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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/25686-8.txt b/25686-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d6168fc --- /dev/null +++ b/25686-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,4952 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Iraq Study Group Report, by +United States Institute for Peace + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Iraq Study Group Report + +Author: United States Institute for Peace + +Release Date: June 3, 2008 [EBook #25686] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT *** + + + + +Produced by Al Haines + + + + + + + + + + +The Iraq + +Study Group + +Report + + + + James A. Baker, III, and + Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs + + + + Lawrence S. Eagleburger, + Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, + Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, + William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, + Alan K. Simpson + + + + +Contents + + +Letter from the Co-Chairs + +Executive Summary + + +I. Assessment + +A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq + + 1. Security + 2. Politics + 3. Economics + 4. International Support + 5. Conclusions + +B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq + +C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq + + 1. Precipitate Withdrawal + 2. Staying the Course + 3. More Troops for Iraq + 4. Devolution to Three Regions + +D. Achieving Our Goals + + + +II. The Way Forward--A New Approach + +A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus + + 1. The New Diplomatic Offensive + 2. The Iraq International Support Group + 3. Dealing with Iran and Syria + 4. The Wider Regional Context + +B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves + + 1. Performance on Milestones + 2. National Reconciliation + 3. Security and Military Forces + 4. Police and Criminal Justice + 5. The Oil Sector + 6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance + 7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review + 8. U.S. Personnel + 9. Intelligence + + + +Appendices + +Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations + +Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions + +Iraq Study Group Consultations + +Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel + +The Iraq Study Group + +Iraq Study Group Support + + + + +Letter from the Co-Chairs + +There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, +there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and +protect American interests. + +Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq +but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq. Our +political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to bring a +responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our +country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a +policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and +Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright +with the American people in order to win their support. + +No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point +will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide toward +chaos. If current trends continue, the potential consequences are +severe. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in +Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States +has special obligations. Our country must address as best it can +Iraq's many problems. The United States has long-term relationships +and interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged. + +In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Group +present a new approach because we believe there is a better way +forward. All options have not been exhausted. We believe it is still +possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an +opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a +critical region of the world, and protect America's credibility, +interests, and values. Our report makes it clear that the Iraqi +government and the Iraqi people also must act to achieve a stable and +hopeful future. + +What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount of +political will and cooperation by the executive and legislative +branches of the U.S. government. It demands skillful implementation. +It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its success +depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political +polarization. Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate +within a democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure--as +is any course of action in Iraq--if it is not supported by a broad, +sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country +toward such a consensus. + + +We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who have +contributed information and assisted the Study Group, both inside and +outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and around the world. We thank +the members of the expert working groups, and staff from the +sponsoring organizations. We especially thank our colleagues on the +Study Group, who have worked with us on these difficult issues in a +spirit of generosity and bipartisanship. + +In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and the American +people, we dedicate it to the men and women--military and civilian--who +have served and are serving in Iraq, and to their families back +home. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage and made difficult +sacrifices. Every American is indebted to them. + +We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf of their +country, and the members of the Coalition Forces who have stood with +us and with the people of Iraq. + + +James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton + + + + +Executive Summary + +The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path +that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. + +In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be +taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. Our most important +recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political +efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of +U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to +move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these +two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. +If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves +forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity +for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be +enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, +interests, and values will be protected. + +The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing in scope +and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias +and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian +conflict is the principal challenge to stability. The Iraqi people +have a democratically elected government, yet it is not adequately +advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or +delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive. + +If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be +severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq's +government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could +intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a +propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global +standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could +become more polarized. + +During the past nine months we have considered a full range of +approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our recommended course +has shortcomings, but we firmly believe that it includes the best +strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and +the region. + + + +External Approach + +The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly affect its +stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in the +long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are not doing +enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting +stability. + +The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive +to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the +region. This diplomatic effort should include every country that has +an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's +neighbors. Iraq's neighbors and key states in and outside the region +should form a support group to reinforce security and national +reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its +own. + +Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq +and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should +try to engage them constructively. In seeking to influence the +behavior of both countries, the United States has disincentives and +incentives available. Iran should stem the flow of arms and training +to Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use +its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national +reconciliation. The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should continue +to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations +Security Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with +Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and +out of Iraq. + +The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless +it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional +instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the +United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: +Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state +solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include +direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians +(those who accept Israel's right to exist), and Syria. + +As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle +East, the United States should provide additional political, economic, +and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might +become available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq. + + + +Internal Approach + +The most important questions about Iraq's future are now the +responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role in +Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own +destiny. + +The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for +Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army +brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the +United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. +military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and +supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat +forces could begin to move out of Iraq. + +The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of +supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary +responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, +subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the +ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could +be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be +deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction +and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, +force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support +efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and +special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al +Qaeda in Iraq. + +It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the +United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out +security responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear to +the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, +including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not +implement their planned changes. The United States must not make an +open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops +deployed in Iraq. + +As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training +and education of forces that have returned to the United States in +order to restore the force to full combat capability. As equipment +returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient +funds to restore the equipment over the next five years. + +The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support +the achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--on national +reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, +but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. +The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and the citizens +of the United States and other countries--that it deserves continued +support. + +Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United +States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. His +list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include milestones +that can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people. +President Bush and his national security team should remain in close +and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear +message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to make +substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones. + +If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes +substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and +support for Iraq's security forces and to continue political, +military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make +substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi +government. + +Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. They include +improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil +sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U.S. budget +process, the training of U.S. government personnel, and U.S. +intelligence capabilities. + + + +Conclusion + +It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these +recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq +and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a +coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in +isolation. The dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq as +events within Iraq. + +The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days ahead. But +by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region, and the United +States of America can emerge stronger. + + + + +I + +Assessment + + +There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in Baghdad +and several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has been removed from +power and the Iraqi people have a democratically elected government +that is broadly representative of Iraq's population, yet the +government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, +providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The level +of violence is high and growing. There is great suffering, and the +daily lives of many Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is +pervasive. + +U.S. military and civilian personnel, and our coalition partners, are +making exceptional and dedicated efforts--and sacrifices--to help +Iraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinary efforts and sacrifices +for a better future. However, the ability of the United States to +influence events within Iraq is diminishing. Many Iraqis are embracing +sectarian identities. The lack of security impedes economic +development. Most countries in the region are not playing a +constructive role in support of Iraq, and some are undercutting +stability. + +Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is critical +to U.S. interests. It runs along the sectarian fault lines of Shia and +Sunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. It has the world's +second-largest known oil reserves. It is now a base of operations for +international terrorism, including al Qaeda. + +Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the +United States is viewed in the region and around the world. Because of +the gravity of Iraq's condition and the country's vital importance, +the United States is facing one of its most difficult and significant +international challenges in decades. Because events in Iraq have been +set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has +both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give +Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy. + +An assessment of the security, political, economic, and regional +situation follows (all figures current as of publication), along with +an assessment of the consequences if Iraq continues to deteriorate, +and an analysis of some possible courses of action. + + + + +A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq + +1. Security + +Attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are +persistent and growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for U.S. +forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed. Total attacks in +October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per day in January 2006. +Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in October were more than +double the level in January. Attacks against civilians in October were +four times higher than in January. Some 3,000 Iraqi civilians are +killed every month. + + + +Sources of Violence + +Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. There are +multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, al +Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death +squads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence--particularly in +and around Baghdad--has become the principal challenge to stability. + +Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency. +The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, +disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. It has +significant support within the Sunni Arab community. The insurgency +has no single leadership but is a network of networks. It benefits +from participants' detailed knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure, and +arms and financing are supplied primarily from within Iraq. The +insurgents have different goals, although nearly all oppose the +presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Most wish to restore Sunni Arab rule +in the country. Some aim at winning local power and control. + +Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, +but that includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, +large truck bombs, and attacks on significant religious or political +targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of +Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters--numbering an estimated 1,300--play a +supporting role or carry out suicide operations. Al Qaeda's goals +include instigating a wider sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and +Shia, and driving the United States out of Iraq. + +Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian +casualties. Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgent +attacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa. Groups of +Iraqis are often found bound and executed, their bodies dumped in +rivers or fields. The perception of unchecked violence emboldens +militias, shakes confidence in the government, and leads Iraqis to +flee to places where their sect is the majority and where they feel +they are in less danger. In some parts of Iraq--notably in +Baghdad--sectarian cleansing is taking place. The United Nations +estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 +million Iraqis have fled the country. + +Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial +threat to immediate and long-term stability. These militias are +diverse. Some are affiliated with the government, some are highly +localized, and some are wholly outside the law. They are fragmenting, +with an increasing breakdown in command structure. The militias target +Sunni Arab civilians, and some struggle for power in clashes with one +another. Some even target government ministries. They undermine the +authority of the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as the +ability of Sunnis to join a peaceful political process. The prevalence +of militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserve +and expand their power only if backed by armed force. + +The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number as many as 60,000 +fighters. It has directly challenged U.S. and Iraqi government forces, +and it is widely believed to engage in regular violence against Sunni +Arab civilians. Mahdi fighters patrol certain Shia enclaves, notably +northeast Baghdad's teeming neighborhood of 2.5 million known as "Sadr +City." As the Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, some +elements have moved beyond Sadr's control. + +The Badr Brigade is affiliated with the Supreme Council for the +Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is led by Abdul Aziz +al-Hakim. The Badr Brigade has long-standing ties with the Iranian +Revolutionary Guard Corps. Many Badr members have become integrated +into the Iraqi police, and others play policing roles in southern +Iraqi cities. While wearing the uniform of the security services, Badr +fighters have targeted Sunni Arab civilians. Badr fighters have also +clashed with the Mahdi Army, particularly in southern Iraq. + +Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many Iraqis. +Robberies, kidnappings, and murder are commonplace in much of the +country. Organized criminal rackets thrive, particularly in unstable +areas like Anbar province. Some criminal gangs cooperate with, +finance, or purport to be part of the Sunni insurgency or a Shiite +militia in order to gain legitimacy. As one knowledgeable American +official put it, "If there were foreign forces in New Jersey, Tony +Soprano would be an insurgent leader." + +Four of Iraq's eighteen provinces are highly insecure--Baghdad, Anbar, +Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These provinces account for about 40 percent +of Iraq's population of 26 million. In Baghdad, the violence is +largely between Sunni and Shia. In Anbar, the violence is attributable +to the Sunni insurgency and to al Qaeda, and the situation is +deteriorating. + +In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basra +and the south, the violence is largely an intra-Shia power struggle. +The most stable parts of the country are the three provinces of the +Kurdish north and parts of the Shia south. However, most of Iraq's +cities have a sectarian mix and are plagued by persistent violence. + + + +U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi Forces + +Confronting this violence are the Multi-National Forces-Iraq under +U.S. command, working in concert with Iraq's security forces. The +Multi-National Forces-Iraq were authorized by UN Security Council +Resolution 1546 in 2004, and the mandate was extended in November 2006 +for another year. + +Approximately 141,000 U.S. military personnel are serving in Iraq, +together with approximately 16,500 military personnel from twenty-seven +coalition partners, the largest contingent being 7,200 from the +United Kingdom. The U.S. Army has principal responsibility for Baghdad +and the north. The U.S. Marine Corps takes the lead in Anbar province. +The United Kingdom has responsibility in the southeast, chiefly in +Basra. + +Along with this military presence, the United States is building its +largest embassy in Baghdad. The current U.S. embassy in Baghdad totals +about 1,000 U.S. government employees. There are roughly 5,000 +civilian contractors in the country. + +Currently, the U.S. military rarely engages in large-scale combat +operations. Instead, counterinsurgency efforts focus on a strategy of +"clear, hold, and build"--"clearing" areas of insurgents and death +squads, "holding" those areas with Iraqi security forces, and +"building" areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects. + +Nearly every U.S. Army and Marine combat unit, and several National +Guard and Reserve units, have been to Iraq at least once. Many are on +their second or even third rotations; rotations are typically one year +for Army units, seven months for Marine units. Regular rotations, in +and out of Iraq or within the country, complicate brigade and +battalion efforts to get to know the local scene, earn the trust of +the population, and build a sense of cooperation. + +Many military units are under significant strain. Because the harsh +conditions in Iraq are wearing out equipment more quickly than +anticipated, many units do not have fully functional equipment for +training when they redeploy to the United States. An extraordinary +amount of sacrifice has been asked of our men and women in uniform, +and of their families. The American military has little reserve force +to call on if it needs ground forces to respond to other crises around +the world. + +A primary mission of U.S. military strategy in Iraq is the training of +competent Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2006, the Multi-National +Security Transition Command-Iraq under American leadership is +expected to have trained and equipped a target number of approximately +326,000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes 138,000 members +of the Iraqi Army and 188,000 Iraqi police. Iraqis have operational +control over roughly one-third of Iraqi security forces; the U.S. has +operational control over most of the rest. No U.S. forces are under +Iraqi command. + + + +The Iraqi Army + +The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable +and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government. By +the end of 2006, the Iraqi Army is expected to comprise 118 battalions +formed into 36 brigades under the command of 10 divisions. Although +the Army is one of the more professional Iraqi institutions, its +performance has been uneven. The training numbers are impressive, but +they represent only part of the story. + +Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and +loyalties of some Iraqi units--specifically, whether they will carry +out missions on behalf of national goals instead of a sectarian +agenda. Of Iraq's 10 planned divisions, those that are even-numbered +are made up of Iraqis who signed up to serve in a specific area, and +they have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. As +a result, elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions. + +The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significant +challenges: + +--Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together and +perform at higher levels of organization--the brigade and division +level. Leadership training and the experience of leadership are the +essential elements to improve performance. + +--Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions without +adequate equipment. Congress has been generous in funding requests for +U.S. troops, but it has resisted fully funding Iraqi forces. The +entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion) +is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two +weeks. + +--Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a month so that +they can visit their families and take them their pay. Soldiers are +paid in cash because there is no banking system. Soldiers are given +leave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave. Unit +readiness rates are low, often at 50 percent or less. + +--Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain +their operations, the capability to transport supplies and troops, and +the capacity to provide their own indirect fire support, close-air +support, technical intelligence, and medical evacuation. They will +depend on the United States for logistics and support through at least +2007. + + + +The Iraqi Police + +The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the +Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers roughly 135,000 +and is responsible for local policing. It has neither the training nor +legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower +to take on organized crime, insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi +National Police numbers roughly 25,000 and its officers have been +trained in counterinsurgency operations, not police work. The Border +Enforcement Department numbers roughly 28,000. + +Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in +sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture, and +targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police are organized +under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruption +and militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the +provinces. + +The United States and the Iraqi government recognize the importance of +reform. The current Minister of the Interior has called for purging +militia members and criminals from the police. But he has little +police experience or base of support. There is no clear Iraqi or U.S. +agreement on the character and mission of the police. U.S. authorities +do not know with precision the composition and membership of the +various police forces, nor the disposition of their funds and +equipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers +participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and +ammunition for use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but +don't show up for work. In the words of a senior American general, +"2006 was supposed to be 'the year of the police' but it hasn't +materialized that way." + + + +Facilities Protection Services + +The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems. Each +Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the ministry's +infrastructure. All together, these units total roughly 145,000 +uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units have questionable +loyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of Health, Agriculture, +and Transportation--controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr--the Facilities +Protection Service is a source of funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army. +One senior U.S. official described the Facilities Protection Service +as "incompetent, dysfunctional, or subversive." Several Iraqis simply +referred to them as militias. + +The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities Protection +Service under the control of the Interior Ministry. The intention is +to identify and register Facilities Protection personnel, standardize +their treatment, and provide some training. Though the approach is +reasonable, this effort may exceed the current capability of the +Interior Ministry. + + + + +Operation Together Forward II + +In a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U.S. military forces +joined with Iraqi forces to establish security in Baghdad with an +operation called "Operation Together Forward II," which began in +August 2006. Under Operation Together Forward II, U.S. forces are +working with members of the Iraqi Army and police to "clear, hold, and +build" in Baghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood. There are +roughly 15,000 U.S. troops in Baghdad. + +This operation--and the security of Baghdad--is crucial to security in +Iraq more generally. A capital city of more than 6 million, Baghdad +contains some 25 percent of the country's population. It is the +largest Sunni and Shia city in Iraq. It has high concentrations of +both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Both Iraqi and American +leaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq. + +The results of Operation Together Forward II are disheartening. +Violence in Baghdad--already at high levels--jumped more than 43 +percent between the summer and October 2006. U.S. forces continue to +suffer high casualties. Perpetrators of violence leave neighborhoods +in advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi police +have been unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration and continuing +violence. The Iraqi Army has provided only two out of the six +battalions that it promised in August would join American forces in +Baghdad. The Iraqi government has rejected sustained security +operations in Sadr City. + +Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both the capability +to hold areas that have been cleared and the will to clear +neighborhoods that are home to Shiite militias. U.S. forces can +"clear" any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U.S. troops +present nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to "hold" +neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq. +Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and Iraqi military +forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the +sectarian violence, U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that +has no foreseeable end. + + + +2. Politics + +Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council of +Representatives. A government of national unity was formed in May 2006 +that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people. Iraq has ratified +a constitution, and--per agreement with Sunni Arab leaders--has +initiated a process of review to determine if the constitution needs +amendment. + +The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and +key players within the government too often act in their sectarian +interest. Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to +demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's national interest, and +too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The +result is an even weaker central government than the constitution +provides. + +There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international agreement on +the key issues confronting the Iraqi government: national +reconciliation, including the negotiation of a "political deal" among +Iraq's sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-Baathification, oil +revenue sharing, provincial elections, the future of Kirkuk, and +amnesty; security, particularly curbing militias and reducing the +violence in Baghdad; and governance, including the provision of basic +services and the rollback of pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi +leaders view issues through a sectarian prism, we will summarize the +differing perspectives of Iraq's main sectarian groups. + + + +Sectarian Viewpoints + +The Shia, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power for the +first time in more than 1,300 years. Above all, many Shia are +interested in preserving that power. However, fissures have emerged +within the broad Shia coalition, known as the United Iraqi Alliance. +Shia factions are struggling for power--over regions, ministries, and +Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad and +fractious coalition have led several observers in Baghdad to comment +that Shia leaders are held "hostage to extremes." Within the coalition +as a whole, there is a reluctance to reach a political accommodation +with the Sunnis or to disarm Shiite militias. + +Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding of +the key issues facing Iraq, notably the need for national +reconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains have emerged +between Maliki's government and the United States. Maliki has publicly +rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the +removal of blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi +security forces, and resisted U.S. requests to move forward on +reconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias. + + + +Sistani, Sadr, Hakim + +The U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but the most +powerful Shia figures in Iraq do not hold national office. Of the +following three vital power brokers in the Shia community, the United +States is unable to talk directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali +al-Sistani) and does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr). + +GRAND AYATOLLAH ALI AL-SISTANI: Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric +in Iraq. Despite staying out of day-to-day politics, he has been the +most influential leader in the country: all major Shia leaders have +sought his approval or guidance. Sistani has encouraged a unified Shia +bloc with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani's influence +may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in preventing +intra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis. + +ABDUL AZIZ AL-HAKIM: Hakim is a cleric and the leader of the Supreme +Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest and +most organized Shia political party. It seeks the creation of an +autonomous Shia region comprising nine provinces in the south. Hakim +has consistently protected and advanced his party's position. SCIRI +has close ties with Iran. + +MOQTADA AL-SADR: Sadr has a large following among impoverished Shia, +particularly in Baghdad. He has joined Maliki's governing coalition, +but his Mahdi Army has clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with +Iraqi, U.S., and U.K. forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist. +Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model of +Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic +services within the government and an armed militia outside of the +government. + + +Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional +position of power in Iraq. They are torn, unsure whether to seek their +aims through political participation or through violent insurgency. +They remain angry about U.S. decisions to dissolve Iraqi security +forces and to pursue the "de-Baathification" of Iraq's government and +society. Sunnis are confronted by paradoxes: they have opposed the +presence of U.S. forces in Iraq but need those forces to protect them +against Shia militias; they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia +administration but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see +a Sunni autonomous region as feasible for themselves. + + + +Hashimi and Dhari + +The influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government is +questionable. The leadership of the Sunni Arab insurgency is murky, +but the following two key Sunni Arab figures have broad support. + +tariq al-hashimi: Hashimi is one of two vice presidents of Iraq and +the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in +parliament. Hashimi opposes the formation of autonomous regions and +has advocated the distribution of oil revenues based on population, a +reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite militia +fighters from the Iraqi security forces. Shiite death squads have +recently killed three of his siblings. + +sheik harith al-dhari: Dhari is the head of the Muslim Scholars +Association, the most influential Sunni organization in Iraq. Dhari +has condemned the American occupation and spoken out against the Iraqi +government. His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arab +insurgency and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant was +recently issued for his arrest for inciting violence and terrorism, an +act that sparked bitter Sunni protests across Iraq. + + +Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two main +political blocs--the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the +Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have secured a largely +autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and have achieved a prominent +role for Kurds within the national government. Barzani leads the +Kurdish regional government, and Talabani is president of Iraq. + +Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be within a +democratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent Kurdistan would +be surrounded by hostile neighbors. However, a majority of Kurds favor +independence. The Kurds have their own security forces--the +peshmerga--which number roughly 100,000. They believe they could +accommodate themselves to either a unified or a fractured Iraq. + + + +Barzani and Talabani + +Kurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures who have +long-standing ties in movements for Kurdish independence and +self-government. + +MASSOUD BARZANI: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic +Party and the President of the Kurdish regional government. Barzani +has cooperated with his longtime rival, Jalal Talabani, in securing an +empowered, autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Barzani has +ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish flags in +Kurdish-controlled areas. + +JALAL TALABANI: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic Union of +Kurdistan and the President of Iraq. Whereas Barzani has focused his +efforts in Kurdistan, Talabani has secured power in Baghdad, and +several important PUK government ministers are loyal to him. Talabani +strongly supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to bring +real power to the office of the presidency. + + + +Key Issues + +NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. Prime Minister Maliki outlined a commendable +program of national reconciliation soon after he entered office. +However, the Iraqi government has not taken action on the key elements +of national reconciliation: revising de-Baathification, which prevents +many Sunni Arabs from participating in governance and society; +providing amnesty for those who have fought against the government; +sharing the country's oil revenues; demobilizing militias; amending +the constitution; and settling the future of Kirkuk. + +One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution, which created a +largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows other such regions to be +established later, perhaps including a "Shi'astan" comprising nine +southern provinces. This highly decentralized structure is favored by +the Kurds and many Shia (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz +al-Hakim), but it is anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally +Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe +they should govern. Second, because Iraq's energy resources are in the +Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible "Sunni +region." Particularly contentious is a provision in the constitution +that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while +allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the +regions. + +The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting +process, and acceded to entering the government only on the condition +that the constitution be amended. In September, the parliament agreed +to initiate a constitutional review commission slated to complete its +work within one year; it delayed considering the question of forming a +federalized region in southern Iraq for eighteen months. + +Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city +in northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers of Kurds, Arabs, +and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that the constitution require a +popular referendum by December 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk can +formally join the Kurdish administered region, an outcome that Arabs +and Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violence +sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great. + +Iraq's leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the +country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little +commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent Shia leader told +us pointedly that the current government has the support of 80 percent +of the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought +for independence for decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, +the leader of the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags +and the raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general +commented that the Iraqis "still do not know what kind of country they +want to have." Yet many of Iraq's most powerful and well-positioned +leaders are not working toward a united Iraq. + + +SECURITY. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in +support of national reconciliation. Shiite leaders must make the +decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must make the decision to +seek their aims through a peaceful political process, not through +violent revolt. The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes must +aggressively pursue al Qaeda. + +Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political +action. Shia political leaders make distinctions between the Sunni +insurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government) and Shia militias +(which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods, and maximize +power within the government). Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he +will address the problem of militias, he has taken little meaningful +action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to +Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi +Army. + +Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent +insurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni politicians within +the government have a limited level of support and influence among +their own population, and questionable influence over the insurgency. +Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation against Sunni +leaders--assassinating the family members of those who do participate in +the government. Too often, insurgents tolerate and cooperate with al +Qaeda, as they share a mutual interest in attacking U.S. and Shia +forces. However, Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently +took the positive step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreign +fighters in their midst, and have started to take action on those +commitments. + +Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take on the +militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has to help +them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each side watches the +other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shia +militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni +insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: there are many armed groups +within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms. + + +GOVERNANCE. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its +people with basic services: electricity, drinking water, sewage, +health care, and education. In many sectors, production is below or +hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and other unstable areas, the +situation is much worse. There are five major reasons for this +problem. + +First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian +basis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of Shia-governed +Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity each day and +trash piles are waist-high. One American official told us that Baghdad +is run like a "Shia dictatorship" because Sunnis boycotted provincial +elections in 2005, and therefore are not represented in local +government. + +Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. For +instance, electricity transmission towers are downed by explosives, +and then sniper attacks prevent repairs from being made. + +Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated that +official corruption costs Iraq $5-7 billion per year. Notable steps +have been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit board and inspectors +general in the ministries, and senior leaders including the Prime +Minister have identified rooting out corruption as a national +priority. But too many political leaders still pursue their personal, +sectarian, or party interests. There are still no examples of senior +officials who have been brought before a court of law and convicted on +corruption charges. + +Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq's technocratic class was +pushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification. Other +skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has risen. Too often, +Iraq's elected representatives treat the ministries as political +spoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay salaries, spending +as little as 10-15 percent of their capital budget. They lack +technical expertise and suffer from corruption, inefficiency, a +banking system that does not permit the transfer of moneys, extensive +red tape put in place in part to deter corruption, and a Ministry of +Finance reluctant to disburse funds. + +Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish an Iraqi +judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has some dedicated +judges. But criminal investigations are conducted by magistrates, and +they are too few and inadequately trained to perform this function. +Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless. As one senior +U.S. official said to us, "We can protect judges, but not their +families, their extended families, their friends." Many Iraqis feel +that crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded. + + + +3. Economics + +There has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has tremendous +potential for growth. But economic development is hobbled by +insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated +infrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U.S. official observed to us, +Iraq's economy has been badly shocked and is dysfunctional after +suffering decades of problems: Iraq had a police state economy in the +1970s, a war economy in the 1980s, and a sanctions economy in the +1990s. Immediate and long-term growth depends predominantly on the oil +sector. + + + +Economic Performance + +There are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are stable and +growing at $12 billion. Consumer imports of computers, cell phones, +and other appliances have increased dramatically. New businesses are +opening, and construction is moving forward in secure areas. Because +of Iraq's ample oil reserves, water resources, and fertile lands, +significant growth is possible if violence is reduced and the capacity +of government improves. For example, wheat yields increased more than +40 percent in Kurdistan during this past year. + +The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting benchmarks set +by the International Monetary Fund. Most prominently, subsidies have +been reduced--for instance, the price per liter of gas has increased +from roughly 1.7 cents to 23 cents (a figure far closer to regional +prices). However, energy and food subsidies generally remain a burden, +costing Iraq $11 billion per year. + +Despite the positive signs, many leading economic indicators are +negative. Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is +at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. +Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The +investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 +percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in +their daily economic situation. + + + +Oil Sector + +Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq's GDP, +and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq produces around +2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about 1.5 million barrels per +day. This is below both prewar production levels and the Iraqi +government's target of 2.5 million barrels per day, and far short of +the vast potential of the Iraqi oil sector. Fortunately for the +government, global energy prices have been higher than projected, +making it possible for Iraq to meet its budget revenue targets. + +Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security, lack of +investment, and lack of technical capacity. Insurgents with a detailed +knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure target pipelines and oil +facilities. There is no metering system for the oil. There is poor +maintenance at pumping stations, pipelines, and port facilities, as +well as inadequate investment in modern technology. Iraq had a cadre +of experts in the oil sector, but intimidation and an extended +migration of experts to other countries have eroded technical +capacity. Foreign companies have been reluctant to invest, and Iraq's +Ministry of Oil has been unable to spend more than 15 percent of its +capital budget. + +Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 150,000 to +200,000--and perhaps as many as 500,000--barrels of oil per day are +being stolen. Controlled prices for refined products result in +shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers to the thriving black +market. One senior U.S. official told us that corruption is more +responsible than insurgents for breakdowns in the oil sector. + + + + +The Politics of Oil + +The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country's +already fragile efforts to create a unified central government. The +Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions to take the lead +in developing new oil resources. Article 108 states that "oil and gas +are the ownership of all the peoples of Iraq in all the regions and +governorates," while Article 109 tasks the federal government with +"the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields." This +language has led to contention over what constitutes a "new" or an +"existing" resource, a question that has profound ramifications for +the ultimate control of future oil revenue. + +Senior members of Iraq's oil industry argue that a national oil +company could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues and +reducing regional or local claims to a percentage of the revenue +derived from production. However, regional leaders are suspicious and +resist this proposal, affirming the rights of local communities to +have direct access to the inflow of oil revenue. Kurdish leaders have +been particularly aggressive in asserting independent control of their +oil assets, signing and implementing investment deals with foreign oil +companies in northern Iraq. Shia politicians are also reported to be +negotiating oil investment contracts with foreign companies. + +There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues directly +to the population on a per capita basis. These proposals have the +potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation's chief +natural resource, but it would take time to develop a fair +distribution system. Oil revenues have been incorporated into state +budget projections for the next several years. There is no institution +in Iraq at present that could properly implement such a distribution +system. It would take substantial time to establish, and would have to +be based on a well-developed state census and income tax system, which +Iraq currently lacks. + + + +U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts + +The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion to +support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion has +been appropriated for the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund." +Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost all the funds have been +committed. The administration requested $1.6 billion for +reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The +administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for +economic assistance in FY 2008 also appears downward. + +Congress has little appetite for appropriating more funds for +reconstruction. There is a substantial need for continued +reconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about the +capacity of the U.S. and Iraqi governments. + +The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, +State Department, United States Agency for International Development, +and other agencies has been ineffective. There are no clear lines +establishing who is in charge of reconstruction. + +As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is changing its +focus, shifting from infrastructure, education, and health to +smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some degree managed by +local communities. A major attempt is also being made to improve the +capacity of government bureaucracies at the national, regional, and +provincial levels to provide services to the population as well as to +select and manage infrastructure projects. + +The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi ministries, but +it confronts problems with access and sustainability. Moqtada al-Sadr +objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq, and therefore the ministries he +controls--Health, Agriculture, and Transportation--will not work with +Americans. It is not clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and +operate reconstruction projects launched by the United States. + +Several senior military officers commented to us that the Commander's +Emergency Response Program, which funds quick-impact projects such as +the clearing of sewage and the restoration of basic services, is +vital. The U.S. Agency for International Development, in contrast, is +focused on long-term economic development and capacity building, but +funds have not been committed to support these efforts into the +future. The State Department leads seven Provincial Reconstruction +Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a positive +effect in secure areas, but not in areas where their work is hampered +by significant security constraints. + +Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided to +contractors, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction +has documented numerous instances of waste and abuse. They have not +all been put right. Contracting has gradually improved, as more +oversight has been exercised and fewer cost-plus contracts have been +granted; in addition, the use of Iraqi contractors has enabled the +employment of more Iraqis in reconstruction projects. + + + +4. International Support + +International support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid. +International donors pledged $13.5 billion to support reconstruction, +but less than $4 billion has been delivered. + +An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a significant +amount of Iraq's government debt and put the country on firmer +financial footing. But the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and +Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that they have not forgiven. + +The United States is currently working with the United Nations and +other partners to fashion the "International Compact" on Iraq. The +goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and credits from +the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid from +international donors. In return, the Iraqi government will agree to +achieve certain economic reform milestones, such as building +anticorruption measures into Iraqi institutions, adopting a fair legal +framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic +self-sufficiency by 2012. Several U.S. and international officials told +us that the compact could be an opportunity to seek greater international +engagement in the country. + + + +The Region + +The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly influence its +stability and prosperity. No country in the region wants a chaotic +Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are doing little to help it, and some are +undercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors are +meddling in their affairs. When asked which of Iraq's neighbors are +intervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official replied, "All of them." + +The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region. U.S. +efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding focus +of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq. Several Iraqi, U.S., and +international officials commented to us that Iraqi opposition to the +United States--and support for Sadr--spiked in the aftermath of +Israel's bombing campaign in Lebanon. The actions of Syria and Iran in +Iraq are often tied to their broader concerns with the United States. +Many Sunni Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence in +Iraq and the region. Most of the region's countries are wary of U.S. +efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East. + + + +Neighboring States + +IRAN. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq. Iran +has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many of whom +were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein regime. Iran has +provided arms, financial support, and training for Shiite militias +within Iraq, as well as political support for Shia parties. There are +also reports that Iran has supplied improvised explosive devices to +groups--including Sunni Arab insurgents--that attack U.S. forces. The +Iranian border with Iraq is porous, and millions of Iranians travel to +Iraq each year to visit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranian +meddling, and Sunnis took a particularly alarmist view. One leading +Sunni politician told us, "If you turn over any stone in Iraq today, +you will find Iran underneath." + +U.S., Iraqi, and international officials also commented on the range +of tensions between the United States and Iran, including Iran's +nuclear program, Iran's support for terrorism, Iran's influence in +Lebanon and the region, and Iran's influence in Iraq. Iran appears +content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that +limits U.S. options in addressing Iran's nuclear program and allows +Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran and +the United States about the situation in Iraq have not taken place. +One Iraqi official told us: "Iran is negotiating with the United +States in the streets of Baghdad." + + +SYRIA. Syria is also playing a counterproductive role. Iraqis are +upset about what they perceive as Syrian support for efforts to +undermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is not so much to take +active measures as to countenance malign neglect: the Syrians look the +other way as arms and foreign fighters flow across their border into +Iraq, and former Baathist leaders find a safe haven within Syria. Like +Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq. +That said, the Syrians have indicated that they want a dialogue with +the United States, and in November 2006 agreed to restore diplomatic +relations with Iraq after a 24-year break. + + +SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. These countries for the most part +have been passive and disengaged. They have declined to provide debt +relief or substantial economic assistance to the Iraqi government. +Several Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians complained that Saudi Arabia has +not provided political support for their fellow Sunnis within Iraq. +One observed that Saudi Arabia did not even send a letter when the +Iraqi government was formed, whereas Iran has an ambassador in Iraq. +Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within +Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments help +facilitate U.S. military operations in Iraq by providing basing and +overflight rights and by cooperating on intelligence issues. + +As worries about Iraq increase, the Gulf States are becoming more +active. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have hosted meetings in +support of the International Compact. Saudi Arabia recently took the +positive step of hosting a conference of Iraqi religious leaders in +Mecca. Several Gulf States have helped foster dialogue with Iraq's +Sunni Arab population. While the Gulf States are not proponents of +democracy in Iraq, they worry about the direction of events: +battle-hardened insurgents from Iraq could pose a threat to their own +internal stability, and the growth of Iranian influence in the region +is deeply troubling to them. + + +TURKEY. Turkish policy toward Iraq is focused on discouraging Kurdish +nationalism, which is seen as an existential threat to Turkey's own +internal stability. The Turks have supported the Turkmen minority +within Iraq and have used their influence to try to block the +incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, +Turkish companies have invested in Kurdish areas in northern Iraq, and +Turkish and Kurdish leaders have sought constructive engagement on +political, security, and economic issues. + +The Turks are deeply concerned about the operations of the Kurdish +Workers Party (PKK)--a terrorist group based in northern Iraq that has +killed thousands of Turks. They are upset that the United States and +Iraq have not targeted the PKK more aggressively. The Turks have +threatened to go after the PKK themselves, and have made several +forays across the border into Iraq. + + +JORDAN AND EGYPT. Both Jordan and Egypt have provided some assistance +for the Iraqi government. Jordan has trained thousands of Iraqi +police, has an ambassador in Baghdad, and King Abdullah recently +hosted a meeting in Amman between President Bush and Prime Minister +Maliki. Egypt has provided some limited Iraqi army training. Both +Jordan and Egypt have facilitated U.S. military operations--Jordan by +allowing overflight and search-and-rescue operations, Egypt by +allowing overflight and Suez Canal transits; both provide important +cooperation on intelligence. Jordan is currently home to 700,000 Iraqi +refugees (equal to 10 percent of its population) and fears a flood of +many more. Both Jordan and Egypt are concerned about the position of +Iraq's Sunni Arabs and want constitutional reforms in Iraq to bolster +the Sunni community. They also fear the return of insurgents to their +countries. + + + +The International Community + +The international community beyond the United Kingdom and our other +coalition partners has played a limited role in Iraq. The United +Nations--acting under Security Council Resolution 1546--has a small +presence in Iraq; it has assisted in holding elections, drafting the +constitution, organizing the government, and building institutions. +The World Bank, which has committed a limited number of resources, has +one and sometimes two staff in Iraq. The European Union has a +representative there. + +Several U.S.-based and international nongovernmental organizations +have done excellent work within Iraq, operating under great hardship. +Both Iraqi and international nongovernmental organizations play an +important role in reaching across sectarian lines to enhance dialogue +and understanding, and several U.S.-based organizations have employed +substantial resources to help Iraqis develop their democracy. However, +the participation of international nongovernmental organizations is +constrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts face +a cumbersome and often politicized process of registration with the +government. + +The United Kingdom has dedicated an extraordinary amount of resources +to Iraq and has made great sacrifices. In addition to 7,200 troops, +the United Kingdom has a substantial diplomatic presence, particularly +in Basra and the Iraqi southeast. The United Kingdom has been an +active and key player at every stage of Iraq's political development. +U.K. officials told us that they remain committed to working for +stability in Iraq, and will reduce their commitment of troops and +resources in response to the situation on the ground. + + + +5. Conclusions + +The United States has made a massive commitment to the future of Iraq +in both blood and treasure. As of December 2006, nearly 2,900 +Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another 21,000 +Americans have been wounded, many severely. + +To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq +War, and costs are running about $8 billion per month. In addition, +the United States must expect significant "tail costs" to come. Caring +for veterans and replacing lost equipment will run into the hundreds +of billions of dollars. Estimates run as high as $2 trillion for the +final cost of the U.S. involvement in Iraq. + +Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive and the +situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot now govern, +sustain, and defend itself without the support of the United States. +Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for +their own future. Iraq's neighbors and much of the international +community have not been persuaded to play an active and constructive +role in supporting Iraq. The ability of the United States to shape +outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out. + + + + +B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq + +If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences +could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the +world. + +Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflict +greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of Iraq's +government and economy would further cripple a country already unable +to meet its people's needs. Iraq's security forces could split along +sectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more +refugees are forced to relocate across the country and the region. +Ethnic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjected +to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle +required to impose order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost. + +Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their +borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to +protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader +regional war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent +Kurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops to +restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil +fields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when that +country is on a path to producing nuclear weapons. + +Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that they fear the +distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world. +Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections--perhaps fomented by +Iran--in Sunni-ruled states. Such a broader sectarian conflict could +open a Pandora's box of problems--including the radicalization of +populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes--that +might take decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to +the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead +to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global +economy. + +Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now +a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald's." Left unchecked, al Qaeda in +Iraq could continue to incite violence between Sunnis and Shia. A +chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for +terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda will +portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant +victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their +cause in the region and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to +Osama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will +seek to expel the Americans and then spread "the jihad wave to the +secular countries neighboring Iraq." A senior European official told +us that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks within his +country. + +The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends +further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. +military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. Perceived failure +there could diminish America's credibility and influence in a region +that is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world's +energy supply. This loss would reduce America's global influence at a +time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand +our full attention and strong U.S. leadership of international +alliances. And the longer that U.S. political and military resources +are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in +Afghanistan increase. + +Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within +the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of the +government's handling of the war, and more than 60 percent feel that +there is no clear plan for moving forward. The November elections were +largely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. Arguments +about continuing to provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall +on deaf ears if Americans become disillusioned with the government +that the United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy +cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of the +American people. + +Continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater Iraqi opposition +to the United States. Recent polling indicates that only 36 percent of +Iraqis feel their country is heading in the right direction, and 79 +percent of Iraqis have a "mostly negative" view of the influence that +the United States has in their country. Sixty-one percent of Iraqis +approve of attacks on U.S.-led forces. If Iraqis continue to perceive +Americans as representing an occupying force, the United States could +become its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. + +These and other predictions of dire consequences in Iraq and the +region are by no means a certainty. Iraq has taken several positive +steps since Saddam Hussein was overthrown: Iraqis restored full +sovereignty, conducted open national elections, drafted a permanent +constitution, ratified that constitution, and elected a new government +pursuant to that constitution. Iraqis may become so sobered by the +prospect of an unfolding civil war and intervention by their regional +neighbors that they take the steps necessary to avert catastrophe. But +at the moment, such a scenario seems implausible because the Iraqi +people and their leaders have been slow to demonstrate the capacity or +will to act. + + + + +C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq + +Because of the gravity of the situation in Iraq and of its +consequences for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world, +the Iraq Study Group has carefully considered the full range of +alternative approaches for moving forward. We recognize that there is +no perfect solution and that all that have been suggested have flaws. +The following are some of the more notable possibilities that we have +considered. + + +1. Precipitate Withdrawal + +Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and +the role and commitments of the United States in initiating events +that have led to the current situation, we believe it would be wrong +for the United States to abandon the country through a precipitate +withdrawal of troops and support. A premature American departure from +Iraq would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence and +further deterioration of conditions, leading to a number of the +adverse consequences outlined above. The near-term results would be a +significant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional +destabilization, and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda would +depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraq +descends into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually +require the United States to return. + + +2. Staying the Course + +Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq +is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. +Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at +a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United +States is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other +international crises is constrained. A majority of the American people +are soured on the war. This level of expense is not sustainable over +an extended period, especially when progress is not being made. The +longer the United States remains in Iraq without progress, the more +resentment will grow among Iraqis who believe they are subjects of a +repressive American occupation. As one U.S. official said to us, "Our +leaving would make it worse. . . . The current approach without +modification will not make it better." + + +3. More Troops for Iraq + +Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the +fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of +national reconciliation. A senior American general told us that adding +U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a highly +localized area. However, past experience indicates that the violence +would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved to another +area. As another American general told us, if the Iraqi government +does not make political progress, "all the troops in the world will +not provide security." Meanwhile, America's military capacity is +stretched thin: we do not have the troops or equipment to make a +substantial, sustained increase in our troop presence. Increased +deployments to Iraq would also necessarily hamper our ability to +provide adequate resources for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond +to crises around the world. + + +4. Devolution to Three Regions + +The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous +regions with loose central control would be too high. Because Iraq's +population is not neatly separated, regional boundaries cannot be easily +drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces have mixed populations, as do +Baghdad and most other major cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could +result in mass population movements, collapse of the Iraqi security +forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization +of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate +Iraqi regions. Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a +division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the +United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state. + +While such devolution is a possible consequence of continued +instability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States should +support this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome on the +Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, +the United States should manage the situation to ameliorate +humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of violence, and +minimize regional instability. The United States should support as +much as possible central control by governmental authorities in +Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues. + + + + +D. Achieving Our Goals + +We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the +President: an Iraq that can "govern itself, sustain itself, and defend +itself." In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a broadly +representative government that maintains its territorial integrity, is +at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn't +brutalize its own people. Given the current situation in Iraq, +achieving this goal will require much time and will depend primarily +on the actions of the Iraqi people. + +In our judgment, there is a new way forward for the United States to +support this objective, and it will offer people of Iraq a reasonable +opportunity to lead a better life than they did under Saddam Hussein. +Our recommended course has shortcomings, as does each of the policy +alternatives we have reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it +includes the best strategies and tactics available to us to positively +influence the outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it could +enable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a +chance to pursue a better future, as well as serving America's +interests and values in the years ahead. + + + + +II + +The Way Forward--A New Approach + +Progress in Iraq is still possible if new approaches are taken +promptly by Iraq, the United States, and other countries that have a +stake in the Middle East. + +To attain the goals we have outlined, changes in course must be made +both outside and inside Iraq. Our report offers a comprehensive +strategy to build regional and international support for stability in +Iraq, as it encourages the Iraqi people to assume control of their own +destiny. It offers a responsible transition. + +Externally, the United States should immediately begin to employ all +elements of American power to construct a regional mechanism that can +support, rather than retard, progress in Iraq. Internally, the Iraqi +government must take the steps required to achieve national +reconciliation, reduce violence, and improve the daily lives of +Iraqis. Efforts to implement these external and internal strategies +must begin now and must be undertaken in concert with one another. + +This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in the U.S. +presence in Iraq over time. + + + + +A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus + + +The United States must build a new international consensus for +stability in Iraq and the region. + +In order to foster such consensus, the United States should embark on +a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international support +structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other +countries in the region. This support structure should include every +country that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all +of Iraq's neighbors--Iran and Syria among them. Despite the well-known +differences between many of these countries, they all share an +interest in avoiding the horrific consequences that would flow from a +chaotic Iraq, particularly a humanitarian catastrophe and regional +destabilization. + +A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is clear that +the Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing, defending, and +sustaining itself by relying on U.S. military and economic support +alone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed by relying only on U.S. +military support in conjunction with Iraqi military and police +capabilities. Some states have been withholding commitments they could +make to support Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction. Some states +have been actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve a +political solution within Iraq, a broader international support +structure is needed. + + + +1. The New Diplomatic Offensive + +Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major +regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put it +simply, all key issues in the Middle East--the Arab-Israeli conflict, +Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism +and terrorism--are inextricably linked. In addition to supporting +stability in Iraq, a comprehensive diplomatic offensive--the New +Diplomatic Offensive--should address these key regional issues. By +doing so, it would help marginalize extremists and terrorists, promote +U.S. values and interests, and improve America's global image. + +Under the diplomatic offensive, we propose regional and international +initiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government in achieving +certain security, political, and economic milestones. Achieving these +milestones will require at least the acquiescence of Iraq's neighbors, +and their active and timely cooperation would be highly desirable. + +The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily economic +"Compact for Iraq" by also emphasizing political, diplomatic, and +security issues. At the same time, it would be coordinated with the +goals of the Compact for Iraq. The diplomatic offensive would also be +broader and more far-reaching than the "Gulf Plus Two" efforts +currently being conducted, and those efforts should be folded into and +become part of the diplomatic offensive. + +States included within the diplomatic offensive can play a major role +in reinforcing national reconciliation efforts between Iraqi Sunnis +and Shia. Such reinforcement would contribute substantially to +legitimizing of the political process in Iraq. Iraq's leaders may not +be able to come together unless they receive the necessary signals and +support from abroad. This backing will not materialize of its own +accord, and must be encouraged urgently by the United States. + +In order to advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution, the Study +Group recommends as follows: + + +RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with the Iraqi +government, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive +to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This new +diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006. + +RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates +to regional players should be to: + +i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. + +ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq's neighbors. + +iii. Secure Iraq's borders, including the use of joint patrols with +neighboring countries. + +iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond +Iraq's borders. + +v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, +and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from +non-neighboring Muslim nations. + +vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in +Iraq. + +vii. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, +where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad. + +viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key +capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). + +ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk. + +x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, +political, and economic milestones, including better performance on +issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil +revenues, and the dismantling of militias. + + +RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in +addition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States and +the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or +meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or +the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting +national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic +presence in Iraq. + + +2. The Iraq International Support Group + +This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes +the active participation of those countries that have a critical stake +in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage their +participation, the United States should immediately seek the creation +of the Iraq International Support Group. The Support Group should also +include all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countries +in the region and the world. + +The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations or undertakings +on the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group would assist +Iraq in ways the government of Iraq would desire, attempting to +strengthen Iraq's sovereignty--not diminish it. + +It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq's neighbors +are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq +that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not +so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of +the Iraqi state. Each country in the region views the situation in +Iraq through the filter of its particular set of interests. For +example: + + +--Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous Kurdistan +because of its own national security considerations. + +--Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in Iraq, +but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its influence +and hedge its bets on possible outcomes. + +--Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups, +would be threatened by the impact that the breakup of Iraq would have +on its own multiethnic and multiconfessional society. + +--Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim of +Iraqi irredentism and aggression. + +--Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy in +Iraq and the region as a whole. + +--The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an outcome +in Iraq that does not destabilize the region and exacerbate Shia-Sunni +tensions. + +--None of Iraq's neighbors--especially major countries such as Egypt, +Saudi Arabia, and Israel--see it in their interest for the situation +in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence by Iran. Indeed, +they may take active steps to limit Iran's influence, steps that could +lead to an intraregional conflict. + + +Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to reinforce +ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi society. But +if the Support Group takes a systematic and active approach toward +considering the concerns of each country, we believe that each can be +encouraged to play a positive role in Iraq and the region. + + +SAUDI ARABIA. Saudi Arabia's agreement not to intervene with +assistance to Sunni Arab Iraqis could be an essential quid pro quo for +similar forbearance on the part of other neighbors, especially Iran. +The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials to help reconcile +differences between Iraqi factions and build broader support in the +Islamic world for a stabilization agreement, as their recent hosting +of a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Mecca suggests. If the +government in Baghdad pursues a path of national reconciliation with +the Sunnis, the Saudis could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda +in Iraq. They could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, +the Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate. + + +TURKEY. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq's borders, Turkey can +be a partner in supporting the national reconciliation process in +Iraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpful given Turkey's interest +in Kurdistan remaining an integral part of a unified Iraq and its +interest in preventing a safe haven for Kurdish terrorists (the PKK). + + +EGYPT. Because of its important role in the Arab world, Egypt should +be encouraged to foster the national reconciliation process in Iraq +with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. At the same time, +Egypt has the means, and indeed has offered, to train groups of Iraqi +military and security forces in Egypt on a rotational basis. + + +JORDAN. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliation +process in Iraq with the Sunnis. It too has the professional +capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces. + + +RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an +Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately +following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive. + +RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the +states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional +states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent +members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; +and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries--for instance, Germany, +Japan and South Korea--that might be willing to contribute to +resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq +could also become members. + +RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the +Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be +conducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above. +The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S. +effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as +circumstances require. + +RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on the participation +of the office of the United Nations Secretary-General in its work. The +United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as +his representative. + +RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic +Offensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries +that take into account the interests, perspectives, and potential +contributions as suggested above. + + +3. Dealing with Iran and Syria + +Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our +view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries +and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent +with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively +engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without +preconditions. + +The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with Iran and Syria +involve difficult issues that must be resolved. Diplomatic talks +should be extensive and substantive, and they will require a balancing +of interests. The United States has diplomatic, economic, and military +disincentives available in approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, +the United States should also consider incentives to try to engage +them constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya. + +Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include: + +i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors +and the region. + +ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Taliban +from destabilizing Afghanistan. + +iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World +Trade Organization. + +iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United +States. + +v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and +economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating +regime change. + +vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated +between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement as part of a broader +initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined below. + + +RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and +the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran +and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive +policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and +Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as +disincentives, in seeking constructive results. + + +IRAN. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state of the +U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran cooperated +in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whether this model can +be replicated in the case of Iraq. + +Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United States bogged +down in Iraq, Iran's interests would not be served by a failure of +U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorial +disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran's population is slightly more +than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24 percent +of the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities. Worst-case +scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with +serious consequences for Iranian national security interests. + +Our limited contacts with Iran's government lead us to believe that +its leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic +efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctance +to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran. + +Nevertheless, as one of Iraq's neighbors Iran should be asked to +assume its responsibility to participate in the Support Group. An +Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of the +world Iran's rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to +its isolation. Further, Iran's refusal to cooperate on this matter +would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in the +broader dialogue it seeks. + + +RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should +continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and +its five permanent members (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, +France, Russia, and China) plus Germany. + +RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the Support Group should +seek to persuade Iran that it should take specific steps to improve +the situation in Iraq. + +Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following: + +--Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to +any group resorting to violence in Iraq. + +--Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of +Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty of +Iraq and its government. + +--Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to +encourage national reconciliation. + +--Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic +reconstruction of Iraq. + + +SYRIA. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both +countries have important interests in the region that could be +enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to +move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s. In +this context, Syria's national interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute +are important and can be brought into play. + +Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq's stability in several +ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the following: + + +RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support Group should +encourage and persuade Syria of the merit of such contributions as the +following: + +--Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent +possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. +Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and +terrorists in and out of Iraq. + +--Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with the +Iraqis. + +--Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq. + + + +4. The Wider Regional Context + +The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle +East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli +conflict. + +There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States +to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, +and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for +Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, +by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept +Israel's right to exist), and particularly Syria--which is the +principal transit point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, and +which supports radical Palestinian groups. + +The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding direct +involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, +we should act boldly: + +--There is no military solution to this conflict. + +--The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a +nation perpetually at war. + +--No American administration--Democratic or Republican--will ever +abandon Israel. + +--Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-Israeli +dispute because it is an axiom that when the political process breaks +down there will be violence on the ground. + +--The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set forth in +UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and in the principle of +"land for peace." + +--The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace such as +Israel has achieved with Egypt and Jordan. + + +This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments in the +region, especially the democratically elected government of Lebanon, +and the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas. + + +RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by +the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: +Lebanon and Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a +two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. + + +RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include--as soon as possible--the +unconditional calling and holding of meetings, under the auspices +of the United States or the Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, +European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon +and Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who +acknowledge Israel's right to exist) on the other. The purpose of +these meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid +Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks--one Syrian/Lebanese, +and the other Palestinian. + + +RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated +peace should be: be: + +--Syria's full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of +August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain +sovereign control over its territory. + +--Syria's full cooperation with all investigations into political +assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre +Gemayel. + +--A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of +Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to +Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel's problem with +Hezbollah.) + +--Syria's use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the +release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers. + +--A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the +democratically elected government of Lebanon. + +--A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through +Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups. + +--A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of +Israel's right to exist. + +--Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq. + + +RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context of +a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the +Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could +include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if +requested by both parties. + + +RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that +negotiated peace should include: + +--Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the +principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving +peace. + +--Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the +Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing the way for +negotiations with Israel. + +--A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating +the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis in +November 2006. + +--Support for a Palestinian national unity government. + +--Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along +the lines of President Bush's two-state solution, which would address +the key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the +right of return, and the end of conflict. + + + +Afghanistan + +At the same time, we must not lose sight of the importance of the +situation inside Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed by the +Taliban. Afghanistan's borders are porous. If the Taliban were to +control more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda the political +space to conduct terrorist operations. This development would +destabilize the region and have national security implications for the +United States and other countries around the world. Also, the +significant increase in poppy production in Afghanistan fuels the +illegal drug trade and narco-terrorism. + +The huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic support on +Iraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan. As the +United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle East, +it must also give priority to the situation in Afghanistan. Doing so +may require increased political, security, and military measures. + + +RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States to provide +additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, +including resources that might become available as combat forces are +moved from Iraq. + + + + +B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves + + +The New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper external +environment and support for the difficult internal steps that the +Iraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation, +establish security, and make progress on governance. + +The most important issues facing Iraq's future are now the +responsibility of Iraq's elected leaders. Because of the security and +assistance it provides, the United States has a significant role to +play. Yet only the government and people of Iraq can make and sustain +certain decisions critical to Iraq's future. + + + +1. Performance on Milestones + +The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support +the achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--on national +reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, +but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. +The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and the citizens +of the United States and other countries--that it deserves continued +support. + +The U.S. government must make clear that it expects action by the +Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward these milestones. +Such a message can be sent only at the level of our national leaders, +and only in person, during direct consultation. + +As President Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Amman, +Jordan demonstrates, it is important for the President to remain in +close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. There is no +substitute for sustained dialogue at the highest levels of government. + +During these high-level exchanges, the United States should lay out an +agenda for continued support to help Iraq achieve milestones, as well +as underscoring the consequences if Iraq does not act. It should be +unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military, and economic +support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi government's demonstrating +political will and making substantial progress toward the achievement +of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance. +The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces units +from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq's +performance on milestones. + +The United States should also signal that it is seeking broad +international support for Iraq on behalf of achieving these +milestones. The United States can begin to shape a positive climate +for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, through +public statements by President Bush that reject the notion that the +United States seeks to control Iraq's oil, or seeks permanent military +bases within Iraq. However, the United States could consider a request +from Iraq for temporary bases. + + +RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his national +security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the +Iraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: there +must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress +toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the +President should convey as much detail as possible about the substance +of these exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi +people, and the countries in the region well informed. + +RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will +and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on +national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States +should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, +and support for Iraq's security forces, and to continue political, +military, and economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq +becomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, +the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced. + +RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial +progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi +government. + +RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States +does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi +government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. +government could consider that request as it would in the case of any +other government. + +RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States +does not seek to control Iraq's oil. + + + +Milestones for Iraq + +The government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are necessary +to avert a downward spiral and make progress. Prime Minister Maliki +has worked closely in consultation with the United States and has put +forward the following milestones in the key areas of national +reconciliation, security and governance: + + +NATIONAL RECONCILIATION + +By the end of 2006-early 2007: + +Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an election date + +Approval of the Petroleum Law + +Approval of the De-Baathification Law + +Approval of the Militia Law + + +By March 2007: + +A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary) + + +By May 2007: + +Completion of Militia Law implementation + +Approval of amnesty agreement + +Completion of reconciliation efforts + + +By June 2007: + +Provincial elections + + +SECURITY (pending joint U.S.-Iraqi review) + +By the end of 2006: + +Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levels + +By April 2007: + +Iraqi control of the Army + +By September 2007: + +Iraqi control of provinces + +By December 2007: + +Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support) + + +GOVERNANCE + +By the end of 2006: + +The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20 percent and +appreciate the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to combat accelerating +inflation. + +Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum +products and sell imported fuel at market prices. + + +RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion dates of the end of +2006 or early 2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. These +should be completed by the first quarter of 2007. + +RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good start. The United +States should consult closely with the Iraqi government and develop +additional milestones in three areas: national reconciliation, +security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives +of Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones +should be tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible. + + + +2. National Reconciliation + +National reconciliation is essential to reduce further violence and +maintain the unity of Iraq. + +U.S. forces can help provide stability for a time to enable Iraqi +leaders to negotiate political solutions, but they cannot stop the +violence--or even contain it--if there is no underlying political +agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country. + +The Iraqi government must send a clear signal to Sunnis that there is +a place for them in national life. The government needs to act now, to +give a signal of hope. Unless Sunnis believe they can get a fair deal +in Iraq through the political process, there is no prospect that the +insurgency will end. To strike this fair deal, the Iraqi government +and the Iraqi people must address several issues that are critical to +the success of national reconciliation and thus to the future of Iraq. + + + +Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf of National Reconciliation + +RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of the constitution is +essential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on an +urgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, and +should play a role in this process. + +RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation +requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into +national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein's regime +excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified +Iraqi professionals--Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd +or Turkmen or Christian or Arab--into the government. + +RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to +the central government and be shared on the basis of population. No +formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the +regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatible +with national reconciliation. + +RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial elections should +be held at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, new +provincial elections should have been held already. They are necessary +to restore representative government. + +RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in +Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communal +violence. Kirkuk's mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could +make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as +required by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would be +explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the +agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New +Diplomatic Offensive. + +RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. +Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in +the government finding ways and means to reconcile with former bitter +enemies. + +RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of +all minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, +Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected. + +RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop +using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a +tool for politicizing or stopping their activities. Registration +should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for government +censorship and interference. + + + +Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of National +Reconciliation + +The United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq's +reconciliation process. + +The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in a +national reconciliation dialogue. The point is not for the United +States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that +we oppose. The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear +their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi +forces take on the security mission. A successful national +reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date. + +RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must +be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue +takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of +participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase +the possibilities for success. + +Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue must +involve those who wield power, not simply those who hold political +office. The United States must try to talk directly to Grand Ayatollah +Sistani and must consider appointing a high-level American Shia Muslim +to serve as an emissary to him. The United States must also try to +talk directly to Moqtada al-Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent +leaders. The United Nations can help facilitate contacts. + +RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to +engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United +States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada +al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders. + +The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also presents +opportunities to seek broader support for a national reconciliation +dialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, the international community and +religious leaders can play an important role in fostering dialogue and +reconciliation across the sectarian divide. The United States should +actively encourage the constructive participation of all who can take +part in advancing national reconciliation within Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between +sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive +above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to +speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation. + +Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an important +incentive in reconciliation talks and they need to be generous. +Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be difficult for the +United States to accept, just as they will be difficult for the Iraqis +to make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the Iraqis, +not by Americans. Despite being politically unpopular--in the United +States as well as in Iraq--amnesty is essential if progress is to take +place. Iraqi leaders need to be certain that they have U.S. support as +they move forward with this critical element of national +reconciliation. + +RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in +Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch. + + + +Militias and National Reconciliation + +The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and +necessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use violence +against institutions of the state. However, solving the problem of +militias requires national reconciliation. + +Dealing with Iraq's militias will require long-term attention, and +substantial funding will be needed to disarm, demobilize, and +reintegrate militia members into civilian society. Around the world, +this process of transitioning members of irregular military forces +from civil conflict to new lives once a peace settlement takes hold is +familiar. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of +militias depends on national reconciliation and on confidence-building +measures among the parties to that reconciliation. + +Both the United Nations and expert and experienced nongovernmental +organizations, especially the International Organization for +Migration, must be on the ground with appropriate personnel months +before any program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia +members begins. Because the United States is a party to the conflict, +the U.S. military should not be involved in implementing such a +program. Yet U.S. financial and technical support is crucial. + +RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of +neutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on +the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. + +RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial and +technical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate +assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a +program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members. + + + + +3. Security and Military Forces + +A Military Strategy for Iraq + +There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can +bring about success in Iraq. But there are actions that the U.S. and +Iraqi governments, working together, can and should take to increase +the probability of avoiding disaster there, and increase the chance of +success. + +The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently needed national +reconciliation program to which it has already committed. And it +should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by +increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. As the Iraqi +Army increases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should be +able to take real responsibility for governance. + +While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United +States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military +personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi +Army units. As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combat +forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should +evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over +primary responsibility for combat operations. We should continue to +maintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operations +forces, intelligence units, search-and-rescue units, and force +protection units. + +While the size and composition of the Iraqi Army is ultimately a +matter for the Iraqi government to determine, we should be firm on the +urgent near-term need for significant additional trained Army +brigades, since this is the key to Iraqis taking over full +responsibility for their own security, which they want to do and which +we need them to do. It is clear that they will still need security +assistance from the United States for some time to come as they work +to achieve political and security changes. + +One of the most important elements of our support would be the +imbedding of substantially more U.S. military personnel in all Iraqi +Army battalions and brigades, as well as within Iraqi companies. U.S. +personnel would provide advice, combat assistance, and staff +assistance. The training of Iraqi units by the United States has +improved and should continue for the coming year. In addition to this +training, Iraqi combat units need supervised on-the-job training as +they move to field operations. This on-the-job training could be best +done by imbedding more U.S. military personnel in Iraqi deployed +units. The number of imbedded personnel would be based on the +recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it should be +large enough to accelerate the development of a real combat capability +in Iraqi Army units. Such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 +American troops instead of the 3,000 to 4,000 now in this role. This +increase in imbedded troops could be carried out without an aggregate +increase over time in the total number of troops in Iraq by making a +corresponding decrease in troops assigned to U.S. combat brigades. + +Another mission of the U.S. military would be to assist Iraqi deployed +brigades with intelligence, transportation, air support, and logistics +support, as well as providing some key equipment. + +A vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain +rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These teams would be +available to undertake strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq when +the opportunity arises, as well as for other missions considered vital +by the U.S. commander in Iraq. + +The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be significantly improved +if it had improved equipment. One source could be equipment left +behind by departing U.S. units. The quickest and most effective way +for the Iraqi Army to get the bulk of their equipment would be through +our Foreign Military Sales program, which they have already begun to +use. + +While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades +are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of +Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments +in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not +necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, +U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded +with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and +in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and +rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after +the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would +maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our +still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and +naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an +increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently +robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, +to accomplish four missions: + +--Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order to +avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country. + +--Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using +special operations teams. + +--Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces. + +--Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran. + + +Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and +to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make +a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) in the number of U.S. +troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that +the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, +adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of +the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence +is intended to be a long-term "occupation." We could, however, support +a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to +stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, +if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be +effective. + +We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we +believe that so much is at stake. + +We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army the +support it needs to have a reasonable chance to take responsibility +for Iraq's security. Given the ongoing deterioration in the security +situation, it is urgent to move as quickly as possible to have that +security role taken over by Iraqi security forces. + +The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep +large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq for three compelling +reasons. + +First, and most importantly, the United States faces other security +dangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment of American +ground forces at present levels will leave no reserve available to +meet other contingencies. On September 7, 2006, General James Jones, +our NATO commander, called for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. +and NATO forces are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban +forces. The United States should respond positively to that request, +and be prepared for other security contingencies, including those in +Iran and North Korea. + +Second, the long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq at +current levels is adversely affecting Army readiness, with less than a +third of the Army units currently at high readiness levels. The Army +is unlikely to be able to meet the next rotation of troops in Iraq +without undesirable changes in its deployment practices. The Army is +now considering breaking its compact with the National Guard and +Reserves that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers +can be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term risk +that the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will take years +to reverse. + +And finally, an open-ended commitment of American forces would not +provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the +political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian +violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government +might continue to delay taking those difficult actions. + +While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is +moderating the violence, there is little evidence that the long-term +deployment of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead to +fundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important to +recognize that there are no risk-free alternatives available to the +United States at this time. Reducing our combat troop commitments in +Iraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably creates risks, but leaving +those forces tied down in Iraq indefinitely creates its own set of +security risks. + + +RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended +commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi +government that the United States could carry out its plans, including +planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned +changes. America's other security needs and the future of our military +cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi +government. + +RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and +equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General +George Casey on October 24, 2006. + +RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the +highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and +support mission and to counterterrorism operations. + +RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and +military personnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and +American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company +level. The U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancing +incentives for these officers and personnel. + +RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better +equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to +accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combat +brigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment +for Iraqi forces. + + + +Restoring the U.S. Military + +We recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that have +great consequence for our nation. One consequence has been the stress +and uncertainty imposed on our military--the most professional and +proficient military in history. The United States will need its +military to protect U.S. security regardless of what happens in Iraq. +We therefore considered how to limit the adverse consequences of the +strain imposed on our military by the Iraq war. + +U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have been +stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments in +Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead and more than +21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and accelerated +wear on equipment. + +Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of disarray, +as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs become clear. It +will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements for other +current and future security threats that need to be accommodated +together with spending for operations and maintenance, reset, +personnel, and benefits for active duty and retired personnel. +Restoring the capability of our military forces should be a high +priority for the United States at this time. + +The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership between +the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the uniformed +services. Both have long benefited from a relationship in which the +civilian leadership exercises control with the advantage of fully +candid professional advice, and the military serves loyally with the +understanding that its advice has been heard and valued. That +tradition has frayed, and civil-military relations need to be +repaired. + + +RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make every +effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an +environment in which the senior military feel free to offer +independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon +but also to the President and the National Security Council, as +envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. + +RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership +should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that +have returned to the continental United States in order to "reset" the +force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for +global contingencies. + +RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the United States, Congress +should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full +functionality over the next five years. + +RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with the +relevant committees of Congress, should assess the full future +budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on the +future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retain +high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in research +and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies +involved in the stability and reconstruction effort. + + + +4. Police and Criminal Justice + +The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are +profound. + +The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support the mission +to "protect and serve" all Iraqis. Today, far too many Iraqi police do +not embrace that mission, in part because of problems in how reforms +were organized and implemented by the Iraqi and U.S. governments. + + +Recommended Iraqi Actions + +Within Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent +militia infiltration is due, in part, to the poor organization of +Iraq's component police forces: the Iraqi National Police, the Iraqi +Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service. + +The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more military than +domestic in nature--involving commando-style operations--and is thus +ill-suited to the Ministry of the Interior. The more natural home for +the National Police is within the Ministry of Defense, which should be +the authority for counterinsurgency operations and heavily armed +forces. Though depriving the Ministry of the Interior of operational +forces, this move will place the Iraqi National Police under better +and more rigorous Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will enable these +units to better perform their counterinsurgency mission. + + +RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be +transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando +units will become part of the new Iraqi Army. + +Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that bears +little resemblance to ordinary policing, especially in light of the +current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and weaponry across +Iraq's borders and the need for joint patrols of the border with +foreign militaries. Thus the natural home for the Border Police is +within the Ministry of Defense, which should be the authority for +controlling Iraq's borders. + +RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should be +transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have total +responsibility for border control and external security. + +The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and provides +local policing, needs to become a true police force. It needs legal +authority, training, and equipment to control crime and protect Iraqi +citizens. Accomplishing those goals will not be easy, and the presence +of American advisors will be required to help the Iraqis determine a +new role for the police. + +RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater +responsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand +its cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi judicial system in +order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians. + +In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service, the +Ministry of the Interior needs to undertake substantial reforms to +purge bad elements and highlight best practices. Once the ministry +begins to function effectively, it can exert a positive influence over +the provinces and take back some of the authority that was lost to +local governments through decentralization. To reduce corruption and +militia infiltration, the Ministry of the Interior should take +authority from the local governments for the handling of policing +funds. Doing so will improve accountability and organizational +discipline, limit the authority of provincial police officials, and +identify police officers with the central government. + +RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a +process of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand +the capability and reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal +Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over local police +forces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse +financial support to local police should be transferred to the +Ministry of the Interior. + +Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities Protection +Service under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. +Simply disbanding these units is not an option, as the members will +take their weapons and become full-time militiamen or insurgents. All +should be brought under the authority of a reformed Ministry of the +Interior. They will need to be vetted, retrained, and closely +supervised. Those who are no longer part of the Facilities Protection +Service need to participate in a disarmament, demobilization, and +reintegration program (outlined above). + +RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed +with current efforts to identify, register, and control the Facilities +Protection Service. + + + +U.S. Actions + +The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training +mission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity. It has +not always been clear who is in charge of the police training mission, +and the U.S. military lacks expertise in certain areas pertaining to +police and the rule of law. The United States has been more successful +in training the Iraqi Army than it has the police. The U.S. Department +of Justice has the expertise and capacity to carry out the police +training mission. The U.S. Department of Defense is already bearing +too much of the burden in Iraq. Meanwhile, the pool of expertise in +the United States on policing and the rule of law has been +underutilized. + +The United States should adjust its training mission in Iraq to match +the recommended changes in the Iraqi government--the movement of the +National and Border Police to the Ministry of Defense and the new +emphasis on the Iraqi Police Service within the Ministry of the +Interior. To reflect the reorganization, the Department of Defense +would continue to train the Iraqi National and Border Police, and the +Department of Justice would become responsible for training the Iraqi +Police Service. + + +RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its +mission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border +Police, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. + +RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice should direct the +training mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry of +the Interior. + +RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training teams are imbedded +within Iraqi Army units, the current practice of imbedding U.S. police +trainers should be expanded and the numbers of civilian training +officers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi +Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should +be obtained from among experienced civilian police executives and +supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace the +military police personnel currently assigned to training teams. + +The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to train +the Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the Interior, +which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded a large team +within Iraq for counterterrorism activities. + +Building on this experience, the training programs should be expanded +and should include the development of forensic investigation training +and facilities that could apply scientific and technical investigative +methods to counterterrorism as well as to ordinary criminal activity. + +RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and +forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of +terrorism as well as criminal activity. + +One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its lack +of equipment, particularly in the area of communications and motor +transport. + +RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand +and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi +Police Service. + +The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department of +Defense to carry out the mission of reforming Iraq's Ministry of the +Interior and Iraq's judicial system. Iraq needs more than training for +cops on the beat: it needs courts, trained prosecutors and +investigators, and the ability to protect Iraqi judicial officials. + +RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work +of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This +approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and +moving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standard +administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures +that Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in +partnership. + +RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to +establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and +to create institutions and practices to fight corruption must be +strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses with +improved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial +staff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service +are essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice. + + + +5. The Oil Sector + +Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the +Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help Iraq +maximize its capability. + +Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore oil +production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a day +over a three-to five-year period, depending on evolving conditions in +key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil production +would decline unless current problems in the oil sector were +addressed. + + +Short Term + +RECOMMENDATION 62: + +--As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical +assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that +defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a +fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential +to attract investment. + +--The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to +accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs in the +southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States +should no longer fund such infrastructure projects. + +--The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with +private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. +Protective measures could include a program to improve pipeline +security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput +(rather than fixed amounts). + +--Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This +step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector. + +--In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. +government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the +energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis pay +market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain. + + +Long Term + +Expanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will require +creating corporate structures, establishing management systems, and +installing competent managers to plan and oversee an ambitious list of +major oil-field investment projects. + +To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts forward the +following recommendations. + +RECOMMENDATION 63: + +--The United States should encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector +by the international community and by international energy companies. + +--The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the +national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance +efficiency, transparency, and accountability. + +--To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi +government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web +so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export +revenues. + +--The United States should support the World Bank's efforts to ensure +that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves +providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them +in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits. + +--The United States should provide technical assistance to the +Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments +process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating +professional training programs for management and technical personnel. + + + +6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance + +Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heart +of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands +additional U.S. resources. + +Progress in providing essential government services is necessary to +sustain any progress on the political or security front. The period of +large U.S.-funded reconstruction projects is over, yet the Iraqi +government is still in great need of technical assistance and advice +to build the capacity of its institutions. The Iraqi government needs +help with all aspects of its operations, including improved +procedures, greater delegation of authority, and better internal +controls. The strong emphasis on building capable central ministries +must be accompanied by efforts to develop functioning, effective +provincial government institutions with local citizen participation. + +Job creation is also essential. There is no substitute for private-sector +job generation, but the Commander's Emergency Response Program +is a necessary transitional mechanism until security and the economic +climate improve. It provides immediate economic assistance for trash +pickup, water, sewers, and electricity in conjunction with clear, +hold, and build operations, and it should be funded generously. A +total of $753 million was appropriated for this program in FY 2006. + + +RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should be increased to a +level of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. +The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work +hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and job +creation, including reliance on the Commander's Emergency Response +Program, should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be +provided on a nonsectarian basis. + +The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more international +partners to assist with the reconstruction mission. The United +Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization for +Economic Cooperation and Development, and some Arab League members +need to become hands-on participants in Iraq's reconstruction. + +RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq +should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who +should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively +participate in the design and construction of projects. + +The number of refugees and internally displaced persons within Iraq is +increasing dramatically. If this situation is not addressed, Iraq and +the region could be further destabilized, and the humanitarian +suffering could be severe. Funding for international relief efforts is +insufficient, and should be increased. + +RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take the lead in funding +assistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for +Refugees, and other humanitarian agencies. + + + +Coordination of Economic and Reconstruction Assistance + +A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington still +hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq's reconstruction. + +Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in short +supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held +accountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives of +key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have also spoken to us +directly and specifically about the need for a point of contact that +can coordinate their efforts with the U.S. government. + +A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies continuing +to follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer dollars on +duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste will further +undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq. + +A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is required. He +or she should report to the President, be given a staff and funding, +and chair a National Security Council interagency group consisting of +senior principals at the undersecretary level from all relevant U.S. +government departments and agencies. The Senior Advisor's +responsibility must be to bring unity of effort to the policy, budget, +and implementation of economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. The +Senior Advisor must act as the principal point of contact with U.S. +partners in the overall reconstruction effort. + +He or she must have close and constant interaction with senior U.S. +officials and military commanders in Iraq, especially the Director of +the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office, so that the realities +on the ground are brought directly and fully into the policy-making +process. In order to maximize the effectiveness of assistance, all +involved must be on the same page at all times. + + +RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for +Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. ATION 67: The President should create +a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. + + + +Improving the Effectiveness of Assistance Programs + +Congress should work with the administration to improve its ability to +implement assistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly, and +effectively. + +As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the +authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to promote national +reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding from programs and +projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating +effective partnership. These are important tools to improve +performance and accountability--as is the work of the Special +Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. + + +RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the +authority to spend significant funds through a program structured +along the lines of the Commander's Emergency Response Program, and +should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and +projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating +effective partnership. + +RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for +Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistance +programs in Iraq. + +U.S. security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably by +the differing requirements of State and Defense Department programs +and of their respective congressional oversight committees. Since +Iraqi forces must be trained and equipped, streamlining the provision +of training and equipment to Iraq is critical. Security assistance +should be delivered promptly, within weeks of a decision to provide +it. + +RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance program for +Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, +should be authorized and implemented. + +The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage +U.S. partnerships with international donors and Iraqi participants to +promote reconstruction. The ability of the United States to form such +partnerships will encourage greater international participation in +Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from +international donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance +projects should be provided. + + + +7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review + +The public interest is not well served by the government's +preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war in +Iraq. + +First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budget +request but in requests for emergency supplemental appropriations. +This means that funding requests are drawn up outside the normal +budget process, are not offset by budgetary reductions elsewhere, and +move quickly to the White House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the +normal review erodes budget discipline and accountability. + +Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in a confusing +manner, making it difficult for both the general public and members of +Congress to understand the request or to differentiate it from +counterterrorism operations around the world or operations in +Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget experts are needed to answer +what should be a simple question: "How much money is the President +requesting for the war in Iraq?" + +Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive branch +erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing committees +(including the House and Senate Armed Services committees) spend the +better part of a year reviewing the President's annual budget request. +When the President submits an emergency supplemental request, the +authorizing committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the +appropriations committees, and they are pressured by the need to act +quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds. The +result is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory +review. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes loaded +with special spending projects that would not survive the normal +review process. + + +RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the +President's annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in +its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be +circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented +clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out +its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the +war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight. + + + +8. U.S. Personnel + +The United States can take several steps to ensure that it has +personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq. + +All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by +Americans' lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of +1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of +fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient +communication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There are +still far too few Arab language--proficient military and civilian +officers in Iraq, to the detriment of the U.S. mission. + +Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex overseas +interventions to restore and maintain order--stability +operations--outside of the normal embassy setting. The nature of the +mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the United States has +had great difficulty filling civilian assignments in Iraq with sufficient +numbers of properly trained personnel at the appropriate rank. + + +RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, +and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highest +possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural +training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel +about to be assigned to Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians +volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill +those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to +mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed +assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for +U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government +needs to improve how its constituent agencies--Defense, State, Agency +for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence +community, and others--respond to a complex stability operation like +that represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the +previous decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, +and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the +Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. +armed services. + +RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to +carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operation +outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a +Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide +surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, +including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar +technical assistance capabilities. + + + +9. Intelligence + +While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes +superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still +does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the +role of the militias. + +A senior commander told us that human intelligence in Iraq has +improved from 10 percent to 30 percent. Clearly, U.S. intelligence +agencies can and must do better. As mentioned above, an essential part +of better intelligence must be improved language and cultural skills. +As an intelligence analyst told us, "We rely too much on others to +bring information to us, and too often don't understand what is +reported back because we do not understand the context of what we are +told." + +The Defense Department and the intelligence community have not +invested sufficient people and resources to understand the political +and military threat to American men and women in the armed forces. +Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for +countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised +explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a +request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the +people who fabricate, plant, and explode those devices. + +We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the job at the +Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two years' experience +in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts are rotated to new +assignments, and on-the-job training begins anew. Agencies must have a +better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the +insurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect +it, and understand it on a national and provincial level. The analytic +community's knowledge of the organization, leadership, financing, and +operations of militias, as well as their relationship to government +security forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to +know. + +In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in +Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep +events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not +necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of +a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A +roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. +personnel doesn't count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there +were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a +careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light +1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when +information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its +discrepancy with policy goals. + + +RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the +Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic +resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of +violence in Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the +Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the +collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq +to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground. + + + +Recommended Iraqi Actions + +The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, +initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take full +responsibility for this intelligence function. + +To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the CIA should +increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel. +The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorism +intelligence center for the all-source fusion of information on the +various sources of terrorism within Iraq. This center would analyze +data concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and support +groups involved in terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate +intelligence-led police and military actions against them. + + +RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq +to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a +counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate +intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts. + + + + +Appendices + + + +Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations + +The initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking +"fresh-eyes" assessment of Iraq emerged from conversations U.S. House +Appropriations Committee Member Frank Wolf had with us. In late 2005, +Congressman Wolf asked the United States Institute of Peace, a +bipartisan federal entity, to facilitate the assessment, in +collaboration with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy +at Rice University, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and +the Center for Strategic and International Studies. + +Interested members of Congress, in consultation with the sponsoring +organizations and the administration, agreed that former Republican +U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and former Democratic +Congressman Lee H. Hamilton had the breadth of knowledge of foreign +affairs required to co-chair this bipartisan effort. The co-chairs +subsequently selected the other members of the bipartisan Iraq Study +Group, all senior individuals with distinguished records of public +service. Democrats included former Secretary of Defense William J. +Perry, former Governor and U.S. Senator Charles S. Robb, former +Congressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta, and Vernon +E. Jordan, Jr., advisor to President Bill Clinton. Republicans +included former Associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court Sandra Day +O'Connor, former U.S. Senator Alan K. Simpson, former Attorney General +Edwin Meese III, and former Secretary of State Lawrence S. +Eagleburger. Former CIA Director Robert Gates was an active member for +a period of months until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. + +The Iraq Study Group was launched on March 15, 2006, in a Capitol Hill +meeting hosted by U.S. Senator John Warner and attended by +congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle. + +To support the Study Group, the sponsoring organizations created four +expert working groups consisting of 44 leading foreign policy analysts +and specialists on Iraq. The working groups, led by staff of the +United States Institute of Peace, focused on the Strategic +Environment, Military and Security Issues, Political Development, and +the Economy and Reconstruction. Every effort was made to ensure the +participation of experts across a wide span of the political spectrum. +Additionally, a panel of retired military officers was consulted. + +We are grateful to all those who have assisted the Study Group, +especially the supporting experts and staff. Our thanks go to Daniel +P. Serwer of the Institute of Peace, who served as executive director; +Christopher Kojm, advisor to the Study Group; John Williams, Policy +Assistant to Mr. Baker; and Ben Rhodes, Special Assistant to Mr. +Hamilton. + + Richard H. Solomon, President + United States Institute of Peace + + Edward P. Djerejian, Founding Director + James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, + Rice University + + David M. Abshire, President + Center for the Study of the Presidency + + John J. Hamre, President + Center for Strategic and International Studies + + + + +Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions + + March 15, 2006 + April 11-12, 2006 + May 18-19, 2005 + June 13-14, 2006 August 2-3, 2006 + August 30-September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad) + September 18-19, 2006 + November 13-14, 2006 + November 27-29, 2006 + + + + +Iraq Study Group Consultations + +(* denotes a meeting that took place in Iraq) + + +Iraqi Officials and Representatives + + *Jalal Talabani--President + *Tariq al-Hashimi--Vice President + *Adil Abd al-Mahdi--Vice President + *Nouri Kamal al-Maliki--Prime Minister + *Salaam al-Zawbai--Deputy Prime Minister + *Barham Salih--Deputy Prime Minister + *Mahmoud al-Mashhadani--Speaker of the Parliament + *Mowaffak al-Rubaie--National Security Advisor + *Jawad Kadem al-Bolani--Minister of Interior + *Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi--Minister of Defense + *Hoshyar Zebari--Minister of Foreign Affairs + *Bayan Jabr--Minister of Finance + *Hussein al-Shahristani--Minister of Oil + *Karim Waheed--Minister of Electricity + *Akram al-Hakim--Minister of State for National + Reconciliation Affairs + *Mithal al-Alusi--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Ayad Jamal al-Din--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Sami al-Ma'ajoon--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud--Member, Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Wijdan Mikhael--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + Lt. General Nasir Abadi--Deputy Chief of Staff of the + Iraqi Joint Forces + *Adnan al-Dulaimi--Head of the Tawafuq list + Ali Allawi--Former Minister of Finance + *Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi--representative of Moqtada al-Sadr + *Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim--Shia Coalition Leader + *Sheik Maher al-Hamraa--Ayat Allah Said Sussein Al Sadar + *Hajim al-Hassani--Member of the Parliament on the Iraqiya list + *Hunain Mahmood Ahmed Al-Kaddo--President of the + Iraqi Minorities Council + *Abid al-Gufhoor Abid al-Razaq al-Kaisi--Dean of the + Islamic University of the Imam Al-Atham + *Ali Neema Mohammed Aifan al-Mahawili--Rafiday Al-Iraq + Al-Jaded Foundation + *Saleh al-Mutlaq--Leader of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue + *Ayyad al-Sammara'l--Member of the Parliament + *Yonadim Kenna--Member of the Parliament and Secretary General + of Assyrian Movement + *Shahla Wali Mohammed--Iraqi Counterpart International + *Hamid Majid Musa--Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party + *Raid Khyutab Muhemeed--Humanitarian, Cultural, + and Social Foundation + Sinan Shabibi--Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq + Samir Shakir M. Sumaidaie--Ambassador of Iraq to the United States + + +Current U.S. Administration Officials + +Senior Administration Officials + + George W. Bush--President + Richard B. Cheney--Vice President + Condoleezza Rice--Secretary of State + Donald H. Rumsfeld--Secretary of Defense + Stephen J. Hadley--National Security Advisor + Joshua B. Bolten--White House Chief of Staff + + +Department of Defense/Military + +CIVILIAN: + Gordon England--Deputy Secretary of Defense + Stephen Cambone--Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence + Eric Edelman--Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + +MILITARY: + General Peter Pace--Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + Admiral Edmund Giambastiani--Vice-Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff + General John Abizaid--Commander, United States Central Command + *General George W. Casey, Jr.