weigh upon the mind of the Leader.
+The capacity of coming to a correct decision in every special case is
+a mark of the intellectually capable Commander, and of itself gives a
+certain guarantee of its success by rendering possible the
+concentration of the force upon the decisive point; but it will not
+alone suffice to insure success. Boldness and energy of character is
+the final determining cause of successful results.
+
+Above all, every Cavalry leader must be inspired by the determination
+to keep the initiative under all circumstances, and never to
+relinquish it to his opponent. The initiative alone guarantees
+successes, often in a degree which one was hardly entitled to expect,
+for it forces the enemy to accept the law from our hands, disturbs his
+strategical combination, compels him to fight before his troops are
+united, and often gives to the numerically weaker the opportunity of
+establishing a relative local superiority. One must, therefore,
+endeavour to introduce as much of the initiative and offensive element
+as circumstances will permit even in the execution of defensive
+missions.
+
+A Leader must never allow himself to be hindered in an advance, or be
+driven into an attitude of expectation by the passive opposition of
+the enemy's Cavalry, as so often happens in peace.
+
+In all such cases, when a direct frontal attack holds out no prospect
+of success, he must immediately initiate a wide turning movement
+outside the effective range of the enemy's Artillery, and sacrifice
+without hesitation his own line of retreat. Victory restores at once
+the original line of advance, and the outflanking movement threatens
+also the enemy's retreat.
+
+It is never permissible to wait until driven into action by superior
+commands, but one must always endeavour to reap, on one's own
+initiative, the utmost possibilities the situation holds out.
+
+In this way we shall save the troops excessive exertions and
+purposeless riding about, for since the Headquarters can never grasp
+the situation as rapidly or as thoroughly as the General actually on
+the spot, it follows that their orders will generally arrive too
+late. Hence they often lag behind events, and call for excessive
+exertions, night and forced marches if the purpose is to be attained.
+The records of the Campaign of 1870-1871 give innumerable instances of
+these facts, based on experience. Finally, resolutions should never be
+made dependent on circumstances which may happen in the future, but
+must always be based on something positive, which must be followed up
+with all conceivable energy and circumspection. This most necessary
+circumspection on the part of the Leader demands a clearness of
+expression in the issue of orders which must never leave the
+subordinate officers and troops in doubt, and should always reflect a
+clear and determined purpose.
+
+It is, however, equally necessary that the superior Leader must
+himself be clear as to how he means to carry out his purpose, has also
+considered all other possibilities, and has made his arrangements in
+such a manner that, if necessary, he can give his operations a
+different direction. This must be particularly the case where success
+depends on cunning surprise. As concerns the first point, this will
+require the more thorough consideration, because it is most
+particularly difficult to change the strategic direction of a large
+body of Cavalry when once it has been launched forward on a broad
+front. In such a case the whole carefully-elaborated network of
+patrols would be left, so to speak, hanging in the air. To divert it
+sideways into a new direction is generally impracticable; it would, in
+fact, in most cases be impossible to transmit to all the advanced
+detachments the news of the change in the dispositions.
+
+A new system of patrols will, therefore, be absolutely necessary to
+save both energy and time, and the necessity for instituting this new
+service will be particularly detrimental to our whole operations,
+because the information from the new direction will generally arrive
+too late to be of service.
+
+It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that the Cavalry Leader
+should not only reconnoitre in the direction prescribed by the higher
+Command for its particular purpose, but should also scout
+independently in every direction, and inform himself of all the
+circumstances in the whole district over which he is operating; if
+necessary, organize for himself an intelligence system.[14]
+
+         [Footnote 14: I here call attention to the instructions of
+         Frederick the Great on this subject, as well as to the
+         circumspection with which General J. E. B. Stuart prepared
+         for his own undertakings.]
+
+In short, he must exercise such prevision that he can never be overtaken
+by circumstances; and in every case in which action is called for in a
+new, and, perhaps, unexpected direction, he should be prepared to meet
+the emergency. In this way he will save himself much time and energy,
+but it will facilitate his very difficult task essentially if he is
+always kept informed in sufficient time of the views and possible
+intention of the Chief Command; for unless this condition is complied
+with, it will be impossible to insure that the whole energy of the Arm
+will be directed to the carrying out of its reconnoitring functions in
+conformity with the views entertained at Headquarters. It must be
+characterized as one of the most suicidal errors when the superior
+Command conceals its purposes from its executive organs. Diffused
+activity, waste of energy, misunderstandings, and confusion would be the
+inevitable consequences, and military history--not the least that of
+1870-1871--gives a long role of illustrative examples.
+
+As regards all those operations which depend on surprise, the
+circumspection of the Leader becomes the decisive factor. Everything
+must be thought out beforehand, and carefully considered. The very
+soul and being of the Leader must be grasped by the men under his
+Command, and the utmost energy in the execution of his design be
+demanded from every individual. As a general rule, smaller bodies,
+which can conceal themselves behind features of the ground, and hardly
+require a service of security, can act quite differently to larger
+ones, which cannot conceal their presence and always require a certain
+degree of precaution for reconnaissance and security. Above all,
+mobility is the essence of the whole situation, and darkness will
+serve as a most important contributor to success.
+
+On main roads, where it is impossible to lose one's way, darkness can
+be used for forced marches to advantage if beforehand we are clear
+about the conditions on the side of the enemy, and hence can act with
+a certain degree of confidence.
+
+One factor must never be left out of consideration--viz., that under
+modern conditions the difficulties of action by surprise have been
+enormously increased, and the enemy is under certain circumstances
+enabled to paralyze the tactical results of surprise. This factor
+arises from the existence of railways and telegraphs, and it will act
+most detrimentally against us when moving in the enemy's country,
+where both arrangements favour our opponents. Telegraphs carry the
+news of the appearance of Cavalry far and wide beyond the points where
+they have been seen by the enemy's troops, and the railways forward
+supports to the threatened districts.
+
+It is, therefore, of particular importance to destroy by means of
+advanced patrols both telegraphs and railways all over the district on
+which one hopes to act by surprise, and to repeat such active
+destruction again and again. In such enterprises there is a wide field
+for slimness and craftiness--qualities which might very well be
+combined in greater undertakings.
+
+Sudden changes in the line of advance behind the screen of advanced
+troops, unexpected concentration of separate columns at decisive
+points, separation and surprise reunions of one's forces,
+dissemination of false news, feints on points of subsidiary importance
+to distract the attention of the enemy--all these things can lead to
+the deception of the enemy, and in one's own country they will be
+materially supported by a friendly population; but timely and accurate
+information of all the circumstances of the enemy remains always a
+most necessary condition.
+
+If the importance of these measures is particularly striking in these
+cases where we are dealing with surprises, ambushes, and so forth,
+they form also in every other type of Cavalry action one of the
+principal foundations of success, for they alone insure timely
+resolutions and the consequent initiation of the movements necessary
+to bring about concentration and separation.
+
+The Cavalry Commander must, therefore, always choose his position when
+on the march, with the troops in immediate contact with the enemy; or
+if his troops are quartered in the neighbouring villages, then
+immediately behind the advanced line of cantonments, so that whenever
+possible he can see with his own eyes and base his decisions on
+first-hand evidence, where he can receive all reports as soon as
+possible, and make his dispositions in good time. Otherwise it will
+only too frequently happen that his orders and dispositions will drag
+behind events, and disorder and defeat will be the consequence.
+
+This personal supervision of matters in his front is also necessary to
+enable him to come to a correct decision as to his line of action,
+whereas a Commander of all Arms can better decide by the map, because
+his troops are less dependent on the ground than Independent Cavalry,
+move more slowly, and hence are more accessible to subsequent orders.
+But even the utmost energy in the Leader will not alone suffice to
+lead things into their proper lines without the most successful and
+rapid reconnaissance. Hence the practical organization of the system
+of reconnaissance remains the essential task of all strategical
+Cavalry leadership; but it requires to be supplemented by an equally
+practical system of security.
+
+On the two subjects so much has already been written that it is
+impossible to find anything new to say about them. Only one point has
+not been brought out sufficiently--namely, that both security and
+reconnaissance, in so far as both depend on patrols, will only then
+work successfully when they are based on a thoroughly systematized
+method of procedure. The subject is of such importance that I have
+considered it necessary to devote a short chapter to it (Book I.,
+Chap. VIII.).
+
+If reconnaissance--apart from the fact that the roads must be cleared
+for it in the first instance by the defeat of the enemy's
+Cavalry--lies exclusively in the hands of the patrols, nevertheless
+security depends on the arrangement and activity of the other
+branches, such as advance guards, rear guards, flanking detachments,
+and outposts, and the conduct of these depends, again, on thorough
+systematization.
+
+When on the move, safety lies in the distance that separates the main
+body from the advanced detachments, and it is scarcely necessary to
+point out that only systematic arrangements can guarantee the
+necessary time for the exploration of the ground and the enemy which
+is requisite for safety.
+
+Threatened flanks require special detachments, moving on the same
+level and at sufficient distance, and their co-operation will be
+insured by a careful regulation of the mutual rate of march.
+
+A uniform rate of advance in the whole mechanism is an essential
+condition of complete security. Hence every means must be exhausted
+down to the smallest detail. It will not be necessary to assign minor
+flanking detachments for the duration of a whole march. During such a
+period it is practically impossible to retain their relation to the
+main body without keeping them within sight, which in most cases is
+quite impracticable, for circumstances may suddenly check the main
+body, or necessitate a change of direction. To advise the flanking
+detachments of such occurrences will generally be impossible, or at
+any rate very difficult, if one has permanently detached them, and
+therefore has no certainty of finding them at any particular point.
+Hence it is advisable to work them always in sections--that is to say,
+when they have reached certain points to withdraw them to the main
+body, and send out reliefs for the next section.
+
+But in order that the security should never for one instant be
+relaxed, these fresh reliefs should always be sent out at some little
+distance before the point at which the former detachment is to be
+drawn in.
+
+Almost more important than security at night is security during
+prolonged periods of rest. In that case the arrangements must be made
+not only in accordance with tactical requirements, but the fact must
+be taken into account that horses, in order to remain permanently
+useful, require quite a different nature of rest than is needed by
+men.
+
+It is most desirable that as many horses as possible should every day
+be brought under shelter and unsaddled, and all bivouacking should be
+avoided as far as practicable.
+
+The readiness for action from a purely tactical point of view
+certainly suffers, but as rest at night is an absolute necessity for
+the horses, one has to make the best of the matter and minimize this
+disadvantage as much as possible by suitable arrangements.
+
+Against this view it is often urged that Cavalry used to bivouac much
+more frequently in former wars, and nevertheless remained fit for
+service, hence they ought to be able to do the same to-day. I consider
+this an entirely wrong deduction. In the first place, the demands upon
+the troops in former days were generally much less than at present.
+The periods of crisis in which great exertions had to be made by them
+were on the whole less frequent, and the subsequent intervals for rest
+and recuperation were usually longer.
+
+Considering the average marches of the Napoleonic Cavalry as a whole,
+they cannot be considered particularly great, and still less was this
+the case under Frederick the Great, although under both Generals we
+find instances of great individual exertion.
+
+Moreover, the horses in those days were much less well bred, and the
+commoner cold-blooded strain can stand bivouacs, cold and wet, much
+better than our present high-bred material, although the latter stand
+heat and exertion very much better. The leadership must adapt itself
+to these conditions. Where circumstances allow the bulk of the horses
+to take shelter behind the Infantry outposts, the most must be made of
+the opportunity, and only the more distant patrolling service be left
+to the Cavalry. Outpost service makes far less demands on the Infantry
+soldier than on the Cavalry horse, for the former is allowed to sleep
+when on piquet, the Cavalry horse cannot.
+
+The Cavalry soldier certainly gains an advantage here over the
+much-harassed Infantry man, for naturally the man derives advantage
+from the care bestowed on the horse; but I hold this point is of far
+too trifling a nature to take into consideration when the matter
+affects such a necessary and important factor of strength of the whole
+Army. Further, this advantage is more apparent than real, and is only
+intended to give us the means, while sparing the material in one
+direction, to make greater demands on it in another. When in critical
+moments bold and wide-sweeping movements on the enemy's flanks and
+rear become necessary, where our object is to keep the enemy's
+movements under constant observation while screening our own; where,
+finally, on the close of a battle we must pursue the enemy
+relentlessly, or sacrifice ourselves to cover and protect the weary
+and retreating Infantry, then the Cavalry which has been properly
+nursed will be capable of exertions far beyond what could be expected
+of troops less thoughtfully managed. These exertions can then be
+unconditionally demanded, and will repay a hundredfold, both
+tactically and strategically, the care bestowed in easier days.
+
+Only rarely, however, will cases arise in which Cavalry can avail
+themselves of the shelter of the Infantry, for the essence of all
+Cavalry activity lies in the future in its independent undertakings.
+If we were to apply to them the same principles as to the
+Infantry--that is to say, make a principle of bivouacking the outposts
+and exposing them daily to the effects of the weather--this would
+result in a steady drain upon the horses, which would lead to serious
+deterioration in their endurance. Hence the question of bringing them
+under cover does not apply merely to the mass of the forces, but must
+be extended to the whole system of outposts, and wherever practicable
+the greatest possible number of horses must be placed under shelter in
+full and complete security. This security must be sought for by the
+increased depth assigned to the outpost system. Even after a
+victorious advance one must not hesitate, under certain circumstances,
+to withdraw the troops in order to obtain the necessary distances
+between the enemy and the advance guard, as also between the advance
+guard and the main body. Slightly increased distance to be covered
+next day is nothing as compared to the advantage of greater security.
+It will be particularly desirable to make the most of all positions
+the ground may afford, which, being traversable at only certain
+points, hinders the approach of the enemy--such as rivers, which can
+only be crossed at the bridges, woods in which movement is confined to
+the roads, marshes, and so forth. Behind these one can generally go
+into cantonments without anxiety, and they offer the further advantage
+that they can generally be held by small forces of dismounted men.
+Hence the horses can generally be sent back and brought under shelter
+at a distance, and in case of alarm can be saddled up and be made
+ready by men detailed for that purpose.
+
+Where such positions are not available, one must either go back
+further, or, if not altogether too near to the enemy, make the most
+advanced cantonments serve the purpose of the line of security.
+
+Every evening these localities must be hastily prepared for defence,
+with the determination, in case of attack, of defending them carbine
+in hand, and without bringing out the horses until the support can
+come up from the rearward cantonments.
+
+The details of such defence I have already discussed elsewhere.
+
+This method of defence, however, must be supplemented by a suitable
+system of observation sent out towards the enemy. Even detachments far
+advanced towards the enemy may, under favourable circumstances, find
+temporary cover in villages, and every such period of rest is of
+advantage for the horse.
+
+The Cavalry, however, which, in full confidence of its firearms and
+the alertness of its patrols, can venture to go into cantonments, and
+thus save its horses from bivouacking, will very soon assert its
+superiority over an enemy which seeks for safety by remaining
+constantly under arms, and thus dissipates its inherent energy.
+
+This tendency towards cantonments must not be allowed to become
+stereotyped. Occasions will constantly arise when the Cavalry must
+remain in immediate touch with the enemy; then it will be compelled
+not only to bivouac, but will have to stand to its horses, ready to
+mount at a moment's notice. Such occasions will only arise in
+critical situations necessarily of short duration, and the conditions
+both of the weather and the ground must be taken into careful
+consideration in making the arrangements for the outposts.
+
+Thus it is evident that it is not possible to lay down fixed rules of
+conduct either for operations or for the outposts, but all must be
+left to the capacity of the Leader and the adaptability of his men. On
+this capacity depends in the last resort the greater or less strategic
+value of the Arm. Its foundation can only be laid in peace, and will
+depend on thorough and successful training, together with suitable
+preparation of the whole organization for War. To both points I will
+recur in the second part of this work. Here I would only insist that
+naturally the collective strategic employment of the Arm must take a
+thoroughly different form in proportion as the troops are rendered
+more or less independent by their equipment, the leaders of all ranks
+are qualified to act on their own responsibility, and mobility is not
+hampered by difficulties in the provisioning of man and horse, and in
+the supply of ammunition. In the one case the Leader can act with
+courage and daring in the true Cavalry spirit; in the other he will
+feel himself hampered at every step, will not be able to act with the
+necessary degree of self-confidence, and will have to renounce the
+most promising undertakings because the inefficiency of his troops
+leaves him no alternative. However great his genius, no Leader can
+compensate for want of efficiency in his command; but it is the duty
+of such leader to maintain and increase the endurance inherent in his
+material to the utmost limits of its capacity.
+
+In this connection a well-thought-out system of saving and caring for
+one's horses occupies the first position, for this is the bed-rock
+foundation of all subsequent developments. We have seen of what immense
+importance in this respect the sheltering and arrangements for the
+outposts may be. But there are other factors to be considered--above
+all, a rational arrangement of the marches. In the first instance, it is
+a mistake to believe that Cavalry in the long-run can out-stay and
+out-march the Infantry--that, in other words, the Cavalry horse can
+endure greater hardships than well-trained Infantry. For a few days that
+may well be so, but for continuous exertion it is by no means proved.
+
+The German Cavalry horse is much more dependent on a sufficiency of
+food than the man; the nature of his load, together with the rapidity
+of movement, and hence the greater intensity of the exertions demanded
+of him, attack the animal in a far greater degree than the more
+uniform march performance of the men, who, moreover, are susceptible
+to moral influences, capable of greatly increasing their powers;
+finally, sore backs and lameness in long-continued exertions decimate
+the ranks of the horses to a much greater degree than a well-trained
+and equipped Infantry suffers from similar causes.
+
+In normal conditions demands should not be made upon the Cavalry which
+would be justified only in moments of a crisis. We must endeavour to
+reduce the daily performance to the lowest limit that our purpose
+allows. Only in exceptional instances should one move off at such an
+early hour as to interfere materially with the night rest of the
+horses. Unfortunately, there are still officers who will not be
+convinced that it is the horse which most requires rest, and who are
+never satisfied unless they keep the Cavalry night after night on
+their legs, although in darkness they are useless either for
+reconnaissance or for fighting.
+
+Further, in War games and Staff rides it is a custom to make demands
+which in practice are absolutely impossible, mostly by superior
+officers who have never ridden 100 kilometres (66 miles) in a single
+day.
+
+An average of twenty to twenty-five miles a day is in practice a very
+considerable performance. To demand much more of them, day in and day
+out, is impracticable. On the march itself a suitable change of pace
+is very necessary.
+
+To trot hour after hour is the most fruitful source of ruin to our
+horseflesh. Where it becomes necessary it is usually due to the want
+of care on the part of the Leader. Much may be done to spare the
+horses if we never march with considerable numbers on a single road
+without absolute necessity; and when this is not to be avoided, then
+we must seek to maintain an even pace throughout the column by the
+intercalation of suitable distances between the several bodies;
+otherwise there is a continuous hurrying up or checking of the
+rearward detachments, which strains the horses to the very utmost.
+
+One must always arrange for the halts necessary for the horses, water
+them whenever opportunity offers, and never continue a movement to the
+complete exhaustion of the animals. Well-timed periods of rest
+increase the collective power of endurance of the horses most
+materially, and as the training improves, the demands made upon them
+can gradually be raised.
+
+To bring this greater improvement into harmony with the military
+requirements of the situation, next in importance to an intelligent
+execution of a rational marching system comes a wise economy of forces
+with regard to the performance of detached duties and patrolling. It
+is particularly with the Divisional Cavalry that the lavish assignment
+of orderlies and messengers to the leaders of the other Arms and to
+the Infantry outposts has to be kept in check, and it must be insisted
+upon that the men thus allotted should be returned punctually to their
+commands, and not be employed in duties for which they are not
+intended.
+
+Thus one finds Generals who use their messengers as patrols even when
+special patrols have been entrusted with this duty; others who keep
+the detachments assigned to the outposts long after the outposts
+themselves have been relieved. In all these things there is a
+tremendous waste of energy, which must be all the more injurious the
+smaller the proportion of Cavalry which can be detailed to the
+Infantry Divisions.
+
+It is a special duty of every Cavalry Commander to resist this
+tendency to the utmost of his power.
+
+Apart from the regulation of the marching column and the economy of
+forces above referred to, a rational treatment of the rearward
+communications, particularly with the Independent Cavalry, will go far
+to maintain the troops in efficiency, and is also from the strategic
+point of view an important part of the Leader's duty. The daily
+despatch of numerous requisitioning detachments to great distances
+weakens and diminishes the troops to an inadmissible degree, unless it
+is managed with a wise foresight and on a rational system; often on
+great marches it will be altogether impossible. Then the horses must
+manage with what they find at their halting-places for the night. In
+the case of great concentration this will be altogether insufficient.
+Short rations reduce the horses very rapidly and only too thoroughly.
+It is, therefore, necessary in all independent operations of great
+Cavalry 'Masses' to take with one an organized and mobile supply
+train, and, where circumstances require, to arrange for its defence.
+
+The timely arrival of the supply waggons, the rational utilization of
+the resources of the district, the contiguous replenishment of the
+moving supply reserves, are matters which cannot be left entirely to
+the Army Service Corps, but the Cavalry General must himself overlook
+the whole matter, and keep the general control in his own hands. For
+these arrangements must be regulated from the strategic point of view
+since the power of operating at all depends essentially upon them. Of
+course, the Supreme Command must lend assistance also.
+
+In general, it will be advisable to carry with one a five to six days'
+ration of corn if one is to be prepared for all emergencies. That, at
+least, was the practical teaching of the War of 1870-1871. But one
+must add, the further the Cavalry is separated from the masses of the
+Army, and the more it renounces its communications with the latter,
+the greater must be the bulk of supply it takes with it; and the
+closer these supplies have to be kept to the troops, the more thorough
+must be the arrangements for their protection. The latter will be of
+particular importance when operating on a narrow front which favours
+an enemy's outflanking endeavours, whereas wider fronts of themselves
+give a certain degree of security to the rearward communications.
+
+If we are entirely cut off from our home resources, then we must
+select some point to be occupied on the flank or in the rear of the
+enemy's Army, and there arrange a supply centre of our own, and make
+it the point of departure for separate operations.
+
+All means are, then, proper to accumulate in such places a sufficient
+forage reserve, for the subsistence of the horses is the most
+important task which falls upon the Commander. A delay in this
+direction can wreck the most brilliant undertakings--jeopardize the
+result even of the best executed ones. Theory does not attach
+sufficient importance to the point here involved.
+
+Thus we see that the tasks of the independent Cavalry Leader are both
+many-sided and responsible. He can only then prove equal to them when
+all subordinates on whom he has to count support him with the utmost
+goodwill and reliability.
+
+With this necessity a new demand is made upon him--namely, to raise
+the spirit of the men he commands in such a manner that they will be
+equal to the highest requirements. Only a bold, self-confident, and
+active man, who everywhere sets the best example, will be able in this
+manner to inspire and stimulate his command. The sum of the stimulated
+individual performances brings with it also increased opportunities of
+success.
+
+Hence the last and greatest demand for the successful conduct of a
+Cavalry Mass remains always the man who will inspire and stimulate the
+troops under him, and thus lead them to victory.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VIII
+
+PATROLS--TRANSMISSION OF REPORTS--CYCLISTS
+
+
+I have already, in a former section, insisted on the fundamental
+proposition that reconnaissance and security are two diametrically
+opposite conceptions, and cannot on a large scale be confided to one
+and the same body of troops. This conflict of purpose becomes most
+evident when we come to the service of patrols in the field.
+
+Reconnoitring patrols regulate their movements on those of the enemy.
+They must keep touch with and follow him, quite irrespective of the
+movement of their own side, often being compelled to creep after
+him--_i.e._, to utilize intersected ground in order to avoid the
+necessity of fighting.
+
+Security patrols, on the other hand, flanking detachments, piquets,
+vedettes, and the like, have to choose their position with reference
+to the force it is their purpose to cover, and with which they must
+remain in communication. It is their duty to attack and beat off the
+enemy's patrols, as far as their strength will allow them, to prevent
+these latter gaining an insight into the conditions of the marching or
+resting troops whose safety they are intended to secure.
+
+If they were to attempt to follow up their enemy to find out his
+position--_i.e._, to reconnoitre--they would lose their connection
+with their own troops, and endanger the security of the latter by
+relinquishing the special object they are set apart to provide for.
+
+Hence it is absolutely necessary that the two systems should be kept
+separate one from the other, and that each patrol should know clearly
+and distinctly for which of the two purposes it is specifically
+intended. Only then can the troops in rear rely on being kept
+thoroughly informed, and at the same time secure from the possible
+attempts of the enemy.
+
+The more clear and precise the mission, the more can the patrols be
+relied on to execute it; but this, of course, does not exclude the
+necessity for them to keep their eyes open for other things, and to
+report all they may notice.
+
+Such a systematic arrangement brings other advantages in its train. It
+effects a marked economy of one's available forces, for being certain
+that every mission will be settled by a special party detailed for that
+purpose, it ceases to be necessary to keep on despatching fresh patrols
+again and again in the same direction, a practice most detrimental to
+the troops, which is constantly followed in peace-time; and it can never
+happen that a body is surprised by the enemy because its scouts are
+absent reconnoitring, or that it fails to receive information because
+its patrols are busy with security. If, therefore, all patrols thus
+naturally fall into one of these two groups--reconnoitring and security
+patrols--there is still another line of distinction to be observed
+between these patrols themselves, arising from the nature of the tasks
+which the circumstances impose upon them.
+
+It is impossible to lay down any distinct rules in this matter--for
+War will always present new and changing problems--but broadly two
+points of view must be kept in sight, which require fundamentally
+different treatment, and are conditioned by our distance from the
+enemy.
+
+If the opposing forces are still engaged in preliminary approaches one
+to the other, and separated by wide stretches of country, the
+procedure will be altogether distinct from that to be adopted when the
+outposts mutually confront one another.
+
+Between the two extremes there are innumerable intermediate degrees,
+to which one's conduct must be adapted without losing sight of the
+guiding points involved.
+
+Let us take first the period of approach, and consider the
+reconnoitring problem from this aspect, taking into consideration the
+broad requirements of modern War.
+
+It will be apparent at once that there is here a double purpose to be
+fulfilled--viz., to ascertain the whereabouts and direction of
+movement of the elements of the enemy's main fighting force, the
+primary object of all reconnaissance; and, secondly, to find the
+enemy's preceding Cavalry screen, whose purpose it is, on the one
+hand, to prevent our object, and, on the other hand, to conceal their
+own main body. This cavalry we shall have to defeat, but we cannot
+afford to await this event, but must initiate our own reconnaissance
+before the decision, and endeavour to carry this through, even if the
+latter prove unfavourable to us.
+
+Hence it follows that our patrols must be systematically divided from
+the first into strategical and tactical patrols, according as to
+whether they are intended to find the enemy's main army or to beat his
+Cavalry.
+
+The former must not allow themselves to be held up by the enemy's
+Cavalry, but must endeavour to ride through the opposing
+screen--straight for the heads of the enemy's marching columns. They
+must, therefore, avoid all fighting, and act by cunning and stealth,
+and hence their conduct should be entrusted always to officers. They
+will be directed against the probable lines of the enemy's approach,
+as determined by the general strategic situation, and will further be
+given all possible information as to the known whereabouts of the
+enemy, together with the intentions of their own Superior Command, in
+order that they may be in a position to distinguish between important
+and unimportant details, and adapt their action accordingly.
+
+That the position of heads of columns in time and place, their depths,
+the flanks of the enemy's positions, extent of his outposts, districts
+in which troops are quartered, the appearance of new uniforms,
+indicating the presence of regiments believed to be elsewhere, etc.,
+should all be carefully determined, forms part of their normal
+instructions; but, in spite of that, it is very desirable to direct
+their attention very particularly to all such points as are at the
+moment of preponderating consequence. They must also be kept well
+informed as to the mission of their neighbouring patrols, so that
+under all circumstances the systematic subdivision of their several
+tasks can be maintained intact.
+
+For these patrols one must choose the best mounted officers and men
+and horses, since long distances must be covered under difficult
+circumstances, and it would be well to allot to each a competent
+non-commissioned officer, who can carry through the task if his
+Commander is killed or taken prisoner. If possible, they should also
+be supplied with a concentrated horse-ration, so as to be as far as
+possible independent of the resources of the country. (See Part II.,
+Section I.)
+
+As to the strength of these patrols, it will be necessary to keep
+within very narrow limits, because if they are large it is difficult
+for them to escape observation; on the other hand, a certain degree of
+strength is necessary, because one cannot, of course, count on being
+able to send back one's information by single messengers. Since it is
+a prime condition of the problem that a district thoroughly commanded
+by the enemy must be ridden through, the safe return of a single
+messenger can never be guaranteed; hence the Commander will either be
+obliged to send his reports in duplicate or triplicate, or in the last
+resort fight his way through with them himself. Hence it will be
+advisable to compose each party of two or three patrols, each of three
+men, assigning a smart lance-corporal to each.
+
+One officer, one non-commissioned officer, two lance-corporals, and
+five men must, therefore, be considered as a fairly normal type.
+
+The Commander can then despatch two reports, and the third he must
+bring in himself, and must well consider how long it will be safe to
+continue his observation, and what it is of real importance for his
+superiors to know.
+
+But he must never allow himself to be hurried into the despatch of
+unimportant information. He must always keep before his mind the
+essential strategical elements of the whole situation. It seems to me
+altogether wrong to send off such patrols with general instructions to
+keep in touch with the enemy, a common manoeuvre practice. Since
+these latter generally last only a few days, there is not much
+difficulty in maintaining such a system, particularly when information
+is sent by single messengers. But in War everything is very different.
+One would very soon have got through all one's officers and still not
+be well informed. The patrols must, therefore, be told to return
+within a certain time limit, and their reliefs, who are to be fully
+instructed as far as the information available goes, must be
+despatched before this time limit is expired. Even then we shall soon
+exhaust the available supply of officers who will have been driven to
+the limit of their endurance in purely strategic missions, and in the
+end we shall have to fall back upon Non-commissioned Officers for
+tactical observation.
+
+This tactical reconnaissance will, in the first place, devote its
+attention to the enemy's Cavalry. The patrols assigned to these duties
+will attack the enemy wherever they meet him, to find out what is
+going on, and as soon as possible establish a moral superiority over
+them.
+
+But even they cannot remain permanently in touch with the enemy,
+because they, too, must send in their information by messenger, their
+strength thus rapidly diminishing, and they, in turn, will require
+relief.
+
+If permanent observation of a yet distant enemy is necessary, we must
+turn to other means. It will, then, be as well to send out whole
+reconnoitring squadrons or troops (F.D.O.,[15] 128) towards the enemy,
+and through them maintain a permanent tactical observation.
+
+         [Footnote 15: Feld Dienst Ordnung.]
+
+These serve as a patrol reserve and collecting station for
+information, remaining day and night in touch with the enemy, and, of
+course, will also require periodical reliefs.
+
+It goes without saying that, in addition to these squadrons, single
+patrols may be despatched in important directions from the main body
+of the Cavalry, whose duty it will be to report to the latter direct.
+
+These, again, must send off their reports by several men, whilst those
+despatched from the patrols sent out by the reconnoitring squadrons
+will often, owing to the shorter distance and the nearness of the
+support, be able to avail themselves of the despatch riders. In
+general, it cannot be insisted upon too much that the despatch rider,
+so very popular in peace, can only be very occasionally employed in
+War in the interval before the enemy's Cavalry is completely beaten
+out of the field. In peace a man is always riding in his own country;
+if he himself has not a map, he has at least been instructed from a
+map, and every civilian will help him out. Even if he stumbles up
+against an enemy's patrol they will generally let him pass unnoticed;
+but it is quite different in War. Here even a patrol leader has rarely
+got a map. The despatch rider rides across thoroughly unknown
+districts, coming in contact with a foreign, perhaps hostile,
+population; he cannot make himself understood, if, indeed, he is not
+obliged to avoid them. The enemy's patrols are also everywhere, and if
+anything happens to his horse the message does not arrive. Further,
+the enormously increased distances to be traversed in modern War have
+to be taken into account, and these alone render the despatch of
+single horsemen a very doubtful undertaking. We must, therefore,
+recognise that the conveyance of reports by individual despatch riders
+is only possible under very limited conditions, and within the
+districts fully controlled by one's own troops, and that even in one's
+own country reconnoitring patrols sent out to a great distance can
+only be very occasionally employed.