--Commanding General, + Multi-National Forces-Iraq + Lt. General James T. Conway--Director of Operations, J-3, + on the Joint Staff + *Lt. General Peter Chiarelli--Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq + Lt. General David H. Petraeus--Commanding General, + U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth + *Lt. General Martin Dempsey--Commander Multi-National Security + Transition Command-Iraq + *Maj. General Joseph Peterson--Coalition Police Assistance + Training Team + *Maj. General Richard Zilmer--Commander, 1st Marine + Expeditionary Force + Colonel Derek Harvey--Senior Intelligence Officer for Iraq, + Defense Intelligence Agency + Lt. Colonel Richard Bowyer--National War College + (recently served in Iraq) + Lt. Colonel Justin Gubler--National War College + (recently served in Iraq) + Lt. Colonel David Haight--National War College + (recently served in Iraq) + Lt. Colonel Russell Smith--National War College + (recently served in Iraq) + + +Department of State/Civilian Embassy Personnel + + R. Nicholas Burns--Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + Philip Zelikow--Counselor to the Department of State + C. David Welch--Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern Affairs + James Jeffrey--Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and + Coordinator for Iraq Policy + David Satterfield--Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and + Coordinator for Iraq Policy + Zalmay Khalilzad--U.S. Ambassador to Iraq + *Dan Speckhard--Charge D'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Iraq + *Joseph Saloom--Director, Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office + *Hilda Arellano--U.S. Agency for International Development + Director in Iraq + *Terrance Kelly--Director, Office of Strategic Plans and Assessments + *Randall Bennett--Regional Security Officer of the U.S. Embassy, + Baghdad, Iraq + + +Intelligence Community + + John D. Negroponte--Director of National Intelligence + General Michael V. Hayden--Director, Central Intelligence Agency + Thomas Fingar--Deputy Director of National Intelligence for + Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council + John Sherman--Deputy National Intelligence Officer for + Military Issues + Steve Ward--Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East + Jeff Wickham--Iraq Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency + + +Other Senior Officials + + David Walker--Comptroller General of the United States + *Stuart Bowen--Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction + + +Members of Congress + +United States Senate + + Senator William Frist (R-TN)--Majority Leader + Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)--Minority Leader + Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)--Majority Whip + Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL)--Minority Whip + Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)--Chair, Foreign Relations Committee + Senator John Warner (R-VA)--Chair, Armed Services Committee + Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)--Ranking Member, + Foreign Relations Committee + Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)--Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee + Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)--Ranking Member, + Energy and Resources Committee + Senator Kit Bond (R-MO)--Member, Intelligence Committee + Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)--Member, Armed Services Committee + Senator John Kerry (D-MA)--Member, Foreign Relations Committee + Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)--Member, Armed Services Committee + Senator John McCain (R-AZ)--Member, Armed Services Committee + Senator Jack Reed (D-RI)--Member, Armed Services Committee + +United States House of Representatives + + Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)--Minority Leader Representative + Tom Davis (R-VA)--Chair, Government Reform Committee + Representative Jane Harman (D-CA)--Ranking Member, + Intelligence Committee + Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO)--Ranking Member, + Armed Services Committee + Representative John Murtha (D-PA)--Ranking Member, + Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense + Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN)--Member, Armed Services Committee + Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX)--Member, + International Relations Committee + Representative Alan Mollohan (D-WV)--Member, + Appropriations Committee + Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT)--Member, + Government Reform Committee + Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA)--Member, Appropriations Committee + + +Foreign Officials + + Sheikh Salem al-Abdullah al-Sabah--Ambassador of Kuwait + to the United States + Michael Ambuhl--Secretary of State of Switzerland + Kofi Annan--Secretary-General of the United Nations + *Dominic Asquith--British Ambassador to Iraq + Tony Blair--Prime Minister of the United Kingdom + Prince Turki al-Faisal--Ambassador of Saudi Arabia + to the United States + Nabil Fahmy--Ambassador of Egypt to the United States + Karim Kawar--Ambassador of Jordan to the United States + Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa--Ambassador of Qatar + to the United States + *Mukhtar Lamani--Arab League envoy to Iraq + Sir David Manning--British Ambassador to the United States + Imad Moustapha--Ambassador of Syria to the United States + Walid Muallem--Foreign Minister of Syria + Romano Prodi--Prime Minister of Italy + *Ashraf Qazi--Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General + for Iraq + Anders Fogh Rasmussen--Prime Minister of Denmark + Nabi Sensoy--Ambassador of Turkey to the United States + Ephraim Sneh--Deputy Minister of Defense of the State of Israel + Javad Zarif--Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations + Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayad--Minister of Foreign Affairs + of the United Arab Emirates + + +Former Officials and Experts + + William J. Clinton--former President of the United States + Walter Mondale--former Vice President of the United States + Madeleine K. Albright--former United States Secretary of State + Warren Christopher--former United States Secretary of State + Henry Kissinger--former United States Secretary of State + Colin Powell--former United States Secretary of State + George P. Schultz--former United States Secretary of State + Samuel R. Berger--former United States National Security Advisor + Zbigniew Brzezinski--former United States National Security Advisor + Anthony Lake--former United States National Security Advisor + General Brent Scowcroft--former United States National + Security Advisor + General Eric Shinseki--former Chief of Staff of the + United States Army + General Anthony Zinni--former Commander, + United States Central Command + General John Keane--former Vice Chief of Staff of the + United States Army + Admiral Jim Ellis--former Commander of United States + Strategic Command + General Joe Ralston--former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO + Lt. General Roger C. Schultz--former Director + of the United States Army National Guard + Douglas Feith--former United States Under Secretary of Defense + for Policy + Mark Danner--The New York Review of Books + Larry Diamond--Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, + Stanford University + Thomas Friedman--New York Times + Leslie Gelb--President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations + Richard Hill--Director, Office of Strategic Initiatives + and Analysis, CHF International + Richard C. Holbrooke--former Ambassador of the United States + to the United Nations + Martin S. Indyk--Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, + The Brookings Institution + Ronald Johnson--Executive Vice President for International + Development, RTI International + Frederick Kagan--The American Enterprise Institute + Arthur Keys, Jr.--President and CEO, International Relief + and Development + William Kristol--The Weekly Standard + *Guy Laboa--Kellogg, Brown & Root + Nancy Lindborg--President, Mercy Corps + Michael O'Hanlon--Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, + The Brookings Institution + George Packer--The New Yorker + Carlos Pascual--Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, + The Brookings Institution + Robert Perito--Senior Program Officer, United States + Institute of Peace + *Col. Jack Petri, USA (Ret.)--advisor to the Iraqi + Ministry of Interior + Kenneth Pollack--Director of Research, Saban Center for + Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution + Thomas Ricks--The Washington Post + Zainab Salbi--Founder and CEO, Women for Women International + Matt Sherman--former Deputy Senior Advisor and Director of Policy, + Iraqi Ministry of Interior + Strobe Talbott--President, The Brookings Institution + Rabih Torbay--Vice President for International Operations, + International Medical Corps + George Will--The Washington Post + + +Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel + +Economy and Reconstruction + + Gary Matthews, USIP Secretariat + Director, Task Force on the United Nations and Special Projects, + United States Institute of Peace + + Raad Alkadiri + Director, Country Strategies Group, PFC Energy + + Frederick D. Barton + Senior Adviser and Co-Director, International Security Program, + Center for Strategic & International Studies + + Jay Collins + Chief Executive Officer, Public Sector Group, Citigroup, Inc. + + Jock P. Covey + Senior Vice President, External Affairs, Corporate Security + and Sustainability Services, Bechtel Corporation + + Keith Crane + Senior Economist, RAND Corporation + + Amy Myers Jaffe + Associate Director for Energy Studies, James A. Baker III Institute + for Public Policy, Rice University + + K. Riva Levinson + Managing Director, BKSH & Associates + + David A. Lipton + Managing Director and Head of Global Country Risk Management, + Citigroup, Inc + + Michael E. O'Hanlon + Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution + + James A. Placke + Senior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates + + James A. Schear + Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, + National Defense University + + +Military and Security + + Paul Hughes, USIP Secretariat + Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and + Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace + + Hans A. Binnendijk + Director & Theodore Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology & + National Security Policy, National Defense University + + James Carafano + Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, Douglas + and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, + The Heritage Foundation + + Michael Eisenstadt + Director, Military & Security Program, The Washington Institute for + Near East Policy + + Michèle A. Flournoy + Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for + Strategic & International Studies + + Bruce Hoffman + Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of + Foreign Service, Georgetown University + + Clifford May + President, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies + + Robert M. Perito + Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and + Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace + + Kalev I. Sepp + Assistant Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Center + on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School + + John F. Sigler + Adjunct Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center + for Strategic Studies, National Defense University + + W. Andrew Terrill + Research Professor, National Security Affairs, Strategic + Studies Institute + + Jeffrey A. White + Berrie Defense Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy + + +Political Development + + Daniel P. Serwer, USIP Secretariat + Vice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability + Operations, United States Institute of Peace + + Raymond H. Close + Freelance Analyst and Commentator on Middle East Politics + + Larry Diamond Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, + Sanford University, and Co-Editor, Journal of Democracy + + Andrew P. N. Erdmann + Former Director for Iran, Iraq and Strategic Planning, + National Security Council + + Reuel Marc Gerecht + Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute + + David L. Mack + Vice President, The Middle East Institute + + Phebe A. Marr + Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace + + Hassan Mneimneh + Director, Documentation Program, The Iraq Memory Foundation + + Augustus Richard Norton + Professor of International Relations and Anthropology, + Department of International Relations, Boston University + + Marina S. Ottaway + Senior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, + Carnegie Endowment for International Peace + + Judy Van Rest + Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute + + Judith S. Yaphe + Distinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East, + Institute for National Strategic Studies, + National Defense University + + +Strategic Environment + + Paul Stares, USIP Secretariat + Vice President, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, + United States Institute of Peace + + Jon B. Alterman + Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic & + International Studies + + Steven A. Cook + Douglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations + + James F. Dobbins + Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, + RAND Corporation + + Hillel Fradkin + Director, Center for Islam, Democracy and the + Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute + + Chas W. Freeman + Chairman, Projects International and President, + Middle East Policy Council + + Geoffrey Kemp + Director, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center + + Daniel C. Kurtzer + S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor, Middle East Policy Studies, + Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University + + Ellen Laipson + President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center + + William B. Quandt + Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Professor of Government and + Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, and Nonresident Senior + Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, + The Brookings Institution + + Shibley Telhami + Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, + Department of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, + and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, + The Brookings Institution + + Wayne White + Adjunct Scholar, Public Policy Center, Middle East Institute + + +Military Senior Advisor Panel + + Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr. + United States Navy, Retired + + General John M. Keane + United States Army, Retired + + General Edward C. Meyer + United States Army, Retired + + General Joseph W. Ralston + United States Air Force, Retired + + Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Sr. + United States Army, Retired + + + +The Iraq Study Group + +James A. Baker, III--Co-Chair + +James A. Baker, III, has served in senior government positions under +three United States presidents. He served as the nation's 61st +Secretary of State from January 1989 through August 1992 under +President George H. W. Bush. During his tenure at the State +Department, Mr. Baker traveled to 90 foreign countries as the United +States confronted the unprecedented challenges and opportunities of +the post-Cold War era. Mr. Baker's reflections on those years of +revolution, war, and peace--The Politics of Diplomacy--was published +in 1995. + +Mr. Baker served as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 to +1988 under President Ronald Reagan. As Treasury Secretary, he was also +Chairman of the President's Economic Policy Council. From 1981 to +1985, he served as White House Chief of Staff to President Reagan. Mr. +Baker's record of public service began in 1975 as Under Secretary of +Commerce to President Gerald Ford. It concluded with his service as +White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush from +August 1992 to January 1993. + +Long active in American presidential politics, Mr. Baker led +presidential campaigns for Presidents Ford, Reagan, and Bush over the +course of five consecutive presidential elections from 1976 to 1992. + +A native Houstonian, Mr. Baker graduated from Princeton University in +1952. After two years of active duty as a lieutenant in the United +States Marine Corps, he entered the University of Texas School of Law +at Austin. He received his J.D. with honors in 1957 and practiced law +with the Houston firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975. + +Mr. Baker's memoir--Work Hard, Study . . . and Keep Out of Politics! +Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life--was published +in October 2006. + +Mr. Baker received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1991 and has +been the recipient of many other awards for distinguished public +service, including Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson Award, the +American Institute for Public Service's Jefferson Award, Harvard +University's John F. Kennedy School of Government Award, the Hans J. +Morgenthau Award, the George F. Kennan Award, the Department of the +Treasury's Alexander Hamilton Award, the Department of State's +Distinguished Service Award, and numerous honorary academic degrees. + +Mr. Baker is presently a senior partner in the law firm of Baker +Botts. He is Honorary Chairman of the James A. Baker III Institute for +Public Policy at Rice University and serves on the board of the Howard +Hughes Medical Institute. From 1997 to 2004, Mr. Baker served as the +Personal Envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seek +a political solution to the conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr. +Baker was appointed Special Presidential Envoy for President George W. +Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt. In 2005, he was co-chair, with former +President Jimmy Carter, of the Commission on Federal Election Reform. +Since March 2006, Mr. Baker and former U.S. Congressman Lee H. +Hamilton have served as the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group, a +bipartisan blue-ribbon panel on Iraq. + +Mr. Baker was born in Houston, Texas, in 1930. He and his wife, the +former Susan Garrett, currently reside in Houston, and have eight +children and seventeen grandchildren. Garrett, currently reside in +Houston, and have eight children and seventeen grandchildren. + + + +Lee H. Hamilton--Co-Chair + +Lee H. Hamilton became Director of the Woodrow Wilson International +Center for Scholars in January 1999. Previously, Mr. Hamilton served +for thirty-four years as a United States Congressman from Indiana. +During his tenure, he served as Chairman and Ranking Member of the +House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International +Relations) and chaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East +from the early 1970s until 1993. He was Chairman of the Permanent +Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee to +Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. + +Also a leading figure on economic policy and congressional +organization, he served as Chair of the Joint Economic Committee as +well as the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, and was a +member of the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee. In his +home state of Indiana, Mr. Hamilton worked hard to improve education, +job training, and infrastructure. Currently, Mr. Hamilton serves as +Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, which seeks +to educate citizens on the importance of Congress and on how Congress +operates within our government. + +Mr. Hamilton remains an important and active voice on matters of +international relations and American national security. He served as a +Commissioner on the United States Commission on National Security in +the 21st Century (better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), was +Co-Chair with former Senator Howard Baker of the Baker-Hamilton +Commission to Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos, and +was Vice-Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon +the United States (the 9/11 Commission), which issued its report in +July 2004. He is currently a member of the President's Foreign +Intelligence Advisory Board and the President's Homeland Security +Advisory Council, as well as the Director of the Federal Bureau of +Investigation's Advisory Board. + +Born in Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Hamilton relocated with his family +to Tennessee and then to Evansville, Indiana. Mr. Hamilton is a +graduate of DePauw University and the Indiana University School of +Law, and studied for a year at Goethe University in Germany. Before +his election to Congress, he practiced law in Chicago and in Columbus, +Indiana. A former high school and college basketball star, he has been +inducted into the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame. + +Mr. Hamilton's distinguished service in government has been honored +through numerous awards in public service and human rights as well as +honorary degrees. He is the author of A Creative Tension--The Foreign +Policy Roles of the President and Congress (2002) and How Congress +Works and Why You Should Care (2004), and the coauthor of Without +Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (2006). + +Lee and his wife, the former Nancy Ann Nelson, have three children-- +Tracy Lynn Souza, Deborah Hamilton Kremer, and Douglas Nelson +Hamilton--and five grandchildren: Christina, Maria, McLouis and +Patricia Souza and Lina Ying Kremer. + + + +Lawrence S. Eagleburger--Member + +Lawrence S. Eagleburger was sworn in as the 62nd U.S. Secretary of +State by President George H. W. Bush on December 8, 1992, and as +Deputy Secretary of State on March 20, 1989. + +After his entry into the Foreign Service in 1957, Mr. Eagleburger +served in the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in the State +Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in the U.S. Embassy in +Belgrade, and the U.S. Mission to NATO in Belgium. In 1963, after a +severe earthquake in Macedonia, he led the U.S. government effort to +provide medical and other assistance. He was then assigned to +Washington, D.C., where he served on the Secretariat staff and as +special assistant to Dean Acheson, advisor to the President on +Franco-NATO issues. In August 1966, he became acting director of the +Secretariat staff. + +In October 1966, Mr. Eagleburger joined the National Security Council +staff. In October 1967, he was assigned as special assistant to Under +Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. In November 1968, he was +appointed Dr. Henry Kissinger's assistant, and in January 1969, he +became executive assistant to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. In +September 1969, he was assigned as political advisor and chief of the +political section of the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. + +Mr. Eagleburger became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in August +1971. Two years later, he became Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense +for International Security Affairs. The same year he returned to the +White House as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security +Operations. He subsequently followed Dr. Kissinger to the State +Department, becoming Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In +1975, he was made Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management. + +In June 1977, Mr. Eagleburger was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia, +and in 1981 he was nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for +European Affairs. In February 1982, he was appointed Under Secretary +of State for Political Affairs. + +Mr. Eagleburger has received numerous awards, including an honorary +knighthood from Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II (1994); the +Distinguished Service Award (1992), the Wilbur J. Carr Award (1984), +and the Distinguished Honor Award (1984) from the Department of State; +the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal from the Department of +Defense (1978); and the President's Award for Distinguished Federal +Civilian Service (1976). + +After retiring from the Department of State in May 1984, Mr. +Eagleburger was named president of Kissinger Associates, Inc. +Following his resignation as Secretary of State on January 19, 1993, +he joined the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell as +Senior Foreign Policy Advisor. He joined the boards of Halliburton +Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, and Universal Corporation. Mr. +Eagleburger currently serves as Chairman of the International +Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims. + +He received his B.S. degree in 1952 and his M.S. degree in 1957, both +from the University of Wisconsin, and served as first lieutenant in +the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1954. Mr. Eagleburger is married to the +former Marlene Ann Heinemann. He is the father of three sons, Lawrence +Scott, Lawrence Andrew, and Lawrence Jason. + + + +Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.--Member + +Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., is a Senior Managing Director of Lazard Frères +& Co, LLC in New York. He works with a diverse group of clients across +a broad range of industries. + +Prior to joining Lazard, Mr. Jordan was a Senior Executive Partner +with the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, where he +remains Senior Counsel. While there Mr. Jordan practiced general, +corporate, legislative, and international law in Washington, D.C. + +Before Akin Gump, Mr. Jordan held the following positions: President +and Chief Executive Officer of the National Urban League, Inc.; +Executive Director of the United Negro College Fund, Inc.; Director of +the Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional Council; +Attorney-Consultant, U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity; Assistant to +the Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council; Georgia Field +Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored +People; and an attorney in private practice in Arkansas and Georgia. + +Mr. Jordan's presidential appointments include the President's +Advisory Committee for the Points of Light Initiative Foundation, the +Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, the Advisory +Council on Social Security, the Presidential Clemency Board, the +American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, the National Advisory +Committee on Selective Service, and the Council of the White House +Conference "To Fulfill These Rights." In 1992, Mr. Jordan served as +the Chairman of the Clinton Presidential Transition Team. + +Mr. Jordan's corporate and other directorships include American +Express Company; Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.; Howard University +(Trustee); J. C. Penney Company, Inc.; Lazard Ltd.; Xerox Corporation; +and the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold. + +Mr. Jordan is a graduate of DePauw University and the Howard +University Law School. He holds honorary degrees from more than 60 +colleges and universities in America. He is a member of the bars of +Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, and the U.S. Supreme +Court. He is a member of the American Bar Association, the National +Bar Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Bilderberg +Meetings and he is President of the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. +Mr. Jordan is the author of Vernon Can Read! A Memoir (Public Affairs, +2001). + + + +Edwin Meese III--Member + +Edwin Meese III holds the Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy at the +Heritage Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based public policy research +and education institution. He is also the Chairman of Heritage's +Center for Legal and Judicial Studies and a distinguished visiting +fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In addition, +Meese lectures, writes, and consults throughout the United States on a +variety of subjects. + +Meese is the author of With Reagan: The Inside Story, which was +published by Regnery Gateway in June 1992; co-editor of Making America +Safer, published in 1997 by the Heritage Foundation; and coauthor of +Leadership, Ethics and Policing, published by Prentice Hall in 2004. + +Meese served as the 75th Attorney General of the United States from +February 1985 to August 1988. As the nation's chief law enforcement +officer, he directed the Department of Justice and led international +efforts to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. In +1985 he received Government Executive magazine's annual award for +excellence in management. + +From January 1981 to February 1985, Meese held the position of +Counsellor to the President, the senior position on the White House +staff, where he functioned as the President's chief policy advisor. As +Attorney General and as Counsellor, Meese was a member of the +President's cabinet and the National Security Council. He served as +Chairman of the Domestic Policy Council and of the National Drug +Policy Board. Meese headed the President-elect's transition effort +following the November 1980 election. During the presidential +campaign, he served as chief of staff and senior issues advisor for +the Reagan-Bush Committee. + +Formerly, Meese served as Governor Reagan's executive assistant and +chief of staff in California from 1969 through 1974 and as legal +affairs secretary from 1967 through 1968. Before joining Governor +Reagan's staff in 1967, Meese served as deputy district attorney in +Alameda County, California. From 1977 to 1981, Meese was a professor +of law at the University of San Diego, where he also was Director of +the Center for Criminal Justice Policy and Management. + +In addition to his background as a lawyer, educator, and public +official, Meese has been a business executive in the aerospace and +transportation industry, serving as vice president for administration +of Rohr Industries, Inc., in Chula Vista, California. He left Rohr to +return to the practice of law, engaging in corporate and general legal +work in San Diego County. + +Meese is a graduate of Yale University, Class of 1953, and holds a law +degree from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a retired +colonel in the United States Army Reserve. He is active in numerous +civic and educational organizations. Meese is married, has two grown +children, and resides in McLean, Virginia. + + + +Sandra Day O'Connor--Member + +Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated by President Reagan as Associate +Justice of the United States Supreme Court on July 7, 1981, and took +the oath of office on September 25. O'Connor previously served on the +Arizona Court of Appeals (1979-81) and as judge of the Maricopa County +Superior Court in Phoenix, Arizona (1975-79). She was appointed as +Arizona state senator in 1969 and was subsequently elected to two +two-year terms from 1969 to 1975. During her tenure, she was Arizona +Senate Majority Leader and Chairman of the State, County, and +Municipal Affairs Committee, and she served on the Legislative +Council, on the Probate Code Commission, and on the Arizona Advisory +Council on Intergovernmental Relations. + +From 1965 to 1969, O'Connor was assistant attorney general in Arizona. +She practiced law at a private firm in Maryvale, Arizona, from 1958 to +1960 and prior to that was civilian attorney for Quartermaster Market +Center in Frankfurt, Germany (1954-57), and deputy county attorney in +San Mateo County, California (1952-53) + +She was previously Chairman of the Arizona Supreme Court Committee to +Reorganize Lower Courts (1974-75), Vice Chairman of the Arizona Select +Law Enforcement Review Commission (1979-80), and, in Maricopa County, +Chairman of the Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service (1960-62), the +Juvenile Detention Home Visiting Board (1963-64), and the Superior +Court Judges' Training and Education Committee (1977-79) and a member +of the Board of Adjustments and Appeals (1963-64). + +O'Connor currently serves as Chancellor of the College of William and +Mary and on the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, the +Executive Board of the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, +the Advisory Board of the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural +History, and the Advisory Committee of the American Society of +International Law, Judicial. She is an honorary member of the Advisory +Committee for the Judiciary Leadership Development Council, an +honorary chair of America's 400th Anniversary: Jamestown 2007, a +co-chair of the National Advisory Council of the Campaign for the Civic +Mission of Schools, a member of the Selection Committee of the +Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum, and a member of the Advisory +Board of the Stanford Center on Ethics. She also serves on several +bodies of the American Bar Association, including the Museum of Law +Executive Committee, the Commission on Civic Education and Separation +of Powers, and the Advisory Commission of the Standing Committee on +the Law Library of Congress. + +O'Connor previously served as a member of the Anglo-American Exchange +(1980); the State Bar of Arizona Committees on Legal Aid, Public +Relations, Lower Court Reorganization, and Continuing Legal Education; +the National Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services +(1974-76); the Arizona State Personnel Commission (1968-69); the +Arizona Criminal Code Commission (1974-76); and the Cathedral Chapter +of the Washington National Cathedral (1991-99). + +O'Connor is a member of the American Bar Association, the State Bar of +Arizona, the State Bar of California, the Maricopa County Bar +Association, the Arizona Judges' Association, the National Association +of Women Judges, and the Arizona Women Lawyers' Association. She holds +a B.A. (with Great Distinction) and an LL.B. (Order of the Coif) from +Stanford University, where she was also a member of the board of +editors of the Stanford Law Review. + + + +Leon E. Panetta--Member + +Leon E. Panetta currently co-directs the Leon & Sylvia Panetta +Institute for Public Policy, a nonpartisan study center for the +advancement of public policy based at California State University, +Monterey Bay. He serves as distinguished scholar to the chancellor of +the California State University system, teaches a Master's in Public +Policy course at the Panetta Institute, is a presidential professor at +Santa Clara University, and created the Leon Panetta Lecture Series. + +Panetta first went to Washington in 1966, when he served as a +legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California. +In 1969, he became Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, +Education and Welfare and then Director of the U.S. Office for Civil +Rights. His book Bring Us Together (published in 1971) is an account +of that experience. In 1970, he went to New York City, where he served +as Executive Assistant to Mayor John Lindsay. Then, in 1971, Panetta +returned to California, where he practiced law in the Monterey firm of +Panetta, Thompson & Panetta until he was elected to Congress in 1976. + +Panetta was a U.S. Representative from California's 16th (now 17th) +district from 1977 to 1993. He authored the Hunger Prevention Act of +1988, the Fair Employment Practices Resolution, legislation that +established Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for hospice care for +the terminally ill, and other legislation on a variety of education, +health, agriculture, and defense issues. + +From 1989 to 1993, Panetta was Chairman of the House Committee on the +Budget. He also served on that committee from 1979 to 1985. He chaired +the House Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, +Consumer Relations and Nutrition; the House Administration Committee's +Subcommittee on Personnel and Police; and the Select Committee on +Hunger's Task Force on Domestic Hunger. He also served as Vice +Chairman of the Caucus of Vietnam Era Veterans in Congress and as a +member of the President's Commission on Foreign Language and +International Studies. + +Panetta left Congress in 1993 to become Director of the Office of +Management and Budget for the incoming Clinton administration. Panetta +was appointed Chief of Staff to the President of the United States on +July 17, 1994, and served in that position until January 20, 1997. + +In addition, Panetta served a six-year term on the Board of Directors +of the New York Stock Exchange beginning in 1997. He currently serves +on many public policy and organizational boards, including as Chair of +the Pew Oceans Commission and Co-Chair of the California Council on +Base Support and Retention. + +Panetta has received many awards and honors, including the Smithsonian +Paul Peck Award for Service to the Presidency, the John H. Chafee +Coastal Stewardship Award, the Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal +Leadership, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Center +for the Study of the Presidency. + +He earned a B.A. magna cum laude from Santa Clara University in 1960, and +in 1963 received his J.D. from Santa Clara University Law School, +where he was an editor of the Santa Clara Law Review. He served as a +first lieutenant in the Army from 1964 to 1966 and received the Army +Commendation Medal. Panetta is married to the former Sylvia Marie +Varni. They have three grown sons and five grandchildren. + + + +William J. Perry--Member + +William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at +Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli +Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering. He +is a senior fellow at FSI and serves as co-director of the Preventive +Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard +universities. + +Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense of the United States, serving +from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as Deputy +Secretary of Defense (1993-94) and as Under Secretary of Defense for +Research and Engineering (1977-81). He is on the board of directors of +several emerging high-tech companies and is Chairman of Global +Technology Partners. + +His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratory +director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954-64) and as +founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964-77), executive vice president +of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981-85), and founder and chairman of +Technology Strategies & Alliances (1985-93). He is a member of the +National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy +of Arts and Sciences. + +From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of +Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined +the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant +in the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He has received a number of +awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the +Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and +Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 1997), the +Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency +(1977 and 1997), NASA (1981), and the Coast Guard (1997). He received +the American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), the +Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal +Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academy +of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal in 1996. He +has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and +the Air Force. + +He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, +France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and +the United Kingdom. He received a B.S. and M.S. from Stanford +University and a Ph.D. from Penn State, all in mathematics. + + +Charles S. Robb--Member + +Charles S. Robb joined the faculty of George Mason University as a +Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy in 2001. Previously +he served as Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, from 1978 to 1982; as +Virginia's 64th Governor, from 1982 to 1986; and as a United States +Senator, from 1989 to 2001. + +While in the Senate he became the only member ever to serve +simultaneously on all three national security committees +(Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations). He also served +on the Finance, Commerce, and Budget committees. + +Before becoming a member of Congress he chaired the Southern +Governors' Association, the Democratic Governors' Association, the +Education Commission of the States, the Democratic Leadership Council, +Jobs for America's Graduates, the National Conference of Lieutenant +Governors, and the Virginia Forum on Education, and was President of +the Council of State Governments. + +During the 1960s he served on active duty with the United States +Marine Corps, retiring from the Marine Corps Reserve in 1991. He began +as the Class Honor Graduate from Marine Officers Basic School in 1961 +and ended up as head of the principal recruiting program for Marine +officers in 1970. In between, he served in both the 1st and 2nd Marine +Divisions and his assignments included duty as a Military Social Aide +at the White House and command of an infantry company in combat in +Vietnam. + +He received his law degree from the University of Virginia in 1973, +clerked for Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., on the U.S. Court of Appeals +for the Fourth Circuit, and practiced law with Williams and Connolly +prior to his election to state office. Between his state and federal +service he was a partner at Hunton and Williams. + +Since leaving the Senate in 2001 he has served as Chairman of the +Board of Visitors at the United States Naval Academy, Co-Chairman +(with Senior Judge Laurence Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for +the D.C. Circuit) of the President's Commission on Intelligence +Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass +Destruction, and Co-Chairman (with former Governor Linwood Holton) of +a major landowner's alliance that created a special tax district to +finance the extension of Metrorail to Tyson's Corner, Reston, and +Dulles Airport. He has also been a Fellow at the Institute of Politics +at Harvard and at the Marshall Wythe School of Law at William and +Mary. + +He is currently on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory +Board, the Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board +(Chairman of the WMD-Terrorism Task Force), the FBI Director's +Advisory Board, the National Intelligence Council's Strategic Analysis +Advisory Board, the Iraq Study Group, and the MITRE Corp. Board of +Trustees (Vice Chairman). He also serves on the boards of the Space +Foundation, the Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy, the Concord +Coalition, the National Museum of Americans at War, Strategic +Partnerships LLC, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency--and +he works on occasional projects with the Center for Strategic and +International Studies. He is married to Lynda Johnson Robb and they +have three grown daughters and one granddaughter. + + + +Alan K. Simpson--Member + +Alan K. Simpson served from 1979 to 1997 as a United States Senator +from Wyoming. Following his first term in the Senate, Al was elected +by his peers to the position of the Assistant Majority Leader in +1984--and served in that capacity until 1994. He completed his final +term on January 3, 1997. + +Simpson is currently a partner in the Cody firm of Simpson, Kepler and +Edwards, the Cody division of the Denver firm of Burg Simpson +Eldredge, Hersh and Jardine, and also a consultant in the Washington, +D.C., government relations firm The Tongour, Simpson, Holsclaw Group. +He continues to serve on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards and +travels the country giving speeches. His book published by William +Morrow Company, Right in the Old Gazoo: A Lifetime of Scrapping with +the Press (1997), chronicles his personal experiences and views of the +Fourth Estate. + +From January of 1997 until June of 2000, Simpson was a Visiting +Lecturer and for two years the Director of the Institute of Politics +at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. During +the fall of 2000 he returned to his alma mater, the University of +Wyoming, as a Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department +and he continues to team teach a class part-time with his brother, +Peter, titled "Wyoming's Political Identity: Its History and Its +Politics," which is proving to be one of the most popular classes +offered at UW. + +A member of a political family--his father served both as Governor of +Wyoming from 1954 to 1958 and as United States Senator from Wyoming +from 1962 to 1966--Al chose to follow in his father's footsteps and +began his own political career in 1964 when he was elected to the +Wyoming State Legislature as a state representative of his native Park +County. He served for the next thirteen years in the Wyoming House of +Representatives, holding the offices of Majority Whip, Majority Floor +Leader, and Speaker Pro-Tem. His only brother, Peter, also served as a +member of the Wyoming State Legislature. + +Prior to entering politics, Simpson was admitted to the Wyoming bar +and the United States District Court in 1958 and served for a short +time as a Wyoming assistant attorney general. Simpson then joined his +father, Milward L. Simpson, and later Charles G. Kepler in the law +firm of Simpson, Kepler and Simpson in his hometown of Cody. He would +practice law there for the next eighteen years. During that time, +Simpson was very active in all civic, community, and state activities. +He also served ten years as City Attorney. + +Simpson earned a B.S. in law from the University of Wyoming in 1954. +Upon graduation from college, he joined the Army, serving overseas in +the 5th Infantry Division and in the 2nd Armored Division in the final +months of the Army of Occupation in Germany. Following his honorable +discharge in 1956, Simpson returned to the University of Wyoming to +complete his study of law, earning his J.D. degree in 1958. He and his +wife Ann have three children and six grandchildren, who all reside in +Cody, Wyoming. + + + + +Iraq Study Group Support + + + Edward P. Djerejian + Senior Advisor to the Study Group + + Christopher A. Kojm + Senior Advisor to the Study Group + + John B. Williams + Special Assistant to the Study Group + + Benjamin J. Rhodes + Special Assistant to the Study Group + + United States Institute of Peace Support + + Daniel P. Serwer + ISG Executive Director and Political Development Secretariat + + Paul Hughes + Military and Security Secretariat + + Gary Matthews + Economy and Reconstruction Secretariat + + Paul Stares + Strategic Environment Secretariat + + Courtney Rusin + Assistant to the Study Group + + Anne Hingeley Congressional Relations + + Ian Larsen + Outreach and Communications + + Center for the Study of the Presidency Support + + Jay M. Parker + Advisor + + Ysbrant A. Marcelis + Advisor + + Center for Strategic & International Studies Support + + Kay King + Advisor + + + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Iraq Study Group Report, by +United States Institute for Peace + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT *** + +***** This file should be named 25686-8.txt or 25686-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/5/6/8/25686/ + +Produced by Al Haines + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Iraq Study Group Report + +Author: United States Institute for Peace + +Release Date: June 3, 2008 [EBook #25686] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT *** + + + + +Produced by Al Haines + + + + + +</pre> + + +<H1 ALIGN="center"> +The Iraq +<BR> +Study Group +<BR> +Report +</H1> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +James A. Baker, III, and<BR> +Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs<BR> +</H3> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Lawrence S. Eagleburger,<BR> +Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III,<BR> +Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta,<BR> +William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb,<BR> +Alan K. Simpson<BR> +</H3> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +Contents +</H2> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#letter"> +Letter from the Co-Chairs +</A> +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#execsumm"> +Executive Summary +</A> +</H3> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#assessment"> +I. Assessment +</A> +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#assess-A"> +A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq +</A> +</H3> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#assess-A1"> +1. Security</A><BR> +<A HREF="#assess-A2"> +2. Politics</A><BR> +<A HREF="#assess-A3"> +3. Economics</A><BR> +<A HREF="#assess-A4"> +4. International Support</A><BR> +<A HREF="#assess-A5"> +5. Conclusions</A><BR> +</H4> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#assess-B"> +B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq +</A> +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#assess-C"> +C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq +</A> +</H3> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#assess-C1"> +1. Precipitate Withdrawal</A><BR> +<A HREF="#assess-C2"> +2. Staying the Course</A><BR> +<A HREF="#assess-C3"> +3. More Troops for Iraq</A><BR> +<A HREF="#assess-C4"> +4. Devolution to Three Regions</A><BR> +</H4> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#assess-D"> +D. Achieving Our Goals +</A> +</H3> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#forward"> +II. The Way Forward—A New Approach +</A> +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#forward-A"> +A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus +</A> +</H3> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#forward-A1"> +1. The New Diplomatic Offensive</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-A2"> +2. The Iraq International Support Group</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-A3"> +3. Dealing with Iran and Syria</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-A4"> +4. The Wider Regional Context</A><BR> +</H4> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#forward-B"> +B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves +</A> +</H3> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#forward-B1"> +1. Performance on Milestones</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-B2"> +2. National Reconciliation</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-B3"> +3. Security and Military Forces</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-B4"> +4. Police and Criminal Justice</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-B5"> +5. The Oil Sector</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-B6"> +6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-B7"> +7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-B8"> +8. U.S. Personnel</A><BR> +<A HREF="#forward-B9"> +9. Intelligence</A><BR> +</H4> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#appendix"> +Appendices +</A> +</H3> + +<BR> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#append-letter"> +Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations +</A> +</H4> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#append-plenary"> +Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions +</A> +</H4> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#append-consult"> +Iraq Study Group Consultations +</A> +</H4> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#append-expert"> +Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel +</A> +</H4> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#append-group"> +The Iraq Study Group +</A> +</H4> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +<A HREF="#append-support"> +Iraq Study Group Support +</A> +</H4> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="letter"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Letter from the Co-Chairs +</H3> + +<BR> + +<P> +There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, +there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and +protect American interests. +</P> + +<P> +Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq +but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq. Our +political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to bring a +responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our +country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a +policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and +Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright +with the American people in order to win their support. +</P> + +<P> +No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point +will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide toward +chaos. If current trends continue, the potential consequences are +severe. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in +Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States +has special obligations. Our country must address as best it can +Iraq's many problems. The United States has long-term relationships +and interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged. +</P> + +<P> +In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Group +present a new approach because we believe there is a better way +forward. All options have not been exhausted. We believe it is still +possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an +opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a +critical region of the world, and protect America's credibility, +interests, and values. Our report makes it clear that the Iraqi +government and the Iraqi people also must act to achieve a stable and +hopeful future. +</P> + +<P> +What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount of +political will and cooperation by the executive and legislative +branches of the U.S. government. It demands skillful implementation. +It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its success +depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political +polarization. Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate +within a democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure—as +is any course of action in Iraq—if it is not supported by a broad, +sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country +toward such a consensus. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who have +contributed information and assisted the Study Group, both inside and +outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and around the world. We thank +the members of the expert working groups, and staff from the +sponsoring organizations. We especially thank our colleagues on the +Study Group, who have worked with us on these difficult issues in a +spirit of generosity and bipartisanship. +</P> + +<P> +In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and the American +people, we dedicate it to the men and women—military and civilian—who +have served and are serving in Iraq, and to their families back +home. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage and made difficult +sacrifices. Every American is indebted to them. +</P> + +<P> +We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf of their +country, and the members of the Coalition Forces who have stood with +us and with the people of Iraq. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> +James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="execsumm"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Executive Summary +</H3> + +<P> +The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path +that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. +</P> + +<P> +In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be +taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. Our most important +recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political +efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of +U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to +move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these +two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. +If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves +forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity +for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be +enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, +interests, and values will be protected. +</P> + +<P> +The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing in scope +and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias +and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian +conflict is the principal challenge to stability. The Iraqi people +have a democratically elected government, yet it is not adequately +advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or +delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive. +</P> + +<P> +If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be +severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq's +government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could +intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a +propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global +standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could +become more polarized. +</P> + +<P> +During the past nine months we have considered a full range of +approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our recommended course +has shortcomings, but we firmly believe that it includes the best +strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and +the region. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +External Approach +</H3> + +<P> +The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly affect its +stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in the +long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are not doing +enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting +stability. +</P> + +<P> +The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive +to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the +region. This diplomatic effort should include every country that has +an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's +neighbors. Iraq's neighbors and key states in and outside the region +should form a support group to reinforce security and national +reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its +own. +</P> + +<P> +Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq +and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should +try to engage them constructively. In seeking to influence the +behavior of both countries, the United States has disincentives and +incentives available. Iran should stem the flow of arms and training +to Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use +its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national +reconciliation. The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should continue +to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations +Security Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with +Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and +out of Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless +it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional +instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the +United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: +Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state +solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include +direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians +(those who accept Israel's right to exist), and Syria. +</P> + +<P> +As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle +East, the United States should provide additional political, economic, +and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might +become available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Internal Approach +</H3> + +<P> +The most important questions about Iraq's future are now the +responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role in +Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own +destiny. +</P> + +<P> +The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for +Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army +brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the +United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. +military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and +supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat +forces could begin to move out of Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of +supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary +responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, +subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the +ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could +be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be +deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction +and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, +force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support +efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and +special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al +Qaeda in Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the +United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out +security responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear to +the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, +including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not +implement their planned changes. The United States must not make an +open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops +deployed in Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training +and education of forces that have returned to the United States in +order to restore the force to full combat capability. As equipment +returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient +funds to restore the equipment over the next five years. +</P> + +<P> +The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support +the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones—on national +reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, +but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. +The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens +of the United States and other countries—that it deserves continued +support. +</P> + +<P> +Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United +States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. His +list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include milestones +that can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people. +President Bush and his national security team should remain in close +and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear +message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to make +substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones. +</P> + +<P> +If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes +substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and +support for Iraq's security forces and to continue political, +military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make +substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi +government. +</P> + +<P> +Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. They include +improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil +sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U.S. budget +process, the training of U.S. government personnel, and U.S. +intelligence capabilities. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Conclusion +</H3> + +<P> +It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these +recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq +and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a +coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in +isolation. The dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq as +events within Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days ahead. But +by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region, and the United +States of America can emerge stronger. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assessment"></A> +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +I +<BR> +Assessment +</H2> + +<BR> + +<P> +There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in Baghdad +and several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has been removed from +power and the Iraqi people have a democratically elected government +that is broadly representative of Iraq's population, yet the +government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, +providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The level +of violence is high and growing. There is great suffering, and the +daily lives of many Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is +pervasive. +</P> + +<P> +U.S. military and civilian personnel, and our coalition partners, are +making exceptional and dedicated efforts—and sacrifices—to help +Iraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinary efforts and sacrifices +for a better future. However, the ability of the United States to +influence events within Iraq is diminishing. Many Iraqis are embracing +sectarian identities. The lack of security impedes economic +development. Most countries in the region are not playing a +constructive role in support of Iraq, and some are undercutting +stability. +</P> + +<P> +Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is critical +to U.S. interests. It runs along the sectarian fault lines of Shia and +Sunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. It has the world's +second-largest known oil reserves. It is now a base of operations for +international terrorism, including al Qaeda. +</P> + +<P> +Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the +United States is viewed in the region and around the world. Because of +the gravity of Iraq's condition and the country's vital importance, +the United States is facing one of its most difficult and significant +international challenges in decades. Because events in Iraq have been +set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has +both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give +Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy. +</P> + +<P> +An assessment of the security, political, economic, and regional +situation follows (all figures current as of publication), along with +an assessment of the consequences if Iraq continues to deteriorate, +and an analysis of some possible courses of action. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assess-A"></A> +<A NAME="assess-A1"></A> +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq +</H2> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +1. Security +</H3> + +<P> +Attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are +persistent and growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for U.S. +forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed. Total attacks in +October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per day in January 2006. +Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in October were more than +double the level in January. Attacks against civilians in October were +four times higher than in January. Some 3,000 Iraqi civilians are +killed every month. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Sources of Violence +</H3> + +<P> +Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. There are +multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, al +Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death +squads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence—particularly in +and around Baghdad—has become the principal challenge to stability. +</P> + +<P> +Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency. +The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, +disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. It has +significant support within the Sunni Arab community. The insurgency +has no single leadership but is a network of networks. It benefits +from participants' detailed knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure, and +arms and financing are supplied primarily from within Iraq. The +insurgents have different goals, although nearly all oppose the +presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Most wish to restore Sunni Arab rule +in the country. Some aim at winning local power and control. +</P> + +<P> +Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, +but that includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, +large truck bombs, and attacks on significant religious or political +targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of +Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters—numbering an estimated 1,300—play a +supporting role or carry out suicide operations. Al Qaeda's goals +include instigating a wider sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and +Shia, and driving the United States out of Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian +casualties. Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgent +attacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa. Groups of +Iraqis are often found bound and executed, their bodies dumped in +rivers or fields. The perception of unchecked violence emboldens +militias, shakes confidence in the government, and leads Iraqis to +flee to places where their sect is the majority and where they feel +they are in less danger. In some parts of Iraq—notably in +Baghdad—sectarian cleansing is taking place. The United Nations +estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 +million Iraqis have fled the country. +</P> + +<P> +Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial +threat to immediate and long-term stability. These militias are +diverse. Some are affiliated with the government, some are highly +localized, and some are wholly outside the law. They are fragmenting, +with an increasing breakdown in command structure. The militias target +Sunni Arab civilians, and some struggle for power in clashes with one +another. Some even target government ministries. They undermine the +authority of the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as the +ability of Sunnis to join a peaceful political process. The prevalence +of militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserve +and expand their power only if backed by armed force. +</P> + +<P> +The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number as many as 60,000 +fighters. It has directly challenged U.S. and Iraqi government forces, +and it is widely believed to engage in regular violence against Sunni +Arab civilians. Mahdi fighters patrol certain Shia enclaves, notably +northeast Baghdad's teeming neighborhood of 2.5 million known as "Sadr +City." As the Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, some +elements have moved beyond Sadr's control. +</P> + +<P> +The Badr Brigade is affiliated with the Supreme Council for the +Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is led by Abdul Aziz +al-Hakim. The Badr Brigade has long-standing ties with the Iranian +Revolutionary Guard Corps. Many Badr members have become integrated +into the Iraqi police, and others play policing roles in southern +Iraqi cities. While wearing the uniform of the security services, Badr +fighters have targeted Sunni Arab civilians. Badr fighters have also +clashed with the Mahdi Army, particularly in southern Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many Iraqis. +Robberies, kidnappings, and murder are commonplace in much of the +country. Organized criminal rackets thrive, particularly in unstable +areas like Anbar province. Some criminal gangs cooperate with, +finance, or purport to be part of the Sunni insurgency or a Shiite +militia in order to gain legitimacy. As one knowledgeable American +official put it, "If there were foreign forces in New Jersey, Tony +Soprano would be an insurgent leader." +</P> + +<P> +Four of Iraq's eighteen provinces are highly insecure—Baghdad, Anbar, +Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These provinces account for about 40 percent +of Iraq's population of 26 million. In Baghdad, the violence is +largely between Sunni and Shia. In Anbar, the violence is attributable +to the Sunni insurgency and to al Qaeda, and the situation is +deteriorating. +</P> + +<P> +In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basra +and the south, the violence is largely an intra-Shia power struggle. +The most stable parts of the country are the three provinces of the +Kurdish north and parts of the Shia south. However, most of Iraq's +cities have a sectarian mix and are plagued by persistent violence. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi Forces +</H3> + +<P> +Confronting this violence are the Multi-National Forces-Iraq under +U.S. command, working in concert with Iraq's security forces. The +Multi-National Forces-Iraq were authorized by UN Security Council +Resolution 1546 in 2004, and the mandate was extended in November 2006 +for another year. +</P> + +<P> +Approximately 141,000 U.S. military personnel are serving in Iraq, +together with approximately 16,500 military personnel from twenty-seven +coalition partners, the largest contingent being 7,200 from the +United Kingdom. The U.S. Army has principal responsibility for Baghdad +and the north. The U.S. Marine Corps takes the lead in Anbar province. +The United Kingdom has responsibility in the southeast, chiefly in +Basra. +</P> + +<P> +Along with this military presence, the United States is building its +largest embassy in Baghdad. The current U.S. embassy in Baghdad totals +about 1,000 U.S. government employees. There are roughly 5,000 +civilian contractors in the country. +</P> + +<P> +Currently, the U.S. military rarely engages in large-scale combat +operations. Instead, counterinsurgency efforts focus on a strategy of +"clear, hold, and build"—"clearing" areas of insurgents and death +squads, "holding" those areas with Iraqi security forces, and +"building" areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects. +</P> + +<P> +Nearly every U.S. Army and Marine combat unit, and several National +Guard and Reserve units, have been to Iraq at least once. Many are on +their second or even third rotations; rotations are typically one year +for Army units, seven months for Marine units. Regular rotations, in +and out of Iraq or within the country, complicate brigade and +battalion efforts to get to know the local scene, earn the trust of +the population, and build a sense of cooperation. +</P> + +<P> +Many military units are under significant strain. Because the harsh +conditions in Iraq are wearing out equipment more quickly than +anticipated, many units do not have fully functional equipment for +training when they redeploy to the United States. An extraordinary +amount of sacrifice has been asked of our men and women in uniform, +and of their families. The American military has little reserve force +to call on if it needs ground forces to respond to other crises around +the world. +</P> + +<P> +A primary mission of U.S. military strategy in Iraq is the training of +competent Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2006, the Multi-National +Security Transition Command-Iraq under American leadership is +expected to have trained and equipped a target number of approximately +326,000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes 138,000 members +of the Iraqi Army and 188,000 Iraqi police. Iraqis have operational +control over roughly one-third of Iraqi security forces; the U.S. has +operational control over most of the rest. No U.S. forces are under +Iraqi command. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +The Iraqi Army +</H3> + +<P> +The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable +and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government. By +the end of 2006, the Iraqi Army is expected to comprise 118 battalions +formed into 36 brigades under the command of 10 divisions. Although +the Army is one of the more professional Iraqi institutions, its +performance has been uneven. The training numbers are impressive, but +they represent only part of the story. +</P> + +<P> +Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and +loyalties of some Iraqi units—specifically, whether they will carry +out missions on behalf of national goals instead of a sectarian +agenda. Of Iraq's 10 planned divisions, those that are even-numbered +are made up of Iraqis who signed up to serve in a specific area, and +they have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. As +a result, elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions. +</P> + +<P> +The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significant +challenges: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together and +perform at higher levels of organization—the brigade and division +level. Leadership training and the experience of leadership are the +essential elements to improve performance. +</LI> + +<LI> +Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions without +adequate equipment. Congress has been generous in funding requests for +U.S. troops, but it has resisted fully funding Iraqi forces. The +entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion) +is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two +weeks. +</LI> + +<LI> +Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a month so that +they can visit their families and take them their pay. Soldiers are +paid in cash because there is no banking system. Soldiers are given +leave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave. Unit +readiness rates are low, often at 50 percent or less. +</LI> + +<LI> +Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain +their operations, the capability to transport supplies and troops, and +the capacity to provide their own indirect fire support, close-air +support, technical intelligence, and medical evacuation. They will +depend on the United States for logistics and support through at least +2007. +</LI> + +</UL> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +The Iraqi Police +</H3> + +<P> +The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the +Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers roughly 135,000 +and is responsible for local policing. It has neither the training nor +legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower +to take on organized crime, insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi +National Police numbers roughly 25,000 and its officers have been +trained in counterinsurgency operations, not police work. The Border +Enforcement Department numbers roughly 28,000. +</P> + +<P> +Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in +sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture, and +targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police are organized +under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruption +and militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the +provinces. +</P> + +<P> +The United States and the Iraqi government recognize the importance of +reform. The current Minister of the Interior has called for purging +militia members and criminals from the police. But he has little +police experience or base of support. There is no clear Iraqi or U.S. +agreement on the character and mission of the police. U.S. authorities +do not know with precision the composition and membership of the +various police forces, nor the disposition of their funds and +equipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers +participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and +ammunition for use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but +don't show up for work. In the words of a senior American general, +"2006 was supposed to be 'the year of the police' but it hasn't +materialized that way." +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Facilities Protection Services +</H3> + +<P> +The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems. Each +Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the ministry's +infrastructure. All together, these units total roughly 145,000 +uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units have questionable +loyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of Health, Agriculture, +and Transportation—controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr—the Facilities +Protection Service is a source of funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army. +One senior U.S. official described the Facilities Protection Service +as "incompetent, dysfunctional, or subversive." Several Iraqis simply +referred to them as militias. +</P> + +<P> +The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities Protection +Service under the control of the Interior Ministry. The intention is +to identify and register Facilities Protection personnel, standardize +their treatment, and provide some training. Though the approach is +reasonable, this effort may exceed the current capability of the +Interior Ministry. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Operation Together Forward II +</H3> + +<P> +In a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U.S. military forces +joined with Iraqi forces to establish security in Baghdad with an +operation called "Operation Together Forward II," which began in +August 2006. Under Operation Together Forward II, U.S. forces are +working with members of the Iraqi Army and police to "clear, hold, and +build" in Baghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood. There are +roughly 15,000 U.S. troops in Baghdad. +</P> + +<P> +This operation—and the security of Baghdad—is crucial to security in +Iraq more generally. A capital city of more than 6 million, Baghdad +contains some 25 percent of the country's population. It is the +largest Sunni and Shia city in Iraq. It has high concentrations of +both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Both Iraqi and American +leaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +The results of Operation Together Forward II are disheartening. +Violence in Baghdad—already at high levels—jumped more than 43 +percent between the summer and October 2006. U.S. forces continue to +suffer high casualties. Perpetrators of violence leave neighborhoods +in advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi police +have been unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration and continuing +violence. The Iraqi Army has provided only two out of the six +battalions that it promised in August would join American forces in +Baghdad. The Iraqi government has rejected sustained security +operations in Sadr City. +</P> + +<P> +Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both the capability +to hold areas that have been cleared and the will to clear +neighborhoods that are home to Shiite militias. U.S. forces can +"clear" any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U.S. troops +present nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to "hold" +neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq. +Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and Iraqi military +forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the +sectarian violence, U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that +has no foreseeable end. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assess-A2"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +2. Politics +</H3> + +<P> +Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council of +Representatives. A government of national unity was formed in May 2006 +that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people. Iraq has ratified +a constitution, and—per agreement with Sunni Arab leaders—has +initiated a process of review to determine if the constitution needs +amendment. +</P> + +<P> +The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and +key players within the government too often act in their sectarian +interest. Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to +demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's national interest, and +too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The +result is an even weaker central government than the constitution +provides. +</P> + +<P> +There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international agreement on +the key issues confronting the Iraqi government: national +reconciliation, including the negotiation of a "political deal" among +Iraq's sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-Baathification, oil +revenue sharing, provincial elections, the future of Kirkuk, and +amnesty; security, particularly curbing militias and reducing the +violence in Baghdad; and governance, including the provision of basic +services and the rollback of pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi +leaders view issues through a sectarian prism, we will summarize the +differing perspectives of Iraq's main sectarian groups. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Sectarian Viewpoints +</H3> + +<P> +The Shia, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power for the +first time in more than 1,300 years. Above all, many Shia are +interested in preserving that power. However, fissures have emerged +within the broad Shia coalition, known as the United Iraqi Alliance. +Shia factions are struggling for power—over regions, ministries, and +Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad and +fractious coalition have led several observers in Baghdad to comment +that Shia leaders are held "hostage to extremes." Within the coalition +as a whole, there is a reluctance to reach a political accommodation +with the Sunnis or to disarm Shiite militias. +</P> + +<P> +Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding of +the key issues facing Iraq, notably the need for national +reconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains have emerged +between Maliki's government and the United States. Maliki has publicly +rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the +removal of blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi +security forces, and resisted U.S. requests to move forward on +reconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Sistani, Sadr, Hakim +</H3> + +<P> +The U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but the most +powerful Shia figures in Iraq do not hold national office. Of the +following three vital power brokers in the Shia community, the United +States is unable to talk directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali +al-Sistani) and does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr). +</P> + +<P> +GRAND AYATOLLAH ALI AL-SISTANI: Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric +in Iraq. Despite staying out of day-to-day politics, he has been the +most influential leader in the country: all major Shia leaders have +sought his approval or guidance. Sistani has encouraged a unified Shia +bloc with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani's influence +may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in preventing +intra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis. +</P> + +<P> +ABDUL AZIZ AL-HAKIM: Hakim is a cleric and the leader of the Supreme +Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest and +most organized Shia political party. It seeks the creation of an +autonomous Shia region comprising nine provinces in the south. Hakim +has consistently protected and advanced his party's position. SCIRI +has close ties with Iran. +</P> + +<P> +MOQTADA AL-SADR: Sadr has a large following among impoverished Shia, +particularly in Baghdad. He has joined Maliki's governing coalition, +but his Mahdi Army has clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with +Iraqi, U.S., and U.K. forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist. +Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model of +Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic +services within the government and an armed militia outside of the +government. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional +position of power in Iraq. They are torn, unsure whether to seek their +aims through political participation or through violent insurgency. +They remain angry about U.S. decisions to dissolve Iraqi security +forces and to pursue the "de-Baathification" of Iraq's government and +society. Sunnis are confronted by paradoxes: they have opposed the +presence of U.S. forces in Iraq but need those forces to protect them +against Shia militias; they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia +administration but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see +a Sunni autonomous region as feasible for themselves. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Hashimi and Dhari +</H3> + +<P> +The influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government is +questionable. The leadership of the Sunni Arab insurgency is murky, +but the following two key Sunni Arab figures have broad support. +</P> + +<P> +tariq al-hashimi: Hashimi is one of two vice presidents of Iraq and +the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in +parliament. Hashimi opposes the formation of autonomous regions and +has advocated the distribution of oil revenues based on population, a +reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite militia +fighters from the Iraqi security forces. Shiite death squads have +recently killed three of his siblings. +</P> + +<P> +sheik harith al-dhari: Dhari is the head of the Muslim Scholars +Association, the most influential Sunni organization in Iraq. Dhari +has condemned the American occupation and spoken out against the Iraqi +government. His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arab +insurgency and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant was +recently issued for his arrest for inciting violence and terrorism, an +act that sparked bitter Sunni protests across Iraq. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two main +political blocs—the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the +Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have secured a largely +autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and have achieved a prominent +role for Kurds within the national government. Barzani leads the +Kurdish regional government, and Talabani is president of Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be within a +democratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent Kurdistan would +be surrounded by hostile neighbors. However, a majority of Kurds favor +independence. The Kurds have their own security forces—the +peshmerga—which number roughly 100,000. They believe they could +accommodate themselves to either a unified or a fractured Iraq. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Barzani and Talabani +</H3> + +<P> +Kurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures who have +long-standing ties in movements for Kurdish independence and +self-government. +</P> + +<P> +MASSOUD BARZANI: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic +Party and the President of the Kurdish regional government. Barzani +has cooperated with his longtime rival, Jalal Talabani, in securing an +empowered, autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Barzani has +ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish flags in +Kurdish-controlled areas. +</P> + +<P> +JALAL TALABANI: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic Union of +Kurdistan and the President of Iraq. Whereas Barzani has focused his +efforts in Kurdistan, Talabani has secured power in Baghdad, and +several important PUK government ministers are loyal to him. Talabani +strongly supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to bring +real power to the office of the presidency. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Key Issues +</H3> + +<P> +NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. Prime Minister Maliki outlined a commendable +program of national reconciliation soon after he entered office. +However, the Iraqi government has not taken action on the key elements +of national reconciliation: revising de-Baathification, which prevents +many Sunni Arabs from participating in governance and society; +providing amnesty for those who have fought against the government; +sharing the country's oil revenues; demobilizing militias; amending +the constitution; and settling the future of Kirkuk. +</P> + +<P> +One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution, which created a +largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows other such regions to be +established later, perhaps including a "Shi'astan" comprising nine +southern provinces. This highly decentralized structure is favored by +the Kurds and many Shia (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz +al-Hakim), but it is anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally +Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe +they should govern. Second, because Iraq's energy resources are in the +Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible "Sunni +region." Particularly contentious is a provision in the constitution +that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while +allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the +regions. +</P> + +<P> +The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting +process, and acceded to entering the government only on the condition +that the constitution be amended. In September, the parliament agreed +to initiate a constitutional review commission slated to complete its +work within one year; it delayed considering the question of forming a +federalized region in southern Iraq for eighteen months. +</P> + +<P> +Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city +in northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers of Kurds, Arabs, +and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that the constitution require a +popular referendum by December 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk can +formally join the Kurdish administered region, an outcome that Arabs +and Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violence +sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great. +</P> + +<P> +Iraq's leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the +country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little +commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent Shia leader told +us pointedly that the current government has the support of 80 percent +of the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought +for independence for decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, +the leader of the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags +and the raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general +commented that the Iraqis "still do not know what kind of country they +want to have." Yet many of Iraq's most powerful and well-positioned +leaders are not working toward a united Iraq. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +SECURITY. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in +support of national reconciliation. Shiite leaders must make the +decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must make the decision to +seek their aims through a peaceful political process, not through +violent revolt. The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes must +aggressively pursue al Qaeda. +</P> + +<P> +Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political +action. Shia political leaders make distinctions between the Sunni +insurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government) and Shia militias +(which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods, and maximize +power within the government). Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he +will address the problem of militias, he has taken little meaningful +action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to +Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi +Army. +</P> + +<P> +Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent +insurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni politicians within +the government have a limited level of support and influence among +their own population, and questionable influence over the insurgency. +Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation against Sunni +leaders—assassinating the family members of those who do participate in +the government. Too often, insurgents tolerate and cooperate with al +Qaeda, as they share a mutual interest in attacking U.S. and Shia +forces. However, Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently +took the positive step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreign +fighters in their midst, and have started to take action on those +commitments. +</P> + +<P> +Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take on the +militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has to help +them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each side watches the +other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shia +militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni +insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: there are many armed groups +within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +GOVERNANCE. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its +people with basic services: electricity, drinking water, sewage, +health care, and education. In many sectors, production is below or +hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and other unstable areas, the +situation is much worse. There are five major reasons for this +problem. +</P> + +<P> +First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian +basis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of Shia-governed +Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity each day and +trash piles are waist-high. One American official told us that Baghdad +is run like a "Shia dictatorship" because Sunnis boycotted provincial +elections in 2005, and therefore are not represented in local +government. +</P> + +<P> +Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. For +instance, electricity transmission towers are downed by explosives, +and then sniper attacks prevent repairs from being made. +</P> + +<P> +Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated that +official corruption costs Iraq $5-7 billion per year. Notable steps +have been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit board and inspectors +general in the ministries, and senior leaders including the Prime +Minister have identified rooting out corruption as a national +priority. But too many political leaders still pursue their personal, +sectarian, or party interests. There are still no examples of senior +officials who have been brought before a court of law and convicted on +corruption charges. +</P> + +<P> +Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq's technocratic class was +pushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification. Other +skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has risen. Too often, +Iraq's elected representatives treat the ministries as political +spoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay salaries, spending +as little as 10-15 percent of their capital budget. They lack +technical expertise and suffer from corruption, inefficiency, a +banking system that does not permit the transfer of moneys, extensive +red tape put in place in part to deter corruption, and a Ministry of +Finance reluctant to disburse funds. +</P> + +<P> +Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish an Iraqi +judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has some dedicated +judges. But criminal investigations are conducted by magistrates, and +they are too few and inadequately trained to perform this function. +Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless. As one senior +U.S. official said to us, "We can protect judges, but not their +families, their extended families, their friends." Many Iraqis feel +that crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assess-A3"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +3. Economics +</H3> + +<P> +There has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has tremendous +potential for growth. But economic development is hobbled by +insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated +infrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U.S. official observed to us, +Iraq's economy has been badly shocked and is dysfunctional after +suffering decades of problems: Iraq had a police state economy in the +1970s, a war economy in the 1980s, and a sanctions economy in the +1990s. Immediate and long-term growth depends predominantly on the oil +sector. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Economic Performance +</H3> + +<P> +There are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are stable and +growing at $12 billion. Consumer imports of computers, cell phones, +and other appliances have increased dramatically. New businesses are +opening, and construction is moving forward in secure areas. Because +of Iraq's ample oil reserves, water resources, and fertile lands, +significant growth is possible if violence is reduced and the capacity +of government improves. For example, wheat yields increased more than +40 percent in Kurdistan during this past year. +</P> + +<P> +The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting benchmarks set +by the International Monetary Fund. Most prominently, subsidies have +been reduced—for instance, the price per liter of gas has increased +from roughly 1.7 cents to 23 cents (a figure far closer to regional +prices). However, energy and food subsidies generally remain a burden, +costing Iraq $11 billion per year. +</P> + +<P> +Despite the positive signs, many leading economic indicators are +negative. Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is +at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. +Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The +investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 +percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in +their daily economic situation. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Oil Sector +</H3> + +<P> +Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq's GDP, +and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq produces around +2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about 1.5 million barrels per +day. This is below both prewar production levels and the Iraqi +government's target of 2.5 million barrels per day, and far short of +the vast potential of the Iraqi oil sector. Fortunately for the +government, global energy prices have been higher than projected, +making it possible for Iraq to meet its budget revenue targets. +</P> + +<P> +Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security, lack of +investment, and lack of technical capacity. Insurgents with a detailed +knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure target pipelines and oil +facilities. There is no metering system for the oil. There is poor +maintenance at pumping stations, pipelines, and port facilities, as +well as inadequate investment in modern technology. Iraq had a cadre +of experts in the oil sector, but intimidation and an extended +migration of experts to other countries have eroded technical +capacity. Foreign companies have been reluctant to invest, and Iraq's +Ministry of Oil has been unable to spend more than 15 percent of its +capital budget. +</P> + +<P> +Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 150,000 to +200,000—and perhaps as many as 500,000—barrels of oil per day are +being stolen. Controlled prices for refined products result in +shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers to the thriving black +market. One senior U.S. official told us that corruption is more +responsible than insurgents for breakdowns in the oil sector. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +The Politics of Oil +</H3> + +<P> +The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country's +already fragile efforts to create a unified central government. The +Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions to take the lead +in developing new oil resources. Article 108 states that "oil and gas +are the ownership of all the peoples of Iraq in all the regions and +governorates," while Article 109 tasks the federal government with +"the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields." This +language has led to contention over what constitutes a "new" or an +"existing" resource, a question that has profound ramifications for +the ultimate control of future oil revenue. +</P> + +<P> +Senior members of Iraq's oil industry argue that a national oil +company could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues and +reducing regional or local claims to a percentage of the revenue +derived from production. However, regional leaders are suspicious and +resist this proposal, affirming the rights of local communities to +have direct access to the inflow of oil revenue. Kurdish leaders have +been particularly aggressive in asserting independent control of their +oil assets, signing and implementing investment deals with foreign oil +companies in northern Iraq. Shia politicians are also reported to be +negotiating oil investment contracts with foreign companies. +</P> + +<P> +There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues directly +to the population on a per capita basis. These proposals have the +potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation's chief +natural resource, but it would take time to develop a fair +distribution system. Oil revenues have been incorporated into state +budget projections for the next several years. There is no institution +in Iraq at present that could properly implement such a distribution +system. It would take substantial time to establish, and would have to +be based on a well-developed state census and income tax system, which +Iraq currently lacks. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts +</H3> + +<P> +The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion to +support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion has +been appropriated for the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund." +Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost all the funds have been +committed. The administration requested $1.6 billion for +reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The +administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for +economic assistance in FY 2008 also appears downward. +</P> + +<P> +Congress has little appetite for appropriating more funds for +reconstruction. There is a substantial need for continued +reconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about the +capacity of the U.S. and Iraqi governments. +</P> + +<P> +The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, +State Department, United States Agency for International Development, +and other agencies has been ineffective. There are no clear lines +establishing who is in charge of reconstruction. +</P> + +<P> +As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is changing its +focus, shifting from infrastructure, education, and health to +smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some degree managed by +local communities. A major attempt is also being made to improve the +capacity of government bureaucracies at the national, regional, and +provincial levels to provide services to the population as well as to +select and manage infrastructure projects. +</P> + +<P> +The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi ministries, but +it confronts problems with access and sustainability. Moqtada al-Sadr +objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq, and therefore the ministries he +controls—Health, Agriculture, and Transportation—will not work with +Americans. It is not clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and +operate reconstruction projects launched by the United States. +</P> + +<P> +Several senior military officers commented to us that the Commander's +Emergency Response Program, which funds quick-impact projects such as +the clearing of sewage and the restoration of basic services, is +vital. The U.S. Agency for International Development, in contrast, is +focused on long-term economic development and capacity building, but +funds have not been committed to support these efforts into the +future. The State Department leads seven Provincial Reconstruction +Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a positive +effect in secure areas, but not in areas where their work is hampered +by significant security constraints. +</P> + +<P> +Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided to +contractors, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction +has documented numerous instances of waste and abuse. They have not +all been put right. Contracting has gradually improved, as more +oversight has been exercised and fewer cost-plus contracts have been +granted; in addition, the use of Iraqi contractors has enabled the +employment of more Iraqis in reconstruction projects. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assess-A4"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +4. International Support +</H3> + +<P> +International support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid. +International donors pledged $13.5 billion to support reconstruction, +but less than $4 billion has been delivered. +</P> + +<P> +An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a significant +amount of Iraq's government debt and put the country on firmer +financial footing. But the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and +Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that they have not forgiven. +</P> + +<P> +The United States is currently working with the United Nations and +other partners to fashion the "International Compact" on Iraq. The +goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and credits from +the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid from +international donors. In return, the Iraqi government will agree to +achieve certain economic reform milestones, such as building +anticorruption measures into Iraqi institutions, adopting a fair legal +framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic +self-sufficiency by 2012. Several U.S. and international officials told +us that the compact could be an opportunity to seek greater international +engagement in the country. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +The Region +</H3> + +<P> +The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly influence its +stability and prosperity. No country in the region wants a chaotic +Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are doing little to help it, and some are +undercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors are +meddling in their affairs. When asked which of Iraq's neighbors are +intervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official replied, "All of them." +</P> + +<P> +The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region. U.S. +efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding focus +of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq. Several Iraqi, U.S., and +international officials commented to us that Iraqi opposition to the +United States—and support for Sadr—spiked in the aftermath of +Israel's bombing campaign in Lebanon. The actions of Syria and Iran in +Iraq are often tied to their broader concerns with the United States. +Many Sunni Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence in +Iraq and the region. Most of the region's countries are wary of U.S. +efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Neighboring States +</H3> + +<P> +IRAN. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq. Iran +has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many of whom +were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein regime. Iran has +provided arms, financial support, and training for Shiite militias +within Iraq, as well as political support for Shia parties. There are +also reports that Iran has supplied improvised explosive devices to +groups—including Sunni Arab insurgents—that attack U.S. forces. The +Iranian border with Iraq is porous, and millions of Iranians travel to +Iraq each year to visit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranian +meddling, and Sunnis took a particularly alarmist view. One leading +Sunni politician told us, "If you turn over any stone in Iraq today, +you will find Iran underneath." +</P> + +<P> +U.S., Iraqi, and international officials also commented on the range +of tensions between the United States and Iran, including Iran's +nuclear program, Iran's support for terrorism, Iran's influence in +Lebanon and the region, and Iran's influence in Iraq. Iran appears +content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that +limits U.S. options in addressing Iran's nuclear program and allows +Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran and +the United States about the situation in Iraq have not taken place. +One Iraqi official told us: "Iran is negotiating with the United +States in the streets of Baghdad." +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +SYRIA. Syria is also playing a counterproductive role. Iraqis are +upset about what they perceive as Syrian support for efforts to +undermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is not so much to take +active measures as to countenance malign neglect: the Syrians look the +other way as arms and foreign fighters flow across their border into +Iraq, and former Baathist leaders find a safe haven within Syria. Like +Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq. +That said, the Syrians have indicated that they want a dialogue with +the United States, and in November 2006 agreed to restore diplomatic +relations with Iraq after a 24-year break. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. These countries for the most part +have been passive and disengaged. They have declined to provide debt +relief or substantial economic assistance to the Iraqi government. +Several Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians complained that Saudi Arabia has +not provided political support for their fellow Sunnis within Iraq. +One observed that Saudi Arabia did not even send a letter when the +Iraqi government was formed, whereas Iran has an ambassador in Iraq. +Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within +Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments help +facilitate U.S. military operations in Iraq by providing basing and +overflight rights and by cooperating on intelligence issues. +</P> + +<P> +As worries about Iraq increase, the Gulf States are becoming more +active. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have hosted meetings in +support of the International Compact. Saudi Arabia recently took the +positive step of hosting a conference of Iraqi religious leaders in +Mecca. Several Gulf States have helped foster dialogue with Iraq's +Sunni Arab population. While the Gulf States are not proponents of +democracy in Iraq, they worry about the direction of events: +battle-hardened insurgents from Iraq could pose a threat to their own +internal stability, and the growth of Iranian influence in the region +is deeply troubling to them. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +TURKEY. Turkish policy toward Iraq is focused on discouraging Kurdish +nationalism, which is seen as an existential threat to Turkey's own +internal stability. The Turks have supported the Turkmen minority +within Iraq and have used their influence to try to block the +incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, +Turkish companies have invested in Kurdish areas in northern Iraq, and +Turkish and Kurdish leaders have sought constructive engagement on +political, security, and economic issues. +</P> + +<P> +The Turks are deeply concerned about the operations of the Kurdish +Workers Party (PKK)—a terrorist group based in northern Iraq that has +killed thousands of Turks. They are upset that the United States and +Iraq have not targeted the PKK more aggressively. The Turks have +threatened to go after the PKK themselves, and have made several +forays across the border into Iraq. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +JORDAN AND EGYPT. Both Jordan and Egypt have provided some assistance +for the Iraqi government. Jordan has trained thousands of Iraqi +police, has an ambassador in Baghdad, and King Abdullah recently +hosted a meeting in Amman between President Bush and Prime Minister +Maliki. Egypt has provided some limited Iraqi army training. Both +Jordan and Egypt have facilitated U.S. military operations—Jordan by +allowing overflight and search-and-rescue operations, Egypt by +allowing overflight and Suez Canal transits; both provide important +cooperation on intelligence. Jordan is currently home to 700,000 Iraqi +refugees (equal to 10 percent of its population) and fears a flood of +many more. Both Jordan and Egypt are concerned about the position of +Iraq's Sunni Arabs and want constitutional reforms in Iraq to bolster +the Sunni community. They also fear the return of insurgents to their +countries. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +The International Community +</H3> + +<P> +The international community beyond the United Kingdom and our other +coalition partners has played a limited role in Iraq. The United +Nations—acting under Security Council Resolution 1546—has a small +presence in Iraq; it has assisted in holding elections, drafting the +constitution, organizing the government, and building institutions. +The World Bank, which has committed a limited number of resources, has +one and sometimes two staff in Iraq. The European Union has a +representative there. +</P> + +<P> +Several U.S.-based and international nongovernmental organizations +have done excellent work within Iraq, operating under great hardship. +Both Iraqi and international nongovernmental organizations play an +important role in reaching across sectarian lines to enhance dialogue +and understanding, and several U.S.-based organizations have employed +substantial resources to help Iraqis develop their democracy. However, +the participation of international nongovernmental organizations is +constrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts face +a cumbersome and often politicized process of registration with the +government. +</P> + +<P> +The United Kingdom has dedicated an extraordinary amount of resources +to Iraq and has made great sacrifices. In addition to 7,200 troops, +the United Kingdom has a substantial diplomatic presence, particularly +in Basra and the Iraqi southeast. The United Kingdom has been an +active and key player at every stage of Iraq's political development. +U.K. officials told us that they remain committed to working for +stability in Iraq, and will reduce their commitment of troops and +resources in response to the situation on the ground. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assess-A5"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +5. Conclusions +</H3> + +<P> +The United States has made a massive commitment to the future of Iraq +in both blood and treasure. As of December 2006, nearly 2,900 +Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another 21,000 +Americans have been wounded, many severely. +</P> + +<P> +To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq +War, and costs are running about $8 billion per month. In addition, +the United States must expect significant "tail costs" to come. Caring +for veterans and replacing lost equipment will run into the hundreds +of billions of dollars. Estimates run as high as $2 trillion for the +final cost of the U.S. involvement in Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive and the +situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot now govern, +sustain, and defend itself without the support of the United States. +Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for +their own future. Iraq's neighbors and much of the international +community have not been persuaded to play an active and constructive +role in supporting Iraq. The ability of the United States to shape +outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assess-B"></A> +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq +</H2> + +<P> +If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences +could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the +world. +</P> + +<P> +Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflict +greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of Iraq's +government and economy would further cripple a country already unable +to meet its people's needs. Iraq's security forces could split along +sectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more +refugees are forced to relocate across the country and the region. +Ethnic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjected +to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle +required to impose order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost. +</P> + +<P> +Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their +borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to +protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader +regional war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent +Kurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops to +restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil +fields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when that +country is on a path to producing nuclear weapons. +</P> + +<P> +Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that they fear the +distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world. +Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections—perhaps fomented by +Iran—in Sunni-ruled states. Such a broader sectarian conflict could +open a Pandora's box of problems—including the radicalization of +populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes—that +might take decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to +the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead +to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global +economy. +</P> + +<P> +Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now +a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald's." Left unchecked, al Qaeda in +Iraq could continue to incite violence between Sunnis and Shia. A +chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for +terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda will +portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant +victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their +cause in the region and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to +Osama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will +seek to expel the Americans and then spread "the jihad wave to the +secular countries neighboring Iraq." A senior European official told +us that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks within his +country. +</P> + +<P> +The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends +further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. +military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. Perceived failure +there could diminish America's credibility and influence in a region +that is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world's +energy supply. This loss would reduce America's global influence at a +time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand +our full attention and strong U.S. leadership of international +alliances. And the longer that U.S. political and military resources +are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in +Afghanistan increase. +</P> + +<P> +Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within +the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of the +government's handling of the war, and more than 60 percent feel that +there is no clear plan for moving forward. The November elections were +largely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. Arguments +about continuing to provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall +on deaf ears if Americans become disillusioned with the government +that the United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy +cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of the +American people. +</P> + +<P> +Continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater Iraqi opposition +to the United States. Recent polling indicates that only 36 percent of +Iraqis feel their country is heading in the right direction, and 79 +percent of Iraqis have a "mostly negative" view of the influence that +the United States has in their country. Sixty-one percent of Iraqis +approve of attacks on U.S.-led forces. If Iraqis continue to perceive +Americans as representing an occupying force, the United States could +become its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. +</P> + +<P> +These and other predictions of dire consequences in Iraq and the +region are by no means a certainty. Iraq has taken several positive +steps since Saddam Hussein was overthrown: Iraqis restored full +sovereignty, conducted open national elections, drafted a permanent +constitution, ratified that constitution, and elected a new government +pursuant to that constitution. Iraqis may become so sobered by the +prospect of an unfolding civil war and intervention by their regional +neighbors that they take the steps necessary to avert catastrophe. But +at the moment, such a scenario seems implausible because the Iraqi +people and their leaders have been slow to demonstrate the capacity or +will to act. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assess-C"></A> +<A NAME="assess-C1"></A> +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq +</H2> + +<P> +Because of the gravity of the situation in Iraq and of its +consequences for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world, +the Iraq Study Group has carefully considered the full range of +alternative approaches for moving forward. We recognize that there is +no perfect solution and that all that have been suggested have flaws. +The following are some of the more notable possibilities that we have +considered. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +1. Precipitate Withdrawal +</H3> + +<P> +Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and +the role and commitments of the United States in initiating events +that have led to the current situation, we believe it would be wrong +for the United States to abandon the country through a precipitate +withdrawal of troops and support. A premature American departure from +Iraq would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence and +further deterioration of conditions, leading to a number of the +adverse consequences outlined above. The near-term results would be a +significant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional +destabilization, and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda would +depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraq +descends into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually +require the United States to return. +</P> + +<BR> + +<A NAME="assess-C2"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +2. Staying the Course +</H3> + +<P> +Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq +is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. +Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at +a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United +States is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other +international crises is constrained. A majority of the American people +are soured on the war. This level of expense is not sustainable over +an extended period, especially when progress is not being made. The +longer the United States remains in Iraq without progress, the more +resentment will grow among Iraqis who believe they are subjects of a +repressive American occupation. As one U.S. official said to us, "Our +leaving would make it worse. . . . The current approach without +modification will not make it better." +</P> + +<BR> + +<A NAME="assess-C3"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +3. More Troops for Iraq +</H3> + +<P> +Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the +fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of +national reconciliation. A senior American general told us that adding +U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a highly +localized area. However, past experience indicates that the violence +would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved to another +area. As another American general told us, if the Iraqi government +does not make political progress, "all the troops in the world will +not provide security." Meanwhile, America's military capacity is +stretched thin: we do not have the troops or equipment to make a +substantial, sustained increase in our troop presence. Increased +deployments to Iraq would also necessarily hamper our ability to +provide adequate resources for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond +to crises around the world. +</P> + +<BR> + +<A NAME="assess-C4"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +4. Devolution to Three Regions +</H3> + +<P> +The costs associated with devolving +Iraq into three semiautonomous regions with loose central control +would be too high. Because Iraq's population is not neatly separated, +regional boundaries cannot be easily drawn. All eighteen Iraqi +provinces have mixed populations, as do Baghdad and most other major +cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could result in mass population +movements, collapse of the Iraqi security forces, strengthening of +militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization of neighboring states, or +attempts by neighboring states to dominate Iraqi regions. Iraqis, +particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division would confirm +wider fears across the Arab world that the United States invaded Iraq +to weaken a strong Arab state. +</P> + +<P> +While such devolution is a possible consequence of continued +instability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States should +support this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome on the +Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, +the United States should manage the situation to ameliorate +humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of violence, and +minimize regional instability. The United States should support as +much as possible central control by governmental authorities in +Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="assess-D"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +D. Achieving Our Goals +</H3> + +<P> +We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the +President: an Iraq that can "govern itself, sustain itself, and defend +itself." In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a broadly +representative government that maintains its territorial integrity, is +at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn't +brutalize its own people. Given the current situation in Iraq, +achieving this goal will require much time and will depend primarily +on the actions of the Iraqi people. +</P> + +<P> +In our judgment, there is a new way forward for the United States to +support this objective, and it will offer people of Iraq a reasonable +opportunity to lead a better life than they did under Saddam Hussein. +Our recommended course has shortcomings, as does each of the policy +alternatives we have reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it +includes the best strategies and tactics available to us to positively +influence the outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it could +enable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a +chance to pursue a better future, as well as serving America's +interests and values in the years ahead. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward"></A> +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +II +<BR> +The Way Forward—A New Approach +</H2> + +<BR> + +<P> +Progress in Iraq is still possible if new approaches are taken +promptly by Iraq, the United States, and other countries that have a +stake in the Middle East. +</P> + +<P> +To attain the goals we have outlined, changes in course must be made +both outside and inside Iraq. Our report offers a comprehensive +strategy to build regional and international support for stability in +Iraq, as it encourages the Iraqi people to assume control of their own +destiny. It offers a responsible transition. +</P> + +<P> +Externally, the United States should immediately begin to employ all +elements of American power to construct a regional mechanism that can +support, rather than retard, progress in Iraq. Internally, the Iraqi +government must take the steps required to achieve national +reconciliation, reduce violence, and improve the daily lives of +Iraqis. Efforts to implement these external and internal strategies +must begin now and must be undertaken in concert with one another. +</P> + +<P> +This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in the U.S. +presence in Iraq over time. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-A"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus +</H3> + +<BR> + +<P> +The United States must build a new international consensus for +stability in Iraq and the region. +</P> + +<P> +In order to foster such consensus, the United States should embark on +a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international support +structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other +countries in the region. This support structure should include every +country that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all +of Iraq's neighbors—Iran and Syria among them. Despite the well-known +differences between many of these countries, they all share an +interest in avoiding the horrific consequences that would flow from a +chaotic Iraq, particularly a humanitarian catastrophe and regional +destabilization. +</P> + +<P> +A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is clear that +the Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing, defending, and +sustaining itself by relying on U.S. military and economic support +alone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed by relying only on U.S. +military support in conjunction with Iraqi military and police +capabilities. Some states have been withholding commitments they could +make to support Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction. Some states +have been actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve a +political solution within Iraq, a broader international support +structure is needed. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-A1"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +1. The New Diplomatic Offensive +</H3> + +<P> +Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major +regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put it +simply, all key issues in the Middle East—the Arab-Israeli conflict, +Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism +and terrorism—are inextricably linked. In addition to supporting +stability in Iraq, a comprehensive diplomatic offensive—the New +Diplomatic Offensive—should address these key regional issues. By +doing so, it would help marginalize extremists and terrorists, promote +U.S. values and interests, and improve America's global image. +</P> + +<P> +Under the diplomatic offensive, we propose regional and international +initiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government in achieving +certain security, political, and economic milestones. Achieving these +milestones will require at least the acquiescence of Iraq's neighbors, +and their active and timely cooperation would be highly desirable. +</P> + +<P> +The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily economic +"Compact for Iraq" by also emphasizing political, diplomatic, and +security issues. At the same time, it would be coordinated with the +goals of the Compact for Iraq. The diplomatic offensive would also be +broader and more far-reaching than the "Gulf Plus Two" efforts +currently being conducted, and those efforts should be folded into and +become part of the diplomatic offensive. +</P> + +<P> +States included within the diplomatic offensive can play a major role +in reinforcing national reconciliation efforts between Iraqi Sunnis +and Shia. Such reinforcement would contribute substantially to +legitimizing of the political process in Iraq. Iraq's leaders may not +be able to come together unless they receive the necessary signals and +support from abroad. This backing will not materialize of its own +accord, and must be encouraged urgently by the United States. +</P> + +<P> +In order to advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution, the Study +Group recommends as follows: +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with the Iraqi +government, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive +to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This new +diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates +to regional players should be to: +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq's neighbors. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +iii. Secure Iraq's borders, including the use of joint patrols with +neighboring countries. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond +Iraq's borders. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, +and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from +non-neighboring Muslim nations. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in +Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +vii. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, +where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key +capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, +political, and economic milestones, including better performance on +issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil +revenues, and the dismantling of militias. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in +addition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States and +the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or +meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or +the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting +national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic +presence in Iraq. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-A2"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +2. The Iraq International Support Group +</H3> + +<P> +This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes +the active participation of those countries that have a critical stake +in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage their +participation, the United States should immediately seek the creation +of the Iraq International Support Group. The Support Group should also +include all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countries +in the region and the world. +</P> + +<P> +The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations or undertakings +on the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group would assist +Iraq in ways the government of Iraq would desire, attempting to +strengthen Iraq's sovereignty—not diminish it. +</P> + +<P> +It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq's neighbors +are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq +that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not +so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of +the Iraqi state. Each country in the region views the situation in +Iraq through the filter of its particular set of interests. For +example: +</P> + +<BR> + +<UL> +<LI> +Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous Kurdistan +because of its own national security considerations. +</LI> + +<LI> +Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in Iraq, +but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its influence +and hedge its bets on possible outcomes. +</LI> + +<LI> +Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups, +would be threatened by the impact that the breakup of Iraq would have +on its own multiethnic and multiconfessional society. +</LI> + +<LI> +Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim of +Iraqi irredentism and aggression. +</LI> + +<LI> +Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy in +Iraq and the region as a whole. +</LI> + +<LI> +The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an outcome +in Iraq that does not destabilize the region and exacerbate Shia-Sunni +tensions. +</LI> + +<LI> +None of Iraq's neighbors—especially major countries such as Egypt, +Saudi Arabia, and Israel—see it in their interest for the situation +in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence by Iran. Indeed, +they may take active steps to limit Iran's influence, steps that could +lead to an intraregional conflict. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR> + +<P> +Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to reinforce +ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi society. But +if the Support Group takes a systematic and active approach toward +considering the concerns of each country, we believe that each can be +encouraged to play a positive role in Iraq and the region. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P> +SAUDI ARABIA. Saudi Arabia's agreement not to intervene with +assistance to Sunni Arab Iraqis could be an essential quid pro quo for +similar forbearance on the part of other neighbors, especially Iran. +The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials to help reconcile +differences between Iraqi factions and build broader support in the +Islamic world for a stabilization agreement, as their recent hosting +of a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Mecca suggests. If the +government in Baghdad pursues a path of national reconciliation with +the Sunnis, the Saudis could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda +in Iraq. They could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, +the Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +TURKEY. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq's borders, Turkey can +be a partner in supporting the national reconciliation process in +Iraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpful given Turkey's interest +in Kurdistan remaining an integral part of a unified Iraq and its +interest in preventing a safe haven for Kurdish terrorists (the PKK). +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +EGYPT. Because of its important role in the Arab world, Egypt should +be encouraged to foster the national reconciliation process in Iraq +with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. At the same time, +Egypt has the means, and indeed has offered, to train groups of Iraqi +military and security forces in Egypt on a rotational basis. +</P> + +<P> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +JORDAN. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliation +process in Iraq with the Sunnis. It too has the professional +capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an +Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately +following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the +states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional +states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent +members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; +and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries—for instance, Germany, +Japan and South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to +resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq +could also become members. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the +Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be +conducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above. +The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S. +effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as +circumstances require. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on the participation +of the office of the United Nations Secretary-General in its work. The +United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as +his representative. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic +Offensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries +that take into account the interests, perspectives, and potential +contributions as suggested above. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-A3"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +3. Dealing with Iran and Syria +</H3> + +<P> +Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our +view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries +and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent +with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively +engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without +preconditions. +</P> + +<P> +The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with Iran and Syria +involve difficult issues that must be resolved. Diplomatic talks +should be extensive and substantive, and they will require a balancing +of interests. The United States has diplomatic, economic, and military +disincentives available in approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, +the United States should also consider incentives to try to engage +them constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya. +</P> + +<P> +Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include: +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors +and the region. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Taliban +from destabilizing Afghanistan. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World +Trade Organization. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United +States. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and +economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating +regime change. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated +between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement as part of a broader +initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined below. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and +the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran +and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive +policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and +Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as +disincentives, in seeking constructive results. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +IRAN. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state of the +U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran cooperated +in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whether this model can +be replicated in the case of Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United States bogged +down in Iraq, Iran's interests would not be served by a failure of +U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorial +disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran's population is slightly more +than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24 percent +of the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities. Worst-case +scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with +serious consequences for Iranian national security interests. +</P> + +<P> +Our limited contacts with Iran's government lead us to believe that +its leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic +efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctance +to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran. +</P> + +<P> +Nevertheless, as one of Iraq's neighbors Iran should be asked to +assume its responsibility to participate in the Support Group. An +Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of the +world Iran's rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to +its isolation. Further, Iran's refusal to cooperate on this matter +would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in the +broader dialogue it seeks. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should +continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and +its five permanent members (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, +France, Russia, and China) plus Germany. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the Support Group should +seek to persuade Iran that it should take specific steps to improve +the situation in Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to +any group resorting to violence in Iraq. +</LI> + +<LI> +Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of +Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty of +Iraq and its government. +</LI> + +<LI> +Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to +encourage national reconciliation. +</LI> + +<LI> +Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic +reconstruction of Iraq. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +SYRIA. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both +countries have important interests in the region that could be +enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to +move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s. In +this context, Syria's national interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute +are important and can be brought into play. +</P> + +<P> +Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq's stability in several +ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the following: +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support Group should +encourage and persuade Syria of the merit of such contributions as the +following: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent +possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. +Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and +terrorists in and out of Iraq. +</LI> + +<LI> +Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with the +Iraqis. +</LI> + +<LI> +Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-A4"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +4. The Wider Regional Context +</H3> + +<P> +The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle +East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli +conflict. +</P> + +<P> +There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States +to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, +and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for +Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, +by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept +Israel's right to exist), and particularly Syria—which is the +principal transit point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, and +which supports radical Palestinian groups. +</P> + +<P> +The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding direct +involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, +we should act boldly: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +There is no military solution to this conflict. +</LI> + +<LI> +The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a +nation perpetually at war. +</LI> + +<LI> +No American administration—Democratic or Republican—will ever +abandon Israel. +</LI> + +<LI> +Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-Israeli +dispute because it is an axiom that when the political process breaks +down there will be violence on the ground. +</LI> + +<LI> +The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set forth in +UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and in the principle of +"land for peace." +</LI> + +<LI> +The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace such as +Israel has achieved with Egypt and Jordan. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR> + +<P> +This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments in the +region, especially the democratically elected government of Lebanon, +and the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by +the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: +Lebanon and Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a +two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include—as soon as possible—the +unconditional calling and holding of meetings, under the auspices +of the United States or the Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, +European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon +and Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who +acknowledge Israel's right to exist) on the other. The purpose of +these meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid +Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks—one Syrian/Lebanese, +and the other Palestinian. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated +peace should be: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +Syria's full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of +August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain +sovereign control over its territory. +</LI> + +<LI> +Syria's full cooperation with all investigations into political +assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre +Gemayel. +</LI> + +<LI> +A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of +Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to +Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel's problem with +Hezbollah.) +</LI> + +<LI> +Syria's use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the +release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers. +</LI> + +<LI> +A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the +democratically elected government of Lebanon. +</LI> + +<LI> +A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through +Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups. +</LI> + +<LI> +A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of +Israel's right to exist. +</LI> + +<LI> +Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context of +a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the +Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could +include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if +requested by both parties. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that +negotiated peace should include: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the +principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving +peace. +</LI> + +<LI> +trong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the +Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing the way for +negotiations with Israel. +</LI> + +<LI> +A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating +the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis in +November 2006. +</LI> + +<LI> +Support for a Palestinian national unity government. +</LI> + +<LI> +Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along +the lines of President Bush's two-state solution, which would address +the key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the +right of return, and the end of conflict. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Afghanistan +</H3> + +<P> +At the same time, we must not lose sight of the importance of the +situation inside Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed by the +Taliban. Afghanistan's borders are porous. If the Taliban were to +control more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda the political +space to conduct terrorist operations. This development would +destabilize the region and have national security implications for the +United States and other countries around the world. Also, the +significant increase in poppy production in Afghanistan fuels the +illegal drug trade and narco-terrorism. +</P> + +<P> +The huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic support on +Iraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan. As the +United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle East, +it must also give priority to the situation in Afghanistan. Doing so +may require increased political, security, and military measures. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States to provide +additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, +including resources that might become available as combat forces are +moved from Iraq. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B"></A> +<A NAME="forward-B1"></A> +<H2 ALIGN="center"> +B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves +</H2> + +<BR> + +<P> +The New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper external +environment and support for the difficult internal steps that the +Iraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation, +establish security, and make progress on governance. +</P> + +<P> +The most important issues facing Iraq's future are now the +responsibility of Iraq's elected leaders. Because of the security and +assistance it provides, the United States has a significant role to +play. Yet only the government and people of Iraq can make and sustain +certain decisions critical to Iraq's future. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +1. Performance on Milestones +</H3> + +<P> +The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support +the achievement of specific objectives—or milestones—on national +reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, +but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. +The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens—and the citizens +of the United States and other countries—that it deserves continued +support. +</P> + +<P> +The U.S. government must make clear that it expects action by the +Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward these milestones. +Such a message can be sent only at the level of our national leaders, +and only in person, during direct consultation. +</P> + +<P> +As President Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Amman, +Jordan demonstrates, it is important for the President to remain in +close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. There is no +substitute for sustained dialogue at the highest levels of government. +</P> + +<P> +During these high-level exchanges, the United States should lay out an +agenda for continued support to help Iraq achieve milestones, as well +as underscoring the consequences if Iraq does not act. It should be +unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military, and economic +support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi government's demonstrating +political will and making substantial progress toward the achievement +of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance. +The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces units +from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq's +performance on milestones. +</P> + +<P> +The United States should also signal that it is seeking broad +international support for Iraq on behalf of achieving these +milestones. The United States can begin to shape a positive climate +for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, through +public statements by President Bush that reject the notion that the +United States seeks to control Iraq's oil, or seeks permanent military +bases within Iraq. However, the United States could consider a request +from Iraq for temporary bases. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his national +security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the +Iraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: there +must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress +toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the +President should convey as much detail as possible about the substance +of these exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi +people, and the countries in the region well informed. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will +and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on +national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States +should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, +and support for Iraq's security forces, and to continue political, +military, and economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq +becomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, +the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial +progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi +government. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States +does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi +government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. +government could consider that request as it would in the case of any +other government. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States +does not seek to control Iraq's oil. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Milestones for Iraq +</H3> + +<P> +The government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are necessary +to avert a downward spiral and make progress. Prime Minister Maliki +has worked closely in consultation with the United States and has put +forward the following milestones in the key areas of national +reconciliation, security and governance: +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +NATIONAL RECONCILIATION +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By the end of 2006-early 2007: +</P> + +<P> +Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an election date +</P> + +<P> +Approval of the Petroleum Law +</P> + +<P> +Approval of the De-Baathification Law +</P> + +<P> +Approval of the Militia Law +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By March 2007: +</P> + +<P> +A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary) +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By May 2007: +</P> + +<P> +Completion of Militia Law implementation +</P> + +<P> +Approval of amnesty agreement +</P> + +<P> +Completion of reconciliation efforts +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By June 2007: +</P> + +<P> +Provincial elections +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +SECURITY (pending joint U.S.-Iraqi review) +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By the end of 2006: +</P> + +<P> +Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levels +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By April 2007: +</P> + +<P> +Iraqi control of the Army +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By September 2007: +</P> + +<P> +Iraqi control of provinces +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By December 2007: +</P> + +<P> +Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support) +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +GOVERNANCE +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +By the end of 2006: +</P> + +<P> +The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20 percent and +appreciate the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to combat accelerating +inflation. +</P> + +<P> +Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum +products and sell imported fuel at market prices. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion dates of the end of +2006 or early 2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. These +should be completed by the first quarter of 2007. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good start. The United +States should consult closely with the Iraqi government and develop +additional milestones in three areas: national reconciliation, +security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives +of Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones +should be tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B2"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +2. National Reconciliation +</H3> + +<P> +National reconciliation is essential to reduce further violence and +maintain the unity of Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +U.S. forces can help provide stability for a time to enable Iraqi +leaders to negotiate political solutions, but they cannot stop the +violence—or even contain it—if there is no underlying political +agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country. +</P> + +<P> +The Iraqi government must send a clear signal to Sunnis that there is +a place for them in national life. The government needs to act now, to +give a signal of hope. Unless Sunnis believe they can get a fair deal +in Iraq through the political process, there is no prospect that the +insurgency will end. To strike this fair deal, the Iraqi government +and the Iraqi people must address several issues that are critical to +the success of national reconciliation and thus to the future of Iraq. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf of <BR> +National Reconciliation +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of the constitution is +essential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on an +urgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, and +should play a role in this process. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation +requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into +national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein's regime +excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified +Iraqi professionals—Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd +or Turkmen or Christian or Arab—into the government. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to +the central government and be shared on the basis of population. No +formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the +regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatible +with national reconciliation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial elections should +be held at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, new +provincial elections should have been held already. They are necessary +to restore representative government. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in +Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communal +violence. Kirkuk's mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could +make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as +required by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would be +explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the +agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New +Diplomatic Offensive. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. +Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in +the government finding ways and means to reconcile with former bitter +enemies. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of +all minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, +Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop +using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a +tool for politicizing or stopping their activities. Registration +should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for government +censorship and interference. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of <BR> +National Reconciliation +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq's +reconciliation process. +</P> + +<P> +The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in a +national reconciliation dialogue. The point is not for the United +States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that +we oppose. The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear +their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi +forces take on the security mission. A successful national +reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must +be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue +takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of +participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase +the possibilities for success. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue must +involve those who wield power, not simply those who hold political +office. The United States must try to talk directly to Grand Ayatollah +Sistani and must consider appointing a high-level American Shia Muslim +to serve as an emissary to him. The United States must also try to +talk directly to Moqtada al-Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent +leaders. The United Nations can help facilitate contacts. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to +engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United +States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada +al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also presents +opportunities to seek broader support for a national reconciliation +dialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, the international community and +religious leaders can play an important role in fostering dialogue and +reconciliation across the sectarian divide. The United States should +actively encourage the constructive participation of all who can take +part in advancing national reconciliation within Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between +sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive +above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to +speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an important +incentive in reconciliation talks and they need to be generous. +Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be difficult for the +United States to accept, just as they will be difficult for the Iraqis +to make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the Iraqis, +not by Americans. Despite being politically unpopular—in the United +States as well as in Iraq—amnesty is essential if progress is to take +place. Iraqi leaders need to be certain that they have U.S. support as +they move forward with this critical element of national +reconciliation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in +Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Militias and National Reconciliation +</H3> + +<P> +The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and +necessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use violence +against institutions of the state. However, solving the problem of +militias requires national reconciliation. +</P> + +<P> +Dealing with Iraq's militias will require long-term attention, and +substantial funding will be needed to disarm, demobilize, and +reintegrate militia members into civilian society. Around the world, +this process of transitioning members of irregular military forces +from civil conflict to new lives once a peace settlement takes hold is +familiar. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of +militias depends on national reconciliation and on confidence-building +measures among the parties to that reconciliation. +</P> + +<P> +Both the United Nations and expert and experienced nongovernmental +organizations, especially the International Organization for +Migration, must be on the ground with appropriate personnel months +before any program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia +members begins. Because the United States is a party to the conflict, +the U.S. military should not be involved in implementing such a +program. Yet U.S. financial and technical support is crucial. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of +neutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on +the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial and +technical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate +assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a +program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B3"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +3. Security and Military Forces +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +A Military Strategy for Iraq +</H3> + +<P> +There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can +bring about success in Iraq. But there are actions that the U.S. and +Iraqi governments, working together, can and should take to increase +the probability of avoiding disaster there, and increase the chance of +success. +</P> + +<P> +The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently needed national +reconciliation program to which it has already committed. And it +should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by +increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. As the Iraqi +Army increases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should be +able to take real responsibility for governance. +</P> + +<P> +While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United +States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military +personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi +Army units. As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combat +forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should +evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over +primary responsibility for combat operations. We should continue to +maintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operations +forces, intelligence units, search-and-rescue units, and force +protection units. +</P> + +<P> +While the size and composition of the Iraqi Army is ultimately a +matter for the Iraqi government to determine, we should be firm on the +urgent near-term need for significant additional trained Army +brigades, since this is the key to Iraqis taking over full +responsibility for their own security, which they want to do and which +we need them to do. It is clear that they will still need security +assistance from the United States for some time to come as they work +to achieve political and security changes. +</P> + +<P> +One of the most important elements of our support would be the +imbedding of substantially more U.S. military personnel in all Iraqi +Army battalions and brigades, as well as within Iraqi companies. U.S. +personnel would provide advice, combat assistance, and staff +assistance. The training of Iraqi units by the United States has +improved and should continue for the coming year. In addition to this +training, Iraqi combat units need supervised on-the-job training as +they move to field operations. This on-the-job training could be best +done by imbedding more U.S. military personnel in Iraqi deployed +units. The number of imbedded personnel would be based on the +recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it should be +large enough to accelerate the development of a real combat capability +in Iraqi Army units. Such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 +American troops instead of the 3,000 to 4,000 now in this role. This +increase in imbedded troops could be carried out without an aggregate +increase over time in the total number of troops in Iraq by making a +corresponding decrease in troops assigned to U.S. combat brigades. +</P> + +<P> +Another mission of the U.S. military would be to assist Iraqi deployed +brigades with intelligence, transportation, air support, and logistics +support, as well as providing some key equipment. +</P> + +<P> +A vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain +rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These teams would be +available to undertake strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq when +the opportunity arises, as well as for other missions considered vital +by the U.S. commander in Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be significantly improved +if it had improved equipment. One source could be equipment left +behind by departing U.S. units. The quickest and most effective way +for the Iraqi Army to get the bulk of their equipment would be through +our Foreign Military Sales program, which they have already begun to +use. +</P> + +<P> +While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades +are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of +Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments +in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not +necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, +U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded +with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and +in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and +rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after +the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would +maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our +still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and +naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an +increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently +robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, +to accomplish four missions: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order to +avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country. +</LI> + +<LI> +Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using +special operations teams. +</LI> + +<LI> +Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces. +</LI> + +<LI> +Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR> + +<P> +Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and +to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make +a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) in the number of U.S. +troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that +the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, +adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of +the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence +is intended to be a long-term "occupation." We could, however, support +a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to +stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, +if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be +effective. +</P> + +<P> +We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we +believe that so much is at stake. +</P> + +<P> +We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army the +support it needs to have a reasonable chance to take responsibility +for Iraq's security. Given the ongoing deterioration in the security +situation, it is urgent to move as quickly as possible to have that +security role taken over by Iraqi security forces. +</P> + +<P> +The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep +large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq for three compelling +reasons. +</P> + +<P> +First, and most importantly, the United States faces other security +dangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment of American +ground forces at present levels will leave no reserve available to +meet other contingencies. On September 7, 2006, General James Jones, +our NATO commander, called for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. +and NATO forces are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban +forces. The United States should respond positively to that request, +and be prepared for other security contingencies, including those in +Iran and North Korea. +</P> + +<P> +Second, the long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq at +current levels is adversely affecting Army readiness, with less than a +third of the Army units currently at high readiness levels. The Army +is unlikely to be able to meet the next rotation of troops in Iraq +without undesirable changes in its deployment practices. The Army is +now considering breaking its compact with the National Guard and +Reserves that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers +can be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term risk +that the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will take years +to reverse. +</P> + +<P> +And finally, an open-ended commitment of American forces would not +provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the +political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian +violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government +might continue to delay taking those difficult actions. +</P> + +<P> +While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is +moderating the violence, there is little evidence that the long-term +deployment of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead to +fundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important to +recognize that there are no risk-free alternatives available to the +United States at this time. Reducing our combat troop commitments in +Iraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably creates risks, but leaving +those forces tied down in Iraq indefinitely creates its own set of +security risks. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended +commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi +government that the United States could carry out its plans, including +planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned +changes. America's other security needs and the future of our military +cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi +government. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and +equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General +George Casey on October 24, 2006. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the +highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and +support mission and to counterterrorism operations. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and +military personnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and +American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company +level. The U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancing +incentives for these officers and personnel. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better +equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to +accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combat +brigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment +for Iraqi forces. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Restoring the U.S. Military +</H3> + +<P> +We recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that have +great consequence for our nation. One consequence has been the stress +and uncertainty imposed on our military—the most professional and +proficient military in history. The United States will need its +military to protect U.S. security regardless of what happens in Iraq. +We therefore considered how to limit the adverse consequences of the +strain imposed on our military by the Iraq war. +</P> + +<P> +U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have been +stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments in +Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead and more than +21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and accelerated +wear on equipment. +</P> + +<P> +Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of disarray, +as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs become clear. It +will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements for other +current and future security threats that need to be accommodated +together with spending for operations and maintenance, reset, +personnel, and benefits for active duty and retired personnel. +Restoring the capability of our military forces should be a high +priority for the United States at this time. +</P> + +<P> +The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership between +the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the uniformed +services. Both have long benefited from a relationship in which the +civilian leadership exercises control with the advantage of fully +candid professional advice, and the military serves loyally with the +understanding that its advice has been heard and valued. That +tradition has frayed, and civil-military relations need to be +repaired. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make every +effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an +environment in which the senior military feel free to offer +independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon +but also to the President and the National Security Council, as +envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership +should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that +have returned to the continental United States in order to "reset" the +force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for +global contingencies. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the United States, Congress +should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full +functionality over the next five years. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with the +relevant committees of Congress, should assess the full future +budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on the +future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retain +high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in research +and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies +involved in the stability and reconstruction effort. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B4"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +4. Police and Criminal Justice +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are +profound. +</P> + +<P> +The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support the mission +to "protect and serve" all Iraqis. Today, far too many Iraqi police do +not embrace that mission, in part because of problems in how reforms +were organized and implemented by the Iraqi and U.S. governments. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Recommended Iraqi Actions +</H3> + +<P> +Within Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent +militia infiltration is due, in part, to the poor organization of +Iraq's component police forces: the Iraqi National Police, the Iraqi +Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service. +</P> + +<P> +The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more military than +domestic in nature—involving commando-style operations—and is thus +ill-suited to the Ministry of the Interior. The more natural home for +the National Police is within the Ministry of Defense, which should be +the authority for counterinsurgency operations and heavily armed +forces. Though depriving the Ministry of the Interior of operational +forces, this move will place the Iraqi National Police under better +and more rigorous Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will enable these +units to better perform their counterinsurgency mission. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be +transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando +units will become part of the new Iraqi Army. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that bears +little resemblance to ordinary policing, especially in light of the +current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and weaponry across +Iraq's borders and the need for joint patrols of the border with +foreign militaries. Thus the natural home for the Border Police is +within the Ministry of Defense, which should be the authority for +controlling Iraq's borders. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should be +transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have total +responsibility for border control and external security. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and provides +local policing, needs to become a true police force. It needs legal +authority, training, and equipment to control crime and protect Iraqi +citizens. Accomplishing those goals will not be easy, and the presence +of American advisors will be required to help the Iraqis determine a +new role for the police. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater +responsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand +its cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi judicial system in +order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service, the +Ministry of the Interior needs to undertake substantial reforms to +purge bad elements and highlight best practices. Once the ministry +begins to function effectively, it can exert a positive influence over +the provinces and take back some of the authority that was lost to +local governments through decentralization. To reduce corruption and +militia infiltration, the Ministry of the Interior should take +authority from the local governments for the handling of policing +funds. Doing so will improve accountability and organizational +discipline, limit the authority of provincial police officials, and +identify police officers with the central government. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a +process of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand +the capability and reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal +Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over local police +forces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse +financial support to local police should be transferred to the +Ministry of the Interior. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities Protection +Service under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. +Simply disbanding these units is not an option, as the members will +take their weapons and become full-time militiamen or insurgents. All +should be brought under the authority of a reformed Ministry of the +Interior. They will need to be vetted, retrained, and closely +supervised. Those who are no longer part of the Facilities Protection +Service need to participate in a disarmament, demobilization, and +reintegration program (outlined above). +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed +with current efforts to identify, register, and control the Facilities +Protection Service. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +U.S. Actions +</H3> + +<P> +The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training +mission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity. It has +not always been clear who is in charge of the police training mission, +and the U.S. military lacks expertise in certain areas pertaining to +police and the rule of law. The United States has been more successful +in training the Iraqi Army than it has the police. The U.S. Department +of Justice has the expertise and capacity to carry out the police +training mission. The U.S. Department of Defense is already bearing +too much of the burden in Iraq. Meanwhile, the pool of expertise in +the United States on policing and the rule of law has been +underutilized. +</P> + +<P> +The United States should adjust its training mission in Iraq to match +the recommended changes in the Iraqi government—the movement of the +National and Border Police to the Ministry of Defense and the new +emphasis on the Iraqi Police Service within the Ministry of the +Interior. To reflect the reorganization, the Department of Defense +would continue to train the Iraqi National and Border Police, and the +Department of Justice would become responsible for training the Iraqi +Police Service. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its +mission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border +Police, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice should direct the +training mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry of +the Interior. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training teams are imbedded +within Iraqi Army units, the current practice of imbedding U.S. police +trainers should be expanded and the numbers of civilian training +officers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi +Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should +be obtained from among experienced civilian police executives and +supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace the +military police personnel currently assigned to training teams. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to train +the Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the Interior, +which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded a large team +within Iraq for counterterrorism activities. +</P> + +<P> +Building on this experience, the training programs should be expanded +and should include the development of forensic investigation training +and facilities that could apply scientific and technical investigative +methods to counterterrorism as well as to ordinary criminal activity. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and +forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of +terrorism as well as criminal activity. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its lack +of equipment, particularly in the area of communications and motor +transport. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand +and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi +Police Service. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department of +Defense to carry out the mission of reforming Iraq's Ministry of the +Interior and Iraq's judicial system. Iraq needs more than training for +cops on the beat: it needs courts, trained prosecutors and +investigators, and the ability to protect Iraqi judicial officials. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work +of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This +approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and +moving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standard +administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures +that Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in +partnership. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to +establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and +to create institutions and practices to fight corruption must be +strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses with +improved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial +staff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service +are essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B5"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +5. The Oil Sector +</H3> + +<P> +Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the +Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help Iraq +maximize its capability. +</P> + +<P> +Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore oil +production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a day +over a three-to five-year period, depending on evolving conditions in +key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil production +would decline unless current problems in the oil sector were +addressed. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Short Term +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 62: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical +assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that +defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a +fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential +to attract investment. +</LI> + +<LI> +The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to +accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs in the +southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States +should no longer fund such infrastructure projects. +</LI> + +<LI> +The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with +private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. +Protective measures could include a program to improve pipeline +security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput +(rather than fixed amounts). +</LI> + +<LI> +Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This +step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector. +</LI> + +<LI> +In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. +government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the +energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis pay +market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Long Term +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Expanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will require +creating corporate structures, establishing management systems, and +installing competent managers to plan and oversee an ambitious list of +major oil-field investment projects. +</P> + +<P> +To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts forward the +following recommendations. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 63: +</P> + +<UL> +<LI> +The United States should encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector +by the international community and by international energy companies. +</LI> + +<LI> +The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the +national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance +efficiency, transparency, and accountability. +</LI> + +<LI> +To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi +government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web +so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export +revenues. +</LI> + +<LI> +The United States should support the World Bank's efforts to ensure +that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves +providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them +in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits. +</LI> + +<LI> +The United States should provide technical assistance to the +Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments +process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating +professional training programs for management and technical personnel. +</LI> +</UL> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B6"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heart +of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands +additional U.S. resources. +</P> + +<P> +Progress in providing essential government services is necessary to +sustain any progress on the political or security front. The period of +large U.S.-funded reconstruction projects is over, yet the Iraqi +government is still in great need of technical assistance and advice +to build the capacity of its institutions. The Iraqi government needs +help with all aspects of its operations, including improved +procedures, greater delegation of authority, and better internal +controls. The strong emphasis on building capable central ministries +must be accompanied by efforts to develop functioning, effective +provincial government institutions with local citizen participation. +</P> + +<P> +Job creation is also essential. There is no substitute for private-sector +job generation, but the Commander's Emergency Response Program +is a necessary transitional mechanism until security and the economic +climate improve. It provides immediate economic assistance for trash +pickup, water, sewers, and electricity in conjunction with clear, +hold, and build operations, and it should be funded generously. A +total of $753 million was appropriated for this program in FY 2006. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should be increased to a +level of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. +The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work +hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and job +creation, including reliance on the Commander's Emergency Response +Program, should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be +provided on a nonsectarian basis. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more international +partners to assist with the reconstruction mission. The United +Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization for +Economic Cooperation and Development, and some Arab League members +need to become hands-on participants in Iraq's reconstruction. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq +should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who +should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively +participate in the design and construction of projects. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The number of refugees and internally displaced persons within Iraq is +increasing dramatically. If this situation is not addressed, Iraq and +the region could be further destabilized, and the humanitarian +suffering could be severe. Funding for international relief efforts is +insufficient, and should be increased. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take the lead in funding +assistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for +Refugees, and other humanitarian agencies. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Coordination of Economic and <BR> +Reconstruction Assistance +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington still +hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq's reconstruction. +</P> + +<P> +Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in short +supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held +accountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives of +key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have also spoken to us +directly and specifically about the need for a point of contact that +can coordinate their efforts with the U.S. government. +</P> + +<P> +A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies continuing +to follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer dollars on +duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste will further +undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is required. He +or she should report to the President, be given a staff and funding, +and chair a National Security Council interagency group consisting of +senior principals at the undersecretary level from all relevant U.S. +government departments and agencies. The Senior Advisor's +responsibility must be to bring unity of effort to the policy, budget, +and implementation of economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. The +Senior Advisor must act as the principal point of contact with U.S. +partners in the overall reconstruction effort. +</P> + +<P> +He or she must have close and constant interaction with senior U.S. +officials and military commanders in Iraq, especially the Director of +the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office, so that the realities +on the ground are brought directly and fully into the policy-making +process. In order to maximize the effectiveness of assistance, all +involved must be on the same page at all times. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for +Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. ATION 67: The President should create +a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Improving the Effectiveness of <BR> +Assistance Programs +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Congress should work with the administration to improve its ability to +implement assistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly, and +effectively. +</P> + +<P> +As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the +authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to promote national +reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding from programs and +projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating +effective partnership. These are important tools to improve +performance and accountability—as is the work of the Special +Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the +authority to spend significant funds through a program structured +along the lines of the Commander's Emergency Response Program, and +should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and +projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating +effective partnership. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for +Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistance +programs in Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +U.S. security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably by +the differing requirements of State and Defense Department programs +and of their respective congressional oversight committees. Since +Iraqi forces must be trained and equipped, streamlining the provision +of training and equipment to Iraq is critical. Security assistance +should be delivered promptly, within weeks of a decision to provide +it. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance program for +Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, +should be authorized and implemented. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage +U.S. partnerships with international donors and Iraqi participants to +promote reconstruction. The ability of the United States to form such +partnerships will encourage greater international participation in +Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from +international donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance +projects should be provided. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B7"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, <BR> +and Review +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The public interest is not well served by the government's +preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war in +Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budget +request but in requests for emergency supplemental appropriations. +This means that funding requests are drawn up outside the normal +budget process, are not offset by budgetary reductions elsewhere, and +move quickly to the White House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the +normal review erodes budget discipline and accountability. +</P> + +<P> +Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in a confusing +manner, making it difficult for both the general public and members of +Congress to understand the request or to differentiate it from +counterterrorism operations around the world or operations in +Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget experts are needed to answer +what should be a simple question: "How much money is the President +requesting for the war in Iraq?" +</P> + +<P> +Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive branch +erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing committees +(including the House and Senate Armed Services committees) spend the +better part of a year reviewing the President's annual budget request. +When the President submits an emergency supplemental request, the +authorizing committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the +appropriations committees, and they are pressured by the need to act +quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds. The +result is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory +review. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes loaded +with special spending projects that would not survive the normal +review process. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the +President's annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in +its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be +circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented +clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out +its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the +war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B8"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +8. U.S. Personnel +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The United States can take several steps to ensure that it has +personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by +Americans' lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of +1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of +fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient +communication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There are +still far too few Arab language—proficient military and civilian +officers in Iraq, to the detriment of the U.S. mission. +</P> + +<P> +Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex overseas +interventions to restore and maintain order—stability operations—outside +of the normal embassy setting. The nature of the mission in +Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the United States has had great +difficulty filling civilian assignments in Iraq with sufficient +numbers of properly trained personnel at the appropriate rank. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, +and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highest +possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural +training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel +about to be assigned to Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians +volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill +those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to +mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed +assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for +U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government +needs to improve how its constituent agencies—Defense, State, Agency +for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence +community, and others—respond to a complex stability operation like +that represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the +previous decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, +and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the +Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. +armed services. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to +carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operation +outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a +Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide +surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, +including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar +technical assistance capabilities. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="forward-B9"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +9. Intelligence +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes +superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still +does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the +role of the militias. +</P> + +<P> +A senior commander told us that human intelligence in Iraq has +improved from 10 percent to 30 percent. Clearly, U.S. intelligence +agencies can and must do better. As mentioned above, an essential part +of better intelligence must be improved language and cultural skills. +As an intelligence analyst told us, "We rely too much on others to +bring information to us, and too often don't understand what is +reported back because we do not understand the context of what we are +told." +</P> + +<P> +The Defense Department and the intelligence community have not +invested sufficient people and resources to understand the political +and military threat to American men and women in the armed forces. +Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for +countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised +explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a +request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the +people who fabricate, plant, and explode those devices. +</P> + +<P> +We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the job at the +Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two years' experience +in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts are rotated to new +assignments, and on-the-job training begins anew. Agencies must have a +better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the +insurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect +it, and understand it on a national and provincial level. The analytic +community's knowledge of the organization, leadership, financing, and +operations of militias, as well as their relationship to government +security forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to +know. +</P> + +<P> +In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in +Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep +events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not +necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of +a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A +roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. +personnel doesn't count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there +were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a +careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light +1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when +information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its +discrepancy with policy goals. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the +Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic +resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of +violence in Iraq. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the +Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the +collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq +to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground. +</P> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Recommended Iraqi Actions +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, +initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take full +responsibility for this intelligence function. +</P> + +<P> +To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the CIA should +increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel. +The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorism +intelligence center for the all-source fusion of information on the +various sources of terrorism within Iraq. This center would analyze +data concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and support +groups involved in terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate +intelligence-led police and military actions against them. +</P> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq +to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a +counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate +intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="appendix"></A> +<A NAME="append-letter"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Appendices +</H3> + +<BR><BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations +</H3> + +<P> +The initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking +"fresh-eyes" assessment of Iraq emerged from conversations U.S. House +Appropriations Committee Member Frank Wolf had with us. In late 2005, +Congressman Wolf asked the United States Institute of Peace, a +bipartisan federal entity, to facilitate the assessment, in +collaboration with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy +at Rice University, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and +the Center for Strategic and International Studies. +</P> + +<P> +Interested members of Congress, in consultation with the sponsoring +organizations and the administration, agreed that former Republican +U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and former Democratic +Congressman Lee H. Hamilton had the breadth of knowledge of foreign +affairs required to co-chair this bipartisan effort. The co-chairs +subsequently selected the other members of the bipartisan Iraq Study +Group, all senior individuals with distinguished records of public +service. Democrats included former Secretary of Defense William J. +Perry, former Governor and U.S. Senator Charles S. Robb, former +Congressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta, and Vernon +E. Jordan, Jr., advisor to President Bill Clinton. Republicans +included former Associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court Sandra Day +O'Connor, former U.S. Senator Alan K. Simpson, former Attorney General +Edwin Meese III, and former Secretary of State Lawrence S. +Eagleburger. Former CIA Director Robert Gates was an active member for +a period of months until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. +</P> + +<P> +The Iraq Study Group was launched on March 15, 2006, in a Capitol Hill +meeting hosted by U.S. Senator John Warner and attended by +congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle. +</P> + +<P> +To support the Study Group, the sponsoring organizations created four +expert working groups consisting of 44 leading foreign policy analysts +and specialists on Iraq. The working groups, led by staff of the +United States Institute of Peace, focused on the Strategic +Environment, Military and Security Issues, Political Development, and +the Economy and Reconstruction. Every effort was made to ensure the +participation of experts across a wide span of the political spectrum. +Additionally, a panel of retired military officers was consulted. +</P> + +<P> +We are grateful to all those who have assisted the Study Group, +especially the supporting experts and staff. Our thanks go to Daniel +P. Serwer of the Institute of Peace, who served as executive director; +Christopher Kojm, advisor to the Study Group; John Williams, Policy +Assistant to Mr. Baker; and Ben Rhodes, Special Assistant to Mr. +Hamilton. +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Richard H. Solomon, President<BR> +United States Institute of Peace<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Edward P. Djerejian, Founding Director<BR> +James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy,<BR> +Rice University<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +David M. Abshire, President<BR> +Center for the Study of the Presidency<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +John J. Hamre, President<BR> +Center for Strategic and International Studies<BR> +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="append-plenary"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions +</H3> + +<PRE> +March 15, 2006 +April 11-12, 2006 +May 18-19, 2005 +June 13-14, 2006 August 2-3, 2006 +August 30-September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad) +September 18-19, 2006 +November 13-14, 2006 +November 27-29, 2006 +</PRE> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="append-consult"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Iraq Study Group Consultations +</H3> + +<H4 ALIGN="center"> +(* denotes a meeting that took place in Iraq) +</H4> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Iraqi Officials and Representatives +</H3> + +<PRE> +*Jalal Talabani—President +*Tariq al-Hashimi—Vice President +*Adil Abd al-Mahdi—Vice President +*Nouri Kamal al-Maliki—Prime Minister +*Salaam al-Zawbai—Deputy Prime Minister +*Barham Salih—Deputy Prime Minister +*Mahmoud al-Mashhadani—Speaker of the Parliament +*Mowaffak al-Rubaie—National Security Advisor +*Jawad Kadem al-Bolani—Minister of Interior +*Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi—Minister of Defense +*Hoshyar Zebari—Minister of Foreign Affairs +*Bayan Jabr—Minister of Finance +*Hussein al-Shahristani—Minister of Oil +*Karim Waheed—Minister of Electricity +*Akram al-Hakim—Minister of State for National Reconciliation Affairs +*Mithal al-Alusi—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation +*Ayad Jamal al-Din—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation +*Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation +*Sami al-Ma'ajoon—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation +*Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud—Member, Commission on National Reconciliation +*Wijdan Mikhael—Member, High Commission on National Reconciliation +Lt. General Nasir Abadi—Deputy Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Joint Forces +*Adnan al-Dulaimi—Head of the Tawafuq list +Ali Allawi—Former Minister of Finance +*Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi—representative of Moqtada al-Sadr +*Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim—Shia Coalition Leader +*Sheik Maher al-Hamraa—Ayat Allah Said Sussein Al Sadar +*Hajim al-Hassani—Member of the Parliament on the Iraqiya list +*Hunain Mahmood Ahmed Al-Kaddo—President of the Iraqi Minorities Council +*Abid al-Gufhoor Abid al-Razaq al-Kaisi—Dean of the Islamic University of the Imam Al-Atham +*Ali Neema Mohammed Aifan al-Mahawili—Rafiday Al-Iraq Al-Jaded Foundation +*Saleh al-Mutlaq—Leader of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue +*Ayyad al-Sammara'l—Member of the Parliament +*Yonadim Kenna—Member of the Parliament and Secretary General of Assyrian Movement +*Shahla Wali Mohammed—Iraqi Counterpart International +*Hamid Majid Musa—Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party +*Raid Khyutab Muhemeed—Humanitarian, Cultural, and Social Foundation +Sinan Shabibi—Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq +Samir Shakir M. Sumaidaie—Ambassador of Iraq to the United States +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Current U.S. Administration Officials +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Senior Administration Officials +</H3> + +<PRE> +George W. Bush—President +Richard B. Cheney—Vice President +Condoleezza Rice—Secretary of State +Donald H. Rumsfeld—Secretary of Defense +Stephen J. Hadley—National Security Advisor +Joshua B. Bolten—White House Chief of Staff +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Department of Defense/Military +</H3> + +<PRE> +CIVILIAN: +Gordon England—Deputy Secretary of Defense +Stephen Cambone—Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence +Eric Edelman—Under Secretary of Defense for Policy +</PRE> + +<PRE> +MILITARY: +General Peter Pace—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff +Admiral Edmund Giambastiani—Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff +General John Abizaid—Commander, United States Central Command +*General George W. Casey, Jr.—Commanding General, Multi-National Forces-Iraq +Lt. General James T. Conway—Director of Operations, J-3, on the Joint Staff +*Lt. General Peter Chiarelli—Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq +Lt. General David H. Petraeus—Commanding General, + U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth +*Lt. General Martin Dempsey—Commander Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq +*Maj. General Joseph Peterson—Coalition Police Assistance Training Team +*Maj. General Richard Zilmer—Commander, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force +Colonel Derek Harvey—Senior Intelligence Officer for Iraq, Defense Intelligence Agency +Lt. Colonel Richard Bowyer—National War College (recently served in Iraq) +Lt. Colonel Justin Gubler—National War College (recently served in Iraq) +Lt. Colonel David Haight—National War College (recently served in Iraq) +Lt. Colonel Russell Smith—National War College (recently served in Iraq) +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Department of State/Civilian Embassy Personnel +</H3> + +<PRE> +R. Nicholas Burns—Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs +Philip Zelikow—Counselor to the Department of State +C. David Welch—Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs +James Jeffrey—Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and Coordinator for Iraq Policy +David Satterfield—Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and Coordinator for Iraq Policy +Zalmay Khalilzad—U.S. Ambassador to Iraq +*Dan Speckhard—Charge D'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Iraq +*Joseph Saloom—Director, Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office +*Hilda Arellano—U.S. Agency for International Development Director in Iraq +*Terrance Kelly—Director, Office of Strategic Plans and Assessments +*Randall Bennett—Regional Security Officer of the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, Iraq +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Intelligence Community +</H3> + +<PRE> +John D. Negroponte—Director of National Intelligence +General Michael V. Hayden—Director, Central Intelligence Agency +Thomas Fingar—Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis and + Chairman of the National Intelligence Council +John Sherman—Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Military Issues +Steve Ward—Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East +Jeff Wickham—Iraq Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Other Senior Officials +</H3> + +<PRE> +David Walker—Comptroller General of the United States +*Stuart Bowen—Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Members of Congress +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +United States Senate +</H3> + +<PRE> +Senator William Frist (R-TN)—Majority Leader +Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)—Minority Leader +Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)—Majority Whip +Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL)—Minority Whip +Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—Chair, Foreign Relations Committee +Senator John Warner (R-VA)—Chair, Armed Services Committee +Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)—Ranking Member, Foreign Relations Committee +Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)—Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee +Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)—Ranking Member, Energy and Resources Committee +Senator Kit Bond (R-MO)—Member, Intelligence Committee +Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)—Member, Armed Services Committee +Senator John Kerry (D-MA)—Member, Foreign Relations Committee +Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)—Member, Armed Services Committee +Senator John McCain (R-AZ)—Member, Armed Services Committee +Senator Jack Reed (D-RI)—Member, Armed Services Committee +</PRE> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +United States House of Representatives +</H3> + +<PRE> +Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)—Minority Leader Representative +Tom Davis (R-VA)—Chair, Government Reform Committee +Representative Jane Harman (D-CA)—Ranking Member, Intelligence Committee +Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO)—Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee +Representative John Murtha (D-PA)—Ranking Member, Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense +Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN)—Member, Armed Services Committee +Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX)—Member, International Relations Committee +Representative Alan Mollohan (D-WV)—Member, Appropriations Committee +Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT)—Member, Government Reform Committee +Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA)—Member, Appropriations Committee +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Foreign Officials +</H3> + +<PRE> +Sheikh Salem al-Abdullah al-Sabah—Ambassador of Kuwait to the United States +Michael Ambuhl—Secretary of State of Switzerland +Kofi Annan—Secretary-General of the United Nations +*Dominic Asquith—British Ambassador to Iraq +Tony Blair—Prime Minister of the United Kingdom +Prince Turki al-Faisal—Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States +Nabil Fahmy—Ambassador of Egypt to the United States +Karim Kawar—Ambassador of Jordan to the United States +Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa—Ambassador of Qatar to the United States +*Mukhtar Lamani—Arab League envoy to Iraq +Sir David Manning—British Ambassador to the United States +Imad Moustapha—Ambassador of Syria to the United States +Walid Muallem—Foreign Minister of Syria +Romano Prodi—Prime Minister of Italy +*Ashraf Qazi—Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq +Anders Fogh Rasmussen—Prime Minister of Denmark +Nabi Sensoy—Ambassador of Turkey to the United States +Ephraim Sneh—Deputy Minister of Defense of the State of Israel +Javad Zarif—Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations +Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayad—Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Former Officials and Experts +</H3> + +<PRE> +William J. Clinton—former President of the United States +Walter Mondale—former Vice President of the United States +Madeleine K. Albright—former United States Secretary of State +Warren Christopher—former United States Secretary of State +Henry Kissinger—former United States Secretary of State +Colin Powell—former United States Secretary of State +George P. Schultz—former United States Secretary of State +Samuel R. Berger—former United States National Security Advisor +Zbigniew Brzezinski—former United States National Security Advisor +Anthony Lake—former United States National Security Advisor +General Brent Scowcroft—former United States National Security Advisor +General Eric Shinseki—former Chief of Staff of the United States Army +General Anthony Zinni—former Commander, United States Central Command +General John Keane—former Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army +Admiral Jim Ellis—former Commander of United States Strategic Command +General Joe Ralston—former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO +Lt. General Roger C. Schultz—former Director of the United States Army National Guard +Douglas Feith—former United States Under Secretary of Defense for Policy +Mark Danner—The New York Review of Books +Larry Diamond—Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University +Thomas Friedman—New York Times +Leslie Gelb—President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations +Richard Hill—Director, Office of Strategic Initiatives and Analysis, CHF International +Richard C. Holbrooke—former Ambassador of the United States to the United Nations +Martin S. Indyk—Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution +Ronald Johnson—Executive Vice President for International Development, RTI International +Frederick Kagan—The American Enterprise Institute +Arthur Keys, Jr.—President and CEO, International Relief and Development +William Kristol—The Weekly Standard +*Guy Laboa—Kellogg, Brown & Root +Nancy Lindborg—President, Mercy Corps +Michael O'Hanlon—Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution +George Packer—The New Yorker +Carlos Pascual—Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution +Robert Perito—Senior Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace +*Col. Jack Petri, USA (Ret.)—advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior +Kenneth Pollack—Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution +Thomas Ricks—The Washington Post +Zainab Salbi—Founder and CEO, Women for Women International +Matt Sherman—former Deputy Senior Advisor and Director of Policy, Iraqi Ministry of Interior +Strobe Talbott—President, The Brookings Institution +Rabih Torbay—Vice President for International Operations, International Medical Corps +George Will—The Washington Post +</PRE> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="append-expert"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Economy and Reconstruction +</H3> + +<PRE> +Gary Matthews, USIP Secretariat +Director, Task Force on the United Nations and Special Projects, +United States Institute of Peace + +Raad Alkadiri +Director, Country Strategies Group, PFC Energy + +Frederick D. Barton +Senior Adviser and Co-Director, International Security Program, +Center for Strategic & International Studies + +Jay Collins +Chief Executive Officer, Public Sector Group, Citigroup, Inc. + +Jock P. Covey +Senior Vice President, External Affairs, Corporate Security +and Sustainability Services, Bechtel Corporation + +Keith Crane +Senior Economist, RAND Corporation + +Amy Myers Jaffe +Associate Director for Energy Studies, James A. Baker III Institute +for Public Policy, Rice University + +K. Riva Levinson +Managing Director, BKSH & Associates + +David A. Lipton +Managing Director and Head of Global Country Risk Management, +Citigroup, Inc + +Michael E. O'Hanlon +Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution + +James A. Placke +Senior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates + +James A. Schear +Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, +National Defense University +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Military and Security +</H3> + +<PRE> +Paul Hughes, USIP Secretariat +Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and +Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace + +Hans A. Binnendijk +Director & Theodore Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology & +National Security Policy, National Defense University + +James Carafano +Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, Douglas +and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, +The Heritage Foundation + +Michael Eisenstadt +Director, Military & Security Program, The Washington Institute for +Near East Policy + +Michèle A. Flournoy +Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for +Strategic & International Studies + +Bruce Hoffman +Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of +Foreign Service, Georgetown University + +Clifford May +President, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies + +Robert M. Perito +Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and +Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace + +Kalev I. Sepp +Assistant Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Center +on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School + +John F. Sigler +Adjunct Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center +for Strategic Studies, National Defense University + +W. Andrew Terrill +Research Professor, National Security Affairs, Strategic +Studies Institute + +Jeffrey A. White +Berrie Defense Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Political Development +</H3> + +<PRE> +Daniel P. Serwer, USIP Secretariat +Vice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability +Operations, United States Institute of Peace + +Raymond H. Close +Freelance Analyst and Commentator on Middle East Politics + +Larry Diamond Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, +Sanford University, and Co-Editor, Journal of Democracy + +Andrew P. N. Erdmann +Former Director for Iran, Iraq and Strategic Planning, +National Security Council + +Reuel Marc Gerecht +Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute + +David L. Mack +Vice President, The Middle East Institute + +Phebe A. Marr +Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace + +Hassan Mneimneh +Director, Documentation Program, The Iraq Memory Foundation + +Augustus Richard Norton +Professor of International Relations and Anthropology, +Department of International Relations, Boston University + +Marina S. Ottaway +Senior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, +Carnegie Endowment for International Peace + +Judy Van Rest +Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute + +Judith S. Yaphe +Distinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East, +Institute for National Strategic Studies, +National Defense University +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Strategic Environment +</H3> + +<PRE> +Paul Stares, USIP Secretariat +Vice President, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, +United States Institute of Peace + +Jon B. Alterman +Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic & +International Studies + +Steven A. Cook +Douglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations + +James F. Dobbins +Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, +RAND Corporation + +Hillel Fradkin +Director, Center for Islam, Democracy and the +Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute + +Chas W. Freeman +Chairman, Projects International and President, +Middle East Policy Council + +Geoffrey Kemp +Director, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center + +Daniel C. Kurtzer +S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor, Middle East Policy Studies, +Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University + +Ellen Laipson +President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center + +William B. Quandt +Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Professor of Government and +Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, and Nonresident Senior +Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, +The Brookings Institution + +Shibley Telhami +Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, +Department of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, +and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, +The Brookings Institution + +Wayne White +Adjunct Scholar, Public Policy Center, Middle East Institute +</PRE> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Military Senior Advisor Panel +</H3> + +<PRE> +Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr. +United States Navy, Retired + +General John M. Keane +United States Army, Retired + +General Edward C. Meyer +United States Army, Retired + +General Joseph W. Ralston +United States Air Force, Retired + +Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Sr. +United States Army, Retired +</PRE> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="append-group"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +The Iraq Study Group +</H3> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +James A. Baker, III—Co-Chair +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +James A. Baker, III, has served in senior government positions under +three United States presidents. He served as the nation's 61st +Secretary of State from January 1989 through August 1992 under +President George H. W. Bush. During his tenure at the State +Department, Mr. Baker traveled to 90 foreign countries as the United +States confronted the unprecedented challenges and opportunities of +the post-Cold War era. Mr. Baker's reflections on those years of +revolution, war, and peace—The Politics of Diplomacy—was published +in 1995. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Baker served as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 to +1988 under President Ronald Reagan. As Treasury Secretary, he was also +Chairman of the President's Economic Policy Council. From 1981 to +1985, he served as White House Chief of Staff to President Reagan. Mr. +Baker's record of public service began in 1975 as Under Secretary of +Commerce to President Gerald Ford. It concluded with his service as +White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush from +August 1992 to January 1993. +</P> + +<P> +Long active in American presidential politics, Mr. Baker led +presidential campaigns for Presidents Ford, Reagan, and Bush over the +course of five consecutive presidential elections from 1976 to 1992. +</P> + +<P> +A native Houstonian, Mr. Baker graduated from Princeton University in +1952. After two years of active duty as a lieutenant in the United +States Marine Corps, he entered the University of Texas School of Law +at Austin. He received his J.D. with honors in 1957 and practiced law +with the Houston firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Baker's memoir—Work Hard, Study . . . and Keep Out of Politics! +Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life—was published +in October 2006. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Baker received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1991 and has +been the recipient of many other awards for distinguished public +service, including Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson Award, the +American Institute for Public Service's Jefferson Award, Harvard +University's John F. Kennedy School of Government Award, the Hans J. +Morgenthau Award, the George F. Kennan Award, the Department of the +Treasury's Alexander Hamilton Award, the Department of State's +Distinguished Service Award, and numerous honorary academic degrees. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Baker is presently a senior partner in the law firm of Baker +Botts. He is Honorary Chairman of the James A. Baker III Institute for +Public Policy at Rice University and serves on the board of the Howard +Hughes Medical Institute. From 1997 to 2004, Mr. Baker served as the +Personal Envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seek +a political solution to the conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr. +Baker was appointed Special Presidential Envoy for President George W. +Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt. In 2005, he was co-chair, with former +President Jimmy Carter, of the Commission on Federal Election Reform. +Since March 2006, Mr. Baker and former U.S. Congressman Lee H. +Hamilton have served as the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group, a +bipartisan blue-ribbon panel on Iraq. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Baker was born in Houston, Texas, in 1930. He and his wife, the +former Susan Garrett, currently reside in Houston, and have eight +children and seventeen grandchildren. Garrett, currently reside in +Houston, and have eight children and seventeen grandchildren. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Lee H. Hamilton—Co-Chair +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Lee H. Hamilton became Director of the Woodrow Wilson International +Center for Scholars in January 1999. Previously, Mr. Hamilton served +for thirty-four years as a United States Congressman from Indiana. +During his tenure, he served as Chairman and Ranking Member of the +House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International +Relations) and chaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East +from the early 1970s until 1993. He was Chairman of the Permanent +Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee to +Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. +</P> + +<P> +Also a leading figure on economic policy and congressional +organization, he served as Chair of the Joint Economic Committee as +well as the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, and was a +member of the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee. In his +home state of Indiana, Mr. Hamilton worked hard to improve education, +job training, and infrastructure. Currently, Mr. Hamilton serves as +Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, which seeks +to educate citizens on the importance of Congress and on how Congress +operates within our government. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Hamilton remains an important and active voice on matters of +international relations and American national security. He served as a +Commissioner on the United States Commission on National Security in +the 21st Century (better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), was +Co-Chair with former Senator Howard Baker of the Baker-Hamilton +Commission to Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos, and +was Vice-Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon +the United States (the 9/11 Commission), which issued its report in +July 2004. He is currently a member of the President's Foreign +Intelligence Advisory Board and the President's Homeland Security +Advisory Council, as well as the Director of the Federal Bureau of +Investigation's Advisory Board. +</P> + +<P> +Born in Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Hamilton relocated with his family +to Tennessee and then to Evansville, Indiana. Mr. Hamilton is a +graduate of DePauw University and the Indiana University School of +Law, and studied for a year at Goethe University in Germany. Before +his election to Congress, he practiced law in Chicago and in Columbus, +Indiana. A former high school and college basketball star, he has been +inducted into the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Hamilton's distinguished service in government has been honored +through numerous awards in public service and human rights as well as +honorary degrees. He is the author of A Creative Tension—The Foreign +Policy Roles of the President and Congress (2002) and How Congress +Works and Why You Should Care (2004), and the coauthor of Without +Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (2006). +</P> + +<P> +Lee and his wife, the former Nancy Ann Nelson, have three children— +Tracy Lynn Souza, Deborah Hamilton Kremer, and Douglas Nelson +Hamilton—and five grandchildren: Christina, Maria, McLouis and +Patricia Souza and Lina Ying Kremer. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Lawrence S. Eagleburger—Member +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Lawrence S. Eagleburger was sworn in as the 62nd U.S. Secretary of +State by President George H. W. Bush on December 8, 1992, and as +Deputy Secretary of State on March 20, 1989. +</P> + +<P> +After his entry into the Foreign Service in 1957, Mr. Eagleburger +served in the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in the State +Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in the U.S. Embassy in +Belgrade, and the U.S. Mission to NATO in Belgium. In 1963, after a +severe earthquake in Macedonia, he led the U.S. government effort to +provide medical and other assistance. He was then assigned to +Washington, D.C., where he served on the Secretariat staff and as +special assistant to Dean Acheson, advisor to the President on +Franco-NATO issues. In August 1966, he became acting director of the +Secretariat staff. +</P> + +<P> +In October 1966, Mr. Eagleburger joined the National Security Council +staff. In October 1967, he was assigned as special assistant to Under +Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. In November 1968, he was +appointed Dr. Henry Kissinger's assistant, and in January 1969, he +became executive assistant to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. In +September 1969, he was assigned as political advisor and chief of the +political section of the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Eagleburger became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in August +1971. Two years later, he became Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense +for International Security Affairs. The same year he returned to the +White House as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security +Operations. He subsequently followed Dr. Kissinger to the State +Department, becoming Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In +1975, he was made Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management. +</P> + +<P> +In June 1977, Mr. Eagleburger was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia, +and in 1981 he was nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for +European Affairs. In February 1982, he was appointed Under Secretary +of State for Political Affairs. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Eagleburger has received numerous awards, including an honorary +knighthood from Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II (1994); the +Distinguished Service Award (1992), the Wilbur J. Carr Award (1984), +and the Distinguished Honor Award (1984) from the Department of State; +the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal from the Department of +Defense (1978); and the President's Award for Distinguished Federal +Civilian Service (1976). +</P> + +<P> +After retiring from the Department of State in May 1984, Mr. +Eagleburger was named president of Kissinger Associates, Inc. +Following his resignation as Secretary of State on January 19, 1993, +he joined the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell as +Senior Foreign Policy Advisor. He joined the boards of Halliburton +Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, and Universal Corporation. Mr. +Eagleburger currently serves as Chairman of the International +Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims. +</P> + +<P> +He received his B.S. degree in 1952 and his M.S. degree in 1957, both +from the University of Wisconsin, and served as first lieutenant in +the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1954. Mr. Eagleburger is married to the +former Marlene Ann Heinemann. He is the father of three sons, Lawrence +Scott, Lawrence Andrew, and Lawrence Jason. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.—Member +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., is a Senior Managing Director of Lazard Frères +& Co, LLC in New York. He works with a diverse group of clients across +a broad range of industries. +</P> + +<P> +Prior to joining Lazard, Mr. Jordan was a Senior Executive Partner +with the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, where he +remains Senior Counsel. While there Mr. Jordan practiced general, +corporate, legislative, and international law in Washington, D.C. +</P> + +<P> +Before Akin Gump, Mr. Jordan held the following positions: President +and Chief Executive Officer of the National Urban League, Inc.; +Executive Director of the United Negro College Fund, Inc.; Director of +the Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional Council; +Attorney-Consultant, U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity; Assistant to +the Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council; Georgia Field +Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored +People; and an attorney in private practice in Arkansas and Georgia. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Jordan's presidential appointments include the President's +Advisory Committee for the Points of Light Initiative Foundation, the +Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, the Advisory +Council on Social Security, the Presidential Clemency Board, the +American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, the National Advisory +Committee on Selective Service, and the Council of the White House +Conference "To Fulfill These Rights." In 1992, Mr. Jordan served as +the Chairman of the Clinton Presidential Transition Team. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Jordan's corporate and other directorships include American +Express Company; Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.; Howard University +(Trustee); J. C. Penney Company, Inc.; Lazard Ltd.; Xerox Corporation; +and the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold. +</P> + +<P> +Mr. Jordan is a graduate of DePauw University and the Howard +University Law School. He holds honorary degrees from more than 60 +colleges and universities in America. He is a member of the bars of +Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, and the U.S. Supreme +Court. He is a member of the American Bar Association, the National +Bar Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Bilderberg +Meetings and he is President of the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. +Mr. Jordan is the author of Vernon Can Read! A Memoir (Public Affairs, +2001). +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Edwin Meese III—Member +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Edwin Meese III holds the Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy at the +Heritage Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based public policy research +and education institution. He is also the Chairman of Heritage's +Center for Legal and Judicial Studies and a distinguished visiting +fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In addition, +Meese lectures, writes, and consults throughout the United States on a +variety of subjects. +</P> + +<P> +Meese is the author of With Reagan: The Inside Story, which was +published by Regnery Gateway in June 1992; co-editor of Making America +Safer, published in 1997 by the Heritage Foundation; and coauthor of +Leadership, Ethics and Policing, published by Prentice Hall in 2004. +</P> + +<P> +Meese served as the 75th Attorney General of the United States from +February 1985 to August 1988. As the nation's chief law enforcement +officer, he directed the Department of Justice and led international +efforts to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. In +1985 he received Government Executive magazine's annual award for +excellence in management. +</P> + +<P> +From January 1981 to February 1985, Meese held the position of +Counsellor to the President, the senior position on the White House +staff, where he functioned as the President's chief policy advisor. As +Attorney General and as Counsellor, Meese was a member of the +President's cabinet and the National Security Council. He served as +Chairman of the Domestic Policy Council and of the National Drug +Policy Board. Meese headed the President-elect's transition effort +following the November 1980 election. During the presidential +campaign, he served as chief of staff and senior issues advisor for +the Reagan-Bush Committee. +</P> + +<P> +Formerly, Meese served as Governor Reagan's executive assistant and +chief of staff in California from 1969 through 1974 and as legal +affairs secretary from 1967 through 1968. Before joining Governor +Reagan's staff in 1967, Meese served as deputy district attorney in +Alameda County, California. From 1977 to 1981, Meese was a professor +of law at the University of San Diego, where he also was Director of +the Center for Criminal Justice Policy and Management. +</P> + +<P> +In addition to his background as a lawyer, educator, and public +official, Meese has been a business executive in the aerospace and +transportation industry, serving as vice president for administration +of Rohr Industries, Inc., in Chula Vista, California. He left Rohr to +return to the practice of law, engaging in corporate and general legal +work in San Diego County. +</P> + +<P> +Meese is a graduate of Yale University, Class of 1953, and holds a law +degree from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a retired +colonel in the United States Army Reserve. He is active in numerous +civic and educational organizations. Meese is married, has two grown +children, and resides in McLean, Virginia. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Sandra Day O'Connor—Member +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated by President Reagan as Associate +Justice of the United States Supreme Court on July 7, 1981, and took +the oath of office on September 25. O'Connor previously served on the +Arizona Court of Appeals (1979-81) and as judge of the Maricopa County +Superior Court in Phoenix, Arizona (1975-79). She was appointed as +Arizona state senator in 1969 and was subsequently elected to two +two-year terms from 1969 to 1975. During her tenure, she was Arizona +Senate Majority Leader and Chairman of the State, County, and +Municipal Affairs Committee, and she served on the Legislative +Council, on the Probate Code Commission, and on the Arizona Advisory +Council on Intergovernmental Relations. +</P> + +<P> +From 1965 to 1969, O'Connor was assistant attorney general in Arizona. +She practiced law at a private firm in Maryvale, Arizona, from 1958 to +1960 and prior to that was civilian attorney for Quartermaster Market +Center in Frankfurt, Germany (1954-57), and deputy county attorney in +San Mateo County, California (1952-53) +</P> + +<P> +She was previously Chairman of the Arizona Supreme Court Committee to +Reorganize Lower Courts (1974-75), Vice Chairman of the Arizona Select +Law Enforcement Review Commission (1979-80), and, in Maricopa County, +Chairman of the Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service (1960-62), the +Juvenile Detention Home Visiting Board (1963-64), and the Superior +Court Judges' Training and Education Committee (1977-79) and a member +of the Board of Adjustments and Appeals (1963-64). +</P> + +<P> +O'Connor currently serves as Chancellor of the College of William and +Mary and on the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, the +Executive Board of the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, +the Advisory Board of the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural +History, and the Advisory Committee of the American Society of +International Law, Judicial. She is an honorary member of the Advisory +Committee for the Judiciary Leadership Development Council, an +honorary chair of America's 400th Anniversary: Jamestown 2007, a +co-chair of the National Advisory Council of the Campaign for the Civic +Mission of Schools, a member of the Selection Committee of the +Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum, and a member of the Advisory +Board of the Stanford Center on Ethics. She also serves on several +bodies of the American Bar Association, including the Museum of Law +Executive Committee, the Commission on Civic Education and Separation +of Powers, and the Advisory Commission of the Standing Committee on +the Law Library of Congress. +</P> + +<P> +O'Connor previously served as a member of the Anglo-American Exchange +(1980); the State Bar of Arizona Committees on Legal Aid, Public +Relations, Lower Court Reorganization, and Continuing Legal Education; +the National Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services +(1974-76); the Arizona State Personnel Commission (1968-69); the +Arizona Criminal Code Commission (1974-76); and the Cathedral Chapter +of the Washington National Cathedral (1991-99). +</P> + +<P> +O'Connor is a member of the American Bar Association, the State Bar of +Arizona, the State Bar of California, the Maricopa County Bar +Association, the Arizona Judges' Association, the National Association +of Women Judges, and the Arizona Women Lawyers' Association. She holds +a B.A. (with Great Distinction) and an LL.B. (Order of the Coif) from +Stanford University, where she was also a member of the board of +editors of the Stanford Law Review. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Leon E. Panetta—Member +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Leon E. Panetta currently co-directs the Leon & Sylvia Panetta +Institute for Public Policy, a nonpartisan study center for the +advancement of public policy based at California State University, +Monterey Bay. He serves as distinguished scholar to the chancellor of +the California State University system, teaches a Master's in Public +Policy course at the Panetta Institute, is a presidential professor at +Santa Clara University, and created the Leon Panetta Lecture Series. +</P> + +<P> +Panetta first went to Washington in 1966, when he served as a +legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California. +In 1969, he became Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, +Education and Welfare and then Director of the U.S. Office for Civil +Rights. His book Bring Us Together (published in 1971) is an account +of that experience. In 1970, he went to New York City, where he served +as Executive Assistant to Mayor John Lindsay. Then, in 1971, Panetta +returned to California, where he practiced law in the Monterey firm of +Panetta, Thompson & Panetta until he was elected to Congress in 1976. +</P> + +<P> +Panetta was a U.S. Representative from California's 16th (now 17th) +district from 1977 to 1993. He authored the Hunger Prevention Act of +1988, the Fair Employment Practices Resolution, legislation that +established Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for hospice care for +the terminally ill, and other legislation on a variety of education, +health, agriculture, and defense issues. +</P> + +<P> +From 1989 to 1993, Panetta was Chairman of the House Committee on the +Budget. He also served on that committee from 1979 to 1985. He chaired +the House Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, +Consumer Relations and Nutrition; the House Administration Committee's +Subcommittee on Personnel and Police; and the Select Committee on +Hunger's Task Force on Domestic Hunger. He also served as Vice +Chairman of the Caucus of Vietnam Era Veterans in Congress and as a +member of the President's Commission on Foreign Language and +International Studies. +</P> + +<P> +Panetta left Congress in 1993 to become Director of the Office of +Management and Budget for the incoming Clinton administration. Panetta +was appointed Chief of Staff to the President of the United States on +July 17, 1994, and served in that position until January 20, 1997. +</P> + +<P> +In addition, Panetta served a six-year term on the Board of Directors +of the New York Stock Exchange beginning in 1997. He currently serves +on many public policy and organizational boards, including as Chair of +the Pew Oceans Commission and Co-Chair of the California Council on +Base Support and Retention. +</P> + +<P> +Panetta has received many awards and honors, including the Smithsonian +Paul Peck Award for Service to the Presidency, the John H. Chafee +Coastal Stewardship Award, the Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal +Leadership, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Center +for the Study of the Presidency. +</P> + +<P> +He earned a B.A. magna cum laude from Santa Clara University in 1960, and +in 1963 received his J.D. from Santa Clara University Law School, +where he was an editor of the Santa Clara Law Review. He served as a +first lieutenant in the Army from 1964 to 1966 and received the Army +Commendation Medal. Panetta is married to the former Sylvia Marie +Varni. They have three grown sons and five grandchildren. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +William J. Perry—Member +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at +Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli +Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering. He +is a senior fellow at FSI and serves as co-director of the Preventive +Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard +universities. +</P> + +<P> +Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense of the United States, serving +from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as Deputy +Secretary of Defense (1993-94) and as Under Secretary of Defense for +Research and Engineering (1977-81). He is on the board of directors of +several emerging high-tech companies and is Chairman of Global +Technology Partners. +</P> + +<P> +His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratory +director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954-64) and as +founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964-77), executive vice president +of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981-85), and founder and chairman of +Technology Strategies & Alliances (1985-93). He is a member of the +National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy +of Arts and Sciences. +</P> + +<P> +From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of +Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined +the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant +in the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He has received a number of +awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the +Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and +Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 1997), the +Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency +(1977 and 1997), NASA (1981), and the Coast Guard (1997). He received +the American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), the +Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal +Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academy +of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal in 1996. He +has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and +the Air Force. +</P> + +<P> +He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, +France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and +the United Kingdom. He received a B.S. and M.S. from Stanford +University and a Ph.D. from Penn State, all in mathematics. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Charles S. Robb—Member +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Charles S. Robb joined the faculty of George Mason University as a +Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy in 2001. Previously +he served as Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, from 1978 to 1982; as +Virginia's 64th Governor, from 1982 to 1986; and as a United States +Senator, from 1989 to 2001. +</P> + +<P> +While in the Senate he became the only member ever to serve +simultaneously on all three national security committees +(Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations). He also served +on the Finance, Commerce, and Budget committees. +</P> + +<P> +Before becoming a member of Congress he chaired the Southern +Governors' Association, the Democratic Governors' Association, the +Education Commission of the States, the Democratic Leadership Council, +Jobs for America's Graduates, the National Conference of Lieutenant +Governors, and the Virginia Forum on Education, and was President of +the Council of State Governments. +</P> + +<P> +During the 1960s he served on active duty with the United States +Marine Corps, retiring from the Marine Corps Reserve in 1991. He began +as the Class Honor Graduate from Marine Officers Basic School in 1961 +and ended up as head of the principal recruiting program for Marine +officers in 1970. In between, he served in both the 1st and 2nd Marine +Divisions and his assignments included duty as a Military Social Aide +at the White House and command of an infantry company in combat in +Vietnam. +</P> + +<P> +He received his law degree from the University of Virginia in 1973, +clerked for Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., on the U.S. Court of Appeals +for the Fourth Circuit, and practiced law with Williams and Connolly +prior to his election to state office. Between his state and federal +service he was a partner at Hunton and Williams. +</P> + +<P> +Since leaving the Senate in 2001 he has served as Chairman of the +Board of Visitors at the United States Naval Academy, Co-Chairman +(with Senior Judge Laurence Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for +the D.C. Circuit) of the President's Commission on Intelligence +Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass +Destruction, and Co-Chairman (with former Governor Linwood Holton) of +a major landowner's alliance that created a special tax district to +finance the extension of Metrorail to Tyson's Corner, Reston, and +Dulles Airport. He has also been a Fellow at the Institute of Politics +at Harvard and at the Marshall Wythe School of Law at William and +Mary. +</P> + +<P> +He is currently on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory +Board, the Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board +(Chairman of the WMD-Terrorism Task Force), the FBI Director's +Advisory Board, the National Intelligence Council's Strategic Analysis +Advisory Board, the Iraq Study Group, and the MITRE Corp. Board of +Trustees (Vice Chairman). He also serves on the boards of the Space +Foundation, the Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy, the Concord +Coalition, the National Museum of Americans at War, Strategic +Partnerships LLC, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency—and +he works on occasional projects with the Center for Strategic and +International Studies. He is married to Lynda Johnson Robb and they +have three grown daughters and one granddaughter. +</P> + +<BR> + +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Alan K. Simpson—Member +</H3> + +<P CLASS="noindent"> +Alan K. Simpson served from 1979 to 1997 as a United States Senator +from Wyoming. Following his first term in the Senate, Al was elected +by his peers to the position of the Assistant Majority Leader in +1984—and served in that capacity until 1994. He completed his final +term on January 3, 1997. +</P> + +<P> +Simpson is currently a partner in the Cody firm of Simpson, Kepler and +Edwards, the Cody division of the Denver firm of Burg Simpson +Eldredge, Hersh and Jardine, and also a consultant in the Washington, +D.C., government relations firm The Tongour, Simpson, Holsclaw Group. +He continues to serve on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards and +travels the country giving speeches. His book published by William +Morrow Company, Right in the Old Gazoo: A Lifetime of Scrapping with +the Press (1997), chronicles his personal experiences and views of the +Fourth Estate. +</P> + +<P> +From January of 1997 until June of 2000, Simpson was a Visiting +Lecturer and for two years the Director of the Institute of Politics +at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. During +the fall of 2000 he returned to his alma mater, the University of +Wyoming, as a Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department +and he continues to team teach a class part-time with his brother, +Peter, titled "Wyoming's Political Identity: Its History and Its +Politics," which is proving to be one of the most popular classes +offered at UW. +</P> + +<P> +A member of a political family—his father served both as Governor of +Wyoming from 1954 to 1958 and as United States Senator from Wyoming +from 1962 to 1966—Al chose to follow in his father's footsteps and +began his own political career in 1964 when he was elected to the +Wyoming State Legislature as a state representative of his native Park +County. He served for the next thirteen years in the Wyoming House of +Representatives, holding the offices of Majority Whip, Majority Floor +Leader, and Speaker Pro-Tem. His only brother, Peter, also served as a +member of the Wyoming State Legislature. +</P> + +<P> +Prior to entering politics, Simpson was admitted to the Wyoming bar +and the United States District Court in 1958 and served for a short +time as a Wyoming assistant attorney general. Simpson then joined his +father, Milward L. Simpson, and later Charles G. Kepler in the law +firm of Simpson, Kepler and Simpson in his hometown of Cody. He would +practice law there for the next eighteen years. During that time, +Simpson was very active in all civic, community, and state activities. +He also served ten years as City Attorney. +</P> + +<P> +Simpson earned a B.S. in law from the University of Wyoming in 1954. +Upon graduation from college, he joined the Army, serving overseas in +the 5th Infantry Division and in the 2nd Armored Division in the final +months of the Army of Occupation in Germany. Following his honorable +discharge in 1956, Simpson returned to the University of Wyoming to +complete his study of law, earning his J.D. degree in 1958. He and his +wife Ann have three children and six grandchildren, who all reside in +Cody, Wyoming. +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR> + +<A NAME="append-support"></A> +<H3 ALIGN="center"> +Iraq Study Group Support +</H3> + +<BR> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Edward P. Djerejian<BR> + Senior Advisor to the Study Group<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Christopher A. Kojm<BR> + Senior Advisor to the Study Group<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + John B. Williams<BR> + Special Assistant to the Study Group<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Benjamin J. Rhodes<BR> + Special Assistant to the Study Group<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + United States Institute of Peace Support<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Daniel P. Serwer<BR> + ISG Executive Director and Political Development Secretariat<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Paul Hughes<BR> + Military and Security Secretariat<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Gary Matthews<BR> + Economy and Reconstruction Secretariat<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Paul Stares<BR> + Strategic Environment Secretariat<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Courtney Rusin<BR> + Assistant to the Study Group<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Anne Hingeley Congressional Relations<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Ian Larsen<BR> + Outreach and Communications<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Center for the Study of the Presidency Support<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Jay M. Parker<BR> + Advisor<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Ysbrant A. Marcelis<BR> + Advisor<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Center for Strategic & International Studies Support<BR> +</P> + +<P CLASS="noindent" ALIGN="center"> + Kay King<BR> + Advisor<BR> +</P> + +<BR><BR><BR><BR> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Iraq Study Group Report, by +United States Institute for Peace + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT *** + +***** This file should be named 25686-h.htm or 25686-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/5/6/8/25686/ + +Produced by Al Haines + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: The Iraq Study Group Report + +Author: United States Institute for Peace + +Release Date: June 3, 2008 [EBook #25686] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT *** + + + + +Produced by Al Haines + + + + + + + + + + +The Iraq + +Study Group + +Report + + + + James A. Baker, III, and + Lee H. Hamilton, Co-Chairs + + + + Lawrence S. Eagleburger, + Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin Meese III, + Sandra Day O'Connor, Leon E. Panetta, + William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, + Alan K. Simpson + + + + +Contents + + +Letter from the Co-Chairs + +Executive Summary + + +I. Assessment + +A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq + + 1. Security + 2. Politics + 3. Economics + 4. International Support + 5. Conclusions + +B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq + +C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq + + 1. Precipitate Withdrawal + 2. Staying the Course + 3. More Troops for Iraq + 4. Devolution to Three Regions + +D. Achieving Our Goals + + + +II. The Way Forward--A New Approach + +A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus + + 1. The New Diplomatic Offensive + 2. The Iraq International Support Group + 3. Dealing with Iran and Syria + 4. The Wider Regional Context + +B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves + + 1. Performance on Milestones + 2. National Reconciliation + 3. Security and Military Forces + 4. Police and Criminal Justice + 5. The Oil Sector + 6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance + 7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review + 8. U.S. Personnel + 9. Intelligence + + + +Appendices + +Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations + +Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions + +Iraq Study Group Consultations + +Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel + +The Iraq Study Group + +Iraq Study Group Support + + + + +Letter from the Co-Chairs + +There is no magic formula to solve the problems of Iraq. However, +there are actions that can be taken to improve the situation and +protect American interests. + +Many Americans are dissatisfied, not just with the situation in Iraq +but with the state of our political debate regarding Iraq. Our +political leaders must build a bipartisan approach to bring a +responsible conclusion to what is now a lengthy and costly war. Our +country deserves a debate that prizes substance over rhetoric, and a +policy that is adequately funded and sustainable. The President and +Congress must work together. Our leaders must be candid and forthright +with the American people in order to win their support. + +No one can guarantee that any course of action in Iraq at this point +will stop sectarian warfare, growing violence, or a slide toward +chaos. If current trends continue, the potential consequences are +severe. Because of the role and responsibility of the United States in +Iraq, and the commitments our government has made, the United States +has special obligations. Our country must address as best it can +Iraq's many problems. The United States has long-term relationships +and interests at stake in the Middle East, and needs to stay engaged. + +In this consensus report, the ten members of the Iraq Study Group +present a new approach because we believe there is a better way +forward. All options have not been exhausted. We believe it is still +possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an +opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stabilize a +critical region of the world, and protect America's credibility, +interests, and values. Our report makes it clear that the Iraqi +government and the Iraqi people also must act to achieve a stable and +hopeful future. + +What we recommend in this report demands a tremendous amount of +political will and cooperation by the executive and legislative +branches of the U.S. government. It demands skillful implementation. +It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its success +depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political +polarization. Americans can and must enjoy the right of robust debate +within a democracy. Yet U.S. foreign policy is doomed to failure--as +is any course of action in Iraq--if it is not supported by a broad, +sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country +toward such a consensus. + + +We want to thank all those we have interviewed and those who have +contributed information and assisted the Study Group, both inside and +outside the U.S. government, in Iraq, and around the world. We thank +the members of the expert working groups, and staff from the +sponsoring organizations. We especially thank our colleagues on the +Study Group, who have worked with us on these difficult issues in a +spirit of generosity and bipartisanship. + +In presenting our report to the President, Congress, and the American +people, we dedicate it to the men and women--military and civilian--who +have served and are serving in Iraq, and to their families back +home. They have demonstrated extraordinary courage and made difficult +sacrifices. Every American is indebted to them. + +We also honor the many Iraqis who have sacrificed on behalf of their +country, and the members of the Coalition Forces who have stood with +us and with the people of Iraq. + + +James A. Baker, III Lee H. Hamilton + + + + +Executive Summary + +The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path +that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved. + +In this report, we make a number of recommendations for actions to be +taken in Iraq, the United States, and the region. Our most important +recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political +efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of +U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to +move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these +two recommendations are equally important and reinforce one another. +If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves +forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity +for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be +enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, +interests, and values will be protected. + +The challenges in Iraq are complex. Violence is increasing in scope +and lethality. It is fed by a Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias +and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality. Sectarian +conflict is the principal challenge to stability. The Iraqi people +have a democratically elected government, yet it is not adequately +advancing national reconciliation, providing basic security, or +delivering essential services. Pessimism is pervasive. + +If the situation continues to deteriorate, the consequences could be +severe. A slide toward chaos could trigger the collapse of Iraq's +government and a humanitarian catastrophe. Neighboring countries could +intervene. Sunni-Shia clashes could spread. Al Qaeda could win a +propaganda victory and expand its base of operations. The global +standing of the United States could be diminished. Americans could +become more polarized. + +During the past nine months we have considered a full range of +approaches for moving forward. All have flaws. Our recommended course +has shortcomings, but we firmly believe that it includes the best +strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome in Iraq and +the region. + + + +External Approach + +The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly affect its +stability and prosperity. No country in the region will benefit in the +long term from a chaotic Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are not doing +enough to help Iraq achieve stability. Some are undercutting +stability. + +The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive +to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the +region. This diplomatic effort should include every country that has +an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's +neighbors. Iraq's neighbors and key states in and outside the region +should form a support group to reinforce security and national +reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its +own. + +Given the ability of Iran and Syria to influence events within Iraq +and their interest in avoiding chaos in Iraq, the United States should +try to engage them constructively. In seeking to influence the +behavior of both countries, the United States has disincentives and +incentives available. Iran should stem the flow of arms and training +to Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use +its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national +reconciliation. The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should continue +to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the United Nations +Security Council plus Germany. Syria should control its border with +Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and terrorists in and +out of Iraq. + +The United States cannot achieve its goals in the Middle East unless +it deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict and regional +instability. There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the +United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: +Lebanon, Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state +solution for Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include +direct talks with, by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians +(those who accept Israel's right to exist), and Syria. + +As the United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle +East, the United States should provide additional political, economic, +and military support for Afghanistan, including resources that might +become available as combat forces are moved out of Iraq. + + + +Internal Approach + +The most important questions about Iraq's future are now the +responsibility of Iraqis. The United States must adjust its role in +Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of their own +destiny. + +The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for +Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army +brigades. While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the +United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. +military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and +supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat +forces could begin to move out of Iraq. + +The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of +supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary +responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, +subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the +ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could +be out of Iraq. At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be +deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction +and special operations teams, and in training, equipping, advising, +force protection, and search and rescue. Intelligence and support +efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and +special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al +Qaeda in Iraq. + +It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the +United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out +security responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear to +the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, +including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not +implement their planned changes. The United States must not make an +open-ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops +deployed in Iraq. + +As redeployment proceeds, military leaders should emphasize training +and education of forces that have returned to the United States in +order to restore the force to full combat capability. As equipment +returns to the United States, Congress should appropriate sufficient +funds to restore the equipment over the next five years. + +The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support +the achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--on national +reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, +but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. +The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and the citizens +of the United States and other countries--that it deserves continued +support. + +Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, in consultation with the United +States, has put forward a set of milestones critical for Iraq. His +list is a good start, but it must be expanded to include milestones +that can strengthen the government and benefit the Iraqi people. +President Bush and his national security team should remain in close +and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership to convey a clear +message: there must be prompt action by the Iraqi government to make +substantial progress toward the achievement of these milestones. + +If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes +substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and +support for Iraq's security forces and to continue political, +military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make +substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi +government. + +Our report makes recommendations in several other areas. They include +improvements to the Iraqi criminal justice system, the Iraqi oil +sector, the U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the U.S. budget +process, the training of U.S. government personnel, and U.S. +intelligence capabilities. + + + +Conclusion + +It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these +recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq +and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a +coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in +isolation. The dynamics of the region are as important to Iraq as +events within Iraq. + +The challenges are daunting. There will be difficult days ahead. But +by pursuing this new way forward, Iraq, the region, and the United +States of America can emerge stronger. + + + + +I + +Assessment + + +There is no guarantee for success in Iraq. The situation in Baghdad +and several provinces is dire. Saddam Hussein has been removed from +power and the Iraqi people have a democratically elected government +that is broadly representative of Iraq's population, yet the +government is not adequately advancing national reconciliation, +providing basic security, or delivering essential services. The level +of violence is high and growing. There is great suffering, and the +daily lives of many Iraqis show little or no improvement. Pessimism is +pervasive. + +U.S. military and civilian personnel, and our coalition partners, are +making exceptional and dedicated efforts--and sacrifices--to help +Iraq. Many Iraqis have also made extraordinary efforts and sacrifices +for a better future. However, the ability of the United States to +influence events within Iraq is diminishing. Many Iraqis are embracing +sectarian identities. The lack of security impedes economic +development. Most countries in the region are not playing a +constructive role in support of Iraq, and some are undercutting +stability. + +Iraq is vital to regional and even global stability, and is critical +to U.S. interests. It runs along the sectarian fault lines of Shia and +Sunni Islam, and of Kurdish and Arab populations. It has the world's +second-largest known oil reserves. It is now a base of operations for +international terrorism, including al Qaeda. + +Iraq is a centerpiece of American foreign policy, influencing how the +United States is viewed in the region and around the world. Because of +the gravity of Iraq's condition and the country's vital importance, +the United States is facing one of its most difficult and significant +international challenges in decades. Because events in Iraq have been +set in motion by American decisions and actions, the United States has +both a national and a moral interest in doing what it can to give +Iraqis an opportunity to avert anarchy. + +An assessment of the security, political, economic, and regional +situation follows (all figures current as of publication), along with +an assessment of the consequences if Iraq continues to deteriorate, +and an analysis of some possible courses of action. + + + + +A. Assessment of the Current Situation in Iraq + +1. Security + +Attacks against U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi security forces are +persistent and growing. October 2006 was the deadliest month for U.S. +forces since January 2005, with 102 Americans killed. Total attacks in +October 2006 averaged 180 per day, up from 70 per day in January 2006. +Daily attacks against Iraqi security forces in October were more than +double the level in January. Attacks against civilians in October were +four times higher than in January. Some 3,000 Iraqi civilians are +killed every month. + + + +Sources of Violence + +Violence is increasing in scope, complexity, and lethality. There are +multiple sources of violence in Iraq: the Sunni Arab insurgency, al +Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, Shiite militias and death +squads, and organized criminality. Sectarian violence--particularly in +and around Baghdad--has become the principal challenge to stability. + +Most attacks on Americans still come from the Sunni Arab insurgency. +The insurgency comprises former elements of the Saddam Hussein regime, +disaffected Sunni Arab Iraqis, and common criminals. It has +significant support within the Sunni Arab community. The insurgency +has no single leadership but is a network of networks. It benefits +from participants' detailed knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure, and +arms and financing are supplied primarily from within Iraq. The +insurgents have different goals, although nearly all oppose the +presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Most wish to restore Sunni Arab rule +in the country. Some aim at winning local power and control. + +Al Qaeda is responsible for a small portion of the violence in Iraq, +but that includes some of the more spectacular acts: suicide attacks, +large truck bombs, and attacks on significant religious or political +targets. Al Qaeda in Iraq is now largely Iraqi-run and composed of +Sunni Arabs. Foreign fighters--numbering an estimated 1,300--play a +supporting role or carry out suicide operations. Al Qaeda's goals +include instigating a wider sectarian war between Iraq's Sunni and +Shia, and driving the United States out of Iraq. + +Sectarian violence causes the largest number of Iraqi civilian +casualties. Iraq is in the grip of a deadly cycle: Sunni insurgent +attacks spark large-scale Shia reprisals, and vice versa. Groups of +Iraqis are often found bound and executed, their bodies dumped in +rivers or fields. The perception of unchecked violence emboldens +militias, shakes confidence in the government, and leads Iraqis to +flee to places where their sect is the majority and where they feel +they are in less danger. In some parts of Iraq--notably in +Baghdad--sectarian cleansing is taking place. The United Nations +estimates that 1.6 million are displaced within Iraq, and up to 1.8 +million Iraqis have fled the country. + +Shiite militias engaging in sectarian violence pose a substantial +threat to immediate and long-term stability. These militias are +diverse. Some are affiliated with the government, some are highly +localized, and some are wholly outside the law. They are fragmenting, +with an increasing breakdown in command structure. The militias target +Sunni Arab civilians, and some struggle for power in clashes with one +another. Some even target government ministries. They undermine the +authority of the Iraqi government and security forces, as well as the +ability of Sunnis to join a peaceful political process. The prevalence +of militias sends a powerful message: political leaders can preserve +and expand their power only if backed by armed force. + +The Mahdi Army, led by Moqtada al-Sadr, may number as many as 60,000 +fighters. It has directly challenged U.S. and Iraqi government forces, +and it is widely believed to engage in regular violence against Sunni +Arab civilians. Mahdi fighters patrol certain Shia enclaves, notably +northeast Baghdad's teeming neighborhood of 2.5 million known as "Sadr +City." As the Mahdi Army has grown in size and influence, some +elements have moved beyond Sadr's control. + +The Badr Brigade is affiliated with the Supreme Council for the +Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which is led by Abdul Aziz +al-Hakim. The Badr Brigade has long-standing ties with the Iranian +Revolutionary Guard Corps. Many Badr members have become integrated +into the Iraqi police, and others play policing roles in southern +Iraqi cities. While wearing the uniform of the security services, Badr +fighters have targeted Sunni Arab civilians. Badr fighters have also +clashed with the Mahdi Army, particularly in southern Iraq. + +Criminality also makes daily life unbearable for many Iraqis. +Robberies, kidnappings, and murder are commonplace in much of the +country. Organized criminal rackets thrive, particularly in unstable +areas like Anbar province. Some criminal gangs cooperate with, +finance, or purport to be part of the Sunni insurgency or a Shiite +militia in order to gain legitimacy. As one knowledgeable American +official put it, "If there were foreign forces in New Jersey, Tony +Soprano would be an insurgent leader." + +Four of Iraq's eighteen provinces are highly insecure--Baghdad, Anbar, +Diyala, and Salah ad Din. These provinces account for about 40 percent +of Iraq's population of 26 million. In Baghdad, the violence is +largely between Sunni and Shia. In Anbar, the violence is attributable +to the Sunni insurgency and to al Qaeda, and the situation is +deteriorating. + +In Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basra +and the south, the violence is largely an intra-Shia power struggle. +The most stable parts of the country are the three provinces of the +Kurdish north and parts of the Shia south. However, most of Iraq's +cities have a sectarian mix and are plagued by persistent violence. + + + +U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi Forces + +Confronting this violence are the Multi-National Forces-Iraq under +U.S. command, working in concert with Iraq's security forces. The +Multi-National Forces-Iraq were authorized by UN Security Council +Resolution 1546 in 2004, and the mandate was extended in November 2006 +for another year. + +Approximately 141,000 U.S. military personnel are serving in Iraq, +together with approximately 16,500 military personnel from twenty-seven +coalition partners, the largest contingent being 7,200 from the +United Kingdom. The U.S. Army has principal responsibility for Baghdad +and the north. The U.S. Marine Corps takes the lead in Anbar province. +The United Kingdom has responsibility in the southeast, chiefly in +Basra. + +Along with this military presence, the United States is building its +largest embassy in Baghdad. The current U.S. embassy in Baghdad totals +about 1,000 U.S. government employees. There are roughly 5,000 +civilian contractors in the country. + +Currently, the U.S. military rarely engages in large-scale combat +operations. Instead, counterinsurgency efforts focus on a strategy of +"clear, hold, and build"--"clearing" areas of insurgents and death +squads, "holding" those areas with Iraqi security forces, and +"building" areas with quick-impact reconstruction projects. + +Nearly every U.S. Army and Marine combat unit, and several National +Guard and Reserve units, have been to Iraq at least once. Many are on +their second or even third rotations; rotations are typically one year +for Army units, seven months for Marine units. Regular rotations, in +and out of Iraq or within the country, complicate brigade and +battalion efforts to get to know the local scene, earn the trust of +the population, and build a sense of cooperation. + +Many military units are under significant strain. Because the harsh +conditions in Iraq are wearing out equipment more quickly than +anticipated, many units do not have fully functional equipment for +training when they redeploy to the United States. An extraordinary +amount of sacrifice has been asked of our men and women in uniform, +and of their families. The American military has little reserve force +to call on if it needs ground forces to respond to other crises around +the world. + +A primary mission of U.S. military strategy in Iraq is the training of +competent Iraqi security forces. By the end of 2006, the Multi-National +Security Transition Command-Iraq under American leadership is +expected to have trained and equipped a target number of approximately +326,000 Iraqi security services. That figure includes 138,000 members +of the Iraqi Army and 188,000 Iraqi police. Iraqis have operational +control over roughly one-third of Iraqi security forces; the U.S. has +operational control over most of the rest. No U.S. forces are under +Iraqi command. + + + +The Iraqi Army + +The Iraqi Army is making fitful progress toward becoming a reliable +and disciplined fighting force loyal to the national government. By +the end of 2006, the Iraqi Army is expected to comprise 118 battalions +formed into 36 brigades under the command of 10 divisions. Although +the Army is one of the more professional Iraqi institutions, its +performance has been uneven. The training numbers are impressive, but +they represent only part of the story. + +Significant questions remain about the ethnic composition and +loyalties of some Iraqi units--specifically, whether they will carry +out missions on behalf of national goals instead of a sectarian +agenda. Of Iraq's 10 planned divisions, those that are even-numbered +are made up of Iraqis who signed up to serve in a specific area, and +they have been reluctant to redeploy to other areas of the country. As +a result, elements of the Army have refused to carry out missions. + +The Iraqi Army is also confronted by several other significant +challenges: + +--Units lack leadership. They lack the ability to work together and +perform at higher levels of organization--the brigade and division +level. Leadership training and the experience of leadership are the +essential elements to improve performance. + +--Units lack equipment. They cannot carry out their missions without +adequate equipment. Congress has been generous in funding requests for +U.S. troops, but it has resisted fully funding Iraqi forces. The +entire appropriation for Iraqi defense forces for FY 2006 ($3 billion) +is less than the United States currently spends in Iraq every two +weeks. + +--Units lack personnel. Soldiers are on leave one week a month so that +they can visit their families and take them their pay. Soldiers are +paid in cash because there is no banking system. Soldiers are given +leave liberally and face no penalties for absence without leave. Unit +readiness rates are low, often at 50 percent or less. + +--Units lack logistics and support. They lack the ability to sustain +their operations, the capability to transport supplies and troops, and +the capacity to provide their own indirect fire support, close-air +support, technical intelligence, and medical evacuation. They will +depend on the United States for logistics and support through at least +2007. + + + +The Iraqi Police + +The state of the Iraqi police is substantially worse than that of the +Iraqi Army. The Iraqi Police Service currently numbers roughly 135,000 +and is responsible for local policing. It has neither the training nor +legal authority to conduct criminal investigations, nor the firepower +to take on organized crime, insurgents, or militias. The Iraqi +National Police numbers roughly 25,000 and its officers have been +trained in counterinsurgency operations, not police work. The Border +Enforcement Department numbers roughly 28,000. + +Iraqi police cannot control crime, and they routinely engage in +sectarian violence, including the unnecessary detention, torture, and +targeted execution of Sunni Arab civilians. The police are organized +under the Ministry of the Interior, which is confronted by corruption +and militia infiltration and lacks control over police in the +provinces. + +The United States and the Iraqi government recognize the importance of +reform. The current Minister of the Interior has called for purging +militia members and criminals from the police. But he has little +police experience or base of support. There is no clear Iraqi or U.S. +agreement on the character and mission of the police. U.S. authorities +do not know with precision the composition and membership of the +various police forces, nor the disposition of their funds and +equipment. There are ample reports of Iraqi police officers +participating in training in order to obtain a weapon, uniform, and +ammunition for use in sectarian violence. Some are on the payroll but +don't show up for work. In the words of a senior American general, +"2006 was supposed to be 'the year of the police' but it hasn't +materialized that way." + + + +Facilities Protection Services + +The Facilities Protection Service poses additional problems. Each +Iraqi ministry has an armed unit, ostensibly to guard the ministry's +infrastructure. All together, these units total roughly 145,000 +uniformed Iraqis under arms. However, these units have questionable +loyalties and capabilities. In the ministries of Health, Agriculture, +and Transportation--controlled by Moqtada al-Sadr--the Facilities +Protection Service is a source of funding and jobs for the Mahdi Army. +One senior U.S. official described the Facilities Protection Service +as "incompetent, dysfunctional, or subversive." Several Iraqis simply +referred to them as militias. + +The Iraqi government has begun to bring the Facilities Protection +Service under the control of the Interior Ministry. The intention is +to identify and register Facilities Protection personnel, standardize +their treatment, and provide some training. Though the approach is +reasonable, this effort may exceed the current capability of the +Interior Ministry. + + + + +Operation Together Forward II + +In a major effort to quell the violence in Iraq, U.S. military forces +joined with Iraqi forces to establish security in Baghdad with an +operation called "Operation Together Forward II," which began in +August 2006. Under Operation Together Forward II, U.S. forces are +working with members of the Iraqi Army and police to "clear, hold, and +build" in Baghdad, moving neighborhood by neighborhood. There are +roughly 15,000 U.S. troops in Baghdad. + +This operation--and the security of Baghdad--is crucial to security in +Iraq more generally. A capital city of more than 6 million, Baghdad +contains some 25 percent of the country's population. It is the +largest Sunni and Shia city in Iraq. It has high concentrations of +both Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias. Both Iraqi and American +leaders told us that as Baghdad goes, so goes Iraq. + +The results of Operation Together Forward II are disheartening. +Violence in Baghdad--already at high levels--jumped more than 43 +percent between the summer and October 2006. U.S. forces continue to +suffer high casualties. Perpetrators of violence leave neighborhoods +in advance of security sweeps, only to filter back later. Iraqi police +have been unable or unwilling to stop such infiltration and continuing +violence. The Iraqi Army has provided only two out of the six +battalions that it promised in August would join American forces in +Baghdad. The Iraqi government has rejected sustained security +operations in Sadr City. + +Security efforts will fail unless the Iraqis have both the capability +to hold areas that have been cleared and the will to clear +neighborhoods that are home to Shiite militias. U.S. forces can +"clear" any neighborhood, but there are neither enough U.S. troops +present nor enough support from Iraqi security forces to "hold" +neighborhoods so cleared. The same holds true for the rest of Iraq. +Because none of the operations conducted by U.S. and Iraqi military +forces are fundamentally changing the conditions encouraging the +sectarian violence, U.S. forces seem to be caught in a mission that +has no foreseeable end. + + + +2. Politics + +Iraq is a sovereign state with a democratically elected Council of +Representatives. A government of national unity was formed in May 2006 +that is broadly representative of the Iraqi people. Iraq has ratified +a constitution, and--per agreement with Sunni Arab leaders--has +initiated a process of review to determine if the constitution needs +amendment. + +The composition of the Iraqi government is basically sectarian, and +key players within the government too often act in their sectarian +interest. Iraq's Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders frequently fail to +demonstrate the political will to act in Iraq's national interest, and +too many Iraqi ministries lack the capacity to govern effectively. The +result is an even weaker central government than the constitution +provides. + +There is widespread Iraqi, American, and international agreement on +the key issues confronting the Iraqi government: national +reconciliation, including the negotiation of a "political deal" among +Iraq's sectarian groups on Constitution review, de-Baathification, oil +revenue sharing, provincial elections, the future of Kirkuk, and +amnesty; security, particularly curbing militias and reducing the +violence in Baghdad; and governance, including the provision of basic +services and the rollback of pervasive corruption. Because Iraqi +leaders view issues through a sectarian prism, we will summarize the +differing perspectives of Iraq's main sectarian groups. + + + +Sectarian Viewpoints + +The Shia, the majority of Iraq's population, have gained power for the +first time in more than 1,300 years. Above all, many Shia are +interested in preserving that power. However, fissures have emerged +within the broad Shia coalition, known as the United Iraqi Alliance. +Shia factions are struggling for power--over regions, ministries, and +Iraq as a whole. The difficulties in holding together a broad and +fractious coalition have led several observers in Baghdad to comment +that Shia leaders are held "hostage to extremes." Within the coalition +as a whole, there is a reluctance to reach a political accommodation +with the Sunnis or to disarm Shiite militias. + +Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has demonstrated an understanding of +the key issues facing Iraq, notably the need for national +reconciliation and security in Baghdad. Yet strains have emerged +between Maliki's government and the United States. Maliki has publicly +rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the +removal of blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi +security forces, and resisted U.S. requests to move forward on +reconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias. + + + +Sistani, Sadr, Hakim + +The U.S. deals primarily with the Iraqi government, but the most +powerful Shia figures in Iraq do not hold national office. Of the +following three vital power brokers in the Shia community, the United +States is unable to talk directly with one (Grand Ayatollah Ali +al-Sistani) and does not talk to another (Moqtada al-Sadr). + +GRAND AYATOLLAH ALI AL-SISTANI: Sistani is the leading Shiite cleric +in Iraq. Despite staying out of day-to-day politics, he has been the +most influential leader in the country: all major Shia leaders have +sought his approval or guidance. Sistani has encouraged a unified Shia +bloc with moderated aims within a unified Iraq. Sistani's influence +may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in preventing +intra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis. + +ABDUL AZIZ AL-HAKIM: Hakim is a cleric and the leader of the Supreme +Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the largest and +most organized Shia political party. It seeks the creation of an +autonomous Shia region comprising nine provinces in the south. Hakim +has consistently protected and advanced his party's position. SCIRI +has close ties with Iran. + +MOQTADA AL-SADR: Sadr has a large following among impoverished Shia, +particularly in Baghdad. He has joined Maliki's governing coalition, +but his Mahdi Army has clashed with the Badr Brigades, as well as with +Iraqi, U.S., and U.K. forces. Sadr claims to be an Iraqi nationalist. +Several observers remarked to us that Sadr was following the model of +Hezbollah in Lebanon: building a political party that controls basic +services within the government and an armed militia outside of the +government. + + +Sunni Arabs feel displaced because of the loss of their traditional +position of power in Iraq. They are torn, unsure whether to seek their +aims through political participation or through violent insurgency. +They remain angry about U.S. decisions to dissolve Iraqi security +forces and to pursue the "de-Baathification" of Iraq's government and +society. Sunnis are confronted by paradoxes: they have opposed the +presence of U.S. forces in Iraq but need those forces to protect them +against Shia militias; they chafe at being governed by a majority Shia +administration but reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see +a Sunni autonomous region as feasible for themselves. + + + +Hashimi and Dhari + +The influence of Sunni Arab politicians in the government is +questionable. The leadership of the Sunni Arab insurgency is murky, +but the following two key Sunni Arab figures have broad support. + +tariq al-hashimi: Hashimi is one of two vice presidents of Iraq and +the head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni Muslim bloc in +parliament. Hashimi opposes the formation of autonomous regions and +has advocated the distribution of oil revenues based on population, a +reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite militia +fighters from the Iraqi security forces. Shiite death squads have +recently killed three of his siblings. + +sheik harith al-dhari: Dhari is the head of the Muslim Scholars +Association, the most influential Sunni organization in Iraq. Dhari +has condemned the American occupation and spoken out against the Iraqi +government. His organization has ties both to the Sunni Arab +insurgency and to Sunnis within the Iraqi government. A warrant was +recently issued for his arrest for inciting violence and terrorism, an +act that sparked bitter Sunni protests across Iraq. + + +Iraqi Kurds have succeeded in presenting a united front of two main +political blocs--the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the +Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The Kurds have secured a largely +autonomous Kurdish region in the north, and have achieved a prominent +role for Kurds within the national government. Barzani leads the +Kurdish regional government, and Talabani is president of Iraq. + +Leading Kurdish politicians told us they preferred to be within a +democratic, federal Iraqi state because an independent Kurdistan would +be surrounded by hostile neighbors. However, a majority of Kurds favor +independence. The Kurds have their own security forces--the +peshmerga--which number roughly 100,000. They believe they could +accommodate themselves to either a unified or a fractured Iraq. + + + +Barzani and Talabani + +Kurdish politics has been dominated for years by two figures who have +long-standing ties in movements for Kurdish independence and +self-government. + +MASSOUD BARZANI: Barzani is the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic +Party and the President of the Kurdish regional government. Barzani +has cooperated with his longtime rival, Jalal Talabani, in securing an +empowered, autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. Barzani has +ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags and raising of Kurdish flags in +Kurdish-controlled areas. + +JALAL TALABANI: Talabani is the leader of the Patriotic Union of +Kurdistan and the President of Iraq. Whereas Barzani has focused his +efforts in Kurdistan, Talabani has secured power in Baghdad, and +several important PUK government ministers are loyal to him. Talabani +strongly supports autonomy for Kurdistan. He has also sought to bring +real power to the office of the presidency. + + + +Key Issues + +NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. Prime Minister Maliki outlined a commendable +program of national reconciliation soon after he entered office. +However, the Iraqi government has not taken action on the key elements +of national reconciliation: revising de-Baathification, which prevents +many Sunni Arabs from participating in governance and society; +providing amnesty for those who have fought against the government; +sharing the country's oil revenues; demobilizing militias; amending +the constitution; and settling the future of Kirkuk. + +One core issue is federalism. The Iraqi Constitution, which created a +largely autonomous Kurdistan region, allows other such regions to be +established later, perhaps including a "Shi'astan" comprising nine +southern provinces. This highly decentralized structure is favored by +the Kurds and many Shia (particularly supporters of Abdul Aziz +al-Hakim), but it is anathema to Sunnis. First, Sunni Arabs are generally +Iraqi nationalists, albeit within the context of an Iraq they believe +they should govern. Second, because Iraq's energy resources are in the +Kurdish and Shia regions, there is no economically feasible "Sunni +region." Particularly contentious is a provision in the constitution +that shares revenues nationally from current oil reserves, while +allowing revenues from reserves discovered in the future to go to the +regions. + +The Sunnis did not actively participate in the constitution-drafting +process, and acceded to entering the government only on the condition +that the constitution be amended. In September, the parliament agreed +to initiate a constitutional review commission slated to complete its +work within one year; it delayed considering the question of forming a +federalized region in southern Iraq for eighteen months. + +Another key unresolved issue is the future of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city +in northern Iraq that is home to substantial numbers of Kurds, Arabs, +and Turkmen. The Kurds insisted that the constitution require a +popular referendum by December 2007 to determine whether Kirkuk can +formally join the Kurdish administered region, an outcome that Arabs +and Turkmen in Kirkuk staunchly oppose. The risks of further violence +sparked by a Kirkuk referendum are great. + +Iraq's leaders often claim that they do not want a division of the +country, but we found that key Shia and Kurdish leaders have little +commitment to national reconciliation. One prominent Shia leader told +us pointedly that the current government has the support of 80 percent +of the population, notably excluding Sunni Arabs. Kurds have fought +for independence for decades, and when our Study Group visited Iraq, +the leader of the Kurdish region ordered the lowering of Iraqi flags +and the raising of Kurdish flags. One senior American general +commented that the Iraqis "still do not know what kind of country they +want to have." Yet many of Iraq's most powerful and well-positioned +leaders are not working toward a united Iraq. + + +SECURITY. The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in +support of national reconciliation. Shiite leaders must make the +decision to demobilize militias. Sunni Arabs must make the decision to +seek their aims through a peaceful political process, not through +violent revolt. The Iraqi government and Sunni Arab tribes must +aggressively pursue al Qaeda. + +Militias are currently seen as legitimate vehicles of political +action. Shia political leaders make distinctions between the Sunni +insurgency (which seeks to overthrow the government) and Shia militias +(which are used to fight Sunnis, secure neighborhoods, and maximize +power within the government). Though Prime Minister Maliki has said he +will address the problem of militias, he has taken little meaningful +action to curb their influence. He owes his office in large part to +Sadr and has shown little willingness to take on him or his Mahdi +Army. + +Sunni Arabs have not made the strategic decision to abandon violent +insurgency in favor of the political process. Sunni politicians within +the government have a limited level of support and influence among +their own population, and questionable influence over the insurgency. +Insurgents wage a campaign of intimidation against Sunni +leaders--assassinating the family members of those who do participate in +the government. Too often, insurgents tolerate and cooperate with al +Qaeda, as they share a mutual interest in attacking U.S. and Shia +forces. However, Sunni Arab tribal leaders in Anbar province recently +took the positive step of agreeing to pursue al Qaeda and foreign +fighters in their midst, and have started to take action on those +commitments. + +Sunni politicians told us that the U.S. military has to take on the +militias; Shia politicians told us that the U.S. military has to help +them take out the Sunni insurgents and al Qaeda. Each side watches the +other. Sunni insurgents will not lay down arms unless the Shia +militias are disarmed. Shia militias will not disarm until the Sunni +insurgency is destroyed. To put it simply: there are many armed groups +within Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms. + + +GOVERNANCE. The Iraqi government is not effectively providing its +people with basic services: electricity, drinking water, sewage, +health care, and education. In many sectors, production is below or +hovers around prewar levels. In Baghdad and other unstable areas, the +situation is much worse. There are five major reasons for this +problem. + +First, the government sometimes provides services on a sectarian +basis. For example, in one Sunni neighborhood of Shia-governed +Baghdad, there is less than two hours of electricity each day and +trash piles are waist-high. One American official told us that Baghdad +is run like a "Shia dictatorship" because Sunnis boycotted provincial +elections in 2005, and therefore are not represented in local +government. + +Second, security is lacking. Insurgents target key infrastructure. For +instance, electricity transmission towers are downed by explosives, +and then sniper attacks prevent repairs from being made. + +Third, corruption is rampant. One senior Iraqi official estimated that +official corruption costs Iraq $5-7 billion per year. Notable steps +have been taken: Iraq has a functioning audit board and inspectors +general in the ministries, and senior leaders including the Prime +Minister have identified rooting out corruption as a national +priority. But too many political leaders still pursue their personal, +sectarian, or party interests. There are still no examples of senior +officials who have been brought before a court of law and convicted on +corruption charges. + +Fourth, capacity is inadequate. Most of Iraq's technocratic class was +pushed out of the government as part of de-Baathification. Other +skilled Iraqis have fled the country as violence has risen. Too often, +Iraq's elected representatives treat the ministries as political +spoils. Many ministries can do little more than pay salaries, spending +as little as 10-15 percent of their capital budget. They lack +technical expertise and suffer from corruption, inefficiency, a +banking system that does not permit the transfer of moneys, extensive +red tape put in place in part to deter corruption, and a Ministry of +Finance reluctant to disburse funds. + +Fifth, the judiciary is weak. Much has been done to establish an Iraqi +judiciary, including a supreme court, and Iraq has some dedicated +judges. But criminal investigations are conducted by magistrates, and +they are too few and inadequately trained to perform this function. +Intimidation of the Iraqi judiciary has been ruthless. As one senior +U.S. official said to us, "We can protect judges, but not their +families, their extended families, their friends." Many Iraqis feel +that crime not only is unpunished, it is rewarded. + + + +3. Economics + +There has been some economic progress in Iraq, and Iraq has tremendous +potential for growth. But economic development is hobbled by +insecurity, corruption, lack of investment, dilapidated +infrastructure, and uncertainty. As one U.S. official observed to us, +Iraq's economy has been badly shocked and is dysfunctional after +suffering decades of problems: Iraq had a police state economy in the +1970s, a war economy in the 1980s, and a sanctions economy in the +1990s. Immediate and long-term growth depends predominantly on the oil +sector. + + + +Economic Performance + +There are some encouraging signs. Currency reserves are stable and +growing at $12 billion. Consumer imports of computers, cell phones, +and other appliances have increased dramatically. New businesses are +opening, and construction is moving forward in secure areas. Because +of Iraq's ample oil reserves, water resources, and fertile lands, +significant growth is possible if violence is reduced and the capacity +of government improves. For example, wheat yields increased more than +40 percent in Kurdistan during this past year. + +The Iraqi government has also made progress in meeting benchmarks set +by the International Monetary Fund. Most prominently, subsidies have +been reduced--for instance, the price per liter of gas has increased +from roughly 1.7 cents to 23 cents (a figure far closer to regional +prices). However, energy and food subsidies generally remain a burden, +costing Iraq $11 billion per year. + +Despite the positive signs, many leading economic indicators are +negative. Instead of meeting a target of 10 percent, growth in Iraq is +at roughly 4 percent this year. Inflation is above 50 percent. +Unemployment estimates range widely from 20 to 60 percent. The +investment climate is bleak, with foreign direct investment under 1 +percent of GDP. Too many Iraqis do not see tangible improvements in +their daily economic situation. + + + +Oil Sector + +Oil production and sales account for nearly 70 percent of Iraq's GDP, +and more than 95 percent of government revenues. Iraq produces around +2.2 million barrels per day, and exports about 1.5 million barrels per +day. This is below both prewar production levels and the Iraqi +government's target of 2.5 million barrels per day, and far short of +the vast potential of the Iraqi oil sector. Fortunately for the +government, global energy prices have been higher than projected, +making it possible for Iraq to meet its budget revenue targets. + +Problems with oil production are caused by lack of security, lack of +investment, and lack of technical capacity. Insurgents with a detailed +knowledge of Iraq's infrastructure target pipelines and oil +facilities. There is no metering system for the oil. There is poor +maintenance at pumping stations, pipelines, and port facilities, as +well as inadequate investment in modern technology. Iraq had a cadre +of experts in the oil sector, but intimidation and an extended +migration of experts to other countries have eroded technical +capacity. Foreign companies have been reluctant to invest, and Iraq's +Ministry of Oil has been unable to spend more than 15 percent of its +capital budget. + +Corruption is also debilitating. Experts estimate that 150,000 to +200,000--and perhaps as many as 500,000--barrels of oil per day are +being stolen. Controlled prices for refined products result in +shortages within Iraq, which drive consumers to the thriving black +market. One senior U.S. official told us that corruption is more +responsible than insurgents for breakdowns in the oil sector. + + + + +The Politics of Oil + +The politics of oil has the potential to further damage the country's +already fragile efforts to create a unified central government. The +Iraqi Constitution leaves the door open for regions to take the lead +in developing new oil resources. Article 108 states that "oil and gas +are the ownership of all the peoples of Iraq in all the regions and +governorates," while Article 109 tasks the federal government with +"the management of oil and gas extracted from current fields." This +language has led to contention over what constitutes a "new" or an +"existing" resource, a question that has profound ramifications for +the ultimate control of future oil revenue. + +Senior members of Iraq's oil industry argue that a national oil +company could reduce political tensions by centralizing revenues and +reducing regional or local claims to a percentage of the revenue +derived from production. However, regional leaders are suspicious and +resist this proposal, affirming the rights of local communities to +have direct access to the inflow of oil revenue. Kurdish leaders have +been particularly aggressive in asserting independent control of their +oil assets, signing and implementing investment deals with foreign oil +companies in northern Iraq. Shia politicians are also reported to be +negotiating oil investment contracts with foreign companies. + +There are proposals to redistribute a portion of oil revenues directly +to the population on a per capita basis. These proposals have the +potential to give all Iraqi citizens a stake in the nation's chief +natural resource, but it would take time to develop a fair +distribution system. Oil revenues have been incorporated into state +budget projections for the next several years. There is no institution +in Iraq at present that could properly implement such a distribution +system. It would take substantial time to establish, and would have to +be based on a well-developed state census and income tax system, which +Iraq currently lacks. + + + +U.S.