+
+Here we come upon an increased difficulty in the whole system of
+intelligence, and yet all reconnaissance is useless unless the return
+of information works without a hitch. We must, therefore, endeavour to
+regulate it accordingly.
+
+Above all, the connection between the reconnoitring squadrons and the
+main body by relays must be very carefully assured, and their strength
+must be proportionate to the number of the enemy's patrols moving in
+the district. In these cases a co-operation between Cavalry and
+cyclists will be of service, whilst within the radius which we
+completely command the whole rearward intelligence service, so far as
+it can move upon roads, must be left as much as possible to cyclists.
+
+_Fundamentally, no Cavalry soldier should be allowed to ride to the
+rear without pressing circumstances._ This is an absolute necessity if
+we are to spare our valuable and almost irreplaceable horses. Towards
+these safe lines of communication all reports must be directed, in
+order to be forwarded with the utmost rapidity by fresh horses or
+cyclists.
+
+If these main roads do not run as far as the reconnoitring squadrons,
+in order to allow of the patrols making use of them without long
+detours, then further collecting stations, protected by other troops,
+must be interpolated. (F.D.O., 273.)
+
+Occasionally the Cavalry Telegraph equipment may be of assistance, but
+we must not expect too much from it in periods of rapid movement,
+because since its application depends upon a number of favourable
+circumstances, its value in such changing conditions is more or less
+illusory.
+
+Results obtained in manoeuvres, in my opinion, convey no correct
+experience in this matter.
+
+Another point, however, must be specially brought out--namely, the
+necessity, not only of sending back information through the proper
+channels, but also of forwarding all important news direct to the
+principal Commander of the Cavalry or to the Army Headquarters. It is
+of the utmost importance that the Headquarters in each theatre of the
+War should receive information about the enemy simultaneously with
+their subordinates, so that they always remain in the position to
+dispose of their troops according to their own ideas, and do not find
+themselves bound by instructions previously issued by their
+subordinates. It is precisely this evil which made itself felt in
+1870-1871. Very often the most important information never reached
+Headquarters at all, and hence no action could be taken upon it.
+
+The fault lay chiefly in the fact that the subordinates, not being
+informed as to the connection of events, did not perceive the
+importance of the information, and therefore did not forward it on,
+and partly because the telegraph wires were overburdened by the
+private messages of distinguished persons who had nothing whatever to
+do with the conduct of operations.
+
+The control of the wires for purely military purposes must, therefore,
+be maintained with rigid severity, and information to Headquarters or
+Army Commands must have precedence over all other business.
+
+If collecting stations for information are not available, the
+question arises, Which groups should be Authorized to report direct to
+Headquarters? In my opinion this cannot be determined by the strength
+of the troops concerned, but must always depend on the strategic
+situation. Generally it may be laid down that the lie of the roads
+must decide.
+
+Those detachments entrusted with the reconnaissance of a single line
+of road will report direct any important information gained within
+their own sphere if no stronger body should be moving along the same
+line, and this reporting body may, therefore, according to
+circumstances, be a patrol, a regiment, or a brigade. It is desirable
+from this point of view that all Cavalry officers down to patrol
+leaders should be kept so thoroughly informed as to the general
+situation that they may judge of the importance of the information
+obtained, and hence know where to send the information they have
+secured.
+
+As the opposing Cavalries first, then the larger bodies of the Army,
+approach one another the situation changes. The reconnoitring
+squadrons clear the front and turn their attention to the enemy's
+flanks. The advanced squadrons are withdrawn, and the larger Cavalry
+bodies drawn off towards the wings of the Army, and seek shelter
+behind the Infantry columns, if they have been defeated in the Cavalry
+duel, or turn against flank and rear of the enemy's Army if they have
+been victorious. In front of the Armies reconnaissance now falls to
+the Divisional Cavalry. Here the strategical and tactical duties
+coincide. What the conduct of the Independent Cavalry will be must
+depend on whether it is still held in check by the enemy or not. If
+the latter have been finally beaten out of the field so that one has a
+free hand, then the strategic patrols will direct their attention to
+the enemy's rearward communications, and will seek to determine the
+approach of his reserves, but tactical reconnaissance will be directed
+against his flanks.
+
+The principles governing our conduct remain the same, only the
+reconnoitring and advanced squadrons now act primarily as supports to
+the strategic patrols. If, however, a decision between the two
+Cavalries has not been finally arrived at, one will now endeavour to
+bring it about, and for this purpose unite all available forces,
+leaving meanwhile the reconnaissance to strong patrols, who in this
+period of the combat must never avoid those of the enemy, for now our
+object is to get information quickly, and the time for circumvention
+and evasion is at an end.
+
+When the first battle has been decided, there follows either pursuit
+or retreat--operations in which the tactical reconnaissance cannot for
+one moment be omitted. Then by degrees, as the defeated side succeeds
+in disembarrassing itself of its pursuers, things revert to normal
+conditions again. The two Armies are separated by a certain area in
+depth, and a new series of operations commences, in which, as before,
+reconnaissance is required.
+
+Matters are somewhat different as regards security. Here also in
+general a distinction must be drawn between safety obtained by bodies
+detached in advance and that derived from piquets, etc., immediately
+at hand. But too much importance cannot be laid upon the principle
+that, as above pointed out, reconnaissance alone cannot suffice to
+insure safety; the reconnoitring detachments must rather always be
+followed by a line of security troops, so that as a general type
+three lines of patrols result--viz., strategical patrols far in
+advance, tactical patrols, and security patrols, which latter, when
+the main body is halted, become the standing outposts.
+
+Coming next to the measures of security necessary for Independent
+Cavalry when in movement, the tactical reconnoitring patrols, by
+sending in early information of the enemy, will make a far-spread line
+of security patrols unnecessary. In general, the ordinary point of the
+advance guard and flankers will suffice. For the latter the same holds
+good which has been said in the previous section on the subject of
+flanking detachments altogether--viz., that they must be worked by
+sections, and arranged in a proper system of reliefs.
+
+If the necessity arises to screen, as well as to secure--_i.e._, to
+hide absolutely our movements from the enemy--then all roads leading
+towards him and the section of the ground comprised between them must
+be occupied in such manner that the enemy cannot find intervals at
+which to break through, and this will be best attained by a system of
+local patrols, tied to definite beats. These patrols must fight the
+enemy wherever he appears, and must, therefore, be given sufficient
+strength and be followed by small supports duly allotted to each
+section of the whole front.
+
+When the main body is stationary, the conditions are different,
+because the troops require a certain time to turn out; therefore more
+precautions are necessary, and the end can be best attained by placing
+the patrols further to the front. Hence we arrive at a double system
+of security--the first line formed by outpost squadrons, with
+officers, non-commissioned officers, and small patrols, to which a
+certain district to be ridden over will be assigned, and which must
+maintain a systematic connection by patrols between its separate
+parts, to insure absolutely the control of the ground around them; and
+the second, formed of far advanced posts of observation at suitable
+points--road crossings, defiles, etc.--from whence they can detect at
+the earliest moment any approach of the enemy. These are indispensable
+at night, when reconnaissance is always more or less liable to break
+down, for darkness interferes with sight, and the horses require rest.
+Their importance also increases naturally with the vicinity of the
+enemy, and the consequent greater risk of surprise. In the case of the
+larger bodies, whole squadrons (see F.D.O., No. 272) must be detached
+for this purpose, and communication with them assured by strong relay
+lines. These strong advanced detachments can, under favourable
+circumstances, get shelter in villages, so that the horses at least
+obtain better rest and care for a few hours, and the same applies
+naturally to the reconnoitring squadrons. In all such instances the
+guiding idea must be to evacuate the village the moment the enemy
+appears, and evade collision with him. How this is to be managed has
+been already explained (Book I., Chap. VI.). Accurate knowledge of
+where all the roads lead to, the barricading of those running towards
+the enemy's position, and extreme alertness on the part of the
+patrols, are in such cases all-important.
+
+Above all, the Commander must be confident in the steadiness and
+coolness of his men.
+
+As to the immediate security of the Army itself, this depends in the
+first place on the Divisional Cavalry, but during the advance the
+Independent Cavalry on the front and flanks guarantees this security
+so thoroughly that the former can confine themselves to the most
+elementary precautions, which must include primarily the maintenance
+of connection with the latter for this purpose. Then they will not
+only have to provide for security in the most thorough manner, but
+will also have to reconnoitre, and for this purpose follow the same
+rules which we have laid down for the Independent Cavalry. If the
+enemy's horse prove overpowering, then they will use their power of
+defence to the utmost, and seek to increase it by cyclists belonging
+to the Infantry, Maxims, and Artillery, in order to beat off the enemy
+with loss, and to clear the path for the reconnoitring patrols.
+
+Speaking generally, the system I propose is in harmony with the
+spirit, if not with the letter, of our Field Service Regulations, in
+which the systematic distinction between reconnoitring and security,
+as also between strategic and tactical patrols, is, in my opinion, not
+sufficiently defined. The essential point which necessitates this
+distinction has not been grasped with sufficient precision. If we are
+to follow literally the wording of the Field Service Regulations, and
+not the spirit which pervades it, which disregards all stereotyped
+formations and keeps always the practical in view, then it would be
+impossible to carry out screening operations on the scale which the
+conditions of modern War will render indispensable. Sufficient stress
+has not been laid on the necessary systematizing of the whole
+procedure. Finally, too, much weight has been laid upon the employment
+of the despatch rider (_Meldereiter_), although the experience of
+1870-1871 has sufficiently shown that this system was unreliable. I
+recall as an instance the pursuit of Vinoy's Corps (after Sedan), in
+which case the most important report was entrusted to a despatch
+rider, who only reached his destination twenty-four hours after he
+was despatched, and by that time it was too late to take any action on
+the information he conveyed.
+
+The Field Service Regulations should also contain detailed
+instructions as to the employment of cyclists with the Cavalry, for
+the rapid development of this mode of locomotion has rendered this
+absolutely indispensable. But the point must be brought out that the
+use of a cyclist is always only conditional, as it depends on the
+weather, the roads, and the country. On heavy, steep, and stony roads,
+on which the tyres are only too apt to be punctured, the cyclists are
+obliged to dismount; against a head wind they can only make progress
+with difficulty. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that for the
+transmission of reports from the advanced lines, as well as for
+communication between separated bodies of troops within the district
+controlled by our Cavalry, they are of inestimable service. Granted
+that in particularly unfavourable weather and bad roads they must be
+supplemented by Cavalry, they, nevertheless, on the whole, make it
+possible to expedite materially the delivery of despatches. This is of
+all the greater importance because in case of War the German Armies
+will be relatively weak in Cavalry, and under certain circumstances
+they will have to fight against a great numerical superiority.
+
+Even though the principal use of the cyclists lies in the transmission
+of information in which they can help the Divisional Cavalry most
+materially, nevertheless one must not base too sanguine hopes on their
+activity.
+
+The reason is that because of their wheels they are tied to the roads,
+and in consequence they can neither reconnoitre nor provide for
+security independently. If for these purposes Cavalry patrols are
+attached to them, the chief advantage of their greater mobility is
+sacrificed, but without such supports in difficult country they are
+tolerably helpless against surprise attacks. If one further takes into
+account that a hill takes off from their speed to such a degree that a
+horseman can easily catch them up, one must admit that they afford no
+sufficient guarantee for the fulfilment of independent missions
+outside of the country which our own Cavalry commands. In such
+districts they can only be employed on relays, as already pointed out.
+Here the duty of providing safety can best be fulfilled by the
+Cavalry, because it is not a question of rapid advance, but only of
+the protection of stationary posts and certain defined road stretches.
+But for the defence of these posts, and for the transmission of
+intelligence, the cyclists will do even better service than the
+horsemen, because they can cover the ground faster, and when fighting
+are not hampered by their horses. Their employment here is all the
+more desirable because the relay service makes enormous demands upon
+the Cavalry. That was proved up to the hilt in the War of 1870-1871;
+the complaints under this head repeat themselves over and over again,
+as the records of the Campaign abundantly testify.
+
+Besides, on these relay duties the cyclists can be tactically employed
+in the district which our Cavalry by its patrols commands, for the
+rapid occupation of far-advanced posts which neither Cavalry nor
+Infantry can reach with sufficient celerity and in adequate force; for
+the defence of defiles lying to our rear, which must be kept open to
+secure the retreat of the Cavalry; for the support of Independent
+Cavalry on outpost duty, particularly at night; and for other similar
+purposes. To satisfy all these conditions, these cyclist detachments
+require a sufficient tactical training, but in times of peace one sees
+in this respect feats performed whose impracticability in War are
+glaringly apparent. For instance, men keep their cycles with them
+right up in the firing line, and when they want to retreat or break
+off the fight they try to mount under fire. As they are generally tied
+to the roads, they then file off to the flanks. I have, indeed, often
+seen Cyclist detachments lay down their cycles in the front of the
+position, and then advance to mount them again in the teeth of the
+enemy's fire. All these kind of things are absurd. The cycles must be
+treated like the led horses of the Cavalry--that is to say, the men
+must dismount under cover, then move up to the firing line, and then
+move back to cover in order to mount again. The position must,
+moreover, be so chosen as to enable them to move off without exposing
+themselves. All these points, which in practice are rendered
+difficult, diminish very materially the usefulness of cyclists, and
+take away from them, above all, their power of offence; and in all
+missions entrusted to them these limitations must be carefully kept in
+mind.
+
+
+
+
+II
+
+ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER I
+
+NUMBERS
+
+ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
+
+
+When we take into consideration the conditions of modern Warfare, as I
+have endeavoured in the foregoing pages to develop them--the numerical
+strength of modern Armies; the numerous formations of Artillery and
+Infantry set on foot on the outbreak of hostilities; the area of
+future theatres of operations--when, further, we consider how many
+important tasks await the Cavalry from the moment when the first shot
+is fired, and how the most important of these, as I have endeavoured
+to establish, can only be dealt with satisfactorily by the employment
+of Cavalry 'Masses,' the conviction must force itself home to every
+mind that our German Cavalry is numerically inadequate to meet even
+the principal demands the future must make upon it.
+
+If, further, we reflect that, owing to causes which it would be out of
+place to deal with in these pages at length, it is precisely upon our
+Cavalry that the role of fighting against crushing numerical
+superiority must devolve, this conviction must give rise to the
+gravest anxiety, more especially when it is remembered that the
+difficulty of securing a supply of reinforcements adequate for the
+performance of our duties is greater with the Cavalry than with any
+other Arm. A few days' training at a pinch will turn out an Infantry
+soldier or gunner, whose presence need not necessarily be either
+dangerous or even detrimental to the efficiency of his company or
+battery. An unbroken horse or a bad rider may create confusion in the
+ranks of the steadiest squadron.
+
+The danger is still further aggravated by the fact that a rapid
+reduction in their available numbers is certain to take place, owing
+to the increased demands which the future must make upon the endurance
+of our horsemen, and presumably also the heavier losses they will be
+called upon to suffer in action, both of which must be intensified in
+proportion as their numerical inadequacy for the tasks incurring on
+them increases. Germany is certainly comparatively well supplied with
+horses; but owing to the demands of the aforesaid new formations,
+which must be set on foot immediately on the declaration of
+hostilities, upon the complement of animals fit for War purposes
+within our own frontiers, the country will be practically denuded, and
+only those horses still too young or those too old for the field will
+be left behind.
+
+Even among those classified as 'fit for War' but few are fit for
+Cavalry purposes. Riding horses good enough for the Infantry and
+Train--even for the Artillery--may, no doubt, be found; but equal to
+the requirements made on the Cavalry horse there are but few indeed,
+and even this number is diminishing yearly. As regards the supply from
+foreign sources, this must depend on the political situation--i.e., on
+conditions which lie beyond our control. Even when these conditions
+are favourable, horses cannot be usefully drafted into the ranks
+without prolonged training and breaking to fit them for their new
+duties. Hence the conclusion is inevitable that the numerical strength
+of our Cavalry, already, as I have shown, so inadequate, must fall off
+very rapidly at the commencement of a campaign, because its rapid
+reinforcement with satisfactory material is, under the circumstances,
+quite out of the question.
+
+From this conclusion there is no escape; and in view of the increased
+importance I have above assigned to the due performance of all Cavalry
+duties, its recognition carries with it, as its corollary, the
+absolute need for the numerical augmentation of this branch of the
+service.
+
+The enormous mechanism of our modern Armies can only work normally and
+successfully when its constituent 'power factors'--_i.e._, the three
+Arms--have been apportioned with due regard to the work to be
+accomplished. If driving-power fails any one portion, the danger lies
+near that at some critical moment the whole apparatus will suffer in
+sympathy, and fail to respond to the strain it is called upon to
+endure.
+
+The question of this increase in the Cavalry has, indeed, often before
+been raised, but never with the weight of concentrated conviction the
+situation, in my opinion, deserves. For the most part, only expedients
+to avoid the bitter necessity of a serious augmentation have been
+suggested. Thus it has been proposed to form new regiments of four
+squadrons each by taking away from the existing ones their fifth
+squadron, and the suggestion has been supported by an appeal to the
+fact that in War-time only four squadrons per regiment take the field.
+
+No expert, however, can fail to agree with Lieutenant-General von
+Pelet-Narbonne, who maintains in his 'Cavalry Regiments of Four
+Squadrons' (_Kreuz Zeitung_, January 17, 1899) that such a measure
+would entail the ruin of our Cavalry, and would destroy with one blow
+all that the reorganizations of 1859 and 1860 have done for the War
+efficiency of our regiments by entailing a depreciation of the value
+of the squadrons at the very moment when called on to move out and
+face the enemy.
+
+Thus he writes: 405 squadrons are in Peace retained on the lower
+establishment of 133, or the middle one of 137. Their numbers are 170
+of the former, 235 of the latter, and the War strength averages 150
+per squadron. To attain this figure those on the lower establishment
+need 17 horses, those on the middle 13.
+
+With no fifth squadron to draw upon for horses, as at present, these
+vacancies would have to be filled by 'augmentation horses'--_i.e._,
+animals straight from the country, thoroughly raw and unaccustomed to
+work under the rider, often also of inferior quality. But these 13 to
+17 horses per squadron by no means exhaust the situation. The field
+squadrons must leave their youngest remounts--say 15 in number--still
+too young and unbroken, behind them; for the experiences of the last
+War proved abundantly that where this precaution was neglected the
+greater part of them broke down under the hardships of the Campaign.
+Taking even the most favourable time of year for mobilization--viz.,
+in May--then out of the 15 young remounts of good material, and with
+careful choice, not more than 8 will be found fit for the ranks; the
+remainder will have to be left behind with the 'Depot' squadron, to
+be sent on afterwards. Any other procedure would only lead to the
+useless sacrifice of these valuable young animals. The places of the
+horses thus left behind will, therefore, also have to be filled by
+augmentation horses, thus bringing the number of these up to 24 and 20
+respectively.
+
+Then we still have to provide for the wants of the Depot squadron,
+which has to train the recruits, and for these a further number of
+trained horses, averaging 32, must be left behind, or another 8 from
+each squadron; and, finally, another 2 per squadron will be required
+for Staff orderlies and Staff guard duties.
+
+According to this calculation, the Field squadron would have to move
+out with from 34 to 30 augmentation horses (the sixty squadrons on the
+higher establishment with 27).
+
+The matter, however, presents a totally different appearance when in
+peace five squadrons are in existence, of which one remains behind as
+a depot. Taking away the 35 horses for recruits, and following our
+previous calculation of 7 young remounts, there would remain on the
+lower establishment 91 efficient horses to be divided amongst the
+other four squadrons, or 23 each, so that these would take the field
+with only 11, 7, or 4 'augmentation horses,' according to the
+respective peace establishments of the regiments. With these numbers
+the squadron suffers no reduction of its efficiency, for these few can
+always be employed--in the squadron carts, etc.--at any rate, need not
+be in the ranks.
+
+These figures, worked out in the spring of 1899, are still
+substantially correct, and it appears to me General von Pelet-Narbonne
+deals too leniently with this proposal for forming the fifth squadrons
+into new regiments, because many of the calls made on the squadrons
+are even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always in every
+squadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will presently have to
+be cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to take eight remounts
+into the field, for these young animals are by no means equal to the
+demands which modern conditions must make upon them from the very
+first days of mobilization.
+
+Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increased
+above General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correct
+in his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals will
+exercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions than
+formerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often had
+a considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituent
+elements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to the
+front by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities the
+fullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, and
+others not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannot
+possibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a day
+straight across country. After a very short spell most of the
+augmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would only
+have brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of their
+squadrons.
+
+These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if the
+squadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment and
+somewhat above it--say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this would
+mean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, our
+Peace conditions would be difficult to adapt to such an organization.
+Without going closer into these details, it will be sufficient to
+point out that all our barracks and riding-schools are designed for
+five squadrons; and further, that we do not need numerically stronger
+regiments, but a greater number, in order to satisfy all requirements.
+
+Hence, if it is admitted that swamping our squadrons with thirty or
+more augmentation horses must diminish most seriously the efficiency
+of our Cavalry, then it follows that a still further increase in their
+number will make matters still worse. Such proposals have no doubt
+been made, and it certainly would be convenient if our Cavalry could
+thus easily on mobilization be increased by one-third to one-half its
+strength; but after what has been said, above all such suggestions
+must be seen to be impracticable, for squadrons which consisted, for
+instance, of one-half augmentation horses would be simply useless for
+War purposes. A proceeding, therefore, which brought such results in
+its train would imply no increase of the Arm, but rather the
+destruction of the existing standard of Peace-time efficiency.
+
+Even as Divisional Cavalry such squadrons would be useless, for these
+require good individual horsemanship even more than those of the
+Independent Division for the performance of their special duties, and
+the necessary standard can never be attained with untrained horses.
+
+All who put forward proposals of this nature are labouring under the
+dominion of a fundamental fallacy. They overlook the fact I have
+explained in the foregoing section, that Cavalry by its very nature
+can never be other than a highly-specialized Arm, and hence that the
+system adopted by the Infantry of raising the cadres to War strength
+by the absorption of reserve men is for the Cavalry fundamentally
+impossible. For in the Infantry the ranks are filled by the addition
+of trained men; in the Cavalry they must be completed with untrained
+horses, and the untrained horses break down under service conditions
+much more rapidly than the men.
+
+Our experience in 1870-1871 was conclusive on this point. Already
+towards the end of August--_i.e._, in less than six weeks from the
+outbreak of the War--the greater part of the augmentation horses were
+quite useless for field purposes. If one looks up the reports in the
+War Archives, everywhere this complaint about the untrained animals is
+recurrent.
+
+From all the above-mentioned circumstances it must be clear that a
+numerical increase in the Cavalry is most urgently called for, and in
+my opinion it would be best if this indispensable increase, the need
+for which is becoming apparent even to public opinion, were grafted
+upon the existing five-squadron system, which at least guarantees a
+certain amount of preparation of the augmentation horses, without
+entailing the reduction of the squadrons below the minimum standard
+necessary for efficiency. I would, however, be willing to support any
+other method which would give a sensible increase in the Cavalry
+strength of our Peace establishment, and only protest against any
+scheme which would seek to swell out the ranks or create new units on
+mobilization; for all these are mere self-delusion, increasing, no
+doubt, the numbers on paper, but in reality striking at the efficiency
+of the Arm in the most vital manner.
+
+If, then, at the moment there may be conditions outside my ken which
+render a measure of the nature I have indicated impracticable, we
+must, nevertheless, not close our eyes to the fact that, after the
+recent reorganization of the Artillery, the creation of an adequate
+number of Cavalry regiments in the nearest future is an absolute
+necessity, and that in the meanwhile any such palliative as a recourse
+to the cadre system must be absolutely rejected.
+
+As an indispensable complement of the proposal to form new regiments,
+so that we shall not be compelled to fall back on an inferior class of
+horse to meet their requirements, and at the same time to insure as
+far as possible a supply of suitable remounts to replace our losses in
+War, further encouragement of horse-breeding operations in our own
+territories is most urgently called for. This can only be attained by
+a further reasonable increase in the price paid for remounts.[16]
+
+         [Footnote 16: In passing, I may note that some portions of
+         Lorraine are amongst the richest in horseflesh in all
+         Germany. Here, by the introduction of suitable stallions, an
+         excellent Artillery horse might be bred; but nothing is being
+         done in this direction.]
+
+Such a measure must form a preliminary to the coming increase of the
+Arm, and the sooner it is undertaken the better will be the result.
+
+These points of view cannot be insisted upon too vehemently, since
+even in Military circles they have not everywhere received the
+consideration they deserve, and it is most necessary that public
+opinion, which finds its ultimate expression within the walls of the
+Reichstag, should receive adequate instruction as to the vital
+interests involved.
+
+In any case, the difficulties attending any adequate increase of our
+Cavalry must not be underrated, and we must remain prepared to face
+the strain of a European Campaign with a strength inadequate for the
+difficult and most momentous problems we shall be called on to
+face--problems which, according to the measure of success or the
+reverse attending their solution, will exercise the most far-reaching
+consequences on the whole course of the War.
+
+Under all circumstances we shall have to endeavour to attain at least
+that measure of success which the Army Headquarters unconditionally
+require to render possible their own effective operations.
+
+Superior energy and skill in the conduct of our operations,
+concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance both
+of the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in our
+undertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of our
+objectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness,
+and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directly
+conducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at the
+psychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces in
+hand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superiority
+such concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the end
+of the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with this
+purpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, and
+material strength of the troops, the more we are justified in
+demanding that, at least as regards organization and training, they
+shall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them.
+If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing the
+highest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even on
+the most necessary results in time of War.
+
+The question, then, arises whether from these points of view our
+German Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on to
+endure.
+
+As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that those
+commands which form the basis of our War organization--_i.e._, the
+Cavalry Divisions--should exist already in Peace as concrete units;
+and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know each
+other mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to be
+realized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions were
+definitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they would
+more frequently be brought together for manoeuvres on a large scale,
+to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned.
+
+It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question of
+organization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Division
+in Peace than people generally imagine.
+
+The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannot
+accept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. However
+desirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is one
+which has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. The
+practicable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles in
+accordance with which the commands are handled should be so thoroughly
+flesh and blood of both leaders and led, that under all circumstances
+a sufficient result is secure. To reach this ideal is the true purpose
+of our training.
+
+In the permanent existence of Divisions it seems to me there is great
+danger that such a guarantee for their successful employment would be
+sacrificed.
+
+We have seen that the demands likely to be made on the Cavalry require
+widely different arrangement of the disposable forces; that this
+requirement increases in importance as the Arm falls numerically
+beneath the needs of the situation, and that only a most adaptable
+organization can deal adequately with the emergencies this numerical
+insufficiency may entail. Hence it is to be feared that a permanent
+constitution in Divisions might lose this requisite adaptability, and,
+however highly we may appreciate the advantages of a firmly welded War
+organization, one should never allow the form to interfere with the
+practical application of the means--_i.e._, never allow the troops to
+become so rigid as to hamper their employment in the field. But this
+is just what would happen if the Divisions were maintained on a
+permanent War footing.
+
+Every application of Cavalry Masses requires a certain measure of
+drill control, because it depends always on the movement of closed
+bodies of troops, and if the Cavalry Divisions are constantly drilled
+together under the same Leader in Peace, there is at least a very
+great risk that this certain degree of drill control, which we
+recognise as indispensable, will degenerate into hard-and-fast
+prescription, since the Leader has always the same number of units at
+his disposal, and will thus by degrees habituate himself to consider
+these as invariable quantities in the solution of every tactical
+problem.
+
+Our experiences with the Regulations for 1876 show that this danger is
+by no means imaginary, for by the constant practice of the so-called
+'Three-Line Tactics' we had already progressed far on the downward
+path which leads to tactical destruction. If the 'Form' would not fit
+the conditions, so much the worse for the conditions. Fortunately,
+thanks to subsequent changes, we have shed the worst of these
+tendencies, and are on the high-road towards freer and more adaptable
+tactical formations, but to me it seems that any attempt to fetter
+this progress by the adoption of a more or less rigid organization can
+only result in evil for the whole Arm. Rather should we lay down as a
+fixed principle that all Cavalry units must be able both to move and
+fight according to the same tactical principles, no matter in what
+order these units may be grouped together.
+
+The question now arises whether our present formation of six regiments
+to a Division is really equal to all demands which may be made upon
+it; whether, in fact, in view of the strategical requirements it may
+be called on to fulfil, and the degree of resistance to their
+execution it is likely to encounter, six regiments will prove
+numerically equal to their task.
+
+Considered in relation to the enormous Armies of the present day, and
+the still greater possibilities a general call to arms of a whole
+nation may involve, six regiments represent a very small actual factor
+of strength. If they should have to take the field for an independent
+mission, it would not even be possible to keep them all together. The
+protection of the flanks, and of the necessary baggage and supply
+trains, the far-reaching reconnaissances, and the need for extended
+requisitions, all unite to compel the creation of detachments, which
+in the aggregate must make considerable inroads on the total strength.
+Then there is the inevitable tale of losses on the march, the
+necessity for subdivision of one's forces for the passage or the
+turning of defiles; in fact, the demands are so many that the true
+fighting body of the Division--_i.e._, the squadrons available for the
+ultimate decisive shock--is represented by a very small fraction of
+its original forces. If a complete Division can place only 3,600
+sabres in the field, or, dismounted, from 1,680 to 3,000 rifles,
+according to the number of horse-holders required--figures which even
+without the above-mentioned detachments are quite inconsiderable in
+relation to what even an inconsiderable Infantry opponent can bring
+into action--what prospect of success is there for the weakened
+Independent Division in the execution of quite minor operations, when
+even in 1870-1871, not once, but frequently, the main body of our
+Cavalry Divisions shrank often to six or seven weak squadrons.
+
+It is chiefly the consequences of our, on the whole, satisfactory
+experiences in the above Campaign which have led us to accept the
+existing Division of six regiments as a satisfactory solution of this
+problem of strength; but we forget that in those days we had no
+Cavalry opponent to encounter, and that our sphere of action, owing to
+the want on our side of an adequate equipment of firearms, was small
+indeed in comparison with what we must expect in the future. We are
+encouraged in our illusion by the fact that in our Peace manoeuvres
+the strength of the opposing forces is generally nearly equal, and
+also because the actual demands War will make upon the Arm are still
+in these exercises very imperfectly realized, and from the nature of
+the case cannot receive full recognition. Further, there is the fact
+that our possible opponents have adopted the same organization, and
+last, but not least, there remains the view that every tactical unit
+of the Cavalry must not only be capable of being strategically
+employed as a whole, but must also be in point of size within the
+control of its Leader as a tactical unit.
+
+Our unfortunate experiences with larger formations in 1866 are often
+cited in favour of our present system, the point being ignored that it
+was not the size of these bodies, but the faulty methods in which
+they were employed, both strategically and tactically, that led to our
+disappointment.
+
+I think, therefore, that unprejudiced consideration must come to the
+conclusion that our Divisions as they now exist are too weak for the
+many and most decisive operations they will be called on to undertake.
+The absolute necessity to secure the victory over the enemy's Cavalry
+at the decisive point under all circumstances, and at the same time to
+retain a sufficient force in hand to reap all the consequences of that
+victory, will, I am convinced, lead to a materially greater
+concentration of power in the single unit.
+
+If from this point of view the permanent constitution of Cavalry
+Divisions cannot be upheld, it follows that even less is to be said
+for the formation of still stronger units in Peace-time, for this
+measure would entail in even greater degree the very same strategical
+and tactical limitations we have noted in the case of the Divisions,
+and still further cramp the necessary adaptability of the organization
+to meet the conditions of our Peace-time training. At the same time,
+it is clear that it is of the utmost importance that the formation of
+these stronger formations, Corps, or Divisions of greater numerical
+strength, the necessity for which can be recognised in advance, should
+be arranged for in the mobilization plans, and not built up afterwards
+by the mere combination of existing Divisions.
+
+For such bodies cannot be improvised altogether. In order to develop
+their full efficiency they require a carefully selected and ample
+staff of men who can be trusted to pull well together, and who have at
+their disposal all the auxiliary services necessary for greater
+independent operations. For these both trains and columns are needed,
+which must be larger than those of two or even three single Divisions;
+for, on the one hand, the greater size of the Corps entails closer
+concentration of its units, thus making heavier demands on the
+provision columns; and, on the other, the Corps must be capable of
+carrying out longer and more obstinate engagements than a single
+Division.
+
+It is, therefore, most essential that the several Staffs required for
+the Corps to be created in War-time should be thoroughly trained so as
+to insure their working together, and the trains and columns necessary
+to complete these units should be held ready for them in time of
+Peace.[17]
+
+         [Footnote 17: In a report addressed to H.M. the King in 1868
+         by General von Moltke on the experiences deduced from the
+         events of 1866, it is proposed that there should be at Army
+         Headquarters the Staff of a Cavalry Corps Command, together
+         with its necessary Administrative services, always ready for
+         the field. As Field Marshal he returns to the idea in another
+         place, adding, 'particularly when we have found the right
+         "Murat" to lead it' (Moltke's 'Militarische Werke,' II.,
+         Second Part, First Group, B).]
+
+To hand over the functions of Corps Commander to the senior of the two
+or three Divisional Commanders would hardly be an adequate means of
+securing satisfactory results even for a single day of battle; still
+less could it suffice in the case of an independent strategic
+operation. On the other hand, it is not at all essential that the
+Corps thus formed at the outset of operations should be retained
+intact throughout their whole period. One can make detachments from
+them, or reinforce them according to circumstances, and thus attain
+that very flexibility of organization which I have endeavoured to
+prove to be an absolutely indispensable factor to meet the conditions
+of our times.
+
+It appears to me also that the same advantage which it is hoped to
+realize by the creation of permanent Divisions can be reached by other
+roads, and with still better results.
+
+I would divide the whole territory of the German Empire into a number
+of territorial districts, and call them Cavalry Inspections, or
+Corps--the name is immaterial--each to comprise about twenty
+regiments, and subdivide these again into sub-Inspections (_i.e._,
+Divisions and Brigades), and thus obtain, not only the foundations and
+the Staffs for a practical War formation, but for a systematic
+preparation of the Arm in time of Peace. The Inspections would detail
+annually the necessary squadrons on a War strength for manoeuvres of
+the three Arms, according to a changing roster, and hold special
+Cavalry manoeuvres in a manner I propose to develop hereafter.
+
+We should thus, from the point of view of organization, gain the
+advantage of having the cadres for both Corps and Divisions ready in
+time of Peace, without being bound once for all to a hard-and-fast
+strength for the Division.
+
+It may be objected that it would be illogical to separate the Cavalry
+from the Army Corps and Divisional Commands at the very moment that we
+have assigned the whole of the Artillery to the Infantry Divisions,
+but for the latter Arm the conditions are quite different. It always
+fights in combination with the other Arms; by itself it cannot fight
+at all.
+
+The Cavalry, on the other hand, as regards its principal masses, is
+quite independent, and only occasionally in moments of crisis
+intervenes in the action of the other Arms, even then still as an
+independent unit. The connection with the remainder of the Army would
+be sufficiently secured by its participation in the annual manoeuvres
+of the three Arms, and, as at present, Cavalry Brigade Commanders
+would still have to be employed in the arrangement of the Brigade
+manoeuvres. The participation of the Cavalry Regiments in the Garrison
+Field Service exercises would remain matter of arrangement between the
+respective Commands, but definite rules would have to be drawn up to
+secure their effective co-operation.
+
+The necessary trains for the Inspections and Divisions would be kept
+ready in time of Peace, and, whether Horse Artillery--possibly also
+Maxim guns--should be permanently allotted to them or otherwise, might
+remain open for further discussion, though there is undoubtedly much
+to be urged in favour of the suggestion.
+
+In this manner I believe an organization could be created which would
+meet all reasonable requirements. Certain new Staffs, fully equipped
+with both General Staff Officers and those necessary for the
+contemplated trains, etc., would be of course necessary, for in case
+of War such creations cannot be improvised to work together without
+most detrimental friction for any units, and least of all for those
+which from the first moment of hostilities will be called on for
+decisive action, and thus have less time and opportunity to shake down
+into their new duties.
+
+A practical Peace Organization, such as in fact we do not at present
+possess, is a necessity of the first importance. But 'Mobility' in the
+Arm itself remains the prime condition of efficiency in its
+strategical activity, which, as we have seen above, must henceforward
+be considered the most important sphere of its duties.
+
+To secure this mobility is, therefore, our unconditional duty, and it
+is in this direction in particular that, in my opinion, our Cavalry is
+as yet hardly sufficiently prepared for the tasks that await it.
+
+Strategical 'mobility' certainly depends in the first place on the
+excellence of the horse supply and the suitable 'training' both of man
+and horse; but the tactical independence of the troops themselves, and
+the means of maintaining them in condition--_i.e._, conditions of
+supply--are at least of equal importance. Owing to our experiences in
+the French Campaign, where food and fodder were generally abundant,
+sufficient attention has not been given universally to this factor.
+Had we been compelled to undergo the same hardships as the Russians in
+1877-1878, our views would doubtless have been very different.
+
+The amount of forage that even under most favourable circumstances can
+be carried on the horses is very small. To count on finding even that
+amount always in the country through which we may have to operate
+would be more than imprudent. Even in 1870-1871 we could not always
+find what we needed in spite of the very favourable agricultural
+conditions, and with the enormous Armies of the present day we shall
+probably find the country even more exhausted of supplies than
+formerly, particularly in the latter phases of the struggle, except
+when one has the good-fortune to fall upon rich stretches of the
+country which by chance may have escaped the devastation of previous
+operations.
+
+We may also be called on to work in sparsely settled districts with a
+large export trade in corn, in which at times stocks may sink very
+low. In short, unless we wish to be hampered at every step of our
+movements by the necessity for wide-reaching foraging expeditions, we
+shall have to rely upon our magazines and the supplies which can be
+transmitted from them to the front through the agency of our supply
+columns. The carrying capacity and mobility of the latter, therefore,
+condition inexorably the degree of mobility in strategical operations
+which, under all circumstances, the Cavalry can be counted on to
+develop. Whoever relies on more will lay himself open to most bitter
+disappointments exactly at the decisive moments.
+
+The supply trains must, therefore, be able to march at least as fast
+as the troops themselves, for only on this condition is there any
+guarantee that even under difficult circumstances the necessary
+supplies will be forthcoming; yet though experience most abundantly
+demonstrates the difficulties of maintaining the supplies of the
+Infantry in spite of the fact that, as a rule, their columns can cover
+the ground faster than the men can march, there appears to be a tacit
+assumption that with the Cavalry the trains will always arrive in
+time, although they move far slower than the troops they follow and
+supply.
+
+There was, indeed, a certain amount of justification for this idea in
+the days when Cavalry were more or less tied to the movements of the
+rest of the Army; but nowadays, when Cavalry operates independently,
+and must cover long distances in the shortest time, it has become
+simply preposterous.
+
+We have only to consider that we have now to reckon with average daily
+marches of from twenty-five to thirty miles, and that a beaten or
+evading force may have to retrace the same distance, perhaps even on
+the very same day, at a much faster rate than that at which it
+advanced, to perceive its absurdity. What chance would there be for
+waggons which could not go out of a walk, and cannot reverse on the
+road itself, which check at every hill, and sink to the axles in mud
+or sand? How can strategically independent Cavalry provide for the
+security of its baggage when it must often be left some days' marches
+behind? And yet it is precisely when operating against an active
+opposing Cavalry or an insurgent population that protection for the
+baggage becomes most indispensable. Again, how are such trains to be
+cleared away from the front when the main bodies of the two armies are
+closing on one another for battle? or how, after it is decided, can
+they be brought forward again to follow their Cavalry in pursuit, and
+convey to it the supplies which in such moments it will most need, and
+on whose prompt arrival its striking radius will depend? How, with
+insufficient mobility, will they maintain the connection between the
+combatants in front and the standing magazines, or even with the
+movable supply depots following behind the marching Army?
+
+Here we come upon one of the most difficult problems of the day, and
+it cannot be insisted on too strongly that its solution during Peace
+is an indispensable condition of the efficiency of the Arm in War. The
+Cavalry trains must be organized in such a manner that they will be
+able to march at least as fast as the Cavalry itself, and be adequate
+in number to carry from five to six days' corn. Only when this demand
+has been complied with will it be possible to count on the attainment
+of the strategical independence at which we aim, and to attempt all
+that this implies with less would only lead to the complete breakdown
+of the Arm, which, as we have already seen, under existing conditions,
+can never be efficiently replaced during the same Campaign.
+
+It is not alone with the splendid chaussees of France that we must
+reckon, but with the sand roads of East and West Prussia, the swamps
+of Poland and Russia, and so forth, on all of which the same degree of
+mobility must be developed, for the speed of the Cavalry itself is
+practically independent of the nature of the roads. Without going
+further into the detailed measures necessary to attain this ideal, the
+importance of which must be evident to every practical soldier. I
+would call attention to only one fundamental consideration: the desire
+to curtail the length of supply columns by concentrating the loads,
+with the object of lessening the congestion of the roads and
+diminishing the time needed to bring their contents to the troops, is
+sound as long as it attains its object, fatal everywhere else.[18]
+
+         [Footnote 18: Generally defeats its own object; the heavy
+         load destroys the roads, causes breakdowns and delays, etc.]
+
+Now, the Cavalry Masses move under different conditions to the rest of
+the Army. Either they are in the front of or on the flanks; in the
+latter case, they have roads at their own disposal, in the former,
+being generally some days' march in advance, they clear the front when
+collision is imminent by moving to the flanks, and only quite
+exceptionally retire through the advancing columns, and in all cases
+they must be able to get off the roads quickly. The depth of these
+columns is comparatively unimportant.
+
+Hence, from the strategical relations of the Cavalry Masses to the
+rest of the Army there arises no particular reason to endeavour to
+shorten their trains. If the heavy baggage of a Cavalry Division is
+two and a half or five kilometres in length it is tolerably
+immaterial, but it is imperative, as we have seen, that they should be
+able to move and get out of the way. Hence, it is not the number of
+waggons which concerns us, but their individual lightness and
+mobility, so that on all roads they can follow their units at a trot,
+and only in the case of Divisional Cavalry can the other point of view
+be admitted.
+
+The possibility must also not be overlooked that it may not always be
+practical for Cavalry masses to fill up their supply columns direct
+from the Army reserves; and to meet this, second echelons of waggons
+will be required, in every degree as mobile as the first, and so
+organized as to require a minimum escort for their safety.
+
+For such escorts Cavalry Reservists and men of the Landwehr exist in
+adequate numbers, and armed with a useful carbine and mounted on
+horses, only as a means of locomotion, they will answer their purpose
+well enough.
+
+No matter, however, how ample the supply of these columns may be, or
+how mobile, circumstances will still arise during periods of great
+concentration in which it will be impossible to bring up supply
+waggons in sufficient numbers. In these cases we require an emergency
+horse ration, which within a small compass contains great nourishment.
+
+Too much cannot be expected from such a ration; for instance, it
+cannot be bulky enough to fill the animal's stomach. All that is
+necessary is that it should be willingly eaten by the horses, keep
+well, and be easily carried. It should contain about three times the
+nutritive qualities, weight for weight, of oats, and should suffice to
+keep horses in condition for three or four days in succession. These
+demands are fairly satisfied by a food manufactured by Marck at
+Darmstadt. It should be always carried in the field and replenished as
+consumed, and with it even the most advanced patrols might be made
+independent of requisitions, a matter which appears to me of the
+greatest importance.
+
+The fundamental condition of mobility being thus satisfied, the next
+step will be to insure the technical and tactical independence of the
+units under all circumstances which can be reasonably foreseen.
+
+In this direction much has been done, and materials for the
+destruction of railways, folding pontoons, and a field telegraph, now
+form part of our equipment. The opportunities for the use of the
+latter in the course of rapid movements--_i.e._, just in the most
+important sphere of our activities--seem to me highly problematical,
+as I have already pointed out; and the waggons which transport the
+bridging equipment are too heavy to be always at hand when most
+needed. Essentially, it seems only fitted to facilitate the progress
+of smaller bodies of troops, and would hardly suffice to secure rapid
+and safe passage of Cavalry Masses with all their attendant trains
+over the rivers for which we ought to be prepared. For such purposes
+they would only suffice if all the boats of a whole Division were
+united into one bridging train.
+
+Nevertheless, the collapsible boats are a most useful concession, and
+they would be still more so if the load was more suitably subdivided;
+as it is, the weight of the whole waggon ties us too much to the made
+roads. For the Divisional Cavalry, which always moves in close
+connection with the Infantry, and in need can always fall back upon
+the Divisional Bridge Train, it has no particular value, and it would
+therefore be better if, in War-time, all the collapsible boat
+equipment were handed over to the independent Cavalry Divisions, and
+their bridging equipment thus augmented.
+
+More important, however, than this collapsible boat question is the
+matter of the pioneer detachments to be assigned to the Cavalry
+Divisions which require further equipment. A waggon of bridging
+material just sufficient to cross smaller ditches and watercourses,
+which can neither be jumped nor scrambled over, but which require only
+one, or at most two, bays, would be invaluable, for it is just these
+little hindrances, whose importance cannot be measured or deduced from
+the map, which may bring most important Cavalry undertakings
+unexpectedly to a check, particularly when in an enemy's country all
+the culverts, etc., have been destroyed. In the days of Frederick the
+Great such bridging equipment was often assigned to the Cavalry
+marching at the head of the Columns, in order to help them over
+similar obstacles.
+
+Given, however, that all has been done to attain the degree of
+collective mobility we require, a point of equal importance is that
+the troops should be adequately provided with all they require for
+their tactical action. In this respect, it cannot be too much insisted
+upon that carbine ammunition should be placed in the very first line;
+our present allowance is altogether insufficient.
+
+The importance of dismounted action, as we have already seen, has
+enormously increased. Almost daily, under certain conditions, we shall
+have to have recourse to our firearms, and often be obliged to expend
+very considerable quantities of ammunition to attain the object we
+fight for. The replenishment of this consumption is far more difficult
+in our case than with the Infantry, particularly in operations
+partaking of the nature of raids, in which our communications are
+likely to be interrupted. These conditions require first of all a
+considerable increase in the number of rounds carried on the man's
+person, and also in the number of Small Arm Ammunition waggons
+attached to the units, and the regulations for the replenishment of
+these require also corresponding development.
+
+Further, it must be pointed out with all possible insistence that the
+present equipment of the trooper is thoroughly impracticable. That the
+carbine should be carried on the horse and the sword on the man is
+opposed to common sense, for the latter is only of use when mounted,
+the former only on foot. The sword should, therefore, be attached to
+the saddle, the carbine to the man, as is, in fact, the practice of
+all races of born horsemen. A practicable method of attachment is
+certainly capable of being devised; it is probably only the question
+of expense that stands in the way of its solution. The consequences,
+however, of the existing attachment to the saddle are that the weapon
+must be shorter than that of the Infantry soldier, and hence has a
+lesser range; but it is precisely the Cavalry that requires to be able
+to obtain good results at long ranges. Even against Infantry it must
+always be in a position to obtain decisive results in the shortest
+time. To obtain these ends it needs a weapon at least equal, if
+possible superior, to that of the Infantry; and instead it has only
+the carbine, a weapon of most restricted range, and most inadequately
+sighted. It is required of Cavalry that it should break off an
+engagement when the enemy approaches within 700 metres (Drill
+Regulations, No. 562), and all the training the man gets in Peace is
+at 600 metres at target practice, and only quite occasionally, if at
+all, at greater distances at field practice.
+
+I consider it most important that the Cavalry should be supplied with
+a weapon which admits of accurate practice at long ranges, and for
+which the greatest number of rounds can be carried. This would entail,
+on the one hand, an increase in the length of the weapon carried; on
+the other, a reduction in calibre, which should be made as small as
+possible. We might thus safely go down to a 6-millimetre bore, and
+increase the ammunition accordingly. The desire to retain the same
+cartridge as the Infantry, to facilitate mutual assistance in
+ammunition supply on occasions, seems to me of quite secondary
+importance. As long as the Cavalry were still tied to the Infantry on
+the line of march this consideration had indeed some weight; but now
+that it moves far in front of, or on the flanks of, the Infantry
+columns, and has its own arrangements for ammunition supply, the case
+is quite different. The point nowadays is to make sure of that degree
+of effect which is unconditionally necessary to our purpose, and for
+this we require a weapon specially adapted to our particular need.
+
+Our method of carrying our cartridges in the pouch attached to the
+cross-belt is also impracticable. The bandoliers of the Boers would be
+undoubtedly preferable, and could at the same time be made use of to
+secure the carbine on the back.
+
+It is also a matter for serious consideration whether cycle
+detachments should not be attached to the Cavalry,[19] and I think I
+am not going too far in estimating fifteen to twenty cyclists per
+regiment as a suitable number to perform the many duties which may
+fall to their lot. On the advantages they confer I have already dwelt
+(Book I., Chap. VIII.), and further, I would advocate the addition of
+portable or wheelable Maxims to the Cavalry to add to their fire
+power. The latest patterns of this weapon are capable of easy
+transportation, and can come into action very rapidly. Naturally such
+heavy batteries as we now possess should be avoided. As regards this
+latter weapon, one should not think of it primarily as destined to
+take part in the real Cavalry duel; one should do nothing in this
+direction to rob the horsemen of their confidence in themselves by
+teaching them to lean on the firearm for support. Even the effect of
+the Artillery in this respect is not always and everywhere
+advantageous. One is too much inclined to make the action of the
+Cavalry depend on the effect of the guns, and thus to sacrifice the
+initiative when opposed to an enemy's horse. Nor would there be many
+opportunities in practice for the Maxims to render support to the
+charge. In the introductory phases of an engagement--_i.e._, when the
+enemy is still at a considerable distance--they promise little
+results, and in the moments when the 'Masses' are sent forward to the
+attack, they would get in the way and hinder their freedom of
+movement. On the other hand, they would be of great use in cases where
+it is necessary to overcome or parry an Infantry opponent, and in the
+battle, or in pursuit, when the Cavalry succeed in getting in on the
+flanks or rear of the enemy's chief masses, they might prove
+invaluable. Here, where reserves, columns, and trains all form
+suitable targets, they would not only add materially to the striking
+power of the Cavalry, but increase its radius of action very
+materially.
+
+         [Footnote 19: The wheel should be so low that the man could
+         use his rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it
+         should be 'transportable' (?'folding').]
+
+By their side the Artillery will always maintain its high importance
+for the fight against localities, woods, and defiles, and with this
+Arm the German Cavalry is, in my opinion, sufficiently supplied;
+only--and this is of the greatest importance--more adequate steps to
+insure ammunition supply are essential in the case of the Independent
+Cavalry Masses. Here, too, we shall have to reckon with far higher
+consumption than in 1870-1871, and the greater distances will make it
+impossible to replenish from the general Reserves of the Army. The
+Cavalry, therefore, require sufficient ammunition columns of its very
+own.
+
+The nature of Cavalry operations indicate yet another
+requirement--namely, batteries so organized that to every brigade of
+two regiments one battery of four pieces should be assigned. Many will
+be the occasions in our strategical operations on which guns will be
+required, and in most of these it is more a question of having _some_
+Artillery at hand rather than of the development of superior fire
+power--_i.e._, a few shells into a village at the right time may be
+all that is needed for our purpose. Further, in operating on several
+roads it can seldom be foretold with exactness on which road the need
+may first arise.
+
+Under these conditions it is of the greatest importance to be able, if
+necessary, to assign a battery to each brigade, and at the same time
+not to allow the half of the whole available Artillery to escape from
+control.[20]
+
+         [Footnote 20: With stronger Divisions, a corresponding
+         increase in Artillery must, of course, be made.]
+
+Further, these small batteries are both handier and more mobile in
+themselves; they are, therefore, better suited to Cavalry
+requirements, and at the same time the power of concentration when
+such is required is fully retained.
+
+The advantage of this proposed division seems, therefore, to me
+sufficiently clear to need no further recommendation.[21]
+
+         [Footnote 21: King William I. had already suggested the
+         formation of batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in
+         1869--in a marginal note on the report of Moltke's of
+         1868--already referred to in the note on p. 166 above.]
+
+This organization of the Artillery requires, however, to be
+supplemented by the introduction of a true quick-firing gun, even if
+it is necessary to reduce the calibre somewhat to keep down the
+weight. For it is particularly with the Cavalry, and especially in the
+Cavalry duel, when the opportunities for Artillery action are often
+compressed into a very few moments, and yet a great effect must be
+attained, that a gun without recoil and a great rapidity of loading is
+most urgently required. If the Cavalry is thus equipped with all that
+the conditions of War demand and modern technical skill can supply,
+then it will find in these--at least in part--compensation for its
+numerical weakness on condition that at the same time it also succeeds
+in raising its training to a corresponding height.
+
+It cannot be denied that in this direction all ranks have worked with
+most devoted and admirable industry, and that new points of view, new
+methods, and new aims towards which to strive have been opened up.
+But, on the whole, this question of the training of our Cavalry is
+still based upon the ideas of a period which lies behind us. There has
+been no conscious breach with the past, even in those very fields
+wherein the developments and demands of modern times have brought
+about a complete disturbance of all military relations.
+
+That a method of training which does not take into account the
+phenomena of modern Warfare, and follow them even to their furthermost
+consequences, can never give satisfactory results, needs no
+demonstration. But a method free from these objections we have to
+find. In its training our Cavalry _must_ excel all others if it would
+maintain its position on the field of battle, and it can do so, for it
+possesses by far the best material both in men and horses of any
+country in the Continent of Europe. There are only two essentials
+which we must bear in mind. First, we must be absolutely clear as to
+those points in which our system is behind the requirements of the
+time, and what objectives we must now pursue. Secondly, being
+satisfied as to the above, that we should take the straightest way
+which leads towards them, not hesitating to break with tradition
+wherever it hinders our advance.
+
+If we now consider in the spirit of this first requirement the
+separate branches of Cavalry work which our training must embrace, the
+very first point which attracts attention is the vastly increased
+demands on the endurance of our horseflesh that will now be made, far
+exceeding what was required in our last Wars. Increase of endurance is
+thus an unconditional necessity.
+
+Further, it is perfectly clear that in the combat of Cavalry against
+Cavalry, the decision will depend on the action of the great tactical
+units, and that with regard to dismounted fighting, a complete
+revolution in the conditions has occurred. In future this will tend
+evermore to come to the front, and both points of view must be kept in
+mind in our training.
+
+Finally, it is evident that the centre of gravity of these two factors
+is no longer in the same position. As long as decisive results in the
+combat itself were expected from the Cavalry, it was quite right and
+expedient to train them to meet this special requirement. But now,
+when it is clear that the combat is only a means to an end--that end
+being the possibility opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre,
+screen, or break the enemy's communications--this change in the
+conditions must be taken into account in the process of our education.
+
+Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that we can afford
+to neglect the training for the actual combat: the defeat of the
+enemy's Cavalry remains now, as always, the necessary condition of all
+subsequent activity; but the Arm must be taught to understand that
+victory in combat is only the first link in the chain of operations,
+and to extend its outlook beyond the point of actual collision, and to
+appreciate the tasks which are the consequence of success.
+
+To this end we must undergo a preparation of a quite different
+character, for nowadays, freed from the chains which formerly bound us
+to conform to the action of the other Arms, we appear within the
+framework of the Great Armies indeed, but operating in independent
+'Masses,' and this change in conditions extends its influence even to
+the smallest reconnoitring patrol.
+
+In this new field our training must seek to follow the demands of War.
+It must accustom the troops to the greatness of their mission both
+with regard to time and space, attain higher results with the
+individual, raise the education of its officers above the sphere of
+the technicalities special to the Arm, and give them a wider horizon
+of general military conditions.
+
+In what way we can reach these new ideals, in the best and most
+practical manner, I propose to investigate in the following chapters,
+and need only point out here that it is not my object to discuss every
+detail of military education, but rather to bring out the essentials,
+and lay stress on those questions which, in my opinion, compel us to
+strike out new ways to find our objective.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER II
+
+RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING
+
+
+When we discuss the training of the Cavalry, the first point which
+naturally occurs to us is the question of 'horsemanship'--_i.e._, the
+breaking-in of the horses and the teaching of equitation to the men.
+Horsemanship is so absolutely the bed-rock of all Cavalry
+performances, that the advantages of improved methods of breaking and
+of equitation must bear fruit in every branch of their activity. Above
+all, they exercise the most enduring influence both on the
+conservation and endurance of the horses themselves.
+
+Anglomaniacs and faddists, who, in spite of many a healthy impulse
+they have imparted, have nevertheless exercised, and still seek to
+exercise, an influence the reverse of favourable upon our Cavalry,
+maintain that for certain purposes one can obtain better results with
+horses broken by one of their short-cuts to the object, and then
+'trained' in the sense that racehorses and hunters are prepared for
+their work, than with those who have been gradually brought forward by
+the methods in use in our Cavalry schools, and at the same time secure
+the advantage of 'unconditional obedience' in the horse, a result
+which they allege cannot be always counted on with our existing
+methods.
+
+On the other hand, the fact remains that our recruits, in the short
+time available for their education, can only be well and quickly
+taught on well-trained pliable horses. That such horses, with
+sufficient exercise, go better and more safely across country than
+those brought forward by more hasty methods, is sufficiently proved by
+the fact that all our steeplechase riders in the Army take the
+greatest pains to prepare their horses thoroughly (by school methods
+understood), because experience shows that this preparation alone
+gives them a chance against the more highly-priced animals with which
+they are called on to compete. Only this thorough training guarantees
+good individual riding, and insures the 'pliability' which alone makes
+it possible to correct disobedience rapidly should it arise. And,
+further, there can be no question that this prolonged preparation
+improves the endurance of the horse--on that point at least experience
+leaves no room for doubt. The thoroughly broken horse, which moves in
+easy balance, with all its muscle thoroughly well and equally
+developed, not only saves its forelegs and joints, and supports the
+spinal arch better, but trots easier, and hence for longer periods
+with less fatigue, than the unpliable animal, who stiffens itself
+against the rider's load, and thus expends its power uselessly, and
+the rider himself is far less shaken about under the former, a point
+by no means to be neglected.
+
+The recognition of these facts has at length led us to break with the
+Anglomania of former years, and the tendency towards improved
+preparation has become more evident, whilst the centrifugal strivings
+of individuals no longer find acceptance. On the other hand, it seems
+to me beyond a doubt that the objects which we wish to obtain from
+our Military school of horsemanship could in many respects be reached
+more directly and better than is at present the case.
+
+In conformity with the whole essence of modern War, the individual
+training of both man and horse must form the foundation of our whole
+education--that is to say, steadiness in the movement of closed bodies
+must be the consequence of individual horsemanship. Only in this way
+can the bodily, intellectual, and moral qualities of both man and
+horse be brought into useful activity, and in this way only can we
+conquer the gregarious instincts of the horses and develop in their
+riders the individuality which modern conditions absolutely demand.
+
+More stress requires to be laid on riding with one hand only and with
+arms (_i.e._, drawn swords), for the bit, with or without a feeling on
+the bridoon, is in War the only practical method of direction; and the
+use of his weapons when mounted must have become second nature to the
+man if they are not to be a constant impediment to him in the control
+of his horse. Finally, independent riding across country must be
+encouraged by every conceivable means.
+
+To attain all this will only be possible if we succeed in overcoming
+the preliminary steps of the man's education--_i.e._, the elementary
+training of man and horse--more rapidly than has hitherto been the
+case, and thus gain time for the true practical preparation for the
+field. If from this standpoint we look at our present system, it will
+soon be clear where to apply the lever.
+
+First, it should be possible, with the better bred and stauncher
+material we now receive, to make more rapid progress in the first year
+than has hitherto been generally the case. By the increased demands
+and the greater freedom in the choice of means allowed us by the new
+Regulations as compared with the conditions formerly prevalent,
+considerable changes have been made; the point now is, in what manner
+to derive the fullest advantage from this greater freedom for the
+practical curtailment of the periods previously allotted for each
+stage in the training.
+
+But prudence is necessary in this direction. That the English
+thoroughbred, for instance, develops better under work in its early
+years, admits of no doubt whatever; but there is room to question
+whether this experience can be transferred without modification to our
+present Remounts, although many of them have a strong strain of
+English blood. Our Prussian horses, for instance, only reach their
+full development between the seventh and eighth years; it would,
+therefore, be a mistake to attempt to force them up to the full
+demands made on a Cavalry horse before that age. This slowness of
+growth must always be considered, and the animals be saved as much as
+possible; but there is still room to unite with this necessary
+concession increased demands on the degree of training.
+
+Without any detriment to their efficiency, the young remounts can be
+taken in hand immediately on joining their regiments, instead of
+waiting till the conclusion of the manoeuvres, as is still a common
+practice. It seems feasible, also, to begin with the gallop earlier
+than was formerly the custom; and, finally, it is by no means
+absolutely necessary to go back to the bridoon again at the
+commencement of their second year's training.[22] One can well go on
+with riding on the bit at the point where the course was interrupted
+by the manoeuvres.
+
+         [Footnote 22: Under the new Regulations this is now left to
+         the discretion of the Regimental Commander.]
+
+All these measures together produce quite a remarkable saving of time,
+and there cannot well be any doubt that in this way, as far as
+concerns the riding education of the horse alone--_i.e._, without
+arms--the same standard of progress can be reached by Christmas of the
+second year as was formerly often only reached at the end of the
+second winter.
+
+If from this foundation we go on to specific training of the
+charger--still working, of course, concurrently at the gymnastic side
+of his training also--to accustoming him to the curb, then by the end
+of February the remount ought easily to be ready to be placed in the
+ranks.
+
+Side by side with this increase of rapidity in his training, we both
+can and must make the individual training the foundation of his whole
+education, so that from the very first the horse learns to go alone
+and with safety in all kinds of ground.
+
+The very first lessons to accustom him to both saddle and rider are
+better given on the lunging rein than when led by an older horse, for
+nothing teaches the bad habit of 'sticking' more than this last
+practice. And since now the first months of training fall in the
+summer, we can avail ourselves of the fine weather to send out the
+young horses in charge of trustworthy riders, some of whom must be
+left behind even during the manoeuvres, to go singly or in small
+groups under suitable supervision, which can easily be arranged, out
+into the country, if possible into woods and fairly difficult ground,
+to habituate them to minor obstacles and the objects one meets with,
+instead of, as formerly, keeping them in the school or manege, and
+making them into 'stickers' first, only to have the trouble of
+breaking them of the habit, often after many a hard tussle,
+afterwards.
+
+All through their subsequent training they must constantly be sent out
+singly into the country, and even in the school itself they should be
+exercised as little as possible in squads one behind the other.
+
+It goes without saying that only the best horsemen should be trusted
+with the young horses, for bad habits developed at the beginning of
+their instruction are of all the most difficult to correct hereafter,
+and may ruin the result of all one's trouble.
+
+That in this way we can meet the requirements of the service much more
+rapidly than by existing methods cannot be open to question and may be
+taken as practically settled, and similar considerations apply to the
+recruits.