-Led Reconstruction Efforts + +The United States has appropriated a total of about $34 billion to +support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which about $21 billion has +been appropriated for the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund." +Nearly $16 billion has been spent, and almost all the funds have been +committed. The administration requested $1.6 billion for +reconstruction in FY 2006, and received $1.485 billion. The +administration requested $750 million for FY 2007. The trend line for +economic assistance in FY 2008 also appears downward. + +Congress has little appetite for appropriating more funds for +reconstruction. There is a substantial need for continued +reconstruction in Iraq, but serious questions remain about the +capacity of the U.S. and Iraqi governments. + +The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense Department, +State Department, United States Agency for International Development, +and other agencies has been ineffective. There are no clear lines +establishing who is in charge of reconstruction. + +As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is changing its +focus, shifting from infrastructure, education, and health to +smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some degree managed by +local communities. A major attempt is also being made to improve the +capacity of government bureaucracies at the national, regional, and +provincial levels to provide services to the population as well as to +select and manage infrastructure projects. + +The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi ministries, but +it confronts problems with access and sustainability. Moqtada al-Sadr +objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq, and therefore the ministries he +controls--Health, Agriculture, and Transportation--will not work with +Americans. It is not clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and +operate reconstruction projects launched by the United States. + +Several senior military officers commented to us that the Commander's +Emergency Response Program, which funds quick-impact projects such as +the clearing of sewage and the restoration of basic services, is +vital. The U.S. Agency for International Development, in contrast, is +focused on long-term economic development and capacity building, but +funds have not been committed to support these efforts into the +future. The State Department leads seven Provincial Reconstruction +Teams operating around the country. These teams can have a positive +effect in secure areas, but not in areas where their work is hampered +by significant security constraints. + +Substantial reconstruction funds have also been provided to +contractors, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction +has documented numerous instances of waste and abuse. They have not +all been put right. Contracting has gradually improved, as more +oversight has been exercised and fewer cost-plus contracts have been +granted; in addition, the use of Iraqi contractors has enabled the +employment of more Iraqis in reconstruction projects. + + + +4. International Support + +International support for Iraqi reconstruction has been tepid. +International donors pledged $13.5 billion to support reconstruction, +but less than $4 billion has been delivered. + +An important agreement with the Paris Club relieved a significant +amount of Iraq's government debt and put the country on firmer +financial footing. But the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and +Kuwait, hold large amounts of Iraqi debt that they have not forgiven. + +The United States is currently working with the United Nations and +other partners to fashion the "International Compact" on Iraq. The +goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt relief and credits from +the Gulf States, as well as to deliver on pledged aid from +international donors. In return, the Iraqi government will agree to +achieve certain economic reform milestones, such as building +anticorruption measures into Iraqi institutions, adopting a fair legal +framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic +self-sufficiency by 2012. Several U.S. and international officials told +us that the compact could be an opportunity to seek greater international +engagement in the country. + + + +The Region + +The policies and actions of Iraq's neighbors greatly influence its +stability and prosperity. No country in the region wants a chaotic +Iraq. Yet Iraq's neighbors are doing little to help it, and some are +undercutting its stability. Iraqis complain that neighbors are +meddling in their affairs. When asked which of Iraq's neighbors are +intervening in Iraq, one senior Iraqi official replied, "All of them." + +The situation in Iraq is linked with events in the region. U.S. +efforts in Afghanistan have been complicated by the overriding focus +of U.S. attention and resources on Iraq. Several Iraqi, U.S., and +international officials commented to us that Iraqi opposition to the +United States--and support for Sadr--spiked in the aftermath of +Israel's bombing campaign in Lebanon. The actions of Syria and Iran in +Iraq are often tied to their broader concerns with the United States. +Many Sunni Arab states are concerned about rising Iranian influence in +Iraq and the region. Most of the region's countries are wary of U.S. +efforts to promote democracy in Iraq and the Middle East. + + + +Neighboring States + +IRAN. Of all the neighbors, Iran has the most leverage in Iraq. Iran +has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many of whom +were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein regime. Iran has +provided arms, financial support, and training for Shiite militias +within Iraq, as well as political support for Shia parties. There are +also reports that Iran has supplied improvised explosive devices to +groups--including Sunni Arab insurgents--that attack U.S. forces. The +Iranian border with Iraq is porous, and millions of Iranians travel to +Iraq each year to visit Shia holy sites. Many Iraqis spoke of Iranian +meddling, and Sunnis took a particularly alarmist view. One leading +Sunni politician told us, "If you turn over any stone in Iraq today, +you will find Iran underneath." + +U.S., Iraqi, and international officials also commented on the range +of tensions between the United States and Iran, including Iran's +nuclear program, Iran's support for terrorism, Iran's influence in +Lebanon and the region, and Iran's influence in Iraq. Iran appears +content for the U.S. military to be tied down in Iraq, a position that +limits U.S. options in addressing Iran's nuclear program and allows +Iran leverage over stability in Iraq. Proposed talks between Iran and +the United States about the situation in Iraq have not taken place. +One Iraqi official told us: "Iran is negotiating with the United +States in the streets of Baghdad." + + +SYRIA. Syria is also playing a counterproductive role. Iraqis are +upset about what they perceive as Syrian support for efforts to +undermine the Iraqi government. The Syrian role is not so much to take +active measures as to countenance malign neglect: the Syrians look the +other way as arms and foreign fighters flow across their border into +Iraq, and former Baathist leaders find a safe haven within Syria. Like +Iran, Syria is content to see the United States tied down in Iraq. +That said, the Syrians have indicated that they want a dialogue with +the United States, and in November 2006 agreed to restore diplomatic +relations with Iraq after a 24-year break. + + +SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. These countries for the most part +have been passive and disengaged. They have declined to provide debt +relief or substantial economic assistance to the Iraqi government. +Several Iraqi Sunni Arab politicians complained that Saudi Arabia has +not provided political support for their fellow Sunnis within Iraq. +One observed that Saudi Arabia did not even send a letter when the +Iraqi government was formed, whereas Iran has an ambassador in Iraq. +Funding for the Sunni insurgency comes from private individuals within +Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, even as those governments help +facilitate U.S. military operations in Iraq by providing basing and +overflight rights and by cooperating on intelligence issues. + +As worries about Iraq increase, the Gulf States are becoming more +active. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have hosted meetings in +support of the International Compact. Saudi Arabia recently took the +positive step of hosting a conference of Iraqi religious leaders in +Mecca. Several Gulf States have helped foster dialogue with Iraq's +Sunni Arab population. While the Gulf States are not proponents of +democracy in Iraq, they worry about the direction of events: +battle-hardened insurgents from Iraq could pose a threat to their own +internal stability, and the growth of Iranian influence in the region +is deeply troubling to them. + + +TURKEY. Turkish policy toward Iraq is focused on discouraging Kurdish +nationalism, which is seen as an existential threat to Turkey's own +internal stability. The Turks have supported the Turkmen minority +within Iraq and have used their influence to try to block the +incorporation of Kirkuk into Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, +Turkish companies have invested in Kurdish areas in northern Iraq, and +Turkish and Kurdish leaders have sought constructive engagement on +political, security, and economic issues. + +The Turks are deeply concerned about the operations of the Kurdish +Workers Party (PKK)--a terrorist group based in northern Iraq that has +killed thousands of Turks. They are upset that the United States and +Iraq have not targeted the PKK more aggressively. The Turks have +threatened to go after the PKK themselves, and have made several +forays across the border into Iraq. + + +JORDAN AND EGYPT. Both Jordan and Egypt have provided some assistance +for the Iraqi government. Jordan has trained thousands of Iraqi +police, has an ambassador in Baghdad, and King Abdullah recently +hosted a meeting in Amman between President Bush and Prime Minister +Maliki. Egypt has provided some limited Iraqi army training. Both +Jordan and Egypt have facilitated U.S. military operations--Jordan by +allowing overflight and search-and-rescue operations, Egypt by +allowing overflight and Suez Canal transits; both provide important +cooperation on intelligence. Jordan is currently home to 700,000 Iraqi +refugees (equal to 10 percent of its population) and fears a flood of +many more. Both Jordan and Egypt are concerned about the position of +Iraq's Sunni Arabs and want constitutional reforms in Iraq to bolster +the Sunni community. They also fear the return of insurgents to their +countries. + + + +The International Community + +The international community beyond the United Kingdom and our other +coalition partners has played a limited role in Iraq. The United +Nations--acting under Security Council Resolution 1546--has a small +presence in Iraq; it has assisted in holding elections, drafting the +constitution, organizing the government, and building institutions. +The World Bank, which has committed a limited number of resources, has +one and sometimes two staff in Iraq. The European Union has a +representative there. + +Several U.S.-based and international nongovernmental organizations +have done excellent work within Iraq, operating under great hardship. +Both Iraqi and international nongovernmental organizations play an +important role in reaching across sectarian lines to enhance dialogue +and understanding, and several U.S.-based organizations have employed +substantial resources to help Iraqis develop their democracy. However, +the participation of international nongovernmental organizations is +constrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts face +a cumbersome and often politicized process of registration with the +government. + +The United Kingdom has dedicated an extraordinary amount of resources +to Iraq and has made great sacrifices. In addition to 7,200 troops, +the United Kingdom has a substantial diplomatic presence, particularly +in Basra and the Iraqi southeast. The United Kingdom has been an +active and key player at every stage of Iraq's political development. +U.K. officials told us that they remain committed to working for +stability in Iraq, and will reduce their commitment of troops and +resources in response to the situation on the ground. + + + +5. Conclusions + +The United States has made a massive commitment to the future of Iraq +in both blood and treasure. As of December 2006, nearly 2,900 +Americans have lost their lives serving in Iraq. Another 21,000 +Americans have been wounded, many severely. + +To date, the United States has spent roughly $400 billion on the Iraq +War, and costs are running about $8 billion per month. In addition, +the United States must expect significant "tail costs" to come. Caring +for veterans and replacing lost equipment will run into the hundreds +of billions of dollars. Estimates run as high as $2 trillion for the +final cost of the U.S. involvement in Iraq. + +Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive and the +situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot now govern, +sustain, and defend itself without the support of the United States. +Iraqis have not been convinced that they must take responsibility for +their own future. Iraq's neighbors and much of the international +community have not been persuaded to play an active and constructive +role in supporting Iraq. The ability of the United States to shape +outcomes is diminishing. Time is running out. + + + + +B. Consequences of Continued Decline in Iraq + +If the situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate, the consequences +could be severe for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the +world. + +Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and inflict +greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse of Iraq's +government and economy would further cripple a country already unable +to meet its people's needs. Iraq's security forces could split along +sectarian lines. A humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more +refugees are forced to relocate across the country and the region. +Ethnic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could be subjected +to another strongman who flexes the political and military muscle +required to impose order amid anarchy. Freedoms could be lost. + +Other countries in the region fear significant violence crossing their +borders. Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to +protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a broader +regional war. Turkey could send troops into northern Iraq to prevent +Kurdistan from declaring independence. Iran could send in troops to +restore stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil +fields. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time when that +country is on a path to producing nuclear weapons. + +Ambassadors from neighboring countries told us that they fear the +distinct possibility of Sunni-Shia clashes across the Islamic world. +Many expressed a fear of Shia insurrections--perhaps fomented by +Iran--in Sunni-ruled states. Such a broader sectarian conflict could +open a Pandora's box of problems--including the radicalization of +populations, mass movements of populations, and regime changes--that +might take decades to play out. If the instability in Iraq spreads to +the other Gulf States, a drop in oil production and exports could lead +to a sharp increase in the price of oil and thus could harm the global +economy. + +Terrorism could grow. As one Iraqi official told us, "Al Qaeda is now +a franchise in Iraq, like McDonald's." Left unchecked, al Qaeda in +Iraq could continue to incite violence between Sunnis and Shia. A +chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for +terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al Qaeda will +portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant +victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their +cause in the region and around the world. Ayman al-Zawahiri, deputy to +Osama bin Laden, has declared Iraq a focus for al Qaeda: they will +seek to expel the Americans and then spread "the jihad wave to the +secular countries neighboring Iraq." A senior European official told +us that failure in Iraq could incite terrorist attacks within his +country. + +The global standing of the United States could suffer if Iraq descends +further into chaos. Iraq is a major test of, and strain on, U.S. +military, diplomatic, and financial capacities. Perceived failure +there could diminish America's credibility and influence in a region +that is the center of the Islamic world and vital to the world's +energy supply. This loss would reduce America's global influence at a +time when pressing issues in North Korea, Iran, and elsewhere demand +our full attention and strong U.S. leadership of international +alliances. And the longer that U.S. political and military resources +are tied down in Iraq, the more the chances for American failure in +Afghanistan increase. + +Continued problems in Iraq could lead to greater polarization within +the United States. Sixty-six percent of Americans disapprove of the +government's handling of the war, and more than 60 percent feel that +there is no clear plan for moving forward. The November elections were +largely viewed as a referendum on the progress in Iraq. Arguments +about continuing to provide security and assistance to Iraq will fall +on deaf ears if Americans become disillusioned with the government +that the United States invested so much to create. U.S. foreign policy +cannot be successfully sustained without the broad support of the +American people. + +Continued problems in Iraq could also lead to greater Iraqi opposition +to the United States. Recent polling indicates that only 36 percent of +Iraqis feel their country is heading in the right direction, and 79 +percent of Iraqis have a "mostly negative" view of the influence that +the United States has in their country. Sixty-one percent of Iraqis +approve of attacks on U.S.-led forces. If Iraqis continue to perceive +Americans as representing an occupying force, the United States could +become its own worst enemy in a land it liberated from tyranny. + +These and other predictions of dire consequences in Iraq and the +region are by no means a certainty. Iraq has taken several positive +steps since Saddam Hussein was overthrown: Iraqis restored full +sovereignty, conducted open national elections, drafted a permanent +constitution, ratified that constitution, and elected a new government +pursuant to that constitution. Iraqis may become so sobered by the +prospect of an unfolding civil war and intervention by their regional +neighbors that they take the steps necessary to avert catastrophe. But +at the moment, such a scenario seems implausible because the Iraqi +people and their leaders have been slow to demonstrate the capacity or +will to act. + + + + +C. Some Alternative Courses in Iraq + +Because of the gravity of the situation in Iraq and of its +consequences for Iraq, the United States, the region, and the world, +the Iraq Study Group has carefully considered the full range of +alternative approaches for moving forward. We recognize that there is +no perfect solution and that all that have been suggested have flaws. +The following are some of the more notable possibilities that we have +considered. + + +1. Precipitate Withdrawal + +Because of the importance of Iraq, the potential for catastrophe, and +the role and commitments of the United States in initiating events +that have led to the current situation, we believe it would be wrong +for the United States to abandon the country through a precipitate +withdrawal of troops and support. A premature American departure from +Iraq would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence and +further deterioration of conditions, leading to a number of the +adverse consequences outlined above. The near-term results would be a +significant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional +destabilization, and a threat to the global economy. Al Qaeda would +depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. If we leave and Iraq +descends into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually +require the United States to return. + + +2. Staying the Course + +Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq +is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. +Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at +a high cost. Nearly 100 Americans are dying every month. The United +States is spending $2 billion a week. Our ability to respond to other +international crises is constrained. A majority of the American people +are soured on the war. This level of expense is not sustainable over +an extended period, especially when progress is not being made. The +longer the United States remains in Iraq without progress, the more +resentment will grow among Iraqis who believe they are subjects of a +repressive American occupation. As one U.S. official said to us, "Our +leaving would make it worse. . . . The current approach without +modification will not make it better." + + +3. More Troops for Iraq + +Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the +fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of +national reconciliation. A senior American general told us that adding +U.S. troops might temporarily help limit violence in a highly +localized area. However, past experience indicates that the violence +would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved to another +area. As another American general told us, if the Iraqi government +does not make political progress, "all the troops in the world will +not provide security." Meanwhile, America's military capacity is +stretched thin: we do not have the troops or equipment to make a +substantial, sustained increase in our troop presence. Increased +deployments to Iraq would also necessarily hamper our ability to +provide adequate resources for our efforts in Afghanistan or respond +to crises around the world. + + +4. Devolution to Three Regions + +The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous +regions with loose central control would be too high. Because Iraq's +population is not neatly separated, regional boundaries cannot be easily +drawn. All eighteen Iraqi provinces have mixed populations, as do +Baghdad and most other major cities in Iraq. A rapid devolution could +result in mass population movements, collapse of the Iraqi security +forces, strengthening of militias, ethnic cleansing, destabilization +of neighboring states, or attempts by neighboring states to dominate +Iraqi regions. Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a +division would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the +United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state. + +While such devolution is a possible consequence of continued +instability in Iraq, we do not believe the United States should +support this course as a policy goal or impose this outcome on the +Iraqi state. If events were to move irreversibly in this direction, +the United States should manage the situation to ameliorate +humanitarian consequences, contain the spread of violence, and +minimize regional instability. The United States should support as +much as possible central control by governmental authorities in +Baghdad, particularly on the question of oil revenues. + + + + +D. Achieving Our Goals + +We agree with the goal of U.S. policy in Iraq, as stated by the +President: an Iraq that can "govern itself, sustain itself, and defend +itself." In our view, this definition entails an Iraq with a broadly +representative government that maintains its territorial integrity, is +at peace with its neighbors, denies terrorism a sanctuary, and doesn't +brutalize its own people. Given the current situation in Iraq, +achieving this goal will require much time and will depend primarily +on the actions of the Iraqi people. + +In our judgment, there is a new way forward for the United States to +support this objective, and it will offer people of Iraq a reasonable +opportunity to lead a better life than they did under Saddam Hussein. +Our recommended course has shortcomings, as does each of the policy +alternatives we have reviewed. We firmly believe, however, that it +includes the best strategies and tactics available to us to positively +influence the outcome in Iraq and the region. We believe that it could +enable a responsible transition that will give the Iraqi people a +chance to pursue a better future, as well as serving America's +interests and values in the years ahead. + + + + +II + +The Way Forward--A New Approach + +Progress in Iraq is still possible if new approaches are taken +promptly by Iraq, the United States, and other countries that have a +stake in the Middle East. + +To attain the goals we have outlined, changes in course must be made +both outside and inside Iraq. Our report offers a comprehensive +strategy to build regional and international support for stability in +Iraq, as it encourages the Iraqi people to assume control of their own +destiny. It offers a responsible transition. + +Externally, the United States should immediately begin to employ all +elements of American power to construct a regional mechanism that can +support, rather than retard, progress in Iraq. Internally, the Iraqi +government must take the steps required to achieve national +reconciliation, reduce violence, and improve the daily lives of +Iraqis. Efforts to implement these external and internal strategies +must begin now and must be undertaken in concert with one another. + +This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in the U.S. +presence in Iraq over time. + + + + +A. The External Approach: Building an International Consensus + + +The United States must build a new international consensus for +stability in Iraq and the region. + +In order to foster such consensus, the United States should embark on +a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international support +structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other +countries in the region. This support structure should include every +country that has an interest in averting a chaotic Iraq, including all +of Iraq's neighbors--Iran and Syria among them. Despite the well-known +differences between many of these countries, they all share an +interest in avoiding the horrific consequences that would flow from a +chaotic Iraq, particularly a humanitarian catastrophe and regional +destabilization. + +A reinvigorated diplomatic effort is required because it is clear that +the Iraqi government cannot succeed in governing, defending, and +sustaining itself by relying on U.S. military and economic support +alone. Nor can the Iraqi government succeed by relying only on U.S. +military support in conjunction with Iraqi military and police +capabilities. Some states have been withholding commitments they could +make to support Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction. Some states +have been actively undermining stability in Iraq. To achieve a +political solution within Iraq, a broader international support +structure is needed. + + + +1. The New Diplomatic Offensive + +Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major +regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. To put it +simply, all key issues in the Middle East--the Arab-Israeli conflict, +Iraq, Iran, the need for political and economic reforms, and extremism +and terrorism--are inextricably linked. In addition to supporting +stability in Iraq, a comprehensive diplomatic offensive--the New +Diplomatic Offensive--should address these key regional issues. By +doing so, it would help marginalize extremists and terrorists, promote +U.S. values and interests, and improve America's global image. + +Under the diplomatic offensive, we propose regional and international +initiatives and steps to assist the Iraqi government in achieving +certain security, political, and economic milestones. Achieving these +milestones will require at least the acquiescence of Iraq's neighbors, +and their active and timely cooperation would be highly desirable. + +The diplomatic offensive would extend beyond the primarily economic +"Compact for Iraq" by also emphasizing political, diplomatic, and +security issues. At the same time, it would be coordinated with the +goals of the Compact for Iraq. The diplomatic offensive would also be +broader and more far-reaching than the "Gulf Plus Two" efforts +currently being conducted, and those efforts should be folded into and +become part of the diplomatic offensive. + +States included within the diplomatic offensive can play a major role +in reinforcing national reconciliation efforts between Iraqi Sunnis +and Shia. Such reinforcement would contribute substantially to +legitimizing of the political process in Iraq. Iraq's leaders may not +be able to come together unless they receive the necessary signals and +support from abroad. This backing will not materialize of its own +accord, and must be encouraged urgently by the United States. + +In order to advance a comprehensive diplomatic solution, the Study +Group recommends as follows: + + +RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with the Iraqi +government, should launch the comprehensive New Diplomatic Offensive +to deal with the problems of Iraq and of the region. This new +diplomatic offensive should be launched before December 31, 2006. + +RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive as it relates +to regional players should be to: + +i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. + +ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq's neighbors. + +iii. Secure Iraq's borders, including the use of joint patrols with +neighboring countries. + +iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond +Iraq's borders. + +v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, +and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi government from +non-neighboring Muslim nations. + +vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation in +Iraq. + +vii. Validate Iraq's legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, +where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad. + +viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key +capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia). + +ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk. + +x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security, +political, and economic milestones, including better performance on +issues such as national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil +revenues, and the dismantling of militias. + + +RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic offensive, and in +addition to the Support Group discussed below, the United States and +the Iraqi government should support the holding of a conference or +meeting in Baghdad of the Organization of the Islamic Conference or +the Arab League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting +national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic +presence in Iraq. + + +2. The Iraq International Support Group + +This new diplomatic offensive cannot be successful unless it includes +the active participation of those countries that have a critical stake +in preventing Iraq from falling into chaos. To encourage their +participation, the United States should immediately seek the creation +of the Iraq International Support Group. The Support Group should also +include all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countries +in the region and the world. + +The Support Group would not seek to impose obligations or undertakings +on the government of Iraq. Instead, the Support Group would assist +Iraq in ways the government of Iraq would desire, attempting to +strengthen Iraq's sovereignty--not diminish it. + +It is clear to Iraq Study Group members that all of Iraq's neighbors +are anxious about the situation in Iraq. They favor a unified Iraq +that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not +so powerful as to threaten its neighbors. None favors the breakup of +the Iraqi state. Each country in the region views the situation in +Iraq through the filter of its particular set of interests. For +example: + + +--Turkey opposes an independent or even highly autonomous Kurdistan +because of its own national security considerations. + +--Iran backs Shia claims and supports various Shia militias in Iraq, +but it also supports other groups in order to enhance its influence +and hedge its bets on possible outcomes. + +--Syria, despite facilitating support for Iraqi insurgent groups, +would be threatened by the impact that the breakup of Iraq would have +on its own multiethnic and multiconfessional society. + +--Kuwait wants to ensure that it will not once again be the victim of +Iraqi irredentism and aggression. + +--Saudi Arabia and Jordan share Sunni concerns over Shia ascendancy in +Iraq and the region as a whole. + +--The other Arab Gulf states also recognize the benefits of an outcome +in Iraq that does not destabilize the region and exacerbate Shia-Sunni +tensions. + +--None of Iraq's neighbors--especially major countries such as Egypt, +Saudi Arabia, and Israel--see it in their interest for the situation +in Iraq to lead to aggrandized regional influence by Iran. Indeed, +they may take active steps to limit Iran's influence, steps that could +lead to an intraregional conflict. + + +Left to their own devices, these governments will tend to reinforce +ethnic, sectarian, and political divisions within Iraqi society. But +if the Support Group takes a systematic and active approach toward +considering the concerns of each country, we believe that each can be +encouraged to play a positive role in Iraq and the region. + + +SAUDI ARABIA. Saudi Arabia's agreement not to intervene with +assistance to Sunni Arab Iraqis could be an essential quid pro quo for +similar forbearance on the part of other neighbors, especially Iran. +The Saudis could use their Islamic credentials to help reconcile +differences between Iraqi factions and build broader support in the +Islamic world for a stabilization agreement, as their recent hosting +of a meeting of Islamic religious leaders in Mecca suggests. If the +government in Baghdad pursues a path of national reconciliation with +the Sunnis, the Saudis could help Iraq confront and eliminate al Qaeda +in Iraq. They could also cancel the Iraqi debt owed them. In addition, +the Saudis might be helpful in persuading the Syrians to cooperate. + + +TURKEY. As a major Sunni Muslim country on Iraq's borders, Turkey can +be a partner in supporting the national reconciliation process in +Iraq. Such efforts can be particularly helpful given Turkey's interest +in Kurdistan remaining an integral part of a unified Iraq and its +interest in preventing a safe haven for Kurdish terrorists (the PKK). + + +EGYPT. Because of its important role in the Arab world, Egypt should +be encouraged to foster the national reconciliation process in Iraq +with a focus on getting the Sunnis to participate. At the same time, +Egypt has the means, and indeed has offered, to train groups of Iraqi +military and security forces in Egypt on a rotational basis. + + +JORDAN. Jordan, like Egypt, can help in the national reconciliation +process in Iraq with the Sunnis. It too has the professional +capability to train and equip Iraqi military and security forces. + + +RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an +Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately +following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive. + +RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the +states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional +states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent +members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; +and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries--for instance, Germany, +Japan and South Korea--that might be willing to contribute to +resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq +could also become members. + +RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the +Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be +conducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above. +The Secretary of State, if not the President, should lead the U.S. +effort. That effort should be both bilateral and multilateral, as +circumstances require. + +RECOMMENDATION 7: The Support Group should call on the participation +of the office of the United Nations Secretary-General in its work. The +United Nations Secretary-General should designate a Special Envoy as +his representative. + +RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the New Diplomatic +Offensive, should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries +that take into account the interests, perspectives, and potential +contributions as suggested above. + + +3. Dealing with Iran and Syria + +Dealing with Iran and Syria is controversial. Nevertheless, it is our +view that in diplomacy, a nation can and should engage its adversaries +and enemies to try to resolve conflicts and differences consistent +with its own interests. Accordingly, the Support Group should actively +engage Iran and Syria in its diplomatic dialogue, without +preconditions. + +The Study Group recognizes that U.S. relationships with Iran and Syria +involve difficult issues that must be resolved. Diplomatic talks +should be extensive and substantive, and they will require a balancing +of interests. The United States has diplomatic, economic, and military +disincentives available in approaches to both Iran and Syria. However, +the United States should also consider incentives to try to engage +them constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya. + +Some of the possible incentives to Iran, Syria, or both include: + +i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors +and the region. + +ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Taliban +from destabilizing Afghanistan. + +iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World +Trade Organization. + +iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United +States. + +v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and +economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating +regime change. + +vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated +between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement as part of a broader +initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined below. + + +RECOMMENDATION 9: Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and +the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran +and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive +policies toward Iraq and other regional issues. In engaging Syria and +Iran, the United States should consider incentives, as well as +disincentives, in seeking constructive results. + + +IRAN. Engaging Iran is problematic, especially given the state of the +U.S.-Iranian relationship. Yet the United States and Iran cooperated +in Afghanistan, and both sides should explore whether this model can +be replicated in the case of Iraq. + +Although Iran sees it in its interest to have the United States bogged +down in Iraq, Iran's interests would not be served by a failure of +U.S. policy in Iraq that led to chaos and the territorial +disintegration of the Iraqi state. Iran's population is slightly more +than 50 percent Persian, but it has a large Azeri minority (24 percent +of the population) as well as Kurdish and Arab minorities. Worst-case +scenarios in Iraq could inflame sectarian tensions within Iran, with +serious consequences for Iranian national security interests. + +Our limited contacts with Iran's government lead us to believe that +its leaders are likely to say they will not participate in diplomatic +efforts to support stability in Iraq. They attribute this reluctance +to their belief that the United States seeks regime change in Iran. + +Nevertheless, as one of Iraq's neighbors Iran should be asked to +assume its responsibility to participate in the Support Group. An +Iranian refusal to do so would demonstrate to Iraq and the rest of the +world Iran's rejectionist attitude and approach, which could lead to +its isolation. Further, Iran's refusal to cooperate on this matter +would diminish its prospects of engaging with the United States in the +broader dialogue it seeks. + + +RECOMMENDATION 10: The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should +continue to be dealt with by the United Nations Security Council and +its five permanent members (i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, +France, Russia, and China) plus Germany. + +RECOMMENDATION 11: Diplomatic efforts within the Support Group should +seek to persuade Iran that it should take specific steps to improve +the situation in Iraq. + +Among steps Iran could usefully take are the following: + +--Iran should stem the flow of equipment, technology, and training to +any group resorting to violence in Iraq. + +--Iran should make clear its support for the territorial integrity of +Iraq as a unified state, as well as its respect for the sovereignty of +Iraq and its government. + +--Iran can use its influence, especially over Shia groups in Iraq, to +encourage national reconciliation. + +--Iran can also, in the right circumstances, help in the economic +reconstruction of Iraq. + + +SYRIA. Although the U.S.-Syrian relationship is at a low point, both +countries have important interests in the region that could be +enhanced if they were able to establish some common ground on how to +move forward. This approach worked effectively in the early 1990s. In +this context, Syria's national interests in the Arab-Israeli dispute +are important and can be brought into play. + +Syria can make a major contribution to Iraq's stability in several +ways. Accordingly, the Study Group recommends the following: + + +RECOMMENDATION 12: The United States and the Support Group should +encourage and persuade Syria of the merit of such contributions as the +following: + +--Syria can control its border with Iraq to the maximum extent +possible and work together with Iraqis on joint patrols on the border. +Doing so will help stem the flow of funding, insurgents, and +terrorists in and out of Iraq. + +--Syria can establish hotlines to exchange information with the +Iraqis. + +--Syria can increase its political and economic cooperation with Iraq. + + + +4. The Wider Regional Context + +The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle +East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli +conflict. + +There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States +to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, +and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for +Israel and Palestine. This commitment must include direct talks with, +by, and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept +Israel's right to exist), and particularly Syria--which is the +principal transit point for shipments of weapons to Hezbollah, and +which supports radical Palestinian groups. + +The United States does its ally Israel no favors in avoiding direct +involvement to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several reasons, +we should act boldly: + +--There is no military solution to this conflict. + +--The vast majority of the Israeli body politic is tired of being a +nation perpetually at war. + +--No American administration--Democratic or Republican--will ever +abandon Israel. + +--Political engagement and dialogue are essential in the Arab-Israeli +dispute because it is an axiom that when the political process breaks +down there will be violence on the ground. + +--The only basis on which peace can be achieved is that set forth in +UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and in the principle of +"land for peace." + +--The only lasting and secure peace will be a negotiated peace such as +Israel has achieved with Egypt and Jordan. + + +This effort would strongly support moderate Arab governments in the +region, especially the democratically elected government of Lebanon, +and the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas. + + +RECOMMENDATION 13: There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by +the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: +Lebanon and Syria, and President Bush's June 2002 commitment to a +two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. + + +RECOMMENDATION 14: This effort should include--as soon as possible--the +unconditional calling and holding of meetings, under the auspices +of the United States or the Quartet (i.e., the United States, Russia, +European Union, and the United Nations), between Israel and Lebanon +and Syria on the one hand, and Israel and Palestinians (who +acknowledge Israel's right to exist) on the other. The purpose of +these meetings would be to negotiate peace as was done at the Madrid +Conference in 1991, and on two separate tracks--one Syrian/Lebanese, +and the other Palestinian. + + +RECOMMENDATION 15: Concerning Syria, some elements of that negotiated +peace should be: be: + +--Syria's full adherence to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 of +August 2006, which provides the framework for Lebanon to regain +sovereign control over its territory. + +--Syria's full cooperation with all investigations into political +assassinations in Lebanon, especially those of Rafik Hariri and Pierre +Gemayel. + +--A verifiable cessation of Syrian aid to Hezbollah and the use of +Syrian territory for transshipment of Iranian weapons and aid to +Hezbollah. (This step would do much to solve Israel's problem with +Hezbollah.) + +--Syria's use of its influence with Hamas and Hezbollah for the +release of the captured Israeli Defense Force soldiers. + +--A verifiable cessation of Syrian efforts to undermine the +democratically elected government of Lebanon. + +--A verifiable cessation of arms shipments from or transiting through +Syria for Hamas and other radical Palestinian groups. + +--A Syrian commitment to help obtain from Hamas an acknowledgment of +Israel's right to exist. + +--Greater Syrian efforts to seal its border with Iraq. + + +RECOMMENDATION 16: In exchange for these actions and in the context of +a full and secure peace agreement, the Israelis should return the +Golan Heights, with a U.S. security guarantee for Israel that could +include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if +requested by both parties. + + +RECOMMENDATION 17: Concerning the Palestinian issue, elements of that +negotiated peace should include: + +--Adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and to the +principle of land for peace, which are the only bases for achieving +peace. + +--Strong support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the +Palestinian Authority to take the lead in preparing the way for +negotiations with Israel. + +--A major effort to move from the current hostilities by consolidating +the cease-fire reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis in +November 2006. + +--Support for a Palestinian national unity government. + +--Sustainable negotiations leading to a final peace settlement along +the lines of President Bush's two-state solution, which would address +the key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the +right of return, and the end of conflict. + + + +Afghanistan + +At the same time, we must not lose sight of the importance of the +situation inside Afghanistan and the renewed threat posed by the +Taliban. Afghanistan's borders are porous. If the Taliban were to +control more of Afghanistan, it could provide al Qaeda the political +space to conduct terrorist operations. This development would +destabilize the region and have national security implications for the +United States and other countries around the world. Also, the +significant increase in poppy production in Afghanistan fuels the +illegal drug trade and narco-terrorism. + +The huge focus of U.S. political, military, and economic support on +Iraq has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan. As the +United States develops its approach toward Iraq and the Middle East, +it must also give priority to the situation in Afghanistan. Doing so +may require increased political, security, and military measures. + + +RECOMMENDATION 18: It is critical for the United States to provide +additional political, economic, and military support for Afghanistan, +including resources that might become available as combat forces are +moved from Iraq. + + + + +B. The Internal Approach: Helping Iraqis Help Themselves + + +The New Diplomatic Offensive will provide the proper external +environment and support for the difficult internal steps that the +Iraqi government must take to promote national reconciliation, +establish security, and make progress on governance. + +The most important issues facing Iraq's future are now the +responsibility of Iraq's elected leaders. Because of the security and +assistance it provides, the United States has a significant role to +play. Yet only the government and people of Iraq can make and sustain +certain decisions critical to Iraq's future. + + + +1. Performance on Milestones + +The United States should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support +the achievement of specific objectives--or milestones--on national +reconciliation, security, and governance. Miracles cannot be expected, +but the people of Iraq have the right to expect action and progress. +The Iraqi government needs to show its own citizens--and the citizens +of the United States and other countries--that it deserves continued +support. + +The U.S. government must make clear that it expects action by the +Iraqi government to make substantial progress toward these milestones. +Such a message can be sent only at the level of our national leaders, +and only in person, during direct consultation. + +As President Bush's meeting with Prime Minister Maliki in Amman, +Jordan demonstrates, it is important for the President to remain in +close and frequent contact with the Iraqi leadership. There is no +substitute for sustained dialogue at the highest levels of government. + +During these high-level exchanges, the United States should lay out an +agenda for continued support to help Iraq achieve milestones, as well +as underscoring the consequences if Iraq does not act. It should be +unambiguous that continued U.S. political, military, and economic +support for Iraq depends on the Iraqi government's demonstrating +political will and making substantial progress toward the achievement +of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance. +The transfer of command and control over Iraqi security forces units +from the United States to Iraq should be influenced by Iraq's +performance on milestones. + +The United States should also signal that it is seeking broad +international support for Iraq on behalf of achieving these +milestones. The United States can begin to shape a positive climate +for its diplomatic efforts, internationally and within Iraq, through +public statements by President Bush that reject the notion that the +United States seeks to control Iraq's oil, or seeks permanent military +bases within Iraq. However, the United States could consider a request +from Iraq for temporary bases. + + +RECOMMENDATION 19: The President and the leadership of his national +security team should remain in close and frequent contact with the +Iraqi leadership. These contacts must convey a clear message: there +must be action by the Iraqi government to make substantial progress +toward the achievement of milestones. In public diplomacy, the +President should convey as much detail as possible about the substance +of these exchanges in order to keep the American people, the Iraqi +people, and the countries in the region well informed. + +RECOMMENDATION 20: If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will +and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on +national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States +should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, +and support for Iraq's security forces, and to continue political, +military, and economic support for the Iraqi government. As Iraq +becomes more capable of governing, defending, and sustaining itself, +the U.S. military and civilian presence in Iraq can be reduced. + +RECOMMENDATION 21: If the Iraqi government does not make substantial +progress toward the achievement of milestones on national +reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should +reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi +government. + +RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that the United States +does not seek permanent military bases in Iraq. If the Iraqi +government were to request a temporary base or bases, then the U.S. +government could consider that request as it would in the case of any +other government. + +RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that the United States +does not seek to control Iraq's oil. + + + +Milestones for Iraq + +The government of Iraq understands that dramatic steps are necessary +to avert a downward spiral and make progress. Prime Minister Maliki +has worked closely in consultation with the United States and has put +forward the following milestones in the key areas of national +reconciliation, security and governance: + + +NATIONAL RECONCILIATION + +By the end of 2006-early 2007: + +Approval of the Provincial Election Law and setting an election date + +Approval of the Petroleum Law + +Approval of the De-Baathification Law + +Approval of the Militia Law + + +By March 2007: + +A referendum on constitutional amendments (if it is necessary) + + +By May 2007: + +Completion of Militia Law implementation + +Approval of amnesty agreement + +Completion of reconciliation efforts + + +By June 2007: + +Provincial elections + + +SECURITY (pending joint U.S.-Iraqi review) + +By the end of 2006: + +Iraqi increase of 2007 security spending over 2006 levels + +By April 2007: + +Iraqi control of the Army + +By September 2007: + +Iraqi control of provinces + +By December 2007: + +Iraqi security self-reliance (with U.S. support) + + +GOVERNANCE + +By the end of 2006: + +The Central Bank of Iraq will raise interest rates to 20 percent and +appreciate the Iraqi dinar by 10 percent to combat accelerating +inflation. + +Iraq will continue increasing domestic prices for refined petroleum +products and sell imported fuel at market prices. + + +RECOMMENDATION 24: The contemplated completion dates of the end of +2006 or early 2007 for some milestones may not be realistic. These +should be completed by the first quarter of 2007. + +RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good start. The United +States should consult closely with the Iraqi government and develop +additional milestones in three areas: national reconciliation, +security, and improving government services affecting the daily lives +of Iraqis. As with the current milestones, these additional milestones +should be tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible. + + + +2. National Reconciliation + +National reconciliation is essential to reduce further violence and +maintain the unity of Iraq. + +U.S. forces can help provide stability for a time to enable Iraqi +leaders to negotiate political solutions, but they cannot stop the +violence--or even contain it--if there is no underlying political +agreement among Iraqis about the future of their country. + +The Iraqi government must send a clear signal to Sunnis that there is +a place for them in national life. The government needs to act now, to +give a signal of hope. Unless Sunnis believe they can get a fair deal +in Iraq through the political process, there is no prospect that the +insurgency will end. To strike this fair deal, the Iraqi government +and the Iraqi people must address several issues that are critical to +the success of national reconciliation and thus to the future of Iraq. + + + +Steps for Iraq to Take on Behalf of National Reconciliation + +RECOMMENDATION 26: Constitution review. Review of the constitution is +essential to national reconciliation and should be pursued on an +urgent basis. The United Nations has expertise in this field, and +should play a role in this process. + +RECOMMENDATION 27: De-Baathification. Political reconciliation +requires the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into +national life, with the leading figures of Saddam Hussein's regime +excluded. The United States should encourage the return of qualified +Iraqi professionals--Sunni or Shia, nationalist or ex-Baathist, Kurd +or Turkmen or Christian or Arab--into the government. + +RECOMMENDATION 28: Oil revenue sharing. Oil revenues should accrue to +the central government and be shared on the basis of population. No +formula that gives control over revenues from future fields to the +regions or gives control of oil fields to the regions is compatible +with national reconciliation. + +RECOMMENDATION 29: Provincial elections. Provincial elections should +be held at the earliest possible date. Under the constitution, new +provincial elections should have been held already. They are necessary +to restore representative government. + +RECOMMENDATION 30: Kirkuk. Given the very dangerous situation in +Kirkuk, international arbitration is necessary to avert communal +violence. Kirkuk's mix of Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen populations could +make it a powder keg. A referendum on the future of Kirkuk (as +required by the Iraqi Constitution before the end of 2007) would be +explosive and should be delayed. This issue should be placed on the +agenda of the International Iraq Support Group as part of the New +Diplomatic Offensive. + +RECOMMENDATION 31: Amnesty. Amnesty proposals must be far-reaching. +Any successful effort at national reconciliation must involve those in +the government finding ways and means to reconcile with former bitter +enemies. + +RECOMMENDATION 32: Minorities. The rights of women and the rights of +all minority communities in Iraq, including Turkmen, Chaldeans, +Assyrians, Yazidis, Sabeans, and Armenians, must be protected. + +RECOMMENDATION 33: Civil society. The Iraqi government should stop +using the process of registering nongovernmental organizations as a +tool for politicizing or stopping their activities. Registration +should be solely an administrative act, not an occasion for government +censorship and interference. + + + +Steps for the United States to Take on Behalf of National +Reconciliation + +The United States can take several steps to assist in Iraq's +reconciliation process. + +The presence of U.S. forces in Iraq is a key topic of interest in a +national reconciliation dialogue. The point is not for the United +States to set timetables or deadlines for withdrawal, an approach that +we oppose. The point is for the United States and Iraq to make clear +their shared interest in the orderly departure of U.S. forces as Iraqi +forces take on the security mission. A successful national +reconciliation dialogue will advance that departure date. + +RECOMMENDATION 34: The question of the future U.S. force presence must +be on the table for discussion as the national reconciliation dialogue +takes place. Its inclusion will increase the likelihood of +participation by insurgents and militia leaders, and thereby increase +the possibilities for success. + +Violence cannot end unless dialogue begins, and the dialogue must +involve those who wield power, not simply those who hold political +office. The United States must try to talk directly to Grand Ayatollah +Sistani and must consider appointing a high-level American Shia Muslim +to serve as an emissary to him. The United States must also try to +talk directly to Moqtada al-Sadr, to militia leaders, and to insurgent +leaders. The United Nations can help facilitate contacts. + +RECOMMENDATION 35: The United States must make active efforts to +engage all parties in Iraq, with the exception of al Qaeda. The United +States must find a way to talk to Grand Ayatollah Sistani, Moqtada +al-Sadr, and militia and insurgent leaders. + +The very focus on sectarian identity that endangers Iraq also presents +opportunities to seek broader support for a national reconciliation +dialogue. Working with Iraqi leaders, the international community and +religious leaders can play an important role in fostering dialogue and +reconciliation across the sectarian divide. The United States should +actively encourage the constructive participation of all who can take +part in advancing national reconciliation within Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 36: The United States should encourage dialogue between +sectarian communities, as outlined in the New Diplomatic Offensive +above. It should press religious leaders inside and outside Iraq to +speak out on behalf of peace and reconciliation. + +Finally, amnesty proposals from the Iraqi government are an important +incentive in reconciliation talks and they need to be generous. +Amnesty proposals to once-bitter enemies will be difficult for the +United States to accept, just as they will be difficult for the Iraqis +to make. Yet amnesty is an issue to be grappled with by the Iraqis, +not by Americans. Despite being politically unpopular--in the United +States as well as in Iraq--amnesty is essential if progress is to take +place. Iraqi leaders need to be certain that they have U.S. support as +they move forward with this critical element of national +reconciliation. + +RECOMMENDATION 37: Iraqi amnesty proposals must not be undercut in +Washington by either the executive or the legislative branch. + + + +Militias and National Reconciliation + +The use of force by the government of Iraq is appropriate and +necessary to stop militias that act as death squads or use violence +against institutions of the state. However, solving the problem of +militias requires national reconciliation. + +Dealing with Iraq's militias will require long-term attention, and +substantial funding will be needed to disarm, demobilize, and +reintegrate militia members into civilian society. Around the world, +this process of transitioning members of irregular military forces +from civil conflict to new lives once a peace settlement takes hold is +familiar. The disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of +militias depends on national reconciliation and on confidence-building +measures among the parties to that reconciliation. + +Both the United Nations and expert and experienced nongovernmental +organizations, especially the International Organization for +Migration, must be on the ground with appropriate personnel months +before any program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia +members begins. Because the United States is a party to the conflict, +the U.S. military should not be involved in implementing such a +program. Yet U.S. financial and technical support is crucial. + +RECOMMENDATION 38: The United States should support the presence of +neutral international experts as advisors to the Iraqi government on +the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. + +RECOMMENDATION 39: The United States should provide financial and +technical support and establish a single office in Iraq to coordinate +assistance to the Iraqi government and its expert advisors to aid a +program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members. + + + + +3. Security and Military Forces + +A Military Strategy for Iraq + +There is no action the American military can take that, by itself, can +bring about success in Iraq. But there are actions that the U.S. and +Iraqi governments, working together, can and should take to increase +the probability of avoiding disaster there, and increase the chance of +success. + +The Iraqi government should accelerate the urgently needed national +reconciliation program to which it has already committed. And it +should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by +increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. As the Iraqi +Army increases in size and capability, the Iraqi government should be +able to take real responsibility for governance. + +While this process is under way, and to facilitate it, the United +States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military +personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi +Army units. As these actions proceed, we could begin to move combat +forces out of Iraq. The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should +evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over +primary responsibility for combat operations. We should continue to +maintain support forces, rapid-reaction forces, special operations +forces, intelligence units, search-and-rescue units, and force +protection units. + +While the size and composition of the Iraqi Army is ultimately a +matter for the Iraqi government to determine, we should be firm on the +urgent near-term need for significant additional trained Army +brigades, since this is the key to Iraqis taking over full +responsibility for their own security, which they want to do and which +we need them to do. It is clear that they will still need security +assistance from the United States for some time to come as they work +to achieve political and security changes. + +One of the most important elements of our support would be the +imbedding of substantially more U.S. military personnel in all Iraqi +Army battalions and brigades, as well as within Iraqi companies. U.S. +personnel would provide advice, combat assistance, and staff +assistance. The training of Iraqi units by the United States has +improved and should continue for the coming year. In addition to this +training, Iraqi combat units need supervised on-the-job training as +they move to field operations. This on-the-job training could be best +done by imbedding more U.S. military personnel in Iraqi deployed +units. The number of imbedded personnel would be based on the +recommendation of our military commanders in Iraq, but it should be +large enough to accelerate the development of a real combat capability +in Iraqi Army units. Such a mission could involve 10,000 to 20,000 +American troops instead of the 3,000 to 4,000 now in this role. This +increase in imbedded troops could be carried out without an aggregate +increase over time in the total number of troops in Iraq by making a +corresponding decrease in troops assigned to U.S. combat brigades. + +Another mission of the U.S. military would be to assist Iraqi deployed +brigades with intelligence, transportation, air support, and logistics +support, as well as providing some key equipment. + +A vital mission of the U.S. military would be to maintain +rapid-reaction teams and special operations teams. These teams would be +available to undertake strike missions against al Qaeda in Iraq when +the opportunity arises, as well as for other missions considered vital +by the U.S. commander in Iraq. + +The performance of the Iraqi Army could also be significantly improved +if it had improved equipment. One source could be equipment left +behind by departing U.S. units. The quickest and most effective way +for the Iraqi Army to get the bulk of their equipment would be through +our Foreign Military Sales program, which they have already begun to +use. + +While these efforts are building up, and as additional Iraqi brigades +are being deployed, U.S. combat brigades could begin to move out of +Iraq. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments +in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not +necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq. At that time, +U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded +with Iraqi forces, in rapid-reaction and special operations teams, and +in training, equipping, advising, force protection, and search and +rescue. Intelligence and support efforts would continue. Even after +the United States has moved all combat brigades out of Iraq, we would +maintain a considerable military presence in the region, with our +still significant force in Iraq and with our powerful air, ground, and +naval deployments in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as an +increased presence in Afghanistan. These forces would be sufficiently +robust to permit the United States, working with the Iraqi government, +to accomplish four missions: + +--Provide political reassurance to the Iraqi government in order to +avoid its collapse and the disintegration of the country. + +--Fight al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations in Iraq using +special operations teams. + +--Train, equip, and support the Iraqi security forces. + +--Deter even more destructive interference in Iraq by Syria and Iran. + + +Because of the importance of Iraq to our regional security goals and +to our ongoing fight against al Qaeda, we considered proposals to make +a substantial increase (100,000 to 200,000) in the number of U.S. +troops in Iraq. We rejected this course because we do not believe that +the needed levels are available for a sustained deployment. Further, +adding more American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of +the security problem that are fed by the view that the U.S. presence +is intended to be a long-term "occupation." We could, however, support +a short-term redeployment or surge of American combat forces to +stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the training and equipping mission, +if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would be +effective. + +We also rejected the immediate withdrawal of our troops, because we +believe that so much is at stake. + +We believe that our recommended actions will give the Iraqi Army the +support it needs to have a reasonable chance to take responsibility +for Iraq's security. Given the ongoing deterioration in the security +situation, it is urgent to move as quickly as possible to have that +security role taken over by Iraqi security forces. + +The United States should not make an open-ended commitment to keep +large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq for three compelling +reasons. + +First, and most importantly, the United States faces other security +dangers in the world, and a continuing Iraqi commitment of American +ground forces at present levels will leave no reserve available to +meet other contingencies. On September 7, 2006, General James Jones, +our NATO commander, called for more troops in Afghanistan, where U.S. +and NATO forces are fighting a resurgence of al Qaeda and Taliban +forces. The United States should respond positively to that request, +and be prepared for other security contingencies, including those in +Iran and North Korea. + +Second, the long-term commitment of American ground forces to Iraq at +current levels is adversely affecting Army readiness, with less than a +third of the Army units currently at high readiness levels. The Army +is unlikely to be able to meet the next rotation of troops in Iraq +without undesirable changes in its deployment practices. The Army is +now considering breaking its compact with the National Guard and +Reserves that limits the number of years that these citizen-soldiers +can be deployed. Behind this short-term strain is the longer-term risk +that the ground forces will be impaired in ways that will take years +to reverse. + +And finally, an open-ended commitment of American forces would not +provide the Iraqi government the incentive it needs to take the +political actions that give Iraq the best chance of quelling sectarian +violence. In the absence of such an incentive, the Iraqi government +might continue to delay taking those difficult actions. + +While it is clear that the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is +moderating the violence, there is little evidence that the long-term +deployment of U.S. troops by itself has led or will lead to +fundamental improvements in the security situation. It is important to +recognize that there are no risk-free alternatives available to the +United States at this time. Reducing our combat troop commitments in +Iraq, whenever that occurs, undeniably creates risks, but leaving +those forces tied down in Iraq indefinitely creates its own set of +security risks. + + +RECOMMENDATION 40: The United States should not make an open-ended +commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 41: The United States must make it clear to the Iraqi +government that the United States could carry out its plans, including +planned redeployments, even if Iraq does not implement its planned +changes. America's other security needs and the future of our military +cannot be made hostage to the actions or inactions of the Iraqi +government. + +RECOMMENDATION 42: We should seek to complete the training and +equipping mission by the first quarter of 2008, as stated by General +George Casey on October 24, 2006. + +RECOMMENDATION 43: Military priorities in Iraq must change, with the +highest priority given to the training, equipping, advising, and +support mission and to counterterrorism operations. + +RECOMMENDATION 44: The most highly qualified U.S. officers and +military personnel should be assigned to the imbedded teams, and +American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company +level. The U.S. military should establish suitable career-enhancing +incentives for these officers and personnel. + +RECOMMENDATION 45: The United States should support more and better +equipment for the Iraqi Army by encouraging the Iraqi government to +accelerate its Foreign Military Sales requests and, as American combat +brigades move out of Iraq, by leaving behind some American equipment +for Iraqi forces. + + + +Restoring the U.S. Military + +We recognize that there are other results of the war in Iraq that have +great consequence for our nation. One consequence has been the stress +and uncertainty imposed on our military--the most professional and +proficient military in history. The United States will need its +military to protect U.S. security regardless of what happens in Iraq. +We therefore considered how to limit the adverse consequences of the +strain imposed on our military by the Iraq war. + +U.S. military forces, especially our ground forces, have been +stretched nearly to the breaking point by the repeated deployments in +Iraq, with attendant casualties (almost 3,000 dead and more than +21,000 wounded), greater difficulty in recruiting, and accelerated +wear on equipment. + +Additionally, the defense budget as a whole is in danger of disarray, +as supplemental funding winds down and reset costs become clear. It +will be a major challenge to meet ongoing requirements for other +current and future security threats that need to be accommodated +together with spending for operations and maintenance, reset, +personnel, and benefits for active duty and retired personnel. +Restoring the capability of our military forces should be a high +priority for the United States at this time. + +The U.S. military has a long tradition of strong partnership between +the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense and the uniformed +services. Both have long benefited from a relationship in which the +civilian leadership exercises control with the advantage of fully +candid professional advice, and the military serves loyally with the +understanding that its advice has been heard and valued. That +tradition has frayed, and civil-military relations need to be +repaired. + + +RECOMMENDATION 46: The new Secretary of Defense should make every +effort to build healthy civil-military relations, by creating an +environment in which the senior military feel free to offer +independent advice not only to the civilian leadership in the Pentagon +but also to the President and the National Security Council, as +envisioned in the Goldwater-Nichols legislation. + +RECOMMENDATION 47: As redeployment proceeds, the Pentagon leadership +should emphasize training and education programs for the forces that +have returned to the continental United States in order to "reset" the +force and restore the U.S. military to a high level of readiness for +global contingencies. + +RECOMMENDATION 48: As equipment returns to the United States, Congress +should appropriate sufficient funds to restore the equipment to full +functionality over the next five years. + +RECOMMENDATION 49: The administration, in full consultation with the +relevant committees of Congress, should assess the full future +budgetary impact of the war in Iraq and its potential impact on the +future readiness of the force, the ability to recruit and retain +high-quality personnel, needed investments in procurement and in research +and development, and the budgets of other U.S. government agencies +involved in the stability and reconstruction effort. + + + +4. Police and Criminal Justice + +The problems in the Iraqi police and criminal justice system are +profound. + +The ethos and training of Iraqi police forces must support the mission +to "protect and serve" all Iraqis. Today, far too many Iraqi police do +not embrace that mission, in part because of problems in how reforms +were organized and implemented by the Iraqi and U.S. governments. + + +Recommended Iraqi Actions + +Within Iraq, the failure of the police to restore order and prevent +militia infiltration is due, in part, to the poor organization of +Iraq's component police forces: the Iraqi National Police, the Iraqi +Border Police, and the Iraqi Police Service. + +The Iraqi National Police pursue a mission that is more military than +domestic in nature--involving commando-style operations--and is thus +ill-suited to the Ministry of the Interior. The more natural home for +the National Police is within the Ministry of Defense, which should be +the authority for counterinsurgency operations and heavily armed +forces. Though depriving the Ministry of the Interior of operational +forces, this move will place the Iraqi National Police under better +and more rigorous Iraqi and U.S. supervision and will enable these +units to better perform their counterinsurgency mission. + + +RECOMMENDATION 50: The entire Iraqi National Police should be +transferred to the Ministry of Defense, where the police commando +units will become part of the new Iraqi Army. + +Similarly, the Iraqi Border Police are charged with a role that bears +little resemblance to ordinary policing, especially in light of the +current flow of foreign fighters, insurgents, and weaponry across +Iraq's borders and the need for joint patrols of the border with +foreign militaries. Thus the natural home for the Border Police is +within the Ministry of Defense, which should be the authority for +controlling Iraq's borders. + +RECOMMENDATION 51: The entire Iraqi Border Police should be +transferred to the Ministry of Defense, which would have total +responsibility for border control and external security. + +The Iraqi Police Service, which operates in the provinces and provides +local policing, needs to become a true police force. It needs legal +authority, training, and equipment to control crime and protect Iraqi +citizens. Accomplishing those goals will not be easy, and the presence +of American advisors will be required to help the Iraqis determine a +new role for the police. + +RECOMMENDATION 52: The Iraqi Police Service should be given greater +responsibility to conduct criminal investigations and should expand +its cooperation with other elements in the Iraqi judicial system in +order to better control crime and protect Iraqi civilians. + +In order to more effectively administer the Iraqi Police Service, the +Ministry of the Interior needs to undertake substantial reforms to +purge bad elements and highlight best practices. Once the ministry +begins to function effectively, it can exert a positive influence over +the provinces and take back some of the authority that was lost to +local governments through decentralization. To reduce corruption and +militia infiltration, the Ministry of the Interior should take +authority from the local governments for the handling of policing +funds. Doing so will improve accountability and organizational +discipline, limit the authority of provincial police officials, and +identify police officers with the central government. + +RECOMMENDATION 53: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should undergo a +process of organizational transformation, including efforts to expand +the capability and reach of the current major crime unit (or Criminal +Investigation Division) and to exert more authority over local police +forces. The sole authority to pay police salaries and disburse +financial support to local police should be transferred to the +Ministry of the Interior. + +Finally, there is no alternative to bringing the Facilities Protection +Service under the control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. +Simply disbanding these units is not an option, as the members will +take their weapons and become full-time militiamen or insurgents. All +should be brought under the authority of a reformed Ministry of the +Interior. They will need to be vetted, retrained, and closely +supervised. Those who are no longer part of the Facilities Protection +Service need to participate in a disarmament, demobilization, and +reintegration program (outlined above). + +RECOMMENDATION 54: The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior should proceed +with current efforts to identify, register, and control the Facilities +Protection Service. + + + +U.S. Actions + +The Iraqi criminal justice system is weak, and the U.S. training +mission has been hindered by a lack of clarity and capacity. It has +not always been clear who is in charge of the police training mission, +and the U.S. military lacks expertise in certain areas pertaining to +police and the rule of law. The United States has been more successful +in training the Iraqi Army than it has the police. The U.S. Department +of Justice has the expertise and capacity to carry out the police +training mission. The U.S. Department of Defense is already bearing +too much of the burden in Iraq. Meanwhile, the pool of expertise in +the United States on policing and the rule of law has been +underutilized. + +The United States should adjust its training mission in Iraq to match +the recommended changes in the Iraqi government--the movement of the +National and Border Police to the Ministry of Defense and the new +emphasis on the Iraqi Police Service within the Ministry of the +Interior. To reflect the reorganization, the Department of Defense +would continue to train the Iraqi National and Border Police, and the +Department of Justice would become responsible for training the Iraqi +Police Service. + + +RECOMMENDATION 55: The U.S. Department of Defense should continue its +mission to train the Iraqi National Police and the Iraqi Border +Police, which should be placed within the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. + +RECOMMENDATION 56: The U.S. Department of Justice should direct the +training mission of the police forces remaining under the Ministry of +the Interior. + +RECOMMENDATION 57: Just as U.S. military training teams are imbedded +within Iraqi Army units, the current practice of imbedding U.S. police +trainers should be expanded and the numbers of civilian training +officers increased so that teams can cover all levels of the Iraqi +Police Service, including local police stations. These trainers should +be obtained from among experienced civilian police executives and +supervisors from around the world. These officers would replace the +military police personnel currently assigned to training teams. + +The Federal Bureau of Investigation has provided personnel to train +the Criminal Investigation Division in the Ministry of the Interior, +which handles major crimes. The FBI has also fielded a large team +within Iraq for counterterrorism activities. + +Building on this experience, the training programs should be expanded +and should include the development of forensic investigation training +and facilities that could apply scientific and technical investigative +methods to counterterrorism as well as to ordinary criminal activity. + +RECOMMENDATION 58: The FBI should expand its investigative and +forensic training and facilities within Iraq, to include coverage of +terrorism as well as criminal activity. + +One of the major deficiencies of the Iraqi Police Service is its lack +of equipment, particularly in the area of communications and motor +transport. + +RECOMMENDATION 59: The Iraqi government should provide funds to expand +and upgrade communications equipment and motor vehicles for the Iraqi +Police Service. + +The Department of Justice is also better suited than the Department of +Defense to carry out the mission of reforming Iraq's Ministry of the +Interior and Iraq's judicial system. Iraq needs more than training for +cops on the beat: it needs courts, trained prosecutors and +investigators, and the ability to protect Iraqi judicial officials. + +RECOMMENDATION 60: The U.S. Department of Justice should lead the work +of organizational transformation in the Ministry of the Interior. This +approach must involve Iraqi officials, starting at senior levels and +moving down, to create a strategic plan and work out standard +administrative procedures, codes of conduct, and operational measures +that Iraqis will accept and use. These plans must be drawn up in +partnership. + +RECOMMENDATION 61: Programs led by the U.S. Department of Justice to +establish courts; to train judges, prosecutors, and investigators; and +to create institutions and practices to fight corruption must be +strongly supported and funded. New and refurbished courthouses with +improved physical security, secure housing for judges and judicial +staff, witness protection facilities, and a new Iraqi Marshals Service +are essential parts of a secure and functioning system of justice. + + + +5. The Oil Sector + +Since the success of the oil sector is critical to the success of the +Iraqi economy, the United States must do what it can to help Iraq +maximize its capability. + +Iraq, a country with promising oil potential, could restore oil +production from existing fields to 3.0 to 3.5 million barrels a day +over a three-to five-year period, depending on evolving conditions in +key reservoirs. Even if Iraq were at peace tomorrow, oil production +would decline unless current problems in the oil sector were +addressed. + + +Short Term + +RECOMMENDATION 62: + +--As soon as possible, the U.S. government should provide technical +assistance to the Iraqi government to prepare a draft oil law that +defines the rights of regional and local governments and creates a +fiscal and legal framework for investment. Legal clarity is essential +to attract investment. + +--The U.S. government should encourage the Iraqi government to +accelerate contracting for the comprehensive well work-overs in the +southern fields needed to increase production, but the United States +should no longer fund such infrastructure projects. + +--The U.S. military should work with the Iraqi military and with +private security forces to protect oil infrastructure and contractors. +Protective measures could include a program to improve pipeline +security by paying local tribes solely on the basis of throughput +(rather than fixed amounts). + +--Metering should be implemented at both ends of the supply line. This +step would immediately improve accountability in the oil sector. + +--In conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, the U.S. +government should press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the +energy sector, instead of providing grant assistance. Until Iraqis pay +market prices for oil products, drastic fuel shortages will remain. + + +Long Term + +Expanding oil production in Iraq over the long term will require +creating corporate structures, establishing management systems, and +installing competent managers to plan and oversee an ambitious list of +major oil-field investment projects. + +To improve oil-sector performance, the Study Group puts forward the +following recommendations. + +RECOMMENDATION 63: + +--The United States should encourage investment in Iraq's oil sector +by the international community and by international energy companies. + +--The United States should assist Iraqi leaders to reorganize the +national oil industry as a commercial enterprise, in order to enhance +efficiency, transparency, and accountability. + +--To combat corruption, the U.S. government should urge the Iraqi +government to post all oil contracts, volumes, and prices on the Web +so that Iraqis and outside observers can track exports and export +revenues. + +--The United States should support the World Bank's efforts to ensure +that best practices are used in contracting. This support involves +providing Iraqi officials with contracting templates and training them +in contracting, auditing, and reviewing audits. + +--The United States should provide technical assistance to the +Ministry of Oil for enhancing maintenance, improving the payments +process, managing cash flows, contracting and auditing, and updating +professional training programs for management and technical personnel. + + + +6. U.S. Economic and Reconstruction Assistance + +Building the capacity of the Iraqi government should be at the heart +of U.S. reconstruction efforts, and capacity building demands +additional U.S. resources. + +Progress in providing essential government services is necessary to +sustain any progress on the political or security front. The period of +large U.S.-funded reconstruction projects is over, yet the Iraqi +government is still in great need of technical assistance and advice +to build the capacity of its institutions. The Iraqi government needs +help with all aspects of its operations, including improved +procedures, greater delegation of authority, and better internal +controls. The strong emphasis on building capable central ministries +must be accompanied by efforts to develop functioning, effective +provincial government institutions with local citizen participation. + +Job creation is also essential. There is no substitute for private-sector +job generation, but the Commander's Emergency Response Program +is a necessary transitional mechanism until security and the economic +climate improve. It provides immediate economic assistance for trash +pickup, water, sewers, and electricity in conjunction with clear, +hold, and build operations, and it should be funded generously. A +total of $753 million was appropriated for this program in FY 2006. + + +RECOMMENDATION 64: U.S. economic assistance should be increased to a +level of $5 billion per year rather than being permitted to decline. +The President needs to ask for the necessary resources and must work +hard to win the support of Congress. Capacity building and job +creation, including reliance on the Commander's Emergency Response +Program, should be U.S. priorities. Economic assistance should be +provided on a nonsectarian basis. + +The New Diplomatic Offensive can help draw in more international +partners to assist with the reconstruction mission. The United +Nations, the World Bank, the European Union, the Organization for +Economic Cooperation and Development, and some Arab League members +need to become hands-on participants in Iraq's reconstruction. + +RECOMMENDATION 65: An essential part of reconstruction efforts in Iraq +should be greater involvement by and with international partners, who +should do more than just contribute money. They should also actively +participate in the design and construction of projects. + +The number of refugees and internally displaced persons within Iraq is +increasing dramatically. If this situation is not addressed, Iraq and +the region could be further destabilized, and the humanitarian +suffering could be severe. Funding for international relief efforts is +insufficient, and should be increased. + +RECOMMENDATION 66: The United States should take the lead in funding +assistance requests from the United Nations High Commissioner for +Refugees, and other humanitarian agencies. + + + +Coordination of Economic and Reconstruction Assistance + +A lack of coordination by senior management in Washington still +hampers U.S. contributions to Iraq's reconstruction. + +Focus, priority setting, and skillful implementation are in short +supply. No single official is assigned responsibility or held +accountable for the overall reconstruction effort. Representatives of +key foreign partners involved in reconstruction have also spoken to us +directly and specifically about the need for a point of contact that +can coordinate their efforts with the U.S. government. + +A failure to improve coordination will result in agencies continuing +to follow conflicting strategies, wasting taxpayer dollars on +duplicative and uncoordinated efforts. This waste will further +undermine public confidence in U.S. policy in Iraq. + +A Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq is required. He +or she should report to the President, be given a staff and funding, +and chair a National Security Council interagency group consisting of +senior principals at the undersecretary level from all relevant U.S. +government departments and agencies. The Senior Advisor's +responsibility must be to bring unity of effort to the policy, budget, +and implementation of economic reconstruction programs in Iraq. The +Senior Advisor must act as the principal point of contact with U.S. +partners in the overall reconstruction effort. + +He or she must have close and constant interaction with senior U.S. +officials and military commanders in Iraq, especially the Director of +the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office, so that the realities +on the ground are brought directly and fully into the policy-making +process. In order to maximize the effectiveness of assistance, all +involved must be on the same page at all times. + + +RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for +Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. ATION 67: The President should create +a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. + + + +Improving the Effectiveness of Assistance Programs + +Congress should work with the administration to improve its ability to +implement assistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly, and +effectively. + +As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the +authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to promote national +reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding from programs and +projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating +effective partnership. These are important tools to improve +performance and accountability--as is the work of the Special +Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. + + +RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the +authority to spend significant funds through a program structured +along the lines of the Commander's Emergency Response Program, and +should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and +projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating +effective partnership. + +RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for +Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of assistance +programs in Iraq. + +U.S. security assistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably by +the differing requirements of State and Defense Department programs +and of their respective congressional oversight committees. Since +Iraqi forces must be trained and equipped, streamlining the provision +of training and equipment to Iraq is critical. Security assistance +should be delivered promptly, within weeks of a decision to provide +it. + +RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security assistance program for +Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, +should be authorized and implemented. + +The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage +U.S. partnerships with international donors and Iraqi participants to +promote reconstruction. The ability of the United States to form such +partnerships will encourage greater international participation in +Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from +international donors and Iraqi participants on behalf of assistance +projects should be provided. + + + +7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review + +The public interest is not well served by the government's +preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war in +Iraq. + +First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budget +request but in requests for emergency supplemental appropriations. +This means that funding requests are drawn up outside the normal +budget process, are not offset by budgetary reductions elsewhere, and +move quickly to the White House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the +normal review erodes budget discipline and accountability. + +Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in a confusing +manner, making it difficult for both the general public and members of +Congress to understand the request or to differentiate it from +counterterrorism operations around the world or operations in +Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget experts are needed to answer +what should be a simple question: "How much money is the President +requesting for the war in Iraq?" + +Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive branch +erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing committees +(including the House and Senate Armed Services committees) spend the +better part of a year reviewing the President's annual budget request. +When the President submits an emergency supplemental request, the +authorizing committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the +appropriations committees, and they are pressured by the need to act +quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds. The +result is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory +review. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes loaded +with special spending projects that would not survive the normal +review process. + + +RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the +President's annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in +its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be +circumvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented +clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out +its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for the +war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight. + + + +8. U.S. Personnel + +The United States can take several steps to ensure that it has +personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq. + +All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by +Americans' lack of language and cultural understanding. Our embassy of +1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of +fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient +communication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There are +still far too few Arab language--proficient military and civilian +officers in Iraq, to the detriment of the U.S. mission. + +Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex overseas +interventions to restore and maintain order--stability +operations--outside of the normal embassy setting. The nature of the +mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the United States has +had great difficulty filling civilian assignments in Iraq with sufficient +numbers of properly trained personnel at the appropriate rank. + + +RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, +and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highest +possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural +training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel +about to be assigned to Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians +volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill +those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to +mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed +assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for +U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government +needs to improve how its constituent agencies--Defense, State, Agency +for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence +community, and others--respond to a complex stability operation like +that represented by this decade's Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the +previous decade's operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, +and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the +Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S. +armed services. + +RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to +carry out civilian tasks associated with a complex stability operation +outside of the traditional embassy setting. It should establish a +Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide +surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, +including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar +technical assistance capabilities. + + + +9. Intelligence + +While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes +superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still +does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the +role of the militias. + +A senior commander told us that human intelligence in Iraq has +improved from 10 percent to 30 percent. Clearly, U.S. intelligence +agencies can and must do better. As mentioned above, an essential part +of better intelligence must be improved language and cultural skills. +As an intelligence analyst told us, "We rely too much on others to +bring information to us, and too often don't understand what is +reported back because we do not understand the context of what we are +told." + +The Defense Department and the intelligence community have not +invested sufficient people and resources to understand the political +and military threat to American men and women in the armed forces. +Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for +countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised +explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a +request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the +people who fabricate, plant, and explode those devices. + +We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the job at the +Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two years' experience +in analyzing the insurgency. Capable analysts are rotated to new +assignments, and on-the-job training begins anew. Agencies must have a +better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the +insurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect +it, and understand it on a national and provincial level. The analytic +community's knowledge of the organization, leadership, financing, and +operations of militias, as well as their relationship to government +security forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to +know. + +In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in +Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep +events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not +necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of +a sectarian attack, that assault does not make it into the database. A +roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn't hurt U.S. +personnel doesn't count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there +were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a +careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light +1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when +information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its +discrepancy with policy goals. + + +RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the +Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater analytic +resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of +violence in Iraq. + +RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the +Secretary of Defense should also institute immediate changes in the +collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq +to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground. + + + +Recommended Iraqi Actions + +The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, +initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take full +responsibility for this intelligence function. + +To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the CIA should +increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel. +The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorism +intelligence center for the all-source fusion of information on the +various sources of terrorism within Iraq. This center would analyze +data concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and support +groups involved in terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate +intelligence-led police and military actions against them. + + +RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq +to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a +counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate +intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts. + + + + +Appendices + + + +Letter from the Sponsoring Organizations + +The initiative for a bipartisan, independent, forward-looking +"fresh-eyes" assessment of Iraq emerged from conversations U.S. House +Appropriations Committee Member Frank Wolf had with us. In late 2005, +Congressman Wolf asked the United States Institute of Peace, a +bipartisan federal entity, to facilitate the assessment, in +collaboration with the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy +at Rice University, the Center for the Study of the Presidency, and +the Center for Strategic and International Studies. + +Interested members of Congress, in consultation with the sponsoring +organizations and the administration, agreed that former Republican +U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III and former Democratic +Congressman Lee H. Hamilton had the breadth of knowledge of foreign +affairs required to co-chair this bipartisan effort. The co-chairs +subsequently selected the other members of the bipartisan Iraq Study +Group, all senior individuals with distinguished records of public +service. Democrats included former Secretary of Defense William J. +Perry, former Governor and U.S. Senator Charles S. Robb, former +Congressman and White House chief of staff Leon E. Panetta, and Vernon +E. Jordan, Jr., advisor to President Bill Clinton. Republicans +included former Associate Justice to the U.S. Supreme Court Sandra Day +O'Connor, former U.S. Senator Alan K. Simpson, former Attorney General +Edwin Meese III, and former Secretary of State Lawrence S. +Eagleburger. Former CIA Director Robert Gates was an active member for +a period of months until his nomination as Secretary of Defense. + +The Iraq Study Group was launched on March 15, 2006, in a Capitol Hill +meeting hosted by U.S. Senator John Warner and attended by +congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle. + +To support the Study Group, the sponsoring organizations created four +expert working groups consisting of 44 leading foreign policy analysts +and specialists on Iraq. The working groups, led by staff of the +United States Institute of Peace, focused on the Strategic +Environment, Military and Security Issues, Political Development, and +the Economy and Reconstruction. Every effort was made to ensure the +participation of experts across a wide span of the political spectrum. +Additionally, a panel of retired military officers was consulted. + +We are grateful to all those who have assisted the Study Group, +especially the supporting experts and staff. Our thanks go to Daniel +P. Serwer of the Institute of Peace, who served as executive director; +Christopher Kojm, advisor to the Study Group; John Williams, Policy +Assistant to Mr. Baker; and Ben Rhodes, Special Assistant to Mr. +Hamilton. + + Richard H. Solomon, President + United States Institute of Peace + + Edward P. Djerejian, Founding Director + James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, + Rice University + + David M. Abshire, President + Center for the Study of the Presidency + + John J. Hamre, President + Center for Strategic and International Studies + + + + +Iraq Study Group Plenary Sessions + + March 15, 2006 + April 11-12, 2006 + May 18-19, 2005 + June 13-14, 2006 August 2-3, 2006 + August 30-September 4, 2006 (Trip to Baghdad) + September 18-19, 2006 + November 13-14, 2006 + November 27-29, 2006 + + + + +Iraq Study Group Consultations + +(* denotes a meeting that took place in Iraq) + + +Iraqi Officials and Representatives + + *Jalal Talabani--President + *Tariq al-Hashimi--Vice President + *Adil Abd al-Mahdi--Vice President + *Nouri Kamal al-Maliki--Prime Minister + *Salaam al-Zawbai--Deputy Prime Minister + *Barham Salih--Deputy Prime Minister + *Mahmoud al-Mashhadani--Speaker of the Parliament + *Mowaffak al-Rubaie--National Security Advisor + *Jawad Kadem al-Bolani--Minister of Interior + *Abdul Qader Al-Obeidi--Minister of Defense + *Hoshyar Zebari--Minister of Foreign Affairs + *Bayan Jabr--Minister of Finance + *Hussein al-Shahristani--Minister of Oil + *Karim Waheed--Minister of Electricity + *Akram al-Hakim--Minister of State for National + Reconciliation Affairs + *Mithal al-Alusi--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Ayad Jamal al-Din--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Ali Khalifa al-Duleimi--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Sami al-Ma'ajoon--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Muhammad Ahmed Mahmoud--Member, Commission on + National Reconciliation + *Wijdan Mikhael--Member, High Commission on + National Reconciliation + Lt. General Nasir Abadi--Deputy Chief of Staff of the + Iraqi Joint Forces + *Adnan al-Dulaimi--Head of the Tawafuq list + Ali Allawi--Former Minister of Finance + *Sheik Najeh al-Fetlawi--representative of Moqtada al-Sadr + *Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim--Shia Coalition Leader + *Sheik Maher al-Hamraa--Ayat Allah Said Sussein Al Sadar + *Hajim al-Hassani--Member of the Parliament on the Iraqiya list + *Hunain Mahmood Ahmed Al-Kaddo--President of the + Iraqi Minorities Council + *Abid al-Gufhoor Abid al-Razaq al-Kaisi--Dean of the + Islamic University of the Imam Al-Atham + *Ali Neema Mohammed Aifan al-Mahawili--Rafiday Al-Iraq + Al-Jaded Foundation + *Saleh al-Mutlaq--Leader of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue + *Ayyad al-Sammara'l--Member of the Parliament + *Yonadim Kenna--Member of the Parliament and Secretary General + of Assyrian Movement + *Shahla Wali Mohammed--Iraqi Counterpart International + *Hamid Majid Musa--Secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party + *Raid Khyutab Muhemeed--Humanitarian, Cultural, + and Social Foundation + Sinan Shabibi--Governor of the Central Bank of Iraq + Samir Shakir M. Sumaidaie--Ambassador of Iraq to the United States + + +Current U.S. Administration Officials + +Senior Administration Officials + + George W. Bush--President + Richard B. Cheney--Vice President + Condoleezza Rice--Secretary of State + Donald H. Rumsfeld--Secretary of Defense + Stephen J. Hadley--National Security Advisor + Joshua B. Bolten--White House Chief of Staff + + +Department of Defense/Military + +CIVILIAN: + Gordon England--Deputy Secretary of Defense + Stephen Cambone--Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence + Eric Edelman--Under Secretary of Defense for Policy + +MILITARY: + General Peter Pace--Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff + Admiral Edmund Giambastiani--Vice-Chairman of the + Joint Chiefs of Staff + General John Abizaid--Commander, United States Central Command + *General George W. Casey, Jr.--Commanding General, + Multi-National Forces-Iraq + Lt. General James T. Conway--Director of Operations, J-3, + on the Joint Staff + *Lt. General Peter Chiarelli--Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq + Lt. General David H. Petraeus--Commanding General, + U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth + *Lt. General Martin Dempsey--Commander Multi-National Security + Transition Command-Iraq + *Maj. General Joseph Peterson--Coalition Police Assistance + Training Team + *Maj. General Richard Zilmer--Commander, 1st Marine + Expeditionary Force + Colonel Derek Harvey--Senior Intelligence Officer for Iraq, + Defense Intelligence Agency + Lt. Colonel Richard Bowyer--National War College + (recently served in Iraq) + Lt. Colonel Justin Gubler--National War College + (recently served in Iraq) + Lt. Colonel David Haight--National War College + (recently served in Iraq) + Lt. Colonel Russell Smith--National War College + (recently served in Iraq) + + +Department of State/Civilian Embassy Personnel + + R. Nicholas Burns--Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs + Philip Zelikow--Counselor to the Department of State + C. David Welch--Assistant Secretary of State for + Near Eastern Affairs + James Jeffrey--Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and + Coordinator for Iraq Policy + David Satterfield--Senior Advisor to Secretary Rice and + Coordinator for Iraq Policy + Zalmay Khalilzad--U.S. Ambassador to Iraq + *Dan Speckhard--Charge D'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Iraq + *Joseph Saloom--Director, Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office + *Hilda Arellano--U.S. Agency for International Development + Director in Iraq + *Terrance Kelly--Director, Office of Strategic Plans and Assessments + *Randall Bennett--Regional Security Officer of the U.S. Embassy, + Baghdad, Iraq + + +Intelligence Community + + John D. Negroponte--Director of National Intelligence + General Michael V. Hayden--Director, Central Intelligence Agency + Thomas Fingar--Deputy Director of National Intelligence for + Analysis and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council + John Sherman--Deputy National Intelligence Officer for + Military Issues + Steve Ward--Deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East + Jeff Wickham--Iraq Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency + + +Other Senior Officials + + David Walker--Comptroller General of the United States + *Stuart Bowen--Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction + + +Members of Congress + +United States Senate + + Senator William Frist (R-TN)--Majority Leader + Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)--Minority Leader + Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY)--Majority Whip + Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL)--Minority Whip + Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)--Chair, Foreign Relations Committee + Senator John Warner (R-VA)--Chair, Armed Services Committee + Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE)--Ranking Member, + Foreign Relations Committee + Senator Carl Levin (D-MI)--Ranking Member, Armed Services Committee + Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM)--Ranking Member, + Energy and Resources Committee + Senator Kit Bond (R-MO)--Member, Intelligence Committee + Senator James Inhofe (R-OK)--Member, Armed Services Committee + Senator John Kerry (D-MA)--Member, Foreign Relations Committee + Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)--Member, Armed Services Committee + Senator John McCain (R-AZ)--Member, Armed Services Committee + Senator Jack Reed (D-RI)--Member, Armed Services Committee + +United States House of Representatives + + Representative Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)--Minority Leader Representative + Tom Davis (R-VA)--Chair, Government Reform Committee + Representative Jane Harman (D-CA)--Ranking Member, + Intelligence Committee + Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO)--Ranking Member, + Armed Services Committee + Representative John Murtha (D-PA)--Ranking Member, + Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense + Representative Jim Cooper (D-TN)--Member, Armed Services Committee + Representative Michael McCaul (R-TX)--Member, + International Relations Committee + Representative Alan Mollohan (D-WV)--Member, + Appropriations Committee + Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT)--Member, + Government Reform Committee + Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA)--Member, Appropriations Committee + + +Foreign Officials + + Sheikh Salem al-Abdullah al-Sabah--Ambassador of Kuwait + to the United States + Michael Ambuhl--Secretary of State of Switzerland + Kofi Annan--Secretary-General of the United Nations + *Dominic Asquith--British Ambassador to Iraq + Tony Blair--Prime Minister of the United Kingdom + Prince Turki al-Faisal--Ambassador of Saudi Arabia + to the United States + Nabil Fahmy--Ambassador of Egypt to the United States + Karim Kawar--Ambassador of Jordan to the United States + Nasser bin Hamad al-Khalifa--Ambassador of Qatar + to the United States + *Mukhtar Lamani--Arab League envoy to Iraq + Sir David Manning--British Ambassador to the United States + Imad Moustapha--Ambassador of Syria to the United States + Walid Muallem--Foreign Minister of Syria + Romano Prodi--Prime Minister of Italy + *Ashraf Qazi--Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General + for Iraq + Anders Fogh Rasmussen--Prime Minister of Denmark + Nabi Sensoy--Ambassador of Turkey to the United States + Ephraim Sneh--Deputy Minister of Defense of the State of Israel + Javad Zarif--Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations + Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayad--Minister of Foreign Affairs + of the United Arab Emirates + + +Former Officials and Experts + + William J. Clinton--former President of the United States + Walter Mondale--former Vice President of the United States + Madeleine K. Albright--former United States Secretary of State + Warren Christopher--former United States Secretary of State + Henry Kissinger--former United States Secretary of State + Colin Powell--former United States Secretary of State + George P. Schultz--former United States Secretary of State + Samuel R. Berger--former United States National Security Advisor + Zbigniew Brzezinski--former United States National Security Advisor + Anthony Lake--former United States National Security Advisor + General Brent Scowcroft--former United States National + Security Advisor + General Eric Shinseki--former Chief of Staff of the + United States Army + General Anthony Zinni--former Commander, + United States Central Command + General John Keane--former Vice Chief of Staff of the + United States Army + Admiral Jim Ellis--former Commander of United States + Strategic Command + General Joe Ralston--former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO + Lt. General Roger C. Schultz--former Director + of the United States Army National Guard + Douglas Feith--former United States Under Secretary of Defense + for Policy + Mark Danner--The New York Review of Books + Larry Diamond--Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, + Stanford University + Thomas Friedman--New York Times + Leslie Gelb--President Emeritus, Council on Foreign Relations + Richard Hill--Director, Office of Strategic Initiatives + and Analysis, CHF International + Richard C. Holbrooke--former Ambassador of the United States + to the United Nations + Martin S. Indyk--Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, + The Brookings Institution + Ronald Johnson--Executive Vice President for International + Development, RTI International + Frederick Kagan--The American Enterprise Institute + Arthur Keys, Jr.--President and CEO, International Relief + and Development + William Kristol--The Weekly Standard + *Guy Laboa--Kellogg, Brown & Root + Nancy Lindborg--President, Mercy Corps + Michael O'Hanlon--Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, + The Brookings Institution + George Packer--The New Yorker + Carlos Pascual--Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy Studies, + The Brookings Institution + Robert Perito--Senior Program Officer, United States + Institute of Peace + *Col. Jack Petri, USA (Ret.)--advisor to the Iraqi + Ministry of Interior + Kenneth Pollack--Director of Research, Saban Center for + Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution + Thomas Ricks--The Washington Post + Zainab Salbi--Founder and CEO, Women for Women International + Matt Sherman--former Deputy Senior Advisor and Director of Policy, + Iraqi Ministry of Interior + Strobe Talbott--President, The Brookings Institution + Rabih Torbay--Vice President for International Operations, + International Medical Corps + George Will--The Washington Post + + +Expert Working Groups and Military Senior Advisor Panel + +Economy and Reconstruction + + Gary Matthews, USIP Secretariat + Director, Task Force on the United Nations and Special Projects, + United States Institute of Peace + + Raad Alkadiri + Director, Country Strategies Group, PFC Energy + + Frederick D. Barton + Senior Adviser and Co-Director, International Security Program, + Center for Strategic & International Studies + + Jay Collins + Chief Executive Officer, Public Sector Group, Citigroup, Inc. + + Jock P. Covey + Senior Vice President, External Affairs, Corporate Security + and Sustainability Services, Bechtel Corporation + + Keith Crane + Senior Economist, RAND Corporation + + Amy Myers Jaffe + Associate Director for Energy Studies, James A. Baker III Institute + for Public Policy, Rice University + + K. Riva Levinson + Managing Director, BKSH & Associates + + David A. Lipton + Managing Director and Head of Global Country Risk Management, + Citigroup, Inc + + Michael E. O'Hanlon + Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies, The Brookings Institution + + James A. Placke + Senior Associate, Cambridge Energy Research Associates + + James A. Schear + Director of Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, + National Defense University + + +Military and Security + + Paul Hughes, USIP Secretariat + Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and + Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace + + Hans A. Binnendijk + Director & Theodore Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology & + National Security Policy, National Defense University + + James Carafano + Senior Research Fellow, Defense and Homeland Security, Douglas + and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, + The Heritage Foundation + + Michael Eisenstadt + Director, Military & Security Program, The Washington Institute for + Near East Policy + + Michele A. Flournoy + Senior Advisor, International Security Program, Center for + Strategic & International Studies + + Bruce Hoffman + Professor, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of + Foreign Service, Georgetown University + + Clifford May + President, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies + + Robert M. Perito + Senior Program Officer, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and + Stability Operations, United States Institute of Peace + + Kalev I. Sepp + Assistant Professor, Department of Defense Analysis, Center + on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School + + John F. Sigler + Adjunct Distinguished Professor, Near East South Asia Center + for Strategic Studies, National Defense University + + W. Andrew Terrill + Research Professor, National Security Affairs, Strategic + Studies Institute + + Jeffrey A. White + Berrie Defense Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy + + +Political Development + + Daniel P. Serwer, USIP Secretariat + Vice President, Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability + Operations, United States Institute of Peace + + Raymond H. Close + Freelance Analyst and Commentator on Middle East Politics + + Larry Diamond Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, + Sanford University, and Co-Editor, Journal of Democracy + + Andrew P. N. Erdmann + Former Director for Iran, Iraq and Strategic Planning, + National Security Council + + Reuel Marc Gerecht + Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute + + David L. Mack + Vice President, The Middle East Institute + + Phebe A. Marr + Senior Fellow, United States Institute of Peace + + Hassan Mneimneh + Director, Documentation Program, The Iraq Memory Foundation + + Augustus Richard Norton + Professor of International Relations and Anthropology, + Department of International Relations, Boston University + + Marina S. Ottaway + Senior Associate, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, + Carnegie Endowment for International Peace + + Judy Van Rest + Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute + + Judith S. Yaphe + Distinguished Research Fellow for the Middle East, + Institute for National Strategic Studies, + National Defense University + + +Strategic Environment + + Paul Stares, USIP Secretariat + Vice President, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, + United States Institute of Peace + + Jon B. Alterman + Director, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic & + International Studies + + Steven A. Cook + Douglas Dillon Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations + + James F. Dobbins + Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, + RAND Corporation + + Hillel Fradkin + Director, Center for Islam, Democracy and the + Future of the Muslim World, Hudson Institute + + Chas W. Freeman + Chairman, Projects International and President, + Middle East Policy Council + + Geoffrey Kemp + Director, Regional Strategic Programs, The Nixon Center + + Daniel C. Kurtzer + S. Daniel Abraham Visiting Professor, Middle East Policy Studies, + Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University + + Ellen Laipson + President and CEO, The Henry L. Stimson Center + + William B. Quandt + Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. Professor of Government and + Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, and Nonresident Senior + Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, + The Brookings Institution + + Shibley Telhami + Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, + Department of Government & Politics, University of Maryland, + and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, + The Brookings Institution + + Wayne White + Adjunct Scholar, Public Policy Center, Middle East Institute + + +Military Senior Advisor Panel + + Admiral James O. Ellis, Jr. + United States Navy, Retired + + General John M. Keane + United States Army, Retired + + General Edward C. Meyer + United States Army, Retired + + General Joseph W. Ralston + United States Air Force, Retired + + Lieutenant General Roger C. Schultz, Sr. + United States Army, Retired + + + +The Iraq Study Group + +James A. Baker, III--Co-Chair + +James A. Baker, III, has served in senior government positions under +three United States presidents. He served as the nation's 61st +Secretary of State from January 1989 through August 1992 under +President George H. W. Bush. During his tenure at the State +Department, Mr. Baker traveled to 90 foreign countries as the United +States confronted the unprecedented challenges and opportunities of +the post-Cold War era. Mr. Baker's reflections on those years of +revolution, war, and peace--The Politics of Diplomacy--was published +in 1995. + +Mr. Baker served as the 67th Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 to +1988 under President Ronald Reagan. As Treasury Secretary, he was also +Chairman of the President's Economic Policy Council. From 1981 to +1985, he served as White House Chief of Staff to President Reagan. Mr. +Baker's record of public service began in 1975 as Under Secretary of +Commerce to President Gerald Ford. It concluded with his service as +White House Chief of Staff and Senior Counselor to President Bush from +August 1992 to January 1993. + +Long active in American presidential politics, Mr. Baker led +presidential campaigns for Presidents Ford, Reagan, and Bush over the +course of five consecutive presidential elections from 1976 to 1992. + +A native Houstonian, Mr. Baker graduated from Princeton University in +1952. After two years of active duty as a lieutenant in the United +States Marine Corps, he entered the University of Texas School of Law +at Austin. He received his J.D. with honors in 1957 and practiced law +with the Houston firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975. + +Mr. Baker's memoir--Work Hard, Study . . . and Keep Out of Politics! +Adventures and Lessons from an Unexpected Public Life--was published +in October 2006. + +Mr. Baker received the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1991 and has +been the recipient of many other awards for distinguished public +service, including Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson Award, the +American Institute for Public Service's Jefferson Award, Harvard +University's John F. Kennedy School of Government Award, the Hans J. +Morgenthau Award, the George F. Kennan Award, the Department of the +Treasury's Alexander Hamilton Award, the Department of State's +Distinguished Service Award, and numerous honorary academic degrees. + +Mr. Baker is presently a senior partner in the law firm of Baker +Botts. He is Honorary Chairman of the James A. Baker III Institute for +Public Policy at Rice University and serves on the board of the Howard +Hughes Medical Institute. From 1997 to 2004, Mr. Baker served as the +Personal Envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seek +a political solution to the conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Mr. +Baker was appointed Special Presidential Envoy for President George W. +Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt. In 2005, he was co-chair, with former +President Jimmy Carter, of the Commission on Federal Election Reform. +Since March 2006, Mr. Baker and former U.S. Congressman Lee H. +Hamilton have served as the co-chairs of the Iraq Study Group, a +bipartisan blue-ribbon panel on Iraq. + +Mr. Baker was born in Houston, Texas, in 1930. He and his wife, the +former Susan Garrett, currently reside in Houston, and have eight +children and seventeen grandchildren. Garrett, currently reside in +Houston, and have eight children and seventeen grandchildren. + + + +Lee H. Hamilton--Co-Chair + +Lee H. Hamilton became Director of the Woodrow Wilson International +Center for Scholars in January 1999. Previously, Mr. Hamilton served +for thirty-four years as a United States Congressman from Indiana. +During his tenure, he served as Chairman and Ranking Member of the +House Committee on Foreign Affairs (now the Committee on International +Relations) and chaired the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East +from the early 1970s until 1993. He was Chairman of the Permanent +Select Committee on Intelligence and the Select Committee to +Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran. + +Also a leading figure on economic policy and congressional +organization, he served as Chair of the Joint Economic Committee as +well as the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, and was a +member of the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee. In his +home state of Indiana, Mr. Hamilton worked hard to improve education, +job training, and infrastructure. Currently, Mr. Hamilton serves as +Director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, which seeks +to educate citizens on the importance of Congress and on how Congress +operates within our government. + +Mr. Hamilton remains an important and active voice on matters of +international relations and American national security. He served as a +Commissioner on the United States Commission on National Security in +the 21st Century (better known as the Hart-Rudman Commission), was +Co-Chair with former Senator Howard Baker of the Baker-Hamilton +Commission to Investigate Certain Security Issues at Los Alamos, and +was Vice-Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon +the United States (the 9/11 Commission), which issued its report in +July 2004. He is currently a member of the President's Foreign +Intelligence Advisory Board and the President's Homeland Security +Advisory Council, as well as the Director of the Federal Bureau of +Investigation's Advisory Board. + +Born in Daytona Beach, Florida, Mr. Hamilton relocated with his family +to Tennessee and then to Evansville, Indiana. Mr. Hamilton is a +graduate of DePauw University and the Indiana University School of +Law, and studied for a year at Goethe University in Germany. Before +his election to Congress, he practiced law in Chicago and in Columbus, +Indiana. A former high school and college basketball star, he has been +inducted into the Indiana Basketball Hall of Fame. + +Mr. Hamilton's distinguished service in government has been honored +through numerous awards in public service and human rights as well as +honorary degrees. He is the author of A Creative Tension--The Foreign +Policy Roles of the President and Congress (2002) and How Congress +Works and Why You Should Care (2004), and the coauthor of Without +Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission (2006). + +Lee and his wife, the former Nancy Ann Nelson, have three children-- +Tracy Lynn Souza, Deborah Hamilton Kremer, and Douglas Nelson +Hamilton--and five grandchildren: Christina, Maria, McLouis and +Patricia Souza and Lina Ying Kremer. + + + +Lawrence S. Eagleburger--Member + +Lawrence S. Eagleburger was sworn in as the 62nd U.S. Secretary of +State by President George H. W. Bush on December 8, 1992, and as +Deputy Secretary of State on March 20, 1989. + +After his entry into the Foreign Service in 1957, Mr. Eagleburger +served in the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in the State +Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, in the U.S. Embassy in +Belgrade, and the U.S. Mission to NATO in Belgium. In 1963, after a +severe earthquake in Macedonia, he led the U.S. government effort to +provide medical and other assistance. He was then assigned to +Washington, D.C., where he served on the Secretariat staff and as +special assistant to Dean Acheson, advisor to the President on +Franco-NATO issues. In August 1966, he became acting director of the +Secretariat staff. + +In October 1966, Mr. Eagleburger joined the National Security Council +staff. In October 1967, he was assigned as special assistant to Under +Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. In November 1968, he was +appointed Dr. Henry Kissinger's assistant, and in January 1969, he +became executive assistant to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. In +September 1969, he was assigned as political advisor and chief of the +political section of the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels. + +Mr. Eagleburger became Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in August +1971. Two years later, he became Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense +for International Security Affairs. The same year he returned to the +White House as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security +Operations. He subsequently followed Dr. Kissinger to the State +Department, becoming Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State. In +1975, he was made Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management. + +In June 1977, Mr. Eagleburger was appointed Ambassador to Yugoslavia, +and in 1981 he was nominated as Assistant Secretary of State for +European Affairs. In February 1982, he was appointed Under Secretary +of State for Political Affairs. + +Mr. Eagleburger has received numerous awards, including an honorary +knighthood from Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II (1994); the +Distinguished Service Award (1992), the Wilbur J. Carr Award (1984), +and the Distinguished Honor Award (1984) from the Department of State; +the Distinguished Civilian Service Medal from the Department of +Defense (1978); and the President's Award for Distinguished Federal +Civilian Service (1976). + +After retiring from the Department of State in May 1984, Mr. +Eagleburger was named president of Kissinger Associates, Inc. +Following his resignation as Secretary of State on January 19, 1993, +he joined the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman and Caldwell as +Senior Foreign Policy Advisor. He joined the boards of Halliburton +Company, Phillips Petroleum Company, and Universal Corporation. Mr. +Eagleburger currently serves as Chairman of the International +Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims. + +He received his B.S. degree in 1952 and his M.S. degree in 1957, both +from the University of Wisconsin, and served as first lieutenant in +the U.S. Army from 1952 to 1954. Mr. Eagleburger is married to the +former Marlene Ann Heinemann. He is the father of three sons, Lawrence +Scott, Lawrence Andrew, and Lawrence Jason. + + + +Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.--Member + +Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., is a Senior Managing Director of Lazard Freres +& Co, LLC in New York. He works with a diverse group of clients across +a broad range of industries. + +Prior to joining Lazard, Mr. Jordan was a Senior Executive Partner +with the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, where he +remains Senior Counsel. While there Mr. Jordan practiced general, +corporate, legislative, and international law in Washington, D.C. + +Before Akin Gump, Mr. Jordan held the following positions: President +and Chief Executive Officer of the National Urban League, Inc.; +Executive Director of the United Negro College Fund, Inc.; Director of +the Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional Council; +Attorney-Consultant, U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity; Assistant to +the Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council; Georgia Field +Director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored +People; and an attorney in private practice in Arkansas and Georgia. + +Mr. Jordan's presidential appointments include the President's +Advisory Committee for the Points of Light Initiative Foundation, the +Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa, the Advisory +Council on Social Security, the Presidential Clemency Board, the +American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, the National Advisory +Committee on Selective Service, and the Council of the White House +Conference "To Fulfill These Rights." In 1992, Mr. Jordan served as +the Chairman of the Clinton Presidential Transition Team. + +Mr. Jordan's corporate and other directorships include American +Express Company; Asbury Automotive Group, Inc.; Howard University +(Trustee); J. C. Penney Company, Inc.; Lazard Ltd.; Xerox Corporation; +and the International Advisory Board of Barrick Gold. + +Mr. Jordan is a graduate of DePauw University and the Howard +University Law School. He holds honorary degrees from more than 60 +colleges and universities in America. He is a member of the bars of +Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Georgia, and the U.S. Supreme +Court. He is a member of the American Bar Association, the National +Bar Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Bilderberg +Meetings and he is President of the Economic Club of Washington, D.C. +Mr. Jordan is the author of Vernon Can Read! A Memoir (Public Affairs, +2001). + + + +Edwin Meese III--Member + +Edwin Meese III holds the Ronald Reagan Chair in Public Policy at the +Heritage Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based public policy research +and education institution. He is also the Chairman of Heritage's +Center for Legal and Judicial Studies and a distinguished visiting +fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. In addition, +Meese lectures, writes, and consults throughout the United States on a +variety of subjects. + +Meese is the author of With Reagan: The Inside Story, which was +published by Regnery Gateway in June 1992; co-editor of Making America +Safer, published in 1997 by the Heritage Foundation; and coauthor of +Leadership, Ethics and Policing, published by Prentice Hall in 2004. + +Meese served as the 75th Attorney General of the United States from +February 1985 to August 1988. As the nation's chief law enforcement +officer, he directed the Department of Justice and led international +efforts to combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and organized crime. In +1985 he received Government Executive magazine's annual award for +excellence in management. + +From January 1981 to February 1985, Meese held the position of +Counsellor to the President, the senior position on the White House +staff, where he functioned as the President's chief policy advisor. As +Attorney General and as Counsellor, Meese was a member of the +President's cabinet and the National Security Council. He served as +Chairman of the Domestic Policy Council and of the National Drug +Policy Board. Meese headed the President-elect's transition effort +following the November 1980 election. During the presidential +campaign, he served as chief of staff and senior issues advisor for +the Reagan-Bush Committee. + +Formerly, Meese served as Governor Reagan's executive assistant and +chief of staff in California from 1969 through 1974 and as legal +affairs secretary from 1967 through 1968. Before joining Governor +Reagan's staff in 1967, Meese served as deputy district attorney in +Alameda County, California. From 1977 to 1981, Meese was a professor +of law at the University of San Diego, where he also was Director of +the Center for Criminal Justice Policy and Management. + +In addition to his background as a lawyer, educator, and public +official, Meese has been a business executive in the aerospace and +transportation industry, serving as vice president for administration +of Rohr Industries, Inc., in Chula Vista, California. He left Rohr to +return to the practice of law, engaging in corporate and general legal +work in San Diego County. + +Meese is a graduate of Yale University, Class of 1953, and holds a law +degree from the University of California at Berkeley. He is a retired +colonel in the United States Army Reserve. He is active in numerous +civic and educational organizations. Meese is married, has two grown +children, and resides in McLean, Virginia. + + + +Sandra Day O'Connor--Member + +Sandra Day O'Connor was nominated by President Reagan as Associate +Justice of the United States Supreme Court on July 7, 1981, and took +the oath of office on September 25. O'Connor previously served on the +Arizona Court of Appeals (1979-81) and as judge of the Maricopa County +Superior Court in Phoenix, Arizona (1975-79). She was appointed as +Arizona state senator in 1969 and was subsequently elected to two +two-year terms from 1969 to 1975. During her tenure, she was Arizona +Senate Majority Leader and Chairman of the State, County, and +Municipal Affairs Committee, and she served on the Legislative +Council, on the Probate Code Commission, and on the Arizona Advisory +Council on Intergovernmental Relations. + +From 1965 to 1969, O'Connor was assistant attorney general in Arizona. +She practiced law at a private firm in Maryvale, Arizona, from 1958 to +1960 and prior to that was civilian attorney for Quartermaster Market +Center in Frankfurt, Germany (1954-57), and deputy county attorney in +San Mateo County, California (1952-53) + +She was previously Chairman of the Arizona Supreme Court Committee to +Reorganize Lower Courts (1974-75), Vice Chairman of the Arizona Select +Law Enforcement Review Commission (1979-80), and, in Maricopa County, +Chairman of the Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service (1960-62), the +Juvenile Detention Home Visiting Board (1963-64), and the Superior +Court Judges' Training and Education Committee (1977-79) and a member +of the Board of Adjustments and Appeals (1963-64). + +O'Connor currently serves as Chancellor of the College of William and +Mary and on the Board of Trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation, the +Executive Board of the Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative, +the Advisory Board of the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural +History, and the Advisory Committee of the American Society of +International Law, Judicial. She is an honorary member of the Advisory +Committee for the Judiciary Leadership Development Council, an +honorary chair of America's 400th Anniversary: Jamestown 2007, a +co-chair of the National Advisory Council of the Campaign for the Civic +Mission of Schools, a member of the Selection Committee of the +Oklahoma City National Memorial & Museum, and a member of the Advisory +Board of the Stanford Center on Ethics. She also serves on several +bodies of the American Bar Association, including the Museum of Law +Executive Committee, the Commission on Civic Education and Separation +of Powers, and the Advisory Commission of the Standing Committee on +the Law Library of Congress. + +O'Connor previously served as a member of the Anglo-American Exchange +(1980); the State Bar of Arizona Committees on Legal Aid, Public +Relations, Lower Court Reorganization, and Continuing Legal Education; +the National Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services +(1974-76); the Arizona State Personnel Commission (1968-69); the +Arizona Criminal Code Commission (1974-76); and the Cathedral Chapter +of the Washington National Cathedral (1991-99). + +O'Connor is a member of the American Bar Association, the State Bar of +Arizona, the State Bar of California, the Maricopa County Bar +Association, the Arizona Judges' Association, the National Association +of Women Judges, and the Arizona Women Lawyers' Association. She holds +a B.A. (with Great Distinction) and an LL.B. (Order of the Coif) from +Stanford University, where she was also a member of the board of +editors of the Stanford Law Review. + + + +Leon E. Panetta--Member + +Leon E. Panetta currently co-directs the Leon & Sylvia Panetta +Institute for Public Policy, a nonpartisan study center for the +advancement of public policy based at California State University, +Monterey Bay. He serves as distinguished scholar to the chancellor of +the California State University system, teaches a Master's in Public +Policy course at the Panetta Institute, is a presidential professor at +Santa Clara University, and created the Leon Panetta Lecture Series. + +Panetta first went to Washington in 1966, when he served as a +legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel of California. +In 1969, he became Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, +Education and Welfare and then Director of the U.S. Office for Civil +Rights. His book Bring Us Together (published in 1971) is an account +of that experience. In 1970, he went to New York City, where he served +as Executive Assistant to Mayor John Lindsay. Then, in 1971, Panetta +returned to California, where he practiced law in the Monterey firm of +Panetta, Thompson & Panetta until he was elected to Congress in 1976. + +Panetta was a U.S. Representative from California's 16th (now 17th) +district from 1977 to 1993. He authored the Hunger Prevention Act of +1988, the Fair Employment Practices Resolution, legislation that +established Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for hospice care for +the terminally ill, and other legislation on a variety of education, +health, agriculture, and defense issues. + +From 1989 to 1993, Panetta was Chairman of the House Committee on the +Budget. He also served on that committee from 1979 to 1985. He chaired +the House Agriculture Committee's Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, +Consumer Relations and Nutrition; the House Administration Committee's +Subcommittee on Personnel and Police; and the Select Committee on +Hunger's Task Force on Domestic Hunger. He also served as Vice +Chairman of the Caucus of Vietnam Era Veterans in Congress and as a +member of the President's Commission on Foreign Language and +International Studies. + +Panetta left Congress in 1993 to become Director of the Office of +Management and Budget for the incoming Clinton administration. Panetta +was appointed Chief of Staff to the President of the United States on +July 17, 1994, and served in that position until January 20, 1997. + +In addition, Panetta served a six-year term on the Board of Directors +of the New York Stock Exchange beginning in 1997. He currently serves +on many public policy and organizational boards, including as Chair of +the Pew Oceans Commission and Co-Chair of the California Council on +Base Support and Retention. + +Panetta has received many awards and honors, including the Smithsonian +Paul Peck Award for Service to the Presidency, the John H. Chafee +Coastal Stewardship Award, the Julius A. Stratton Award for Coastal +Leadership, and the Distinguished Public Service Medal from the Center +for the Study of the Presidency. + +He earned a B.A. magna cum laude from Santa Clara University in 1960, and +in 1963 received his J.D. from Santa Clara University Law School, +where he was an editor of the Santa Clara Law Review. He served as a +first lieutenant in the Army from 1964 to 1966 and received the Army +Commendation Medal. Panetta is married to the former Sylvia Marie +Varni. They have three grown sons and five grandchildren. + + + +William J. Perry--Member + +William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at +Stanford University, with a joint appointment at the Freeman Spogli +Institute for International Studies and the School of Engineering. He +is a senior fellow at FSI and serves as co-director of the Preventive +Defense Project, a research collaboration of Stanford and Harvard +universities. + +Perry was the 19th Secretary of Defense of the United States, serving +from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as Deputy +Secretary of Defense (1993-94) and as Under Secretary of Defense for +Research and Engineering (1977-81). He is on the board of directors of +several emerging high-tech companies and is Chairman of Global +Technology Partners. + +His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratory +director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954-64) and as +founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964-77), executive vice president +of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981-85), and founder and chairman of +Technology Strategies & Alliances (1985-93). He is a member of the +National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy +of Arts and Sciences. + +From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of +Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined +the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant +in the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He has received a number of +awards, including the Presidential Medal of Freedom (1997), the +Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and +Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 1997), the +Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency +(1977 and 1997), NASA (1981), and the Coast Guard (1997). He received +the American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), the +Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal +Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academy +of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal in 1996. He +has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and +the Air Force. + +He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, +France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, and +the United Kingdom. He received a B.S. and M.S. from Stanford +University and a Ph.D. from Penn State, all in mathematics. + + +Charles S. Robb--Member + +Charles S. Robb joined the faculty of George Mason University as a +Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy in 2001. Previously +he served as Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, from 1978 to 1982; as +Virginia's 64th Governor, from 1982 to 1986; and as a United States +Senator, from 1989 to 2001. + +While in the Senate he became the only member ever to serve +simultaneously on all three national security committees +(Intelligence, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations). He also served +on the Finance, Commerce, and Budget committees. + +Before becoming a member of Congress he chaired the Southern +Governors' Association, the Democratic Governors' Association, the +Education Commission of the States, the Democratic Leadership Council, +Jobs for America's Graduates, the National Conference of Lieutenant +Governors, and the Virginia Forum on Education, and was President of +the Council of State Governments. + +During the 1960s he served on active duty with the United States +Marine Corps, retiring from the Marine Corps Reserve in 1991. He began +as the Class Honor Graduate from Marine Officers Basic School in 1961 +and ended up as head of the principal recruiting program for Marine +officers in 1970. In between, he served in both the 1st and 2nd Marine +Divisions and his assignments included duty as a Military Social Aide +at the White House and command of an infantry company in combat in +Vietnam. + +He received his law degree from the University of Virginia in 1973, +clerked for Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., on the U.S. Court of Appeals +for the Fourth Circuit, and practiced law with Williams and Connolly +prior to his election to state office. Between his state and federal +service he was a partner at Hunton and Williams. + +Since leaving the Senate in 2001 he has served as Chairman of the +Board of Visitors at the United States Naval Academy, Co-Chairman +(with Senior Judge Laurence Silberman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for +the D.C. Circuit) of the President's Commission on Intelligence +Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass +Destruction, and Co-Chairman (with former Governor Linwood Holton) of +a major landowner's alliance that created a special tax district to +finance the extension of Metrorail to Tyson's Corner, Reston, and +Dulles Airport. He has also been a Fellow at the Institute of Politics +at Harvard and at the Marshall Wythe School of Law at William and +Mary. + +He is currently on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory +Board, the Secretary of State's International Security Advisory Board +(Chairman of the WMD-Terrorism Task Force), the FBI Director's +Advisory Board, the National Intelligence Council's Strategic Analysis +Advisory Board, the Iraq Study Group, and the MITRE Corp. Board of +Trustees (Vice Chairman). He also serves on the boards of the Space +Foundation, the Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy, the Concord +Coalition, the National Museum of Americans at War, Strategic +Partnerships LLC, and the Center for the Study of the Presidency--and +he works on occasional projects with the Center for Strategic and +International Studies. He is married to Lynda Johnson Robb and they +have three grown daughters and one granddaughter. + + + +Alan K. Simpson--Member + +Alan K. Simpson served from 1979 to 1997 as a United States Senator +from Wyoming. Following his first term in the Senate, Al was elected +by his peers to the position of the Assistant Majority Leader in +1984--and served in that capacity until 1994. He completed his final +term on January 3, 1997. + +Simpson is currently a partner in the Cody firm of Simpson, Kepler and +Edwards, the Cody division of the Denver firm of Burg Simpson +Eldredge, Hersh and Jardine, and also a consultant in the Washington, +D.C., government relations firm The Tongour, Simpson, Holsclaw Group. +He continues to serve on numerous corporate and nonprofit boards and +travels the country giving speeches. His book published by William +Morrow Company, Right in the Old Gazoo: A Lifetime of Scrapping with +the Press (1997), chronicles his personal experiences and views of the +Fourth Estate. + +From January of 1997 until June of 2000, Simpson was a Visiting +Lecturer and for two years the Director of the Institute of Politics +at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. During +the fall of 2000 he returned to his alma mater, the University of +Wyoming, as a Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department +and he continues to team teach a class part-time with his brother, +Peter, titled "Wyoming's Political Identity: Its History and Its +Politics," which is proving to be one of the most popular classes +offered at UW. + +A member of a political family--his father served both as Governor of +Wyoming from 1954 to 1958 and as United States Senator from Wyoming +from 1962 to 1966--Al chose to follow in his father's footsteps and +began his own political career in 1964 when he was elected to the +Wyoming State Legislature as a state representative of his native Park +County. He served for the next thirteen years in the Wyoming House of +Representatives, holding the offices of Majority Whip, Majority Floor +Leader, and Speaker Pro-Tem. His only brother, Peter, also served as a +member of the Wyoming State Legislature. + +Prior to entering politics, Simpson was admitted to the Wyoming bar +and the United States District Court in 1958 and served for a short +time as a Wyoming assistant attorney general. Simpson then joined his +father, Milward L. Simpson, and later Charles G. Kepler in the law +firm of Simpson, Kepler and Simpson in his hometown of Cody. He would +practice law there for the next eighteen years. During that time, +Simpson was very active in all civic, community, and state activities. +He also served ten years as City Attorney. + +Simpson earned a B.S. in law from the University of Wyoming in 1954. +Upon graduation from college, he joined the Army, serving overseas in +the 5th Infantry Division and in the 2nd Armored Division in the final +months of the Army of Occupation in Germany. Following his honorable +discharge in 1956, Simpson returned to the University of Wyoming to +complete his study of law, earning his J.D. degree in 1958. He and his +wife Ann have three children and six grandchildren, who all reside in +Cody, Wyoming. + + + + +Iraq Study Group Support + + + Edward P. Djerejian + Senior Advisor to the Study Group + + Christopher A. Kojm + Senior Advisor to the Study Group + + John B. Williams + Special Assistant to the Study Group + + Benjamin J. Rhodes + Special Assistant to the Study Group + + United States Institute of Peace Support + + Daniel P. Serwer + ISG Executive Director and Political Development Secretariat + + Paul Hughes + Military and Security Secretariat + + Gary Matthews + Economy and Reconstruction Secretariat + + Paul Stares + Strategic Environment Secretariat + + Courtney Rusin + Assistant to the Study Group + + Anne Hingeley Congressional Relations + + Ian Larsen + Outreach and Communications + + Center for the Study of the Presidency Support + + Jay M. Parker + Advisor + + Ysbrant A. Marcelis + Advisor + + Center for Strategic & International Studies Support + + Kay King + Advisor + + + + + + + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Iraq Study Group Report, by +United States Institute for Peace + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT *** + +***** This file should be named 25686.txt or 25686.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/2/5/6/8/25686/ + +Produced by Al Haines + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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