+
+The system laid down in the regulations does not go directly enough to
+the purpose, a consequence, no doubt, of the fact that we have now
+better horses on which to instruct them than at the time these
+instructions were evolved.
+
+If one begins as soon as possible with the gallop and individual
+riding--if necessary on the lunge--and allows the recruit as soon as
+he has acquired anything approaching a firm seat to practise the aids
+for the leg and the side paces--passage and shoulder-in--one will
+attain quite different results than from riding only on straight lines
+and practising closing in the ranks. The practice in the use of the
+legs makes the men more independent and individual, compels them to
+trust to their seat, and not to hang on by the reins.
+
+The individual riding makes the man drive his horse forward by the
+pressure of his legs, which he is not compelled to do in the squad,
+where the horses follow one another almost automatically. The horses,
+too, are saved from becoming dull and heavy, as they are only too apt
+to do under the recruits of the old system.
+
+By Christmas the recruits can thus be brought forward as far and
+farther than they now are by the time of the inspection on the
+bridoon, and can then go on to riding on the curb, so that by February
+they should be able to ride the side paces, gallop and change, and all
+other school paces, without arms, and generally be so firm in the
+saddle that they may be advanced to drilling with arms, and can begin
+their real instruction as troopers. Of course, it is not to be
+expected that these school paces should be ridden as yet in perfect
+form, but the men must understand what these lessons are intended for,
+and the effort to get the correct bend should be recognisable. And we
+may add that to teach them to rely on their seat and not on their
+hands suitable exercises with the lance may be introduced even at an
+earlier period.
+
+As regards the remainder of the squadron, the so-called 'Dressur'[23]
+detachment, it is hardly necessary to point out that one can ask of it
+at least all that can be attained by the remounts and the
+recruits--that is to say, that by the beginning of February the men
+and horses should reach the highest point of their purely riding
+training. Of course, to achieve this they must not be put back every
+autumn to the very ABC of their work--riding on the bridoon. They must
+go on with the curb, to which by this time they are accustomed, and in
+the place of the bridoon work, individual riding must be encouraged
+as much as possible.
+
+         [Footnote 23: 'Dressur' literally means 'preparation.' We use
+         the term 'breaking-in.' Note the difference.--TRANSLATOR.]
+
+Only those squads will require somewhat different treatment in which
+the best men of the second year are being trained on the best horses
+for the riding of the remounts in the following year. These men will
+certainly require more bridoon work in the autumn, but even these
+should be sufficiently forward by Christmas-time to pass on to the
+bit, so that, in spite of the very high degree of perfection required
+from their horses, they can be dismissed the school by the middle of
+February.
+
+From the increased demands made on the individual training of man and
+horse, it follows as a necessary consequence that a different kind of
+inspection in equitation will be required to that hitherto in vogue.
+
+The presentation of closed detachments must be restricted as much as
+possible, and all previous rehearsals of a special inspection
+programme absolutely prohibited. Horse and rider, since they have been
+trained individually, must be inspected and judged on their individual
+merits, not otherwise. In this manner not only is it easier to
+appreciate difficulties, but good work also has a fairer chance of
+securing recognition. It needs an expert to bring together the sum of
+all the performances, and express a fair judgment on the total result.
+In any case, however, such a judgment will be nearer the truth because
+it is uninfluenced by 'eye-wash' and mere externals.
+
+Hence we arrive at the conclusion that in the manner we have above
+indicated the whole squadron can have completed its training in
+equitation by the middle of February.
+
+That many objections will have to be met and many difficulties
+overcome before this end is attained goes without saying; but where in
+human affairs can it be said that this is not the case?
+
+It may be urged that both for horses and men there is a distinct
+advantage in beginning again every year with bridoon riding.
+
+The action of the rider is easier to control than on the bit, and if
+once the men take to holding on by the curb, the consequences are much
+worse than with the former. On the other hand, also, it is easier for
+the horses on the curb to assume a false bend or poise, or to refuse
+to go up to their bits, and thus deceive the instructor. Wrong
+application of the aids with the bit entail worse consequences on the
+horses than with the bridoon; hence almost exclusive work on the bit
+requires better teachers and lighter hands, and if one has few of
+these at one's disposal, undoubtedly a disadvantage will accrue.
+
+It may further be objected that for such a thorough extension of the
+course of individual riding as I have demanded there is neither time,
+school accommodation, nor teachers available, and it must be granted
+that the regulation allowance of three schools per regiment is, in
+fact, insufficient for the attainment of the required standard by the
+methods I have in view. Nor will it suffice to allow each training
+detachment only three-quarters of an hour in the school at a time.
+Detachments of average strength require daily one hour and a quarter,
+if the necessary skill in individual riding is to be acquired, and
+recruit squads even longer. Further, it will not do to exclude
+recruits who begin early with the side paces and the gallop altogether
+from the school; on the contrary, they require to attend it at least
+once or twice a week.
+
+But with only three schools per regiment, particularly in our northern
+provinces, these requirements cannot be fulfilled. Four I consider as
+the least number, and it would be still better if each squadron had
+its own school, so that difficult animals and backward men could be
+taken individually, and work on the lunge and circle thoroughly
+carried out.
+
+Still, all these obstacles can be overcome. With increased practice,
+comprehension of the management of the bit in military riding would
+gradually increase both with teacher and pupils, and work with the
+reins in both hands be usefully employed to facilitate the transition
+from the bridoon to the bit and counteract the possible evils of
+riding on the bit alone.
+
+The better training of the Remounts, which will be obtained by the
+means I have indicated, will in course of time give us better, more
+obedient, and more pliable horses, and better-trained recruits again
+will give us a better choice of riders for the young remounts.
+
+Our instructional staff for equitation is thoroughly satisfactory. In
+this respect the Riding-School in Hanover has done excellent work. We
+have also amongst our senior non-commissioned officers some excellent
+instructors.
+
+The necessary time for all my demands can very well be saved if we
+make up our minds to leave out all superfluities in the daily routine
+of duty; and as regards the question of school accommodation, it is
+well within the bounds of possibility for most regiments to provide
+themselves with a fourth school--eventually even with a fifth--out of
+their own financial resources. No investment could be more
+remunerative. Certainly under circumstances red tape may stand in the
+way; but when his superiors will support the Regimental Commander, and
+sometimes without, one will generally find appreciative backing, even
+from the War Office (_Intendantur_).
+
+If the drawbacks and difficulties in the way of the proposed changes
+are, as I have endeavoured to show, to be surmounted, on the other
+hand, the advantages accruing therefrom are so enormous that the
+former need not be taken into consideration at all. In the first
+place, as we have seen, better individual horsemanship and more
+practice in riding on the bit are in themselves advantages which react
+directly on the War efficiency of the whole squadron. Secondly, the
+earlier completion of the remount training is a direct gain, for, in
+case of mobilization, we shall be better able to place remounts in the
+mobilized squadrons, leaving in exchange older horses behind, which is
+again an advantage for the training of the recruits destined hereafter
+to join us at the front. I cannot too earnestly warn against the
+taking of _all_ the old horses into the field. No man can foretell how
+great the losses will be, but that they will be great admits of no
+doubt whatever. Nor is it at all certain that future Wars will be of
+short duration; on the contrary, they may drag on for a very long
+time. Hence it is absolutely indispensable that suitable horses for
+recruit training should be left behind, even if the marching out
+strength per squadron should be reduced by a file or two--it cannot be
+many in any case. For the rest, the quicker and better training of the
+recruits will be all to the good in case of War breaking out, as one
+will be able to detail men for the field squadrons towards the close
+of the winter season--_i.e._, some weeks sooner than under the old
+system; and finally the proposed procedure brings with it an enormous
+gain of time in the training of the whole arm.
+
+To begin with, we gain in winter the months from the middle of
+February to the beginning of the Drill Season (April). This time can
+be devoted to direct training for the demands War must make upon us.
+We can practise again, and confirm the men in the fundamental
+principle of dressing in motion, the exact squareness of the horses to
+the alignment and rallying, with which one had already commenced in
+the early months of winter, before being driven into the schools by
+frost and snow; and, further, take advantage of fine days and similar
+circumstances to practise men in taking jumps, scrambling, etc., the
+development of the regulation drill gallop (fifteen miles an hour),
+whilst still maintaining the control and standard of equitation for
+which the school training is specially adapted. The winter exercises
+in field service duties, which, as long as they are allowed constantly
+to interrupt the formal lessons in equitation, do more harm than good,
+can be postponed to this period, when the recruits will now be able to
+take part in them--a point of essential importance in case War breaks
+out. Above all, the time thus saved must be devoted to individual
+riding and single combat.
+
+Our Regulations (Sections 129 and 324) lay special stress on this
+latter point, and in most regiments it is constantly practised. The
+results, however, are sometimes questionable, and many Squadron
+Commanders are of opinion that such training can be overdone. Nor is
+this view without foundation. If single combats are carried out in the
+regulation way on imperfectly broken horses, the horse is not only
+spoilt, but the rider also, and a clumsy rider will very soon make a
+good horse hard in the mouth and refractory.
+
+Now, since we have neither ideal horses nor riders at our disposal,
+there is much danger in overdoing these exercises, because the method
+of their execution is often thoroughly unpractical. The combatants
+ride round one another in unnatural circles, one retreats, the other
+pursues, and both tear at their horses' mouths to turn them sharply
+about, all things which, except the latter, they never do in action.
+
+Nor should we overlook the really imminent danger which lies in
+teaching the men to run away before an opponent. Few of them are
+'Horatios,' and if, in fact, they once turn about, it is, to say the
+least, highly problematical whether, in a real fight, they will ever
+stop again. In the field matters are very different. If one has but
+one adversary, one tries to ride him down, and, if unsuccessful, then
+after one turn about both get locked together, turning only on the
+fore hand; and the man who turns a second time can only trust to the
+speed of his horse--he has given up the fight.
+
+Such duels are rare indeed; in most engagements the man fights between
+crowds of his own comrades and the other side, in wild confusion,
+under clouds of dust. He must attack at one moment to the right, at
+the next to the left, and guard himself. The essential here is not so
+much the skilful use of the lance, as complete command over the horse,
+and the determination to _kill_, which must rise to the height of
+_fanaticism_. He who can twist and turn his horse by his weight alone,
+without dragging at its mouth, whose arm does not tire, and who can
+make sure of striking what he aims at, even at speed, and with the
+energy born of hatred, thinking only of destroying his enemy, never on
+retreating--he alone can hope to remain the conqueror; but such a one
+very soon learns all that is practical in the use of sword or lance.
+
+The exercises in single combats, therefore, must be based mainly on
+preparatory practice, intended to strengthen the arm, give command of
+the weapon, heighten the man's energy, and, above all, aim at securing
+the most perfect harmony between man and horse by constant exercise in
+those forms of individual riding which are really needed in the fight:
+the rapid turning about of the horse; serpentining between, and
+cutting and thrusting at, different objects in varying directions, as
+far as possible without reins, and never according to a prescribed
+formula.
+
+The actual combats between squads should follow only when considerable
+excellence in these preliminary exercises has been attained--_i.e._,
+for recruits--about the end of the summer, before the manoeuvres; and
+they should always be kept down to the lowest limits, and then only
+carried out in thoroughly practical form--_i.e._, between squads, and
+not larger detachments. I believe that in this way a far higher
+standard will be reached, and with less damage to the horses than is
+possible under existing conditions, in which one generally begins with
+single combats, man against man, at the very commencement of the drill
+season. In any case, we shall at least obtain this advantage--that the
+work to be done in the latter will be materially reduced if the
+exercises I have suggested are begun already in the winter months.
+
+The more the men have learnt to ride with a light hand on the bit, the
+greater command they possess over their lances--thanks to more
+constant practice--and the more thoroughly they have been grounded in
+the principles of direction, pace, alignment, and rallying. Further,
+the more quietly the horses move--and even at rapid paces have learnt
+to carry their heads not too high, with a firm bearing on the
+reins--the easier it will be for the Commander to drill his squadron,
+and to eliminate all the plunging and surging in movement which is
+fatal to all excellence in manoeuvring.
+
+The drill season can thus be cut down, and the time thus saved devoted
+to field service practices and riding across country, because the
+whole system, thanks to this considerable saving of time it effects,
+enables one to extend the education of man and horse over the whole
+year instead of confining it to the winter months.
+
+Though every efficient squadron possesses a considerable number of
+horses that do not require six months' practice in 'shouldering in,'
+and in 'collected paces,' on the other hand, everyone has some horses
+that do urgently need 're-making,' but which one has to entrust to
+inferior riders, because the better ones are all needed for the
+remounts and young horses.
+
+This is a consequence of the whole system in which the training of the
+horses and of the men eventually react on one another. There will be
+remounts which need correction, and horses ridden by recruits to be
+cured of acquired bad habits; and on my system there will now be time
+and opportunity to hand these over, say from the beginning of
+February, to non-commissioned officers and the better riders, either
+by forming them in a special squad or entrusting them to individuals,
+and the process of re-making the horses can be continued throughout
+the whole summer, for now there will be ample time.
+
+On the importance of this latter point I would especially insist. If
+this work of equitation ceases for the whole summer, and the difficult
+horses are kept incessantly at drill and field service, it is
+inevitable that their defects will develop and become more firmly
+fixed; hence one will never get a good average of well-broken horses
+in the ranks. That some of them must always be taken for drill goes
+without saying; but the point is, that from February onwards, and
+throughout the summer, they should be constantly taken in hand and
+corrected by good riders. If this idea is applied with thoroughgoing
+energy, particularly with the young horses--even if it entails at
+first a diminution in the number of files on parade--the number of
+difficult horses in the squadron will soon show a most encouraging
+diminution.
+
+To all these advantages there comes yet another, to my mind even more
+important. According to established custom, after the inspection in
+riding on the bit which forms the conclusion of the winter's training,
+the whole squadron is completely reformed before it begins the drills.
+The new exercises in unaccustomed surroundings are begun by the men on
+strange horses, to which they have had no opportunity to accustom
+themselves. This drawback can be obviated, if the squadron is
+definitely made up already in February--_i.e._, after the close of the
+purely equitation course. The men can now ride the same horses in the
+school on the drill-ground, and in the country, which they are to
+retain throughout the summer, and the squadron will commence the drill
+season with much steadier ranks than would otherwise be the case,
+particularly if its Commander understands how to make the most of all
+the advantages his good methods and well-broken horses secure for him
+by changing them about individually as circumstances require.
+
+Much, no doubt, may be urged against this proposal, and the expert
+will hardly need my assistance to recognise the difficulties that
+await him. But they can be overcome, and their advantages thus
+secured--and these seem to me the essential points--enormously
+outweigh the minor troubles that follow in their train.
+
+I do not believe that either thorough or essential changes are needed
+in our Regulations to adapt them to the principles I have developed.
+All that is important is that we should definitely break with the
+routine of the several courses and inspections.
+
+To constitute a framework, not with a view of developing a fresh
+network of red tape, I here submit an outline programme of the
+time-table I suggest, so far as concerns the equitation and the
+training of the horses in their several periods.
+
+Commencement of Remount training, at the latest, the end of July. It
+is worth consideration whether the young horses could not be sent to
+the Regiments even earlier.
+
+Inspection of recruits on the bridoon, and of the Second Ride Second
+Class shortly before Christmas.
+
+Inspection of the second year's remounts on the bit of the whole of
+the remount training squads, and of the recruits, concluding with the
+latter and Second Ride Second Class about the middle of February. Then
+constitution of the squadron to meet the requirements of the coming
+drill season.
+
+End of March, or beginning of April, bridoon inspection of the young
+remounts, in which generally side-paces, collected canter, and the
+canter and change, may be demanded.
+
+Inspection of the squadron in 'Military riding' (_i.e._, with arms,
+and on the curb); preparatory exercises for single combat, thrusting
+at targets, regulation gallop, riding in the ranks, together with a
+careful investigation of the teaching received in the school.
+Inspection of all difficult horses.
+
+Shortly before the manoeuvres, inspection of the young remounts on the
+bit. Inspection of the second year remounts in 'rides' (at the same
+time note their condition after the drill). Inspection of the
+difficult horses.
+
+Inspection of single combats.
+
+If one tries, naturally with due regard to local and climatic
+variations, to adapt the course of training to this plan of
+inspection, and endeavours to arrange that every man, if only for a
+few minutes every day, should practise lance exercises to develop his
+hand and arm, that he should ride every day individually, and every
+difficult horse should be taken in hand and corrected at once; that
+the principles of dressing, alignment, and of wheeling, are daily
+impressed on the men in the school, as I have already indicated; and,
+if further, wherever it is in any way possible, the men are exercised
+in boldly riding across country--for which purpose funds to cover
+possible damage to crops, etc., must be provided by the
+authorities--then I believe, and base my belief on the result of my
+practical experience, that not only will a higher standard of training
+for specifically military purposes be attained, but also a
+considerable improvement in equitation.
+
+It will be worth while here to add a few words on the methods of
+training the horses I recommend, for it is precisely on this point that
+ideas so often divide, and the most opposite views on this subject find
+their expression in current literature. To stir up all these
+controversies is not my object, but I want to state quite generally that
+it is under all circumstances a downright evil to try to follow out any
+theoretical system to its logical development, whether the one selected
+be that of Captain Plinzner[24] or another's. We have neither such a
+uniform type of horse nor sufficiently skilled riders as to be able to
+employ the same method to all indiscriminately.
+
+         [Footnote 24: Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H.M. the
+         Emperor, and is author of a well-known work on equitation.]
+
+We must exercise our powers of selection, and find the best method to
+meet the idiosyncrasies of each man and each horse, always keeping in
+mind the aim to be obtained. What we want are horses that can use
+their back muscles, especially in the gallop, with pliable necks,
+light on the hand, able to turn easily, and safe across country (with
+special reference to rat-holes, etc., not fences), that do not refuse
+to quit the ranks, and are not headstrong. To reach this aim with our
+material, our present riding instructions applied in their spirit, not
+their letter, are for the present, I think, a sufficiently firm
+foundation.
+
+A higher standard of riding alone will not, however, suffice. We have
+seen that modern War makes also increased demands on the endurance of
+the horses, and, in fact, in two directions: first, on their marching
+power, and secondly, on their capacity to execute the long gallops at
+the regulation pace which are indispensable for the manoeuvring of
+large masses and of attacks against modern firearms. That a thorough
+physical preparation of the horse increases indirectly its endurance
+has been already pointed out, and when exceptional exertions are
+called for, breeding plays a great part; but great as is the influence
+of these two factors, the ultimate foundation on which the endurance
+of our horses depends is the general 'condition' of the animal, and
+this again is a consequence of the quality of his food and his
+'training,' used here in the same sense as in a racing stable. I lay
+special stress on this question of food, because great demands, both
+in the way of covering long distances and on the drill ground, can
+only be met without injury to the horses if they are supplied with a
+sufficient quantity of nourishment, and our peace-time ration is
+undoubtedly too small to satisfy this condition. No regiment could
+maintain itself always at the high pitch of condition we have
+undoubtedly attained if it did not have recourse to all manner of
+expedients to increase, at any rate for the time, the amount of the
+ration. Of these expedients there are quite an imposing number, and
+since, however desirable an increase of the ration may be, we are not
+likely to obtain it, it seems to me well worth while to develop them
+to the utmost.
+
+How this is to be done will depend mainly on the local conditions of
+each garrison. The point is to make the most of the opportunities each
+locality offers, and as an example it may be of interest to give my
+personal experience on this head.
+
+Thanks to the confidence reposed in me by my General and to his
+liberality, I was allowed to draw the equivalent of sixty rations of
+oats per day and per squadron in cash, and to handle this money to the
+best of my judgment.
+
+Since peas, beans, and white American maize--the yellow Hungarian
+quality is generally considered inferior--were ninepence to one
+shilling cheaper per hundredweight than oats, I laid in a stock of
+them, and was able to give not only an increased weight of ration, but
+one of considerably greater nutritive value. Thus I gained the double
+advantage, not only of not being compelled to stint the corn ration in
+winter in order to save up for the harder work of the summers, but I
+was able to increase even the winter ration itself. This I consider an
+essential gain, for horses that after the winter season are well fed
+and in their full condition are equal to far higher exertions than
+those which have been kept low, and then fed up for perhaps a very
+short time before the increased strain is thrown upon them.
+
+The food was thus divided: After the manoeuvres, in cases where an
+increased ration was required, American maize was issued, and the
+ration improved by half a pound. From about Christmas-time onwards
+peas and beans were served out, and the amount increased until midway
+through the Squadron drills, after which it was kept at the same level
+until the manoeuvres. In the end it amounted to the equivalent of 15
+pounds of oats, which can be considered as the normal scale for our
+medium and light Cavalry horses. The peas and beans were soaked for
+twelve hours, the water being twice changed during this time to
+prevent their turning sour.
+
+During the manoeuvres, according to circumstances, I laid down at
+suitable points in the district stores of forage, or gave the Squadron
+Commanders money with which to supply themselves locally, and thus was
+able to keep up the increase in the ration during the greater part of
+this trying period.
+
+The experiment was continued for nearly two years, and its results
+were astonishingly satisfactory. Not only did the visible condition of
+the horses develop markedly, and maintain itself throughout the
+greatest exertions, both during the manoeuvres and the Divisional
+exercises, but in spite of increased performances the numbers of
+breakdowns and cases of lameness sensibly diminished; the paces were
+fresher; in short, the material improved most noticeably. Are not
+these breakdowns, lameness, and dulness in the horses, in the great
+majority of cases but the consequences of over-exertion of the animals
+when in a low state of condition? The cases of colic, too, diminished
+rather than increased, which speaks well for the harmlessness of the
+foods employed, but may in part also have been due to the fact that
+both the bulk of the ration and the amount of exertion demanded were
+only gradually diminished after the manoeuvres.
+
+The experiment also showed that most horses would not touch the white
+beans at all, or only unwillingly, and the best proved to be either
+the green Smyrna or brown Dutch beans, which for the same weight and
+nutritive value bulked bigger, for instance, than the peas, and were
+very willingly eaten. Peas and beans as a ration alone were found not
+to answer, as the horse misses the mechanical action--irritation of
+the bowel and stomach--and requires also certain chemical constituents
+present in oats to assist digestion. Even with the proportion of oats
+and beans actually used--seventy-six to seventy-eight oats to sixty
+beans--it was found advisable to increase the 'Rauffutter' ration to
+replace the missing oat-husks. But to provide this addition there were
+ample means, since the manure fund of the regiment, or of the
+squadron, was available; and in spite of the increased ration it
+became possible to make savings which in a single year sufficed to
+build a spacious riding-school, and thus contributed in another way
+to the training and general efficiency of the squadrons.
+
+In the third year the price of oats fell, and that of the other feed
+rose; hence, and for other reasons also, the conversion of the oat
+ration into other more nourishing materials had to be abandoned,
+although it would still have been possible to maintain a considerable
+increase in the nutritive value of the food issued. To keep the ration
+up to approximately the same level as in the preceding year, recourse
+had to be had to other means.
+
+It was found by experiment that a couple of pounds of straw per horse
+could easily be saved per day, and again ample funds for a supplement
+to the ration were available, a measure particularly applicable when
+the price of straw rules high. This year, too, as the expenditure on
+the riding-school was closed, the manure fund was also available, and
+the horses did nearly as well as before.
+
+I would not maintain that similar results are everywhere obtainable.
+The price of grains varies; the receipts from manure are everywhere
+different; in some garrisons peas and beans are difficult to obtain;
+the cost of transport also fluctuates. But all this is no reason why
+we should not seize an advantage even if we cannot always retain it.
+Even a few years of more and better food bring about an improvement in
+the horses, which lasts for a considerable time, and every effort,
+therefore, should be made to obtain these advantages offered by price
+variations whenever it is possible to do so.
+
+It is well to call attention to the fact that to accustom horses to
+the most varied food--rye, barley, wheat, etc.--is part of their
+indispensable training for War, where such foods are all they can
+get, as the experience of our last War sufficiently demonstrated. To
+this end it is necessary--and I wish particularly to insist upon this
+point--that our Regimental Commanders should have the utmost latitude
+of action within certain fixed limits, and should not be dependent on
+the consideration of the Commissariat, with its innumerable
+regulations and formal considerations. I consider the objection
+sometimes urged against me that in the purchase of supplementary foods
+by the Regimental Commander there would be an opening for fraud and
+speculation on the part of under officials quite untenable, for a
+proper system of audit and check could be quite easily devised.
+
+The capacity of the Commander to manage affairs in a businesslike
+manner can hardly be called in question, and his interest in the
+matter would grow in proportion to the degree of freedom allowed to
+him.
+
+Next in importance to the question of food comes the preparation of
+the horses for efforts of long duration. That this preparation must go
+hand in hand with the food question is obvious, but apart from this
+interdependence, it is not possible to keep horses always up to the
+necessary standard of endurance; for this training not only throws
+heavy strains on the muscles, joints, and sinews, but on the nervous
+system of the animal, and in particular attacks the nerves of the
+stomach if maintained too long. If one wishes to preserve one's
+material, the horses must be allowed from time to time a thorough
+rest, during which their feeding must enable them to put on the degree
+of fat which is requisite for health.
+
+The best time for this rest is about Christmas, during which one can
+reduce the work to the very minimum, and feed with 'Rastfutter' hay,
+maize, malt--dried brewer's--molasses, even potatoes; and also, after
+reaching the highest points of the training for galloping, there must
+be a certain relaxation of the strain to give the nerves time to
+recuperate.
+
+Generally, the course of training must be conducted from the
+standpoint of what War demands, and never allowed to assume the
+characteristics of the racing stable, for the purposes of the two are
+entirely distinct, and this is particularly the case with regard to
+the gallop.
+
+It is precisely in this respect that the necessities of War are not
+always seen with sufficient clearness.
+
+We obtain from our troops by means of most careful preparation quite
+remarkable performances in galloping. I have myself seen whole
+regiments cover 8,800 yards (5 miles) at the regulation gallop, and
+the horses at the end of it had still both strength and wind to
+increase the pace. On such and similar performances we then base our
+tactical exercises both for the Brigade and Division, and many horses
+are sacrificed as a consequence. Now, I am the last man to suggest
+that accurate drill at the gallop is not the crowning work of all
+tactical education, but it must be accomplished under War conditions,
+and it cannot be too persistently insisted on that all these tactical
+pictures and the deductions founded thereon, which we attain in the
+manner indicated, have practically nothing to do with real War at all.
+
+In these peace exercises we usually ride with considerably less than
+field service weights, on specially selected and favourable ground,
+and on specially trained horses. All these conditions are wanting in
+War. Then horses must carry their full marching-order kit, and
+generally they will be entirely lacking in specific training for this
+fast kind of work. The ordinary pace on the march and patrol is the
+marching trot; only single patrols have now and again to gallop, the
+troops as a whole only on the rare occasions when a charge has
+actually to be delivered. Then, the carefully-selected conditions of
+the drill ground are generally lacking; and, finally, in all War
+strength squadrons there are always some augmentation horses and
+remounts, whose weaknesses must be taken into account if they are not
+to be broken down at the very beginning of operations, as too often
+happened in 1870, in which case it would have been better to have left
+them behind from the first. Thus the galloping possibilities are
+reduced most considerably, and it is only with these reduced
+possibilities that the Leader can safely reckon.
+
+That these conditions have a most important influence on tactics is
+apparent. The question is whether it is worth while to strain towards
+false ideals, at a considerable cost in horseflesh, when in War they
+are quite unattainable, and only serve to call up in men's minds false
+pictures of the reality.
+
+To this I return an unqualified negative. Certainly, it is
+indisputable that the horses must be trained to gallop for long
+distances and in suitable poise, and that men should learn to retain a
+correct seat even in gallops of long duration; that they should have
+their horses under complete control, and learn to turn and check by
+the use of the weight of their bodies; but these demands can only be
+satisfied by continuous practice under conditions which render control
+over the poise both of man and horse comparatively easy to
+maintain--that is to say, singly on the galloping track or in squads,
+and also as closed tactical units.
+
+Speaking generally, however, such exercises do not need to be extended
+materially beyond the limit which can be attained by horses not
+specifically trained to galloping under full marching order weights.
+
+This limit depends on the degree of breeding, the strength and
+condition of the horses, and may be estimated at the most at two and a
+half miles for our Light Cavalry, and somewhat less for the
+Cuirassiers. To exceed these distances seems both superfluous and
+injurious, particularly when it goes so far as to risk permanent
+depreciation of the material.
+
+It is far more important, in my opinion, to habituate the horses to
+gallop with their full marching order weights, under service
+conditions, and in all kinds of ground; for nothing is more difficult
+than to preserve the proper rates of movement and keep the ranks
+closed under such circumstances, as experience even in the manoeuvres
+abundantly shows.
+
+The 'trot' tends always to get shorter, for the regulation pace is
+already as much as Light Cavalry can manage on the Drill ground; and
+the gallop, too, falls generally behind the prescribed rate, the
+reason being, in my opinion, that as a rule the distances demanded are
+too great, and that we do not drill with sufficient frequency in full
+marching order, partly to save wear and tear of the kit, but also
+because with lighter weights we can undertake in the same time more
+exercises, covering a greater area, than would otherwise be possible
+without knocking up the horses. Much may be used in defence of this
+procedure from the point of view of the training of the Leaders, but
+the dangers to the true training of the troops themselves for War
+must not be overlooked, and practice under full War service conditions
+must thus ever remain the keystone of our whole educational edifice.
+
+But it is not only the training in galloping which suffers from this
+practice of riding light. The preparation of the horses as regards
+endurance suffers equally, for patrols and long-distance rides are
+generally undertaken with stripped saddles; it is only for manoeuvres
+and the larger tactical exercises away from the garrison that marching
+order is carried. To me this system seems hardly rational. Rather, it
+would appear to me, must such sudden increase in the weights on the
+horses tend to break them down, and experience confirms this view, for
+the first day's marches in the manoeuvres in marching order tire out
+the horses to a quite disproportionate degree.
+
+We can never eliminate this evil altogether, for the attempt would
+entail either marching order all the year round, or the limitation of
+practical exercises to certain periods of the year only, both or
+either of which would conflict on the one hand with the necessity of
+saving the horses as much as possible, on the other with the needs of
+the military training of the men; but a gradual increase in the loads
+carried and distances covered seems well within the scope of a
+practical policy.
+
+The Company Commander, who wishes to get his men fit for marching,
+increases quite gradually and systematically the weight in the men's
+knapsacks, till these are scarcely noticed as a hindrance by their
+wearers, and similarly one could arrange in the Cavalry. In each
+period we should begin with stripped saddles, progressing onwards to
+the full kit; but the inspections of tactical units, and the final
+inspection in individual combat, should fundamentally be taken in full
+marching order always, and horses should be prepared gradually for the
+full weight carried in the manoeuvres.
+
+I believe such a system would not only bring about a considerable
+improvement in the training for War both of men and horses, but would
+secure us from many disappointments by insuring in the Leaders a true
+idea of what may reasonably be expected from their commands in the
+field. Naturally the demands made on them in the inspections must
+undergo a corresponding diminution.
+
+Only by constantly keeping these points in view and combining them in
+harmonious progression will it be possible to attain the degree of
+perfection in the elementary instruction of men and horses which can
+alone guarantee the highest results in practice.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER III
+
+THE TRAINING FOR MOUNTED COMBAT
+
+
+In the same manner as, in the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to
+show that in many points in equitation, in the school of individual
+combat, and in the 'training' both of man and horse, we can, by
+alterations of method, attain more directly to a possibly higher
+standard in our performances than is at present achieved, I now
+propose to consider the tactical education of the troops as a whole,
+with a view to their best utilization in mounted engagements.
+
+According to the existing Regulations, the chief importance is still
+laid on the efficiency of the small and medium-sized combinations.
+Squadrons, Regiments, and Brigades are prepared with the utmost care
+and attention, but exercises of the larger bodies only take place more
+or less exceptionally, and on a very restricted scale. The systematic
+education of the Cavalry does not, in fact, extend beyond the Brigade.
+
+That this state of affairs no longer responds to the changed nature of
+Warfare follows from all that I have already said, and does not
+require to be insisted on.
+
+If in War the employment of 'Masses' has become the decisive element,
+our system of training must be correspondingly extended, so as to
+insure the existence of the skill and power needed for their
+successful application. To this end all, even the most elementary,
+exercises must be permeated thoroughly by the idea of preparing the
+troops for united action in adequate numbers; and the relative
+importance of the several periods of training, the allotment of time
+to each step in the progression, as well as the exercises themselves,
+must all be dominated by the same idea.
+
+The foundation of all sound tactical training will remain now, as
+ever, the school of the squadron. The cohesion of this unit and the
+ease with which it can be moved is the first condition of its useful
+employment at the right time and place, and the importance of
+thoroughness in this branch of training grows with every increment in
+the total number to be handled. Even more attention, therefore, should
+be given to squadron drill in the future than in the past.
+
+Next comes the question of regimental drill. Here, as we shall
+presently see, the chief point is to develop the independence of the
+Squadron Commander and the tactical handiness of his unit; and as I
+understand the problem, this calls for a more extended framework,
+within which the regiment must be prepared, than was formerly the
+case.
+
+If, even under present conditions, it is scarcely possible in the few
+days allowed by the Field Service Regulations to train the squadrons
+up to the requirements of active service, even on a level drill
+ground, it is obvious that in the future this difficulty will become
+intensified. It is a question, therefore, to be considered, whether it
+would not be better to remove these time limitations altogether, and
+leave it to the Cavalry Commanders themselves to determine
+everywhere, with regard to local conditions, how to make the best use
+of the total time available. Where considerable expense would be
+incurred in bringing in squadrons detached at a distance, the consent
+of the War Ministry would, of course, have to be obtained.
+
+Brigade drill, however, stands on quite a different footing; it forms,
+as it were, the preparatory school for the movement of 'Masses,' in
+which the principle of the employment of the constituent parts of the
+'Mass,' whether in 'Lines' or by 'Wings,' has to be inculcated. But as
+one has now to deal with tactically thoroughly trained bodies, less
+time is required than for either squadron or regimental drill.
+
+On the other hand, it is most essential that the 'Mass' itself, consisting
+as it does of several Brigades, should be thoroughly drilled as a
+Division or Corps, for it is with these units, and not with Brigades,
+that one has to deal in War, and their duties are so many-sided, and
+require for their due performance such thoroughly-trained Commanders,
+that perfection is not to be attained in a few days, which are not even
+available every year. On this point, in my opinion, there is no room for
+doubt, and hence it becomes absolutely essential that, if necessary,
+Brigade drill must be curtailed in order to give to all Brigades an
+annual opportunity of exercising, as part of the higher units.
+
+It might well be possible to allow a wider latitude to the Brigade
+Commanders in regard to the choice of time for their special
+exercises, in which they might be guided by the special circumstances
+of the locality in which they are quartered, and by the advice of
+their superiors.
+
+For the exercise of the greater 'Masses,' for which, under all
+circumstances, troops have to be brought together from considerable
+distances, a particular period must, of necessity, be fixed by
+regulations; but it must be borne in mind that these 'Masses' should
+not always be formed of equal strength in Divisions of three Brigades,
+for the danger to the higher education which lies in always working
+with units of similar composition has already been sufficiently dwelt
+on. The conditions of War absolutely demand that the higher Cavalry
+Leaders should be equally at home in handling 'Masses' with certainty
+and precision, no matter what their composition, and the troops
+themselves must learn to apply the principles on which efficiency in
+action really depends under all and every circumstance.
+
+As regards the manner in which the several periods into which the
+training is divided should follow one another, the question arises
+whether the squadron, regimental, and brigade drill periods should
+follow one another as a continuous whole, or whether they should go
+hand in hand with Field Service Exercises.
+
+This seems to me to need a specific reply, because, as a fact, it is
+differently answered in different Army Corps.
+
+Where the troops have to leave their garrisons in order to be
+quartered in the vicinity of the ground specially selected for those
+purposes, the question of expense must play an important part in the
+decision; but the principle involved can hardly be affected by these
+exceptional circumstances, for in by far the greater number of cases
+the troops can find room to drill either within the district of their
+own garrisons or on the manoeuvre grounds in the vicinity, and in
+these latter the question of extra cost should hardly stand in the way
+of an extension of the time allowance. Hence, if such an extension,
+due to the intercalation of Field Service practices, really does offer
+advantages, one could decide in principle in favour of this solution,
+in spite of all other circumstances; but it still seems to me open to
+discussion whether it is advisable to make the same principle
+applicable in equal measure to all the time intervals.
+
+For the squadron drill, which begins with an entirely untrained troop,
+the conditions are obviously quite different to those in the
+subsequent exercises, in which the point lies in the working together
+of units already finished and completed in themselves; and taking
+these differences into account, we must first examine more especially
+the case of the squadron.
+
+At the beginning of its drill season, the exertions demanded are
+comparatively slight. The distance covered either at the trot or
+gallop is only gradually increased, and the paces are at first kept
+somewhat below the regulation limits--at least, from practical
+experience I should recommend that they should be, for the Instructor
+can control and correct the precision of all movements, and the
+individual conduct both of man and horse, better at the slower paces
+than when moving fast. Riders and horses accustom themselves
+gradually, and hence more easily, to movement in closed bodies, and it
+is of decisive importance for the whole subsequent course of their
+training that at the very beginning of the drills this harmony between
+man and horse under the new and unaccustomed conditions should be
+secured to the utmost possible degree.
+
+If this point of view be kept in mind, then I think the drills should
+be continued daily, for, on the one hand, there is no risk of
+overtiring the horses, and, on the other, the object is to weld the
+men into a cohesive whole, and impress on them the essential
+principles of the elementary tactical evolutions, in order to make
+them as soon as possible into a combatant unit.
+
+Towards the latter end of the squadron drills, however, the conditions
+change. Now, it becomes necessary to drive into the whole body a
+proper appreciation of the several 'paces,' to fit them for long
+gallops, and to train them for actual combat. At this period I
+consider it better to interpolate one or more Field Service days,
+partly because it is of practical moment to press on this side of
+their training as quick as possible, and, further, because the drills
+now begin to make very considerable demands upon the horses. These
+Field Service days afford an opportunity to rest the horses, and thus
+to prevent small and inconsiderable injuries developing into severe
+lameness and ultimate breakdowns. Further, a quiet ride in the country
+gives those horses which have become nervously excited by the
+unaccustomed conditions of the drill ground a chance of cooling down,
+and thus saving themselves very materially; and this must certainly be
+considered as one of the most important functions of the Commander,
+whether in Peace or War, to keep his horses fresh on their legs, and
+ready to turn out in good condition at whatever hour the call may
+sound. Of course, these precautions must not go so far as to endanger
+the training for service of the squadron, but drill and manoeuvre
+results at excessive cost of horseflesh must be absolutely condemned.
+
+If these reasons speak for an intercalation of Field Service exercises
+between the drill days, I am further of opinion that the result which
+would be arrived at by this system would give a better standard of
+the drill efficiency of the unit for War than can be attained by
+continuous drill alone.
+
+With the latter, it is certainly much easier to secure unity,
+cohesion, and precision in the movements; but we must remember that in
+War the emergency calling for drill performances may arise after weeks
+of marching, during which no drill has been practised at all, and our
+Peace training must take into account such conditions, and accustom
+the troops to execute with safety and cohesion such drill movement as
+may be necessary without having practised them day for day.
+
+In still greater degree do these principles apply both to regimental
+and brigade drills; since in these the demands on the horses are
+constantly increasing, the need to give them opportunity for rest and
+recovery becomes even more pronounced.
+
+Moreover, the purpose of these exercises is not so much to secure a
+single representation of acquired skill in the exhibition of drill
+evolutions, but rather to develop and confirm in the men an
+ever-increasing familiarity with the principles of their tactical
+employment, and this will only then be attained when, as far as
+possible, these practices are continued during the whole summer, so
+that the Grand Manoeuvres either in the Division or in the Corps form
+the natural conclusion of the whole series. In the period of combined
+manoeuvres, it is, of course, impossible, in order to save the horses,
+to lengthen the fixed period allotted to them; but all the more
+necessary, therefore, does it appear to spare them as much as possible
+by the introduction of these Field Service days (exclusive of the
+ordinary 'rest days') during the time of the drill exercises. In the
+course of the subsequent considerations, we shall see that not only
+will our horses gain thereby, but many other important objects of our
+training be served as well.
+
+Turning now to the subject of these exercises themselves, it must be
+laid down generally that throughout a steady intensification of the
+exertions demanded must be maintained, and that the gallop is not to
+be employed except when, under service conditions, its use would be
+practicable. Further, whatever the Regulations prescribe must be
+practised, no matter what the views of the Commanding Officer as to
+their practicability or otherwise may be. This is absolutely essential
+to secure a uniform standard of execution throughout the Arm.
+
+Nevertheless, it makes a very essential difference in what spirit the
+Regulations are approached, for the result will depend upon which
+points in the training the chief stress is laid, and generally on the
+character given to the exercises.
+
+In drilling the squadron this point is of less importance. Here, in
+accordance with the spirit of the whole Arm, it is a matter of formal
+drill, and nothing more. It is here that the foundation has to be laid
+for smart, never-failing 'drill,' for the unconditional cohesion of
+the squadron in itself, and for the certain interpretation of its
+Leader's views, whether the latter makes use of commands, signals, or
+merely rides in the required direction.
+
+Here the paces must be hammered into the troops till they become
+mechanical habit, and the several forms of movement and attack be
+practised, so that they can be executed in any direction, whether the
+squadron has been told off or not. No matter how hasty the rally may
+be, the troop must charge at the moment and without hesitation.
+
+The only difference that can arise here will be due to the
+individuality of the Leader, and all are good which lead to the
+required end, only the Regulations are not quite clear as to
+practising the charge, and the guiding points might be laid down with
+rather greater precision.
+
+In the charge against Cavalry cohesion is the first and dominating
+condition. It must be absolutely impossible for the horses to swerve
+either to right or left. Accurate dressing and the maintenance of the
+two ranks come only in the second place. Against Infantry or
+Artillery, on the other hand, the essential is that every horse should
+have room to gallop in his own form, so that no crowding or jostling
+arises, thus giving the horses a chance of avoiding or jumping clear
+over falling men or animals. Hence, although on the level drill ground
+the requirements of Regulations as regards dressing and the
+maintenance of the two well-defined lines must be attended to, one
+must remember that it may be impossible to comply with these demands
+across country and be prepared in such cases to stick to the spirit,
+not to the letter, of the law.
+
+In both cases it will hardly be of advantage to lay too much stress on
+dressing and touch. Against Cavalry it is rather a case of jamming the
+files together by pressure from the flanks, and the men must hold as a
+vital article of faith that only the closest knee-to-knee riding will
+guarantee either victory or their personal safety. Against Infantry,
+on the contrary, the files must be loosened, and every horse go in his
+normal stride, as in hunting; nor must anyone allow himself to be
+squeezed out of the ranks to the rear or remain behind as long as the
+strength of his horse holds out.
+
+Utmost speed consistent with closely-locked files against Cavalry, a
+natural extended gallop against Infantry or Artillery--these are the
+two cardinal points to be observed in attacking. Maintenance of
+dressing or of the ranks become positive evils if the above are
+sacrificed to either. There, in my opinion, should be the essentials
+to guide the decision of superior officers in their criticisms.
+
+With these exceptions the lines for the squadron training are so
+closely drawn that differences in practice can scarcely arise. The
+matter, however, assumes quite a different aspect with the regiment,
+and still more with the higher units.
+
+Here it is not only a case of consolidating the cohesion of the troops
+by the agency of the discipline of the drill ground, or of teaching
+the forms of movement and of fighting, although, of course, these
+points of view cannot be entirely disregarded; but the essential is to
+teach the methods of employment of the forms laid down in the
+Regulations for the combat.
+
+A regiment which can work through the Drill Book smoothly and with
+precision is still far from being trained for battle, but at the most
+has merely laid the foundations on which such a training can be
+subsequently built up. The same applies to a Brigade or Division, each
+of which has practised and made certain of the execution of such
+movements as passages of defiles, deployments, attacks, changes of
+front or of lines, and so forth. All these things are in themselves
+necessary and useful, but they make no great demands on the skill of
+the Leaders, only requiring an accurate knowledge of the book, and a
+certain degree of routine in the application of its prescriptions; but
+War makes quite different demands on their ability, and it is for War
+that we have to be prepared.
+
+First of all, in the purely formal side of the training, stress must
+especially be laid on those forms of movement which can actually be
+applied on the battle-field.
+
+Then, the troops must be exercised to apply these forms not only on
+the drill ground, but over every kind of country. Further, the
+tactical judgment and independence of the Leaders of all ranks must,
+be thoroughly developed. They must not only learn to act on
+fundamentally sound principles, but to apply these principles
+everywhere where circumstances require rapid decision, utilizing at
+once the tactical advantages the ground may offer, and adapting
+practically the few forms which can be employed before the enemy in
+the field instinctively; and, finally, opportunities must be granted
+to the Commanders to practise the combination of locally separated
+bodies to a single tactical purpose.
+
+In face of these requirements, it seems to me that our tactical
+training remains far too elementary in character, and does not tend
+with sufficient directness towards what is alone possible in War.
+
+The blame for this state of affairs rests by no means only on the
+shoulders of the troops, but is due to a variety of complex causes
+which are difficult to disentangle. In the first place comes the
+passive resistance, that moment of inertia which custom and tradition
+everywhere oppose to changes, and it is not to be expected that the
+troops of their own initiative will be able to abandon the accustomed
+ruts, when more especially the methods applied in our inspections are
+not always of a nature to encourage such attempts.
+
+A further cause is to be found in the Regulations themselves. These
+give no firm foothold for the decision of the question as to what
+forms and movements really are practicable in War-time, and, probably
+in the endeavours not to hamper too much the initiative of the
+Leaders, does not express the principle on which the conduct of the
+combat is based with sufficient precision to preclude very different
+opinions as to what these principles really are. Finally, the local
+conditions of many of our garrisons often create an almost insuperable
+difficulty for the proper training of the troops over country.
+
+In face of these conditions, we must strike out new paths for our
+guidance if we do not intend to remain behind the times altogether.
+
+We must first, however, be perfectly clear in our own minds as to
+which of the Regulation forms are really practicable, and hence
+require increased attention. Then we must endeavour to formulate the
+guiding principles for the conduct of an engagement in a manner so
+clear and definite that they can easily be fixed in the memory, and
+then work out the best way in which the troops can be thoroughly
+grounded in their application. Finally, we must acquire a quite
+distinct grasp of what can be practised over country, and from what
+points of view such exercises are to be undertaken in order to make
+them of direct utility in the solution of the problems modern Warfare
+will set before us.
+
+To clear up the first point it will be best to sketch in its general
+outline the course in which events succeed one another in an
+engagement, and then to deduce the forms of movement which are
+essentially practical.
+
+Taking the case of Cavalry in combination with the other Arms, at the
+commencement of the action we find the squadrons in 'rendezvous'
+formation under cover outside the immediate danger sphere, either on
+the flanks or behind the general line of battle.
+
+When the moment to act arrives, they advance at a rapid pace, either
+in closed-up column of route or in any other dense formation which
+permits of ready deployment in the direction of their allotted target.
+Often in this movement they will have to overcome difficulties of the
+ground--defiles and the like, of varying breadth.
+
+Arrived in the vicinity of the field of attack, they deploy into lines
+of squadron columns, form line to the front, and execute the charge.
+
+In such cases it may often become necessary to secure one's own flanks
+by forming protective echelons, or to endeavour to surround those of
+the enemy by corresponding offensive movements.
+
+In the case of Cavalry acting alone, it will often be necessary to
+form for action directly from column of route, and it will be
+essential to establish co-operation not only between the advance guard
+and the main body, but also between columns concentrating from
+different directions upon the field of coming action.
+
+It is at once evident that for these few manoeuvres few and simple
+formations and movements will suffice, and that, in view of the
+excitement of the battle-field, only such are, in fact,
+applicable.[25]
+
+         [Footnote 25: As a measure of this excitement the following
+         example may be useful. During the great Cavalry engagement on
+         the plateau west of the Yron brook near Mars-la-Tour a
+         squadron under most brilliant leadership galloped out in
+         column of troops to threaten the enemy's flank. When,
+         however, the order to wheel into line was given, the men were
+         so excited that it was only with the utmost difficulty that
+         its Captain succeeded in getting three troops to obey, whilst
+         the leading one continued on in its original direction. The
+         Squadron Commander was Rittmeister von Rosenberg, who
+         afterwards became Inspector-General of Cavalry, and the
+         above-mentioned incident was related by him personally to the
+         author.]
+
+Hence it follows that all complicated movements and changes of lines,
+and similar formations occurring in the Regulations, may be classed in
+the category of evolutions intended mainly for disciplinary purposes.
+On the other hand, we must practise, as thoroughly as practicable,
+long movements at a rapid pace in the closest formations for
+manoeuvre--_i.e._, in double and Regimental Columns; changes of
+direction in these columns by shouldering, passage of defiles,
+deployments into fighting formations with simultaneous slight
+alterations in the line of advance; further, measures to secure one's
+own flanks, or to threaten those of the enemy; deployments to the
+front immediately out of column of route or after the passage of
+defiles; the combination of detachments arriving from different
+directions; and, finally, the charge itself under the most varied
+assumptions, the transition from the melee to pursuit, and rallying in
+order to attack again in a new direction against a fresh enemy.
+Naturally, the most rapid deployments out of any and every formation
+against a suddenly appearing enemy must also be practised, for such
+surprises are always possible in War-time.
+
+To be avoided, on the other hand, as for the most part quite
+impracticable, are all movements of a dilatory nature for the
+formation of fronts of attack, as well as long movements of manoeuvres
+and considerable changes of front when already deployed into line.
+
+In all these exercises, as a general and fundamental principle, such a
+grouping of the available forces must be striven for that the units
+can be employed by 'Wings'; for, as I have endeavoured to point out,
+it is this form of employment which best satisfies the requirements of
+the combat and meets the needs of the Commander.
+
+For instance, under many circumstances the Regimental Column can be
+employed as a practical tactical formation. Thus, if against Infantry
+or Artillery, it is desirable to attack in many following 'Lines.' The
+need is at once satisfied if our advance is made in a number of
+Regimental Columns, wheeled into line to a flank. For a flank attack,
+if the movement is initiated in a number of Regimental Columns formed
+to the front and following one another, forming line by a subsequent
+wheel. In both cases--in the latter after the wheel--one has only to
+insure that the laterally adjacent squadrons move off together at
+'Treffen' (_i.e._, Line) distance to have all one's Lines complete.
+Such a formation can secure its flanks with the greatest ease by the
+retention of closed units, or, by bringing up the rearward squadrons,
+can prolong its front to either flank. In any case it is preferable to
+the triple column of troops, which makes all influence of the leader
+impossible, mixes all units in the charge, and hence would best be
+left out of the Regulations altogether. Nevertheless, practice in the
+employment of 'Treffen' (_i.e._, 'Lines' as opposed to 'Wings') must
+not be entirely neglected, as under certain circumstances this form
+may also become necessary.
+
+This tendency to group the available forces by 'Wings' in the larger
+units from the Brigade upwards must also be extended downwards to the
+regiment, which represents the fundamental tactical unit of the
+Cavalry, and those formations for manoeuvre which favour the
+arrangement of its constituent squadrons one behind the
+other--formations which, at the same time, are both handier and
+susceptible of more convenient control--must be constantly practised.
+
+That Squadron Columns to the Front hardly meet these demands ideally
+can scarcely be denied. They are unhandy, render all changes of
+direction materially more difficult, lose direction and distance very
+easily, and necessitate complex movements in order to arrange them one
+behind the other. Already in Brigade formations these drawbacks are
+apparent, and in larger masses they prove most formidable. The
+Squadron Column is, in fact, a formation derived exclusively with a
+view to 'Line' tactics, and for this reason alone they hamper all
+other demands. There is, however, no compelling reason why they should
+be retained as the principal working formation for Cavalry, and
+therefore as fundamentally beyond the reach of criticism.
+
+It seems to me that a formation which would group every two Squadron
+Columns as a unit would be far preferable. The Regimental Commander
+would then have only two units to direct, which would maintain their
+mutual relations of distance and interval more easily than four, could
+change direction more readily, and form line quicker, and allow of a
+far easier transition to wing formations and other columns than is
+possible at present.
+
+The Regulations certainly do not mention this formation specifically,
+but, on the other hand, this regimental double column offers
+advantages for certain circumstances greater than can be found in any
+of the forms it suggests. It allows in the simplest manner of
+deployment into 'Lines,' either to the front or flank, the formation
+of echelons in any desired direction; it is very mobile, easily
+concealed in folds of the ground, and combines the advantages of
+reduced depth both as a marching and as a manoeuvre formation. As the
+latter, it is peculiarly adapted to the purposes of large units in
+close country; for, as already pointed out, it is easy to conceal, and
+whilst keeping the troops well in the hands of the Regimental
+Commander, allows also of the most rapid deployments into 'Lines'
+either to the front or to the flank. It confers also the same
+advantages in brigade when the regiments are formed side by side, and
+is particularly applicable to flanking movements in which it is
+especially desirable to be able at any moment to develop strong
+fighting power in the direction of the movement, and after the wheel
+into line, to be formed in successive lines and protected on the
+uncovered flank.
+
+[Illustration: Double column.]
+
+It would take us too far at this point to compare in detail the
+advantages and disadvantages of this or alternative formations. I only
+desire to indicate in what direction practical progress is possible,
+even in the domain of formal tactics, without exceeding the limits
+laid down by Regulations, although it can only be most desirable that
+changes in the Regulations[26] themselves should be forthwith
+undertaken. I would, in conclusion, only bring forward one point which
+seems to me of particular importance.
+
+         [Footnote 26: This formation has since been adopted, and is
+         almost invariably employed.--TRANSLATOR.]
+
+The more this employment of Cavalry by 'Wings' gains ground, the more
+apparent becomes the advantages of the use of the bugle-calls assigned
+to the several units, particularly of the regimental call; because
+when it is used, the regiment or other unit remains as a closed body,
+unmixed with other units, and hence can be employed as a distinct
+tactical entity, which is not so much the case when working in
+'Lines.'
+
+These sounds are the only ones which never lead to confusion, if they
+are employed not as cautions only, but as a call on which the unit
+moves at once, whether in line or in column--preferably the latter--in
+the direction from which the call is heard. With the call the
+Commander would have the means of collecting his men behind him, and
+leading them in the direction he desires, no matter in what degree of
+order or the reverse they might be, without any verbal commands or
+instructions.
+
+Used in this sense these sounds--but particularly the regimental
+call--might become the principal drill and manoeuvre calls for the
+Cavalry.
+
+Thus it appears to me we could achieve a considerable reduction in the
+amount of practical drill necessary, and the change would tell all the
+more the more frequently the call was employed, until at last it
+became ingrained in the very flesh and blood of each man in the ranks.
+
+Unfortunately the Regulations do not allow their employment in this
+sense, but permit them only as cautionary sounds (Section 115, note);
+but even in this restricted sense they deserve most constant use in
+drilling, for they are always a means of preventing, in a measure,
+misapprehensions in the execution of other sounds.
+
+We come now to the second portion of our requirements--viz., how to
+obtain clearness in the appreciation of tactical principles.
+Fortunately they are few in number, but it is absolutely indispensable
+that every Cavalry Leader should most fully have mastered their
+meaning. No knowledge, however accurate, of the formal prescriptions
+of the Regulations can in any way compensate for a deficiency in this
+respect. They are certainly not indicated as 'General Principles' in
+the Regulations themselves, but may be read between the lines with
+more or less precision from its several paragraphs.
+
+
+FOR CAVALRY VERSUS CAVALRY.
+
+1. The German Cavalry must always endeavour to attack first in order
+to utilize to the utmost its superior 'moral,' and to catch the enemy
+in the act of deployment. If an opening for such an attack is offered,
+then even the risks of a long preliminary gallop must be accepted
+(Section 339).
+
+2. The leading lines must _always_ be followed by supporting squadrons
+in adequate numbers (Section 843, and note also Section 346); that is
+to say, the enemy's Cavalry will always be attacked in two 'Lines,'
+unless special circumstances compel departure from this prescription.
+
+3. One must always endeavour to keep the last closed Reserve in hand,
+because in the melee the impetus of the last closed body generally
+decides. One must never, therefore, as long as one suspects that the
+enemy has still further Reserves in hand, engage a greater number of
+squadrons than he shows, in order to save up Reserves.
+
+4. Success must be looked for in the vehemence of the onslaught, not
+in superiority of numbers (Section 313). The greatest importance must
+be attached to cohesion; hence, unless necessary to surprise the enemy
+in the act of deployment, the 'gallop' should not be sounded too soon,
+or the 'charge' too late (Section 339).
+
+5. Outflanking detachments, or troops in the following lines, turn
+against the enemy's Reserves, or remain in reserve. They must never,
+except in most pressing circumstances, throw themselves into a melee
+already formed (Section 313). Following Lines must therefore not keep
+too close to the leading ones--a mistake often committed in peace--as
+otherwise they are committed to an attack in the same direction. They
+should therefore keep so far to the rear that they can overlook the
+line of collisions, and move in full freedom wherever their
+intervention is most called for. This important principle was always
+observed by Frederick the Great's Cavalry.
+
+6. One must always try to cover at least one flank by obstacles of the
+ground or by one's own troops; but having satisfied this condition,
+then attack on the outer Lines, and endeavour to gain them by previous
+strategical directions.
+
+7. Superfluous forces, which do not follow the front as supporting
+squadrons, echelon themselves in general, forwards or backwards of the
+outer (unsupported) wing, to protect one's own flank and threaten
+that of the enemy, also to be ready to engage the enemy's Reserves
+(Sections 323, 343, 345), or they are kept together as Reserves behind
+the fighting line, if it is not possible to foresee in what direction
+they may be required. They must not be too weak.
+
+8. Attempts to surround us made by the enemy are best met by a flank
+movement on the original line without change of front (_cf._ Section
+338). Defensive flanking cover, with the front turned outwards, gives
+the worst conceivable direction for attack, since in case of failure
+one is thrown back across the line of retreat of one's main body.
+
+9. Being in 'rendezvous formation,' the leading units are, if
+possible, sent off for offensive flank movements, as they have the
+shortest way to traverse. Such attacks only then promise success if
+they are unnoticed by the enemy--_i.e._, can be executed under the
+concealment of the ground--or if the enemy has neither time nor space
+to encounter them. The object of flank attacks is to induce the enemy
+to use up his rearward Reserves to oppose them, or to induce him to
+undertake manoeuvres before attacking.
+
+10. Those units which are to be committed to the attack simultaneously
+must never be arranged so that a part follows in echelon
+backwards--they must always be disposed on the same alignment.
+
+11. In case of a melee, which threatens to terminate unsatisfactorily,
+the Reserves must be put in on a broad front and straight forward, not
+directed against the flanks. For the longer the line of collision, the
+less effect do such flank attacks exercise; they are only too often
+mere blows in the air, and lead to waste of energy.
+
+12. Out of every victorious melee one must endeavour, as soon as
+possible, to rally closed detachments (Section 326). For immediate
+pursuit only fractions of the available troops will be employed
+(Section 325). This pursuit, however, must be carried out with the
+utmost energy, and the complete expenditure of the horses' power--if
+possible, to the total extermination of the enemy. The forces employed
+must be adequate for the attainment of this end.
+
+
+CAVALRY AGAINST INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY.
+
+1. The attack must be as concentric as possible, and from different
+directions, to compel the defender to scatter his fire. The units are
+always to be employed by 'Wings.'
+
+2. If possible, the defender must be surprised, and if Artillery, he
+should be attacked from the flank.
+
+3. Where a wide zone of fire has to be ridden through, though even
+against Artillery, successive 'Lines' must be employed, and the less
+shaken the enemy appears to be the greater the number of such 'Lines'
+(Section 350). Artillery attacked frontally must be compelled by the
+leading 'Lines' to change both elevation and the nature of their fire.
+
+4. The result, however, depends less on the Form employed than on the
+rapid seizure of momentarily favourable circumstances.
+
+5. Only _closed_ 'Lines' on a broad front can be relied on for
+success. Where the squadrons each seek independently for an object of
+attack, they generally miss it altogether, and to assign each
+individual squadron a special target will mostly be impossible, for
+the attack will be launched from such a distance that separate objects
+in the defender's lines will hardly be recognisable. Once within the
+zone of serious losses it will be obviously impossible to undertake
+those changes of direction which one sees unhappily so constantly in
+peace. One rides, in general, straight at a long fire line, and
+penetrates through as far as one can.
+
+6. Such frontal attacks require, generally, reserves on both flanks
+for security against possible disengaging efforts of the enemy's
+Cavalry.
+
+7. As the crisis of the engagement approaches, one must close well up
+on the fighting line, no matter whether one incurs loss or not, in
+order to be at hand to take advantage of opportunities.
+
+8. Deployment, changes of direction and of front, are only possible
+outside the principal fire zone of the enemy.
+
+9. The distance between following lines varies according to the nature
+of the enemy's fire.
+
+To make these principles familiar to the troops must be one's constant
+care from the commencement of the regimental drill season onwards. At
+the same time, the subordinate Leaders must learn to apply them
+independently, even if no direct order reaches them, or if compelled
+to act on only the shortest indication of the Superior Commander
+(Sections 330, 333, 348), and this independence of the subordinate
+must be the more practised the greater the size of the units (Section
+317).
+
+To attain this object, as soon as the troops have sufficient mastery
+of the purely mechanical part of their drill, it will be necessary to
+append a series of exercises designed both to bring out the essentials
+of these principles, and, at the same time, to develop the judgment
+and independence of the junior officers.
+
+Such exercises must hence always be based on a well-defined tactical
+situation, from which it clearly appears whether the Cavalry is
+'Independent,' or whether it is acting on the flank or behind the
+middle of a fighting line; and the corresponding conditions on the
+enemy's side must also be readily deducible, and on such foundation,
+under constantly changing assumptions, as to strength and distance of
+the enemy, all such movements as changes from one tactical formation
+to another--flank attacks, deployment from column of route or after
+the passage of defiles--must be practised. In all these exercises the
+point at issue must be clearly and comprehensively expressed. When one
+has attained a certain degree of security in the application of these
+principles, these exercises must be repeated under conditions of
+ever-increasing difficulty.
+
+The order for deployment must be given whilst the troops are in rapid
+motion. Observation, thought, and command when in full gallop have to
+be learnt; they do not come naturally. The most various movements,
+without command or bugle-call, must be executed from a message brought
+by a galloper. The troops will be practised against a suddenly
+appearing enemy on simple warnings such as 'Against Cavalry,' 'Against
+Infantry,' or merely on the sound 'Alert,' and pains must always be
+taken to see that the fundamentally right formation is adopted. In
+these exercises it must be left to the initiative of the subordinates
+to judge the situation for themselves, and always move to their proper
+place in the prescribed formation by the shortest path. Of course, in
+such movements the first principle is that the troops nearest the
+enemy furnish the first 'Line'; the remainder fall into their places
+as flank coverers, supporting squadrons or reserve.
+
+If, in this manner, we succeed in imparting to the junior Leaders
+thorough clearness as to the principles of the game, and to make them
+both quick and skilful in their appreciation of the situation, then
+the work of education on the drill ground is complete, and the troops
+are ready for exercises over country. No pains must be spared to
+separate the purely formal and ceremonial side of drill from the
+practical field-training. The former keeps always, as I have indicated
+in the first section, its full value for the creation of discipline
+and alertness, but leads only too easily to a routine which has
+nothing in common with the battle-field, and to that poverty-stricken
+'schematisimus' to which human nature so readily inclines.
+
+To the formal school of training, which I have hitherto only had in
+mind, a whole series of exercises must now be coupled, having for
+their purpose the application of the acquired forms and principles
+under all circumstances of the ground. But before we proceed to their
+detail consideration, we must answer the question how far the drill
+ground only suffices for the purpose of training. Generally, one can
+subscribe to General von Schlichting's principle--that forms and
+principles must be learnt in the drill book, but their application in
+action only in the open country. Tactical exercises on the drill
+ground, which have not for sole purposes to bring to expression
+certain formal principles, are always an evil, and mislead the troops.
+On the other hand, the principles of the tactical employment of
+Cavalry are particularly suited to representation on the drill ground
+because they are frequently of a purely formal nature.
+
+Keeping firmly to these established principles, then, to define the
+limits of usefulness of the drill ground, we have only to answer the
+question within what tactical units this formal drilling is still
+instructive or possible. My opinion is that the Brigade marks the
+highest limit, as within it all tactical principles find their
+application, and it is the largest body which can still in any way be
+handled by drill methods only. In the Division, and still more in the
+higher units, the strategical element preponderates so greatly that
+anything approaching real drill is out of the question, and all
+movements which they can execute are based on a complete command of
+these principles already. Of course, it is not intended to prohibit
+altogether the formal working together of these masses at the
+beginning in order to secure complete control and knowledge of them
+for further instruction; but one must not delay over these formal
+movements a moment longer than absolutely necessary, since the real
+centre of gravity lies in the practical training, and no doubt must be
+allowed to exist as to which exercises are intended as purely drill
+and which as practical preparation for War.
+
+Nor would I have it implied that brigade and regimental training
+should be entirely confined to the drill ground. On the contrary, the
+exercises over country are absolutely essential for practical
+training, and form the keystone of the whole edifice; but it seems to
+me not merely permissible but desirable that a portion of these
+exercises should be carried out on the drill ground in order to
+expedite this portion of the work. But all the more energetically must
+it be insisted on that the remainder of the programme--the greater
+part in regard to time--should be executed, as far as possible, in
+variable ground, and that all exercises of the larger formations
+should be confined to such ground as we shall have to work over in
+War; not alone are they by far the most important for the higher
+tactical education of the Arm, but they cannot be represented on drill
+grounds at all; their whole essence is too entirely out of harmony
+with the conditions of a level plain.
+
+That the degree of cultivation existing in the vicinity of the
+garrisons may interfere seriously with these demands is obvious, and
+in the absence of the necessary spaces to work over we must fall back
+on the great training grounds (Truppenuebungs Plaetze); even the
+possibilities of these are very soon exhausted. But this, at least, is
+certain: that it is better to hold these exercises on these training
+grounds than to confine them exclusively to the drill field. Every
+effort must, therefore, be made to transfer all exercises of bodies
+above the regiment to the training grounds, on which one will always
+find some portion sufficiently suitable for the amount of drill
+required, and to extend the period of work on these grounds so that in
+all periods it will be possible to interpose between the drill days a
+sufficient number of field service days, always supposing that these
+training grounds offer sufficient diversity of contour, etc., for our
+purposes. Where this is not the case, then, in spite of the expense
+entailed by possible damage to crops, etc., suitable ground will have
+to be acquired. The extra cost of a few thousand pounds cannot be
+allowed to stand in the way of the adequate training of the Arm which,
+owing to its numerical strength, relatively small in comparison with
+the magnitude of its tasks, is in the last resort dependent for its
+success on its internal excellence alone.
+
+As concerns the nature of these exercises, with special reference to
+the larger formations, first of all we must secure, by means of a
+graduated series, the certain co-operation of the constituent elements
+and of their leaders. Next, it must be insisted on that, for the
+further actual practical training, as well as for the purely formal
+drill, a systematic procedure should be the fundamental principle, so
+that all who participate in them may become clearly aware of the
+conditions of Warfare, and the means of dealing with them. It is
+evident that these conditions must form the foundation of the required
+system.
+
+As in War these are constantly changing, there seems a certain degree
+of contradiction in this demand; but in reality this is not the case,
+for no matter how the situation may vary, there will always be for its
+proper criticism some one chief point which will characterize the
+whole procedure, and thus be decisive for the systematic arrangement
+of these exercises.
+
+The latter can then be divided into two principal groups, according as
+to whether they are based on the assumption of a Cavalry force acting
+as an independent unit or in combination with the other Arms. The
+general conditions in both cases must be clearly brought out, and give
+them the point of attachment for the further subdivision of the
+exercises.
+
+Thus, with regard to the first case:
+
+Reconnaissance from a great distance. Deployment of one or more
+columns out of defiles or in open country. The land in the vicinity of
+the training ground can here be advantageously employed. It is not
+desirable to place the heads of the separate columns at once on the
+scene of action, using these points as starting-points for the
+forthcoming exercise. One must give the columns longer marches, and
+demand that--assisted by a properly-working mechanism for circulating
+information and orders--they should arrive at the point of action at
+the proper time, in spite of possible delays or interference on the
+road. The enemy, whether skeleton or otherwise, must, of course, be
+handled so that collision occurs within the limits of the training
+ground.
+
+Transition from the relations of advance (or rear) guard and main body
+to the order these assume on the battle-field.
+
+Attacks on a railway or hostile post.
+
+Government boundaries form no support for the flanks; these can only
+be considered as secure when protected by natural obstacles; hence, as
+a rule, measures must be taken to cover both flanks.
+
+Transition from the tactical to the strategical form after completion
+of an encounter; pursuit of the enemy with one fraction of the force,
+and continuation of the operation with the remainder; for the latter,
+only orders need be issued; but it is a matter of considerable
+importance how this division of force rendered necessary by the
+tactical encounters is arranged.
+
+Retreat after a repulse, in one or several columns.
+
+Retirement through defiles.
+
+In the second case:
+
+Selection of position on the battle-field in a proper relation to the
+fighting line, zone of danger, etc., and reconnaissance to front and
+flanks.
+
+Advance from a position in reserve to attack on the enemy's Cavalry
+round one wing of an Army.
+
+Transition from a victorious charge against Cavalry to a further
+attack against the enemy's flank.
+
+Protection of the outer flank in either case.
+
+Retreat after defeat by the enemy's Cavalry to the protection of one's
+own Army wing.
+
+Advance for frontal attack against the enemy's line of battle; passage
+through the intervals of one's own Artillery and Cavalry. Protection
+of both flanks. Attack upon Infantry, Artillery, or both; disengaging
+a front attacked by Cavalry; combat against the latter.
+
+Flank attacks against retreating columns; ambushes at defiles.
+
+Of course, it is not intended in the above to lay down a hard-and-fast
+scheme of instruction, but only to indicate how the work to be done
+can be systematically arranged, and brought under one point of view,
+so that the lessons they are intended to convey become impressed on
+the mind. It is also evident that by the supposed conduct of the
+enemy, and the strength assigned to him, the utmost variation can be
+brought about in the grouping and representation of the several
+conditioning circumstances. In short, these exercises must be taken
+direct from the most diverse demands of War, and be based, as far as
+possible, on an assumed general situation. They must never be allowed
+to descend to mere fighting on horseback backwards and forwards across
+the training ground, and with often quite unnatural sequence of ideas,
+having no connection with the natural order of events. It is also most
+desirable that Infantry and additional Artillery should be made
+available for their execution.
+
+How far the dismounted action of the Arm is to be represented in these
+series will be gone into in the next section; but in all cases,
+whether working mounted or on foot, the Leader must insist that the
+troops are handled in accordance with tactical precepts suitably
+applied in every case to the special circumstances of the given
+situation; and for this, even on the smallest training grounds, a
+proper utilization of the features of the country is essential.
+
+The desire to suit the formation to the ground; to carry out turning
+movements under cover; to find support for the flanks in natural
+obstacles, so that they cannot be surrounded; to choose the actual
+field of encounter, so that every advantage of the ground, the
+direction of the wind, of the sun, of covered approach, etc., all fall
+to our advantage; to deal with defiles and passes on correct
+principles; to utilize suitably strong defensive positions--all these
+must be clearly brought to light, and in the 'Critique' these points
+must be particularly borne in mind, for they are by no means
+universally current in the Cavalry, which has a tendency always and
+everywhere in peace to revert to the levellest ground obtainable. I
+have seen at Cavalry Division Exercises troops handled without the
+slightest regard to the nature of the country, and without the fact
+attracting attention at the 'Critique'; but these are conditions
+which, thanks to the energetic action of the Inspector-General, we may
+hope, are now everywhere overcome.
+
+It must, further, be brought out in the clearest possible manner under
+what conditions the employment of the units by 'Wings' is to be
+recommended, and under which others their employment in 'Lines'
+becomes necessary. The principles regulating this matter have already
+received attention in Book I., Chap. V. The freedom which, as we have
+seen, is given us by Section 346 of the Regulations must be utilized
+to the fullest extent, for it alone answers to the demands of the
+modern battle-field.[27]
+
+         [Footnote 27: If, in the course of time, as I fully
+         anticipate, the necessity should become apparent to give
+         further expression in the form of Regulations to the point of
+         view laid down in Section 346, it would certainly necessitate
+         a complete rearrangement of the whole Regulations, out of
+         which, in that case, other defects might then be eliminated.
+         The following ideas might then be taken into consideration:
+
+         1. Fundamental and formal separation of tactical prescription
+         from instructions concerning the methods of training.
+
+         2. Simplification of the Regimental drill in the direction of
+         conferring increased freedom of movements to the Squadrons
+         and double Squadrons. Limitations in the application of
+         Squadron Columns, and their partial replacement by more
+         suitable formations.
+
+         3. More precise wording of the tactical principles, and their
+         extension to prescriptions as to the use of 'Wing' or 'Line'
+         formation.
+
+         4. Re-introduction of the true idea of 'Line tactics,'
+         limitation of the word 'Echelon' to troops overlapping the
+         first line, of 'Reserve' for all held back behind it.
+
+         5. The preparation for all instructions for the movement and
+         combat of masses larger than Brigades without reference to
+         any fixed standard of strength.
+
+         6. More extended use of the different bugle sounds.
+
+         7. Extension of the instructions for dismounted action to
+         cover the employment of several Squadrons, Regiments, or
+         Brigades, and with especial stress on the decisive offensive.
+         (See next section.)]
+
+One last point requires further consideration, which is of
+considerable importance for Cavalry exercises--viz., the use of
+skeleton enemies.
+
+In no Arm does the skeleton enemy replace an actual enemy less than
+with the Cavalry.
+
+If it rides the prescribed paces, then, as a consequence of the ease
+of movement and rapidity of deployment, it has an unfair advantage; if
+it rides slowly or halts altogether as a target, it makes things
+altogether too easy for the other side. Besides, it is a very much
+easier matter to judge a number of flags correctly than to estimate
+the actual strength of a rapidly moving body of horse.
+
+Most movements in practice develop so quickly, and, owing to the
+ground, the direction in which the dust drives, etc., give such
+changing pictures, that it is most difficult to judge them accurately
+when one's self is in rapid motion.
+
+Often the Cavalry Commanders must decide, at least in general, on the
+instant, strength, tactical distribution, and direction of movement of
+a rapidly approaching enemy almost hidden in dense dust clouds; in the
+same instant he must make up his mind with reference to the conditions
+disclosed by the adversary and the nature of the ground, and issue his
+orders clearly and intelligibly. The demand is such a great one that
+both the physical and mental sight even of a born Leader needs
+constant practice against real objects in order to be in any way equal
+to it. Hence the necessity for bringing great Cavalry 'Masses'--at
+least, Divisions--as frequently as possible together to manoeuvre
+against one another, and in such a manner that the strength of the
+opposing forces remains unknown, which, with a little management, can
+easily be arranged. If one knows beforehand the precise number of the
+opposing forces, as with Divisions of uniform composition will
+generally be the case, the matter is very much simplified indeed, but
+in proportion it is less practical, a consideration which still
+further supports our already formulated demand for Cavalry Divisions
+differing as far as possible in their composition.
+
+Thus, it is clear that the field is wide indeed which opens itself for
+the practical training of Cavalry as soon as one gets down to the
+bed-rock conditions which determine success in actual War, and frees
+one's self of all conventional suppositions. Whether we shall succeed
+in satisfying the new conditions which press upon us from every side,
+taking into consideration the excellence of our existing material,
+equal to the highest performances, will depend in the main on the
+support of the superior authorities. For the manner in which Cavalry
+are inspected decides how they practise and what they learn, just as
+the way in which they are led determines what they can do.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER IV
+
+TRAINING FOR DISMOUNTED FIGHTING
+
+
+If in the previous pages it has been shown that increased attention
+must be devoted, in the training of our Cavalry for its mounted
+duties, to the changed conditions we shall encounter in modern War--if
+it is to do justice to itself on the battle-fields of the future--it
+must, on the other hand, be insisted on that the foundation available
+for such further effort is indeed an excellent one. Our squadrons are,
+in general, exceptionally well trained, capable of great endeavour,
+and well in the hands of their Commanders.
+
+It needs, therefore, in my opinion, but a slight change in the
+direction, the practical consideration of certain new points, and,
+above all, a wider range of practice in the higher Commands, to attain
+the very highest mark.
+
+With its dismounted action, however, it is a different matter.
+
+In spite of the increased importance this form of fighting has
+acquired in modern War, our Cavalry has not as yet paid anything like
+the amount of attention to the subject that it deserves. Almost
+everywhere it is treated as of quite minor importance, and many
+Cavalrymen still close their eyes to the view that, without a training
+at once as thorough and earnest for dismounted action as that
+bestowed on the Arm to fit it for its mounted duties, modern Cavalry
+will hardly survive the trials it will encounter in the future.
+
+This idea rests on long-standing tradition, which is difficult to
+overcome. It is not so very long ago that on the rifle ranges some
+officers caused volleys to be fired in order to get through their
+cartridges so as to get back to quarters the sooner; but mainly, it is
+up-borne and continued by the fact that in the Inspections the
+superior Commanders generally treat dismounted fighting as a matter
+hardly worth their serious consideration, or judge it by
+false--_i.e._, too narrow--standards. Further, because in the
+manoeuvres, as in the principal Cavalry exercises generally,
+situations requiring dismounted action for their due solution hardly
+ever arise; and lastly, because of the manner in which the whole
+subject is discussed in the Regulations themselves.
+
+The latter approach the question from a far narrower standpoint than I
+propose. They lay down quite openly that only under especially
+favourable circumstances can Cavalry hope to obtain easy and minor
+results from their carbine, fire, and that they are not in a position
+to enter on and carry through obstinate encounters.
+
+They lay principal stress on the defensive, and practically exclude
+the combat of larger 'Masses' altogether from their horizon.[28] In
+fact, they consider only the minimum conditions which the Cavalry must
+fulfil if it is not to fall into the background altogether.
+
+         [Footnote 28: Section 355, and note 357, 363, 365, 366.]
+
+The final consequences of modern development, hardly even those
+resulting from the experiences of 1870-1871, they have emphatically
+not yet even approached.
+
+Those who have studied the action of our Cavalry in that campaign
+thoroughly--as I myself had full opportunity of doing--will agree that
+we seldom had to have recourse to the carbine except on the offensive,
+as I have pointed out above, and only in the rarest cases did we need
+them for defensive purposes; and though in future against overwhelming
+forces this necessity may arise more frequently, still, as in 1870,
+this tendency towards a resolute offensive must always stand in the
+foreground. Nevertheless, the Regulations, in spite of all practical
+experience and theoretical considerations, lay down that in most cases
+fire action will be confined to the defensive (Cavalry Regulations,
+Section 357).
+
+It is quite natural that the troops themselves should not place their
+ideal higher than the Regulations require; all the more necessary,
+therefore, do I hold it to express with all emphasis that _our
+training must go far beyond the limits prescribed for it officially_
+if we are in any degree to satisfy the demands that War will make upon
+us. But for these, I hold our Cavalry thoroughly capable (when
+trained, understood), and even if they were not, one should never
+breathe such a suspicion to the men themselves. For should such an
+impression get abroad, one would dig at once the grave of initiative,
+daring, and resolution in the execution of all necessary undertakings.
+
+Keenness, the very life and soul of all Cavalry action, can only grow
+where the troops believe themselves fully equal to all eventualities.
+The idea, therefore, that Cavalry, even when dismounted, is not equal
+to any Infantry, must never be allowed to show its head; rather, the
+men must be brought up in the conviction that, owing to their longer
+term of service, absence of reservists, etc., they are, unit for unit,
+more than a match for the best. Only when they feel this thoroughly
+will they develop their utmost fighting value. But it is indispensable
+that they should be thoroughly at home in all forms of the dismounted
+combat, for only then will they feel confidence in the weapons they
+carry.
+
+This ideal is as yet far from being attained in our service, and we
+must break entirely with the existing training and enter on new paths
+if it is in any way to be attained.
+
+For the tactical subdivision of the squadron, and the elementary forms
+of skirmishing action, the Regulations afford a sufficient foundation,
+but their application must be brought home to the men in a totally
+different manner to that at present in use.
+
+A few weeks after their arrival--at latest the beginning of
+November--the recruits must be taken out into the country and
+practised in utilizing all the advantages it offers, both as a group
+and in firing lines, and at the same time they must be taught with the
+carbine, aiming, judging distance, etc., always from the point of view
+of making each man a practical independent shot, without any
+theoretical mystification or pedantry. Soon after Christmas they must
+be sufficiently far advanced to commence practice on the range, which
+must be carried out with the utmost individual care.
+
+_A considerable increase in the amount of ammunition is essential_ to
+keep the men constantly in practice, so that there are no long pauses
+between the days set aside for shooting, that these are divided over
+the whole year, and that firing at long distances and under field
+conditions can be carried out on a greater scale than at present.
+Before the beginning of the squadron drills, the men must be
+thoroughly at home both in mounting and dismounting for fire action;
+with this object, vaulting exercises with horses in full kit must be
+especially practised. They must also have progressed so far in the
+elementary preliminaries that tactical training of the dismounted
+squadron can be proceeded with at once; but the individual exercises
+must be continued throughout the whole year if knowledge of them is to
+pass over into the flesh and blood of the men.
+
+Special importance is to be attached to field firing, and for this in
+particular far more ammunition must be provided. In this most
+important respect Cavalry must be put on precisely the same footing as
+the Infantry, and be able to practise at real service targets exactly
+like the latter. But these exercises must not be begun until the men
+are thoroughly at home in judging distance and aiming, the class
+shooting is at an end, and the tactical training of the squadron
+completed.
+
+In aiming practices, low targets, representing men lying down, or
+well-covered shooting lines at great distances, are to be preferred;
+but in field firing the targets should be so disposed as to make the
+typical cases it is desired to represent, in which Cavalry will
+generally have to employ their firearms on service, sufficiently clear
+to the men's understanding--such, for instance, as the following:
+
+1. Attack of an occupied position.--Fire opens according to ground at
+1,100 to 1,200 yards; gradual advances by rushes to decisive
+distances, which, with modern weapons and in open country, may be put
+at 700 to 900 yards. Development of the principal fire effort at this
+range, and beating down of the enemy's return fire. After attainment
+of the fire superiority, rapid advance by rushes, and in larger
+bodies. These rushes must be covered by the fire of those still lying
+down, until the point for the commencement of their assault is
+reached. Meanwhile, advance of the last Reserves, also by rushes, to
+the last fire position to give the final impulse for assault; assault;
+pursuit by fire. The strongest development possible of concentric fire
+consistent with the retention of adequate reserves to carry forward
+the fighting line.
+
+2. Defence of a position.--(_a_) Obstinate defence; object not to let
+the assailant come too close; hence from 1,100 yards a considerable
+development of fire power; continuation of the fight at decisive
+range, and, according to the result, either pursuit by fire or rapid
+evacuation of the position with ultimate sacrifice of the rearguard to
+be formed by the last reserve. (_b_) Defence without the intention of
+standing fast, either to gain time or compel the enemy to deploy.
+Hence, principal fire effort between 1,000 and 1,300 yards, and then
+gradual break-off of the fight before the enemy can approach too
+close.
+
+N.B. In practice a favourable position is essential.
+
+3. Surprise fire against marching columns or reserves whilst
+reconnoitring the enemy's approach, or whilst working round his flank
+and rear in the battle, or in pursuit without the intention of
+charging or defending one's self, mainly with the purpose of securing
+a momentary but considerable moral and material effect, then
+disappearing and renewing the attempt from another place, hence sudden
+'Mass' fire from 1,500 to not less than 1,000 yards. At the same
+time, it must be explained that with our present carbine even a
+nominal effect can hardly be secured at the greater distances. Here I
+have anticipated the issue of a better weapon, an unconditional
+necessity for the Cavalry in any case.
+
+All these practices, however, will only then be of value when the
+officers possess a far more thorough knowledge of musketry and the
+capabilities of their weapon than is at present the case with us. It
+must therefore be insisted upon that, first our Regimental Commanders,
+and then the junior officers, should be ordered to attend the Infantry
+School of Musketry, in order that they may thoroughly master this new
+branch of knowledge.
+
+It will be asserted that the time for such thorough training in
+musketry cannot be found except at the cost of neglecting still more
+important branches of our service. But from my practical experience I
+cannot assent to this view. There is ample time, if it is not wasted
+on unpractical affairs.
+
+Judging distance and the use of ground can be most thoroughly taught
+during field-service practices, whilst the troops are on piquet, or
+the squadron at the reserve of the outposts, when the men who do not
+at the moment happen to be on patrol or vedette often lie about for
+hours doing nothing. We have then opportunities to take these matters
+in hand in the most practical manner; particularly the former, on
+which shooting in the field so essentially depends, and whose
+importance is so little appreciated by our Cavalry.
+
+The duties in the afternoon can also be much reduced to save time for
+the same purpose. For instance, let me call attention to the waste of
+time involved by lengthy parades for lance exercise. No man can keep
+on at lance practice for an hour at a time. The consequence is that
+most of it is spent in standing easy, and therefore wasted. But the
+object--viz., of gradually strengthening the muscles of the arm and
+making the man handy with the weapon--can be equally well attained by
+a couple of parades for the purpose weekly. Perhaps still better, if
+before every afternoon parade and every mounted duty throughout the
+year the men are exercised with the lance for a few minutes only. In
+this manner the muscles of the arm will develop more rapidly and much
+time will be saved. Similarly, more can be gained by the method of
+imparting the instruction pursued, if attention is restrained to the
+thing that the man must know only, and everything superfluous, such as
+the learning by heart of the names of every portion of the weapon and
+so forth--at any rate with the recruits--is left out, and at the same
+time all such opportunities as occur in stable duty, on the march, in
+the cleaning hour, etc., are made the most of.
+
+Finally, speaking generally, not only is more time than is necessary
+spent on squadron drill, but also more than is advantageous. If one is
+constantly drilling for four weeks at a stretch, that is ample, and
+then there is time for a considerable extension of our shooting
+training; and if the inspection of the squadron is postponed for any
+particular reason, then shooting and field-service days can be
+interpolated, which in itself is a very good thing.
+
+If in these ways time for the elementary training for dismounted work
+and for shooting can be gained, it is still easier to arrange things
+for the foot training of the squadron as a unit. During the drill
+period the pauses to rest the horses which must be granted to them
+can be utilized, and in the field-service exercise the schemes must
+often be framed so as to afford practice in dismounted operations in
+suitable ground. For the technical training of the men it is of
+particular importance that they should be accustomed, with immobile
+horses, to couple (? knee halter) them rapidly, and with mobile horses
+in bringing them up or retiring them.
+
+These two essential practices receive far too little attention in the
+German Cavalry. The chief difficulty of the latter lies in the way in
+which the spare lances which the man cannot hold fast in his hand fly
+backwards and forwards when in rapid motion; and the ease with which a
+lance can be jerked out of the shoe, and then trail on the ground can
+give rise to the gravest disorder, not to mention danger.
+
+It is most desirable that something should be done to remove this
+evil. The best, perhaps, would be to devise some arrangement by which
+each lance could be attached to its own horse. If that is possible,
+then the shoe must be made so deep that the lance cannot be thrown
+out. It is obvious that this problem will not be long in finding a
+solution as soon as attention is directed to its absolute necessity.
+
+The above will suffice to make it abundantly clear that as far as
+concerns the thorough training of the squadron for dismounted purposes
+no serious difficulties exist. These only begin when we come to the
+employment of larger forces, and principally because the Regulations
+give us no point of support for the purpose, whilst our Cavalry
+officers themselves are in no way prepared for this branch of their
+duties. For the employment of the tactical units and the fundamental
+principles governing their use in action we are therefore compelled to
+lean on the Infantry Regulations. But how many of our Cavalry officers
+are sufficiently acquainted with these to employ them practically? How
+is it to be expected that they should be, when nobody expects such
+knowledge of them?
+
+Hence to prepare for the training of the Leaders, officers of all
+ranks should be encouraged, whenever time and opportunity offers, to
+attend the more important tactical exercises of the Infantry. It would
+be better still if a sufficient number of Cavalry officers were to be
+attached--Lieutenants to Companies, senior officers to Battalions and
+Regiments--for suitable periods. But we must be quite clear in our
+minds that in this way we have at most an expedient to meet a period
+of transition, which will not suffice as a permanent remedy.
+
+It can never be considered otherwise than as a grave disadvantage when
+one Arm is compelled to seek the instruction necessary for its
+practical application in War from the Regulations and parade grounds
+of another, and more especially when, as in this case, the principles
+of the Cavalry are by no means applicable without modification to the
+other.
+
+Actually, the peculiarities and the duties of Cavalry render many
+variations from Infantry practice essential which require
+consideration. For instance, the Infantry company is told off in
+three, the dismounted squadron with mobile horses in two, with
+immobile ones in three fractions, which are always very much weaker
+than those of the Infantry, and, therefore, entail entirely different
+methods of husbanding their respective strengths. I can only consider
+it, therefore, as a most pressing need, and one which can no longer
+be delayed, that the Cavalry Regulations should receive the necessary
+expansion to meet the different conditions, and that the practical
+training of the men on foot should be carried on in the same
+systematic way as their preparation for mounted duties.
+
+For these alterations in the Regulations the principles of the Company
+Column tactics must, in my opinion, form the general groundwork. A
+dismounted squadron with immobile horses bring 125, with mobile ones
+about 70, carbines in the line of fire; a regiment, therefore, from
+280 to 500--numbers, therefore, materially smaller than those of a
+company or battalion respectively, and their power in action is
+correspondingly reduced. Nevertheless, it will be well, with regard to
+the conditions of command, to treat the squadron tactically on the
+same footing as the company, and within these limits the principles
+governing extensions, depth and arrangement of the units for attack or
+defence must be laid down clear and distinct in the Regulations.
+
+These principles must be formulated in general on the lines which in
+discussing the question of tactical direction (Book I., Chap. V.) I
+have already attempted to develop. They must distinguish clearly
+between the cases of the detachment acting for itself alone or with
+either or both flanks protected, and lay down what distribution of
+force and apportionment of reserves is of decisive importance, and,
+therefore, requiring special instructions.
+
+The chief stress, in opposition to all previous prescriptions, must
+now be laid on the combat of the regiment and the brigade, as those
+units whose employment will be principally called for in modern War,
+and the principle of the offensive must be steadily kept in view.
+Fights for localities and about defiles require especial attention,
+and further, the conditions must be laid down by Regulation in which
+action is to be engaged in with mobile or immobile horses, and how
+these led horses are to be placed and protected.
+
+The present Regulations pass lightly over these questions, because, as
+I have pointed out, the standpoint from which they view the matter is
+fundamentally different. If, however, the increased importance of
+dismounted action is granted, then these points call for decision, and
+how they are to be dealt with as a matter of principle cannot be left
+to the goodwill of the Leader.
+
+A very important defect in the Regulations lies in the uncertainty it
+allows to exist as to the subdivision of the dismounted squadron, and
+how the skirmishers on dismounting are to form.
+
+According to Section 54 the squadron dismounted is divided into four
+troops of twelve files, or if the number of files does not suffice,
+into three troops. According to Section 87, eight to twelve men form a
+group, two or three groups a troop. In Section 155 the skirmishers of
+a troop when dismounted, with mobile horses, form one group. How many
+'troops' are to be formed is not indicated. 'The skirmishers fall in,
+in front of or by the side of the squadron, arranged as on horseback.'
+When working with immobile detachments, then, according to Section
+156, the skirmishers form in front or by the side of the squadrons in
+two ranks, and in how many groups or troops they are to be told off is
+not specified.
+
+The confusion here cannot be explained away, and its consequences are
+frequently manifested. It must be laid down once for all that with
+mobile horses the dismounted men of a squadron form one troop in four
+groups, or with immobile ones two troops, also of four groups, and
+that they always form up in front of the squadrons, each troop in
+line, and one behind the other. Then everyone should know exactly what
+he has to do. It is altogether a misfortune that the dismounted
+squadron and the squadron on foot parade are two entirely different
+things. The latter is only required for ceremonial, and everything
+relating to it should be consigned to Part IV. of the Regulations
+(ceremonial, etc.); whilst the training of the squadron on foot should
+from the beginning be based on the needs of the squadron dismounted
+for action. Then there would be unity and system in the matter.
+
+Turning now to the practical education in larger units, it is
+necessary that the fundamental principles guiding the distribution of
+the men in attack or defence in the typical kinds of encounter should
+be taught and practised on the drill ground. The corresponding
+positions of the led horses must also be represented. As typical
+situations I would enumerate the following:
+
+Attack on localities, with or without the tendency to outflank.
+
+Attack by surprise, or after preparation.
+
+Defence of a section or of a locality, with known direction of the
+enemy's advance, or when the flanks may be threatened.
+
+Obstinate defence and maintenance of an isolated locality.
+
+Keeping open the entrance of a defile, and its utilization for a
+further offensive or retreat.
+
+Deployment for surprise fire action, in order to disappear again
+immediately.
+
+Combined action of dismounted men with a mounted reserve, to ward off
+an attack or pursue a retreating enemy.
+
+In all these cases we require not only fundamentally different
+methods, but the methods themselves will be different according to
+whether the led horses are mobile or immobile, because in each case
+the strength of the tactical units is an entirely different one.
+
+These more or less elementary exercises, after the squadron
+inspections, both mounted and on foot, have been concluded, must be
+principally carried out in the regiment, which also when dismounted
+remains the true tactical unit of the Cavalry; but they must be
+continued by the brigade, in which the employment of the regiments
+formed side by side--_i.e._, by 'Wings'--must be represented under
+most varying circumstances.
+
+It appears to me that in the present state of our training it is
+exactly these elementary exercises which are the most important,
+because more than any others they are adapted to make clear and
+comprehensible the general conditions of successful fire employment.
+This comprehension, owing to the specifically Cavalry tendencies of
+our training, is in general almost entirely lacking in our Cavalry
+Commanders, so that in this direction the tactical education of our
+officers requires to be built up almost from the ground.
+
+For the rest, these exercises, like the corresponding ones when
+mounted, form only the basis for the true practical training, which it
+is not possible to impart on a drill ground, and requires, as a first
+condition, natural country, with all its changing features. For this
+reason it must be insisted on that a part of the regimental and
+brigade drill season should be spent in the country and on wide open
+spaces, with great variety of topographical expression. Where such are
+not to be had, then we must go to the troop training grounds; and
+hence the desire, above expressed, to extend as far as possible the
+period spent by the troops in the district or on these training
+grounds, and which I have based on the necessity for holding annual
+exercises for the higher units, in which all regiments should take
+part, finds additional support.
+
+Of course, this does not preclude the necessity of utilizing the
+surroundings of the garrisons to their utmost.
+
+As regards the arrangement and nature of these exercises, when working
+on the drill ground they will have to be inserted between the pauses
+in mounted movements necessary to rest the horses, but they must never
+on this account be allowed to be treated as of any less importance.
+When out in the country in larger and continuous movements, this
+opportunity, from the nature of things, will not be available.
+
+But it is precisely on the larger movements, if possible of whole
+Divisions, that the principal stress should be laid. In these the
+fight can be initiated under the most varied conditions, as a
+consequence of the direction of approach, and after its execution
+further operations arising out of the resulting situation can be set
+on foot, which, as we have seen (Book I., Chap. VI.), will generally
+entail the interaction of dismounted men with mounted reserves.
+
+Such exercises must naturally be laid out quite independently, and
+must take rank in the programmes for Brigade and Divisional drills on
+an equal footing with the others. All Leaders must by degrees learn
+to control the whole of this section, and find themselves as much at
+home in every tactical situation on foot as if they were in the
+saddle.
+
+Hence great importance must be laid on the capacity for exercising
+independent resolve in all ranks of the subordinate officers; but,
+above all, they must be made to acquire that relentless tendency to go
+forward which is the very soul of their service, and generally the
+best adapted to its tactical requirements. Officers and men must
+realize that, once dismounted, victory alone can restore to them their
+horses. These latter must be so disposed that the impossibility of
+making use of them to break off the engagement springs in the eyes of
+every man. Only in this way can one get clear ideas: so long as the
+men do not look on their action on foot as in itself something
+serious, but are thinking principally of how to get back to their
+horses, as long as the Leader himself makes his action dependent on
+this possibility, for just so long will the men fail to put their
+whole soul into their work, and we shall obtain only partial results,
+with uncertain handling.
+
+This point of view must be constantly kept in mind throughout the
+training, and every effort be made to habituate the men to work up to
+it. But we shall only then succeed in breaking with the old
+traditions, and in fitting ourselves to meet the changed conditions of
+War, when the superior officers in their inspections attach _as much
+importance to the combat dismounted as they now do to the fight in the
+saddle_, and submit the Leaders to an equally searching and practical
+examination in each.
+
+Amongst these changed conditions we must include the intelligent
+co-operation of the Artillery with the skirmishers, and also of the
+machine-guns, which latter may be expected to play a considerable part
+in defence, and also on occasions requiring the sudden development of
+a great intensity of fire. It is in this connection that lies (Book
+I., Chap. VI.) the chief importance of the Horse Artillery batteries,
+and yet in peace they have practically no opportunity to make
+themselves familiar with its peculiarities.
+
+Instead, we find in the great Cavalry manoeuvres the constantly
+recurring tendency to theatrical display. Batteries accompany the
+formal drill evolutions of the Divisions--a performance which, in my
+opinion, has not the slightest practical value, but only subjects the
+horses to unnecessary exertion, and prevents the Leaders from devoting
+their attention to the really important elements of their
+business--the enemy and the nature of the ground. Against all such
+methods the sharpest protest should be entered.
+
+As long as formal evolutions are being practised, the Artillery has no
+place on the drill ground; the Cavalry only require its services when
+the tactical training commences, and the batteries belong to the
+places they would occupy in War--_i.e._, in the advance guard, or
+before the front. But, above all, they must be given opportunity to
+co-operate in the dismounted engagements, and not merely for their own
+training--though this, of course, is of importance--but principally
+for the education of the Cavalry officers, who must learn to employ
+the power of this Arm tactically, wait for its effect, and utilize it.
+
+That this object can only partially be obtained on the larger
+exercising grounds, and not at all on the drill grounds, is
+sufficiently obvious, and it is only necessary to call to mind the
+attacks on villages, railway-stations, and the like, which are not
+usually found on such places to make the difficulty apparent. The
+keystone, therefore, for our purposes can only be found in the country
+itself, or in manoeuvres, in which the application of every tactical
+form develops naturally, and finds its justification in the general
+scheme of operations, and in which the varying conditions are always
+creating new situations, more or less practical in their nature.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER V
+
+FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES
+
+
+If in the above sections we have dealt almost exclusively with the
+training of the Cavalry for actual combat, the cause lies in the
+nature of things. Victory whether in the shock of 'Masses' or even in
+the minor encounters of patrols, forms so much the foundation of every
+possible success, whether strategical or otherwise, that training with
+this end in view naturally comes first under our consideration.
+
+But as the chief importance of Cavalry no longer lies in its
+application on the battle-field, but rather in the solution of the
+strategical problems encountered in the progress of operations, so its
+training for battle is no longer the one aim and object, but only one
+element of its whole preparation for the field. Field service, its
+true duties in reconnaissance and strategic movements, must all be
+taken into account as factors of equal importance.
+
+I wish to bring this necessity most especially into the foreground,
+since hitherto, and particularly in view of the changed conditions of
+modern Warfare, it has not attracted anything approaching the
+attention it deserves.
+
+What do we practise in the field-service exercises and in the
+manoeuvres beyond the normal Cavalry versus Cavalry encounters?
+Principally, only formal outpost duties in combination with Infantry,
+the smallest incidents of War on the smallest scaled tactical
+scouting, and the participation of small Cavalry bodies in the
+encounter between the combined Arms--all matters which nowadays come
+within the sphere of the Divisional Cavalry; and, indeed, only then
+when the divisions to which they belong, or even smaller bodies, are
+operating independently, for the daily routine of the Divisional
+Cavalry in the enormous Armies of the present day will be on a most
+modest scale. At most in the Army Corps manoeuvres we may get as far
+as the employment of Brigades, and perhaps to the shadowing of an
+enemy's line of advance.
+
+For the most important field of our enterprise, which is to be sought
+in the activity of the Independent Cavalry, all this is of small
+account. The real duties of Cavalry in War are only practised in peace
+on the most confined scale, and often not at all.
+
+Long marches of endurance, independent outposts, attack and defence of
+localities, the forcing of defiles, passage of rivers, etc., which are
+held by an enemy's dismounted men, reconnaissances in the widest
+sense, undertakings against the enemy's communications, pursuit,
+protracted engagements covering retreats, marches with columns and
+convoys, finally, the arrangement and execution of wide strategic
+movements under practical conditions, with accurate computation of
+time and space, the suitable employment of fighting power for the
+attainment of the strategical object, and the best strategic
+introduction of the consciously sought-out combat, all within the
+limits imposed by the magnitude of the masses handled, are matters
+which in future will form the principal sum of all Cavalry activity,
+but find no place in our scheme of education.
+
+Even the Imperial Manoeuvres do not meet the situation, because, in
+the first place, only comparatively few regiments are annually
+affected by them; and in the second, the forces are generally from the
+outset in such close proximity with one another that it is only,
+perhaps, on the first day that a suitable situation for their
+strategic employment may be said to arise at all.
+
+Whilst in this manner our whole training is adopted for conditions
+which in future campaigns can only arise exceptionally, whilst it
+practically ignores the true sphere of action of the Cavalry, we are
+working in a vicious circle of forms and misrepresentations which
+belong to an extinct era of Warfare, and which have long since ceased
+to have any but the smallest connection with the facts of stern
+reality.
+
+That things were no better in the period before the last Wars the
+negative results obtained by our Cavalry in 1866 and 1870 sufficiently
+prove. In no sphere of their action during these campaigns did they
+obtain the results the Arm is really capable of--not because the
+material in the ranks was inferior, but simply and solely because in
+equipment and training they had lagged behind the requirements of the
+time. These experiences should have been to us a serious warning not
+to fall into similar errors a second time; and yet at the present
+there is most serious danger that a future War may again find us
+regarding by far the most important branch of our duties from a
+standpoint which has long since passed away.
+
+The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me of a twofold
+character. In the first place, the tasks accruing to the Arm in War do
+not receive either amongst its own officers, still less amongst those
+of the rest of the Army, their proper appreciation, because in this
+direction guidance and instruction are alike lacking; in the second,
+because most serious difficulties lie in the way of a practical
+adaptation of our training to modern conditions.
+
+In contradistinction to former times, the tasks which await the
+Cavalry lie principally in the sphere of strategical operations, and
+here is the root of our special difficulty.
+
+Great Armies, with their communications, reconnaissances and raids
+under really warlike conditions--that is to say, with their full
+allowance of trains and baggage--extended retreats with beaten troops,
+and the consequent pursuit, can only with difficulty be represented in
+peace, owing to their expense and the consideration necessary to be
+shown to local circumstances; but it is precisely in exercises of this
+description, which might give a really working representation of the
+conditions we shall be called upon to deal with, that circumstances
+leave us entirely deficient.
+
+Considering all these conditions, it must be recognised that an ideal
+method of instruction is practically beyond the bounds of the
+attainable; but for that very reason, in my opinion, we must pursue
+with all energy the practically possible, and for the unattainable
+find the best substitute we can.
+
+The first point which strikes one, and which lies at the bottom of all
+Cavalry undertakings, but in which no real education ever takes place,
+is the conduct of patrols, and particularly of those employed for
+reconnoitring purposes.
+
+Instruction in the matter is certainly universal, and in the writing
+of reports the non-commissioned officers have considerable practice,
+but no uniform or systematic method or fixed principle is observed,
+and the practical performances of the men are subject to no superior
+check. It is left to the Leaders to apply practically their, for the
+most part, very nebulous, theoretical knowledge. The young officer in
+particular is altogether left to his own devices; no one takes the
+trouble to teach him what is essential, and yet he is expected to
+instruct his inferiors. The consequences are what might be
+anticipated. The performances of the patrols in covering distances are
+generally most commendable, but their reports most deficient. Seldom
+is a clear distinction drawn between the essential and the
+non-essential; the most trivial news is forwarded with the same
+expenditure of horses' power as matter of greatest moment; for most
+patrol Leaders find it very difficult, for want of an imagination
+trained by the study of military history, to think themselves into and
+see the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act and
+ride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Most
+information, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner;
+and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situation
+affords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point,
+and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, with
+a proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty change
+is imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundation
+of the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner.
+Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War.
+
+How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers, which forms
+the basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and imparted forms
+the subject of this next section. Here we can only consider what can
+and must be done within the regiments and brigades, and the following
+suggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty.
+
+In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, the
+Regimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commanders
+must take the training in hand. He must begin with a definite
+strategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise corresponding
+schemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood of
+the garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as in
+practice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity in
+which contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what the
+patrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, write
+their reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure.
+
+In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to be
+followed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts of
+exercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completely
+assimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particular
+importance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders never
+lose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations always
+to this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their true
+importance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what time
+the report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of use
+for the special operation.
+
+The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so often
+happened, it arrives too late. This the patrol leader must keep in
+mind throughout his ride, and thence deduce the time at which his
+report must be despatched. He must also not only state clearly and
+precisely what he has seen, but call attention to its probable bearing
+on the operations, and inform his superior as to any peculiarities of
+the ground that may influence his future conduct. The object of the
+ride must be constantly in view, and the report not be overburdened
+with trivialities about the enemy's patrols and the like, which are
+often in War of quite negligible importance.
+
+If the Commanding Officer chooses to take the whole of his officers
+out to these expeditions, he is, of course, free to do so.
+
+The Squadron Commanders now take their subordinates in hand and pass
+on the instruction in the same spirit and manner, or hand over the
+matter to the senior lieutenant, if he has been thoroughly instructed
+for the purpose. In this manner a good uniform system of patrol
+leading based on sound principles can be attained if the Commanding
+Officer and his subordinates take all types of patrol duty into the
+sphere of their practical instruction. The Brigade Commander can use
+his discretion in its supervision, and give any assistance he may
+consider necessary.
+
+For the practical training of the men, the foundation must, of course,
+be found in the squadron. But the teaching must start from constantly
+changing standpoints, and must be systematically carried on in the
+higher Commands, which is at present not the case. For though at times
+such exercises are carried out by the regiments, there is no
+systematic progress, and no consequent development or representation
+of the most important elements, whilst higher up no attempt is even
+made to continue the instruction further. The influence of the
+Brigadier is confined in general to the detail education and drill,
+and though the Division is now and again drilled, it never 'operates'
+in the strategical sense.
+
+As concerns the education of the squadron, this must from the very
+beginning be rooted in modern conditions, which in the first place
+demand the development in the man of the greatest possible
+individuality. War requires this, as well as the gift of grasp and
+resolution even in difficult situations, from every Cavalry soldier,
+from the highest to the lowest. The exercise, however, of such
+qualities can only be demanded from men who bring with them at least a
+certain degree of comprehension for the nature of War, and it is
+therefore of the utmost importance that this comprehension should be
+developed by suitable instruction. This is often sinned against,
+because sufficient attention is not paid to such instruction, and also
+because we still work on out-of-date lines, and without any
+well-defined principles. In my opinion the recruit must not be
+overwhelmed with a whole mass of thoroughly unpractical knowledge.
+
+In this period of education one must limit the scope to only the most
+important and necessary matters, but teach these so that the men
+understand them clearly and thoroughly.
+
+In the latter years one can build out systematically on this
+foundation. Thus I consider it quite unnecessary to harass the recruit
+with long-winded explanations of the military virtues--loyalty,
+obedience, and courage--or with long lists of different salutes to be
+given, the recipients of which never come within his ken. It is quite
+superfluous to teach them the different parts of the lock of the
+carbine and their mutual interaction, all about stable duty and guard
+mounting. Even the theoretical instruction about the organization of
+the Army, treatment of sore backs, horse sickness, etc., can be
+reduced to much smaller dimensions than at present. Stable work and
+guard duties, and so forth, a man learns much quicker and better from
+daily practice. On the other hand, the time gained by curtailing these
+matters must be used most zealously to teach him what he absolutely
+must know for War. That is to say, the simplest principles of Field
+Service, the composition of mixed detachments, practical shooting, and
+the exterior treatment of the carbine. The instruction in Field
+Service, which interests us here the most, can, for the recruits, be
+kept down to very narrow limits. The principles to be observed in
+placing pickets, vedettes, etc., he can very well do without. On the
+other hand, he must know thoroughly those things which he will have to
+do himself--his duty on patrols, or as bearer of a message, or
+orderly, also the general connection of the military conditions
+amongst which he will have to move or to notice amongst the enemy,
+such as organization of the troops, arrangement of the outposts,
+relation of the commands, plan and appearance of entrenchments,
+shelter trenches, gun epaulments, cover, etc.[29]
+
+         [Footnote 29: Instruction with models helps the man quickest;
+         it is very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture
+         of military things.]
+
+He must know, too, that if taken prisoner, he must give no correct
+answers as to anything concerning his own Army.
+
+It is quite possible to awaken the intellectual faculties of the man
+and to develop them even within these narrow limits, for the more
+tersely the facts are stated, and the more thorough the instructions,
+the more is his thinking power stimulated, whereas a mass of material
+to be absorbed merely confuses him. This intellectual pressure of the
+instructor must not, of course, be limited solely to the lesson hour,
+but he must seize every possible opportunity to assert his influence.
+Especial attention is to be directed to habituate the men to carry in
+their minds verbal messages for a considerable period, and then to
+repeat them clearly and concisely. It is of great assistance to the
+intellectual development of the men if they are compelled always to
+express themselves in grammatically complete sentences, instead of in
+broken phrases; but I should consider it as a serious error to attempt
+to teach the recruit the neighbourhood of the garrison, both on the
+map and on the ground. For in this way one deprives the man of one of
+his few opportunities which occur to him during his whole service of
+learning to find his way in unknown country, and thus to develop the
+instinct of finding his way, which requires considerable practice.
+
+That this faculty is one of the most important in War-time for every
+Cavalry soldier can hardly be open to doubt. From the same point of
+view I must enter a protest against the absurd misuse of maps in
+Peace-time. Of course, the men, and particularly the patrol leaders,
+must understand how to read a map and find their way by it, and all
+non-commissioned officers and men out of their first year's service
+must be trained in so doing, but it is altogether impractical, and
+therefore a bad preparation for war, if in the interests of better
+manoeuvre results maps are issued in uncounted numbers even on the
+larger scales, so that not only every patrol leader, but every
+orderly, can obtain one for a couple of pence. In War, and
+particularly in an enemy's country, such extravagance in their issue
+is obviously out of the question.
+
+The education of the non-commissioned officers must also be
+systematically set in hand. They should be divided, according to their
+intelligence and performances, in different groups--two will generally
+suffice--and the abler men should not only receive instruction for the
+higher branches of their duties, but must also be rationally taught
+how to teach others. The non-commissioned officers' school must also
+receive thorough attention; if it is not conducted seriously, it
+involves a scandalous waste of time, but if the men receive a really
+earnest and stimulating instruction, it helps most materially in their
+intellectual development, and thus reacts most favourably on their
+military capacity.
+
+As concerns the practical exercises of the squadron, these must, as
+far as possible, cut themselves free from the spirit of minor tactics,
+and work as directly as they can towards the requirements of War on a
+great scale. The destruction of railways and bridges, service on
+requisitioning duties, etc., must naturally continue to be practised;
+for though in spirit they belong to minor tactics, they are also
+required in great Wars. But, above all, one must break with the old
+one-sided schemes of outpost squadron--officers and non-commissioned
+officers, posts and vedettes--and the whole subject must be treated on
+wider lines more in accordance with the changing requirements of
+active service. The different purposes for which localities are held
+and utilized in different manners, the use of woods, and waves of the
+ground, must all be drawn most thoroughly into the scope of the
+exercises; and whilst still at squadron work the men must be made
+clearly to understand the difference between mixed outposts and those
+of Independent Cavalry, and the chief importance of their whole
+training in this branch of their duty must be laid on the latter,
+which is even nowadays not yet sufficiently the case. Further, there
+must be thorough training in duties of security and reconnoitring at
+night, and in particular of the defence of cantonments against
+nocturnal attacks.
+
+In general, it must be clearly understood that all squadron training
+can only be elementary, and hence must be regarded as a stepping-stone
+towards the whole field-service training. Where this is left
+altogether to the squadrons, the men never have the opportunity of
+becoming acquainted with the conditions of time and space which limit
+their action when in large bodies. Continuous exercises also, always
+in the same units, lead only too easily to empty repetition and many
+misunderstandings. The Squadron Field Service training must,
+therefore, be limited in time, and as soon as it is completed it must
+be continued in the regiment, and where the conditions at all
+allow--_i.e._, where the garrisons are not too far apart--it must
+culminate in brigade work.
+
+The 'training'--_i.e._, the condition of the horses-must by this time
+have made such progress that marches of twenty to thirty miles for the
+main body are well within their power. Here a wide and profitable
+field opens for the Brigade Commander, but it is important in every
+case--security, screening, reconnaissance, raid, or surprise--to bring
+out systematically and clearly the essential difference of procedure
+required, so that all grades of Leaders learn to realize the
+fundamental distinction which exists between these various forms of
+their several duties.
+
+It is also equally important that in each Command operations in
+several detachments, the regulation of their marching speed, their
+combined action in the fight, the proper working of the arrangements
+for collecting information or transmitting orders, should be practised
+again and again till certainty in their interaction is secured.
+
+It is further necessary to call attention to the necessity, in the
+interests of a prudent economy of one's forces, to arrange the patrol
+service systematically, not only as regards the sphere of action
+allotted to each, but also as to the time of their departure.
+
+Thus, in the march of a single body, the duty of attending to its
+security may be assigned to the troops themselves, whilst the
+reconnoitring task is allotted by the officer directing the
+operations; or, in the case of separate bodies, that each receives its
+own particular scouting mission, with which, then, the Director
+refrains from interfering. Otherwise it may easily happen that patrols
+are despatched for the same purpose by different Commanders, with a
+corresponding waste of power and the risks of leaving gaps in the
+whole line.
+
+The Commanders of mixed detachments should also make this need of
+systematic procedure clear to themselves, and either leave the whole
+duty of reconnaissance in the hands of the Cavalry, or if they elect
+to retain certain portions of the work in their own hands they should
+inform the Cavalry Commander of the fact, and not interfere afterwards
+with his arrangements, or fail to keep him acquainted with the
+measures they have themselves taken.
+
+The first course is correct in principle, and will always give the
+best results when a competent Cavalry officer is kept sufficiently
+acquainted with the views of his superior, and made personally
+responsible for results.
+
+Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms,
+these, too, must lead into different paths from those at present
+pursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry for
+reconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalry
+itself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance,
+except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization and
+development of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinion
+when viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalry
+with companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all,
+and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important to
+secure practice for the troops in judging the appearance of
+considerable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position,
+and thence deducing their probable numerical strength.
+
+The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted a
+scale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and by
+arrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often be
+made. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade to
+further the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, although
+such exercises can in no way replace the actual manoeuvring of large
+bodies.
+
+It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training of
+the Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in the
+strategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units.
+Even the manoeuvres, important as they undoubtedly are, can never
+replace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing of equal
+importance with the great drill practices of the higher units, since
+the strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander of the Army
+depends on its intelligent handling in this particular field, and it
+is here that the difficulties to be overcome are especially great.
+
+Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of the
+several problems is to be produced.
+
+It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible,
+trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should be
+employed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents;
+otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of under-estimating
+the difficulties with which in real War we shall have to contend. But to
+guard against this self-deception should be the end and object of all
+our efforts.
+
+It will, therefore, be necessary to calculate distance and the width
+of areas to be swept over, with reference to modern conditions, and
+not to work on the scale that sufficed us in France in 1870. The
+telegraph must also be taken into account, and it must be strictly
+insisted on that it is only to be used for such reports and in such
+cases in which it would be available on service. It should, therefore,
+be laid down beforehand which side is to be considered as in an
+enemy's country. For the representation of following portions of the
+Army, flag columns and peace garrisons may be employed, as this is of
+the utmost importance for the systematic practice of the patrol
+service.
+
+The formation of territorial Cavalry Inspections and Sub-Inspections,
+already advocated above, would give the necessary foundation for our
+purposes. After finding the Divisional Cavalry necessary on a War
+strength, the remaining regiments in their several districts could be
+formed in Divisions and Corps of always varying composition in order
+to carry out Independent Cavalry manoeuvres.
+
+To practise the participation of the other Arms, corresponding
+arrangements with the adjacent Corps Commanders could be made, so that
+their annual manoeuvres could work in with the Cavalry scheme, but the
+strategic side should have the preference. Operations would not always
+culminate in a great Cavalry engagement, but a skilful conduct of the
+manoeuvres in practical country would generally insure such encounters
+without too great a charge for agricultural compensation.
+
+I do not believe that such a scheme, though it would certainly mean a
+complete break with established Routine, would materially increase the
+cost of the manoeuvres. The damage, now disseminated by the many
+regiments without any corresponding gain to their efficiency, would
+now be concentrated on the same district, but the gain to the Arm
+itself, as well as for the whole Army, would be both decisive and
+epoch-making.
+
+Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seems
+to me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly count
+on seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile we
+must search for expedients.
+
+From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the period
+allotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such a
+degree that Field-Service days can be interposed between the drill
+days, in which at least the combined action of masses within the
+limits of Field-Service exercises can be practised.
+
+The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrifice
+a part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in the
+interest of the proposed strategic manoeuvres, and whether the
+advantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any rate
+partially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to a
+certain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up our
+minds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the present
+exercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed in
+groups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carried
+out without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are so
+managed that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters,
+during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very small
+cost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not at
+all necessary to carry them through to their culmination in an
+engagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, when
+necessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery for
+reconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation,
+the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonable
+limits.
+
+An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regiments
+in Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those in
+Saarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forces
+are constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by which
+each element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screen
+covering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night the
+points at which they are actually quartered. The distances of the
+places named one from another are such that they fairly represent a
+possible situation in War, and a single day's march might well bring
+them into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could easily be found
+in the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and the Infantry in
+the respective garrisons might represent the heads of the following
+Armies' columns without undue interference with their programme of
+training. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons only per
+regiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train, the point
+being not so much the number of such waggons provided as the service
+loading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night preceding
+the march, outposts could be established, and the service of
+exploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercise
+for the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low cost
+and with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally be
+conducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the example
+shows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easily
+organized.[30]
+
+         [Footnote 30: Taking into account these and similar demands
+         on the Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the
+         time has not come to attach to them permanently officers of
+         the General Staff. Every increase in the number of these
+         officers employed in peace is a great advantage for War,
+         because the War formations require far more Staff Officers to
+         fill the new positions created on mobilization than are
+         employed in peace--a very serious disadvantage. I consider it
+         absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry
+         should be provided with a permanent Staff.]
+
+Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into account
+the numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in future
+Warfare, it would be a great gain to the Arm if in the manoeuvres, in
+which its action in combination with the other Arms should be taught,
+this point of view was brought more into the foreground.
+
+Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Arms
+should be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather is
+whether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; the
+importance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background,
+and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses.'
+Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficiently
+practised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising the
+large units are far more difficult to find.
+
+I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms if
+present Brigade manoeuvres, with all their superannuated customs, were
+abolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps manoeuvres. The
+Cavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its point
+of view these manoeuvres could be made far more practical, and it
+would be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in accordance
+with reality.
+
+It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry should
+have opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action on
+a grand scale. At present these only arise in the manoeuvres with
+mixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry manoeuvres they are
+difficult of representation.
+
+The Director of the manoeuvres can also do much to make the operations
+instructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the interests of
+all engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon the Cavalry
+are kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens that patrols
+are despatched at far too late an hour to make it possible for their
+reports to arrive in time. Commanders, again, frequently wish to be
+informed as to the exact position of every battalion on the other
+side, although they generally know his total force with accuracy, or
+they want to know the exact strength of the Garrison holding a certain
+village or locality, as if Cavalry could under any circumstances
+supply such information; and if at night no sketch of the enemy's
+outpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are held to have failed
+in their duty. All these demands are, in my opinion, entirely
+unpractical; in War one never has such precise information, and no
+rational man dreams of wasting the strength of his Cavalry in
+endeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere remnants of
+the Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme case when
+perhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly unpractical to
+require under all circumstances complete information as to the
+progress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is impossible,
+unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not merely are
+such demands unpractical, but they exercise a most prejudicial effect,
+for too accurate and too detailed information gets the Generals into
+bad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is well-nigh ruined.
+Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men must not be afraid to
+keep well up to the enemy, and bring back intelligence even out of the
+zone of his fire; but, generally, reliable observations are only made
+out of range. The Cavalry must learn principally to judge the enemy's
+arrangements from a distance; they must direct their attention to the
+essential only, and not waste their time in unnecessary side issues.
+If justice is to be done to these requirements, it is quite impossible
+to collect all the information the Generals so frequently require.
+Thus they get in the habit of observing in an unpractical manner, and
+the whole of this most important branch of their education suffers
+accordingly. So much is this the case that nowadays the patrol leaders
+often exchange mutual confidences to one another, as it is practically
+impossible, owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain the
+required information otherwise, and they consider it better to get it
+in this manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats of
+riding.
+
+Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the training
+when kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates.
+
+Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic element
+in which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is the
+constant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of the
+enemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning element
+in which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work,
+and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in our
+Peace-time training.
+
+
+
+
+CHAPTER VI
+
+THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS
+
+
+The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the
+various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions
+of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon
+the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an
+absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready
+to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of
+the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony
+with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods
+of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able
+to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with
+swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in
+addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess
+inexhaustible activity of mind and body.
+
+If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders
+of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified
+in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental
+qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various
+problems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increased
+amount of military knowledge and executive ability.
+
+The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry
+engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of
+the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above,
+and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole
+situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such
+moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education
+which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness,
+and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the
+great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with
+accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of
+an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results
+deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by
+Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a
+large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be
+reported--deductions will not be drawn. There will be no
+discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the
+Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to
+the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what
+it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform.
+They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce
+the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to
+divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to
+determine the most important points and directions in which to follow
+up any available clue.
+
+If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, he
+should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to
+determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point
+to direct his further advance.
+
+If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to
+decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their
+subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other
+direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest
+importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in
+face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.
+
+Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all
+points to the same conclusion--viz., that a comprehensive military
+education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the
+Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The
+history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable
+examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the
+future.
+
+Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only--the point was
+to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or
+were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose
+doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence,
+seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would
+have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for
+the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction
+in which the troops they saw were moving--a matter of most vital
+importance--or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or
+reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were
+all moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily have
+ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus,
+because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led
+to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence--the
+actual position of the French right flank--could not be determined
+until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire
+misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have
+repeated themselves times without number.
+
+When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable
+information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a
+proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is
+of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently
+guarantee their competence.
+
+The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is
+on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these
+schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the
+more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry
+Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the
+practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with
+nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training.
+Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details,
+which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the
+whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and
+in the few great manoeuvres in which an Officer might find an
+opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in
+the foundation necessary to make full use of it.
+
+The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted to the needs
+of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find himself in
+situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for their
+solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military
+authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical
+and practical education.
+
+The latter could best be provided for in connection with the
+development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt
+with above. The former--_i.e._, the scientific side--could be most
+adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of
+the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for
+the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have
+spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their
+own units.
+
+If on the broader foundations of the military sciences--principally
+those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and
+Tactics--thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by
+practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the
+training were modified in conformity with the views therein already
+expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst
+our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs
+only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be
+achieved.
+
+Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing
+School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of
+Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to
+the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably
+to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides.
+
+So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, we must
+strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our existing
+educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no delay.
+
+We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers'
+training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they
+are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical
+relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an
+enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the
+other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given
+strategical situation.
+
+All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.
+
+One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual
+horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every
+circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert
+force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how
+to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre
+before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results
+than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.
+
+Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other
+soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress
+of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men
+most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.
+
+Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard
+of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the
+remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the
+unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the exercises in
+Field-Service duties, in manoeuvres and Cavalry exercises, always
+provided that these are all conducted in conformity with the spirit of
+modern operations. But since we have seen this practical duty, as at
+present carried on, nowhere meets the above conditions, we must find a
+supplement to it by recourse to systematic training in Field-Service
+rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for which, of course, the necessary
+funds must be provided.
+
+These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through
+each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being
+enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.
+
+But they will only then possess value and importance when based on
+connected military situations arising from the operations of modern
+Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution
+of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their
+mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own
+Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is
+necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he
+has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me,
+therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with
+these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all
+interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever
+placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate
+conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations,
+to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the
+framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently
+trivial in themselves, can mount up in the mass until they may
+jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.
+
+The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider
+becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative
+importance of each individual link in the chain.
+
+
+
+
+CONCLUSION
+
+
+If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief
+results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:
+
+The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen
+materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced
+into the conduct of modern War--viz., those due to changes in the
+composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc.
+Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the
+battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.
+
+Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal
+importance. Great results--whether strategical or tactical--can only
+be obtained by the employment of 'Masses.'
+
+The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both
+organic, strategic, and tactical.
+
+The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions,
+have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has
+remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence
+we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it
+must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of
+which the following are the most important items:
+
+Increase in the price paid for our remounts.
+
+Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, on the
+lines of our existing and well-tried organization.
+
+Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically
+equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.
+
+Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in
+peace and War.
+
+Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.
+
+Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding
+increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true
+quick-firer.
+
+Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the
+supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary
+strategical mobility.
+
+Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both
+individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the
+horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.
+
+Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field
+service, to fit us for employment in 'Masses,' and to meet the new
+strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must
+be taken into account.
+
+Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only
+simplification in many details, but the addition of sections
+developing the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the several
+units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action,
+and more precise formulation of tactical principles.
+
+Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance,
+security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service
+regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where
+practicable.
+
+A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers;
+creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on
+scientific principles.
+
+Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts,
+to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions),
+which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.
+
+Annual Cavalry Manoeuvres.
+
+Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare.
+
+This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a
+few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a
+single stroke of the pen--indeed, it needs a considerable degree of
+optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am
+equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the
+extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our
+minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall
+short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.
+
+Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be
+attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms,
+safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain
+victory.
+
+Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races
+which will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' which
+seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but
+rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the
+evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of
+force--fighting power--which conditions the development of all other
+social interests. If we possess the 'force,' the rest will follow.
+Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our power the
+utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our own minds
+as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in any other
+'act of human intercourse,' is the 'best' ever reached by mortal
+executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of
+destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made
+the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.
+
+In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us,
+unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart
+and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be
+encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we
+shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: _Per aspera
+ad Astra_.
+
+
+
+
+INDEX
+
+
+  Action, typical case of Cavalry, 225;
+    example of Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
+
+  Advance, time to be selected for, 32;
+    rate of, 121;
+    of enemy marks period for pushing forward, 27
+
+  Advantages, in War, must be fought for, 29
+
+  Ammunition, carbine, insufficiency of, 175, 179;
+    increase in amount of, for practice, 250
+
+  Ammunition columns, special, required for Cavalry, 179
+
+  Armies, change of character of modern, 3
+
+  Art of War, new conditions in, 3;
+    their effect on Cavalry, 9;
+    result of first engagement of overwhelming importance, 12
+
+  Artillery, effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, 15;
+    power of, can be over-estimated, 54;
+    support of dismounted Cavalry by, 60, 100;
+    protection of, 95;
+    Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action, 100;
+    position for, 101;
+    one battery per brigade recommended, 179;
+    quick-firing guns wanted, 180;
+    should be attacked from flank, 234;
+    co-operation in Cavalry training, 263
+
+  Attack, stereotyped forms of, prohibited, 72;
+    on flank when advisable, 78;
+    simultaneous, on front and flank, 79;
+    'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during, 91;
+    by dismounted troops, 99;
+    change of direction of, when permissible, 116;
+    importance of vehemence of onslaught, 232;
+    formation for, against Infantry and Artillery, 234;
+    distribution and duties of dismounted men in, 259
+
+
+  Baggage-train should be represented at manoeuvres, 279
+
+  Bapaume, Battle of, 57
+
+  Barley as forage, 206
+
+  Battle-field, place of Cavalry in, 81, 84;
+    case of Mars la Tour, 82;
+    best formation for, 85;
+    decided by circumstances of case, 82, 85;
+    simple formations alone applicable on, 225;
+    Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
+
+  Beans as a ration, 205
+
+  Bit and bridoon, merits of, 192, 197
+
+  Bivouac, disadvantages of, 122, 125
+
+  Breaking in. See 'Training'
+
+  Bridging material, sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with
+    small streams, etc., 175
+
+  Bridoon. See 'Bit'
+
+  Brigade, highest unit for drill purposes, 238
+
+  Bugle calls, when allowable, 69;
+    value of, 230;
+    regimental calls, 230;
+    movements to be practised without, 236
+
+
+  Cantonments, advantages of providing, 125
+
+  Carbine, method of attachment, 176;
+    improved pattern needed, 177
+
+  Cartridges, method of carrying, 177
+
+  Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,' 7;
+    during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878, 7;
+    experiences of the past insufficient, 8;
+    proportion to other Arms, 10;
+    importance of, greater than formerly, 11;
+    new tasks for, 14;
+    actual fighting value diminished, 16;
+    best strategic value increased, 16;
+    public opinion at fault, 16;
+    exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged, 16;
+    German organization of, requires reform, 17;
+    clear conception of requirements during each phase needed, 17;
+    advance during mobilization deprecated, 23;
+    should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins, 28;
+    importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement, 31;
+    in what cases the principal Arm, 37;
+    Divisional, 38;
+    Independent, 38;
+    fire action of, during battles, 55;
+    greater tactical cohesion than Infantry, 58;
+    scope of, enormously increased, 59;
+    importance of good leadership, 63;
+    place of, in line of battle, 81, 84;
+    formation of, on battle-field, 85;
+    factors determining strategic employment of, 126;
+    difficulty of supplying reinforcements, 151;
+    augmentation of German, necessary, 153;
+    and not to be postponed till mobilization, 158;
+    training of, requires reforming, 181 _et seq._;
+    Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs, 257;
+    tasks for, in future War not properly appreciated, 268
+
+  Change of formation during action, 69;
+    from 'rendezvous' to 'attack,' 79
+
+  Charge, the, when preferable to fire action, 52;
+    example of Waterloo, 52;
+    position of Commander during, 65;
+    choice of moment for, 87;
+    cohesion during, 221;
+    speed of, 221
+
+  Chargers. See 'Horses'
+
+  Chotusitz, Battle of, 83
+
+  Civilians, possible participation in future Wars by, 10;
+    armed resistance by, to be suppressed, 33
+
+  Column, regimental, value of, for War, 227;
+    squadron, disadvantages of, 228
+
+  Combined action, factors essential to success of, 68
+
+  Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments, 45;
+    must be under a single leader, 46;
+    efficiency of, more important with Cavalry than Infantry, 63
+
+  Commander, qualities needed in a good, 64, 286;
+    place of, before and during charges, 65;
+    when working with other Arms, 66;
+    choice of formation to be left to, 72, 76, 77;
+    must be informed of progress of Infantry combat, 86;
+    qualities required in covering a retreat, 86;
+    in dismounted action, 93;
+    must decide as to extension in strategy, 106;
+    and concentration in combat, 106;
+    to be kept informed of general situation, 111, 117;
+    must organize his own reconnaissance, 120;
+    personal supervision of front by, 121;
+    forage reserve to be formed by, 131;
+    to arrange times for drill, 215;
+    but not to deviate from Regulations, 220;
+    importance of handling 'masses,' 216.
+    See also 'Leader'
+
+  Commencement of War, essence of all Cavalry action during, 26;
+    obtaining intelligence during, 27
+
+  Communications, increased liability to interruption of, 13;
+    greater opportunities for Cavalry to interfere with, 14;
+    especially after victory, 14;
+    to be maintained with Headquarters on field of battle, 67
+
+  Comparison between Cavalry and Infantry, 59
+
+  Concentration, question of disturbing enemy's communications during, 19;
+    views of other Powers on this, 20;
+    value of raids during, 20;
+    premature commitment of Cavalry during, 24;
+    reasons against sacrificing Cavalry during, 25;
+    defensive duties during, 26;
+    advantages of pushing forward during enemy's, 28;
+    of force for raids, 35;
+    of considerable masses, when essential, 44;
+    for combat, 106, 108, 109
+
+  Corn, amount of, to be carried by Cavalry, 130;
+    author's experiment, 203
+
+  Coulmiers, Battle of, 86
+
+  'Critique' after field days, 243
+
+  Cyclists, value of, in conjunction with Cavalry, 22, 147;
+    circulation of intelligence by, 39;
+    should enable Divisional Cavalry to be economized, 42;
+    further Regulations required, 146;
+    limitations of, 148;
+    to be attached to Cavalry, 178
+
+
+  Deception of enemy, means towards, 119
+
+  Defects in horses, correction of, 199
+
+  Defence of villages, 97
+
+  Defensive duties at commencement of War, 26;
+    combat, 92;
+    'immobile' detachments during, 92;
+    action, breaking off a, 94;
+    action, duties of dismounted men during, 259
+
+  Despatch riders, 138, 145
+
+  Detachments, economy in use of, 38;
+    reports from, to Headquarters, 111;
+    outflanking, during attack, 232
+
+  Direction, change of, during action, 117
+
+  Dismounted action, increased importance of, 49;
+    when desirable in attack, 49;
+    when inevitable, 50;
+    Sheridan's Cavalry in, 51;
+    during rearguard actions, 52;
+    during general engagements, 55;
+    examples of Fredericksburg and Five Forks, 55;
+    in South African War, 56;
+    Franco-German War, 57;
+    'mobile' and 'immobile' horses, 91;
+    in defensive combat, 92, 93;
+    tactical distribution of men in, 96;
+    'Wing' or 'Line' systems, 96;
+    in defence of villages, 97 _et seq._;
+    in attack, 99;
+    training for, 247;
+    importance of, not sufficiently appreciated, 248 _et seq._;
+    not to be confined to the defensive, 249;
+    recruits' course, 250;
+    Regulations as to, require expansion, 257 _et seq._;
+    as important as fighting in the saddle, 262
+
+  Dispersion of troops for raids, 35;
+    for screening and security, 106, 109
+
+  Divisional Cavalry defined, 38;
+    duties of, 39;
+    apportionment of, 41;
+    as little as possible should be retained for Infantry Divisions, 42;
+    reconnaissance duties of, 141;
+    security duties of, 144
+
+  Divisions of Cavalry, maintenance of, during peace, 161;
+    present strength insufficient, 165;
+    permanent creation of, not advisable, 167
+
+  'Double-column' formation, when recommended, 80, 229
+
+  'Drei Treffen Taktik,' 73
+
+  'Dressur' detachment, 190
+
+  Drill, shortening of season for, 198;
+    importance of Squadron and Regimental, 214 _et seq._;
+    merits of Brigade and Divisional, 215 _et seq._;
+    ceremonial to be separated from practical, 237;
+    Brigade, the highest unit for formal, 238
+
+
+  Education, military, for man and horse, 186;
+    tactical, for troops generally, 213 _et seq._;
+    of recruits, 272;
+    of non-commissioned ranks, 275;
+    higher, of officers, 286 _et seq._
+
+  Efficiency of troops essential to good leadership, 126
+
+  Enemy, advance of, marks period for pushing forward Cavalry, 27;
+    Cavalry of, must be beaten off field to obtain information, 30;
+    outposts of, to be broken through, 33;
+    communications, of, to be attacked, 33
+
+  Equipment for bridging and telegraphs, 174
+
+  Equitation, Staff for, 193;
+    proposed new procedure, 200;
+    school of, in Hanover, 290
+
+  Exercises to develop 'tactical principles,' 236;
+    of larger formations than Brigades, 239;
+   'field-service' exercises, 240 _et seq._
+
+  Expediency, the highest ideal of strategy, 47
+
+  Extension of front when advisable, 107;
+    in action when favourable, 240 _et seq._
+
+
+  Field-firing, increased importance of, 251;
+    scheme for, 252
+
+  'Field-service' exercises, 218;
+    nature of, 240;
+    ground for, 239;
+
+  Cavalry acting independently, 240;
+    Cavalry in combination with other Arms, 241;
+    existing deficiencies in, 266
+
+  Fire action often imperative nowadays, 47;
+    occasions when it will decide the day, 50;
+    General Lee's capitulation, 51;
+    South African War, 56;
+    Franco-German War, 57
+
+  Firearms, increased range of, 36;
+    better class of, needed by Cavalry, 58
+
+  Flank attack, when advisable, 78, 79;
+    after victory, 83;
+    during charge, 233
+
+  Flanks of enemy to be worked round to obtain information, 29
+
+  Forage, reserve of, 131;
+    amount to be carried on horses, 169;
+    author's experiment, 203
+
+  Force necessary to be employed in various circumstances, 36
+
+  Formation for attack, 36;
+    change of, during action, 69;
+    latitude to be allowed to Commander, 76, 77;
+    merits of 'double column,' 80;
+    'mass' when suitable, 81;
+    on battle-field, 85;
+    of dismounted men in action, 96;
+    in defence of villages, 96;
+    in dismounted attack, 100;
+    best, suitable for War, 226;
+    to be avoided, 226;
+    regimental column, 227
+
+  Four-squadron regiments, 154
+
+  Frederick the Great on length of marches, 122
+
+  Front, extension and concentration of, 107
+
+  Frontal attack against Infantry and Artillery, 235
+
+
+  Galloping, exercises in, 209
+
+  German Cavalry, numerically inadequate, 151;
+    expedients for augmenting, 153;
+    proposed territorial organization, 167
+
+  Gravelotte, example of faulty reconnaissance reports, 288
+
+  Ground, value of tactical advantage of, 78;
+    acquisition of, for field-training, 239
+
+
+  Halts on march, 128
+
+  Headquarters, reports to be sent to, from detachments, 111
+
+  Horsemanship, 184
+
+  Horses, demands on, 87;
+    'mobile' or 'immobile,' 91;
+    position for led, 93 _et seq._;
+    protection of, 95;
+    rest for, 122;
+    security of, during rest, 122, 124;
+    bivouac on march, 122;
+    on outpost, 123;
+    importance of care bestowed on, 123, 127;
+    excessive demands on, 128;
+    shortage of, in Germany, 152;
+    'augmentation,' 155;
+    'untrained,' of small use, 158;
+    increased demands on, 181;
+    training of, 185 _et seq._;
+    English thoroughbreds, 187;
+    Prussian, 187;
+    old, 194;
+    food for, increase of, 203;
+    endurance of, 202;
+    feeding, author's experiment in, 203;
+    galloping powers, 209;
+    weight to be put on, 212
+
+
+  Increase of German Cavalry needed, 158
+
+  Independence, when to be given to subordinates, 68
+
+  'Independent Cavalry' defined, 38;
+    conditions which determine allotment of, 42;
+    in what cases it should be concentrated on decisive lines, 43;
+    security duties of, 144
+
+  Individual superiority essential for patrols, 31
+
+  Infantry, effect on Cavalry of extended zone of fire of, 9;
+    difficult for Cavalry to encounter in close bodies, 10;
+    when once broken offer great opportunity to Cavalry, 15;
+    defence of villages and woods by, more difficult now, 15;
+    compared with Cavalry, 59
+
+  Initial success, great importance of, 12
+
+  Initiative, value of, 115
+
+  Inspections, new scheme of, for recruits and schools, 200;
+    importance of thorough, 246
+
+  Inspector-General of Cavalry, position of, 282 and footnote
+
+  Intelligence indispensable at commencement of War, 27;
+    spaces between enemy's columns to be penetrated to obtain, 27;
+    when more important than security, 28;
+    circulation of, 39;
+    during progress of action, 40;
+    experience of 1870, 40;
+    to be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through
+      usual channel, 45
+
+
+  Lance-exercises, 254;
+    better attachment of, necessary, 255
+
+  Leader, importance of-independence of, in combined action, 68, 76;
+    more initiative to be given to, 73;
+    to be careful about his horses, 87;
+    duty when covering a retreat, 88;
+    modern requirements in a good, 89, 90;
+    to be kept informed of the general situation, 111, 117;
+    clearness of intention, 116;
+    must organize his own intelligence, 117;
+    capacity of, 126;
+    of great Cavalry masses, 286
+
+  Led horses, 91;
+    place for, 93, 94;
+    in dismounted practice, 259
+
+  Lines--three-line system, 73
+
+  Locality, faculty of finding way in unknown, 274
+
+  Lunging rein, 188
+
+
+  Manoeuvres, Brigade and Divisional, little criterion of work in War, 42;
+    trotting and galloping at, 210;
+    weight to be carried at, 210;
+    movements which are of use for War, 226;
+    theatrical display in great Cavalry, 263;
+    deficiencies in existing, 266;
+    Imperial, 267;
+    baggage train to be represented at, 279;
+    limitations of telegraphs at, 279;
+    of Brigades to be abolished in favour of Divisional and Corps, 283;
+    limitation of demands on Cavalry at, 284
+
+  Maps, misuse of, 274
+
+  Marches, flanking detachments to, 121;
+    length of, 122;
+    endurance of horses on, 127;
+    excessive lengths of, 128;
+    average lengths of, 128;
+    trotting and halts on, 128
+
+  Mars la Tour, 82, 83, 86, 225 (footnote)
+
+  'Mass' when suitable, 81, 82
+
+  Masses, training of Cavalry in large, 214, 215;
+    necessity for bringing Cavalry together frequently in, 245
+
+  Maxim guns with Cavalry, 178
+
+  Messengers, employment of, to be limited, 129
+
+  Mobility, essential in surprise actions, 118;
+    German Cavalry deficient in, 169;
+    of supply waggons, 173
+
+  Mounted Reserve, duties of, 95;
+    strength of, 96
+
+  Movements most suitable for battle-field, 226;
+    to be avoided, 226;
+    to be practised on simple warnings, 236
+
+  Musketry, importance of knowledge of, by officers, 253;
+    judging distances, 253
+
+
+  Napoleon on length of Cavalry marches, 122
+
+  Narbonne, General von Pelet, proposals of, 155
+
+  Numbers alone can prevail in victory or in covering retreat, 36;
+    give opportunities of dismounted action, 57
+
+
+  Oats, 205
+
+  Observation of masses of enemy's army by officers patrol, 31;
+    during combat, 40
+
+  Offensive against Infantry, Cavalry capable of taking the, 60
+
+  Officers of Cavalry have better knowledge of their men than in
+      Infantry, 59;
+    importance of training of, 64;
+    increased importance of knowledge of musketry, 253;
+    to be attached to Infantry for instruction, 256;
+    higher education of, 286 _et seq._;
+    training in horsemanship of, 291
+
+  Officers patrols, when necessary, 31
+
+  Orderlies to be limited, 128
+
+  Orders, simplicity essential in, 68;
+    how to be transmitted in the field, 69;
+    by bugle call, 69;
+    verbal, 69;
+    to be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates, 112;
+    importance of clearness in, 116
+
+  Organization of German Cavalry unchanged, 17;
+    requires reform, 17;
+    must be elastic, 47;
+    example of 1870, 47;
+    also of Napoleon, 48;
+    of German Cavalry to be by territorial districts, 167
+
+  'Outer lines,' advantages of, 78
+
+  Outflanking tactics, when undesirable, 53;
+    detachments, work of, during charge, 232
+
+  Outposts, necessity for breaking through enemy's, 33;
+    fixed rules for, impossible, 126
+
+
+  Patrols, causes of possible danger in the future, 10;
+    breaking up of enemy's communications by officers, 22;
+    must ascertain changes in enemy's initial dispositions, 25;
+    must protect frontier districts from raids, 25;
+    must avoid becoming desperately involved, 26;
+    superiority in individual patroller essential, 31;
+    defeat of enemy's, necessary, 31;
+    'reconnoitring' distinct from 'security' patrols, 133;
+    strength of, 136;
+    duties of commander, 136;
+    transmission of despatches by, 138;
+    must report to Headquarters as well as through ordinary channel, 140;
+    'tactical,' 143;
+    'security,' 143;
+    screening by, 144;
+    Regulations need amendment, 145;
+    training for scouting basis of all reconnaissance instruction, 269;
+    suggestion as to instruction, 270
+
+  Place on battle-field of Cavalry, 84, 85
+
+  Prague, Battle of, 83
+
+  'Principles,' tactical, of Cavalry opposed to Cavalry, 231;
+    of Cavalry opposed to Infantry and Artillery, 234
+
+  Prisoners, value of capturing, during enemy's mobilization, 24
+
+  Protection of main force, steps required differ from those for
+      obtaining information, 29;
+    opposite views held, 29
+
+  Pursuit of beaten enemy imperative, 84;
+    methods of, 51;
+    dismounted action during, 51;
+    Waterloo, 52;
+    wars of 1866 and 1870, 84;
+    duties during, 88;
+    to be practised on a grand scale, 283
+
+
+  Quick-firing guns, employment of 180
+
+
+  Raids, value of, on outbreak of War, 20;
+    to exploit enemy's resources, 34;
+    indispensable element in future, 34;
+    depend on rapidity and surprise, 34;
+    and on concentration of force at night-time, 35;
+    dispersion during, 35
+
+  Rapidity essential in raids, 34;
+    and in dismounted attack, 99
+
+  Rations, emergency, for horses, 174;
+    author's experiment with forage, 203 _et seq._
+
+  Rearguard actions, to be practised on a grand scale, 283
+
+  Reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry necessary, 7;
+    rendered more difficult by range of modern firearms, 10;
+    and by smokeless powder, 10;
+    value of intensified, 12;
+    must be a separate service from screening, 31;
+    an exception to this, 41;
+    advantage of defeating enemy's reconnoitrers, 31;
+    under fire very difficult to effect, 39;
+    on the battle-field, 66;
+    cavalry leader must organize his own, 120;
+    training for scouting the basis of instruction in, 269;
+    knowledge of principles of 'higher strategy' essential, 288
+
+  Reconnoitring patrols, 134 _et seq._
+
+  Recruits, training of, 188 _et seq._, 273. See also 'Training'
+
+  Regiment, the fundamental tactical unit, 228
+
+  Regimental call, value of, 230 _et seq._
+
+  'Regimental column' formation, 227;
+    merits of double, 229
+
+  Regulations should not lay down fixed evolutions, 70;
+    but only essential principles of action, 70;
+    existing edition of, requires revision, 70, 79;
+    importance of Section 346, 76;
+    rearrangement recommended, 244;
+    as to training of dismounted squadrons, 253
+
+  Reinforcements, difficulty of supplying Cavalry, 151
+
+  Remounts, supply of, in War, 159;
+    English blood in, 187;
+    training of, 187
+
+  Reports in the field to be made to Headquarters and to adjacent
+      columns, 11;
+    transmission of, 138 _et seq._
+
+  Reserve forage, 131
+
+  Reserve squadrons, position for, during attack, 232
+
+  Reserve troops an easy prey to Cavalry when once beaten, 15
+
+  Rest, importance of, to horses, 124, 125
+
+  Retreat, advantages of 'outer lines' in, 78;
+    duty of Cavalry covering a, 88
+
+  Riding, cross-country, 186;
+    individual, 189
+
+  Riding School, 193 _et seq._
+
+  Roszbach, Battle of, 83
+
+  Rushes, advancing by, 113
+
+  Rye as forage, 206
+
+
+  Schlichting, General von, writings of, 81;
+    criticism of, 83;
+    on application of drill-book principles, 237
+
+  School, Riding, 192;
+    War (see 'War School');
+    of Cavalry, 290
+
+  Screening, importance of, 12;
+    during absence of troops, 27;
+    must give way to obtaining intelligence, 28;
+    distinct from reconnoitring, 32;
+    must be fought for, 33
+
+  Security when secondary to obtaining intelligence, 28;
+    during rest, 122;
+    general advantages of, 124
+
+  Sedan, Battle of, 87
+
+  Seidlitz, Von, at Zorndorf, 87
+
+  Simplicity essential to successful tactics, 68
+
+  Single combat exercises, 195 _et seq._
+
+  Skeleton enemy, 244
+
+  Soor, action of, 83
+
+  Squadron School, the basis of tactical training, 214;
+    drill, 217;
+    tactical training of dismounted, 258;
+    general education of, 272, 276;
+    practical exercises for, 275
+
+  'Squadron column,' merits of, 228
+
+  Staff required for Cavalry corps, 228
+
+  Strategical handling of Cavalry, importance of, 37;
+    fixed regulations inapplicable to, 105;
+    general principles, 105
+
+  Subdivision of force, 107
+
+  Summary of opinions on Cavalry generally, 294
+
+  Supply trains must march as fast as Cavalry, 171;
+    length of, 172;
+    mobility of, 173
+
+  Supreme Commander, presence of Cavalry essential to success of, 37
+
+  Surprise the essence of Cavalry actions, 16;
+    indispensable in raids, 34;
+    requirements for success in, 118
+
+  System, the 'three-line,' 74
+
+
+  Tactical action by Divisional Cavalry precluded, 40;
+    of Cavalry changed by new conditions, 49;
+    'Drei Treffen,' 73;
+    training for, too elementary, 223
+
+  Tactical education for troops generally, 213 _et seq._
+
+  Tactical principles, Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 231 _et seq._;
+    Cavalry _v._ Infantry and Artillery, 232 _et seq._;
+    exercises to develop the, 236
+
+  Tactical and strategical principles of the future, 83
+
+  Telegraph, control of, 140;
+    limitations as to the use of, in Manoeuvres, 279
+
+  'Three-line' system, 73
+
+  Training, true purpose of, 161
+    of Cavalry Staff, 166;
+    Von Moltke's proposals, 166;
+    changes must be met by new methods, 181;
+    of horses and men, 184 _et seq._;
+    length of period of, 188, 194;
+    proposed programme for, 200;
+    preparation for endurance, 207;
+    War conditions essential to, 208;
+    tactical, too elementary at present, 223;
+    for dismounted fighting, 247 _et seq._;
+    some deficiencies in present, 217;
+    of squadrons a stepping-stone to field service, 276
+
+  Training grounds ('Truppenuebungs Plaetze'), 239
+
+  Transmission of orders during action, 69
+
+  'Treffen,' definition of, 74
+
+  Trotting on march, 128
+
+  Turning movements, when imperative, 115
+
+
+  Verbal orders, 69
+
+  Villages, dismounted defence of, 97 _et seq._;
+    withdrawal from, 99
+
+  Vionville, Battle of, 107
+
+  Von-Rosenberg at Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
+
+
+  Waggons, supply, pace of, 171
+
+  War conditions essential to training, 208
+
+  War School, extent of teaching at, 289;
+    creation of school for Cavalry desirable, 290
+
+  Weight to be carried by horses, 212
+
+  Wheat as forage, 206
+
+  'Wing attack,' 76;
+    best formation for requirements of combat, 227;
+    in action against Infantry and Artillery, 234;
+    freedom as to use of, 244
+
+  Woerth, Battle of, 87
+
+
+  Zone of fire, results of extension of, 9
+
+  Zorndorf, Battle of, 87
+
+
+
+
+THE END
+
+
+BILLING AND SONS, LTD., PRINTERS, GUILDFORD
+
+
+
+
+THE ART OF RECONNAISSANCE. By
+
+Colonel DAVID HENDERSON, D.S.O. With Diagrams. Small Crown 8vo., 5s.
+net.
+
+'The details of procedure suggested for a patrol are simpler, more
+practicable, and more efficacious than I have yet seen in any
+textbook. These chapters may be warmly recommended to every officer
+who wishes to prepare himself and his men for the most difficult and
+most important of those minor operations of war which form so great a
+part of its every-day reality.'--_Morning Post._
+
+
+THE FRONTIERSMAN'S POCKET BOOK.
+
+Compiled and Edited by ROGER POCOCK, on behalf of the Council of the
+Legion of Frontiersmen. With Illustrations. Leather, 5s. net.
+
+'A very handy and well-packed little volume.... It brings together a
+large amount of well-digested practical information about camping, means
+of travel, signals, shooting, first-aid, and, in short, everything that
+a pioneering, handy man ought to know.... May be heartily recommended to
+all classes of scouts and frontiersmen.'--_Scotsman._
+
+
+IMPERIAL STRATEGY. By the Military Correspondent of _The Times_. With
+Maps. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.
+
+'"Imperial Strategy" is one of the most valuable volumes published
+within recent years. The admirable volume should stand upon the shelf
+of every soldier, and of every thinker upon Imperial things.'--_Army
+and Navy Gazette._
+
+
+ARTILLERY AND EXPLOSIVES. Essays and Lectures written and delivered at
+various times. By Sir ANDREW NOBLE, K.C.B., D.C.L., F.R.S. With
+numerous Diagrams and Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.
+
+'The experience of Sir Andrew Noble covers such a wide field, and so
+many important changes have taken place in connection with rifled guns,
+their ammunition and projectiles, during the long period dealt with,
+that the views of so eminent an expert are of an incalculable value. He
+is therefore to be congratulated on his decision to bring into one
+volume the mass of important information and invaluable details
+respecting the progress in naval and artillery science.'--_Broad Arrow._
+
+
+FORTIFICATION: Its Past Achievements, Recent Developments, Future
+Progress. By Colonel Sir GEORGE S. CLARKE, R.E., K.C.M.G., F.R.S.,
+Governor of Bombay. New Edition, enlarged. With numerous
+Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 18s. net.
+
+'The reflections of this great soldier-statesman will be found as
+fascinating as they are instructive, and that reasonable intelligence
+is the only essential qualification for reading them with profit as
+well as with interest and pleasure.'--_Westminster Gazette._
+
+
+THE TRUTH ABOUT PORT ARTHUR. By Monsieur E. K. NOJINE, Accredited
+Russian War Correspondent during the Siege. Translated and abridged by
+Captain A. B. LINDSAY. Edited by Major E. D. SWINTON, D.S.O. With Maps
+and Illustrations. Demy 8vo., 15s. net.
+
+'M. Nojine is unusually well qualified to offer testimony on the long
+beleaguerment. He writes with vivacity and force, and the translation
+is competent and spirited, both on account of its vivid narrative and
+by reason of the extraordinary revelations it contains.... It is the
+most remarkable book about the war yet issued.'--_Times._
+
+
+THE BATTLE OF TSU-SHIMA. Between the Japanese and Russian Fleets,
+fought on 27th May, 1905. By Captain VLADIMIR SEMENOFF (one of the
+survivors). Translated by Captain A. B. LINDSAY. Crown 8vo., 3s. 6d.
+net.
+
+'The most thrilling and touching records of naval warfare that we have
+ever read, and its very simplicity and lack of literary ornament make
+it the more impressive.... We share the emotions on board, feel the
+nervous thrill behind the gallant spirit and the cheerful
+countenance,'--_Westminster Gazette._
+
+
+FROM LIBAU TO TSU-SHIMA. A Narrative of the Voyage of Admiral
+Rojdestvensky's Squadron to the East, including a Detailed Account of
+the Dogger Bank Incident. By the late EUGENE POLITOVSKY, Chief
+Engineer of the Squadron. Translated by Major F. R. GODFREY, R.M.L.I.
+Large Crown 8vo., 2s. 6d. net.
+
+'Among terrible stories of the sea this is unique. In sentences whose
+graphic power Defoe did not exceed, he jots down from day to day what he
+sees and suffers.... The story of the sinking of the British
+fishing-boats in the North Sea is told with superb simplicity.'--PUNCH.
+
+
+OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE SECOND AFGHAN WAR, 1878--1880. Produced in the
+Intelligence Branch, Army Headquarters, India. Abridged Official
+Account. With numerous Maps and Illustrations. Medium 8vo., 21s. net.
+
+'An excellent compendium of the whole war, clearly written and amply
+illustrated by photographs, maps, and diagrams.... It is a narrative
+that will fascinate the many who love to read about warlike
+movements.... It is a story of wise and patient preparation, carefully
+arranged generalship, supreme daring, amazing tenacity. Undoubtedly the
+right thing has been done in giving to the world a stirring story, which
+has remained too long, many will think, a secret record.'--_Sheffield
+Independent._
+
+
+THE GERMAN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. Prepared in
+the Historical Section of the Great General Staff, Berlin. With Maps
+and Plans. Demy 8vo., 15s. net each.
+
+Part I.--From its Commencement in 1899 the Capture of General Cronje's
+Forces at Paardeburg. Translated by Colonel W. H. H. WATERS, R.A.,
+C.V.O.
+
+Part II.--The Advance to Pretoria, the Upper Tugela Campaign, etc.,
+etc. Translated by Colonel HUBERT DU CANE, R.A., M.V.O.
+
+'The most valuable work in which, since its close, the war has been
+discussed. It stands alone, because it is the only work in which the
+war has been surveyed by trained and competent students of war, the
+only one of which the judgments are based on a familiarity with the
+modern theory of war. The best book that has yet appeared on the South
+African War.'--_Morning Post._
+
+
+THE BATTLE OF WAVRE AND GROUCHY'S RETREAT. A Study of an obscure part
+of the Waterloo Campaign. By W. HYDE KELLY, R.E. With Maps and Plans.
+Demy 8vo., 8s. net.
+
+'... brings forward, with a vividness and brilliancy which compel
+attention throughout one of the most obscure pages in the story of the
+famous struggle.'--_Birmingham Post._
+
+
+THE BOOK OF WAR. Translated into English by Captain E. F. CALTHROP,
+R.A. Crown 8vo., 2s. 6d. net.
+
+This work, the writings of Suntzu and Wutzu, Chinese strategists of
+about the fifth century B.C., is the most famous work on the art of
+war in the Far East. It deals with operations of war, statecraft,
+moral and training of troops, stratagem, the use of spies, etc., and
+for twenty-five centuries it has been the bible of the Chinese or
+Japanese ruler. The book is distinguished alike by the poetry and
+grandeur of its language and the modernity of its spirit.
+
+
+LONDON: JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of Project Gutenberg's Cavalry in Future Wars, by Frederick von Bernhardi
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